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| author | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-04-04 08:21:20 -0700 |
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| committer | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-04-04 08:21:20 -0700 |
| commit | e4807c17b80d06988dc1385211cd2b95140fb905 (patch) | |
| tree | 2c7699b8d78986b728996004bf4e7e01cabeb703 | |
| parent | 40fc021976e292f734fcfeb2d68e0239e04d7a91 (diff) | |
| -rw-r--r-- | 57628-0.txt | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 57628-h/57628-h.htm | 9078 |
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diff --git a/57628-0.txt b/57628-0.txt index d9cee53..b02f8db 100644 --- a/57628-0.txt +++ b/57628-0.txt @@ -3,10 +3,6 @@ - - - - THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY BY @@ -27531,7 +27527,7 @@ by active than by passive repetition. I mean that in learning by heart (for example), when we almost know the piece, it pays better to wait and recollect by an effort from within, than to look at the book again. If we recover the words in the former way, we shall probably know them -the next time; if in the latter way, we shall very likely need the hook +the next time; if in the latter way, we shall very likely need the book once more. The learning by heart means the formation of paths from a former set to a later set of cerebral word-processes: call 1 and 2 in the diagram the processes in question; then when we remember by inward @@ -28118,13 +28114,6 @@ Huber: Das Gedächtniss, p. 36 ff. [617] Why not say 'know'?—-W. J. - - - - - - - End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (of 2), by William James diff --git a/57628-h/57628-h.htm b/57628-h/57628-h.htm index cbb9823..46dfcf8 100644 --- a/57628-h/57628-h.htm +++ b/57628-h/57628-h.htm @@ -1,13 +1,8 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" - "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> <head> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> - <title> - The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James. - </title> - <style type="text/css"> + <meta charset="utf-8"><title>The Principles of Psychology | Project Gutenberg</title> + <style> body { margin-left: 10%; @@ -138,14 +133,14 @@ table { <div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="titlepage" /> +<img src="images/cover.jpg" alt="titlepage" style="width: 500px"> </div> -<hr class="chapl" /> +<hr class="chapl" > -<h1>THE PRINCIPLES<br /> +<h1>THE PRINCIPLES<br > -OF<br /> +OF<br > PSYCHOLOGY</h1> @@ -162,33 +157,33 @@ PSYCHOLOGY</h1> <h4>VOL. I</h4> -<h5>NEW YORK<br /> +<h5>NEW YORK<br > HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY</h5> <h5>1918</h5> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > <p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;"> -TO<br /> -MY DEAR FRIEND<br /> -FRANÇOIS PILLON.<br /> -AS A TOKEN OF AFFECTION,<br /> -AND AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF WHAT I OWE<br /> -TO THE<br /> +TO<br > +MY DEAR FRIEND<br > +FRANÇOIS PILLON.<br > +AS A TOKEN OF AFFECTION,<br > +AND AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF WHAT I OWE<br > +TO THE<br > CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. </p> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> -<h4><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE">PREFACE.</a></h4> +<h4><a id="PREFACE">PREFACE.</a></h4> <p>The treatise which follows has in the main grown up in @@ -222,7 +217,7 @@ Philosophy, vol. xiii, p. 64, may be found by some persons a useful substitute for the entire chapter.</p> <p>I have kept close to the point of view of natural science -throughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span> +throughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span> data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on. Psychology, the @@ -263,7 +258,7 @@ would be as well to keep them, <i>as thus presented</i>, out of psychology as it is to keep the results of idealism out of physics.</p> -<p>I have therefore treated our passing thoughts as integers,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span> +<p>I have therefore treated our passing thoughts as integers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span> and regarded the mere laws of their coexistence with brain-states as the ultimate laws for our science. The reader will in vain seek for any closed system in the book. @@ -304,14 +299,14 @@ and Josiah Royce.</p> <p><span class="smcap">Harvard University</span>, August 1890.</p> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii"></a><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii"></a><a id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></p> -<h4><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS.</a></h4> +<h4><a id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS.</a></h4> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#PSYCHOLOGY">CHAPTER I.</a></p> @@ -319,8 +314,8 @@ and Josiah Royce.</p> <p><span class="smcap">The Scope of Psychology</span>, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></p> <p>Mental Manifestations depend on Cerebral Conditions, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>. -Pursuit of ends and choice are the marks of Mind's presence, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +Pursuit of ends and choice are the marks of Mind's presence, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.</a></p> @@ -336,8 +331,8 @@ Aphasia, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>. The sight-centre, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>. hearing-centre, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>. Sensory Aphasia, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>. Centres for smell and taste, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>. The touch-centre, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>. Man's Consciousness limited to the hemispheres, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>. The restitution of function, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>. Final -correction of the Meynert scheme, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>. Conclusions, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +correction of the Meynert scheme, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>. Conclusions, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.</a></p> @@ -346,8 +341,8 @@ correction of the Meynert scheme, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>. Conclusions, <a hre <p>The summation of Stimuli, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>. Reaction-time, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>. Cerebral blood-supply, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>. Cerebral Thermometry, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>. Phosphorus and -Thought, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +Thought, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV136">CHAPTER IV.</a></p> @@ -356,8 +351,8 @@ Thought, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.<br /> <p>Due to plasticity of neural matter, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>. Produces ease of action, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>. Diminishes attention, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>. Concatenated performances, -<a href="#Page_116">116</a>. Ethical implications and pedagogic maxims, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +<a href="#Page_116">116</a>. Ethical implications and pedagogic maxims, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.</a></p> @@ -365,10 +360,10 @@ action, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>. Diminishes attention, <a href="#Page_115">1 <p><span class="smcap">The Automaton-theory</span>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></p> <p>The theory described, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>. Reasons for it, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>. Reasons -against it, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +against it, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>.<br > +<br ></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI.</a></p> @@ -381,8 +376,8 @@ Self-compounding of mental facts is inadmissible, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>. C states of mind be unconscious? <a href="#Page_162">162</a>. Refutation of alleged proofs of unconscious thought, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>. Difficulty of stating the connection between mind and brain, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>. 'The Soul' is logically the least -objectionable hypothesis, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>. Conclusion, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +objectionable hypothesis, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>. Conclusion, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII.</a></p> @@ -391,8 +386,8 @@ objectionable hypothesis, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>. Conclusion, <a href="#Pag <p>Psychology is a natural Science, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>. Introspection, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>. Experiment, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>. Sources of error, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>. The 'Psychologist's -fallacy,' <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +fallacy,' <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII.</a></p> @@ -404,8 +399,8 @@ fallacy,' <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.<br /> Minds may split into dissociated parts, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>. Space-relations: the Seat of the Soul, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>. Cognitive relations, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>. The Psychologist's point of view, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>. Two kinds of knowledge, acquaintance -and knowledge about, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +and knowledge about, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX.</a></p> @@ -421,8 +416,8 @@ possible in any kind of mental material, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>. Thought an <a href="#Page_267">267</a>. Consciousness is cognitive, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>. The word Object, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>. Every cognition is due to one integral pulse of thought <a href="#Page_276">276</a>. Diagrams of Thought's stream, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>. Thought is always -selective, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +selective, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X.</a></p> @@ -431,7 +426,7 @@ selective, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.<br /> <p>The Empirical Self or Me, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>. Its constituents, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>. The material self, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>. The Social Self, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>. The Spiritual Self, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>. -Difficulty of apprehending Thought as a purely spiritual activity,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> +Difficulty of apprehending Thought as a purely spiritual activity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> <a href="#Page_299">299</a>. Emotions of Self, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>. Rivalry and conflict of one's different selves, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>. Their hierarchy, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>. What Self we love in 'Self-love,' <a href="#Page_317">317</a>. The Pure Ego, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>. The verifiable ground of the @@ -440,8 +435,8 @@ Thinker which Psychology requires, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>. Theories of Self 1) The theory of the Soul, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>. 2) The Associationist theory, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>. 3) The Transcendentalist theory, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>. The mutations of the Self, <a href="#Page_373">373</a>. Insane delusions, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>. Alternating selves, -<a href="#Page_379">379</a>. Mediumships or possessions, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>. Summary, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +<a href="#Page_379">379</a>. Mediumships or possessions, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>. Summary, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI.</a></p> @@ -458,8 +453,8 @@ recollection, <a href="#Page_427">427</a>;—on reaction-time, <a href="#Pag in attention: 1) Accommodation of sense-organ, <a href="#Page_434">434</a>. 2) Preperception, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>. Is voluntary attention a resultant or a force? <a href="#Page_447">447</a>. The effort to attend can be conceived as a -resultant, <a href="#Page_450">450</a>. Conclusion, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>. Acquired Inattention, <a href="#Page_455">455</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +resultant, <a href="#Page_450">450</a>. Conclusion, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>. Acquired Inattention, <a href="#Page_455">455</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII.</a></p> @@ -469,8 +464,8 @@ resultant, <a href="#Page_450">450</a>. Conclusion, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>. <p>The sense of sameness, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>. Conception defined, <a href="#Page_461">461</a>. Conceptions are unchangeable, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>. Abstract ideas, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>. Universals, <a href="#Page_473">473</a>. The conception 'of the same' is not the 'same state' of -mind, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +mind, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII.</a></p> @@ -487,10 +482,10 @@ process of analysis, <a href="#Page_502">502</a>. The process of abstraction, <a improvement of discrimination by practice, <a href="#Page_508">508</a>. Its two causes, <a href="#Page_510">510</a>. Practical interests limit our discrimination, <a href="#Page_515">515</a>. Reaction-time after discrimination, <a href="#Page_523">523</a>. The perception of likeness, <a href="#Page_528">528</a>. -The magnitude of differences, <a href="#Page_530">530</a>. The measurement of discriminative <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span> +The magnitude of differences, <a href="#Page_530">530</a>. The measurement of discriminative <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span> sensibility: Weber's law, <a href="#Page_533">533</a>. Fechner's interpretation -of this as the psycho-physic law, <a href="#Page_537">537</a>. Criticism thereof, <a href="#Page_545">545</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +of this as the psycho-physic law, <a href="#Page_537">537</a>. Criticism thereof, <a href="#Page_545">545</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV463">CHAPTER XIV.</a></p> @@ -506,8 +501,8 @@ The 'law of contiguity,' <a href="#Page_561">561</a>. The elementary law of asso <a href="#Page_578">578</a>. Elementary expression of the difference between the three kinds of association, <a href="#Page_581">581</a>. Association in voluntary thought, <a href="#Page_583">583</a>. Similarity no elementary law, <a href="#Page_590">590</a>. History of the doctrine of -association, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +association, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_XV512">CHAPTER XV.</a></p> @@ -518,8 +513,8 @@ association, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>.<br /> <a href="#Page_608">608</a>. Accuracy of our estimate of short durations, <a href="#Page_611">611</a>. We have no sense for empty time, <a href="#Page_619">619</a>. Variations of our time-estimate, <a href="#Page_624">624</a>. The feeling of past time is a present feeling, -<a href="#Page_627">627</a>. Its cerebral process, <a href="#Page_632">632</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +<a href="#Page_627">627</a>. Its cerebral process, <a href="#Page_632">632</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">CHAPTER XVI.</a></p> @@ -533,20 +528,20 @@ memory, <a href="#Page_659">659</a>. Native retentiveness is unchangeable, <a hr of memory consists in better <i>thinking</i>, <a href="#Page_667">667</a>. Other conditions of good memory, <a href="#Page_669">669</a>. Recognition, or the sense of familiarity, <a href="#Page_673">673</a>. Exact measurements of memory, <a href="#Page_676">676</a>. Forgetting, -<a href="#Page_679">679</a>. Pathological cases, <a href="#Page_681">681</a>. Professor Ladd criticised, <a href="#Page_687">687</a>.<br /> -<br /></p> +<a href="#Page_679">679</a>. Pathological cases, <a href="#Page_681">681</a>. Professor Ladd criticised, <a href="#Page_687">687</a>.<br > +<br ></p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em;"><a href="#INDEX">INDEX.</a></p> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> -<h3><a name="PSYCHOLOGY" id="PSYCHOLOGY">PSYCHOLOGY.</a></h3> +<h3><a id="PSYCHOLOGY">PSYCHOLOGY.</a></h3> <h5>CHAPTER I.</h5> @@ -577,7 +572,7 @@ explains houses by stones and bricks. The 'associationist' schools of Herbart in Germany, and of Hume the Mills and Bain in Britain have thus constructed a <i>psychology without a soul</i> by taking discrete 'ideas,' faint or vivid, -and showing how, by their cohesions, repulsions, and forms<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> +and showing how, by their cohesions, repulsions, and forms<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> of succession, such things as reminiscences, perceptions, emotions, volitions, passions, theories, and all the other furnishings of an individual's mind may be engendered. @@ -619,7 +614,7 @@ of the associationist already grants.</p> <p>And yet the admission is far from being a satisfactory simplification of the concrete facts. For why should this absolute god-given Faculty retain so much better the events -of yesterday than those of last year, and, best of all, those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> +of yesterday than those of last year, and, best of all, those<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> of an hour ago? Why, again, in old age should its grasp of childhood's events seem firmest? Why should illness and exhaustion enfeeble it? Why should repeating an experience @@ -661,7 +656,7 @@ kaleidoscope,—whence do they get their fantastic laws of clinging, and why do they cling in just the shapes they do?</p> <p>For this the associationist must introduce the order of -experience in the outer world. The dance of the ideas is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> +experience in the outer world. The dance of the ideas is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> a copy, somewhat mutilated and altered, of the order of phenomena. But the slightest reflection shows that phenomena have absolutely no power to influence our ideas @@ -702,12 +697,12 @@ account. <i>The spiritualist and the associationist must both be 'cerebralists'</i>, to the extent at least of admitting that certain peculiarities in the way of working of their own favorite principles are explicable only by the fact that the -brain laws are a codeterminant of the result.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> +brain laws are a codeterminant of the result.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> Our first conclusion, then, is that a certain amount of brain-physiology must be presupposed or included in -Psychology.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> +Psychology.<a id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>In still another way the psychologist is forced to be something of a nerve-physiologist. Mental phenomena are @@ -732,7 +727,7 @@ they never impressed his retina. Our psychology must therefore take account not only of the conditions antecedent to mental states, but of their resultant consequences as well.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>But actions originally prompted by conscious intelligence may grow so automatic by dint of habit as to be @@ -743,7 +738,7 @@ in other things. The performances of animal <i>instinct</i> seem semi-automatic, and the <i>reflex acts</i> of self-preservation certainly are so. Yet they resemble intelligent acts in bringing about the <i>same ends</i> at which the animals' -consciousness, on other occasions, deliberately aims.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> +consciousness, on other occasions, deliberately aims.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> Shall the study of such machine-like yet purposive acts as these be included in Psychology?</p> @@ -772,7 +767,7 @@ into zoology or into pure nerve-physiology which may seem instructive for our purposes, but otherwise shall leave those sciences to the physiologists.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Can we state more distinctly still the manner in which the mental life seems to intervene between impressions @@ -787,7 +782,7 @@ the phenomenon explains it as the result of an attraction or love between the magnet and the filings. But let a card cover the poles of the magnet, and the filings will press forever against its surface without its ever occurring -to them to pass around its sides and thus come into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> +to them to pass around its sides and thus come into<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> more direct contact with the object of their love. Blow bubbles through a tube into the bottom of a pail of water, they will rise to the surface and mingle with the air. Their @@ -830,7 +825,7 @@ end by leading men to deny that in the physical world final purposes exist at all. Loves and desires are to-day no longer imputed to particles of iron or of air. No one supposes now that the end of any activity which -they may display is an ideal purpose presiding over the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> +they may display is an ideal purpose presiding over the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> activity from its outset and soliciting or drawing it into being by a sort of <i>vis a fronte</i>. The end, on the contrary, is deemed a mere passive result, pushed into being <i>a tergo</i>, @@ -842,7 +837,7 @@ the activity displayed, but not the end reached; for here the idea of the yet unrealized end co-operates with the conditions to determine what the activities shall be.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence @@ -874,7 +869,7 @@ such that we must believe them to be performed <i>for the sake</i> of their result? The result in question, as we shall hereafter abundantly see, is as a rule a useful one,—the animal is, on the whole, safer under the circumstances for bringing -it forth. So far the action has a teleological character;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> +it forth. So far the action has a teleological character;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> but such mere outward teleology as this might still be the blind result of <i>vis a tergo</i>. The growth and movements of plants, the processes of development, digestion, secretion, @@ -917,7 +912,7 @@ achieves the wished-for end.</p> frog's optic lobes and cerebellum. We alluded above to the manner in which a sound frog imprisoned in water will discover an outlet to the atmosphere. Goltz found that frogs -deprived of their cerebral hemispheres would often exhibit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> +deprived of their cerebral hemispheres would often exhibit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> a like ingenuity. Such a frog, after rising from the bottom and finding his farther upward progress checked by the glass bell which has been inverted over him, will not persist @@ -936,7 +931,7 @@ position. They seem determined, consequently, not merely by the antecedent irritant, but by the final end,—though the irritant of course is what makes the end desired.</p> -<p>Another brilliant German author, Liebmann,<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> argues +<p>Another brilliant German author, Liebmann,<a id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> argues against the brain's mechanism accounting for mental action, by very similar considerations. A machine as such, he says, will bring forth right results when it is in good order, @@ -958,7 +953,7 @@ as contradicting the inner law—the law from in front, the purpose or ideal for which the brain <i>should</i> act, whether it do so or not.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span></p> <p>We need not discuss here whether these writers in drawing their conclusion have done justice to all the premises I @@ -976,26 +971,26 @@ described anew. The reader will find in H. N. Martin's 'Human Body,' in G. T. Ladd's 'Physiological Psychology,' and in all the other standard Anatomies and Physiologies, a mass of information which we must regard as preliminary -and take for granted in the present work.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Of +and take for granted in the present work.<a id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Of the functions of the cerebral hemispheres, however, since they directly subserve consciousness, it will be well to give some little account.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> Geo. T. Ladd: Elements of Physiological Psychology (1887), pt. +<p><a id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> Geo. T. Ladd: Elements of Physiological Psychology (1887), pt. iii, chap. iii, §§ 9, 12.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit, p. 489.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit, p. 489.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Nothing is easier than to familiarize one's self with the mammalian +<p><a id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Nothing is easier than to familiarize one's self with the mammalian brain. Get a sheep's head, a small saw, chisel, scalpel and forceps (all three can best be had from a surgical-instrument maker), and unravel its parts either by the aid of a human dissecting book, such as Holden's 'Manual @@ -1003,13 +998,13 @@ of Anatomy,' or by the specific directions <i>ad hoc</i> given in such books as Foster and Langley's 'Practical Physiology' (Macmillan) or Morrell's 'Comparative Anatomy and Dissection of Mammalia' (Longmans).</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.</a></h5> <h4>THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN.</h4> @@ -1047,7 +1042,7 @@ the effect of which is to shield the body from too sudden a shock. If a cinder enter my eye, its lids close forcibly and a copious flow of tears tends to wash it out.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span></p> <p>These three responses to a sensational stimulus differ, however, in many respects. The closure of the eye and the @@ -1089,7 +1084,7 @@ take place with an unconsciousness apparently complete, fly to the opposite extreme and maintain that the appropriateness even of voluntary actions owes nothing to the fact that consciousness attends them. They are, according -to these writers, results of physiological mechanism pure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> +to these writers, results of physiological mechanism pure<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> and simple. In a near chapter we shall return to this controversy again. Let us now look a little more closely at the brain and at the ways in which its states may be supposed @@ -1110,7 +1105,7 @@ plausible scheme of the way in which cerebral and mental operations go hand in hand.</p> <div class="figleft" style="width: 120px;"> -<img src="images/jame_014_0001.jpg" width="120" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_014_0001.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 120px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 1.—<i>C H</i>, cerebral Hemispheres; <i>O Th</i>, Optic Thalami; <i>O L</i>, @@ -1142,7 +1137,7 @@ to start with too simple a formula and correct it later on. Our first formula, as we shall later see, will have to be softened down somewhat by the results of more careful experimentation both on frogs and birds, -and by those of the most recent observations on dogs,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> +and by those of the most recent observations on dogs,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> monkeys, and man. But it will put us, from the outset, in clear possession of some fundamental notions and distinctions which we could otherwise not gain so well, and none @@ -1184,7 +1179,7 @@ defence. We may call it the <i>centre for defensive movements</i> in this animal. We may indeed go farther than this, and by cutting the spinal cord in various places find that its separate segments are independent mechanisms, for appropriate -activities of the head and of the arms and legs respectively.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> +activities of the head and of the arms and legs respectively.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> The segment governing the arms is especially active, in male frogs, in the breeding season; and these members alone with the breast and back appertaining to them, @@ -1204,7 +1199,7 @@ others, this is not the place to speak.</p> optic lobes so that the cerebellum and medulla oblongata remain attached to the cord, then swallowing, breathing, crawling, and a rather enfeebled jumping and swimming -are added to the movements previously observed.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> There +are added to the movements previously observed.<a id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> There are other reflexes too. The animal, thrown on his back, immediately turns over to his belly. Placed in a shallow bowl, which is floated on water and made to rotate, he responds @@ -1224,7 +1219,7 @@ and water becomes quite normal, and, in addition to the reflexes already shown by the lower centres, he croaks regularly whenever he is pinched under the arms. He compensates rotations, etc., by movements of the head, and -turns over from his back; but still drops off his tilted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> +turns over from his back; but still drops off his tilted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> board. As his optic nerves are destroyed by the usual operation, it is impossible to say whether he will avoid obstacles placed in his path.</p> @@ -1266,7 +1261,7 @@ hemispheres, or if, in other words, we make an intact animal the subject of our observations, all this is changed. In addition to the previous responses to present incitements of sense, our frog now goes through long and complex acts -of locomotion <i>spontaneously</i>, or as if moved by what in ourselves<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> +of locomotion <i>spontaneously</i>, or as if moved by what in ourselves<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> we should call an idea. His reactions to outward stimuli vary their form, too. Instead of making simple defensive movements with his hind legs like a headless @@ -1284,7 +1279,7 @@ it exactly. Effort to escape is his dominant reaction, but he <i>may</i> do anything else, even swell up and become perfectly passive in our hands.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Such are the phenomena commonly observed, and such the impressions which one naturally receives. Certain @@ -1309,7 +1304,7 @@ differently the occasions</i> on which the movements shall occur, making the usual stimuli less fatal and machine-like; we need suppose no such machinery <i>directly</i> co-ordinative of muscular contractions to exist. We may rather assume, -when the mandate for a wiping-movement is sent forth by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> +when the mandate for a wiping-movement is sent forth by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> the hemispheres, that a current goes straight to the wiping-arrangement in the spinal cord, exciting this arrangement as a whole. Similarly, if an intact frog wishes to jump @@ -1318,7 +1313,7 @@ the hemispheres the jumping-centre in the thalami or wherever it may be, and the latter will provide for the details of the execution. It is like a general ordering a colonel to make a certain movement, but not telling him -how it shall be done.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> +how it shall be done.<a id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> <p><i>The same muscle, then, is repeatedly represented at different heights;</i> and at each it enters into a different combination @@ -1347,7 +1342,7 @@ promptings seem deficient, and when left to himself he spends most of his time crouched on the ground with his head sunk between his shoulders as if asleep.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span></p> <h4>GENERAL NOTION OF HEMISPHERES.</h4> @@ -1390,11 +1385,11 @@ through which the current may pass when for any reason the direct line is not used.</p> <div class="figright" style="width: 125px;"> -<img src="images/jame_021_0002.jpg" width="125" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_021_0002.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 125px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 2.</div> </div> -<p>Thus, a tired wayfarer on a hot day throws himself on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> +<p>Thus, a tired wayfarer on a hot day throws himself on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> the damp earth beneath a maple-tree. The sensations of delicious rest and coolness pouring themselves through the direct @@ -1438,7 +1433,7 @@ fatally and irresistibly to snap at it whenever presented, no matter what the circumstances may be; he can no more disobey this prompting than water can refuse to boil when a fire is kindled under the pot. His -life will again and again pay the forfeit of his gluttony.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> +life will again and again pay the forfeit of his gluttony.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> Exposure to retaliation, to other enemies, to traps, to poisons, to the dangers of repletion, must be regular parts of his existence. His lack of all thought by which to @@ -1479,7 +1474,7 @@ place from these causes alone.</p> <p>No one need be told how dependent all human social elevation is upon the prevalence of chastity. Hardly any -factor measures more than this the difference between civilisation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> +factor measures more than this the difference between civilisation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> and barbarism. Physiologically interpreted, chastity means nothing more than the fact that present solicitations of sense are overpowered by suggestions of æsthetic and @@ -1522,7 +1517,7 @@ conception of the nerve-centres! Let us define it more distinctly before we see how well physiological observation will bear it out in detail.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span></p> <h4>THE EDUCATION OF THE HEMISPHERES.</h4> @@ -1534,7 +1529,7 @@ in the hemispheres, which either permit the reflexes in question, check them, or substitute others for them. All ideas being in the last resort reminiscences, the question to answer is: <i>How can processes become organized in the hemispheres -which correspond to reminiscences in the mind?</i><a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> +which correspond to reminiscences in the mind?</i><a id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> <p>Nothing is easier than to conceive a <i>possible</i> way in which this might be done, provided four assumptions be @@ -1559,12 +1554,12 @@ centre tends to spread upwards and arouse an idea.</p> movement or to check one which otherwise would be produced.</p> <div class="figright" style="width: 120px;"> -<img src="images/jame_025_0003.jpg" width="120" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_025_0003.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 120px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 3.</div> </div> <p>Suppose now (these assumptions being granted) that we -have a baby before us who sees a candle-flame for the first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> +have a baby before us who sees a candle-flame for the first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> time, and, by virtue of a reflex tendency common in babies of a certain age, extends his hand to grasp it, so that his @@ -1588,7 +1583,7 @@ experience usually protects the fingers forever. The point is to see how the hemispheres may bring this result to pass.</p> <div class="figleft" style="width: 120px;"> -<img src="images/jame_025_0004.jpg" width="120" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_025_0004.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 120px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 4.—The dotted lines stand for afferent paths, the broken lines for paths between the centres; the entire lines @@ -1613,7 +1608,7 @@ together by the path the first to the last, so that if anything touches off <i>s<sup>1</sup></i>, ideas of the extension, of the burnt -finger, and of the retraction will pass in rapid succession<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> +finger, and of the retraction will pass in rapid succession<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> through the mind. The effect on the child's conduct when the candle-flame is next presented is easy to imagine. Of course the sight of it arouses the grasping reflex; but it @@ -1652,7 +1647,7 @@ combinations impossible to the lower machinery taken alone, and an endless consequent increase in the possibilities of behavior on the creature's part.</p> -<p>All this, as a mere scheme,<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> is so clear and so concordant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> +<p>All this, as a mere scheme,<a id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> is so clear and so concordant<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> with the general look of the facts as almost to impose itself on our belief; but it is anything but clear in detail. The brain-physiology of late years has with great effort sought @@ -1690,7 +1685,7 @@ or 'color;' some being instinctive tendencies like 'alimentiveness' or 'amativeness;' and others, again, being complex resultants like 'conscientiousness,' 'individuality.' Phrenology fell promptly into disrepute among scientific -men because observation seemed to show that large faculties<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> +men because observation seemed to show that large faculties<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> and large 'bumps' might fail to coexist; because the scheme of Gall was so vast as hardly to admit of accurate determination at all—who of us can say even of his own @@ -1731,7 +1726,7 @@ former correspond to the elementary functions of the latter. But phrenology, except by occasional coincidence, takes no account of elements at all. Its 'faculties,' as a rule, are fully equipped persons in a particular mental attitude. -Take, for example, the 'faculty' of language. It involves<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> +Take, for example, the 'faculty' of language. It involves<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> in reality a host of distinct powers. We must first have images of concrete things and ideas of abstract qualities and relations; we must next have the memory of words @@ -1770,12 +1765,12 @@ locomotive. With a horse inside truly everything becomes clear, even though it be a queer enough sort of horse—the horse itself calls for no explanation! Phrenology takes a start to get beyond the point of view of the ghost-like soul entity, but she ends by populating the whole skull -with ghosts of the same order."<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p></blockquote> +with ghosts of the same order."<a id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Modern Science conceives of the matter in a very different way. <i>Brain and mind alike consist of simple elements, sensory and motor</i>. "All nervous centres," says Dr. Hughlings -Jackson,<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> "from the lowest to the very highest (the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> +Jackson,<a id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> "from the lowest to the very highest (the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> substrata of consciousness), are made up of nothing else than nervous arrangements, representing impressions and movements.... I do not see of what other materials @@ -1818,7 +1813,7 @@ HEMISPHERES.</h4> <p>Up to 1870, the opinion which prevailed was that which the experiments of Flourens on pigeons' brains had made -plausible, namely, that the different functions of the hemispheres<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> +plausible, namely, that the different functions of the hemispheres<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> were not locally separated, but carried on each by the aid of the whole organ. Hitzig in 1870 showed, however, that in a dog's brain highly specialized movements @@ -1860,7 +1855,7 @@ at first raised against the validity of these experiments have been overcome. The movements are certainly not due to irritations of the base of the brain by the downward spread of the current, for: <i>a</i>) mechanical irritations will produce -them, though less easily than electrical; <i>b</i>) shifting the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> +them, though less easily than electrical; <i>b</i>) shifting the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> electrodes to a point close by on the surface changes the movement in ways quite inexplicable by changed physical conduction of the current; <i>c</i>) if the cortical 'centre' for a @@ -1880,7 +1875,7 @@ of the cord take a certain time to discharge. Similarly, when a stimulus is applied directly to the cortex the muscle contracts two or three hundredths of a second later than it does when the place on the cortex is cut away and the electrodes -are applied to the white fibres below.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> +are applied to the white fibres below.<a id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> <p>(2) <i>Cortical Ablations.</i> When the cortical spot which is found to produce a movement of the fore-leg, in a dog, @@ -1892,7 +1887,7 @@ surface, stands with it crossing the other leg, does not remove it if it hangs over the edge of a table, can no longer 'give the paw' at word of command if able to do so before the operation, does not use it for scratching the ground, or holding a -bone as formerly, lets it slip out when running on a smooth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> +bone as formerly, lets it slip out when running on a smooth<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> surface or when shaking himself, etc., etc. Sensibility of all kinds seems diminished as well as motility, but of this I shall speak later on. Moreover the dog tends in voluntary @@ -1916,20 +1911,20 @@ masse</i> as effects of an increased inertia in all the processes of innervation towards the side opposed to the lesion. All such movements require an unwonted effort for their execution; and when only the normally usual effort is made -they fall behind in effectiveness.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> +they fall behind in effectiveness.<a id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_033_0005.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_033_0005.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 5.—Left Hemisphere of Dog's Brain, after Ferrier. <i>A</i>, the fissure of Sylvius. <i>B</i>, the crucial sulcus. <i>O</i>, the olfactory bulb. <i>I, II, III, IV,</i> indicate the first, second, third, and fourth external convolutions respectively. (1), (4), and (5) are on the <i>sigmoid</i> gyrus.</div> </div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span></p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_034_0006.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_034_0006.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 6.—Left Hemisphere of Monkey's Brain. Outer Surface.</div> </div> @@ -1945,26 +1940,26 @@ paw for holding a bone whilst gnawing it, or for reaching after a piece of meat. Had he been taught to give his paw Before the operations, it would have been curious to see whether that faculty also came back. His tactile sensibility -was permanently diminished on the right side.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> In +was permanently diminished on the right side.<a id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> In <i>monkeys</i> a genuine paralysis follows upon ablations of the cortex in the motor region. This paralysis affects parts of the body which vary with the brain-parts removed. The monkey's opposite arm or leg hangs flaccid, or at most takes a small part in associated movements. When the entire region is removed there is a genuine and permanent hemiplegia -in which the arm is more affected than the leg; and this is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> +in which the arm is more affected than the leg; and this is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> followed months later by contracture of the muscles, as in -man after inveterate hemiplegia.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> According to Schaefer +man after inveterate hemiplegia.<a id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> According to Schaefer and Horsley, the trunk-muscles also become paralyzed after destruction of the <i>marginal</i> convolution on <i>both</i> sides (see Fig. 7). These differences between dogs and monkeys show the danger of drawing general conclusions from experiments done on any one sort of animal. I subjoin the figures given by the last-named authors of the motor regions in the -monkey's brain.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p> +monkey's brain.<a id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_035_0007.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_035_0007.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 7.—Left Hemisphere of Monkey's Brain. Mesial Surface.</div> </div> @@ -1975,7 +1970,7 @@ during life from such conditions is either localized spasm, or palsy of certain muscles of the opposite side. The cortical regions which invariably produce these results are homologous with those which we have just been studying -in the dog, cat, ape, etc. Figs. 8 and 9 show the result of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> +in the dog, cat, ape, etc. Figs. 8 and 9 show the result of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> 169 cases carefully studied by Exner. The parts shaded are regions where lesions produced <i>no</i> motor disturbance. Those left white were, on the contrary, never injured without @@ -1985,16 +1980,16 @@ permanent and is succeeded by muscular rigidity in the paralyzed parts, just as it may be in the monkey.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_036_0008.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_036_0008.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 8.—Right Hemisphere of Human Brain. Lateral Surface.</div> </div> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_036_0009.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_036_0009.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 9.—Right Hemisphere of Human Brain. Mesial Surface.</div> </div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p> <p>(3) <i>Descending degenerations</i> show the intimate connection of the rolandic regions of the cortex with the motor @@ -2029,7 +2024,7 @@ produce movements analogous to those which excitement of the cortical surface calls forth.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 375px;"> -<img src="images/jame_038_0010.jpg" width="375" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_038_0010.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 375px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 10.—Schematic Transverse Section of Brain showing Motor Strand.—After Edinger.</div> </div> @@ -2043,13 +2038,13 @@ hypoglossal and facial nerves, except those necessary for speaking, may go on perfectly well. He can laugh and cry, and even sing; but he either is unable to utter any words at all; or a few meaningless stock phrases form his only speech; -or else he speaks incoherently and confusedly, mispronouncing,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> +or else he speaks incoherently and confusedly, mispronouncing,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> misplacing, and misusing his words in various degrees. Sometimes his speech is a mere broth of unintelligible syllables. In cases of pure motor aphasia the patient recognizes his mistakes and suffers acutely from them. Now whenever a patient dies in such a condition as this, and -an examination of his brain is permitted, it is found that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> +an examination of his brain is permitted, it is found that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> the lowest frontal gyrus (see Fig. 11) is the seat of injury. Broca first noticed this fact in 1861, and since then the gyrus has gone by the name of Broca's convolution. The @@ -2070,7 +2065,7 @@ offered by the vocal organs, in that highly delicate and special motor service which we call speech. Either hemisphere <i>can</i> innervate them bilaterally, just as either seems able to innervate bilaterally the muscles of the trunk, ribs, -and diaphragm. Of the special movements of speech, however,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> +and diaphragm. Of the special movements of speech, however,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> it would appear (from the facts of aphasia) that the left hemisphere in most persons habitually takes exclusive charge. With that hemisphere thrown out of gear, speech is @@ -2079,7 +2074,7 @@ for the performance of less specialized acts, such as the various movements required in eating.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_039_0011.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_039_0011.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 11.—Schematic Profile of Left Hemisphere, with the parts shaded whose destruction causes motor ('Broca') and sensory ('Wernicke') Aphasia.</div> </div> @@ -2097,7 +2092,7 @@ One which interests us in this connection has been called read writing and understand it; but either cannot use the pen at all or make egregious mistakes with it. The seat of the lesion here is less well determined, owing to an insufficient -number of good cases to conclude from.<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> There +number of good cases to conclude from.<a id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> There is no doubt, however, that it is (in right-handed people) on the left side, and little doubt that it consists of elements of the hand-and-arm region specialized for that service, @@ -2112,11 +2107,11 @@ now quite clearly explained by separate brain-centres for the various feelings and movements and tracts for associating these together. But their minute discussion belongs to medicine rather than to general psychology, and I can only -use them here to illustrate the principles of motor localization.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> +use them here to illustrate the principles of motor localization.<a id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Under the heads of sight and hearing I shall have a little more to say.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span></p> <p>The different lines of proof which I have taken up establish conclusively the proposition that <i>all the motor @@ -2161,7 +2156,7 @@ an operation; and the first to notice the <i>hemiopic</i> character of the visual disturbances which result when only one hemisphere is injured. Sensorial blindness is absolute insensibility to light; psychic blindness is inability to recognize -the <i>meaning</i> of the optical impressions, as when we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> +the <i>meaning</i> of the optical impressions, as when we<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> see a page of Chinese print but it suggests nothing to us. A hemiopic disturbance of vision is one in which neither retina is affected in its totality, but in which, for example, @@ -2181,7 +2176,7 @@ visual function was essentially bound up with any one localized portion of the hemispheres. Other divergent results soon came in from many quarters, so that, without going into the history of the matter any more, I may report -the existing state of the case as follows:<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> +the existing state of the case as follows:<a id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> <p>In <i>fishes, frogs</i>, and <i>lizards</i> vision persists when the hemispheres are entirely removed. This is admitted for @@ -2201,13 +2196,13 @@ or three weeks had elapsed, and the inhibitions resulting from the wound had passed away. They invariably avoided even the slightest obstacles, flew very regularly towards certain perches, etc., differing <i>toto cœlo</i> in these respects -with certain simply <i>blinded</i> pigeons who were kept with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> +with certain simply <i>blinded</i> pigeons who were kept with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> them for comparison. They did not pick up food strewn on the ground, however. Schrader found that they would do this if even a small part of the frontal region of the hemispheres was left, and ascribes their non-self-feeding when deprived of their occipital cerebrum not to a visual, -but to a motor, defect, a sort of alimentary aphasia.<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> +but to a motor, defect, a sort of alimentary aphasia.<a id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> <p>In presence of such discord as that between Munk and his opponents one must carefully note how differently significant @@ -2239,9 +2234,9 @@ more the importance of the remark.</p> <p><i>In rabbits</i> loss of the entire cortex seems compatible with the preservation of enough sight to guide the poor animals' movements, and enable them to avoid obstacles. -Christiani's observations and discussions seem conclusively<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> +Christiani's observations and discussions seem conclusively<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> to have established this, although Munk found that all <i>his</i> -animals were made totally blind.<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> +animals were made totally blind.<a id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> <p><i>In dogs</i> also Munk found absolute stone-blindness after ablation of the occipital lobes. He went farther and @@ -2279,7 +2274,7 @@ seize upon it first. If only one piece of meat be offered, he takes it, on whichever side it be.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_045_0012_13.jpg" width="400" alt="Engravings" /> +<img src="images/jame_045_0012_13.jpg" alt="Engravings" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Figs.</span> 12 and 13. The Dog's visual centre according to Munk, the entire striated region, <i>A, A</i>, being the exclusive seat of vision, and the dark central circle, <i>A<sup>1</sup></i>, being correlated with the @@ -2287,7 +2282,7 @@ retinal centre of the opposite eye.</div> </div> <p>When both occipital lobes are extensively destroyed -total blindness may result. Munk maps out his 'Sehsphäre'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> +total blindness may result. Munk maps out his 'Sehsphäre'<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> definitely, and says that blindness <i>must</i> result when the entire shaded part, marked <i>A, A,</i> in Figs. 12 and 13, is involved in the lesion. Discrepant reports @@ -2296,7 +2291,7 @@ ablation. Luciani, Goltz, and Lannegrace, however, contend that they have made complete bilateral extirpations of Munk's Sehsphäre more than once, and found a sort of crude indiscriminating sight of objects to return in a -few weeks.<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> The question whether a dog is blind or not +few weeks.<a id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> The question whether a dog is blind or not is harder to solve than would at first appear; for simply blinded dogs, in places to which they are accustomed, show little of their loss and avoid all obstacles; whilst dogs @@ -2306,7 +2301,7 @@ they may see is that which Goltz's dogs furnished: they carefully avoided, as it seemed, strips of sunshine or paper on the floor, as if they were solid obstacles. This no really blind dog would do. Luciani tested his dogs when hungry -(a condition which sharpens their attention) by strewing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> +(a condition which sharpens their attention) by strewing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> pieces of meat and pieces of cork before them. If they went straight at them, they <i>saw</i>; and if they chose the meat and left the cork, they <i>saw discriminatingly</i>. The quarrel @@ -2318,7 +2313,7 @@ seems hardly to be worth considering, on the one hand; and on the other, Munk admits in his penultimate paper that out of 85 dogs he only 'succeeded' 4 times in his operation of producing complete blindness by complete extirpation -of his 'Sehsphäre.'<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The safe conclusion for <i>us</i> is that +of his 'Sehsphäre.'<a id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The safe conclusion for <i>us</i> is that Luciani's diagram, Fig. 14, represents something like the truth. The occipital lobes are far more important for vision than any other part of the cortex, so that their complete @@ -2327,7 +2322,7 @@ the crude sensibility to light which <i>may</i> then remain, nothing exact is known either about its nature or its seat.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_046_0014.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_046_0014.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 14.—Distribution of the Visual Function in the Cortex, according to Luciani.</div> </div> @@ -2340,7 +2335,7 @@ of them are left, for Ferrier found no 'appreciable impairment' of it after almost complete destruction of them on both sides. On the other hand, he found complete and permanent blindness to ensue when they and the <i>angular gyri</i> in -addition were destroyed on both sides. Munk, as well as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> +addition were destroyed on both sides. Munk, as well as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> Brown and Schaefer, found no disturbance of sight from destroying the <i>angular gyri</i> alone, although Ferrier found blindness to ensue. This blindness was probably due to @@ -2357,7 +2352,7 @@ seem, however, not to have extirpated the entire lobes. When one lobe only is injured the affection of sight is hemiopic in monkeys: in this all observers agree. On the whole, then, Munk's original location of vision in the -occipital lobes is confirmed by the later evidence.<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> +occipital lobes is confirmed by the later evidence.<a id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> <p><i>In man</i> we have more exact results, since we are not driven to interpret the vision from the outward conduct. @@ -2373,12 +2368,12 @@ sensorial as well as psychic, from destruction of both.</p> especially the neighboring angular and supra-marginal gyri, and it may accompany extensive injury in the motor region of the cortex. In these cases it seems probable that it is -due to an <i>actio in distans</i>, probably to the interruption of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> +due to an <i>actio in distans</i>, probably to the interruption of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> fibres proceeding from the occipital lobe. There seem to be a few cases on record where there was injury to the occipital lobes without visual defect. Ferrier has collected as many as possible to prove his localization in the angular -gyrus.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> A strict application of logical principles would make +gyrus.<a id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> A strict application of logical principles would make one of these cases outweigh one hundred contrary ones. And yet, remembering how imperfect observations may be, and how individual brains may vary, it would certainly be rash for @@ -2390,7 +2385,7 @@ of the pyramids,' nor any more usual pathological fact than its consequence, that left-handed hemorrhages into the motor region produce right-handed paralyses. And yet the decussation is variable in amount, and seems -sometimes to be absent altogether.<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> If, in such a case as +sometimes to be absent altogether.<a id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> If, in such a case as this last, the left brain were to become the seat of apoplexy, the left and not the right half of the body would be the one to suffer paralysis.</p> @@ -2400,10 +2395,10 @@ Seguin, expresses, on the whole, the probable truth about the regions concerned in vision. Not the entire occipital lobes, but the so-called cunei, and the first convolutions, are the cortical parts most intimately concerned. Nothnagel agrees -with Seguin in this limitation of the essential tracts.<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> +with Seguin in this limitation of the essential tracts.<a id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_049_0015.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_049_0015.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 15.—Scheme of the mechanism of vision, after Seguin. The <i>cuneus</i> convolution (<i>Cu</i>) of the right occipital lobe is supposed to be injured, and all the parts which lead to it are darkly shaded to show that they fail to exert their function. <i>F. O.</i> are @@ -2416,7 +2411,7 @@ blind: in other words, the right nasal field, <i>R. N. F.</i>, and the left temp <i>L. T. F.</i>, have become invisible to the subject with the lesion at <i>Cu</i>.</div> </div> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>A most interesting effect of cortical disorder is <i>mental blindness</i>. This consists not so much in insensibility to @@ -2424,7 +2419,7 @@ optical impressions, as in <i>inability to understand them</i>. Psychologically it is interpretable as <i>loss of associations</i> between optical sensations and what they signify; and any interruption of the paths between the optic centres and the -centres for other ideas ought to bring it about. Thus,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> +centres for other ideas ought to bring it about. Thus,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> printed letters of the alphabet, or words, signify certain sounds and certain articulatory movements. If the connection between the articulating or auditory centres, on the @@ -2432,7 +2427,7 @@ one hand, and the visual centres on the other, be ruptured we ought <i>a priori</i> to expect that the sight of words would fail to awaken the idea of their sound, or the movement for pronouncing them. We ought, in short, to have <i>alexia</i>, or -inability to read: and this is just what we do have in many<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> +inability to read: and this is just what we do have in many<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> cases of extensive injury about the fronto-temporal regions, as a complication of <i>aphasic</i> disease. Nothnagel suggests that whilst the <i>cuneus</i> is the seat of optical <i>sensations</i>, the @@ -2447,8 +2442,8 @@ in its lighter grades) is not mentally blind in the least, for he recognizes perfectly all that he sees. On the other hand, he <i>may</i> be mentally blind, with his optical imagination well preserved; as in the interesting case published -by Wilbrand in 1887.<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> In the still more interesting -case of mental blindness recently published by Lissauer,<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> +by Wilbrand in 1887.<a id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> In the still more interesting +case of mental blindness recently published by Lissauer,<a id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> though the patient made the most ludicrous mistakes, calling for instance a clothes-brush a pair of spectacles, an umbrella a plant with flowers, an apple a portrait of a lady, etc. @@ -2468,9 +2463,9 @@ me of visual <i>images</i>, experience seeming to show that the unaffected hemisphere is always sufficient for production of these. To abolish them entirely I should have to be deprived of both occipital lobes, and that would deprive -me not only of my inward images of sight, but of my<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> -sight altogether.<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Recent pathological annals seem to offer -a few such cases.<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> Meanwhile there are a number of cases +me not only of my inward images of sight, but of my<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> +sight altogether.<a id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Recent pathological annals seem to offer +a few such cases.<a id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> Meanwhile there are a number of cases of mental blindness, especially for written language, coupled with hemianopsia, usually of the rightward field of view. These are all explicable by the breaking down, through @@ -2480,13 +2475,13 @@ the centres for speech in the frontal and temporal regions of the left hemisphere. They are to be classed among disturbances of <i>conduction</i> or of <i>association</i>; and nowhere can I find any fact which should force us to believe that optical images -need<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> be lost in mental blindness, or that the cerebral +need<a id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> be lost in mental blindness, or that the cerebral centres for such images are locally distinct from those for -direct sensations from the eyes.<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> +direct sensations from the eyes.<a id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> <p>Where an object fails to be recognized by sight, it often happens that the patient will recognize and name it as soon -as he touches it with his hand. This shows in an interesting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> +as he touches it with his hand. This shows in an interesting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> way how numerous the associative paths are which all end by running out of the brain through the channel of speech. The hand-path is open, though the eye-path be @@ -2498,7 +2493,7 @@ The patient will put his breeches on one shoulder and his hat upon the other, will bite into the soap and lay his shoes on the table, or take his food into his hand and throw it down again, not knowing what to do with it, etc. Such disorder -can only come from extensive brain-injury.<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> +can only come from extensive brain-injury.<a id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> <p>The <i>method of degeneration</i> corroborates the other evidence localizing the tracts of vision. In young animals one @@ -2507,7 +2502,7 @@ destroying an eyeball, and, <i>vice versâ</i>, degeneration of the optic nerves from destroying the occipital regions. The corpora geniculata, thalami, and subcortical fibres leading to the occipital lobes are also found atrophied in these -cases. The phenomena are not uniform, but are indisputable;<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> +cases. The phenomena are not uniform, but are indisputable;<a id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> so that, taking all lines of evidence together, the special connection of vision with the occipital lobes is perfectly made out. It should be added, that the occipital @@ -2526,12 +2521,12 @@ mixture of black dots and gray dots in the diagram is meant to represent this mixture of 'crossed' and 'uncrossed' connections, though of course no topographical exactitude is aimed at. Of all the region, the temporal lobe is the most -important part; yet permanent absolute deafness did not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> +important part; yet permanent absolute deafness did not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> result in a dog of Luciani's, even from bilateral destruction -of both temporal lobes in their entirety.<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></p> +of both temporal lobes in their entirety.<a id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_053_0016.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_053_0016.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 16.—Luciani's Hearing Region.</div> </div> @@ -2545,11 +2540,11 @@ temporal lobes were destroyed. After a week or two of depression of the mental faculties this beast recovered and became one of the brightest monkeys possible, domineering over all his mates, and admitted by all who saw him to -have all his senses, including hearing, 'perfectly acute.'<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> +have all his senses, including hearing, 'perfectly acute.'<a id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> Terrible recriminations have, as usual, ensued between the investigators, Ferrier denying that Brown and Schaefer's -ablations were complete,<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> Schaefer that Ferrier's monkey -was really deaf.<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> In this unsatisfactory condition the subject +ablations were complete,<a id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> Schaefer that Ferrier's monkey +was really deaf.<a id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> In this unsatisfactory condition the subject must be left, although there seems no reason to doubt that Brown and Schaefer's observation is the more important of the two.</p> @@ -2558,7 +2553,7 @@ of the two.</p> the hearing function, and the superior convolution adjacent to the sylvian fissure is its most important part. The phenomena of aphasia show this. We studied motor aphasia a -few pages back; we must now consider <i>sensory aphasia</i>.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> +few pages back; we must now consider <i>sensory aphasia</i>.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> Our knowledge of this disease has had three stages: we may talk of the period of Broca, the period of Wernicke, and the period of Charcot. What Broca's discovery was we @@ -2566,9 +2561,9 @@ have seen. Wernicke was the first to discriminate those cases in which the patient can <i>not even understand</i> speech from those in which he can understand, only not talk; and to ascribe the former condition to lesion of the temporal -lobe.<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> The condition in question is <i>word-deafness</i>, and the +lobe.<a id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> The condition in question is <i>word-deafness</i>, and the disease is <i>auditory aphasia</i>. The latest statistical survey of -the subject is that by Dr. Allen Starr.<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> In the seven cases +the subject is that by Dr. Allen Starr.<a id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> In the seven cases of <i>pure</i> word-deafness which he has collected, cases in which the patient could read, talk, and write, but not understand what was said to him, the lesion was limited to the first and @@ -2595,7 +2590,7 @@ articulation must suffer. In the few cases in which the channel is abolished with no bad effect on speech we must suppose an idiosyncrasy. The patient must innervate his speech-organs either from the corresponding portion of the -other hemisphere or directly from the centres of ideation,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> +other hemisphere or directly from the centres of ideation,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> those, namely, of vision, touch, etc., without leaning on the auditory region. It is the minuter analysis of the facts in the light of such individual differences as these which constitutes @@ -2637,17 +2632,17 @@ that individual, injury to his <i>visual</i> centres will make him not only word-blind, but aphasic as well. His speech will become confused in consequence of an occipital lesion. Naunyn, consequently, plotting out on a diagram of the -hemisphere the 71 irreproachably reported cases of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> +hemisphere the 71 irreproachably reported cases of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> aphasia which he was able to collect, finds that the lesions concentrate themselves in three places: first, on Broca's centre; second, on Wernicke's; third, on the supra-marginal and angular gyri under which those fibres pass which connect -the visual centres with the rest of the brain<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> (see Fig. +the visual centres with the rest of the brain<a id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> (see Fig. 17). With this result Dr. Starr's analysis of purely sensory cases agrees.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_056_0017.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_056_0017.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 17.</div> </div> @@ -2657,7 +2652,7 @@ individuals. Meanwhile few things show more beautifully than the history of our knowledge of aphasia how the sagacity and patience of many banded workers are in time certain to analyze the darkest confusion into an orderly -display.<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> There is no 'centre of Speech' in the brain any +display.<a id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> There is no 'centre of Speech' in the brain any more than there is a faculty of Speech in the mind. The entire brain, more or less, is at work in a man who uses language. The subjoined diagram, from Boss, shows the @@ -2665,11 +2660,11 @@ four parts most critically concerned, and, in the light of our text, needs no farther explanation (see Fig. 18).</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 350px;"> -<img src="images/jame_057_0018.jpg" width="350" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_057_0018.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 350px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 18.</div> </div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span></p> <h4><i>Smell.</i></h4> @@ -2683,9 +2678,9 @@ rest of it for touch. Anatomy and pathology also point to the hippocampal gyrus; but as the matter is less interesting from the point of view of human psychology than were sight and hearing, I will say no more, but simply add -Luciani and Seppili's diagram of the dog's smell-centre.<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> Of</p> +Luciani and Seppili's diagram of the dog's smell-centre.<a id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> Of</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span></p> <h4><i>Taste</i></h4> @@ -2696,7 +2691,7 @@ below.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_058_0019.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_058_0019.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 19.—Luciani's Olfactory Region in the Dog.</div> </div> @@ -2720,7 +2715,7 @@ when pinched, remains standing in cold water, etc. Ferrier meanwhile denied that there was any true anæsthesia produced by ablations in the motor zone, and explains the appearance of it as an effect of the sluggish motor -responses of the affected side.<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> Munk<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> and Schiff<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a>, on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> +responses of the affected side.<a id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> Munk<a id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> and Schiff<a id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a>, on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> contrary, conceive of the 'motor zone' as essentially sensory, and in different ways explain the motor disorders as secondary results of the anæsthesia which is always there, @@ -2737,12 +2732,12 @@ wrong in denying it. On the other hand, Munk and Schiff are wrong in making the motor symptoms <i>depend</i> on the anæsthesia, for in certain rare cases they have been observed to exist not only without insensibility, but with -actual hyperæsthesia of the parts.<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> The motor and +actual hyperæsthesia of the parts.<a id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> The motor and sensory symptoms seem, therefore, to be independent variables.</p> <p><i>In monkeys</i> the latest experiments are those of Horsley -and Schaefer,<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> whose results Ferrier accepts. They find +and Schaefer,<a id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> whose results Ferrier accepts. They find that excision of the hippocampal convolution produces transient insensibility of the opposite side of the body, and that permanent insensibility is produced by destruction of its @@ -2751,13 +2746,13 @@ continuation upwards above the corpus callosum, the so-called fissure' in Fig. 7). The insensibility is at its maximum when the entire tract comprising both convolutions is destroyed. Ferrier says that the sensibility of monkeys is -'entirely unaffected' by ablations of the motor zone,<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> and -Horsley and Schaefer consider it by no means necessarily<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> -abolished.<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Luciani found it diminished in his three experiments -on apes.<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> +'entirely unaffected' by ablations of the motor zone,<a id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> and +Horsley and Schaefer consider it by no means necessarily<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> +abolished.<a id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Luciani found it diminished in his three experiments +on apes.<a id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_060_0020.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_060_0020.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 20.—Luciani's Tactile Region in the Dog.</div> </div> @@ -2770,9 +2765,9 @@ with which patients are examined. He himself believes that in dogs the tactile sphere extends backwards and forwards of the directly excitable region, into the frontal and parietal lobes (see Fig. 20). Nothnagel considers that pathological -evidence points in the same direction;<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> and Dr. Mills, carefully +evidence points in the same direction;<a id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> and Dr. Mills, carefully reviewing the evidence, adds the gyri fornicatus and -hippocampi to the cutaneo-muscular region in man.<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> If one +hippocampi to the cutaneo-muscular region in man.<a id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> If one compare Luciani's diagrams together (Figs. 14, 16, 19, 20) one will see that the entire parietal region of the dog's skull is common to the four senses of sight, hearing, smell, and @@ -2781,9 +2776,9 @@ in the human brain (upper parietal and supra-marginal gyri—see Fig. 17) seems to be a somewhat similar place of conflux. Optical aphasias and motor and tactile disturbances all result from its injury, especially when that is -on the left side.<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> The lower we go in the animal scale the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> +on the left side.<a id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> The lower we go in the animal scale the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> less differentiated the functions of the several brain-parts -seem to be.<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> It may be that the region in question still +seem to be.<a id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> It may be that the region in question still represents in ourselves something like this primitive condition, and that the surrounding parts, in adapting themselves more and more to specialized and narrow functions, have @@ -2810,20 +2805,20 @@ grounds for supposing the <i>muscular</i> sense to be exclusively connected with the parietal lobe and not with the motor zone. "Disease of this lobe gives pure ataxy without palsy, and of the motor zone pure palsy without loss of muscular -sense."<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> He fails, however, to convince more competent -critics than the present writer,<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> so I conclude with them +sense."<a id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> He fails, however, to convince more competent +critics than the present writer,<a id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> so I conclude with them that as yet we have no decisive grounds for locating muscular and cutaneous feeling apart. Much still remains to be learned about the relations between musculo-cutaneous sensibility and the cortex, but one thing is certain: that neither the occipital, the forward frontal, nor the temporal -lobes seem to have anything essential to do with it in man.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> +lobes seem to have anything essential to do with it in man.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> It is knit up with the performances of the <i>motor zone and of the convolutions backwards and midwards of them</i>. The reader must remember this conclusion when we come to the chapter on the Will.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>I must add a word about the connection of aphasia with the tactile sense. On <a href="#Page_40">p. 40</a> I spoke of those cases @@ -2832,7 +2827,7 @@ He cannot read by his eyes; but he can read by the feeling in his fingers, if he retrace the letters in the air. It is convenient for such a patient to have a pen in hand whilst reading in this way, in order to make the usual feeling -of writing more complete.<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> In such a case we must +of writing more complete.<a id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> In such a case we must suppose that the path between the optical and the graphic centres remains open, whilst that between the optical and the auditory and articulatory centres is closed. Only thus @@ -2852,10 +2847,10 @@ both read and write with his fingers most likely uses an identical 'graphic' centre, at once sensory and motor, for both operations.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="figleft" style="width: 125px;"> -<img src="images/jame_064_0021.jpg" width="125" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_064_0021.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 125px"> <div class="capt02">Dog's motor centres, right hemisphere, according to Paneth.—The points of the motor region @@ -2878,7 +2873,7 @@ In its main outlines it stands firm, though much has still to be discovered. The anterior frontal lobes, for example, so far as is yet known, have no definite functions. Goltz finds that dogs bereft of them both are incessantly in -motion, and excitable by every small stimulus. They are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> +motion, and excitable by every small stimulus. They are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> irascible and amative in an extraordinary degree, and their sides grow bare with perpetual reflex scratching; but they show no <i>local</i> troubles of either motion or sensibility. In @@ -2886,7 +2881,7 @@ monkeys not even this lack of inhibitory ability is shown, and neither stimulation nor excision of the prefrontal lobes produces any symptoms whatever. One monkey of Horsley and Schaefer's was as tame, and did certain tricks as well, -after as before the operation.<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> It is probable that we have +after as before the operation.<a id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> It is probable that we have about reached the limits of what can be learned about brain-functions from vivisecting inferior animals, and that we must hereafter look more exclusively to human pathology @@ -2914,9 +2909,9 @@ in the same mixed way. As Mr. Horsley says: "There are border centres, and the area of representation of the face merges into that for the representation of the upper limb. If there was a focal lesion at that point, you would have -the movements of these two parts starting together."<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> +the movements of these two parts starting together."<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span><a id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> The accompanying figure from Paneth shows just how the -matter stands in the dog.<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a></p> +matter stands in the dog.<a id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a></p> <p>I am speaking now of localizations breadthwise over the brain-surface. @@ -2927,13 +2922,13 @@ more superficial cells are smaller, the deepest layer of them is large; and it has been suggested that the superficial cells are sensorial, the -deeper ones motor;<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> or that the +deeper ones motor;<a id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> or that the superficial ones in the motor region are correlated with the extremities of the organs to be moved (fingers, etc.), the deeper ones with the more central segments (wrist, elbow, -etc.).<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> It need hardly be said that +etc.).<a id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> It need hardly be said that all such theories are as yet but guesses.</p> @@ -2947,9 +2942,9 @@ contain nothing but arrangements for representing impressions and movements, and other arrangements for coupling the activity Of these -arrangements together.</i><a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> Currents +arrangements together.</i><a id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> Currents pouring in from the sense-organs -first excite some arrangements,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> +first excite some arrangements,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> which in turn excite others, until at last a motor discharge downwards of some sort occurs. When this is once clearly grasped there remains little ground for keeping @@ -2960,13 +2955,13 @@ the currents probably have feelings going with them, and sooner or later bring movements about. In one aspect, then, every centre is afferent, in another efferent, even the motor cells of the spinal cord having these two aspects inseparably -conjoined. Marique,<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> and Exner and Paneth<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> have +conjoined. Marique,<a id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> and Exner and Paneth<a id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> have shown that by cutting <i>round</i> a 'motor' centre and so separating it from the influence of the rest of the cortex, the same disorders are produced as by cutting it out, so that really it is only the mouth of the funnel, as it were, through which the stream of innervation, starting from elsewhere, -pours;<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> consciousness accompanying the stream, +pours;<a id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> consciousness accompanying the stream, and being mainly of things seen if the stream is strongest occipitally, of things heard if it is strongest temporally, of things felt, etc., if the stream occupies most intensely the @@ -2986,11 +2981,11 @@ centres conscious as well?</i></p> <p>This is a difficult question to decide, how difficult one only learns when one discovers that the cortex-consciousness itself of certain objects can be seemingly annihilated -in any good hypnotic subject by a bare wave of his operator's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> +in any good hypnotic subject by a bare wave of his operator's<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> hand, and yet be proved by circumstantial evidence to -exist all the while in a split-off condition, quite as 'ejective'<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> +exist all the while in a split-off condition, quite as 'ejective'<a id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> to the rest of the subject's mind as that mind is to the mind -of the bystanders.<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> The lower centres themselves may +of the bystanders.<a id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> The lower centres themselves may conceivably all the while have a split-off consciousness of their own, similarly ejective to the cortex-consciousness; but whether they have it or not can never be known from @@ -3019,7 +3014,7 @@ themselves. For practical purposes, nevertheless, and limiting the meaning of the word consciousness to the personal self of the individual, we can pretty confidently answer the question prefixed to this paragraph by saying that <i>the -cortex is the sole organ of consciousness in man</i>.<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> If there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> +cortex is the sole organ of consciousness in man</i>.<a id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> If there<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> be any consciousness pertaining to the lower centres, it is a consciousness of which the self knows nothing.</p> @@ -3067,10 +3062,10 @@ cutting the spinal cord in dogs, proved that there were functions inhibited still longer by the wound, but which re-established themselves ultimately if the animal was kept alive. The lumbar region of the cord was thus found to -contain independent vaso-motor centres, centres for erection,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> +contain independent vaso-motor centres, centres for erection,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> for control of the sphincters, etc., which could be excited to activity by tactile stimuli and as readily reinhibited -by others simultaneously applied.<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> We may therefore +by others simultaneously applied.<a id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> We may therefore plausibly suppose that the rapid reappearance of motility, vision, etc., after their first disappearance in consequence of a cortical mutilation, is due to the passing off of @@ -3084,16 +3079,16 @@ In favor of an indefinite extension of the inhibition theory facts may be cited such as the following: In dogs whose disturbances due to cortical lesion have disappeared, they may in consequence of some inner or outer accident reappear in all -their intensity for 24 hours or so and then disappear again.<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> +their intensity for 24 hours or so and then disappear again.<a id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> In a dog made half blind by an operation, and then shut up in the dark, vision comes back just as quickly as in other similar dogs whose sight is exercised systematically -every day.<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> A dog which has learned to beg before the +every day.<a id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> A dog which has learned to beg before the operation recommences this practice quite <i>spontaneously</i> -a week after a double-sided ablation of the motor zone.<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> +a week after a double-sided ablation of the motor zone.<a id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> Occasionally, in a pigeon (or even, it is said, in a dog) we see the disturbances less marked immediately after -the operation than they are half an hour later.<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> This +the operation than they are half an hour later.<a id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> This would be impossible were they due to the subtraction of the organs which normally carried them on. Moreover the entire drift of recent physiological and pathological speculation @@ -3101,13 +3096,13 @@ is towards enthroning inhibition as an ever-present and indispensable condition of orderly activity. We shall see how great is its importance, in the chapter on the Will. Mr. Charles Mercier considers that no muscular contraction, -once begun, would ever stop without it, short of exhaustion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> -of the system;<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> and Brown-Séquard has for years been -accumulating examples to show how far its influence extends.<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> +once begun, would ever stop without it, short of exhaustion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> +of the system;<a id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> and Brown-Séquard has for years been +accumulating examples to show how far its influence extends.<a id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> Under these circumstances it seems as if error might more probably lie in curtailing its sphere too much than in stretching it too far as an explanation of the -phenomena following cortical lesion.<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a></p> +phenomena following cortical lesion.<a id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a></p> <p>On the other hand, if we admit <i>no</i> re-education of centres, we not only fly in the face of an <i>a priori</i> probability, @@ -3126,7 +3121,7 @@ long ago as 1875 Carville and Duret tested this by cutting out the fore-leg-centre on one side, in a dog, and then, after waiting till restitution had occurred, cutting it out on the opposite side as well. Goltz and others have done the -same thing.<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> If the opposite side were really the seat of the +same thing.<a id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> If the opposite side were really the seat of the restored function, the original palsy should have appeared again and been permanent. But it did not appear at all; there appeared only a palsy of the hitherto unaffected side. @@ -3134,21 +3129,21 @@ The next supposition is that <i>the parts surrounding the cut-out region</i> learn vicariously to perform its duties. But here, again, experiment seems to upset the hypothesis, so far as the motor zone goes at least; for we may wait till motility -has returned in the affected limb, and then both irritate the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> +has returned in the affected limb, and then both irritate the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> cortex surrounding the wound without exciting the limb to movement, and ablate it, without bringing back the -vanished palsy.<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> It would accordingly seem that <i>the cerebral +vanished palsy.<a id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> It would accordingly seem that <i>the cerebral centres below the cortex</i> must be the seat of the regained activities. But Goltz destroyed a dog's entire left hemisphere, together with the <i>corpus striatum</i> and the <i>thalamus</i> on that side, and kept him alive until a surprisingly small -amount of motor and tactile disturbance remained.<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> These +amount of motor and tactile disturbance remained.<a id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> These centres cannot here have accounted for the restitution. He -has even, as it would appear,<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> ablated both the hemispheres +has even, as it would appear,<a id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> ablated both the hemispheres of a dog, and kept him alive 51 days, able to walk and stand. The corpora striata and thalami in this dog were also practically gone. In view of such results we seem driven, with -M. François-Franck,<a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> to fall back on the <i>ganglia lower still</i>, +M. François-Franck,<a id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> to fall back on the <i>ganglia lower still</i>, or even on the <i>spinal cord</i> as the 'vicarious' organ of which we are in quest. If the abeyance of function between the operation and the restoration was due <i>exclusively</i> to inhibition, @@ -3169,11 +3164,11 @@ out, by its old path. Either of these inabilities may come from a local ablation; and 'restitution' can then only mean that, in spite of a temporary block, an inrunning current has at last become enabled to flow out by its old path again—e.g., -the sound of 'give your paw' discharges after some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> +the sound of 'give your paw' discharges after some<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> weeks into the same canine muscles into which it used to discharge before the operation. As far as the cortex itself goes, since one of the purposes for which it actually exists -is the production of new paths,<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> the only question before +is the production of new paths,<a id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> the only question before us is: Is the formation of <i>these particular 'vicarious' paths</i> too much to expect of its plastic powers? It would certainly be too much to expect that a hemisphere should @@ -3205,7 +3200,7 @@ that the old habitual act is at last successfully back again, becomes itself a new stimulus which stamps all the existing currents in. It is matter of experience that such feelings of successful achievement do tend to fix in our memory -whatever processes have led to them; and we shall have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> +whatever processes have led to them; and we shall have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> a good deal more to say upon the subject when we come to the Chapter on the Will.</p> @@ -3245,9 +3240,9 @@ The time has now come for that correction to be made.</p> lower centres are more spontaneous, and that the hemispheres are more automatic, than the Meynert scheme allows. Schrader's observations in Goltz's Laboratory on -hemisphereless frogs<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> and pigeons<a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> give an idea quite +hemisphereless frogs<a id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> and pigeons<a id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> give an idea quite different from the picture of these creatures which is -classically current. Steiner's<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> observations on frogs<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> +classically current. Steiner's<a id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> observations on frogs<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> already went a good way in the same direction, showing, for example, that locomotion is a well-developed function of the medulla oblongata. But Schrader, by great care @@ -3256,13 +3251,13 @@ found that at least in some of them the spinal cord would produce movements of locomotion when the frog was smartly roused by a poke, and that swimming and croaking could sometimes be performed when nothing above the -medulla oblongata remained.<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> Schrader's hemisphereless +medulla oblongata remained.<a id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> Schrader's hemisphereless frogs moved spontaneously, ate flies, buried themselves in the ground, and in short did many things which before his observations were supposed to be impossible unless the -hemispheres remained. Steiner<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> and Vulpian have remarked +hemispheres remained. Steiner<a id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> and Vulpian have remarked an even greater vivacity in fishes deprived of their -hemispheres. Vulpian says of his brainless carps<a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> that +hemispheres. Vulpian says of his brainless carps<a id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> that three days after the operation one of them darted at food and at a knot tied on the end of a string, holding the latter so tight between his jaws that his head was drawn out of @@ -3282,8 +3277,8 @@ small pebbles for example, which are at the bottom of the water. The same carp which, three days after operation, seized the knot on a piece of string, no longer snaps at it now, but if one brings it near her, she draws away from it -by swimming backwards before it comes into contact with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> -her mouth."<a name="FNanchor_90_90" id="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> Already on <a href="#Page_9">pp. 9-10</a>, as the reader may remember, +by swimming backwards before it comes into contact with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> +her mouth."<a id="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> Already on <a href="#Page_9">pp. 9-10</a>, as the reader may remember, we instanced those adaptations of conduct to new conditions, on the part of the frog's spinal cord and thalami, which led Pflüger and Lewes on the one hand and Goltz on @@ -3315,14 +3310,14 @@ the environing objects as intermediate goals of flight, showing a perfectly correct judgment of their distance. Although able to fly directly to the ground, she prefers to make the journey in successive stages.... Once on the ground, she -hardly ever rises spontaneously into the air."<a name="FNanchor_91_91" id="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></p> +hardly ever rises spontaneously into the air."<a id="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></p> <p>Young rabbits deprived of their hemispheres will stand, run, start at noises, avoid obstacles in their path, and give responsive cries of suffering when hurt. Rats will do the same, and throw themselves moreover into an attitude of defence. Dogs never survive such an operation if performed -at once. But Goltz's latest dog, mentioned on <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> +at once. But Goltz's latest dog, mentioned on <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> <a href="#Page_70">p. 70</a>, which is said to have been kept alive for fifty-one days after both hemispheres had been removed by a series of ablations and the corpora striata and thalami had softened @@ -3364,16 +3359,16 @@ for this. The blindness must have been an 'Ausfallserscheinung,' due to the loss of vision's essential organ. It would seem, then, that in these higher creatures the lower centres must be less adequate than they are farther down -in the zoological scale; and that even for certain elementary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> +in the zoological scale; and that even for certain elementary<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> combinations of movement and impression the co-operation of the hemispheres is necessary from the start. Even in birds and dogs the power of <i>eating properly</i> is lost when -the frontal lobes are cut off.<a name="FNanchor_92_92" id="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p> +the frontal lobes are cut off.<a id="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p> <p>The plain truth is that neither in man nor beast are the hemispheres the virgin organs which our scheme called them. So far from being unorganized at birth, they must -have native tendencies to reaction of a determinate sort.<a name="FNanchor_93_93" id="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> +have native tendencies to reaction of a determinate sort.<a id="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> These are the tendencies which we know as <i>emotions</i> and <i>instincts</i>, and which we must study with some detail in later chapters of this book. Both instincts and emotions are reactions @@ -3394,10 +3389,10 @@ of one instinctive reaction often prove to be the inciters of an opposite reaction, and being <i>suggested</i> on later occasions by the original object, may then suppress the first reaction altogether, just as in the case of the child and -the flame. For this education the hemispheres do not need<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> +the flame. For this education the hemispheres do not need<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> to be <i>tabulæ rasæ</i> at first, as the Meynert scheme would have them; and so far from their being educated by the -lower centres exclusively, they educate themselves.<a name="FNanchor_94_94" id="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a></p> +lower centres exclusively, they educate themselves.<a id="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a></p> <p>We have already noticed the absence of reactions from fear and hunger in the ordinary brainless frog. Schrader @@ -3425,9 +3420,9 @@ whether the she-bird be there or not. If one is placed near him, he leaves her unnoticed.... As the male pays no attention to the female, so she pays none to her young. The brood may follow the mother ceaselessly calling for food, -but they might as well ask it from a stone.... The hemisphereless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> +but they might as well ask it from a stone.... The hemisphereless<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> sphereless pigeon is in the highest degree tame, and fears -man as little as cat or bird of prey."<a name="FNanchor_95_95" id="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p> +man as little as cat or bird of prey."<a id="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p> <p>Putting together now all the facts and reflections which we have been through, it seems to me that <i>we can no longer @@ -3460,7 +3455,7 @@ realization must of course be proportional to the possible complication of the consciousness. Even the spinal cord may possibly have some little power of will in this sense, and of effort towards modified behavior in consequence of -new experiences of sensibility.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_96_96" id="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p> +new experiences of sensibility.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span><a id="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p> <p>All nervous centres have then in the first instance one essential function, that of 'intelligent' action. They feel, @@ -3468,7 +3463,7 @@ prefer one thing to another, and have 'ends.' Like all other organs, however, they <i>evolve</i> from ancestor to descendant, and their evolution takes two directions, the lower centres passing downwards into more unhesitating automatism, -and the higher ones upwards into larger intellectuality.<a name="FNanchor_97_97" id="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> +and the higher ones upwards into larger intellectuality.<a id="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> Thus it may happen that those functions which can safely grow uniform and fatal become least accompanied by mind, and that their organ, the spinal cord, becomes a @@ -3480,7 +3475,7 @@ consciousness grow more and more elaborate as zoological evolution proceeds. In this way it might come about that in man and the monkeys the basal ganglia should do fewer things by themselves than they can do in dogs, fewer in dogs -than in rabbits, fewer in rabbits than in hawks,<a name="FNanchor_98_98" id="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> fewer in +than in rabbits, fewer in rabbits than in hawks,<a id="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> fewer in hawks than in pigeons, fewer in pigeons than in frogs, fewer in frogs than in fishes, and that the hemispheres should correspondingly do more. This passage of functions forward @@ -3489,7 +3484,7 @@ of the evolutive changes, to be explained like the development of the hemispheres themselves, either by fortunate variation or by inherited effects of use. The reflexes, on this view, upon which the education of our human hemispheres -depends, would not be due to the basal ganglia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> +depends, would not be due to the basal ganglia<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> alone. They would be tendencies in the hemispheres themselves, modifiable by education, unlike the reflexes of the medulla oblongata, pons, optic lobes and spinal cord. Such @@ -3517,23 +3512,23 @@ any rate makes us realize how enormous are the gaps in our knowledge, the moment we try to cover the facts by any one formula of a general kind.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> It should be said that this particular cut commonly proves fatal. The +<p><a id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> It should be said that this particular cut commonly proves fatal. The text refers to the rare cases which survive.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> I confine myself to the frog for simplicity's sake. In higher animals, +<p><a id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> I confine myself to the frog for simplicity's sake. In higher animals, especially the ape and man, it would seem as if not only determinate combinations of muscles, but limited groups or even single muscles could be innervated from the hemispheres.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> I hope that the reader will take no umbrage at my so mixing the +<p><a id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> I hope that the reader will take no umbrage at my so mixing the physical and mental, and talking of reflex acts and hemispheres and reminiscences in the same breath, as if they were homogeneous quantities and factors of one causal chain. I have done so deliberately; for although I @@ -3550,7 +3545,7 @@ process' for 'idea.'</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> I shall call it hereafter for shortness 'the Meynert scheme;' for the +<p><a id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> I shall call it hereafter for shortness 'the Meynert scheme;' for the child-and-flame example, as well as the whole general notion that the hemispheres are a supernumerary surface for the projection and association of sensations and movements natively coupled in the centres below, is due to @@ -3562,15 +3557,15 @@ York, 1885.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Geschichte des Materialismus, 2d ed., ii, p. 345.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Geschichte des Materialismus, 2d ed., ii, p. 345.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> West Riding Asylum Reports, 1876, p. 267.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> West Riding Asylum Reports, 1876, p. 267.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> For a thorough discussion of the various objections, see Ferrier's +<p><a id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> For a thorough discussion of the various objections, see Ferrier's 'Functions of the Brain,' 2d ed., pp. 227-234, and François-Franck's 'Leçons sur les Fonctions Motrices du Cerveau' (1887), Leçon 31. The most minutely accurate experiments on irritation of cortical points are those @@ -3583,55 +3578,55 @@ have then been verified in men.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> J. Loeb: Beiträge zur Physiologie des Grosshirns; Pflüger's Archiv, +<p><a id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> J. Loeb: Beiträge zur Physiologie des Grosshirns; Pflüger's Archiv, xxxix, 293. I simplify the author's statement.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Goltz: Pflüger's Archiv, xlii, 419.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Goltz: Pflüger's Archiv, xlii, 419.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> 'Hemiplegia' means one-sided palsy.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> 'Hemiplegia' means one-sided palsy.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Philosophical Transactions, vol. 179, pp. 6, 10 (1888). In a later paper +<p><a id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Philosophical Transactions, vol. 179, pp. 6, 10 (1888). In a later paper (<i>ibid.</i> p. 205) Messrs. Beevor and Horsley go into the localization still more minutely, showing spots from which single muscles or single digits can be made to contract.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Nothnagel und Naunyn; Die Localization in den Gehirnkrankheiten +<p><a id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Nothnagel und Naunyn; Die Localization in den Gehirnkrankheiten (Wiesbaden, 1887), p. 34.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> An accessible account of the history of our knowledge of motor +<p><a id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> An accessible account of the history of our knowledge of motor aphasia is in W. A. Hammond's 'Treatise on the Diseases of the Nervous System,' chapter vii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> The history up to 1885 may be found in A. Christiani: Zur Physiologie +<p><a id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> The history up to 1885 may be found in A. Christiani: Zur Physiologie des Gehirnes (Berlin, 1885).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 44, p. 176. Munk (Berlin Academy Sitzsungberichte, +<p><a id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 44, p. 176. Munk (Berlin Academy Sitzsungberichte, 1889, xxxi) returns to the charge, denying the extirpations of Schrader to be complete: "Microscopic portions of the <i>Sehsphäre</i> must remain."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> A. Christiani; Zur Physiol. d. Gehirnes (Berlin, 1885), chaps. ii, iii, iv, +<p><a id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> A. Christiani; Zur Physiol. d. Gehirnes (Berlin, 1885), chaps. ii, iii, iv, H. Munk: Berlin Akad. Stzgsb. 1884, xxiv.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Luciani und Seppili: Die Functions-Localization auf der Grosshirnrinde +<p><a id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Luciani und Seppili: Die Functions-Localization auf der Grosshirnrinde (Deutsch von Fraenkel), Leipzig, 1886, Dogs M, N, and S. Goltz in Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 34, pp. 490-6; vol. 42, p. 454. Cf. also Munk: Berlin Akad. Stzgsb. 1886, vii, viii, pp. 113-121, and Loeb: Pflüger's Archiv, @@ -3639,11 +3634,11 @@ vol. 39, p. 337.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Berlin Akad. Sitzungsberichte, 1886, vii, viii, p. 124.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Berlin Akad. Sitzungsberichte, 1886, vii, viii, p. 124.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> H. Munk: Functionen der Grosshirnrinde (Berlin, 1881), pp. 36-40. +<p><a id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> H. Munk: Functionen der Grosshirnrinde (Berlin, 1881), pp. 36-40. Ferrier: Functions, etc., 2d ed., chap, ix, pt. i. Brown and Schaefer, Philos. Transactions, vol. 179, p. 321. Luciani u. Seppili, op. cit. pp. 131-138. Lannegrace found traces of sight with both occipital lobes destroyed, @@ -3656,45 +3651,45 @@ in avoiding obstacles and in emotional disturbance in the presence of men.</p></ <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Localization of Cerebral Disease (1878), pp. 117-8.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Localization of Cerebral Disease (1878), pp. 117-8.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> For cases see Flechsig: Die Leitungsbahnen in Gehirn u. Rückenmark +<p><a id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> For cases see Flechsig: Die Leitungsbahnen in Gehirn u. Rückenmark (Leipzig, 1876), pp. 112, 272; Exner's Untersuchungen, etc., p. 83; Ferrier's Localization, etc., p. 11; François-Franck's Cerveau Moteur, p. 63, note.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> E. C. Seguin: Hemianopsia of Cerebral Origin, in Journal of Nervous +<p><a id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> E. C. Seguin: Hemianopsia of Cerebral Origin, in Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, vol. xiii, p. 30. Nothnagel und Naunyn: Ueber die Localization der Gehirnkrankheiten (Wiesbaden, 1887), p. 16.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Die Seelenblindheit, etc., p. 51 ff. The mental blindness was in +<p><a id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Die Seelenblindheit, etc., p. 51 ff. The mental blindness was in this woman's case moderate in degree.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vol. 21, p. 222.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vol. 21, p. 222.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Nothnagel (<i>loc. cit.</i> p. 22) says: "<i>Dies trifft aber nicht zu</i>." He gives, +<p><a id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Nothnagel (<i>loc. cit.</i> p. 22) says: "<i>Dies trifft aber nicht zu</i>." He gives, however, no case in support of his opinion that double-sided cortical lesion may make one stone-blind and yet not destroy one's visual images; so that I do not know whether it is an observation of fact or an <i>a priori</i> assumption.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> In a case published by C. S. Freund: Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vol. xx, the +<p><a id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> In a case published by C. S. Freund: Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vol. xx, the occipital lobes were injured, but their cortex was not destroyed, on both sides. There was still vision. Cf. <a href="#Page_291">pp. 291-5</a>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> I say 'need,' for I do not of course deny the <i>possible</i> coexistence of the +<p><a id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> I say 'need,' for I do not of course deny the <i>possible</i> coexistence of the two symptoms. Many a brain-lesion might block optical associations and at the same time impair optical imagination, without entirely stopping vision. Such a case seems to have been the remarkable one from Charcot which I @@ -3702,7 +3697,7 @@ shall give rather fully in the chapter on Imagination.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> Freund (in the article cited above 'Ueber optische Aphasie und +<p><a id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> Freund (in the article cited above 'Ueber optische Aphasie und Seelenblindheit') and Bruns ('Ein Fall von Alexie,' etc., in the Neurologisches Centralblatt for 1888, pp. 581, 509) explain their cases by broken-down conduction. Wilbrand, whose painstaking monograph on mental @@ -3718,71 +3713,71 @@ Intérieur (1886), chap. viii; and Jas. Boss's little book on Aphasia (1887), p. <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> For a case see Wernicke's Lehrb. d. Gehirnkrankheiten, vol. ii, p. +<p><a id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> For a case see Wernicke's Lehrb. d. Gehirnkrankheiten, vol. ii, p. 554 (1881).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> The latest account of them is the paper 'Über die optischen Centren +<p><a id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> The latest account of them is the paper 'Über die optischen Centren u. Bahnen' by von Monakow in the Archiv für Psychiatrie, vol. xx, p. 714.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Die Functions-Localization, etc., Dog X; see also p. 161.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Die Functions-Localization, etc., Dog X; see also p. 161.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Philos. Trans., vol. 179, p. 312.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Philos. Trans., vol. 179, p. 312.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> Brain, vol. xi, p. 10.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> Brain, vol. xi, p. 10.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 147.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 147.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> Der aphasische Symptomencomplex (1874). See in Fig. 11 the convolution +<p><a id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> Der aphasische Symptomencomplex (1874). See in Fig. 11 the convolution marked <span class="smcap">Wernicke</span>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> 'The Pathology of Sensory Aphasia,' 'Brain,' July, 1889.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> 'The Pathology of Sensory Aphasia,' 'Brain,' July, 1889.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> Nothnagel und Naunyn; <i>op. cit.</i> plates.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> Nothnagel und Naunyn; <i>op. cit.</i> plates.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Ballet's and Bernard's works cited on <a href="#Page_51">p. 51</a> are the most accessible +<p><a id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Ballet's and Bernard's works cited on <a href="#Page_51">p. 51</a> are the most accessible documents of Charcot's school. Bastian's book on the Brain as an Organ of Mind (last three chapters) is also good.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> For details, see Ferrier's 'Functions,' chap. ix, pt. iii, and Chas. +<p><a id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> For details, see Ferrier's 'Functions,' chap. ix, pt. iii, and Chas. K. Mills: Transactions of Congress of American Physicians and Surgeons, 1888, vol. i, p. 278.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> Functions of the Brain, chap. x, § 14.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> Functions of the Brain, chap. x, § 14.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> Ueber die Functionen d. Grosshirnrinde (1881), p. 50.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> Ueber die Functionen d. Grosshirnrinde (1881), p. 50.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> Lezioni di Fisiologia sperimentale sul sistema nervoso encefalico +<p><a id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> Lezioni di Fisiologia sperimentale sul sistema nervoso encefalico (l. 73), p. 527 ff. Also 'Brain,' vol. ix, p. 298.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> Bechterew (Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 35, p. 137) found <i>no</i> anæsthesia in +<p><a id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> Bechterew (Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 35, p. 137) found <i>no</i> anæsthesia in a cat with motor symptoms from ablation of sigmoid gyrus. Luciani got hyperæsthesia coexistent with cortical motor defect in a dog, by simultaneously hemisecting the spinal cord (Luciani u. Seppili, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 234). @@ -3792,76 +3787,76 @@ after ablating the motor zone (Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 34, p. 471).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> Philos. Transactions, vol. 179, p. 20 ff.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> Philos. Transactions, vol. 179, p. 20 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> Functions, p. 375.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> Functions, p. 375.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> Pp. 15-17.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> Pp. 15-17.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> Luciani u. Seppili, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 275-288.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> Luciani u. Seppili, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 275-288.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 18.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 18.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> Trans. of Congress, etc., p. 272.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> Trans. of Congress, etc., p. 272.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> See Exner's Unters. üb. Localization, plate xxv.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> See Exner's Unters. üb. Localization, plate xxv.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> Cf. Ferrier's Functions, etc., chap. iv, and chap. x, §§ 6 to 9.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> Cf. Ferrier's Functions, etc., chap. iv, and chap. x, §§ 6 to 9.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 17.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 17.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> E.g. Starr, <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 272; Leyden, Beiträge zur Lehre v. d. Localization +<p><a id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> E.g. Starr, <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 272; Leyden, Beiträge zur Lehre v. d. Localization im Gehirn (1888), p. 72.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> Bernard, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 84.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> Bernard, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 84.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> Philos. Trans., vol. 179, p. 3.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> Philos. Trans., vol. 179, p. 3.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> Trans. of Congress of Am. Phys. and Surg. 1888, vol. i, p. 343. +<p><a id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> Trans. of Congress of Am. Phys. and Surg. 1888, vol. i, p. 343. Beevor and Horsley's paper on electric stimulation of the monkey's brain is the most beautiful work yet done for precision. See Phil. Trans., vol. 179, p. 205, especially the plates.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 37, p. 523 (1885).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 37, p. 523 (1885).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> By Luys in his generally preposterous book 'The Brain'; also by +<p><a id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> By Luys in his generally preposterous book 'The Brain'; also by Horsley.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> C. Mercier: The Nervous System and the Mind, p. 124.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> C. Mercier: The Nervous System and the Mind, p. 124.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> The frontal lobes as yet remain a puzzle. Wundt tries to explain +<p><a id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> The frontal lobes as yet remain a puzzle. Wundt tries to explain them as an organ of 'apperception' (Grundzüge d. Physiologischen Psychologie, 3d ed., vol. i, p. 233 ff.), but I confess myself unable to apprehend clearly the Wundtian philosophy so far as this word enters into it, so @@ -3872,30 +3867,30 @@ wane.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> Rech. Exp. sur le Fonctionnement des Centres Psycho-moteurs (Brussels, +<p><a id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> Rech. Exp. sur le Fonctionnement des Centres Psycho-moteurs (Brussels, 1885).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 44, p. 544.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 44, p. 544.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> I ought to add, however, that François-Franck (Fonctions Motrices, +<p><a id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> I ought to add, however, that François-Franck (Fonctions Motrices, p. 370) got, in two dogs and a cat, a different result from this sort of 'circumvallation.'</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> For this word, see T. K. Clifford's Lectures and Essays (1879), vol. ii, +<p><a id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> For this word, see T. K. Clifford's Lectures and Essays (1879), vol. ii, p. 72.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> See below, <a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">Chapter VIII</a>.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> See below, <a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">Chapter VIII</a>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> Cf. Ferrier's Functions, pp. 120, 147, 414. See also Vulpian: Leçons +<p><a id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> Cf. Ferrier's Functions, pp. 120, 147, 414. See also Vulpian: Leçons sur la Physiol. du Syst. Nerveux, p. 548; Luciani u. Seppili, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 404-5; H. Maudsley: Physiology of Mind (1876), pp. 138 ff., 197 ff., and 241 ff. In G. H. Lewes's Physical Basis of Mind, Problem IV: 'The Reflex @@ -3903,112 +3898,112 @@ Theory,' a very full history of the question is given.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> Goltz: Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 8, p. 460; Freusberg: <i>ibid.</i> vol. 10, p. 174.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> Goltz: Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 8, p. 460; Freusberg: <i>ibid.</i> vol. 10, p. 174.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> Goltz: Verrichtungen des Grosshirns, p. 78.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> Goltz: Verrichtungen des Grosshirns, p. 78.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> Loeb: Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 89, p. 276.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> Loeb: Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 89, p. 276.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 289.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 289.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> Schrader: <i>ibid.</i> vol. 44, p. 218.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> Schrader: <i>ibid.</i> vol. 44, p. 218.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), chaps. iii, vi; also in +<p><a id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), chaps. iii, vi; also in Brain, vol. xi, p. 361.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> Brown-Séquard has given a resume of his opinions in the Archives +<p><a id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> Brown-Séquard has given a resume of his opinions in the Archives de Physiologie for Oct. 1889, 5me. Série, vol. i, p 751.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> Goltz first applied the inhibition theory to the brain in his 'Verrichtungen +<p><a id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> Goltz first applied the inhibition theory to the brain in his 'Verrichtungen des Grosshirns,' p. 39 ff. On the general philosophy of Inhibition the reader may consult Brunton's 'Pharmakology and Therapeutics,' p. 154 ff., and also 'Nature,' vol. 27, p. 419 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> E.g. Herzen, Herman u. Schwalbe's Jahres-bericht for 1886, Physiol. +<p><a id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> E.g. Herzen, Herman u. Schwalbe's Jahres-bericht for 1886, Physiol. Abth. p. 38. (Experiments on new-born puppies.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> François-Franck: <i>op. cit.</i> p. 382. Results are somewhat contradictory.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> François-Franck: <i>op. cit.</i> p. 382. Results are somewhat contradictory.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 42, p. 419.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 42, p. 419.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_81_81" id="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1889, p. 372.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1889, p. 372.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_82_82" id="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 387. See pp. 378 to 388 for a discussion of the whole +<p><a id="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 387. See pp. 378 to 388 for a discussion of the whole question. Compare also Wundt's Physiol. Psych., 3d ed., i, 225 ff., and Luciani u. Seppili, pp. 243, 293.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_83_83" id="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> The Chapters on Habit, Association, Memory, and Perception will +<p><a id="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> The Chapters on Habit, Association, Memory, and Perception will change our present preliminary conjecture that that is one of its essential uses, into an unshakable conviction.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_84_84" id="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 41, p. 75 (1887).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 41, p. 75 (1887).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_85_85" id="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> vol. 44, p. 175 (1889).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> vol. 44, p. 175 (1889).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_86_86" id="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> Untersuchungen über die Physiologie des Froschhirns. 1885.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> Untersuchungen über die Physiologie des Froschhirns. 1885.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_87_87" id="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> pp. 80, 82-3. Schrader also found a <i>biting-reflex</i> developed +<p><a id="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> pp. 80, 82-3. Schrader also found a <i>biting-reflex</i> developed when the medulla oblongata is cut through just behind the cerebellum.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_88_88" id="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> Berlin Akad. Sitzungsberichte for 1886.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> Berlin Akad. Sitzungsberichte for 1886.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_89_89" id="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> Comptes Rendus, vol. 102, p. 90.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> Comptes Rendus, vol. 102, p. 90.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_90_90" id="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. d. Sciences, vol. 102, p. 1530.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. d. Sciences, vol. 102, p. 1530.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_91_91" id="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 210.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 210.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_92_92" id="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> Goltz: Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 42, p. 447; Schrader: <i>ibid.</i> vol. 44, p. +<p><a id="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> Goltz: Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 42, p. 447; Schrader: <i>ibid.</i> vol. 44, p. 219 ff. It is possible that this symptom may be an effect of traumatic inhibition, however.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_93_93" id="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> A few years ago one of the strongest arguments for the theory that +<p><a id="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> A few years ago one of the strongest arguments for the theory that the hemispheres are purely supernumerary was Soltmann's often-quoted observation that in new-born puppies the motor zone of the cortex is not excitable by electricity and only becomes so in the course of a fortnight, @@ -4021,7 +4016,7 @@ however, noticing Paneth's work.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_94_94" id="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> Münsterberg (Die Willenshandlung, 1888, p. 134) challenges Meynert's +<p><a id="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> Münsterberg (Die Willenshandlung, 1888, p. 134) challenges Meynert's scheme <i>in toto</i>, saying that whilst we have in our personal experience plenty of examples of acts which were at first voluntary becoming secondarily automatic and reflex, we have no conscious record of a single originally @@ -4035,11 +4030,11 @@ we are made to feel how ignorant we really are.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_95_95" id="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 44, p. 230-1.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 44, p. 230-1.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_96_96" id="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> Naturally, as Schiff long ago pointed out (Lehrb. d. Muskel-u. Nervenphysiologie, +<p><a id="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> Naturally, as Schiff long ago pointed out (Lehrb. d. Muskel-u. Nervenphysiologie, 1859, p. 213 ff.), the 'Rückenmarksseele,' if it now exist, can have no higher sense-consciousness, for its incoming currents are solely from the skin. But it may, in its dim way, both feel, prefer, and @@ -4058,7 +4053,7 @@ often traversed.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_97_97" id="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> Whether this evolution takes place through the inheritance of habits +<p><a id="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> Whether this evolution takes place through the inheritance of habits acquired, or through the preservation of lucky variations, is an alternative which we need not discuss here. We shall consider it in the last chapter in the book. For our present purpose the <i>modus operandi</i> of the evolution @@ -4066,14 +4061,14 @@ makes no difference, provided it be admitted to occur.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_98_98" id="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> See Schrader's Observations, <i>loc. cit.</i></p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> See Schrader's Observations, <i>loc. cit.</i></p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.</a></h5> <h4>ON SOME GENERAL CONDITIONS OF BRAIN-ACTIVITY.</h4> @@ -4093,7 +4088,7 @@ contain cells which send off fibres, we say that Nature has realized our diagram for us, and that the mechanical substratum of thought is plain. In <i>some</i> way, it is true, our diagram must be realized in the brain; but surely in no -such visible and palpable way as we at first suppose.<a name="FNanchor_99_99" id="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> An +such visible and palpable way as we at first suppose.<a id="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> An enormous number of the cellular bodies in the hemispheres are fibreless. Where fibres are sent off they soon divide into untraceable ramifications; and nowhere do we see a simple @@ -4102,7 +4097,7 @@ between two cells. Too much anatomy has been found to order for theoretic purposes, even by the anatomists; and the popular-science notions of cells and fibres are almost wholly wide of the truth. Let us therefore relegate -the subject of the <i>intimate</i> workings of the brain to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> +the subject of the <i>intimate</i> workings of the brain to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> the physiology of the future, save in respect to a few points of which a word must now be said. And first of</p> @@ -4141,7 +4136,7 @@ at all.</p> <p>The subject belongs too much to physiology for the evidence to be cited in detail in these pages. I will throw into a note a few references for such readers as may be interested -in following it out,<a name="FNanchor_100_100" id="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> and simply say that the direct<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> +in following it out,<a id="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> and simply say that the direct<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> electrical irritation of the cortical centres sufficiently proves the point. For it was found by the earliest experimenters here that whereas it takes an exceedingly strong current @@ -4174,14 +4169,14 @@ contraction does so. If in any way a reflex contraction of the muscle experimented on has been produced, or if it is contracted spontaneously by the animal (as not unfrequently happens 'by sympathy,' during a deep inspiration), it is found that an electrical stimulus, until then -inoperative, operates energetically if immediately applied."<a name="FNanchor_101_101" id="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a></p></blockquote> +inoperative, operates energetically if immediately applied."<a id="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Furthermore:</p> <blockquote> <p>"In a certain stage of the morphia-narcosis an ineffectively weak -shock will become powerfully effective, if, immediately before its application<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> +shock will become powerfully effective, if, immediately before its application<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> to the motor centre, the skin of certain parts of the body is exposed to gentle tactile stimulation.... If, having ascertained the subminimal strength of current and convinced one's self repeatedly of its @@ -4191,7 +4186,7 @@ at once strongly effective. The increase of irritability lasts some seconds before it disappears. Sometimes the effect of a single light stroking of the paw is only sufficient to make the previously ineffectual current produce a very weak contraction. Repeating the tactile stimulation -will then, as a rule, increase the contraction's extent."<a name="FNanchor_102_102" id="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a></p></blockquote> +will then, as a rule, increase the contraction's extent."<a id="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a></p></blockquote> <p>We constantly use the summation of stimuli in our practical appeals. If a car-horse balks, the final way of @@ -4209,17 +4204,17 @@ beast to pursuit, but if the sight of movement be added to that of form, pursuit occurs. "Brücke noted that his brainless hen, which made no attempt to peck at the grain under her very eyes, began pecking if the grain were thrown on -the ground with force, so as to produce a rattling sound."<a name="FNanchor_103_103" id="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> +the ground with force, so as to produce a rattling sound."<a id="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> "Dr. Allen Thomson hatched out some chickens on a carpet, where he kept them for several days. They showed no inclination to scrape,... but when Dr. Thomson sprinkled a little gravel on the carpet,... the chickens immediately -began their scraping movements."<a name="FNanchor_104_104" id="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> A strange person, and +began their scraping movements."<a id="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> A strange person, and darkness, are both of them stimuli to fear and mistrust in -dogs (and for the matter of that, in men). Neither circumstance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> +dogs (and for the matter of that, in men). Neither circumstance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> alone may awaken outward manifestations, but together, i.e. when the strange man is met in the dark, the dog -will be excited to violent defiance.<a name="FNanchor_105_105" id="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> Street-hawkers well +will be excited to violent defiance.<a id="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> Street-hawkers well know the efficacy of summation, for they arrange themselves in a line upon the sidewalk, and the passer often buys from the last one of them, through the effect of the reiterated solicitation, @@ -4251,7 +4246,7 @@ The phrase 'quick as thought' had from time immemorial signified all that was wonderful and elusive of determination in the line of speed; and the way in which Science laid her doomful hand upon this mystery reminded people -of the day when Franklin first '<i>eripuit cœlo fulmen</i>,' foreshadowing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> +of the day when Franklin first '<i>eripuit cœlo fulmen</i>,' foreshadowing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> the reign of a newer and colder race of gods. We shall take up the various operations measured, each in the chapter to which it more naturally pertains. I may @@ -4283,7 +4278,7 @@ One type is that of the revolving drum covered with smoked paper, on which one electric pen traces a line which the signal breaks and the 'reaction' draws again; whilst another electric pen (connected with a pendulum or a rod of metal -vibrating at a known rate) traces alongside of the former<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> +vibrating at a known rate) traces alongside of the former<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> line a 'time-line' of which each undulation or link stands for a certain fraction of a second, and against which the break in the reaction-line can be measured. Compare @@ -4293,7 +4288,7 @@ Ludwig's Kymograph, Marey's Chronograph are good examples of this type of instrument.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_086_0021.jpg" width="400" alt=" Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_086_0021.jpg" alt=" Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 21.</div> </div> @@ -4310,7 +4305,7 @@ of which I picture a modification devised by my colleague Professor H. P. Bowditch, which works very well.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_087_0022.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_087_0022.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="caption"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 22.—Bowditch's Reaction-timer. <i>F</i>, tuning-fork carrying a little plate which holds the paper on which the electric pen <i>M</i> makes the tracing, and sliding in grooves on the base-board. <i>P</i>, a plug which spreads the prongs of the fork apart @@ -4327,9 +4322,9 @@ the second level.</div> </div> <p>The manner in which the signal and reaction are connected -with the chronographic apparatus varies indefinitely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> +with the chronographic apparatus varies indefinitely<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> in different experiments. Every new problem requires -some new electric or mechanical disposition of apparatus.<a name="FNanchor_106_106" id="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> +some new electric or mechanical disposition of apparatus.<a id="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> <p>The least complicated time-measurement is that known as <i>simple reaction-time</i>, in which there is but one possible @@ -4337,7 +4332,7 @@ signal and one possible movement, and both are known in advance. The movement is generally the closing of an electric key with the hand. The foot, the jaw, the lips, even the eyelid, have been in turn made organs of reaction, and -the apparatus has been modified accordingly.<a name="FNanchor_107_107" id="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> The time +the apparatus has been modified accordingly.<a id="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> The time usually elapsing between stimulus and movement lies between one and three tenths of a second, varying according to circumstances which will be mentioned anon.</p> @@ -4369,7 +4364,7 @@ a motor current occurs in the centres;</p> <p>5. The motor current excites the muscle to the contracting point.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span></p> <p>Time is also lost, of course, outside the muscle, in the joints, skin, etc., and between the parts of the apparatus; @@ -4396,14 +4391,14 @@ uses the words. To these two forms of awareness of the impression Wundt adds the conscious volition to react, gives to the trio the name of 'psycho-physical' processes, and assumes that they actually follow upon each other in -the succession in which they have been named.<a name="FNanchor_108_108" id="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> So at +the succession in which they have been named.<a id="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> So at least I understand him. The simplest way to determine the time taken up by this psycho-physical stage No. 3 would be to determine separately the duration of the several purely physical processes, 1, 2, 4, and 5, and to subtract them from the total reaction-time. Such attempts -have been made.<a name="FNanchor_109_109" id="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> But the data for calculation are too<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> -inaccurate for use, and, as Wundt himself admits,<a name="FNanchor_110_110" id="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> the precise +have been made.<a id="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> But the data for calculation are too<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> +inaccurate for use, and, as Wundt himself admits,<a id="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> the precise duration of stage 3 must at present be left enveloped with that of the other processes, in the total reaction-time.</p> @@ -4416,7 +4411,7 @@ eclipsed by the more substantive and enduring memory of the impression as it came in, and of the executed movement of response. Feeling of the impression, attention to it, thought of the reaction, volition to react, <i>would</i>, undoubtedly, -all be links of the process <i>under other conditions</i>,<a name="FNanchor_111_111" id="FNanchor_111_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> and +all be links of the process <i>under other conditions</i>,<a id="FNanchor_111_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> and would lead to the same reaction—after an indefinitely longer time. But these other conditions are not those of the experiments we are discussing; and it is mythological psychology @@ -4438,16 +4433,16 @@ which receives the stimulus, into the motor centre which discharges the reaction, is already tingling with premonitory innervation, is raised to such a pitch of heightened irritability by the expectant attention, that the signal is -instantaneously sufficient to cause the overflow.<a name="FNanchor_112_112" id="FNanchor_112_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> No other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> +instantaneously sufficient to cause the overflow.<a id="FNanchor_112_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> No other<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> tract of the nervous system is, at the moment, in this hair-trigger condition. The consequence is that one sometimes responds to a <i>wrong</i> signal, especially if it be an impression -of the same <i>kind</i> with the signal we expect.<a name="FNanchor_113_113" id="FNanchor_113_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> But if by +of the same <i>kind</i> with the signal we expect.<a id="FNanchor_113_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> But if by chance we are tired, or the signal is unexpectedly weak, and we do not react instantly, but only after an express perception that the signal has come, and an express volition, the time becomes quite disproportionately long (a -second or more, according to Exner<a name="FNanchor_114_114" id="FNanchor_114_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a>), and we feel that the +second or more, according to Exner<a id="FNanchor_114_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a>), and we feel that the process is in nature altogether different.</p> <p>In fact, the reaction-time experiments are a case to @@ -4465,23 +4460,23 @@ under these conditions, exactly resembles any reflex action. The only difference is that whilst, in the ordinarily so-called reflex acts, the reflex arc is a permanent result of organic growth, it is here a transient result of -previous cerebral conditions.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_115_115" id="FNanchor_115_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p> +previous cerebral conditions.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span><a id="FNanchor_115_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p> <p>I am happy to say that since the preceding paragraphs (and the notes thereto appertaining) were written, Wundt has himself become converted to the view which I defend. He now admits that in the shortest reactions "there is neither apperception nor will, but that they are merely -<i>brain-reflexes due to practice</i>."<a name="FNanchor_116_116" id="FNanchor_116_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> The means of his conversion +<i>brain-reflexes due to practice</i>."<a id="FNanchor_116_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> The means of his conversion are certain experiments performed in his laboratory -by Herr L. Lange,<a name="FNanchor_117_117" id="FNanchor_117_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> who was led to distinguish between +by Herr L. Lange,<a id="FNanchor_117_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> who was led to distinguish between two ways of setting the attention in reacting on a signal, and who found that they gave very different time-results. -In the '<i>extreme sensorial</i>' way, as Lange calls it, of reacting,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> +In the '<i>extreme sensorial</i>' way, as Lange calls it, of reacting,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> one keeps one's mind as intent as possible upon the expected -signal, and 'purposely avoids'<a name="FNanchor_118_118" id="FNanchor_118_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> thinking of the movement +signal, and 'purposely avoids'<a id="FNanchor_118_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> thinking of the movement to be executed; in the '<i>extreme muscular</i>' way one -'does not think at all'<a name="FNanchor_119_119" id="FNanchor_119_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> of the signal, but stands as ready as +'does not think at all'<a id="FNanchor_119_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> of the signal, but stands as ready as possible for the movement. The muscular reactions are much shorter than the sensorial ones, the average difference being in the neighborhood of a tenth of a second. @@ -4498,13 +4493,13 @@ the reacter has succeeded by repeated and conscientious practice in bringing about an extremely precise co-ordination of his voluntary impulse with his sense-impression do we get times which can be regarded as typical sensorial -reaction-times."<a name="FNanchor_120_120" id="FNanchor_120_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> Now it seems to me that these excessive +reaction-times."<a id="FNanchor_120_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> Now it seems to me that these excessive and 'untypical' times are probably the real 'complete times,' the only ones in which distinct processes of actual perception and volition occur (see above, <a href="#Page_88">pp. 88-9</a>). The typical sensorial time which is attained by practice is probably another sort of reflex, less perfect than the reflexes prepared -by straining one's attention towards the movement.<a name="FNanchor_121_121" id="FNanchor_121_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_121_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> +by straining one's attention towards the movement.<a id="FNanchor_121_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_121_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> The times are much more variable in the sensorial way than in the muscular. The several muscular reactions differ little from each other. Only in them does the phenomenon @@ -4513,7 +4508,7 @@ before the signal. Times intermediate between these two types occur according as the attention fails to turn itself exclusively to one of the extremes. It is obvious that Herr Lange's distinction between the two types of reaction is a -highly important one, and that the 'extreme muscular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> +highly important one, and that the 'extreme muscular<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> method,' giving both the shortest times and the most constant ones, ought to be aimed at in all comparative investigations. Herr Lange's own muscular time averaged @@ -4538,7 +4533,7 @@ under those names. Meanwhile the simple reaction-time remains as the starting point of all these superinduced complications. It is the fundamental physiological constant in all time-measurements. As such, its own variations -have an interest, and must be briefly passed in review.<a name="FNanchor_122_122" id="FNanchor_122_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a></p> +have an interest, and must be briefly passed in review.<a id="FNanchor_122_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a></p> <p>The reaction-time varies with the <i>individual</i> and his <i>age</i>. An individual may have it particularly long in respect of @@ -4553,14 +4548,14 @@ a minimum beyond which no farther reduction can be made. The aforesaid old pauper's time was, after much practice, reduced to 0.1866 sec. (<i>loc. cit.</i> p. 626).</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span></p> <p><i>Fatigue</i> lengthens it.</p> <p><i>Concentration of attention</i> shortens it. Details will be given in the chapter on Attention.</p> -<p>The <i>nature of the signal</i> makes it vary.<a name="FNanchor_123_123" id="FNanchor_123_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> Wundt writes:</p> +<p>The <i>nature of the signal</i> makes it vary.<a id="FNanchor_123_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> Wundt writes:</p> <blockquote> @@ -4569,23 +4564,23 @@ electric stimulus is less than for true touch-sensations, as the following averages show:</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Average. </td><td align="left">Average Variation</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Sound</td><td align="left">0.167 sec. </td><td align="left">0.0221 sec.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Light</td><td align="left">0.222 sec.</td><td align="left">0.0219 sec.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Electric skin-sensation </td><td align="left">0.201 sec.</td><td align="left">0.0115 sec.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Touch-sensations</td><td align="left">0.213 sec.</td><td align="left">0.0134 sec.</td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;"> </td><td style="text-align: left;">Average. </td><td style="text-align: left;">Average Variation</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Sound</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.167 sec. </td><td style="text-align: left;">0.0221 sec.</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Light</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.222 sec.</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.0219 sec.</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Electric skin-sensation </td><td style="text-align: left;">0.201 sec.</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.0115 sec.</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Touch-sensations</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.213 sec.</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.0134 sec.</td></tr> </table></div> <p>"I here bring together the averages which have been obtained by some other observers:</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Hirsch. </td><td align="left">Hankel. </td><td align="left">Exner.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Sound</td><td align="left">0.149</td><td align="left">0.1505</td><td align="left">0.1360</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Light</td><td align="left">0.200</td><td align="left">0.2246</td><td align="left">0.1506</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Skin-sensation </td><td align="left">0.182</td><td align="left">0.1546</td><td align="left">0.1337"<a name="FNanchor_124_124" id="FNanchor_124_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_124_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a></td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;"> </td><td style="text-align: left;">Hirsch. </td><td style="text-align: left;">Hankel. </td><td style="text-align: left;">Exner.</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Sound</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.149</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.1505</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.1360</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Light</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.200</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.2246</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.1506</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Skin-sensation </td><td style="text-align: left;">0.182</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.1546</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.1337"<a id="FNanchor_124_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_124_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a></td></tr> </table></div> </blockquote> @@ -4603,7 +4598,7 @@ The mere perception of the presence of the substance on the tongue varied from 0''.159 to 0''.219 (Pflüger's Archiv, xiv, 529).</p> -<p><i>Olfactory</i> reactions have been studied by Vintschgau,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> +<p><i>Olfactory</i> reactions have been studied by Vintschgau,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> Buccola, and Beaunis. They are slow, averaging about half a second (cf. Beaunis, Recherches exp. sur l'Activité Cérébrale, 1884, p. 49 ff.).</p> @@ -4647,7 +4642,7 @@ near the extremity of a limb. The same observers found that signals seen by the periphery of the retina gave longer times than the same signals seen by direct vision.</p> -<p>The <i>season</i> makes a difference, the time being some hundredths<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> +<p>The <i>season</i> makes a difference, the time being some hundredths<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> of a second shorter on cold winter days (Vintschgau <i>apud</i> Exner, Hermann's Hdbh., p. 270).</p> @@ -4687,7 +4682,7 @@ minds, and they have not failed to profit by the opportunity.</p> circulation which accompany cerebral activity</i>.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_098_0023.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_098_0023.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 23.—Sphymographic pulse-tracing. <i>A</i>, during intellectual repose; <i>B</i>, during intellectual activity. (Mosso.)</div> </div> @@ -4698,16 +4693,16 @@ rises, as a rule, all over the body, no matter where the cortical irritation is applied, though the motor zone is the most sensitive region for the purpose. Elsewhere the current must be strong enough for an epileptic attack to be -produced.<a name="FNanchor_125_125" id="FNanchor_125_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> Slowing and quickening of the heart are also +produced.<a id="FNanchor_125_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> Slowing and quickening of the heart are also observed, and are independent of the vaso-constrictive -phenomenon. Mosso, using his ingenious 'plethysmograph'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> +phenomenon. Mosso, using his ingenious 'plethysmograph'<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> as an indicator, discovered that the blood-supply to the arms diminished during intellectual activity, and found furthermore that the arterial tension (as shown by the sphygmograph) was increased in these members (see Fig. 23). So slight an emotion as that produced by the entrance of Professor Ludwig into the laboratory was instantly -followed by a shrinkage of the arms.<a name="FNanchor_126_126" id="FNanchor_126_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> The brain +followed by a shrinkage of the arms.<a id="FNanchor_126_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> The brain itself is an excessively vascular organ, a sponge full of blood, in fact; and another of Mosso's inventions showed that when less blood went to the arms, more went to the @@ -4720,7 +4715,7 @@ of the redistribution of blood in his system. But the best proof of the immediate afflux of blood to the brain during mental activity is due to Mosso's observations on three persons whose brain had been laid bare by lesion of -the skull. By means of apparatus described in his book,<a name="FNanchor_127_127" id="FNanchor_127_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> +the skull. By means of apparatus described in his book,<a id="FNanchor_127_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> this physiologist was enabled to let the brain-pulse record itself directly by a tracing. The intra-cranial blood-pressure rose immediately whenever the subject was spoken to, or @@ -4728,7 +4723,7 @@ when he began to think actively, as in solving a problem in mental arithmetic. Mosso gives in his work a large number of reproductions of tracings which show the instantaneity of the change of blood-supply, whenever the mental -activity was quickened by any cause whatever, intellectual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> +activity was quickened by any cause whatever, intellectual<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> or emotional. He relates of his female subject that one day whilst tracing her brain-pulse he observed a sudden rise with no apparent outer or inner cause. She however @@ -4737,7 +4732,7 @@ caught sight of a <i>skull</i> on top of a piece of furniture in the room, and that this had given her a slight emotion.</p> <p>The fluctuations of the blood supply to the brain were -independent of respiratory changes,<a name="FNanchor_128_128" id="FNanchor_128_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> and followed the +independent of respiratory changes,<a id="FNanchor_128_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> and followed the quickening of mental activity almost immediately. We must suppose a very delicate adjustment whereby the circulation follows the needs of the cerebral activity. Blood @@ -4750,7 +4745,7 @@ the other way about, and as if mental activity were due to the afflux of blood. But, as Professor H. N. Martin has well said, "that belief has no physiological foundation whatever; it is even directly opposed to all that we know of -cell life."<a name="FNanchor_129_129" id="FNanchor_129_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a> A chronic pathological congestion may, it is true, +cell life."<a id="FNanchor_129_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a> A chronic pathological congestion may, it is true, have secondary consequences, but the primary congestions which we have been considering <i>follow</i> the activity of the brain-cells by an adaptive reflex vaso-motor mechanism @@ -4767,7 +4762,7 @@ I will speak in the chapter which treats of that subject.</p> <p><i>Brain-activity seems accompanied by a local disengagement of heat.</i> The earliest careful work in this direction was by Dr. J. S. Lombard in 1867. Dr. Lombard's latest results include -the records of over 60,000 observations.<a name="FNanchor_130_130" id="FNanchor_130_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> He noted the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> +the records of over 60,000 observations.<a id="FNanchor_130_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> He noted the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> changes in delicate thermometers and electric piles placed against the scalp in human beings, and found that any intellectual effort, such as computing, composing, reciting poetry @@ -4780,7 +4775,7 @@ poetry silently than in reciting it aloud. Dr. Lombard's explanation is that "in internal recitation an additional portion of energy, which in recitation aloud was converted into nervous and muscular force, now appears as -heat."<a name="FNanchor_131_131" id="FNanchor_131_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> I should suggest rather, if we must have a theory, +heat."<a id="FNanchor_131_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> I should suggest rather, if we must have a theory, that the surplus of heat in recitation to one's self is due to inhibitory processes which are absent when we recite aloud. In the chapter on the Will we shall see that the <i>simple</i> central @@ -4802,9 +4797,9 @@ was much greater. Schiff concluded from these and other experiments that sensorial activity heats the brain-tissue, but he did not try to localize the increment of heat beyond finding that it was in both hemispheres, whatever might be -the sensation applied.<a name="FNanchor_132_132" id="FNanchor_132_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_132_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> Dr. R. W. Amidon in 1880 made +the sensation applied.<a id="FNanchor_132_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_132_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> Dr. R. W. Amidon in 1880 made a farther step forward, in localizing the heat produced by -voluntary muscular contractions. Applying a number of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> +voluntary muscular contractions. Applying a number of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> delicate surface-thermometers simultaneously against the scalp, he found that when different muscles of the body were made to contract vigorously for ten minutes or more, @@ -4816,7 +4811,7 @@ regions represent the centres of highest temperature for the various special movements which were investigated. To a large extent they correspond to the centres for the same movements assigned by Ferrier and others on other -grounds; only they cover more of the skull.<a name="FNanchor_133_133" id="FNanchor_133_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a></p> +grounds; only they cover more of the skull.<a id="FNanchor_133_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a></p> <h4><i>Phosphorus and Thought.</i></h4> @@ -4845,7 +4840,7 @@ more intelligent than farmers because they eat so much fish, which contains so much phosphorus. All the facts may be doubted.</p> -<p>The only straight way to ascertain the importance of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> +<p>The only straight way to ascertain the importance of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> phosphorus to thought would be to find whether more is excreted by the brain during mental activity than during rest. Unfortunately we cannot do this directly, but can @@ -4853,7 +4848,7 @@ only gauge the amount of PO<sub>5</sub> in the urine, which represents other organs as well as the brain, and this procedure, as Dr. Edes says, is like measuring the rise of water at the mouth of the Mississippi to tell where there has been a -thunder-storm in Minnesota.<a name="FNanchor_134_134" id="FNanchor_134_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_134_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> It has been adopted, however, +thunder-storm in Minnesota.<a id="FNanchor_134_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_134_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> It has been adopted, however, by a variety of observers, some of whom found the phosphates in the urine diminished, whilst others found them increased, by intellectual work. On the whole, it is @@ -4862,7 +4857,7 @@ excitement less phosphorus than usual seems to be excreted. More is excreted during sleep. There are differences between the alkaline and earthy phosphates into which I will not enter, as my only aim is to show that the popular way -of looking at the matter has no exact foundation.<a name="FNanchor_135_135" id="FNanchor_135_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> The +of looking at the matter has no exact foundation.<a id="FNanchor_135_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> The fact that phosphorus-preparations may do good in nervous exhaustion proves nothing as to the part played by phosphorus in mental activity. Like iron, arsenic, and other @@ -4880,7 +4875,7 @@ need hardly be pointed out. The materials which the brain they may be) are the analogues of the urine and the bile, being in fact real material excreta. As far as these matters go, the brain is a ductless gland. But we know of -nothing connected with liver-and kidney-activity which can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> +nothing connected with liver-and kidney-activity which can<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> be in the remotest degree compared with the stream of thought that accompanies the brain's material secretions.</p> @@ -4890,11 +4885,11 @@ important feature of all. I refer to the aptitude of the brain for acquiring <i>habits</i>. But I will treat of that in a chapter by itself.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_99_99" id="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> I shall myself in later places indulge in much of this schematization. +<p><a id="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> I shall myself in later places indulge in much of this schematization. The reader will understand once for all that it is symbolic; and that the use of it is hardly more than to show what a deep congruity there is between mental processes and mechanical processes of <i>some</i> kind, not necessarily of @@ -4902,7 +4897,7 @@ the exact kind portrayed.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_100_100" id="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> Valentin: Archiv f. d. gesammt. Physiol., 1873, p. 458. Stirling: +<p><a id="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> Valentin: Archiv f. d. gesammt. Physiol., 1873, p. 458. Stirling: Leipzig Acad. Berichte, 1875, p. 372 (Journal of Physiol., 1875). J. Ward: Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol., 1880, p. 72. H. Sewall: Johns Hopkins Studies, 1880, p. 30. Kronecker u. Nicolaides: Archiv f. @@ -4920,29 +4915,29 @@ No. 7. Grünhagen: Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 34, p. 301 (1884).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_101_101" id="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> Bubnoff und Heidenhain: Ueber Erregungs- und Hemmungsvorgänge +<p><a id="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> Bubnoff und Heidenhain: Ueber Erregungs- und Hemmungsvorgänge innerhalb der motorischen Hirncentren. Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 26, p. 156 (1881).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_102_102" id="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 26, p. 176 (1881). Exner thinks (<i>ibid.</i> +<p><a id="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 26, p. 176 (1881). Exner thinks (<i>ibid.</i> Bd. 28, p. 497 (1882)) that the summation here occurs in the spinal cord. It makes no difference where this particular summation occurs, so far as the general philosophy of summation goes.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_103_103" id="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> G H. Lewes: Physical Basis of Mind, p. 479, where many similar +<p><a id="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> G H. Lewes: Physical Basis of Mind, p. 479, where many similar examples are given, 487-9.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_104_104" id="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> Romanes: Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 168.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> Romanes: Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 168.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_105_105" id="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> See a similar instance in Mach: Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, +<p><a id="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> See a similar instance in Mach: Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, p. 36, a sparrow being the animal. My young children are afraid of their own pug-dog, if he enters their room after they are in bed and the lights are out. Compare this statement also: "The first question to a @@ -4955,7 +4950,7 @@ on the Mental State of the Blind, and Deaf, and Dumb (Salisbury, <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_106_106" id="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> The reader will find a great deal about chronographic apparatus in +<p><a id="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> The reader will find a great deal about chronographic apparatus in J. Marey: La Méthode Graphique, pt. ii, chap. ii. One can make pretty fair measurements with no other instrument than a watch, by making a large number of reactions, each serving as a signal for the following one, @@ -4965,11 +4960,11 @@ applied by Professor Jastrow. See 'Science' for September 10, 1886.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_107_107" id="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> See, for a few modifications, Cattell, Mind, xi, 220 ff.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> See, for a few modifications, Cattell, Mind, xi, 220 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_108_108" id="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 221-2. Cf. also the first edition, 728-9. I must +<p><a id="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 221-2. Cf. also the first edition, 728-9. I must confess to finding all Wundt's utterances about 'apperception' both vacillating and obscure. I see no use whatever for the word, as he employs it, in Psychology. Attention, perception, conception, volition, are its ample @@ -4982,21 +4977,21 @@ f. wiss. Philos., x, 346.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_109_109" id="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> By Exner, for example, Pflüger's Archiv, vii, 628 ff.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> By Exner, for example, Pflüger's Archiv, vii, 628 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_110_110" id="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> P. 222. Cf. also Richet, Rev. Philos., vi, 395-6.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> P. 222. Cf. also Richet, Rev. Philos., vi, 395-6.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_111_111" id="Footnote_111_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> For instance, if, on the previous day, one had resolved to act on a +<p><a id="Footnote_111_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> For instance, if, on the previous day, one had resolved to act on a signal when it should come, and it now came whilst we were engaged in other things, and reminded us of the resolve.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_112_112" id="Footnote_112_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> "I need hardly mention that success in these experiments depends in +<p><a id="Footnote_112_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> "I need hardly mention that success in these experiments depends in a high degree on our concentration of attention. If inattentive, one gets very discrepant figures.... This concentration of the attention is in the highest degree exhausting. After some experiments in which I was concerned @@ -5006,15 +5001,15 @@ while." (Exner, <i>loc. cit.</i> vii, 618.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_113_113" id="Footnote_113_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> Wundt, Physiol. Psych., ii, 226</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_113_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> Wundt, Physiol. Psych., ii, 226</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_114_114" id="Footnote_114_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vii, 616.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_114_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vii, 616.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_115_115" id="Footnote_115_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> In short, what M. Delbœuf calls an '<i>organe adventice</i>.' The reaction-time, +<p><a id="Footnote_115_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> In short, what M. Delbœuf calls an '<i>organe adventice</i>.' The reaction-time, moreover, is quite compatible with the reaction itself being of a reflex order. Some reflexes (sneezing, e.g.) are very slow. The only time-measurement of a reflex act in the human subject with which I am @@ -5060,32 +5055,32 @@ involves either conscious perception or conscious will.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_116_116" id="Footnote_116_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 3d edition (1887), vol. ii, p. 266.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_116_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 3d edition (1887), vol. ii, p. 266.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_117_117" id="Footnote_117_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, vol. iv, p. 479 (1888).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_117_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, vol. iv, p. 479 (1888).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_118_118" id="Footnote_118_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 488.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_118_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 488.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_119_119" id="Footnote_119_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 487.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_119_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 487.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_120_120" id="Footnote_120_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 489.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_120_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 489.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_121_121" id="Footnote_121_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_121_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> Lange has an interesting hypothesis as to the brain-process concerned +<p><a id="Footnote_121_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_121_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> Lange has an interesting hypothesis as to the brain-process concerned in the latter, for which I can only refer to his essay.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_122_122" id="Footnote_122_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_122_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> The reader who wishes to know more about the matter will find a +<p><a id="Footnote_122_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_122_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> The reader who wishes to know more about the matter will find a most faithful compilation of all that has been done, together with much original matter, in G. Buccola's 'Legge del Tempo,' etc. See also chapter xvi of Wundt's Physiol. Psychology; Exner in Hermann's Hdbch., @@ -5094,7 +5089,7 @@ chap. viii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_123_123" id="Footnote_123_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_123_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> The nature of the movement also seems to make it vary. Mr. B. I. +<p><a id="Footnote_123_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_123_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> The nature of the movement also seems to make it vary. Mr. B. I. Gilman and I reacted to the same signal by simply raising our hand, and again by carrying our hand towards our back. The moment registered was always that at which the hand broke an electric contact in <i>starting</i> to @@ -5108,68 +5103,68 @@ explains this by the fact that a more ample contraction makes a greater <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_124_124" id="Footnote_124_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_124_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 223.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_124_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_124_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 223.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_125_125" id="Footnote_125_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_125_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> François-Franck, Fonctions Motrices, Leçon xxii.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_125_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_125_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> François-Franck, Fonctions Motrices, Leçon xxii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_126_126" id="Footnote_126_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_126_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> La Paura (1884), p. 117.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_126_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_126_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> La Paura (1884), p. 117.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_127_127" id="Footnote_127_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_127_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> Ueber den Kreislauf des Blutes im menschlichen Gehirn (1881), +<p><a id="Footnote_127_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_127_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> Ueber den Kreislauf des Blutes im menschlichen Gehirn (1881), chap. ii. The Introduction gives the history of our previous knowledge of the subject.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_128_128" id="Footnote_128_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_128_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> In this conclusion M. Gley (Archives de Physiologie, 1881, p. 742) +<p><a id="Footnote_128_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_128_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> In this conclusion M. Gley (Archives de Physiologie, 1881, p. 742) agrees with Professor Mosso. Gley found his pulse rise 1-3 beats, his carotid dilate, and his radial artery contract during hard mental work.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_129_129" id="Footnote_129_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> Address before Med. and Chirurg. Society of Maryland, 1879.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_129_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> Address before Med. and Chirurg. Society of Maryland, 1879.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_130_130" id="Footnote_130_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_130_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> See his book; "Experimental Researches on the Regional Temperature +<p><a id="Footnote_130_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_130_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> See his book; "Experimental Researches on the Regional Temperature of the Head" (London, 1879).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_131_131" id="Footnote_131_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_131_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 195.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_131_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_131_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 195.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_132_132" id="Footnote_132_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> The most convenient account of Schiff's experiments is by Prof. +<p><a id="Footnote_132_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> The most convenient account of Schiff's experiments is by Prof. Hierzen, in the Revue Philosophique, vol. iii, p. 36.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_133_133" id="Footnote_133_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_133_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> A New Study of Cerebral Cortical Localization (N. Y., Putnam, +<p><a id="Footnote_133_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_133_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> A New Study of Cerebral Cortical Localization (N. Y., Putnam, 1880), pp. 48-53.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_134_134" id="Footnote_134_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_134_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> Archives of Medicine, vol. x, No. 1 (1883).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_134_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_134_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> Archives of Medicine, vol. x, No. 1 (1883).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_135_135" id="Footnote_135_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_135_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> Without multiplying references, I will simply cite Mendel (Archiv f. +<p><a id="Footnote_135_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_135_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> Without multiplying references, I will simply cite Mendel (Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vol. iii, 1871), Mairet (Archives de Neurologie, vol. ix, 1885), and Beaunis (Rech. Expérimentales sur l'Activité Cérébrale, 1887). Richet gives a partial bibliography in the Revue Scientifique, vol. 38, p. 788 (1886).</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_IV136" id="CHAPTER_IV136">CHAPTER IV.</a><a name="FNanchor_136_136" id="FNanchor_136_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_IV136">CHAPTER IV.</a><a id="FNanchor_136_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a></h5> <h4>HABIT.</h4> @@ -5203,7 +5198,7 @@ matter can change, because they are in the last instance due to the structure of the compound, and either outward forces or inward tensions can, from one hour to another, turn that structure into something different from what it was. That -is, they can do so if the body be plastic enough to maintain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> +is, they can do so if the body be plastic enough to maintain<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> its integrity, and be not disrupted when its structure yields.</p> <p>The change of structure here spoken of need not involve @@ -5227,7 +5222,7 @@ especially nervous tissue, seems endowed with a very extraordinary degree of plasticity of this sort; so that we may without hesitation lay down as our first proposition the following, that <i>the phenomena of habit in living beings are -due to the plasticity<a name="FNanchor_137_137" id="FNanchor_137_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> of the organic materials of which their +due to the plasticity<a id="FNanchor_137_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> of the organic materials of which their bodies are composed</i>.</p> <p>But the philosophy of habit is thus, in the first instance, @@ -5246,7 +5241,7 @@ there has been a change in the tissue, and this change is a new habit of cohesion. A lock works better after being used some time; at the outset more force was required to overcome certain roughnesses in the mechanism. The overcoming of their resistance is a phenomenon of -habituation. It costs less trouble to fold a paper when it has been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> +habituation. It costs less trouble to fold a paper when it has been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> folded already. This saving of trouble is due to the essential nature of habit, which brings it about that, to reproduce the effect, a less amount of the outward cause is required. The sounds of a violin improve by @@ -5259,7 +5254,7 @@ when it flows again, the path traced by itself before. Just so, the impressions of outer objects fashion for themselves in the nervous system more and more appropriate paths, and these vital phenomena recur under similar excitements from without, when they have been interrupted -a certain time."<a name="FNanchor_138_138" id="FNanchor_138_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a></p></blockquote> +a certain time."<a id="FNanchor_138_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Not in the nervous system alone. A scar anywhere is a <i>locus minoris resistentiæ</i>, more liable to be abraded, @@ -5286,10 +5281,10 @@ much the morbid manifestations themselves were due to the mere inertia of the nervous organs, when once launched on a false career.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Can we now form a notion of what the inward physical -changes may be like, in organs whose habits have thus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> +changes may be like, in organs whose habits have thus<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> struck into new paths? In other words, can we say just what mechanical facts the expression 'change of habit' covers when it is applied to a nervous system? Certainly @@ -5330,7 +5325,7 @@ sense-organs make with extreme facility paths which do not easily disappear. For, of course, a simple habit, like every other nervous event—the habit of snuffling, for example, or of putting one's hands into one's pockets, or of -biting one's nails—is, mechanically, nothing but a reflex<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> +biting one's nails—is, mechanically, nothing but a reflex<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> discharge; and its anatomical substratum must be a path in the system. The most complex habits, as we shall presently see more fully, are, from the same point of view, @@ -5348,7 +5343,7 @@ system of paths between a sensory <i>terminus a quo</i> and a muscular, glandular, or other <i>terminus ad quem</i>. A path once traversed by a nerve-current might be expected to follow the law of most of the paths we know, and to be scooped -out and made more permeable than before;<a name="FNanchor_139_139" id="FNanchor_139_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> and this ought +out and made more permeable than before;<a id="FNanchor_139_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> and this ought to be repeated with each new passage of the current. Whatever obstructions may have kept it at first from being a path should then, little by little, and more and more, be @@ -5366,14 +5361,14 @@ itself, the neighboring parts remaining inert, it is easy to see how their inertness might oppose a friction which it would take many waves of rearrangement to break down and overcome. If we call the path itself the 'organ,' and -the wave of rearrangement the 'function,' then it is obviously<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> +the wave of rearrangement the 'function,' then it is obviously<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> a case for repeating the celebrated French formula of '<i>La fonction fait l'organe.</i>'</p> <p>So nothing is easier than to imagine how, when a current once has traversed a path, it should traverse it more readily still a second time. But what made it ever traverse -it the first time?<a name="FNanchor_140_140" id="FNanchor_140_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> In answering this question we can only +it the first time?<a id="FNanchor_140_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> In answering this question we can only fall back on our general conception of a nervous system as a mass of matter whose parts, constantly kept in states of different tension, are as constantly tending to equalize their @@ -5389,12 +5384,12 @@ become the beginning of a new reflex arc. All this is vague to the last degree, and amounts to little more than saying that a new path may be formed by the sort of <i>chances</i> that in nervous material are likely to occur. But, vague as it -is, it is really the last word of our wisdom in the matter.<a name="FNanchor_141_141" id="FNanchor_141_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a></p> +is, it is really the last word of our wisdom in the matter.<a id="FNanchor_141_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a></p> <p>It must be noticed that the growth of structural modification in living matter may be more rapid than in any lifeless mass, because the incessant nutritive renovation of -which the living matter is the seat tends often to corroborate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> +which the living matter is the seat tends often to corroborate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> and fix the impressed modification, rather than to counteract it by renewing the original constitution of the tissue that has been impressed. Thus, we notice after exercising @@ -5405,7 +5400,7 @@ surprises us. I have often noticed this in learning a tune; and it has led a German author to say that we learn to swim during the winter and to skate during the summer.</p> -<p>Dr. Carpenter writes:<a name="FNanchor_142_142" id="FNanchor_142_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p> +<p>Dr. Carpenter writes:<a id="FNanchor_142_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p> <blockquote> @@ -5431,7 +5426,7 @@ the newly forming skin which is closing over an open wound, or in the recovery of the sensibility of a piece of 'transplanted' skin, which has for a time been rendered insensible by the complete interruption of the continuity of its nerves. The most remarkable example of this reproduction, -however, is afforded by the results of M. Brown-Séquard's<a name="FNanchor_143_143" id="FNanchor_143_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> +however, is afforded by the results of M. Brown-Séquard's<a id="FNanchor_143_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> experiments upon the gradual restoration of the functional activity of the spinal cord after its complete division; which takes place in a way that indicates rather a <i>reproduction</i> of the whole, or the lower part of @@ -5439,7 +5434,7 @@ the cord and of the nerves proceeding from it, than a mere <i>reunion</i> of divided surfaces. This reproduction is but a special manifestation of the reconstructive change which is <i>always</i> taking place in the nervous system; it being not less obvious to the eye of reason that the 'waste' -occasioned by its functional activity must be constantly repaired by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> +occasioned by its functional activity must be constantly repaired by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> production of new tissue, than it is to the eye of sense that such reparation supplies an actual <i>loss</i> of substance by disease or injury.</p> @@ -5488,7 +5483,7 @@ mental action which are so entirely conformable to those of bodily action as to indicate their intimate relation to a 'mechanism of thought and feeling,' acting under the like conditions with that of sense and motion. The psychical principles of <i>association</i>, indeed, and the physiological -principles of <i>nutrition</i>, simply express—the former in terms of mind,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> +principles of <i>nutrition</i>, simply express—the former in terms of mind,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> the latter in terms of brain—the universally admitted fact that any sequence of mental action which has been frequently repeated tends to perpetuate itself; so that we find ourselves automatically prompted to @@ -5537,7 +5532,7 @@ the impulse is determined to the motion of the hand and of the single finger. This is, in the first place, because the movement of the finger is the movement <i>thought of</i> and, in the second place, because its movement and that of the key are the movements we try to <i>perceive</i>, along -with the results of the latter on the ear. The more often the process<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> +with the results of the latter on the ear. The more often the process<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> is repeated, the more easily the movement follows, on account of the increase in permeability of the nerves engaged.</p> @@ -5568,7 +5563,7 @@ it overflows into larger muscular regions. He usually plays with his fingers, his body being at rest. But no sooner does he get excited than his whole body becomes 'animated,' and he moves his head and trunk, in particular, as if these also were organs with which he meant to -belabor the keys."<a name="FNanchor_144_144" id="FNanchor_144_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a></p></blockquote> +belabor the keys."<a id="FNanchor_144_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Man is born with a tendency to do more things than he has ready-made arrangements for in his nerve-centres. @@ -5577,7 +5572,7 @@ But in him the number of them is so enormous, that most of them must be the fruit of painful study. If practice did not make perfect, nor habit economize the expense of nervous and muscular energy, he would therefore be in a sorry -plight. As Dr. Maudsley says:<a name="FNanchor_145_145" id="FNanchor_145_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_145_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a></p> +plight. As Dr. Maudsley says:<a id="FNanchor_145_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_145_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a></p> <blockquote> @@ -5585,7 +5580,7 @@ plight. As Dr. Maudsley says:<a name="FNanchor_145_145" id="FNanchor_145_145"></ careful direction of consciousness were necessary to its accomplishment on each occasion, it is evident that the whole activity of a lifetime might be confined to one or two deeds—that no progress could take place in -development. A man might be occupied all day in dressing and undressing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> +development. A man might be occupied all day in dressing and undressing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> himself; the attitude of his body would absorb all his attention and energy; the washing of his hands or the fastening of a button would be as difficult to him on each occasion as to the child on its first @@ -5628,7 +5623,7 @@ that he has instantly made the right parry and return. A glance at the musical hieroglyphics, and the pianist's fingers have rippled through a cataract of notes. And not only is it the right thing at the right time that we thus involuntarily -do, but the wrong thing also, if it be an habitual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> +do, but the wrong thing also, if it be an habitual<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> thing. Who is there that has never wound up his watch on taking off his waistcoat in the daytime, or taken his latch-key out on arriving at the door-step of a friend? Very @@ -5669,12 +5664,12 @@ is not a thought or a perception, but the <i>sensation occasioned by the muscular contraction just finished</i>. A strictly voluntary act has to be guided by idea, perception, and volition, throughout its whole course. In an habitual action, -mere sensation is a sufficient guide, and the upper<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> +mere sensation is a sufficient guide, and the upper<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> regions of brain and mind are set comparatively free. A diagram will make the matter clear:</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_116_0024.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_116_0024.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 24.</div> </div> @@ -5707,7 +5702,7 @@ movement <i>A</i>, than <i>A</i>, through the sensation <i>a</i> of its own occurrence, awakens <i>B</i> reflexly; <i>B</i> then excites <i>C</i> through <i>b</i>, and so on till the chain is ended, when the intellect generally takes cognizance of the final result. The process, in -fact, resembles the passage of a wave of 'peristaltic' motion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> +fact, resembles the passage of a wave of 'peristaltic' motion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> down the bowels. The intellectual perception at the end is indicated in the diagram by the effect of <i>G</i> being represented, at <i>G'</i>, in the ideational centres above the merely @@ -5750,14 +5745,14 @@ them still more when I say that I have just amused myself with repeating this curious experiment. Though thirty years have elapsed since the time I was writing, and though I have scarcely once touched the balls during that period, I can still manage to read with ease while -keeping <i>three</i> balls up.'"(Autobiography, p. 26.)<a name="FNanchor_146_146" id="FNanchor_146_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a></p></blockquote> +keeping <i>three</i> balls up.'"(Autobiography, p. 26.)<a id="FNanchor_146_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a></p></blockquote> <p>We have called <i>a, b, c, d, e, f,</i> the antecedents of the successive muscular attractions, by the name of sensations. -Some authors seem to deny that they are even this. If not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> +Some authors seem to deny that they are even this. If not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> even this, they can only be centripetal nerve-currents, not sufficient to arouse feeling, but sufficient to arouse motor -response.<a name="FNanchor_147_147" id="FNanchor_147_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> It may be at once admitted that they are not +response.<a id="FNanchor_147_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> It may be at once admitted that they are not distinct <i>volitions</i>. The will, if any will be present, limits itself to a <i>permission</i> that they exert their motor effects. Dr. Carpenter writes:</p> @@ -5784,7 +5779,7 @@ that the mechanism of locomotion, as of other habitual movements, works automatically under the general control and direction of the will, can scarcely be put down by any assumption of an hypothetical necessity, which rests only on the basis of ignorance of one side of our composite -nature."<a name="FNanchor_148_148" id="FNanchor_148_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_148_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a></p></blockquote> +nature."<a id="FNanchor_148_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_148_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a></p></blockquote> <p>But if not distinct acts of will, these immediate antecedents of each movement of the chain are at any rate @@ -5800,7 +5795,7 @@ off,</p> <p>"we are continuously aware of certain muscular feelings; and we have, moreover, a feeling of certain impulses to keep our equilibrium and to set down one leg after another. It is doubtful whether we could -preserve equilibrium if no sensation of our body's attitude were there,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> +preserve equilibrium if no sensation of our body's attitude were there,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> and doubtful whether we should advance our leg if we had no sensation of its movement as executed, and not even a minimal feeling of impulse to set it down. Knitting appears altogether mechanical, and the knitter @@ -5824,7 +5819,7 @@ acts are very faint. But none the less are they necessary. Imagine your hands not feeling; your movements could then only be provoked by ideas, and if your ideas were then diverted away, the movements ought to come to a standstill, which is a consequence that seldom -occurs."<a name="FNanchor_149_149" id="FNanchor_149_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a></p></blockquote> +occurs."<a id="FNanchor_149_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Again:</p> @@ -5854,7 +5849,7 @@ slipping is a cause of new sensations starting up in the hand, so that the attention is in a moment brought back to the grasping of the bow.</p> <p>"The following experiment shows this well: When one begins to -play on the violin, to keep him from raising his right elbow in playing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> +play on the violin, to keep him from raising his right elbow in playing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> a book is placed under his right armpit, which he is ordered to hold fast by keeping the upper arm tight against his body. The muscular feelings, and feelings of contact connected with the book, provoke an @@ -5866,7 +5861,7 @@ attention may be wholly absorbed by the notes and the fingering with the left hand. <i>The simultaneous combination of movements is thus in the first instance conditioned by the facility with which in us, alongside of intellectual processes, processes of inattentive feeling may still -go on.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_150_150" id="FNanchor_150_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a></p></blockquote> +go on.</i>"<a id="FNanchor_150_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a></p></blockquote> <p>This brings us by a very natural transition to the <i>ethical implications of the law of habit</i>. They are numerous and @@ -5893,12 +5888,12 @@ be true, of a practical joker, who, seeing a discharged veteran carrying home his dinner, suddenly called out, 'Attention!' whereupon the man instantly brought his hands down, and lost his mutton and potatoes in the gutter. The drill had been thorough, and its -effects had become embodied in the man's nervous structure."<a name="FNanchor_151_151" id="FNanchor_151_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a></p></blockquote> +effects had become embodied in the man's nervous structure."<a id="FNanchor_151_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Riderless cavalry-horses, at many a battle, have been seen to come together and go through their customary evolutions at the sound of the bugle-call. Most trained -domestic animals, dogs and oxen, and omnibus- and car-horses,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> +domestic animals, dogs and oxen, and omnibus- and car-horses,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> seem to be machines almost pure and simple, undoubtingly, unhesitatingly doing from minute to minute the duties they have been taught, and giving no sign that the @@ -5940,7 +5935,7 @@ the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again.</p> <p>If the period between twenty and thirty is the critical -one in the formation of intellectual and professional habits,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> +one in the formation of intellectual and professional habits,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> the period below twenty is more important still for the fixing of <i>personal</i> habits, properly so called, such as vocalization and pronunciation, gesture, motion, and address. @@ -5982,7 +5977,7 @@ hour to set the matter right.</p> <p>In Professor Bain's chapter on 'The Moral Habits' there are some admirable practical remarks laid down. -Two great maxims emerge from his treatment. The first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> +Two great maxims emerge from his treatment. The first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> is that in the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off of an old one, we must take care to <i>launch ourselves with as strong and decided an initiative as possible</i>. Accumulate all @@ -6025,7 +6020,7 @@ about an enterprise but mistrusted his own powers: "Ach! you need only blow on your hands!" And the remark illustrates the effect on Goethe's spirits of his own habitually successful career. Prof. Baumann, from whom I borrow -the anecdote,<a name="FNanchor_152_152" id="FNanchor_152_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> says that the collapse of barbarian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> +the anecdote,<a id="FNanchor_152_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> says that the collapse of barbarian<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> nations when Europeans come among them is due to their despair of ever succeeding as the new-comers do in the larger tasks of life. Old ways are broken and new ones @@ -6055,7 +6050,7 @@ fresh resolve is like one who, arriving at the edge of the ditch he is to leap, forever stops and returns for a fresh run. Without <i>unbroken</i> advance there is no such thing as <i>accumulation</i> of the ethical forces possible, and to make this possible, and to exercise us and habituate us -in it, is the sovereign blessing of regular <i>work</i>."<a name="FNanchor_153_153" id="FNanchor_153_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a></p></blockquote> +in it, is the sovereign blessing of regular <i>work</i>."<a id="FNanchor_153_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a></p></blockquote> <p>A third maxim may be added to the preceding pair: <i>Seize the very first possible opportunity to act on every resolution @@ -6074,7 +6069,7 @@ will may multiply its strength, and raise itself aloft. He who has no solid ground to press against will never get beyond the stage of empty gesture-making."</p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span></p> <p>No matter how full a reservoir of <i>maxims</i> one may possess, and no matter how good one's <i>sentiments</i> may be, if one @@ -6115,14 +6110,14 @@ over the fictitious personages in the play, while her coachman is freezing to death on his seat outside, is the sort of thing that everywhere happens on a less glaring scale. Even the habit of excessive indulgence in music, for those -who are neither performers themselves nor musically gifted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> +who are neither performers themselves nor musically gifted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> enough to take it in a purely intellectual way, has probably a relaxing effect upon the character. One becomes filled with emotions which habitually pass without prompting to any deed, and so the inertly sentimental condition is kept up. The remedy would be, never to suffer one's self to have an emotion at a concert, without expressing it afterward -in <i>some</i> active way.<a name="FNanchor_154_154" id="FNanchor_154_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a> Let the expression be the least +in <i>some</i> active way.<a id="FNanchor_154_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a> Let the expression be the least thing in the world—speaking genially to one's aunt, or giving up one's seat in a horse-car, if nothing more heroic offers—but let it not fail to take place.</p> @@ -6153,7 +6148,7 @@ to stand the test. Asceticism of this sort is like the insurance which a man pays on his house and goods. The tax does him no good at the time, and possibly may never bring him a return. But if the fire <i>does</i> come, his having paid it -will be his salvation from ruin. So with the man who has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> +will be his salvation from ruin. So with the man who has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> daily inured himself to habits of concentrated attention, energetic volition, and self-denial in unnecessary things. He will stand like a tower when everything rocks around @@ -6197,31 +6192,31 @@ ignorance of it has probably engendered more discouragement and faint-heartedness in youths embarking on arduous careers than all other causes put together.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_136_136" id="Footnote_136_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_136_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> This chapter has already appeared in the Popular Science Monthly +<p><a id="Footnote_136_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_136_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> This chapter has already appeared in the Popular Science Monthly for February 1887.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_137_137" id="Footnote_137_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> In the sense above explained, which applies to inner structure as well +<p><a id="Footnote_137_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> In the sense above explained, which applies to inner structure as well as to outer form.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_138_138" id="Footnote_138_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_138_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> Revue Philosophique, i, 324.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_138_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_138_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> Revue Philosophique, i, 324.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_139_139" id="Footnote_139_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_139_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> Some paths, to be sure, are banked up by bodies moving through +<p><a id="Footnote_139_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_139_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> Some paths, to be sure, are banked up by bodies moving through them under too great pressure, and made impervious. These special cases we disregard.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_140_140" id="Footnote_140_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> We cannot say <i>the will</i>, for, though many, perhaps most, human +<p><a id="Footnote_140_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> We cannot say <i>the will</i>, for, though many, perhaps most, human habits were once voluntary actions, no action, as we shall see in a later chapter, can be <i>primarily</i> such. While an habitual action may once have been voluntary, the voluntary action must before that, at least once, have @@ -6230,7 +6225,7 @@ consider in the text.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_141_141" id="Footnote_141_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_141_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> Those who desire a more definite formulation may consult J. Fiske's +<p><a id="Footnote_141_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_141_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> Those who desire a more definite formulation may consult J. Fiske's 'Cosmic Philosophy,' vol. ii, pp. 142-146 and Spencer's 'Principles of Biology,' sections 302 and 303, and the part entitled 'Physical Synthesis' of his 'Principles of Psychology.' Mr. Spencer there tries, not only to @@ -6242,71 +6237,71 @@ show of precision, conceal vagueness and improbability, and even self-contradict <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_142_142" id="Footnote_142_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> 'Mental Physiology' (1874) pp. 339-345.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_142_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> 'Mental Physiology' (1874) pp. 339-345.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_143_143" id="Footnote_143_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_143_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> [See, later, Masius in Van Benedens' and Van Bambeke's 'Archives +<p><a id="Footnote_143_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_143_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> [See, later, Masius in Van Benedens' and Van Bambeke's 'Archives de Biologie,' vol. i (Liège, 1880).—W. J.]</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_144_144" id="Footnote_144_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_144_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> G. H. Schneider: 'Der menschliche Wille' (1882), pp. 417-419 (freely +<p><a id="Footnote_144_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_144_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> G. H. Schneider: 'Der menschliche Wille' (1882), pp. 417-419 (freely translated). For the drain-simile, see also Spencer's 'Psychology,' part v, chap. viii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_145_145" id="Footnote_145_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_145_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> Physiology of Mind, p. 155.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_145_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_145_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> Physiology of Mind, p. 155.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_146_146" id="Footnote_146_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_146_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> Carpenter's 'Mental Physiology' (1874), pp. 217, 218.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_146_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_146_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> Carpenter's 'Mental Physiology' (1874), pp. 217, 218.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_147_147" id="Footnote_147_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_147_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> Von Hartmann devotes a chapter of his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' +<p><a id="Footnote_147_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_147_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> Von Hartmann devotes a chapter of his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' (English translation, vol. i, p. 72) to proving that they must be both <i>ideas</i> and <i>unconscious</i>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_148_148" id="Footnote_148_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_148_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> 'Mental Physiology,' p. 20.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_148_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_148_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> 'Mental Physiology,' p. 20.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_149_149" id="Footnote_149_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_149_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> 'Der menschliche Wille,' pp. 447, 448.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_149_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_149_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> 'Der menschliche Wille,' pp. 447, 448.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_150_150" id="Footnote_150_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> 'Der menschliche Wille,' p. 439. The last sentence is rather freely +<p><a id="Footnote_150_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> 'Der menschliche Wille,' p. 439. The last sentence is rather freely translated—the sense is unaltered.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_151_151" id="Footnote_151_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> Huxley's 'Elementary Lessons in Physiology,' lesson xii.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_151_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> Huxley's 'Elementary Lessons in Physiology,' lesson xii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_152_152" id="Footnote_152_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> See the admirable passage about success at the outset, in his Handbuch +<p><a id="Footnote_152_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> See the admirable passage about success at the outset, in his Handbuch der Moral (1878), pp. 38-43.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_153_153" id="Footnote_153_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> J. Bahnsen: 'Beiträge zu Charakterologie' (1867), vol i, p. 209.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_153_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> J. Bahnsen: 'Beiträge zu Charakterologie' (1867), vol i, p. 209.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_154_154" id="Footnote_154_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154_154"><span class="label">[154]</span></a> See for remarks on this subject a readable article by Miss V. Scudder +<p><a id="Footnote_154_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154_154"><span class="label">[154]</span></a> See for remarks on this subject a readable article by Miss V. Scudder on 'Musical Devotees and Morals,' in the Andover Review for January. 1887.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.</a></h5> <h4>THE AUTOMATON-THEORY.</h4> @@ -6342,7 +6337,7 @@ for every shading, however fine, of the history of its owner's mind. Whatever degree of complication the latter may reach, the complication of the machinery must be quite as extreme, otherwise we should have to admit that there -may be mental events to which no brain-events correspond.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> +may be mental events to which no brain-events correspond.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> But such an admission as this the physiologist is reluctant to make. It would violate all his beliefs. 'No psychosis without neurosis,' is one form which the principle of continuity @@ -6385,7 +6380,7 @@ about 'considerations' as guiding the animal. We ought to have said 'paths left in the hemispherical cortex by former currents,' and nothing more.</p> -<p>Now so simple and attractive is this conception from the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> +<p>Now so simple and attractive is this conception from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> consistently physiological point of view, that it is quite wonderful to see how late it was stumbled on in philosophy, and how few people, even when it has been explained to @@ -6417,13 +6412,13 @@ by saying that feelings, no matter how intensely they may be present, can have no causal efficacy whatever, and comparing them to the colors laid on the surface of a mosaic, of which the events in the nervous system are represented by -the stones.<a name="FNanchor_155_155" id="FNanchor_155_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_155_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> Obviously the stones are held in place by each +the stones.<a id="FNanchor_155_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_155_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> Obviously the stones are held in place by each other and not by the several colors which they support.</p> <p>About the same time Mr. Spalding, and a little later Messrs. Huxley and Clifford, gave great publicity to an identical doctrine, though in their case it was backed by -less refined metaphysical considerations.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_156_156" id="FNanchor_156_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p> +less refined metaphysical considerations.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span><a id="FNanchor_156_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p> <p>A few sentences from Huxley and Clifford may be subjoined to make the matter entirely clear. Professor Huxley @@ -6469,7 +6464,7 @@ facts go along by themselves, and the mental facts go along by themselves. There is a parallelism between them, but there is no interference of one with the other. Again, if anybody says that the will influences matter, the statement is not untrue, but it is nonsense. Such -an assertion belongs to the crude materialism of the savage. The only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> +an assertion belongs to the crude materialism of the savage. The only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> thing which influences matter is the position of surrounding matter or the motion of surrounding matter.... The assertion that another man's volition, a feeling in his consciousness that I cannot perceive, is @@ -6513,7 +6508,7 @@ degree acknowledging the existence of the thoughts in Shakespeare's mind. The words and sentences would be taken, not as signs of anything beyond themselves, but as little outward facts, pure and simple. In like manner we might -exhaustively write the biography of those two hundred<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> +exhaustively write the biography of those two hundred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> pounds, more or less, of warmish albuminoid matter called Martin Luther, without ever implying that it felt.</p> @@ -6558,7 +6553,7 @@ simply juxtaposed.</p> <p>The 'conscious automaton-theory,' as this conception is generally called, is thus a radical and simple conception of -the manner in which certain facts may possibly occur. But<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> +the manner in which certain facts may possibly occur. But<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> between conception and belief, proof ought to lie. And when we ask, 'What proves that all this is more than a mere conception of the possible?' it is not easy to get a @@ -6599,7 +6594,7 @@ mixed up with such incommensurable factors as feelings is certainly very strong. I have heard a most intelligent biologist say: "It is high time for scientific men to protest against the recognition of any such thing as consciousness -in a scientific investigation." In a word, feeling constitutes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> +in a scientific investigation." In a word, feeling constitutes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> the 'unscientific' half of existence, and any one who enjoys calling himself a 'scientist' will be too happy to purchase an untrammelled homogeneity of terms in the studies of his @@ -6632,7 +6627,7 @@ this decomposition? Manifestly it can do so only by increasing; the force which binds the molecules together. Good! Try to imagine the idea of a beefsteak binding two molecules together. It is impossible. Equally impossible is it to imagine a similar idea loosening the -attractive force between two molecules."<a name="FNanchor_157_157" id="FNanchor_157_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a></p></blockquote> +attractive force between two molecules."<a id="FNanchor_157_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a></p></blockquote> <p>This passage from an exceedingly clever writer expresses admirably the difficulty to which I allude. Combined with @@ -6647,7 +6642,7 @@ matter shall hold all the power.</p> <blockquote> <p>"Having thoroughly recognized the fathomless abyss that separates -mind from matter, and having so blended the very notion into his very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> +mind from matter, and having so blended the very notion into his very<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> nature that there is no chance of his ever forgetting it or failing to saturate with it all his meditations, the student of psychology has next to appreciate the association between these two orders of phenomena.... @@ -6663,7 +6658,7 @@ that we never shall and never can know. Having firmly and tenaciously grasped these two notions, of the absolute separateness of mind and matter, and of the invariable concomitance of a mental change with a bodily change, the student will enter on the study of psychology -with half his difficulties surmounted."<a name="FNanchor_158_158" id="FNanchor_158_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_158_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a></p></blockquote> +with half his difficulties surmounted."<a id="FNanchor_158_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_158_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Half his difficulties ignored, I should prefer to say. For this 'concomitance' in the midst of 'absolute separateness' @@ -6688,7 +6683,7 @@ no use for the conceptions, and is satisfied when she can express in simple 'laws' the bare space-relations of the molecules as functions of each other and of time. To the more curiously inquiring mind, however, this simplified -expression of the bare facts is not enough; there must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> +expression of the bare facts is not enough; there must<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> be a 'reason' for them, and something must 'determine' the laws. And when one seriously sits down to consider what sort of a thing one <i>means</i> when one asks @@ -6728,7 +6723,7 @@ breach with common-sense in this matter, and she loses, to say the least, all naturalness of speech. If feelings are causes, of course their effects must be furtherances and checkings of internal cerebral motions, of which in themselves -we are entirely without knowledge. It is probable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> +we are entirely without knowledge. It is probable<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> that for years to come we shall have to infer what happens in the brain either from our feelings or from motor effects which we observe. The organ will be for us a sort of vat @@ -6773,14 +6768,14 @@ could be shown in what way consciousness <i>might</i> help him, and if, moreover, the defects of his other organs (where consciousness is most developed) are such as to make them need just the kind of help that consciousness would bring -provided it <i>were</i> efficacious; why, then the plausible inference<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> +provided it <i>were</i> efficacious; why, then the plausible inference<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> would be that it came just <i>because</i> of its efficacy—in other words, its efficacy would be inductively proved.</p> <p>Now the study of the phenomena of consciousness which we shall make throughout the rest of this book will show us that consciousness is at all times primarily <i>a selecting -agency</i>.<a name="FNanchor_159_159" id="FNanchor_159_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> Whether we take it in the lowest sphere of sense, +agency</i>.<a id="FNanchor_159_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> Whether we take it in the lowest sphere of sense, or in the highest of intellection, we find it always doing one thing, choosing one out of several of the materials so presented to its notice, emphasizing and accentuating that @@ -6813,7 +6808,7 @@ is in this sense that we may call it a matter of accident whether a child be a boy or a girl. The ovum is so unstable a body that certain causes too minute for our apprehension may at a certain moment tip it one way or the -other. The natural law of an organ constituted after this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> +other. The natural law of an organ constituted after this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> fashion can be nothing but a law of caprice. I do not see how one could reasonably expect from it any certain pursuance of useful lines of reaction, such as the few and fatally @@ -6856,7 +6851,7 @@ but for it, would have no status in the realm of being whatever. We talk, it is true, when we are darwinizing, as if the mere <i>body</i> that owns the brain had interests; we speak about the utilities of its various organs and how they help -or hinder the body's survival; and we treat the survival as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> +or hinder the body's survival; and we treat the survival as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> if it were an absolute end, existing as such in the physical world, a sort of actual <i>should-be</i>, presiding over the animal and judging his reactions, quite apart from the presence of @@ -6897,7 +6892,7 @@ of attaining these ends mechanically, but only out of a lot of other ends, if so they may be called, which are not the proper ones of the animal, but often quite opposed. The brain is an instrument of possibilities, but of no certainties. -But the consciousness, with its own ends present to it, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> +But the consciousness, with its own ends present to it, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> knowing also well which possibilities lead thereto and which away, will, if endowed with causal efficacy, reinforce the favorable possibilities and repress the unfavorable or @@ -6930,7 +6925,7 @@ chain of nervous discharge, ascertaining the links already laid down, and groping among the fresh ends presented to it for the one which seems best to fit the case.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The phenomena of 'vicarious function' which we studied in <a href="#CHAPTER_II">Chapter II</a> seem to form another bit of circumstantial @@ -6940,7 +6935,7 @@ Take out a valve, throw a wheel out of gear or bend a pivot, and it becomes a different machine, acting just as fatally in another way which we call the wrong way. But the machine itself knows nothing of wrong or right: matter -has no ideals to pursue. A locomotive will carry its train<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> +has no ideals to pursue. A locomotive will carry its train<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> through an open drawbridge as cheerfully as to any other destination.</p> @@ -6966,7 +6961,7 @@ those <i>duties as such</i> exerting any persuasive or coercive force. At the end of Chapter XXVI I shall return to this again.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>There is yet another set of facts which seem explicable on the supposition that consciousness has causal efficacy. @@ -6983,7 +6978,7 @@ these coincidences are due, not to any pre-established harmony, but to the mere action of natural selection which would certainly kill off in the long-run any breed of creatures to whom the fundamentally noxious experience seemed -enjoyable. An animal that should take pleasure in a feeling<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> +enjoyable. An animal that should take pleasure in a feeling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> of suffocation would, if that pleasure were efficacious enough to make him immerse his head in water, enjoy a longevity of four or five minutes. But if pleasures and @@ -7007,7 +7002,7 @@ and his reasoning is based exclusively on that causal efficacy of pleasures and pains which the 'double-aspect' partisans so strenuously deny.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Thus, then, from every point of view the circumstantial evidence against that theory is strong. <i>A priori</i> analysis @@ -7026,15 +7021,15 @@ not yet successfully achieved), shall have no hesitation in using the language of common-sense throughout this book.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_155_155" id="Footnote_155_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155_155"><span class="label">[155]</span></a> The Theory of Practice, vol. i, p. 416 ff.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_155_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155_155"><span class="label">[155]</span></a> The Theory of Practice, vol. i, p. 416 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_156_156" id="Footnote_156_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_156_156"><span class="label">[156]</span></a> The present writer recalls how in 1869, when still a medical student, +<p><a id="Footnote_156_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_156_156"><span class="label">[156]</span></a> The present writer recalls how in 1869, when still a medical student, he began to write an essay showing how almost every one who speculated about brain-processes illicitly interpolated into his account of them links derived from the entirely heterogeneous universe of Feeling. Spencer, @@ -7047,22 +7042,22 @@ no proofs to be adduced of its reality. Later it seemed to him that whatever <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_157_157" id="Footnote_157_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157_157"><span class="label">[157]</span></a> Chas. Mercier: The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), p. 9.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_157_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157_157"><span class="label">[157]</span></a> Chas. Mercier: The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), p. 9.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_158_158" id="Footnote_158_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_158_158"><span class="label">[158]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 11.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_158_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_158_158"><span class="label">[158]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 11.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_159_159" id="Footnote_159_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159_159"><span class="label">[159]</span></a> See in particular the end of <a href="#CHAPTER_IX">Chapter IX</a>.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_159_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159_159"><span class="label">[159]</span></a> See in particular the end of <a href="#CHAPTER_IX">Chapter IX</a>.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI.</a></h5> <h4>THE MIND-STUFF THEORY.</h4> @@ -7096,7 +7091,7 @@ treatment before taking up the descriptive part of our work. <i>The theory of 'mind-stuff' is the theory that our mental states are compounds</i>, expressed in its most radical form.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span></p> <h4>EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY DEMANDS A MIND-DUST.</h4> @@ -7144,10 +7139,10 @@ have been as forward as any one else to emphasize the <p>"Can the oscillations of a molecule," says Mr. Spencer, "be represented side by side with a nervous shock [he means a mental shock], -and the two be recognized as one? No effort enables us to assimilate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> +and the two be recognized as one? No effort enables us to assimilate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> them. That a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion becomes more than ever manifest when we bring the two into -juxtaposition."<a name="FNanchor_160_160" id="FNanchor_160_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_160_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a></p></blockquote> +juxtaposition."<a id="FNanchor_160_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_160_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a></p></blockquote> <p>And again:</p> @@ -7156,7 +7151,7 @@ juxtaposition."<a name="FNanchor_160_160" id="FNanchor_160_160"></a><a href="#Fo <p>"Suppose it to have become quite clear that a shock in consciousness and a molecular motion are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing; we continue utterly incapable of uniting the two, so as -to conceive that reality of which they are the opposite faces."<a name="FNanchor_161_161" id="FNanchor_161_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_161_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a></p></blockquote> +to conceive that reality of which they are the opposite faces."<a id="FNanchor_161_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_161_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a></p></blockquote> <p>In other words, incapable of perceiving in them any common character. So Tyndall, in that lucky paragraph @@ -7170,7 +7165,7 @@ facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning, -from one to the other."<a name="FNanchor_162_162" id="FNanchor_162_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a></p></blockquote> +from one to the other."<a id="FNanchor_162_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Or in this other passage:</p> @@ -7182,16 +7177,16 @@ undoubting certainty that they go hand in hand. But we try to soar in a vacuum the moment we seek to comprehend the connection between them.... There is no fusion possible between the two classes of facts—no motor energy in the intellect of man to carry it without -logical rupture from the one to the other."<a name="FNanchor_163_163" id="FNanchor_163_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a></p></blockquote> +logical rupture from the one to the other."<a id="FNanchor_163_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a></p></blockquote> <p>None the less easily, however, when the evolutionary afflatus is upon them, do the very same writers leap over the breach whose flagrancy they are the foremost to announce, and talk as if mind grew out of body in a continuous way. Mr. Spencer, looking back on his review of -mental evolution, tells us how "in tracing up the increase<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> +mental evolution, tells us how "in tracing up the increase<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> we found ourselves passing <i>without break</i> from the phenomena -of bodily life to the phenomena of mental life."<a name="FNanchor_164_164" id="FNanchor_164_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> And Mr. +of bodily life to the phenomena of mental life."<a id="FNanchor_164_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> And Mr. Tyndall, in the same Belfast Address from which we just quoted, delivers his other famous passage:</p> @@ -7202,7 +7197,7 @@ before you is that I prolong the vision backward across the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern in that matter which we, in our ignorance and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium the promise and potency of -every form and quality of life."<a name="FNanchor_165_165" id="FNanchor_165_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_165_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a></p></blockquote> +every form and quality of life."<a id="FNanchor_165_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_165_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a></p></blockquote> <p>—mental life included, as a matter of course.</p> @@ -7216,7 +7211,7 @@ may <i>not</i> appear equivalent to the irruption into the universe of a new nature, non-existent until then.</p> <p>Merely to call the consciousness 'nascent' will not -serve our turn.<a name="FNanchor_166_166" id="FNanchor_166_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> It is true that the word signifies not yet<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> +serve our turn.<a id="FNanchor_166_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> It is true that the word signifies not yet<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> <i>quite</i> born, and so seems to form a sort of bridge between existence and nonentity. But that is a verbal quibble. The fact is that discontinuity comes in if a new nature @@ -7240,7 +7235,7 @@ which we know in ourselves and suppose to exist in our fellow-animals. Some such doctrine of <i>atomistic hylozoism</i> as this is an indispensable part of a thorough-going philosophy of evolution. According to it -there must be an infinite number of degrees of consciousness,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> +there must be an infinite number of degrees of consciousness,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> following the degrees of complication and aggregation of the primordial mind-dust. To prove the separate existence of these degrees of consciousness by indirect evidence, @@ -7268,8 +7263,8 @@ the discrimination of the feelings of warmth and of touch, when only a very small portion of the skin was excited through a hole in a card, the surrounding parts being protected by the card. He found that under these circumstances -mistakes were frequently made by the patient,<a name="FNanchor_167_167" id="FNanchor_167_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> -and concluded that this must be because the number of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> +mistakes were frequently made by the patient,<a id="FNanchor_167_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> +and concluded that this must be because the number of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> sensations from the elementary nerve-tips affected was too small to sum itself distinctly into either of the qualities of feeling in question. He tried to show how a different @@ -7320,7 +7315,7 @@ at a rate not exceeding some sixteen per second, the effect of each is perceived as a separate noise; but when the rapidity with which the blows follow one another exceeds this, the noises are no longer identified in separate states of consciousness, and there arises in place of them a -continuous state of consciousness, called a tone. In further increasing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> +continuous state of consciousness, called a tone. In further increasing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> the rapidity of the blows, the tone undergoes the change of quality distinguished as rise in pitch; and it continues to rise in pitch as the blows continue to increase in rapidity, until it reaches an acuteness beyond @@ -7370,7 +7365,7 @@ mental impressions differently originated. The subjective effect produced by a crack or noise that has no appreciable duration is little else than a nervous shock. Though we distinguish such a nervous shock as belonging to what we call sounds, yet it does not differ very -much from nervous shocks of other kinds. An electric discharge sent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> +much from nervous shocks of other kinds. An electric discharge sent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> through the body causes a feeling akin to that which a sudden loud report causes. A strong unexpected impression made through the eyes, as by a flash of lightning, similarly gives rise to a start or shock; and @@ -7416,28 +7411,28 @@ composed of rapidly-recurring shocks as strong as those ordinarily called shocks, they would be unbearable; indeed life would cease at once. We must think of them rather as successive faint pulses of subjective change, each having the same quality as the strong pulse of -subjective change distinguished as a nervous shock."<a name="FNanchor_168_168" id="FNanchor_168_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a></p></blockquote> +subjective change distinguished as a nervous shock."<a id="FNanchor_168_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span></p> <h4>INSUFFICIENCY OF THESE PROOFS.</h4> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_154_0025.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_154_0025.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt2"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 25.</div> </div> <p>Convincing as this argument of Mr. Spencer's may appear on a first reading, it is singular how weak it really -is.<a name="FNanchor_169_169" id="FNanchor_169_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> We do, it is true, when we study the connection between +is.<a id="FNanchor_169_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> We do, it is true, when we study the connection between a musical note and its outward cause, find the note simple and continuous while the cause is multiple and discrete. Somewhere, then, there <i>is</i> a transformation, reduction, or fusion. The question is, Where?—in the nerve-world or in the mind-world? Really we have no experimental -proof by which to decide; and if decide we must,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> +proof by which to decide; and if decide we must,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> analogy and <i>a priori</i> probability can alone guide us. Mr. Spencer assumes that the fusion must come to pass in the mental world, and that the physical processes get through @@ -7480,7 +7475,7 @@ higher octave. Turn on the gas slightly and light it: you get a tiny flame. Turn on more gas, and the breadth of the flame increases. Will this relation increase indefinitely? No, again; for at a certain moment up shoots the flame -into a ragged streamer and begins to hiss. Send slowly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> +into a ragged streamer and begins to hiss. Send slowly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> through the nerve of a frog's gastrocnemius muscle a succession of galvanic shocks: you get a succession of twitches. Increasing the number of shocks does not increase the @@ -7499,7 +7494,7 @@ diagram will serve to contrast this supposition with Spencer's.</p> <div class="figleft" style="width: 130px;"> -<img src="images/jame_156_0026.jpg" width="130" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_156_0026.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 130px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 26.</div> </div> @@ -7523,11 +7518,11 @@ so that the front men get so retarded that the hinder ones catch up with them before the journey is done, and all arrive together -at the goal.<a name="FNanchor_170_170" id="FNanchor_170_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a></p> +at the goal.<a id="FNanchor_170_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span></p> <p>On this supposition there <i>are</i> no unperceived units of mind-stuff preceding and composing the full consciousness. @@ -7554,14 +7549,14 @@ and make a feeling of yellowness out of them? Why has optics neglected the open road to truth, and wasted centuries in disputing about theories of color-composition which two minutes of introspection would have settled -forever<a name="FNanchor_171_171" id="FNanchor_171_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_171_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> We cannot mix feelings as such, though we may +forever<a id="FNanchor_171_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_171_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> We cannot mix feelings as such, though we may mix the objects we feel, and from <i>their</i> mixture get new feelings. We cannot even (as we shall later see) have two feelings in our mind at once. At most we can compare together <i>objects previously presented</i> to us in distinct feelings; -but then we find each object stubbornly maintaining<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> +but then we find each object stubbornly maintaining<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> its separate identity before consciousness, whatever the -verdict of the comparison may be.<a name="FNanchor_172_172" id="FNanchor_172_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p> +verdict of the comparison may be.<a id="FNanchor_172_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p> <h4>SELF-COMPOUNDING OF MENTAL FACTS IS INADMISSIBLE.</h4> @@ -7592,13 +7587,13 @@ attachments. They might then still be capable of contracting with the same energy as before, yet no co-operative result would be accomplished. The medium of dynamical combination would be wanting. The multiple energies, singly exerted on no common recipient, would lose -themselves on entirely isolated and disconnected efforts."<a name="FNanchor_173_173" id="FNanchor_173_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a></p></blockquote> +themselves on entirely isolated and disconnected efforts."<a id="FNanchor_173_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a></p></blockquote> <p>In other words, no possible number of entities (call them as you like, whether forces, material particles, or mental elements) can sum <i>themselves</i> together. Each remains, in the sum, what it always was; and the sum itself exists only -<i>for a bystander</i> who happens to overlook the units and to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> +<i>for a bystander</i> who happens to overlook the units and to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> apprehend the sum as such; or else it exists in the shape of some other <i>effect</i> on an entity external to the sum itself. Let it not be objected that H<sub>2</sub> and O combine of themselves @@ -7617,7 +7612,7 @@ of marble, but as such it has no unity. For the spectator it is one; in itself it is an aggregate; just as, to the consciousness of an ant crawling over it, it may again appear a mere aggregate. No summing up of parts can make an unity of a mass of discrete constituents, unless -this unity exist for some other subject, not for the mass itself."<a name="FNanchor_174_174" id="FNanchor_174_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_174_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a></p></blockquote> +this unity exist for some other subject, not for the mass itself."<a id="FNanchor_174_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_174_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Just so, in the parallelogram of forces, the 'forces' themselves do not combine into the diagonal resultant; a @@ -7627,7 +7622,7 @@ se</i> into concords or discords. Concord and discord are names for their combined effects on that external medium, the <i>ear</i>.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span></p> <p>Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a hundred of them, @@ -7649,7 +7644,7 @@ sense) say that they <i>evolved</i> it.</p> and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness -of the whole sentence.<a name="FNanchor_175_175" id="FNanchor_175_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_175_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> We talk of the 'spirit of the age,' +of the whole sentence.<a id="FNanchor_175_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_175_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> We talk of the 'spirit of the age,' and the 'sentiment of the people,' and in various ways we hypostatize 'public opinion.' But we know this to be symbolic speech, and never dream that the spirit, opinion, @@ -7660,7 +7655,7 @@ minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind. This has always been the invincible contention of the spiritualists against the associationists in Psychology,—a contention which we shall take up at greater length in -<a href="#CHAPTER_X">Chapter X</a>. The associationists say the mind is constituted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> +<a href="#CHAPTER_X">Chapter X</a>. The associationists say the mind is constituted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> by a multiplicity of distinct 'ideas' <i>associated</i> into a unity. There is, they say, an idea of <i>a</i>, and also an idea of <i>b. Therefore,</i> they say, there is an idea of <i>a</i> + <i>b</i>, or of <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> @@ -7701,9 +7696,9 @@ out of our mind. So of the states of mind which are supposed to be compound because they know many different things together. Since indubitably such states do exist, they must exist as single new facts, effects, possibly, as -the spiritualists say, on the Soul (we will not decide that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> +the spiritualists say, on the Soul (we will not decide that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> point here), but at any rate independent and integral, and -not compounded of psychic atoms.<a name="FNanchor_176_176" id="FNanchor_176_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_176_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a></p> +not compounded of psychic atoms.<a id="FNanchor_176_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_176_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a></p> <h4>CAN STATES OF MIND BE UNCONSCIOUS?</h4> @@ -7713,7 +7708,7 @@ not compounded of psychic atoms.<a name="FNanchor_176_176" id="FNanchor_176_176" so insatiate that, in spite of the logical clearness of these reasonings and conclusions, many will fail to be influenced by them. They establish a sort of disjointedness in things -which in certain quarters will appear intolerable. They<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> +which in certain quarters will appear intolerable. They<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> sweep away all chance of 'passing without break' either from the material to the mental, or from the lower to the higher mental; and they thrust us back into a pluralism of @@ -7755,7 +7750,7 @@ only ingenious. The distinction is that <i>between the unconscious and the conscious being of the mental state</i>. It is the sovereign means for believing what one likes in psychology, and of turning what might become a science into a tumbling-ground -for whimsies. It has numerous champions,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> +for whimsies. It has numerous champions,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> and elaborate reasons to give for itself. We must therefore accord it due consideration. In discussing the question:</p> @@ -7765,7 +7760,7 @@ accord it due consideration. In discussing the question:</p> <p>it will be best to give the list of so-called proofs as briefly as possible, and to follow each by its objection, as in scholastic -books.<a name="FNanchor_177_177" id="FNanchor_177_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_177_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a></p> +books.<a id="FNanchor_177_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_177_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a></p> <p><i>First Proof</i>. The <i>minimum visibile</i>, the <i>minimum audibile</i>, are objects composed of parts. How can the whole affect @@ -7784,7 +7779,7 @@ noise would not be noticed if its wave were alone. One must be affected a little by the movement of one wave, one must have some perception of each several noise, however small it be. Otherwise one would not hear that of 100,000 waves, for of 100,000 zeros one can never make a -quantity."<a name="FNanchor_178_178" id="FNanchor_178_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a></p></blockquote> +quantity."<a id="FNanchor_178_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a></p></blockquote> <p><i>Reply</i>. This is an excellent example of the so-called 'fallacy of division,' or predicating what is true only of a @@ -7793,7 +7788,7 @@ It no more follows that if a thousand things together cause sensation, one thing alone must cause it, than it follows that if one pound weight moves a balance, then one ounce weight must move it too, in less degree. One ounce -weight does not move it <i>at all</i>; its movement <i>begins</i> with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> +weight does not move it <i>at all</i>; its movement <i>begins</i> with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> the pound. At most we can say that each ounce affects it in <i>some</i> way which helps the advent of that movement. And so each infra-sensible stimulus to a nerve @@ -7802,7 +7797,7 @@ when the other stimuli come. But this affection is a nerve-affection, and there is not the slightest ground for supposing it to be a 'perception' unconscious of itself. "A certain <i>quantity</i> of the cause may be a necessary condition -to the production of <i>any</i> of the effect,"<a name="FNanchor_179_179" id="FNanchor_179_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_179_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a> when the +to the production of <i>any</i> of the effect,"<a id="FNanchor_179_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_179_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a> when the latter is a mental state.</p> <p><i>Second Proof.</i> In all acquired dexterities and habits, @@ -7828,12 +7823,12 @@ automatic acts, it will not do to say either that they occur without consciousness or that their consciousness is that of the lower centres, which we know nothing about. But either lack of memory or split-off cortical consciousness -will certainly account for all of the facts.<a name="FNanchor_180_180" id="FNanchor_180_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_180_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a></p> +will certainly account for all of the facts.<a id="FNanchor_180_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_180_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a></p> <p><i>Third Proof.</i> Thinking of A, we presently find ourselves thinking of C. Now B is the natural logical link between A and C, but we have no consciousness of having -thought of B. It must have been in our mind '<i>un</i>consciously,'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> +thought of B. It must have been in our mind '<i>un</i>consciously,'<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> and in that state affected the sequence of our ideas.</p> @@ -7881,7 +7876,7 @@ comparing them would be. No counting, either conscious or 'unconscious,' is required.</p> <p><i>Seventh Proof.</i> Every hour we make theoretic judgments -and emotional reactions, and exhibit practical tendencies,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> +and emotional reactions, and exhibit practical tendencies,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> for which we can give no explicit logical justification, but which are good inferences from certain premises. We know more than we can say. Our conclusions run ahead @@ -7905,7 +7900,7 @@ that enables you to recognize it when he is coming? Did you ever consciously think the idea, 'if I run into a solid piece of matter I shall get hurt, or be hindered in my progress'? and do you avoid running into obstacles because you ever distinctly conceived, or consciously acquired -and thought, that idea?"<a name="FNanchor_181_181" id="FNanchor_181_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_181_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a></p></blockquote> +and thought, that idea?"<a id="FNanchor_181_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_181_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Most of our knowledge is at all times potential. We act in accordance with the whole drift of what we have learned, @@ -7925,7 +7920,7 @@ aroused strongly enough to give any 'idea' distinct enough to be a premise, may, nevertheless, help to determine just that resultant process of whose psychic accompaniment the said idea <i>would</i> be a premise, if the idea existed at all. A -certain overtone may be a feature of my friend's voice, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> +certain overtone may be a feature of my friend's voice, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> may conspire with the other tones thereof to arouse in my brain the process which suggests to my consciousness his name. And yet I may be ignorant of the overtone <i>per se</i>, @@ -7968,14 +7963,14 @@ film is spread over everything; and knowing that under such a film a red thing would look gray, we wrongly infer from the gray appearance that a red thing must be there. Our study of space-perception in Chapter XVIII will give -abundant additional examples both of the truthful and illusory<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> +abundant additional examples both of the truthful and illusory<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> percepts which have been explained to result from unconscious logic operations.</p> <p><i>Reply.</i> That chapter will also in many cases refute this explanation. Color-and light-contrast are certainly purely sensational affairs, in which inference plays no part. -This has been satisfactorily proved by Hering,<a name="FNanchor_182_182" id="FNanchor_182_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a> and shall +This has been satisfactorily proved by Hering,<a id="FNanchor_182_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a> and shall be treated of again in Chapter XVII. Our rapid judgments of size, shape, distance, and the like, are best explained as processes of simple cerebral association. Certain @@ -7989,7 +7984,7 @@ that unconscious inference is a vital factor in sense-perception, have seen fit on later occasions to modify their views and to admit that results <i>like</i> those of reasoning may accrue without any actual reasoning process unconsciously taking -place.<a name="FNanchor_183_183" id="FNanchor_183_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> Maybe the excessive and riotous applications made +place.<a id="FNanchor_183_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> Maybe the excessive and riotous applications made by Hartmann of their principle have led them to this change. It would be natural to feel towards him as the sailor in the story felt towards the horse who got his foot @@ -8006,7 +8001,7 @@ its climax. The visual perception, for example, of an object in space results, according to him, from the intellect performing the following operations, all unconscious. First, it apprehends the inverted retinal image and turns it right -side up, constructing <i>flat space</i> as a preliminary operation;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> +side up, constructing <i>flat space</i> as a preliminary operation;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> then it computes from the angle of convergence of the eyeballs that the two retinal images must be the projection of but a single <i>object</i>; thirdly, it constructs the third dimension @@ -8014,7 +8009,7 @@ and sees this object <i>solid</i>; fourthly, it assigns its <i>distance</i>; and fifthly, in each and all of these operations it gets the objective character of what it 'constructs' by unconsciously inferring it as the only possible <i>cause</i> of some sensation -which it unconsciously feels.<a name="FNanchor_184_184" id="FNanchor_184_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> Comment on this +which it unconsciously feels.<a id="FNanchor_184_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> Comment on this seems hardly called for. It is, as I said, pure mythology.</p> <p>None of these facts, then, appealed to so confidently in @@ -8028,7 +8023,7 @@ is one more argument to be alleged, less obviously insufficient than those which we have reviewed, and demanding a new sort of reply.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>Tenth Proof.</i> There is a great class of experiences in our mental life which may be described as discoveries that @@ -8047,9 +8042,9 @@ the habit of receiving all our days, elements, too, which have been there from the first, since otherwise we should have been unable to distinguish the sensations containing them from others nearly allied. The elements must exist, -for we use them to discriminate by; but they must exist in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> +for we use them to discriminate by; but they must exist in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> an unconscious state, since we so completely fail to single -them out.<a name="FNanchor_185_185" id="FNanchor_185_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_185_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> The books of the analytic school of psychology +them out.<a id="FNanchor_185_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_185_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> The books of the analytic school of psychology abound in examples of the kind. Who knows the countless associations that mingle with his each and every thought? Who can pick apart all the nameless feelings @@ -8085,7 +8080,7 @@ passage from the nostrils to the throat, are instances of what I mean. Every one gets these feelings many times an hour; but few readers, probably, are conscious of exactly what sensations are meant by the names I have just used. -All these facts, and an enormous number more, seem to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> +All these facts, and an enormous number more, seem to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> prove conclusively that, in addition to the fully conscious way in which an idea may exist in the mind, there is also an unconscious way; that it is unquestionably the same @@ -8127,7 +8122,7 @@ sensations</i> from those of the B and the V taken in a simple way. They stand, it is true, for the <i>same letters</i>, and thus mean the <i>same outer realities</i>; but they are different mental affections, and certainly depend on widely different processes -of cerebral activity. It is unbelievable that two mental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> +of cerebral activity. It is unbelievable that two mental<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> states so different as the passive reception of a sound as a whole, and the analysis of that whole into distinct ingredients by voluntary attention, should be due to processes @@ -8168,7 +8163,7 @@ say that, however it may fare in the outer world, the mind at any rate is a place in which a thing can be all kinds of other things without ceasing to be itself as well.</p> -<p>Now take the other cases alleged, and the other distinction,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> +<p>Now take the other cases alleged, and the other distinction,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> that namely between <i>having</i> a mental state and knowing all <i>about</i> it. The truth is here even simpler to unravel. When I decide that I have, without knowing it, been for @@ -8208,13 +8203,13 @@ ideas preserve their own several substantive identities as so many several successive states of mind. To believe the contrary would make any definite science of psychology impossible. The only identity to be found among our successive -ideas is their similarity of cognitive or representative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> +ideas is their similarity of cognitive or representative<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> function as dealing with the same objects. Identity of <i>being</i>, there is none; and I believe that throughout the rest of this volume the reader will reap the advantages of the -simpler way of formulating the facts which is here begun.<a name="FNanchor_186_186" id="FNanchor_186_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_186_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a></p> +simpler way of formulating the facts which is here begun.<a id="FNanchor_186_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_186_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>So we seem not only to have ascertained the unintelligibility of the notion that a mental fact can be two things @@ -8222,7 +8217,7 @@ at once, and that what seems like one feeling, of blueness for example, or of hatred, may really and 'unconsciously' be ten thousand elementary feelings which do not resemble blueness or hatred at all, but we find that we can -express all the observed facts in other ways. The mind-stuff<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> +express all the observed facts in other ways. The mind-stuff<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> theory, however, though scotched, is, we may be sure, not killed. If we ascribe consciousness to unicellular animalcules, then single cells can have it, and analogy @@ -8265,7 +8260,7 @@ being mainly of things seen if the occipital lobes are much involved, of things heard if the action is focalized in the temporal lobes, etc., etc.; and I had added that a vague formula like this was as much as one could safely venture -on in the actual state of physiology. The facts of mental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> +on in the actual state of physiology. The facts of mental<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> deafness and blindness, of auditory and optical aphasia, show us that the whole brain must act together if certain thoughts are to occur. The consciousness, which is itself @@ -8309,7 +8304,7 @@ side</i>. But in taking the entire brain-process as its minimal fact on the material side it confronts other difficulties almost as bad.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span></p> <p>In the first place, it ignores analogies on which certain critics will insist, those, namely, between the composition @@ -8352,7 +8347,7 @@ point in celebrating the mystery of the Unknowable and the 'awe' which we should feel at having such a principle to take final charge of our perplexities. Others would rejoice that the finite and separatist view of things with which we -started had at last developed its contradictions, and was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> +started had at last developed its contradictions, and was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> about to lead us dialectically upwards to some 'higher synthesis' in which inconsistencies cease from troubling and logic is at rest. It may be a constitutional infirmity, @@ -8397,7 +8392,7 @@ function) be <i>aware of <span class="smcap">things</span></i> many and complica proportion to the number of other cells that have helped to modify the central cell.</p> -<p>By a conception of this sort, one incurs neither of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> +<p>By a conception of this sort, one incurs neither of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> internal contradictions which we found to beset the other two theories. One has no unintelligible self-combining of psychic units to account for on the one hand; and on the @@ -8440,7 +8435,7 @@ readers have certainly been saying to themselves for the last few pages: "Why on earth doesn't the poor man say <i>the Soul</i> and have done with it?" Other readers, of anti-spiritualistic training and prepossessions, advanced thinkers, -or popular evolutionists, will perhaps be a little surprised<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> +or popular evolutionists, will perhaps be a little surprised<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> to find this much-despised word now sprung upon them at the end of so physiological a train of thought. But the plain fact is that all the arguments for a 'pontifical cell' @@ -8483,7 +8478,7 @@ some mysterious way by the brain-states and responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line of least logical resistance, so far as we yet have attained.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span></p> <p>If it does not strictly <i>explain</i> anything, it is at any rate less positively objectionable than either mind-stuff or a @@ -8515,23 +8510,23 @@ of clay and flame, of brain and mind, that the two things hang indubitably together and determine each other's being, but how or why, no mortal may ever know.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_160_160" id="Footnote_160_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_160_160"><span class="label">[160]</span></a> Psychol. § 62.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_160_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_160_160"><span class="label">[160]</span></a> Psychol. § 62.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_161_161" id="Footnote_161_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161_161"><span class="label">[161]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> § 272.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_161_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161_161"><span class="label">[161]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> § 272.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_162_162" id="Footnote_162_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162_162"><span class="label">[162]</span></a> Fragments of Science, 5th ed., p. 420.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_162_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162_162"><span class="label">[162]</span></a> Fragments of Science, 5th ed., p. 420.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_163_163" id="Footnote_163_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_163_163"><span class="label">[163]</span></a> Belfast Address, 'Nature,' August 20, 1874, p. 318. I cannot help +<p><a id="Footnote_163_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_163_163"><span class="label">[163]</span></a> Belfast Address, 'Nature,' August 20, 1874, p. 318. I cannot help remarking that the disparity between motions and feelings on which these authors lay so much stress, is somewhat less absolute than at first sight it seems. There are categories common to the two worlds. Not only temporal @@ -8543,15 +8538,15 @@ something in common.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_164_164" id="Footnote_164_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_164_164"><span class="label">[164]</span></a> Psychology, § 131</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_164_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_164_164"><span class="label">[164]</span></a> Psychology, § 131</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_165_165" id="Footnote_165_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_165_165"><span class="label">[165]</span></a> 'Nature,' as above, 317-8.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_165_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_165_165"><span class="label">[165]</span></a> 'Nature,' as above, 317-8.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_166_166" id="Footnote_166_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_166_166"><span class="label">[166]</span></a> 'Nascent' is Mr. Spencer's great word. In showing how at a certain +<p><a id="Footnote_166_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_166_166"><span class="label">[166]</span></a> 'Nascent' is Mr. Spencer's great word. In showing how at a certain point consciousness must appear upon the evolving scene this author fairly outdoes himself in vagueness. </p> @@ -8608,7 +8603,7 @@ is carried on.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_167_167" id="Footnote_167_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167_167"><span class="label">[167]</span></a> His own words are: "Mistakes are made in the sense that he admits +<p><a id="Footnote_167_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167_167"><span class="label">[167]</span></a> His own words are: "Mistakes are made in the sense that he admits having been touched, when in reality it was radiant heat that affected his skin. In our own before-mentioned experiments there was never any deception on the entire palmar side of the hand or on the face. On the back @@ -8628,11 +8623,11 @@ Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane (1862), p. 29.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_168_168" id="Footnote_168_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168_168"><span class="label">[168]</span></a> Principles of Psychology, § 60.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_168_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168_168"><span class="label">[168]</span></a> Principles of Psychology, § 60.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_169_169" id="Footnote_169_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_169_169"><span class="label">[169]</span></a> Oddly enough, Mr. Spencer seems quite unaware of the <i>general</i> function +<p><a id="Footnote_169_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_169_169"><span class="label">[169]</span></a> Oddly enough, Mr. Spencer seems quite unaware of the <i>general</i> function of the theory of elementary units of mind-stuff in the evolutionary philosophy. We have seen it to be absolutely indispensable, if that philosophy is to work, to postulate consciousness in the nebula,—-the simplest @@ -8645,7 +8640,7 @@ quoted in the text stands as a mere local detail, without general bearings.</p>< <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_170_170" id="Footnote_170_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_170_170"><span class="label">[170]</span></a> The compounding of colors may be dealt with in an identical way. +<p><a id="Footnote_170_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_170_170"><span class="label">[170]</span></a> The compounding of colors may be dealt with in an identical way. Helmholtz has shown that if green light and red light fall simultaneously on the retina, we see the color yellow. The mind-stuff theory would interpret this as a ease where the feeling green and the feeling red 'combine' @@ -8661,11 +8656,11 @@ taking place.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_171_171" id="Footnote_171_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_171_171"><span class="label">[171]</span></a> Cf. Mill's Logic, book vi, chap. iv, § 3.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_171_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_171_171"><span class="label">[171]</span></a> Cf. Mill's Logic, book vi, chap. iv, § 3.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_172_172" id="Footnote_172_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_172_172"><span class="label">[172]</span></a> I find in my students an almost invincible tendency to think that we +<p><a id="Footnote_172_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_172_172"><span class="label">[172]</span></a> I find in my students an almost invincible tendency to think that we can immediately perceive that feelings do combine. "What!" they say, "is not the taste of lemonade composed of that of lemon <i>plus</i> that of sugar?" This is taking the combining of objects for that of feelings. @@ -8679,11 +8674,11 @@ not always be held to involve partial identity.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_173_173" id="Footnote_173_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_173_173"><span class="label">[173]</span></a> E. Montgomery, in 'Mind,' v, 18-19. See also <a href="#Page_24">pp. 24-5</a>.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_173_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_173_173"><span class="label">[173]</span></a> E. Montgomery, in 'Mind,' v, 18-19. See also <a href="#Page_24">pp. 24-5</a>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_174_174" id="Footnote_174_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_174_174"><span class="label">[174]</span></a> J. Royce, 'Mind,' vi, p. 376. Lotze has set forth the truth of this law +<p><a id="Footnote_174_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_174_174"><span class="label">[174]</span></a> J. Royce, 'Mind,' vi, p. 376. Lotze has set forth the truth of this law more clearly and copiously than any other writer. Unfortunately he is too lengthy to quote. See his Microcosmus, bk. ii, ch. i, § 5; Metaphysik, §§ 242, 260; Outlines of Metaphysics, part ii, chap. i, §§ 3, 4, 5. Compare @@ -8709,7 +8704,7 @@ Statements is, as far as it goes, that of Prince.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_175_175" id="Footnote_175_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_175_175"><span class="label">[175]</span></a> "Someone might say that although it is true that neither a blind +<p><a id="Footnote_175_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_175_175"><span class="label">[175]</span></a> "Someone might say that although it is true that neither a blind man nor a deaf man by himself can compare sounds with colors, yet since one hears and the other sees they might do so both together.... But whether they are apart or close together makes no difference; not even @@ -8721,7 +8716,7 @@ be compared." (Brentano: Psychologie, p. 209.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_176_176" id="Footnote_176_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176_176"><span class="label">[176]</span></a> The reader must observe that we are reasoning altogether about the +<p><a id="Footnote_176_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176_176"><span class="label">[176]</span></a> The reader must observe that we are reasoning altogether about the <i>Logic</i> of the mind-stuff theory, about whether it can <i>exist in the constitution</i> of higher mental states by viewing them as <i>identical with lower ones</i> summed together. We say the two sorts of fact are not identical: a higher @@ -8764,7 +8759,7 @@ no farther explanation, or 'evidence of the fact.'</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_177_177" id="Footnote_177_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_177_177"><span class="label">[177]</span></a> The writers about 'unconscious cerebration' seem sometimes to mean +<p><a id="Footnote_177_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_177_177"><span class="label">[177]</span></a> The writers about 'unconscious cerebration' seem sometimes to mean that and sometimes unconscious thought. The arguments which follow are culled from various quarters. The reader will find them most systematically urged by E. von Hartmann: Philosophy of the Unconscious, vol. @@ -8780,44 +8775,44 @@ J. M. Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, chap. iv.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_178_178" id="Footnote_178_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_178_178"><span class="label">[178]</span></a> Nouveaux Essais, Avant-propos.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_178_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_178_178"><span class="label">[178]</span></a> Nouveaux Essais, Avant-propos.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_179_179" id="Footnote_179_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_179_179"><span class="label">[179]</span></a> J. S. Mill, Exam. of Hamilton, chap. xv.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_179_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_179_179"><span class="label">[179]</span></a> J. S. Mill, Exam. of Hamilton, chap. xv.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_180_180" id="Footnote_180_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_180_180"><span class="label">[180]</span></a> Cf. Dugald Stewart, Elements, chap. ii.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_180_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_180_180"><span class="label">[180]</span></a> Cf. Dugald Stewart, Elements, chap. ii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_181_181" id="Footnote_181_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_181_181"><span class="label">[181]</span></a> J. E. Maude: 'The Unconscious in Education,' in 'Education,' vol. +<p><a id="Footnote_181_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_181_181"><span class="label">[181]</span></a> J. E. Maude: 'The Unconscious in Education,' in 'Education,' vol. i, p. 401 (1882).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_182_182" id="Footnote_182_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182_182"><span class="label">[182]</span></a> Zur Lehre vor Lichtsinne (1878).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_182_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182_182"><span class="label">[182]</span></a> Zur Lehre vor Lichtsinne (1878).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_183_183" id="Footnote_183_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_183_183"><span class="label">[183]</span></a> Cf. Wundt: Ueber den Einfluss der Philosophie, etc.—Antrittsrede +<p><a id="Footnote_183_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_183_183"><span class="label">[183]</span></a> Cf. Wundt: Ueber den Einfluss der Philosophie, etc.—Antrittsrede (1876), pp. 10-11;—Helmholtz: Die Thatsachen in der Wahrnehmung (1879), p. 27.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_184_184" id="Footnote_184_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184_184"><span class="label">[184]</span></a> Cf. Satz vom Grunde, pp. 59-65. Compare also F. Zöllner's Natur +<p><a id="Footnote_184_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184_184"><span class="label">[184]</span></a> Cf. Satz vom Grunde, pp. 59-65. Compare also F. Zöllner's Natur der Kometen, pp. 342 ff. and 425.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_185_185" id="Footnote_185_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_185_185"><span class="label">[185]</span></a> Cf. the statements from Helmholtz to be found later in <a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">Chapter +<p><a id="Footnote_185_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_185_185"><span class="label">[185]</span></a> Cf. the statements from Helmholtz to be found later in <a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">Chapter XIII</a>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_186_186" id="Footnote_186_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_186_186"><span class="label">[186]</span></a> The text was written before Professor Lipps's Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens +<p><a id="Footnote_186_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_186_186"><span class="label">[186]</span></a> The text was written before Professor Lipps's Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens (1883) came into my hands. In Chapter III of that book the notion of unconscious thought is subjected to the clearest and most searching criticism which it has yet received. Some passages are so similar to @@ -8852,12 +8847,12 @@ two consciousnesses, <i>a</i> and <i>a<sup>1</sup></i>, equally distinct <i>in s external object A corresponds with different degrees of distinctness." (P. 38-9.)</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII.</a></h5> <h4>THE METHODS AND SNARES OF PSYCHOLOGY</h4> @@ -8898,7 +8893,7 @@ which he believes to represent it, and that he declares the relation between them to be of a certain kind. In making this critical judgment, the psychologist stands as much outside of the perception which he criticises as he does of the -color. Both are his objects. And if this is true of him when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> +color. Both are his objects. And if this is true of him when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> he reflects on his own conscious states, how much truer is it when he treats of those of others! In German philosophy since Kant the word <i>Erkenntnisstheorie</i>, criticism of the @@ -8924,8 +8919,8 @@ to be expected to perform.</p> assumptions of Psychology must be:</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">1. The Psychologist </td><td align="left">2. The Thought Studied </td><td align="left">3. The Thought's Object </td><td align="left">4. The Psychologist's Reality</td></tr> +<table style="border: 1px solid; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">1. The Psychologist </td><td style="text-align: left;">2. The Thought Studied </td><td style="text-align: left;">3. The Thought's Object </td><td style="text-align: left;">4. The Psychologist's Reality</td></tr> </table></div> @@ -8937,10 +8932,10 @@ can without troubling himself with the puzzle of how he can report them at all. About such <i>ultimate </i> puzzles he in the main need trouble himself no more than the geometer, the chemist, or the botanist do, who make precisely the -same assumptions as he.<a name="FNanchor_187_187" id="FNanchor_187_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p> +same assumptions as he.<a id="FNanchor_187_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p> <p>Of certain fallacies to which the psychologist is exposed -by reason of his peculiar point of view—that of being a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> +by reason of his peculiar point of view—that of being a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> reporter of subjective as well as of objective facts, we must presently speak. But not until we have considered the methods he uses for ascertaining what the facts in question @@ -8968,7 +8963,7 @@ fundamental of all the postulates of Psychology,</i> and shall discard all curious inquiries about its certainty as too metaphysical for the scope of this book.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>A Question of Nomenclature.</i> We ought to have some general term by which to designate all states of consciousness @@ -8983,7 +8978,7 @@ both active and neuter, and such derivatives as 'feelingly,' But on the other hand it has specific meanings as well as its generic one, sometimes standing for pleasure and pain, and being sometimes a synonym of '<i>sensation</i>' as opposed -to <i>thought</i>; whereas we wish a term to cover sensation and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> +to <i>thought</i>; whereas we wish a term to cover sensation and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> thought indifferently. Moreover, 'feeling' has acquired in the hearts of platonizing thinkers a very opprobrious set of implications; and since one of the great obstacles to mutual @@ -9023,11 +9018,11 @@ have been mentioned. <i>My own partiality is for either <span class="smcap">feeling</span> or <span class="smcap">thought.</span></i> I shall probably often use both words in a wider sense than usual, and alternately startle two classes of readers by their unusual sound; but if the connection -makes it clear that mental states at large, irrespective<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> +makes it clear that mental states at large, irrespective<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> of their kind, are meant, this will do no harm, and may -even do some good.<a name="FNanchor_188_188" id="FNanchor_188_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_188_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a></p> +even do some good.<a id="FNanchor_188_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_188_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>The inaccuracy of introspective observation</i> has been made a subject of debate. It is important to gain some fixed @@ -9055,7 +9050,7 @@ there is no meaning in seeking to distinguish its existence in my consciousness (in me) from its existence out of my consciousness (in itself); for the object apprehended is, in this case, one which does not even exist, as the objects of external perception do, in itself outside of my -consciousness. It exists only within me."<a name="FNanchor_189_189" id="FNanchor_189_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a></p></blockquote> +consciousness. It exists only within me."<a id="FNanchor_189_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a></p></blockquote> <p>And Brentano:</p> @@ -9074,16 +9069,16 @@ light?"</p></blockquote> <p>"No one can doubt whether the psychic condition he apprehends in himself <i>be</i>, and be <i>so</i>, as he apprehends it. Whoever should doubt this would have reached that <i>finished</i> doubt which destroys itself in destroying -every fixed point from which to make an attack upon knowledge."<a name="FNanchor_190_190" id="FNanchor_190_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a></p></blockquote> +every fixed point from which to make an attack upon knowledge."<a id="FNanchor_190_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Others have gone to the opposite extreme, and maintained -that we can have no introspective cognition of our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> +that we can have no introspective cognition of our<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> own minds at all. A deliverance of Auguste Comte to this effect has been so often quoted as to be almost classical; and some reference to it seems therefore indispensable here.</p> -<p>Philosophers, says Comte,<a name="FNanchor_191_191" id="FNanchor_191_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a> have</p> +<p>Philosophers, says Comte,<a id="FNanchor_191_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a> have</p> <blockquote> @@ -9125,10 +9120,10 @@ are individuals who think they practise it."</p></blockquote> <p>Comte hardly could have known anything of the English, and nothing of the German, empirical psychology. The -'results' which he had in mind when writing were probably<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> +'results' which he had in mind when writing were probably<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> scholastic ones, such as principles of internal activity, the faculties, the ego, the <i>liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ</i>, etc. -John Mill, in replying to him,<a name="FNanchor_192_192" id="FNanchor_192_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_192_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> says:</p> +John Mill, in replying to him,<a id="FNanchor_192_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_192_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> says:</p> <blockquote> @@ -9165,7 +9160,7 @@ in their absolute veritableness, he must report them and write about them, name them, classify and compare them and trace their relations to other things. Whilst alive they are their own property; it is only <i>post-mortem</i> that they become -his prey.<a name="FNanchor_193_193" id="FNanchor_193_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> And as in the naming, classing, and knowing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> +his prey.<a id="FNanchor_193_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> And as in the naming, classing, and knowing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> of things in general we are notoriously fallible, why not also here? Comte is quite right in laying stress on the fact that a feeling, to be named, judged, or perceived, must @@ -9183,7 +9178,7 @@ state of anger. It is the state of <i>saying-I-feel-tired</i>, of that the fatigue and anger apparently included in them are considerable modifications of the fatigue and anger directly felt the previous instant. The act of naming them has -momentarily detracted from their force.<a name="FNanchor_194_194" id="FNanchor_194_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_194_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a></p> +momentarily detracted from their force.<a id="FNanchor_194_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_194_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a></p> <p>The only sound grounds on which the infallible veracity of the introspective judgment might be maintained are @@ -9196,9 +9191,9 @@ ground actually maintained by Herr Mohr.</p> <p>"The illusions of our senses," says this author, "have undermined our belief in the reality of the outer world; but in the sphere of inner observation our confidence is intact, for we have never found ourselves -to be in error about the reality of an act of thought or feeling. We<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> +to be in error about the reality of an act of thought or feeling. We<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> have never been misled into thinking we were <i>not</i> in doubt or in anger -when these conditions were really states of our consciousness."<a name="FNanchor_195_195" id="FNanchor_195_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_195_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a></p></blockquote> +when these conditions were really states of our consciousness."<a id="FNanchor_195_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_195_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a></p></blockquote> <p>But sound as the reasoning here would be, were the premises correct, I fear the latter cannot pass. However @@ -9235,7 +9230,7 @@ direct introspection exactly what our feelings and their relations are, we need not anticipate our own future details, I but just state our general conclusion that <i>introspection is difficult and fallible; and that the difficulty is simply that -of all observation of whatever kind</i>. Something is before<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> +of all observation of whatever kind</i>. Something is before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> us; we do our best to tell what it is, but in spite of our good will we may go astray, and give a description more applicable to some other sort of thing. The only safeguard @@ -9260,7 +9255,7 @@ still untechnical and generally intelligible, like the Chemistry of Lavoisier, or Anatomy before the microscope was used.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>The Experimental Method</i>. But psychology is passing into a less simple phase. Within a few years what one may @@ -9278,7 +9273,7 @@ mental life, dissecting them out from the gross results in which they are embedded, and as far as possible reducing them to quantitative scales. The simple and open method of attack having done what it can, the method of patience, -starving out, and harassing to death is tried; the Mind<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> +starving out, and harassing to death is tried; the Mind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> must submit to a regular <i>siege</i>, in which minute advantages gained night and day by the forces that hem her in must sum themselves up at last into her overthrow. There is @@ -9319,9 +9314,9 @@ Meanwhile the experimental method has quite changed the face of the science so far as the latter is a record of mere work done.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > -<p>The <i>comparative method</i>, finally, supplements the introspective<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> +<p>The <i>comparative method</i>, finally, supplements the introspective<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> and experimental methods. This method presupposes a normal psychology of introspection to be established in its main features. But where the origin of these @@ -9364,7 +9359,7 @@ as candid as you can.</p> Speech.</i> Language was originally made by men who were not psychologists, and most men to-day employ almost exclusively the vocabulary of outward things. The cardinal -passions of our life, anger, love, fear, hate, hope,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> +passions of our life, anger, love, fear, hate, hope,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> and the most comprehensive divisions of our intellectual activity, to remember, expect, think, know, dream, with the broadest genera of æsthetic feeling, joy, sorrow, @@ -9391,7 +9386,7 @@ as often leads to the directly opposite error. We are then prone to suppose that no entity can be there; and so we come to overlook phenomena whose existence would be patent to us all, had we only grown up to hear it familiarly -recognized in speech.<a name="FNanchor_196_196" id="FNanchor_196_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_196_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a> It is hard to focus our attention on +recognized in speech.<a id="FNanchor_196_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_196_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a> It is hard to focus our attention on the nameless, and so there results a certain vacuousness in the descriptive parts of most psychologies.</p> @@ -9401,7 +9396,7 @@ our thought by its own objects, we almost all of us assume that as the objects are, so the thought must be. The thought of several distinct things can only consist of several distinct bits of thought, or 'ideas;' that of an abstract or -universal object can only be an abstract or universal idea.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> +universal object can only be an abstract or universal idea.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> As each object may come and go, be forgotten and then thought of again, it is held that the thought of it has a precisely similar independence, self-identity, and mobility. @@ -9439,9 +9434,9 @@ object</i>. He himself, meanwhile, knowing the self-same object in <i>his</i> way, gets easily led to suppose that the thought, which is <i>of</i> it, knows it in the same way in which he knows it, although this is often very far from being the -case.<a name="FNanchor_197_197" id="FNanchor_197_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> The most fictitious puzzles have been introduced +case.<a id="FNanchor_197_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> The most fictitious puzzles have been introduced into our science by this means. The so-called question of -presentative or representative perception, of whether an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> +presentative or representative perception, of whether an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> object is present to the thought that thinks it by a counterfeit image of itself, or directly and without any intervening image at all; the question of nominalism and conceptualism, @@ -9482,43 +9477,43 @@ their objects, to the brain, and to the rest of the world constitute the subject-matter of psychologic science.</i> Its methods are introspection, experimentation, and comparison. But introspection is no sure guide to truths <i>about</i> our mental states; -and in particular the poverty of the psychological vocabulary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> +and in particular the poverty of the psychological vocabulary<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> leads us to drop out certain states from our consideration, and to treat others as if they knew themselves and their objects as the psychologist knows both, which is a disastrous fallacy in the science.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_187_187" id="Footnote_187_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_187_187"><span class="label">[187]</span></a> On the relation between Psychology and General Philosophy, see G. +<p><a id="Footnote_187_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_187_187"><span class="label">[187]</span></a> On the relation between Psychology and General Philosophy, see G. C. Robertson, 'Mind,' vol. viii, p. 1, and J. Ward, <i>ibid.</i> p. 153; J. Dewey <i>ibid.</i> vol. ix, p. 1.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_188_188" id="Footnote_188_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_188_188"><span class="label">[188]</span></a> Compare some remarks in Mill's Logic, bk. i, chap. iii, §§ 2, 3.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_188_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_188_188"><span class="label">[188]</span></a> Compare some remarks in Mill's Logic, bk. i, chap. iii, §§ 2, 3.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_189_189" id="Footnote_189_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_189_189"><span class="label">[189]</span></a> Logic, § 40.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_189_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_189_189"><span class="label">[189]</span></a> Logic, § 40.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_190_190" id="Footnote_190_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_190_190"><span class="label">[190]</span></a> Psychologie, bk. ii, chap. iii, §§ 1, 2.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_190_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_190_190"><span class="label">[190]</span></a> Psychologie, bk. ii, chap. iii, §§ 1, 2.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_191_191" id="Footnote_191_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_191_191"><span class="label">[191]</span></a> Cours de Philosophie Positive, i, 34-8.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_191_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_191_191"><span class="label">[191]</span></a> Cours de Philosophie Positive, i, 34-8.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_192_192" id="Footnote_192_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_192_192"><span class="label">[192]</span></a> Auguste Comte and Positivism, 3d edition (1882), p. 64.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_192_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_192_192"><span class="label">[192]</span></a> Auguste Comte and Positivism, 3d edition (1882), p. 64.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_193_193" id="Footnote_193_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_193_193"><span class="label">[193]</span></a> Wundt says: "The first rule for utilizing inward observation consists +<p><a id="Footnote_193_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_193_193"><span class="label">[193]</span></a> Wundt says: "The first rule for utilizing inward observation consists in taking, as far as possible, experiences that are accidental, unexpected, and not intentionally brought about.... <i>First</i> it is best as far as possible to rely on <i>Memory</i> and not on immediate Apprehension.... @@ -9530,7 +9525,7 @@ in memory." (Logik, ii, 432.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_194_194" id="Footnote_194_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_194_194"><span class="label">[194]</span></a> In cases like this, where the state outlasts the act of naming it, exists +<p><a id="Footnote_194_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_194_194"><span class="label">[194]</span></a> In cases like this, where the state outlasts the act of naming it, exists before it, and recurs when it is past, we probably run little practical risk of error when we talk as if the state knew itself. The state of feeling and the state of naming the feeling are continuous, and the infallibility of @@ -9542,26 +9537,26 @@ the principle that applies.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_195_195" id="Footnote_195_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_195_195"><span class="label">[195]</span></a> J. Mohr: Grundlage der Empirischen Psychologie (Leipzig, 1882), +<p><a id="Footnote_195_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_195_195"><span class="label">[195]</span></a> J. Mohr: Grundlage der Empirischen Psychologie (Leipzig, 1882), p. 47.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_196_196" id="Footnote_196_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_196_196"><span class="label">[196]</span></a> In English we have not even the generic distinction between the-thing-thought-of +<p><a id="Footnote_196_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_196_196"><span class="label">[196]</span></a> In English we have not even the generic distinction between the-thing-thought-of and the-thought-thinking-it, which in German is expressed by the opposition between <i>Gedachtes</i> and <i>Gedanke</i>, in Latin by that between <i>cogitatum</i> and <i>cogitatio</i>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_197_197" id="Footnote_197_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_197_197"><span class="label">[197]</span></a> Compare B. P. Bowne's Metaphysics (1882), p. 408.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_197_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_197_197"><span class="label">[197]</span></a> Compare B. P. Bowne's Metaphysics (1882), p. 408.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII.</a></h5> <h4>THE RELATIONS OF MINDS TO OTHER THINGS.</h4> @@ -9601,13 +9596,13 @@ even perhaps in an incessant and fine-grained form?</p> <p>This might happen, and yet the subject himself never know it. We often take ether and have operations performed -without a suspicion that our consciousness has suffered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> +without a suspicion that our consciousness has suffered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> a breach. The two ends join each other smoothly over the gap; and only the sight of our wound assures us that we must have been living through a time which for our immediate consciousness was non-existent. Even in sleep this sometimes happens: We think we have had no -nap, and it takes the clock to assure us that we are wrong.<a name="FNanchor_198_198" id="FNanchor_198_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_198_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> +nap, and it takes the clock to assure us that we are wrong.<a id="FNanchor_198_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_198_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> We thus may live through a real outward time, a time known by the psychologist who studies us, and yet not <i>feel</i> the time, or infer it from any inward sign. The question @@ -9639,11 +9634,11 @@ M. Jouffroy and Sir W. Hamilton, attacking the question in the same empirical way, are led to an opposite conclusion. Their reasons, briefly stated, are these:</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span></p> <p>In somnambulism, natural or induced, there is often a great display of intellectual activity, followed by complete -oblivion of all that has passed.<a name="FNanchor_199_199" id="FNanchor_199_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_199_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a></p> +oblivion of all that has passed.<a id="FNanchor_199_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_199_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a></p> <p>On being suddenly awakened from a sleep, however profound, we always catch ourselves in the middle of a dream. @@ -9681,7 +9676,7 @@ without mental activity during the interval?</p> <p>Such are what we may call the classical reasons for admitting that the mind is active even when the person afterwards -ignores the fact.<a name="FNanchor_200_200" id="FNanchor_200_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> Of late years, or rather, one may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> +ignores the fact.<a id="FNanchor_200_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> Of late years, or rather, one may<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> say, of late months, they have been reinforced by a lot of curious observations made on hysterical and hypnotic subjects, which prove the existence of a highly developed @@ -9717,7 +9712,7 @@ separated from the naturally sensitive skin of the right by a perfectly sharp line of demarcation down the middle of the front and back. Sometimes, most remarkable of all, the entire skin, hands, feet, face, everything, and the mucous -membranes, muscles and joints so far as they can be explored,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> +membranes, muscles and joints so far as they can be explored,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> become <i>completely</i> insensible without the other vital functions becoming gravely disturbed.</p> @@ -9736,7 +9731,7 @@ the hypnotic trance, into which many of these patients can be very easily placed, and in which their lost sensibility not infrequently becomes entirely restored. Such returns of sensibility succeed the times of insensibility and alternate -with them. But Messrs. Pierre Janet<a name="FNanchor_201_201" id="FNanchor_201_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_201_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> and A. Binet<a name="FNanchor_202_202" id="FNanchor_202_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a> have +with them. But Messrs. Pierre Janet<a id="FNanchor_201_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_201_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> and A. Binet<a id="FNanchor_202_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a> have shown that during the times of anæsthesia, and coexisting with it, <i>sensibility to the anæsthetic parts is also there, in the form of a secondary consciousness</i> entirely cut off from the @@ -9758,7 +9753,7 @@ into the room again, and greets you accordingly. This singular forgetfulness makes her liable to tell all her secrets aloud, unrestrained by the presence of unsuitable auditors."</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span></p> <p>Now M. Janet found in several subjects like this that if he came up behind them whilst they were plunged in conversation @@ -9801,7 +9796,7 @@ felt nothing. Similarly the subject <i>thought of</i> the number 3, 6, etc., if the hand or finger was bent three or six times by the operator, or if he stroked it three, six, etc., times.</p> -<p>In certain individuals there was found a still odder<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> +<p>In certain individuals there was found a still odder<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> phenomenon, which reminds one of that curious idiosyncrasy of 'colored hearing' of which a few cases have been lately described with great care by foreign writers. These individuals, @@ -9820,7 +9815,7 @@ come when manipulated and finally objects placed in it would come; but on the hand itself nothing would ever be felt. Of course simulation would not be hard here; but M. Binet disbelieves this (usually very shallow) explanation -to be a probable one in cases in question.<a name="FNanchor_203_203" id="FNanchor_203_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_203_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a></p> +to be a probable one in cases in question.<a id="FNanchor_203_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_203_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a></p> <p>The usual way in which doctors measure the delicacy of our touch is by the compass-points. Two points are @@ -9838,7 +9833,7 @@ a perfectly normal sensibility if the appeal be made to that other secondary or sub-consciousness, which expresses itself automatically by writing or by movements of the hand. M. Binet, M. Pierre Janet, and M. Jules Janet have all found -this. The subject, whenever touched, would signify 'one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> +this. The subject, whenever touched, would signify 'one<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> point' or 'two points,' as accurately as if she were a normal person. She would signify it only by these movements; and of the movements themselves her primary self would @@ -9880,7 +9875,7 @@ what the upper self knows the under self is ignorant of, and <i>vice versâ</i>. M. Janet has proved this beautifully in his subject Lucie. The following experiment will serve as the type of the rest: In her trance he covered her lap with -cards, each bearing a number. He then told her that on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> +cards, each bearing a number. He then told her that on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> waking she should <i>not see</i> any card whose number was a multiple of three. This is the ordinary so-called 'post-hypnotic suggestion,' now well known, and for which Lucie @@ -9922,7 +9917,7 @@ wears a gold bracelet. This zone has feeling; but in the deepest trance, when all the rest of her body feels, this particular zone becomes absolutely anæsthetic.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span></p> <p>Sometimes the mutual ignorance of the selves leads to incidents which are strange enough. The acts and movements @@ -9958,11 +9953,11 @@ on the planchette</i>, however, accused me in strong terms of hurting the hand. Pricks on the <i>other</i> (non-writing) hand, meanwhile, which awakened strong protest from the young man's vocal organs, were denied to exist by the self -which made the planchette go.<a name="FNanchor_204_204" id="FNanchor_204_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a></p> +which made the planchette go.<a id="FNanchor_204_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a></p> <p><i>We get exactly similar results in the so-called post-hypnotic suggestion.</i> It is a familiar fact that certain subjects, -when told during a trance to perform an act or to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> +when told during a trance to perform an act or to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> experience an hallucination after waking, will when the time comes, obey the command. How is the command registered? How is its performance so accurately timed? @@ -9981,7 +9976,7 @@ their upper attention fully engrossed by reading aloud, talking, or solving problems in mental arithmetic,—would inscribe the orders which they had received, together with notes relative to the time elapsed and the time yet to run -before the execution.<a name="FNanchor_205_205" id="FNanchor_205_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_205_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a> It is therefore to no 'automatism' +before the execution.<a id="FNanchor_205_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_205_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a> It is therefore to no 'automatism' in the mechanical sense that such acts are due: a self presides over them, a split-off, limited and buried, but yet a fully conscious, self. More than this, the buried self often @@ -10002,7 +9997,7 @@ awakened. Hardly is she in the normal state, when up go her arms above her head, but she pays no attention to them. She goes, comes, converses, holding her arms high in the air. If asked what her arms are doing, she is surprised at such a question, and says very sincerely: -'My hands are doing nothing; they are just like yours.'... I command<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> +'My hands are doing nothing; they are just like yours.'... I command<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> her to weep, and when awake she really sobs, but continues in the midst of her tears to talk of very gay matters. The sobbing over, there remained no trace of this grief, which seemed to have been quite @@ -10010,7 +10005,7 @@ sub-conscious."</p></blockquote> <p>The primary self often has to invent an hallucination by which to mask and hide from its own view the deeds which -the other self is enacting. Léonie 3<a name="FNanchor_206_206" id="FNanchor_206_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_206_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a> writes real letters +the other self is enacting. Léonie 3<a id="FNanchor_206_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_206_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a> writes real letters whilst Léonie 1 believes that she is knitting; or Lucie 2 really comes to the doctor's office, whilst Lucie 1 believes herself to be at home. This is a sort of delirium. The @@ -10023,7 +10018,7 @@ Few things are more curious than these relations of mutual exclusion, of which all gradations exist between the several partial consciousnesses.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>How far this splitting up of the mind into separate consciousnesses may exist in each one of us is a problem. M. @@ -10043,7 +10038,7 @@ sub-consciousness seems to think of nothing but the order which it last received; the cataleptic sub-consciousness, of nothing but the last position imprinted on the limb. M. Janet could cause definitely circumscribed reddening -and tumefaction of the skin on two of his subjects,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> +and tumefaction of the skin on two of his subjects,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> by suggesting to them in hypnotism the hallucination of a mustard-poultice of any special shape. "J'ai tout le temps pensé à votre sinapisme," says the subject, when @@ -10062,7 +10057,7 @@ of conversation, when, a year later, she meets him again, up goes the same hand to her nose again, without Léonie's normal self suspecting the fact.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>All these facts, taken together, form unquestionably the beginning of an inquiry which is destined to throw a new @@ -10085,7 +10080,7 @@ The subject is made blind or deaf to a certain person in the room and to no one else, and thereupon denies that that person is present, or has spoken, etc. M. P. Janet's Lucie, blind to some of the numbered cards in her lap (<a href="#Page_207">p. 207</a> above), is -a case in point. Now when the object is simple, like a red<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> +a case in point. Now when the object is simple, like a red<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> wafer or a black cross, the subject, although he denies that he sees it when he looks straight at it, nevertheless gets a 'negative after-image' of it when he looks away again, @@ -10128,7 +10123,7 @@ which a moment ago saw it, and both eyes will revert to their original blind state.</p> <p>We have, then, to deal in these cases neither with a blindness -of the eye itself, nor with a mere failure to notice, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> +of the eye itself, nor with a mere failure to notice, but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> with something much more complex; namely, an active counting out and positive exclusion of certain objects. It is as when one 'cuts' an acquaintance, 'ignores' a claim, @@ -10137,7 +10132,7 @@ perceptive activity which works to this result is disconnected from the consciousness which is personal, so to speak, to the subject, and makes of the object concerning which the suggestion is made, its own private possession -and prey.<a name="FNanchor_207_207" id="FNanchor_207_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_207_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a></p> +and prey.<a id="FNanchor_207_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_207_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a></p> <p>The mother who is asleep to every sound but the stirrings of her babe, evidently has the babe-portion of her auditory @@ -10160,7 +10155,7 @@ On the whole it is best to abstain from a conclusion. The science of the near future will doubtless answer this question more wisely than we can now.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span></p> <p>Let us turn now to consider the</p> @@ -10203,7 +10198,7 @@ another, part to part,—but not so does the soul, which has no parts, correspond with the body. Sir Wm. Hamilton and Professor Bowen defend something like this view. I. H. Fichte, Ulrici, and, among American philosophers, Mr. -J. E. Walter,<a name="FNanchor_208_208" id="FNanchor_208_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a> maintain the soul to be a space-filling principle.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> +J. E. Walter,<a id="FNanchor_208_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a> maintain the soul to be a space-filling principle.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> Fichte calls it the inner body, Ulrici likens it to a fluid of non-molecular composition. These theories remind us of the 'theosophic' doctrines of the present day, and @@ -10215,7 +10210,7 @@ the courage, and the appetites, as their seats respectively. Aristotle argues that the heart is the sole seat. Elsewhere we find the blood, the brain, the lungs, the liver the kidneys even, in turn assigned as seat of the whole or -part of the soul.<a name="FNanchor_209_209" id="FNanchor_209_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a></p> +part of the soul.<a id="FNanchor_209_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a></p> <p>The truth is that if the thinking principle is extended we neither know its form nor its seat; whilst if unextended, it @@ -10234,7 +10229,7 @@ dynamic, to talk of the soul being 'present' is only a figure of speech. Hamilton's doctrine that the soul is present to the whole body is at any rate false: for cognitively its presence extends far beyond the body, and dynamically it does -not extend beyond the brain.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_210_210" id="FNanchor_210_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_210_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a></p> +not extend beyond the brain.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span><a id="FNanchor_210_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_210_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a></p> <h4>THE RELATIONS OF MINDS TO OTHER OBJECTS</h4> @@ -10255,7 +10250,7 @@ to <i>act</i> upon them, it only does so through the intermediary of its own body, so that not it but the body is what acts on them, and the brain must first act upon the body. The same is true when other things seem to act on it—they only -act on the body, and through that on its brain.<a name="FNanchor_211_211" id="FNanchor_211_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a> All that +act on the body, and through that on its brain.<a id="FNanchor_211_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a> All that it <i>can</i> do <i>directly</i> is to know other things, misknow or ignore them, and to find that they interest it, in this fashion or in that.</p> @@ -10277,7 +10272,7 @@ which no one seeks to explain.</p> <p>Were our topic Absolute Mind instead of being the concrete minds of individuals dwelling in the natural world, we could not tell whether that Mind had the function of -knowing or not, as knowing is commonly understood. We<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> +knowing or not, as knowing is commonly understood. We<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> might learn the complexion of its thoughts; but, as we should have no realities outside of it to compare them with,—for if we had, the Mind would not be Absolute,—we could @@ -10319,7 +10314,7 @@ of us, may be in doubt. Let the mental state, for example, occur during the sleep of its subject. Let the latter dream of the death of a certain man, and let the man simultaneously die. Is the dream a mere coincidence, or a veritable -cognition of the death? Such puzzling cases are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> +cognition of the death? Such puzzling cases are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> what the Societies for 'Psychical Research' are collecting and trying to interpret in the most reasonable way.</p> @@ -10349,7 +10344,7 @@ tests as these that we are convinced that the waking minds of our fellows and our own minds know the same external world.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>The psychologist's attitude towards cognition</i> will be so important in the sequel that we must not leave it until it is @@ -10362,13 +10357,13 @@ world, and one simply knows, or is known unto, its counterpart. This singular relation is not to be expressed in any lower terms, or translated into any more intelligible name. Some sort of <i>signal</i> must be given by the thing to the mind's -brain, or the knowing will not occur—we find as a matter<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> +brain, or the knowing will not occur—we find as a matter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> of fact that the mere <i>existence</i> of a thing outside the brain is not a sufficient cause for our knowing it: it must strike the brain in some way, as well as be there, to be known. But the brain being struck, the knowledge is constituted by a new construction that occurs altogether <i>in</i> the mind. -The thing remains the same whether known or not.<a name="FNanchor_212_212" id="FNanchor_212_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> And +The thing remains the same whether known or not.<a id="FNanchor_212_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> And when once there, the knowledge may remain there, whatever becomes of the thing.</p> @@ -10407,7 +10402,7 @@ construct it in thought, and that our knowledge of the universe is but the unfolding of the mind's inner nature.... By describing the mind as a waxen tablet, and things as impressing themselves upon it, we seem to get great insight until we think to ask where this extended -tablet is, and how things stamp themselves on it, and how the perceptive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> +tablet is, and how things stamp themselves on it, and how the perceptive<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> act would be explained even if they did.... The immediate antecedents of sensation and perception are a series of nervous changes in the brain. Whatever we know of the outer world is revealed only @@ -10445,23 +10440,23 @@ this fact makes it necessary for us either to admit a pre-established harmony between the laws and nature of thought and the laws and nature of things, or else to allow that the objects of perception, the universe as it appears, are purely phenomenal, being but the way in -which the mind reacts against the ground of its sensations."<a name="FNanchor_213_213" id="FNanchor_213_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_213_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p></blockquote> +which the mind reacts against the ground of its sensations."<a id="FNanchor_213_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_213_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p></blockquote> <p>The dualism of Object and Subject and their pre-established harmony are what the psychologist as such must assume, whatever ulterior monistic philosophy he may, as an individual who has the right also to be a metaphysician, -have in reserve. I hope that this general point is now<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> +have in reserve. I hope that this general point is now<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> made clear, so that we may leave it, and descend to some distinctions of detail.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>There are two kinds of knowledge</i> broadly and practically distinguishable: we may call them respectively <i>knowledge of acquaintance</i> and <i>knowledge-about</i>. Most languages express the distinction; thus, <i>γνῶναι, εὶδέναι; noscere, scire; -kennen, wissen; connaître, savoir</i>.<a name="FNanchor_214_214" id="FNanchor_214_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a> I am acquainted with +kennen, wissen; connaître, savoir</i>.<a id="FNanchor_214_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a> I am acquainted with many people and things, which I know very little about, except their presence in the places where I have met them. I know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a @@ -10491,7 +10486,7 @@ with it is of the acquaintance-type. The two kinds of knowledge are, therefore, as the human mind practically exerts them, relative terms. That is, the same thought of a thing may be called knowledge-about it in comparison -with a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in comparison<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> +with a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in comparison<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> with a thought of it that is more articulate and explicit still.</p> @@ -10532,7 +10527,7 @@ recognized in popular parlance, are the <i>conceptions</i> and we shall have to say a word about the cognitive function and value of each. It may perhaps be well to notice now that our senses only give us acquaintance with -facts of body, and that of the mental states of other persons<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> +facts of body, and that of the mental states of other persons<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> we only have conceptual knowledge. Of our own past states of mind we take cognizance in a peculiar way. They are 'objects of memory,' and appear to us endowed with @@ -10540,11 +10535,11 @@ a sort of warmth and intimacy that makes the perception of them seem more like a process of sensation than like a thought.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_198_198" id="Footnote_198_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198_198"><span class="label">[198]</span></a> Messrs. Payton Spence (Journal of Spec. Phil., x, 338, xiv, 286) +<p><a id="Footnote_198_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198_198"><span class="label">[198]</span></a> Messrs. Payton Spence (Journal of Spec. Phil., x, 338, xiv, 286) and M. M. Garver (Amer. Jour. of Science, 3d series, xx, 189) argue, the one from speculative, the other from experimental grounds, that, the physical condition of consciousness being neural vibration, the consciousness @@ -10553,13 +10548,13 @@ a second, according to Garver.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_199_199" id="Footnote_199_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_199_199"><span class="label">[199]</span></a> That the appearance of mental activity here is real can be proved by +<p><a id="Footnote_199_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_199_199"><span class="label">[199]</span></a> That the appearance of mental activity here is real can be proved by suggesting to the 'hypnotized' somnambulist that he shall remember when he awakes. He will then often do so.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_200_200" id="Footnote_200_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_200_200"><span class="label">[200]</span></a> For more details, cf. Malebranche, Rech. de la Verité, bk. iii, chap. +<p><a id="Footnote_200_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_200_200"><span class="label">[200]</span></a> For more details, cf. Malebranche, Rech. de la Verité, bk. iii, chap. i; J. Locke, Essay conc. H. U., book iii, ch. i; C. Wolf, Psychol. rationalis, § 59; Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaph., lecture xvii; J. Bascom, Science of Mind, § 12; Th. Jouffroy, Mélanges Philos., 'du @@ -10570,38 +10565,38 @@ p. 72; Th. Ribot, Maladies de la Personnalité, pp. 8-10; H. Lotze, Metaphysics, <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_201_201" id="Footnote_201_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_201_201"><span class="label">[201]</span></a> L'Automatisme Psychologique, Paris, 1889, <i>passim</i>.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_201_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_201_201"><span class="label">[201]</span></a> L'Automatisme Psychologique, Paris, 1889, <i>passim</i>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_202_202" id="Footnote_202_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_202_202"><span class="label">[202]</span></a> See his articles in the Chicago Open Court, for July, August and +<p><a id="Footnote_202_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_202_202"><span class="label">[202]</span></a> See his articles in the Chicago Open Court, for July, August and November, 1889. Also in the Revue Philosophique for 1889 and '90.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_203_203" id="Footnote_203_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_203_203"><span class="label">[203]</span></a> This whole phenomenon shows how an idea which remains itself below +<p><a id="Footnote_203_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_203_203"><span class="label">[203]</span></a> This whole phenomenon shows how an idea which remains itself below the threshold of a certain conscious self may occasion associative effects therein. The skin-sensations unfelt by the patient's primary consciousness awaken nevertheless their usual visual associates therein.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_204_204" id="Footnote_204_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_204_204"><span class="label">[204]</span></a> See Proceedings of American Soc. for Psych. Research, vol. i, p. +<p><a id="Footnote_204_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_204_204"><span class="label">[204]</span></a> See Proceedings of American Soc. for Psych. Research, vol. i, p. 548.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_205_205" id="Footnote_205_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_205_205"><span class="label">[205]</span></a> Proceedings of the (London) Soc. for Psych. Research, May, 1887, p. +<p><a id="Footnote_205_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_205_205"><span class="label">[205]</span></a> Proceedings of the (London) Soc. for Psych. Research, May, 1887, p. 268 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_206_206" id="Footnote_206_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_206_206"><span class="label">[206]</span></a> M. Janet designates by numbers the different personalities which the +<p><a id="Footnote_206_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_206_206"><span class="label">[206]</span></a> M. Janet designates by numbers the different personalities which the subject may display.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_207_207" id="Footnote_207_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_207_207"><span class="label">[207]</span></a> How to conceive of this state of mind is not easy. It would be much +<p><a id="Footnote_207_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_207_207"><span class="label">[207]</span></a> How to conceive of this state of mind is not easy. It would be much simpler to understand the process, if adding new strokes made the first one visible. There would then be two different objects apperceived as totals,—paper with one stroke, paper with many strokes; and, blind to the former, @@ -10617,18 +10612,18 @@ previously been blind, by seeing it as part of the face.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_208_208" id="Footnote_208_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_208_208"><span class="label">[208]</span></a> Perception of Space and Matter, 1879, part ii, chap. 3.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_208_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_208_208"><span class="label">[208]</span></a> Perception of Space and Matter, 1879, part ii, chap. 3.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_209_209" id="Footnote_209_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_209_209"><span class="label">[209]</span></a> For a very good condensed history of the various opinions, see W. +<p><a id="Footnote_209_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_209_209"><span class="label">[209]</span></a> For a very good condensed history of the various opinions, see W. Volkmann von Volkmar, Lehrbuch d. Psychologie, § 16, Anm. Complete references to Sir W. Hamilton are given in J. E. Walter, Perception of Space and Matter, pp. 65-6.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_210_210" id="Footnote_210_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_210_210"><span class="label">[210]</span></a> Most contemporary writers ignore the question of the soul's seat. +<p><a id="Footnote_210_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_210_210"><span class="label">[210]</span></a> Most contemporary writers ignore the question of the soul's seat. Lotze is the only one who seems to have been much concerned about it, and his views have varied. Cf. Medicinische Psychol., § 10. Microcosmus, bk. iii, ch. 2. Metaphysic, bk. iii, ch. 5. Outlines of Psychol., @@ -10636,30 +10631,30 @@ part ii, ch. 3. See also G. T. Fechner, Psychophysik, chap. xxxvii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_211_211" id="Footnote_211_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_211_211"><span class="label">[211]</span></a> I purposely ignore 'clairvoyance' and action upon distant things by +<p><a id="Footnote_211_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_211_211"><span class="label">[211]</span></a> I purposely ignore 'clairvoyance' and action upon distant things by 'mediums,' as not yet matters of common consent.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_212_212" id="Footnote_212_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_212_212"><span class="label">[212]</span></a> I disregard <i>consequences</i> which may later come to the thing from the +<p><a id="Footnote_212_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_212_212"><span class="label">[212]</span></a> I disregard <i>consequences</i> which may later come to the thing from the fact that it is known. The knowing <i>per se</i> in no wise affects the thing.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_213_213" id="Footnote_213_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_213_213"><span class="label">[213]</span></a> B. P. Bowne: Metaphysics, pp. 407-10. Cf. also Lotze: Logik, +<p><a id="Footnote_213_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_213_213"><span class="label">[213]</span></a> B. P. Bowne: Metaphysics, pp. 407-10. Cf. also Lotze: Logik, §§ 308, 326-7.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_214_214" id="Footnote_214_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_214_214"><span class="label">[214]</span></a> Cf. John Grote: Exploratio Philosophica, p. 60; H. Helmholtz, +<p><a id="Footnote_214_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_214_214"><span class="label">[214]</span></a> Cf. John Grote: Exploratio Philosophica, p. 60; H. Helmholtz, Popular Scientific Lectures, London, p. 308-9.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX.</a><a name="FNanchor_215_215" id="FNanchor_215_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_215_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX.</a><a id="FNanchor_215_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_215_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a></h5> <h4>THE STREAM OF THOUGHT.</h4> @@ -10691,7 +10686,7 @@ start.</p> of some sort goes on.</i> I use the word thinking, in accordance with what was said on <a href="#Page_186">p. 186</a>, for every form of consciousness indiscriminately. If we could say in English 'it -thinks,' as we say 'it rains 'or 'it blows,' we should be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> +thinks,' as we say 'it rains 'or 'it blows,' we should be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> stating the fact most simply and with the minimum of assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that <i>thought goes on</i>.</p> @@ -10743,7 +10738,7 @@ in the next chapter; here a preliminary word will suffice.</p> of thoughts, yours and mine, some of which cohere mutually, and some not. They are as little each-for-itself and reciprocally independent as they are all-belonging-together. -They are neither: no one of them is separate,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> +They are neither: no one of them is separate,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> but each belongs with certain others and with none beside. My thought belongs with my other thoughts, and your thought with your other thoughts. Whether anywhere in @@ -10772,7 +10767,7 @@ is insisted on, without any particular view of its nature being implied. On these terms the personal self rather than the thought might be treated as the immediate datum in psychology. The universal conscious fact is not 'feelings -and thoughts exist,' but 'I think' and 'I feel.'<a name="FNanchor_216_216" id="FNanchor_216_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> No +and thoughts exist,' but 'I think' and 'I feel.'<a id="FNanchor_216_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> No psychology, at any rate, can question the <i>existence</i> of personal selves. The worst a psychology can do is so to interpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their @@ -10782,7 +10777,7 @@ by certain peculiarities which they display, we 'end by personifying' the procession which they make,—such personification being regarded by him as a great philosophic blunder on our part. It could only be a blunder if the -notion of personality meant something essentially different<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> +notion of personality meant something essentially different<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> from anything to be found in the mental procession. But if that procession be itself the very 'original' of the notion of personality, to personify it cannot possibly be wrong. It is @@ -10823,7 +10818,7 @@ thoughts pertaining to it remember the earlier ones and adopt them as their own. M. Janet caught the actual moment of inspissation (so to speak) of one of these secondary personalities in his anæsthetic somnambulist Lucie. He -found that when this young woman's attention was absorbed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> +found that when this young woman's attention was absorbed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> in conversation with a third party, her anæsthetic hand would write simple answers to questions whispered to her by himself. "Do you hear?" he asked. "<i>No,</i>" was the unconsciously @@ -10839,7 +10834,7 @@ psychological characters. In particular she shows us that she is conscious of the feelings excluded from the consciousness of the primary or normal personage. She it is who tells us that I am pinching the arm or touching the little -finger in which Lucie for so long has had no tactile sensations."<a name="FNanchor_217_217" id="FNanchor_217_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_217_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a></p> +finger in which Lucie for so long has had no tactile sensations."<a id="FNanchor_217_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_217_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a></p> <p>In other cases the adoption of the name by the secondary self is more spontaneous. I have seen a number of @@ -10859,7 +10854,7 @@ spiritualistic community we get optimistic messages, whilst in an ignorant Catholic village the secondary personage calls itself by the name of a demon, and proffers blasphemies and obscenities, instead of telling us how happy it -is in the summer-land.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_218_218" id="FNanchor_218_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a></p> +is in the summer-land.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span><a id="FNanchor_218_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a></p> <p>Beneath these tracts of thought, which, however rudimentary, are still organized selves with a memory, habits, @@ -10886,10 +10881,10 @@ escorts them. The feeling is probably merely that of the position or movement of the limb, and it produces no more than its natural effects when it discharges into the motor centres which keep the position maintained, or the movement -incessantly renewed.<a name="FNanchor_219_219" id="FNanchor_219_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_219_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> Such thoughts as these, says M. +incessantly renewed.<a id="FNanchor_219_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_219_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> Such thoughts as these, says M. Janet, "are known by <i>no one</i>, for disaggregated sensations reduced to a state of mental dust are not synthetized in -any personality."<a name="FNanchor_220_220" id="FNanchor_220_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a> He admits, however, that these very +any personality."<a id="FNanchor_220_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a> He admits, however, that these very same unutterably stupid thoughts tend to develop memory,—the cataleptic ere long moves her arm at a bare hint; so that they form no important exception to the law that all @@ -10900,7 +10895,7 @@ thought tends to assume the form of personal consciousness.</p> <p>I do not mean necessarily that no one state of mind has -any duration—even if true, that would be hard to establish.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> +any duration—even if true, that would be hard to establish.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> The change which I have more particularly in view is that which takes place in sensible intervals of time; and the result on which I wish to lay stress is this, that <i>no state once gone @@ -10920,7 +10915,7 @@ always have a succession of different feelings. Anything else that I may have also, of a more special character, comes in as parts of this succession, Not to have the succession of different feelings is not to be conscious at all.... The chain of consciousness is a sequence of -<i>differents</i>."<a name="FNanchor_221_221" id="FNanchor_221_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_221_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a></p></blockquote> +<i>differents</i>."<a id="FNanchor_221_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_221_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Such a description as this can awaken no possible protest from any one. We all recognize as different great @@ -10945,7 +10940,7 @@ under the dissolving-view-appearance of the mind elementary facts of <i>any</i> sort that remained unchanged amid the flow.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span></p> <p>And the view of these philosophers has been called little into question, for our common experience seems at first @@ -10987,7 +10982,7 @@ This is what makes off-hand testimony about the subjective identity of different sensations well-nigh worthless as a proof of the fact. The entire history of Sensation is a commentary on our inability to tell whether two sensations -received apart are exactly alike. What appeals to our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> +received apart are exactly alike. What appeals to our<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> attention far more than the absolute quality or quantity of a given sensation is its <i>ratio</i> to whatever other sensations we may have at the same time. When everything is dark @@ -10995,7 +10990,7 @@ a somewhat less dark sensation makes us see an object white. Helmholtz calculates that the white marble painted in a picture representing an architectural view by moonlight is, when seen by daylight, from ten to twenty thousand -times brighter than the real moonlit marble would be.<a name="FNanchor_222_222" id="FNanchor_222_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_222_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a></p> +times brighter than the real moonlit marble would be.<a id="FNanchor_222_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_222_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a></p> <p>Such a difference as this could never have been <i>sensibly</i> learned; it had to be inferred from a series of indirect considerations. @@ -11006,7 +11001,7 @@ The eye's sensibility to light is at its maximum when the eye is first exposed, and blunts itself with surprising rapidity. A long night's sleep will make it see things twice as brightly on wakening, as simple rest by closure will make -it see them later in the day.<a name="FNanchor_223_223" id="FNanchor_223_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_223_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> We feel things differently +it see them later in the day.<a id="FNanchor_223_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_223_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> We feel things differently according as we are sleepy or awake, hungry or full, fresh or tired; differently at night and in the morning, differently in summer and in winter, and above all things differently in @@ -11026,7 +11021,7 @@ undergoing an essential change, must be added another presumption, based on what must happen in the brain. Every sensation corresponds to some cerebral action. For an identical sensation to recur it would have to occur the -second time <i>in an unmodified brain</i>. But as this, strictly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> +second time <i>in an unmodified brain</i>. But as this, strictly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> speaking, is a physiological impossibility, so is an unmodified feeling an impossibility; for to every brain-modification, however small, must correspond a change of equal @@ -11069,7 +11064,7 @@ now so dull and common! the young girls that brought an aura of infinity, at present hardly distinguishable existences; pictures so empty; and as for the books, what <i>was</i> there to find so mysteriously significant in Goethe, or in -John Mill so full of weight? Instead of all this, more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> +John Mill so full of weight? Instead of all this, more<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> zestful than ever is the work, the work; and fuller and deeper the import of common duties and of common goods.</p> @@ -11111,12 +11106,12 @@ sounds delicious after noise, and a note, when the scale is sung up, sounds unlike itself when the scale is sung down; as the presence of certain lines in a figure changes the apparent form of the other lines, and as in music the whole -æsthetic effect comes from the manner in which one set of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> +æsthetic effect comes from the manner in which one set of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> sounds alters our feeling of another; so, in thought, we must admit that those portions of the brain that have just been maximally excited retain a kind of soreness which is a condition of our present consciousness, a codeterminant -of how and what we now shall feel.<a name="FNanchor_224_224" id="FNanchor_224_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a></p> +of how and what we now shall feel.<a id="FNanchor_224_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a></p> <p>Ever some tracts are waning in tension, some waxing, whilst others actively discharge. The states of tension @@ -11145,7 +11140,7 @@ about it, it will grow clearer as we advance. Meanwhile, if it be true, it is certainly also true that no two 'ideas' are ever exactly the same, which is the proposition we started to prove. The proposition is more important -theoretically than it at first sight seems. For it makes it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> +theoretically than it at first sight seems. For it makes it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> already impossible for us to follow obediently in the footprints of either the Lockian or the Herbartian school, schools which have had almost unlimited influence in Germany @@ -11186,7 +11181,7 @@ us, the agglutinative languages, and even Greek and Latin with their declensions, would be the better guides. Names did not appear in them inalterable, but changed their shape to suit the context in which they lay. It must -have been easier then than now to conceive of the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> +have been easier then than now to conceive of the same<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> object as being thought of at different times in non-identical conscious states.</p> @@ -11232,7 +11227,7 @@ that they might be more numerous than is usually supposed. If the consciousness is not aware of them, it cannot feel them as interruptions. In the unconsciousness produced by nitrous oxide and other anæsthetics, in that of epilepsy -and fainting, the broken edges of the sentient life may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> +and fainting, the broken edges of the sentient life may<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> meet and merge over the gap, much as the feelings of space of the opposite margins of the 'blind spot' meet and merge over that objective interruption to the sensitiveness @@ -11252,7 +11247,7 @@ gaps that are unfelt.</p> sleep, we usually know that we have been unconscious, and we often have an accurate judgment of how long. The judgment here is certainly an inference from sensible signs, -and its ease is due to long practice in the particular field.<a name="FNanchor_225_225" id="FNanchor_225_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_225_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a> +and its ease is due to long practice in the particular field.<a id="FNanchor_225_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_225_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a> The result of it, however, is that the consciousness is, <i>for itself,</i> not what it was in the former case, but interrupted and discontinuous, in the mere sense of the words. But @@ -11272,7 +11267,7 @@ buried mate, across no matter how much intervening earth; so Peter's present instantly finds out Peter's past, and never by mistake knits itself on to that of Paul. Paul's thought in turn is as little liable to go astray. The past thought of -Peter is appropriated by the present Peter alone. He may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> +Peter is appropriated by the present Peter alone. He may<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> have a <i>knowledge</i>, and a correct one too, of what Paul's last drowsy states of mind were as he sank into sleep, but it is an entirely different sort of knowledge from that which he @@ -11303,7 +11298,7 @@ the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. <i>In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life.</i></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>But now there appears, even within the limits of the same self, and between thoughts all of which alike have @@ -11315,7 +11310,7 @@ segments of the stream of thought If the words 'chain' and 'train' had no natural fitness in them, how came such words to be used at all? Does not a loud explosion rend the consciousness upon which it abruptly breaks, in twain? -Does not every sudden shock, appearance of a new object,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> +Does not every sudden shock, appearance of a new object,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> or change in a sensation, create a real interruption, sensibly felt as such, which cuts the conscious stream across at the moment at which it appears? Do not such interruptions @@ -11353,9 +11348,9 @@ between the thoughts by whose means they are cognized. Into the awareness of the thunder itself the awareness of the previous silence creeps and continues; for what we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder -<i>pure</i>, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it.<a name="FNanchor_226_226" id="FNanchor_226_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_226_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a> +<i>pure</i>, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it.<a id="FNanchor_226_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_226_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a> Our feeling of the same objective thunder, coming -in this way, is quite different from what it would be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> +in this way, is quite different from what it would be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> were the thunder a continuation of previous thunder. The thunder itself we believe to abolish and exclude the silence; but the <i>feeling</i> of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence @@ -11369,10 +11364,10 @@ What each really knows is clearly the thing it is named for, with dimly perhaps a thousand other things. It ought to be named after all of them, but it never is. Some of them are always things known a moment ago more clearly; others -are things to be known more clearly a moment hence.<a name="FNanchor_227_227" id="FNanchor_227_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_227_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a> Our +are things to be known more clearly a moment hence.<a id="FNanchor_227_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_227_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a> Our own bodily position, attitude, condition, is one of the things of which <i>some</i> awareness, however inattentive, invariably -accompanies the knowledge of whatever else we know. We<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> +accompanies the knowledge of whatever else we know. We<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> think; and as we think we feel our bodily selves as the seat of the thinking. If the thinking be <i>our</i> thinking, it must be suffused through all its parts with that peculiar warmth @@ -11382,7 +11377,7 @@ the same old body always there, is a matter for the next chapter to decide. <i>Whatever</i> the content of the ego may be, it is habitually felt <i>with</i> everything else by us humans, and must form a <i>liaison</i> between all the things of which we -become successively aware.<a name="FNanchor_228_228" id="FNanchor_228_228"></a><a href="#Footnote_228_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a></p> +become successively aware.<a id="FNanchor_228_228"></a><a href="#Footnote_228_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a></p> <p>On this gradualness in the changes of our mental content the principles of nerve-action can throw some more @@ -11412,7 +11407,7 @@ not be something <i>like</i> each of the three other thoughts whose tracts are concerned in its production, though in a fast-waning phase.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span></p> <p>It all goes back to what we said in another connection only a few pages ago (<a href="#Page_233">p. 233</a>). As the total neurosis changes, @@ -11422,7 +11417,7 @@ successive psychoses shade gradually into each other, although their <i>rate</i> of change may be much faster at one moment than at the next.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>This difference in the rate of change lies at the basis of a difference of subjective states of which we ought immediately @@ -11457,7 +11452,7 @@ to another.</p> parts for what they really are. If they are but flights to a conclusion, stopping them to look at them before the conclusion is reached is really annihilating them. Whilst -if we wait till the conclusion <i>be</i> reached, it so exceeds them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> +if we wait till the conclusion <i>be</i> reached, it so exceeds them<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> in vigor and stability that it quite eclipses and swallows them up in its glare. Let anyone try to cut a thought across in the middle and get a look at its section, and he @@ -11498,12 +11493,12 @@ coarse feelings corresponding to the innumerable relations and forms of connection between the facts of the world, finding no <i>named</i> subjective modifications mirroring such relations, they have for the most part denied that feelings -of relation exist, and many of them, like Hume, have gone<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> +of relation exist, and many of them, like Hume, have gone<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> so far as to deny the reality of most relations <i>out</i> of the mind as well as in it. Substantive psychoses, sensations and their copies and derivatives, juxtaposed like dominoes in a game, but really separate, everything else verbal illusion,—such -is the upshot of this view.<a name="FNanchor_229_229" id="FNanchor_229_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a> The <i>Intellectualists</i>, +is the upshot of this view.<a id="FNanchor_229_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a> The <i>Intellectualists</i>, on the other hand, unable to give up the reality of relations <i>extra mentem</i>, but equally unable to point to any distinct substantive feelings in which they were known, have @@ -11536,7 +11531,7 @@ are numberless, and no existing language is capable of doing justice to all their shades.</p> <p>We ought to say a feeling of <i>and</i>, a feeling of <i>if</i>, a feeling -of <i>but</i>, and a feeling of <i>by</i>, quite as readily as we say a feeling<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> +of <i>but</i>, and a feeling of <i>by</i>, quite as readily as we say a feeling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> of <i>blue</i> or a feeling of <i>cold</i>. Yet we do not: so inveterate has our habit become of recognizing the existence of the substantive parts alone, that language almost refuses @@ -11577,25 +11572,25 @@ the rearrangement stop not, should the consciousness ever cease? And if a lingering rearrangement brings with it one kind of consciousness, why should not a swift rearrangement bring another kind of consciousness as peculiar as -the rearrangement itself? The lingering consciousnesses,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> +the rearrangement itself? The lingering consciousnesses,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> if of simple objects, we call 'sensations' or 'images,' according as they are vivid or faint; if of complex objects, we call them 'percepts' when vivid, 'concepts' or 'thoughts' when faint. For the swift consciousnesses we have only those names of 'transitive states,' or 'feelings of -relation,' which we have used.<a name="FNanchor_230_230" id="FNanchor_230_230"></a><a href="#Footnote_230_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a> As the brain-changes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> +relation,' which we have used.<a id="FNanchor_230_230"></a><a href="#Footnote_230_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a> As the brain-changes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> are continuous, so do all these consciousnesses melt into each other like dissolving views. Properly they are but one protracted consciousness, one unbroken stream.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span></p> <h4><i>Feelings of Tendency.</i></h4> <p>So much for the transitive states. But there are other -unnamed states or qualities of states that are just as important<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> +unnamed states or qualities of states that are just as important<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> and just as cognitive as they, and just as much unrecognized by the traditional sensationalist and intellectualist philosophies of mind. The first fails to find them @@ -11603,10 +11598,10 @@ at all, the second finds their <i>cognitive function</i>, but denies that anything in the way of <i>feeling</i> has a share in bringing it about. Examples will make clear what these inarticulate psychoses, due to waxing and waning excitements of -the brain, are like.<a name="FNanchor_231_231" id="FNanchor_231_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a></p> +the brain, are like.<a id="FNanchor_231_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a></p> <p>Suppose three successive persons say to us: 'Wait!' -'Hark!' 'Look!' Our consciousness is thrown into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> +'Hark!' 'Look!' Our consciousness is thrown into<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> three quite different attitudes of expectancy, although no definite object is before it in any one of the three cases. Leaving out different actual bodily attitudes, and leaving @@ -11647,7 +11642,7 @@ the names of objects not yet in the mind. Which is to say that our psychological vocabulary is wholly inadequate to name the differences that exist, even such strong differences as these. But namelessness is compatible with -existence. There are innumerable consciousnesses of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> +existence. There are innumerable consciousnesses of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> emptiness, no one of which taken in itself has a name, but all different from each other. The ordinary way is to assume that they are all emptinesses of consciousness, and @@ -11690,7 +11685,7 @@ it, though so impalpable to direct examination? Is not the same true of such negatives as 'no,' 'never,' 'not yet'?</p> -<p>The truth is that large tracts of human speech are nothing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> +<p>The truth is that large tracts of human speech are nothing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> but <i>signs of direction</i> in thought, of which direction we nevertheless have an acutely discriminative sense, though no definite sensorial image plays any part in it whatsoever. @@ -11731,7 +11726,7 @@ it can receive. One may admit that a good third of our psychic life consists in these rapid premonitory perspective views of schemes of thought not yet articulate. How comes it about that a man reading something aloud for the -first time is able immediately to emphasize all his words<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> +first time is able immediately to emphasize all his words<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> aright, unless from the very first he have a sense of at least the form of the sentence yet to come, which sense is fused with his consciousness of the present word, and modifies @@ -11773,7 +11768,7 @@ press on the attention. Mr. Galton and Prof. Huxley have, as we shall see in Chapter XVIII, made one step in advance in exploding the ridiculous theory of Hume and Berkeley that we can have no images but of perfectly definite things. -Another is made in the overthrow of the equally ridiculous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> +Another is made in the overthrow of the equally ridiculous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> notion that, whilst simple objective qualities are revealed to our knowledge in subjective feelings, relations are not. But these reforms are not half sweeping and radical enough. @@ -11803,9 +11798,9 @@ which we pass judgment when the actual thing is done? What is our notion of a scientific or philosophical system? Great thinkers have vast premonitory glimpses of schemes of relation between terms, which hardly even as verbal -images enter the mind, so rapid is the whole process.<a name="FNanchor_232_232" id="FNanchor_232_232"></a><a href="#Footnote_232_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> We +images enter the mind, so rapid is the whole process.<a id="FNanchor_232_232"></a><a href="#Footnote_232_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> We all of us have this permanent consciousness of whither our -thought is going. It is a feeling like any other, a feeling<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> +thought is going. It is a feeling like any other, a feeling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> of what thoughts are next to arise, before they have arisen. This field of view of consciousness varies very much in extent, depending largely on the degree of mental freshness @@ -11849,7 +11844,7 @@ intention is. It casts its influence over the whole of the sentence, both before and after the spot in which the word <i>man</i> is used.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span></p> <p>Nothing is easier than to symbolize all these facts in terms of brain-action. Just as the echo of the <i>whence</i>, the @@ -11864,7 +11859,7 @@ by a curve, the neurosis underlying consciousness must at any moment be like this:</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 300px;"> -<img src="images/jame_257_0027.jpg" width="300" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_257_0027.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 300px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 27.</div> </div> @@ -11888,8 +11883,8 @@ vivid form. I mean those mistakes of speech or writing by which, in Dr. Carpenter's words, "we mispronounce or misspell a word, by introducing into it a letter or syllable of some other, whose turn is shortly to come; or, it may be, -the whole of the anticipated word is substituted for the one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> -which ought to have been expressed."<a name="FNanchor_233_233" id="FNanchor_233_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a> In these cases +the whole of the anticipated word is substituted for the one<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> +which ought to have been expressed."<a id="FNanchor_233_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a> In these cases one of two things must have happened: either some local accident of nutrition <i>blocks</i> the process that is <i>due</i>, so that other processes discharge that ought as yet to be but nascently @@ -11910,14 +11905,14 @@ at every moment blend with and suffuse and alter the psychic effect of the processes which are at their culminating point.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Let us use the words <i>psychic overtone, suffusion,</i> or <i>fringe</i>, to designate the influence of a faint brain-process upon our thought, as it makes it aware of relations and objects but -dimly perceived.<a name="FNanchor_234_234" id="FNanchor_234_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a></p> +dimly perceived.<a id="FNanchor_234_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a></p> -<p>If we then consider the <i>cognitive function</i> of different<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> +<p>If we then consider the <i>cognitive function</i> of different<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> states of mind, we may feel assured that the difference between those that are mere 'acquaintance,' and those that are 'knowledges-<i>about</i>' (see <a href="#Page_221">p. 221</a>) is reducible almost @@ -11959,7 +11954,7 @@ and cast about us for other thoughts. Now <i>any</i> thought the quality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves 'all right,' is an acceptable member of our thinking, whatever kind of thought it may otherwise be. Provided we only feel it -to have a place in the scheme of relations in which the interesting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> +to have a place in the scheme of relations in which the interesting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> topic also lies, that is quite sufficient to make of it a relevant and appropriate portion of our train of ideas.</p> @@ -12003,7 +11998,7 @@ we feel the images to lie? Does not the discrepancy of terms involve a discrepancy of felt relations among them?</p> <p>If the terms be taken <i>quâ</i> mere sensations, it assuredly -does. For instance, the words may rhyme with each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> +does. For instance, the words may rhyme with each<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> other,—the visual images can have no such affinity as <i>that</i>. But <i>quâ</i> thoughts, <i>quâ</i> sensations <i>understood</i>, the words have contracted by long association fringes of mutual repugnance @@ -12017,7 +12012,7 @@ fact, and his words, often quoted, deserve to be quoted again. The chapter is entitled "What is the cause that nonsense so often escapes being detected, both by the writer and by the reader?" The author, in answering this question, makes -(<i>inter alia</i>) the following remarks:<a name="FNanchor_235_235" id="FNanchor_235_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_235_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a></p> +(<i>inter alia</i>) the following remarks:<a id="FNanchor_235_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_235_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a></p> <blockquote> @@ -12049,7 +12044,7 @@ from that of which sounds are naturally susceptible.</p> <p>"Now this conception, habit, or tendency of the mind, call it which you please, is considerably strengthened by the frequent use of language -and by the structure of it. Language is the sole channel through which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> +and by the structure of it. Language is the sole channel through which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> we communicate our knowledge and discoveries to others, and through which the knowledge and discoveries of others are communicated to us. By reiterated recourse to this medium, it necessarily happens that @@ -12092,7 +12087,7 @@ incongruous vocabulary suddenly appear, such as 'rat-trap' or 'plumber's bill' in a philosophical discourse, the sentence detonates, as it were, we receive a shock from the incongruity, and the drowsy assent is gone. The feeling of -rationality in these cases seems rather a negative than a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> +rationality in these cases seems rather a negative than a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> positive thing, being the mere absence of shock, or sense of discord, between the terms of thought.</p> @@ -12115,7 +12110,7 @@ cool, and pleasant," is a sentence I remember reading once in a report of some athletic exercises in Jerome Park. It was probably written unconsciously by the hurried reporter, and read uncritically by many readers. An entire -volume of 784 pages lately published in Boston<a name="FNanchor_236_236" id="FNanchor_236_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> is composed +volume of 784 pages lately published in Boston<a id="FNanchor_236_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> is composed of stuff like this passage picked out at random:</p> <blockquote> @@ -12126,9 +12121,9 @@ nuclear organism is continuous as their respective atmospheric fruitage up to the altitudinal limit of their expansibility, whence, when atmosphered by like but coalescing essences from higher altitudes,—those sensibly expressed as the essential qualities of external forms,—they -descend, and become assimilated by the afferents of the nuclear organism."<a name="FNanchor_237_237" id="FNanchor_237_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a></p></blockquote> +descend, and become assimilated by the afferents of the nuclear organism."<a id="FNanchor_237_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span></p> <p>There are every year works published whose contents show them to be by real lunatics. To the reader, the @@ -12151,7 +12146,7 @@ subjective feeling of the rationality of these sentences was strong in the writer as he penned them, or even that some readers by straining may have reproduced it in themselves.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>To sum up, certain kinds of verbal associate, certain grammatical expectations fulfilled, stand for a good part of @@ -12166,7 +12161,7 @@ forefelt conclusion. Suffuse all the words of a sentence, as they pass, with these three fringes or haloes of relation, let the conclusion seem worth arriving at, and all will admit the sentence to be an expression of thoroughly -continuous, unified, and rational thought.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_238_238" id="FNanchor_238_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a></p> +continuous, unified, and rational thought.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span><a id="FNanchor_238_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a></p> <p>Each word, in such a sentence, is felt, not only as a word, but as having a <i>meaning</i>. The 'meaning' of a word @@ -12202,7 +12197,7 @@ of which this 'knowing' is made seems to be verbal images exclusively. But if the words 'coffee,' 'bacon,' 'muffins,' and 'eggs' lead a man to speak to his cook, to pay his bills, and to take measures for the morrow's meal exactly as -visual and gustatory memories would, why are they not,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> +visual and gustatory memories would, why are they not,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> for all practical intents and purposes, as good a kind of material in which to think? In fact, we may suspect them to be for most purposes better than terms with a richer @@ -12249,7 +12244,7 @@ the circle of my own observation....</p> measure, compensate me for the loss of my hearing. It was that of taking me with him when business required him to ride abroad; and he took me more frequently than he did my brothers; giving, as the -reason for his apparent partiality, that they could acquire information<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> +reason for his apparent partiality, that they could acquire information<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> through the ear, while I depended solely upon my eye for acquaintance with affairs of the outside world....</p> @@ -12300,7 +12295,7 @@ most.</p> <p>"I think I was five years old, when I began to understand the descent from parent to child and the propagation of animals. I was -nearly eleven years old, when I entered the Institution where I was educated;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> +nearly eleven years old, when I entered the Institution where I was educated;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> and I remember distinctly that it was at least two years before this time that I began to ask myself the question as to the origin of the universe. My age was then about eight, not over nine years.</p> @@ -12350,12 +12345,12 @@ sky.</p> thunder-claps. I asked one of my brothers where they came from. He pointed to the sky and made a zigzag motion with his finger, signifying lightning. I imagined there was a great man somewhere in the blue -vault, who made a loud noise with his voice out of it; and each time I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> -heard<a name="FNanchor_239_239" id="FNanchor_239_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a> a thunder-clap I was frightened, and looked up at the sky, fearing -he was speaking a threatening word."<a name="FNanchor_240_240" id="FNanchor_240_240"></a><a href="#Footnote_240_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a></p></blockquote> +vault, who made a loud noise with his voice out of it; and each time I<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> +heard<a id="FNanchor_239_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a> a thunder-clap I was frightened, and looked up at the sky, fearing +he was speaking a threatening word."<a id="FNanchor_240_240"></a><a href="#Footnote_240_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a></p></blockquote> <div class="figright" style="width: 150px;"> -<img src="images/jame_269_0028.jpg" width="150" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_269_0028.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 150px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 28.</div> </div> @@ -12386,7 +12381,7 @@ and broken into many steps. But when the penultimate terms of all the trains, however differing <i>inter se</i>, finally shoot into the same conclusion, we say and rightly say, that all the thinkers have had substantially the same -thought. It would probably astound each of them beyond<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> +thought. It would probably astound each of them beyond<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> measure to be let into his neighbor's mind and to find how different the scenery there was from that in his own.</p> @@ -12435,7 +12430,7 @@ faint. Images of blood, heart, violent rushing, pulse, quickening, and sight, were either not revived at all, or were passing shadows. Had any such images arisen, they would have hampered thought, retarding the logical process of judgment by irrelevant connections. The symbols -had substituted <i>relations</i> for these <i>values</i>.... There are no images of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> +had substituted <i>relations</i> for these <i>values</i>.... There are no images of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> two things and three things, when I say 'two and three equal five;' there are simply familiar symbols having precise relations.... The verbal symbol 'horse,' which stands for all our experiences of horses, @@ -12443,7 +12438,7 @@ serves all the purposes of Thought, without recalling one of the images clustered in the perception of horses, just as the sight of a horse's form serves all the purposes of <i>recognition</i> without recalling the sound of its neighing or its tramp, its qualities as an animal of draught, and so -forth."<a name="FNanchor_241_241" id="FNanchor_241_241"></a><a href="#Footnote_241_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a></p></blockquote> +forth."<a id="FNanchor_241_241"></a><a href="#Footnote_241_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a></p></blockquote> <p>It need only be added that as the Algebrist, though the sequence of his terms is fixed by their relations rather than @@ -12478,7 +12473,7 @@ in <i>its</i> 'there,' or then, in <i>its</i> 'then'; and the question would never arise whether an extra-mental duplicate of it existed or not. The reason why we all believe that the objects of our thoughts have a duplicate existence outside, is that there -are <i>many</i> human thoughts, each with the <i>same</i> objects, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> +are <i>many</i> human thoughts, each with the <i>same</i> objects, as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> we cannot help supposing. The judgment that <i>my</i> thought has the same object as <i>his</i> thought is what makes the psychologist call my thought cognitive of an outer reality. @@ -12488,7 +12483,7 @@ the object out of either and project it by a sort of triangulation into an independent position, from which it may <i>appear</i> to both. <i>Sameness</i> in a multiplicity of objective appearances is thus the basis of our belief in realities -outside of thought.<a name="FNanchor_242_242" id="FNanchor_242_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_242_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> In <a href="#CHAPTER_XII">Chapter XII</a> we shall have to take +outside of thought.<a id="FNanchor_242_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_242_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> In <a href="#CHAPTER_XII">Chapter XII</a> we shall have to take up the judgment of sameness again.</p> <p>To show that the question of reality being extra-mental @@ -12515,7 +12510,7 @@ uncritical non-idealistic point of view of all natural science, beyond which this book cannot go. A mind which has become conscious of its own cognitive function, plays what we have called 'the psychologist' upon itself. It not only -knows the things that appear before it; it knows that it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> +knows the things that appear before it; it knows that it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> knows them. This stage of reflective condition is, more or less explicitly, our habitual adult state of mind.</p> @@ -12525,7 +12520,7 @@ into this primordial condition when consciousness is reduced to a minimum by the inhalation of anæsthetics or during a faint. Many persons testify that at a certain stage of the anæsthetic process objects are still cognized whilst -the thought of self is lost. Professor Herzen says:<a name="FNanchor_243_243" id="FNanchor_243_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a></p> +the thought of self is lost. Professor Herzen says:<a id="FNanchor_243_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a></p> <blockquote> @@ -12548,7 +12543,7 @@ present no dreams or visions in any way connected with human affairs, no ideas or impressions akin to anything in past experience, no emotions, of course no idea of personality. There was no conception as to what being it was that was regarding the two lines, or that there existed -any such thing as such a being; the lines and waves were all."<a name="FNanchor_244_244" id="FNanchor_244_244"></a><a href="#Footnote_244_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a></p></blockquote> +any such thing as such a being; the lines and waves were all."<a id="FNanchor_244_244"></a><a href="#Footnote_244_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Similarly a friend of Mr. Herbert Spencer, quoted by him in 'Mind' (vol iii, p. 556), speaks of "an undisturbed @@ -12560,13 +12555,13 @@ somewhat familiar phase in chloroformization, though in my own case it is too deep a phase for any articulate after-memory to remain. I only know that as it vanishes I seem to wake to a sense of my own existence as something -additional to what had previously been there.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_245_245" id="FNanchor_245_245"></a><a href="#Footnote_245_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a></p> +additional to what had previously been there.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span><a id="FNanchor_245_245"></a><a href="#Footnote_245_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a></p> <p>Many philosophers, however, hold that the reflective consciousness of the self is essential to the cognitive function of thought. They hold that a thought, in order to know a thing at all, must expressly distinguish between the thing -and its own self.<a name="FNanchor_246_246" id="FNanchor_246_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_246_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> This is a perfectly wanton assumption, +and its own self.<a id="FNanchor_246_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_246_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> This is a perfectly wanton assumption, and not the faintest shadow of reason exists for supposing it true. As well might I contend that I cannot dream without dreaming that I dream, swear without swearing @@ -12583,7 +12578,7 @@ O <i>per se</i>, or O <i>plus</i> P, are as good objects of knowledge as O <i>plus me</i> is. The philosophers in question simply substitute one particular object for all others, and call it <i>the</i> object <i>par excellence</i>. It is a case of the 'psychologist's fallacy' -(see <a href="#Page_197">p. 197</a>). <i>They</i> know the object to be one thing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> +(see <a href="#Page_197">p. 197</a>). <i>They</i> know the object to be one thing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> and the thought another; and they forthwith foist their own knowledge into that of the thought of which they pretend to give a true account. To conclude, then, <i>thought may, @@ -12623,7 +12618,7 @@ substantively, we must make a substantive of it by writing it out thus with hyphens between all its words. Nothing but this can possibly name its delicate idiosyncrasy. And if we wish to <i>feel</i> that idiosyncrasy we must reproduce the -thought as it was uttered, with every word fringed and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> +thought as it was uttered, with every word fringed and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> whole sentence bathed in that original halo of obscure relations, which, like an horizon, then spread about its meaning.</p> @@ -12660,21 +12655,21 @@ The mass of our thinking vanishes for ever, beyond hope of recovery, and psychology only gathers up a few of the crumbs that fall from the feast.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The next point to make clear is that, <i>however complex the object may be, the thought of it is one undivided state of consciousness</i>. -As Thomas Brown says:<a name="FNanchor_247_247" id="FNanchor_247_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_247_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a></p> +As Thomas Brown says:<a id="FNanchor_247_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_247_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a></p> <blockquote> <p>"I have already spoken too often to require again to caution you -against the mistake into which, I confess, that the terms which the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> +against the mistake into which, I confess, that the terms which the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> poverty of our language obliges us to use might of themselves very naturally lead you; the mistake of supposing that the most complex states of mind are not truly, in their very essence, as much one and indivisible as those which we term simple—the complexity and seeming -coexistence which they involve being relative to our feeling<a name="FNanchor_248_248" id="FNanchor_248_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> only, +coexistence which they involve being relative to our feeling<a id="FNanchor_248_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> only, not to their own absolute nature. I trust I need not repeat to you that, in itself, every notion, however seemingly complex, is, and must be, truly simple—being one state or affection, of one simple substance, @@ -12688,13 +12683,13 @@ of simple unity."</p></blockquote> contrast with this, that whenever an object of thought contains many elements, the thought itself must be made up of just as many ideas, one idea for each element, and all -fused together in appearance, but really separate.<a name="FNanchor_249_249" id="FNanchor_249_249"></a><a href="#Footnote_249_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> The +fused together in appearance, but really separate.<a id="FNanchor_249_249"></a><a href="#Footnote_249_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> The enemies of this psychology find (as we have already seen) little trouble in showing that such a bundle of separate ideas would never form one thought at all, and they contend that an Ego must be added to the bundle to give it unity, and bring the various ideas into relation with each -other.<a name="FNanchor_250_250" id="FNanchor_250_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_250_250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a> We will not discuss the ego just yet, but it is obvious +other.<a id="FNanchor_250_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_250_250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a> We will not discuss the ego just yet, but it is obvious that if things are to be thought in relation, they must be thought together, and in one <i>something</i>, be that something ego, psychosis, state of consciousness, or whatever you @@ -12703,7 +12698,7 @@ thought in relation at all. Now most believers in the ego make the same mistake as the associationists and sensationists whom they oppose. Both agree that the elements of the subjective stream are discrete and separate and constitute -what Kant calls a 'manifold.' But while the associationists<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> +what Kant calls a 'manifold.' But while the associationists<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> think that a 'manifold' can form a single knowledge, the egoists deny this, and say that the knowledge comes only when the manifold is subjected to the synthetizing @@ -12745,10 +12740,10 @@ taken as an example is, in the first place, not of 'a pack of cards.' It is of 'the-pack-of-cards-is-on-the-table,' an entirely different subjective phenomenon, whose Object implies the pack, and every one of the cards in it, but whose conscious -constitution bears very little resemblance to that of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> +constitution bears very little resemblance to that of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> thought of the pack <i>per se</i>. What a thought <i>is</i>, and what it may be developed into, or explained to stand for, and be -equivalent to, are two things, not one.<a name="FNanchor_251_251" id="FNanchor_251_251"></a><a href="#Footnote_251_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a></p> +equivalent to, are two things, not one.<a id="FNanchor_251_251"></a><a href="#Footnote_251_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a></p> <p>An analysis of what passes through the mind as we utter the phrase <i>the pack of cards is on the table</i> will, I hope, make @@ -12756,7 +12751,7 @@ this clear, and may at the same time condense into a concrete example a good deal of what has gone before.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_279_0029.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_279_0029.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 29.—The Stream of Consciousness.</div> </div> @@ -12775,7 +12770,7 @@ I mean by denying that in the thought any parts can be found corresponding to the object's parts. Time-parts are not such parts.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span></p> <p>Now let the vertical dimensions of the figure stand for the objects or contents of the thoughts. A line vertical to @@ -12812,25 +12807,25 @@ to say, but afterwards one is filled with admiration and surprise at having said and thought it so well."</p> <p>This latter author seems to me to have kept at much -closer quarters with the facts than any other analyst of consciousness.<a name="FNanchor_252_252" id="FNanchor_252_252"></a><a href="#Footnote_252_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> +closer quarters with the facts than any other analyst of consciousness.<a id="FNanchor_252_252"></a><a href="#Footnote_252_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> But even he does not quite hit the mark, for, as I understand him, he thinks that each word as it occupies the mind <i>displaces</i> the rest of the thought's content. -He distinguishes the 'idea' (what I have called the total<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> +He distinguishes the 'idea' (what I have called the total<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> <i>object</i> or meaning) from the consciousness of the words, calling the former a very feeble state, and contrasting it with the liveliness of the words, even when these are only silently rehearsed. "The feeling," he says, "of the words makes ten or twenty times more noise in our consciousness than the sense of the phrase, which for consciousness is a -very slight matter."<a name="FNanchor_253_253" id="FNanchor_253_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> And having distinguished these two +very slight matter."<a id="FNanchor_253_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> And having distinguished these two things, he goes on to separate them in time, saying that the idea may either precede or follow the words, but that it is -a 'pure illusion' to suppose them simultaneous.<a name="FNanchor_254_254" id="FNanchor_254_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_254_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a> Now I +a 'pure illusion' to suppose them simultaneous.<a id="FNanchor_254_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_254_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a> Now I believe that in all cases where the words are <i>understood</i>, the total idea may be and usually is present not only before and after the phrase has been spoken, but also whilst each -separate word is uttered.<a name="FNanchor_255_255" id="FNanchor_255_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_255_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a> It is the overtone, halo, or fringe +separate word is uttered.<a id="FNanchor_255_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_255_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a> It is the overtone, halo, or fringe of the word, <i>as spoken in that sentence</i>. It is never absent; no word in an understood sentence comes to consciousness as a mere noise. We feel its meaning as it passes; and @@ -12840,7 +12835,7 @@ the entire segment of the stream. The same object is known everywhere, now from the point of view, if we may so call it, of this word, now from the point of view of that. And in our feeling of each word there chimes an echo or -foretaste of every other. The consciousness of the 'Idea'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> +foretaste of every other. The consciousness of the 'Idea'<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> and that of the words are thus consubstantial. They are made of the same 'mind-stuff,' and form an unbroken stream. Annihilate a mind at any instant, cut @@ -12857,21 +12852,21 @@ sentence in different degrees, each one in turn becoming maximally excited and then yielding the momentary verbal 'kernel,' to the thought's content, at other times being only sub-excited, and then combining with the other sub-excited -processes to give the overtone or fringe.<a name="FNanchor_256_256" id="FNanchor_256_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256_256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a></p> +processes to give the overtone or fringe.<a id="FNanchor_256_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256_256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a></p> <div class="figleft" style="width: 110px;"> -<img src="images/jame_282_0030_01.jpg" width="125" alt="Engraving" /> -<div class="capt02"> The pack of cards is on the table.<br /><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 30.</div> +<img src="images/jame_282_0030_01.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 125px"> +<div class="capt02"> The pack of cards is on the table.<br ><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 30.</div> </div> <div class="figleft" style="width: 119px;"> -<img src="images/jame_282_0030_02.jpg" width="125" alt="Engraving" /> -<div class="capt02"> The pack of cards is on the table.<br /><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 31.</div> +<img src="images/jame_282_0030_02.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 125px"> +<div class="capt02"> The pack of cards is on the table.<br ><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 31.</div> </div> <div class="figleft" style="width: 125px;"> -<img src="images/jame_282_0030_03.jpg" width="125" alt="Engraving" /> -<div class="capt02"> The pack of cards is on the table.<br /><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 32.</div> +<img src="images/jame_282_0030_03.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 125px"> +<div class="capt02"> The pack of cards is on the table.<br ><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 32.</div> </div> <p>We may illustrate this by a farther @@ -12895,7 +12890,7 @@ thought. At the moment symbolized by the first figure <i>pack</i> is the prominent part; in the third figure it is <i>table</i>, etc.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span></p> <p>We can easily add all these plane sections together to make a solid, one of whose solid dimensions will represent @@ -12923,17 +12918,17 @@ successive moments, of the several nerve-processes to which the various parts of the thought-object correspond.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_283_0031.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_283_0031.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 33.</div> </div> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The last peculiarity of consciousness to which attention is to be drawn in this first rough description of its stream is that</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span></p> <h4>5) <i>It is always interested more in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, all the while @@ -12977,7 +12972,7 @@ rays has anything like the objective importance subjectively represented by that between light and darkness. Out of what is in itself an undistinguishable, swarming <i>continuum</i>, devoid of distinction or emphasis, our senses -make for us, by attending to this motion and ignoring that,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> +make for us, by attending to this motion and ignoring that,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> a world full of contrasts, of sharp accents, of abrupt changes, of picturesque light and shade.</p> @@ -13020,7 +13015,7 @@ the latter <i>perspective</i> views, and the four right angles the <i>true</i> form of the table, and erect the attribute squareness; into the table's essence, for æsthetic reasons of my own. In like manner, the real form of the circle is deemed to be -the sensation it gives when the line of vision is perpendicular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> +the sensation it gives when the line of vision is perpendicular<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> to its centre—all its other sensations are signs of this sensation. The real sound of the cannon is the sensation it makes when the ear is close by. The real color of the @@ -13062,7 +13057,7 @@ home only picturesque impressions—costumes and colors, parks and views and works of architecture, pictures and statues. To another all this will be non-existent; and distances and prices, populations and drainage-arrangements, door- -and window-fastenings, and other useful statistics will take<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> +and window-fastenings, and other useful statistics will take<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> their place. A third will give a rich account of the theatres, restaurants, and public balls, and naught beside; whilst the fourth will perhaps have been so wrapped in his own @@ -13104,7 +13099,7 @@ with this.</p> where choice reigns notoriously supreme. An act has no ethical quality whatever unless it be chosen out of several all equally possible. To sustain the arguments for the -good course and keep them ever before us, to stifle our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> +good course and keep them ever before us, to stifle our<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> longing for more flowery ways, to keep the foot unflinchingly on the arduous path, these are characteristic ethical energies. But more than these; for these but deal with @@ -13144,7 +13139,7 @@ from the rest. Just so the world of each of us, howsoever different our several views of it may be, all lay embedded in the primordial chaos of sensations, which gave the mere <i>matter</i> to the thought of all of us indifferently. We may, -if we like, by our reasonings unwind things back to that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> +if we like, by our reasonings unwind things back to that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> black and jointless continuity of space and moving clouds of swarming atoms which science calls the only real world. But all the while the world <i>we</i> feel and live in will be that @@ -13158,7 +13153,7 @@ alike real to those who may abstract them. How different must be the worlds in the consciousness of ant, cuttle-fish, or crab!</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>But in my mind and your mind the rejected portions and the selected portions of the original world-stuff are to a @@ -13185,7 +13180,7 @@ his own <i>me</i> stands out in startling relief. Even the trodden worm, as Lotze somewhere says, contrasts his own suffering self with the whole remaining universe, though he have no clear conception either of himself or of what the universe -may be. He is for me a mere part of the world;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> +may be. He is for me a mere part of the world;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> for him it is I who am the mere part. Each of us dichotomizes the Kosmos in a different place.</p> @@ -13195,52 +13190,52 @@ of this fact of self-consciousness to which we have thus once more been led.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_215_215" id="Footnote_215_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_215_215"><span class="label">[215]</span></a> A good deal of this chapter is reprinted from an article 'On some +<p><a id="Footnote_215_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_215_215"><span class="label">[215]</span></a> A good deal of this chapter is reprinted from an article 'On some Omissions of Introspective Psychology' which appeared in 'Mind' for January 1884.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_216_216" id="Footnote_216_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_216_216"><span class="label">[216]</span></a> B. P. Bowne: Metaphysics, p. 362.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_216_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_216_216"><span class="label">[216]</span></a> B. P. Bowne: Metaphysics, p. 362.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_217_217" id="Footnote_217_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_217_217"><span class="label">[217]</span></a> L'Automatisme Psychologique, p. 318.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_217_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_217_217"><span class="label">[217]</span></a> L'Automatisme Psychologique, p. 318.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_218_218" id="Footnote_218_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_218_218"><span class="label">[218]</span></a> Cf. A. Constans: Relation sur une Épidémie d'hystéro-démonopathie +<p><a id="Footnote_218_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_218_218"><span class="label">[218]</span></a> Cf. A. Constans: Relation sur une Épidémie d'hystéro-démonopathie en 1861. 2me ed. Paris, 1863.—Chiap e Franzolin: L'Epidemia d'istero-demonopatie in Verzegnis. Reggio, 1879.—See also J. Kerner's little work: Nachricht von dem Vorkommen des Besessenseins. 1836.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_219_219" id="Footnote_219_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_219_219"><span class="label">[219]</span></a> For the Physiology of this compare the chapter on the Will.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_219_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_219_219"><span class="label">[219]</span></a> For the Physiology of this compare the chapter on the Will.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_220_220" id="Footnote_220_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_220_220"><span class="label">[220]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 316.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_220_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_220_220"><span class="label">[220]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> p. 316.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_221_221" id="Footnote_221_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_221_221"><span class="label">[221]</span></a> The Philosophy of Reflection, i, 248, 290.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_221_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_221_221"><span class="label">[221]</span></a> The Philosophy of Reflection, i, 248, 290.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_222_222" id="Footnote_222_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_222_222"><span class="label">[222]</span></a> Populäre Wissenschaftliche Vorträge, Drittes Heft (1876). p. 72.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_222_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_222_222"><span class="label">[222]</span></a> Populäre Wissenschaftliche Vorträge, Drittes Heft (1876). p. 72.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_223_223" id="Footnote_223_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_223_223"><span class="label">[223]</span></a> Fick, in L. Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., Bd. iii, Th. i, p. 225.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_223_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_223_223"><span class="label">[223]</span></a> Fick, in L. Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., Bd. iii, Th. i, p. 225.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_224_224" id="Footnote_224_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_224_224"><span class="label">[224]</span></a> It need of course not follow, because a total brain-state does not recur, +<p><a id="Footnote_224_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_224_224"><span class="label">[224]</span></a> It need of course not follow, because a total brain-state does not recur, that no <i>point</i> of the brain can ever be twice in the same condition. That would be as improbable a consequence as that in the sea a wave-crest should never come twice at the same point of space. What can hardly @@ -13251,17 +13246,17 @@ at any moment is due.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_225_225" id="Footnote_225_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_225_225"><span class="label">[225]</span></a> The accurate registration of the 'how long' is still a little mysterious.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_225_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_225_225"><span class="label">[225]</span></a> The accurate registration of the 'how long' is still a little mysterious.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_226_226" id="Footnote_226_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_226_226"><span class="label">[226]</span></a> Cf. Brentano; Psychologie, vol. i, pp. 219-20. Altogether this +<p><a id="Footnote_226_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_226_226"><span class="label">[226]</span></a> Cf. Brentano; Psychologie, vol. i, pp. 219-20. Altogether this chapter of Brentano's on the Unity of Consciousness is as good as anything with which I am acquainted.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_227_227" id="Footnote_227_227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_227_227"><span class="label">[227]</span></a> Honor to whom honor is due! The most explicit acknowledgment I +<p><a id="Footnote_227_227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_227_227"><span class="label">[227]</span></a> Honor to whom honor is due! The most explicit acknowledgment I have anywhere found of all this is in a buried and forgotten paper by the Rev. Jas. Wills, on 'Accidental Association,' in the Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy, vol xxi, part i (1846). Mr. Wills writes: @@ -13294,19 +13289,19 @@ operations commence."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_228_228" id="Footnote_228_228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_228_228"><span class="label">[228]</span></a> Compare the charming passage in Taine on Intelligence (N. Y. ed.), +<p><a id="Footnote_228_228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_228_228"><span class="label">[228]</span></a> Compare the charming passage in Taine on Intelligence (N. Y. ed.), i, 83-4.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_229_229" id="Footnote_229_229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_229_229"><span class="label">[229]</span></a> E.g.: "The stream of thought is not a continuous current, but a series +<p><a id="Footnote_229_229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_229_229"><span class="label">[229]</span></a> E.g.: "The stream of thought is not a continuous current, but a series of distinct ideas, more or less rapid in their succession; the rapidity being measurable by the number that pass through the mind in a given time." (Bain: E. and W., p. 29.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_230_230" id="Footnote_230_230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_230_230"><span class="label">[230]</span></a> Few writers have admitted that we cognize relations through feeling. +<p><a id="Footnote_230_230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_230_230"><span class="label">[230]</span></a> Few writers have admitted that we cognize relations through feeling. The intellectualists have explicitly denied the possibility of such a thing—e.g., Prof. T. H. Green ('Mind,' vol. vii, p. 28): "No feeling, as such or as felt, is [of?] a relation.... Even a relation between feelings is not @@ -13477,7 +13472,7 @@ inferred, feelings are composed of units of feelings, or shocks."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_231_231" id="Footnote_231_231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_231_231"><span class="label">[231]</span></a> M. Paulhan (Revue Philosophique, xx, 455-6), after speaking of the +<p><a id="Footnote_231_231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_231_231"><span class="label">[231]</span></a> M. Paulhan (Revue Philosophique, xx, 455-6), after speaking of the faint mental images of objects and emotions, says: "We find other vaguer states still, upon which attention seldom rests, except in persons who by nature or profession are addicted to internal observation. It is even difficult @@ -13497,7 +13492,7 @@ remains, but is not understood; its definite meaning is lost." (P. 458.)</p></di <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_232_232" id="Footnote_232_232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_232_232"><span class="label">[232]</span></a> Mozart describes thus his manner of composing: First bits and crumbs +<p><a id="Footnote_232_232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_232_232"><span class="label">[232]</span></a> Mozart describes thus his manner of composing: First bits and crumbs of the piece come and gradually join together in his mind; then the soul getting warmed to the work, the thing grows more and more, "and I spread it out broader and clearer, and at last it gets almost finished in my @@ -13510,12 +13505,12 @@ strong dream. But the best of all is the <i>hearing of it all at once</i>."</p>< <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_233_233" id="Footnote_233_233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_233_233"><span class="label">[233]</span></a> Mental Physiology, § 236. Dr. Carpenter's explanation differs materially +<p><a id="Footnote_233_233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_233_233"><span class="label">[233]</span></a> Mental Physiology, § 236. Dr. Carpenter's explanation differs materially from that given in the text.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_234_234" id="Footnote_234_234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_234_234"><span class="label">[234]</span></a> Cf. also S. Stricker: Vorlesungen über allg. u. exp. Pathologie (1879), +<p><a id="Footnote_234_234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_234_234"><span class="label">[234]</span></a> Cf. also S. Stricker: Vorlesungen über allg. u. exp. Pathologie (1879), pp. 462-3, 501, 547; Romanes: Origin of Human Faculty, p. 82. It is so hard to make one's self clear that I may advert to a misunderstanding of my views by the late Prof. Thos. Maguire of Dublin (Lectures on Philosophy, @@ -13533,15 +13528,15 @@ supposes, and supposes me to suppose, to be there.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_235_235" id="Footnote_235_235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_235_235"><span class="label">[235]</span></a> George Campbell: Philosophy of Rhetoric, book ii, chap. vii.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_235_235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_235_235"><span class="label">[235]</span></a> George Campbell: Philosophy of Rhetoric, book ii, chap. vii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_236_236" id="Footnote_236_236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_236_236"><span class="label">[236]</span></a> Substantialism or Philosophy of Knowledge, by 'Jean Story' (1879).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_236_236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_236_236"><span class="label">[236]</span></a> Substantialism or Philosophy of Knowledge, by 'Jean Story' (1879).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_237_237" id="Footnote_237_237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_237_237"><span class="label">[237]</span></a> M. G. Tarde, quoting (in Delbœuf, Le Sommeil et les Rêves (1885), p. +<p><a id="Footnote_237_237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_237_237"><span class="label">[237]</span></a> M. G. Tarde, quoting (in Delbœuf, Le Sommeil et les Rêves (1885), p. 226) some nonsense-verses from a dream, says they show "how prosodic forms may subsist in a mind from which logical rules are effaced.... I was able, in dreaming, to preserve the faculty of finding two words which @@ -13556,7 +13551,7 @@ whole nothing is commoner than trains of words not understood."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_238_238" id="Footnote_238_238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_238_238"><span class="label">[238]</span></a> We think it odd that young children should listen with such rapt +<p><a id="Footnote_238_238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_238_238"><span class="label">[238]</span></a> We think it odd that young children should listen with such rapt attention to the reading of stories expressed in words half of which they do not understand, and of none of which they ask the meaning. But their thinking is in form just what ours is when it is rapid. Both of us @@ -13571,13 +13566,13 @@ swiftly carried to a familiar and intelligible terminus.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_239_239" id="Footnote_239_239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_239_239"><span class="label">[239]</span></a> Not literally <i>heard</i>, of course. Deaf mutes are quick to perceive +<p><a id="Footnote_239_239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_239_239"><span class="label">[239]</span></a> Not literally <i>heard</i>, of course. Deaf mutes are quick to perceive shocks and jars that can be felt, even when so slight as to be unnoticed by those who can hear.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_240_240" id="Footnote_240_240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_240_240"><span class="label">[240]</span></a> Quoted by Samuel Porter: 'Is Thought possible without Language?' +<p><a id="Footnote_240_240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_240_240"><span class="label">[240]</span></a> Quoted by Samuel Porter: 'Is Thought possible without Language?' in Princeton Review, 57th year, pp. 108-12 (Jan. 1881?). Cf. also W. W. Ireland: The Blot upon the Brain (1886), Paper x, part ii; G. J. Romanes: Mental Evolution in Man, pp. 81-83, and references therein made. Prof. @@ -13589,27 +13584,27 @@ summary glimpses which we have of systems of relation and direction.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_241_241" id="Footnote_241_241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_241_241"><span class="label">[241]</span></a> Problems of Life and Mind, 3d Series, Problem iv, chapter 5. Compare +<p><a id="Footnote_241_241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_241_241"><span class="label">[241]</span></a> Problems of Life and Mind, 3d Series, Problem iv, chapter 5. Compare also Victor Egger: La Parole Intérieure (Paris, 1881), chap. vi.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_242_242" id="Footnote_242_242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_242_242"><span class="label">[242]</span></a> If but one person sees an apparition we consider it his private hallucination. +<p><a id="Footnote_242_242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_242_242"><span class="label">[242]</span></a> If but one person sees an apparition we consider it his private hallucination. If more than one, we begin to think it may be a real external presence.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_243_243" id="Footnote_243_243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_243_243"><span class="label">[243]</span></a> Revue Philosophique, vol. xxi, p. 671.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_243_243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_243_243"><span class="label">[243]</span></a> Revue Philosophique, vol. xxi, p. 671.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_244_244" id="Footnote_244_244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_244_244"><span class="label">[244]</span></a> Quoted from the Therapeutic Gazette, by the N. Y. Semi-weekly +<p><a id="Footnote_244_244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_244_244"><span class="label">[244]</span></a> Quoted from the Therapeutic Gazette, by the N. Y. Semi-weekly Evening Post for Nov. 2, 1886.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_245_245" id="Footnote_245_245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_245_245"><span class="label">[245]</span></a> In half-stunned states self-consciousness may lapse. A friend writes +<p><a id="Footnote_245_245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_245_245"><span class="label">[245]</span></a> In half-stunned states self-consciousness may lapse. A friend writes me: "We were driving back from —— in a wagonette. The door flew open and X., alias 'Baldy,' fell out on the road. We pulled up at once, and then he said, 'Did anybody fall out?' or 'Who fell out?'—I don't @@ -13618,7 +13613,7 @@ Baldy fall out? Poor Baldy!'"</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_246_246" id="Footnote_246_246"></a><a href="#FNanchor_246_246"><span class="label">[246]</span></a> Kant originated this view. I subjoin a few English statements of it. +<p><a id="Footnote_246_246"></a><a href="#FNanchor_246_246"><span class="label">[246]</span></a> Kant originated this view. I subjoin a few English statements of it. J. Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysic, Proposition i: "Along with whatever any intelligence knows it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some knowledge of itself." Sir Wm. Hamilton, Discussions, @@ -13638,16 +13633,16 @@ thought or intelligence."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_247_247" id="Footnote_247_247"></a><a href="#FNanchor_247_247"><span class="label">[247]</span></a> Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Lecture 45.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_247_247"></a><a href="#FNanchor_247_247"><span class="label">[247]</span></a> Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Lecture 45.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_248_248" id="Footnote_248_248"></a><a href="#FNanchor_248_248"><span class="label">[248]</span></a> Instead of saying <i>to our feeling only</i>, he should have said, to the <i>object</i> +<p><a id="Footnote_248_248"></a><a href="#FNanchor_248_248"><span class="label">[248]</span></a> Instead of saying <i>to our feeling only</i>, he should have said, to the <i>object</i> only.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_249_249" id="Footnote_249_249"></a><a href="#FNanchor_249_249"><span class="label">[249]</span></a> "There can be no difficulty in admitting that association does form +<p><a id="Footnote_249_249"></a><a href="#FNanchor_249_249"><span class="label">[249]</span></a> "There can be no difficulty in admitting that association does form the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals into one complex idea; because it is an acknowledged fact. Have we not the idea of an army? And is not that precisely the ideas of an indefinite number of men formed @@ -13656,11 +13651,11 @@ Edition), vol. i, p. 264.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_250_250" id="Footnote_250_250"></a><a href="#FNanchor_250_250"><span class="label">[250]</span></a> For their arguments, see above.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_250_250"></a><a href="#FNanchor_250_250"><span class="label">[250]</span></a> For their arguments, see above.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_251_251" id="Footnote_251_251"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251_251"><span class="label">[251]</span></a> I know there are readers whom nothing can convince that the thought +<p><a id="Footnote_251_251"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251_251"><span class="label">[251]</span></a> I know there are readers whom nothing can convince that the thought of a complex object has not as many parts as are discriminated in the object itself. Well, then, let the word parts pass. Only observe that these parts are not the separate 'ideas' of traditional psychology. No one of @@ -13675,16 +13670,16 @@ Each bubble, each thought, is a fresh organic unity, <i>sui generis</i>.</p></di <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_252_252" id="Footnote_252_252"></a><a href="#FNanchor_252_252"><span class="label">[252]</span></a> In his work, La Parole Intérieure (Paris, 1881), especially chapters +<p><a id="Footnote_252_252"></a><a href="#FNanchor_252_252"><span class="label">[252]</span></a> In his work, La Parole Intérieure (Paris, 1881), especially chapters vi and vii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_253_253" id="Footnote_253_253"></a><a href="#FNanchor_253_253"><span class="label">[253]</span></a> Page 301.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_253_253"></a><a href="#FNanchor_253_253"><span class="label">[253]</span></a> Page 301.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_254_254" id="Footnote_254_254"></a><a href="#FNanchor_254_254"><span class="label">[254]</span></a> Page 218. To prove this point, M. Egger appeals to the fact that we +<p><a id="Footnote_254_254"></a><a href="#FNanchor_254_254"><span class="label">[254]</span></a> Page 218. To prove this point, M. Egger appeals to the fact that we often hear some one speak whilst our mind is preoccupied, but do not understand him until some moments afterwards, when we suddenly 'realize' what he meant. Also to our digging out the meaning of a sentence in an @@ -13702,23 +13697,23 @@ normal cases the simultaneity, as he admits, is obviously there.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_255_255" id="Footnote_255_255"></a><a href="#FNanchor_255_255"><span class="label">[255]</span></a> A good way to get the words and the sense separately is to inwardly +<p><a id="Footnote_255_255"></a><a href="#FNanchor_255_255"><span class="label">[255]</span></a> A good way to get the words and the sense separately is to inwardly articulate word for word the discourse of another. One then finds that the meaning will often come to the mind in pulses, after clauses or sentences are finished.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_256_256" id="Footnote_256_256"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256_256"><span class="label">[256]</span></a> The nearest approach (with which I am acquainted) to the doctrine +<p><a id="Footnote_256_256"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256_256"><span class="label">[256]</span></a> The nearest approach (with which I am acquainted) to the doctrine set forth here is in O. Liebmaun's Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit, pp. 427-438.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X.</a></h5> <h4>THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF.</h4> @@ -13757,7 +13752,7 @@ ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels -cast down,—not necessarily in the same degree for each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> +cast down,—not necessarily in the same degree for each<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> thing, but in much the same way for all. Understanding the Self in this widest sense, we may begin by dividing the history of it into three parts, relating respectively to—</p> @@ -13769,7 +13764,7 @@ history of it into three parts, relating respectively to—</p> <p>3. The actions to which they prompt,—<i>Self-seeking and Self-preservation.</i></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>1. <i>The constituents of the Self</i> may be divided into two classes, those which make up respectively—</p> @@ -13792,7 +13787,7 @@ them that there are few of us who, if asked to choose between having a beautiful body clad in raiment perpetually shabby and unclean, and having an ugly and blemished form always spotlessly attired, would not hesitate a moment -before making a decisive reply.<a name="FNanchor_257_257" id="FNanchor_257_257"></a><a href="#Footnote_257_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> Next, our immediate +before making a decisive reply.<a id="FNanchor_257_257"></a><a href="#Footnote_257_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> Next, our immediate family is a part of ourselves. Our father and mother, our wife and babes, are bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. When they die, a part of our very selves is gone. @@ -13805,7 +13800,7 @@ in visiting it, finds fault with its arrangements or treats it with contempt. All these different things are the objects of instinctive preferences coupled with the most important practical interests of life. We all have a blind impulse -to watch over our body, to deck it with clothing of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> +to watch over our body, to deck it with clothing of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> an ornamental sort, to cherish parents, wife and babes, and to find for ourselves a home of our own which we may live in and 'improve.'</p> @@ -13835,7 +13830,7 @@ before whom, stiffen ourselves as we will by appealing to anti-snobbish first principles, we cannot escape an emotion, open or sneaking, of respect and dread.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>(<i>b</i>) <i>A man's Social Self</i> is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are not only gregarious animals, liking @@ -13848,7 +13843,7 @@ by all the members thereof. If no one turned round when we entered, answered when we spoke, or minded what we did, but if every person we met 'cut us dead,' and acted as if we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and impotent -despair would ere long well up in us, from which the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> +despair would ere long well up in us, from which the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> cruellest bodily tortures would be a relief; for these would make us feel that, however bad might be our plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of attention @@ -13857,7 +13852,7 @@ at all.</p> <p>Properly speaking, <i>a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him</i> and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his -images is to wound him.<a name="FNanchor_258_258" id="FNanchor_258_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_258_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> But as the individuals who +images is to wound him.<a id="FNanchor_258_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_258_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> But as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct <i>groups</i> of persons about whose opinion @@ -13889,7 +13884,7 @@ when it is recognized his contentment passes all bounds.</p> are names for one of his social selves. The particular social self of a man called his honor is usually the result of one of those splittings of which we have spoken. It is -his image in the eyes of his own 'set,' which exalts or condemns<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> +his image in the eyes of his own 'set,' which exalts or condemns<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> him as he conforms or not to certain requirements that may not be made of one in another walk of life. Thus a layman may abandon a city infected with cholera; but a @@ -13905,19 +13900,19 @@ different selves of this sort: "As a man I pity you, but as an official I must show you no mercy; as a politician I regard him as an ally, but as a moralist I loathe him;" etc., etc. What may be called 'club-opinion' is one of the very -strongest forces in life.<a name="FNanchor_259_259" id="FNanchor_259_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a> The thief must not steal from +strongest forces in life.<a id="FNanchor_259_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a> The thief must not steal from other thieves; the gambler must pay his gambling-debts, though he pay no other debts in the world. The code of honor of fashionable society has throughout history been full of permissions as well as of vetoes, the only reason for -following either of which is that so we best serve one of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> +following either of which is that so we best serve one of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> our social selves. You must not lie in general, but you may lie as much as you please if asked about your relations with a lady; you must accept a challenge from an equal, but if challenged by an inferior you may laugh him to scorn: these are examples of what is meant.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>(<i>c</i>) By the Spiritual Self, so far as it belongs to the Empirical Me, I mean a man's inner or subjective being, his @@ -13955,7 +13950,7 @@ of ourselves with it rather than with any of the objects which it reveals, is a momentous and in some respects a rather mysterious operation, of which we need here only say that as a matter of fact it exists; and that in everyone, -at an early age, the distinction between thought as such,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> +at an early age, the distinction between thought as such,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> and what it is 'of' or 'about,' has become familiar to the mind. The deeper grounds for this discrimination may possibly be hard to find; but superficial grounds are plenty @@ -13997,7 +13992,7 @@ thought may include, there is a spiritual something in him which seems to <i>go out</i> to meet these qualities and contents, whilst they seem to <i>come in</i> to be received by it. It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception -of sensations, and by giving or withholding its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> +of sensations, and by giving or withholding its<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> assent it influences the movements they tend to arouse. It is the home of interest,—not the pleasant or the painful, not even pleasure or pain, as such, but that within us to @@ -14040,7 +14035,7 @@ settle for ourselves as definitely as we can, just how this central nucleus of the Self may <i>feel</i>, no matter whether it be a spiritual substance or only a delusive word.</p> -<p>For this central part of the Self is <i>felt</i>. It may be all that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> +<p>For this central part of the Self is <i>felt</i>. It may be all that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> Transcendentalists say it is, and all that Empiricists say it is into the bargain, but it is at any rate no <i>mere ens rationis</i>, cognized only in an intellectual way, and no <i>mere</i> summation @@ -14083,7 +14078,7 @@ or no. This palpitating inward life is, in me, that central nucleus which I just tried to describe in terms that all men might use.</p> -<p>But when I forsake such general descriptions and grapple<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> +<p>But when I forsake such general descriptions and grapple<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> with particulars, coming to the closest possible quarters with the facts, <i>it is difficult for me to detect in the activity any purely spiritual element at all. Whenever my introspective @@ -14125,9 +14120,9 @@ a physical thing. In reasoning, I find that I am apt to have a kind of vaguely localized diagram in my mind, with the various fractional objects of the thought disposed at particular points thereof; and the oscillations of my attention -from one of them to another are most distinctly felt<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> +from one of them to another are most distinctly felt<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> as alternations of direction in movements occurring inside -the head.<a name="FNanchor_260_260" id="FNanchor_260_260"></a><a href="#Footnote_260_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a></p> +the head.<a id="FNanchor_260_260"></a><a href="#Footnote_260_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a></p> <p>In consenting and negating, and in making a mental effort, the movements seem more complex, and I find them @@ -14165,11 +14160,11 @@ the portions of my innermost activity of which I am <i>most distinctly aware</i>. If the dim portions which I cannot yet define should prove to be like unto these distinct portions in me, and I like other men, <i>it would follow that our entire -feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> +feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> <i>name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked.</i></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Now, without pledging ourselves in any way to adopt this hypothesis, let us dally with it for a while to see to what @@ -14208,14 +14203,14 @@ either approved or sent back. These primary reactions are like the opening or the closing of the door. In the midst of psychic change they are the permanent core of turnings-towards and turnings-from, of yieldings and -arrests, which naturally seem central and interior in comparison<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> +arrests, which naturally seem central and interior in comparison<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> with the foreign matters, <i>a propos</i> to which they occur, and hold a sort of arbitrating, decisive position, quite unlike that held by any of the other constituents of the Me. It would not be surprising, then, if we were to feel them as the birthplace of conclusions and the starting point of acts, or if they came to appear as what we called a while back -the 'sanctuary within the citadel' of our personal life.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_261_261" id="FNanchor_261_261"></a><a href="#Footnote_261_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a></p> +the 'sanctuary within the citadel' of our personal life.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span><a id="FNanchor_261_261"></a><a href="#Footnote_261_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a></p> <p>If they really were the innermost sanctuary, the <i>ultimate</i> one of all the selves whose being we can ever directly @@ -14257,12 +14252,12 @@ ulterior metaphysical inquiry.</p> only do they traverse common sense (which in philosophy is no insuperable objection) but they contradict the fundamental assumption of <i>every</i> philosophic school. Spiritualists, -transcendentalists, and empiricists alike admit in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> +transcendentalists, and empiricists alike admit in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> us a continual direct perception of the thinking activity in the concrete. However they may otherwise disagree, they vie with each other in the cordiality of their recognition of our <i>thoughts</i> as the one sort of existent which skepticism -cannot touch.<a name="FNanchor_262_262" id="FNanchor_262_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262_262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a> I will therefore treat the last few pages as +cannot touch.<a id="FNanchor_262_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262_262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a> I will therefore treat the last few pages as a parenthetical digression, and from now to the end of the volume revert to the path of common-sense again. I mean by this that I will continue to assume (as I have assumed @@ -14274,7 +14269,7 @@ volume, however, I may permit myself to revert again to the doubts here provisionally mooted, and will indulge in some metaphysical reflections suggested by them.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>At present, then, the only conclusion I come to is the following: That (in some persons at least) the part of the @@ -14301,7 +14296,7 @@ emotions of Self which they arouse.</p> <p>These are primarily <i>self-complacency</i> and <i>self-dissatisfaction</i>. -Of what is called 'self-love,' I will treat a little<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> +Of what is called 'self-love,' I will treat a little<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> farther on. Language has synonyms enough for both primary feelings. Thus pride, conceit, vanity, self-esteem, arrogance, vainglory, on the one hand; and on the other @@ -14337,9 +14332,9 @@ with powers that have uniformly brought him success, with place and wealth and friends and fame, is not likely to be visited by the morbid diffidences and doubts about himself which he had when he was a boy. "Is not this great -Babylon, which I have planted?"<a name="FNanchor_263_263" id="FNanchor_263_263"></a><a href="#Footnote_263_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> Whereas he who has +Babylon, which I have planted?"<a id="FNanchor_263_263"></a><a href="#Footnote_263_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> Whereas he who has made one blunder after another, and still lies in middle life -among the failures at the foot of the hill, is liable to grow<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> +among the failures at the foot of the hill, is liable to grow<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> all sicklied o'er with self-distrust, and to shrink from trials with which his powers can really cope.</p> @@ -14384,7 +14379,7 @@ of alimentation and defence are acts of bodily self-preservation. Fear and anger prompt to acts that are useful in the same way. Whilst if by self-seeking we mean the providing for the future as distinguished from maintaining -the present, we must class both anger and fear<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> +the present, we must class both anger and fear<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> with the hunting, the acquisitive, the home-constructing and the tool-constructing instincts, as impulses to self-seeking of the bodily kind. Really, however, these latter @@ -14426,7 +14421,7 @@ one of the most heartfelt expressions was: "The newspaper press of this land has a big bill to settle with thee, O Lord!"</p> <p>Not only the people but the places and things I know -enlarge my Self in a sort of metaphoric social way. "<i>Ça<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span> +enlarge my Self in a sort of metaphoric social way. "<i>Ça<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span> me connaît</i>," as the French workman says of the implement he can use well. So that it comes about that persons for whose <i>opinion</i> we care nothing are nevertheless persons @@ -14470,7 +14465,7 @@ African explorer, as well as a 'tone-poet' and saint. But the thing is simply impossible. The millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's; the <i>bon-vivant</i> and the philanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher -and the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> +and the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> tenement of clay. Such different characters may conceivably at the outset of life be alike <i>possible</i> to a man. But to make any one of them actual, the rest must more or less @@ -14511,9 +14506,9 @@ depends entirely on what we <i>back</i> ourselves to be and do. It is determined by the ratio of our actualities to our supposed potentialities; a fraction of which our pretensions are the denominator and the numerator our success: thus, -Self-esteem = Success/ Pretensions. Such a fraction may be increased<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> +Self-esteem = Success/ Pretensions. Such a fraction may be increased<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> as well by diminishing the denominator as by increasing the -numerator.<a name="FNanchor_264_264" id="FNanchor_264_264"></a><a href="#Footnote_264_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> To give up pretensions is as blessed a relief as +numerator.<a id="FNanchor_264_264"></a><a href="#Footnote_264_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> To give up pretensions is as blessed a relief as to get them gratified; and where disappointment is incessant, and the struggle unending, this is what men will always do. The history of evangelical theology, with its conviction of @@ -14546,7 +14541,7 @@ they touch some one of his potential or actual selves. Only thus can we, as a rule, get a 'purchase' on another's will. The first care of diplomatists and monarchs and all who wish to rule or influence is, accordingly, to find out their victim's -strongest principle of self-regard, so as to make that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> +strongest principle of self-regard, so as to make that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> fulcrum of all appeals. But if a man has given up those things which are subject to foreign fate, and ceased to regard them as parts of himself at all, we are well-nigh @@ -14567,7 +14562,7 @@ is performed. This matter belongs to the pilot. But the ship is sinking; what then have I to do? That which alone I can do—submit to being drowned without fear, without clamor or accusing of God, but as one who knows that -what is born must likewise die."<a name="FNanchor_265_265" id="FNanchor_265_265"></a><a href="#Footnote_265_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a></p> +what is born must likewise die."<a id="FNanchor_265_265"></a><a href="#Footnote_265_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a></p> <p>This Stoic fashion, though efficacious and heroic enough in its place and time, is, it must be confessed, only possible @@ -14584,8 +14579,8 @@ who treat them with indifference, people over whom they gain no influence, are people on whose existence, however meritorious it may intrinsically be, they look with chill negation, if not with positive hate. Who will not be mine -I will exclude from existence altogether; that is, as far as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> -I can make it so, such people shall be as if they were not.<a name="FNanchor_266_266" id="FNanchor_266_266"></a><a href="#Footnote_266_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> +I will exclude from existence altogether; that is, as far as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> +I can make it so, such people shall be as if they were not.<a id="FNanchor_266_266"></a><a href="#Footnote_266_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> Thus may a certain absoluteness and definiteness in the outline of my Me console me for the smallness of its content.</p> @@ -14613,7 +14608,7 @@ wishest," has a self from which every trace of negativeness and obstructiveness has been removed—no wind can blow except to fill its sails.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>A tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the different selves of which a man may be 'seized and possessed,' and @@ -14622,7 +14617,7 @@ the consequent different orders of his self-regard, in an spiritual Self at top, and the extracorporeal material selves and the various social selves between</i>. Our merely natural self-seeking would lead us to aggrandize all these selves; -we give up deliberately only those among them which we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> +we give up deliberately only those among them which we<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> find we cannot keep. Our unselfishness is thus apt to be a 'virtue of necessity'; and it is not without all show of reason that cynics quote the fable of the fox and the grapes in @@ -14664,7 +14659,7 @@ wider material selves are regarded as higher than the immediate body. He is esteemed a poor creature who is unable to forego a little meat and drink and warmth and sleep for the sake of getting on in the world. The social -self as a whole, again, ranks higher than the material self<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> +self as a whole, again, ranks higher than the material self<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> as a whole. We must care more for our honor, our friends, our human ties, than for a sound skin or wealth. And the spiritual self is so supremely precious that, rather than @@ -14703,7 +14698,7 @@ me, to know nothing about me when I am dead and gone. Yet still the emotion that beckons me on is indubitably the pursuit of an ideal social self, of a self that is at least <i>worthy</i> of approving recognition by the highest <i>possible</i> -judging companion, if such companion there be.<a name="FNanchor_267_267" id="FNanchor_267_267"></a><a href="#Footnote_267_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> +judging companion, if such companion there be.<a id="FNanchor_267_267"></a><a href="#Footnote_267_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> This<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> self is the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the permanent Me which I seek. This judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the 'Great Companion.' We hear, in these days of @@ -14738,7 +14733,7 @@ it are possibly the most <i>religious</i> men. But I am sure that even those who say they are altogether without it deceive themselves, and really have it in some degree. Only a non-gregarious animal could be completely without it. -Probably no one can make sacrifices for 'right,' without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> +Probably no one can make sacrifices for 'right,' without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> to some degree personifying the principle of right for which the sacrifice is made, and expecting thanks from it. <i>Complete</i> social unselfishness, in other words, can hardly @@ -14778,7 +14773,7 @@ that is regular in the life of the Self in man.</p> self-seeking a little more delicately from within.</p> <p>A man in whom self-seeking of any sort is largely -developed is said to be selfish.<a name="FNanchor_268_268" id="FNanchor_268_268"></a><a href="#Footnote_268_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a> He is on the other hand<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> +developed is said to be selfish.<a id="FNanchor_268_268"></a><a href="#Footnote_268_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a> He is on the other hand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> called unselfish if he shows consideration for the interests of other selves than his own. Now what is the intimate <i>nature</i> of the selfish emotion in him? and what is the primary @@ -14813,7 +14808,7 @@ if my regard for my own body even were an interest not simply in this body, but in this body only so far as it is mine.</p> -<p>But what is this abstract numerical principle of identity,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> +<p>But what is this abstract numerical principle of identity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> this 'Number One' within me, for which, according to proverbial philosophy, I am supposed to keep so constant a 'lookout'? Is it the inner nucleus of my spiritual self, that @@ -14854,7 +14849,7 @@ in detail.</p> <p>The most palpable selfishness of a man is his bodily selfishness; and his most palpable self is the body to which that selfishness relates. Now I say that he identifies himself -with this body because he loves <i>it</i>, and that he does<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> +with this body because he loves <i>it</i>, and that he does<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> not love it because he finds it to be identified with himself. Reverting to natural history-psychology will help us to see the truth of this. In the chapter on Instincts we shall @@ -14895,7 +14890,7 @@ They need neither know nor care for any pure principle within. In fact the more utterly 'selfish' I am in this primitive way, the more blindly absorbed my thought will be in the objects and impulses of my lusts, and the more -devoid of any inward looking glance. A baby, whose consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> +devoid of any inward looking glance. A baby, whose consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> of the pure Ego, of himself as a thinker, is not usually supposed developed, is, in this way, as some German has said, '<i>der vollendeteste Egoist</i>.' His corporeal person, @@ -14937,7 +14932,7 @@ change. But the pride and shame which I feel are not concerned merely with <i>those</i> changes. I feel as if something else had changed too, when I perceive my image in your mind to have changed for the worse, something in me -to which that image belongs, and which a moment ago I felt<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> +to which that image belongs, and which a moment ago I felt<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> inside of me, big and strong and lusty, but now weak, contracted, and collapsed. Is not this latter change the change I feel the shame about? Is not the condition of this thing @@ -14978,7 +14973,7 @@ quite as reflex and immediate, to another sort of behavior, which the bystanders call 'shame-faced' and which they consider due to another kind of self-regard. But in both cases there may be no particular self <i>regarded</i> at all by the -mind: and the name self-regard may be only a descriptive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> +mind: and the name self-regard may be only a descriptive<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> title imposed from without the reflex acts themselves, and the feelings that immediately result from their discharge.</p> @@ -15022,7 +15017,7 @@ finally its spiritual dispositions,</i> <span class="smcap">must</span> <i>be th begin with, must have a certain minimum of selfishness in the shape of instincts of bodily self-seeking in order to exist. This minimum must be there as a basis for all farther conscious -acts, whether of self-negation or of a selfishness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> +acts, whether of self-negation or of a selfishness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> more subtle still. All minds must have come, by the way of the survival of the fittest, if by no directer path, to take an intense interest in the bodies to which they are yoked, @@ -15065,16 +15060,16 @@ my friend dies, and where he goes I feel that part of myself now is and evermore shall be:</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"For this losing is true dying;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">This is lordly man's down-lying;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">This his slow but sure reclining,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Star by star his world resigning."</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"For this losing is true dying;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">This is lordly man's down-lying;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">This his slow but sure reclining,</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Star by star his world resigning."</span><br > </p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span></p> <p>The fact remains, however, that certain special sorts of thing tend primordially to possess this interest, and form the <i>natural</i> me. But all these things are <i>objects</i>, properly -so called, to the subject which does the thinking.<a name="FNanchor_269_269" id="FNanchor_269_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_269_269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a> And +so called, to the subject which does the thinking.<a id="FNanchor_269_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_269_269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a> And this latter fact upsets at once the dictum of the old-fashioned sensationalist psychology, that altruistic passions and interests are contradictory to the nature of things, and @@ -15104,13 +15099,13 @@ co-ordinate. They arise, so far as we can tell, on the same psychologic level. The only difference between them is, that the instincts called egoistic form much the larger mass.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The only author whom I know to have discussed the question whether the 'pure Ego,' <i>per se</i>, can be an object of regard, is Herr Horwicz, in his extremely able and acute <i>Psychologische Analysen</i>. He too says that all self-regard -is regard for certain objective things. He disposes so well<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> +is regard for certain objective things. He disposes so well<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> of one kind of objection that I must conclude by quoting a part of his own words:</p> @@ -15167,7 +15162,7 @@ one's self is heard and understood better than when it is played by another. We get more exactly all the details, penetrate more deeply into the musical thought. We may meanwhile perceive perfectly well that the other person is the better performer, and yet nevertheless—at times—get -more enjoyment from our own playing because it brings the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> +more enjoyment from our own playing because it brings the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> melody and harmony so much nearer home to us. This case may almost be taken as typical for the other cases of self-love. On close examination, we shall almost always find that a great part of our feeling about @@ -15191,7 +15186,7 @@ by ourselves. What greets our eyes is what we know best, most deeply understand; because we ourselves have felt it and lived through it. We know what has ploughed these furrows, deepened these shadows, blanched this hair; and other faces may be handsomer, but none can -speak to us or interest us like this."<a name="FNanchor_270_270" id="FNanchor_270_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_270_270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a></p></blockquote> +speak to us or interest us like this."<a id="FNanchor_270_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_270_270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Moreover, this author goes on to show that our own things are <i>fuller</i> for us than those of others because of the @@ -15206,12 +15201,12 @@ these things the name of 'self' may be given, or to our conduct towards them the name of 'selfishness,' but neither in the self nor the selfishness does the pure Thinker play the 'title-role.'</i></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Only one more point connected with our self-regard need be mentioned. We have spoken of it so far as active instinct or emotion. It remains to speak of it as cold <i>intellectual -self-estimation</i>. We may weigh our own Me in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> +self-estimation</i>. We may weigh our own Me in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> balance of praise and blame as easily as we weigh other people,—though with difficulty quite as fairly. The <i>just</i> man is the one who can weigh himself impartially. Impartial @@ -15233,7 +15228,7 @@ merely one application of intellectual comparison, it need no longer detain us here. Please note again, however, how the pure Ego appears merely as the vehicle in which the estimation is carried on, the objects estimated being all of -them facts of an empirical sort,<a name="FNanchor_271_271" id="FNanchor_271_271"></a><a href="#Footnote_271_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> one's body, one's credit,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> +them facts of an empirical sort,<a id="FNanchor_271_271"></a><a href="#Footnote_271_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> one's body, one's credit,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> one' fame, one's intellectual ability, one's goodness, or whatever the case may be.</p> @@ -15244,21 +15239,53 @@ whatever the case may be.</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">MATERIAL.</td><td align="left">SOCIAL.</td><td align="left">SPIRITUAL.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">SELF-SEEKING.</td><td align="left">Bodily Appetites and Instincts</td><td align="left">Desire to please, be noticed, admired, etc.</td><td align="left">Intellectual, Moral and Religious Aspiration, Conscientiousness.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Love of Adornment, Foppery, Acquisitiveness, Constructiveness.</td><td align="left">Sociability, Emulation, Envy, Love, Pursuit of Honor, Ambition, etc.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Love of Home, etc.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">SELF-ESTIMATION.</td><td align="left">Personal Vanity, Modesty, etc.</td><td align="left">Social and Family Pride, Vainglory, Snobbery, Humility, Shame, etc.</td><td align="left">Sense of Moral or Mental Superiority, Purity, etc.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Pride of Wealth, Fear of Poverty</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Sense of Inferiority or of Guilt</td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 2px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">MATERIAL.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">SOCIAL.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">SPIRITUAL.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">SELF-SEEKING.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Bodily Appetites and Instincts</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Desire to please, be noticed, admired, etc.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Intellectual, Moral and Religious Aspiration, Conscientiousness.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Love of Adornment, Foppery, Acquisitiveness, Constructiveness.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Sociability, Emulation, Envy, Love, Pursuit of Honor, Ambition, etc.</td> +<td> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Love of Home, etc.</td> +<td> </td> +<td> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td colspan="4"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">SELF-ESTIMATION.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Personal Vanity, Modesty, etc.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Social and Family Pride, Vainglory, Snobbery, Humility, Shame, etc.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Sense of Moral or Mental Superiority, Purity, etc.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Pride of Wealth, Fear of Poverty</td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Sense of Inferiority or of Guilt</td> +</tr> </table></div> <h4>THE PURE EGO.</h4> <p>Having summed up in the above table the principal -results of the chapter thus far, I have said all that need<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> +results of the chapter thus far, I have said all that need<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> be said of the constituents of the phenomenal self, and of the nature of self-regard. Our decks are consequently cleared for the struggle with that pure principle of personal @@ -15285,7 +15312,7 @@ the matter will be to take up first—</p> <p>In the last chapter it was stated in as radical a way as possible that the thoughts which we actually know to exist -do not fly about loose, but seem each to belong to some one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> +do not fly about loose, but seem each to belong to some one<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> thinker and not to another. Each thought, out of a multitude of other thoughts of which it may think, is able to distinguish those which belong to its own Ego from those @@ -15322,11 +15349,11 @@ of judging that they do not <i>belong</i> together. This sort of <i>subjective synthesis</i>, essential to knowledge as such (whenever it has a complex object), must not be confounded with <i>objective synthesis</i> or union instead of difference or disconnection, -known among the things.<a name="FNanchor_272_272" id="FNanchor_272_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_272_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a> The subjective synthesis<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> +known among the things.<a id="FNanchor_272_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_272_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a> The subjective synthesis<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> thesis is involved in thought's mere existence. Even a really disconnected world could only be <i>known</i> to be such by having its parts temporarily united in the Object of some -pulse of consciousness.<a name="FNanchor_273_273" id="FNanchor_273_273"></a><a href="#Footnote_273_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a></p> +pulse of consciousness.<a id="FNanchor_273_273"></a><a href="#Footnote_273_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a></p> <p>The sense of personal identity is not, then, this mere synthetic form essential to all thought. It is the sense of a @@ -15347,7 +15374,7 @@ lay. Let us now be the psychologist and see whether it be right or wrong when it says, <i>I am the same self that I was yesterday</i>.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>We may immediately call it right and intelligible so far as it posits a past time with past thoughts or selves contained @@ -15355,7 +15382,7 @@ therein—these were data which we assumed at the outset of the book. Right also and intelligible so far as it thinks of a present self—that present self we have just studied in its various forms. The only question for us is -as to what the consciousness may mean when it calls the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span> +as to what the consciousness may mean when it calls the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span> present self the <i>same</i> with one of the past selves which it has in mind.</p> @@ -15398,7 +15425,7 @@ consequence, we shall assimilate them to each other and to the warm and intimate self we now feel within us as we think, and separate them as a collection from whatever selves have not this mark, much as out of a herd of cattle -let loose for the winter on some wide western prairie the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> +let loose for the winter on some wide western prairie the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> owner picks out and sorts together when the time for the round-up comes in the spring, all the beasts on which he finds his own particular brand.</p> @@ -15441,7 +15468,7 @@ respect; or on the continuity before the mind, of the phenomena compared.</i></p> <p>And it must not be taken to mean more than these -grounds warrant, or treated as a sort of metaphysical or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> +grounds warrant, or treated as a sort of metaphysical or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> absolute Unity in which all differences are overwhelmed. The past and present selves compared are the same just so far as they <i>are</i> the same, and no farther. A uniform feeling @@ -15481,7 +15508,7 @@ It is the same with certain of our dimly-recollected experiences. We hardly know whether to appropriate them or to disown them as fancies, or things read or heard and not lived through. Their animal heat has evaporated; the feelings -that accompanied them are so lacking in the recall, or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> +that accompanied them are so lacking in the recall, or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> so different from those we now enjoy, that no judgment of identity can be decisively cast.</p> @@ -15520,14 +15547,14 @@ taken so much of the meaning of personal identity out of the clouds and made of the Self an empirical and verifiable thing.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>But in leaving the matter here, and saying that this sum of passing things is all, these writers have neglected certain more subtle aspects of the Unity of Consciousness, to which we next must turn.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span></p> <p>Our recent simile of the herd of cattle will help us. It will be remembered that the beasts were brought together @@ -15568,7 +15595,7 @@ the beasts are driven and by which they are held. The beasts stick together by sticking severally to him. Just so, common-sense insists, there must be a real proprietor in the case of the selves, or else their actual accretion into a -'personal consciousness' would never have taken place.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> +'personal consciousness' would never have taken place.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> To the usual empiricist explanation of personal consciousness this is a formidable reproof, because all the individual thoughts and feelings which have succeeded each other 'up @@ -15610,7 +15637,7 @@ or a resemblance, as in our account, but a <i>real unity</i>? Common-sense in fact would drive us to admit what we may for the moment call an Arch-Ego, dominating the entire stream of thought and all the selves that may be -represented in it, as the ever self-same and changeless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> +represented in it, as the ever self-same and changeless<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> principle implied in their union. The 'Soul' of Metaphysics and the 'Transcendental Ego' of the Kantian Philosophy, are, as we shall soon see, but attempts to satisfy @@ -15652,12 +15679,12 @@ both up into <i>its</i> consciousness and passed them to a third, until the last ball held all that the other balls had held, and realized it as its own. It is this trick which the nascent thought has of immediately taking up the expiring -thought and 'adopting' it, which is the foundation of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> +thought and 'adopting' it, which is the foundation of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> appropriation of most of the remoter constituents of the self. Who owns the last self owns the self before the last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>It is impossible to discover any <i>verifiable</i> features in personal identity, which this sketch does not contain, impossible @@ -15695,7 +15722,7 @@ choices it makes are these appropriations, or repudiations, of its 'own.' But the Thought never is an object in its own hands, it never appropriates or disowns itself. It appropriates <i>to</i> itself, it is the actual focus of accretion, the hook -from which the chain of past selves dangles, planted firmly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> +from which the chain of past selves dangles, planted firmly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> in the Present, which alone passes for real, and thus keeping the chain from being a purely ideal thing. Anon the hook itself will drop into the past with all it carries, and @@ -15718,7 +15745,7 @@ parts of the Self are assimilated, accreted, and knit on; and even were Thought entirely unconscious of itself in the act of thinking, these 'warm' parts of its present object would be a firm basis on which the consciousness -of personal identity would rest.<a name="FNanchor_274_274" id="FNanchor_274_274"></a><a href="#Footnote_274_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a> Such consciousness, then,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> +of personal identity would rest.<a id="FNanchor_274_274"></a><a href="#Footnote_274_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a> Such consciousness, then,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> as a psychologic fact, can be fully described without supposing any other agent than a succession of perishing thoughts, endowed with the functions of appropriation and @@ -15727,7 +15754,7 @@ reject objects already known, appropriated, or rejected by the rest.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 375px;"> -<img src="images/jame_342_0032.jpg" width="375" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_342_0032.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 375px"> <div class="caption"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 34.</div> </div> @@ -15742,7 +15769,7 @@ same brain, on which each experience in passing leaves its mark, might very well engender thoughts differing from each other in just such a way as this.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The passing Thought then seems to be the Thinker; and though there <i>may</i> be another non-phenomenal Thinker @@ -15770,7 +15797,7 @@ next proceed. They are three in number, as follows:</p> <p>In <a href="#CHAPTER_VI">Chapter VI</a> we were led ourselves to the spiritualist theory of the 'Soul,' as a means of escape from the unintelligibilities -of mind-stuff 'integrating' with itself, and from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> +of mind-stuff 'integrating' with itself, and from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> the physiological improbability of a material monad, with thought attached to it, in the brain. But at the end of the chapter we said we should examine the 'Soul' critically in @@ -15813,7 +15840,7 @@ not as something of an altogether different kind. The Soul then exists as a simple spiritual substance in which the various psychic faculties, operations, and affections inhere.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span></p> <p>If we ask what a Substance is, the only answer is that it is a self-existent being, or one which needs no other subject @@ -15856,7 +15883,7 @@ The unity, the identity, the individuality, and the immateriality that appear in the psychic life are thus accounted for as phenomenal and temporal facts exclusively, and with no need of reference to any more simple or substantial agent -than the present Thought or 'section' of the stream. We<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> +than the present Thought or 'section' of the stream. We<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> have seen it to be single and unique in the sense of having no <i>separable</i> parts (above, <a href="#Page_239">p. 239</a> ff.)—perhaps that is the only kind of simplicity meant to be predicated of the soul. The @@ -15897,7 +15924,7 @@ meaning has the Soul, when scrutinized, but the <i>ground of possibility</i> of the thought? And what is the 'knocking' but the <i>determining of the possibility to actuality</i>? And what is this after all but giving a sort of concreted form to one's belief -that the coming of the thought, when the brain-processes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> +that the coming of the thought, when the brain-processes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> occur, has <i>some</i> sort of ground in the nature of things? If the world Soul be understood merely to express that claim, it is a good word to use. But if it be held to do more, @@ -15938,7 +15965,7 @@ like our 'Thought' as in a permanent one like the supposed Soul. The same is true of the argument from the kinds of things cognized. Even if the brain could not cognize universal, immaterials, or its 'Self,' still the 'Thought' which -we have relied upon in our account <i>is</i> not the brain, closely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> +we have relied upon in our account <i>is</i> not the brain, closely<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> as it seems connected with it; and after all, if the brain could cognize at all, one does not well see why it might not cognize one sort of thing as well as another. The great difficulty @@ -15961,7 +15988,7 @@ whose great maxim, according to Dr. Hodgson, is: "Whatever you are <i>totally</i> ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else."</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Locke and Kant, whilst still believing in the soul, began the work of undermining the notion that we know anything @@ -15981,7 +16008,7 @@ conscious of the existence of mind. It is only by the exertion of its own powers that the mind becomes cognizant of their existence. The cognizance of its powers, however, gives us no knowledge of that essence of which they are -predicated. In these respects our knowledge of mind is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> +predicated. In these respects our knowledge of mind is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> precisely analogous to our knowledge of matter." This analogy of our two ignorances is a favorite remark in the Scotch school. It is but a step to lump them together @@ -16024,7 +16051,7 @@ essentially teleological. We believe ourselves immortal because we believe ourselves <i>fit</i> for immortality. A 'substance' ought surely to perish, we think, if not worthy to survive; and an insubstantial 'stream' to prolong itself, -provided it be worthy, if the nature of Things is organized<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> +provided it be worthy, if the nature of Things is organized<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> in the rational way in which we trust it is. Substance or no substance, soul or 'stream,' what Lotze says of immortality is about all that human wisdom can say:</p> @@ -16038,7 +16065,7 @@ whilst every one will pass away whose reality is justified only in a transitory phase of the world's course. That this principle admits of no further application in human hands need hardly be said. <i>We</i> surely know not the merits which may give to one being a claim on eternity, -nor the defects which would cut others off."<a name="FNanchor_275_275" id="FNanchor_275_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a></p></blockquote> +nor the defects which would cut others off."<a id="FNanchor_275_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a></p></blockquote> <p>A second alleged necessity for a soul-substance is our forensic responsibility before God. Locke caused an uproar @@ -16058,7 +16085,7 @@ however, who are less insatiate for retribution than their grandfathers, this argument will hardly be as convincing as it seems once to have been.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>One great use of the Soul has always been to account for, and at the same time to guarantee, the closed individuality @@ -16067,7 +16094,7 @@ soul must unite into one self, it was supposed, and must be eternally insulated from those of every other soul. But we have already begun to see that, although unity is the rule of each man's consciousness, yet in some individuals, at least, -thoughts may split away from the others and form separate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> +thoughts may split away from the others and form separate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> selves. As for insulation, it would be rash, in view of the phenomena of thought-transference, mesmeric influence and spirit-control, which are being alleged nowadays on @@ -16081,7 +16108,7 @@ long as our self, on the whole, makes itself good and practically maintains itself as a closed individual, why, as Lotze says, is not that enough? And why is the <i>being</i>-an-individual in some inaccessible metaphysical way so much prouder -an achievement?<a name="FNanchor_276_276" id="FNanchor_276_276"></a><a href="#Footnote_276_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a></p> +an achievement?<a id="FNanchor_276_276"></a><a href="#Footnote_276_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a></p> <p>My final conclusion, then, about the substantial Soul is that it explains nothing and guarantees nothing. Its successive @@ -16109,7 +16136,7 @@ have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes.</p> <p>Locke paved the way for it by the hypothesis he suggested -of the same substance having two successive consciousnesses,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> +of the same substance having two successive consciousnesses,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> or of the same consciousness being supported by more than one substance. He made his readers feel that the <i>important</i> unity of the Self was its verifiable and @@ -16159,7 +16186,7 @@ collection of different perceptions</i>, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses -and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> +and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away and mingle in an infinite @@ -16202,8 +16229,8 @@ mind perceive some real connection</i> among them, there would be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding, I pretend not, however, to pronounce it insuperable. Others, perhaps,... -may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile these contradictions."<a name="FNanchor_277_277" id="FNanchor_277_277"></a><a href="#Footnote_277_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span></p> +may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile these contradictions."<a id="FNanchor_277_277"></a><a href="#Footnote_277_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span></p> <p>Hume is at bottom as much of a metaphysician as Thomas Aquinas. No wonder he can discover no 'hypothesis.' The unity of the parts of the stream is just as 'real' @@ -16218,7 +16245,7 @@ Hume seeks 'the world behind the looking glass,' and gives a striking example of that Absolutism which is the great disease of philosophic Thought.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The chain of distinct existences into which Hume thus chopped up our 'stream' was adopted by all of his successors @@ -16242,10 +16269,10 @@ in a series of discrete ideas and feelings a knowledge was somehow supposed to be engendered in each feeling that it <i>was</i> recurrent and resembling, and that it helped to form a series to whose unity the name <i>I</i> came to -be joined. In the same way, substantially, Herbart,<a name="FNanchor_278_278" id="FNanchor_278_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278_278" class="fnanchor">[278]</a> in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> +be joined. In the same way, substantially, Herbart,<a id="FNanchor_278_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278_278" class="fnanchor">[278]</a> in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> Germany, tried to show how a conflict of ideas would fuse into a <i>manner of representing itself</i> for which <i>I</i> was the consecrated -name.<a name="FNanchor_279_279" id="FNanchor_279_279"></a><a href="#Footnote_279_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a></p> +name.<a id="FNanchor_279_279"></a><a href="#Footnote_279_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a></p> <p>The defect of all these attempts is that the conclusion pretended to follow from certain premises is by no means @@ -16283,7 +16310,7 @@ avowedly to have postulated in the form of a present lack of discernment or are undiscerning themselves.</p> <p>Mr. D. G. Thompson is the only associationist writer I -know who perfectly escapes this confusion, and <i>postulates</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> +know who perfectly escapes this confusion, and <i>postulates</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> openly what he needs. "All states of consciousness," he says, "imply and postulate a subject Ego, whose substance is unknown and unknowable, to which [why not say @@ -16291,7 +16318,7 @@ is unknown and unknowable, to which [why not say but which in the process of reference becomes objectified and becomes itself an attribute of a subject Ego which lies still beyond, and which ever eludes cognition -though ever postulated for cognition."<a name="FNanchor_280_280" id="FNanchor_280_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280_280" class="fnanchor">[280]</a> This is exactly +though ever postulated for cognition."<a id="FNanchor_280_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280_280" class="fnanchor">[280]</a> This is exactly our judging and remembering present 'Thought,' described in less simple terms.</p> @@ -16299,7 +16326,7 @@ in less simple terms.</p> credit for seeking to be as clear as they can. Taine tells us in the first volume of his 'Intelligence' what the Ego <i>is</i>,—a continuous web of conscious events no more really distinct -from each other<a name="FNanchor_281_281" id="FNanchor_281_281"></a><a href="#Footnote_281_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a> than rhomboids, triangles, and +from each other<a id="FNanchor_281_281"></a><a href="#Footnote_281_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a> than rhomboids, triangles, and squares marked with chalk on a plank are really distinct, for the plank itself is one. In the second volume he <i>says</i> all these parts have a common character embedded in them, @@ -16320,8 +16347,8 @@ thoughts, the entire 'plank,' is the reflecting psychologist.</p> ideas beginning with that of my past self and ending with that of my present self, defines my Self as a train of ideas of which Memory declares the first to be continuously -connected with the last. The successive associated ideas<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> -'run, as it were, into a single point of consciousness.<a name="FNanchor_282_282" id="FNanchor_282_282"></a><a href="#Footnote_282_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a> +connected with the last. The successive associated ideas<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> +'run, as it were, into a single point of consciousness.<a id="FNanchor_282_282"></a><a href="#Footnote_282_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a> John Mill, annotating this account, says:</p> <blockquote> @@ -16364,8 +16391,8 @@ spiritual self' now actually felt] and a different person from those who had any of the parallel successions of feelings; and this bond, to me, constitutes my Ego. Here I think the question must rest, until some psychologist succeeds better than anyone else has done, in showing a -mode in which the analysis can be carried further."<a name="FNanchor_283_283" id="FNanchor_283_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_283_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span></p> +mode in which the analysis can be carried further."<a id="FNanchor_283_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_283_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span></p> <p>The reader must judge of our own success in carrying the analysis farther. The various distinctions we have made are all parts of an endeavor so to do. John Mill himself, @@ -16398,12 +16425,12 @@ nothing of it except the states of consciousness themselves. The feelings or consciousnesses which belong or have belonged to it, and its possibilities of having more, are the only facts there are to be asserted of Self—the only positive attributes, except permanence, which we can -ascribe to it."<a name="FNanchor_284_284" id="FNanchor_284_284"></a><a href="#Footnote_284_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a></p></blockquote> +ascribe to it."<a id="FNanchor_284_284"></a><a href="#Footnote_284_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Mr. Mill's habitual method of philosophizing was to affirm boldly some general doctrine derived from his father, and then make so many concessions of detail to its enemies -as practically to abandon it altogether.<a name="FNanchor_285_285" id="FNanchor_285_285"></a><a href="#Footnote_285_285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a> In this place the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> +as practically to abandon it altogether.<a id="FNanchor_285_285"></a><a href="#Footnote_285_285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a> In this place the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> concessions amount, so far as they are intelligible, to the admission of something very like the Soul. This 'inexplicable tie' which connects the feelings, this 'something @@ -16418,7 +16445,7 @@ blunder as Hume: the sensations <i>per se</i>, he thinks, have no 'tie.' The tie of resemblance and continuity which the remembering Thought finds among them is not a 'real tie' but 'a mere product of the laws of thought;' and the -fact that the present Thought 'appropriates' them is also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> +fact that the present Thought 'appropriates' them is also<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> no real tie. But whereas Hume was contented to say that there might after all <i>be</i> no 'real tie,' Mill, unwilling to admit this possibility, is driven, like any scholastic, to place it @@ -16434,7 +16461,7 @@ which were the only baggage it was willing to take along. One must <i>beg</i> memory, knowledge on the part of the feelings of something outside themselves. That granted, every other true thing follows naturally, and it is hard to go -astray. The knowledge the present feeling has of the past<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span> +astray. The knowledge the present feeling has of the past<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span> ones is a real tie between them, so is their resemblance; so is their continuity; so is the one's 'appropriation' of the other: all are real ties, realized in the judging @@ -16471,12 +16498,12 @@ him, from a view of the <i>Object</i> essentially like our own description of it on <a href="#Page_275">p. 275</a> ff., that is, it is a system of things, qualities or facts in relation. "<i>Object</i> is that in the knowledge (Begriff) of which the Manifold of a given Perception -is connected."<a name="FNanchor_286_286" id="FNanchor_286_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_286_286" class="fnanchor">[286]</a> But whereas we simply begged the vehicle +is connected."<a id="FNanchor_286_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_286_286" class="fnanchor">[286]</a> But whereas we simply begged the vehicle of this connected knowledge in the shape of what we call the present Thought, or section of the Stream of Consciousness (which we declared to be the ultimate fact for psychology), Kant denies this to be an ultimate fact -and insists on analyzing it into a large number of distinct,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> +and insists on analyzing it into a large number of distinct,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> though equally essential, elements. The 'Manifoldness' of the Object is due to Sensibility, which <i>per se</i> is chaotic, and the unity is due to the synthetic handling which this @@ -16499,7 +16526,7 @@ faculty, but by nature 'empty.' And the bringing of this material 'under the unity of Apperception' is explained by Kant to mean the thinking it always so that, whatever its other determinations be, it may be known as -<i>thought by me</i>.<a name="FNanchor_287_287" id="FNanchor_287_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_287_287" class="fnanchor">[287]</a> Though this consciousness, that <i>I think +<i>thought by me</i>.<a id="FNanchor_287_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_287_287" class="fnanchor">[287]</a> Though this consciousness, that <i>I think it</i>, need not be at every moment explicitly realized, it is always <i>capable</i> of being realized. For if an object <i>incapable</i> of being combined with the idea of a thinker were there, @@ -16510,7 +16537,7 @@ form part of 'experience' at all?</p> No connected consciousness of anything without that of <i>Self</i> as its presupposition and 'transcendental' condition! All things, then, so far as they are intelligible at all, -are so through combination with pure consciousness of <i>Self</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> +are so through combination with pure consciousness of <i>Self</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> and apart from this, at least potential, combination nothing is knowable <i>to us</i> at all.</p> @@ -16553,7 +16580,7 @@ of space as well as time.</p> <p>Those purposes go no farther than to ascertain whether anything in Kant's conception ought to make us give up our -own, of a remembering and appropriating Thought incessantly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span> +own, of a remembering and appropriating Thought incessantly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span> renewed. In many respects Kant's meaning is obscure, but it will not be necessary for us to squeeze the texts in order to make sure what it actually and historically @@ -16598,7 +16625,7 @@ latter and not in the former member of the couple of related terms. The parts and their relations surely belong less to the knower than to what is known.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span></p> <p>But even were all the mythology true, the process of synthesis would in no whit be <i>explained</i> by calling the inside @@ -16630,7 +16657,7 @@ using it instead of our own term of the present passing 'Thought,' as the principle by which the Many is simultaneously known.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The <i>ambiguity</i> referred to in the meaning of the transcendental Ego is as to whether Kant signified by it an @@ -16642,11 +16669,11 @@ Ego and Manifold must both be existent prior to that collision which results in the experience of one by the other. If a mere analysis is meant, there is no such prior existence, and the elements only <i>are</i> in so far as they are in union. -Now Kant's tone and language are everywhere the very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> +Now Kant's tone and language are everywhere the very<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> words of one who is talking of operations and the agents -by which they are performed.<a name="FNanchor_288_288" id="FNanchor_288_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a> And yet there is reason to +by which they are performed.<a id="FNanchor_288_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a> And yet there is reason to think that at bottom he may have had nothing of the sort -in mind.<a name="FNanchor_289_289" id="FNanchor_289_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a> In this uncertainty we need again do no more +in mind.<a id="FNanchor_289_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a> In this uncertainty we need again do no more than decide what to think of his transcendental Ego <i>if it be</i> an agent.</p> @@ -16677,7 +16704,7 @@ however, I am uncertain of the facts of history, and know that I may not read my authors aright. The whole lesson of Kantian and post-Kantian speculation is, it seems to me, the lesson of simplicity. With Kant, complication both of -thought and statement was an inborn infirmity, enhanced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span> +thought and statement was an inborn infirmity, enhanced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span> by the musty academicism of his Königsberg existence. With Hegel it was a raging fever. Terribly, therefore, do the sour grapes which these fathers of philosophy have @@ -16688,7 +16715,7 @@ come; and, unable to find any definite psychology in what Hegel, Rosenkranz, or Erdmann tells us of the Ego, I turn to Caird and Green.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The great difference, practically, between these authors and Kant is their complete abstraction from the onlooking @@ -16706,7 +16733,7 @@ only provisionally and speciously the limited thing which it seems <i>prima facie</i> to be. The later 'sections' of our 'Stream,' which come and appropriate the earlier ones, <i>are</i> those earlier ones, just as in substantialism the Soul is -throughout all time the same.<a name="FNanchor_290_290" id="FNanchor_290_290"></a><a href="#Footnote_290_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a> This 'solipsistic' character<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> +throughout all time the same.<a id="FNanchor_290_290"></a><a href="#Footnote_290_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a> This 'solipsistic' character<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> of an Experience conceived as absolute really annihilates psychology as a distinct body of science.</p> @@ -16744,11 +16771,11 @@ series of phenomena or a succession of states.... It then becomes clear that there is a function of consciousness, as exercised in the most rudimentary experience [namely, the function of <i>synthesis</i>] which is incompatible with the definition of consciousness as any sort of succession of -any sort of phenomena."<a name="FNanchor_291_291" id="FNanchor_291_291"></a><a href="#Footnote_291_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a></p></blockquote> +any sort of phenomena."<a id="FNanchor_291_291"></a><a href="#Footnote_291_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Were we to follow these remarks, we should have to abandon our notion of the 'Thought' (perennially renewed in -time, but always cognitive thereof), and to espouse instead of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> +time, but always cognitive thereof), and to espouse instead of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> it an entity copied from thought in all essential respects, but differing from it in being 'out of time.' What psychology can gain by this barter would be hard to divine. Moreover @@ -16776,7 +16803,7 @@ self-consciousness upon data of sensation.'</p> the <i>action</i> of a principle of consciousness, not itself subject to conditions of time, upon successive appearances, such action as may <i>hold the appearances together</i>, without fusion, in an apprehended -fact."<a name="FNanchor_292_292" id="FNanchor_292_292"></a><a href="#Footnote_292_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a></p></blockquote> +fact."<a id="FNanchor_292_292"></a><a href="#Footnote_292_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a></p></blockquote> <p>It is needless to repeat that the connection of things in our knowledge is in no whit <i>explained</i> by making it the @@ -16790,7 +16817,7 @@ unintelligibilities become quite paroxysmal, and we are forced to confess that the entire school of thought in question, in spite of occasional glimpses of something more refined, still dwells habitually in that mythological stage of -thought where phenomena are explained as results of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> +thought where phenomena are explained as results of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> dramas enacted by entities which but reduplicate the characters of the phenomena themselves. The self must not only <i>know</i> its object,—that is too bald and dead a relation @@ -16811,7 +16838,7 @@ antagonism of opposites which ... seems to rend the world asunder. The intelligence is able to understand the world, or, in other words, to break down the barrier between itself and things and find itself in them, just because its own existence is implicitly the solution of all the division -and conflict of things."<a name="FNanchor_293_293" id="FNanchor_293_293"></a><a href="#Footnote_293_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a></p></blockquote> +and conflict of things."<a id="FNanchor_293_293"></a><a href="#Footnote_293_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a></p></blockquote> <p>This dynamic (I had almost written dynamitic) way of representing knowledge has the merit of not being tame. @@ -16820,15 +16847,15 @@ turning from the fireworks, trap-doors, and transformations of the pantomime into the insipidity of the midnight, where</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 4em;">"ghastly through the drizzling rain,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">On the bald street breaks the blank day!"<a name="FNanchor_294_294" id="FNanchor_294_294"></a><a href="#Footnote_294_294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a></span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 4em;">"ghastly through the drizzling rain,</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">On the bald street breaks the blank day!"<a id="FNanchor_294_294"></a><a href="#Footnote_294_294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a></span><br > </p> <p>And yet turn we must, with the confession that our 'Thought'—a cognitive phenomenal event in time—is, if it exist at all, itself the only Thinker which the facts require. The only service that transcendental egoism has done to -psychology has been by its protests against Hume's 'bundle'-theory<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> +psychology has been by its protests against Hume's 'bundle'-theory<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> of mind. But this service has been ill-performed; for the Egoists themselves, let them say what they will, believe in the bundle, and in their own system merely <i>tie it @@ -16842,12 +16869,12 @@ the transcendentalist school, it is (whatever ulterior metaphysical truth it may divine) a school in which psychology at least has naught to learn, and whose deliverances about the Ego in particular in no wise oblige us to revise our own -formulation of the Stream of Thought.<a name="FNanchor_295_295" id="FNanchor_295_295"></a><a href="#Footnote_295_295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a></p> +formulation of the Stream of Thought.<a id="FNanchor_295_295"></a><a href="#Footnote_295_295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>With this, all possible rival formulations have been discussed. -The literature of the Self is large, but all its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span> +The literature of the Self is large, but all its<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span> authors may be classed as radical or mitigated representatives of the three schools we have named, substantialism, associationism, or transcendentalism. Our own opinion @@ -16864,7 +16891,7 @@ known by a passing subjective Thought and recognized as continuing in time. <i>Hereafter let us use the words</i> <span class="smcap">me</span> <i>and</i> <span class="smcap">I</span> <i>for the empirical person and the judging Thought.</i></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <h4><i>Certain vicissitudes in the me demand our notice.</i></h4> @@ -16877,18 +16904,18 @@ these are but the habits in which organic activities and sensibilities run. Well, from infancy to old age, this assemblage of feelings, most constant of all, is yet a prey to slow mutation. Our powers, bodily and mental, change at least -as fast.<a name="FNanchor_296_296" id="FNanchor_296_296"></a><a href="#Footnote_296_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a> Our possessions notoriously are perishable facts.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span> +as fast.<a id="FNanchor_296_296"></a><a href="#Footnote_296_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a> Our possessions notoriously are perishable facts.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span> The identity which the <i>I</i> discovers, as it surveys this long procession, can only be a relative identity, that of a slow shifting in which there is always some common ingredient -retained.<a name="FNanchor_297_297" id="FNanchor_297_297"></a><a href="#Footnote_297_297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a> The commonest element of all, the most uniform, +retained.<a id="FNanchor_297_297"></a><a href="#Footnote_297_297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a> The commonest element of all, the most uniform, is the possession of the same memories. However different the man may be from the youth, both look back on the same childhood, and call it their own.</p> <p>Thus the identity found by the <i>I</i> in its <i>me</i> is only a loosely construed thing, an identity 'on the whole,' just -like that which any outside observer might find in the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> +like that which any outside observer might find in the same<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> assemblage of facts. We often say of a man 'he is so changed one would not know him'; and so does a man, less often, speak of himself. These changes in the <i>me</i>, @@ -16905,7 +16932,7 @@ or slight. They deserve some notice here.</p> <p>2. Alterations in the present bodily and spiritual selves.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>1. <i>Alterations of memory</i> are either <i>losses</i> or false recollections. In either case the <i>me</i> is changed. Should a man @@ -16937,7 +16964,7 @@ may only have dreamed or imagined they did so. The content of a dream will oftentimes insert itself into the stream of real life in a most perplexing way. The most frequent source of false memory is the accounts we give to -others of our experiences. Such accounts we almost always<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> +others of our experiences. Such accounts we almost always<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> make both more simple and more interesting than the truth. We quote what we should have said or done, rather than what we really said or did; and in the first @@ -16961,11 +16988,11 @@ to look at the note she had made ten years previously of the transaction. The note was examined, and was found to contain the distinct statement that the table rapped when <i>the hands of six persons rested on it!</i> The lady's memory as to all other points proved to be strictly -correct; and in this point she had erred in entire good faith."<a name="FNanchor_298_298" id="FNanchor_298_298"></a><a href="#Footnote_298_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a></p></blockquote> +correct; and in this point she had erred in entire good faith."<a id="FNanchor_298_298"></a><a href="#Footnote_298_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a></p></blockquote> <p>It is next to impossible to get a story of this sort accurate in all its details, although it is the inessential details -that suffer most change.<a name="FNanchor_299_299" id="FNanchor_299_299"></a><a href="#Footnote_299_299" class="fnanchor">[299]</a> Dickens and Balzac were said to +that suffer most change.<a id="FNanchor_299_299"></a><a href="#Footnote_299_299" class="fnanchor">[299]</a> Dickens and Balzac were said to have constantly mingled their fictions with their real experiences. Every one must have known <i>some</i> specimen of our mortal dust so intoxicated with the thought of his own @@ -16973,7 +17000,7 @@ person and the sound of his own voice as never to be able even to think the truth when his autobiography was in question. Amiable, harmless, radiant J. V.! mayst thou ne'er wake to the difference between thy real and thy -fondly-imagined self!<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_300_300" id="FNanchor_300_300"></a><a href="#Footnote_300_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a></p> +fondly-imagined self!<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span><a id="FNanchor_300_300"></a><a href="#Footnote_300_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a></p> <p>2. When we pass beyond alterations of memory to abnormal <i>alterations in the present self</i> we have still graver @@ -16990,7 +17017,7 @@ having any profound significance. The types are:</p> <p>(3) Mediumships or possessions.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>1) In insanity we often have delusions projected into the past, which are melancholic or sanguine according to @@ -17021,8 +17048,8 @@ with its stored-up memory of the past. There can be no doubt that in such a case the afflux of unaccustomed vital sensations would produce the gravest disorders. Between the old sense of existence engraved on the nervous system, and the new one acting with all the -intensity of its reality and novelty, there would be irreconcilable contradiction."<a name="FNanchor_301_301" id="FNanchor_301_301"></a><a href="#Footnote_301_301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span></p> +intensity of its reality and novelty, there would be irreconcilable contradiction."<a id="FNanchor_301_301"></a><a href="#Footnote_301_301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span></p> <p>With the beginnings of cerebral disease there often happens something quite comparable to this:</p> @@ -17032,7 +17059,7 @@ happens something quite comparable to this:</p> and ideas of the same inexperienced kind, for example terrors, representations of enacted crime, of enemies pursuing one, etc. At the outset, these stand in contrast with the old familiar <i>me</i>, as a strange, -often astonishing and abhorrent <i>thou</i>.<a name="FNanchor_302_302" id="FNanchor_302_302"></a><a href="#Footnote_302_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a> Often their invasion into the +often astonishing and abhorrent <i>thou</i>.<a id="FNanchor_302_302"></a><a href="#Footnote_302_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a> Often their invasion into the former circle of feelings is felt as if the old self were being taken possession of by a dark overpowering might, and the fact of such 'possession' is described in fantastic images. Always this doubleness, this @@ -17053,8 +17080,8 @@ into itself of the abnormal elements of feeling and of will. The patient may again be quiet, and his thought sometimes logically correct, but in it the morbid erroneous ideas are always present, with the adhesions they have contracted, as uncontrollable premises, and the man is -no longer the same, but a really new person, his old self transformed."<a name="FNanchor_303_303" id="FNanchor_303_303"></a><a href="#Footnote_303_303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span></p> +no longer the same, but a really new person, his old self transformed."<a id="FNanchor_303_303"></a><a href="#Footnote_303_303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span></p> <p>But the patient himself rarely continues to describe the change in just these terms unless new <i>bodily sensations</i> in him or the loss of old ones play a predominant part. @@ -17078,7 +17105,7 @@ quite separate from the speaker's self. Occasionally, parts of the body lose their connection for consciousness with the rest, and are treated as belonging to another person and moved by a hostile will. Thus the right hand may -fight with the left as with an enemy.<a name="FNanchor_304_304" id="FNanchor_304_304"></a><a href="#Footnote_304_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a> Or the cries of the +fight with the left as with an enemy.<a id="FNanchor_304_304"></a><a href="#Footnote_304_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a> Or the cries of the patient himself are assigned to another person with whom the patient expresses sympathy. The literature of insanity is filled with narratives of such illusions as these. M. @@ -17095,7 +17122,7 @@ give an account to myself of what I experienced.... Here is the first thing of which I retain a clear remembrance. I was alone, and already a prey to permanent visual trouble, when I was suddenly seized with a visual trouble infinitely more pronounced. Objects grew small and receded -to infinite distances—men and things together. I was myself immeasurably<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span> +to infinite distances—men and things together. I was myself immeasurably<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span> far away, I looked about me with terror and astonishment; <i>the world was escaping from me</i>.... I remarked at the same time that my voice was extremely far away from me, that it sounded no @@ -17118,7 +17145,7 @@ let myself go and lived the unhappy life of this new entity. I had an ardent desire to see my old world again, to get back to my old self. This desire kept me from killing myself.... I was another, and I hated, I despised this other; he was perfectly odious to me; it was certainly -another who had taken my form and assumed my functions."<a name="FNanchor_305_305" id="FNanchor_305_305"></a><a href="#Footnote_305_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a></p></blockquote> +another who had taken my form and assumed my functions."<a id="FNanchor_305_305"></a><a href="#Footnote_305_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a></p></blockquote> <p>In cases similar to this, it is as certain that the <i>I</i> is unaltered as that the <i>me</i> is changed. That is to say, the present @@ -17131,8 +17158,8 @@ the past both seen therein will not unite. Where is my old me? What is this new one? Are they the same? Or have I two? Such questions, answered by whatever theory the patient is able to conjure up as plausible, form the beginning -of his insane life.<a name="FNanchor_306_306" id="FNanchor_306_306"></a><a href="#Footnote_306_306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span></p> +of his insane life.<a id="FNanchor_306_306"></a><a href="#Footnote_306_306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span></p> <p>A case with which I am acquainted through Dr. C. J. Fisher of Tewksbury has possibly its origin in this way. The woman, Bridget F.,</p> @@ -17167,10 +17194,10 @@ telling him he is another altogether imaginary personage, in which case all facts about himself seem for the time being to lapse from out his mind, and he throws himself into the new character with a vivacity proportionate to the amount -of histrionic imagination which he possesses.<a name="FNanchor_307_307" id="FNanchor_307_307"></a><a href="#Footnote_307_307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a> But in the +of histrionic imagination which he possesses.<a id="FNanchor_307_307"></a><a href="#Footnote_307_307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a> But in the pathological cases the transformation is spontaneous. The -most famous case, perhaps, on record is that of Félida X.,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> -reported by Dr. Azam of Bordeaux.<a name="FNanchor_308_308" id="FNanchor_308_308"></a><a href="#Footnote_308_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a> At the age of fourteen +most famous case, perhaps, on record is that of Félida X.,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> +reported by Dr. Azam of Bordeaux.<a id="FNanchor_308_308"></a><a href="#Footnote_308_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a> At the age of fourteen this woman began to pass into a 'secondary' state characterized by a change in her general disposition and character, as if certain 'inhibitions,' previously existing, @@ -17192,7 +17219,7 @@ of how it had come to pass. Her distress at these blanks of memory is sometimes intense and once drove her to attempt suicide.</p> -<p>To take another example, Dr. Rieger gives an account<a name="FNanchor_309_309" id="FNanchor_309_309"></a><a href="#Footnote_309_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> +<p>To take another example, Dr. Rieger gives an account<a id="FNanchor_309_309"></a><a href="#Footnote_309_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> of an epileptic man who for seventeen years had passed his life alternately free, in prisons, or in asylums, his character being orderly enough in the normal state, but alternating @@ -17209,14 +17236,14 @@ his wretchedness.</p> impression as from this man, of whom it could not be said that he had any properly conscious past at all.... It is really impossible to think one's self into such a state of mind. His last larceny had been performed -in Nürnberg, he knew nothing of it, and saw himself before the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span> +in Nürnberg, he knew nothing of it, and saw himself before the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span> court and then in the hospital, but without in the least understanding the reason why. That he had epileptic attacks, he knew. But it was impossible to convince him that for hours together he raved and acted in an abnormal way."</p></blockquote> <p>Another remarkable case is that of Mary Reynolds, -lately republished again by Dr. Weir Mitchell.<a name="FNanchor_310_310" id="FNanchor_310_310"></a><a href="#Footnote_310_310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a> This dull +lately republished again by Dr. Weir Mitchell.<a id="FNanchor_310_310"></a><a href="#Footnote_310_310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a> This dull and melancholy young woman, inhabiting the Pennsylvania wilderness in 1811,</p> @@ -17260,7 +17287,7 @@ transplanted, though from what region or state of existence was a problem unsolved.'</p> <p>"The next lesson was to re-teach her the arts of reading and writing. -She was apt enough, and made such rapid progress in both that <i>in a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span></i> +She was apt enough, and made such rapid progress in both that <i>in a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span></i> <i>few weeks</i> she had readily re-learned to read and write. In copying her name which her brother had written for her as a first lesson, she took her pen in a very awkward manner and began to copy from right to left @@ -17311,7 +17338,7 @@ and immediately went about the performance of duties incumbent upon her, and which she had planned five weeks previously. Great was her surprise at the change which one night (as she supposed) had produced. Nature bore a different aspect. Not a trace was left in -her mind of the giddy scenes through which she had passed. Her ramblings<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> +her mind of the giddy scenes through which she had passed. Her ramblings<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> through the forest, her tricks and humor, all were faded from her memory, and not a shadow left behind. Her parents saw their child; her brothers and sisters saw their sister. She now had all the knowledge @@ -17363,7 +17390,7 @@ school, and in that capacity was both useful and acceptable, being a general favorite with old and young.</p> <p>"During these last twenty-five years she lived in the same -house with the Rev. Dr. John V. Reynolds, her nephew, part of that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> +house with the Rev. Dr. John V. Reynolds, her nephew, part of that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> time keeping house for him, showing a sound judgment and a thorough acquaintance with the duties of her position.</p> @@ -17397,14 +17424,14 @@ amnesias (losses of memory) of hypnotic subjects ordered to forget all nouns, or all verbs, or a particular letter of the alphabet, or all that is relative to a certain person, are inhibitions of the sort on a more extensive scale. They -sometimes occur spontaneously as symptoms of disease.<a name="FNanchor_311_311" id="FNanchor_311_311"></a><a href="#Footnote_311_311" class="fnanchor">[311]</a> +sometimes occur spontaneously as symptoms of disease.<a id="FNanchor_311_311"></a><a href="#Footnote_311_311" class="fnanchor">[311]</a> Now M. Pierre Janet has shown that such inhibitions when they bear on a certain class of sensations (making the subject anæsthetic thereto) and also on the memory of such sensations, are the basis of changes of personality. The anæsthetic and 'amnesic' hysteric is one person; but when you restore her inhibited sensibilities and memories by -plunging her into the hypnotic trance—in other words, when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> +plunging her into the hypnotic trance—in other words, when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> you rescue them from their 'dissociated' and split-off condition, and make them rejoin the other sensibilities and memories—she is a different person. As said above (<a href="#Page_203">p. 203</a>), @@ -17445,9 +17472,9 @@ personality in Lucie, M. Janet naturally became eager to find it in his other subjects. He found it in Rose, in Marie, and in Léonie; and his brother, Dr. Jules Janet, who was <i>interne</i> at the Salpétrière Hospital, found it in the celebrated -subject Wit.... whose trances had been studied for years<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> +subject Wit.... whose trances had been studied for years<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> by the various doctors of that institution without any of -them having happened to awaken this very peculiar individuality.<a name="FNanchor_312_312" id="FNanchor_312_312"></a><a href="#Footnote_312_312" class="fnanchor">[312]</a></p> +them having happened to awaken this very peculiar individuality.<a id="FNanchor_312_312"></a><a href="#Footnote_312_312" class="fnanchor">[312]</a></p> <p>With the return of all the sensibilities in the deeper trance, these subjects turned, as it were, into normal @@ -17482,7 +17509,7 @@ for example, is what French writers call the <i>phase des attitudes passionelles</i>, in which the patient, without speaking or giving any account of herself, will go through the outward movements of fear, anger, or some other emotional -state of mind. Usually this phase is, with each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> +state of mind. Usually this phase is, with each<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> patient, a thing so stereotyped as to seem automatic, and doubts have even been expressed as to whether any consciousness exists whilst it lasts. When, however, the @@ -17530,7 +17557,7 @@ She refuses the name of Léonie and takes that of Léontine (Léonie 2) to which her first magnetizers had accustomed her. 'That good woman is not myself,' she says, 'she is too stupid!' To herself, Léontine or Léonie 2, she attributes all the sensations and all the actions, in a word -all the conscious experiences which she has undergone <i>in somnambulism</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> +all the conscious experiences which she has undergone <i>in somnambulism</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> and knits them together to make the history of her already long life. To Léonie 1 [as M. Janet calls the waking woman] on the other hand, she exclusively ascribes the events lived through in waking hours. I was @@ -17575,9 +17602,9 @@ first master."</p></blockquote> <p>The most carefully studied case of multiple personality is that of the hysteric youth Louis V. about whom MM. -Bourru and Burot have written a book.<a name="FNanchor_313_313" id="FNanchor_313_313"></a><a href="#Footnote_313_313" class="fnanchor">[313]</a> The symptoms +Bourru and Burot have written a book.<a id="FNanchor_313_313"></a><a href="#Footnote_313_313" class="fnanchor">[313]</a> The symptoms are too intricate to be reproduced here with detail. Suffice -it that Louis V. had led an irregular life, in the army, in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> +it that Louis V. had led an irregular life, in the army, in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> hospitals, and in houses of correction, and had had numerous hysteric anæsthesias, paralyses, and contractures attacking him differently at different times and when he lived at @@ -17617,8 +17644,8 @@ of character.</p> <p>"The law of these changes," say the authors, "is quite clear. There exist precise, constant, and necessary relations between the bodily and the mental state, such that it is impossible to modify the -one without modifying the other in a parallel fashion."<a name="FNanchor_314_314" id="FNanchor_314_314"></a><a href="#Footnote_314_314" class="fnanchor">[314]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span></p> +one without modifying the other in a parallel fashion."<a id="FNanchor_314_314"></a><a href="#Footnote_314_314" class="fnanchor">[314]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span></p> <p>The case of this proteiform individual would seem, then, nicely to corroborate M. P. Janet's law that anæsthesias and gaps in memory go together. Coupling Janet's law with @@ -17631,7 +17658,7 @@ and associative paths, co-ordinate with those of the sensorial paths rather than consecutive upon them. And indeed a glance at other cases than M. Janet's own, suffices to show us that sensibility and memory are not coupled in any -invariable way.<a name="FNanchor_315_315" id="FNanchor_315_315"></a><a href="#Footnote_315_315" class="fnanchor">[315]</a> M. Janet's law, true of his own cases, +invariable way.<a id="FNanchor_315_315"></a><a href="#Footnote_315_315" class="fnanchor">[315]</a> M. Janet's law, true of his own cases, does not seem to hold good in all.</p> <p>Of course it is mere guesswork to speculate on what @@ -17644,9 +17671,9 @@ after considering the third class of alterations of the Self, those, namely, which I have called 'possessions.'</p> <p>I have myself become quite recently acquainted with -the subject of a case of alternate personality of the 'ambulatory'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span> +the subject of a case of alternate personality of the 'ambulatory'<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span> sort, who has given me permission to name him in -these pages.<a name="FNanchor_316_316" id="FNanchor_316_316"></a><a href="#Footnote_316_316" class="fnanchor">[316]</a></p> +these pages.<a id="FNanchor_316_316"></a><a href="#Footnote_316_316" class="fnanchor">[316]</a></p> <blockquote> @@ -17692,7 +17719,7 @@ he refused to set foot in it again.</p> <p>The first two weeks of the period remained unaccounted for, as he had no memory, after he had once resumed his normal personality, of -any part of the time, and no one who knew him seems to have seen him<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> +any part of the time, and no one who knew him seems to have seen him<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> after he left home. The remarkable part of the change is, of course, the peculiar occupation which the so-called Brown indulged in. Mr. Bourne has never in his life had the slightest contact with trade. @@ -17712,7 +17739,7 @@ to make him whilst in the hypnosis remember any of the facts of his normal life. He had heard of Ansel Bourne, but "didn't know as he had ever met the man." When confronted with Mrs. Bourne he said that he had "never seen the woman before," etc. On the other -hand, he told of his peregrinations during the lost fortnight,<a name="FNanchor_317_317" id="FNanchor_317_317"></a><a href="#Footnote_317_317" class="fnanchor">[317]</a> and gave +hand, he told of his peregrinations during the lost fortnight,<a id="FNanchor_317_317"></a><a href="#Footnote_317_317" class="fnanchor">[317]</a> and gave all sorts of details about the Norristown episode. The whole thing was prosaic enough; and the Brown-personality seems to be nothing but a rather shrunken, dejected, and amnesic extract of Mr. Bourne himself. @@ -17733,11 +17760,11 @@ skull to-day still covers two distinct personal selves.</p> <p>The case (whether it contain an epileptic element or not) should apparently be classed as one of spontaneous hypnotic trance, persisting for two months. The peculiarity of it is that nothing else like it ever -occurred in the man's life, and that no eccentricity of character came<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> +occurred in the man's life, and that no eccentricity of character came<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> out. In most similar cases, the attacks recur, and the sensibilities and -conduct markedly change.<a name="FNanchor_318_318" id="FNanchor_318_318"></a><a href="#Footnote_318_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a></p></blockquote> +conduct markedly change.<a id="FNanchor_318_318"></a><a href="#Footnote_318_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a></p></blockquote> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>3. In '<i>mediumships</i>' or '<i>possessions</i>' the invasion and the passing away of the secondary state are both relatively @@ -17770,7 +17797,7 @@ etc., also belong to the relatively lower phases of possession, in which the normal self is not excluded from conscious participation in the performance, though their initiative seems to come from elsewhere. In the highest -phase the trance is complete, the voice, language, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span> +phase the trance is complete, the voice, language, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span> everything are changed, and there is no after-memory whatever until the next trance comes. One curious thing about trance-utterances is their generic similarity in different @@ -17813,7 +17840,7 @@ has a large collection of manuscript automatically produced.</p> <blockquote> <p>"Some of it," he writes us, "is in hieroglyph, or strange compounded -arbitrary characters, each series possessing a seeming unity in general<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span> +arbitrary characters, each series possessing a seeming unity in general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span> design or character, followed by what purports to be a translation or rendering into mother English. I never attempted the seemingly impossible feat of copying the characters. They were cut with the precision @@ -17863,7 +17890,7 @@ it fails, as a theory, in numberless points, when applied to this strange work through me. It would be far more reasonable and satisfactory for me to accept the silly hypothesis of re-incarnation,—the old doctrine of metempsychosis,—as taught by some spiritualists to-day, and to believe -that I lived a former life here, and that once in a while it dominates my<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> +that I lived a former life here, and that once in a while it dominates my<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> intellectual powers, and writes chapters upon the philosophy of life, or opens a post-office for spirits to drop their effusions, and have them put into English script. No; the easiest and most natural solution to @@ -17907,8 +17934,8 @@ spirit whom it pretends to be. The phenomena shade off so gradually into cases where this is obviously absurd, that the presumption (quite apart from <i>a priori</i> 'scientific' prejudice) is great against its being true. The case -of Lurancy Vennum is perhaps as extreme a case of 'possession'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span> -of the modern sort as one can find.<a name="FNanchor_319_319" id="FNanchor_319_319"></a><a href="#Footnote_319_319" class="fnanchor">[319]</a> Lurancy was +of Lurancy Vennum is perhaps as extreme a case of 'possession'<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span> +of the modern sort as one can find.<a id="FNanchor_319_319"></a><a href="#Footnote_319_319" class="fnanchor">[319]</a> Lurancy was a young girl of fourteen, living with her parents at Watseka, Ill., who (after various distressing hysterical disorders and spontaneous trances, during which she was possessed by departed @@ -17951,7 +17978,7 @@ family."</p></blockquote> i.e., without the original personality of Lurancy returning. After eight or nine weeks, however, the memory and manner of Lurancy would sometimes partially, but not entirely, -return for a few minutes. Once Lurancy seems to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span> +return for a few minutes. Once Lurancy seems to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span> have taken full possession for a short time. At last, after some fourteen weeks, conformably to the prophecy which 'Mary' had made when she first assumed 'control,' she @@ -17993,13 +18020,13 @@ she was cured by spirit power, and that Mary Roff controlled the girl."</p></blo <p>Eight years later, Lurancy was reported to be married and a mother, and in good health. She had apparently outgrown -the mediumistic phase of her existence.<a name="FNanchor_320_320" id="FNanchor_320_320"></a><a href="#Footnote_320_320" class="fnanchor">[320]</a></p> +the mediumistic phase of her existence.<a id="FNanchor_320_320"></a><a href="#Footnote_320_320" class="fnanchor">[320]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>On the condition of the sensibility during these invasions, few observations have been made. I have found the -hands of two automatic writers anæsthetic during the act.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span> +hands of two automatic writers anæsthetic during the act.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span> In two others I have found this not to be the case. Automatic writing is usually preceded by shooting pains along the arm-nerves and irregular contractions of the arm-muscles. @@ -18007,7 +18034,7 @@ I have found one medium's tongue and lips apparently insensible to pin-pricks during her (speaking) trance.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>If we speculate on the brain-condition during all these different perversions of personality, we see that it must be @@ -18042,11 +18069,11 @@ chapter, this hardly needs further remark.</p> suggest that the systems thrown out of gear with each other are contained one in the right and the other in the left hemisphere. The subjects, e.g., often write backwards, or -they transpose letters, or they write mirror-script. All these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> +they transpose letters, or they write mirror-script. All these<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> are symptoms of agraphic disease. The left hand, if left to its natural impulse, will in most people write mirror-script more easily than natural script. Mr. F. W. H. Myers -has laid stress on these analogies.<a name="FNanchor_321_321" id="FNanchor_321_321"></a><a href="#Footnote_321_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a> He has also called +has laid stress on these analogies.<a id="FNanchor_321_321"></a><a href="#Footnote_321_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a> He has also called attention to the usual inferior moral tone of ordinary planchette writing. On Hughlings Jackson's principles, the left hemisphere, being the more evolved organ, at ordinary @@ -18080,7 +18107,7 @@ themselves <i>constituents</i> of the me in a larger sense,—such are the clothes, the material possessions, the friends, the honors and esteem which the person receives or may receive. This me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively -known. The <i>I</i> which knows them cannot itself be an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> +known. The <i>I</i> which knows them cannot itself be an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> aggregate, neither for psychological purposes need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as 'out @@ -18123,20 +18150,20 @@ and discussed impartially. But that carries us beyond the psychological or naturalistic point of view.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_257_257" id="Footnote_257_257"></a><a href="#FNanchor_257_257"><span class="label">[257]</span></a> See, for a charming passage on the Philosophy of Dress, H. Lotze's +<p><a id="Footnote_257_257"></a><a href="#FNanchor_257_257"><span class="label">[257]</span></a> See, for a charming passage on the Philosophy of Dress, H. Lotze's Microcosmus, Eng. tr. vol. i, p. 592 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_258_258" id="Footnote_258_258"></a><a href="#FNanchor_258_258"><span class="label">[258]</span></a> "Who filches from me my good name," etc.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_258_258"></a><a href="#FNanchor_258_258"><span class="label">[258]</span></a> "Who filches from me my good name," etc.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_259_259" id="Footnote_259_259"></a><a href="#FNanchor_259_259"><span class="label">[259]</span></a> "He who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong +<p><a id="Footnote_259_259"></a><a href="#FNanchor_259_259"><span class="label">[259]</span></a> "He who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives on men ... seems little skilled in the nature and history of mankind; the greatest part whereof he shall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fashion; and so they do that which keeps @@ -18163,12 +18190,12 @@ and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions." <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_260_260" id="Footnote_260_260"></a><a href="#FNanchor_260_260"><span class="label">[260]</span></a> For some farther remarks on these feelings of movement see the +<p><a id="Footnote_260_260"></a><a href="#FNanchor_260_260"><span class="label">[260]</span></a> For some farther remarks on these feelings of movement see the <a href="#CHAPTER_XI">next chapter</a>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_261_261" id="Footnote_261_261"></a><a href="#FNanchor_261_261"><span class="label">[261]</span></a> Wundt's account of Self-consciousness deserves to be compared with +<p><a id="Footnote_261_261"></a><a href="#FNanchor_261_261"><span class="label">[261]</span></a> Wundt's account of Self-consciousness deserves to be compared with this. What I have called 'adjustments' he calls processes of 'Apperception.' "In this development (of consciousness) one particular group of percepts claims a prominent significance, namely, those of which the spring @@ -18213,18 +18240,18 @@ Psychologie, 2te Aufl. Bd. ii, pp. 217-19.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_262_262" id="Footnote_262_262"></a><a href="#FNanchor_262_262"><span class="label">[262]</span></a> The only exception I know of is M. J. Souriau, in his important +<p><a id="Footnote_262_262"></a><a href="#FNanchor_262_262"><span class="label">[262]</span></a> The only exception I know of is M. J. Souriau, in his important article in the Revue Philosophique, vol. xxi, p. 449. M. Souriau's conclusion is 'que la conscience n'existe pas' (p. 472).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_263_263" id="Footnote_263_263"></a><a href="#FNanchor_263_263"><span class="label">[263]</span></a> See the excellent remarks by Prof. Bain on the 'Emotion of Power' +<p><a id="Footnote_263_263"></a><a href="#FNanchor_263_263"><span class="label">[263]</span></a> See the excellent remarks by Prof. Bain on the 'Emotion of Power' in his 'Emotions and the Will.'</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_264_264" id="Footnote_264_264"></a><a href="#FNanchor_264_264"><span class="label">[264]</span></a> Cf. Carlyle: <i>Sartor Resartus</i>, 'The Everlasting Yea.' "I tell thee, +<p><a id="Footnote_264_264"></a><a href="#FNanchor_264_264"><span class="label">[264]</span></a> Cf. Carlyle: <i>Sartor Resartus</i>, 'The Everlasting Yea.' "I tell thee, blockhead, it all comes of thy vanity; of what thou fanciest those same deserts of thine to be. Fancy that thou deservest to be hanged (as is most likely), thou wilt feel it happiness to be only shot: fancy that thou deservest @@ -18234,18 +18261,18 @@ while ago thou hadst no right to <i>be</i> at all." etc., etc.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_265_265" id="Footnote_265_265"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265_265"><span class="label">[265]</span></a> T. W. Higginson's translation (1866), p. 105.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_265_265"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265_265"><span class="label">[265]</span></a> T. W. Higginson's translation (1866), p. 105.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_266_266" id="Footnote_266_266"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266_266"><span class="label">[266]</span></a> "The usual mode of lessening the shock of disappointment or disesteem +<p><a id="Footnote_266_266"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266_266"><span class="label">[266]</span></a> "The usual mode of lessening the shock of disappointment or disesteem is to contract, if possible, a low estimate of the persons that inflict it. This is our remedy for the unjust censures of party spirit, as well as of personal malignity." (Bain: Emotion and Will, p. 209.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_267_267" id="Footnote_267_267"></a><a href="#FNanchor_267_267"><span class="label">[267]</span></a> It must be observed that the qualities of the Self thus ideally constituted +<p><a id="Footnote_267_267"></a><a href="#FNanchor_267_267"><span class="label">[267]</span></a> It must be observed that the qualities of the Self thus ideally constituted are all qualities approved by my actual fellows in the first instance; and that my reason for now appealing from their verdict to that of the ideal judge lies in some outward peculiarity of the immediate case. What @@ -18257,7 +18284,7 @@ fellows, misled by interest and prejudice, have gone astray.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_268_268" id="Footnote_268_268"></a><a href="#FNanchor_268_268"><span class="label">[268]</span></a> The <i>kind</i> of selfishness varies with the self that is sought. If it be +<p><a id="Footnote_268_268"></a><a href="#FNanchor_268_268"><span class="label">[268]</span></a> The <i>kind</i> of selfishness varies with the self that is sought. If it be the mere bodily self; if a man grabs the best food, the warm corner, the vacant seat; if he makes room for no one, spits about, and belches in our faces,—we call it hoggishness. If it be the social self, in the form of popularity @@ -18271,16 +18298,16 @@ called.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_269_269" id="Footnote_269_269"></a><a href="#FNanchor_269_269"><span class="label">[269]</span></a> Lotze, Med. Psych. 498-501; Microcosmos, bk. ii, chap. v, §§ 3, 4.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_269_269"></a><a href="#FNanchor_269_269"><span class="label">[269]</span></a> Lotze, Med. Psych. 498-501; Microcosmos, bk. ii, chap. v, §§ 3, 4.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_270_270" id="Footnote_270_270"></a><a href="#FNanchor_270_270"><span class="label">[270]</span></a> Psychologische Analysen auf Physiologischer Grundlage. Theil ii, +<p><a id="Footnote_270_270"></a><a href="#FNanchor_270_270"><span class="label">[270]</span></a> Psychologische Analysen auf Physiologischer Grundlage. Theil ii, 2te Hälfte, § 11. The whole section ought to be read.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_271_271" id="Footnote_271_271"></a><a href="#FNanchor_271_271"><span class="label">[271]</span></a> Professor Bain, in his chapter on 'Emotions of Self,' does scant justice +<p><a id="Footnote_271_271"></a><a href="#FNanchor_271_271"><span class="label">[271]</span></a> Professor Bain, in his chapter on 'Emotions of Self,' does scant justice to the primitive nature of a large part of our self-feeling, and seems to reduce it to reflective self-estimation of this sober intellectual sort, which certainly <i>most</i> of it is not. He says that when the attention is turned @@ -18348,7 +18375,7 @@ by universal judgments, in Microcosmus, book v, chap. v, § 5.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_272_272" id="Footnote_272_272"></a><a href="#FNanchor_272_272"><span class="label">[272]</span></a> "Also nur dadurch, dass ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegehener Vorstellungen +<p><a id="Footnote_272_272"></a><a href="#FNanchor_272_272"><span class="label">[272]</span></a> "Also nur dadurch, dass ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegehener Vorstellungen in <i>einem Bewusstsein</i> verbinden kann, ist es möglich dass ich die <i>Identität des Bewusstseins</i> in diesen <i>Vorstellungen</i> selbst vorstelle, d. h. die analytische Einheit der Apperception ist nur unter der Voraussetzung irgend @@ -18363,7 +18390,7 @@ hardly good human, speech.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_273_273" id="Footnote_273_273"></a><a href="#FNanchor_273_273"><span class="label">[273]</span></a> So that we might say, by a sort of bad pun, "only a connected world +<p><a id="Footnote_273_273"></a><a href="#FNanchor_273_273"><span class="label">[273]</span></a> So that we might say, by a sort of bad pun, "only a connected world can be known as disconnected." I say bad pun, because the point of view shifts between the connectedness and the disconnectedness. The disconnectedness is of the realities known; the connectedness is of the knowledge @@ -18372,7 +18399,7 @@ point of view held fast to in these pages, two different facts.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_274_274" id="Footnote_274_274"></a><a href="#FNanchor_274_274"><span class="label">[274]</span></a> Some subtle reader will object that the Thought cannot call any part +<p><a id="Footnote_274_274"></a><a href="#FNanchor_274_274"><span class="label">[274]</span></a> Some subtle reader will object that the Thought cannot call any part of its Object 'I' and knit other parts on to it, without first knitting that part on to <i>Itself</i>; and that it cannot knit it on to Itself without knowing Itself;—so that our supposition (above, <a href="#Page_304">p. 304</a>) that the Thought may conceivably @@ -18394,55 +18421,55 @@ is something not yet dogmatically decided in the text.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_275_275" id="Footnote_275_275"></a><a href="#FNanchor_275_275"><span class="label">[275]</span></a> Metaphysik, § 245 <i>fin</i>. This writer, who in his early work, the Medizinische +<p><a id="Footnote_275_275"></a><a href="#FNanchor_275_275"><span class="label">[275]</span></a> Metaphysik, § 245 <i>fin</i>. This writer, who in his early work, the Medizinische Psychologie, was (to my reading) a strong defender of the Soul-Substance theory, has written in §§ 243-5 of his Metaphysik the most beautiful criticism of this theory which exists.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_276_276" id="Footnote_276_276"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276_276"><span class="label">[276]</span></a> On the empirical and transcendental conceptions of the self's unity, +<p><a id="Footnote_276_276"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276_276"><span class="label">[276]</span></a> On the empirical and transcendental conceptions of the self's unity, see Lotze, Metaphysic, § 244.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_277_277" id="Footnote_277_277"></a><a href="#FNanchor_277_277"><span class="label">[277]</span></a> Appendix to book i of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_277_277"></a><a href="#FNanchor_277_277"><span class="label">[277]</span></a> Appendix to book i of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_278_278" id="Footnote_278_278"></a><a href="#FNanchor_278_278"><span class="label">[278]</span></a> Herbart believed in the Soul, too; but for him the 'Self' of which we +<p><a id="Footnote_278_278"></a><a href="#FNanchor_278_278"><span class="label">[278]</span></a> Herbart believed in the Soul, too; but for him the 'Self' of which we are 'conscious' is the empirical Self—not the soul.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_279_279" id="Footnote_279_279"></a><a href="#FNanchor_279_279"><span class="label">[279]</span></a> Compare again the remarks on <a href="#Page_158">pp. 158-162</a> above.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_279_279"></a><a href="#FNanchor_279_279"><span class="label">[279]</span></a> Compare again the remarks on <a href="#Page_158">pp. 158-162</a> above.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_280_280" id="Footnote_280_280"></a><a href="#FNanchor_280_280"><span class="label">[280]</span></a> System of Psychology (1884). vol. i, p. 114.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_280_280"></a><a href="#FNanchor_280_280"><span class="label">[280]</span></a> System of Psychology (1884). vol. i, p. 114.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_281_281" id="Footnote_281_281"></a><a href="#FNanchor_281_281"><span class="label">[281]</span></a> 'Distinct only to <i>observation</i>,' he adds. To whose observation? the +<p><a id="Footnote_281_281"></a><a href="#FNanchor_281_281"><span class="label">[281]</span></a> 'Distinct only to <i>observation</i>,' he adds. To whose observation? the outside psychologist's, the Ego's, their own, or the plank's? <i>Darauf kommt es an!</i></p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_282_282" id="Footnote_282_282"></a><a href="#FNanchor_282_282"><span class="label">[282]</span></a> Analysis, etc., J. S. Mill's Edition, vol. i, p. 331. The 'as it were' +<p><a id="Footnote_282_282"></a><a href="#FNanchor_282_282"><span class="label">[282]</span></a> Analysis, etc., J. S. Mill's Edition, vol. i, p. 331. The 'as it were' is delightfully characteristic of the school.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_283_283" id="Footnote_283_283"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283_283"><span class="label">[283]</span></a> J. Mill's Analysis, vol. ii, p. 175.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_283_283"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283_283"><span class="label">[283]</span></a> J. Mill's Analysis, vol. ii, p. 175.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_284_284" id="Footnote_284_284"></a><a href="#FNanchor_284_284"><span class="label">[284]</span></a> Examination of Hamilton. 4th ed. p. 263.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_284_284"></a><a href="#FNanchor_284_284"><span class="label">[284]</span></a> Examination of Hamilton. 4th ed. p. 263.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_285_285" id="Footnote_285_285"></a><a href="#FNanchor_285_285"><span class="label">[285]</span></a> His chapter on the Psychological Theory of Mind is a beautiful case in +<p><a id="Footnote_285_285"></a><a href="#FNanchor_285_285"><span class="label">[285]</span></a> His chapter on the Psychological Theory of Mind is a beautiful case in point, and his concessions there have become so celebrated that they must be quoted for the reader's benefit. He ends the chapter with these words (<i>loc. cit.</i> p. 247): "The theory, therefore, which resolves Mind into a series @@ -18516,11 +18543,11 @@ much that has gone before.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_286_286" id="Footnote_286_286"></a><a href="#FNanchor_286_286"><span class="label">[286]</span></a> Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, 2te Aufl. § 17.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_286_286"></a><a href="#FNanchor_286_286"><span class="label">[286]</span></a> Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, 2te Aufl. § 17.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_287_287" id="Footnote_287_287"></a><a href="#FNanchor_287_287"><span class="label">[287]</span></a> It must be noticed, in justice to what was said above on <a href="#Page_274">page 274</a> ff., +<p><a id="Footnote_287_287"></a><a href="#FNanchor_287_287"><span class="label">[287]</span></a> It must be noticed, in justice to what was said above on <a href="#Page_274">page 274</a> ff., that neither Kant nor his successors anywhere discriminate between the <i>presence</i> of the apperceiving Ego to the combined object, and the <i>awareness by</i> that Ego <i>of</i> its own presence and of its distinctness from what it @@ -18535,21 +18562,21 @@ case.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_288_288" id="Footnote_288_288"></a><a href="#FNanchor_288_288"><span class="label">[288]</span></a> "As regards the soul, now, or the 'I,' the 'thinker,' the whole drift of +<p><a id="Footnote_288_288"></a><a href="#FNanchor_288_288"><span class="label">[288]</span></a> "As regards the soul, now, or the 'I,' the 'thinker,' the whole drift of Kant's advance upon Hume and sensational psychology is towards the demonstration that the subject of knowledge is an <i>Agent</i>." (G. S. Morris, Kant's Critique, etc. (Chicago, 1882), p. 224.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_289_289" id="Footnote_289_289"></a><a href="#FNanchor_289_289"><span class="label">[289]</span></a> "In Kant's Prolegomena," says H. Cohen,—I do not myself find the +<p><a id="Footnote_289_289"></a><a href="#FNanchor_289_289"><span class="label">[289]</span></a> "In Kant's Prolegomena," says H. Cohen,—I do not myself find the passage,—"it is expressly said that the problem is not to show how experience arises (ensteht), but of what it consists (besteht)." (Kant's Theorie d. Erfahrung (1871), p. 138.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_290_290" id="Footnote_290_290"></a><a href="#FNanchor_290_290"><span class="label">[290]</span></a> The contrast between the Monism thus reached and our own psychological +<p><a id="Footnote_290_290"></a><a href="#FNanchor_290_290"><span class="label">[290]</span></a> The contrast between the Monism thus reached and our own psychological point of view can be exhibited schematically thus, the terms in squares standing for what, for us, are the ultimate irreducible data of psychological science, and the vincula above it symbolizing the reductions @@ -18557,7 +18584,7 @@ which post-Kantian idealism performs: </p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_366fn_0033.jpg" width="400" alt="Chart" /> +<img src="images/jame_366fn_0033.jpg" alt="Chart" style="width: 400px"> </div> <p> @@ -18572,19 +18599,19 @@ in.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_291_291" id="Footnote_291_291"></a><a href="#FNanchor_291_291"><span class="label">[291]</span></a> T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, §§ 57, 61, 64.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_291_291"></a><a href="#FNanchor_291_291"><span class="label">[291]</span></a> T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, §§ 57, 61, 64.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_292_292" id="Footnote_292_292"></a><a href="#FNanchor_292_292"><span class="label">[292]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> § 64.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_292_292"></a><a href="#FNanchor_292_292"><span class="label">[292]</span></a> <i>Loc. cit.</i> § 64.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_293_293" id="Footnote_293_293"></a><a href="#FNanchor_293_293"><span class="label">[293]</span></a> E. Caird: Hegel (1883), p. 149.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_293_293"></a><a href="#FNanchor_293_293"><span class="label">[293]</span></a> E. Caird: Hegel (1883), p. 149.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_294_294" id="Footnote_294_294"></a><a href="#FNanchor_294_294"><span class="label">[294]</span></a> One is almost tempted to believe that the pantomime-state of mind +<p><a id="Footnote_294_294"></a><a href="#FNanchor_294_294"><span class="label">[294]</span></a> One is almost tempted to believe that the pantomime-state of mind and that of the Hegelian dialectics are, emotionally considered, one and the same thing. In the pantomime all common things are represented to happen in impossible ways, people jump down each other's throats, houses @@ -18599,7 +18626,7 @@ thoroughly enjoying the spectacle they show.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_295_295" id="Footnote_295_295"></a><a href="#FNanchor_295_295"><span class="label">[295]</span></a> The reader will please understand that I am quite willing to leave the +<p><a id="Footnote_295_295"></a><a href="#FNanchor_295_295"><span class="label">[295]</span></a> The reader will please understand that I am quite willing to leave the hypothesis of the transcendental Ego as a substitute for the passing Thought open to discussion on <i>general speculative grounds</i>. Only <i>in this book</i> I prefer to stick by the common sense assumption that we have successive @@ -18629,7 +18656,7 @@ upon all this again.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_296_296" id="Footnote_296_296"></a><a href="#FNanchor_296_296"><span class="label">[296]</span></a> "When we compare the listless inactivity of the infant, slumbering +<p><a id="Footnote_296_296"></a><a href="#FNanchor_296_296"><span class="label">[296]</span></a> "When we compare the listless inactivity of the infant, slumbering from the moment at which he takes his milky food to the moment at which he wakes to require it again, with the restless energies of that mighty being which he is to become in his maturer years, pouring truth after truth, in @@ -18673,7 +18700,7 @@ the Human Mind, 'on Mental Identity.')</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_297_297" id="Footnote_297_297"></a><a href="#FNanchor_297_297"><span class="label">[297]</span></a> "Sir John Cutler had a pair of black worsted stockings, which his +<p><a id="Footnote_297_297"></a><a href="#FNanchor_297_297"><span class="label">[297]</span></a> "Sir John Cutler had a pair of black worsted stockings, which his maid darned so often with silk that they became at last a pair of silk stockings. Now, supposing these stockings of Sir John's endued with some degree of consciousness at every particular darning, they would have @@ -18686,11 +18713,11 @@ Scriblerus, quoted by Brown, <i>ibid.</i>)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_298_298" id="Footnote_298_298"></a><a href="#FNanchor_298_298"><span class="label">[298]</span></a> Hours of Work and Play, p. 100.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_298_298"></a><a href="#FNanchor_298_298"><span class="label">[298]</span></a> Hours of Work and Play, p. 100.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_299_299" id="Footnote_299_299"></a><a href="#FNanchor_299_299"><span class="label">[299]</span></a> For a careful study of the errors in narratives, see E. Gurney: Phantasms +<p><a id="Footnote_299_299"></a><a href="#FNanchor_299_299"><span class="label">[299]</span></a> For a careful study of the errors in narratives, see E. Gurney: Phantasms of the Living, vol. i, pp. 126-158. In the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research for May 1887 Mr. Richard Hodgson shows by an extraordinary array of instances how utterly inaccurate everyone's @@ -18698,14 +18725,14 @@ description from memory of a rapid series of events is certain to be.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_300_300" id="Footnote_300_300"></a><a href="#FNanchor_300_300"><span class="label">[300]</span></a> See Josiah Royce (Mind, vol. 13, p. 244, and Proceedings of Am. Soc. +<p><a id="Footnote_300_300"></a><a href="#FNanchor_300_300"><span class="label">[300]</span></a> See Josiah Royce (Mind, vol. 13, p. 244, and Proceedings of Am. Soc. of Psych. Research, vol. i, p. 366), for evidence that a certain sort of hallucination of memory which he calls 'pseudo-presentiment' is no uncommon phenomenon.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_301_301" id="Footnote_301_301"></a><a href="#FNanchor_301_301"><span class="label">[301]</span></a> Maladies de la Mémoire, p. 85. The little that would be left of personal +<p><a id="Footnote_301_301"></a><a href="#FNanchor_301_301"><span class="label">[301]</span></a> Maladies de la Mémoire, p. 85. The little that would be left of personal consciousness if <i>all</i> our senses stopped their work is ingenuously shown in the remark of the extraordinary anæsthetic youth whose case Professor Strümpell reports (in the Deutsches Archiv f. klin. Med., xxii, @@ -18717,7 +18744,7 @@ nicht</i>—I no longer <i>am</i>."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_302_302" id="Footnote_302_302"></a><a href="#FNanchor_302_302"><span class="label">[302]</span></a> "One can compare the state of the patient to nothing so well as to +<p><a id="Footnote_302_302"></a><a href="#FNanchor_302_302"><span class="label">[302]</span></a> "One can compare the state of the patient to nothing so well as to that of a caterpillar, which, keeping all its caterpillar's ideas and remembrances, should suddenly become a butterfly with a butterfly's senses and sensations. Between the old and the new state, between the first self, that @@ -18731,22 +18758,22 @@ second, somewhat later, which consists in his saying, <i>I am another person.</i <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_303_303" id="Footnote_303_303"></a><a href="#FNanchor_303_303"><span class="label">[303]</span></a> W. Griesinger: Mental Diseases, § 29.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_303_303"></a><a href="#FNanchor_303_303"><span class="label">[303]</span></a> W. Griesinger: Mental Diseases, § 29.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_304_304" id="Footnote_304_304"></a><a href="#FNanchor_304_304"><span class="label">[304]</span></a> See the interesting case of 'old Stump' in the Proceedings of the Am. +<p><a id="Footnote_304_304"></a><a href="#FNanchor_304_304"><span class="label">[304]</span></a> See the interesting case of 'old Stump' in the Proceedings of the Am. Soc. for Psych. Research, p. 552.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_305_305" id="Footnote_305_305"></a><a href="#FNanchor_305_305"><span class="label">[305]</span></a> De l'Intelligence, 3me édition (1878), vol. ii, note, p. 461. Krishaber's +<p><a id="Footnote_305_305"></a><a href="#FNanchor_305_305"><span class="label">[305]</span></a> De l'Intelligence, 3me édition (1878), vol. ii, note, p. 461. Krishaber's book (La Névropathie Cérébro-cardiaque, 1873) is full of similar observations.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_306_306" id="Footnote_306_306"></a><a href="#FNanchor_306_306"><span class="label">[306]</span></a> Sudden alterations in outward fortune often produce such a change +<p><a id="Footnote_306_306"></a><a href="#FNanchor_306_306"><span class="label">[306]</span></a> Sudden alterations in outward fortune often produce such a change in the empirical <i>me</i> as almost to amount to a pathological disturbance of self-consciousness. When a poor man draws the big prize in a lottery, or unexpectedly inherits an estate; when a man high in fame is publicly @@ -18760,49 +18787,49 @@ is no unfrequent result.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_307_307" id="Footnote_307_307"></a><a href="#FNanchor_307_307"><span class="label">[307]</span></a> The number of subjects who can do this with any fertility and exuberance +<p><a id="Footnote_307_307"></a><a href="#FNanchor_307_307"><span class="label">[307]</span></a> The number of subjects who can do this with any fertility and exuberance is relatively quite small.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_308_308" id="Footnote_308_308"></a><a href="#FNanchor_308_308"><span class="label">[308]</span></a> First in the Revue Scientifique for May 26, 1876, then in his book, +<p><a id="Footnote_308_308"></a><a href="#FNanchor_308_308"><span class="label">[308]</span></a> First in the Revue Scientifique for May 26, 1876, then in his book, Hypnotisme, Double Conscience, et Altérations de la Personnalité (Paris, 1887).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_309_309" id="Footnote_309_309"></a><a href="#FNanchor_309_309"><span class="label">[309]</span></a> Der Hypnotismus (1884), pp. 109-15.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_309_309"></a><a href="#FNanchor_309_309"><span class="label">[309]</span></a> Der Hypnotismus (1884), pp. 109-15.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_310_310" id="Footnote_310_310"></a><a href="#FNanchor_310_310"><span class="label">[310]</span></a> Transactions of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia, April 4, +<p><a id="Footnote_310_310"></a><a href="#FNanchor_310_310"><span class="label">[310]</span></a> Transactions of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia, April 4, 1888. Also, less complete, in Harper's Magazine, May 1860.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_311_311" id="Footnote_311_311"></a><a href="#FNanchor_311_311"><span class="label">[311]</span></a> Cf. Ribot's Diseases of Memory for cases. See also a large number of +<p><a id="Footnote_311_311"></a><a href="#FNanchor_311_311"><span class="label">[311]</span></a> Cf. Ribot's Diseases of Memory for cases. See also a large number of them in Forbes Winslow's Obscure Diseases of the Brain and Mind, chapters xiii-xvii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_312_312" id="Footnote_312_312"></a><a href="#FNanchor_312_312"><span class="label">[312]</span></a> See the interesting account by M. J. Janet in the Revue Scientifique, +<p><a id="Footnote_312_312"></a><a href="#FNanchor_312_312"><span class="label">[312]</span></a> See the interesting account by M. J. Janet in the Revue Scientifique, May 19, 1888.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_313_313" id="Footnote_313_313"></a><a href="#FNanchor_313_313"><span class="label">[313]</span></a> Variations de la Personnalité (Paris, 1888).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_313_313"></a><a href="#FNanchor_313_313"><span class="label">[313]</span></a> Variations de la Personnalité (Paris, 1888).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_314_314" id="Footnote_314_314"></a><a href="#FNanchor_314_314"><span class="label">[314]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 84. In this work and in Dr. Azam's (cited on a previous +<p><a id="Footnote_314_314"></a><a href="#FNanchor_314_314"><span class="label">[314]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 84. In this work and in Dr. Azam's (cited on a previous page), as well as in Prof. Th. Ribot's Maladies de la Personnalité (1885), the reader will find information and references relative to the other known cases of the kind.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_315_315" id="Footnote_315_315"></a><a href="#FNanchor_315_315"><span class="label">[315]</span></a> His own brother's subject Wit...., although in her anæsthetic waking +<p><a id="Footnote_315_315"></a><a href="#FNanchor_315_315"><span class="label">[315]</span></a> His own brother's subject Wit...., although in her anæsthetic waking state she recollected nothing of either of her trances, yet remembered her deeper trance (in which her sensibilities became perfect—see above, <a href="#Page_207">p. 207</a>) when she was in her lighter trance. Nevertheless in the latter she was as @@ -18820,12 +18847,12 @@ imagine the things which they can no longer see.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_316_316" id="Footnote_316_316"></a><a href="#FNanchor_316_316"><span class="label">[316]</span></a> A full account of the case, by Mr. R. Hodgson, will be found in the +<p><a id="Footnote_316_316"></a><a href="#FNanchor_316_316"><span class="label">[316]</span></a> A full account of the case, by Mr. R. Hodgson, will be found in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research for 1891.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_317_317" id="Footnote_317_317"></a><a href="#FNanchor_317_317"><span class="label">[317]</span></a> He had spent an afternoon in Boston, a night in New York, an afternoon +<p><a id="Footnote_317_317"></a><a href="#FNanchor_317_317"><span class="label">[317]</span></a> He had spent an afternoon in Boston, a night in New York, an afternoon in Newark, and ten days or more in Philadelphia, first in a certain hotel and next in a certain boarding-house, making no acquaintances, 'resting,' reading, and 'looking round.' I have unfortunately been unable to @@ -18835,7 +18862,7 @@ He forgets the name of the two ladies who kept it.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_318_318" id="Footnote_318_318"></a><a href="#FNanchor_318_318"><span class="label">[318]</span></a> The details of the case, it will be seen, are all <i>compatible</i> with simulation. +<p><a id="Footnote_318_318"></a><a href="#FNanchor_318_318"><span class="label">[318]</span></a> The details of the case, it will be seen, are all <i>compatible</i> with simulation. I can only say of that, that no one who has examined Mr. Bourne (including Dr. Read, Dr. Weir Mitchell, Dr. Guy Hinsdale, and Mr. R. Hodgson) practically doubts his ingrained honesty, nor, so far as I can @@ -18843,12 +18870,12 @@ discover, do any of his personal acquaintances indulge in a sceptical view.</p>< <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_319_319" id="Footnote_319_319"></a><a href="#FNanchor_319_319"><span class="label">[319]</span></a> The Watseka Wonder, by E. W. Stevens. Chicago, Religio-Philosophical +<p><a id="Footnote_319_319"></a><a href="#FNanchor_319_319"><span class="label">[319]</span></a> The Watseka Wonder, by E. W. Stevens. Chicago, Religio-Philosophical Publishing House, 1887.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_320_320" id="Footnote_320_320"></a><a href="#FNanchor_320_320"><span class="label">[320]</span></a> My friend Mr. R. Hodgson informs me that he visited Watseka in +<p><a id="Footnote_320_320"></a><a href="#FNanchor_320_320"><span class="label">[320]</span></a> My friend Mr. R. Hodgson informs me that he visited Watseka in April 1890, and cross-examined the principal witnesses of this case. His confidence in the original narrative was strengthened by what he learned; and various unpublished facts were ascertained, which increased the plausibility @@ -18856,18 +18883,18 @@ of the spiritualistic interpretation of the phenomenon.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_321_321" id="Footnote_321_321"></a><a href="#FNanchor_321_321"><span class="label">[321]</span></a> See his highly important series of articles on Automatic Writing, etc., +<p><a id="Footnote_321_321"></a><a href="#FNanchor_321_321"><span class="label">[321]</span></a> See his highly important series of articles on Automatic Writing, etc., in the Proceedings of the Soc. for Psych. Research, especially Article ii (May 1885). Compare also Dr. Maudsley's instructive article in Mind, vol. xiv, p. 161, and Luys's essay, 'Sur le Dédoublement,' etc., in l'Encéphale for 1889.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI.</a></h5> <h4>ATTENTION.</h4> @@ -18878,7 +18905,7 @@ from psychologists of the English empiricist school. The Germans have explicitly treated of it, either as a faculty or as a resultant, but in the pages of such writers as Locke, Hume, Hartley, the Mills, and Spencer the word hardly -occurs, or if it does so, it is parenthetically and as if by inadvertence.<a name="FNanchor_322_322" id="FNanchor_322_322"></a><a href="#Footnote_322_322" class="fnanchor">[322]</a> +occurs, or if it does so, it is parenthetically and as if by inadvertence.<a id="FNanchor_322_322"></a><a href="#Footnote_322_322" class="fnanchor">[322]</a> The motive of this ignoring of the phenomenon of attention is obvious enough. These writers are bent on showing how the higher faculties of the mind are pure @@ -18899,7 +18926,7 @@ experience. Why? Because they have no <i>interest</i> for me. which I <i>notice</i> shape my mind—without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground—intelligible -perspective, in a word. It varies in every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span> +perspective, in a word. It varies in every<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span> creature, but without it the consciousness of every creature would be a gray chaotic indiscriminateness, impossible for us even to conceive. Such an empiricist writer as Mr. @@ -18937,11 +18964,11 @@ than the most frequent ones possess. The interest itself, though its genesis is doubtless perfectly <i>natural, makes</i> experience more than it is made by it.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of -what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span> +what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span> of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition @@ -18983,9 +19010,9 @@ mechanical occupations that end by being automatically carried on, tend to produce it in men. It is not sleep; and yet when aroused from such a state, a person will often hardly be able to say what he has been thinking about -Subjects of the hypnotic trance seem to lapse into it when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> +Subjects of the hypnotic trance seem to lapse into it when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> left to themselves; asked what they are thinking of, they -reply, 'of nothing particular'!<a name="FNanchor_323_323" id="FNanchor_323_323"></a><a href="#Footnote_323_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a></p> +reply, 'of nothing particular'!<a id="FNanchor_323_323"></a><a href="#Footnote_323_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a></p> <p>The abolition of this condition is what we call the awakening of the attention. One principal object comes then @@ -19016,7 +19043,7 @@ which they form one complex 'object' (<a href="#Page_276">p. 276</a> ff.), so th properly speaking there is before the mind at no time a plurality of <i>ideas</i>, properly so called.</p> -<p>The 'unity of the soul' has been supposed by many<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span> +<p>The 'unity of the soul' has been supposed by many<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span> philosophers, who also believed in the distinct atomic nature of 'ideas,' to preclude the presence to it of more than one objective fact, manifested in one idea, at a time. Even @@ -19033,7 +19060,7 @@ relative situation of the different points with respect to each other, we must conclude that the perception of figure by the eye is the result of a number of different acts of attention. These acts of attention, however, are performed with such rapidity, that the effect, with respect to -us, is the same as if the perception were instantaneous."<a name="FNanchor_324_324" id="FNanchor_324_324"></a><a href="#Footnote_324_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a></p></blockquote> +us, is the same as if the perception were instantaneous."<a id="FNanchor_324_324"></a><a href="#Footnote_324_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Such glaringly artificial views can only come from fantastic metaphysics or from the ambiguity of the word 'idea,' @@ -19059,25 +19086,25 @@ view at once more than six, or seven at most, without confusion; but if you group them into twos, or threes, or fives, you can comprehend as many groups as you can units; because the mind considers these groups only as units—it views them as wholes, and throws their parts -out of consideration."<a name="FNanchor_325_325" id="FNanchor_325_325"></a><a href="#Footnote_325_325" class="fnanchor">[325]</a></p></blockquote> +out of consideration."<a id="FNanchor_325_325"></a><a href="#Footnote_325_325" class="fnanchor">[325]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Professor Jevons, repeating this observation, by counting instantaneously beans thrown into a box, found that the number 6 was guessed correctly 120 times out of 147, 5 -correctly 102 times out of 107, and 4 and 3 always right.<a name="FNanchor_326_326" id="FNanchor_326_326"></a><a href="#Footnote_326_326" class="fnanchor">[326]</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span>It is obvious that such observations decide nothing at all +correctly 102 times out of 107, and 4 and 3 always right.<a id="FNanchor_326_326"></a><a href="#Footnote_326_326" class="fnanchor">[326]</a> +<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span>It is obvious that such observations decide nothing at all about our attention, properly so called. They rather measure in part the distinctness of our vision—especially of the -primary-memory-image<a name="FNanchor_327_327" id="FNanchor_327_327"></a><a href="#Footnote_327_327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a>—in part the amount of association +primary-memory-image<a id="FNanchor_327_327"></a><a href="#Footnote_327_327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a>—in part the amount of association in the individual between seen arrangements and the names -of numbers.<a name="FNanchor_328_328" id="FNanchor_328_328"></a><a href="#Footnote_328_328" class="fnanchor">[328]</a></p> +of numbers.<a id="FNanchor_328_328"></a><a href="#Footnote_328_328" class="fnanchor">[328]</a></p> <p>Each number-name is a way of grasping the beans as one total object. In such a total object, all the parts converge harmoniously to the one resultant concept; no single bean has special discrepant associations of its own; and so, with <i>practice</i>, they may grow quite numerous ere -we fail to estimate them aright. But where the 'object' before<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span> +we fail to estimate them aright. But where the 'object' before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span> us breaks into parts disconnected with each other, and forming each as it were a separate object or system, not conceivable in union with the rest, it becomes harder to @@ -19087,7 +19114,7 @@ limits this can be done. M. Paulhan has experimented carefully on the matter by declaiming one poem aloud whilst he repeated a different one mentally, or by writing one sentence whilst speaking another, or by performing -calculations on paper whilst reciting poetry.<a name="FNanchor_329_329" id="FNanchor_329_329"></a><a href="#Footnote_329_329" class="fnanchor">[329]</a> He found +calculations on paper whilst reciting poetry.<a id="FNanchor_329_329"></a><a href="#Footnote_329_329" class="fnanchor">[329]</a> He found that</p> <blockquote> @@ -19129,7 +19156,7 @@ combining them."</p></blockquote> <p>Of course these time-measurements lack precision. With three systems of object (writing with <i>each</i> hand whilst reciting) the operation became much more difficult.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span></p> <p>If, then, by the original question, how many ideas or things can we attend to at once, be meant how many entirely disconnected systems or processes of conception can go on @@ -19138,13 +19165,13 @@ unless the processes are very habitual; but then two, or even three,</i> without very much oscillation of the attention. Where, however, the processes are less automatic, as in the story of Julius Cæsar dictating four letters whilst he writes -a fifth,<a name="FNanchor_330_330" id="FNanchor_330_330"></a><a href="#Footnote_330_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a> there must be a rapid oscillation of the mind from +a fifth,<a id="FNanchor_330_330"></a><a href="#Footnote_330_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a> there must be a rapid oscillation of the mind from one to the next, and no consequent gain of time. Within any one of the systems the parts may be numberless, but we attend to them collectively when we conceive the whole which they form.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>When the things to be attended to are small sensations, and when the effort is to be exact in noting them, it is @@ -19171,7 +19198,7 @@ succession</i> in time of two sensations we shall have to quote in another chapter, makes some noteworthy remarks about the way in which the attention must be <i>set</i> to catch the interval and the right order of the sensations, when the -time is exceeding small. The point was to tell whether<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span> +time is exceeding small. The point was to tell whether<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span> two signals were simultaneous or successive; and, if successive, which one of them came first.</p> @@ -19201,7 +19228,7 @@ to sight it often seemed to me as if the impression for which the attention was <i>not</i> prepared were there already when the other came."</p></blockquote> <p>Exner found himself employing this method oftenest -when the impressions differed strongly.<a name="FNanchor_331_331" id="FNanchor_331_331"></a><a href="#Footnote_331_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a></p> +when the impressions differed strongly.<a id="FNanchor_331_331"></a><a href="#Footnote_331_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a></p> <p>In such observations (which must not be confounded with those where the two signals were identical and their @@ -19218,7 +19245,7 @@ light thereon.</p> of which we treated in <a href="#CHAPTER_III">Chapter III</a>. It happened occasionally in Wundt's experiments that the reaction-time was reduced to zero or even assumed a negative value, which, -being translated into common speech, means that the observer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> +being translated into common speech, means that the observer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> was sometimes so intent upon the signal that his reaction <i>actually coincided in time with it, or even preceded it,</i> instead of coming a fraction of a second after it, as in the @@ -19238,7 +19265,7 @@ itself. We seek to make our own feelings of touch and innervation which we hear; and experience shows that in many cases we approximately succeed. In these cases we have a distinct consciousness of hearing the signal, reacting upon it, and feeling our reaction take -place,—all at one and the same moment."<a name="FNanchor_332_332" id="FNanchor_332_332"></a><a href="#Footnote_332_332" class="fnanchor">[332]</a></p></blockquote> +place,—all at one and the same moment."<a id="FNanchor_332_332"></a><a href="#Footnote_332_332" class="fnanchor">[332]</a></p></blockquote> <p>In another place, Wundt adds:</p> @@ -19252,7 +19279,7 @@ always tries to bring the ideas into a certain connection, to grasp them as components of a certain complex representation. Thus in the experiments in question, it has often seemed to me that I produced by my own recording movement the sound which the ball made in dropping -on the board."<a name="FNanchor_333_333" id="FNanchor_333_333"></a><a href="#Footnote_333_333" class="fnanchor">[333]</a></p></blockquote> +on the board."<a id="FNanchor_333_333"></a><a href="#Footnote_333_333" class="fnanchor">[333]</a></p></blockquote> <p>The 'difficulty,' in the cases of which Wundt speaks, is that of forcing two non-simultaneous events into apparent @@ -19269,7 +19296,7 @@ as possible his exact words:</p> <blockquote> <p>"The conditions become more complicated when we receive a series -of impressions separated by distinct intervals, into the midst of which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> +of impressions separated by distinct intervals, into the midst of which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> a heterogeneous impression is suddenly brought. Then comes the question, with which member of the series do we perceive the additional impression to coincide? with that member with whose presence it @@ -19317,11 +19344,11 @@ bell-stroke with this actually seen position; and in so doing may easily overlook more than 1/4 of a second of time. Results, therefore, to be of any value, must be drawn from long-continued and very numerous observations, in which such irregular oscillations of the attention neutralize -each other according to the law of great numbers, and allow the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span> +each other according to the law of great numbers, and allow the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span> true laws to appear. Although my own experiments extend over many years (with interruptions), they are not even yet numerous enough to exhaust the subject—still, they bring out the principal laws which the -attention follows under such conditions."<a name="FNanchor_334_334" id="FNanchor_334_334"></a><a href="#Footnote_334_334" class="fnanchor">[334]</a></p></blockquote> +attention follows under such conditions."<a id="FNanchor_334_334"></a><a href="#Footnote_334_334" class="fnanchor">[334]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Wundt accordingly distinguishes the <i>direction</i> from the <i>amount</i> of the apparent displacement in time of the bell-stroke. @@ -19336,10 +19363,10 @@ hand, if the rapidity went <i>quickening</i>, errors became <i>negative</i>; if <i>slowing, positive</i>. The amount of error is, in general, the greater the slower the speed and its alterations. Finally, individual differences prevail, as well as differences -in the same individual at different times.<a name="FNanchor_335_335" id="FNanchor_335_335"></a><a href="#Footnote_335_335" class="fnanchor">[335]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span></p> +in the same individual at different times.<a id="FNanchor_335_335"></a><a href="#Footnote_335_335" class="fnanchor">[335]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span></p> <p>Wundt's pupil von Tschisch has carried out these experiments -on a still more elaborate scale,<a name="FNanchor_336_336" id="FNanchor_336_336"></a><a href="#Footnote_336_336" class="fnanchor">[336]</a> using, not only +on a still more elaborate scale,<a id="FNanchor_336_336"></a><a href="#Footnote_336_336" class="fnanchor">[336]</a> using, not only the single bell-stroke, but 2, 3, 4, or 5 simultaneous impressions, so that the attention had to note the place of the index at the moment when a whole group of things was @@ -19367,12 +19394,12 @@ than the rate at which the strokes come. If faster, then it hears the stroke too early; if slower, it hears it too late. The position of the index on the scale, meanwhile, is noted at the moment, early or late, at which the bell-stroke is -subjectively heard. Substituting several impressions for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span> +subjectively heard. Substituting several impressions for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span> the single bell-stroke makes the ripening of the perception slower, and the index is seen too late. So, at least, do I understand the explanations which Herren Wundt and v. -Tschisch give.<a name="FNanchor_337_337" id="FNanchor_337_337"></a><a href="#Footnote_337_337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span></p> +Tschisch give.<a id="FNanchor_337_337"></a><a href="#Footnote_337_337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span></p> <p>This is all I have to say about the difficulty of having two discrepant concepts together, and about the number of things to which we can simultaneously attend.</p> @@ -19415,7 +19442,7 @@ intellectual attention may be either passive or voluntary.</p> <p>In <i>passive immediate sensorial attention</i> the stimulus is a sense-impression, either very intense, voluminous, or sudden,—in -which case it makes no difference what its nature<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span> +which case it makes no difference what its nature<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span> may be, whether sight, sound, smell, blow, or inner pain,—or else it is an <i>instinctive</i> stimulus, a perception which, by reason of its nature rather than its mere force, appeals to @@ -19430,7 +19457,7 @@ things, words, blows, blood, etc., etc., etc.</p> characterizes the attention of childhood and youth. In mature age we have generally selected those stimuli which are connected with one or more so-called permanent interests, -and our attention has grown irresponsive to the rest.<a name="FNanchor_338_338" id="FNanchor_338_338"></a><a href="#Footnote_338_338" class="fnanchor">[338]</a> +and our attention has grown irresponsive to the rest.<a id="FNanchor_338_338"></a><a href="#Footnote_338_338" class="fnanchor">[338]</a> But childhood is characterized by great active energy, and has few organized interests by which to meet new impressions and decide whether they are worthy of notice or not, @@ -19455,7 +19482,7 @@ called the <i>motives</i> of the attention. The impression draws an interest from them, or perhaps it even fuses into a single complex object with them; the result is that it is brought into the focus of the mind. A faint tap <i>per se</i> is not an -interesting sound; it may well escape being discriminated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span> +interesting sound; it may well escape being discriminated<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span> from the general rumor of the world. But when it is a signal, as that of a lover on the window-pane, it will hardly go unperceived. Herbart writes:</p> @@ -19489,7 +19516,7 @@ words awaken old thoughts, forming strongly-connected series with which the new impression easily combined, than out of new and old together a total interest resulted which drove the vagrant ideas below the threshold of consciousness, and brought for a while settled attention -into their place."<a name="FNanchor_339_339" id="FNanchor_339_339"></a><a href="#Footnote_339_339" class="fnanchor">[339]</a></p></blockquote> +into their place."<a id="FNanchor_339_339"></a><a href="#Footnote_339_339" class="fnanchor">[339]</a></p></blockquote> <p><i>Passive intellectual attention</i> is immediate when we follow in thought a train of images exciting or interesting <i>per se</i>; @@ -19500,7 +19527,7 @@ which immense numbers of real things become integrated into single objects of thought for us, there is no clear line to be drawn between immediate and derived attention of an intellectual sort. When absorbed in intellectual attention -we may become so inattentive to outer things as to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> +we may become so inattentive to outer things as to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> 'absent-minded,' 'abstracted,' or '<i>distraits</i>.' All revery or concentrated meditation is apt to throw us into this state.</p> @@ -19529,7 +19556,7 @@ and was then wholly unconscious of everything going on around him. On the day of his marriage the great Budæus forgot everything in his philological speculations, and he was only awakened to the affairs of the external world by a tardy embassy from the marriage-party, who found -him absorbed in the composition of his <i>Commentarii</i>."<a name="FNanchor_340_340" id="FNanchor_340_340"></a><a href="#Footnote_340_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a></p></blockquote> +him absorbed in the composition of his <i>Commentarii</i>."<a id="FNanchor_340_340"></a><a href="#Footnote_340_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a></p></blockquote> <p>The absorption may be so deep as not only to banish ordinary sensations, but even the severest pain. Pascal, @@ -19545,10 +19572,10 @@ himself into the stream of thought, than he has found himself continuously borne along without the least distraction, until the end has come, and the attention has been released; when the pain has recurred with a force that has overmastered all resistance, making him -wonder how he could have ever ceased to feel it."<a name="FNanchor_341_341" id="FNanchor_341_341"></a><a href="#Footnote_341_341" class="fnanchor">[341]</a></p></blockquote> +wonder how he could have ever ceased to feel it."<a id="FNanchor_341_341"></a><a href="#Footnote_341_341" class="fnanchor">[341]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Dr. Carpenter speaks of launching himself by a determined -<i>effort</i>. This effort characterizes what we called<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span> +<i>effort</i>. This effort characterizes what we called<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span> <i>active or voluntary attention</i>. It is a feeling which every one knows, but which most people would call quite indescribable. We get it in the sensorial sphere whenever we seek @@ -19574,7 +19601,7 @@ and talking about exciting and interesting things.</p> <p><i>There is no such thing as voluntary attention sustained for more than a few seconds at a time.</i> What is called sustained voluntary attention is a repetition of successive efforts -which bring back the topic to the mind.<a name="FNanchor_342_342" id="FNanchor_342_342"></a><a href="#Footnote_342_342" class="fnanchor">[342]</a> The topic once +which bring back the topic to the mind.<a id="FNanchor_342_342"></a><a href="#Footnote_342_342" class="fnanchor">[342]</a> The topic once brought back, if a congenial one, <i>develops</i>; and if its development is interesting it engages the attention passively for a time. Dr. Carpenter, a moment back, described the @@ -19583,7 +19610,7 @@ This passive interest may be short or long. As soon as it flags, the attention is diverted by some irrelevant thing, and then a voluntary effort may bring it back to the topic again; and so on, under favorable conditions, for hours together. -During all this time, however, note that it is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span> +During all this time, however, note that it is not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span> an identical <i>object</i> in the psychological sense (<a href="#Page_275">p. 275</a>), but a succession of mutually related objects forming an identical <i>topic</i> only, upon which the attention is fixed. <i>No one can @@ -19624,7 +19651,7 @@ inaudible,—if we attend to it too unmovingly. Helmholtz, who has put his sensorial attention to the severest tests, by using his eyes on objects which in common life are expressly overlooked, makes some interesting remarks on -this point in his chapter on retinal rivalry.<a name="FNanchor_343_343" id="FNanchor_343_343"></a><a href="#Footnote_343_343" class="fnanchor">[343]</a> The phenomenon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span> +this point in his chapter on retinal rivalry.<a id="FNanchor_343_343"></a><a href="#Footnote_343_343" class="fnanchor">[343]</a> The phenomenon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span> called by that name is this, that if we look with each eye upon a different picture (as in the annexed stereoscopic slide), sometimes one picture, sometimes the other, @@ -19651,7 +19678,7 @@ object, we must seek constantly to find out something new about the latter, especially if other powerful impressions are attracting us away."</p></blockquote> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 375px;"> -<img src="images/jame_422_0035.jpg" width="375" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_422_0035.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 375px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 36.</div> </div> @@ -19664,7 +19691,7 @@ will, Helmholtz writes:</p> <p>"This is only restrictedly true. We move our eyes by our will; but one without training cannot so easily execute the intention of making them converge. At any moment, however, he can execute that of -looking at a near object, in which act convergence is involved. Now<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span> +looking at a near object, in which act convergence is involved. Now<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span> just as little can we carry out our purpose to keep our attention steadily fixed upon a certain object, when our interest in the object is exhausted, and the purpose is inwardly formulated in this abstract way. <i>But we @@ -19682,7 +19709,7 @@ different aspects and relations of it in turn. Only in pathological states will a fixed and ever monotonously recurring idea possess the mind.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>And now we can see why it is that what is called sustained attention is the easier, the richer in acquisitions and @@ -19693,7 +19720,7 @@ But an intellect unfurnished with materials, stagnant, unoriginal, will hardly be likely to consider any subject long. A glance exhausts its possibilities of interest. Geniuses are commonly believed to excel other men in their power -of sustained attention.<a name="FNanchor_344_344" id="FNanchor_344_344"></a><a href="#Footnote_344_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a> In most of them, it is to be feared, +of sustained attention.<a id="FNanchor_344_344"></a><a href="#Footnote_344_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a> In most of them, it is to be feared, the so-called 'power' is of the passive sort. Their ideas coruscate, every subject branches infinitely before their fertile minds, and so for hours they may be rapt. <i>But it @@ -19702,7 +19729,7 @@ making geniuses of them.</i> And, when we come down to the root of the matter, we see that they differ from ordinary men less in the character of their attention than in the nature of the objects upon which it is successively bestowed. -In the genius, these form a concatenated series, suggesting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span> +In the genius, these form a concatenated series, suggesting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span> each other mutually by some rational law. Therefore we call the attention 'sustained' and the topic of meditation for hours 'the same.' In the common man the series is @@ -19730,7 +19757,7 @@ already there; and if possible awaken curiosity, so that the new thing shall seem to come as an answer, or part of an answer, to a question pre-existing in his mind.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>At present having described the varieties, let us turn to</p> @@ -19756,18 +19783,18 @@ shall appear to himself to inhabit.</p> <p><i>c</i>) distinguish—</p> <p><i>d</i>) remember—</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span></p> <p>better than otherwise we could—both more successive things and each thing more clearly. It also</p> <p>(<i>e</i>) shortens 'reaction-time.'</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>a</i> and <i>b</i>. Most people would say that a sensation attended to becomes stronger than it otherwise would be. This point is, however, not quite plain, and has occasioned -some discussion.<a name="FNanchor_345_345" id="FNanchor_345_345"></a><a href="#Footnote_345_345" class="fnanchor">[345]</a> From the strength or intensity of a +some discussion.<a id="FNanchor_345_345"></a><a href="#Footnote_345_345" class="fnanchor">[345]</a> From the strength or intensity of a sensation must be distinguished its clearness; and to increase <i>this</i> is, for some psychologists, the utmost that attention can do. When the facts are surveyed, however, @@ -19796,7 +19823,7 @@ of reality, and (in the case of certain exceptionally gifted observers) leave a negative after-image of itself when it passes away (see Chapter XVIII). Confident expectation of a certain intensity or quality of impression will often -make us sensibly see or hear it in an object which really<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span> +make us sensibly see or hear it in an object which really<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span> falls far short of it. In face of such facts it is rash to say that attention cannot make a sense-impression more intense.</p> @@ -19817,11 +19844,11 @@ clock no louder, no matter how much we increase the strain of our attention upon them. No one, by doing this, can make the gray paper look white, or the stroke of the pendulum sound like the blow of a strong hammer,—everyone, on the contrary, feels the increase as that -of his own conscious activity turned upon the thing."<a name="FNanchor_346_346" id="FNanchor_346_346"></a><a href="#Footnote_346_346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a></p></blockquote> +of his own conscious activity turned upon the thing."<a id="FNanchor_346_346"></a><a href="#Footnote_346_346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Were it otherwise, we should not be able to note <i>intensities</i> by attending to them. Weak impressions would, as -Stumpf says,<a name="FNanchor_347_347" id="FNanchor_347_347"></a><a href="#Footnote_347_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a> become stronger by the very fact of being +Stumpf says,<a id="FNanchor_347_347"></a><a href="#Footnote_347_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a> become stronger by the very fact of being observed.</p> <blockquote> @@ -19838,20 +19865,20 @@ question whatever that attention augments the <i>clearness</i> of all that we perceive or conceive by its aid. But what is meant by clearness here?</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>c. Clearness</i>, so far as attention produces it, <i>means distinction from other things</i> and <i>internal analysis or subdivision</i>. These are essentially products of intellectual <i>discrimination</i>, involving comparison, memory, and perception of various relations. The attention <i>per se</i> does not distinguish and -analyze and relate. The most we can say is that it is a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span> +analyze and relate. The most we can say is that it is a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span> condition of our doing so. And as these processes are to be described later, the clearness they produce had better not be farther discussed here. The important point to notice -here is that it is not attention's <i>immediate</i> fruit.<a name="FNanchor_348_348" id="FNanchor_348_348"></a><a href="#Footnote_348_348" class="fnanchor">[348]</a></p> +here is that it is not attention's <i>immediate</i> fruit.<a id="FNanchor_348_348"></a><a href="#Footnote_348_348" class="fnanchor">[348]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>d.</i> Whatever future conclusion we may reach as to this, we cannot deny that <i>an object once attended to will remain @@ -19861,7 +19888,7 @@ will leave no traces behind. Already in Chapter VI (see were 'unconscious,' or whether they were not rather states to which no attention had been paid, and of whose passage recollection could afterwards find no vestiges. Dugald -Stewart says:<a name="FNanchor_349_349" id="FNanchor_349_349"></a><a href="#Footnote_349_349" class="fnanchor">[349]</a> "The connection between attention and +Stewart says:<a id="FNanchor_349_349"></a><a href="#Footnote_349_349" class="fnanchor">[349]</a> "The connection between attention and memory has been remarked by many authors." He quotes Quintilian, Locke, and Helvetius; and goes on at great length to explain the phenomena of 'secondary automatism' @@ -19870,7 +19897,7 @@ grown so inattentive as to preserve no memory of itself. In our chapter on Memory, later on, the point will come up again.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>e</i>) Under this head, the <i>shortening of reaction-time</i>, there is a good deal to be said of Attention's effects. Since @@ -19891,7 +19918,7 @@ happen that instead of registering the stimulus, we react upon some entirely different impression,—and this not through confounding the one with the other. On the contrary, we are perfectly well aware at the moment of making the movement that we respond to the wrong -stimulus. Sometimes even, though not so often, the latter may be another<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span> +stimulus. Sometimes even, though not so often, the latter may be another<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span> kind of sensation altogether,—one may, for example, in experimenting with sound, register a flash of light, produced either by accident or design. We cannot well explain these results otherwise @@ -19903,7 +19930,7 @@ any chance impression, even by one to which we never intended to respond. When the preparatory innervation has once reached this pitch of intensity, the time that intervenes between the stimulus and the contraction of the muscles which react, may become vanishingly -small."<a name="FNanchor_350_350" id="FNanchor_350_350"></a><a href="#Footnote_350_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a></p> +small."<a id="FNanchor_350_350"></a><a href="#Footnote_350_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a></p> <p>"The perception of an impression is facilitated when the impression is preceded by a warning which announces beforehand that it is @@ -19923,32 +19950,63 @@ are the averages of two series of such experiments:</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Height of Fall.</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Average. </td><td align="left">Mean Error. </td><td align="left">No. of Expts.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">25 cm.</td><td align="left">No warning </td><td align="left">0.253</td><td align="left">0.051</td><td align="left">13</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Warning</td><td align="left">0.076</td><td align="left">0.060</td><td align="left">17</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">5 cm.</td><td align="left">No warning</td><td align="left">0.266</td><td align="left">0.036</td><td align="left">14</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Warning</td><td align="left">0.175</td><td align="left">0.035</td><td align="left">17</td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">Height of Fall.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Average. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Mean Error. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">No. of Expts.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">25 cm.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">No warning </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.253</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.051</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">13</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Warning</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.076</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.060</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">17</td></tr> +<tr> +<td colspan="5"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">5 cm.</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">No warning</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.266</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.036</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">14</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Warning</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.175</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.035</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">17</td> +</tr> </table></div> <p>"... In a long series of experiments, (the interval between warning and stimulus remaining the same) the reaction-time grows less and less, and it is possible occasionally to reduce it to a vanishing quantity -(a few thousandths of a second), to zero, or even to a negative value.<a name="FNanchor_351_351" id="FNanchor_351_351"></a><a href="#Footnote_351_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a>... +(a few thousandths of a second), to zero, or even to a negative value.<a id="FNanchor_351_351"></a><a href="#Footnote_351_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a>... The only ground that we can assign for this phenomenon is <i>the preparation (vorbereitende Spannung) of the attention</i>. It is easy to understand that the reaction-time should be shortened by this means; but that it should sometimes sink to zero and even assume negative values, may appear surprising. Nevertheless this latter case is also explained by what happens in the simple reaction-time experiments" -just referred to, in which, "when the strain of the attention has reached<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span> +just referred to, in which, "when the strain of the attention has reached<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span> its climax, the movement we stand ready to execute escapes from the control of on will, and we register a wrong signal. In these other experiments, in which a warning foretells the moment of the stimulus, it is also plain that attention accommodates itself so exactly to the latter's reception that <i>no sooner is it objectively given than it is fully -apperceived, and with the apperception the motor discharge coincides</i>."<a name="FNanchor_352_352" id="FNanchor_352_352"></a><a href="#Footnote_352_352" class="fnanchor">[352]</a></p></blockquote> +apperceived, and with the apperception the motor discharge coincides</i>."<a id="FNanchor_352_352"></a><a href="#Footnote_352_352" class="fnanchor">[352]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Usually, when the impression is fully anticipated, attention prepares the motor centres so completely for both @@ -19957,7 +20015,7 @@ physiological conduction downwards. But even this interval may disappear, i.e. the stimulus and reaction may become objectively contemporaneous; or more remarkable still, the reaction may be discharged before the stimulus has -actually occurred.<a name="FNanchor_353_353" id="FNanchor_353_353"></a><a href="#Footnote_353_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a> Wundt, as we saw some pages back +actually occurred.<a id="FNanchor_353_353"></a><a href="#Footnote_353_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a> Wundt, as we saw some pages back (<a href="#Page_411">p. 411</a>), explains this by the effort of the mind so to react that we may feel our own movement and the signal which prompts it, both at the same instant. As the execution of @@ -19984,22 +20042,55 @@ await it.</p> <p>"If, e.g., we make reactions on a sound in such a way that weak and strong stimuli irregularly alternate so that the observer can never expect a determinate strength with any certainty, the reaction-time for -<i>all</i> the various signals is increased,—and so is the average error. I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span> +<i>all</i> the various signals is increased,—and so is the average error. I<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span> append two examples.... In Series I a strong and a weak sound alternated regularly, so that the intensity was each time known in advance. In II they came irregularly.</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">I. <i>Regular Alternation.</i></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Average Time. </td><td align="left">Average Error. </td><td align="left">No. of Expts.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Strong sound</td><td align="left">0.116"</td><td align="left">0.010"</td><td align="left">18</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Weak sound</td><td align="left">0.127"</td><td align="left">0.012"</td><td align="left">9</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">II. <i>Irregular Alternation.</i></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Strong sound</td><td align="left">0.189"</td><td align="left">0.038"</td><td align="left">9</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Weak sound</td><td align="left">0.298"</td><td align="left">0.076"</td><td align="left">15</td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">I. <i>Regular Alternation.</i></td> +<td colspan="3"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Average Time. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Average Error. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">No. of Expts.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">Strong sound</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.116"</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.010"</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">18</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">Weak sound</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.127"</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.012"</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">9</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td colspan="4"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">II. <i>Irregular Alternation.</i></td> +<td colspan="3"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">Strong sound</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.189"</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.038"</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">9</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">Weak sound</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.298"</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.076"</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">15</td> +</tr> </table></div> <p>"Still greater is the increase of the time when, unexpectedly into a @@ -20039,7 +20130,7 @@ by other stimuli which make the concentration of the attention difficult. The reaction-time is here always more or less prolonged. The simplest case of the sort is where a momentary impression is registered in the midst of another, and continuous, sensorial-stimulation of -considerable strength. The continuous stimulus may belong to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span> +considerable strength. The continuous stimulus may belong to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span> same sense as the stimulus to be reacted on, or to another. When it is of the same sense, the retardation it causes may be partly due to the distraction of the attention by it, but partly also to the fact that the @@ -20061,15 +20152,58 @@ heard with perfect distinctness above the noise.</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Mean. </td><td align="left">Maximum. </td><td align="left">Minimum. </td><td align="left">No. of Experiments.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">A</td><td align="left">Without noise </td><td align="left">0.189</td><td align="left">0.214</td><td align="left">0.156</td><td align="left">21</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">(Bell-stroke </td><td align="left">With noise</td><td align="left">0.313</td><td align="left">0.499</td><td align="left">0.183</td><td align="left">16</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">moderate)</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">B</td><td align="left">Without noise</td><td align="left">0.158</td><td align="left">0.206</td><td align="left">0.133</td><td align="left">20</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">(Bell-stroke</td><td align="left">With noise</td><td align="left">0.203</td><td align="left">0.295</td><td align="left">0.140</td><td align="left">19</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">loud)</td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Mean. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Maximum. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Minimum. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">No. of Experiments.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">A</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Without noise </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.189</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.214</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.156</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">21</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">(Bell-stroke </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">With noise</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.313</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.499</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.183</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">16</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">moderate)</td> +<td colspan="5"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td colspan="6"> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">B</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Without noise</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.158</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.206</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.133</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">20</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">(Bell-stroke</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">With noise</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.203</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.295</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.140</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">19</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">loud)</td> +<td colspan="5"> </td> +</tr> </table></div> <p>"Since, in these experiments, the sound B even with noise made a @@ -20084,10 +20218,10 @@ noise above described.</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Spark.</td><td align="left">Mean. </td><td align="left">Maximum. </td><td align="left">Minimum. </td><td align="left">No. of Expts.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Without noise </td><td align="left">0.222</td><td align="left">0.284</td><td align="left">0.158</td><td align="left">20</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">With noise</td><td align="left">0.300</td><td align="left">0.390</td><td align="left">0.250</td><td align="left">18</td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Spark.</td><td style="text-align: left;">Mean. </td><td style="text-align: left;">Maximum. </td><td style="text-align: left;">Minimum. </td><td style="text-align: left;">No. of Expts.</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Without noise </td><td style="text-align: left;">0.222</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.284</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.158</td><td style="text-align: left;">20</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">With noise</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.300</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.390</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.250</td><td style="text-align: left;">18</td></tr> </table></div> <p>"When one reflects that in the experiments with one and the same @@ -20098,33 +20232,56 @@ is greater when the stimuli are disparate than when they belong to the same sense</i>. One does not, in fact, find it particularly hard to register immediately, when the bell rings in the midst of the noise; but when the spark is the signal one has a feeling of being coerced, as one -turns away from the noise towards it. This fact is immediately connected<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span> +turns away from the noise towards it. This fact is immediately connected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span> with other properties of our attention. The effort of the latter is accompanied by various corporeal sensations, according to the sense which is engaged. The innervation which exists during the effort of -attention is therefore probably a different one for each sense-organ."<a name="FNanchor_354_354" id="FNanchor_354_354"></a><a href="#Footnote_354_354" class="fnanchor">[354]</a></p></blockquote> +attention is therefore probably a different one for each sense-organ."<a id="FNanchor_354_354"></a><a href="#Footnote_354_354" class="fnanchor">[354]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Wundt then, after some theoretical remarks which we need not quote now, gives a table of retardations, as follows:</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Retardation.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">1. </td><td align="left">Unexpected strength of impression:</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><i>a</i>) Unexpectedly strong sound </td><td align="left">0.073</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><i>b</i>) Unexpectedly weak sound </td><td align="left">0.171</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">2. </td><td align="left">Interference by like stimulus (sound by sound) </td><td align="left">0.045<a name="FNanchor_355_355" id="FNanchor_355_355"></a><a href="#Footnote_355_355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">3. </td><td align="left">Interference by unlike stimulus (light by sound) </td><td align="left">0.078</td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Retardation.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">1. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Unexpected strength of impression:</td> +<td> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"><i>a</i>) Unexpectedly strong sound </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.073</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"><i>b</i>) Unexpectedly weak sound </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.171</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">2. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Interference by like stimulus (sound by sound) </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.045<a id="FNanchor_355_355"></a><a href="#Footnote_355_355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">3. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">Interference by unlike stimulus (light by sound) </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.078</td></tr> </table></div> <p>It seems probable, from these results obtained with elementary processes of mind, that all processes, even the higher ones of reminiscence, reasoning, etc., whenever attention is concentrated upon them instead of being diffused -and languid, are thereby more rapidly performed.<a name="FNanchor_356_356" id="FNanchor_356_356"></a><a href="#Footnote_356_356" class="fnanchor">[356]</a></p> +and languid, are thereby more rapidly performed.<a id="FNanchor_356_356"></a><a href="#Footnote_356_356" class="fnanchor">[356]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Still more interesting reaction-time observations have been made by Münsterberg. The reader will recollect the @@ -20134,7 +20291,7 @@ movement than when one concentrates it on the expected signal. Herr Münsterberg found that this is equally the case when the reaction is no simple reflex, but can take place only after an intellectual operation. In a series of -experiments the five fingers were used to react with, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span> +experiments the five fingers were used to react with, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span> the reacter had to use a different finger according as the signal was of one sort or another. Thus when a word in the nominative case was called out he used the thumb, for @@ -20153,7 +20310,7 @@ and several other fruits) "which do you prefer, apples or cherries?" etc.; or "which is Goethe's finest drama?" etc.; or "which letter comes the later in the alphabet, the letter L or the first letter of the most beautiful tree?" etc.; or -"which is less, 15 or 20 <i>minus</i> 8?"<a name="FNanchor_357_357" id="FNanchor_357_357"></a><a href="#Footnote_357_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> etc. etc. etc. Even in +"which is less, 15 or 20 <i>minus</i> 8?"<a id="FNanchor_357_357"></a><a href="#Footnote_357_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> etc. etc. etc. Even in this series of reactions <i>the time was much quicker token the reacter turned his attention in advance towards the answer than when he turned it towards the question</i>. The shorter reaction-time @@ -20164,14 +20321,14 @@ longer, from four to eight times as long.</p> in these experiments the reacter always knew in advance in a general way the <i>kind</i> of question which he was to receive, and consequently the <i>sphere within which</i> his possible -answer lay.<a name="FNanchor_358_358" id="FNanchor_358_358"></a><a href="#Footnote_358_358" class="fnanchor">[358]</a> In turning his attention, therefore, from the +answer lay.<a id="FNanchor_358_358"></a><a href="#Footnote_358_358" class="fnanchor">[358]</a> In turning his attention, therefore, from the outset towards the answer, those brain-processes in him which were connected with this entire 'sphere' were kept sub-excited, and the question could then discharge with a minimum amount of lost time that particular answer out of the 'sphere' which belonged especially to it. When, on the contrary, the attention was kept looking towards the question -exclusively and averted from the possible reply, all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434">[Pg 434]</a></span> +exclusively and averted from the possible reply, all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_434">[Pg 434]</a></span> this preliminary sub-excitement of motor tracts failed to occur, and the entire process of answering had to be gone through with <i>after</i> the question was heard. No wonder @@ -20218,7 +20375,7 @@ degree derived from its connection with other objects—that <i>the two processes of sensorial adjustment and ideational preparation probably coexist in all our concrete attentive acts.</i></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span></p> <p>The two points must now be proved in more detail. First, as respects the sensorial adjustment.</p> @@ -20267,7 +20424,7 @@ by touch, taste, or smell.</p> <p>"But now I have, when I try to vividly recall a picture of memory or fancy, a feeling perfectly analogous to that which I experience when I -seek to apprehend a thing keenly by eye or ear; and this analogous feeling<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span> +seek to apprehend a thing keenly by eye or ear; and this analogous feeling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span> is very differently localized. While in sharpest possible attention to real objects (as well as to after-images) the strain is plainly forwards, and when the attention changes from one sense to another only alters its @@ -20277,18 +20434,18 @@ here the feeling withdraws entirely from the external sense-organs, and seems rather to take refuge in that part of the head which the brain fills; if I wish, for example, to recall a place or person it will arise before me with vividness, not according as I strain my attention forwards, -but rather in proportion as I, so to speak, retract it backwards."<a name="FNanchor_359_359" id="FNanchor_359_359"></a><a href="#Footnote_359_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a></p></blockquote> +but rather in proportion as I, so to speak, retract it backwards."<a id="FNanchor_359_359"></a><a href="#Footnote_359_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a></p></blockquote> <p>In myself the 'backward retraction' which is felt during attention to ideas of memory, etc., seems to be principally constituted by the feeling of an actual rolling outwards and upwards of the eyeballs, such as occurs in sleep, and is the exact opposite of their behavior when we look at a physical -thing. I have already spoken of this feeling on <a href="#Page_300">page 300</a>.<a name="FNanchor_360_360" id="FNanchor_360_360"></a><a href="#Footnote_360_360" class="fnanchor">[360]</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span>The reader who doubts the presence of these organic feelings +thing. I have already spoken of this feeling on <a href="#Page_300">page 300</a>.<a id="FNanchor_360_360"></a><a href="#Footnote_360_360" class="fnanchor">[360]</a> +<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span>The reader who doubts the presence of these organic feelings is requested to read the whole of that passage again.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>It has been said, however, that we may attend to an object on the periphery of the visual field and yet not @@ -20327,7 +20484,7 @@ kept immovable, be perceived as solids at a single flash of the spark. But when the figures were complicated photographs, many successive flashes were required to grasp their totality.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span></p> <blockquote> <p>"Now it is interesting," he says, "to find that, although we keep @@ -20340,7 +20497,7 @@ then, our attention is quite independent of the position and accommodation of the eyes, and of any known alteration in these organs; and free to direct itself by a conscious and voluntary effort upon any selected portion of a dark and undifferenced field of view. This is one of the -most important observations for a future theory of attention."<a name="FNanchor_361_361" id="FNanchor_361_361"></a><a href="#Footnote_361_361" class="fnanchor">[361]</a></p></blockquote> +most important observations for a future theory of attention."<a id="FNanchor_361_361"></a><a href="#Footnote_361_361" class="fnanchor">[361]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Hering, however, adds the following detail:</p> @@ -20353,7 +20510,7 @@ towards the former, as may be easily recognized by the after-images produced, or by the muscular sounds heard. The case is then less properly to be called one of translocation, than one of unusually wide <i>dispersion</i>, of the attention, in which dispersion the largest share still -falls upon the thing directly looked at,"<a name="FNanchor_362_362" id="FNanchor_362_362"></a><a href="#Footnote_362_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a></p></blockquote> +falls upon the thing directly looked at,"<a id="FNanchor_362_362"></a><a href="#Footnote_362_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a></p></blockquote> <p>and consequently directly accommodated for. Accommodation exists here, then, as it does elsewhere, and without it @@ -20363,7 +20520,7 @@ the experiment) is due in part to unusually strong contractions of the muscles needed to keep the eyeballs still, which produce unwonted feelings of pressure in those organs.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>2. But if the peripheral part of the picture in this experiment be not physically accommodated for, what is meant @@ -20376,7 +20533,7 @@ region of the picture consists in nothing more nor less than the effort to form as clear an idea as is possible of what is there portrayed.</i> The idea is to come to the help of the sensation and make it more distinct. It comes with effort, and such -a mode of coming is the remaining part of what we know as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span> +a mode of coming is the remaining part of what we know as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span> our attention's 'strain' under the circumstances. Let us show how universally present in our acts of attention this reinforcing imagination, this inward reproduction, this anticipatory @@ -20420,7 +20577,7 @@ seems the best possible designation.</p> <p>Where the impression to be caught is very weak, the way not to miss it is to sharpen our attention for it by preliminary contact with it in a stronger form.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span></p> <blockquote> <p>"If we wish to begin to observe overtones, it is advisable, just @@ -20440,7 +20597,7 @@ attentive to the sound which it is to catch. For when the resonator is gradually removed, the <i>g'</i> grows weaker; but the attention, once directed to it, holds it now more easily fast, and the observer hears the tone <i>g'</i> now in the natural unaltered sound of the note with his unaided -ear."<a name="FNanchor_363_363" id="FNanchor_363_363"></a><a href="#Footnote_363_363" class="fnanchor">[363]</a></p></blockquote> +ear."<a id="FNanchor_363_363"></a><a href="#Footnote_363_363" class="fnanchor">[363]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Wundt, commenting on experiences of this sort, says that</p> @@ -20469,10 +20626,10 @@ place. The surprise which unexpected impressions give us is due essentially to the fact that our attention, at the moment when the impression occurs, is not accommodated for it. The accommodation itself is of the double sort, relating as it does to the intensity as well as to the quality -of the stimulus. Different qualities of impression require disparate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span> +of the stimulus. Different qualities of impression require disparate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span> adaptations. And we remark that our feeling of the <i>strain</i> of our inward attentiveness increases with every increase in the strength of -the impressions on whose perception we are intent."<a name="FNanchor_364_364" id="FNanchor_364_364"></a><a href="#Footnote_364_364" class="fnanchor">[364]</a></p></blockquote> +the impressions on whose perception we are intent."<a id="FNanchor_364_364"></a><a href="#Footnote_364_364" class="fnanchor">[364]</a></p></blockquote> <p>The natural way of conceiving all this is under the symbolic form of a brain-cell played upon from two directions. @@ -20496,9 +20653,9 @@ pictures so simple that it is relatively difficult for me to see them double, I can succeed in seeing them double, even when the illumination is only instantaneous, the moment I strive to <i>imagine in a lively way how they ought then to look</i>. The influence of attention is here pure; for -all eye movements are shut out."<a name="FNanchor_365_365" id="FNanchor_365_365"></a><a href="#Footnote_365_365" class="fnanchor">[365]</a></p></blockquote> +all eye movements are shut out."<a id="FNanchor_365_365"></a><a href="#Footnote_365_365" class="fnanchor">[365]</a></p></blockquote> -<p>In another place<a name="FNanchor_366_366" id="FNanchor_366_366"></a><a href="#Footnote_366_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a> the same writer says:</p> +<p>In another place<a id="FNanchor_366_366"></a><a href="#Footnote_366_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a> the same writer says:</p> <blockquote> @@ -20520,8 +20677,8 @@ any phenomenon so well fitted for the study of the causes which are capable of determining the attention. It is not enough to form the conscious intention of seeing first with one eye and then with the other; <i>we must form as clear a notion as possible of what we expect to see. -Then it will actually appear</i>."<a name="FNanchor_367_367" id="FNanchor_367_367"></a><a href="#Footnote_367_367" class="fnanchor">[367]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span></p> +Then it will actually appear</i>."<a id="FNanchor_367_367"></a><a href="#Footnote_367_367" class="fnanchor">[367]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span></p> <p>In figures 37 and 38, where the result is ambiguous, we can make the change from one apparent form to the other by imagining strongly in advance the form we @@ -20535,7 +20692,7 @@ can attend to it again whenever we like, on account of the mental duplicate of it which our imagination now bears. In the meaningless French words '<i>pas de lieu Rhône que nous</i>,' who can recognize immediately the English 'paddle your -own canoe'?<a name="FNanchor_368_368" id="FNanchor_368_368"></a><a href="#Footnote_368_368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a> But who that has once noticed the identity +own canoe'?<a id="FNanchor_368_368"></a><a href="#Footnote_368_368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a> But who that has once noticed the identity can fail to have it arrest his attention again? When watching for the distant clock to strike, our mind is so filled with its image that at every moment we think we hear the longed-for @@ -20545,14 +20702,14 @@ his pursuers. Every bonnet in the street is momentarily taken by the lover to enshroud the head of his idol. The image in the mind <i>is</i> the attention; the <i>preperception</i>, as Mr. Lewes calls it, is half of the perception of the looked-for -thing.<a name="FNanchor_369_369" id="FNanchor_369_369"></a><a href="#Footnote_369_369" class="fnanchor">[369]</a></p> +thing.<a id="FNanchor_369_369"></a><a href="#Footnote_369_369" class="fnanchor">[369]</a></p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 375px;"> -<img src="images/jame_442_0036.jpg" width="375" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_442_0036.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 375px"> <div class="caption"><span class="smcap">Figs.</span> 37 & 38.</div> </div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span></p> <p>It is for this reason that men have no eyes but for those aspects of things which they have already been taught to discern. Any one of us can notice a phenomenon after it @@ -20563,7 +20720,7 @@ we may single out, and what effects we may admire, before our æsthetic nature can 'dilate' to its full extent and never 'with the wrong emotion.' In kindergarten instruction one of the exercises is to make the children see how many -features they can point out in such an object as a flower or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span> +features they can point out in such an object as a flower or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span> a stuffed bird. They readily name the features they know already, such as leaves, tail, bill, feet. But they may look for hours without distinguishing nostrils, claws, scales, etc., @@ -20575,13 +20732,13 @@ have been labelled for us, and the labels stamped into our mind. If we lost our stock of labels we should be intellectually lost in the midst of the world.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Organic adjustment, then, and ideational preparation or preperception are concerned in all attentive acts. An interesting theory is defended by no less authorities than Professors -Bain<a name="FNanchor_370_370" id="FNanchor_370_370"></a><a href="#Footnote_370_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a> and Ribot,<a name="FNanchor_371_371" id="FNanchor_371_371"></a><a href="#Footnote_371_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> and still more ably advocated by Mr. N. -Lange,<a name="FNanchor_372_372" id="FNanchor_372_372"></a><a href="#Footnote_372_372" class="fnanchor">[372]</a> who will have it that the ideational preparation +Bain<a id="FNanchor_370_370"></a><a href="#Footnote_370_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a> and Ribot,<a id="FNanchor_371_371"></a><a href="#Footnote_371_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> and still more ably advocated by Mr. N. +Lange,<a id="FNanchor_372_372"></a><a href="#Footnote_372_372" class="fnanchor">[372]</a> who will have it that the ideational preparation itself is a consequence of muscular adjustment, so that the latter may be called the essence of the attentive process throughout. This at least is what the theory of these @@ -20603,8 +20760,8 @@ a slight movement [of the eyes] corresponding to the straight line, and that he often gets a weak feeling of innervation of the hand as if touching the pencil's surface. So, in thinking of a certain sound, we turn towards its direction or repeat muscularly its rhythm, or articulate an -imitation of it."<a name="FNanchor_373_373" id="FNanchor_373_373"></a><a href="#Footnote_373_373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">[Pg 445]</a></span></p> +imitation of it."<a id="FNanchor_373_373"></a><a href="#Footnote_373_373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_445">[Pg 445]</a></span></p> <p>But it is one thing to point out the presence of muscular contractions as constant concomitants of our thoughts, and another thing to say, with Herr Lange, that thought is @@ -20614,7 +20771,7 @@ one perceived by movement and another not, the part perceived by movement is habitually called up first and fixed in the mind by the movement's execution, whilst the other part comes secondarily as the movement's mere associate. -But even were this the rule with all men (which I doubt<a name="FNanchor_374_374" id="FNanchor_374_374"></a><a href="#Footnote_374_374" class="fnanchor">[374]</a>), +But even were this the rule with all men (which I doubt<a id="FNanchor_374_374"></a><a href="#Footnote_374_374" class="fnanchor">[374]</a>), it would only be a practical habit, not an ultimate necessity. In the chapter on the Will we shall learn that movements themselves are results of images coming before the mind, @@ -20631,7 +20788,7 @@ call other ideas to the mind.</p> third process I can think of as always present is the inhibition of irrelevant movements and ideas. This seems, however, to be a feature incidental to voluntary attention rather -than the essential feature of attention at large,<a name="FNanchor_375_375" id="FNanchor_375_375"></a><a href="#Footnote_375_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a> and need<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">[Pg 446]</a></span> +than the essential feature of attention at large,<a id="FNanchor_375_375"></a><a href="#Footnote_375_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a> and need<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_446">[Pg 446]</a></span> not concern us particularly now. Noting merely the intimate connection which our account so far establishes between attention, on the one hand, and imagination, discrimination, @@ -20639,7 +20796,7 @@ and memory, on the other, let us draw a couple of practical inferences, and then pass to the more speculative problem that remains.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The practical inferences are pedagogic. First, <i>to strengthen attention in children</i> who care nothing for the subject @@ -20663,7 +20820,7 @@ and direct one. Reading has no immediate attractiveness, but it has a borrowed one, and that is enough. The child is caught in the wheelwork, the first step is made."</p></blockquote> -<p>I take another example, from M. B. Perez:<a name="FNanchor_376_376" id="FNanchor_376_376"></a><a href="#Footnote_376_376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a></p> +<p>I take another example, from M. B. Perez:<a id="FNanchor_376_376"></a><a href="#Footnote_376_376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a></p> <blockquote> @@ -20678,9 +20835,9 @@ agreeable surprise to mamma.'"</p></blockquote> <p>Here, again, a birth of voluntary attention, grafted this time on a sympathetic instead of a selfish sentiment like -that of the first example. The piano, the German, awaken<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">[Pg 447]</a></span> +that of the first example. The piano, the German, awaken<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_447">[Pg 447]</a></span> no spontaneous attention; but they arouse and maintain it -by borrowing a force from elsewhere.<a name="FNanchor_377_377" id="FNanchor_377_377"></a><a href="#Footnote_377_377" class="fnanchor">[377]</a></p> +by borrowing a force from elsewhere.<a id="FNanchor_377_377"></a><a href="#Footnote_377_377" class="fnanchor">[377]</a></p> <p>Second, take that mind-wandering which at a later age may trouble us <i>whilst reading or listening to a discourse</i>. If @@ -20693,7 +20850,7 @@ keep my wandering mind a great deal more closely upon a conversation or a lecture if I actively re-echo to myself the words than if I simply hear them; and I find a number of my students who report benefit from voluntarily adopting -a similar course.<a name="FNanchor_378_378" id="FNanchor_378_378"></a><a href="#Footnote_378_378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a></p> +a similar course.<a id="FNanchor_378_378"></a><a href="#Footnote_378_378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a></p> <p>Second, <i>a teacher who wishes to engage the attention of his class must knit his novelties on to things of which they already @@ -20721,10 +20878,10 @@ believe that our autonomy in the midst of nature depends on our not being pure effect, but a cause,—</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Principium quoddam quod fati fœdera rumpat,</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Ex infinito ne causant causa sequatur—</i></span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Principium quoddam quod fati fœdera rumpat,</i></span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Ex infinito ne causant causa sequatur—</i></span><br > </p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">[Pg 448]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_448">[Pg 448]</a></span></p> <p>we must admit that the question whether attention involve such a principle of spiritual activity or not is metaphysical as well as psychological, and is well worthy of all the pains @@ -20760,10 +20917,10 @@ of attention are equally clear; and whoever affirms either conception to be true must do so on metaphysical or universal rather than on scientific or particular grounds.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>As regards <i>immediate sensorial attention</i> hardly any one -is tempted to regard it as anything but an effect.<a name="FNanchor_379_379" id="FNanchor_379_379"></a><a href="#Footnote_379_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> We<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_449" id="Page_449">[Pg 449]</a></span> +is tempted to regard it as anything but an effect.<a id="FNanchor_379_379"></a><a href="#Footnote_379_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> We<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_449">[Pg 449]</a></span> are 'evolved' so as to respond to special stimuli by special accommodative acts which produce clear perceptions on the one hand in us, and on the other hand such feelings of @@ -20789,7 +20946,7 @@ attention bounding, as it were, in that direction, as the imagination of the whole transaction revives. Where such a stirring-up occurs, organic adjustment must exist as well, and the ideas must innervate to some degree the muscles. -Thus the whole process of involuntary derived attention is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_450" id="Page_450">[Pg 450]</a></span> +Thus the whole process of involuntary derived attention is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_450">[Pg 450]</a></span> accounted for if we grant that there is something interesting enough to arouse and fix the thought of whatever may be connected with it. This fixing <i>is</i> the attention; and it @@ -20831,7 +20988,7 @@ need no more fix and retain the ideas than it need bring them. The associates which bring them also fix them by the interest which they lend. In short, voluntary and involuntary attention may be essentially the same. It is -true that where the ideas are intrinsically very unwelcome<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_451" id="Page_451">[Pg 451]</a></span> +true that where the ideas are intrinsically very unwelcome<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_451">[Pg 451]</a></span> and the effort to attend to them is great, it seems to us as if the frequent renewal of the effort were the very cause by which they are held fast, and we naturally think of the effort @@ -20873,7 +21030,7 @@ whole easy simple flowing predominates in it, the drift of things is with the pull of gravity, and effortless attention is the rule. But at intervals an obstruction, a set-back, a log-jam occurs, stops the current, creates an eddy, and -makes things temporarily move the other way. If a real<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_452" id="Page_452">[Pg 452]</a></span> +makes things temporarily move the other way. If a real<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_452">[Pg 452]</a></span> river could feel, it would feel these eddies and set-backs as places of effort. "I am here flowing," it would say, "in the direction of greatest resistance, instead of flowing, as usual, @@ -20902,9 +21059,9 @@ may be an excrescence on Psychology. No need of it to drag ideas before consciousness or fix them, when we see how perfectly they drag and fix each other there.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > -<p>I have stated the effect-theory as persuasively as I can.<a name="FNanchor_380_380" id="FNanchor_380_380"></a><a href="#Footnote_380_380" class="fnanchor">[380]</a> +<p>I have stated the effect-theory as persuasively as I can.<a id="FNanchor_380_380"></a><a href="#Footnote_380_380" class="fnanchor">[380]</a> It is a clear, strong, well-equipped conception, and like all such, is fitted to carry conviction, where there is no contrary proof. The feeling of effort certainly <i>may</i> be an inert @@ -20912,7 +21069,7 @@ accompaniment and not the active element which it seems. No measurements are as yet performed (it is safe to say none ever will be performed) which can show that it contributes energy to the result. We <i>may</i> then regard attention -as a superfluity, or a 'Luxus,' and dogmatize against<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_453" id="Page_453">[Pg 453]</a></span> +as a superfluity, or a 'Luxus,' and dogmatize against<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_453">[Pg 453]</a></span> its causal function with no feeling in our hearts but one of pride that we are applying Occam's razor to an entity that has multiplied itself 'beyond necessity.'</p> @@ -20954,7 +21111,7 @@ on our sense that in it things are <i>really being decided</i> from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago. This appearance, which makes life and history tingle with such -a tragic zest, <i>may</i> not be an illusion. As we grant to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_454" id="Page_454">[Pg 454]</a></span> +a tragic zest, <i>may</i> not be an illusion. As we grant to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_454">[Pg 454]</a></span> the advocate of the mechanical theory that it may be one, so he must grant to us that it may <i>not</i>. And the result is two conceptions of possibility face to face with no facts @@ -20968,7 +21125,7 @@ without hesitation, and they ought not to refuse a similar privilege to the believers in a spiritual force. I count myself among the latter, but as my reasons are ethical they are hardly suited for introduction into a psychological -work.<a name="FNanchor_381_381" id="FNanchor_381_381"></a><a href="#Footnote_381_381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a> The last word of psychology here is ignorance, for +work.<a id="FNanchor_381_381"></a><a href="#Footnote_381_381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a> The last word of psychology here is ignorance, for the 'forces' engaged are certainly too delicate and numerous to be followed in detail. Meanwhile, in view of the strange arrogance with which the wildest materialistic speculations @@ -20989,8 +21146,8 @@ which Nature has introduced (the presence of feeling and of effort, namely) is not worthy of scientific recognition at all. Such conduct may conceivably be <i>wise</i>, though I doubt it; but scientific, as contrasted with metaphysical, -it cannot seriously be called.<a name="FNanchor_382_382" id="FNanchor_382_382"></a><a href="#Footnote_382_382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_455" id="Page_455">[Pg 455]</a></span></p> +it cannot seriously be called.<a id="FNanchor_382_382"></a><a href="#Footnote_382_382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_455">[Pg 455]</a></span></p> <h4>INATTENTION.</h4> @@ -21021,7 +21178,7 @@ ac non sentire ad idem revertunt</i>."</p> mere blunting of the sense-organs. Were the sensation important, we should notice it well enough; and we can at any moment notice it by expressly throwing our attention -upon it,<a name="FNanchor_383_383" id="FNanchor_383_383"></a><a href="#Footnote_383_383" class="fnanchor">[383]</a> provided it have not become so inveterate that inattention +upon it,<a id="FNanchor_383_383"></a><a href="#Footnote_383_383" class="fnanchor">[383]</a> provided it have not become so inveterate that inattention to it is ingrained in our very constitution, as in the case of the <i>muscæ volitantes</i> the double retinal images, etc. But even in these cases artificial conditions of observation @@ -21029,7 +21186,7 @@ and patience soon give us command of the impression which we seek. The inattentiveness must then be a habit grounded on higher conditions than mere sensorial fatigue.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_456" id="Page_456">[Pg 456]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_456">[Pg 456]</a></span></p> <p>Helmholtz has formulated a general law of inattention which we shall have to study in the next chapter but @@ -21063,7 +21220,7 @@ traced.</p> be thus shunted off from all relation to the rest of consciousness? Professor G. E. Müller has made a plausible reply to this question, and most of what follows is -borrowed from him.<a name="FNanchor_384_384" id="FNanchor_384_384"></a><a href="#Footnote_384_384" class="fnanchor">[384]</a> He begins with the fact that</p> +borrowed from him.<a id="FNanchor_384_384"></a><a href="#Footnote_384_384" class="fnanchor">[384]</a> He begins with the fact that</p> <blockquote> @@ -21073,7 +21230,7 @@ were <i>lacking</i>. Our total feeling of existence is different from what it was when we were in the mill.... A friend writes to me: 'I have in my room a little clock which does not run quite twenty-four hours without winding. In consequence of this, it often stops. So soon as this -happens, I notice it, whereas I naturally fail to notice it when going.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_457" id="Page_457">[Pg 457]</a></span> +happens, I notice it, whereas I naturally fail to notice it when going.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_457">[Pg 457]</a></span> When this first began to happen, there was this modification: I suddenly felt an undefined uneasiness or sort of void, without being able to say what was the matter; and only after some consideration did I find @@ -21105,13 +21262,13 @@ or insignificant muscular contractions which, when stopped by the cessation of their instigating cause, immediately give us the feeling that something is gone from our existence (as Müller says), or (as his friend puts it) the feeling -of a void.<a name="FNanchor_385_385" id="FNanchor_385_385"></a><a href="#Footnote_385_385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a></p> +of a void.<a id="FNanchor_385_385"></a><a href="#Footnote_385_385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a></p> <p>Müller's suggestion awakens another. It is a well-known fact that persons striving to keep their attention on a difficult subject will resort to movements of various unmeaning kinds, such as pacing the room, drumming with -the fingers, playing with keys or watch-chain, scratching<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_458" id="Page_458">[Pg 458]</a></span> +the fingers, playing with keys or watch-chain, scratching<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_458">[Pg 458]</a></span> head, pulling mustache, vibrating foot, or what not, according to the individual. There is an anecdote of Sir W. Scott, when a boy, rising to the head of his class by cutting off @@ -21142,17 +21299,17 @@ for what it is worth; the connection of the movements themselves with the continued effort of attention is certainly a genuine and curious fact.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_322_322" id="Footnote_322_322"></a><a href="#FNanchor_322_322"><span class="label">[322]</span></a> Bain mentions attention in the Senses and the Intellect, p. 558, and +<p><a id="Footnote_322_322"></a><a href="#FNanchor_322_322"><span class="label">[322]</span></a> Bain mentions attention in the Senses and the Intellect, p. 558, and even gives a theory of it on pp. 370-374 of the Emotions of the Will. I shall recur to this theory later on.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_323_323" id="Footnote_323_323"></a><a href="#FNanchor_323_323"><span class="label">[323]</span></a> "The first and most important, but also the most difficult, task at the +<p><a id="Footnote_323_323"></a><a href="#FNanchor_323_323"><span class="label">[323]</span></a> "The first and most important, but also the most difficult, task at the outset of an education is to overcome gradually the inattentive dispersion of mind which shows itself wherever the organic life preponderates over the intellectual. The training of animals ... must be in the first instance @@ -21169,19 +21326,19 @@ single items with sufficient sharpness." (Waitz, Lehrb. d. Psychol., p. 632.)</p <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_324_324" id="Footnote_324_324"></a><a href="#FNanchor_324_324"><span class="label">[324]</span></a> Elements, part i, chap. ii, <i>fin.</i></p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_324_324"></a><a href="#FNanchor_324_324"><span class="label">[324]</span></a> Elements, part i, chap. ii, <i>fin.</i></p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_325_325" id="Footnote_325_325"></a><a href="#FNanchor_325_325"><span class="label">[325]</span></a> Lectures on Metaphysics, lecture xiv.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_325_325"></a><a href="#FNanchor_325_325"><span class="label">[325]</span></a> Lectures on Metaphysics, lecture xiv.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_326_326" id="Footnote_326_326"></a><a href="#FNanchor_326_326"><span class="label">[326]</span></a> Nature, vol. iii, p. 281 (1871).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_326_326"></a><a href="#FNanchor_326_326"><span class="label">[326]</span></a> Nature, vol. iii, p. 281 (1871).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_327_327" id="Footnote_327_327"></a><a href="#FNanchor_327_327"><span class="label">[327]</span></a> If a lot of dots or strokes on a piece of paper be exhibited for a moment +<p><a id="Footnote_327_327"></a><a href="#FNanchor_327_327"><span class="label">[327]</span></a> If a lot of dots or strokes on a piece of paper be exhibited for a moment to a person in <i>normal</i> condition, with the request that he say how many are there, he will find that they break into groups in his mind's eye, and that whilst he is analyzing and counting one group in his memory the @@ -21192,7 +21349,7 @@ the mind's eye so long as they do not much exceed twenty in number.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_328_328" id="Footnote_328_328"></a><a href="#FNanchor_328_328"><span class="label">[328]</span></a> Mr. Cattell made Jevons's experiment in a much more precise way +<p><a id="Footnote_328_328"></a><a href="#FNanchor_328_328"><span class="label">[328]</span></a> Mr. Cattell made Jevons's experiment in a much more precise way (Philosophische Studien, iii, 121 ff.). Cards were ruled with short lines, varying in number from four to fifteen, and exposed to the eye for a hundredth of a second. When the number was but four or five, no mistakes @@ -21221,32 +21378,32 @@ was 0.3 sec., and he then discriminated a group of 18 from one of <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_329_329" id="Footnote_329_329"></a><a href="#FNanchor_329_329"><span class="label">[329]</span></a> Revue Scientifique, vol. 39, p. 684 (May 28, 1887).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_329_329"></a><a href="#FNanchor_329_329"><span class="label">[329]</span></a> Revue Scientifique, vol. 39, p. 684 (May 28, 1887).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_330_330" id="Footnote_330_330"></a><a href="#FNanchor_330_330"><span class="label">[330]</span></a> Cf. Chr. Wolff: Psychologia Empirica, § 245. Wolff's account of the +<p><a id="Footnote_330_330"></a><a href="#FNanchor_330_330"><span class="label">[330]</span></a> Cf. Chr. Wolff: Psychologia Empirica, § 245. Wolff's account of the phenomena of attention is in general excellent.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_331_331" id="Footnote_331_331"></a><a href="#FNanchor_331_331"><span class="label">[331]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, xi, 429-31.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_331_331"></a><a href="#FNanchor_331_331"><span class="label">[331]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, xi, 429-31.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_332_332" id="Footnote_332_332"></a><a href="#FNanchor_332_332"><span class="label">[332]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, pp. 238-40.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_332_332"></a><a href="#FNanchor_332_332"><span class="label">[332]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, pp. 238-40.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_333_333" id="Footnote_333_333"></a><a href="#FNanchor_333_333"><span class="label">[333]</span></a> <i>Ib.</i> p. 262.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_333_333"></a><a href="#FNanchor_333_333"><span class="label">[333]</span></a> <i>Ib.</i> p. 262.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_334_334" id="Footnote_334_334"></a><a href="#FNanchor_334_334"><span class="label">[334]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 264-6.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_334_334"></a><a href="#FNanchor_334_334"><span class="label">[334]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 264-6.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_335_335" id="Footnote_335_335"></a><a href="#FNanchor_335_335"><span class="label">[335]</span></a> This was the original 'personal equation' observation of Bessel. An +<p><a id="Footnote_335_335"></a><a href="#FNanchor_335_335"><span class="label">[335]</span></a> This was the original 'personal equation' observation of Bessel. An Observer looked through his equatorial telescope to note the moment at which a star crossed the meridian, the latter being marked in the telescopic field of view by a visible thread, beside which other equidistant threads @@ -21270,17 +21427,17 @@ sometimes to more than a second." (<i>Op. cit.</i> p. 270.) </p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 275px;"> -<img src="images/jame_413_0034.jpg" width="275" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_413_0034.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 275px"> <div class="caption"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 35.</div> </div></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_336_336" id="Footnote_336_336"></a><a href="#FNanchor_336_336"><span class="label">[336]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, ii, 601.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_336_336"></a><a href="#FNanchor_336_336"><span class="label">[336]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, ii, 601.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_337_337" id="Footnote_337_337"></a><a href="#FNanchor_337_337"><span class="label">[337]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 273-4; 3d ed. ii, 339; Philosophische +<p><a id="Footnote_337_337"></a><a href="#FNanchor_337_337"><span class="label">[337]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 273-4; 3d ed. ii, 339; Philosophische Studien, ii, 621 ff.—I know that I am stupid, but I confess I find these theoretical statements, especially Wundt's, a little hazy. Herr v. Tschisch considers it impossible that the perception of the index's position should @@ -21339,25 +21496,25 @@ appeal to the unity of consciousness, and may be considered quite crude.</p></di <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_338_338" id="Footnote_338_338"></a><a href="#FNanchor_338_338"><span class="label">[338]</span></a> Note that the permanent interests are themselves grounded in certain +<p><a id="Footnote_338_338"></a><a href="#FNanchor_338_338"><span class="label">[338]</span></a> Note that the permanent interests are themselves grounded in certain objects and relations in which our interest is immediate and instinctive.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_339_339" id="Footnote_339_339"></a><a href="#FNanchor_339_339"><span class="label">[339]</span></a> Herbart: Psychologie als Wissenschaft, § 128.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_339_339"></a><a href="#FNanchor_339_339"><span class="label">[339]</span></a> Herbart: Psychologie als Wissenschaft, § 128.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_340_340" id="Footnote_340_340"></a><a href="#FNanchor_340_340"><span class="label">[340]</span></a> Sir W. Hamilton. Metaphysics, lecture xiv.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_340_340"></a><a href="#FNanchor_340_340"><span class="label">[340]</span></a> Sir W. Hamilton. Metaphysics, lecture xiv.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_341_341" id="Footnote_341_341"></a><a href="#FNanchor_341_341"><span class="label">[341]</span></a> Mental Physiol., § 124. The oft-cited case of soldiers not perceiving +<p><a id="Footnote_341_341"></a><a href="#FNanchor_341_341"><span class="label">[341]</span></a> Mental Physiol., § 124. The oft-cited case of soldiers not perceiving that they are wounded is of an analogous sort.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_342_342" id="Footnote_342_342"></a><a href="#FNanchor_342_342"><span class="label">[342]</span></a> Prof. J. M. Cattell made experiments to which we shall refer further +<p><a id="Footnote_342_342"></a><a href="#FNanchor_342_342"><span class="label">[342]</span></a> Prof. J. M. Cattell made experiments to which we shall refer further on, on the degree to which reaction-times might be shortened by distracting or voluntarily concentrating the attention. He says of the latter series that "the averages show that the attention can be kept strained, that is, the @@ -21366,11 +21523,11 @@ centres kept in a state of unstable equilibrium, for one second" (Mind, xi, <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_343_343" id="Footnote_343_343"></a><a href="#FNanchor_343_343"><span class="label">[343]</span></a> Physiologische Optik, § 32.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_343_343"></a><a href="#FNanchor_343_343"><span class="label">[343]</span></a> Physiologische Optik, § 32.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_344_344" id="Footnote_344_344"></a><a href="#FNanchor_344_344"><span class="label">[344]</span></a> "'Genius,' says Helvetius, 'is nothing but a continued attention (<i>une +<p><a id="Footnote_344_344"></a><a href="#FNanchor_344_344"><span class="label">[344]</span></a> "'Genius,' says Helvetius, 'is nothing but a continued attention (<i>une attention suivie</i>).' 'Genius,' says Buffon, 'is only a protracted patience (<i>une longue patience</i>).' 'In the exact sciences, at least,' says Cuvier, 'it is the patience of a sound intellect, when invincible, which truly constitutes @@ -21380,53 +21537,53 @@ mark of a superior genius.'" (Hamilton: Lect. on Metaph., lecture xiv.)</p></div <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_345_345" id="Footnote_345_345"></a><a href="#FNanchor_345_345"><span class="label">[345]</span></a> See, e.g., Ulrici: Leib u. Seele, ii, 28; Lotze: Metaphysik, § 273; +<p><a id="Footnote_345_345"></a><a href="#FNanchor_345_345"><span class="label">[345]</span></a> See, e.g., Ulrici: Leib u. Seele, ii, 28; Lotze: Metaphysik, § 273; Fechner, Revision d. Psychophysik, xix; G. E. Müller: Zur Theorie d. sinnl. Aufmerksamkeit, $ 1; Stumpf: Tonpsychologie, i, 71.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_346_346" id="Footnote_346_346"></a><a href="#FNanchor_346_346"><span class="label">[346]</span></a> Fechner, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 271.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_346_346"></a><a href="#FNanchor_346_346"><span class="label">[346]</span></a> Fechner, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 271.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_347_347" id="Footnote_347_347"></a><a href="#FNanchor_347_347"><span class="label">[347]</span></a> Tonpsychologie, i, p. 71.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_347_347"></a><a href="#FNanchor_347_347"><span class="label">[347]</span></a> Tonpsychologie, i, p. 71.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_348_348" id="Footnote_348_348"></a><a href="#FNanchor_348_348"><span class="label">[348]</span></a> Compare, on clearness as the essential fruit of attention, Lotze's Metaphysic, +<p><a id="Footnote_348_348"></a><a href="#FNanchor_348_348"><span class="label">[348]</span></a> Compare, on clearness as the essential fruit of attention, Lotze's Metaphysic, § 273.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_349_349" id="Footnote_349_349"></a><a href="#FNanchor_349_349"><span class="label">[349]</span></a> Elements, part i, chap. ii.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_349_349"></a><a href="#FNanchor_349_349"><span class="label">[349]</span></a> Elements, part i, chap. ii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_350_350" id="Footnote_350_350"></a><a href="#FNanchor_350_350"><span class="label">[350]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 226.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_350_350"></a><a href="#FNanchor_350_350"><span class="label">[350]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 226.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_351_351" id="Footnote_351_351"></a><a href="#FNanchor_351_351"><span class="label">[351]</span></a> By a negative value of the reaction-time Wundt means the case of the +<p><a id="Footnote_351_351"></a><a href="#FNanchor_351_351"><span class="label">[351]</span></a> By a negative value of the reaction-time Wundt means the case of the reactive movement occurring <i>before</i> the stimulus.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_352_352" id="Footnote_352_352"></a><a href="#FNanchor_352_352"><span class="label">[352]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ii, 239.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_352_352"></a><a href="#FNanchor_352_352"><span class="label">[352]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> ii, 239.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_353_353" id="Footnote_353_353"></a><a href="#FNanchor_353_353"><span class="label">[353]</span></a> The reader must not suppose this phenomenon to be of frequent +<p><a id="Footnote_353_353"></a><a href="#FNanchor_353_353"><span class="label">[353]</span></a> The reader must not suppose this phenomenon to be of frequent occurrence. Experienced observers, like Exner and Cattell, deny having met with it in their personal experience.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_354_354" id="Footnote_354_354"></a><a href="#FNanchor_354_354"><span class="label">[354]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 241-5.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_354_354"></a><a href="#FNanchor_354_354"><span class="label">[354]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 241-5.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_355_355" id="Footnote_355_355"></a><a href="#FNanchor_355_355"><span class="label">[355]</span></a> It should be added that Mr. J. M. Cattell (Mind, xi, 33) found, on +<p><a id="Footnote_355_355"></a><a href="#FNanchor_355_355"><span class="label">[355]</span></a> It should be added that Mr. J. M. Cattell (Mind, xi, 33) found, on repeating Wundt's experiments with a disturbing noise upon two practised observers, that the simple reaction-time either for light or sound was hardly perceptibly increased. Making strong voluntary concentration of @@ -21442,25 +21599,25 @@ faint stimulus to the other.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_356_356" id="Footnote_356_356"></a><a href="#FNanchor_356_356"><span class="label">[356]</span></a> Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., 1st ed. p. 794.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_356_356"></a><a href="#FNanchor_356_356"><span class="label">[356]</span></a> Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., 1st ed. p. 794.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_357_357" id="Footnote_357_357"></a><a href="#FNanchor_357_357"><span class="label">[357]</span></a> Beiträge zur Experimentellen Psychologie, Heft i, pp. 73-106 (1889).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_357_357"></a><a href="#FNanchor_357_357"><span class="label">[357]</span></a> Beiträge zur Experimentellen Psychologie, Heft i, pp. 73-106 (1889).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_358_358" id="Footnote_358_358"></a><a href="#FNanchor_358_358"><span class="label">[358]</span></a> To say the very least, he always brought his articulatory innervation +<p><a id="Footnote_358_358"></a><a href="#FNanchor_358_358"><span class="label">[358]</span></a> To say the very least, he always brought his articulatory innervation close to the discharging point. Herr M. describes a tightening of the head-muscles as characteristic of the attitude of attention to the reply.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_359_359" id="Footnote_359_359"></a><a href="#FNanchor_359_359"><span class="label">[359]</span></a> Psychophysik, Bd. ii, pp. 475-6.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_359_359"></a><a href="#FNanchor_359_359"><span class="label">[359]</span></a> Psychophysik, Bd. ii, pp. 475-6.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_360_360" id="Footnote_360_360"></a><a href="#FNanchor_360_360"><span class="label">[360]</span></a> I must say that I am wholly unconscious of the peculiar feelings in +<p><a id="Footnote_360_360"></a><a href="#FNanchor_360_360"><span class="label">[360]</span></a> I must say that I am wholly unconscious of the peculiar feelings in the scalp which Fechner goes on to describe. "The feeling of strained attention in the different sense-organs seems to be only a muscular one produced in using these various organs by setting in motion, by a sort of reflex @@ -21494,41 +21651,41 @@ being closed." (Wien. Sitzungsberichte, Math. Naturw., xlviii, 2, 297. <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_361_361" id="Footnote_361_361"></a><a href="#FNanchor_361_361"><span class="label">[361]</span></a> Physiol. Optik, p. 741.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_361_361"></a><a href="#FNanchor_361_361"><span class="label">[361]</span></a> Physiol. Optik, p. 741.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_362_362" id="Footnote_362_362"></a><a href="#FNanchor_362_362"><span class="label">[362]</span></a> Hermann's Handbuch, iii, i, 548.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_362_362"></a><a href="#FNanchor_362_362"><span class="label">[362]</span></a> Hermann's Handbuch, iii, i, 548.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_363_363" id="Footnote_363_363"></a><a href="#FNanchor_363_363"><span class="label">[363]</span></a> Helmholtz: Tonempfindungen, 3d ed. 85-9 (Engl. tr., 2d ed. 50, 51; +<p><a id="Footnote_363_363"></a><a href="#FNanchor_363_363"><span class="label">[363]</span></a> Helmholtz: Tonempfindungen, 3d ed. 85-9 (Engl. tr., 2d ed. 50, 51; see also pp. 60-1).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_364_364" id="Footnote_364_364"></a><a href="#FNanchor_364_364"><span class="label">[364]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 209.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_364_364"></a><a href="#FNanchor_364_364"><span class="label">[364]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 209.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_365_365" id="Footnote_365_365"></a><a href="#FNanchor_365_365"><span class="label">[365]</span></a> Physiol. Optik, 741.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_365_365"></a><a href="#FNanchor_365_365"><span class="label">[365]</span></a> Physiol. Optik, 741.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_366_366" id="Footnote_366_366"></a><a href="#FNanchor_366_366"><span class="label">[366]</span></a> P. 728.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_366_366"></a><a href="#FNanchor_366_366"><span class="label">[366]</span></a> P. 728.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_367_367" id="Footnote_367_367"></a><a href="#FNanchor_367_367"><span class="label">[367]</span></a> Popular Scientific Lectures, Eng. Trans., p. 295.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_367_367"></a><a href="#FNanchor_367_367"><span class="label">[367]</span></a> Popular Scientific Lectures, Eng. Trans., p. 295.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_368_368" id="Footnote_368_368"></a><a href="#FNanchor_368_368"><span class="label">[368]</span></a> Similarly in the verses which some one tried to puzzle me with the +<p><a id="Footnote_368_368"></a><a href="#FNanchor_368_368"><span class="label">[368]</span></a> Similarly in the verses which some one tried to puzzle me with the other day: "<i>Gui n'a beau dit, qui sabot dit, nid a beau dit elle?</i>"</p></div> <div class="footnote"> <p> -<a name="Footnote_369_369" id="Footnote_369_369"></a><a href="#FNanchor_369_369"><span class="label">[369]</span></a> I cannot refrain from referring in a note to an additional set of facts +<a id="Footnote_369_369"></a><a href="#FNanchor_369_369"><span class="label">[369]</span></a> I cannot refrain from referring in a note to an additional set of facts instanced by Lotze in his Medizinische Psychologie, § 431, although I am not satisfied with the explanation, fatigue of the sense-organ, which <i>he</i> gives. "In quietly lying and contemplating a wall-paper pattern, sometimes @@ -21539,7 +21696,7 @@ system, and all without any intention on our part. [This is beautifully seen in Moorish patterns; but a simple diagram like Fig. 39 also shows it well.</p> <div class="figright" style="width: 155px;"> -<img src="images/jame_443_0037.jpg" width="200" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_443_0037.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 200px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 39.</div> </div> <p>We see it sometimes as two @@ -21575,24 +21732,24 @@ obviously due to this cause. <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_370_370" id="Footnote_370_370"></a><a href="#FNanchor_370_370"><span class="label">[370]</span></a> The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed. p. 370.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_370_370"></a><a href="#FNanchor_370_370"><span class="label">[370]</span></a> The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed. p. 370.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_371_371" id="Footnote_371_371"></a><a href="#FNanchor_371_371"><span class="label">[371]</span></a> Psychologie de l'Attention (1889), p. 32 ff.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_371_371"></a><a href="#FNanchor_371_371"><span class="label">[371]</span></a> Psychologie de l'Attention (1889), p. 32 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_372_372" id="Footnote_372_372"></a><a href="#FNanchor_372_372"><span class="label">[372]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, iv, 413 ff.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_372_372"></a><a href="#FNanchor_372_372"><span class="label">[372]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, iv, 413 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_373_373" id="Footnote_373_373"></a><a href="#FNanchor_373_373"><span class="label">[373]</span></a> See Lange, <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 417, for another proof of his view, drawn from +<p><a id="Footnote_373_373"></a><a href="#FNanchor_373_373"><span class="label">[373]</span></a> See Lange, <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 417, for another proof of his view, drawn from the phenomenon of retinal rivalry.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_374_374" id="Footnote_374_374"></a><a href="#FNanchor_374_374"><span class="label">[374]</span></a> Many of my students have at my request experimented with imagined +<p><a id="Footnote_374_374"></a><a href="#FNanchor_374_374"><span class="label">[374]</span></a> Many of my students have at my request experimented with imagined letters of the alphabet and syllables, and they tell me that they can see them inwardly as total colored pictures without following their outlines with the eye. I am myself a bad visualizer, and make movements all the @@ -21604,7 +21761,7 @@ their relations to attention. I am glad to cite him as an ally.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_375_375" id="Footnote_375_375"></a><a href="#FNanchor_375_375"><span class="label">[375]</span></a> Drs. Ferrier (Functions of the Brain, §§ 102-3) and Obersteiner (Brain, +<p><a id="Footnote_375_375"></a><a href="#FNanchor_375_375"><span class="label">[375]</span></a> Drs. Ferrier (Functions of the Brain, §§ 102-3) and Obersteiner (Brain, i, 439 ff.) treat it as the essential feature. The author whose treatment of the subject is by far the most thorough and satisfactory is Prof. G. E. Müller, whose little work Zur Théorie der sinnlichen Aufmerksamkeit, @@ -21619,22 +21776,22 @@ in 'Brain,' Oct. 1890.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_376_376" id="Footnote_376_376"></a><a href="#FNanchor_376_376"><span class="label">[376]</span></a> L'Enfant de trois à sept Ans, p. 108.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_376_376"></a><a href="#FNanchor_376_376"><span class="label">[376]</span></a> L'Enfant de trois à sept Ans, p. 108.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_377_377" id="Footnote_377_377"></a><a href="#FNanchor_377_377"><span class="label">[377]</span></a> Psychologie de l'Attention, p. 53.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_377_377"></a><a href="#FNanchor_377_377"><span class="label">[377]</span></a> Psychologie de l'Attention, p. 53.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_378_378" id="Footnote_378_378"></a><a href="#FNanchor_378_378"><span class="label">[378]</span></a> Repetition of this sort does not confer <i>intelligence</i> of what is said, it only +<p><a id="Footnote_378_378"></a><a href="#FNanchor_378_378"><span class="label">[378]</span></a> Repetition of this sort does not confer <i>intelligence</i> of what is said, it only keeps the mind from wandering into other channels. The intelligence sometimes comes in beats, as it were, at the end of sentences, or in the midst of words which were mere words until then. See above, <a href="#Page_281">p. 281</a>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_379_379" id="Footnote_379_379"></a><a href="#FNanchor_379_379"><span class="label">[379]</span></a> The reader will please observe that I am saying all that can <i>possibly</i> +<p><a id="Footnote_379_379"></a><a href="#FNanchor_379_379"><span class="label">[379]</span></a> The reader will please observe that I am saying all that can <i>possibly</i> be said in favor of the effect-theory, since, inclining as I do myself to the cause-theory, I do not want to undervalue the enemy. As a matter of fact, one might begin to take one's stand against the effect theory at @@ -21660,23 +21817,23 @@ Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen (1886), pp. 55 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_380_380" id="Footnote_380_380"></a><a href="#FNanchor_380_380"><span class="label">[380]</span></a> F. H. Bradley, "Is there a Special Activity of Attention?" in 'Mind,' +<p><a id="Footnote_380_380"></a><a href="#FNanchor_380_380"><span class="label">[380]</span></a> F. H. Bradley, "Is there a Special Activity of Attention?" in 'Mind,' xi, 305, and Lipps, Grundtatsachen, chaps. iv and xxx, have stated it similarly.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_381_381" id="Footnote_381_381"></a><a href="#FNanchor_381_381"><span class="label">[381]</span></a> More will be said of the matter when we come to the chapter on the +<p><a id="Footnote_381_381"></a><a href="#FNanchor_381_381"><span class="label">[381]</span></a> More will be said of the matter when we come to the chapter on the Will.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_382_382" id="Footnote_382_382"></a><a href="#FNanchor_382_382"><span class="label">[382]</span></a> See, for a defence of the notion of inward activity, Mr. James Ward's +<p><a id="Footnote_382_382"></a><a href="#FNanchor_382_382"><span class="label">[382]</span></a> See, for a defence of the notion of inward activity, Mr. James Ward's searching articles in 'Mind,' xii, 45 and 564.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_383_383" id="Footnote_383_383"></a><a href="#FNanchor_383_383"><span class="label">[383]</span></a> It must be admitted that some little time will often elapse before this +<p><a id="Footnote_383_383"></a><a href="#FNanchor_383_383"><span class="label">[383]</span></a> It must be admitted that some little time will often elapse before this effort succeeds. As a child, I slept in a nursery with a very loud-ticking clock, and remember my astonishment more than once, on listening for its tick, to find myself unable to catch it for what seemed a long space of @@ -21688,22 +21845,22 @@ moonlight, and then heard it too.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_384_384" id="Footnote_384_384"></a><a href="#FNanchor_384_384"><span class="label">[384]</span></a> Zur Theorie d. sinnl. Aufmerksamkeit, p. 128 foll.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_384_384"></a><a href="#FNanchor_384_384"><span class="label">[384]</span></a> Zur Theorie d. sinnl. Aufmerksamkeit, p. 128 foll.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_385_385" id="Footnote_385_385"></a><a href="#FNanchor_385_385"><span class="label">[385]</span></a> I have begun to inquire experimentally whether any of the measurable +<p><a id="Footnote_385_385"></a><a href="#FNanchor_385_385"><span class="label">[385]</span></a> I have begun to inquire experimentally whether any of the measurable functions of the workmen change after the din of machinery stops at a workshop. So far I have found no constant results as regards either pulse, breathing, or strength of squeeze by the hand. I hope to prosecute the inquiry farther (May, 1890).</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_459" id="Page_459">[Pg 459]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_459">[Pg 459]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII.</a></h5> <h4>CONCEPTION.</h4> @@ -21741,7 +21898,7 @@ a universe of our experience.</p> <p>Note, however, that we are in the first instance speaking of the sense of sameness from the point of view of the mind's structure alone, and not from the point of view of -the universe. We are psychologizing, not philosophizing,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_460" id="Page_460">[Pg 460]</a></span> +the universe. We are psychologizing, not philosophizing,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_460">[Pg 460]</a></span> That is, we do not care whether there be any <i>real</i> sameness in <i>things</i> or not, or whether the mind be true or false in its assumptions of it. Our principle only lays it down that @@ -21749,7 +21906,7 @@ the mind makes continual use of the <i>notion</i> of sameness, and if deprived of it, would have a different structure from what it has. In a word, the principle that the mind can mean the Same is true of its <i>meanings</i>, but not necessarily -of aught besides.<a name="FNanchor_386_386" id="FNanchor_386_386"></a><a href="#Footnote_386_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a> The mind must conceive as possible +of aught besides.<a id="FNanchor_386_386"></a><a href="#Footnote_386_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a> The mind must conceive as possible that the Same should be before it, for our experience to be the sort of thing it is. Without the psychological sense of identity, sameness might rain down upon us from the outer @@ -21775,7 +21932,7 @@ on the web they weave, feel ourselves to be working over identical materials and thinking them in different ways. And the man who identifies the materials most is held to have the most philosophic human mind.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_461" id="Page_461">[Pg 461]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_461">[Pg 461]</a></span></p> <h4>CONCEPTION DEFINED.</h4> @@ -21807,12 +21964,12 @@ else, that is, <i>instead</i> of that, though it may be of much else <i>in addition</i> to that. Each act of conception results from our attention singling out some one part of the mass of matter for thought which the world presents, and holding -fast to it, without confusion.<a name="FNanchor_387_387" id="FNanchor_387_387"></a><a href="#Footnote_387_387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a> Confusion occurs when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_462" id="Page_462">[Pg 462]</a></span> +fast to it, without confusion.<a id="FNanchor_387_387"></a><a href="#Footnote_387_387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a> Confusion occurs when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_462">[Pg 462]</a></span> we do not know whether a certain object proposed to us is the same with one of our meanings or not; so that the conceptual function requires, to be complete, that the thought should not only say 'I mean this,' but also say 'I -don't mean that.'<a name="FNanchor_388_388" id="FNanchor_388_388"></a><a href="#Footnote_388_388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a></p> +don't mean that.'<a id="FNanchor_388_388"></a><a href="#Footnote_388_388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a></p> <p>Each conception thus eternally remains what it is, and never can become another. The mind may change its @@ -21829,13 +21986,13 @@ stayed, I should simply say 'blackness' and know no more. Thus, amid the flux of opinions and of physical things, the world of conceptions, or things intended to be thought about, stands stiff and immutable, like Plato's Realm of -Ideas.<a name="FNanchor_389_389" id="FNanchor_389_389"></a><a href="#Footnote_389_389" class="fnanchor">[389]</a></p> +Ideas.<a id="FNanchor_389_389"></a><a href="#Footnote_389_389" class="fnanchor">[389]</a></p> <p>Some conceptions are of things, some of events, some of qualities. Any fact, be it thing, event, or quality, may be conceived sufficiently for purposes of identification, if only it be singled out and marked so as to separate it from -other things. Simply calling it 'this' or 'that' will suffice.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_463" id="Page_463">[Pg 463]</a></span> +other things. Simply calling it 'this' or 'that' will suffice.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_463">[Pg 463]</a></span> To speak in technical language, a subject may be conceived by its <i>denotation</i>, with no <i>connotation</i>, or a very minimum of connotation, attached. The essential point is that it should @@ -21869,8 +22026,8 @@ does not touch the question of its conceivability in this problematic way. 'Round square,' 'black-white-thing,' are absolutely definite conceptions; it is a mere accident, as far as conception goes, that they happen to stand for things -which nature never lets us sensibly perceive.<a name="FNanchor_390_390" id="FNanchor_390_390"></a><a href="#Footnote_390_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_464" id="Page_464">[Pg 464]</a></span></p> +which nature never lets us sensibly perceive.<a id="FNanchor_390_390"></a><a href="#Footnote_390_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_464">[Pg 464]</a></span></p> <h4>CONCEPTIONS ARE UNCHANGEABLE.</h4> @@ -21904,7 +22061,7 @@ which tastes bitter, we find will also kill, etc. Now I say that where the new knowledge merely comes from <i>thinking</i>, the facts are essentially the same, and that <i>to talk of self-development on the part of our conceptions is a very bad -way of stating the case</i>. Not new sensations, as in the empirical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_465" id="Page_465">[Pg 465]</a></span> +way of stating the case</i>. Not new sensations, as in the empirical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_465">[Pg 465]</a></span> instance, but new conceptions, are the indispensable conditions of advance.</p> @@ -21946,7 +22103,7 @@ in bringing them forth. But no single one of the mind's conceptions is fertile <i>of itself</i> as the opinion which I criticise pretends. When the several notes of a chord are sounded together, we get a new feeling from their combination. -This feeling is due to the mind reacting upon that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_466" id="Page_466">[Pg 466]</a></span> +This feeling is due to the mind reacting upon that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_466">[Pg 466]</a></span> group of sounds in that determinate way, and no one would think of saying of any single note of the chord that it 'developed' of itself into the other notes or into the feeling of @@ -21988,7 +22145,7 @@ not evolve into the conception, as such, of the parts. Let the conception of some object as a whole be given first. To begin with, it points to and identifies for future thought a certain <i>that</i>. The 'whole' in question might be one of -those mechanical puzzles of which the difficulty is to unlock<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_467" id="Page_467">[Pg 467]</a></span> +those mechanical puzzles of which the difficulty is to unlock<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_467">[Pg 467]</a></span> the parts. In this case, nobody would pretend that the richer and more elaborate conception which we gain of the puzzle after solving it came directly out of our first @@ -22029,7 +22186,7 @@ mysteries out of sight, when I insist that the psychology of conception is not the place in which to treat of those of continuity and change. Conceptions form the one class of entities that cannot under any circumstances change. -They can cease to be, altogether; or they can stay, as what<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_468" id="Page_468">[Pg 468]</a></span> +They can cease to be, altogether; or they can stay, as what<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_468">[Pg 468]</a></span> they severally are; but there is for them no middle way. They form an essentially discontinuous system, and translate the process of our perceptual experience, which is naturally @@ -22038,7 +22195,7 @@ very conception of flux itself is an absolutely changeless meaning in the mind: it signifies just that one thing, flux, immovably.—And, with this, the doctrine of the flux of the concept may be dismissed, and need not occupy our attention -again.<a name="FNanchor_391_391" id="FNanchor_391_391"></a><a href="#Footnote_391_391" class="fnanchor">[391]</a></p> +again.<a id="FNanchor_391_391"></a><a href="#Footnote_391_391" class="fnanchor">[391]</a></p> <h4>'ABSTRACT' IDEAS.</h4> @@ -22053,7 +22210,7 @@ elements of an experience, but are compelled, whenever we think it, to think it in its totality, just as it came.</p> <p>I will be silent of mediæval Nominalism, and begin with -Berkeley, who is supposed to have rediscovered the doctrine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_469" id="Page_469">[Pg 469]</a></span> +Berkeley, who is supposed to have rediscovered the doctrine<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_469">[Pg 469]</a></span> for himself. His asseverations against 'abstract ideas' are among the oftenest quoted passages in philosophic literature.</p> @@ -22103,8 +22260,8 @@ couple of children cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every common name they -make use of?"<a name="FNanchor_392_392" id="FNanchor_392_392"></a><a href="#Footnote_392_392" class="fnanchor">[392]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_470" id="Page_470">[Pg 470]</a></span></p> +make use of?"<a id="FNanchor_392_392"></a><a href="#Footnote_392_392" class="fnanchor">[392]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_470">[Pg 470]</a></span></p> <p>The note, so bravely struck by Berkeley, could not, however, be well sustained in face of the fact patent to every human being that we <i>can</i> mean color without meaning @@ -22115,7 +22272,7 @@ in his son John the nominalistic voice has grown so weak that, although 'abstract ideas' are repudiated as a matter of traditional form, the opinions uttered are really nothing but a conceptualism ashamed to call itself by its own legitimate -name.<a name="FNanchor_393_393" id="FNanchor_393_393"></a><a href="#Footnote_393_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> Conceptualism says the mind can conceive +name.<a id="FNanchor_393_393"></a><a href="#Footnote_393_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> Conceptualism says the mind can conceive any quality or relation it pleases, and mean nothing but it, in isolation from everything else in the world. This is, of course, the doctrine which we have professed. John Mill @@ -22142,16 +22299,16 @@ parts</i> of the concrete idea: and by that <i>exclusive attention</i> we enable those parts to <i>determine exclusively the course of our thoughts</i> as subsequently called up by association; and are in a condition to carry on a train of meditation or reasoning relating to those parts only, <i>exactly -as if</i> we were able to <i>conceive</i> them separately from the rest."<a name="FNanchor_394_394" id="FNanchor_394_394"></a><a href="#Footnote_394_394" class="fnanchor">[394]</a></p></blockquote> +as if</i> we were able to <i>conceive</i> them separately from the rest."<a id="FNanchor_394_394"></a><a href="#Footnote_394_394" class="fnanchor">[394]</a></p></blockquote> <p>This is a lovely example of Mill's way of holding piously to his general statements, but conceding in detail all that their adversaries ask. If there be a better description extant, -of a mind in possession of an 'abstract idea,' than is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_471" id="Page_471">[Pg 471]</a></span> +of a mind in possession of an 'abstract idea,' than is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_471">[Pg 471]</a></span> contained in the words I have italicized, I am unacquainted with it. The Berkeleyan nominalism thus breaks down.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>It is easy to lay bare the false assumption which underlies the whole discussion of the question as hitherto carried @@ -22163,7 +22320,7 @@ nominalists. <i>Omnis cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis et cogniti</i> has been the maxim, more or less explicitly assumed, of writers of every school. Practically it amounts to saying that an idea must <i>be</i> a duplicate edition of what -it knows<a name="FNanchor_395_395" id="FNanchor_395_395"></a><a href="#Footnote_395_395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a>—in other words, that it can only know itself—or, +it knows<a id="FNanchor_395_395"></a><a href="#Footnote_395_395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a>—in other words, that it can only know itself—or, more shortly still, that knowledge in any strict sense of the word, as a self-transcendent function, is impossible.</p> @@ -22188,7 +22345,7 @@ what it means, and mean what it <i>is</i>, and that if it be a picture of an entire individual, it cannot mean any part of him to the exclusion of the rest. I say nothing here of the preposterously false descriptive psychology involved in the -statement that the only things we can mentally picture are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_472" id="Page_472">[Pg 472]</a></span> +statement that the only things we can mentally picture are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_472">[Pg 472]</a></span> individuals completely determinate in all regards. Chapter XVIII will have something to say on that point, and we can ignore it here. For even if it were true that our images @@ -22229,7 +22386,7 @@ doctrine, therefore, of the 'fringe' leads to a perfectly satisfactory decision of the nominalistic and conceptualistic controversy,</i> so far as it touches psychology. <i>We must decide in favor of the conceptualists,</i> and affirm that the power to think things, -qualities, relations, or whatever other elements there may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_473" id="Page_473">[Pg 473]</a></span> +qualities, relations, or whatever other elements there may<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_473">[Pg 473]</a></span> be, isolated and abstracted from the total experience in which they appear, is the most indisputable function of our thought.</p> @@ -22244,7 +22401,7 @@ An individual conception is of something restricted, in its application, to a single case. A universal or general conception is of an entire class, or of something belonging to an entire class, of things. The conception of an abstract -quality is, taken by itself, neither universal nor particular.<a name="FNanchor_396_396" id="FNanchor_396_396"></a><a href="#Footnote_396_396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a> +quality is, taken by itself, neither universal nor particular.<a id="FNanchor_396_396"></a><a href="#Footnote_396_396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a> If I abstract <i>white</i> from the rest of the wintry landscape this morning, it is a perfectly definite conception, a self-identical quality which I may mean again; but, as I have @@ -22257,14 +22414,14 @@ world. Properly it is, in this state, a singular—I have 'singled it out;' and when, later, I universalize or individualize its application, and my thought turns to mean either <i>this</i> white or <i>all possible</i> whites, I am in reality meaning -two new things and forming two new conceptions.<a name="FNanchor_397_397" id="FNanchor_397_397"></a><a href="#Footnote_397_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a> +two new things and forming two new conceptions.<a id="FNanchor_397_397"></a><a href="#Footnote_397_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a> Such an alteration of my meaning has nothing to do with any change in the image I may have in my mental eye, but solely with the vague consciousness that surrounds the image, of the sphere to which it is intended to apply. We -can give no more definite account of this vague consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_474" id="Page_474">[Pg 474]</a></span> +can give no more definite account of this vague consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_474">[Pg 474]</a></span> than has been given on <a href="#Page_249">pp. 249-266</a>. But that is no -reason for denying its presence.<a name="FNanchor_398_398" id="FNanchor_398_398"></a><a href="#Footnote_398_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a></p> +reason for denying its presence.<a id="FNanchor_398_398"></a><a href="#Footnote_398_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a></p> <p>But the nominalists and traditional conceptualists find matter for an inveterate quarrel in these simple facts. Full @@ -22292,7 +22449,7 @@ lower terms. Invoked in the first instance as a vehicle for the knowledge of universals, the higher principle presently is made the indispensable vehicle of all thinking whatever, for, it is contended, "a universal element is present in -every thought." The nominalists meanwhile, who dislike<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_475" id="Page_475">[Pg 475]</a></span> +every thought." The nominalists meanwhile, who dislike<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_475">[Pg 475]</a></span> <i>actus purus</i> and awe-inspiring principles and despise the reverential mood, content themselves with saying that we are mistaken in supposing we ever get sight of @@ -22336,10 +22493,10 @@ from any imperfection or limitation of our faculties, but is a quality inherent in the very nature of intelligence. A contradiction is involved in the supposition that an idea or a universal can become the object either of sense or of the imagination. An idea is thus diametrically -opposed to an image."<a name="FNanchor_399_399" id="FNanchor_399_399"></a><a href="#Footnote_399_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a></p></blockquote> +opposed to an image."<a id="FNanchor_399_399"></a><a href="#Footnote_399_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a></p></blockquote> <p>The nominalists, on their side, admit a <i>quasi</i>-universal, -something which we think <i>as if it were</i> universal, though it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_476" id="Page_476">[Pg 476]</a></span> +something which we think <i>as if it were</i> universal, though it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_476">[Pg 476]</a></span> is not; and in all that they say about this something, which they explain to be 'an indefinite number of particular ideas,' the same vacillation between the subjective and the @@ -22349,7 +22506,7 @@ or a known. The authors themselves do not distinguish. They want to get something in the mind which shall <i>resemble</i> what is out of the mind, however vaguely, and they think that when that fact is accomplished, no farther questions -will be asked. James Mill writes:<a name="FNanchor_400_400" id="FNanchor_400_400"></a><a href="#Footnote_400_400" class="fnanchor">[400]</a></p> +will be asked. James Mill writes:<a id="FNanchor_400_400"></a><a href="#Footnote_400_400" class="fnanchor">[400]</a></p> <blockquote> @@ -22373,7 +22530,7 @@ indefinite number of ideas, by the irresistible laws of association, and forming them into one very complex and indistinct, but not therefore unintelligible, idea."</p></blockquote> -<p>Berkeley had already said:<a name="FNanchor_401_401" id="FNanchor_401_401"></a><a href="#Footnote_401_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a></p> +<p>Berkeley had already said:<a id="FNanchor_401_401"></a><a href="#Footnote_401_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a></p> <blockquote> @@ -22387,7 +22544,7 @@ or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort."</p></blockquote> <i>aware of something</i> general; 'particular ideas,' not particular <i>things</i>—everywhere the same timidity about begging the fact of knowing, and the pitifully impotent attempt -to foist it in the shape of a mode of <i>being</i> of 'ideas.' If<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_477" id="Page_477">[Pg 477]</a></span> +to foist it in the shape of a mode of <i>being</i> of 'ideas.' If<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_477">[Pg 477]</a></span> the fact to be conceived be the indefinitely numerous actual and possible members of a class, then it is assumed that if we can only get enough ideas to huddle together for @@ -22424,10 +22581,10 @@ third set that of a universal taking, of the extent of the same word. The thought corresponding to either set of processes, is always itself a unique and singular event, whose dependence on its peculiar nerve-process I of course -am far from professing to explain.<a name="FNanchor_402_402" id="FNanchor_402_402"></a><a href="#Footnote_402_402" class="fnanchor">[402]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_478" id="Page_478">[Pg 478]</a></span></p> +am far from professing to explain.<a id="FNanchor_402_402"></a><a href="#Footnote_402_402" class="fnanchor">[402]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_478">[Pg 478]</a></span></p> <p>Truly in comparison with the fact that every conception, -whatever it be of, is one of the mind's immutable possessions,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_479" id="Page_479">[Pg 479]</a></span> +whatever it be of, is one of the mind's immutable possessions,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_479">[Pg 479]</a></span> the question whether a single thing, or a whole class of things, or only an unassigned quality, be meant by it, is an insignificant matter of detail. Our meanings are of @@ -22436,7 +22593,7 @@ together in every way. A singular individual is as much <i>conceived</i> when he is isolated and identified away from the rest of the world in my mind, as is the most rarefied and universally applicable quality he may possess—<i>being</i>, for -example, when treated in the same way.<a name="FNanchor_403_403" id="FNanchor_403_403"></a><a href="#Footnote_403_403" class="fnanchor">[403]</a> From every +example, when treated in the same way.<a id="FNanchor_403_403"></a><a href="#Footnote_403_403" class="fnanchor">[403]</a> From every point of view, the overwhelming and portentous character ascribed to universal conceptions is surprising. Why, from Plato and Aristotle downwards, philosophers should have @@ -22445,7 +22602,7 @@ and in adoration of that of the general, is hard to understand, seeing that the more adorable knowledge ought to be that of the more adorable things, and that the <i>things</i> of worth are all concretes and singulars. The only value -of universal characters is that they help us, by reasoning,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_480" id="Page_480">[Pg 480]</a></span> +of universal characters is that they help us, by reasoning,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_480">[Pg 480]</a></span> to know new truths about individual things. The restriction of one's meaning, moreover, to an individual thing, probably requires even more complicated brain-processes @@ -22456,7 +22613,7 @@ therefore, the traditional universal-worship can only be called a bit of perverse sentimentalism, a philosophic 'idol of the cave.'</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>It may seem hardly necessary to add (what follows as a matter of course from <a href="#Page_229">pp. 229-237</a>, and what has @@ -22488,7 +22645,7 @@ of different subjective states do form the vehicle by which the same is known; and it must contradict the opposite view.</p> -<p>The ordinary Psychology of 'ideas' constantly talks as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_481" id="Page_481">[Pg 481]</a></span> +<p>The ordinary Psychology of 'ideas' constantly talks as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_481">[Pg 481]</a></span> if the vehicle of the same thing-known must be the same recurrent state of mind, and as if the having over again of the same 'idea' were not only a necessary but a sufficient condition @@ -22510,7 +22667,7 @@ in making <i>judgments</i>. A succession of judgments may all be about the same thing. The general practical postulate which encourages us to keep thinking at all is that by going on to do so we shall judge better <i>of the same things</i> than if -we do not.<a name="FNanchor_404_404" id="FNanchor_404_404"></a><a href="#Footnote_404_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a> In the successive judgments, all sorts of new +we do not.<a id="FNanchor_404_404"></a><a href="#Footnote_404_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a> In the successive judgments, all sorts of new operations are performed on the things, and all sorts of new results brought out, without the sense of the main topic ever getting lost. At the outset, we merely <i>have</i> the @@ -22528,7 +22685,7 @@ it, neither locate nor count nor compare nor like nor dislike nor deduce it, nor recognize it articulately as having been met with before. At the same time we know that, instead of staring at it in this entranced and senseless way, -we may rally our activity in a moment, and locate, class,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_482" id="Page_482">[Pg 482]</a></span> +we may rally our activity in a moment, and locate, class,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_482">[Pg 482]</a></span> compare, count, and judge it. There is nothing involved in all this which we did not postulate at the very outset of our introspective work: realities, namely, <i>extra mentem</i>, thoughts, @@ -22553,7 +22710,7 @@ all the predicates and relations of the conception with which it is identified become its predicates and relations too; it is subjected to the sieve's network, in other words. Thus comes to pass what Mr. Hodgson calls the translation -of the perceptual into the conceptual order of the world.<a name="FNanchor_405_405" id="FNanchor_405_405"></a><a href="#Footnote_405_405" class="fnanchor">[405]</a> +of the perceptual into the conceptual order of the world.<a id="FNanchor_405_405"></a><a href="#Footnote_405_405" class="fnanchor">[405]</a> In Chapter XXII we shall see how this translation always takes place for the sake of some subjective <i>interest</i>, and how the conception with which we handle a bit of sensible @@ -22564,11 +22721,11 @@ that the conceiver is a creature with partial purposes and private ends.</i> There remains, therefore, much more to be said about conception, but for the present this will suffice.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_386_386" id="Footnote_386_386"></a><a href="#FNanchor_386_386"><span class="label">[386]</span></a> There are two other 'principles of identity' in philosophy. The +<p><a id="Footnote_386_386"></a><a href="#FNanchor_386_386"><span class="label">[386]</span></a> There are two other 'principles of identity' in philosophy. The <i>ontological</i> one asserts that every real thing is what it is, that <i>a</i> is <i>a</i>, and <i>b, b</i>. The <i>logical</i> one says that what is once true of the subject of a judgment is always true of that subject. The ontological law is a tautological @@ -22581,7 +22738,7 @@ as 'the same' with anything else.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_387_387" id="Footnote_387_387"></a><a href="#FNanchor_387_387"><span class="label">[387]</span></a> In later chapters we shall see that determinate relations exist between +<p><a id="Footnote_387_387"></a><a href="#FNanchor_387_387"><span class="label">[387]</span></a> In later chapters we shall see that determinate relations exist between the various data thus fixed upon by the mind. These are called <i>a priori</i> or axiomatic relations. Simple inspection of the data enables us to perceive them; and one inspection is as effective as a million for engendering @@ -22610,18 +22767,18 @@ not <i>make</i>, but <i>find</i>, their relations.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_388_388" id="Footnote_388_388"></a><a href="#FNanchor_388_388"><span class="label">[388]</span></a> Cf. Hodgson, Time and Space, § 46. Lotze, Logic, § 11.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_388_388"></a><a href="#FNanchor_388_388"><span class="label">[388]</span></a> Cf. Hodgson, Time and Space, § 46. Lotze, Logic, § 11.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_389_389" id="Footnote_389_389"></a><a href="#FNanchor_389_389"><span class="label">[389]</span></a> "For though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste +<p><a id="Footnote_389_389"></a><a href="#FNanchor_389_389"><span class="label">[389]</span></a> "For though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste which at another time would produce a sweet one, yet the idea of bitter in that man's mind would be as distinct as if he had tasted only gall." (Locke's Essay bk. ii, chap. xi, § 3. Read the whole section!)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_390_390" id="Footnote_390_390"></a><a href="#FNanchor_390_390"><span class="label">[390]</span></a> Black round things, square white things, <i>per contra</i>, Nature gives us +<p><a id="Footnote_390_390"></a><a href="#FNanchor_390_390"><span class="label">[390]</span></a> Black round things, square white things, <i>per contra</i>, Nature gives us freely enough. But the combinations which she refuses to realize may exist as distinctly, in the shape of postulates, as those which she gives may exist in the shape of positive images, in our mind. As a matter of fact, she <i>may</i> @@ -22644,7 +22801,7 @@ them, meaning <i>them</i> and not other things?</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_391_391" id="Footnote_391_391"></a><a href="#FNanchor_391_391"><span class="label">[391]</span></a> Arguments seldom make converts in matters philosophical; and some +<p><a id="Footnote_391_391"></a><a href="#FNanchor_391_391"><span class="label">[391]</span></a> Arguments seldom make converts in matters philosophical; and some readers, I know, who find that they conceive a certain matter differently from what they did, will still prefer saying they have two different editions of the same conception, one evolved from the other, to saying they have @@ -22672,26 +22829,26 @@ in each particular case.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_392_392" id="Footnote_392_392"></a><a href="#FNanchor_392_392"><span class="label">[392]</span></a> Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §§ 10, 14.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_392_392"></a><a href="#FNanchor_392_392"><span class="label">[392]</span></a> Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §§ 10, 14.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_393_393" id="Footnote_393_393"></a><a href="#FNanchor_393_393"><span class="label">[393]</span></a> 'Conceptualisme honteux,' Rabier, Psychologie, 310.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_393_393"></a><a href="#FNanchor_393_393"><span class="label">[393]</span></a> 'Conceptualisme honteux,' Rabier, Psychologie, 310.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_394_394" id="Footnote_394_394"></a><a href="#FNanchor_394_394"><span class="label">[394]</span></a> Exam. of Hamilton, p. 393. Cf. also Logic, bk. ii, chap. v, § 1, and +<p><a id="Footnote_394_394"></a><a href="#FNanchor_394_394"><span class="label">[394]</span></a> Exam. of Hamilton, p. 393. Cf. also Logic, bk. ii, chap. v, § 1, and bk iv, chap ii, § 1.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_395_395" id="Footnote_395_395"></a><a href="#FNanchor_395_395"><span class="label">[395]</span></a> E.g.: "The knowledge of things must mean that the mind finds +<p><a id="Footnote_395_395"></a><a href="#FNanchor_395_395"><span class="label">[395]</span></a> E.g.: "The knowledge of things must mean that the mind finds itself in them, or that, in some way, the difference between them and the mind is dissolved." (E. Caird, Philosophy of Kant, first edition, p. 553.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_396_396" id="Footnote_396_396"></a><a href="#FNanchor_396_396"><span class="label">[396]</span></a> The traditional conceptualist doctrine is that an abstract must <i>eo ipso</i> +<p><a id="Footnote_396_396"></a><a href="#FNanchor_396_396"><span class="label">[396]</span></a> The traditional conceptualist doctrine is that an abstract must <i>eo ipso</i> be a universal. Even modern and independent authors like Prof. Dewey (Psychology, 207) obey the tradition: "The mind seizes upon some one aspect,... abstracts or prescinds it. This very seizure of some one @@ -22703,12 +22860,12 @@ mind; and significance is always universal."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_397_397" id="Footnote_397_397"></a><a href="#FNanchor_397_397"><span class="label">[397]</span></a> C. F. Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay v, chap. iii.—<i>Whiteness</i> is +<p><a id="Footnote_397_397"></a><a href="#FNanchor_397_397"><span class="label">[397]</span></a> C. F. Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay v, chap. iii.—<i>Whiteness</i> is one thing, <i>the whiteness of this sheet of paper</i> another thing.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_398_398" id="Footnote_398_398"></a><a href="#FNanchor_398_398"><span class="label">[398]</span></a> Mr. F. H. Bradley says the conception or the 'meaning' "consists +<p><a id="Footnote_398_398"></a><a href="#FNanchor_398_398"><span class="label">[398]</span></a> Mr. F. H. Bradley says the conception or the 'meaning' "consists of a part of the content, cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign. It would not be correct to add, and referred away to another real subject; for where we think without judging, @@ -22723,19 +22880,19 @@ Philosophical System, Introduction by Thomas Davidson, p. 43 (London, <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_399_399" id="Footnote_399_399"></a><a href="#FNanchor_399_399"><span class="label">[399]</span></a> Lectures on Greek Philosophy, pp. 33-39.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_399_399"></a><a href="#FNanchor_399_399"><span class="label">[399]</span></a> Lectures on Greek Philosophy, pp. 33-39.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_400_400" id="Footnote_400_400"></a><a href="#FNanchor_400_400"><span class="label">[400]</span></a> Analysis, chap. viii.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_400_400"></a><a href="#FNanchor_400_400"><span class="label">[400]</span></a> Analysis, chap. viii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_401_401" id="Footnote_401_401"></a><a href="#FNanchor_401_401"><span class="label">[401]</span></a> Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §§ 11, 12.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_401_401"></a><a href="#FNanchor_401_401"><span class="label">[401]</span></a> Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §§ 11, 12.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_402_402" id="Footnote_402_402"></a><a href="#FNanchor_402_402"><span class="label">[402]</span></a> It may add to the effect of the text to quote a passage from the essay +<p><a id="Footnote_402_402"></a><a href="#FNanchor_402_402"><span class="label">[402]</span></a> It may add to the effect of the text to quote a passage from the essay in 'Mind,' referred to on <a href="#Page_224">p. 224</a>. </p> <p> @@ -22822,22 +22979,22 @@ worship or of contempt." (Mind, ix, pp. 18-19.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_403_403" id="Footnote_403_403"></a><a href="#FNanchor_403_403"><span class="label">[403]</span></a> Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 404.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_403_403"></a><a href="#FNanchor_403_403"><span class="label">[403]</span></a> Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 404.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_404_404" id="Footnote_404_404"></a><a href="#FNanchor_404_404"><span class="label">[404]</span></a> Compare the admirable passage in Hodgson's Time and Space, p. 310.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_404_404"></a><a href="#FNanchor_404_404"><span class="label">[404]</span></a> Compare the admirable passage in Hodgson's Time and Space, p. 310.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_405_405" id="Footnote_405_405"></a><a href="#FNanchor_405_405"><span class="label">[405]</span></a> Philosophy of Reflection, i, 273-308.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_405_405"></a><a href="#FNanchor_405_405"><span class="label">[405]</span></a> Philosophy of Reflection, i, 273-308.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_483" id="Page_483">[Pg 483]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_483">[Pg 483]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII.</a></h5> <h4>DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON.</h4> @@ -22881,7 +23038,7 @@ ready at hand consists quickness of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another where there is but the least difference, consists in a great measure the exactness of judgment and clearness of reason which is to be observed -in one man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_484" id="Page_484">[Pg 484]</a></span> +in one man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given some<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_484">[Pg 484]</a></span> reason of that common observation,—that men who have a great deal of wit and prompt memories have not always the clearest judgment or deepest reason. For, wit lying most in the assemblage @@ -22896,7 +23053,7 @@ quite contrary to metaphor and allusion, wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit which strikes so lively on the fancy, and therefore, so acceptable to all people because its beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labor of thought to examine -what truth or reason there is in it."<a name="FNanchor_406_406" id="FNanchor_406_406"></a><a href="#Footnote_406_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a></p></blockquote> +what truth or reason there is in it."<a id="FNanchor_406_406"></a><a href="#Footnote_406_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a></p></blockquote> <p>But Locke's descendants have been slow to enter into the path whose fruitfulness was thus pointed out by their master, @@ -22927,7 +23084,7 @@ Mill: and the tendency of the modern teachers on this point is to recede more and more from the better-chosen track of their master. Hartley, for example, regarded the whole present effect upon us of any single object—say, an orange—as a single sensation; and the whole vestige -it left behind, as a single 'idea of sensation.' His modern disciples,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_485" id="Page_485">[Pg 485]</a></span> +it left behind, as a single 'idea of sensation.' His modern disciples,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_485">[Pg 485]</a></span> on the other hand, consider this same effect as an aggregate from a plurality of sensations, and the ideal trace it leaves as highly compound. 'The idea of an object,' instead of being an elementary starting-point @@ -22947,7 +23104,7 @@ sensations regarded as in a particular state of combination, that is, concomitance. Particular sensations of sight, of touch, of the muscles, are the sensations to the ideas of which, color, extension, roughness, hardness, smoothness, taste, smell, so coalescing as to appear one idea, -I give the name of the idea of a tree.'<a name="FNanchor_407_407" id="FNanchor_407_407"></a><a href="#Footnote_407_407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a></p> +I give the name of the idea of a tree.'<a id="FNanchor_407_407"></a><a href="#Footnote_407_407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a></p> <p>"To precisely the same effect Mr. Bain remarks:</p> @@ -22965,7 +23122,7 @@ of all these qualities in one aggregate, so as to give us for all purposes the enduring image of the rose. When fully acquired, any one of the characteristic impressions will revive the others; the odor, the sight, the feeling of the thorny stalk—each of these by itself will -hoist the entire impression into the view.'<a name="FNanchor_408_408" id="FNanchor_408_408"></a><a href="#Footnote_408_408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a></p> +hoist the entire impression into the view.'<a id="FNanchor_408_408"></a><a href="#Footnote_408_408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a></p> <p>"Now, this order of derivation, making our objective knowledge begin with plurality of impression and arrive at unity, we take to be a @@ -22975,7 +23132,7 @@ which an object delivers its effect upon us, and, in spite of this circumstance, treating the effect as one.... Even now, after life has read us so many analytic lessons, in proportion as we can fix the attitude of our scene and ourselves, the sense of plurality in our impressions retreats, -and we lapse into an undivided consciousness; losing, for instance,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_486" id="Page_486">[Pg 486]</a></span> +and we lapse into an undivided consciousness; losing, for instance,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_486">[Pg 486]</a></span> the separate notice of any uniform hum in the ear, or light in the eye, or weight of clothes on the body, though not one of them is inoperative on the complexion of our feeling. This law, once granted, @@ -23022,10 +23179,10 @@ not by reduction of pluralities of impression to one, but by the opening out of one into many; and a true psychological history must expound itself in analytic rather than synthetic terms. Precisely those ideas—of Substance, of Mind, of Cause, of Space—which this system -treats as infinitely complex, the last result of myriads of confluent elements,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_487" id="Page_487">[Pg 487]</a></span> +treats as infinitely complex, the last result of myriads of confluent elements,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_487">[Pg 487]</a></span> are in truth the residuary simplicities of consciousness, whose stability the eddies and currents of phenomenal experience have left -undisturbed."<a name="FNanchor_409_409" id="FNanchor_409_409"></a><a href="#Footnote_409_409" class="fnanchor">[409]</a></p></blockquote> +undisturbed."<a id="FNanchor_409_409"></a><a href="#Footnote_409_409" class="fnanchor">[409]</a></p></blockquote> <p>The truth is that Experience is trained by <i>both</i> association and dissociation, and that psychology must be writ @@ -23062,7 +23219,7 @@ especially seems gone; for one sees light and hears sound, but whether one or many lights and sounds is quite impossible to tell. Where the parts of an object have already been discerned, and each made the object of -a special discriminative act, we can with difficulty feel the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_488" id="Page_488">[Pg 488]</a></span> +a special discriminative act, we can with difficulty feel the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_488">[Pg 488]</a></span> object again in its pristine unity; and so prominent may our consciousness of its composition be, that we may hardly believe that it ever could have appeared undivided. But @@ -23084,7 +23241,7 @@ bignesses of all the sensations which came to our notice at once, coalesced together into one and the same space. There is no other reason than this why "the hand I touch and see coincides spatially with the hand I immediately -feel."<a name="FNanchor_410_410" id="FNanchor_410_410"></a><a href="#Footnote_410_410" class="fnanchor">[410]</a></p> +feel."<a id="FNanchor_410_410"></a><a href="#Footnote_410_410" class="fnanchor">[410]</a></p> <p>It is true that we may sometimes be tempted to exclaim, when once a lot of hitherto unnoticed details of the object lie @@ -23100,7 +23257,7 @@ our first rapid conclusion was really based on these intermediate inferences, all the while, only we failed to note the fact." But this is nothing but the fatal 'psychologist's fallacy' (<a href="#Page_196">p. 196</a>) of treating an inferior state of mind as if it -must somehow know implicitly all that is explicitly known<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_489" id="Page_489">[Pg 489]</a></span> +must somehow know implicitly all that is explicitly known<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_489">[Pg 489]</a></span> <i>about the same topic</i> by superior states of mind. The thing thought of is unquestionably the same, but it is thought twice over in two absolutely different psychoses,—once as an @@ -23143,7 +23300,7 @@ A peculiarity of differential discriminations is that they result in a perception of differences which are felt as <i>greater or less</i> one than the other. Entire groups of differences may be ranged in series: the musical scale, the color -scale, are examples. Every department of our experience<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_490" id="Page_490">[Pg 490]</a></span> +scale, are examples. Every department of our experience<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_490">[Pg 490]</a></span> may have its data written down in an evenly gradated order, from a lowest to a highest member. And any one datum may be a term in several such orders. A given note may @@ -23186,7 +23343,7 @@ rational operations.</p> <p>Each of the differences in one of these uniform series feels like a definite sensible quantity, and each term seems like the last term with this quantity added. In many concrete -objects which differ from one another we can plainly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_491" id="Page_491">[Pg 491]</a></span> +objects which differ from one another we can plainly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_491">[Pg 491]</a></span> see that the difference does consist singly in the fact that one object is the same as the other <i>plus</i> something else, or that they both have an identical part, to which each adds @@ -23217,11 +23374,11 @@ the lowest difference be called <i>d</i>, then the composition of the series would be as follows:</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>A</i> = <i>X</i> + <i>d</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>B</i> = (<i>X</i> + <i>d</i>) + <i>d</i>, or <i>X</i> + 2<i>d</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>C</i> = <i>X</i> + 3<i>d</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>D</i> = <i>X</i> + 4<i>d</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;"> . . . . . . .</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>A</i> = <i>X</i> + <i>d</i>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>B</i> = (<i>X</i> + <i>d</i>) + <i>d</i>, or <i>X</i> + 2<i>d</i>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>C</i> = <i>X</i> + 3<i>d</i>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>D</i> = <i>X</i> + 4<i>d</i>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"> . . . . . . .</span><br > </p> <p>If <i>X</i> itself were ultimately composed of <i>d</i>'s we should @@ -23229,7 +23386,7 @@ have the entire series explained as due to the varying combination and re-combination with itself of an unvarying element; and all the apparent differences of quality would be translated into differences of quantity alone. This is the -sort of reduction which the atomic theory in physics and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_492" id="Page_492">[Pg 492]</a></span> +sort of reduction which the atomic theory in physics and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_492">[Pg 492]</a></span> the mind-stuff theory in psychology regard as their ideal. So that, following the analogy of our instances, one might easily be tempted to generalize and to say that all difference @@ -23246,7 +23403,7 @@ one, would resolve itself into mere logical affirmation and negation, or perception that a feature found in one thing, in another does not exist.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Theoretically, however, this theory is full of difficulty. If all the differences which we feel were <i>in one direction</i>, @@ -23271,7 +23428,7 @@ complication of self-compoundings of the ultimate differential increment by which, on this theory, all the innumerable unlikenesses of the world are explained, in order to avoid writing any of them down as ultimate differences of kind, -would beggar all conception. It is the mind-dust theory;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_493" id="Page_493">[Pg 493]</a></span> +would beggar all conception. It is the mind-dust theory;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_493">[Pg 493]</a></span> with all its difficulties in a particularly uncompromising form; and all for the sake of the fantastic pleasure of being able arbitrarily to say that there is between the things in @@ -23286,7 +23443,7 @@ as an indecomposable relation amongst things, and a relation moreover of which there were all degrees. Absolute not-sameness would be the maximal degree, absolute sameness the minimal degree of this unlikeness, the discernment -of which would be one of our ultimate cognitive powers.<a name="FNanchor_411_411" id="FNanchor_411_411"></a><a href="#Footnote_411_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> +of which would be one of our ultimate cognitive powers.<a id="FNanchor_411_411"></a><a href="#Footnote_411_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> Certainly the natural appearances are dead against the notion that no qualitative differences exist. With the same clearness with which, in certain objects, we do feel a difference to @@ -23295,22 +23452,22 @@ that this is not the case. Contrast our feeling of the difference between the length of two lines with our feeling of the difference between blue and yellow, or with that between right and left. Is right equal to left with something added? -Is blue yellow <i>plus</i> something? If so, <i>plus</i> what?<a name="FNanchor_412_412" id="FNanchor_412_412"></a><a href="#Footnote_412_412" class="fnanchor">[412]</a> So +Is blue yellow <i>plus</i> something? If so, <i>plus</i> what?<a id="FNanchor_412_412"></a><a href="#Footnote_412_412" class="fnanchor">[412]</a> So long as we stick to <i>verifiable</i> psychology, <i>we are forced to admit that differences of simple</i> <span class="smcap">kind</span> <i>form an irreducible sort of relation</i> between some of the elements of our experience, -and forced to deny that differential discrimination<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_494" id="Page_494">[Pg 494]</a></span> +and forced to deny that differential discrimination<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_494">[Pg 494]</a></span> can everywhere be reduced to the mere ascertainment that elements present in one fact, in another fail to exist. The perception that an element exists in one thing and does not exist in another and the perception of qualitative difference -are, in short, entirely disconnected mental functions.<a name="FNanchor_413_413" id="FNanchor_413_413"></a><a href="#Footnote_413_413" class="fnanchor">[413]</a></p> +are, in short, entirely disconnected mental functions.<a id="FNanchor_413_413"></a><a href="#Footnote_413_413" class="fnanchor">[413]</a></p> <p>But at the same time that we insist on this, we must also admit that differences of quality, however abundant, are not the only distinctions with which our mind has to deal. Differences which seem of mere composition, of -number, of <i>plus</i> and <i>minus</i>, also abound.<a name="FNanchor_414_414" id="FNanchor_414_414"></a><a href="#Footnote_414_414" class="fnanchor">[414]</a> But it will be +number, of <i>plus</i> and <i>minus</i>, also abound.<a id="FNanchor_414_414"></a><a href="#Footnote_414_414" class="fnanchor">[414]</a> But it will be best for the present to disregard all these quantitative cases and, taking the others (which, by the least favorable calculation, will still be numerous enough), to consider @@ -23335,7 +23492,7 @@ after it. Discrimination is here <i>involuntary</i>. But where the objective difference is less, discrimination need not so inevitably occur, and may even require considerable effort of attention to be performed at all.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_495" id="Page_495">[Pg 495]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_495">[Pg 495]</a></span></p> <p>Another condition which then favors it is that the sensations excited by <i>the differing objects should not come to us simultaneously but fall in immediate</i> <span class="smcap">succession</span> upon the @@ -23375,10 +23532,10 @@ unless some of its ingredients have changed. We <i>now</i> discern, 'tis true, a multitude of coexisting things about us at every moment: but this is because we have had a long education, and each thing we now see distinct has -been already differentiated from its neighbors by repeated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_496" id="Page_496">[Pg 496]</a></span> +been already differentiated from its neighbors by repeated<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_496">[Pg 496]</a></span> appearances in successive order. To the infant, sounds, sights, touches, and pains, form probably one unanalyzed -bloom of confusion.<a name="FNanchor_415_415" id="FNanchor_415_415"></a><a href="#Footnote_415_415" class="fnanchor">[415]</a></p> +bloom of confusion.<a id="FNanchor_415_415"></a><a href="#Footnote_415_415" class="fnanchor">[415]</a></p> <p>Where the difference between the successive sensations is but slight, the transition between them must be made as @@ -23401,14 +23558,14 @@ can observe two neighboring musical tones to differ, and still not know which of the two is the higher in pitch. Similarly I may discriminate two neighboring tints, whilst remaining uncertain which is the bluer or the yellower, -or <i>how</i> either differs from its mate.<a name="FNanchor_416_416" id="FNanchor_416_416"></a><a href="#Footnote_416_416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a></p> +or <i>how</i> either differs from its mate.<a id="FNanchor_416_416"></a><a href="#Footnote_416_416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>With such direct perceptions of difference as this, we must not confound those entirely unlike cases in which we <i>infer</i> that two things must differ because we know enough -<i>about</i> each of them taken by itself to warrant our classing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_497" id="Page_497">[Pg 497]</a></span> +<i>about</i> each of them taken by itself to warrant our classing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_497">[Pg 497]</a></span> them under distinct heads. It often happens, when the interval is long between two experiences, that our judgments are guided, not so much by a positive image or copy @@ -23450,7 +23607,7 @@ in which men are led, by noticing differences in effects, to assume new hypothetical causes, differing from any known heretofore. But no matter how many may be the steps by which such inferential discriminations are made, <i>they all -end in a direct intuition of difference somewhere</i>. The <i>last</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_498" id="Page_498">[Pg 498]</a></span> +end in a direct intuition of difference somewhere</i>. The <i>last</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_498">[Pg 498]</a></span> ground for inferring that A and B differ must be that, whilst A is an <i>m</i>, B is an <i>n</i>, and that <i>m</i> and <i>n</i> are <i>seen to differ</i>. Let us then neglect the complex cases, the A's and @@ -23481,12 +23638,12 @@ to keep them <i>pure</i>. If kept pure, it would mean that they remained uncompared. With us, inevitably, by a mechanism which we as yet fail to understand, the shock of difference is felt between them, and the second object is not <i>n</i> -pure, but <i>n-as-different-from-m</i>.<a name="FNanchor_417_417" id="FNanchor_417_417"></a><a href="#Footnote_417_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a> It is no more a paradox +pure, but <i>n-as-different-from-m</i>.<a id="FNanchor_417_417"></a><a href="#Footnote_417_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a> It is no more a paradox that under these conditions this cognition of <i>m</i> and <i>n</i> in mutual relation should occur, than that under other conditions the cognition of <i>m</i>'s or <i>n</i>'s simple quality should occur. But as it has been treated as a paradox, and as a -spiritual agent, not itself a portion of the stream, has been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_499" id="Page_499">[Pg 499]</a></span> +spiritual agent, not itself a portion of the stream, has been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_499">[Pg 499]</a></span> invoked to account for it, a word of further remark seems desirable.</p> @@ -23516,7 +23673,7 @@ as separate entities. These pure ideas, so called, of <i>m</i> and <i>are distinct</i>, say the sensationalists, they are <i>eo ipso</i> distinguished. "To have ideas different and ideas distinguished, are synonymous expressions; different and distinguished -meaning exactly the same thing," says James Mill.<a name="FNanchor_418_418" id="FNanchor_418_418"></a><a href="#Footnote_418_418" class="fnanchor">[418]</a> "Distinguished!" +meaning exactly the same thing," says James Mill.<a id="FNanchor_418_418"></a><a href="#Footnote_418_418" class="fnanchor">[418]</a> "Distinguished!" say the spiritualists, "distinguished <i>by what</i>, forsooth? Truly the respective ideas of <i>m</i> and of <i>n</i> in the mind are distinct. But for that very reason neither can @@ -23526,7 +23683,7 @@ become the other, and that would be to get mixed up with the other and to lose its own distinctness. Distinctness of ideas and idea of distinctness, are not one thing, but two. This last is a <i>relation</i>. Only a <i>relating principle</i>, opposed -in nature to all facts of feeling, an Ego, Soul, or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_500" id="Page_500">[Pg 500]</a></span> +in nature to all facts of feeling, an Ego, Soul, or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_500">[Pg 500]</a></span> Subject, is competent, by being present to both of the ideas alike, to hold them together and at the same time to keep them distinct."</p> @@ -23539,8 +23696,8 @@ precious quarrel drops out and neither party is left with anything to fight about. Surely such a consummation ought to be welcomed, especially when brought about, us here, by a formulation of the facts which offers itself so -naturally and unsophistically.<a name="FNanchor_419_419" id="FNanchor_419_419"></a><a href="#Footnote_419_419" class="fnanchor">[419]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_501" id="Page_501">[Pg 501]</a></span></p> +naturally and unsophistically.<a id="FNanchor_419_419"></a><a href="#Footnote_419_419" class="fnanchor">[419]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_501">[Pg 501]</a></span></p> <p>We may, then, conclude our examination of the manner in which simple involuntary discrimination comes about, by saying, 1) that its vehicle is a thought possessed of a knowledge @@ -23559,7 +23716,7 @@ it holds.</p> their difference, nor <i>contain</i> them. A man's thought can know and mean all sorts of things without those things getting bodily into it—the distant, for example, the future, and -the past.<a name="FNanchor_420_420" id="FNanchor_420_420"></a><a href="#Footnote_420_420" class="fnanchor">[420]</a> The vanishing term in the case which occupies +the past.<a id="FNanchor_420_420"></a><a href="#Footnote_420_420" class="fnanchor">[420]</a> The vanishing term in the case which occupies us vanishes; but because it is the specific term it is and nothing else, it leaves a specific influence behind it when it vanishes, the effect of which is to determine the succeeding @@ -23569,7 +23726,7 @@ term and call it different from the one now there.</p> <p>Here we are at the end of our tether about involuntary discrimination of successively felt simple things; and must -drop the subject, hopeless of seeing any deeper into it for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_502" id="Page_502">[Pg 502]</a></span> +drop the subject, hopeless of seeing any deeper into it for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_502">[Pg 502]</a></span> the present, and turn to discriminations of a less simple sort.</p> @@ -23613,7 +23770,7 @@ of the eyes) inseparably linked, and neither can (without a sort of artificial training which shall presently be mentioned) be felt by itself. We learn that the <i>causes</i> of such groups of feelings are multiple, and therefore we frame theories -about the composition of the feelings themselves, by 'fusion,'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_503" id="Page_503">[Pg 503]</a></span> +about the composition of the feelings themselves, by 'fusion,'<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_503">[Pg 503]</a></span> 'integration,' 'synthesis,' or what not. But by direct introspection no analysis of them is ever made. A conspicuous case will come to view when we treat of the emotions. @@ -23655,7 +23812,7 @@ received. Attention being the condition of analysis, and separate imagination being the condition of attention, it follows also that separate imagination is the condition of analysis. <i>Only such elements as we are acquainted with, and -can imagine, separately, can be discriminated within a total</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_504" id="Page_504">[Pg 504]</a></span> +can imagine, separately, can be discriminated within a total</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_504">[Pg 504]</a></span> <i>sense-impression</i>. The image seems to welcome its own mate from out of the compound, and to heighten the feeling thereof; whereas it dampens and opposes the feeling of @@ -23700,7 +23857,7 @@ and vaguely known, the analysis of their sum into them must be correspondingly uncertain. If we do not know with certainty how much of the musical tone under consideration is to be attributed to its prime, we cannot but be uncertain as to what belongs to the partials. -Consequently we must begin by making the individual elements which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_505" id="Page_505">[Pg 505]</a></span> +Consequently we must begin by making the individual elements which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_505">[Pg 505]</a></span> have to be distinguished individually audible, so as to obtain an entirely fresh recollection of the corresponding sensation, and the whole business requires undisturbed and concentrated attention. We are even @@ -23709,7 +23866,7 @@ experiment, such as we possess in the analysis of musical chords into their individual notes. In that case we hear the individual notes sufficiently often by themselves, whereas we rarely hear simple tones, and may almost be said never to hear the building up of a compound from -its simple tones."<a name="FNanchor_421_421" id="FNanchor_421_421"></a><a href="#Footnote_421_421" class="fnanchor">[421]</a></p></blockquote> +its simple tones."<a id="FNanchor_421_421"></a><a href="#Footnote_421_421" class="fnanchor">[421]</a></p></blockquote> <h4>THE PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION.</h4> @@ -23744,7 +23901,7 @@ either of <i>a</i> or of <i>d</i> in the abstract. But it leads us to it as the <i>extreme</i> of a certain direction. 'Dry' wines and 'sweet' wines, for example, differ, and form a series. It happens that we have an experience of sweetness -pure and simple in the taste of sugar, and this we can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_506" id="Page_506">[Pg 506]</a></span> +pure and simple in the taste of sugar, and this we can<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_506">[Pg 506]</a></span> analyze out of the wine-taste. But no one knows what 'dryness' tastes like, all by itself. It must, however, be something extreme in the dry direction; and we should @@ -23783,7 +23940,7 @@ happen that by multiplication of experiences the impressions produced by these properties on the organism will be disconnected and rendered so far independent in the organism as the properties are in the environment, whence must eventually result a power to recognize attributes in -themselves, apart from particular bodies."<a name="FNanchor_422_422" id="FNanchor_422_422"></a><a href="#Footnote_422_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a></p></blockquote> +themselves, apart from particular bodies."<a id="FNanchor_422_422"></a><a href="#Footnote_422_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a></p></blockquote> <p>And still more to the point Dr. Martineau, in the passage I have already quoted, writes:</p> @@ -23791,7 +23948,7 @@ I have already quoted, writes:</p> <blockquote> <p>"When a red ivory ball, seen for the first time, has been withdrawn, -it will leave a mental representation of itself, in which all that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_507" id="Page_507">[Pg 507]</a></span> +it will leave a mental representation of itself, in which all that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_507">[Pg 507]</a></span> it simultaneously gave us will indistinguishably coexist. Let a white ball succeed to it; now, and not before, will an attribute detach itself, and the <i>color</i>, by force of contrast, be shaken out into the foreground. @@ -23835,7 +23992,7 @@ in.</p> <p>This mode of abstraction is realized on a very wide scale, because the elements of the world in which we find ourselves appear, as a matter of fact, here, there, and everywhere, -and are changing their concomitants all the while.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_508" id="Page_508">[Pg 508]</a></span> +and are changing their concomitants all the while.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_508">[Pg 508]</a></span> But on the other hand the abstraction is, so to speak, never complete, the analysis of a compound never perfect, because no element is ever given to us absolutely alone, and @@ -23879,7 +24036,7 @@ the differences involved to be so large as to be flagrant, and the discrimination, where successive, was treated as involuntary. But, so far from being always involuntary, discriminations are often difficult in the extreme, and by most -men never performed. Professor de Morgan, thinking, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_509" id="Page_509">[Pg 509]</a></span> +men never performed. Professor de Morgan, thinking, it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_509">[Pg 509]</a></span> is true, rather of conceptual than of perceptive discrimination, wrote, wittily enough:</p> @@ -23893,7 +24050,7 @@ to shake a distinction. With them all such things are evasions, subterfuges, come-offs, loop-holes, etc. They would hang a man for horse-stealing under a statute against sheep-stealing; and would laugh at you if you quibbled about the distinction between a horse and a -sheep."<a name="FNanchor_423_423" id="FNanchor_423_423"></a><a href="#Footnote_423_423" class="fnanchor">[423]</a></p></blockquote> +sheep."<a id="FNanchor_423_423"></a><a href="#Footnote_423_423" class="fnanchor">[423]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Any personal or practical interest, however, in the results to be obtained by distinguishing, makes one's wits @@ -23923,7 +24080,7 @@ grown in Iowa or Tennessee. The blind deaf-mute, Laura Bridgman, had so improved her touch as to recognize, after a year's interval, the hand of a person who once had shaken hers; and her sister in misfortune, Julia Brace, is -said to have been employed in the Hartford Asylum to sort<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_510" id="Page_510">[Pg 510]</a></span> +said to have been employed in the Hartford Asylum to sort<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_510">[Pg 510]</a></span> the linen of its multitudinous inmates, after it came from the wash, by her wonderfully educated sense of smell.</p> @@ -23937,7 +24094,7 @@ to we perceive more minutely." This answer is true, but too general; it seems to me that we can be a little more precise.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>There are at least two distinct causes</i> which we can see at work whenever experience improves discrimination:</p> @@ -23970,7 +24127,7 @@ only contrast in the cases is that we can easily name the <p>Two things, then, B and C, indistinguishable when compared together alone, may each contract adhesions -with different associates, and the compounds thus formed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_511" id="Page_511">[Pg 511]</a></span> +with different associates, and the compounds thus formed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_511">[Pg 511]</a></span> may, as wholes, be judged very distinct. <i>The effect of practice in increasing discrimination must then, in part be due to the reinforcing effect, upon an original slight difference between @@ -24012,7 +24169,7 @@ the terms.</p> <p>The reader may say that this has nothing to do with making us feel the <i>difference</i> between the two terms. It is -merely fixing, identifying, and so to speak substantializing,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_512" id="Page_512">[Pg 512]</a></span> +merely fixing, identifying, and so to speak substantializing,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_512">[Pg 512]</a></span> the <i>terms</i>. But what we feel as their <i>difference</i>, we should feel, even though we were unable to name or otherwise identify the terms.</p> @@ -24033,8 +24190,8 @@ to follow from naming the terms between which it obtains; although I admit myself that it is difficult to show coercively that naming or otherwise identifying any given pair of hardly distinguishable terms is essential to their being felt -as different at <i>first</i>.<a name="FNanchor_424_424" id="FNanchor_424_424"></a><a href="#Footnote_424_424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_513" id="Page_513">[Pg 513]</a></span></p> +as different at <i>first</i>.<a id="FNanchor_424_424"></a><a href="#Footnote_424_424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_513">[Pg 513]</a></span></p> <p>I offer the explanation only as a partial one: it certainly is not complete. Take the way in which <i>practice refines our local discrimination on the skin</i>, for example. Two @@ -24060,7 +24217,7 @@ wise <i>c—d</i> would no longer be bare <i>c—d</i>, but something mo like <i>abc—def</i>,—palpably differing impressions. But in actual experience the education can take place in a much less methodical way, and we learn at last to discriminate <i>c</i> and <i>d</i> -without any constant adhesion being contracted between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_514" id="Page_514">[Pg 514]</a></span> +without any constant adhesion being contracted between<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_514">[Pg 514]</a></span> one of these spots and <i>ab</i>, and the other and <i>ef</i>. Volkmann's experiments show this. He and Fechner, prompted by Czermak's observation that the skin of the blind was twice @@ -24079,8 +24236,8 @@ sitting, the compass-points had to be a Paris line asunder, in order to be distinguished by the little-finger-tip. But after exercising the <i>other fingers</i>, it was found that the little-finger-tip could discriminate points only half a line -apart.<a name="FNanchor_425_425" id="FNanchor_425_425"></a><a href="#Footnote_425_425" class="fnanchor">[425]</a> The same relation existed betwixt divers points of -the arm and hand.<a name="FNanchor_426_426" id="FNanchor_426_426"></a><a href="#Footnote_426_426" class="fnanchor">[426]</a></p> +apart.<a id="FNanchor_425_425"></a><a href="#Footnote_425_425" class="fnanchor">[425]</a> The same relation existed betwixt divers points of +the arm and hand.<a id="FNanchor_426_426"></a><a href="#Footnote_426_426" class="fnanchor">[426]</a></p> <p>Here it is clear that the cause which I first suggested fails to apply, and that we must invoke another.</p> @@ -24099,7 +24256,7 @@ give us the earliest; and between them are intermediary places. But as soon as the <i>image of the doubleness</i> as it is felt in the more discriminative places gets lodged in our memory, it helps us to find its like in places where otherwise -we might have missed it, much as the recent hearing of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_515" id="Page_515">[Pg 515]</a></span> +we might have missed it, much as the recent hearing of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_515">[Pg 515]</a></span> an 'overtone' helps us to detect the latter in a compound sound (<i>supra</i>, <a href="#Page_439">pp. 439-40</a>). A dim doubleness grows clearer by being assimilated to the image of a distincter doubleness @@ -24107,7 +24264,7 @@ felt a moment before. It is interpreted by means of the latter. And so is any difference, like any other sort of impression, more easily perceived when we carry in our mind to meet it a distinct image of what sort of a thing we are to -look for, of what its nature is likely to be.<a name="FNanchor_427_427" id="FNanchor_427_427"></a><a href="#Footnote_427_427" class="fnanchor">[427]</a></p> +look for, of what its nature is likely to be.<a id="FNanchor_427_427"></a><a href="#Footnote_427_427" class="fnanchor">[427]</a></p> <p><i>These two processes</i>, the reinforcement of the terms by disparate associates, and the filling of the memory with @@ -24137,7 +24294,7 @@ look-out for. We draw it frequently, and we get all the benefits of so doing, benefits which have just been explained. Where, on the other hand, a distinction has no practical interest, where we gain nothing by analyzing a -feature from out of the compound total of which it forms a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_516" id="Page_516">[Pg 516]</a></span> +feature from out of the compound total of which it forms a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_516">[Pg 516]</a></span> part, we contract a habit of leaving it unnoticed, and at last grow callous to its presence. Helmholtz was the first psychologist who dwelt on these facts as emphatically as they @@ -24190,17 +24347,17 @@ place without our needing, or indeed being able, to ascertain to what particular part of our sensations we owe this or that circumstance in our perceptions. In this case we will say that the impression of the sensation in question is <i>perceived synthetically</i>. The second higher -grade is when we immediately distinguish the sensation in question as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_517" id="Page_517">[Pg 517]</a></span> +grade is when we immediately distinguish the sensation in question as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_517">[Pg 517]</a></span> an existing part of the sum of the sensations excited in us. We will say, then, that the sensation is <i>perceived analytically</i>. The two cases -must be carefully distinguished from each other."<a name="FNanchor_428_428" id="FNanchor_428_428"></a><a href="#Footnote_428_428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a></p></blockquote> +must be carefully distinguished from each other."<a id="FNanchor_428_428"></a><a href="#Footnote_428_428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a></p></blockquote> <p>By the sensation being perceived synthetically, Helmholtz means that it is not discriminated at all, but only felt in a mass with other simultaneous sensations. That it <i>is</i> felt there he thinks is proved by the fact that our <i>judgment</i> of the total will change if anything occurs to alter -the <i>outer cause</i> of the sensation.<a name="FNanchor_429_429" id="FNanchor_429_429"></a><a href="#Footnote_429_429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a> The following pages +the <i>outer cause</i> of the sensation.<a id="FNanchor_429_429"></a><a href="#Footnote_429_429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a> The following pages from an earlier edition show what the concrete cases of synthetic perception and what those of analytic perception are wont to be:</p> @@ -24235,7 +24392,7 @@ the outer world. The physiology of the sense-organs has, in recent times, made us acquainted with a number of such phenomena, discovered partly in consequence of theoretic speculations and questionings, partly by individuals, like Goethe and Purkinje, specially endowed by -nature with talent for this sort of observation. These so-called subjective<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_518" id="Page_518">[Pg 518]</a></span> +nature with talent for this sort of observation. These so-called subjective<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_518">[Pg 518]</a></span> phenomena are extraordinarily hard to find; and when they are once found, special aids for the attention are almost always required to observe them. It is usually hard to notice the phenomenon again even @@ -24284,7 +24441,7 @@ wandering, and the moment an object interests us we turn them full upon it. So it follows that the object which at any actual moment excites our attention never happens to fall upon this gap, and thus it is that we never grow conscious of the blind spot in the field. In order -to notice it, we must first purposely rivet our gaze upon one object and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_519" id="Page_519">[Pg 519]</a></span> +to notice it, we must first purposely rivet our gaze upon one object and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_519">[Pg 519]</a></span> then move about a second object in the neighborhood of the blind spot, striving meanwhile to <i>attend</i> to this latter without moving the direction of our gaze from the first object. This runs counter to all our habits, and @@ -24309,7 +24466,7 @@ seldom learn that these images exist. In order to find them we must set our attention a new and unusual task; we must make it explore the lateral parts of the field of vision, not, as usual, to find what objects are there, but to analyze our sensations. Then only do we notice this -phenomenon.<a name="FNanchor_430_430" id="FNanchor_430_430"></a><a href="#Footnote_430_430" class="fnanchor">[430]</a></p> +phenomenon.<a id="FNanchor_430_430"></a><a href="#Footnote_430_430" class="fnanchor">[430]</a></p> <p>"The same difficulty which is found in the observation of subjective sensations to which no external object corresponds is found also in the @@ -24323,7 +24480,7 @@ sensible sign of the voice of a clarionet, etc. And the oftener any such combination is heard, the more accustomed we grow to perceiving it as an integral total, and the harder it becomes to analyze it by immediate observation. I believe that this is one of the principal reasons why -the analysis of the notes of the human voice in singing is relatively so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_520" id="Page_520">[Pg 520]</a></span> +the analysis of the notes of the human voice in singing is relatively so<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_520">[Pg 520]</a></span> difficult. Such fusions of many sensations into what, to conscious perception, seems a simple whole, abound in all our senses.</p> @@ -24374,7 +24531,7 @@ makes. Even when we have made experiments and convinced ourselves in every possible manner that such must be the fact, it still remains hidden from our immediate introspective observation.</p> -<p>"These examples" [of 'synthetic perception,' perception in which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_521" id="Page_521">[Pg 521]</a></span> +<p>"These examples" [of 'synthetic perception,' perception in which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_521">[Pg 521]</a></span> each contributory sensation is felt <i>in</i> the whole, and is a co-determinant of what the whole shall be, but does not attract the attention to its separate self] "may suffice to show the vital part which the direction @@ -24393,12 +24550,12 @@ number. For this reason we confine our attention in analyzing a mass of sound to the several instruments' voices, and expressly abstain, as it were, from discriminating the elementary components of the latter. In this last sort of discrimination we are as unpractised as we are, on the -contrary, well trained in the former kind."<a name="FNanchor_431_431" id="FNanchor_431_431"></a><a href="#Footnote_431_431" class="fnanchor">[431]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_522" id="Page_522">[Pg 522]</a></span></p> +contrary, well trained in the former kind."<a id="FNanchor_431_431"></a><a href="#Footnote_431_431" class="fnanchor">[431]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_522">[Pg 522]</a></span></p> <p>After all we have said, no comment seems called for upon these interesting and important facts and reflections of Helmholtz.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_523" id="Page_523">[Pg 523]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_523">[Pg 523]</a></span></p> <h4>REACTION-TIME AFTER DISCRIMINATION.</h4> @@ -24422,20 +24579,20 @@ averaged, for three observers respectively (the signals being the sudden appearance of a black or of a white object),</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.050 sec;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.047 sec.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.079 sec.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.050 sec;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.047 sec.</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.079 sec.</span><br > </p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_524" id="Page_524">[Pg 524]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_524">[Pg 524]</a></span></p> <p>In the latter case, a red and a green signal being added to the former ones, it became, for the same observers,</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.157;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.073;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.132.<a name="FNanchor_432_432" id="FNanchor_432_432"></a><a href="#Footnote_432_432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a></span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.157;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.073;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.132.<a id="FNanchor_432_432"></a><a href="#Footnote_432_432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a></span><br > </p> <p>Later, in Wundt's Laboratory, Herr Tischer made many @@ -24451,11 +24608,11 @@ times are expressed in thousandths of a second.</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">2 </td><td align="left">6 </td><td align="left">8.5 </td><td align="left">10.75 </td><td align="left">10.7 </td><td align="left">33 </td><td align="left">53</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">3</td><td align="left">10</td><td align="left">14.4 </td><td align="left">19.9</td><td align="left">22.7</td><td align="left">58.5 </td><td align="left">57.8</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">4</td><td align="left">16.7 </td><td align="left">20.8</td><td align="left">29</td><td align="left">29.1</td><td align="left">75</td><td align="left">84</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">5</td><td align="left">25.6</td><td align="left">31</td><td align="left">...</td><td align="left">40.1</td><td align="left">95.5 </td><td align="left">138<a name="FNanchor_433_433" id="FNanchor_433_433"></a><a href="#Footnote_433_433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a></td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">2 </td><td style="text-align: left;">6 </td><td style="text-align: left;">8.5 </td><td style="text-align: left;">10.75 </td><td style="text-align: left;">10.7 </td><td style="text-align: left;">33 </td><td style="text-align: left;">53</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">3</td><td style="text-align: left;">10</td><td style="text-align: left;">14.4 </td><td style="text-align: left;">19.9</td><td style="text-align: left;">22.7</td><td style="text-align: left;">58.5 </td><td style="text-align: left;">57.8</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">4</td><td style="text-align: left;">16.7 </td><td style="text-align: left;">20.8</td><td style="text-align: left;">29</td><td style="text-align: left;">29.1</td><td style="text-align: left;">75</td><td style="text-align: left;">84</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">5</td><td style="text-align: left;">25.6</td><td style="text-align: left;">31</td><td style="text-align: left;">...</td><td style="text-align: left;">40.1</td><td style="text-align: left;">95.5 </td><td style="text-align: left;">138<a id="FNanchor_433_433"></a><a href="#Footnote_433_433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a></td></tr> </table></div> <p>The interesting points here are the great individual variations, @@ -24468,10 +24625,10 @@ said, for example, that in the experiments with three sounds, he kept the image of the middle one ready in his mind, and compared what he heard as either louder, lower, or the same. His discrimination among three possibilities -became thus very similar to a discrimination between two.<a name="FNanchor_434_434" id="FNanchor_434_434"></a><a href="#Footnote_434_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a></p> +became thus very similar to a discrimination between two.<a id="FNanchor_434_434"></a><a href="#Footnote_434_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a></p> <p>Mr. J. M. Cattell found he could get no results by this -method,<a name="FNanchor_435_435" id="FNanchor_435_435"></a><a href="#Footnote_435_435" class="fnanchor">[435]</a> and reverted to one used by observers previous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_525" id="Page_525">[Pg 525]</a></span> +method,<a id="FNanchor_435_435"></a><a href="#Footnote_435_435" class="fnanchor">[435]</a> and reverted to one used by observers previous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_525">[Pg 525]</a></span> to Wundt and which Wundt had rejected. This is the <i>einfache Wahlmethode</i>, as Wundt calls it. The reacter awaits the signal and reacts if it is of one sort, but omits to @@ -24493,7 +24650,7 @@ time used in the cortex is about equally divided between the perception of the signal and the preparation of the motor discharge, if we divide it equally between perception (discrimination) and volition, the error cannot be -great.<a name="FNanchor_436_436" id="FNanchor_436_436"></a><a href="#Footnote_436_436" class="fnanchor">[436]</a> We can moreover change the nature of the perception +great.<a id="FNanchor_436_436"></a><a href="#Footnote_436_436" class="fnanchor">[436]</a> We can moreover change the nature of the perception without altering the will-time, and thus investigate with considerable thoroughness the length of the perception-time.</p> @@ -24502,40 +24659,40 @@ required for distinguishing a white signal from no signal to be, in two observers:</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.030 sec. and 0.050 sec;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.030 sec. and 0.050 sec;</span><br > </p> <p>that for distinguishing one color from another was similarly:</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.100 and 0.110;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.100 and 0.110;</span><br > </p> <p>that for distinguishing a certain color from ten other colors:</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.105 and 0.117;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.105 and 0.117;</span><br > </p> <p>that for distinguishing the letter A in ordinary print from the letter Z:</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.142 and 0.137;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.142 and 0.137;</span><br > </p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_526" id="Page_526">[Pg 526]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_526">[Pg 526]</a></span></p> <p>that for distinguishing a given letter from all the rest of the alphabet (not reacting until that letter appeared)</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.119 and 0.116;</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.119 and 0.116;</span><br > </p> <p>that for distinguishing a word from any of twenty-five other words, from</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.118 sec. to 0.158 sec.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">0.118 sec. to 0.158 sec.</span><br > </p> <p>The difference depending on the length of the words and @@ -24553,7 +24710,7 @@ teaching children to read is evident."</p></blockquote> <p>He also finds a great difference in the time with which various letters are distinguished, E being particularly -bad.<a name="FNanchor_437_437" id="FNanchor_437_437"></a><a href="#Footnote_437_437" class="fnanchor">[437]</a></p> +bad.<a id="FNanchor_437_437"></a><a href="#Footnote_437_437" class="fnanchor">[437]</a></p> <p>I have, in describing these experiments, followed the example of previous writers and spoken as if the process by @@ -24572,7 +24729,7 @@ have made, with myself and students, a large number of measurements where the signal expected was in one series a touch <i>somewhere</i> on the skin of the back and head, and in another series a spark <i>somewhere</i> in the field of view. -The hand had to move as quickly as possible towards the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_527" id="Page_527">[Pg 527]</a></span> +The hand had to move as quickly as possible towards the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_527">[Pg 527]</a></span> place of the touch or the spark. It did so infallibly, and sensibly instantly; whilst both place and movement seemed to be <i>perceived</i> only a moment later, in memory. These experiments @@ -24580,7 +24737,7 @@ were undertaken for the express purpose of ascertaining whether the movement at the sight of the spark was discharged <i>immediately</i> by the visual perception, or whether a 'motor-idea' had to intervene between the perception of -the spark and the reaction.<a name="FNanchor_438_438" id="FNanchor_438_438"></a><a href="#Footnote_438_438" class="fnanchor">[438]</a> The first thing that was manifest +the spark and the reaction.<a id="FNanchor_438_438"></a><a href="#Footnote_438_438" class="fnanchor">[438]</a> The first thing that was manifest to introspection was that no perception or idea of <i>any</i> sort preceded the reaction. It jumped of itself, whenever the signal came; and perception was retrospective. We @@ -24599,18 +24756,18 @@ chance for delay, and the amount of practice would then determine the speed. This is well shown in Tischer's results, quoted on <a href="#Page_524">p. 524</a>, where the most practised observer, Tischer himself, reacted in one eighth of the time needed -by one of the others.<a name="FNanchor_439_439" id="FNanchor_439_439"></a><a href="#Footnote_439_439" class="fnanchor">[439]</a> But what all investigators have +by one of the others.<a id="FNanchor_439_439"></a><a href="#Footnote_439_439" class="fnanchor">[439]</a> But what all investigators have aimed to determine in these experiments is the <i>minimum</i> time. I trust I have said enough to convince the student that this minimum time by no means measures what we consciously know as discrimination. It only measures -something which, under the experimental conditions, leads<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_528" id="Page_528">[Pg 528]</a></span> +something which, under the experimental conditions, leads<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_528">[Pg 528]</a></span> to a similar result. But it is the bane of psychology to suppose that where results are similar, processes must be the same. Psychologists are too apt to reason as geometers would, if the latter were to say that the diameter of a circle is the same thing as its semi-circumference, because, forsooth, -they terminate in the same two points.<a name="FNanchor_440_440" id="FNanchor_440_440"></a><a href="#Footnote_440_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a></p> +they terminate in the same two points.<a id="FNanchor_440_440"></a><a href="#Footnote_440_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a></p> <h4>THE PERCEPTION OF LIKENESS.</h4> @@ -24640,7 +24797,7 @@ usually arouse that of resemblance also</i>. And the analysis of them, so as to define wherein the difference and wherein the resemblance respectively consists, is called <i>comparison</i>. If we start to deal with the things as simply the same or alike, -we are liable to be surprised by the difference. If we start to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_529" id="Page_529">[Pg 529]</a></span> +we are liable to be surprised by the difference. If we start to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_529">[Pg 529]</a></span> treat them as merely different, we are apt to discover how much they are alike. <i>Difference, commonly so called, is thus between species of a genus.</i> And the faculty by which @@ -24652,7 +24809,7 @@ from one thing to another which in the first instance we merely discriminate numerically, but, at the moment of bringing our attention to bear, perceive to be <i>similar</i> to the first; just as there is a shock of difference when we pass between -two dissimilars.<a name="FNanchor_441_441" id="FNanchor_441_441"></a><a href="#Footnote_441_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> The objective extent of the likeness, +two dissimilars.<a id="FNanchor_441_441"></a><a href="#Footnote_441_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> The objective extent of the likeness, just like that of the difference, determines the magnitude of the shock. The likeness may be so evanescent, or the basis of it so habitual and little liable to be attended @@ -24679,7 +24836,7 @@ as well as in that of difference.</p> <p>But when all is said and done about the conditions which favor our perception of resemblance and our abstraction -of its ground, the crude fact remains, that <i>some</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_530" id="Page_530">[Pg 530]</a></span> +of its ground, the crude fact remains, that <i>some</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_530">[Pg 530]</a></span> <i>people are far more sensitive to resemblances, and far more ready to point out wherein they consist, than others are</i>. They are the wits, the poets, the inventors, the scientific @@ -24722,10 +24879,10 @@ or difference—between all pairs of adjacent terms were equal. This would be an evenly gradated series. And it is an interesting fact in psychology that we are able, in many departments of our sensibility, to arrange the -terms without difficulty in this evenly gradated way. Differences,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_531" id="Page_531">[Pg 531]</a></span> +terms without difficulty in this evenly gradated way. Differences,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_531">[Pg 531]</a></span> in other words, between diverse pairs of terms, <i>a</i> and <i>b</i>, for example, on the one hand, and <i>c</i> and <i>d</i> on the -other,<a name="FNanchor_442_442" id="FNanchor_442_442"></a><a href="#Footnote_442_442" class="fnanchor">[442]</a> can be judged equal or diverse in amount. The distances +other,<a id="FNanchor_442_442"></a><a href="#Footnote_442_442" class="fnanchor">[442]</a> can be judged equal or diverse in amount. The distances from one term to another in the series are equal. Linear magnitudes and musical notes are perhaps the impressions which we easiest arrange in this way. Next come @@ -24734,18 +24891,18 @@ arranging by steps of difference of sensibly equal value. Messrs. Plateau and Delbœuf have found it fairly easy to determine what shade of gray will be judged by every one to hit the exact middle between a darker and a lighter -shade.<a name="FNanchor_443_443" id="FNanchor_443_443"></a><a href="#Footnote_443_443" class="fnanchor">[443]</a></p> +shade.<a id="FNanchor_443_443"></a><a href="#Footnote_443_443" class="fnanchor">[443]</a></p> <p>How now do we so readily recognize the equality of two differences between different pairs of terms? or, more briefly, how do we recognize the <i>magnitude</i> of a difference at all? Prof. Stumpf discusses this question in an interesting -way;<a name="FNanchor_444_444" id="FNanchor_444_444"></a><a href="#Footnote_444_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a> and comes to the conclusion that our feeling +way;<a id="FNanchor_444_444"></a><a href="#Footnote_444_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a> and comes to the conclusion that our feeling for the size of a difference, and our perception that the terms of two diverse pairs are equally or unequally distant from each other, can be explained by no simpler mental process, but, like the shock of difference itself, must be -regarded as for the present an unanalyzable endowment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_532" id="Page_532">[Pg 532]</a></span> +regarded as for the present an unanalyzable endowment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_532">[Pg 532]</a></span> of the mind. This acute author rejects in particular the notion which would make our judgment of the distance between two sensations depend upon our <i>mentally traversing @@ -24760,7 +24917,7 @@ a common kind.</p> numerically distinct things makes them <i>qualitatively the same</i> or <i>equal</i>. Equality, or <i>qualitative</i> (as distinguished from numerical) <i>identity</i>, is thus nothing but the <i>extreme -degree of likeness</i>.<a name="FNanchor_445_445" id="FNanchor_445_445"></a><a href="#Footnote_445_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a></p> +degree of likeness</i>.<a id="FNanchor_445_445"></a><a href="#Footnote_445_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a></p> <p>We saw above (<a href="#Page_492">p. 492</a>) that some persons consider that the difference between two objects is constituted of two @@ -24790,10 +24947,10 @@ not chosen too close together.... Neither can it be said that the identity consists in their all being sounds, and not a sound, a smell, and a color, respectively. For this identical attribute comes to each of them in equal measure, whereas the first, being less like the third than the -second is, ought, on the terms of the theory we are criticising, to have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_533" id="Page_533">[Pg 533]</a></span> +second is, ought, on the terms of the theory we are criticising, to have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_533">[Pg 533]</a></span> less of the identical quality.... It thus appears impracticable to define all possible cases of likeness as partial identity <i>plus</i> partial disparity; -and it is vain to seek in all cases for identical elements."<a name="FNanchor_446_446" id="FNanchor_446_446"></a><a href="#Footnote_446_446" class="fnanchor">[446]</a></p></blockquote> +and it is vain to seek in all cases for identical elements."<a id="FNanchor_446_446"></a><a href="#Footnote_446_446" class="fnanchor">[446]</a></p></blockquote> <p>And as all compound resemblances are based on simple ones like these, it follows that likeness <i>überhaupt</i> must not @@ -24821,7 +24978,7 @@ how we perceive likenesses between simple things.</p> <p>In 1860, Professor G. T. Fechner of Leipzig, a man of great learning and subtlety of mind, published two volumes entitled 'Psychophysik,' devoted to establishing and explaining -a law called by him the psychophysic law, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_534" id="Page_534">[Pg 534]</a></span> +a law called by him the psychophysic law, which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_534">[Pg 534]</a></span> he considered to express the deepest and most elementary relation between the mental and the physical worlds. It is a formula for the connection between the amount of our @@ -24867,7 +25024,7 @@ same proportion as the stimulus itself, or at a slower or a more rapid rate. In a word, we know by our natural sensibility nothing of the <i>law</i> that connects the sensation and its outward cause together. To find this law we must first find an exact measure for the sensation itself; -we must be able to say: A stimulus of strength <i>one</i> begets a sensation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_535" id="Page_535">[Pg 535]</a></span> +we must be able to say: A stimulus of strength <i>one</i> begets a sensation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_535">[Pg 535]</a></span> of strength <i>one</i>; a stimulus of strength <i>two</i> begets a sensation of strength <i>two</i>, or <i>three</i>, or <i>four</i>, etc. But to do this we must first know what a sensation two, three, or four times greater than another @@ -24918,7 +25075,7 @@ combined with a stimulus a thousand times greater in amount.</p> <p>"We may therefore lay it down as a general rule that a stimulus, in order to be felt, may be so much the smaller if the already pre-existing -stimulation of the organ is small, but must be so much the larger,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_536" id="Page_536">[Pg 536]</a></span> +stimulation of the organ is small, but must be so much the larger,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_536">[Pg 536]</a></span> the greater the pre-existing stimulation is. From this in a general way we can perceive the connection between the stimulus and the feeling it excites. At least thus much appears, that the law of dependence is @@ -24966,7 +25123,7 @@ alteration of sensation, we shall have a series of figures in which is immediately expressed the law according to which the sensation alters when the stimulation is increased...."</p></blockquote> -<p>Observations according to this method are particularly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_537" id="Page_537">[Pg 537]</a></span> +<p>Observations according to this method are particularly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_537">[Pg 537]</a></span> easy to make in the spheres of light-, sound-, and pressure-sensation.... Beginning with the latter case,</p> @@ -24999,12 +25156,12 @@ form:</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Sensation of light,</td><td align="left">1/100</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Muscular sensation,</td><td align="left">1/17</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Feeling of pressure, </td><td align="left">1/3</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Feeling of warmth,</td><td align="left">1/3</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Feeling of sound,</td><td align="left">1/3</td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Sensation of light,</td><td style="text-align: left;">1/100</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Muscular sensation,</td><td style="text-align: left;">1/17</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Feeling of pressure, </td><td style="text-align: left;">1/3</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Feeling of warmth,</td><td style="text-align: left;">1/3</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Feeling of sound,</td><td style="text-align: left;">1/3</td></tr> </table></div> <p>"These figures are far from giving as accurate a measure as might @@ -25022,7 +25179,7 @@ Theory of Sensibility."</p></blockquote> Weber's law. The 'exactness' of the theory of sensibility to which it leads consists in the supposed fact that it gives the means of representing sensations by numbers. The -<i>unit</i> of any kind of sensation will be that increment which,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_538" id="Page_538">[Pg 538]</a></span> +<i>unit</i> of any kind of sensation will be that increment which,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_538">[Pg 538]</a></span> when the stimulus is increased, we can just barely perceive to be added. The total number of units which any given sensation contains will consist of the total number of such @@ -25051,12 +25208,12 @@ have the series of sensation-numbers corresponding to their several stimuli as follows:</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sensation 0 = stimulus A;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sensation 1 = stimulus A (1 + r);</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sensation 2 = stimulus A (1 + r)<sup>2</sup>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sensation 3 = stimulus A (1 + r)<sup>3</sup>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">.....</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sensation <i>n</i> = stimulus A (1 + r)<sup><i>n</i></sup>.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sensation 0 = stimulus A;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sensation 1 = stimulus A (1 + r);</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sensation 2 = stimulus A (1 + r)<sup>2</sup>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sensation 3 = stimulus A (1 + r)<sup>3</sup>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">.....</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Sensation <i>n</i> = stimulus A (1 + r)<sup><i>n</i></sup>.</span><br > </p> <p>The sensations here form an arithmetical series, and @@ -25066,7 +25223,7 @@ this way, the terms of the arithmetical one are called the logarithms of the terms corresponding in rank to them in the geometrical series. A conventional arithmetical series beginning with zero has been formed in the ordinary logarithmic -tables, so that we may truly say (assuming our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_539" id="Page_539">[Pg 539]</a></span> +tables, so that we may truly say (assuming our<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_539">[Pg 539]</a></span> facts to be correct so far) that the <i>sensations vary in the same proportion as the logarithms of their respective stimuli</i>. And we can thereupon proceed to compute the number of @@ -25080,7 +25237,7 @@ we call the stimulus R, and the constant factor C, we get the formula</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">S = C log R,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">S = C log R,</span><br > </p> <p>which is what Fechner calls the <i>psychophysischer Maasformel</i>. @@ -25091,7 +25248,7 @@ it.</p> in various directions, and has given rise to arduous discussions into which I am glad to be exempted from entering here, since their interest is mathematical and metaphysical -and not primarily psychological at all.<a name="FNanchor_447_447" id="FNanchor_447_447"></a><a href="#Footnote_447_447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a> I must say a word +and not primarily psychological at all.<a id="FNanchor_447_447"></a><a href="#Footnote_447_447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a> I must say a word about them metaphysically a few pages later on. Meanwhile it should be understood that no human being, in any investigation into which sensations entered, has ever used @@ -25108,7 +25265,7 @@ place in this chapter.</p> sensations approaches the limit of discernibility, that at one moment we discern it and at the next we do not. There are accidental fluctuations in our inner sensibility which -make it impossible to tell just what the least discernible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_540" id="Page_540">[Pg 540]</a></span> +make it impossible to tell just what the least discernible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_540">[Pg 540]</a></span> increment of the sensation is without taking the average of a large number of appreciations. These <i>accidental errors</i> are as likely to increase as to diminish our sensibility, @@ -25123,7 +25280,7 @@ worked over. Fechner discussed three methods, as follows:</p> <p>(1) <i>The Method of just-discernible Differences.</i> Take a standard sensation <i>S</i>, and add to it until you distinctly feel the addition <i>d</i>; then subtract from <i>S</i> + <i>d</i> until you distinctly -feel the effect of the subtraction;<a name="FNanchor_448_448" id="FNanchor_448_448"></a><a href="#Footnote_448_448" class="fnanchor">[448]</a> call the difference here +feel the effect of the subtraction;<a id="FNanchor_448_448"></a><a href="#Footnote_448_448" class="fnanchor">[448]</a> call the difference here <i>d'</i>. The least discernible difference sought is <i>d</i> + <i>d'</i>/2; and the ratio of this quantity to the original <i>S</i> (or rather to <i>S</i> + <i>d</i> - <i>d'</i>) is what Fechner calls the difference-threshold. @@ -25134,7 +25291,7 @@ true.</i> The difficulty in applying this method is that we are not. Furthermore, if we simply take the smallest <i>d</i> about which we are <i>never</i> in doubt or in error, we certainly get our least discernible difference larger than it ought theoretically -to be.<a name="FNanchor_449_449" id="FNanchor_449_449"></a><a href="#Footnote_449_449" class="fnanchor">[449]</a></p> +to be.<a id="FNanchor_449_449"></a><a href="#Footnote_449_449" class="fnanchor">[449]</a></p> <p>Of course the <i>sensibility</i> is small when the least discernible difference is large, and <i>vice versâ</i>; in other words, @@ -25145,7 +25302,7 @@ other.</p> which is barely greater than another will, on account of accidental errors in a long series of experiments, sometimes be judged equal, and sometimes smaller; i.e., we shall -make a certain number of false and a certain number of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_541" id="Page_541">[Pg 541]</a></span> +make a certain number of false and a certain number of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_541">[Pg 541]</a></span> true judgments about the difference between the two sensations which we are comparing.</p> @@ -25158,7 +25315,7 @@ represents the whole number of judgments, and whose numerator represents those which are true. If <i>m</i> is a ratio of this nature, obtained by comparison of two stimuli, <i>A</i> and <i>B</i>, we may seek another couple of stimuli, <i>a</i> and <i>b</i>, which when compared will give the same ratio of -true to false cases."<a name="FNanchor_450_450" id="FNanchor_450_450"></a><a href="#Footnote_450_450" class="fnanchor">[450]</a></p></blockquote> +true to false cases."<a id="FNanchor_450_450"></a><a href="#Footnote_450_450" class="fnanchor">[450]</a></p></blockquote> <p>If this were done, and the ratio of <i>a</i> to <i>b</i> then proved to be equal to that of <i>A</i> to <i>B</i>, that would prove that pairs @@ -25188,10 +25345,10 @@ in question. It should bear a constant proportion to the stimulus, no matter what the absolute size of the latter may be, if Weber's law hold true.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>These methods deal with just perceptible differences. -Delbœuf and Wundt have experimented with larger differences<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_542" id="Page_542">[Pg 542]</a></span> +Delbœuf and Wundt have experimented with larger differences<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_542">[Pg 542]</a></span> by means of what Wundt calls the <i>Méthode der mittleren Abstufungen</i>, and what we may call</p> @@ -25215,7 +25372,7 @@ make one stimulus seem just double the other, and then measured the objective relation of the two. The remarks just made apply also to this case.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>So much for the methods. The results differ in the hands of different observers. I will add a few of them, @@ -25234,7 +25391,7 @@ and <i>in so far forth</i> Weber's law is verified for light. Absolute figures cannot be given, but Merkel, by method 1, found that Weber's law held good for stimuli (measured by his arbitrary unit) between 96 and 4096, beyond which intensity -no experiments were made.<a name="FNanchor_451_451" id="FNanchor_451_451"></a><a href="#Footnote_451_451" class="fnanchor">[451]</a> König and Brodhun<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_543" id="Page_543">[Pg 543]</a></span> +no experiments were made.<a id="FNanchor_451_451"></a><a href="#Footnote_451_451" class="fnanchor">[451]</a> König and Brodhun<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_543">[Pg 543]</a></span> have given measurements by method 1 which cover the most extensive series, and moreover apply to six different colors of light. These experiments (performed in Helmholtz's @@ -25244,7 +25401,7 @@ laboratory, apparently,) ran from an intensity called this range discriminative sensibility declined. The increment discriminated here was the same for all colors of light, and lay (according to the tables) between 1 and 2 per -cent of the stimulus.<a name="FNanchor_452_452" id="FNanchor_452_452"></a><a href="#Footnote_452_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> Delbœuf had verified Weber's law +cent of the stimulus.<a id="FNanchor_452_452"></a><a href="#Footnote_452_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> Delbœuf had verified Weber's law for a certain range of luminous intensities by method 4; that is, he had found that the objective intensity of a light which appeared midway between two others was really the @@ -25257,7 +25414,7 @@ later, found that the objective intensity of the light which we judge to stand midway between two others neither stands midway nor is a geometric mean. The discrepancy from both figures is enormous, but is least large from the -midway figure or arithmetical mean of the two extreme intensities.<a name="FNanchor_453_453" id="FNanchor_453_453"></a><a href="#Footnote_453_453" class="fnanchor">[453]</a> +midway figure or arithmetical mean of the two extreme intensities.<a id="FNanchor_453_453"></a><a href="#Footnote_453_453" class="fnanchor">[453]</a> Finally, the stars have from time immemorial been arranged in 'magnitudes' supposed to differ by equal-seeming intervals. Lately their intensities have been @@ -25269,8 +25426,8 @@ ratio of the average intensity of each 'magnitude' to that below it decreases as we pass from lower to higher magnitudes, showing a uniform departure from Weber's law, if the method of equal-appearing intervals be held to have -any direct relevance to the latter.<a name="FNanchor_454_454" id="FNanchor_454_454"></a><a href="#Footnote_454_454" class="fnanchor">[454]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_544" id="Page_544">[Pg 544]</a></span></p> +any direct relevance to the latter.<a id="FNanchor_454_454"></a><a href="#Footnote_454_454" class="fnanchor">[454]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_544">[Pg 544]</a></span></p> <p><i>Sounds</i> are less delicately discriminated in intensity than lights. A certain difficulty has come from disputes as to the measurement of the objective intensity of the stimulus. @@ -25279,7 +25436,7 @@ to be about 1/3 of the latter. Merkel's latest results of the method of just perceptible differences make it about 3/10 for that part of the scale of intensities during which Weber's law holds good, which is from 20 to 5000 of M.'s -arbitrary unit.<a name="FNanchor_455_455" id="FNanchor_455_455"></a><a href="#Footnote_455_455" class="fnanchor">[455]</a> Below this the fractional increment must +arbitrary unit.<a id="FNanchor_455_455"></a><a href="#Footnote_455_455" class="fnanchor">[455]</a> Below this the fractional increment must be larger. Above it no measurements were made.</p> <p>For <i>pressure and muscular sense</i> we have rather divergent @@ -25289,7 +25446,7 @@ weight of 1/40 when the two weights were successively lifted by the same hand. It took a much larger fraction to be discerned when the weights were laid on a hand which rested on the table. He seems to have verified his results -for only two pairs of differing weights,<a name="FNanchor_456_456" id="FNanchor_456_456"></a><a href="#Footnote_456_456" class="fnanchor">[456]</a> and on this founded +for only two pairs of differing weights,<a id="FNanchor_456_456"></a><a href="#Footnote_456_456" class="fnanchor">[456]</a> and on this founded his 'law.' Experiments in Hering's laboratory on lifting 11 weights, running from 250 to 2750 grams showed that the least perceptible increment varied from 1/21 for 250 grams @@ -25302,7 +25459,7 @@ felt when there was no movement of the finger, and of about 1/19 when there was movement. Above and below these limits the discriminative power grew less. It was greater when the pressure was upon one square millimeter of surface -than when it was upon seven.<a name="FNanchor_457_457" id="FNanchor_457_457"></a><a href="#Footnote_457_457" class="fnanchor">[457]</a></p> +than when it was upon seven.<a id="FNanchor_457_457"></a><a href="#Footnote_457_457" class="fnanchor">[457]</a></p> <p><i>Warmth and taste</i> have been made the subject of similar investigations with the result of verifying something like @@ -25310,7 +25467,7 @@ Weber's law. The determination of the unit of stimulus is, however, so hard here that I will give no figures. The results may be found in Wundt's Physiologische Psychologie, 3d Ed. i, 370-2.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_545" id="Page_545">[Pg 545]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_545">[Pg 545]</a></span></p> <p><i>The discrimination of lengths by the eye</i> has been found also to obey to a certain extent Weber's law. The figures will all be found in G. E. Müller, <i>op. cit.</i> part ii, chap. x, @@ -25322,9 +25479,9 @@ would seem that the estimated intervals and the real ones are directly and not logarithmically proportionate to each other. This resembles Merkel's results by that method for weights, lights, and sounds, and differs from Jastrow's -own finding about star-magnitudes.<a name="FNanchor_458_458" id="FNanchor_458_458"></a><a href="#Footnote_458_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a></p> +own finding about star-magnitudes.<a id="FNanchor_458_458"></a><a href="#Footnote_458_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>If we look back over these facts as a whole, we see that it is not any fixed amount added to an impression that @@ -25356,7 +25513,7 @@ our feelings are related logarithmically to the quantities of their objects. Fechner seems to find something inscrutably sublime in the existence of an ultimate 'psychophysic' law of this form.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_546" id="Page_546">[Pg 546]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_546">[Pg 546]</a></span></p> <p>These assumptions are all peculiarly fragile. To begin with, the <i>mental fact</i> which in the experiments corresponds to the increase of the stimulus is not an <i>enlarged sensation</i>, @@ -25397,10 +25554,10 @@ the beginning of the scale. <i>It is these</i> <span class="smcap">relations,</s <i>which we are measuring and not the composition of the qualities themselves</i>, as Fechner thinks. Whilst if we turn to objects which <i>are</i> divisible, surely a big object may be -known in a little thought. Introspection shows moreover<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_547" id="Page_547">[Pg 547]</a></span> +known in a little thought. Introspection shows moreover<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_547">[Pg 547]</a></span> that in most sensations a new <i>kind</i> of feeling invariably accompanies our judgment of an increased impression; and -this is a fact which Fechner's formula disregards.<a name="FNanchor_459_459" id="FNanchor_459_459"></a><a href="#Footnote_459_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a></p> +this is a fact which Fechner's formula disregards.<a id="FNanchor_459_459"></a><a href="#Footnote_459_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a></p> <p>But apart from these <i>a priori</i> difficulties, and even supposing that sensations did consist of added units, Fechner's @@ -25416,15 +25573,15 @@ that between their respective stimuli. So many units added to the stimulus, so many added to the sensation, and if the stimulus grew in a certain ratio, in exactly the same ratio would the sensation also grow, though its <i>perceptibility</i> -grew according to the logarithmic law.<a name="FNanchor_460_460" id="FNanchor_460_460"></a><a href="#Footnote_460_460" class="fnanchor">[460]</a></p> +grew according to the logarithmic law.<a id="FNanchor_460_460"></a><a href="#Footnote_460_460" class="fnanchor">[460]</a></p> <p>If <i>A</i> stand for the smallest difference which <i>we perceive</i>, then we should have, instead of the formula Δ<i>s</i> = const., which is Fechner's, the formula Δ<i>s</i>/<i>s</i> = const., a formula which interprets all the <i>facts</i> of Weber's law, in an entirely -different theoretic way from that adopted by Fechner.<a name="FNanchor_461_461" id="FNanchor_461_461"></a><a href="#Footnote_461_461" class="fnanchor">[461]</a></p> +different theoretic way from that adopted by Fechner.<a id="FNanchor_461_461"></a><a href="#Footnote_461_461" class="fnanchor">[461]</a></p> -<p>The entire superstructure which Fechner rears upon the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_548" id="Page_548">[Pg 548]</a></span> +<p>The entire superstructure which Fechner rears upon the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_548">[Pg 548]</a></span> facts is thus not only seen to be arbitrary and subjective, but in the highest degree improbable as well. The departures from Weber's law in regions where it does not obtain, @@ -25455,7 +25612,7 @@ rate than the stimulus itself. An ever larger part of the latter's work would go to overcoming the resistances, and an ever smaller part to the realization of the feeling-bringing state. Weber's law would thus be a sort of <i>law of -friction</i> in the neural machine.<a name="FNanchor_462_462" id="FNanchor_462_462"></a><a href="#Footnote_462_462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a> Just how these inner +friction</i> in the neural machine.<a id="FNanchor_462_462"></a><a href="#Footnote_462_462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a> Just how these inner resistances and frictions are to be conceived is a speculative question. Delbœuf has formulated them as fatigue; Bernstein and Ward, as irradiations. The latest, @@ -25464,7 +25621,7 @@ who supposes that the intensity of sensation depends on the <i>number</i> of neural molecules which are disintegrated in the unit of time. There are only a certain number at any time which are <i>capable</i> of disintegrating; and whilst -most of these are in an average condition of instability,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_549" id="Page_549">[Pg 549]</a></span> +most of these are in an average condition of instability,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_549">[Pg 549]</a></span> some are almost stable and some already near to decomposition. The smallest stimuli affect these latter molecules only; and as they are but few, the sensational effect from @@ -25500,40 +25657,40 @@ wind up by saying that nevertheless to him belongs the turning psychology into an <i>exact science</i>,</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"'And everybody praised the duke</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Who this great fight did win.'</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">'But what good came of it at last?'</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Quoth little Peterkin.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">'Why, that I cannot tell,' said he,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">'But 'twas a famous victory!'"</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"'And everybody praised the duke</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Who this great fight did win.'</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">'But what good came of it at last?'</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Quoth little Peterkin.</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">'Why, that I cannot tell,' said he,</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">'But 'twas a famous victory!'"</span><br > </p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_406_406" id="Footnote_406_406"></a><a href="#FNanchor_406_406"><span class="label">[406]</span></a> Human Understanding, ii, xi, 1, 2.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_406_406"></a><a href="#FNanchor_406_406"><span class="label">[406]</span></a> Human Understanding, ii, xi, 1, 2.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_407_407" id="Footnote_407_407"></a><a href="#FNanchor_407_407"><span class="label">[407]</span></a> Analysis, vol. i, p. 71.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_407_407"></a><a href="#FNanchor_407_407"><span class="label">[407]</span></a> Analysis, vol. i, p. 71.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_408_408" id="Footnote_408_408"></a><a href="#FNanchor_408_408"><span class="label">[408]</span></a> The Senses and the Intellect, page 411.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_408_408"></a><a href="#FNanchor_408_408"><span class="label">[408]</span></a> The Senses and the Intellect, page 411.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_409_409" id="Footnote_409_409"></a><a href="#FNanchor_409_409"><span class="label">[409]</span></a> Essays Philosophical and Theological: First Series, pp. 268-273.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_409_409"></a><a href="#FNanchor_409_409"><span class="label">[409]</span></a> Essays Philosophical and Theological: First Series, pp. 268-273.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_410_410" id="Footnote_410_410"></a><a href="#FNanchor_410_410"><span class="label">[410]</span></a> Montgomery in 'Mind,' x, 527. Cf. also Lipps: Grundtatsachen des +<p><a id="Footnote_410_410"></a><a href="#FNanchor_410_410"><span class="label">[410]</span></a> Montgomery in 'Mind,' x, 527. Cf. also Lipps: Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, p. 579 ff.; and see below, Chapter XIX.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_411_411" id="Footnote_411_411"></a><a href="#FNanchor_411_411"><span class="label">[411]</span></a> Stumpf (Tonpsychologie, i, 116 ff.) tries to prove that the theory that +<p><a id="Footnote_411_411"></a><a href="#FNanchor_411_411"><span class="label">[411]</span></a> Stumpf (Tonpsychologie, i, 116 ff.) tries to prove that the theory that all differences are differences of composition leads necessarily to an infinite regression when we try to determine the unit. It seems to me that in his particular reasoning he forgets the ultimate units of the mind-stuff @@ -25547,14 +25704,14 @@ things sensibly simple.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_412_412" id="Footnote_412_412"></a><a href="#FNanchor_412_412"><span class="label">[412]</span></a> The <i>belief that the causes</i> of effects felt by us to differ qualitatively are +<p><a id="Footnote_412_412"></a><a href="#FNanchor_412_412"><span class="label">[412]</span></a> The <i>belief that the causes</i> of effects felt by us to differ qualitatively are facts which differ only in quantity (e.g. that blue is caused by so many ether-waves, and yellow by a smaller number) must not be confounded with the feeling that the effects differ quantitatively themselves.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_413_413" id="Footnote_413_413"></a><a href="#FNanchor_413_413"><span class="label">[413]</span></a> Herr G. H. Schneider, in his youthful pamphlet (Die Unterscheidung, +<p><a id="Footnote_413_413"></a><a href="#FNanchor_413_413"><span class="label">[413]</span></a> Herr G. H. Schneider, in his youthful pamphlet (Die Unterscheidung, 1877) has tried to show that there are no positively existent elements of sensibility, no substantive qualities between which differences obtain, but that the terms we call such, the sensations, are but sums of differences, @@ -25567,17 +25724,17 @@ denies the existence of relations of difference between them at all.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_414_414" id="Footnote_414_414"></a><a href="#FNanchor_414_414"><span class="label">[414]</span></a> Cf. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, i, 121, and James Ward, Mind, i, 464.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_414_414"></a><a href="#FNanchor_414_414"><span class="label">[414]</span></a> Cf. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, i, 121, and James Ward, Mind, i, 464.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_415_415" id="Footnote_415_415"></a><a href="#FNanchor_415_415"><span class="label">[415]</span></a> The ordinary treatment of this is to call it the result of the <i>fusion</i> of +<p><a id="Footnote_415_415"></a><a href="#FNanchor_415_415"><span class="label">[415]</span></a> The ordinary treatment of this is to call it the result of the <i>fusion</i> of a lot of sensations, in themselves separate. This is pure mythology, as the sequel will abundantly show.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_416_416" id="Footnote_416_416"></a><a href="#FNanchor_416_416"><span class="label">[416]</span></a> "We often begin to be dimly aware of a difference in a sensation or +<p><a id="Footnote_416_416"></a><a href="#FNanchor_416_416"><span class="label">[416]</span></a> "We often begin to be dimly aware of a difference in a sensation or group of sensations, before we can assign any definite character to that which differs. Thus we detect a strange or foreign ingredient or flavor in a familiar dish, or of tone in a familiar tune, and yet are wholly unable for @@ -25588,7 +25745,7 @@ Schneider: Die Unterscheidung, pp. 9-10.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_417_417" id="Footnote_417_417"></a><a href="#FNanchor_417_417"><span class="label">[417]</span></a> In cases where the difference is slight, we may need, as previously +<p><a id="Footnote_417_417"></a><a href="#FNanchor_417_417"><span class="label">[417]</span></a> In cases where the difference is slight, we may need, as previously remarked, to get the dying phase of <i>n</i> as well as of <i>m</i> before <i>n-different-from-m</i> is distinctly felt. In that case the inevitably successive feelings (as far as we can sever what is so continuous) would be four, <i>m, difference, @@ -25597,11 +25754,11 @@ the essential features of the case.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_418_418" id="Footnote_418_418"></a><a href="#FNanchor_418_418"><span class="label">[418]</span></a> Analysis. J. S. Mill's ed., ii, 17. Cf. also pp. 12, 14.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_418_418"></a><a href="#FNanchor_418_418"><span class="label">[418]</span></a> Analysis. J. S. Mill's ed., ii, 17. Cf. also pp. 12, 14.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_419_419" id="Footnote_419_419"></a><a href="#FNanchor_419_419"><span class="label">[419]</span></a> There is only one obstacle, and that is our inveterate tendency to believe +<p><a id="Footnote_419_419"></a><a href="#FNanchor_419_419"><span class="label">[419]</span></a> There is only one obstacle, and that is our inveterate tendency to believe that where two things or qualities are compared, it <i>must</i> be that exact duplicates of both have got into the mind and have matched themselves against each other there. To which the first reply is the empirical @@ -25643,7 +25800,7 @@ two facts.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_420_420" id="Footnote_420_420"></a><a href="#FNanchor_420_420"><span class="label">[420]</span></a> I fear that few will be converted by my words, so obstinately do +<p><a id="Footnote_420_420"></a><a href="#FNanchor_420_420"><span class="label">[420]</span></a> I fear that few will be converted by my words, so obstinately do thinkers of all schools refuse to admit the unmediated function of <i>knowing a thing</i>, and so incorrigibly do they substitute <i>being the thing</i> for it. E.g., in the latest utterance of the spiritualistic philosophy (Bowne's Introduction to @@ -25656,19 +25813,19 @@ anything our soul does <i>not</i> do to its past, it is to carry it with it.</p> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_421_421" id="Footnote_421_421"></a><a href="#FNanchor_421_421"><span class="label">[421]</span></a> Sensations of Tone, 2d English Ed., p. 65.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_421_421"></a><a href="#FNanchor_421_421"><span class="label">[421]</span></a> Sensations of Tone, 2d English Ed., p. 65.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_422_422" id="Footnote_422_422"></a><a href="#FNanchor_422_422"><span class="label">[422]</span></a> Psychology, i, 345.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_422_422"></a><a href="#FNanchor_422_422"><span class="label">[422]</span></a> Psychology, i, 345.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_423_423" id="Footnote_423_423"></a><a href="#FNanchor_423_423"><span class="label">[423]</span></a> A Budget of Paradoxes, p. 380.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_423_423"></a><a href="#FNanchor_423_423"><span class="label">[423]</span></a> A Budget of Paradoxes, p. 380.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_424_424" id="Footnote_424_424"></a><a href="#FNanchor_424_424"><span class="label">[424]</span></a> The explanation I offer presupposes that a difference too faint to have +<p><a id="Footnote_424_424"></a><a href="#FNanchor_424_424"><span class="label">[424]</span></a> The explanation I offer presupposes that a difference too faint to have any direct effect in the way of making the mind notice it <i>per se</i> will nevertheless be strong enough to keep its 'terms' from calling up identical associates. It seems probable from many observations that this is the case. @@ -25703,22 +25860,22 @@ of a compound picture falls, but its effects on our total perception differ in the two eyes.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 300px;"> -<img src="images/jame_512_fn.jpg" width="300" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_512_fn.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 300px"> </div> </div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_425_425" id="Footnote_425_425"></a><a href="#FNanchor_425_425"><span class="label">[425]</span></a> A. W. Volkmann: Ueber den Einfluss der Uebung, etc., Leipzig Berichte, +<p><a id="Footnote_425_425"></a><a href="#FNanchor_425_425"><span class="label">[425]</span></a> A. W. Volkmann: Ueber den Einfluss der Uebung, etc., Leipzig Berichte, Math.-phys. Classe. x, 1858, p. 67.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_426_426" id="Footnote_426_426"></a><a href="#FNanchor_426_426"><span class="label">[426]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> Tabelle 1, p. 43.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_426_426"></a><a href="#FNanchor_426_426"><span class="label">[426]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> Tabelle 1, p. 43.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_427_427" id="Footnote_427_427"></a><a href="#FNanchor_427_427"><span class="label">[427]</span></a> Professor Lipps accounts for the tactile discrimination of the blind +<p><a id="Footnote_427_427"></a><a href="#FNanchor_427_427"><span class="label">[427]</span></a> Professor Lipps accounts for the tactile discrimination of the blind in a way which (divested of its 'mythological' assumptions) seems to me essentially to agree with this. Stronger ideas are supposed to raise weaker ones over the threshold of consciousness by fusing with them, the tendency @@ -25727,16 +25884,16 @@ etc., pp. 232-3; also pp. 118, 492, 526-7.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_428_428" id="Footnote_428_428"></a><a href="#FNanchor_428_428"><span class="label">[428]</span></a> Sensations of Tone, 2d. English Edition, p. 62.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_428_428"></a><a href="#FNanchor_428_428"><span class="label">[428]</span></a> Sensations of Tone, 2d. English Edition, p. 62.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_429_429" id="Footnote_429_429"></a><a href="#FNanchor_429_429"><span class="label">[429]</span></a> Compare as to this, however, what I said above, Chapter V, <a href="#Page_172">pp. +<p><a id="Footnote_429_429"></a><a href="#FNanchor_429_429"><span class="label">[429]</span></a> Compare as to this, however, what I said above, Chapter V, <a href="#Page_172">pp. 172-176</a>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_430_430" id="Footnote_430_430"></a><a href="#FNanchor_430_430"><span class="label">[430]</span></a> When a person squints, double images are formed in the centre of the +<p><a id="Footnote_430_430"></a><a href="#FNanchor_430_430"><span class="label">[430]</span></a> When a person squints, double images are formed in the centre of the field. As a matter of fact, most squinters are found blind of one eye, or almost so; and it has long been supposed amongst ophthalmologists that the blindness is a secondary affection superinduced by the voluntary suppression @@ -25749,7 +25906,7 @@ later.—W. J.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_431_431" id="Footnote_431_431"></a><a href="#FNanchor_431_431"><span class="label">[431]</span></a> Tonempfindungen, Dritte Auflage, pp. 102-107.—The reader who +<p><a id="Footnote_431_431"></a><a href="#FNanchor_431_431"><span class="label">[431]</span></a> Tonempfindungen, Dritte Auflage, pp. 102-107.—The reader who has assimilated the contents of our <a href="#CHAPTER_V">Chapter V</a>, above, will doubtless have remarked that the illustrious physiologist has fallen, in these paragraphs, into that sort of interpretation of the facts which we there @@ -25852,19 +26009,19 @@ with the earlier psychosis—least of all is contained in it.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_432_432" id="Footnote_432_432"></a><a href="#FNanchor_432_432"><span class="label">[432]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 248.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_432_432"></a><a href="#FNanchor_432_432"><span class="label">[432]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 248.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_433_433" id="Footnote_433_433"></a><a href="#FNanchor_433_433"><span class="label">[433]</span></a> Wundt's Philos. Studien, i, 527.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_433_433"></a><a href="#FNanchor_433_433"><span class="label">[433]</span></a> Wundt's Philos. Studien, i, 527.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_434_434" id="Footnote_434_434"></a><a href="#FNanchor_434_434"><span class="label">[434]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 530.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_434_434"></a><a href="#FNanchor_434_434"><span class="label">[434]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 530.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_435_435" id="Footnote_435_435"></a><a href="#FNanchor_435_435"><span class="label">[435]</span></a> Mind, xi, 377 ff. He says: "I apparently either distinguished the +<p><a id="Footnote_435_435"></a><a href="#FNanchor_435_435"><span class="label">[435]</span></a> Mind, xi, 377 ff. He says: "I apparently either distinguished the impression and made the motion simultaneously, or if I tried to avoid this by waiting until I had formed a distinct impression before I began to make the motion, I added to the simple reaction, not only a perception, @@ -25873,11 +26030,11 @@ strict <i>psychologic</i> worth of any of these measurements.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_436_436" id="Footnote_436_436"></a><a href="#FNanchor_436_436"><span class="label">[436]</span></a> Mind, xi, 379.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_436_436"></a><a href="#FNanchor_436_436"><span class="label">[436]</span></a> Mind, xi, 379.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_437_437" id="Footnote_437_437"></a><a href="#FNanchor_437_437"><span class="label">[437]</span></a> For other determinations of discrimination-time by this method cf. +<p><a id="Footnote_437_437"></a><a href="#FNanchor_437_437"><span class="label">[437]</span></a> For other determinations of discrimination-time by this method cf. v. Kries and Auerbach, Archiv f. Physiologie, Bd. i, p. 297 ff. (these authors get much smaller figures); Friedrich, Psychologische Studien, i, 39. Chapter ix of Buccola's book, Le Legge del tempo, etc., gives a full account @@ -25885,7 +26042,7 @@ of the subject.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_438_438" id="Footnote_438_438"></a><a href="#FNanchor_438_438"><span class="label">[438]</span></a> If so, the reactions upon the spark would have to be slower than +<p><a id="Footnote_438_438"></a><a href="#FNanchor_438_438"><span class="label">[438]</span></a> If so, the reactions upon the spark would have to be slower than those upon the touch. The investigation was abandoned because it was found impossible to narrow down the difference between the conditions of the sight-series and those of the touch-series, to nothing more than the @@ -25894,13 +26051,13 @@ could not be excluded.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_439_439" id="Footnote_439_439"></a><a href="#FNanchor_439_439"><span class="label">[439]</span></a> Tischer gives figures from quite unpractised individuals, which I have +<p><a id="Footnote_439_439"></a><a href="#FNanchor_439_439"><span class="label">[439]</span></a> Tischer gives figures from quite unpractised individuals, which I have not quoted. The discrimination-time of one of them is 22 times longer than Tischer's own! (Psychol. Studien, i, 527.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_440_440" id="Footnote_440_440"></a><a href="#FNanchor_440_440"><span class="label">[440]</span></a> Compare Lipps's excellent passage to the same critical effect in his +<p><a id="Footnote_440_440"></a><a href="#FNanchor_440_440"><span class="label">[440]</span></a> Compare Lipps's excellent passage to the same critical effect in his Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, pp. 390-393.—I leave my text just as it was written before the publication of Lange's and Münsterberg's results cited on <a href="#Page_92">pp. 92</a> and <a href="#Page_432">432</a>. Their 'shortened' or 'muscular' times, got @@ -25910,12 +26067,12 @@ and all that I say in the text falls beautifully into line with their results.</ <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_441_441" id="Footnote_441_441"></a><a href="#FNanchor_441_441"><span class="label">[441]</span></a> Cf. Sully: Mind, x, 494-5; Bradley: <i>ibid.</i> xi, 83; Bosanquet: <i>ibid.</i> xi, +<p><a id="Footnote_441_441"></a><a href="#FNanchor_441_441"><span class="label">[441]</span></a> Cf. Sully: Mind, x, 494-5; Bradley: <i>ibid.</i> xi, 83; Bosanquet: <i>ibid.</i> xi, 405.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_442_442" id="Footnote_442_442"></a><a href="#FNanchor_442_442"><span class="label">[442]</span></a> The judgment becomes easier if the two couples of terms have one +<p><a id="Footnote_442_442"></a><a href="#FNanchor_442_442"><span class="label">[442]</span></a> The judgment becomes easier if the two couples of terms have one member in common, if <i>a—b</i> and <i>b—c</i>, for example, are compared. This, as Stumpf says (Tonpsychologie, i, 131), is probably because the introduction of the fourth term brings involuntary cross-comparisons with it, <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> @@ -25924,7 +26081,7 @@ from the relations we ought alone to be estimating.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_443_443" id="Footnote_443_443"></a><a href="#FNanchor_443_443"><span class="label">[443]</span></a> J. Delbœuf: Éléments de Psychophysique (Paris, 1883), p. 64. Plateau +<p><a id="Footnote_443_443"></a><a href="#FNanchor_443_443"><span class="label">[443]</span></a> J. Delbœuf: Éléments de Psychophysique (Paris, 1883), p. 64. Plateau in Stumpf, Tonpsych., i, 125. I have noticed a curious enlargement of certain 'distances' of difference under the influence of chloroform. The jingling of the bells on the horses of a horse-car passing the door, for @@ -25941,15 +26098,15 @@ N. Y., 1874). Cf. also Mind, vii, 200.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_444_444" id="Footnote_444_444"></a><a href="#FNanchor_444_444"><span class="label">[444]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 126 ff.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_444_444"></a><a href="#FNanchor_444_444"><span class="label">[444]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 126 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_445_445" id="Footnote_445_445"></a><a href="#FNanchor_445_445"><span class="label">[445]</span></a> Stumpf, pp. 111-121.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_445_445"></a><a href="#FNanchor_445_445"><span class="label">[445]</span></a> Stumpf, pp. 111-121.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_446_446" id="Footnote_446_446"></a><a href="#FNanchor_446_446"><span class="label">[446]</span></a> Stumpf, pp. 116-7. I have omitted, so as not to make my text too intricate, +<p><a id="Footnote_446_446"></a><a href="#FNanchor_446_446"><span class="label">[446]</span></a> Stumpf, pp. 116-7. I have omitted, so as not to make my text too intricate, an extremely acute and conclusive paragraph, which I reproduce here: "We may generalize: Wherever a number of sensible impressions are apprehended <i>as a series</i>, there in the last instance must perceptions of simple @@ -25967,63 +26124,63 @@ and so on <i>ad infinitum</i>, which is absurd."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_447_447" id="Footnote_447_447"></a><a href="#FNanchor_447_447"><span class="label">[447]</span></a> The most important ameliorations of Fechner's formula are Delbœuf's +<p><a id="Footnote_447_447"></a><a href="#FNanchor_447_447"><span class="label">[447]</span></a> The most important ameliorations of Fechner's formula are Delbœuf's in his Recherches sur la Mesure des Sensations (1873), p. 35, and Elsas's in his pamphlet Über die Psychophysik (1886) p. 16.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_448_448" id="Footnote_448_448"></a><a href="#FNanchor_448_448"><span class="label">[448]</span></a> Reversing the order is for the sake of letting the opposite accidental +<p><a id="Footnote_448_448"></a><a href="#FNanchor_448_448"><span class="label">[448]</span></a> Reversing the order is for the sake of letting the opposite accidental errors due to 'contrast' neutralize each other.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_449_449" id="Footnote_449_449"></a><a href="#FNanchor_449_449"><span class="label">[449]</span></a> Theoretically it would seem that it ought to be equal to the sum of +<p><a id="Footnote_449_449"></a><a href="#FNanchor_449_449"><span class="label">[449]</span></a> Theoretically it would seem that it ought to be equal to the sum of all the additions which we judge to be increases divided by the total number of judgments made.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_450_450" id="Footnote_450_450"></a><a href="#FNanchor_450_450"><span class="label">[450]</span></a> J. Delbœuf, Éléments de Psychophysique (1883), p. 9.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_450_450"></a><a href="#FNanchor_450_450"><span class="label">[450]</span></a> J. Delbœuf, Éléments de Psychophysique (1883), p. 9.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_451_451" id="Footnote_451_451"></a><a href="#FNanchor_451_451"><span class="label">[451]</span></a> Philos. Studien, iv, 588.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_451_451"></a><a href="#FNanchor_451_451"><span class="label">[451]</span></a> Philos. Studien, iv, 588.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_452_452" id="Footnote_452_452"></a><a href="#FNanchor_452_452"><span class="label">[452]</span></a> Berlin Acad. Sitzungsberichte, 1888, p. 917. Other observers (Dobrowolsky, +<p><a id="Footnote_452_452"></a><a href="#FNanchor_452_452"><span class="label">[452]</span></a> Berlin Acad. Sitzungsberichte, 1888, p. 917. Other observers (Dobrowolsky, Lamausky) found great differences in different colors.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_453_453" id="Footnote_453_453"></a><a href="#FNanchor_453_453"><span class="label">[453]</span></a> See Merkel's tables, <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 568.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_453_453"></a><a href="#FNanchor_453_453"><span class="label">[453]</span></a> See Merkel's tables, <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 568.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_454_454" id="Footnote_454_454"></a><a href="#FNanchor_454_454"><span class="label">[454]</span></a> American Journal of Psychology, i, 125. The rate of decrease is +<p><a id="Footnote_454_454"></a><a href="#FNanchor_454_454"><span class="label">[454]</span></a> American Journal of Psychology, i, 125. The rate of decrease is small but steady, and I cannot well understand what Professor J. means by saying that his figures verify Weber's law.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_455_455" id="Footnote_455_455"></a><a href="#FNanchor_455_455"><span class="label">[455]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, v, 514-5.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_455_455"></a><a href="#FNanchor_455_455"><span class="label">[455]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, v, 514-5.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_456_456" id="Footnote_456_456"></a><a href="#FNanchor_456_456"><span class="label">[456]</span></a> Cf. G. E. Müller: Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik, §§ 68-70.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_456_456"></a><a href="#FNanchor_456_456"><span class="label">[456]</span></a> Cf. G. E. Müller: Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik, §§ 68-70.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_457_457" id="Footnote_457_457"></a><a href="#FNanchor_457_457"><span class="label">[457]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, v, 287 ff.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_457_457"></a><a href="#FNanchor_457_457"><span class="label">[457]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, v, 287 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_458_458" id="Footnote_458_458"></a><a href="#FNanchor_458_458"><span class="label">[458]</span></a> American J. of Psychology, iii, 44-7.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_458_458"></a><a href="#FNanchor_458_458"><span class="label">[458]</span></a> American J. of Psychology, iii, 44-7.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_459_459" id="Footnote_459_459"></a><a href="#FNanchor_459_459"><span class="label">[459]</span></a> Cf. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, pp. 397-9. "One sensation cannot be a +<p><a id="Footnote_459_459"></a><a href="#FNanchor_459_459"><span class="label">[459]</span></a> Cf. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, pp. 397-9. "One sensation cannot be a multiple of another. If it could, we ought to be able to subtract the one from the other, and to feel the remainder by itself. Every sensation presents itself as an indivisible unit." Professor von Kries, in the Viertejahrschrift @@ -26035,7 +26192,7 @@ i, 464: Lotze, Metaphysik, § 258.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_460_460" id="Footnote_460_460"></a><a href="#FNanchor_460_460"><span class="label">[460]</span></a> F Brentano, Psychologie, i, 9, 88 ff.—Merkel thinks that his results +<p><a id="Footnote_460_460"></a><a href="#FNanchor_460_460"><span class="label">[460]</span></a> F Brentano, Psychologie, i, 9, 88 ff.—Merkel thinks that his results with the method of equal-appearing intervals show that we compare considerable intervals with each other by a different law from that by which we notice barely perceptible intervals. The stimuli form an arithmetical @@ -26045,21 +26202,21 @@ but somewhat obscure if acute writer.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_461_461" id="Footnote_461_461"></a><a href="#FNanchor_461_461"><span class="label">[461]</span></a> This is the formula which Merkel thinks he has verified (if I understand +<p><a id="Footnote_461_461"></a><a href="#FNanchor_461_461"><span class="label">[461]</span></a> This is the formula which Merkel thinks he has verified (if I understand him aright) by his experiments by method 4.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_462_462" id="Footnote_462_462"></a><a href="#FNanchor_462_462"><span class="label">[462]</span></a> Elsas: Ueber die Psychophysik (1856), p. 41. When the pans of +<p><a id="Footnote_462_462"></a><a href="#FNanchor_462_462"><span class="label">[462]</span></a> Elsas: Ueber die Psychophysik (1856), p. 41. When the pans of a balance are already loaded, but in equilibrium, it takes a proportionally larger weight added to one of them to incline the beam.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_550" id="Page_550">[Pg 550]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_550">[Pg 550]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XIV463" id="CHAPTER_XIV463">CHAPTER XIV.</a><a name="FNanchor_463_463" id="FNanchor_463_463"></a><a href="#Footnote_463_463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_XIV463">CHAPTER XIV.</a><a id="FNanchor_463_463"></a><a href="#Footnote_463_463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a></h5> <h4>ASSOCIATION.</h4> @@ -26093,7 +26250,7 @@ challenged the race of philosophers to banish something of the mystery by formulating the process in simpler terms. The problem which the philosophers have set themselves is that of ascertaining <i>principles of connection</i> -between the thoughts which thus appear to sprout one out<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_551" id="Page_551">[Pg 551]</a></span> +between the thoughts which thus appear to sprout one out<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_551">[Pg 551]</a></span> of the other, whereby their peculiar succession or coexistence may be explained.</p> @@ -26112,7 +26269,7 @@ the list is literally inexhaustible. The only simplification which could possibly be aimed at would be the reduction of the relations to a smaller number of types, like those which such authors as Kant and Renouvier call the 'categories' -of the understanding.<a name="FNanchor_464_464" id="FNanchor_464_464"></a><a href="#Footnote_464_464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> According as we followed +of the understanding.<a id="FNanchor_464_464"></a><a href="#Footnote_464_464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> According as we followed one category or another we should sweep, with our thought, through the world in this way or in that. And all the categories would be logical, would be relations of reason. They @@ -26132,7 +26289,7 @@ follows them.</p> follows them, and these so-called 'transitions of reason' are far from being all alike reasonable. If pure thought runs all our trains, why should she run some so fast and -some so slow, some through dull flats and some through<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_552" id="Page_552">[Pg 552]</a></span> +some so slow, some through dull flats and some through<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_552">[Pg 552]</a></span> gorgeous scenery, some to mountain-heights and jewelled mines, others through dismal swamps and darkness?—and run some off the track altogether, and into the wilderness @@ -26173,12 +26330,12 @@ the worthless seems the same. The laws of our actual thinking, of the <i>cogitatum</i>, must account alike for the bad and the good materials on which the arbiter has to decide, for wisdom and for folly. The laws of the arbiter, of the -<i>cogitandum</i>, of what we <i>ought</i> to think, are to the former as the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_553" id="Page_553">[Pg 553]</a></span> +<i>cogitandum</i>, of what we <i>ought</i> to think, are to the former as the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_553">[Pg 553]</a></span> laws of ethics are to those of history. Who but an Hegelian historian ever pretended that reason in action was <i>per se</i> a sufficient explanation of the political changes in Europe?</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>There are, then, mechanical conditions on which thought depends, and which,</i> to say the least, <i>determine the order in @@ -26216,7 +26373,7 @@ by the aid of distinctions which he did not make.</p> is tainted with one huge error—that of the construction of our thoughts out of the confounding of themselves together of immutable and incessantly recurring 'simple -ideas.' It is the cohesion of these which the 'principles of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_554" id="Page_554">[Pg 554]</a></span> +ideas.' It is the cohesion of these which the 'principles of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_554">[Pg 554]</a></span> association' are considered to account for. In <a href="#CHAPTER_VI">Chapters VI</a> and <a href="#CHAPTER_IX">IX</a> we saw abundant reasons for treating the doctrine of simple ideas or psychic atoms as mythological; and, in @@ -26225,7 +26382,7 @@ the associationist doctrine has caught sight of without weighing it down with the untenable incumbrance that the association is between 'ideas.'</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>Association</i>, so far as the word stands for an <i>effect, is between</i> <span class="smcap">things thought of</span>—<i>it is</i> <span class="smcap">things,</span> <i>not ideas, which are @@ -26237,7 +26394,7 @@ ways, determine what successive objects shall be thought. Let us proceed towards our final generalizations by surveying first a few familiar facts.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The laws of motor habit in the lower centres of the nervous system are disputed by no one. A series of movements @@ -26258,14 +26415,14 @@ doggerel rhymes which children use in their games, such as the formula</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"Ana mana mona mike</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Barcelona bona strike,"</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"Ana mana mona mike</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Barcelona bona strike,"</span><br > </p> <p>used for 'counting out,' form another familiar example of things heard in sequence cohering in the same order in the memory.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_555" id="Page_555">[Pg 555]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_555">[Pg 555]</a></span></p> <p>In touch we have a smaller number of instances, though probably every one who bathes himself in a certain fixed manner is familiar with the fact that each part of his body @@ -26306,7 +26463,7 @@ microscopes, of which the real world seems composed, are nothing but clusters of qualities which through simultaneous stimulation have so coalesced that the moment one is excited actually it serves as a sign or cue for the idea of -the others to arise. Let a person enter his room in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_556" id="Page_556">[Pg 556]</a></span> +the others to arise. Let a person enter his room in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_556">[Pg 556]</a></span> dark and grope among the objects there. The touch of the matches will instantaneously recall their appearance. If his hand comes in contact with an orange on the table, the @@ -26328,9 +26485,9 @@ pour into the mind at such a time forms one of the staple topics of popular psychologic wonder—</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"Lost and gone and lost and gone!</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">A breath, a whisper—some divine farewell—</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Desolate sweetness—far and far away."</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"Lost and gone and lost and gone!</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">A breath, a whisper—some divine farewell—</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Desolate sweetness—far and far away."</span><br > </p> <p>We cannot hear the din of a railroad tram or the yell @@ -26348,9 +26505,9 @@ the sound of each is repeated to him whilst its shape is before his eye. Thenceforward, long as he may live, he will never see a fig, a piebald horse, or a letter of the alphabet without the name which he first heard in conjunction -with each clinging to it in his mind; and inversely he will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_557" id="Page_557">[Pg 557]</a></span> +with each clinging to it in his mind; and inversely he will<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_557">[Pg 557]</a></span> never hear the name without the faint arousal of the image -of the object.<a name="FNanchor_465_465" id="FNanchor_465_465"></a><a href="#Footnote_465_465" class="fnanchor">[465]</a></p> +of the object.<a id="FNanchor_465_465"></a><a href="#Footnote_465_465" class="fnanchor">[465]</a></p> <h4>THE RAPIDITY OF ASSOCIATION.</h4> @@ -26381,7 +26538,7 @@ at once.</p> tried their hand at this problem by more elaborate methods. Galton, using a very simple apparatus, found that the sight of an unforeseen word would awaken an associated 'idea' -in about 5/6 of a second.<a name="FNanchor_466_466" id="FNanchor_466_466"></a><a href="#Footnote_466_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a> Wundt next made determinations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_558" id="Page_558">[Pg 558]</a></span> +in about 5/6 of a second.<a id="FNanchor_466_466"></a><a href="#Footnote_466_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a> Wundt next made determinations<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_558">[Pg 558]</a></span> in which the 'cue' was given by single-syllabled words called out by an assistant. The person experimented on had to press a key as soon as the sound of the word awakened @@ -26396,12 +26553,12 @@ required for the associated idea to arise. These times were separately determined and subtracted. The difference, called by Wundt the <i>association-time</i>, amounted, in the same four persons, to 706, 723, 752, and 874 thousandths of a -second respectively.<a name="FNanchor_467_467" id="FNanchor_467_467"></a><a href="#Footnote_467_467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a> The length of the last figure is due +second respectively.<a id="FNanchor_467_467"></a><a href="#Footnote_467_467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a> The length of the last figure is due to the fact that the person reacting (President G. S. Hall) was an American, whose associations with German words would naturally be slower than those of natives. The shortest association-time noted was when the word 'Sturm' suggested -to Prof. Wundt the word 'Wind' in 0.341 second.<a name="FNanchor_468_468" id="FNanchor_468_468"></a><a href="#Footnote_468_468" class="fnanchor">[468]</a>—Finally, +to Prof. Wundt the word 'Wind' in 0.341 second.<a id="FNanchor_468_468"></a><a href="#Footnote_468_468" class="fnanchor">[468]</a>—Finally, Mr. Cattell made some interesting observations upon the association-time between the look of letters and their names. "I pasted letters," he says, "on a revolving @@ -26420,7 +26577,7 @@ letter he begins to see the ones next following, and so can read them more quickly. Of the nine persons experimented on, four could read the letters faster when five were in view at once, but were not helped by a sixth letter; three were not helped by a fifth, and two not by a -fourth letter. This shows that while one idea is in the centre, two,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_559" id="Page_559">[Pg 559]</a></span> +fourth letter. This shows that while one idea is in the centre, two,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_559">[Pg 559]</a></span> three, or four additional ideas may be in the background of consciousness. The second letter in view shortens the time about 1/40, the third 1/60, the fourth 1/100, the fifth 1/200 sec.</p> @@ -26457,7 +26614,7 @@ word or letter, but take longer to name it. This is because, in the case of words and letters, the association between the idea and name has taken place so often that the process has become automatic, whereas in the case of colors and pictures we must by a voluntary effort choose -the name."<a name="FNanchor_469_469" id="FNanchor_469_469"></a><a href="#Footnote_469_469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a></p></blockquote> +the name."<a id="FNanchor_469_469"></a><a href="#Footnote_469_469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a></p></blockquote> <p>In later experiments Mr. Cattell studied the time for various associations to be performed, the termini (i.e., cue @@ -26466,21 +26623,21 @@ call up its equivalent in another, the name of an author the tongue in which he wrote, that of a city the country in which it lay, that of a writer one of his works, etc. The mean variation from the average is very great in all these -experiments; and the interesting feature which they show<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_560" id="Page_560">[Pg 560]</a></span> +experiments; and the interesting feature which they show<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_560">[Pg 560]</a></span> is the existence of certain constant differences between associations of different sorts. Thus:</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From <i>country</i> to <i>city</i>, Mr. C.'s time was 0.340 sec.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From <i>season</i> to <i>month</i>, Mr. C.'s time was 0.399</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From <i>language</i> to <i>author</i>, Mr. C.'s time was 0.523</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From <i>author</i> to <i>work</i>, Mr. C.'s time was 0.596</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From <i>country</i> to <i>city</i>, Mr. C.'s time was 0.340 sec.</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From <i>season</i> to <i>month</i>, Mr. C.'s time was 0.399</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From <i>language</i> to <i>author</i>, Mr. C.'s time was 0.523</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">From <i>author</i> to <i>work</i>, Mr. C.'s time was 0.596</span><br > </p> <p>The average time of two observers, experimenting on eight different types of association, was 0.420 and 0.436 -sec. respectively.<a name="FNanchor_470_470" id="FNanchor_470_470"></a><a href="#Footnote_470_470" class="fnanchor">[470]</a> The very wide range of variation is -undoubtedly a consequence of the fact that the words used<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_561" id="Page_561">[Pg 561]</a></span> +sec. respectively.<a id="FNanchor_470_470"></a><a href="#Footnote_470_470" class="fnanchor">[470]</a> The very wide range of variation is +undoubtedly a consequence of the fact that the words used<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_561">[Pg 561]</a></span> as cues, and the different types of association studied, differ much in their degree of familiarity.</p> @@ -26491,7 +26648,7 @@ more with literature. C knows quite as well as B that 7 + 5 = 12, yet he needs 1/10 a second longer to call it to mind; B knows quite as well as C that Dante was a poet, but needs 1/20 of a second longer to think of it. Such experiments lay bare the mental life in a way that -is startling and not always gratifying."<a name="FNanchor_471_471" id="FNanchor_471_471"></a><a href="#Footnote_471_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a></p></blockquote> +is startling and not always gratifying."<a id="FNanchor_471_471"></a><a href="#Footnote_471_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a></p></blockquote> <h4>THE LAW OF CONTIGUITY.</h4> @@ -26503,17 +26660,17 @@ once experienced together tend to become associated in the imagination, so that when any one of them is thought of, the others are likely to be thought of also, in the same order of sequence or coexistence as before</i>. This statement we may name the law -of <i>mental association by contiguity</i>.<a name="FNanchor_472_472" id="FNanchor_472_472"></a><a href="#Footnote_472_472" class="fnanchor">[472]</a></p> +of <i>mental association by contiguity</i>.<a id="FNanchor_472_472"></a><a href="#Footnote_472_472" class="fnanchor">[472]</a></p> <p>I preserve this name in order to depart as little as possible from tradition, although Mr. Ward's designation of -the process as that of association by <i>continuity</i><a name="FNanchor_473_473" id="FNanchor_473_473"></a><a href="#Footnote_473_473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a> or Wundt's +the process as that of association by <i>continuity</i><a id="FNanchor_473_473"></a><a href="#Footnote_473_473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a> or Wundt's as that of <i>external</i> association (to distinguish it from the <i>internal</i> association which we shall presently learn to know -under the name of association by similarity)<a name="FNanchor_474_474" id="FNanchor_474_474"></a><a href="#Footnote_474_474" class="fnanchor">[474]</a> are perhaps +under the name of association by similarity)<a id="FNanchor_474_474"></a><a href="#Footnote_474_474" class="fnanchor">[474]</a> are perhaps better terms. Whatever we name the law, since it expresses merely a phenomenon of mental <i>habit, the most -natural way of accounting for it is to conceive it as a result</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_562" id="Page_562">[Pg 562]</a></span> +natural way of accounting for it is to conceive it as a result</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_562">[Pg 562]</a></span> <i>of the laws of habit in the nervous system; in other words, it is to ascribe it to a physiological cause.</i> If it be truly a law of those nerve-centres which co-ordinate sensory @@ -26521,7 +26678,7 @@ and motor processes together that paths once used for coupling any pair of them are thereby made more permeable, there appears no reason why the same law should not hold good of ideational centres and their coupling-paths as -well.<a name="FNanchor_475_475" id="FNanchor_475_475"></a><a href="#Footnote_475_475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a> Parts of these centres which have once been in +well.<a id="FNanchor_475_475"></a><a href="#Footnote_475_475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a> Parts of these centres which have once been in action together will thus grow so linked that excitement at one point will irradiate through the system. The chances of complete irradiation will be strong in proportion as the @@ -26530,7 +26687,7 @@ present points excited afresh are numerous. If all points were originally excited together, the irradiation may be sensibly simultaneous throughout the system, when any single point or group of points is touched off. But where -the original impressions were successive—the conjugation of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_563" id="Page_563">[Pg 563]</a></span> +the original impressions were successive—the conjugation of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_563">[Pg 563]</a></span> a Greek verb, for example—awakening nerve-tracts in a definite order, they will now, when one of them awakens, discharge into each other in that definite order and in no @@ -26575,11 +26732,11 @@ science has not yet succeeded in improving.</p> <p>"Custom," says Locke, "settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the -body; all which seem to be but <i>trains of motion in the animal spirits</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_564" id="Page_564">[Pg 564]</a></span> +body; all which seem to be but <i>trains of motion in the animal spirits</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_564">[Pg 564]</a></span> [by this Locke meant identically what we understand by <i>neural processes</i>] which, once set agoing, continue in the same steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, -and the motion in it becomes easy and, as it were, natural."<a name="FNanchor_476_476" id="FNanchor_476_476"></a><a href="#Footnote_476_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a></p></blockquote> +and the motion in it becomes easy and, as it were, natural."<a id="FNanchor_476_476"></a><a href="#Footnote_476_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Hartley was more thorough in his grasp of the principle. The sensorial nerve-currents, produced when objects @@ -26594,13 +26751,13 @@ in a single formula by saying:</p> Number of Times, get such a Power over <i>a, b, c,</i> etc., the corresponding Miniature Vibrations, that any of the Vibrations A, when impressed alone, shall be able to excite <i>b, c,</i> etc., the Miniatures of the -rest."<a name="FNanchor_477_477" id="FNanchor_477_477"></a><a href="#Footnote_477_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a></p></blockquote> +rest."<a id="FNanchor_477_477"></a><a href="#Footnote_477_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a></p></blockquote> <p>It is evident that if there be any law of neural habit similar to this, the contiguities, coexistences, and successions, met with in outer experience, must inevitably be copied more or less perfectly in our thought. If A B C D E -be a sequence of outer impressions (they may be events<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_565" id="Page_565">[Pg 565]</a></span> +be a sequence of outer impressions (they may be events<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_565">[Pg 565]</a></span> or they may be successively experienced properties of an object) which once gave rise to the successive 'ideas' <i>a b c d e</i>, then no sooner will A impress us again and awaken the @@ -26641,7 +26798,7 @@ Granted an object, A, they never tell us beforehand which of its associates it <i>will</i> suggest; their wisdom is limited to showing, after it <i>has</i> suggested a second object, that that object was once an associate. They have had to -supplement their principle of Contiguity by other principles,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_566" id="Page_566">[Pg 566]</a></span> +supplement their principle of Contiguity by other principles,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_566">[Pg 566]</a></span> such as those of Similarity and Contrast, before they could begin to do justice to the richness of the facts.</p> @@ -26687,9 +26844,9 @@ found itself at different times excited in conjunction with causes. Which of these others it shall awaken now becomes a problem. Shall <i>b</i> or <i>c</i> be aroused next by the present <i>a</i>? We must make a further postulate, based, however, -on the fact of <i>tension</i> in nerve-tissue, and on the fact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_567" id="Page_567">[Pg 567]</a></span> +on the fact of <i>tension</i> in nerve-tissue, and on the fact<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_567">[Pg 567]</a></span> of summation of excitements, each incomplete or latent in -itself, into an open resultant.<a name="FNanchor_478_478" id="FNanchor_478_478"></a><a href="#Footnote_478_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a> The process <i>b</i>, rather than +itself, into an open resultant.<a id="FNanchor_478_478"></a><a href="#Footnote_478_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a> The process <i>b</i>, rather than <i>c</i>, will awake, if in addition to the vibrating tract <i>a</i> some other tract <i>d</i> is in a state of sub-excitement, and formerly was excited with <i>b</i> alone and not with <i>a</i>. In short, we may @@ -26715,13 +26872,13 @@ come up later.</p> Hall':</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"I, the heir of all <i>the ages</i> in the foremost files of time,"</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"I, the heir of all <i>the ages</i> in the foremost files of time,"</span><br > </p> <p>and—</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"For I doubt not through <i>the ages</i> one increasing purpose runs."</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"For I doubt not through <i>the ages</i> one increasing purpose runs."</span><br > </p> <p>Why is it that when we recite from memory one of these @@ -26735,7 +26892,7 @@ of all the words preceding <i>the ages</i>. The word <i>ages</i> at its moment of strongest activity would, <i>per se</i>, indifferently discharge into either 'in' or 'one.' So would the previous words (whose tension is momentarily much -less strong than that of <i>ages</i>) each of them indifferently discharge<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_568" id="Page_568">[Pg 568]</a></span> +less strong than that of <i>ages</i>) each of them indifferently discharge<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_568">[Pg 568]</a></span> into either of a large number of other words with which they have been at different times combined. But when the processes of '<i>I, the heir of all the ages</i>,' simultaneously @@ -26778,7 +26935,7 @@ data, the student's name surges up in his mind.</p> his rather dull child in Kindergarten instruction. Holding the knife upright on the table, he says, "What do you call that, my boy?" "I calls it a <i>knife</i>, I does," is the sturdy reply, -from which the child cannot be induced to swerve by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_569" id="Page_569">[Pg 569]</a></span> +from which the child cannot be induced to swerve by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_569">[Pg 569]</a></span> any alteration in the form of question, until the father recollecting that in the Kindergarten a pencil was used, and not a knife, draws a long one from his pocket, holds it in @@ -26790,7 +26947,7 @@ had to recombine their effect before the word <p>Professor Bain, in his chapters on 'Compound Association,' has treated in a minute and exhaustive way of this type of mental sequence, and what he has done so well -need not be here repeated.<a name="FNanchor_479_479" id="FNanchor_479_479"></a><a href="#Footnote_479_479" class="fnanchor">[479]</a></p> +need not be here repeated.<a id="FNanchor_479_479"></a><a href="#Footnote_479_479" class="fnanchor">[479]</a></p> <h4><i>Impartial Redintegration.</i></h4> @@ -26821,7 +26978,7 @@ of B, and the consequent strength of the combination of influences by which B in its totality is awakened.</p> <p>Hamilton first used the word 'redintegration' to designate -all association. Such processes as we have just described<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_570" id="Page_570">[Pg 570]</a></span> +all association. Such processes as we have just described<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_570">[Pg 570]</a></span> might in an emphatic sense be termed redintegrations, for they would necessarily lead, if unobstructed, to the reinstatement in thought of the <i>entire</i> content of large @@ -26839,7 +26996,7 @@ unroll itself with fatal literality to the end, unless some outward sound, sight, or touch divert the current of thought.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/jame_570_0038.jpg" width="400" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_570_0038.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 400px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 40.</div> </div> @@ -26851,7 +27008,7 @@ flow of thought to take this form. Those insufferably garrulous old women, those dry and fanciless beings who spare you no detail, however petty, of the facts they are recounting, and upon the thread of whose narrative all the irrelevant -items cluster as pertinaciously as the essential ones,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_571" id="Page_571">[Pg 571]</a></span> +items cluster as pertinaciously as the essential ones,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_571">[Pg 571]</a></span> the slaves of literal fact, the stumblers over the smallest abrupt step in thought, are figures known to all of us. Comic literature has made her profit out of them. Juliet's @@ -26899,7 +27056,7 @@ ordinary spontaneous flow of our ideas does not follow the law of impartial redintegration. <i>In no revival of a past experience are all the items of our thought equally operative in determining what the next thought shall be. Always some ingredient -is prepotent over the rest.</i> Its special suggestions or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_572" id="Page_572">[Pg 572]</a></span> +is prepotent over the rest.</i> Its special suggestions or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_572">[Pg 572]</a></span> associations in this case will often be different from those which it has in common with the whole group of items; and its tendency to awaken these outlying associates will @@ -26919,7 +27076,7 @@ in arousing action elsewhere.</i></p> <blockquote> -<p>"Two processes," says Mr. Hodgson,<a name="FNanchor_480_480" id="FNanchor_480_480"></a><a href="#Footnote_480_480" class="fnanchor">[480]</a> "are constantly going on in +<p>"Two processes," says Mr. Hodgson,<a id="FNanchor_480_480"></a><a href="#Footnote_480_480" class="fnanchor">[480]</a> "are constantly going on in redintegration. The one a process of corrosion, melting, decay; the other a process of renewing, arising, becoming.... No object of representation remains long before consciousness in the same state, but @@ -26939,7 +27096,7 @@ by the general flatness and poverty of their æsthetic nature, are kept for ever rotating among the literal sequences of their local and personal history.</p> -<p>Most of us, however, are better organized than this, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_573" id="Page_573">[Pg 573]</a></span> +<p>Most of us, however, are better organized than this, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_573">[Pg 573]</a></span> our musings pursue an erratic course, swerving continually into some new direction traced by the shifting play of interest as it ever falls on some partial item in each @@ -26980,7 +27137,7 @@ spontaneously goes on in average minds. <i>We may call it</i> <p>Another example of it is given by Hobbes in a passage which has been quoted so often as to be classical:</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_574" id="Page_574">[Pg 574]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_574">[Pg 574]</a></span></p> <blockquote> <p>"In a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent @@ -26991,7 +27148,7 @@ King to his enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for thought -is quick."<a name="FNanchor_481_481" id="FNanchor_481_481"></a><a href="#Footnote_481_481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a></p></blockquote> +is quick."<a id="FNanchor_481_481"></a><a href="#Footnote_481_481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Can we determine, now, when a certain portion of the going thought has, by dint of its interest, become so prepotent @@ -27030,7 +27187,7 @@ associate, although frequency is certainly one of the most potent determinants of revival. If I abruptly utter the word <i>swallow</i>, the reader, if by habit an ornithologist, will think of a bird; if a physiologist or a medical specialist in -throat diseases, he will think of deglutition. If I say <i>date</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_575" id="Page_575">[Pg 575]</a></span> +throat diseases, he will think of deglutition. If I say <i>date</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_575">[Pg 575]</a></span> he will, if a fruit-merchant or an Arabian traveller, think of the produce of the palm; if an habitual student of history, figures with <span class="smcap">a.d.</span> or <span class="smcap">b.c.</span> before them will rise in his mind. @@ -27061,13 +27218,13 @@ takes days to die away. As long as it lasts, those tracts or those modes are liable to have their activities awakened by causes which at other times might leave them in repose. Hence, <i>recency</i> in experience is a prime factor in determining -revival in thought.<a name="FNanchor_482_482" id="FNanchor_482_482"></a><a href="#Footnote_482_482" class="fnanchor">[482]</a></p> +revival in thought.<a id="FNanchor_482_482"></a><a href="#Footnote_482_482" class="fnanchor">[482]</a></p> <p><i>Vividness</i> in an original experience may also have the same effect as habit or recency in bringing about likelihood of revival. If we have once witnessed an execution, any subsequent conversation or reading about capital punishment -will almost certainly suggest images of that particular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_576" id="Page_576">[Pg 576]</a></span> +will almost certainly suggest images of that particular<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_576">[Pg 576]</a></span> scene. Thus it is that events lived through only once, and in youth, may come in after-years, by reason of their exciting quality or emotional intensity, to serve as types or @@ -27085,7 +27242,7 @@ in which he has been the sufferer. Daily he has touched his teeth and masticated with them; this very morning he brushed them, chewed his breakfast and picked them; but the rarer and remoter associations arise more -promptly because they were so much more intense.<a name="FNanchor_483_483" id="FNanchor_483_483"></a><a href="#Footnote_483_483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a></p> +promptly because they were so much more intense.<a id="FNanchor_483_483"></a><a href="#Footnote_483_483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a></p> <p>A fourth factor in tracing the course of reproduction is <i>congruity in emotional tone</i> between the reproduced idea and @@ -27105,7 +27262,7 @@ but those of horror at the malignity of Nature; read at another time they suggest only enthusiastic reflections on the indomitable power and pluck of man. Few novels so overflow with joyous animal spirits as 'The Three Guardsmen' -of Dumas. Yet it may awaken in the mind of a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_577" id="Page_577">[Pg 577]</a></span> +of Dumas. Yet it may awaken in the mind of a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_577">[Pg 577]</a></span> reader depressed with sea-sickness (as the writer can personally testify) a most dismal and woeful consciousness of the cruelty and carnage of which heroes like Athos, Porthos, @@ -27147,7 +27304,7 @@ interesting item shall emerge must be called largely a matter of accident—accident, that is, for our intelligence. No doubt it is determined by cerebral causes, but they are too subtile and shifting for our analysis.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_578" id="Page_578">[Pg 578]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_578">[Pg 578]</a></span></p> <h4>ASSOCIATION BY SIMILARITY.</h4> @@ -27179,11 +27336,11 @@ after the fashion we have already seen, and the relation between the new thought's object and the object of the faded thought will be a <i>relation of similarity</i>. The pair of thoughts will form an instance of what is called '<i>Association -by Similarity</i>.'<a name="FNanchor_484_484" id="FNanchor_484_484"></a><a href="#Footnote_484_484" class="fnanchor">[484]</a></p> +by Similarity</i>.'<a id="FNanchor_484_484"></a><a href="#Footnote_484_484" class="fnanchor">[484]</a></p> <p>The similars which are here associated, or of which the first is followed by the second in the mind, are seen to be -<i>compounds</i>. Experience proves that this is always the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_579" id="Page_579">[Pg 579]</a></span> +<i>compounds</i>. Experience proves that this is always the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_579">[Pg 579]</a></span> case. <i>There is no tendency on the part of</i> <span class="smcap">simple</span> <i>'ideas,' attributes, or qualities to remind us of their like.</i> The thought of one shade of blue does not remind us of that of another @@ -27225,7 +27382,7 @@ king,' of a rising and falling stock-market, and the like.</p> <p>The gradual passage from impartial redintegration to similar association through what we have called ordinary mixed association may be symbolized by diagrams. Fig. -41 is impartial redintegration, Fig. 42 is mixed, and Fig. 43<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_580" id="Page_580">[Pg 580]</a></span> +41 is impartial redintegration, Fig. 42 is mixed, and Fig. 43<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_580">[Pg 580]</a></span> similar association. A in each is the passing, B the coming thought. In 'impartial,' all parts of A are equally operative in calling up B. In 'mixed,' most parts of A are inert. @@ -27237,17 +27394,17 @@ with them, forming an identical part in the two ideas, and making these, <i>pro tanto</i>, resemble each other.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 290px;"> -<img src="images/jame_580_0039_01.jpg" width="290" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_580_0039_01.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 290px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 41.</div> </div> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 230px;"> -<img src="images/jame_580_0039_02.jpg" width="230" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_580_0039_02.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 230px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 42.</div> </div> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 275px;"> -<img src="images/jame_580_0039_03.jpg" width="275" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_580_0039_03.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 275px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 43.</div> </div> @@ -27255,13 +27412,13 @@ making these, <i>pro tanto</i>, resemble each other.</p> break out from its concert with the rest and act, as we say, on its own hook, why the other parts should become inert, are mysteries which we can ascertain but not explain. Possibly -a minuter insight into the laws of neural action will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_581" id="Page_581">[Pg 581]</a></span> +a minuter insight into the laws of neural action will<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_581">[Pg 581]</a></span> some day clear the matter up; possibly neural laws will not suffice, and we shall need to invoke a dynamic reaction of the form of consciousness upon its content. But into this we cannot enter now.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>To sum up, then, we see that <i>the difference between the three kinds of association reduces itself to a simple difference in @@ -27299,7 +27456,7 @@ ii railroad king playing foot-ball with the stock-market.</p> <p>It is apparent from such an example how inextricably complex are all the contributory factors whose resultant is -the line of our reverie. It would be folly in most cases to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_582" id="Page_582">[Pg 582]</a></span> +the line of our reverie. It would be folly in most cases to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_582">[Pg 582]</a></span> attempt to trace them out. From an instance like the above, where the pivot of the Similar Association was formed by a definite concrete word, <i>train</i>, to those where it is so subtile @@ -27340,7 +27497,7 @@ is extremely common. It would be one of the most important of physiological discoveries could we assign the mechanical or chemical difference which makes the thoughts of one brain cling close to impartial redintegration, while -those of another shoot about in all the lawless revelry of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_583" id="Page_583">[Pg 583]</a></span> +those of another shoot about in all the lawless revelry of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_583">[Pg 583]</a></span> similarity. Why, in these latter brains, action should tend to focalize itself in small spots, while in the others it fills patiently its broad bed, it seems impossible to guess. @@ -27384,7 +27541,7 @@ interest, then, if the object <i>abc</i> turns up, and <i>b</i> has more associations with Z than have either <i>a</i> or <i>c, b</i> will become the object's interesting, pivotal portion, and will call up its own associates exclusively. For the energy of <i>b</i>'s brain-tract -will be augmented by Z's activity,—an activity which,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_584" id="Page_584">[Pg 584]</a></span> +will be augmented by Z's activity,—an activity which,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_584">[Pg 584]</a></span> from lack of previous connection between Z and <i>a</i> or <i>c</i>, does not influence <i>a</i> or <i>c</i>. If, for instance, I think of Paris whilst I am <i>hungry</i>, I shall not improbably find that its @@ -27426,7 +27583,7 @@ we seem driven to believe that the brain-tract thereof must actually be excited, but only in a minimal and sub-conscious way. Try, for instance, to symbolize what goes on in a man who is racking his brains to remember a thought -which occurred to him last week. The associates of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_585" id="Page_585">[Pg 585]</a></span> +which occurred to him last week. The associates of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_585">[Pg 585]</a></span> thought are there, many of them at least, but they refuse to awaken the thought itself. We cannot suppose that they do not irradiate <i>at all</i> into its brain-tract, because his mind @@ -27467,7 +27624,7 @@ feeling that we are 'warm,' as the children say when they play hide and seek; and such associates as these we clutch at and keep before the attention. Thus we recollect successively that when we had the thought in question we -were at the dinner-table; then that our friend J. D. was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_586" id="Page_586">[Pg 586]</a></span> +were at the dinner-table; then that our friend J. D. was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_586">[Pg 586]</a></span> there; then that the subject talked about was so and so; finally, that the thought came <i>à propos</i> of a certain anecdote, and then that it had something to do with a French quotation. @@ -27497,11 +27654,11 @@ arrows, succeed in helping the tension there to overcome the resistance, and in rousing Z also to full activity.</p> <div class="figcenter" style="width: 200px;"> -<img src="images/jame_586_0040.jpg" width="200" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_586_0040.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 200px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 44.</div> </div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_587" id="Page_587">[Pg 587]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_587">[Pg 587]</a></span></p> <p>The tension present from the first in Z, even though it keep below the threshold of discharge, is probably to some @@ -27517,9 +27674,9 @@ but only through moving about such neighborhoods wherein it is likely to lie, and trusting that it will then strike our eye; so here, by not letting our attention leave the neighborhood of what we seek, we trust that it will end -by speaking to us of its own accord.<a name="FNanchor_485_485" id="FNanchor_485_485"></a><a href="#Footnote_485_485" class="fnanchor">[485]</a></p> +by speaking to us of its own accord.<a id="FNanchor_485_485"></a><a href="#Footnote_485_485" class="fnanchor">[485]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><i>Turn now to the case of finding the unknown means to a distinctly conceived end.</i> The end here stands in the @@ -27533,7 +27690,7 @@ discharge all together into Z, the excitement of which process is, in the mental sphere, equivalent to the solution of our problem. The only difference between this case and the last, is that in this one there need be no original sub-excitement -in Z, co-operating from the very first. When<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_588" id="Page_588">[Pg 588]</a></span> +in Z, co-operating from the very first. When<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_588">[Pg 588]</a></span> we seek a forgotten name, we must suppose the name's centre to be in a state of active tension from the very outset, because of that peculiar feeling of <i>recognition</i> which we @@ -27555,7 +27712,7 @@ it, whilst as yet we have no knowledge of <i>acquaintance</i> with it (see <a href="#Page_221">p. 221</a>), or in Mr. Hodgson's language, "we know what we want to find beforehand, in a certain sense, in its second intention, and do not know it, in another sense, in -its first intention."<a name="FNanchor_486_486" id="FNanchor_486_486"></a><a href="#Footnote_486_486" class="fnanchor">[486]</a> Our intuition that one of the ideas +its first intention."<a id="FNanchor_486_486"></a><a href="#Footnote_486_486" class="fnanchor">[486]</a> Our intuition that one of the ideas which turn up is, at last, our <i>quæsitum</i>, is due to our recognition that its relations are identical with those we had in mind, and this may be a rather slow act of judgment. @@ -27575,7 +27732,7 @@ images before and after"—</p></blockquote> <p>or, to use perhaps clearer language, one which stands in determinate logical relations to those data round about the gap which filled our mind at the start. This feeling of the -blank form of relationship before we get the material quality<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_589" id="Page_589">[Pg 589]</a></span> +blank form of relationship before we get the material quality<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_589">[Pg 589]</a></span> of the thing related will surprise no one who has read <a href="#CHAPTER_IX">Chapter IX</a>.</p> @@ -27587,16 +27744,16 @@ us spontaneously with the appropriate idea:</p> <blockquote> <p>"Our only command over it is by the effort we make to keep the -painful unfilled gap in consciousness.<a name="FNanchor_487_487" id="FNanchor_487_487"></a><a href="#Footnote_487_487" class="fnanchor">[487]</a>... Two circumstances are +painful unfilled gap in consciousness.<a id="FNanchor_487_487"></a><a href="#Footnote_487_487" class="fnanchor">[487]</a>... Two circumstances are important to notice: the first is, that volition has no power of calling up images, but only of rejecting and selecting from those offered by -spontaneous redintegration.<a name="FNanchor_488_488" id="FNanchor_488_488"></a><a href="#Footnote_488_488" class="fnanchor">[488]</a> But the rapidity with which this selection +spontaneous redintegration.<a id="FNanchor_488_488"></a><a href="#Footnote_488_488" class="fnanchor">[488]</a> But the rapidity with which this selection is made, owing to the familiarity of the ways in which spontaneous redintegration runs, gives the process of reasoning the appearance of evoking images that are foreseen to be conformable to the purpose. There is no seeing them before they are offered; there is no summoning them before they are seen. The other circumstance is, that every kind -of reasoning is nothing, in its simplest form, but attention."<a name="FNanchor_489_489" id="FNanchor_489_489"></a><a href="#Footnote_489_489" class="fnanchor">[489]</a></p></blockquote> +of reasoning is nothing, in its simplest form, but attention."<a id="FNanchor_489_489"></a><a href="#Footnote_489_489" class="fnanchor">[489]</a></p></blockquote> <p>It is foreign to our purpose here to enter into any detailed analysis of the different classes of mental pursuit. @@ -27613,7 +27770,7 @@ and in the case of reminiscence the accumulation of helps in the way of associations may advance more rapidly by the use of certain routine methods. In striving to recall a thought, for example, we may of set purpose run through -the successive classes of circumstance with which it may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_590" id="Page_590">[Pg 590]</a></span> +the successive classes of circumstance with which it may<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_590">[Pg 590]</a></span> possibly have been connected, trusting that when the right member of the class has turned up it will help the thought's revival. Thus we may run through all the <i>places</i> in which @@ -27656,7 +27813,7 @@ association. It will be observed that the <i>object called up may bear any logical relation whatever to the one which suggested it</i>. The law requires only that one condition should be fulfilled. The fading object must be due to a brain-process -some of whose elements awaken through habit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_591" id="Page_591">[Pg 591]</a></span> +some of whose elements awaken through habit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_591">[Pg 591]</a></span> some of the elements of the brain-process of the object which comes to view. This awakening is the operative machinery, the causal agency, throughout, quite as @@ -27673,18 +27830,18 @@ like it able to push objects before the mind. This is quite unintelligible. The similarity of two things does not exist till both things are there—it is meaningless to talk of it as an <i>agent of production</i> of anything, whether in the physical -or the psychical realms.<a name="FNanchor_490_490" id="FNanchor_490_490"></a><a href="#Footnote_490_490" class="fnanchor">[490]</a> It is a relation which the mind +or the psychical realms.<a id="FNanchor_490_490"></a><a href="#Footnote_490_490" class="fnanchor">[490]</a> It is a relation which the mind perceives after the fact, just as it may perceive the relations of superiority, of distance, of causality, of container and content, of substance and accident, or of contrast, between an object and some second object which the associative -machinery calls up.<a name="FNanchor_491_491" id="FNanchor_491_491"></a><a href="#Footnote_491_491" class="fnanchor">[491]</a></p> +machinery calls up.<a id="FNanchor_491_491"></a><a href="#Footnote_491_491" class="fnanchor">[491]</a></p> <p>There are, nevertheless, able writers who not only insist on preserving association by similarity as a distinct elementary law, but who make it the most elementary law, and seek to derive contiguous association from it. Their -reasoning is as follows: When the present impression A<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_592" id="Page_592">[Pg 592]</a></span> +reasoning is as follows: When the present impression A<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_592">[Pg 592]</a></span> awakens the idea <i>b</i> of its past contiguous associate B, how can this occur except through first reviving an image <i>a</i> of its own past occurrence. <i>This</i> is the term directly connected @@ -27724,11 +27881,11 @@ they give of the coexistence of <i>a</i> with A is when A gives us a <i>sense of familiarity</i> but fails to awaken any distinct thought of past contiguous associates. In a later chapter I shall consider this case. Here I content myself with saying -that it does not seem conclusive as to the point at issue;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_593" id="Page_593">[Pg 593]</a></span> +that it does not seem conclusive as to the point at issue;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_593">[Pg 593]</a></span> and that I still believe association of coexistent or sequent impressions to be the one <i>elementary</i> law.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p><span class="smcap">Contrast</span> <i>has also been held to be an independent agent in association.</i> But the reproduction of an object contrasting @@ -27742,9 +27899,9 @@ at all, may reproduce the <i>opposite</i> similar, as well as any intermediate term. Moreover, the greater number of contrasts are habitually coupled in speech, young and old, life and death, rich and poor, etc., and are, as Dr. Bain -says, in everybody's memory.<a name="FNanchor_492_492" id="FNanchor_492_492"></a><a href="#Footnote_492_492" class="fnanchor">[492]</a></p> +says, in everybody's memory.<a id="FNanchor_492_492"></a><a href="#Footnote_492_492" class="fnanchor">[492]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>I trust that the student will now feel that the way to a deeper understanding of the order of our ideas lies in the @@ -27766,7 +27923,7 @@ over others falls also within the sphere of cerebral probabilities. Granting such instability as the brain-tissue requires, certain points must always discharge more quickly and strongly than others; and this prepotency would shift -its place from moment to moment by accidental causes,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_594" id="Page_594">[Pg 594]</a></span> +its place from moment to moment by accidental causes,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_594">[Pg 594]</a></span> giving us a perfect mechanical diagram of the capricious play of similar association in the most gifted mind. The study of dreams confirms this view. The usual abundance @@ -27776,7 +27933,7 @@ occur because the currents run—'like sparks in burnt-up paper'—wherever the nutrition of the moment creates an opening, but nowhere else.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>The <i>effects of interested attention and volition</i> remain. These activities seem to hold fast to certain elements, and @@ -27802,14 +27959,14 @@ thinking, it also determines his acts.</p> <h4>THE HISTORY OF OPINION CONCERNING ASSOCIATION</h4> -<p>may be briefly glanced at ere we end the chapter.<a name="FNanchor_493_493" id="FNanchor_493_493"></a><a href="#Footnote_493_493" class="fnanchor">[493]</a> Aristotle +<p>may be briefly glanced at ere we end the chapter.<a id="FNanchor_493_493"></a><a href="#Footnote_493_493" class="fnanchor">[493]</a> Aristotle seems to have caught both the facts and the principle of explanation; but he did not expand his views, and it was not till the time of Hobbes that the matter was again touched on in a definite way. Hobbes first formulated the problem of the succession of our thoughts. He writes in Leviathan, chapter iii, as follows:</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_595" id="Page_595">[Pg 595]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_595">[Pg 595]</a></span></p> <blockquote> <p>"By consequence, or train of thoughts, I understand that succession @@ -27859,7 +28016,7 @@ have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is -governed by design, is nothing but <i>seeking</i> or the faculty of invention,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_596" id="Page_596">[Pg 596]</a></span> +governed by design, is nothing but <i>seeking</i> or the faculty of invention,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_596">[Pg 596]</a></span> which the Latins called <i>sagacitas</i>, and <i>sollertia</i>; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause."</p></blockquote> @@ -27909,18 +28066,18 @@ recall another, than the relation of cause and effect betwixt their objects.... These are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connection by which they are united in our memory. -Here is a kind of <span class="smcap">Attraction</span>, which in the mental world will be found<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_597" id="Page_597">[Pg 597]</a></span> +Here is a kind of <span class="smcap">Attraction</span>, which in the mental world will be found<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_597">[Pg 597]</a></span> to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms. Its effects are everywhere conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved into <i>original</i> qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to -explain."<a name="FNanchor_494_494" id="FNanchor_494_494"></a><a href="#Footnote_494_494" class="fnanchor">[494]</a></p></blockquote> +explain."<a id="FNanchor_494_494"></a><a href="#Footnote_494_494" class="fnanchor">[494]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Hume did not, however, any more than Hobbes, follow out the effects of which he speaks, and the task of popularizing the notion of association and making an effective school -based on association of ideas alone was reserved for Hartley<a name="FNanchor_495_495" id="FNanchor_495_495"></a><a href="#Footnote_495_495" class="fnanchor">[495]</a> -and James Mill.<a name="FNanchor_496_496" id="FNanchor_496_496"></a><a href="#Footnote_496_496" class="fnanchor">[496]</a> These authors traced minutely the +based on association of ideas alone was reserved for Hartley<a id="FNanchor_495_495"></a><a href="#Footnote_495_495" class="fnanchor">[495]</a> +and James Mill.<a id="FNanchor_496_496"></a><a href="#Footnote_496_496" class="fnanchor">[496]</a> These authors traced minutely the presence of association in all the cardinal notions and operations of the mind. The several 'faculties' of the Mind were dispossessed; the one principle of association between @@ -27932,7 +28089,7 @@ ideas did all their work. As Priestley says:</p> sentient principle with this single law.... Not only all our intellectual pleasures and pains but all the phenomena of memory, imagination, volition, reasoning and every other mental affection and operation, -are but different modes or cases of the association of ideas."<a name="FNanchor_497_497" id="FNanchor_497_497"></a><a href="#Footnote_497_497" class="fnanchor">[497]</a></p></blockquote> +are but different modes or cases of the association of ideas."<a id="FNanchor_497_497"></a><a href="#Footnote_497_497" class="fnanchor">[497]</a></p></blockquote> <p>An eminent French psychologist, M. Ribot, repeats Hume's comparison of the law of association with that of @@ -27956,7 +28113,7 @@ discoveries: it came late and seems so simple that it may justly astonish us.</p> <p>"Perhaps it is not superfluous to ask in what this manner of explanation -is superior to the current theory of Faculties.<a name="FNanchor_498_498" id="FNanchor_498_498"></a><a href="#Footnote_498_498" class="fnanchor">[498]</a> The most<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_598" id="Page_598">[Pg 598]</a></span> +is superior to the current theory of Faculties.<a id="FNanchor_498_498"></a><a href="#Footnote_498_498" class="fnanchor">[498]</a> The most<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_598">[Pg 598]</a></span> extended usage consists, as we know, in dividing intellectual phenomena into classes, in separating those which differ, in grouping together those of the same nature and in giving to these a common name and in @@ -27990,7 +28147,7 @@ combine with each other; and that the differences of faculties are only differences of association. It <i>explains</i> all intellectual facts, certainly not after the manner of Metaphysics which demands the ultimate and absolute reason of things; but after the manner of Physics which seeks -only their secondary and immediate cause."<a name="FNanchor_499_499" id="FNanchor_499_499"></a><a href="#Footnote_499_499" class="fnanchor">[499]</a></p></blockquote> +only their secondary and immediate cause."<a id="FNanchor_499_499"></a><a href="#Footnote_499_499" class="fnanchor">[499]</a></p></blockquote> <p>The inexperienced reader may be glad of a brief indication of the manner in which all the different mental operations @@ -28002,13 +28159,13 @@ known to belong to the past. <i>Expectation</i> the same, with future substituted for past. <i>Fancy</i>, the association of images without temporal order.</p> -<p><i>Belief</i> in anything <i>not</i> present to sense is the very lively,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_599" id="Page_599">[Pg 599]</a></span> +<p><i>Belief</i> in anything <i>not</i> present to sense is the very lively,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_599">[Pg 599]</a></span> strong, and steadfast association of the image of that thing with some present sensation, so that as long as the sensation persists the image cannot be excluded from the mind.</p> <p><i>Judgment</i> is 'transferring the idea of <i>truth</i> by association -from one proposition to another that resembles it.'<a name="FNanchor_500_500" id="FNanchor_500_500"></a><a href="#Footnote_500_500" class="fnanchor">[500]</a></p> +from one proposition to another that resembles it.'<a id="FNanchor_500_500"></a><a href="#Footnote_500_500" class="fnanchor">[500]</a></p> <p><i>Reasoning</i> is the perception that "whatever has any mark has that which it is a mark of"; in the concrete case the @@ -28045,7 +28202,7 @@ been transferred to the object, constituting our love therefor.</p> <p><i>Volition</i> is the association of ideas of muscular motion with the ideas of those pleasures which the motion produces. -The motion at first occurs automatically and results<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_600" id="Page_600">[Pg 600]</a></span> +The motion at first occurs automatically and results<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_600">[Pg 600]</a></span> in a pleasure unforeseen. The latter becomes so associated with the motion that whenever we think of it the idea of the motion arises; and the idea of the motion when vivid causes @@ -28068,11 +28225,11 @@ imagination, of other points still more remote. And thus the supposed original and inherent property of these two ideas is completely explained and accounted for by the law of association; and we are enabled to see that if Space or Time were really susceptible of termination, we should -be just as unable as we now are to conceive the idea."<a name="FNanchor_501_501" id="FNanchor_501_501"></a><a href="#Footnote_501_501" class="fnanchor">[501]</a></p></blockquote> +be just as unable as we now are to conceive the idea."<a id="FNanchor_501_501"></a><a href="#Footnote_501_501" class="fnanchor">[501]</a></p></blockquote> <p>These examples of the Associationist Psychology are with the exception of the last, very crudely expressed, but they -suffice for our temporary need. Hartley and James Mill<a name="FNanchor_502_502" id="FNanchor_502_502"></a><a href="#Footnote_502_502" class="fnanchor">[502]</a> +suffice for our temporary need. Hartley and James Mill<a id="FNanchor_502_502"></a><a href="#Footnote_502_502" class="fnanchor">[502]</a> improved upon Hume so far as to employ but a single principle of association, that of contiguity or habit. Hartley ignores resemblance, James Mill expressly repudiates it in @@ -28087,8 +28244,8 @@ observation, I think, we may refer resemblance to the law of frequency [i.e., contiguity], of which it seems to form only a particular case."</p></blockquote> <p>Mr. Herbert Spencer has still more recently tried to construct -a Psychology which ignores Association by Similarity,<a name="FNanchor_503_503" id="FNanchor_503_503"></a><a href="#Footnote_503_503" class="fnanchor">[503]</a> -and in a chapter, which also is a curiosity, he tries<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_601" id="Page_601">[Pg 601]</a></span> +a Psychology which ignores Association by Similarity,<a id="FNanchor_503_503"></a><a href="#Footnote_503_503" class="fnanchor">[503]</a> +and in a chapter, which also is a curiosity, he tries<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_601">[Pg 601]</a></span> to explain the association of two ideas by a conscious reference of the first to the point of time when its sensation was experienced, which point of time is no sooner thought of @@ -28131,7 +28288,7 @@ power. The diversity in these had no doubt for a long time the effect of keeping back their first identification; and to obtuse intellects, this identification might have been for ever impossible. A strong concentration of mind upon the single peculiarity of mechanical force, and a -degree of indifference to the general aspect of the things themselves,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_602" id="Page_602">[Pg 602]</a></span> +degree of indifference to the general aspect of the things themselves,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_602">[Pg 602]</a></span> must conspire with the intellectual energy of resuscitation by similars, in order to summon together in the view three structures so different. We can see, by an instance like this, how new adaptations of existing @@ -28178,18 +28335,18 @@ to a mechanical education almost as a matter of course. That the discovery was not sooner made supposes that something farther, and not of common occurrence, was necessary; and this additional endowment appears to be the identifying power of Similarity in general; the tendency -to detect likeness in the midst of disparity and disguise. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_603" id="Page_603">[Pg 603]</a></span> +to detect likeness in the midst of disparity and disguise. This<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_603">[Pg 603]</a></span> supposition accounts for the fact, and is consistent with the known intellectual -character of the inventor of the steam-engine."<a name="FNanchor_504_504" id="FNanchor_504_504"></a><a href="#Footnote_504_504" class="fnanchor">[504]</a></p></blockquote> +character of the inventor of the steam-engine."<a id="FNanchor_504_504"></a><a href="#Footnote_504_504" class="fnanchor">[504]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Dr. Hodgson's account of association is by all odds the -best yet propounded in English.<a name="FNanchor_505_505" id="FNanchor_505_505"></a><a href="#Footnote_505_505" class="fnanchor">[505]</a> All these writers hold +best yet propounded in English.<a id="FNanchor_505_505"></a><a href="#Footnote_505_505" class="fnanchor">[505]</a> All these writers hold more or less explicitly to the notion of atomistic 'ideas' which recur. In Germany, the same mythological supposition has been more radically grasped, and carried out to -a still more logical, if more repulsive, extreme, by Herbart<a name="FNanchor_506_506" id="FNanchor_506_506"></a><a href="#Footnote_506_506" class="fnanchor">[506]</a> +a still more logical, if more repulsive, extreme, by Herbart<a id="FNanchor_506_506"></a><a href="#Footnote_506_506" class="fnanchor">[506]</a> and his followers, who until recently may be said to -have reigned almost supreme in their native country.<a name="FNanchor_507_507" id="FNanchor_507_507"></a><a href="#Footnote_507_507" class="fnanchor">[507]</a> +have reigned almost supreme in their native country.<a id="FNanchor_507_507"></a><a href="#Footnote_507_507" class="fnanchor">[507]</a> For Herbart each idea is a permanently existing entity, the entrance whereof into consciousness is but an accidental determination of its being. So far as it succeeds in occupying @@ -28209,12 +28366,12 @@ glib Herbartian jargon about <i>Vorstellungsmassen</i> and their and <i>schweben</i>, and <i>Verschmelzungen</i> and <i>Complexionen</i>. Herr Lipps, the most recent systematic German Psychologist, has, I regret to say, carried out the theory of ideas in a -way which the great originality, learning, and acuteness he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_604" id="Page_604">[Pg 604]</a></span> -shows make only the more regrettable.<a name="FNanchor_508_508" id="FNanchor_508_508"></a><a href="#Footnote_508_508" class="fnanchor">[508]</a> Such elaborately +way which the great originality, learning, and acuteness he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_604">[Pg 604]</a></span> +shows make only the more regrettable.<a id="FNanchor_508_508"></a><a href="#Footnote_508_508" class="fnanchor">[508]</a> Such elaborately artificial constructions are, it seems to me, only a burden -and a hindrance, not a help, to our science.<a name="FNanchor_509_509" id="FNanchor_509_509"></a><a href="#Footnote_509_509" class="fnanchor">[509]</a></p> +and a hindrance, not a help, to our science.<a id="FNanchor_509_509"></a><a href="#Footnote_509_509" class="fnanchor">[509]</a></p> -<p>In French, M. Rabier in his chapter on Association,<a name="FNanchor_510_510" id="FNanchor_510_510"></a><a href="#Footnote_510_510" class="fnanchor">[510]</a> +<p>In French, M. Rabier in his chapter on Association,<a id="FNanchor_510_510"></a><a href="#Footnote_510_510" class="fnanchor">[510]</a> handles the subject more vigorously and acutely than any one. His treatment of it, though short, seems to me for general soundness to rank second only to Hodgson's.</p> @@ -28234,34 +28391,34 @@ of view it would be a true <i>ignoratio elenchi</i> to flatter one's self that one has dealt a heavy blow at the psychology of association, when one has exploded the theory of atomistic ideas, or shown that contiguity and similarity between -ideas can only be there after association is done.<a name="FNanchor_511_511" id="FNanchor_511_511"></a><a href="#Footnote_511_511" class="fnanchor">[511]</a> The +ideas can only be there after association is done.<a id="FNanchor_511_511"></a><a href="#Footnote_511_511" class="fnanchor">[511]</a> The whole body of the associationist psychology remains standing after you have translated 'ideas' into 'objects,' on the one hand, and 'brain-processes' on the other; and the analysis of faculties and operations is as conclusive in these terms as in those traditionally used.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_463_463" id="Footnote_463_463"></a><a href="#FNanchor_463_463"><span class="label">[463]</span></a> The theory propounded in this chapter, and a good many pages of +<p><a id="Footnote_463_463"></a><a href="#FNanchor_463_463"><span class="label">[463]</span></a> The theory propounded in this chapter, and a good many pages of the text, were originally published in the Popular Science Monthly for March, 1880.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_464_464" id="Footnote_464_464"></a><a href="#FNanchor_464_464"><span class="label">[464]</span></a> Compare Renouvier's criticism of associationism in his Essais de +<p><a id="Footnote_464_464"></a><a href="#FNanchor_464_464"><span class="label">[464]</span></a> Compare Renouvier's criticism of associationism in his Essais de Critique générale, Logique, ii, p. 493 foll.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_465_465" id="Footnote_465_465"></a><a href="#FNanchor_465_465"><span class="label">[465]</span></a> Unless the name belong to a rapidly uttered sentence, when no substantive +<p><a id="Footnote_465_465"></a><a href="#FNanchor_465_465"><span class="label">[465]</span></a> Unless the name belong to a rapidly uttered sentence, when no substantive image may have time to arise.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_466_466" id="Footnote_466_466"></a><a href="#FNanchor_466_466"><span class="label">[466]</span></a> In his observations he says that time was lost in mentally taking in +<p><a id="Footnote_466_466"></a><a href="#FNanchor_466_466"><span class="label">[466]</span></a> In his observations he says that time was lost in mentally taking in the word which was the cue, "owing to the quiet unobtrusive way in which I found it necessary to bring it into view, so as not to distract the thoughts. Moreover, a substantive standing by itself is usually the equivalent @@ -28275,21 +28432,21 @@ declares itself more quickly." (Inquiries, etc., p. 190.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_467_467" id="Footnote_467_467"></a><a href="#FNanchor_467_467"><span class="label">[467]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 280 fol.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_467_467"></a><a href="#FNanchor_467_467"><span class="label">[467]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 280 fol.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_468_468" id="Footnote_468_468"></a><a href="#FNanchor_468_468"><span class="label">[468]</span></a> For interesting remarks on the sorts of things associated, in these experiments, +<p><a id="Footnote_468_468"></a><a href="#FNanchor_468_468"><span class="label">[468]</span></a> For interesting remarks on the sorts of things associated, in these experiments, with the prompting word, see Galton, <i>op. cit.</i> pp. 185-203, and Trautscholdt in Wundt's Psychologische Studien, i, 213.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_469_469" id="Footnote_469_469"></a><a href="#FNanchor_469_469"><span class="label">[469]</span></a> Mind, xi, 64-5.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_469_469"></a><a href="#FNanchor_469_469"><span class="label">[469]</span></a> Mind, xi, 64-5.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_470_470" id="Footnote_470_470"></a><a href="#FNanchor_470_470"><span class="label">[470]</span></a> This value is much smaller than that got by Wundt as above. No +<p><a id="Footnote_470_470"></a><a href="#FNanchor_470_470"><span class="label">[470]</span></a> This value is much smaller than that got by Wundt as above. No reason for the difference is suggested by Mr. Cattell. Wundt calls attention to the fact that the figures found by him give an average, 0.720'', exactly equal to the <i>time interval</i> which in his experiments (<i>vide infra</i>, chapter @@ -28326,11 +28483,11 @@ time, on the contrary, is increased in mania.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_471_471" id="Footnote_471_471"></a><a href="#FNanchor_471_471"><span class="label">[471]</span></a> Mind, xii, 67-74.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_471_471"></a><a href="#FNanchor_471_471"><span class="label">[471]</span></a> Mind, xii, 67-74.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_472_472" id="Footnote_472_472"></a><a href="#FNanchor_472_472"><span class="label">[472]</span></a> Compare Bain's law of Association by Contiguity: "Actions, Sensations, +<p><a id="Footnote_472_472"></a><a href="#FNanchor_472_472"><span class="label">[472]</span></a> Compare Bain's law of Association by Contiguity: "Actions, Sensations, and States of Feeling, occurring together or in close succession, tend to grow together, or cohere, in such a way that, when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt to be brought @@ -28346,15 +28503,15 @@ thought.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_473_473" id="Footnote_473_473"></a><a href="#FNanchor_473_473"><span class="label">[473]</span></a> Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th Ed., article Psychology, p. 60. col. 2.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_473_473"></a><a href="#FNanchor_473_473"><span class="label">[473]</span></a> Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th Ed., article Psychology, p. 60. col. 2.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_474_474" id="Footnote_474_474"></a><a href="#FNanchor_474_474"><span class="label">[474]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 300.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_474_474"></a><a href="#FNanchor_474_474"><span class="label">[474]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 300.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_475_475" id="Footnote_475_475"></a><a href="#FNanchor_475_475"><span class="label">[475]</span></a> The difficulty here as with habit <i>überhaupt</i> is in seeing how new +<p><a id="Footnote_475_475"></a><a href="#FNanchor_475_475"><span class="label">[475]</span></a> The difficulty here as with habit <i>überhaupt</i> is in seeing how new paths come <i>first</i> to be formed (cf. above, <a href="#Page_109">p. 109</a>). Experience shows that a new path <i>is</i> formed between centres for sensible impressions whenever these vibrate together or in rapid succession. A child sees a certain bottle @@ -28384,7 +28541,7 @@ enough here to have called attention to it as a serious problem.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_476_476" id="Footnote_476_476"></a><a href="#FNanchor_476_476"><span class="label">[476]</span></a> Essay, bk. ii, chap. xxxiii, § 6. Compare Hume, who, like Locke, +<p><a id="Footnote_476_476"></a><a href="#FNanchor_476_476"><span class="label">[476]</span></a> Essay, bk. ii, chap. xxxiii, § 6. Compare Hume, who, like Locke, only uses the principle to account for unreasonable and obstructive mental associations: </p> @@ -28412,19 +28569,19 @@ was occasion."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_477_477" id="Footnote_477_477"></a><a href="#FNanchor_477_477"><span class="label">[477]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> prop. xi.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_477_477"></a><a href="#FNanchor_477_477"><span class="label">[477]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> prop. xi.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_478_478" id="Footnote_478_478"></a><a href="#FNanchor_478_478"><span class="label">[478]</span></a> See Chapter III, <a href="#Page_82">pp. 82-5</a>.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_478_478"></a><a href="#FNanchor_478_478"><span class="label">[478]</span></a> See Chapter III, <a href="#Page_82">pp. 82-5</a>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_479_479" id="Footnote_479_479"></a><a href="#FNanchor_479_479"><span class="label">[479]</span></a> I strongly advise the student to read his Senses and Intellect, pp. 544-556.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_479_479"></a><a href="#FNanchor_479_479"><span class="label">[479]</span></a> I strongly advise the student to read his Senses and Intellect, pp. 544-556.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_480_480" id="Footnote_480_480"></a><a href="#FNanchor_480_480"><span class="label">[480]</span></a> Time and Space, p. 266. Compare Coleridge: "The true practical +<p><a id="Footnote_480_480"></a><a href="#FNanchor_480_480"><span class="label">[480]</span></a> Time and Space, p. 266. Compare Coleridge: "The true practical general law of association is this: that whatever makes certain parts of a total impression more vivid or distinct than the rest will determine the mind to recall these, in preference to others equally linked together by the common @@ -28434,23 +28591,23 @@ distinctness to any object whatsoever." (Biographia Litteraria, Chap. v.)</p></d <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_481_481" id="Footnote_481_481"></a><a href="#FNanchor_481_481"><span class="label">[481]</span></a> Leviathan, pt. i, chap. iii, <i>init.</i></p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_481_481"></a><a href="#FNanchor_481_481"><span class="label">[481]</span></a> Leviathan, pt. i, chap. iii, <i>init.</i></p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_482_482" id="Footnote_482_482"></a><a href="#FNanchor_482_482"><span class="label">[482]</span></a> I refer to a recency of a few hours. Mr. Galton found that experiences +<p><a id="Footnote_482_482"></a><a href="#FNanchor_482_482"><span class="label">[482]</span></a> I refer to a recency of a few hours. Mr. Galton found that experiences from boyhood and youth were more likely to be suggested by words seen at random than experiences of later years. See his highly interesting account of experiments in his Inquiries into Human Faculty, pp. 191-203.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_483_483" id="Footnote_483_483"></a><a href="#FNanchor_483_483"><span class="label">[483]</span></a> For other instances see Wahle, in Vierteljsch. f. Wiss. Phil., ix, 144-417 +<p><a id="Footnote_483_483"></a><a href="#FNanchor_483_483"><span class="label">[483]</span></a> For other instances see Wahle, in Vierteljsch. f. Wiss. Phil., ix, 144-417 (1885).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_484_484" id="Footnote_484_484"></a><a href="#FNanchor_484_484"><span class="label">[484]</span></a> I retain the title of association by similarity in order not to depart +<p><a id="Footnote_484_484"></a><a href="#FNanchor_484_484"><span class="label">[484]</span></a> I retain the title of association by similarity in order not to depart from common usage. The reader will observe, however, that my nomenclature is not based on the same principle throughout. Impartial redintegration connotes neural processes; similarity is an objective relation perceived @@ -28462,7 +28619,7 @@ to popularity, and to keep the latter well-worn phrase.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_485_485" id="Footnote_485_485"></a><a href="#FNanchor_485_485"><span class="label">[485]</span></a> No one has described this process better than Hobbes: "Sometimes +<p><a id="Footnote_485_485"></a><a href="#FNanchor_485_485"><span class="label">[485]</span></a> No one has described this process better than Hobbes: "Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place and time wherein he misses it, his mind runs back from place to place and time to time to and where and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain and @@ -28477,19 +28634,19 @@ should run over the alphabet to start a rhyme." (Leviathan, 165, p. 10.)</p></di <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_486_486" id="Footnote_486_486"></a><a href="#FNanchor_486_486"><span class="label">[486]</span></a> Theory of Practice, vol. i, p. 394.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_486_486"></a><a href="#FNanchor_486_486"><span class="label">[486]</span></a> Theory of Practice, vol. i, p. 394.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_487_487" id="Footnote_487_487"></a><a href="#FNanchor_487_487"><span class="label">[487]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 394.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_487_487"></a><a href="#FNanchor_487_487"><span class="label">[487]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 394.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_488_488" id="Footnote_488_488"></a><a href="#FNanchor_488_488"><span class="label">[488]</span></a> All association is called redintegration by Hodgson.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_488_488"></a><a href="#FNanchor_488_488"><span class="label">[488]</span></a> All association is called redintegration by Hodgson.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_489_489" id="Footnote_489_489"></a><a href="#FNanchor_489_489"><span class="label">[489]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 400. Compare Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 377. "The outgoings +<p><a id="Footnote_489_489"></a><a href="#FNanchor_489_489"><span class="label">[489]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 400. Compare Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 377. "The outgoings of the mind are necessarily random; the end alone is the thing that is clear to the view, and with that there is a perception of the fitness of every passing suggestion. The volitional energy keeps up the attention on @@ -28498,7 +28655,7 @@ the mind, it springs upon that like a wild beast upon its prey."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_490_490" id="Footnote_490_490"></a><a href="#FNanchor_490_490"><span class="label">[490]</span></a> Compare what is said of the principle of Similarity by F. H. Bradley, +<p><a id="Footnote_490_490"></a><a href="#FNanchor_490_490"><span class="label">[490]</span></a> Compare what is said of the principle of Similarity by F. H. Bradley, Principles of Logic, pp. 294 ff.; E. Rabier, Psychologie, 187 ff.; Paulhan, Critique Philosophique, 2me Série, i, 458; Rabier, <i>ibid.</i> 460; Pillon, <i>ibid.</i> ii, 55; B. P. Bowne, Introduction to Psych. Theory, 92; @@ -28507,7 +28664,7 @@ wiss. Philos., ix, 426-431.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_491_491" id="Footnote_491_491"></a><a href="#FNanchor_491_491"><span class="label">[491]</span></a> Dr. McCosh is accordingly only logical when he sinks similarity in +<p><a id="Footnote_491_491"></a><a href="#FNanchor_491_491"><span class="label">[491]</span></a> Dr. McCosh is accordingly only logical when he sinks similarity in what he calls the <i>Law of Correlation</i>, according to which, when we have discovered <i>a relation between things</i>, the idea of one tends to bring up the others, (Psychology, the Cognitive Powers, p. 130). The relations mentioned @@ -28519,56 +28676,56 @@ to a predominant, place.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_492_492" id="Footnote_492_492"></a><a href="#FNanchor_492_492"><span class="label">[492]</span></a> Cf. Bain, Senses and Intellect, 504 ff.; J. S. Mill, Note 39 to J. Mill's +<p><a id="Footnote_492_492"></a><a href="#FNanchor_492_492"><span class="label">[492]</span></a> Cf. Bain, Senses and Intellect, 504 ff.; J. S. Mill, Note 39 to J. Mill's Analysis; Lipps, Grundtatsachen, 97.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_493_493" id="Footnote_493_493"></a><a href="#FNanchor_493_493"><span class="label">[493]</span></a> See, for farther details, Hamilton's Reid, Appendices D** and D***; +<p><a id="Footnote_493_493"></a><a href="#FNanchor_493_493"><span class="label">[493]</span></a> See, for farther details, Hamilton's Reid, Appendices D** and D***; and L. Ferri, La Psychologie de l'Association (Paris, 1883). Also Robertson, art. Association in Encyclop. Britannica.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_494_494" id="Footnote_494_494"></a><a href="#FNanchor_494_494"><span class="label">[494]</span></a> Treatise of Human nature, part i,. § iv.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_494_494"></a><a href="#FNanchor_494_494"><span class="label">[494]</span></a> Treatise of Human nature, part i,. § iv.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_495_495" id="Footnote_495_495"></a><a href="#FNanchor_495_495"><span class="label">[495]</span></a> Observations on Man (London, 1749).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_495_495"></a><a href="#FNanchor_495_495"><span class="label">[495]</span></a> Observations on Man (London, 1749).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_496_496" id="Footnote_496_496"></a><a href="#FNanchor_496_496"><span class="label">[496]</span></a> Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_496_496"></a><a href="#FNanchor_496_496"><span class="label">[496]</span></a> Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_497_497" id="Footnote_497_497"></a><a href="#FNanchor_497_497"><span class="label">[497]</span></a> Hartley's Theory, 2d ed. (1790) p. xxvii.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_497_497"></a><a href="#FNanchor_497_497"><span class="label">[497]</span></a> Hartley's Theory, 2d ed. (1790) p. xxvii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_498_498" id="Footnote_498_498"></a><a href="#FNanchor_498_498"><span class="label">[498]</span></a> [Current, that is, in France.—W. J.]</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_498_498"></a><a href="#FNanchor_498_498"><span class="label">[498]</span></a> [Current, that is, in France.—W. J.]</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_499_499" id="Footnote_499_499"></a><a href="#FNanchor_499_499"><span class="label">[499]</span></a> La Psychologie Angloise, p. 242.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_499_499"></a><a href="#FNanchor_499_499"><span class="label">[499]</span></a> La Psychologie Angloise, p. 242.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_500_500" id="Footnote_500_500"></a><a href="#FNanchor_500_500"><span class="label">[500]</span></a> Priestley, <i>op. cit.</i> p. xxx.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_500_500"></a><a href="#FNanchor_500_500"><span class="label">[500]</span></a> Priestley, <i>op. cit.</i> p. xxx.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_501_501" id="Footnote_501_501"></a><a href="#FNanchor_501_501"><span class="label">[501]</span></a> Review of Bains's Psychology, by J.S. Mill, in Edinb. Review, Oct. 1, +<p><a id="Footnote_501_501"></a><a href="#FNanchor_501_501"><span class="label">[501]</span></a> Review of Bains's Psychology, by J.S. Mill, in Edinb. Review, Oct. 1, 1859, p. 293.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_502_502" id="Footnote_502_502"></a><a href="#FNanchor_502_502"><span class="label">[502]</span></a> Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, J.S. Mill's edition, +<p><a id="Footnote_502_502"></a><a href="#FNanchor_502_502"><span class="label">[502]</span></a> Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, J.S. Mill's edition, vol. i, p. 111.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_503_503" id="Footnote_503_503"></a><a href="#FNanchor_503_503"><span class="label">[503]</span></a> On the Associability of Relations between Feelings, in Principles of +<p><a id="Footnote_503_503"></a><a href="#FNanchor_503_503"><span class="label">[503]</span></a> On the Associability of Relations between Feelings, in Principles of Psychology, vol. i, p. 259. It is impossible to regard the "cohering of each feeling with previously-experienced feelings of the same class, order, genus, species, and, so far as may be, the same variety," which Spencer calls @@ -28577,20 +28734,20 @@ what is commonly known as Association by similarity.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_504_504" id="Footnote_504_504"></a><a href="#FNanchor_504_504"><span class="label">[504]</span></a> The Senses and the Intellect, pp. 491-3.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_504_504"></a><a href="#FNanchor_504_504"><span class="label">[504]</span></a> The Senses and the Intellect, pp. 491-3.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_505_505" id="Footnote_505_505"></a><a href="#FNanchor_505_505"><span class="label">[505]</span></a> See his Time and Space, chapter v, and his Theory of Practice, §§ 53 +<p><a id="Footnote_505_505"></a><a href="#FNanchor_505_505"><span class="label">[505]</span></a> See his Time and Space, chapter v, and his Theory of Practice, §§ 53 to 57.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_506_506" id="Footnote_506_506"></a><a href="#FNanchor_506_506"><span class="label">[506]</span></a> Psychologie als Wissenschaft (1824), 2.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_506_506"></a><a href="#FNanchor_506_506"><span class="label">[506]</span></a> Psychologie als Wissenschaft (1824), 2.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_507_507" id="Footnote_507_507"></a><a href="#FNanchor_507_507"><span class="label">[507]</span></a> Prof. Ribot, in chapter i of his 'Contemporary German Psychology,' +<p><a id="Footnote_507_507"></a><a href="#FNanchor_507_507"><span class="label">[507]</span></a> Prof. Ribot, in chapter i of his 'Contemporary German Psychology,' has given a good account of Herbart and his school, and of Beneke, his rival and partial analogue. See also two articles on the Herbartian Psychology, by G. F. Stout, in Mind for 1888. J. D. Morrell's Outlines of @@ -28599,32 +28756,32 @@ Beneke. I know of no other English book which does so.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_508_508" id="Footnote_508_508"></a><a href="#FNanchor_508_508"><span class="label">[508]</span></a> See his Grundtatsachen des Bewusstseins (1883), chap. vi <i>et passim</i>, +<p><a id="Footnote_508_508"></a><a href="#FNanchor_508_508"><span class="label">[508]</span></a> See his Grundtatsachen des Bewusstseins (1883), chap. vi <i>et passim</i>, especially pp. 106 ff., 364.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_509_509" id="Footnote_509_509"></a><a href="#FNanchor_509_509"><span class="label">[509]</span></a> The most burdensome and utterly gratuitous of them are perhaps +<p><a id="Footnote_509_509"></a><a href="#FNanchor_509_509"><span class="label">[509]</span></a> The most burdensome and utterly gratuitous of them are perhaps Steinthal's, in his Einleitung in die Psychologie, 2te Aufl. (1881). Cf. also G. Glogau: Steinthal's Psychologische Formeln (1886).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_510_510" id="Footnote_510_510"></a><a href="#FNanchor_510_510"><span class="label">[510]</span></a> Leçons de Philosophie, i. Psychologie, chap. xvi (1884).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_510_510"></a><a href="#FNanchor_510_510"><span class="label">[510]</span></a> Leçons de Philosophie, i. Psychologie, chap. xvi (1884).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_511_511" id="Footnote_511_511"></a><a href="#FNanchor_511_511"><span class="label">[511]</span></a> Mr. F. H. Bradley seems to me to have been guilty of something very +<p><a id="Footnote_511_511"></a><a href="#FNanchor_511_511"><span class="label">[511]</span></a> Mr. F. H. Bradley seems to me to have been guilty of something very like this <i>ignoratio elenchi</i> in the, of course, subtle and witty but decidedly long-winded critique of the association of ideas, contained in book ii, part ii, chap. i, of his Principles of Logic.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_605" id="Page_605">[Pg 605]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_605">[Pg 605]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XV512" id="CHAPTER_XV512">CHAPTER XV.</a><a name="FNanchor_512_512" id="FNanchor_512_512"></a><a href="#Footnote_512_512" class="fnanchor">[512]</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_XV512">CHAPTER XV.</a><a id="FNanchor_512_512"></a><a href="#Footnote_512_512" class="fnanchor">[512]</a></h5> <h4>THE PERCEPTION OF TIME.</h4> @@ -28660,14 +28817,14 @@ of bead-like sensations and images, all separate,</p> <p>"we never could have any knowledge except that of the present instant. The moment each of our sensations ceased it would be gone for ever; -and we should be as if we had never been.... We should be wholly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_606" id="Page_606">[Pg 606]</a></span> +and we should be as if we had never been.... We should be wholly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_606">[Pg 606]</a></span> incapable of acquiring experience.... Even if our ideas were associated in trains, but only as they are in imagination, we should still be without the capacity of acquiring knowledge. One idea, upon this supposition, would follow another. But that would be all. Each of our successive states of consciousness, the moment it ceased, would be gone forever. Each of those momentary states would be our whole -being."<a name="FNanchor_513_513" id="FNanchor_513_513"></a><a href="#Footnote_513_513" class="fnanchor">[513]</a></p></blockquote> +being."<a id="FNanchor_513_513"></a><a href="#Footnote_513_513" class="fnanchor">[513]</a></p></blockquote> <p>We might, nevertheless, under these circumstances, <i>act</i> in a rational way, provided the mechanism which produced @@ -28701,11 +28858,11 @@ lingerings of the past dropping successively away, and the incomings of the future making up the loss. These lingerings of old objects, these incomings of new, are the germs of memory and expectation, the retrospective and the -prospective sense of time. They give that continuity to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_607" id="Page_607">[Pg 607]</a></span> +prospective sense of time. They give that continuity to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_607">[Pg 607]</a></span> consciousness without which it could not be called a -stream.<a name="FNanchor_514_514" id="FNanchor_514_514"></a><a href="#Footnote_514_514" class="fnanchor">[514]</a></p> +stream.<a id="FNanchor_514_514"></a><a href="#Footnote_514_514" class="fnanchor">[514]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_608" id="Page_608">[Pg 608]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_608">[Pg 608]</a></span></p> <h4>THE SENSIBLE PRESENT HAS DURATION.</h4> @@ -28718,7 +28875,7 @@ the instant of becoming. As a poet, quoted by Mr. Hodgson, says,</p> <p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"Le moment où je parle est déjà loin de moi,"</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"Le moment où je parle est déjà loin de moi,"</span><br > </p> <p>and it is only as entering into the living and moving organization @@ -28726,11 +28883,11 @@ of a much wider tract of time that the strict present is apprehended at all. It is, in fact, an altogether ideal abstraction, not only never realized in sense, but probably never even conceived of by those unaccustomed to philosophic -meditation. Reflection leads us to the conclusion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_609" id="Page_609">[Pg 609]</a></span> +meditation. Reflection leads us to the conclusion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_609">[Pg 609]</a></span> that it <i>must</i> exist, but that it <i>does</i> exist can never be a fact of our immediate experience. The only fact of our immediate experience is what Mr. E. R. Clay has well called 'the -<i>specious</i> present.' His words deserve to be quoted in full:<a name="FNanchor_515_515" id="FNanchor_515_515"></a><a href="#Footnote_515_515" class="fnanchor">[515]</a></p> +<i>specious</i> present.' His words deserve to be quoted in full:<a id="FNanchor_515_515"></a><a href="#Footnote_515_515" class="fnanchor">[515]</a></p> <blockquote> @@ -28758,7 +28915,7 @@ but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a <i>duration</i>, with a bow and a stern, as it -were—a rearward- and a forward-looking end.<a name="FNanchor_516_516" id="FNanchor_516_516"></a><a href="#Footnote_516_516" class="fnanchor">[516]</a> It is only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_610" id="Page_610">[Pg 610]</a></span> +were—a rearward- and a forward-looking end.<a id="FNanchor_516_516"></a><a href="#Footnote_516_516" class="fnanchor">[516]</a> It is only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_610">[Pg 610]</a></span> as parts of this <i>duration-block</i> that the relation of <i>succession</i> of one end to the other is perceived. We do not first feel one end and then feel the other after it, and from the perception @@ -28798,7 +28955,7 @@ of the apparatus come in exceedingly rapid order, one is at first much perplexed in deciding what the order is, yet of the fact of its occupancy of time we are never in doubt.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_611" id="Page_611">[Pg 611]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_611">[Pg 611]</a></span></p> <h4>ACCURACY OF OUR ESTIMATE OF SHORT DURATIONS.</h4> @@ -28844,7 +29001,7 @@ work on the time-sense has been done by means of strokes of sound. How long a series of sounds, then, can we group in the mind so as not to confound it with a longer or a shorter series?</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_612" id="Page_612">[Pg 612]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_612">[Pg 612]</a></span></p> <p>Our spontaneous tendency is to break up any monotonously given series of sounds into some sort of a rhythm. We involuntarily accentuate every second, or third, or @@ -28861,7 +29018,7 @@ stanza, "Its second verse differs by so much from that of the first stanza," when but for the felt stanza-form the two differing verses would have come to us too separately to be compared at all. But these superposed systems of rhythm -soon reach their limit. In music, as Wundt<a name="FNanchor_517_517" id="FNanchor_517_517"></a><a href="#Footnote_517_517" class="fnanchor">[517]</a> says, "while +soon reach their limit. In music, as Wundt<a id="FNanchor_517_517"></a><a href="#Footnote_517_517" class="fnanchor">[517]</a> says, "while the measure may easily contain 12 changes of intensity of sound (as in 12/8 time), the rhythmical group may embrace 6 measures, and the period consist of 4, exceptionally of 5 @@ -28871,24 +29028,24 @@ sound (as in 12/8 time), the rhythmical group may embrace experimentally the <i>maximal extent of our immediate distinct consciousness for successive impressions.</i></p> -<p>Wundt found<a name="FNanchor_518_518" id="FNanchor_518_518"></a><a href="#Footnote_518_518" class="fnanchor">[518]</a> that twelve impressions could be distinguished +<p>Wundt found<a id="FNanchor_518_518"></a><a href="#Footnote_518_518" class="fnanchor">[518]</a> that twelve impressions could be distinguished clearly as a united cluster, provided they were caught in a certain rhythm by the mind, and succeeded each other at intervals not smaller than 0.3 and not larger than 0.5 of a second. This makes the total time distinctly apprehended to be equal to from 3.6 to 6 seconds.</p> -<p>Dietze<a name="FNanchor_519_519" id="FNanchor_519_519"></a><a href="#Footnote_519_519" class="fnanchor">[519]</a> gives larger figures. The most favorable intervals +<p>Dietze<a id="FNanchor_519_519"></a><a href="#Footnote_519_519" class="fnanchor">[519]</a> gives larger figures. The most favorable intervals for clearly catching the strokes were when they came at from 0.3 second to 0.18 second apart. <i>Forty</i> strokes might then be remembered as a whole, and identified without error when repeated, provided the mind grasped them in five sub-groups of eight, or in eight sub-groups of five strokes each. -When no grouping of the strokes beyond making <i>couples</i> of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_613" id="Page_613">[Pg 613]</a></span> +When no grouping of the strokes beyond making <i>couples</i> of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_613">[Pg 613]</a></span> them by the attention was allowed—and practically it was found impossible not to group them in at least this simplest of all ways—16 was the largest number that could be clearly -apprehended as a whole.<a name="FNanchor_520_520" id="FNanchor_520_520"></a><a href="#Footnote_520_520" class="fnanchor">[520]</a> This would make 40 times 0.8 +apprehended as a whole.<a id="FNanchor_520_520"></a><a href="#Footnote_520_520" class="fnanchor">[520]</a> This would make 40 times 0.8 second, or 12 seconds, to be the <i>maximum filled duration</i> of which we can be both <i>distinctly and immediately</i> aware.</p> @@ -28896,7 +29053,7 @@ which we can be both <i>distinctly and immediately</i> aware.</p> within the same objective range. Estel and Mehner, also working in Wundt's laboratory, found it to vary from 5 or 6 to 12 seconds, and perhaps more. The differences seemed -due to practice rather than to idiosyncrasy.<a name="FNanchor_521_521" id="FNanchor_521_521"></a><a href="#Footnote_521_521" class="fnanchor">[521]</a></p> +due to practice rather than to idiosyncrasy.<a id="FNanchor_521_521"></a><a href="#Footnote_521_521" class="fnanchor">[521]</a></p> <p>These figures may be roughly taken to stand for the most important part of what, with Mr. Clay, we called, a few @@ -28910,20 +29067,20 @@ amount of duration which we can distinctly feel?</p> <p>The smallest figure experimentally ascertained was by Exner, who distinctly heard the doubleness of two successive -clicks of a Savart's wheel, and of two successive snaps<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_614" id="Page_614">[Pg 614]</a></span> +clicks of a Savart's wheel, and of two successive snaps<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_614">[Pg 614]</a></span> of an electric spark, when their interval was made as small -as about 1/500 of a second.<a name="FNanchor_522_522" id="FNanchor_522_522"></a><a href="#Footnote_522_522" class="fnanchor">[522]</a></p> +as about 1/500 of a second.<a id="FNanchor_522_522"></a><a href="#Footnote_522_522" class="fnanchor">[522]</a></p> <p>With the eye, perception is less delicate. Two sparks, made to fall beside each other in rapid succession on the centre of the retina, ceased to be recognized as successive by -Exner when their interval fell below 0.044''.<a name="FNanchor_523_523" id="FNanchor_523_523"></a><a href="#Footnote_523_523" class="fnanchor">[523]</a></p> +Exner when their interval fell below 0.044''.<a id="FNanchor_523_523"></a><a href="#Footnote_523_523" class="fnanchor">[523]</a></p> <p>Where, as here, the succeeding impressions are only two in number, we can easiest perceive the interval between them. President Hall, who experimented with a modified Savart's wheel, which gave clicks in varying number and at -varying intervals, says:<a name="FNanchor_524_524" id="FNanchor_524_524"></a><a href="#Footnote_524_524" class="fnanchor">[524]</a></p> +varying intervals, says:<a id="FNanchor_524_524"></a><a href="#Footnote_524_524" class="fnanchor">[524]</a></p> <blockquote> @@ -28934,22 +29091,22 @@ interval ... are often confidently pronounced to be two or three respectively. It would be well if observations were so directed as to ascertain, at least up to ten or twenty, the increase [of interval] required by each additional click in a series for the sense of discontinuity -to remain constant throughout."<a name="FNanchor_525_525" id="FNanchor_525_525"></a><a href="#Footnote_525_525" class="fnanchor">[525]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_615" id="Page_615">[Pg 615]</a></span></p> +to remain constant throughout."<a id="FNanchor_525_525"></a><a href="#Footnote_525_525" class="fnanchor">[525]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_615">[Pg 615]</a></span></p> <p>Where the first impression falls on one sense, and the second on another, the perception of the intervening time tends to be less certain and delicate, and it makes a difference -which impression comes first. Thus, Exner found<a name="FNanchor_526_526" id="FNanchor_526_526"></a><a href="#Footnote_526_526" class="fnanchor">[526]</a> +which impression comes first. Thus, Exner found<a id="FNanchor_526_526"></a><a href="#Footnote_526_526" class="fnanchor">[526]</a> the smallest perceptible interval to be, in seconds:</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">From sight to touch</td><td align="left">0.071</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">From touch to sight</td><td align="left">0.053</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">From sight to hearing</td><td align="left">0.16</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">From hearing to sight</td><td align="left">0.06</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">From one ear to another </td><td align="left">0.064</td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">From sight to touch</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.071</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">From touch to sight</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.053</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">From sight to hearing</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.16</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">From hearing to sight</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.06</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">From one ear to another </td><td style="text-align: left;">0.064</td></tr> </table></div> <p><i>To be conscious of a time interval at all is one thing; to @@ -28960,11 +29117,11 @@ The problem is that of the <i>smallest difference between two times</i> which we can perceive.</p> <p>The difference is at its minimum when the times themselves -are very short. Exner,<a name="FNanchor_527_527" id="FNanchor_527_527"></a><a href="#Footnote_527_527" class="fnanchor">[527]</a> reacting as rapidly as possible +are very short. Exner,<a id="FNanchor_527_527"></a><a href="#Footnote_527_527" class="fnanchor">[527]</a> reacting as rapidly as possible with his foot, upon a signal seen by the eye (spark), noted all the reactions which seemed to him either slow or fast in the making. He thought thus that deviations of -about 1/100 of a second either way from the average were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_616" id="Page_616">[Pg 616]</a></span> +about 1/100 of a second either way from the average were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_616">[Pg 616]</a></span> correctly noticed by him at the time. The average was here 0.1840''. Hall and Jastrow listened to the intervals between the clicks of their apparatus. Between two such @@ -28977,7 +29134,7 @@ the fourth and last [repetition of the series] would the judgment incline to the <i>plus</i> or <i>minus</i> side. Inserting the variable between two invariable and like intervals greatly facilitated judgment, which between two unlike terms is far -less accurate."<a name="FNanchor_528_528" id="FNanchor_528_528"></a><a href="#Footnote_528_528" class="fnanchor">[528]</a> Three observers in these experiments +less accurate."<a id="FNanchor_528_528"></a><a href="#Footnote_528_528" class="fnanchor">[528]</a> Three observers in these experiments made no error when the middle interval varied 1/60 from the extremes. When it varied 1/120, errors occurred, but were few. This would make the minimum <i>absolute</i> difference @@ -28988,7 +29145,7 @@ as the times compared grow long. Attempts have been made to ascertain what <i>ratio</i> it bears to the times themselves. According to Fechner's 'Psychophysic Law' it ought always to bear the same ratio. Various observers, -however, have found this not to be the case.<a name="FNanchor_529_529" id="FNanchor_529_529"></a><a href="#Footnote_529_529" class="fnanchor">[529]</a> On the contrary, +however, have found this not to be the case.<a id="FNanchor_529_529"></a><a href="#Footnote_529_529" class="fnanchor">[529]</a> On the contrary, very interesting <i>oscillations</i> in the accuracy of judgment and in the direction of the error—oscillations dependent upon the absolute amount of the times compared—have @@ -28999,32 +29156,32 @@ question. Of these a brief account may be given.</p> with there will be found what Vierordt calls an</i> '<span class="smcap">indifference-point</span>;' that is to say, an interval which we judge with maximum accuracy, a time which we tend to estimate as neither -longer or shorter than it really is, and away from which,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_617" id="Page_617">[Pg 617]</a></span> -in both directions, errors increase their size.<a name="FNanchor_530_530" id="FNanchor_530_530"></a><a href="#Footnote_530_530" class="fnanchor">[530]</a> This time +longer or shorter than it really is, and away from which,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_617">[Pg 617]</a></span> +in both directions, errors increase their size.<a id="FNanchor_530_530"></a><a href="#Footnote_530_530" class="fnanchor">[530]</a> This time varies from one observer to another, but its average is remarkably -constant, as the following table shows.<a name="FNanchor_531_531" id="FNanchor_531_531"></a><a href="#Footnote_531_531" class="fnanchor">[531]</a></p> +constant, as the following table shows.<a id="FNanchor_531_531"></a><a href="#Footnote_531_531" class="fnanchor">[531]</a></p> <p>The times, noted by the ear, and the average indifference-points (given in seconds) were, for—</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Wundt<a name="FNanchor_532_532" id="FNanchor_532_532"></a><a href="#Footnote_532_532" class="fnanchor">[532]</a></td><td align="left">0.72</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Kollert<a name="FNanchor_533_533" id="FNanchor_533_533"></a><a href="#Footnote_533_533" class="fnanchor">[533]</a> </td><td align="left">0.75</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Estel (probably)</td><td align="left">0.75</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Mehner </td><td align="left">0.71</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Stevens<a name="FNanchor_534_534" id="FNanchor_534_534"></a><a href="#Footnote_534_534" class="fnanchor">[534]</a> </td><td align="left">0.71</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Mach<a name="FNanchor_535_535" id="FNanchor_535_535"></a><a href="#Footnote_535_535" class="fnanchor">[535]</a> </td><td align="left">0.35</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Buccola (about)<a name="FNanchor_536_536" id="FNanchor_536_536"></a><a href="#Footnote_536_536" class="fnanchor">[536]</a> </td><td align="left">0.40</td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Wundt<a id="FNanchor_532_532"></a><a href="#Footnote_532_532" class="fnanchor">[532]</a></td><td style="text-align: left;">0.72</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Kollert<a id="FNanchor_533_533"></a><a href="#Footnote_533_533" class="fnanchor">[533]</a> </td><td style="text-align: left;">0.75</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Estel (probably)</td><td style="text-align: left;">0.75</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Mehner </td><td style="text-align: left;">0.71</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Stevens<a id="FNanchor_534_534"></a><a href="#Footnote_534_534" class="fnanchor">[534]</a> </td><td style="text-align: left;">0.71</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Mach<a id="FNanchor_535_535"></a><a href="#Footnote_535_535" class="fnanchor">[535]</a> </td><td style="text-align: left;">0.35</td></tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;">Buccola (about)<a id="FNanchor_536_536"></a><a href="#Footnote_536_536" class="fnanchor">[536]</a> </td><td style="text-align: left;">0.40</td></tr> </table></div> <p>The odd thing about these figures is the recurrence they -show in so many men of about three fourths of a second,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_618" id="Page_618">[Pg 618]</a></span> +show in so many men of about three fourths of a second,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_618">[Pg 618]</a></span> as the interval of time most easy to catch and reproduce, Odder still, both Estel and Mehner found that <i>multiples</i> of this time were more accurately reproduced than the time-intervals -of intermediary length;<a name="FNanchor_537_537" id="FNanchor_537_537"></a><a href="#Footnote_537_537" class="fnanchor">[537]</a> and Glass found a certain +of intermediary length;<a id="FNanchor_537_537"></a><a href="#Footnote_537_537" class="fnanchor">[537]</a> and Glass found a certain periodicity, with the constant increment of 1.25 sec., in his observations. There would seem thus to exist something like a periodic or rhythmic sharpening of our time-sense, of @@ -29039,35 +29196,35 @@ was the case.</p> <p>Like other senses, too, <i>our sense of time is sharpened by practice</i>. Mehner ascribes almost all the discrepancies -between other observers and himself to this cause alone.<a name="FNanchor_538_538" id="FNanchor_538_538"></a><a href="#Footnote_538_538" class="fnanchor">[538]</a></p> +between other observers and himself to this cause alone.<a id="FNanchor_538_538"></a><a href="#Footnote_538_538" class="fnanchor">[538]</a></p> <p><i>Tracts of time filled</i> (with clicks of sound) <i>seem longer than vacant ones</i> of the same duration, when the latter -does not exceed a second or two.<a name="FNanchor_539_539" id="FNanchor_539_539"></a><a href="#Footnote_539_539" class="fnanchor">[539]</a> This, which reminds +does not exceed a second or two.<a id="FNanchor_539_539"></a><a href="#Footnote_539_539" class="fnanchor">[539]</a> This, which reminds one of what happens with spaces seen by the eye, becomes reversed when longer times are taken. It is, perhaps, in accordance with this law that a <i>loud</i> sound, limiting a short interval of time, makes it appear longer, a <i>slight</i> sound shorter. In comparing intervals marked out by sounds, -we must take care to keep the sounds uniform.<a name="FNanchor_540_540" id="FNanchor_540_540"></a><a href="#Footnote_540_540" class="fnanchor">[540]</a></p> +we must take care to keep the sounds uniform.<a id="FNanchor_540_540"></a><a href="#Footnote_540_540" class="fnanchor">[540]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>There is a certain emotional <i>feeling</i> accompanying the intervals of time, as is well known in music. <i>The sense of haste goes with one measure of rapidity, that of delay with another;</i> and these two feelings harmonize with different mental moods. Vierordt listened to series of strokes performed -by a metronome at rates varying from 40 to 200 a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_619" id="Page_619">[Pg 619]</a></span> +by a metronome at rates varying from 40 to 200 a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_619">[Pg 619]</a></span> minute, and found that they very naturally fell into seven -categories, from 'very slow' to 'very fast.'<a name="FNanchor_541_541" id="FNanchor_541_541"></a><a href="#Footnote_541_541" class="fnanchor">[541]</a> Each category +categories, from 'very slow' to 'very fast.'<a id="FNanchor_541_541"></a><a href="#Footnote_541_541" class="fnanchor">[541]</a> Each category of feeling included the intervals following each other within a certain range of speed, and no others. This is a qualitative, not a quantitative judgment—an æsthetic judgment, in fact. The middle category, of speed that was neutral, or, as he calls it, 'adequate,' contained intervals that were grouped about 0.62 second, and Vierordt says that this -made what one might almost call an <i>agreeable</i> time.<a name="FNanchor_542_542" id="FNanchor_542_542"></a><a href="#Footnote_542_542" class="fnanchor">[542]</a></p> +made what one might almost call an <i>agreeable</i> time.<a id="FNanchor_542_542"></a><a href="#Footnote_542_542" class="fnanchor">[542]</a></p> <p>The feeling of time and accent in music, of rhythm, is quite independent of that of melody. Tunes with marked @@ -29099,7 +29256,7 @@ quoted, is due to the <i>filling</i> of the time, and to our <i>memory</i> of a content which it had a moment previous, and which we feel to agree or disagree with its content now.</p> -<p>It takes but a small exertion of introspection to show<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_620" id="Page_620">[Pg 620]</a></span> +<p>It takes but a small exertion of introspection to show<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_620">[Pg 620]</a></span> that the latter alternative is the true one, and that <i>we can no more intuit a duration than we can intuit an extension, devoid of all sensible content</i>. Just as with closed eyes we @@ -29124,15 +29281,15 @@ on which our perception of time's flow depends; but there exists no reason to suppose that empty time's own changes are sufficient for the awareness of change to be aroused. The change must be of some concrete sort—an outward -or inward sensible series, or a process of attention or volition.<a name="FNanchor_543_543" id="FNanchor_543_543"></a><a href="#Footnote_543_543" class="fnanchor">[543]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_621" id="Page_621">[Pg 621]</a></span></p> +or inward sensible series, or a process of attention or volition.<a id="FNanchor_543_543"></a><a href="#Footnote_543_543" class="fnanchor">[543]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_621">[Pg 621]</a></span></p> <p>And here again we have an analogy with space. The earliest form of distinct space-perception is undoubtedly that of a movement over some one of our sensitive surfaces, and this movement is originally given as a simple whole of feeling, and is only decomposed into its elements—successive positions successively occupied by the moving body—when -our education in discrimination is much advanced.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_622" id="Page_622">[Pg 622]</a></span> +our education in discrimination is much advanced.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_622">[Pg 622]</a></span> But a movement is a change, a process; so we see that in the time-world and the space-world alike the first known things are not elements, but combinations, not separate @@ -29161,14 +29318,14 @@ same!' The case stands no otherwise with time.</p> <p>After a small number of beats our impression of the amount we have told off becomes quite vague. Our only way of knowing it accurately is by counting, or noticing the -clock, or through some other symbolic conception.<a name="FNanchor_544_544" id="FNanchor_544_544"></a><a href="#Footnote_544_544" class="fnanchor">[544]</a> When +clock, or through some other symbolic conception.<a id="FNanchor_544_544"></a><a href="#Footnote_544_544" class="fnanchor">[544]</a> When the times exceed hours or days, the conception is absolutely symbolic. We think of the amount we mean either solely as a <i>name</i>, or by running over a few salient <i>dates</i> therein, with no pretence of imagining the full durations that lie between them. No one has anything like a <i>perception</i> of the greater length of the time between now and the first century -than of that between now and the tenth. To an historian,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_623" id="Page_623">[Pg 623]</a></span> +than of that between now and the tenth. To an historian,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_623">[Pg 623]</a></span> it is true, the longer interval will suggest a host of additional dates and events, and so appear a more <i>multitudinous</i> thing. And for the same reason most people will think they directly @@ -29179,8 +29336,8 @@ the past week. But there is properly no comparative time I am sure that this is so, even where the times compared are no more than an hour or so in length. It is the same with Spaces of many miles, which we always compare with -each other by the numbers which measure them.<a name="FNanchor_545_545" id="FNanchor_545_545"></a><a href="#Footnote_545_545" class="fnanchor">[545]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_624" id="Page_624">[Pg 624]</a></span></p> +each other by the numbers which measure them.<a id="FNanchor_545_545"></a><a href="#Footnote_545_545" class="fnanchor">[545]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_624">[Pg 624]</a></span></p> <p>From this we pass naturally to speak of certain familial variations in our estimation of lengths of time. <i>In general, a time filled with varied and interesting experiences seems @@ -29205,7 +29362,7 @@ without becoming dizzy—at any rate not now. And yet again, when I look at the village, at the church-tower, it seems as if I could hardly have been seven days away."</p></blockquote> -<p>Prof. Lazarus<a name="FNanchor_546_546" id="FNanchor_546_546"></a><a href="#Footnote_546_546" class="fnanchor">[546]</a> (from whom I borrow this quotation), +<p>Prof. Lazarus<a id="FNanchor_546_546"></a><a href="#Footnote_546_546" class="fnanchor">[546]</a> (from whom I borrow this quotation), thus explains both of these contrasted illusions by our principle of the awakened memories being multitudinous or few:</p> @@ -29219,7 +29376,7 @@ and violent motion, not in chronologic order, or from chronologic motives, but suggesting each other by all sorts of connections—arise massive images of all his rich vagabondage and roving life. They roll and wave confusedly together, first perhaps one from the first year, -then from the sixth, soon from the second, again from the fifth, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_625" id="Page_625">[Pg 625]</a></span> +then from the sixth, soon from the second, again from the fifth, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_625">[Pg 625]</a></span> first, etc., until it seems as if seventy years must have been there, and he reels with the fulness of his vision.... Then the inner eye turns away from all this past. The outer one turns to the village, especially @@ -29242,7 +29399,7 @@ any one remember his last eight or ten school years: it is the space of a century. Compare with them the last eight or ten years of life: it is the space of an hour."</p></blockquote> -<p>So writes Prof. Paul Janet,<a name="FNanchor_547_547" id="FNanchor_547_547"></a><a href="#Footnote_547_547" class="fnanchor">[547]</a> and gives a solution which can +<p>So writes Prof. Paul Janet,<a id="FNanchor_547_547"></a><a href="#Footnote_547_547" class="fnanchor">[547]</a> and gives a solution which can hardly be said to diminish the mystery. There is a law, he says, by which the apparent length of an interval at a given epoch of a man's life is proportional to the total length of @@ -29264,7 +29421,7 @@ experience into automatic routine which we hardly note at all, the days and the weeks smooth themselves out in recollection to contentless units, and the years grow hollow and collapse.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_626" id="Page_626">[Pg 626]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_626">[Pg 626]</a></span></p> <p>So much for the apparent shortening of tracts of time in <i>retrospect</i>. They shorten <i>in passing</i> whenever we are so fully occupied with their content as not to note the actual @@ -29279,7 +29436,7 @@ to the passage of the time itself. Expecting, and being ready for, a new impression to succeed; when it fails to come, we get an empty time instead of it; and such experiences, ceaselessly renewed, make us most formidably aware -of the extent of the mere time itself.<a name="FNanchor_548_548" id="FNanchor_548_548"></a><a href="#Footnote_548_548" class="fnanchor">[548]</a> Close your eyes and +of the extent of the mere time itself.<a id="FNanchor_548_548"></a><a href="#Footnote_548_548" class="fnanchor">[548]</a> Close your eyes and simply wait to hear somebody tell you that a minute has elapsed. The full length of your leisure with it seems incredible. You engulf yourself into its bowels as into those @@ -29292,9 +29449,9 @@ successive subdivision. The <i>odiousness</i> of the whole experience comes from its insipidity; for <i>stimulation</i> is the indispensable requisite for pleasure in an experience, and the feeling of bare time is the least stimulating experience we -can have.<a name="FNanchor_549_549" id="FNanchor_549_549"></a><a href="#Footnote_549_549" class="fnanchor">[549]</a> The sensation of tæedium is a <i>protest</i>, says +can have.<a id="FNanchor_549_549"></a><a href="#Footnote_549_549" class="fnanchor">[549]</a> The sensation of tæedium is a <i>protest</i>, says Volkmann, against the entire present.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_627" id="Page_627">[Pg 627]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_627">[Pg 627]</a></span></p> <p>Exactly parallel variations occur in our consciousness of space. A road we walk back over, hoping to find at each step an object we have dropped, seems to us longer than @@ -29302,7 +29459,7 @@ when we walked over it the other way. A space we measure by pacing appears longer than one we traverse with no thought of its length. And in general an amount of space attended to in itself leaves with us more impression of spaciousness -than one of which we only note the content.<a name="FNanchor_550_550" id="FNanchor_550_550"></a><a href="#Footnote_550_550" class="fnanchor">[550]</a></p> +than one of which we only note the content.<a id="FNanchor_550_550"></a><a href="#Footnote_550_550" class="fnanchor">[550]</a></p> <p>I do not say that <i>everything</i> in these fluctuations of estimate can be accounted for by the time's content being @@ -29326,7 +29483,7 @@ that neither light nor sound <i>copy</i> or <i>mirror</i> the ether- or air-waves; they represent them only symbolically. The <i>only</i> case, says Helmholtz, in which such copying occurs, and in which</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_628" id="Page_628">[Pg 628]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_628">[Pg 628]</a></span></p> <blockquote> <p>"our perceptions can truly correspond with outer reality, is that of @@ -29337,7 +29494,7 @@ place in time, so that the time-relations of the latter can furnish a true copy of those of the former. The sensation of the thunder follows the sensation of the lightning just as the sonorous convulsing of the air by the electric discharge reaches the observer's place later than that of the -luminiferous ether."<a name="FNanchor_551_551" id="FNanchor_551_551"></a><a href="#Footnote_551_551" class="fnanchor">[551]</a></p></blockquote> +luminiferous ether."<a id="FNanchor_551_551"></a><a href="#Footnote_551_551" class="fnanchor">[551]</a></p></blockquote> <p>One experiences an almost instinctive impulse, in pursuing such reflections as these, to follow them to a sort of @@ -29360,13 +29517,13 @@ by the mind.</p> <p>This philosophy is unfortunately too crude. Even though we <i>were</i> to conceive the outer successions as forces stamping their image on the brain, and the brain's successions -as forces stamping their image on the mind,<a name="FNanchor_552_552" id="FNanchor_552_552"></a><a href="#Footnote_552_552" class="fnanchor">[552]</a> still, +as forces stamping their image on the mind,<a id="FNanchor_552_552"></a><a href="#Footnote_552_552" class="fnanchor">[552]</a> still, between the mind's own changes <i>being</i> successive, and <i>knowing their own succession</i>, lies as broad a chasm as between the object and subject of any case of cognition in the world. <i>A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. And since, to our successive feelings, a feeling -of their own succession is added, that must be treated as an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_629" id="Page_629">[Pg 629]</a></span> +of their own succession is added, that must be treated as an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_629">[Pg 629]</a></span> additional fact requiring its own special elucidation,</i> which this talk about outer time-relations stamping copies of themselves within, leaves all untouched.</p> @@ -29395,7 +29552,7 @@ as merely the thinking of A and the thinking of B are there. In short, when we look at the matter sharply, we come to this antithesis, that if <i>A</i> and B are to be represented <i>as occurring in succession</i> they must be <i>simultaneously represented</i>; if we are to think <i>of</i> them as one after the -other, we must <i>think</i> them both at once."<a name="FNanchor_553_553" id="FNanchor_553_553"></a><a href="#Footnote_553_553" class="fnanchor">[553]</a></p></blockquote> +other, we must <i>think</i> them both at once."<a id="FNanchor_553_553"></a><a href="#Footnote_553_553" class="fnanchor">[553]</a></p></blockquote> <p>If we represent the actual time-stream of our thinking by an horizontal line, the thought <i>of</i> the stream or of any @@ -29414,7 +29571,7 @@ the Encyclopædia Britannica, page 64. He says:</p> <p>"We may, if we represent succession as a line, represent simultaneity as a second line at right angles to the first; empty time—or time-length without time-breadth, we may say—is a mere abstraction. -Now, it is with the former line that we have to do in treating of time<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_630" id="Page_630">[Pg 630]</a></span> +Now, it is with the former line that we have to do in treating of time<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_630">[Pg 630]</a></span> as it is, and with the latter in treating of our intuition of time, where, just as in a perspective representation of distance, we are confined to lines in a plane at right angles to the actual line of depth. In a succession @@ -29437,7 +29594,7 @@ not more than that of a minute or so), we must suppose that passing instant of consciousness</i> by virtue of some fairly constant feature in the brain-process to which the consciousness is tied. <i>This feature of the brain-process, whatever it be, -must be the cause of our perceiving the fact of time at all.</i><a name="FNanchor_554_554" id="FNanchor_554_554"></a><a href="#Footnote_554_554" class="fnanchor">[554]</a> The +must be the cause of our perceiving the fact of time at all.</i><a id="FNanchor_554_554"></a><a href="#Footnote_554_554" class="fnanchor">[554]</a> The duration thus steadily perceived is hardly more than the 'specious present,' as it was called a few pages back. Its <i>content</i> is in a constant flux, events dawning into its forward @@ -29455,13 +29612,13 @@ it has once completely dropped out of the rearward end of the specious present, is an entirely different psychic fact from its direct perception in the specious present as a thing immediately past. A creature might be entirely devoid of -<i>reproductive</i> memory, and yet have the time-sense; but the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_631" id="Page_631">[Pg 631]</a></span> +<i>reproductive</i> memory, and yet have the time-sense; but the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_631">[Pg 631]</a></span> latter would be limited, in his case, to the few seconds immediately passing by. Time older than that he would never recall. I assume reproduction in the text, because I am speaking of human beings who notoriously possess it. Thus memory gets strewn with <i>dated</i> things—dated in the sense -of being before or after each other.<a name="FNanchor_555_555" id="FNanchor_555_555"></a><a href="#Footnote_555_555" class="fnanchor">[555]</a> The date of a thing +of being before or after each other.<a id="FNanchor_555_555"></a><a href="#Footnote_555_555" class="fnanchor">[555]</a> The date of a thing is a mere relation of <i>before</i> or <i>after</i> the present thing or some past or future thing. Some things we date simply by mentally tossing them into the past or future <i>direction</i>. So in @@ -29469,7 +29626,7 @@ space we think of England as simply to the eastward, of Charleston as lying south. But, again, we may date an event exactly, by fitting it between two terms of a past or future series explicitly conceived, just as we may accurately think -of England or Charleston being just so many miles away.<a name="FNanchor_556_556" id="FNanchor_556_556"></a><a href="#Footnote_556_556" class="fnanchor">[556]</a></p> +of England or Charleston being just so many miles away.<a id="FNanchor_556_556"></a><a href="#Footnote_556_556" class="fnanchor">[556]</a></p> <p>The things and events thus vaguely or exactly dated become thenceforward those signs and symbols of longer @@ -29480,7 +29637,7 @@ paragon and prototype of all conceived times is the specious present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible.</i></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_632" id="Page_632">[Pg 632]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_632">[Pg 632]</a></span></p> <h4>TO WHAT CEREBRAL PROCESS IS THE SENSE OF TIME DUE?</h4> @@ -29494,14 +29651,14 @@ feeling which all other elements of neural activity bear to their psychic products, be the latter what they may. Several suggestions have been made as to what the element is in the case of time. Treating of them in a -note,<a name="FNanchor_557_557" id="FNanchor_557_557"></a><a href="#Footnote_557_557" class="fnanchor">[557]</a> I will try to express briefly the only conclusion which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_633" id="Page_633">[Pg 633]</a></span> +note,<a id="FNanchor_557_557"></a><a href="#Footnote_557_557" class="fnanchor">[557]</a> I will try to express briefly the only conclusion which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_633">[Pg 633]</a></span> seems to emerge from a study of them and of the facts—unripe though that conclusion be.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_634" id="Page_634">[Pg 634]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_634">[Pg 634]</a></span></p> <p>The phenomena of 'summation of stimuli' in the nervous -system prove that each stimulus leaves some latent activity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_635" id="Page_635">[Pg 635]</a></span> +system prove that each stimulus leaves some latent activity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_635">[Pg 635]</a></span> behind it which only gradually passes away. (See above, <a href="#Page_82">pp. 82-85</a>.) Psychological proof of the same fact is afforded by those 'after-images' which we perceive when a @@ -29523,10 +29680,10 @@ The</i> <span class="smcap">amount of the overlapping</span> <i>determines the f duration depends on just</i> <span class="smcap">what processes</span> <i>the overlapping processes are.</i> We know so little of the intimate nature of the brain's activity that even where a sensation monotonously -endures, we cannot say that the earlier moments of it do<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_636" id="Page_636">[Pg 636]</a></span> +endures, we cannot say that the earlier moments of it do<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_636">[Pg 636]</a></span> not leave fading processes behind which coexist with those of the present moment. <i>Duration and events together form -our intuition of the specious present with its content.</i><a name="FNanchor_558_558" id="FNanchor_558_558"></a><a href="#Footnote_558_558" class="fnanchor">[558]</a> <i>Why</i> +our intuition of the specious present with its content.</i><a id="FNanchor_558_558"></a><a href="#Footnote_558_558" class="fnanchor">[558]</a> <i>Why</i> such an intuition should result from such a combination of brain-processes I do not pretend to say. All I aim at is to state the most <i>elemental</i> form of the psycho-physical conjunction.</p> @@ -29545,7 +29702,7 @@ a sight and a sound—are given at once or nearly at once, we have difficulty in attending to both, and may wrongly judge their interval, or even invert their order. Now, as the result of his experiments on such stimuli. -Wundt lays down this law:<a name="FNanchor_559_559" id="FNanchor_559_559"></a><a href="#Footnote_559_559" class="fnanchor">[559]</a> that of the three possible determinations +Wundt lays down this law:<a id="FNanchor_559_559"></a><a href="#Footnote_559_559" class="fnanchor">[559]</a> that of the three possible determinations we may make of their order—</p> <blockquote> @@ -29557,7 +29714,7 @@ notice a shorter or longer empty time between them, <i>which seems to correspond to the sinking of one of the ideas and to the rise of the other</i>.... For our attention may share itself equally between the two impressions, which will then compose one total percept [and be -simultaneously felt]; or it may be so adapted to one event as to cause<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_637" id="Page_637">[Pg 637]</a></span> +simultaneously felt]; or it may be so adapted to one event as to cause<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_637">[Pg 637]</a></span> it to be perceived immediately, and then the second event can be perceived only after a certain time of latency, during which the attention reaches its effective maximum for it and diminishes for the first event. @@ -29565,7 +29722,7 @@ In this case the events are perceived as <i>two</i>, and in successive order&mda is, as separated by a time-interval in which attention is not sufficiently accommodated to either to bring a distinct perception about.... While we are hurrying from one to the other, everything between them -vanishes in the twilight of general consciousness."<a name="FNanchor_560_560" id="FNanchor_560_560"></a><a href="#Footnote_560_560" class="fnanchor">[560]</a></p></blockquote> +vanishes in the twilight of general consciousness."<a id="FNanchor_560_560"></a><a href="#Footnote_560_560" class="fnanchor">[560]</a></p></blockquote> <p>One might call this the <i>law of discontinuous succession in time, of percepts to which we cannot easily attend at once.</i> Each @@ -29576,7 +29733,7 @@ If our theory of the time-feeling be true, empty time <i>must</i> then subjectively appear to separate the two percepts, no matter how close together they may objectively be; for, according to that theory, the feeling of a time-duration is -the immediate effect of such an overlapping of brain-processes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_638" id="Page_638">[Pg 638]</a></span> +the immediate effect of such an overlapping of brain-processes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_638">[Pg 638]</a></span> of different phase—wherever and from whatever cause it may occur.</p> @@ -29600,7 +29757,7 @@ other experiences indefinitely remote.</p> <p>The number of these direct experiences which the specious present and immediately-intuited past may embrace measures the extent of our 'primary,' as Exner calls -it, or, as Richet calls it, of our 'elementary' memory.<a name="FNanchor_561_561" id="FNanchor_561_561"></a><a href="#Footnote_561_561" class="fnanchor">[561]</a> The +it, or, as Richet calls it, of our 'elementary' memory.<a id="FNanchor_561_561"></a><a href="#Footnote_561_561" class="fnanchor">[561]</a> The sensation resultant from the overlapping is that of the duration which the experiences seem to fill. As is the number of any larger set of events to that of these experiences, @@ -29614,12 +29771,12 @@ changes changed states of consciousness may correspond. But however <i>long we may conceive</i> a space of time to be, the objective amount of it which is <i>directly perceived</i> at any one moment by us can never exceed the scope of our 'primary -memory' at the moment in question.<a name="FNanchor_562_562" id="FNanchor_562_562"></a><a href="#Footnote_562_562" class="fnanchor">[562]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_639" id="Page_639">[Pg 639]</a></span></p> +memory' at the moment in question.<a id="FNanchor_562_562"></a><a href="#Footnote_562_562" class="fnanchor">[562]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_639">[Pg 639]</a></span></p> <p>We have every reason to think that creatures may possibly differ enormously in the amounts of duration which they intuitively feel, and in the fineness of the events that may -fill it. Von Bær has indulged<a name="FNanchor_563_563" id="FNanchor_563_563"></a><a href="#Footnote_563_563" class="fnanchor">[563]</a> in some interesting computations +fill it. Von Bær has indulged<a id="FNanchor_563_563"></a><a href="#Footnote_563_563" class="fnanchor">[563]</a> in some interesting computations of the effect of such differences in changing the aspect of Nature. Suppose we were able, within the length of a second, to note 10,000 events distinctly, instead of barely @@ -29648,7 +29805,7 @@ rash to deny.</p> <blockquote> -<p>"A gnat's wings," says Mr Spencer,<a name="FNanchor_564_564" id="FNanchor_564_564"></a><a href="#Footnote_564_564" class="fnanchor">[564]</a> "make ten or fifteen thousand +<p>"A gnat's wings," says Mr Spencer,<a id="FNanchor_564_564"></a><a href="#Footnote_564_564" class="fnanchor">[564]</a> "make ten or fifteen thousand strokes a second. Each stroke implies a separate nervous action. Each such nervous action or change in a nervous centre is probably as appreciable by the gnat as is a quick movement of his arm by a man. @@ -29658,7 +29815,7 @@ case, must seem much longer than in the other case, when measured by one movement."</p></blockquote> <p>In hashish-intoxication there is a curious increase in the -apparent time-perspective. We utter a sentence, and ere<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_640" id="Page_640">[Pg 640]</a></span> +apparent time-perspective. We utter a sentence, and ere<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_640">[Pg 640]</a></span> the end is reached the beginning seems already to date from indefinitely long ago. We enter a short street, and it is as if we should never get to the end of it. This alteration @@ -29691,14 +29848,14 @@ loses all intuitive sense of the whence and whither of its path. Express acts of memory replace rapid bird's-eye views. In my own case, something like this occurs in extreme fatigue. Long illnesses produce it. Occasionally, it -appears to accompany aphasia.<a name="FNanchor_565_565" id="FNanchor_565_565"></a><a href="#Footnote_565_565" class="fnanchor">[565]</a> It would be vain to seek<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_641" id="Page_641">[Pg 641]</a></span> +appears to accompany aphasia.<a id="FNanchor_565_565"></a><a href="#Footnote_565_565" class="fnanchor">[565]</a> It would be vain to seek<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_641">[Pg 641]</a></span> to imagine the exact brain-change in any of these cases But we must admit the possibility that to some extent the variations of time-estimate between youth and age, and excitement and <i>ennui</i>, are due to such causes, more immediate than to the one we assigned some time ago.</p> -<p><i>But whether our feeling of the time which immediately-past</i><a name="FNanchor_566_566" id="FNanchor_566_566"></a><a href="#Footnote_566_566" class="fnanchor">[566]</a> +<p><i>But whether our feeling of the time which immediately-past</i><a id="FNanchor_566_566"></a><a href="#Footnote_566_566" class="fnanchor">[566]</a> <i>events have filled be of something long or of something short, it is not what it is because those events are past,</i> but <i>because they have left behind them processes which are present. To those processes, @@ -29713,7 +29870,7 @@ up a process additional to these. The processes would overlap; and the new-created man would unquestionably have the feeling, at the very primal instant of his life, of having been in existence already some little space of time.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_642" id="Page_642">[Pg 642]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_642">[Pg 642]</a></span></p> <p>Let me sum up, now, by saying that we are constantly conscious of a certain duration—the specious present—varying in length from a few seconds to probably not more than a @@ -29734,20 +29891,20 @@ phase—fluctuates; and hence a certain range of variation in the amount of the intuition, and in its subdivisibility, accrues.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_512_512" id="Footnote_512_512"></a><a href="#FNanchor_512_512"><span class="label">[512]</span></a> This chapter is reprinted almost verbatim from the Journal of Speculative +<p><a id="Footnote_512_512"></a><a href="#FNanchor_512_512"><span class="label">[512]</span></a> This chapter is reprinted almost verbatim from the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. xx, p. 374.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_513_513" id="Footnote_513_513"></a><a href="#FNanchor_513_513"><span class="label">[513]</span></a> James Mill, Analysis, vol. x, p. 319 (J. S. Mill's edition).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_513_513"></a><a href="#FNanchor_513_513"><span class="label">[513]</span></a> James Mill, Analysis, vol. x, p. 319 (J. S. Mill's edition).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_514_514" id="Footnote_514_514"></a><a href="#FNanchor_514_514"><span class="label">[514]</span></a> "What I find, when I look at consciousness at all, is, that what I cannot +<p><a id="Footnote_514_514"></a><a href="#FNanchor_514_514"><span class="label">[514]</span></a> "What I find, when I look at consciousness at all, is, that what I cannot divest myself of, or not have in consciousness, if I have consciousness at all, is a sequence of different feelings.... The simultaneous perception of both sub-feelings, whether as parts of a coexistence or of a sequence, @@ -29835,11 +29992,11 @@ of the manner in which it comes about</i>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_515_515" id="Footnote_515_515"></a><a href="#FNanchor_515_515"><span class="label">[515]</span></a> The Alternative, p. 167.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_515_515"></a><a href="#FNanchor_515_515"><span class="label">[515]</span></a> The Alternative, p. 167.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_516_516" id="Footnote_516_516"></a><a href="#FNanchor_516_516"><span class="label">[516]</span></a> Locke, in his dim way, derived the sense of duration from reflection +<p><a id="Footnote_516_516"></a><a href="#FNanchor_516_516"><span class="label">[516]</span></a> Locke, in his dim way, derived the sense of duration from reflection on the succession of our ideas (Essay, book ii, chap. xiv, § 3; chap. xv, § 12). Reid justly remarks that if ten successive elements are to make duration, "then one must make duration, otherwise duration must be @@ -29860,19 +30017,19 @@ indépendante."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_517_517" id="Footnote_517_517"></a><a href="#FNanchor_517_517"><span class="label">[517]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 54, 55.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_517_517"></a><a href="#FNanchor_517_517"><span class="label">[517]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 54, 55.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_518_518" id="Footnote_518_518"></a><a href="#FNanchor_518_518"><span class="label">[518]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> ii, 213.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_518_518"></a><a href="#FNanchor_518_518"><span class="label">[518]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> ii, 213.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_519_519" id="Footnote_519_519"></a><a href="#FNanchor_519_519"><span class="label">[519]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, ii, 362.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_519_519"></a><a href="#FNanchor_519_519"><span class="label">[519]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, ii, 362.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_520_520" id="Footnote_520_520"></a><a href="#FNanchor_520_520"><span class="label">[520]</span></a> <i>Counting</i> was of course not permitted. It would have given a symbolic +<p><a id="Footnote_520_520"></a><a href="#FNanchor_520_520"><span class="label">[520]</span></a> <i>Counting</i> was of course not permitted. It would have given a symbolic concept and no intuitive or immediate perception of the totality of the series. With counting we may of course compare together series of any length—series whose beginnings have faded from our mind, and of @@ -29884,7 +30041,7 @@ of association between them and as many names of numbers.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_521_521" id="Footnote_521_521"></a><a href="#FNanchor_521_521"><span class="label">[521]</span></a> Estel in Wundt's Philosophische Studien, ii, 50. Mehner, <i>ibid.</i> ii, +<p><a id="Footnote_521_521"></a><a href="#FNanchor_521_521"><span class="label">[521]</span></a> Estel in Wundt's Philosophische Studien, ii, 50. Mehner, <i>ibid.</i> ii, 571. In Dietze's experiments even numbers of strokes were better caught than odd ones, by the ear. The <i>rapidity of their sequence</i> had a great influence on the result. At more than 4 seconds apart it was impossible to perceive @@ -29900,7 +30057,7 @@ numbers 3, 5, 7 were the series easiest caught; next, 9, 15; hardest of all, <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_522_522" id="Footnote_522_522"></a><a href="#FNanchor_522_522"><span class="label">[522]</span></a> The exact interval of the sparks was 0.00205''. The doubleness of +<p><a id="Footnote_522_522"></a><a href="#FNanchor_522_522"><span class="label">[522]</span></a> The exact interval of the sparks was 0.00205''. The doubleness of their snap was usually replaced by a single-seeming sound when it fell to 0.00198'', the sound becoming <i>louder</i> when the sparks seemed simultaneous. The <i>difference</i> between these two intervals is only 7/100000 of a second; and, @@ -29910,7 +30067,7 @@ Pflüger's Archiv, Bd. xi.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_523_523" id="Footnote_523_523"></a><a href="#FNanchor_523_523"><span class="label">[523]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 407. When the sparks fell so close together that their irradiation-circles +<p><a id="Footnote_523_523"></a><a href="#FNanchor_523_523"><span class="label">[523]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 407. When the sparks fell so close together that their irradiation-circles overlapped, they appeared like <i>one spark moving</i> from the position of the first to that of the second; and they might then follow each other as close as 0.015'' without the <i>direction of the movement</i> ceasing to be @@ -29920,11 +30077,11 @@ retina, the time-interval for successive apprehension had to be raised to <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_524_524" id="Footnote_524_524"></a><a href="#FNanchor_524_524"><span class="label">[524]</span></a> Hall and Jastrow: Studies of Rhythm. Mind, xi, 58.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_524_524"></a><a href="#FNanchor_524_524"><span class="label">[524]</span></a> Hall and Jastrow: Studies of Rhythm. Mind, xi, 58.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_525_525" id="Footnote_525_525"></a><a href="#FNanchor_525_525"><span class="label">[525]</span></a> Nevertheless, multitudinous impressions may be felt as discontinuous, +<p><a id="Footnote_525_525"></a><a href="#FNanchor_525_525"><span class="label">[525]</span></a> Nevertheless, multitudinous impressions may be felt as discontinuous, though separated by excessively minute intervals of time. Grünhagen says (Pflüger's Archiv, vi, 175) that 10,000 electric shocks a second are felt as interrupted, by the tongue (!). Von Wittich (<i>ibid.</i> ii, 329), that between @@ -29943,12 +30100,12 @@ Tonempfindungen, 3d ed. p. 270).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_526_526" id="Footnote_526_526"></a><a href="#FNanchor_526_526"><span class="label">[526]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, xi, 428. Also in Herrmann's Hdbh. d. Physiol., 2 +<p><a id="Footnote_526_526"></a><a href="#FNanchor_526_526"><span class="label">[526]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, xi, 428. Also in Herrmann's Hdbh. d. Physiol., 2 Bd. i, Thl. pp. 260-2.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_527_527" id="Footnote_527_527"></a><a href="#FNanchor_527_527"><span class="label">[527]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vii, 639. Tigerstedt (Bihang till Kongl. Svenska +<p><a id="Footnote_527_527"></a><a href="#FNanchor_527_527"><span class="label">[527]</span></a> Pflüger's Archiv, vii, 639. Tigerstedt (Bihang till Kongl. Svenska Vetenskaps Akad, Handl., Bd. 8, Häfte 2, Stockholm, 1884) revises Exner's figures, and shows that his conclusions are exaggerated. According to Tigerstedt, two observers almost always rightly appreciated 0.05 or 0.06'' @@ -29963,11 +30120,11 @@ with one of 0.003''.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_528_528" id="Footnote_528_528"></a><a href="#FNanchor_528_528"><span class="label">[528]</span></a> Mind, xi, 61 (1886).</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_528_528"></a><a href="#FNanchor_528_528"><span class="label">[528]</span></a> Mind, xi, 61 (1886).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_529_529" id="Footnote_529_529"></a><a href="#FNanchor_529_529"><span class="label">[529]</span></a> Mach, Wiener Sitzungsb., li, 2. 133 (1865); Estel, <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 65; +<p><a id="Footnote_529_529"></a><a href="#FNanchor_529_529"><span class="label">[529]</span></a> Mach, Wiener Sitzungsb., li, 2. 133 (1865); Estel, <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 65; Mehner, <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 586; Buccola, <i>op. cit.</i> p. 378. Fechner labors to prove that his law is only overlaid by other interfering laws in the figures recorded by these experimenters; but his case seems to me to be one of desperate @@ -29976,7 +30133,7 @@ iii, 1.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_530_530" id="Footnote_530_530"></a><a href="#FNanchor_530_530"><span class="label">[530]</span></a> Curious discrepancies exist between the German and the American observers +<p><a id="Footnote_530_530"></a><a href="#FNanchor_530_530"><span class="label">[530]</span></a> Curious discrepancies exist between the German and the American observers with respect to the <i>direction</i> of the error below and above the point of indifference—differences perhaps due the <i>fatigue</i> involved in the American method. The Germans lengthened intervals below it and shortened @@ -29995,7 +30152,7 @@ in Glass's article it is hard to follow.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_531_531" id="Footnote_531_531"></a><a href="#FNanchor_531_531"><span class="label">[531]</span></a> With Vierordt and his pupils the indifference point lay as high as +<p><a id="Footnote_531_531"></a><a href="#FNanchor_531_531"><span class="label">[531]</span></a> With Vierordt and his pupils the indifference point lay as high as from 1.5 sec to 4.9 sec, according to the observer (cf. Der Zeitsinn, 1868, p. 112). In most of these experiments the time heard was actively reproduced, after a short pause, by movements of the hand, which were recorded. @@ -30005,30 +30162,30 @@ is full of important matter, nevertheless.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_532_532" id="Footnote_532_532"></a><a href="#FNanchor_532_532"><span class="label">[532]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 286, 290.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_532_532"></a><a href="#FNanchor_532_532"><span class="label">[532]</span></a> Physiol. Psych., ii, 286, 290.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_533_533" id="Footnote_533_533"></a><a href="#FNanchor_533_533"><span class="label">[533]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, i, 86.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_533_533"></a><a href="#FNanchor_533_533"><span class="label">[533]</span></a> Philosophische Studien, i, 86.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_534_534" id="Footnote_534_534"></a><a href="#FNanchor_534_534"><span class="label">[534]</span></a> Mind, xi, 400.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_534_534"></a><a href="#FNanchor_534_534"><span class="label">[534]</span></a> Mind, xi, 400.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_535_535" id="Footnote_535_535"></a><a href="#FNanchor_535_535"><span class="label">[535]</span></a> <i>Loc cit.</i> p. 144.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_535_535"></a><a href="#FNanchor_535_535"><span class="label">[535]</span></a> <i>Loc cit.</i> p. 144.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_536_536" id="Footnote_536_536"></a><a href="#FNanchor_536_536"><span class="label">[536]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 376. Mach's and Buccola's figures, it will be observed, +<p><a id="Footnote_536_536"></a><a href="#FNanchor_536_536"><span class="label">[536]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 376. Mach's and Buccola's figures, it will be observed, are about <i>one half</i> of the rest—sub-multiples, therefore. It ought to be observed, however, that Buccola's figure has little value, his observations not being well fitted to show this particular point.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_537_537" id="Footnote_537_537"></a><a href="#FNanchor_537_537"><span class="label">[537]</span></a> Estel's figures led him to think that <i>all</i> the multiples enjoyed this privilege; +<p><a id="Footnote_537_537"></a><a href="#FNanchor_537_537"><span class="label">[537]</span></a> Estel's figures led him to think that <i>all</i> the multiples enjoyed this privilege; with Mehner, on the other hand, only the <i>odd</i> multiples showed diminution of the average error; thus, 0.71, 2.15, 3.55, 5, 6.4, 7.8, 9.3, and 10.65 second were respectively registered with the least error. Cf. Phil. @@ -30036,29 +30193,29 @@ Studien, ii, pp. 57, 562-5.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_538_538" id="Footnote_538_538"></a><a href="#FNanchor_538_538"><span class="label">[538]</span></a> Cf. especially pp. 558-561.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_538_538"></a><a href="#FNanchor_538_538"><span class="label">[538]</span></a> Cf. especially pp. 558-561.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_539_539" id="Footnote_539_539"></a><a href="#FNanchor_539_539"><span class="label">[539]</span></a> Wundt: Physiol. Psych., ii, 287. Hall and Jastrow: Mind, xi, 62.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_539_539"></a><a href="#FNanchor_539_539"><span class="label">[539]</span></a> Wundt: Physiol. Psych., ii, 287. Hall and Jastrow: Mind, xi, 62.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_540_540" id="Footnote_540_540"></a><a href="#FNanchor_540_540"><span class="label">[540]</span></a> Mehner: <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 553.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_540_540"></a><a href="#FNanchor_540_540"><span class="label">[540]</span></a> Mehner: <i>loc. cit.</i> p. 553.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_541_541" id="Footnote_541_541"></a><a href="#FNanchor_541_541"><span class="label">[541]</span></a> The number of distinguishable <i>differences</i> of speed between these limits +<p><a id="Footnote_541_541"></a><a href="#FNanchor_541_541"><span class="label">[541]</span></a> The number of distinguishable <i>differences</i> of speed between these limits is, as he takes care to remark, very much larger that 7. (Der Zeitsinn, p. 137).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_542_542" id="Footnote_542_542"></a><a href="#FNanchor_542_542"><span class="label">[542]</span></a> P. 19, § 18, p. 112.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_542_542"></a><a href="#FNanchor_542_542"><span class="label">[542]</span></a> P. 19, § 18, p. 112.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_543_543" id="Footnote_543_543"></a><a href="#FNanchor_543_543"><span class="label">[543]</span></a> I leave the text just as it was printed in the Journal of Speculative +<p><a id="Footnote_543_543"></a><a href="#FNanchor_543_543"><span class="label">[543]</span></a> I leave the text just as it was printed in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (for 'Oct. 1886') in 1887. Since then Münsterberg in his masterly Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie (Heft 2, 1889) seems to have made it clear what the sensible changes are by which we measure the @@ -30117,7 +30274,7 @@ facility in measuring accurately.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_544_544" id="Footnote_544_544"></a><a href="#FNanchor_544_544"><span class="label">[544]</span></a> "Any one wishing yet further examples of this mental substitution +<p><a id="Footnote_544_544"></a><a href="#FNanchor_544_544"><span class="label">[544]</span></a> "Any one wishing yet further examples of this mental substitution will find one on observing how habitually he thinks of the spaces on the clock-face instead of the periods they stand for; how, on discovering it to be half an hour later than be supposed, he does not represent the half hour @@ -30126,7 +30283,7 @@ finger." (H. Spencer: Psychology, § 336.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_545_545" id="Footnote_545_545"></a><a href="#FNanchor_545_545"><span class="label">[545]</span></a> The only objections to this which I can think of are: (1) The accuracy +<p><a id="Footnote_545_545"></a><a href="#FNanchor_545_545"><span class="label">[545]</span></a> The only objections to this which I can think of are: (1) The accuracy with which some men judge of the hour of day or night without looking at the clock; (2) the faculty some have of waking at a preappointed hour; (3) the accuracy of time-perception reported to exist in certain trance-subjects. @@ -30173,15 +30330,15 @@ Philosophy of Mysticism, chap. iii, § 1.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_546_546" id="Footnote_546_546"></a><a href="#FNanchor_546_546"><span class="label">[546]</span></a> Ideale Fragen (1878). p. 219 (Essay, 'Zeit und Weile').</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_546_546"></a><a href="#FNanchor_546_546"><span class="label">[546]</span></a> Ideale Fragen (1878). p. 219 (Essay, 'Zeit und Weile').</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_547_547" id="Footnote_547_547"></a><a href="#FNanchor_547_547"><span class="label">[547]</span></a> Revue Philosophique, vol. iii, p. 496.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_547_547"></a><a href="#FNanchor_547_547"><span class="label">[547]</span></a> Revue Philosophique, vol. iii, p. 496.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_548_548" id="Footnote_548_548"></a><a href="#FNanchor_548_548"><span class="label">[548]</span></a> "Empty time is most strongly perceived when it comes as a <i>pause</i> in +<p><a id="Footnote_548_548"></a><a href="#FNanchor_548_548"><span class="label">[548]</span></a> "Empty time is most strongly perceived when it comes as a <i>pause</i> in music or in speech. Suppose a preacher in the pulpit, a professor at his desk, to stick still in the midst of his discourse; or let a composer (as is sometimes purposely done) make all his instruments stop at once; we await @@ -30197,7 +30354,7 @@ Heft 2, p. 41.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_549_549" id="Footnote_549_549"></a><a href="#FNanchor_549_549"><span class="label">[549]</span></a> A night of pain will seem terribly long: we keep looking forward to +<p><a id="Footnote_549_549"></a><a href="#FNanchor_549_549"><span class="label">[549]</span></a> A night of pain will seem terribly long: we keep looking forward to a moment which never comes—the moment when it shall cease. But the odiousness of this experience is not named <i>ennui</i> or <i>Langweile</i>, like the odiousness of time that seems long from its emptiness. The more positive @@ -30207,7 +30364,7 @@ suffering, not the suffering of the long time <i>per se</i>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_550_550" id="Footnote_550_550"></a><a href="#FNanchor_550_550"><span class="label">[550]</span></a> On these variations of time-estimate, cf. Romanes, Consciousness of +<p><a id="Footnote_550_550"></a><a href="#FNanchor_550_550"><span class="label">[550]</span></a> On these variations of time-estimate, cf. Romanes, Consciousness of Time, in Mind, vol. iii, p. 297; J. Sully, Illusions, pp. 245-261, 302-305; W. Wundt. Physiol. Psych., ii, 287, 288; besides the essays quoted from Lazarus and Janet. In German, the successors of Herbart have treated of @@ -30219,25 +30376,25 @@ eventful. Similarly the English Commonwealth, etc.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_551_551" id="Footnote_551_551"></a><a href="#FNanchor_551_551"><span class="label">[551]</span></a> Physiol. Optik, p. 445.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_551_551"></a><a href="#FNanchor_551_551"><span class="label">[551]</span></a> Physiol. Optik, p. 445.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_552_552" id="Footnote_552_552"></a><a href="#FNanchor_552_552"><span class="label">[552]</span></a> Succession, time <i>per se</i>, is no force. Our talk about its devouring +<p><a id="Footnote_552_552"></a><a href="#FNanchor_552_552"><span class="label">[552]</span></a> Succession, time <i>per se</i>, is no force. Our talk about its devouring tooth, etc., is all elliptical. Its contents are what devour. The law of inertia is incompatible with time's being assumed as an efficient cause of anything.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_553_553" id="Footnote_553_553"></a><a href="#FNanchor_553_553"><span class="label">[553]</span></a> Lehrbuch d. Psych., § 87. Compare also H. Lotze, Metaphysik, § 154.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_553_553"></a><a href="#FNanchor_553_553"><span class="label">[553]</span></a> Lehrbuch d. Psych., § 87. Compare also H. Lotze, Metaphysik, § 154.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_554_554" id="Footnote_554_554"></a><a href="#FNanchor_554_554"><span class="label">[554]</span></a> The cause of the perceiving, not the object perceived!</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_554_554"></a><a href="#FNanchor_554_554"><span class="label">[554]</span></a> The cause of the perceiving, not the object perceived!</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_555_555" id="Footnote_555_555"></a><a href="#FNanchor_555_555"><span class="label">[555]</span></a> "'No more' and 'not yet' are the proper time-feelings, and we are +<p><a id="Footnote_555_555"></a><a href="#FNanchor_555_555"><span class="label">[555]</span></a> "'No more' and 'not yet' are the proper time-feelings, and we are aware of time in no other way than through these feelings," says Volkmann (Psychol., § 87). This, which is not strictly true of our feeling of <i>time per se</i>, as an elementary bit of duration, is true of our feeling of <i>date</i> @@ -30245,7 +30402,7 @@ in its events.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_556_556" id="Footnote_556_556"></a><a href="#FNanchor_556_556"><span class="label">[556]</span></a> We construct the miles just as we construct the years. Travelling in +<p><a id="Footnote_556_556"></a><a href="#FNanchor_556_556"><span class="label">[556]</span></a> We construct the miles just as we construct the years. Travelling in the cars makes a succession of different fields of view pass before our eyes. When those that have passed from present sight revive in memory, they maintain their mutual order because their contents overlap. We think @@ -30267,7 +30424,7 @@ being three miles.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_557_557" id="Footnote_557_557"></a><a href="#FNanchor_557_557"><span class="label">[557]</span></a> Most of these explanations simply give the <i>signs</i> which, adhering to +<p><a id="Footnote_557_557"></a><a href="#FNanchor_557_557"><span class="label">[557]</span></a> Most of these explanations simply give the <i>signs</i> which, adhering to impressions, lead us to date them within a duration, or, in other words, to assign to them their order. Why it should be a <i>time</i>-order, however, is not explained. Herbart's would-be explanation is a simple description of @@ -30426,7 +30583,7 @@ makes us aware of time. The Herbartian mythology purports to <i>explain</i>.</p> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_558_558" id="Footnote_558_558"></a><a href="#FNanchor_558_558"><span class="label">[558]</span></a> It would be rash to say definitely just how many seconds long this +<p><a id="Footnote_558_558"></a><a href="#FNanchor_558_558"><span class="label">[558]</span></a> It would be rash to say definitely just how many seconds long this specious present must needs be, for processes fade 'asymptotically,' and the distinctly intuited present merges into a penumbra of mere dim <i>recency</i> before it turns into the past which is simply reproduced and conceived. @@ -30439,11 +30596,11 @@ still in a 'fading' phase, in spite of the long interval.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_559_559" id="Footnote_559_559"></a><a href="#FNanchor_559_559"><span class="label">[559]</span></a> Physiol. Psych, ii, 263.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_559_559"></a><a href="#FNanchor_559_559"><span class="label">[559]</span></a> Physiol. Psych, ii, 263.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_560_560" id="Footnote_560_560"></a><a href="#FNanchor_560_560"><span class="label">[560]</span></a> I leave my text as it was printed before Münsterberg's essay appeared +<p><a id="Footnote_560_560"></a><a href="#FNanchor_560_560"><span class="label">[560]</span></a> I leave my text as it was printed before Münsterberg's essay appeared (see <a href="#Footnote_542_542">Footnote 542</a>, above). He denies that we measure any but minimal durations by the amount of fading in the ideational processes, and talks almost exclusively of our feelings of muscular tension in his account, @@ -30476,27 +30633,27 @@ sense of time for granted, and only discusses its measurement.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_561_561" id="Footnote_561_561"></a><a href="#FNanchor_561_561"><span class="label">[561]</span></a> Exner in Hermann's Hdbch. d. Physiol., Bd. ii, Thl. ii, p. 281. +<p><a id="Footnote_561_561"></a><a href="#FNanchor_561_561"><span class="label">[561]</span></a> Exner in Hermann's Hdbch. d. Physiol., Bd. ii, Thl. ii, p. 281. Richet in Revue Philosophique, xxi, 568 (juin, 1886). See the next chapter, <a href="#Page_642">pp. 642-646</a>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_562_562" id="Footnote_562_562"></a><a href="#FNanchor_562_562"><span class="label">[562]</span></a> I have spoken of <i>fading</i> brain-processes alone, but only for simplicity's +<p><a id="Footnote_562_562"></a><a href="#FNanchor_562_562"><span class="label">[562]</span></a> I have spoken of <i>fading</i> brain-processes alone, but only for simplicity's sake. <i>Dawning</i> processes probably play as important a part in giving the feeling of duration to the specious present.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_563_563" id="Footnote_563_563"></a><a href="#FNanchor_563_563"><span class="label">[563]</span></a> Reden (St. Petersburg, 1864), vol. i, pp. 255-268.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_563_563"></a><a href="#FNanchor_563_563"><span class="label">[563]</span></a> Reden (St. Petersburg, 1864), vol. i, pp. 255-268.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_564_564" id="Footnote_564_564"></a><a href="#FNanchor_564_564"><span class="label">[564]</span></a> Psychology, § 91.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_564_564"></a><a href="#FNanchor_564_564"><span class="label">[564]</span></a> Psychology, § 91.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_565_565" id="Footnote_565_565"></a><a href="#FNanchor_565_565"><span class="label">[565]</span></a> "The patient cannot retain the image of an object more than a +<p><a id="Footnote_565_565"></a><a href="#FNanchor_565_565"><span class="label">[565]</span></a> "The patient cannot retain the image of an object more than a moment. His memory is as short for sounds, letters, figures, and printed words. If we cover a written or printed word with a sheet of paper in which a little window has been cut, so that only the first letter is visible @@ -30534,14 +30691,14 @@ things—whence the illusion.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_566_566" id="Footnote_566_566"></a><a href="#FNanchor_566_566"><span class="label">[566]</span></a> Again I omit the future, merely for simplicity's sake.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_566_566"></a><a href="#FNanchor_566_566"><span class="label">[566]</span></a> Again I omit the future, merely for simplicity's sake.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_643" id="Page_643">[Pg 643]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_643">[Pg 643]</a></span></p> -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XVI" id="CHAPTER_XVI">CHAPTER XVI.</a></h5> +<h5><a id="CHAPTER_XVI">CHAPTER XVI.</a></h5> <h4>MEMORY.</h4> @@ -30581,7 +30738,7 @@ we explain these differences?</p> to survive in memory it must have endured, for a certain length of time</i>. In other words, it must be what I call a substantive state. Prepositional and conjunctival states of mind -are not remembered as independent facts—we cannot recall<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_644" id="Page_644">[Pg 644]</a></span> +are not remembered as independent facts—we cannot recall<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_644">[Pg 644]</a></span> just how we felt when we said 'how' or 'notwithstanding.' Our consciousness of these transitive states is shut up to their own moment—hence one difficulty in introspective @@ -30609,13 +30766,13 @@ pain may color a life; but, as Professor Richet says:</p> <p>"To suffer for only a hundredth of a second is not to suffer at all; and for my part I would readily agree to undergo a pain, however acute and intense it might be, provided it should last only a hundredth of a -second, and leave after it neither reverberation nor recall."<a name="FNanchor_567_567" id="FNanchor_567_567"></a><a href="#Footnote_567_567" class="fnanchor">[567]</a></p></blockquote> +second, and leave after it neither reverberation nor recall."<a id="FNanchor_567_567"></a><a href="#Footnote_567_567" class="fnanchor">[567]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Not that a momentary state of consciousness need be practically resultless. Far from it: such a state, though absolutely unremembered, might at its own moment determine the transition of our thinking in a vital way, and decide -our action irrevocably.<a name="FNanchor_568_568" id="FNanchor_568_568"></a><a href="#Footnote_568_568" class="fnanchor">[568]</a> But the <i>idea</i> of it could not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_645" id="Page_645">[Pg 645]</a></span> +our action irrevocably.<a id="FNanchor_568_568"></a><a href="#Footnote_568_568" class="fnanchor">[568]</a> But the <i>idea</i> of it could not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_645">[Pg 645]</a></span> <i>afterwards</i> determine transition and action, its content could not be conceived as one of the mind's permanent meanings: that is all I mean by saying that its intellectual @@ -30628,7 +30785,7 @@ the physiology of the sense-organs. If we open our eyes instantaneously upon a scene, and then shroud them in complete darkness, it will be as if we saw the scene in ghostly light through the dark screen. We can read off details in -it which were unnoticed whilst the eyes were open.<a name="FNanchor_569_569" id="FNanchor_569_569"></a><a href="#Footnote_569_569" class="fnanchor">[569]</a></p> +it which were unnoticed whilst the eyes were open.<a id="FNanchor_569_569"></a><a href="#Footnote_569_569" class="fnanchor">[569]</a></p> <p>In every sphere of sense, an intermittent stimulus, often enough repeated, produces a continuous sensation. This @@ -30639,7 +30796,7 @@ stages deep, the total result in consciousness being an increase in the feeling's intensity, and in all probability, as we saw in the last chapter, an elementary sense of the lapse of time (see <a href="#Page_635">p. 635</a>).</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_646" id="Page_646">[Pg 646]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_646">[Pg 646]</a></span></p> <p>Exner writes:</p> <blockquote> @@ -30660,10 +30817,10 @@ whether attention have been turned to the impression or not, an extremely lively one, but is subjectively quite distinct from every sort of after-image or hallucination.... It vanishes, if not caught by attention, in the course of a few seconds. Even when the original impression -is attended to, the liveliness of its image in memory fades fast."<a name="FNanchor_570_570" id="FNanchor_570_570"></a><a href="#Footnote_570_570" class="fnanchor">[570]</a></p></blockquote> +is attended to, the liveliness of its image in memory fades fast."<a id="FNanchor_570_570"></a><a href="#Footnote_570_570" class="fnanchor">[570]</a></p></blockquote> <p>The physical condition in the nerve-tissue of this primary -memory is called by Richet 'elementary memory.'<a name="FNanchor_571_571" id="FNanchor_571_571"></a><a href="#Footnote_571_571" class="fnanchor">[571]</a> I +memory is called by Richet 'elementary memory.'<a id="FNanchor_571_571"></a><a href="#Footnote_571_571" class="fnanchor">[571]</a> I much prefer to reserve the word memory for the conscious phenomenon. What happens in the nerve-tissue is but an example of that plasticity or of semi-inertness, yielding @@ -30682,7 +30839,7 @@ of that term, is one which has been absent from consciousness altogether, and now revives anew. It is brought back, recalled, fished up, so to speak, from a reservoir in which, with countless other objects, it lay buried and lost from -view. But an object of primary memory is not thus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_647" id="Page_647">[Pg 647]</a></span> +view. But an object of primary memory is not thus<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_647">[Pg 647]</a></span> brought back; it never was lost; its date was never cut off in consciousness from that of the immediately present moment. In fact it comes to us as belonging to the rearward @@ -30694,7 +30851,7 @@ called the specious present. All stimuli whose first nerve-vibrations have not yet ceased seem to be conditions of our getting this feeling of the specious present. They give rise to objects which appear to the mind as events just -past.<a name="FNanchor_572_572" id="FNanchor_572_572"></a><a href="#Footnote_572_572" class="fnanchor">[572]</a></p> +past.<a id="FNanchor_572_572"></a><a href="#Footnote_572_572" class="fnanchor">[572]</a></p> <p>When we have been exposed to an unusual stimulus for many minutes or hours, a nervous process is set up which @@ -30708,18 +30865,18 @@ instrument. A thread tied around the finger, an unusual constriction in the clothing, will feel as if still there, long after they have been removed. These revivals (called phenomena of <i>Sinnesgedächtniss</i> by the Germans) have something -periodical in their nature.<a name="FNanchor_573_573" id="FNanchor_573_573"></a><a href="#Footnote_573_573" class="fnanchor">[573]</a> They show that profound +periodical in their nature.<a id="FNanchor_573_573"></a><a href="#Footnote_573_573" class="fnanchor">[573]</a> They show that profound rearrangements and slow settlings into a new equilibrium are going on in the neural substance, and they form the transition to that more peculiar and proper phenomenon of -memory, of which the rest of this chapter must treat. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_648" id="Page_648">[Pg 648]</a></span> +memory, of which the rest of this chapter must treat. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_648">[Pg 648]</a></span> first condition which makes a thing susceptible of recall after it has been forgotten is that the original impression of it should have been prolonged enough to give rise to a <i>recurrent</i> image of it, as distinguished from one of those primary after-images which very fleeting impressions may leave behind, and which contain in themselves no guarantee -that they will ever come back after having once faded away.<a name="FNanchor_574_574" id="FNanchor_574_574"></a><a href="#Footnote_574_574" class="fnanchor">[574]</a> +that they will ever come back after having once faded away.<a id="FNanchor_574_574"></a><a href="#Footnote_574_574" class="fnanchor">[574]</a> A certain length of stimulation seems demanded by the inertia of the nerve-substance. Exposed to a shorter influence, its modification fails to 'set,' and it retains no @@ -30740,11 +30897,11 @@ has already once dropped from consciousness; or rather <i>it is the knowledge of an event, or fact,</i> of which meantime we have not been thinking, <i>with the additional consciousness that we have thought or experienced it before.</i></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_649" id="Page_649">[Pg 649]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_649">[Pg 649]</a></span></p> <p>The first element which such a knowledge involves would seem to be the revival in the mind of an image or copy of -the original event.<a name="FNanchor_575_575" id="FNanchor_575_575"></a><a href="#Footnote_575_575" class="fnanchor">[575]</a> And it is an assumption made by -many writers<a name="FNanchor_576_576" id="FNanchor_576_576"></a><a href="#Footnote_576_576" class="fnanchor">[576]</a> that the revival of an image is all that is +the original event.<a id="FNanchor_575_575"></a><a href="#Footnote_575_575" class="fnanchor">[575]</a> And it is an assumption made by +many writers<a id="FNanchor_576_576"></a><a href="#Footnote_576_576" class="fnanchor">[576]</a> that the revival of an image is all that is needed to constitute the memory of the original occurrence. But such a revival is obviously not a <i>memory</i>, whatever else it may be; it is simply a duplicate, a second event, having @@ -30761,7 +30918,7 @@ and not psychical objects; for psychical objects (sensations for example) simply recurring in successive editions will remember each other <i>on that account</i> no more than clock-strokes do. No memory is involved in the mere fact of recurrence. -The successive editions of a feeling are so many<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_650" id="Page_650">[Pg 650]</a></span> +The successive editions of a feeling are so many<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_650">[Pg 650]</a></span> independent events, each snug in its own skin. Yesterday's feeling is dead and buried; and the presence of to-day's is no reason why it should resuscitate. A farther condition @@ -30805,7 +30962,7 @@ are the elements of every act of memory.</p> <p>It follows that what we began by calling the 'image,' or 'copy,' of the fact in the mind, is really not there at all in that simple shape, as a separate 'idea.' Or at least, if it be -there as a separate idea, no memory will go with it. What<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_651" id="Page_651">[Pg 651]</a></span> +there as a separate idea, no memory will go with it. What<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_651">[Pg 651]</a></span> memory goes with is, on the contrary, a very complex representation, that of the fact to be recalled <i>plus</i> its associates, the whole forming one 'object' (as explained on <a href="#Page_275">page 275</a>, @@ -30834,7 +30991,7 @@ renders you conscious of the state of mind which you found in yourself when you beheld him there. By this you know that you have seen him before, that is, you recognize him. But you recognize him because his idea is now contained in another series of perceptions from that in which -you first saw him."<a name="FNanchor_577_577" id="FNanchor_577_577"></a><a href="#Footnote_577_577" class="fnanchor">[577]</a></p></blockquote> +you first saw him."<a id="FNanchor_577_577"></a><a href="#Footnote_577_577" class="fnanchor">[577]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Similarly James Mill writes:</p> @@ -30854,13 +31011,13 @@ the explanation of the case in which we remember ideas cannot occasion much of difficulty. I have a lively recollection of Polyphemus's cave, and the actions of Ulysses and the Cyclops, as described by Homer. In this recollection there is, first of all, the ideas, or simple conceptions of -the objects and acts; and along with these ideas, and so closely combined<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_652" id="Page_652">[Pg 652]</a></span> +the objects and acts; and along with these ideas, and so closely combined<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_652">[Pg 652]</a></span> as not to be separable, the idea of my having formerly had those same ideas. And this idea of my having formerly had those ideas is a very complicated idea; including the idea of myself of the present moment remembering, and that of myself of the past moment conceiving; and the whole series of the states of consciousness, which intervened -between myself remembering, and myself conceiving."<a name="FNanchor_578_578" id="FNanchor_578_578"></a><a href="#Footnote_578_578" class="fnanchor">[578]</a></p></blockquote> +between myself remembering, and myself conceiving."<a id="FNanchor_578_578"></a><a href="#Footnote_578_578" class="fnanchor">[578]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Memory is then the feeling of belief in a peculiar complex object; but all the elements of this object may be @@ -30890,7 +31047,7 @@ belief or fail to awaken it; <i>the object of memory is only an object imagined in the past</i> (usually very completely imagined there) <i>to which the emotion of belief adheres.</i></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_653" id="Page_653">[Pg 653]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_653">[Pg 653]</a></span></p> <h4>MEMORY'S CAUSES.</h4> @@ -30919,7 +31076,7 @@ often before.</p> <p>"There is," he says, "a state of mind familiar to all men, in which we are said to remember. In this state it is certain we have not in the -mind the idea which we are trying to have in it.<a name="FNanchor_579_579" id="FNanchor_579_579"></a><a href="#Footnote_579_579" class="fnanchor">[579]</a> How is it, then, that +mind the idea which we are trying to have in it.<a id="FNanchor_579_579"></a><a href="#Footnote_579_579" class="fnanchor">[579]</a> How is it, then, that we proceed in the course of our endeavor, to procure its introduction into the mind? If we have not the idea itself, we have certain ideas connected with it. We run over those ideas, one after another, in hopes @@ -30932,13 +31089,13 @@ idea of the individual. I think of all the circumstances in which I have seen him engaged; the time when I knew him, the persons along with whom I knew him, the things he did, or the things he suffered; and, if I chance upon any idea with which the name is associated, then immediately -I have the recollection; if not, my pursuit of it is vain.<a name="FNanchor_580_580" id="FNanchor_580_580"></a><a href="#Footnote_580_580" class="fnanchor">[580]</a> There +I have the recollection; if not, my pursuit of it is vain.<a id="FNanchor_580_580"></a><a href="#Footnote_580_580" class="fnanchor">[580]</a> There is another set of cases, very familiar, but affording very important evidence on the subject. It frequently happens that there are matters which we desire not to forget. What is the contrivance to which we have recourse for preserving the memory—that is, for making sure that it will be called into existence, when it is our wish that it should? All -men invariably employ the same expedient. They endeavor to form<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_654" id="Page_654">[Pg 654]</a></span> +men invariably employ the same expedient. They endeavor to form<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_654">[Pg 654]</a></span> an association between the idea of the thing to be remembered, and some sensation, or some idea, which they know beforehand will occur at or near the time when they wish the remembrance to be in their minds. @@ -30953,7 +31110,7 @@ known beforehand will be frequently seen, and of course at no great distance of time from the occasion on which the memory is desired. The handkerchief being seen, the knot is seen, and this sensation recalls the idea of the commission, between which and itself the association -had been purposely formed."<a name="FNanchor_581_581" id="FNanchor_581_581"></a><a href="#Footnote_581_581" class="fnanchor">[581]</a></p></blockquote> +had been purposely formed."<a id="FNanchor_581_581"></a><a href="#Footnote_581_581" class="fnanchor">[581]</a></p></blockquote> <p>In short, we make search in our memory for a forgotten idea, just as we rummage our house for a lost object. In @@ -30980,7 +31137,7 @@ which the cue calls up the experience on the proper occasion, together with its past associates, the sense that the self was there, the belief that it really happened, etc., etc., just as previously described. When the recollection is of -the 'ready' sort, the resuscitation takes place the instant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_655" id="Page_655">[Pg 655]</a></span> +the 'ready' sort, the resuscitation takes place the instant<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_655">[Pg 655]</a></span> the occasion arises; when it is slow, resuscitation comes after delay. But be the recall prompt or slow, the condition which makes it possible at all (or in other words, the @@ -30990,10 +31147,10 @@ occasion and cue of the recall. <i>When slumbering, these paths are the condition of retention; when active, they are the condition of recall.</i></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="figright" style="width: 200px;"> -<img src="images/jame_655_0041.jpg" width="200" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_655_0041.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 200px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 45.</div> </div> @@ -31027,7 +31184,7 @@ it before.</p> <p>These habit-worn paths of association are a clear rendering of what authors mean by 'predispositions,' 'vestiges,' 'traces,' etc., left in the brain by past experience. Most -writers leave the nature of these vestiges vague; few think<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_656" id="Page_656">[Pg 656]</a></span> +writers leave the nature of these vestiges vague; few think<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_656">[Pg 656]</a></span> of explicitly assimilating them to channels of association. Dr. Maudsley, for example, writes:</p> @@ -31055,7 +31212,7 @@ occasion they should not recognize or remember it; for the second action is a reproduction of the first, with the addition of what it contains from the after-effects of the first. As we have assumed the process to be conscious, this reproduction with its addition would be a memory -or remembrance."<a name="FNanchor_582_582" id="FNanchor_582_582"></a><a href="#Footnote_582_582" class="fnanchor">[582]</a></p></blockquote> +or remembrance."<a id="FNanchor_582_582"></a><a href="#Footnote_582_582" class="fnanchor">[582]</a></p></blockquote> <p>In this passage Dr. Maudsley seems to mean by the 'nerve-element,' or 'anatomical substratum of fibres and @@ -31072,7 +31229,7 @@ other. And a vague 'modification,' supposed to be left behind by the first excitation, helps us not a whit. For, according to all analogy, such a modification can only result in making the next excitation more smooth and rapid. This -might make it less <i>conscious</i>, perhaps, but could not endow<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_657" id="Page_657">[Pg 657]</a></span> +might make it less <i>conscious</i>, perhaps, but could not endow<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_657">[Pg 657]</a></span> it with any reference to the past. The gutter is worn deeper by each successive shower, but not for that reason brought into contact with previous showers. Psychology @@ -31097,7 +31254,7 @@ excited by the event proper, and those excited in its recall, are in part different from each other</i>. If we could revive the past event without any associates we should exclude the possibility of memory, and simply dream that we were undergoing -the experience as if for the first time.<a name="FNanchor_583_583" id="FNanchor_583_583"></a><a href="#Footnote_583_583" class="fnanchor">[583]</a> Wherever,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_658" id="Page_658">[Pg 658]</a></span> +the experience as if for the first time.<a id="FNanchor_583_583"></a><a href="#Footnote_583_583" class="fnanchor">[583]</a> Wherever,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_658">[Pg 658]</a></span> in fact, the recalled event does appear without a definite setting, it is hard to distinguish it from a mere creation of fancy. But in proportion as its image lingers and recalls associates @@ -31133,7 +31290,7 @@ usual vivid fashion. He says:</p> <p>"I meet casually in the street a person whose appearance I am acquainted with, and say to myself at once that I have seen him before. Instantly the figure recedes into the past, and wavers about there -vaguely, without at once fixing itself in any spot. It persists in me for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_659" id="Page_659">[Pg 659]</a></span> +vaguely, without at once fixing itself in any spot. It persists in me for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_659">[Pg 659]</a></span> some time, and surrounds itself with new details. 'When I saw him he was bare-headed, with a working-jacket on, painting in a studio; he is so-and-so, of such-and-such a street. But when was it? It was not @@ -31159,7 +31316,7 @@ again, but forward this time, not backward; and, by a reference to the calendar, is situated at a precise point, a week further back than Easter, and five weeks nearer than the carnival, by the double effect of the contrary impulsions, pushing it, one forward and the other backward, -and which are, at a particular moment, annulled by one another."<a name="FNanchor_584_584" id="FNanchor_584_584"></a><a href="#Footnote_584_584" class="fnanchor">[584]</a></p></blockquote> +and which are, at a particular moment, annulled by one another."<a id="FNanchor_584_584"></a><a href="#Footnote_584_584" class="fnanchor">[584]</a></p></blockquote> <h4>THE CONDITIONS OF GOODNESS IN MEMORY.</h4> @@ -31179,7 +31336,7 @@ their number is altogether due to the facts of his mental experience. Let the quality of permanence in the paths be called the native tenacity, or physiological retentiveness. This tenacity differs enormously from infancy to old age, -and from one person to another. Some minds are like wax<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_660" id="Page_660">[Pg 660]</a></span> +and from one person to another. Some minds are like wax<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_660">[Pg 660]</a></span> under a seal—no impression, however disconnected with others, is wiped out. Others, like a jelly, vibrate to every touch, but under usual conditions retain no permanent @@ -31203,8 +31360,8 @@ of mankind, must needs have amazing retentiveness of the purely physiological sort. Men without this retentiveness may excel in the <i>quality</i> of their work at this point or at that, but will never do such mighty sums of it, or be influential -contemporaneously on such a scale.<a name="FNanchor_585_585" id="FNanchor_585_585"></a><a href="#Footnote_585_585" class="fnanchor">[585]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_661" id="Page_661">[Pg 661]</a></span></p> +contemporaneously on such a scale.<a id="FNanchor_585_585"></a><a href="#Footnote_585_585" class="fnanchor">[585]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_661">[Pg 661]</a></span></p> <p>But there comes a time of life for all of us when we can do no more than hold our own in the way of acquisitions, when the old paths fade as fast as the new ones form in our @@ -31226,7 +31383,7 @@ their number.</p> <p>It is obvious that the more there are of such paths as M—N in the brain, and the more of such possible cues or occasions for the recall of <i>n</i> in the mind, the prompter and -surer, on the whole, the memory of <i>n</i> will be, the more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_662" id="Page_662">[Pg 662]</a></span> +surer, on the whole, the memory of <i>n</i> will be, the more<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_662">[Pg 662]</a></span> frequently one will be reminded of it, the more avenues of approach to it one will possess. In mental terms, <i>the more other facts a fact is associated with in the mind, the better possession @@ -31266,7 +31423,7 @@ relations to the theory will hold them fast; and the more of these the mind is able to discern, the greater the erudition will become. Meanwhile the theorist may have little, if any, desultory memory. Unutilizable facts may be unnoted -by him and forgotten as soon as heard. An ignorance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_663" id="Page_663">[Pg 663]</a></span> +by him and forgotten as soon as heard. An ignorance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_663">[Pg 663]</a></span> almost as encyclopædic as his erudition may coexist with the latter, and hide, as it were, in the interstices of its web. Those who have had much to do with scholars and <i>savants</i> @@ -31311,7 +31468,7 @@ understand the reason why.</p> <p>It will now appear clear that <i>all improvement of the memory lies in the line of</i> <span class="smcap">elaborating the associates</span> of each of the several things to be remembered. <i>No amount -of culture would seem capable of modifying a man's</i> <span class="smcap">general</span><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_664" id="Page_664">[Pg 664]</a></span> +of culture would seem capable of modifying a man's</i> <span class="smcap">general</span><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_664">[Pg 664]</a></span> <i>retentiveness</i>. This is a physiological quality, given once for all with his organization, and which he can never hope to change. It differs no doubt in disease and health; and @@ -31332,7 +31489,7 @@ remembrance of the particular facts used in the exercises, but his faculty for remembering facts at large. And a plausible case is always made out by saying that practice in learning words by heart makes it easier to learn new -words in the same way.<a name="FNanchor_586_586" id="FNanchor_586_586"></a><a href="#Footnote_586_586" class="fnanchor">[586]</a> If this be true, then what +words in the same way.<a id="FNanchor_586_586"></a><a href="#Footnote_586_586" class="fnanchor">[586]</a> If this be true, then what I have just said is false, and the whole doctrine of memory as due to 'paths' must be revised. But I am disposed to think the alleged fact untrue. I have carefully @@ -31349,7 +31506,7 @@ the mere native tenacity is not a whit improved, and is usually, in fact, impaired by age. It is a case of better remembering by better <i>thinking</i>. Similarly when schoolboys improve by practice in ease of learning by heart, the -improvement will, I am sure, be always found to reside in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_665" id="Page_665">[Pg 665]</a></span> +improvement will, I am sure, be always found to reside in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_665">[Pg 665]</a></span> the <i>mode of study of the particular piece</i> (due to the greater interest, the greater suggestiveness, the generic similarity with other pieces, the more sustained attention, etc., etc.), @@ -31358,7 +31515,7 @@ power.</p> <p>The error I speak of pervades an otherwise useful and judicious book, 'How to Strengthen the Memory,' by Dr. -Holbrook of New York.<a name="FNanchor_587_587" id="FNanchor_587_587"></a><a href="#Footnote_587_587" class="fnanchor">[587]</a> The author fails to distinguish +Holbrook of New York.<a id="FNanchor_587_587"></a><a href="#Footnote_587_587" class="fnanchor">[587]</a> The author fails to distinguish between the general physiological retentiveness and the retention of particular things, and talks as if both must be benefited by the same means.</p> @@ -31380,7 +31537,7 @@ to be committed to memory every week. A verse of poetry is to be learned, also a verse from the Bible, daily. He is asked to remember the number of the page in any book where any interesting fact is recorded. These and other methods are slowly resuscitating a failing -memory."<a name="FNanchor_588_588" id="FNanchor_588_588"></a><a href="#Footnote_588_588" class="fnanchor">[588]</a></p></blockquote> +memory."<a id="FNanchor_588_588"></a><a href="#Footnote_588_588" class="fnanchor">[588]</a></p></blockquote> <p>I find it very hard to believe that the memory of the poor old gentleman is a bit the better for all this torture @@ -31396,7 +31553,7 @@ method of strengthening his memory.</p> <p>"My memory was a sieve. I could remember nothing. Dates, names, appointments, faces—everything escaped me. I said to my wife, 'Catherine, I shall never make a successful politician, for I cannot -remember, and that is a prime necessity of politicians.' My wife<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_666" id="Page_666">[Pg 666]</a></span> +remember, and that is a prime necessity of politicians.' My wife<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_666">[Pg 666]</a></span> told me I must train my memory. So when I came home that night, I sat down alone and spent fifteen minutes trying silently to recall with accuracy the principal events of the day. I could remember but little @@ -31420,7 +31577,7 @@ could say my lessons better and better every year, and instead of the practice growing irksome, it became a pleasure to go over again the events of the day. I am indebted to this discipline for a memory of somewhat unusual tenacity, and I recommend the practice to all who wish -to store up facts, or expect to have much to do with influencing men."<a name="FNanchor_589_589" id="FNanchor_589_589"></a><a href="#Footnote_589_589" class="fnanchor">[589]</a></p></blockquote> +to store up facts, or expect to have much to do with influencing men."<a id="FNanchor_589_589"></a><a href="#Footnote_589_589" class="fnanchor">[589]</a></p></blockquote> <p>I do not doubt that Mr. Weed's practical command of his past experiences was much greater after fifty years @@ -31436,10 +31593,10 @@ a fact on the strength of a theory) that the same matter, in his memory no better at the end than at the beginning of his years of heroic self-discipline. He had acquired a better method of noting and recording his experiences, but -his physiological retentiveness was probably not a bit improved.<a name="FNanchor_590_590" id="FNanchor_590_590"></a><a href="#Footnote_590_590" class="fnanchor">[590]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_667" id="Page_667">[Pg 667]</a></span></p> +his physiological retentiveness was probably not a bit improved.<a id="FNanchor_590_590"></a><a href="#Footnote_590_590" class="fnanchor">[590]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_667">[Pg 667]</a></span></p> <p><i>All improvement of memory consists, then, in the improvement -of one's habitual methods of recording facts.</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_668" id="Page_668">[Pg 668]</a></span> +of one's habitual methods of recording facts.</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_668">[Pg 668]</a></span> In the traditional terminology methods are divided into the mechanical, the ingenious, and the judicious.</p> @@ -31471,7 +31628,7 @@ To remember numbers, e.g., a figure-alphabet is first formed, in which each numerical digit is represented by one or more letters. The number is then translated into such letters as will best make a word, if possible a word -suggestive of the object to which the number belongs.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_669" id="Page_669">[Pg 669]</a></span> +suggestive of the object to which the number belongs.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_669">[Pg 669]</a></span> The word will then be remembered when the numbers alone might be forgotten.</p> @@ -31481,12 +31638,65 @@ alone might be forgotten.</p> <div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">1, </td><td align="left">2, </td><td align="left">3, </td><td align="left">4, </td><td align="left">5, </td><td align="left">6, </td><td align="left">7, </td><td align="left">8, </td><td align="left">9, </td><td align="left">0.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">t,</td><td align="left">n,</td><td align="left">m,</td><td align="left">r,</td><td align="left">l,</td><td align="left">sh, </td><td align="left">g,</td><td align="left">f,</td><td align="left">b,</td><td align="left">s,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">d,</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">j,</td><td align="left">k,</td><td align="left">v,</td><td align="left">p,</td><td align="left">c,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">ch, </td><td align="left">c,</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">z,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">g,</td><td align="left">qu. </td></tr> +<table style="border: none; padding: 0px; border-spacing: 0px;"> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">1, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">2, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">3, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">4, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">5, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">6, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">7, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">8, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">9, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">0.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">t,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">n,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">m,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">r,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">l,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">sh, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">g,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">f,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">b,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">s,</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td style="text-align: left;">d,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">j,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">k,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">v,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">p,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">c,</td> +</tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">ch, </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">c,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">z,</td> +</tr> +<tr><td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;">g,</td> +<td style="text-align: left;">qu. </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +<td style="text-align: left;"> </td> +</tr> </table></div> <p>"To briefly show its use, suppose it is desired to fix 1142 feet in a @@ -31496,7 +31706,7 @@ connect it by some such flight of the imagination as that if a man tried to keep up with the velocity of sound, he would have a tight run. When you recall this a few days later great care must be taken not to get confused with the velocity of light, nor to think he had a <i>hard</i> run -which would be 3000 feet too fast."<a name="FNanchor_591_591" id="FNanchor_591_591"></a><a href="#Footnote_591_591" class="fnanchor">[591]</a></p></blockquote> +which would be 3000 feet too fast."<a id="FNanchor_591_591"></a><a href="#Footnote_591_591" class="fnanchor">[591]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Dr. Pick and others use a system which consists in linking together any two ideas to be remembered by means @@ -31510,9 +31720,9 @@ Thus,</p> garden, hair, watchman, philosophy, copper, etc.... We can combine the ideas in this manner: <i>garden,</i> plant, hair of plant—<i>hair; hair,</i> bonnet, <i>watchman;—watchman,</i> wake, study, <i>philosophy; philosophy,</i> -chemistry, <i>copper</i>; etc. etc." (Pick.)<a name="FNanchor_592_592" id="FNanchor_592_592"></a><a href="#Footnote_592_592" class="fnanchor">[592]</a></p></blockquote> +chemistry, <i>copper</i>; etc. etc." (Pick.)<a id="FNanchor_592_592"></a><a href="#Footnote_592_592" class="fnanchor">[592]</a></p></blockquote> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>It is matter of popular knowledge that an impression is remembered the better in proportion as it is</p> @@ -31528,7 +31738,7 @@ two events of equal significance the remoter one will be the one more likely to be forgotten. The memories of childhood which persist in old age can hardly be compared with the events of the day or hour which are forgotten, for -these latter are trivial once-repeated things, whilst the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_670" id="Page_670">[Pg 670]</a></span> +these latter are trivial once-repeated things, whilst the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_670">[Pg 670]</a></span> childish reminiscences have been wrought into us during the retrospective hours of our entire intervening life. <i>Other things equal</i>, at all times of life recency promotes memory. @@ -31562,7 +31772,7 @@ A woman called 'thief' in a dispute remains convinced that every one accuses her of stealing (Esquirol). Another, attacked with mania at the sight of the fires in her street during the Commune, still after six months sees in her delirium -flames on every side about her (Luys), etc., etc."<a name="FNanchor_593_593" id="FNanchor_593_593"></a><a href="#Footnote_593_593" class="fnanchor">[593]</a></p> +flames on every side about her (Luys), etc., etc."<a id="FNanchor_593_593"></a><a href="#Footnote_593_593" class="fnanchor">[593]</a></p> <p>On the general effectiveness of both attention and repetition I cannot do better than copy what M. Taine has @@ -31571,7 +31781,7 @@ written:</p> <blockquote> <p>"If we compare different sensations, images, or ideas, we find that -their aptitudes for revival are not equal. A large number of them are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_671" id="Page_671">[Pg 671]</a></span> +their aptitudes for revival are not equal. A large number of them are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_671">[Pg 671]</a></span> obliterated, and never reappear through life; for instance, I drove through Paris a day or two ago, and though I saw plainly some sixty or eighty new faces, I cannot now recall any one of them; some extraordinary @@ -31620,7 +31830,7 @@ it always acts alike; the image of an object or event is capable of revival, and of complete revival, in proportion to the degree of attention with which we have considered the object or event. We put this rule in practice at every moment in ordinary life. If we are applying -ourselves to a book or are in lively conversation, while an air<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_672" id="Page_672">[Pg 672]</a></span> +ourselves to a book or are in lively conversation, while an air<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_672">[Pg 672]</a></span> is being sung in the adjoining room, we do not retain it; we know vaguely that there is singing going on, and that is all. We then stop our reading or conversation, we lay aside all internal preoccupations @@ -31669,7 +31879,7 @@ the colored forms which will present themselves to my sight; it is otherwise in the case of a house where I have spent two hours, or of a town where I have stayed three days; after ten years have elapsed the images will be vague, full of blanks, sometimes they will not exist, and -I shall have to seek my way or shall lose myself.—This new property of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_673" id="Page_673">[Pg 673]</a></span> +I shall have to seek my way or shall lose myself.—This new property of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_673">[Pg 673]</a></span> images is also derived from the first. As every sensation tends to revive in its image, the sensation twice repeated will leave after it a double tendency, that is, provided the attention be as great the second time as @@ -31677,7 +31887,7 @@ the first; usually this is not the case, for, the novelty diminishing, the interest diminishes; but if other circumstances renew the interest, or if the will renovates the attention, the incessantly increasing tendency will incessantly increase the chances of the resurrection and integrity -of the image."<a name="FNanchor_594_594" id="FNanchor_594_594"></a><a href="#Footnote_594_594" class="fnanchor">[594]</a></p></blockquote> +of the image."<a id="FNanchor_594_594"></a><a href="#Footnote_594_594" class="fnanchor">[594]</a></p></blockquote> <p>If a phenomenon is met with, however, too often, and with too great a variety of contexts, although its image is @@ -31701,7 +31911,7 @@ cf some unseen person slightly known to us, we say we recollect to whom the voice belongs, we do not use the same expression respecting the voices of those with whom we live. The meanings of words which in childhood have to be consciously recalled seem in adult life to be -immediately present."<a name="FNanchor_595_595" id="FNanchor_595_595"></a><a href="#Footnote_595_595" class="fnanchor">[595]</a></p></blockquote> +immediately present."<a id="FNanchor_595_595"></a><a href="#Footnote_595_595" class="fnanchor">[595]</a></p></blockquote> <p>These are cases where too many paths, leading to too diverse associates, block each other's way, and all that the @@ -31713,13 +31923,13 @@ where we cannot say, though we may seem to ourselves to be on the brink of saying it. That nascent cerebral excitations can effect consciousness with a sort of sense of the imminence of that which stronger excitations would make -us definitely feel, is obvious from what happens when we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_674" id="Page_674">[Pg 674]</a></span> +us definitely feel, is obvious from what happens when we<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_674">[Pg 674]</a></span> seek to remember a name. It tingles, it trembles on the verge, but does not come. Just such a tingling and trembling of unrecovered associates is the penumbra of recognition that may surround any experience and make it -seem familiar, though we know not why.<a name="FNanchor_596_596" id="FNanchor_596_596"></a><a href="#Footnote_596_596" class="fnanchor">[596]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_675" id="Page_675">[Pg 675]</a></span></p> +seem familiar, though we know not why.<a id="FNanchor_596_596"></a><a href="#Footnote_596_596" class="fnanchor">[596]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_675">[Pg 675]</a></span></p> <p>There is a curious experience which everyone seems to have had—the feeling that the present moment in its completeness has been experienced before—we were saying just @@ -31728,7 +31938,7 @@ this thing, in just this place, to just these people, etc. This and occasioned much speculation. Dr. Wigan considered it due to a dissociation of the action of the two hemispheres, one of them becoming conscious a little later than -the other, but both of the same fact.<a name="FNanchor_597_597" id="FNanchor_597_597"></a><a href="#Footnote_597_597" class="fnanchor">[597]</a> I must confess that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_676" id="Page_676">[Pg 676]</a></span> +the other, but both of the same fact.<a id="FNanchor_597_597"></a><a href="#Footnote_597_597" class="fnanchor">[597]</a> I must confess that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_676">[Pg 676]</a></span> the quality of mystery seems to me a little strained. I have over and over again in my own case succeeded in resolving the phenomenon into a case of memory, so indistinct that @@ -31737,7 +31947,7 @@ the others are not. The dissimilar portions of the past do not arise completely enough at first for the date to be identified, All we get is the present scene with a general suggestion of pastness about it. That faithful observer, Prof. -Lazarus, interprets the phenomenon in the same way;<a name="FNanchor_598_598" id="FNanchor_598_598"></a><a href="#Footnote_598_598" class="fnanchor">[598]</a> and +Lazarus, interprets the phenomenon in the same way;<a id="FNanchor_598_598"></a><a href="#Footnote_598_598" class="fnanchor">[598]</a> and it is noteworthy that just as soon as the past context grows complete and distinct the emotion of weirdness fades from the experience.</p> @@ -31756,18 +31966,18 @@ after a single reading. It took, however, 16 readings to remember 12, 44 readings to remember 24, and 55 readings to remember 26 syllables, the moment of 'remembering' being here reckoned as the first moment when the list could -be recited without a fault.<a name="FNanchor_599_599" id="FNanchor_599_599"></a><a href="#Footnote_599_599" class="fnanchor">[599]</a> When a 16-syllable list was +be recited without a fault.<a id="FNanchor_599_599"></a><a href="#Footnote_599_599" class="fnanchor">[599]</a> When a 16-syllable list was read over a certain number of times on one day, and then studied on the day following until remembered, it was found that the number of seconds saved in the study on the second day was proportional to the number of readings on the first—proportional, that is, within certain rather -narrow limits, for which see the text.<a name="FNanchor_600_600" id="FNanchor_600_600"></a><a href="#Footnote_600_600" class="fnanchor">[600]</a> No amount of repetition +narrow limits, for which see the text.<a id="FNanchor_600_600"></a><a href="#Footnote_600_600" class="fnanchor">[600]</a> No amount of repetition spent on nonsense-verses over a certain length enabled Dr. Ebbinghaus to retain them without error for 24 hours. In forgetting such things as these lists of syllables, the loss goos on very much more rapidly at first than later -on. He measured the loss by the number of seconds required<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_677" id="Page_677">[Pg 677]</a></span> +on. He measured the loss by the number of seconds required<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_677">[Pg 677]</a></span> to <i>relearn</i> the list after it had been once learned. Roughly speaking, if it took a thousand seconds to learn the list, and five hundred to relearn it, the loss between the @@ -31791,7 +32001,7 @@ oblivion grew slower, so that even for considerable stretches of time the losses were but barely ascertainable. After 24 hours a third, after 6 days a fourth, and after a whole month a good fifth of the original labor remain in the shape of its after-effects, and made the relearning -by so much the more speedy."<a name="FNanchor_601_601" id="FNanchor_601_601"></a><a href="#Footnote_601_601" class="fnanchor">[601]</a></p></blockquote> +by so much the more speedy."<a id="FNanchor_601_601"></a><a href="#Footnote_601_601" class="fnanchor">[601]</a></p></blockquote> <p>But the most interesting result of all those reached by this author relates to the question whether ideas are recalled @@ -31811,7 +32021,7 @@ but that it is <i>directly</i> associated with <i>all</i> that are near it, though in unequal degrees. He first measured the time needed to impress on the memory certain lists of syllables, and then the time needed to impress lists of the same -syllables with gaps between them. Thus, representing the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_678" id="Page_678">[Pg 678]</a></span> +syllables with gaps between them. Thus, representing the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_678">[Pg 678]</a></span> syllables by numbers, if the first list were 1, 2, 3, 4,... 13, 14, 15, 16, the second would be 1, 3, 5,... 15, 2, 4, 6,... 16, and so forth, with many variations.</p> @@ -31837,13 +32047,13 @@ one more fact to the set of facts which prove that association is subtler than consciousness, and that a nerve-process may, without producing consciousness, be effective in the same way in which consciousness would have seemed to be -effective if it had been there.<a name="FNanchor_602_602" id="FNanchor_602_602"></a><a href="#Footnote_602_602" class="fnanchor">[602]</a> Evidently the path from 1<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_679" id="Page_679">[Pg 679]</a></span> +effective if it had been there.<a id="FNanchor_602_602"></a><a href="#Footnote_602_602" class="fnanchor">[602]</a> Evidently the path from 1<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_679">[Pg 679]</a></span> to 3 (omitting 2 from consciousness) is facilitated, broadened perhaps, by the old path from 1 to 3 through 2—only the component which shoots round through this latter way is too feeble to let 2 be thought as a distinct object.</p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>Mr. Wolfe, in his experiments on recognition, used vibrating metal tongues.</p> @@ -31873,7 +32083,7 @@ process of forgetting takes place at first very rapidly, and then more slowly.... This law is subject to considerable variations, one of which seems to be constant and is peculiar; namely, there seems to be a rhythm in the memory itself, which, after falling, recovers slightly, and -then fades out again."<a name="FNanchor_603_603" id="FNanchor_603_603"></a><a href="#Footnote_603_603" class="fnanchor">[603]</a></p></blockquote> +then fades out again."<a id="FNanchor_603_603"></a><a href="#Footnote_603_603" class="fnanchor">[603]</a></p></blockquote> <p>This periodical renewal of acoustic memory would seem to be an important element in the production of the agreeableness @@ -31891,7 +32101,7 @@ a function as recollecting.</p> <blockquote> <p>"The memory of some men, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a -miracle; but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_680" id="Page_680">[Pg 680]</a></span> +miracle; but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_680">[Pg 680]</a></span> even of those which are struck deepest, and in minds the most retentive: so that if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated exercise of the senses, or reflection on those kinds of objects which at first occasioned @@ -31910,7 +32120,7 @@ though it may seem probable that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory; since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever in a few days calcine all those images to dust and confusion, which seemed to -be as lasting as if graven in marble."<a name="FNanchor_604_604" id="FNanchor_604_604"></a><a href="#Footnote_604_604" class="fnanchor">[604]</a></p></blockquote> +be as lasting as if graven in marble."<a id="FNanchor_604_604"></a><a href="#Footnote_604_604" class="fnanchor">[604]</a></p></blockquote> <p>This peculiar mixture of forgetting with our remembering is but one instance of our mind's selective activity. @@ -31937,13 +32147,13 @@ deficit in the amount of represented time. The process of abridgment, of foreshortening, of which we have spoken, presupposes this deficit. If, in order to reach a distant reminiscence, we had to go through the entire series of terms which separate it from our present selves, memory -would become impossible on account of the length of the operation. We<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_681" id="Page_681">[Pg 681]</a></span> +would become impossible on account of the length of the operation. We<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_681">[Pg 681]</a></span> thus reach the paradoxical result that one condition of remembering is that we should forget. Without totally forgetting a prodigious number of states of consciousness, and momentarily forgetting a large number, we could not remember at all. Oblivion, except in certain cases, is thus no malady of memory, but a condition of its health and its -life."<a name="FNanchor_605_605" id="FNanchor_605_605"></a><a href="#Footnote_605_605" class="fnanchor">[605]</a></p></blockquote> +life."<a id="FNanchor_605_605"></a><a href="#Footnote_605_605" class="fnanchor">[605]</a></p></blockquote> <p>There are many irregularities in the process of forgetting which are as yet unaccounted for. A thing forgotten @@ -31981,8 +32191,8 @@ books. The books were ransacked, and among them were found several of the Greek and Latin Fathers, together with a collection of Rabbinical writings. In these works so many of the passages taken down at the young woman's bedside were identified that there could be no -reasonable doubt as to their source."<a name="FNanchor_606_606" id="FNanchor_606_606"></a><a href="#Footnote_606_606" class="fnanchor">[606]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_682" id="Page_682">[Pg 682]</a></span></p> +reasonable doubt as to their source."<a id="FNanchor_606_606"></a><a href="#Footnote_606_606" class="fnanchor">[606]</a></p></blockquote> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_682">[Pg 682]</a></span></p> <p>Hypnotic subjects as a rule forget all that has happened in their trance. But in a succeeding trance they will often remember the events of a past one. This is like what @@ -32014,7 +32224,7 @@ they had handled or had done.</p> sphere of possible recollection may be wider than we think, and that in certain matters apparent oblivion is no proof against possible recall under other conditions. They give -no countenance, however, to the extravagant opinion that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_683" id="Page_683">[Pg 683]</a></span> +no countenance, however, to the extravagant opinion that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_683">[Pg 683]</a></span> nothing we experience can be absolutely forgotten. In real life, in spite of occasional surprises, most of what happens actually is forgotten. The only reasons for supposing @@ -32034,13 +32244,13 @@ energy of the self-active power of a subject one and indivisible: consequently a part of the ego must be detached or annihilated, if a cognition once existent be again extinguished. Hence it is that the problem most difficult of solution is not, how a mental activity endures, but how -it ever vanishes."<a name="FNanchor_607_607" id="FNanchor_607_607"></a><a href="#Footnote_607_607" class="fnanchor">[607]</a></p></blockquote> +it ever vanishes."<a id="FNanchor_607_607"></a><a href="#Footnote_607_607" class="fnanchor">[607]</a></p></blockquote> <p>Those whom such an argument persuades may be left happy with their belief. Other positive argument there is -none, none certainly of a physiological sort.<a name="FNanchor_608_608" id="FNanchor_608_608"></a><a href="#Footnote_608_608" class="fnanchor">[608]</a></p> +none, none certainly of a physiological sort.<a id="FNanchor_608_608"></a><a href="#Footnote_608_608" class="fnanchor">[608]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>When memory begins to decay, proper names are what go first, and at all times proper names are harder to recollect @@ -32051,13 +32261,13 @@ names have contracted an infinitely greater number of associations in our mind than the names of most of the persons whom we know. Their memory is better organized. Proper names as well organized as those of our family and friends are -recollected as well as those of any other objects.<a name="FNanchor_609_609" id="FNanchor_609_609"></a><a href="#Footnote_609_609" class="fnanchor">[609]</a> 'Organization' +recollected as well as those of any other objects.<a id="FNanchor_609_609"></a><a href="#Footnote_609_609" class="fnanchor">[609]</a> 'Organization' means numerous associations; and the more numerous the associations, the greater the number of paths of recall. For the same reason adjectives, conjunctions, prepositions, and the cardinal verbs, those words, in short, which -form the grammatical framework of all our speech, are the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_684" id="Page_684">[Pg 684]</a></span> -very last to decay. Kussmaul<a name="FNanchor_610_610" id="FNanchor_610_610"></a><a href="#Footnote_610_610" class="fnanchor">[610]</a> makes the following acute +form the grammatical framework of all our speech, are the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_684">[Pg 684]</a></span> +very last to decay. Kussmaul<a id="FNanchor_610_610"></a><a href="#Footnote_610_610" class="fnanchor">[610]</a> makes the following acute remark on this subject:</p> <blockquote> @@ -32085,7 +32295,7 @@ paths of association between the brain-centres which support the two, we are in as bad a plight. 'Ataxic' and 'amnesic' aphasia, 'word-deafness,' and 'associative aphasia' are all practical losses of word-memory. We have thus, as -M. Ribot says, not memory so much as memories.<a name="FNanchor_611_611" id="FNanchor_611_611"></a><a href="#Footnote_611_611" class="fnanchor">[611]</a> The +M. Ribot says, not memory so much as memories.<a id="FNanchor_611_611"></a><a href="#Footnote_611_611" class="fnanchor">[611]</a> The visual, the tactile, the muscular, the auditory memory may all vary independently of each other in the same individual; and different individuals may have them developed in different @@ -32096,17 +32306,17 @@ sensibility is high. A man with a bad ear is not likely to have practically a good musical memory, or a purblind person to remember visual appearances well. In a later chapter we shall see illustrations of the differences in men's -imagining power.<a name="FNanchor_612_612" id="FNanchor_612_612"></a><a href="#Footnote_612_612" class="fnanchor">[612]</a> It is obvious that the machinery of +imagining power.<a id="FNanchor_612_612"></a><a href="#Footnote_612_612" class="fnanchor">[612]</a> It is obvious that the machinery of memory must be largely determined thereby.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_685" id="Page_685">[Pg 685]</a></span></p> -<p>Mr. Galton, in his work on English Men of Science,<a name="FNanchor_613_613" id="FNanchor_613_613"></a><a href="#Footnote_613_613" class="fnanchor">[613]</a> has +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_685">[Pg 685]</a></span></p> +<p>Mr. Galton, in his work on English Men of Science,<a id="FNanchor_613_613"></a><a href="#Footnote_613_613" class="fnanchor">[613]</a> has given a very interesting collation of cases showing individual variations in the type of memory, where it is strong. Some have it verbal. Others have it good for facts and figures, others for form. Most say that what is to be remembered -must first be rationally conceived and assimilated.<a name="FNanchor_614_614" id="FNanchor_614_614"></a><a href="#Footnote_614_614" class="fnanchor">[614]</a></p> +must first be rationally conceived and assimilated.<a id="FNanchor_614_614"></a><a href="#Footnote_614_614" class="fnanchor">[614]</a></p> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <p>There is an interesting fact connected with remembering, which, so far as I know, Mr. R. Verdon was the first @@ -32125,7 +32335,7 @@ lines of Homer, says them perfectly, and then forgets them so that he could not say five consecutive lines the next morning, and a barrister may be one week learned in the mysteries of making cog-wheels, but in the next he may be well acquainted with the anatomy of the ribs -instead."<a name="FNanchor_615_615" id="FNanchor_615_615"></a><a href="#Footnote_615_615" class="fnanchor">[615]</a></p></blockquote> +instead."<a id="FNanchor_615_615"></a><a href="#Footnote_615_615" class="fnanchor">[615]</a></p></blockquote> <p>The rationale of this fact is obscure; and the existence of it ought to make us feel how truly subtle are the nervous @@ -32146,7 +32356,7 @@ but that we have real difficulty in attempting to remember it."</p></blockquote> topic as we think, during the time in which we seem to be merely retaining it subject to recall.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_686" id="Page_686">[Pg 686]</a></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_686">[Pg 686]</a></span></p> <blockquote> <p>"Practically," says Mr. Verdon, "we sometimes keep a matter in @@ -32173,10 +32383,10 @@ know the piece, it pays better to wait and recollect by an effort from within, than to look at the book again. If we recover the words in the former way, we shall probably know them the next time; if in the latter way, we shall very likely -need the hook once more.</p> +need the book once more.</p> <div class="figleft" style="width: 150px;"> -<img src="images/jame_686_0042.jpg" width="150" alt="Engraving" /> +<img src="images/jame_686_0042.jpg" alt="Engraving" style="width: 150px"> <div class="capt02"><span class="smcap">Fig.</span> 46.</div> </div> @@ -32198,7 +32408,7 @@ is, moreover, a greater amount of tension accumulated in the brain before the discharge from 1 to 2, when the latter takes place unaided by the eye. This is proved by the general -feeling of strain in the effort to remember 2; and this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_687" id="Page_687">[Pg 687]</a></span> +feeling of strain in the effort to remember 2; and this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_687">[Pg 687]</a></span> also ought to make the discharge more violent and the path more deep. A similar reason doubtless accounts for the familiar fact that we remember our own theories, our @@ -32223,7 +32433,7 @@ not so. Sensational consciousness is something <i>quasi-material</i>, hardly cognitive, which one need not much wonder at. <i>Relating</i> consciousness is quite the reverse, and the mystery of it is unspeakable. Professor Ladd, for example, -in his usually excellent book,<a name="FNanchor_616_616" id="FNanchor_616_616"></a><a href="#Footnote_616_616" class="fnanchor">[616]</a> after well showing the +in his usually excellent book,<a id="FNanchor_616_616"></a><a href="#Footnote_616_616" class="fnanchor">[616]</a> after well showing the matter-of-fact dependence of retention and reproduction on brain-paths, says:</p> @@ -32243,7 +32453,7 @@ even suggest the beginning of a physical explanation. Moreover, no cerebral process can be conceived of, which—in case it were known to exist—could possibly be regarded as a fitting basis for this unifying <i>actus</i> of mind. Thus also, and even more emphatically, -must we insist upon the complete inability of physiology to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_688" id="Page_688">[Pg 688]</a></span> +must we insist upon the complete inability of physiology to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_688">[Pg 688]</a></span> suggest an explanation for conscious memory, in so far as it is <i>memory</i>—that is, in so far as it most imperatively calls for explanation.... The very essence of the act of memory consists in the ability to say: @@ -32264,7 +32474,7 @@ involving the same inexplicable act of memory. It is a fact of consciousness on which all possibility of connected experience and of recorded and cumulative human knowledge is dependent that certain phases or products of consciousness appear with a claim to stand for -(to represent)<a name="FNanchor_617_617" id="FNanchor_617_617"></a><a href="#Footnote_617_617" class="fnanchor">[617]</a> past experiences to which they are regarded as in some +(to represent)<a id="FNanchor_617_617"></a><a href="#Footnote_617_617" class="fnanchor">[617]</a> past experiences to which they are regarded as in some respect similar. It is this peculiar claim in consciousness which constitutes the essence of an act of memory; it is this which makes the memory wholly inexplicable as a mere persistence or recurrence of @@ -32287,7 +32497,7 @@ together' of these sensations would be knowledge, if it could only be brought about, the only mystery being as to the what '<i>actus</i>' can bring it about. At another moment it seems to contend that even this sort of 'combining' would -not be knowledge, because certain of the elements connected<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_689" id="Page_689">[Pg 689]</a></span> +not be knowledge, because certain of the elements connected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_689">[Pg 689]</a></span> must 'claim to represent or stand for' past originals, which is incompatible with their being mere images revived. The result is various confused and scattered mysteries and @@ -32318,15 +32528,15 @@ zu einer Pädagogik, etc., 1888.</p> <h5>END OF VOL. I.</h5> -<hr class="tb" /> +<hr class="tb" > <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_567_567" id="Footnote_567_567"></a><a href="#FNanchor_567_567"><span class="label">[567]</span></a> L'Homme et l'Intelligence, p. 32.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_567_567"></a><a href="#FNanchor_567_567"><span class="label">[567]</span></a> L'Homme et l'Intelligence, p. 32.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_568_568" id="Footnote_568_568"></a><a href="#FNanchor_568_568"><span class="label">[568]</span></a> Professor Richet has therefore no right to say, as he does in another +<p><a id="Footnote_568_568"></a><a href="#FNanchor_568_568"><span class="label">[568]</span></a> Professor Richet has therefore no right to say, as he does in another place (Revue Philosophique, xxi, 570): "<i>Without memory no conscious sensation, without memory no consciousness.</i>" All he is entitled to say is: "Without memory no consciousness known outside of itself." Of the @@ -32345,7 +32555,7 @@ it, ere we can make it enter into the past. <i>Hæret lateri letalis arundo.</i> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_569_569" id="Footnote_569_569"></a><a href="#FNanchor_569_569"><span class="label">[569]</span></a> This is the primary positive after-image. According to Helmholtz, +<p><a id="Footnote_569_569"></a><a href="#FNanchor_569_569"><span class="label">[569]</span></a> This is the primary positive after-image. According to Helmholtz, one third of a second is the most favorable length of exposure to the light for producing it. Longer exposure, complicated by subsequent admission of light to the eye, results in the ordinary negative and complementary @@ -32364,15 +32574,15 @@ never complementary of those of the original.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_570_570" id="Footnote_570_570"></a><a href="#FNanchor_570_570"><span class="label">[570]</span></a> Hermann's Hdbch. ii, 2. 282.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_570_570"></a><a href="#FNanchor_570_570"><span class="label">[570]</span></a> Hermann's Hdbch. ii, 2. 282.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_571_571" id="Footnote_571_571"></a><a href="#FNanchor_571_571"><span class="label">[571]</span></a> Rev. Philos., 562.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_571_571"></a><a href="#FNanchor_571_571"><span class="label">[571]</span></a> Rev. Philos., 562.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_572_572" id="Footnote_572_572"></a><a href="#FNanchor_572_572"><span class="label">[572]</span></a> Richet says: "The present has a certain duration, a variable duration, +<p><a id="Footnote_572_572"></a><a href="#FNanchor_572_572"><span class="label">[572]</span></a> Richet says: "The present has a certain duration, a variable duration, sometimes a rather long one, which comprehends all the time occupied by the after-reverberation [<i>retentissement</i>, after-image] of a sensation. For example, if the reverberation of an electric shock within our nerves lasts @@ -32386,11 +32596,11 @@ The figures which M. Richet supposes appear to be considerably too large.</p></d <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_573_573" id="Footnote_573_573"></a><a href="#FNanchor_573_573"><span class="label">[573]</span></a> Cf. Fechner, Psychophysik, ii, 499.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_573_573"></a><a href="#FNanchor_573_573"><span class="label">[573]</span></a> Cf. Fechner, Psychophysik, ii, 499.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_574_574" id="Footnote_574_574"></a><a href="#FNanchor_574_574"><span class="label">[574]</span></a> The primary after-image itself cannot be utilized if the stimulus is too +<p><a id="Footnote_574_574"></a><a href="#FNanchor_574_574"><span class="label">[574]</span></a> The primary after-image itself cannot be utilized if the stimulus is too brief. Mr. Cattell found (Psychologische Studien, iii, p. 93 ff.) that the color of a light must fall upon the eye for a period varying from 0.00275 to 0.006 of a second, in order to be recognized for what it is. Letters @@ -32412,7 +32622,7 @@ Archiv, iv, 325 ff.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_575_575" id="Footnote_575_575"></a><a href="#FNanchor_575_575"><span class="label">[575]</span></a> When the past is recalled symbolically, or conceptually only, it is +<p><a id="Footnote_575_575"></a><a href="#FNanchor_575_575"><span class="label">[575]</span></a> When the past is recalled symbolically, or conceptually only, it is true that no such copy need be there. In no sort of conceptual knowledge is it requisite that definitely resembling images be there (cf. <a href="#Page_471">pp. 471</a> ff.). But as all conceptual knowledge stands for intuitive knowledge, and terminates @@ -32422,7 +32632,7 @@ intuitively known.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_576_576" id="Footnote_576_576"></a><a href="#FNanchor_576_576"><span class="label">[576]</span></a> E.g. Spencer, Psychology, i, p. 448. How do the believers in the +<p><a id="Footnote_576_576"></a><a href="#FNanchor_576_576"><span class="label">[576]</span></a> E.g. Spencer, Psychology, i, p. 448. How do the believers in the sufficiency of the 'image' formulate the cases where we remember that something did <i>not</i> happen—that we did not wind our watch, did not lock the door, etc.? It is very hard to account for these memories of omission. @@ -32440,11 +32650,11 @@ absence of an image which does such service in the cruder books.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_577_577" id="Footnote_577_577"></a><a href="#FNanchor_577_577"><span class="label">[577]</span></a> Psychologia Empirica, § 174.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_577_577"></a><a href="#FNanchor_577_577"><span class="label">[577]</span></a> Psychologia Empirica, § 174.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_578_578" id="Footnote_578_578"></a><a href="#FNanchor_578_578"><span class="label">[578]</span></a> Analysis, i, 330-1. Mill believed that the various things remembered, +<p><a id="Footnote_578_578"></a><a href="#FNanchor_578_578"><span class="label">[578]</span></a> Analysis, i, 330-1. Mill believed that the various things remembered, the self included, enter consciousness in the form of separate ideas, but so rapidly that they are 'all clustered into one.' "Ideas called up in close conjunction ... assume, even when there is the greatest complexity, the @@ -32453,26 +32663,26 @@ does not impair the accuracy of his description of memory's <i>object</i>.</p></ <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_579_579" id="Footnote_579_579"></a><a href="#FNanchor_579_579"><span class="label">[579]</span></a> Compare, however, <a href="#Page_251">p. 251</a>, Chapter IX.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_579_579"></a><a href="#FNanchor_579_579"><span class="label">[579]</span></a> Compare, however, <a href="#Page_251">p. 251</a>, Chapter IX.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_580_580" id="Footnote_580_580"></a><a href="#FNanchor_580_580"><span class="label">[580]</span></a> Professor Bain adds, in a note to this passage of Mill's: "This process +<p><a id="Footnote_580_580"></a><a href="#FNanchor_580_580"><span class="label">[580]</span></a> Professor Bain adds, in a note to this passage of Mill's: "This process seems best expressed by laying down a law of Compound or Composite Association, under which a plurality of feeble links of connection may be a substitute for one powerful and self-sufficing link."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_581_581" id="Footnote_581_581"></a><a href="#FNanchor_581_581"><span class="label">[581]</span></a> Analysis, chap. x.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_581_581"></a><a href="#FNanchor_581_581"><span class="label">[581]</span></a> Analysis, chap. x.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_582_582" id="Footnote_582_582"></a><a href="#FNanchor_582_582"><span class="label">[582]</span></a> H. Maudsley, The Physiology of Mind (London, 1876), p. 513.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_582_582"></a><a href="#FNanchor_582_582"><span class="label">[582]</span></a> H. Maudsley, The Physiology of Mind (London, 1876), p. 513.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_583_583" id="Footnote_583_583"></a><a href="#FNanchor_583_583"><span class="label">[583]</span></a> The only fact which might plausibly be alleged against this view is the +<p><a id="Footnote_583_583"></a><a href="#FNanchor_583_583"><span class="label">[583]</span></a> The only fact which might plausibly be alleged against this view is the familiar one that we may feel the lapse of time in an experience so monotonous that its earlier portions can have no 'associates' different from its later ones. Sit with closed eyes, for example, and steadily pronounce some @@ -32503,11 +32713,11 @@ so called. Cf. <i>supra</i>, <a href="#Page_646">p. 646</a>.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_584_584" id="Footnote_584_584"></a><a href="#FNanchor_584_584"><span class="label">[584]</span></a> On Intelligence, i, 258-9.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_584_584"></a><a href="#FNanchor_584_584"><span class="label">[584]</span></a> On Intelligence, i, 258-9.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_585_585" id="Footnote_585_585"></a><a href="#FNanchor_585_585"><span class="label">[585]</span></a> Not that <i>mere</i> native tenacity will make a man great. It must be +<p><a id="Footnote_585_585"></a><a href="#FNanchor_585_585"><span class="label">[585]</span></a> Not that <i>mere</i> native tenacity will make a man great. It must be coupled with great passions and great intellect besides. Imbeciles sometimes have extraordinary desultory memory. Drobisch describes (Empirische Psychol., p. 95) the case of a young man whom he examined. He @@ -32553,26 +32763,26 @@ surged up in his mind. Such a memory is of course a priceless boon.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_586_586" id="Footnote_586_586"></a><a href="#FNanchor_586_586"><span class="label">[586]</span></a> Cf. Ebbinghaus: Ueber das Gedächtniss (1885), pp. 67, 45. One may +<p><a id="Footnote_586_586"></a><a href="#FNanchor_586_586"><span class="label">[586]</span></a> Cf. Ebbinghaus: Ueber das Gedächtniss (1885), pp. 67, 45. One may hear a person say: "I have a very poor memory, because I was never systematically made to learn poetry at school."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_587_587" id="Footnote_587_587"></a><a href="#FNanchor_587_587"><span class="label">[587]</span></a> How to Strengthen the Memory; or, The Natural and Scientific Methods +<p><a id="Footnote_587_587"></a><a href="#FNanchor_587_587"><span class="label">[587]</span></a> How to Strengthen the Memory; or, The Natural and Scientific Methods of Never Forgetting. By M. H. Holbrook, M.D. New York (no date).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_588_588" id="Footnote_588_588"></a><a href="#FNanchor_588_588"><span class="label">[588]</span></a> Page 39.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_588_588"></a><a href="#FNanchor_588_588"><span class="label">[588]</span></a> Page 39.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_589_589" id="Footnote_589_589"></a><a href="#FNanchor_589_589"><span class="label">[589]</span></a> Op. cit. p. 100.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_589_589"></a><a href="#FNanchor_589_589"><span class="label">[589]</span></a> Op. cit. p. 100.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_590_590" id="Footnote_590_590"></a><a href="#FNanchor_590_590"><span class="label">[590]</span></a> In order to test the opinion so confidently expressed in the text, I have +<p><a id="Footnote_590_590"></a><a href="#FNanchor_590_590"><span class="label">[590]</span></a> In order to test the opinion so confidently expressed in the text, I have tried to see whether a certain amount of daily training in learning poetry by heart will shorten the time it takes to learn an entirely different kind of poetry. During eight successive days I learned 158 lines of Victor Hugo's @@ -32645,28 +32855,28 @@ then its subdivisions, then its sentences."</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_591_591" id="Footnote_591_591"></a><a href="#FNanchor_591_591"><span class="label">[591]</span></a> E. Pick: Memory and its Doctors (1888), p. 7.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_591_591"></a><a href="#FNanchor_591_591"><span class="label">[591]</span></a> E. Pick: Memory and its Doctors (1888), p. 7.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_592_592" id="Footnote_592_592"></a><a href="#FNanchor_592_592"><span class="label">[592]</span></a> This system is carried out in great detail in a book called 'Memory +<p><a id="Footnote_592_592"></a><a href="#FNanchor_592_592"><span class="label">[592]</span></a> This system is carried out in great detail in a book called 'Memory Training,' by Wm. L. Evans (1889).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_593_593" id="Footnote_593_593"></a><a href="#FNanchor_593_593"><span class="label">[593]</span></a> Paulhan, L'Activité mental, et les Éléments de l'Esprit (1889). p. 70.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_593_593"></a><a href="#FNanchor_593_593"><span class="label">[593]</span></a> Paulhan, L'Activité mental, et les Éléments de l'Esprit (1889). p. 70.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_594_594" id="Footnote_594_594"></a><a href="#FNanchor_594_594"><span class="label">[594]</span></a> On Intelligence, i, 77-82.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_594_594"></a><a href="#FNanchor_594_594"><span class="label">[594]</span></a> On Intelligence, i, 77-82.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_595_595" id="Footnote_595_595"></a><a href="#FNanchor_595_595"><span class="label">[595]</span></a> Psychology, § 201.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_595_595"></a><a href="#FNanchor_595_595"><span class="label">[595]</span></a> Psychology, § 201.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_596_596" id="Footnote_596_596"></a><a href="#FNanchor_596_596"><span class="label">[596]</span></a> Professor Höffding considers that the absence of contiguous associates +<p><a id="Footnote_596_596"></a><a href="#FNanchor_596_596"><span class="label">[596]</span></a> Professor Höffding considers that the absence of contiguous associates distinctly thought-of is a proof that associative processes are not concerned in these cases of instantaneous recognition where we get a strong sense of familiarity with the object, but no recall of previous time or place. His @@ -32747,30 +32957,30 @@ that we recognize a sensation A by comparing it with its own past image <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_597_597" id="Footnote_597_597"></a><a href="#FNanchor_597_597"><span class="label">[597]</span></a> Duality of the Mind, p. 84. The same thesis is defended by the late +<p><a id="Footnote_597_597"></a><a href="#FNanchor_597_597"><span class="label">[597]</span></a> Duality of the Mind, p. 84. The same thesis is defended by the late Mr. R. H. Proctor, who gives some cases rather hard to reconcile with my own proposed explanation, in 'Knowledge' for Nov. 8, 1884. See also Ribot, Maladies de la Mémoire, p. 149 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_598_598" id="Footnote_598_598"></a><a href="#FNanchor_598_598"><span class="label">[598]</span></a> Zeitschr. f. Völkerpsychologie u. s. w., Bd. v, p. 146.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_598_598"></a><a href="#FNanchor_598_598"><span class="label">[598]</span></a> Zeitschr. f. Völkerpsychologie u. s. w., Bd. v, p. 146.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_599_599" id="Footnote_599_599"></a><a href="#FNanchor_599_599"><span class="label">[599]</span></a> Ueber das Gedächtniss, experimentelle Untersuchungen (1885), p. 64.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_599_599"></a><a href="#FNanchor_599_599"><span class="label">[599]</span></a> Ueber das Gedächtniss, experimentelle Untersuchungen (1885), p. 64.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_600_600" id="Footnote_600_600"></a><a href="#FNanchor_600_600"><span class="label">[600]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> § 23.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_600_600"></a><a href="#FNanchor_600_600"><span class="label">[600]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> § 23.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_601_601" id="Footnote_601_601"></a><a href="#FNanchor_601_601"><span class="label">[601]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 103.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_601_601"></a><a href="#FNanchor_601_601"><span class="label">[601]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 103.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_602_602" id="Footnote_602_602"></a><a href="#FNanchor_602_602"><span class="label">[602]</span></a> All the inferences for which we can give no articulate reasons exemplify +<p><a id="Footnote_602_602"></a><a href="#FNanchor_602_602"><span class="label">[602]</span></a> All the inferences for which we can give no articulate reasons exemplify this law. In the chapter on Perception we shall have innumerable examples of it. A good pathological illustration of it is given in the curious observations of M. Binet on certain hysterical subjects, with anæsthetic @@ -32790,20 +33000,20 @@ therein.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_603_603" id="Footnote_603_603"></a><a href="#FNanchor_603_603"><span class="label">[603]</span></a> I copy from the abstract of Wolfe's paper in 'Science' for Nov. 19, +<p><a id="Footnote_603_603"></a><a href="#FNanchor_603_603"><span class="label">[603]</span></a> I copy from the abstract of Wolfe's paper in 'Science' for Nov. 19, 1886. The original is in Psychologische Studien, iii, 534 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_604_604" id="Footnote_604_604"></a><a href="#FNanchor_604_604"><span class="label">[604]</span></a> Essay conc. Human Understanding, ii, x, 5.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_604_604"></a><a href="#FNanchor_604_604"><span class="label">[604]</span></a> Essay conc. Human Understanding, ii, x, 5.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_605_605" id="Footnote_605_605"></a><a href="#FNanchor_605_605"><span class="label">[605]</span></a> Th. Ribot, Les Maladies de la Mémoire, p. 46.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_605_605"></a><a href="#FNanchor_605_605"><span class="label">[605]</span></a> Th. Ribot, Les Maladies de la Mémoire, p. 46.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_606_606" id="Footnote_606_606"></a><a href="#FNanchor_606_606"><span class="label">[606]</span></a> Biographia Literaria, ed. 1847, i, 117 (quoted in Carpenter's Mental +<p><a id="Footnote_606_606"></a><a href="#FNanchor_606_606"><span class="label">[606]</span></a> Biographia Literaria, ed. 1847, i, 117 (quoted in Carpenter's Mental Physiology, chapter x, which see for a number of other cases, all unfortunately deficient, like this one, in the evidence of exact verification which 'psychical research 'demands). Compare also Th. Ribot, Diseases of Memory, @@ -32818,2259 +33028,2253 @@ I have vainly sought the original (see Proc., etc., p. 553).</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_607_607" id="Footnote_607_607"></a><a href="#FNanchor_607_607"><span class="label">[607]</span></a> Lectures on Metaph., ii, 212.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_607_607"></a><a href="#FNanchor_607_607"><span class="label">[607]</span></a> Lectures on Metaph., ii, 212.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_608_608" id="Footnote_608_608"></a><a href="#FNanchor_608_608"><span class="label">[608]</span></a> Cf. on this point J. Delbœuf, Le Sommeil et les Rêves (1885), p. 119 +<p><a id="Footnote_608_608"></a><a href="#FNanchor_608_608"><span class="label">[608]</span></a> Cf. on this point J. Delbœuf, Le Sommeil et les Rêves (1885), p. 119 ff.; R. Verdon, Forgetfulness, in Mind, ii, 437.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_609_609" id="Footnote_609_609"></a><a href="#FNanchor_609_609"><span class="label">[609]</span></a> Cf. A. Maury, Le Sommeil et les Rêves, p. 442.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_609_609"></a><a href="#FNanchor_609_609"><span class="label">[609]</span></a> Cf. A. Maury, Le Sommeil et les Rêves, p. 442.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_610_610" id="Footnote_610_610"></a><a href="#FNanchor_610_610"><span class="label">[610]</span></a> Störungen der Sprache, quoted by Ribot, Les Maladies de la M., p. 133.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_610_610"></a><a href="#FNanchor_610_610"><span class="label">[610]</span></a> Störungen der Sprache, quoted by Ribot, Les Maladies de la M., p. 133.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_611_611" id="Footnote_611_611"></a><a href="#FNanchor_611_611"><span class="label">[611]</span></a> Op. cit. chap. iii.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_611_611"></a><a href="#FNanchor_611_611"><span class="label">[611]</span></a> Op. cit. chap. iii.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_612_612" id="Footnote_612_612"></a><a href="#FNanchor_612_612"><span class="label">[612]</span></a> "Those who have a good memory for figures are in general those +<p><a id="Footnote_612_612"></a><a href="#FNanchor_612_612"><span class="label">[612]</span></a> "Those who have a good memory for figures are in general those who know best how to handle them, that is, those who are most familiar with their relations to each other and to things." (A. Maury, Le Sommeil et les Rêves, p. 443.)</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_613_613" id="Footnote_613_613"></a><a href="#FNanchor_613_613"><span class="label">[613]</span></a> Pp. 107-121.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_613_613"></a><a href="#FNanchor_613_613"><span class="label">[613]</span></a> Pp. 107-121.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_614_614" id="Footnote_614_614"></a><a href="#FNanchor_614_614"><span class="label">[614]</span></a> For other examples see Hamilton's Lectures, ii, 219, and A. Huber: +<p><a id="Footnote_614_614"></a><a href="#FNanchor_614_614"><span class="label">[614]</span></a> For other examples see Hamilton's Lectures, ii, 219, and A. Huber: Das Gedächtniss, p. 36 ff.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_615_615" id="Footnote_615_615"></a><a href="#FNanchor_615_615"><span class="label">[615]</span></a> Mind, ii, 449.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_615_615"></a><a href="#FNanchor_615_615"><span class="label">[615]</span></a> Mind, ii, 449.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_616_616" id="Footnote_616_616"></a><a href="#FNanchor_616_616"><span class="label">[616]</span></a> Physiological Psychology, pt. ii, chap. x, § 23.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_616_616"></a><a href="#FNanchor_616_616"><span class="label">[616]</span></a> Physiological Psychology, pt. ii, chap. x, § 23.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_617_617" id="Footnote_617_617"></a><a href="#FNanchor_617_617"><span class="label">[617]</span></a> Why not say 'know'?—W. J.</p></div> +<p><a id="Footnote_617_617"></a><a href="#FNanchor_617_617"><span class="label">[617]</span></a> Why not say 'know'?—W. J.</p></div> -<hr class="chap" /> +<hr class="chap" > -<h4><a name="INDEX" id="INDEX">INDEX.</a></h4> +<h4><a id="INDEX">INDEX.</a></h4> -<p class="center"><big><a href="#Abbott_T_K">A.</a> <a href="#Babe_and_candle_scheme_of">B.</a> <a href="#Caird_E">C.</a> <a href="#Darwin_C">D.</a> <a href="#Ebbinghaus_H">E.</a> <a href="#Fallacy_the_Psychologists">F.</a> <a href="#Galton_F">G.</a> <a href="#Habit">H.</a> <a href="#Ideal_objects">I.</a> <a href="#Jackson_Hughlings">J.</a> <a href="#Kandinsky_V">K.</a> <a href="#Ladd_G_T">L.</a> <a href="#McCosh">M.</a> <a href="#Nature_the_order_of">N.</a> <a href="#Obersteiner">O.</a> <a href="#Pain">P.</a> +<p class="center"><span style="font-size: larger"><a href="#Abbott_T_K">A.</a> <a href="#Babe_and_candle_scheme_of">B.</a> <a href="#Caird_E">C.</a> <a href="#Darwin_C">D.</a> <a href="#Ebbinghaus_H">E.</a> <a href="#Fallacy_the_Psychologists">F.</a> <a href="#Galton_F">G.</a> <a href="#Habit">H.</a> <a href="#Ideal_objects">I.</a> <a href="#Jackson_Hughlings">J.</a> <a href="#Kandinsky_V">K.</a> <a href="#Ladd_G_T">L.</a> <a href="#McCosh">M.</a> <a href="#Nature_the_order_of">N.</a> <a href="#Obersteiner">O.</a> <a href="#Pain">P.</a> <a href="#Questioning_mania">Q.</a> <a href="#Rabier">R.</a> <a href="#Sagacity">S.</a> <a href="#Tactile_centre">T.</a> <a href="#Ueberweg">U.</a> <a href="#Valentin">V.</a> <a href="#Wahle">W.</a> X. Y. <a href="#Zollner">Z.</a> -</big><br /> -<br /></p> +</span><br > +<br ></p> <p>Authors the titles only of whose works are cited are not, as a rule, referred to in -this index.<br /> -<br /></p> +this index.<br > +<br ></p> <p> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Abbott_T_K"></a>Abbott, T. K.</span>, II. 221<br /> -<br /> -Abstract ideas, I. <a href="#Page_468">468</a>, <a href="#Page_508">508</a>; II. 48<br /> -<br /> -Abstract qualities, II. 329-37, 340<br /> -<br /> -Abstraction, I. <a href="#Page_505">505</a>; II. 346 ff. See <i><a href="#Distraction">distraction</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Accommodation, feeling of, II. 93, 235<br /> -<br /> -Acquaintance, I. <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br /> -<br /> -Acquired characters, see <i><a href="#Inheritance">inheritance</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Acquisitiveness, II. 422, 679<br /> -<br /> -Actors, their emotions whilst playing, II. 464<br /> -<br /> -Adaptation of mind to environment results in our knowing the impressing circumstances, II. 625 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Æsthetic principles, II. 639, 672<br /> -<br /> -After-images, I. <a href="#Page_645">645-7</a>; II. 67, 200, 604<br /> -<br /> -<i>Agoraphobia</i>, II. 421<br /> -<br /> -<i>Agraphia</i>, I. <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Alfieri</span>, II. 543<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Allen, G.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_144">144</a>; II. 631<br /> -<br /> -Alteration of one impression by another one simultaneously taking place, II. 28 ff., 201<br /> -<br /> -Alternating personality, I. <a href="#Page_379">379</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Ambiguity of optical sensations, II. 231-7<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Amidon</span>, I. <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Amnesia">Amnesia</a> in hysterical disease, I. <a href="#Page_384">384</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">accompanies anæsthesia, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_682">682</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in hypnotic trance, II. 602.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Forgetting">forgetting</a></i></span><br /> -<br /> -Amputated limbs, feeling of, II. 38-9, 105<br /> -<br /> -Anæsthesia, in hysterics, I. <a href="#Page_203">203</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involves correlated amnesia, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">movements executed during, II. 105, 489-92, 520-1;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and emotion, 455-6;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in hypnotism, 606-9</span><br /> -<br /> -Analogies, the perception of, I. <a href="#Page_530">530</a><br /> -<br /> -Analysis, I. <a href="#Page_502">502</a>; II. 344<br /> -<br /> -Anger, II. 409, 460, 478<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Aphasia">Aphasia</a>, motor, I. <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sensory, I. <a href="#Page_53">53-4-5</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">optical, I. <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">amnesia in, <a href="#Page_640">640</a>, <a href="#Page_684">684</a>; II. 58</span><br /> -<br /> -Apperception, II. 107 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Apperception, transcendental Unity of, I. <a href="#Page_362">362</a><br /> -<br /> -Appropriateness, characterizes mental acts, I. <a href="#Page_13">13</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Apraxia</i>, I. <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -<br /> -<i><a id="A_priori">A priori</a></i> connections exist only between objects of perception and movements, not between sensory ideas, II. 581.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>A priori</i> ideas and experience, Chapter XXVIII.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>A priori</i> propositions, II. 661-5</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Archer, W.</span>, II. 464<br /> -<br /> -Arithmetic, II. 654.<br /> -<br /> -Articular sensibility, II. 189 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Association, <a href="#CHAPTER_XIV463">Chapter XIV</a>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is not of ideas, but of things thought of, I. <a href="#Page_554">554</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">examples of, <a href="#Page_555">555</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its rapidity, <a href="#Page_557">557</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">by contiguity, <a href="#Page_561">561</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">elementary law of, <a href="#Page_566">566</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'mixed' association, <a href="#Page_571">571</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conditions of, <a href="#Page_575">575</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">by similarity, <a href="#Page_578">578</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">three kinds of association compared, <a href="#Page_580">580</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in voluntary thought, <a href="#Page_583">583</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">by contrast, <a href="#Page_593">593</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">history of the doctrine of, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">association the means of localization, II. 158 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">connection of association by similarity with reasoning, 345 ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Associationism, I. <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -Associationist theory of the self, I. <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of space-perception, II. 271 ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -<i>Asymbolia</i>, I. <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -<br /> -Attention, <a href="#CHAPTER_XI">Chapter XI</a>: to how many things possible, I. <a href="#Page_405">405</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to simultaneous sight and sound, <a href="#Page_411">411</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its varieties, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">passive, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">voluntary, <a href="#Page_420">420</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its effects, <a href="#Page_424">424</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its influence on reaction-time, <a href="#Page_427">427-34</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">accompanied by feelings of tension due to adaptation of sense-organs, <a href="#Page_434">434-8</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involves imagination or preperception of object, <a href="#Page_438">438-44</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conceivable as a mere effect, <a href="#Page_448">448</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Aubert, H.,</span> II. 235<br /> -<br /> -Auditory centre in brain, I. <a href="#Page_52">52-6</a><br /> -<br /> -Auditory type of imagination, II. 60<br /> -<br /> -<i>'Ausfallserscheinungen,'</i> I. <a href="#Page_75">75</a><br /> -<br /> -Automatic writing, I. <a href="#Page_393">393</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Austen, Jane,</span> I. <a href="#Page_571">571</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Automaton-Theory">Automaton-Theory,</a> <a href="#CHAPTER_V">Chapter V</a>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">postulated rather than proved, I. <a href="#Page_134">134-8</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reasons against it, <a href="#Page_138">138-144</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">applied to attention, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">disregarded in this book, II. 583</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Azam,</span> Dr., I. <a href="#Page_380">380</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Babe_and_candle_scheme_of"></a>Babe and candle, scheme of, I. <a href="#Page_25">25</a><br /> -<br /> -Baby's first perception, II. 8, 84;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his early instinctive movements, 404 ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bær, von,</span> I. <a href="#Page_639">639</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bagehot, W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_582">582</a>; II. 283, 308<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bain,</span> on series conscious of itself, I. <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on self-esteem, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on self-love, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association, <a href="#Page_485">485</a>, <a href="#Page_530">530</a>, <a href="#Page_561">561</a>, <a href="#Page_589">589</a>, <a href="#Page_601">601</a>, <a href="#Page_653">653</a>; II. 6, 12, 69, 186, 271, 282, 296, 319, 322, 372-3, 463, 466, 551, 554-5</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Ballard,</span> I. <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Balzac,</span> I. <a href="#Page_374">374</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bartels,</span> I. <a href="#Page_432">432</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bastian, H. C.,</span> II. 488<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Baumann,</span> II. 409<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Baxt,</span> I. <a href="#Page_648">648</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Beaunis, E.,</span> II. 492<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bechterew,</span> I. <a href="#Page_407">407</a><br /> -<br /> -Belief, Chapter XXI:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in sensations, II. 299 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in objects of emotion, 306 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in theories, 311 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and will, 319.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Reality">reality</a></i></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bell, C.,</span> II. 483, 492<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bergson, J.,</span> II. 609<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Berkeley,</span> I. <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>; II. 43, 49, 77, 212, 240, 666<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bernhardt,</span> II. 502<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bernheim,</span> I. <a href="#Page_206">206</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bertrand, A.,</span> II. 518<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bessel,</span> I. <a href="#Page_413">413</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Binet, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_203">203</a> ff.; II. 71, 74, 128 ff., 130, 167, 491, 520<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Black, R. W.,</span> II. 339<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bleek,</span> II. 358<br /> -<br /> -Blind, the, their space-perception, II. 202 ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after restoration to sight, 211-2;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hallucination of a blind man, 323;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">dreams of the, 44</span><br /> -<br /> -Blindness, mental, I. <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>. See <i><a href="#Sight">Sight</a>, <a href="#Hemianopsia">Hemianopsia</a>,</i> etc.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Blix,</span> II. 170<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bloch,</span> II. 515<br /> -<br /> -Blood, its exciting effect on the nerves, II. 412-3<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Blood, B. P.,</span> II. 284<br /> -<br /> -Blood-supply to brain, I. <a href="#Page_97">97</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bourne, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_391">391</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bourru,</span> Dr., I. <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bowditch, H. P.,</span> his reaction-timer, I. <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on contrast in seen motion, II. 247;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on knee-jerk, 380;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">comparison of touch and sight, 520</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bowen, F.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_214">214</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bowne, B. P.,</span> on knowledge, I. <a href="#Page_219">219</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bradley, F. H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_452">452</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a>, <a href="#Page_604">604</a>; II. 7, 9, 284, 648<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Brain"></a>Brain, its functions, Chapter II:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of frog, I. <a href="#Page_14">14</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of dog, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of monkey, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of man, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">lower centres compared with hemispheres, <a href="#Page_9">9-10</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">circulation in, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">instability, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its connection with Mind, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'entire' brain not a real physical fact, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its changes as subtle as those of thought, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its dying vibrations operative in producing consciousness, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Influence of environment upon it, <a href="#Page_626">626</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Brain-process, see <i><a href="#Neural_process">neural process</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Brain-structure, the two modes of its genesis, II. 624<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Brentano,</span> I. <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_547">547</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bridgeman, Laura,</span> II. 62, 358, 420<br /> -<br /> -Broca's convolution, I. <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Brodhun,</span> I. <a href="#Page_542">542</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Brown, Thos.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a>; II. 271<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Brown-Séquard,</span> I. <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>; II. 695<br /> -<br /> -Brutes, the intellect of, II. 348 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bucke, R. M.,</span> II. 460<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Bubnoff,</span> I. <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Burke,</span> II. 464<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Burnham, W. H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_689">689</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Burot,</span> Dr., I. <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Caird_E"></a>Caird, E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>, II. ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Calmeil, A.,</span> II. 524<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Campanella,</span> II. 464<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Campbell, G.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Cardaillac,</span> I. <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Carlyle, T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_311">311</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Carpenter, W. B.,</span> on formation of habits, I. <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ethical remarks on habit, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mistakes in speech, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">lapses of memory, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on not feeling pain, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on ideo-motor action, II. 522</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Carville,</span> I. <a href="#Page_69">69</a><br /> -<br /> -Catalepsy, I. <a href="#Page_229">229</a>; II. 583<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Cattell,</span> on reaction-time, I. <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>; <a href="#Page_524">524</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on recognition, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_648">648</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_420">420</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association-time, <a href="#Page_558">558</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Cause, consciousness a, I. <a href="#Page_187">187</a>; II. 583, 592<br /> -<br /> -Centres, cortical, I. <a href="#Page_30">30</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">motor, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">visual, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">auditory, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">olfactory, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">gustatory, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">tactile, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Cerebral process, see <i><a href="#Neural_process">neural process</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Cerebrum, see <i><a href="#Brain">Brain</a>, <a href="#Hemispheres">Hemispheres</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Chadbourne, P A.,</span> II. 383<br /> -<br /> -Characters, general, II. 329 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Charcot,</span> I. <a href="#Page_54">54-5</a>; II. 58, 596<br /> -<br /> -Chloroform, I. <a href="#Page_531">531</a><br /> -<br /> -Choice, see <i><a href="#Selection">selection</a>, <a href="#Interest">interest</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Circulation in brain, I. <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effects of sensory stimuli upon, II. 374 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in grief, 443-4</span><br /> -<br /> -Classic and romantic, II. 469<br /> -<br /> -Classifications, II. 646<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Clay, E. C. R.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_609">609</a><br /> -<br /> -Cleanliness, II. 434<br /> -<br /> -Clearness, I. <a href="#Page_426">426</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Clifford,</span> I. <a href="#Page_130">130-2</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Clouston,</span> II. 114, 284-5, 537, 539<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Cobbe, F. P.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_374">374</a><br /> -<br /> -Cochlea, theory of its action, II. 169<br /> -<br /> -Cognition, see <i><a href="#Knowing">knowing</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Cohen, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Coleridge, S. T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_572">572</a>, <a href="#Page_681">681</a><br /> -<br /> -Collateral innervation, see <i><a href="#Vicarious_function">vicarious function</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Comparison, <a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">Chapter XIII</a>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relations discovered by comparison have nothing to do with the time and space order of their terms, II. 641;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mediate, 489, 644;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see <i><a href="#Difference">difference</a>, <a href="#Likeness">likeness</a></i></span><br /> -<br /> -Composition, of Mind out of its elements, see <i><a href="#Mind-Stuff_theory">Mind-Stuff theory</a></i>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">differences due to, I. <a href="#Page_491">491</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Comte, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br /> -<br /> -Conceivability, I. <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Conceptions">Conceptions,</a> <a href="#CHAPTER_XII">Chapter XII</a>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defined, I. <a href="#Page_461">461</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their permanence, <a href="#Page_464">464</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">do not develop of themselves, <a href="#Page_466">466</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">abstract, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">universal, <a href="#Page_478">478</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">essentially teleological, II. 332</span><br /> -<br /> -Conceptual order different from perceptual, I. <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br /> -<br /> -Concomitants, law of varying, I. <a href="#Page_506">506</a><br /> -<br /> -Confusion, II. 352<br /> -<br /> -Consciousness, its seat, I. <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its distribution, <a href="#Page_142">142-3</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its function of selection, <a href="#Page_139">139-41</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is <i>personal</i> in form, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is continuous, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of lack, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of self not essential, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of <i>object</i> comes first, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">always partial and selective, <a href="#Page_284">284</a> ff., see <i><a href="#Selection">Selection</a></i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of the process of thinking, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the span of, <a href="#Page_405">405</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Consent, in willing, II. 568<br /> -<br /> -Considerations, I. <a href="#Page_20">20</a><br /> -<br /> -Constructiveness, II. 426<br /> -<br /> -Contiguity, association by, I. <a href="#Page_561">561</a><br /> -<br /> -Continuity of object of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br /> -<br /> -Contrast, of colors, II. 13-27;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of temperatures, 14;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">two theories of, 17 ff., 245;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of movements, 245 ff., 250</span><br /> -<br /> -Convolutions, motor, I. <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -<br /> -Cortex, of brain, experiments on, I. <a href="#Page_31">31</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Cramming, I. <a href="#Page_663">663</a><br /> -<br /> -Credulity, our primitive, II. 319<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Cudworth, R.,</span> II. 9<br /> -<br /> -'Cue,' the mental, II. 497, 518<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Cumberland, S.,</span> II. 525<br /> -<br /> -Curiosity, II. 429<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Czermak,</span> II. 170, 175<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Darwin_C"></a>Darwin, C.,</span> II. 432, 446, 479, 484, 678, 681-2-4<br /> -<br /> -Darwinism, scholastic reputation of, II. 670<br /> -<br /> -Data, the, of psychology, I. <a href="#Page_184">184</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Davidson, T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_474">474</a><br /> -<br /> -Deaf-mute's thought in infancy, I. <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -<br /> -Deafness, mental, I. <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55-6</a>. See <i><a href="#Hearing">hearing</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Dean, S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_394">394</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Decision">Decision,</a> five types of, II. 531<br /> -<br /> -Degenerations, descending in nerve-centres, I. <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Delabarre, E.,</span> II. 13-27, 71<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Delbœuf, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_455">455</a>, <a href="#Page_531">531</a>, <a href="#Page_541">541</a>, <a href="#Page_542">542</a>, <a href="#Page_548">548-9</a>; II. 100, 189, 249, 264, 605, 609, 612<br /> -<br /> -Deliberation, II. 528 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Delusions, insane, I. <a href="#Page_375">375</a>; II. 114 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Depth, see <i><a href="#Third_dimension">third dimension</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Descartes,</span> I. <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Destutt de Tracy,</span> I. <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br /> -<br /> -Determinism must be postulated by psychology, II. 576<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Dewey, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_473">473</a><br /> -<br /> -Dichotomy in thinking, II. 654<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Dickens, C.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_374">374</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Dietze,</span> I. <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_617">617</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Difference">Difference</a>, not resolvable into composition, I. <a href="#Page_490">490</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">noticed most between species of a genus, <a href="#Page_529">529</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the magnitude of, <a href="#Page_531">531</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">least discernible, <a href="#Page_537">537</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">methods for ascertaining, <a href="#Page_540">540</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Difference, local, II. 167 ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">genesis of our perception of, 642</span><br /> -<br /> -Diffusion of movements, the law of, II. 372<br /> -<br /> -Dimension, third, II. 134 ff., 212 ff., 220<br /> -<br /> -Dipsomania, II. 543<br /> -<br /> -Disbelief, II. 284<br /> -<br /> -Discrimination, <a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">Chapter XIII</a>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conditions which favor it, I. <a href="#Page_494">494</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">improves by practice, <a href="#Page_508">508</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">spatial, II. 167 ff.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Difference">difference</a></i></span><br /> -<br /> -Dissociation, I. <a href="#Page_486">486-7</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">law of, by varying concomitants, <a href="#Page_506">506</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Dissociation, ditto, II. 345, 359<br /> -<br /> -Dissociation, of one part of the mind from another, see <i><a href="#Janet_Pierre">Janet, Pierre</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Distance, between terms of a series, I. <a href="#Page_530">530</a><br /> -<br /> -Distance, in space, see <i><a href="#Third_dimension">third dimension</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<i><a id="Distraction"></a>Distraction</i>, I. <a href="#Page_401">401</a>. See <i><a href="#Inattention">inattention</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Dizziness, see <i><a href="#Vertigo">vertigo</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Dog's cortical centres, after Ferrier, I. <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after Munk, I. <a href="#Page_44">44-5</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after Luciani, I. <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">for special muscles, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hemispheres ablated, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Donaldson,</span> II. 170<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Donders,</span> II. 235<br /> -<br /> -Double images, II. 225-30, 252<br /> -<br /> -Doubt, II. 284, 318 ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the mania of, 545</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Dougal, J. D.,</span> II. 222<br /> -<br /> -Drainage of one brain-cell by another, II. 583 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Dreams, II. 294<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Drobisch,</span> I. <a href="#Page_632">632</a>, <a href="#Page_660">660</a><br /> -<br /> -Drunkard, II. 565<br /> -<br /> -Drunkenness, I. <a href="#Page_144">144</a>; II. 543, 565, 628<br /> -<br /> -Dualism of object and knower, I. <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br /> -<br /> -Duality, of Brain, I. <a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Dudley, A. T.,</span> on mental qualities of an athlete, II. 539<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Dufour,</span> II. 211<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Dunan, Ch.,</span> II. 176, 206, 208-9<br /> -<br /> -Duration, the primitive object in time-perception, I. <a href="#Page_609">609</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">our estimate of short, <a href="#Page_611">611</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -'Dynamogeny,' II. 379 ff., 491<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Ebbinghaus_H"></a>Ebbinghaus, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_548">548</a>, <a href="#Page_676">676</a><br /> -<br /> -Eccentric projection of sensations, II. 31 ff., 195 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Education of hemispheres, I. <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Pedagogic_remarks">pedagogic remarks</a></i></span><br /> -<br /> -Effort, II. 534-7;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Muscular effort, 562;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Moral effort, 549, 561, 578-9</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Egger, V.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_280">280-1-2</a>; II. 256<br /> -<br /> -Ego, Empirical, I. <a href="#Page_291">291</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">pure, <a href="#Page_342">342</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'transcendental,' <a href="#Page_362">362</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">criticised, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Elementary factors of mind, see <i><a href="#Units">Units of consciousness</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Elsas,</span> I. <a href="#Page_548">548</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Emerson, R. W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_582">582</a>, II. 307<br /> -<br /> -Emotion, Chapter XXV:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">continuous with instinct, II. 442;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">description of typical emotions, 443-9;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">results from reflex effects of stimulus upon organism, 449 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their classification, 454;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in anæsthetic subjects, 455;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the absence of normal stimulus, 458-60;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effects of expressing, 463 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of repressing, 466;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the subtler, 469 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the neural process in, 472;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">differences in individuals, 474;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">evolution of special emotions, 477 ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Empirical ego, I. <a href="#Page_290">290</a><br /> -<br /> -Empirical propositions, II. 644<br /> -<br /> -Emulation, II. 409<br /> -<br /> -Ennui, I. <a href="#Page_626">626</a><br /> -<br /> -Entoptic sensations, I. <a href="#Page_515">515</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Equation, personal, I. <a href="#Page_413">413</a><br /> -<br /> -'Equilibration,' direct and indirect, II. 627<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Essences">Essences,</a> their meaning, II. 329 ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sentimental and mechanical, 665</span><br /> -<br /> -Essential qualities, see <i><a href="#Essences">essences</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Estel,</span> I. <a href="#Page_613">613</a>, <a href="#Page_618">618</a><br /> -<br /> -Evolutionism demands a 'mind-dust,' I. <a href="#Page_146">146</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Exner,</span> on human cortical centres, I. <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on 'circumvallation' of centres, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his psychodometer, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reaction-time, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on perception of rapid succession, <a href="#Page_409">409</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time-perception, <a href="#Page_615">615</a>, <a href="#Page_638">638</a>, <a href="#Page_646">646</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling of motion, II. 172</span><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Experience">Experience,</a> I. <a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Relation of experience to necessary judgments, Chapter XXVIII;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Experience defined, II. 619 ff., 628</span><br /> -<br /> -Experimentation in psychology, I. <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br /> -<br /> -Extradition of sensations, II. 31 ff., 195 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Fallacy_the_Psychologists"></a>Fallacy, the Psychologist's, I. <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>; II. 281<br /> -<br /> -Familiarity, sense of, see <i><a href="#Recognition">recognition</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Fatalism, II. 574<br /> -<br /> -Fatigue, diminishes span of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_640">640</a><br /> -<br /> -Fear, instinct of, II. 396, 415;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the symptoms of, 446;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">morbid, 460;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">origin of, 478</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Fechner,</span> I. <a href="#Page_435">435-6</a>, <a href="#Page_533">533</a>, <a href="#Page_539">539</a> ff., <a href="#Page_549">549</a>, <a href="#Page_616">616</a>, <a href="#Page_645">645</a>; II. 50, 70, 137 ff., 178, 464<br /> -<br /> -Feeling, synonym for consciousness in general in this book, I. <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">feelings of relation, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Félida X.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_380">380-4</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Féré, Ch.,</span> II. 68, 378 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Ferrier, D.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46-7-8</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57-8-9</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>; II. 503<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Ferrier, Jas.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Fiat</i>, of the will, II. 501, 526, 561, 564; 568.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Decision">decision</a></i></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Fichte,</span> I. <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Fick,</span> I. <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Fiske, J.,</span> II. 577<br /> -<br /> -Fixed ideas. See <i><a href="#Insistent_ideas">insistent ideas</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Flechsig</span>'s Pyramidenbahn, I. <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Flint, R.,</span> II. 425<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Flourens, P.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> -<br /> -Force, supposed sense of, II. 518<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Forgetting"></a>Forgetting, I. <a href="#Page_679">679</a> ff.; II. 870-1. See <i><a href="#Amnesia">amnesia</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Fouillée, A.,</span> II. 500, 570<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">François-Franck,</span> I. <a href="#Page_70">70</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Franklin,</span> Mrs. <span class="smcap">C. L.,</span> II. 94<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Franz,</span> Dr., II. 63<br /> -<br /> -Freedom, of the will, II. 569 ff.<br /> -<br /> -'Fringe' of object, I. <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281-2</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471-2</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br /> -<br /> -Frog's nerve-centres, I. <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br /> -<br /> -Fusion of feelings unintelligible, I. <a href="#Page_157">157-62</a>; II. 2. See <i><a href="#Mind-Stuff_theory">Mind-stuff theory</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Fusion of impressions into one object, I. <a href="#Page_484">484</a>, <a href="#Page_502">502</a>; II. 103, 183<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Galton_F"></a>Galton, F.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_685">685</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on mental imagery, II. 51-7;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on gregariousness, 430</span><br /> -<br /> -<a id="General_propositions">General propositions</a>, what they involve, II. 337 ff. See <i><a href="#Universal_conceptions">universal conceptions</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Genesis of brain-structure, its two modes, II. 624<br /> -<br /> -Genius, I. <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_530">530</a>; II. 110, 352, 360<br /> -<br /> -Gentleman, the mind of the, II. 370<br /> -<br /> -Geometry, II. 658<br /> -<br /> -Giddiness, see <i><a href="#Vertigo">vertigo</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Gilman, B. I.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Gley, E.,</span> II. 514-5, 525<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Goldscheider,</span> II. 170, 192 ff., 200<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Goltz,</span> I. <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a><br /> -<br /> -Gorilla, II. 416<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Graefe, A.,</span> II. 507, 510<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Grashey,</span> I. <a href="#Page_640">640</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Grassman, R.,</span> II. 654<br /> -<br /> -Gregariousness, II. 430<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Green, T. H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_366">366-8</a>; II. 4, 10, 11<br /> -<br /> -Grief, II. 448, 480<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Griesinger, W.,</span> II. 298<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Grubelsucht,</span> II. 284<br /> -<br /> -Guinea-pigs, epileptic, etc., II. 682-7<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Guislain,</span> II. 546<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Gurney, E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_209">209</a>; II. 117, 130, 469, 610<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Guyau,</span> II. 414, 469<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Habit"></a>Habit, <a href="#CHAPTER_IV136">Chapter IV</a>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">due to plasticity of brain-matter, I. <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">depends on <i>paths</i> in nerve-centres, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">origination of, <a href="#Page_109">109-13</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mechanism of concatenated habits, <a href="#Page_114">114-8</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">they demand some sensation, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ethical and pedagogic maxims, <a href="#Page_121">121-7</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is the ground of association, <a href="#Page_566">566</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of memory, <a href="#Page_655">655</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Habits may inhibit instincts, II. 394;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Habit accounts for one large part of our knowledge, 632</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hall, G. S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_96">96-7</a>, <a href="#Page_558">558</a>, <a href="#Page_614">614</a>, <a href="#Page_616">616</a>; II. 155, 247, 281, 423<br /> -<br /> -Hallucination, sensation a veridical, II. 33;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of lost limbs, 38, 105;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of emotional feeling, 459</span><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Hallucinations">Hallucinations,</a> II. 114 ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hypnagogic, 124;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the brain-process in, 122 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hypnotic, 604</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hamilton, W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_569">569</a>, <a href="#Page_578">578</a>, <a href="#Page_682">682</a>; II. 113<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hammond, E.,</span> II. 673<br /> -<br /> -Haploscopic method, II. 226<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Harless,</span> II. 497<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hartley,</span> I. <a href="#Page_553">553</a>, <a href="#Page_561">561</a>, <a href="#Page_564">564</a>, <a href="#Page_600">600</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hartmann, R.,</span> II. 416<br /> -<br /> -Hasheesh-delirium, II. 121<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Hearing">Hearing</a>, its cortical centre, I. <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -<br /> -Heat, of mental work, I. <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hecker,</span> II. 480<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hegel,</span> I. <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_666">666</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Heidenhain,</span> I. <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Helmholtz, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_285">285</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on discrimination, <a href="#Page_504">504</a>, <a href="#Page_516">516-21</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">time as a category, <a href="#Page_637">637-8</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after-images, <a href="#Page_645">645</a>, <a href="#Page_648">648</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on color-contrast, II. 17 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on sensation, 33;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on cochlea, 170;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on convergence of eyes, 200;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">vision with inverted head, 213;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on what marks a sensation, 218 ff., 243-4;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on entoptic objects, 241-2;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on contrast in seen movement, 247;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on relief, 257;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on measurement of the field of view, 266 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on theory of space-perception, 279;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling of innervation, 493, 507, 510;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on conservation of energy, 667</span><br /> -<br /> -Hemiamblyopia, I. <a href="#Page_44">44</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Hemianopsia"></a>Hemianopsia, I. <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>; II. 73<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Hemispheres"></a>Hemispheres, their distinction from lower centres, I. <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their education, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">localization of function in, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the exclusive seat of consciousness, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effects of deprivation of, on frogs, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72-3</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on fishes, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on birds, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on rodents, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on dogs, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on <i>primates</i>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not devoid of connate paths, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their evolution from lower centres, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Henle, J.,</span> II. 445, 461, 481<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Herbart,</span> I. <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_603">603</a>, <a href="#Page_608">608</a>, <a href="#Page_626">626</a><br /> -<br /> -Hereditary transmission of acquired characters, see <i><a href="#Inheritance">inheritance</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hering, E.,</span> on attention, I. <a href="#Page_438">438</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on comparing weights, <a href="#Page_544">544</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on pure sensation, II. 4;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on color-contrast, 20 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on roomy character of sensations, 136 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on after-images and convergence, 200;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on distance of double images, 230;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on stereoscopy, 252;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reproduction in vision, 260 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on movements of closed eye, 510</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Herzen,</span> I. <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reaction-time from a corn, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on cerebral thermometry, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on swooning, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hitzig,</span> I. <a href="#Page_31">31</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hobbes, T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_573">573</a>, <a href="#Page_587">587</a>, <a href="#Page_594">594</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hodgson, R.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hodgson, S. H.,</span> on inertness of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_129">129-30</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on self, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on conceptual order, <a href="#Page_482">482</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association, <a href="#Page_572">572</a> ff., <a href="#Page_603">603</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on voluntary redintegration, <a href="#Page_588">588-9</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the 'present' in time, <a href="#Page_607">607</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Höffding, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_674">674</a>; II. 455<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Holbrook, M. H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_665">665</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Holmes, O. W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_582">582</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Holtei, von,</span> I. <a href="#Page_624">624</a><br /> -<br /> -Horopter, II. 226<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Horsley, V.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Horwicz,</span> I. <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325-7</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Howe, S. G.,</span> II. 358<br /> -<br /> -Human intellect, compared with that of brute, II. 348 ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">depends on association by similarity, 353 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">various orders of, 360;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">what brain-peculiarity it depends on, 366, 638</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hume,</span> I. <a href="#Page_254">254</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on personal identity, <a href="#Page_351">351-3</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">association, <a href="#Page_597">597</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">due to brain-laws, <a href="#Page_564">564</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on mental images, II. 45-6;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on belief, 295-6, 302;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on pleasure and will, 558</span><br /> -<br /> -Hunting instinct, II. 411<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Huxley,</span> I. <a href="#Page_130">130-1</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>; II. 46<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Hyatt, A.,</span> II. 102<br /> -<br /> -Hylozoism, see <i><a href="#Mind-Stuff_theory">Mind-stuff theory</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Hyperæsthesia, in hypnotism, II. 609<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Hypnotism">Hypnotism</a>, I. <a href="#Page_407">407</a>; II. 128, 351;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">general account of, Chapter XXVII;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">methods, II. 593;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theories of, 596;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">symptoms of trance, 602 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">post-hypnotic suggestion, 618</span><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Hysterics">Hysterics</a>, their so-called anæsthesias, and unconsciousness, I. <a href="#Page_202">202</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Ideal_objects"></a>Ideal objects, eternal and necessary relations between, II. 639, 661.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Conceptions">conception</a></i></span><br /> -<br /> -'Ideas,' the theory of, I. <a href="#Page_230">230</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">confounded with objects, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>, <a href="#Page_521">521</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">they do not exist as parts of our thought, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_553">553</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">platonic, <a href="#Page_462">462</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">abstract, <a href="#Page_468">468</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">universal, <a href="#Page_473">473</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">never come twice the same, <a href="#Page_480">480-1</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Ideation, no distinct centres for, I. <a href="#Page_564">564</a>; II. 78<br /> -<br /> -Identity, sense of, I. <a href="#Page_459">459</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">three principles of, <a href="#Page_460">460</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not the foundation of likeness, <a href="#Page_492">492</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Identity, personal, I. <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">based on ordinary judgment of sameness, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">due to resemblance and continuity of our feelings, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lotze on, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">only relatively true, <a href="#Page_372">372</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Ideo-motor action the type of all volition, II. 522<br /> -<br /> -Idiosyncrasy, II. 631<br /> -<br /> -'Idomenians,' II. 214<br /> -<br /> -Illusions, II. 85 ff., 129, 232 ff., 243-66.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Hallucinations">hallucination</a></i></span><br /> -<br /> -Images, double, in vision, II. 225-30<br /> -<br /> -Images, mental, not lost in mental blindness, etc., I. <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>; II. 73<br /> -<br /> -Images, are usually vague, II. 45;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">visual, 51 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">auditory, 160;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">motor, 61;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">tactile, 165;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">between sleep and waking, 124-6</span><br /> -<br /> -Imagination, Chapter XVIII:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">it differs in individuals, II. 51 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sometimes leaves an after-image, 67;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the cerebral process of, 68 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not locally distinct from that of sensation, 73;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is <i>figured</i>, 82</span><br /> -<br /> -Imitation, II. 408<br /> -<br /> -Immortality, I. <a href="#Page_348">348-9</a><br /> -<br /> -Impulses, morbid, II. 542 ff. See <i><a href="#Instinct">instincts</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Impulsiveness of all consciousness, II. 526 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Inattention">Inattention</a>, I. <a href="#Page_404">404</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Increase, serial, I. <a href="#Page_490">490</a><br /> -<br /> -Indeterminism, II. 569 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Ingersoll, R.,</span> II. 469<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Inheritance"></a>Inheritance of acquired characters, II. 367, 678 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Inhibition, I. <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>; II. 126, 373;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of instincts, 391, 394;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of one cortical process by another, 583</span><br /> -<br /> -Innervation, feeling of, II. 236, 493;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">it is unnecessary, 494 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">no evidence for it, 499, 518</span><br /> -<br /> -Innervation, collateral, see <i><a href="#Vicarious_function">vicarious function</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Insane delusions, I. <a href="#Page_375">375</a>; II. 113<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Insistent_ideas">Insistent ideas,</a> II. 545<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Instinct">Instinct.</a> Chapter XXIV;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defined, II. 384;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is a reflex impulse, 385 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is neither blind nor invariable, 389;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">contrary instincts in same animal, 392;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">man has more than other mammals, 393, 441;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their transitoriness, 398;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">special instincts, 404-441;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the origin of instincts, 678</span><br /> -<br /> -'Integration' of feelings, Spencer's theory of, I. <a href="#Page_151">151</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Intelligence">Intelligence,</a> the test of its presence, I. <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of lower brain-centres, <a href="#Page_78">78</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Intention to speak, I. <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Interest">Interest</a>, I. <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a> ff., <a href="#Page_402">402-3</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a>, <a href="#Page_515">515</a> ff., <a href="#Page_572">572</a>, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>; II. 312 ff., 344-5, 634<br /> -<br /> -Intermediaries, the axiom of skipped, II. 646<br /> -<br /> -Introspection, I. <a href="#Page_185">185</a><br /> -<br /> -Inverted head, vision with, II. 213<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Jackson_Hughlings"></a>Jackson, Hughlings,</span> I. <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>; II. 125-6<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Janet, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_385">385</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Janet, Paul,</span> I. <a href="#Page_625">625</a>; II. 40-1<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Janet_Pierre">Janet, Pierre,</a></span> I. <a href="#Page_203">203</a> ff., <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a> ff., <a href="#Page_682">682</a>; II. 456, 614<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Jastrow,</span> I. <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_543">543</a>, <a href="#Page_545">545</a>; II. 44, 135, 180<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Jevons, W. S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_406">406</a><br /> -<br /> -Joints, their sensibility, II. 189 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Judgments, existential, II. 290<br /> -<br /> -Justice, II. 673<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Kandinsky_V"></a>Kandinsky, V.,</span> II. 70, 116<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Kant,</span> I. <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his 'transcendental' deduction of the categories, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his paralogisms, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">criticised, <a href="#Page_363">363-6</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time, <a href="#Page_642">642</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on symmetrical figures, II. 150;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space, 273 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the real, 296;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on synthetic judgments <i>a priori</i>, 661,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and their relation to experience, 664</span><br /> -<br /> -Kinæsthetic feelings, II. 488 ff., 493<br /> -<br /> -'Kleptomania,' II. 425<br /> -<br /> -Knee-jerk, II. 380<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Knowing">Knowing</a>, I. <a href="#Page_216">216</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">psychology assumes it, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not reducible to any other relation, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>, <a href="#Page_688">688</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Knowledge, two kinds of, I. <a href="#Page_221">221</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of Self not essential to, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the relativity of, II. 9 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the genesis of, 630 ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Knowledge-<i>about</i>, I. <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">König,</span> I. <a href="#Page_542">542</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Kries, von,</span> I. <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_547">547</a>; II. 253<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Krishaber,</span> I. <a href="#Page_377">377</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Kussmaul, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_684">684</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Ladd_G_T"></a>Ladd, G. T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_687">687</a>; II. 3, 311<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lamarck,</span> II. 678<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Landry,</span> II. 490, 492<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lange, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lange, C.,</span> II. 443, 449, 455, 457, 460, 462<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lange, K.,</span> II. 111<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lange, L.,</span> on reaction-time, muscular and sensorial, I. <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lange, N.,</span> on muscular element in imagination, I. <a href="#Page_444">444</a><br /> -<br /> -Language, as a human function, II. 356-8<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Laromiguèire,</span> I. <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br /> -<br /> -Laughter, II. 480<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lazarus,</span> I. <a href="#Page_624">624</a>, <a href="#Page_626">626</a>; II. 84, 97, 369, 429<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Le Conte, Joseph,</span> II. 228, 252, 265<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Léonie,</span> M. Janet's trance-subject, I. <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Levy, W. H.,</span> II. 204<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lewes,</span> on frog's sp. cord, I. <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on thought as a sort of algebra, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on 'preperception,' <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on muscular feeling, II. 199;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on begging in pup, 400;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on lapsed intelligence, 678</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lewinski,</span> II. 192<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Liberatore,</span> II. 670<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Liebman, O.,</span> on brain as a machine, I. <a href="#Page_10">10</a>; II. 34<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Liégeois, J.,</span> II. 594, 606<br /> -<br /> -Light, effects of, on movement, II. 379<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Likeness">Likeness</a>, I. <a href="#Page_528">528</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lindsay, T. L.,</span> II. 421<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lipps,</span> on 'unconscious' sensations, I. <a href="#Page_175">175</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on theory of ideas, <a href="#Page_603">603</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">time-perception, <a href="#Page_632">632</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on muscular feeling, II. 200;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on distance, 221;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on visual illusions, 251, 264;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space-perception, 280;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reality, 297;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on effort, 575</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lissauer,</span> I. <a href="#Page_50">50</a><br /> -<br /> -Local signs, II. 155 ff., 167<br /> -<br /> -Localization, in hemispheres, I. <a href="#Page_30">30</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Localization, II. 153 ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of one sensible object in another, II. 31 ff., 183 ff., 195 ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Locke, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a>, <a href="#Page_553">553</a>, <a href="#Page_563">563</a>, <a href="#Page_679">679</a>; II. 210, 306, 644, 662-4<br /> -<br /> -'Locksley Hall,' I. <a href="#Page_567">567</a><br /> -<br /> -Locomotion, instinct of, II. 405<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Loeb,</span> I. <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>; II. 255, 516, 628<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Logic">Logic</a>, II. 647<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lombard, J. S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lombard, W.,</span> II. 380<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lotze,</span> I. <a href="#Page_214">214</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on immortality, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on personal identity, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_442">442-3</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on fusion and discrimination of sensations, <a href="#Page_522">522</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on local signs, II. 157, 495;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on volition, 523-4</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Louis V.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br /> -<br /> -Love, sexual, II. 437, 543;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">parental, 439;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bain's explanation of, 551</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Lowell, J. R.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_582">582</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Luciani,</span> I. <a href="#Page_44">44-5-6-7</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="McCosh"></a>McCosh,</span> I. <a href="#Page_501">501</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mach, E.,</span> on attention, I. <a href="#Page_436">436</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space-feeling, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time feeling, <a href="#Page_616">616</a>, <a href="#Page_635">635</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on motion-contrast, II. 247;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on optical inversion, 255;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on probability, 258;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling of innervation, 509, 511</span><br /> -<br /> -Magnitude of differences, I. <a href="#Page_530">530</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Malebranche,</span> II. 9<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Manouvrier,</span> II. 496<br /> -<br /> -Mania, transitory, II. 460<br /> -<br /> -Man's intellectual distinction from brutes, II. 348 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mansel, H. L.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mantegazza, P.,</span> II. 447, 479, 481<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Marcus Aurelius,</span> I. <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>; II. 675<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Marillier, L.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_445">445</a>; II. 514<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Marique,</span> I. <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Martin, H. N.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_99">99</a>; II. 3<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Martineau, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_484">484</a> ff., <a href="#Page_506">506</a>; II. 9<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Maudsley, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_656">656</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Maury, A.,</span> II. 83, 124, 127<br /> -<br /> -Mechanical philosophy, the, II. 666 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Mechanism <i>vs.</i> intelligence, I. <a href="#Page_8">8-14</a><br /> -<br /> -Mediate comparison, I. <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br /> -<br /> -Mediumship, I. <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mehner,</span> I. <a href="#Page_618">618</a><br /> -<br /> -Memory, <a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">Chapter XVI</a>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">it depends on material conditions, I. <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the essential function of the hemispheres, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">lapses of, <a href="#Page_373">373</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in hysterics, <a href="#Page_384">384</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">favored by attention, <a href="#Page_427">427</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">primary, <a href="#Page_638">638</a>, <a href="#Page_643">643</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">analysis of the phenomenon of Memory, <a href="#Page_648">648</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the return of a mental image is not memory, <a href="#Page_619">619</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">memory's causes, <a href="#Page_653">653</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the result of association, <a href="#Page_654">654</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conditions of good memory, <a href="#Page_659">659</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">brute retentiveness, <a href="#Page_660">660</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">multiple associations, <a href="#Page_662">662</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">improvement of memory, <a href="#Page_667">667</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its usefulness depends on forgetting much, <a href="#Page_680">680</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its decay, <a href="#Page_683">683</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">metaphysical explanations of it, <a href="#Page_687">687</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Mentality, the mark of its presence, I. <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br /> -<br /> -Mental operations, simultaneous, I. <a href="#Page_408">408</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mercier, C.,</span> on inertness of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on inhibition, II. 583</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Merkel,</span> I. <a href="#Page_542">542-3-4</a><br /> -<br /> -Metaphysical principles, II. 669 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Metaphysics, I. <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a><br /> -<br /> -Meyer's experiment on color-contrast, II. 21<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Meyer, G. H.,</span> II. 66, 97-8<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Meynert, T.,</span> his brain-scheme, I. <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mill, James,</span> I. <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a>, <a href="#Page_499">499</a>, <a href="#Page_597">597</a>, <a href="#Page_651">651</a>, <a href="#Page_653">653</a>; II. 77<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mill, J. S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on unity of self, <a href="#Page_356">356-9</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on abstract ideas, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">methods of inquiry, <a href="#Page_590">590</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on infinitude and association, <a href="#Page_600">600</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space, II. 271;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on belief, 285, 822;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reasoning, 331;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the order of Nature, 634;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on arithmetical propositions, 654</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mills, C. K.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_60">60</a><br /> -<br /> -Mimicry, its effects on emotion, II. 463-6<br /> -<br /> -Mind, depends on brain-conditions, I. <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_553">553</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the mark of its presence, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">difficulty of stating its connection with brain, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">what psychology means by it, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Mind-Stuff_theory">Mind-Stuff theory</a>, <a href="#CHAPTER_VI">Chapter VI</a>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">a postulate of evolution, I. <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">some proofs of it, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">author's interpretation of them, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">feelings cannot mix, <a href="#Page_157">157</a> ff., II. 2, 103</span><br /> -<br /> -Miser, associationist explanation of the, II. 423 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mitchell, J. K.,</span> II. 616<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mitchell, S. W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_381">381</a>; II. 38-9, 380<br /> -<br /> -Modesty, II. 435<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Moll, A.,</span> II. 616<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Molyneux,</span> II. 210<br /> -<br /> -Monadism, I. <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -<br /> -Monism, I. <a href="#Page_366">366-7</a><br /> -<br /> -Monkey's cortical centres, I. <a href="#Page_34">34-5</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Montgomery, E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_158">158</a><br /> -<br /> -Moral principles, II. 639, 672<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Morris, G. S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mosso,</span> on blood-supply to brain, I. <a href="#Page_97">97-9</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">plethysmographic researches, II. 378;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on fear, 419, 483</span><br /> -<br /> -Motor centres, I. <a href="#Page_31">31</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -'Motor circle,' II. 583<br /> -<br /> -Motor strands, I. <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">for special muscles, I. <a href="#Page_64">64</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Motor type of imagination, II. 61<br /> -<br /> -Movement, perception of, by sensory surfaces, II. 171 ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">part played by, in vision, 197, 203, 234-7</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the, Production of, Chap. XXII</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">requires guiding sensations, 490</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">illusory perception of, during anæsthesia, 489;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">results from every kind of consciousness, 526</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mozart,</span> I. <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Müller, G. E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456-8</a>; II. 198, 280, 491, 502, 508, 517<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Müller, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_68">68</a>; II. 640<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Müller, J. J.,</span> II. 213<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Müller, Max,</span> I. <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Munk, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_41">41-3-4-5-6</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57-8-9</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Münsterberg,</span> on Meynert's scheme, I. <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reaction times with intellectual operation, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>:</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association, <a href="#Page_562">562</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time-perception, <a href="#Page_620">620</a>, <a href="#Page_637">637</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on imagination, II. 74;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on muscular sensibility, 189;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on volition, 505;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling of innervation, 514;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association, 590</span><br /> -<br /> -Muscles, how represented in nerve-centres, I. <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br /> -<br /> -Muscle-reading, II. 525<br /> -<br /> -Muscular sense, its cortical centre, I. <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its existence, II. 189 ff., 197 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its insignificance in space-perception, 197-203, 234-7</span><br /> -<br /> -Music, its accidental genesis, II. 627; 687<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Mussey,</span> II. 543<br /> -<br /> -Mutilations, inherited, II. 627<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Myers, F. W. H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_400">400</a>; II. 133<br /> -<br /> -Mysophobia, II. 435, 545<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Nature_the_order_of"></a>Nature, the order of, its incongruence with that of our thought, II. 634 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Naunyn,</span> I. <a href="#Page_55">55</a><br /> -<br /> -Necessary truths are all truths of comparison, II. 641 ff., 651, 662.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Experience">experience</a>, <a href="#A_priori">a priori connections</a>,</i> etc.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Neiglick,</span> I. <a href="#Page_543">543</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Neural_process">Neural process</a>, in perception. I. <a href="#Page_78">78</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in habit, <a href="#Page_105">105</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in association, <a href="#Page_566">566</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in memory, <a href="#Page_655">655</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in imagination, II. 68 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in perception, 82 ff., 103 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in hallucination, 122 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in space-perception, 143;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in emotion, 474;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in volition, 580 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in association, 587 ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Nitrous oxide intoxication, II. 284<br /> -<br /> -Nonsense, how it escapes detection, I. <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -<br /> -Normal position in vision, II. 238<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Nothnagel,</span> I. <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60-1</a><br /> -<br /> -Number, II. 653<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Obersteiner"></a>Obersteiner,</span> I. <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a><br /> -<br /> -Object, use of the word, I. <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">confusion of, with thought that knows it, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Objective world, known before self, I. <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its primitive unity, <a href="#Page_487">487-8</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ditto, II. 8</span><br /> -<br /> -Objects <i>versus</i> ideas, I. <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br /> -<br /> -Old-fogyism, II. 110<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Orchansky,</span> I. <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> -<br /> -'Overtone' (psychic), I. <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281-2</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Pain"></a>Pain, I. <a href="#Page_143">143</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its relations to the will, II. 549 ff., 583-4</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Paneth,</span> I. <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br /> -<br /> -Parallelism, theory of, between mental and cerebral phenomena, see <i><a href="#Automaton-Theory">Automaton-theory</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Paresis of external rectus muscle, II. 236, 507<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Parinaud,</span> II. 71<br /> -<br /> -Partiality of mind, see <i><a href="#Interest">interest</a>, <a href="#Teleology">teleology</a>, <a href="#Intelligence">intelligence</a>, <a href="#Selection">selection</a>, <a href="#Essences">essences</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Past time, known in a present feeling, I. <a href="#Page_627">627</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the immediate past is a portion of the present duration-block, <a href="#Page_608">608</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Patellar reflex, II. 380<br /> -<br /> -Paths through cortex, I. <a href="#Page_71">71</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their formation, <a href="#Page_107">107-12</a>; II. 584 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">association depends on them, 567 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">memory depends on them, 655 ff., 661, 686</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Paulhan, F.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_670">670</a>; II. 64, 476<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Pedagogic_remarks">Pedagogic remarks</a>: I. <a href="#Page_121">121-7</a>; II. 110, 401-2, 409, 463, 466<br /> -<br /> -Perception. Chapter XIX:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with sensation, II. 1, 76;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involves reproductive processes, 78;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is of <i>probable</i> objects, 82 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not an unconscious inference, 111 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rapidity of, 131</span><br /> -<br /> -Perception-time, II. 131<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Perez, B.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_446">446</a>; II. 416<br /> -<br /> -Personal equation, I. <a href="#Page_413">413</a><br /> -<br /> -Personality, alterations of, I. <a href="#Page_373">373</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Pflüger,</span> on frog's spinal cord, I. <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -<br /> -Philosophies, their test, II. 312<br /> -<br /> -Phosphorus and thought, I. <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Phrenology">Phrenology</a>, I. <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Pick, E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_669">669</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Pitres,</span> I. <a href="#Page_206">206</a><br /> -<br /> -Planchette-writing, I. <a href="#Page_208">208-9</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Plasticity, as basis of habit, defined, I. <a href="#Page_105">105</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Platner,</span> II. 208<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Plato,</span> I. <a href="#Page_462">462</a><br /> -<br /> -Play, II. 427<br /> -<br /> -Pleasure, as related to will, I. <a href="#Page_143">143</a>; II. 549, 583-4<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Points_identical">Points, identical,</a> theory of, II. 222 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Possession, Spirit-, I. <a href="#Page_393">393</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Post-hypnotic suggestion, II. 613<br /> -<br /> -Practical interests, their effects on discrimination, I. <a href="#Page_515">515</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Prayer, I. <a href="#Page_316">316</a><br /> -<br /> -'Preperception,' I. <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br /> -<br /> -Present, the present moment, I. <a href="#Page_606">606</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Preyer,</span> II. 403<br /> -<br /> -Probability determines what object shall be perceived, II. 82, 104, 258, 260-3<br /> -<br /> -Problematic conceptions, I. <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br /> -<br /> -Problems, the process of solution of, I. <a href="#Page_584">584</a><br /> -<br /> -Projection of sensations, eccentric, II. 31 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Projection">Projection</a>, theory of, II. 228<br /> -<br /> -Psychologist's fallacy, the, see <i><a href="#Fallacy_the_Psychologists">Fallacy</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Psychophysic law, I. <a href="#Page_539">539</a><br /> -<br /> -Pugnacity, II. 409<br /> -<br /> -Pure Ego, I. <a href="#Page_342">342</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Putnam, J. J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Questioning_mania"></a>Questioning mania, II. 284<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Rabier"></a>Rabier,</span> I. <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_604">604</a><br /> -<br /> -Rational propositions, II. 644<br /> -<br /> -Rationality is based on apprehension of series, II. 659<br /> -<br /> -Rationality, postulates of, II. 670, 677<br /> -<br /> -Rationality, sense of, I. <a href="#Page_260">260-4</a>; II. 647<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Reaction-time">Reaction-time</a>, I. <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">simple, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">what it measures is not conscious thought, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lange's distinction between muscular and sensorial, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its variations, <a href="#Page_94">94-7</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">influenced by expectant attention, <a href="#Page_427">427</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after intellectual process, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after discrimination, <a href="#Page_523">523</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after association, <a href="#Page_557">557</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after perception, II. 131</span><br /> -<br /> -Real size and shape of visual objects, II. 179, 237 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Reality">Reality</a>, the Perception of, Chapter XXI;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not a distinct content of consciousness, II. 286;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">various orders of, 287 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">every object has <i>some</i> kind of reality, 291 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the choice of, 290;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">practical, 293 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">means relation to the self, 295-8;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation of sensations to, 299;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of emotions, 306</span><br /> -<br /> -Reason, I. <a href="#Page_551">551</a>. See <i><a href="#Logic">Logic</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Reasoning, Chapter XXII;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its definition, II. 325;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involves the picking out of essences, or sagacity, 329;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and abstraction, 332;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its utility depends on the peculiar constitution of this world, 337 ff., 651;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">depends on association by similarity, 345</span><br /> -<br /> -Recall, I. <a href="#Page_578">578</a>, <a href="#Page_654">654</a><br /> -<br /> -'Recepts,' II. 327, 349, 351<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Recognition">Recognition,</a> I. <a href="#Page_673">673</a><br /> -<br /> -Recollection, voluntary, I. <a href="#Page_585">585</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Redintegration, I. <a href="#Page_569">569</a><br /> -<br /> -'Reductives,' II. 125, 291<br /> -<br /> -Reflex acts, I. <a href="#Page_12">12</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reaction-time measures one, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">concatenated habits are constituted by a chain of, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Reid, Thomas,</span> I. <a href="#Page_609">609</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>; II. 214, 216, 218, 240, 309<br /> -<br /> -Relating principle, I. <a href="#Page_687">687-8</a><br /> -<br /> -Relation, feelings of, I. <a href="#Page_243">243</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">space-relations, II. 148 ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Relations, inward, between ideas, II. 639, 642, 661, 671;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the principle of transferred, 646</span><br /> -<br /> -Relief, II. 254-7. See <i><a href="#Third_dimension">third dimension</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Renouvier, Ch.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_551">551</a>; II. 309<br /> -<br /> -Reproduction in memory, I. <a href="#Page_574">574</a> ff., <a href="#Page_654">654</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">voluntary, <a href="#Page_585">585</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Resemblance, I. <a href="#Page_528">528</a><br /> -<br /> -Respiration, effects of sensory stimuli upon, II. 376<br /> -<br /> -Restitution of function, I. <a href="#Page_67">67</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Restoration of function, I. <a href="#Page_67">67</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Retention in memory, I. <a href="#Page_653">653</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Retentiveness, organic, I. <a href="#Page_659">659</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">it is unchangeable, <a href="#Page_663">663</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Retinal image, II. 92<br /> -<br /> -Retinal sensibility, see <i><a href="#Vision">vision</a>, <a href="#Space">space</a>, <a href="#Points_identical">identical points</a>, <a href="#Third_dimension">third dimension</a>, <a href="#Projection">projection</a>,</i> etc.<br /> -<br /> -Revival in memory, I. <a href="#Page_574">574</a> ff., <a href="#Page_654">654</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Reynolds, Mary,</span> I. <a href="#Page_381">381</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Ribot, Th.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_375">375</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a>, <a href="#Page_680">680</a>, 682</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Richet, Ch.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_638">638</a>, <a href="#Page_644">644-6-7</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Riehl, A.,</span> II. 32<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Robertson, G. C.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_461">461</a>; II. 86<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Romanes, G. J.,</span> II. 95, 132, 327-9, 349, 351, 355, 397<br /> -<br /> -Romantic and classic, II. 469<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Rosenthal,</span> I. <a href="#Page_78">78</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Ross, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_56">56-7</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Royce, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_374">374</a>; II. 316-7<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Royer-Collard,</span> I. <a href="#Page_609">609</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Rutherford,</span> II. 170<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Sagacity"></a>Sagacity, II. 331, 343<br /> -<br /> -Sameness, I. <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>; II. 650<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Schaefer, W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Schiff, M.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Schmid,</span> I. <a href="#Page_683">683</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Schmidt, H. D.,</span> II. 399-400<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Schneider, G. H.,</span> on Habits, I. <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118-20</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on perception of motion, II. 173;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on evolution of movements, 380;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on instincts, 387-8, 411, 418, 439</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Schopenhauer,</span> II. 33, 273<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Schrader,</span> I. <a href="#Page_72">72</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Science, the genesis of, II. 665-9<br /> -<br /> -Sea-sickness, susceptibility to, an accident, II. 627<br /> -<br /> -Seat of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of Soul, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of sensations, no original, II. 34</span><br /> -<br /> -Sciences, the natural, the factors of their production, II. 633 ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">a Turkish cadi upon, 640;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">postulate things with unchangeable properties, 656</span><br /> -<br /> -Sciences, the pure, they express results of comparison exclusively, II. 641;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">classifications, 646;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">logic, 647;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mathematics, 653</span><br /> -<br /> -Secretiveness, II. 432<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Seguin,</span> I. <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Selection">Selection</a>, a cardinal function of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_284">284</a> ff., <a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>; II. 584;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of visual reality, II. 177 ff., 237;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of reality in general, 290, 294;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of essential quality, 333, 370, 634</span><br /> -<br /> -Self, consciousness of, <a href="#CHAPTER_X">Chap. X</a>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not primary, I. <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the empirical self, I. <a href="#Page_291">291</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its constituents, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the material self, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the social self, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the spiritual self, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">resolvable into feelings localized in head, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">consciousness of personal identity, <a href="#Page_330">330</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its alterations, <a href="#Page_373">373</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Self-feeling, I. <a href="#Page_305">305</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Self-love, I. <a href="#Page_317">317</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the name for active impulses and emotions towards certain <i>objects</i>; we do not love our bare principle of individuality, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Self-seeking, I. <a href="#Page_307">307</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Selves, their rivalry, I. <a href="#Page_309">309</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Semi-reflex acts, I. <a href="#Page_13">13</a><br /> -<br /> -Sensation, does attention increase its strength? I. <a href="#Page_425">425</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">terminus of thought, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Sensation, Chapter XVII;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distinguished from perception, II. 1, 76;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its cognitive function, 3;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">pure sensation an abstraction, 3;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the terminus of thought, 7</span><br /> -<br /> -Sensations, are not compounds, I. <a href="#Page_158">158</a> ff.; II. 2;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their supposed combination by a higher principle, I. <a href="#Page_687">687</a>; II. 27-30;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their influence on each other, II. 28-30;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their eccentric projection, 31 ff., 195 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their localization inside of one another, 183 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their relation to reality, 299 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to emotions, 453;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their fusion, see <i><a href="#Mind-Stuff_theory">Mind-stuff theory</a></i></span><br /> -<br /> -Sensationalism, I. <a href="#Page_243">243</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">criticised by spiritualism, <a href="#Page_687">687</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Sensationalism, II. 5;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the field of space-perception, criticised, 216 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its difficulties, 231-7;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defended, 237 ff., 517</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Sergi,</span> II. 34<br /> -<br /> -Serial increase, I. <a href="#Page_490">490</a>; II. 644<br /> -<br /> -Series, II. 644-51, 659 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Seth, A.,</span> II. 4<br /> -<br /> -Sexual function, I. <a href="#Page_22">22</a><br /> -<br /> -Shadows, colored, II. 25<br /> -<br /> -Shame, II. 435<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Shoemaker,</span> Dr., I. <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -<br /> -Shyness, II. 430<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Sight"></a>Sight, its cortical centre, I. <a href="#Page_41">41</a> ff., <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br /> -<br /> -Sign-making, a differentia of man, II. 356<br /> -<br /> -Signs, local, II. 155 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Sigwart, C.,</span> II. 634-6<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Sikorsky,</span> II. 465<br /> -<br /> -Similarity, I. <a href="#Page_528">528</a><br /> -<br /> -Similarity, association by, I. <a href="#Page_578">578</a>; II. 345, 353<br /> -<br /> -Skin, discrimination of points on, I. <a href="#Page_512">512</a><br /> -<br /> -Sleep, partial consciousness during, I. <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br /> -<br /> -Sociability, II. 430<br /> -<br /> -Somnambulism, see <i><a href="#Hypnotism">hypnotism</a>, <a href="#Hysterics">hysterics</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Soul, theory of the, I. <a href="#Page_180">180</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">inaccessibility of, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its essence is to think (according to Descartes), <a href="#Page_200">200</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">seat of, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">arguments for its existence, <a href="#Page_343">343</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">an unnecessary hypothesis for psychology, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with transcendental Ego, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">a relating principle, <a href="#Page_499">499</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Space">Space,</a> the perception of, Chapter XX;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">primitive extensity in three dimensions, II. 134-9;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">spatial order, 145;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">space-relations, 148;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">localization in, 153 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">how real space is mentally constructed, 166 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">part played by movement in, 171-6;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">measurement of extensions, 177 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">synthesis of originally chaotic sensations of extension, 181 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">part played by articular surfaces in, 189 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">by muscles, 197 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">how the blind perceive space, 203 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">visual space, 211-268;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of identical points, 222;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of projection, 228;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">difficulties of sensation-theory expounded and replied to, 231-268;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">historical sketch of opinion, 270 ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Spalding, D. A.,</span> II. 396, 398, 400, 406<br /> -<br /> -Span of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_640">640</a><br /> -<br /> -Speech, the 'centre' of, I. <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its misleading influence in psychology, I. <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">thought possible without it, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Aphasia">Aphasia</a>, <a href="#Phrenology">Phrenology</a></i></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Spencer,</span> his formula of 'adjustment,' I. <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on formation of paths in nerve-centres, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on chasm between mind and matter, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on origin of consciousness, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on 'integration' of nervous shocks, <a href="#Page_151">151-3</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feelings of relation, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on unity of self, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on conceivability, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on abstraction, <a href="#Page_506">506</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association, <a href="#Page_600">600</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time perception, <a href="#Page_622">622</a>, <a href="#Page_639">639</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on memory, <a href="#Page_649">649</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on recognition, <a href="#Page_673">673</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling and perception, II. 113, 180;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space-perception, 272, 282;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on genesis of emotions, 478 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on free-will, 576;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on inheritance of acquired peculiarities, 620 ff., 679;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on 'equilibration,' 627;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on genesis of cognition, 643;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on that of sociality and pity, 685</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Spinoza,</span> II. 288<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Spir, A.,</span> II. 665, 677<br /> -<br /> -'Spirit-control,' I. <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br /> -<br /> -Spiritualist theory of the self, I. <a href="#Page_342">342</a>; II. 5<br /> -<br /> -Spiritualists, I. <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Stanley, Henry M.,</span> II. 310<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Starr, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br /> -<br /> -Statistical method in psychology, I. <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Steiner,</span> I. <a href="#Page_72">72-3</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Steinthal,</span> I. <a href="#Page_604">604</a>; II. 107-9<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Stepanoff,</span> II. 170<br /> -<br /> -Stereoscope, II. 87<br /> -<br /> -Stereoscopy, II. 223, 252. See <i><a href="#Third_dimension">third dimension</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Sternberg,</span> II. 105, 515<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Stevens,</span> I. <a href="#Page_617">617</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Stevens, E. W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_397">397</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Story, Jean,</span> I. <a href="#Page_263">263</a><br /> -<br /> -Stream of Thought, <a href="#CHAPTER_IX">Chapter IX</a>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">schematic representations of, I. <a href="#Page_279">279-82</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Stricker, S.,</span> II. 62 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Strümpell, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Strümpell,</span> Prof., II. 353<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Stuart, D.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Stumpf. C,</span> on attention, I. <a href="#Page_426">426</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on difference, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on fusion of impressions, <a href="#Page_522">522</a>, <a href="#Page_530">530-3</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on strong and weak sensations, <a href="#Page_547">547</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on relativity of knowledge, II. 11;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on sensations of extent, 219, 221</span><br /> -<br /> -Subjective sensations, I. <a href="#Page_516">516</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Substance, spiritual, I. <a href="#Page_345">345</a><br /> -<br /> -Substantive states of mind, I. <a href="#Page_243">243</a><br /> -<br /> -Substitution of parts for wholes in reasoning, II. 330;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of the same for the same, 650</span><br /> -<br /> -Subsumption, the principle of mediate, II. 648<br /> -<br /> -Succession, not known by successive feelings, I. <a href="#Page_628">628</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>vs.</i> duration, <a href="#Page_609">609</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Suggestion, in hypnotism, II. 598-601;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">post-hypnotic, 613</span><br /> -<br /> -Suicide, I. <a href="#Page_317">317</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Sully, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_191">191</a>; II. 79, 221, 272, 281, 322, 425<br /> -<br /> -Summation of stimuli, I. <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of elements of feeling, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the latter is inadmissible, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Superposition, in space-measurements, II. 177, 266 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Symbols as substitutes for reality, II. 305<br /> -<br /> -Sympathy, II. 410<br /> -<br /> -Synthetic judgments <i>a priori</i>, II. 661-2<br /> -<br /> -Systems, philosophic, sentimental, and mechanical, II. 665-7<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Tactile_centre"></a>Tactile centre, I. <a href="#Page_58">58</a><br /> -<br /> -Tactile images, II. 65<br /> -<br /> -Tactile sensibility, its cortical centre, I. <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Taine, H.,</span> on unity of self, I. <a href="#Page_355">355</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on alterations of ditto, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on recollecting, <a href="#Page_658">658</a>, <a href="#Page_670">670</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">On projection of sensations, II. 33;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on images, 48, and their 'reduction,' 125-6;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reality, 291</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Tàkacs,</span> II. 490<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Tarde, G.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_263">263</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Taylor, C. F.,</span> II. 99<br /> -<br /> -Tedium, I. <a href="#Page_626">626</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Teleology">Teleology,</a> created by consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_140">140-1</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">essence of intelligence, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involved in the fact of essences, II. 335;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its barrenness in the natural sciences, 665</span><br /> -<br /> -Tendency, feelings of, I. <a href="#Page_250">250-4</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Thackeray, W. M.,</span> II. 434<br /> -<br /> -Thermometry, cerebral, I. <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br /> -<br /> -'Thing,' II. 184, 259<br /> -<br /> -Thinking, the consciousness of, I. <a href="#Page_300">300</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Thinking principle, I. <a href="#Page_342">342</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Third_dimension">Third dimension</a> of space, II. 134 ff., 212 ff., 220<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Thompson, D. G.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_354">354</a>; II. 662<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Thomson, Allen,</span> I. <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br /> -<br /> -Thought, synonym for consciousness at large, I. <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the stream of, <a href="#CHAPTER_IX">Chapter IX</a>:</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">it tends to personal form, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">same thought never comes twice, <a href="#Page_231">231</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sense in which it is continuous, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">can be carried on in any terms, <a href="#Page_260">260-8</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">what constitutes its rational character, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is cognitive, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not made up of parts, <a href="#Page_276">276</a> ff., II. 79 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">always partial to some of its objects, I. <a href="#Page_284">284</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the consciousness of it as a process, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the present thought is the thinker, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">depends on material conditions, <a href="#Page_553">553</a></span><br /> -<br /> -'Thought reading,' II. 525<br /> -<br /> -Time, occupied by neural and mental processes, see <i><a href="#Reaction-time">reaction-time</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Time, unconscious registration of, I. <a href="#Page_201">201</a><br /> -<br /> -Time, the perception of, <a href="#CHAPTER_XV512">Chapter XV</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">begins with duration, I. <a href="#Page_609">609</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with perception of space, <a href="#Page_610">610</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">empty time not perceived, <a href="#Page_619">619</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its discrete flow, <a href="#Page_621">621</a>, <a href="#Page_637">637</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">long intervals conceived symbolically, <a href="#Page_622">622</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">variations in our estimate of its length, <a href="#Page_623">623</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">cerebral process underlying, <a href="#Page_627">627</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Tischer,</span> I. <a href="#Page_524">524</a>, <a href="#Page_527">527</a><br /> -<br /> -Touch, cortical centre for, I. <a href="#Page_58">58</a><br /> -<br /> -Trance, see <i><a href="#Hypnotism">hypnotism</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Transcendentalist theory of the Self, I. <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">criticised, <a href="#Page_363">363</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Transitive states of mind, I. <a href="#Page_243">243</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Tschisch, von,</span> I. <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_560">560</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Tuke, D. H.,</span> II. 130, 413<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Taylor, E. B.,</span> II. 304<br /> -<br /> -Tympanic membrane, its tactile sensibility, II. 140<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Tyndall,</span> I. <a href="#Page_147">147-8</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Ueberweg"></a>Ueberweg,</span> I. <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br /> -<br /> -Unconscious states of Mind, proofs of their existence, I. <a href="#Page_164">164</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Objections, <a href="#Page_164">164</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Unconsciousness, I. <a href="#Page_199">199</a> ff.;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in hysterics, <a href="#Page_202">202</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of useless sensations, <a href="#Page_517">517</a> ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Understanding of a sentence, I. <a href="#Page_281">281</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Units">Units, psychic,</a> I. <a href="#Page_151">151</a><br /> -<br /> -Unity of original object, I. <a href="#Page_487">487-8</a>; II. 8, 183 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<a id="Universal_conceptions">Universal conceptions,</a> I. <a href="#Page_473">473</a>. See <i><a href="#General_propositions">general propositions</a></i><br /> -<br /> -Unreality, the feeling of, II. 298<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Valentin"></a>Valentin,</span> I. <a href="#Page_557">557</a><br /> -<br /> -Varying concomitants, law of dissociation by, I. <a href="#Page_506">506</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Vennum, Lurancy,</span> I. <a href="#Page_397">397</a><br /> -<br /> -Ventriloquism, II. 184<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Verdon, R.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_685">685</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Vertigo">Vertigo,</a> II. 89;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mental vertigo, 309;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">optical, 506</span><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Vicarious_function">Vicarious function</a> of brain-parts, I. <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>; II. 592<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Vierordt,</span> I. <a href="#Page_616">616</a> ff.; II. 154, 172<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Vintschgau,</span> I. <a href="#Page_95">95-6</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Vision">Vision</a> with head upside down, II. 213<br /> -<br /> -Visual centre in brain, I. <a href="#Page_41">41</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -Visual space, II. 211 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Visualizing power, II. 51-60<br /> -<br /> -Vocalization, II. 407<br /> -<br /> -Volition, see <i><a href="#Will">Will</a></i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Volkmann. A. W.,</span> II. 198, 252 ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Volkmann, W. von Volkmar,</span> I. <a href="#Page_627">627</a>, <a href="#Page_629">629</a>, <a href="#Page_631">631</a>; II. 276<br /> -<br /> -Voluminousness, primitive, of sensations, II. 184<br /> -<br /> -Voluntary thinking, I. <a href="#Page_583">583</a><br /> -<br /> -Vulgarity of mind, II. 370<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Vulpian,</span> I. <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Wahle"></a>Wahle,</span> I. <a href="#Page_493">493</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Waitz, Th.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_632">632</a>; II. 436<br /> -<br /> -Walking, in child, II. 405<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Walter. J. E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_214">214</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Ward, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_548">548</a>, <a href="#Page_562">562</a>, <a href="#Page_629">629</a>, <a href="#Page_633">633</a>; II. 282<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Warren, J. W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_97">97</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Wayland,</span> I. <a href="#Page_347">347</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Weber, E. H.,</span> his 'law,' I. <a href="#Page_537">537</a> ff.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">On space-perception on skin, II. 141-2;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on muscular feeling, 198</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Weed, T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_665">665</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Weissmann, A.,</span> II. 684 ff.<br /> -<br /> -Wernicke's convolution, I. <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54-5</a><br /> -<br /> -'<span class="smcap">Wheatstone</span>'s experiment,' II. 326-7<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Wigan,</span> Dr., I. <a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href="#Page_675">675</a>; II. 566-7<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Wilbrand,</span> I. <a href="#Page_50">50-1</a><br /> -<br /> -<a id="Will">Will</a>, Chapter XXVI;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involves memory of past acts, and nothing else but consent that they shall occur again, II. 487-518;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the memory may involve images of either resident or remote effects of the movement, 518-22;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ideo-motor action, 522-8;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">action after deliberation, 528;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">decision, 531;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effort, 535;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the explosive will, 537;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the obstructed will, 546;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation of will to pleasure and pain, 549 ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to attention, 561;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">terminates in an 'idea', 567;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the question of its indeterminism, 569;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">psychology must assume determinism, 576;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">neural processes concerned in education of the will, 579 ff.</span><br /> -<br /> -Will, relations of, to Belief, II. 320<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Wills, Jas.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -<br /> -Witchcraft, II. 309<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Wolfe, H. K.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_674">674</a>, <a href="#Page_679">679</a><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Wolff, Chr.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_409">409</a>, <a href="#Page_651">651</a><br /> -<br /> -World, the peculiar constitution of the, II. 337, 647, 651-2<br /> -<br /> -Writing, automatic, I. <a href="#Page_393">393</a> ff.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Wundt,</span> on frontal lobes, I. <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reaction-time, <a href="#Page_89">89-94</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a> ff., <a href="#Page_525">525</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on introspective method, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on self-consciousness, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on perception of strokes of sound, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on perception of simultaneous events, <a href="#Page_411">411</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on Weber's law, <a href="#Page_534">534</a> ff.;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">association-time, <a href="#Page_557">557</a>, <a href="#Page_560">560</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time-perception, <a href="#Page_608">608</a>, <a href="#Page_612">612</a> ff., <a href="#Page_620">620</a>, <a href="#Page_634">634</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on local signs, II. 155-7;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on eyeball-muscles, 200;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on sensations, 219;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on paresis of ext. rectus, 236;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on contrast, 250;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on certain illusions, 264;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling of innervation, 266, 493;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space as synthesis, 276;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on emotions, 481;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on dichotomic form of thought, 654</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap"><a id="Zollner"></a>Zöllner</span>'s pattern, II. 232<br /> +<span class="smcap"><a id="Abbott_T_K"></a>Abbott, T. K.</span>, II. 221<br > +<br > +Abstract ideas, I. <a href="#Page_468">468</a>, <a href="#Page_508">508</a>; II. 48<br > +<br > +Abstract qualities, II. 329-37, 340<br > +<br > +Abstraction, I. <a href="#Page_505">505</a>; II. 346 ff. See <i><a href="#Distraction">distraction</a></i><br > +<br > +Accommodation, feeling of, II. 93, 235<br > +<br > +Acquaintance, I. <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br > +<br > +Acquired characters, see <i><a href="#Inheritance">inheritance</a></i><br > +<br > +Acquisitiveness, II. 422, 679<br > +<br > +Actors, their emotions whilst playing, II. 464<br > +<br > +Adaptation of mind to environment results in our knowing the impressing circumstances, II. 625 ff.<br > +<br > +Æsthetic principles, II. 639, 672<br > +<br > +After-images, I. <a href="#Page_645">645-7</a>; II. 67, 200, 604<br > +<br > +<i>Agoraphobia</i>, II. 421<br > +<br > +<i>Agraphia</i>, I. <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Alfieri</span>, II. 543<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Allen, G.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_144">144</a>; II. 631<br > +<br > +Alteration of one impression by another one simultaneously taking place, II. 28 ff., 201<br > +<br > +Alternating personality, I. <a href="#Page_379">379</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Ambiguity of optical sensations, II. 231-7<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Amidon</span>, I. <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Amnesia">Amnesia</a> in hysterical disease, I. <a href="#Page_384">384</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">accompanies anæsthesia, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_682">682</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in hypnotic trance, II. 602.</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Forgetting">forgetting</a></i></span><br > +<br > +Amputated limbs, feeling of, II. 38-9, 105<br > +<br > +Anæsthesia, in hysterics, I. <a href="#Page_203">203</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involves correlated amnesia, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">movements executed during, II. 105, 489-92, 520-1;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and emotion, 455-6;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in hypnotism, 606-9</span><br > +<br > +Analogies, the perception of, I. <a href="#Page_530">530</a><br > +<br > +Analysis, I. <a href="#Page_502">502</a>; II. 344<br > +<br > +Anger, II. 409, 460, 478<br > +<br > +<a id="Aphasia">Aphasia</a>, motor, I. <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sensory, I. <a href="#Page_53">53-4-5</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">optical, I. <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">amnesia in, <a href="#Page_640">640</a>, <a href="#Page_684">684</a>; II. 58</span><br > +<br > +Apperception, II. 107 ff.<br > +<br > +Apperception, transcendental Unity of, I. <a href="#Page_362">362</a><br > +<br > +Appropriateness, characterizes mental acts, I. <a href="#Page_13">13</a><br > +<br > +<i>Apraxia</i>, I. <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br > +<br > +<i><a id="A_priori">A priori</a></i> connections exist only between objects of perception and movements, not between sensory ideas, II. 581.<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>A priori</i> ideas and experience, Chapter XXVIII.</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>A priori</i> propositions, II. 661-5</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Archer, W.</span>, II. 464<br > +<br > +Arithmetic, II. 654.<br > +<br > +Articular sensibility, II. 189 ff.<br > +<br > +Association, <a href="#CHAPTER_XIV463">Chapter XIV</a>:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is not of ideas, but of things thought of, I. <a href="#Page_554">554</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">examples of, <a href="#Page_555">555</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its rapidity, <a href="#Page_557">557</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">by contiguity, <a href="#Page_561">561</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">elementary law of, <a href="#Page_566">566</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'mixed' association, <a href="#Page_571">571</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conditions of, <a href="#Page_575">575</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">by similarity, <a href="#Page_578">578</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">three kinds of association compared, <a href="#Page_580">580</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in voluntary thought, <a href="#Page_583">583</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">by contrast, <a href="#Page_593">593</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">history of the doctrine of, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">association the means of localization, II. 158 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">connection of association by similarity with reasoning, 345 ff.</span><br > +<br > +Associationism, I. <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br > +<br > +Associationist theory of the self, I. <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of space-perception, II. 271 ff.</span><br > +<br > +<i>Asymbolia</i>, I. <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br > +<br > +Attention, <a href="#CHAPTER_XI">Chapter XI</a>: to how many things possible, I. <a href="#Page_405">405</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to simultaneous sight and sound, <a href="#Page_411">411</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its varieties, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">passive, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">voluntary, <a href="#Page_420">420</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its effects, <a href="#Page_424">424</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its influence on reaction-time, <a href="#Page_427">427-34</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">accompanied by feelings of tension due to adaptation of sense-organs, <a href="#Page_434">434-8</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involves imagination or preperception of object, <a href="#Page_438">438-44</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conceivable as a mere effect, <a href="#Page_448">448</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Aubert, H.,</span> II. 235<br > +<br > +Auditory centre in brain, I. <a href="#Page_52">52-6</a><br > +<br > +Auditory type of imagination, II. 60<br > +<br > +<i>'Ausfallserscheinungen,'</i> I. <a href="#Page_75">75</a><br > +<br > +Automatic writing, I. <a href="#Page_393">393</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Austen, Jane,</span> I. <a href="#Page_571">571</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Automaton-Theory">Automaton-Theory,</a> <a href="#CHAPTER_V">Chapter V</a>:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">postulated rather than proved, I. <a href="#Page_134">134-8</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reasons against it, <a href="#Page_138">138-144</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">applied to attention, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">disregarded in this book, II. 583</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Azam,</span> Dr., I. <a href="#Page_380">380</a>.<br > +<br > +<br > +<a id="Babe_and_candle_scheme_of"></a>Babe and candle, scheme of, I. <a href="#Page_25">25</a><br > +<br > +Baby's first perception, II. 8, 84;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his early instinctive movements, 404 ff.</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bær, von,</span> I. <a href="#Page_639">639</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bagehot, W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_582">582</a>; II. 283, 308<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bain,</span> on series conscious of itself, I. <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on self-esteem, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on self-love, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association, <a href="#Page_485">485</a>, <a href="#Page_530">530</a>, <a href="#Page_561">561</a>, <a href="#Page_589">589</a>, <a href="#Page_601">601</a>, <a href="#Page_653">653</a>; II. 6, 12, 69, 186, 271, 282, 296, 319, 322, 372-3, 463, 466, 551, 554-5</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Ballard,</span> I. <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Balzac,</span> I. <a href="#Page_374">374</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bartels,</span> I. <a href="#Page_432">432</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bastian, H. C.,</span> II. 488<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Baumann,</span> II. 409<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Baxt,</span> I. <a href="#Page_648">648</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Beaunis, E.,</span> II. 492<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bechterew,</span> I. <a href="#Page_407">407</a><br > +<br > +Belief, Chapter XXI:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in sensations, II. 299 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in objects of emotion, 306 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in theories, 311 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and will, 319.</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Reality">reality</a></i></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bell, C.,</span> II. 483, 492<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bergson, J.,</span> II. 609<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Berkeley,</span> I. <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>; II. 43, 49, 77, 212, 240, 666<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bernhardt,</span> II. 502<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bernheim,</span> I. <a href="#Page_206">206</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bertrand, A.,</span> II. 518<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bessel,</span> I. <a href="#Page_413">413</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Binet, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_203">203</a> ff.; II. 71, 74, 128 ff., 130, 167, 491, 520<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Black, R. W.,</span> II. 339<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bleek,</span> II. 358<br > +<br > +Blind, the, their space-perception, II. 202 ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after restoration to sight, 211-2;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hallucination of a blind man, 323;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">dreams of the, 44</span><br > +<br > +Blindness, mental, I. <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>. See <i><a href="#Sight">Sight</a>, <a href="#Hemianopsia">Hemianopsia</a>,</i> etc.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Blix,</span> II. 170<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bloch,</span> II. 515<br > +<br > +Blood, its exciting effect on the nerves, II. 412-3<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Blood, B. P.,</span> II. 284<br > +<br > +Blood-supply to brain, I. <a href="#Page_97">97</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bourne, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_391">391</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bourru,</span> Dr., I. <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bowditch, H. P.,</span> his reaction-timer, I. <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on contrast in seen motion, II. 247;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on knee-jerk, 380;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">comparison of touch and sight, 520</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bowen, F.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_214">214</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bowne, B. P.,</span> on knowledge, I. <a href="#Page_219">219</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bradley, F. H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_452">452</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a>, <a href="#Page_604">604</a>; II. 7, 9, 284, 648<br > +<br > +<a id="Brain"></a>Brain, its functions, Chapter II:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of frog, I. <a href="#Page_14">14</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of dog, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of monkey, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of man, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">lower centres compared with hemispheres, <a href="#Page_9">9-10</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">circulation in, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">instability, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its connection with Mind, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'entire' brain not a real physical fact, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its changes as subtle as those of thought, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its dying vibrations operative in producing consciousness, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Influence of environment upon it, <a href="#Page_626">626</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Brain-process, see <i><a href="#Neural_process">neural process</a></i><br > +<br > +Brain-structure, the two modes of its genesis, II. 624<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Brentano,</span> I. <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_547">547</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bridgeman, Laura,</span> II. 62, 358, 420<br > +<br > +Broca's convolution, I. <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Brodhun,</span> I. <a href="#Page_542">542</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Brown, Thos.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a>; II. 271<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Brown-Séquard,</span> I. <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>; II. 695<br > +<br > +Brutes, the intellect of, II. 348 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bucke, R. M.,</span> II. 460<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Bubnoff,</span> I. <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Burke,</span> II. 464<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Burnham, W. H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_689">689</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Burot,</span> Dr., I. <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Caird_E"></a>Caird, E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>, II. ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Calmeil, A.,</span> II. 524<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Campanella,</span> II. 464<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Campbell, G.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Cardaillac,</span> I. <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Carlyle, T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_311">311</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Carpenter, W. B.,</span> on formation of habits, I. <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ethical remarks on habit, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mistakes in speech, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">lapses of memory, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on not feeling pain, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on ideo-motor action, II. 522</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Carville,</span> I. <a href="#Page_69">69</a><br > +<br > +Catalepsy, I. <a href="#Page_229">229</a>; II. 583<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Cattell,</span> on reaction-time, I. <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>; <a href="#Page_524">524</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on recognition, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_648">648</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_420">420</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association-time, <a href="#Page_558">558</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Cause, consciousness a, I. <a href="#Page_187">187</a>; II. 583, 592<br > +<br > +Centres, cortical, I. <a href="#Page_30">30</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">motor, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">visual, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">auditory, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">olfactory, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">gustatory, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">tactile, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></span><br > +<br > +Cerebral process, see <i><a href="#Neural_process">neural process</a></i><br > +<br > +Cerebrum, see <i><a href="#Brain">Brain</a>, <a href="#Hemispheres">Hemispheres</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Chadbourne, P A.,</span> II. 383<br > +<br > +Characters, general, II. 329 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Charcot,</span> I. <a href="#Page_54">54-5</a>; II. 58, 596<br > +<br > +Chloroform, I. <a href="#Page_531">531</a><br > +<br > +Choice, see <i><a href="#Selection">selection</a>, <a href="#Interest">interest</a></i><br > +<br > +Circulation in brain, I. <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effects of sensory stimuli upon, II. 374 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in grief, 443-4</span><br > +<br > +Classic and romantic, II. 469<br > +<br > +Classifications, II. 646<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Clay, E. C. R.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_609">609</a><br > +<br > +Cleanliness, II. 434<br > +<br > +Clearness, I. <a href="#Page_426">426</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Clifford,</span> I. <a href="#Page_130">130-2</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Clouston,</span> II. 114, 284-5, 537, 539<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Cobbe, F. P.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_374">374</a><br > +<br > +Cochlea, theory of its action, II. 169<br > +<br > +Cognition, see <i><a href="#Knowing">knowing</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Cohen, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Coleridge, S. T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_572">572</a>, <a href="#Page_681">681</a><br > +<br > +Collateral innervation, see <i><a href="#Vicarious_function">vicarious function</a></i><br > +<br > +Comparison, <a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">Chapter XIII</a>:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relations discovered by comparison have nothing to do with the time and space order of their terms, II. 641;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mediate, 489, 644;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">see <i><a href="#Difference">difference</a>, <a href="#Likeness">likeness</a></i></span><br > +<br > +Composition, of Mind out of its elements, see <i><a href="#Mind-Stuff_theory">Mind-Stuff theory</a></i>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">differences due to, I. <a href="#Page_491">491</a></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Comte, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br > +<br > +Conceivability, I. <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Conceptions">Conceptions,</a> <a href="#CHAPTER_XII">Chapter XII</a>:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defined, I. <a href="#Page_461">461</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their permanence, <a href="#Page_464">464</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">do not develop of themselves, <a href="#Page_466">466</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">abstract, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">universal, <a href="#Page_478">478</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">essentially teleological, II. 332</span><br > +<br > +Conceptual order different from perceptual, I. <a href="#Page_482">482</a><br > +<br > +Concomitants, law of varying, I. <a href="#Page_506">506</a><br > +<br > +Confusion, II. 352<br > +<br > +Consciousness, its seat, I. <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its distribution, <a href="#Page_142">142-3</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its function of selection, <a href="#Page_139">139-41</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is <i>personal</i> in form, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is continuous, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of lack, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of self not essential, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of <i>object</i> comes first, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">always partial and selective, <a href="#Page_284">284</a> ff., see <i><a href="#Selection">Selection</a></i>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of the process of thinking, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the span of, <a href="#Page_405">405</a></span><br > +<br > +Consent, in willing, II. 568<br > +<br > +Considerations, I. <a href="#Page_20">20</a><br > +<br > +Constructiveness, II. 426<br > +<br > +Contiguity, association by, I. <a href="#Page_561">561</a><br > +<br > +Continuity of object of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_488">488</a><br > +<br > +Contrast, of colors, II. 13-27;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of temperatures, 14;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">two theories of, 17 ff., 245;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of movements, 245 ff., 250</span><br > +<br > +Convolutions, motor, I. <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br > +<br > +Cortex, of brain, experiments on, I. <a href="#Page_31">31</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Cramming, I. <a href="#Page_663">663</a><br > +<br > +Credulity, our primitive, II. 319<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Cudworth, R.,</span> II. 9<br > +<br > +'Cue,' the mental, II. 497, 518<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Cumberland, S.,</span> II. 525<br > +<br > +Curiosity, II. 429<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Czermak,</span> II. 170, 175<br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Darwin_C"></a>Darwin, C.,</span> II. 432, 446, 479, 484, 678, 681-2-4<br > +<br > +Darwinism, scholastic reputation of, II. 670<br > +<br > +Data, the, of psychology, I. <a href="#Page_184">184</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Davidson, T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_474">474</a><br > +<br > +Deaf-mute's thought in infancy, I. <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br > +<br > +Deafness, mental, I. <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55-6</a>. See <i><a href="#Hearing">hearing</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Dean, S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_394">394</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Decision">Decision,</a> five types of, II. 531<br > +<br > +Degenerations, descending in nerve-centres, I. <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Delabarre, E.,</span> II. 13-27, 71<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Delbœuf, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_455">455</a>, <a href="#Page_531">531</a>, <a href="#Page_541">541</a>, <a href="#Page_542">542</a>, <a href="#Page_548">548-9</a>; II. 100, 189, 249, 264, 605, 609, 612<br > +<br > +Deliberation, II. 528 ff.<br > +<br > +Delusions, insane, I. <a href="#Page_375">375</a>; II. 114 ff.<br > +<br > +Depth, see <i><a href="#Third_dimension">third dimension</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Descartes,</span> I. <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Destutt de Tracy,</span> I. <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br > +<br > +Determinism must be postulated by psychology, II. 576<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Dewey, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_473">473</a><br > +<br > +Dichotomy in thinking, II. 654<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Dickens, C.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_374">374</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Dietze,</span> I. <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_617">617</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Difference">Difference</a>, not resolvable into composition, I. <a href="#Page_490">490</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">noticed most between species of a genus, <a href="#Page_529">529</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the magnitude of, <a href="#Page_531">531</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">least discernible, <a href="#Page_537">537</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">methods for ascertaining, <a href="#Page_540">540</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Difference, local, II. 167 ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">genesis of our perception of, 642</span><br > +<br > +Diffusion of movements, the law of, II. 372<br > +<br > +Dimension, third, II. 134 ff., 212 ff., 220<br > +<br > +Dipsomania, II. 543<br > +<br > +Disbelief, II. 284<br > +<br > +Discrimination, <a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">Chapter XIII</a>:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conditions which favor it, I. <a href="#Page_494">494</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">improves by practice, <a href="#Page_508">508</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">spatial, II. 167 ff.</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Difference">difference</a></i></span><br > +<br > +Dissociation, I. <a href="#Page_486">486-7</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">law of, by varying concomitants, <a href="#Page_506">506</a></span><br > +<br > +Dissociation, ditto, II. 345, 359<br > +<br > +Dissociation, of one part of the mind from another, see <i><a href="#Janet_Pierre">Janet, Pierre</a></i><br > +<br > +Distance, between terms of a series, I. <a href="#Page_530">530</a><br > +<br > +Distance, in space, see <i><a href="#Third_dimension">third dimension</a></i><br > +<br > +<i><a id="Distraction"></a>Distraction</i>, I. <a href="#Page_401">401</a>. See <i><a href="#Inattention">inattention</a></i><br > +<br > +Dizziness, see <i><a href="#Vertigo">vertigo</a></i><br > +<br > +Dog's cortical centres, after Ferrier, I. <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after Munk, I. <a href="#Page_44">44-5</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after Luciani, I. <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">for special muscles, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hemispheres ablated, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Donaldson,</span> II. 170<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Donders,</span> II. 235<br > +<br > +Double images, II. 225-30, 252<br > +<br > +Doubt, II. 284, 318 ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the mania of, 545</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Dougal, J. D.,</span> II. 222<br > +<br > +Drainage of one brain-cell by another, II. 583 ff.<br > +<br > +Dreams, II. 294<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Drobisch,</span> I. <a href="#Page_632">632</a>, <a href="#Page_660">660</a><br > +<br > +Drunkard, II. 565<br > +<br > +Drunkenness, I. <a href="#Page_144">144</a>; II. 543, 565, 628<br > +<br > +Dualism of object and knower, I. <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br > +<br > +Duality, of Brain, I. <a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Dudley, A. T.,</span> on mental qualities of an athlete, II. 539<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Dufour,</span> II. 211<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Dunan, Ch.,</span> II. 176, 206, 208-9<br > +<br > +Duration, the primitive object in time-perception, I. <a href="#Page_609">609</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">our estimate of short, <a href="#Page_611">611</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +'Dynamogeny,' II. 379 ff., 491<br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Ebbinghaus_H"></a>Ebbinghaus, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_548">548</a>, <a href="#Page_676">676</a><br > +<br > +Eccentric projection of sensations, II. 31 ff., 195 ff.<br > +<br > +Education of hemispheres, I. <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Pedagogic_remarks">pedagogic remarks</a></i></span><br > +<br > +Effort, II. 534-7;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Muscular effort, 562;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Moral effort, 549, 561, 578-9</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Egger, V.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_280">280-1-2</a>; II. 256<br > +<br > +Ego, Empirical, I. <a href="#Page_291">291</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">pure, <a href="#Page_342">342</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">'transcendental,' <a href="#Page_362">362</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">criticised, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></span><br > +<br > +Elementary factors of mind, see <i><a href="#Units">Units of consciousness</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Elsas,</span> I. <a href="#Page_548">548</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Emerson, R. W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_582">582</a>, II. 307<br > +<br > +Emotion, Chapter XXV:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">continuous with instinct, II. 442;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">description of typical emotions, 443-9;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">results from reflex effects of stimulus upon organism, 449 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their classification, 454;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in anæsthetic subjects, 455;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the absence of normal stimulus, 458-60;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effects of expressing, 463 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of repressing, 466;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the subtler, 469 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the neural process in, 472;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">differences in individuals, 474;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">evolution of special emotions, 477 ff.</span><br > +<br > +Empirical ego, I. <a href="#Page_290">290</a><br > +<br > +Empirical propositions, II. 644<br > +<br > +Emulation, II. 409<br > +<br > +Ennui, I. <a href="#Page_626">626</a><br > +<br > +Entoptic sensations, I. <a href="#Page_515">515</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Equation, personal, I. <a href="#Page_413">413</a><br > +<br > +'Equilibration,' direct and indirect, II. 627<br > +<br > +<a id="Essences">Essences,</a> their meaning, II. 329 ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sentimental and mechanical, 665</span><br > +<br > +Essential qualities, see <i><a href="#Essences">essences</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Estel,</span> I. <a href="#Page_613">613</a>, <a href="#Page_618">618</a><br > +<br > +Evolutionism demands a 'mind-dust,' I. <a href="#Page_146">146</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Exner,</span> on human cortical centres, I. <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on 'circumvallation' of centres, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his psychodometer, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reaction-time, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on perception of rapid succession, <a href="#Page_409">409</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time-perception, <a href="#Page_615">615</a>, <a href="#Page_638">638</a>, <a href="#Page_646">646</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling of motion, II. 172</span><br > +<br > +<a id="Experience">Experience,</a> I. <a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Relation of experience to necessary judgments, Chapter XXVIII;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Experience defined, II. 619 ff., 628</span><br > +<br > +Experimentation in psychology, I. <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br > +<br > +Extradition of sensations, II. 31 ff., 195 ff.<br > +<br > +<br > +<a id="Fallacy_the_Psychologists"></a>Fallacy, the Psychologist's, I. <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>; II. 281<br > +<br > +Familiarity, sense of, see <i><a href="#Recognition">recognition</a></i><br > +<br > +Fatalism, II. 574<br > +<br > +Fatigue, diminishes span of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_640">640</a><br > +<br > +Fear, instinct of, II. 396, 415;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the symptoms of, 446;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">morbid, 460;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">origin of, 478</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Fechner,</span> I. <a href="#Page_435">435-6</a>, <a href="#Page_533">533</a>, <a href="#Page_539">539</a> ff., <a href="#Page_549">549</a>, <a href="#Page_616">616</a>, <a href="#Page_645">645</a>; II. 50, 70, 137 ff., 178, 464<br > +<br > +Feeling, synonym for consciousness in general in this book, I. <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">feelings of relation, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Félida X.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_380">380-4</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Féré, Ch.,</span> II. 68, 378 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Ferrier, D.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46-7-8</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57-8-9</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>; II. 503<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Ferrier, Jas.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a><br > +<br > +<i>Fiat</i>, of the will, II. 501, 526, 561, 564; 568.<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Decision">decision</a></i></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Fichte,</span> I. <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Fick,</span> I. <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Fiske, J.,</span> II. 577<br > +<br > +Fixed ideas. See <i><a href="#Insistent_ideas">insistent ideas</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Flechsig</span>'s Pyramidenbahn, I. <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Flint, R.,</span> II. 425<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Flourens, P.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br > +<br > +Force, supposed sense of, II. 518<br > +<br > +<a id="Forgetting"></a>Forgetting, I. <a href="#Page_679">679</a> ff.; II. 870-1. See <i><a href="#Amnesia">amnesia</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Fouillée, A.,</span> II. 500, 570<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">François-Franck,</span> I. <a href="#Page_70">70</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Franklin,</span> Mrs. <span class="smcap">C. L.,</span> II. 94<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Franz,</span> Dr., II. 63<br > +<br > +Freedom, of the will, II. 569 ff.<br > +<br > +'Fringe' of object, I. <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281-2</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471-2</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a><br > +<br > +Frog's nerve-centres, I. <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br > +<br > +Fusion of feelings unintelligible, I. <a href="#Page_157">157-62</a>; II. 2. See <i><a href="#Mind-Stuff_theory">Mind-stuff theory</a></i><br > +<br > +Fusion of impressions into one object, I. <a href="#Page_484">484</a>, <a href="#Page_502">502</a>; II. 103, 183<br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Galton_F"></a>Galton, F.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_685">685</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on mental imagery, II. 51-7;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on gregariousness, 430</span><br > +<br > +<a id="General_propositions">General propositions</a>, what they involve, II. 337 ff. See <i><a href="#Universal_conceptions">universal conceptions</a></i><br > +<br > +Genesis of brain-structure, its two modes, II. 624<br > +<br > +Genius, I. <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_530">530</a>; II. 110, 352, 360<br > +<br > +Gentleman, the mind of the, II. 370<br > +<br > +Geometry, II. 658<br > +<br > +Giddiness, see <i><a href="#Vertigo">vertigo</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Gilman, B. I.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Gley, E.,</span> II. 514-5, 525<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Goldscheider,</span> II. 170, 192 ff., 200<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Goltz,</span> I. <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a><br > +<br > +Gorilla, II. 416<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Graefe, A.,</span> II. 507, 510<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Grashey,</span> I. <a href="#Page_640">640</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Grassman, R.,</span> II. 654<br > +<br > +Gregariousness, II. 430<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Green, T. H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_366">366-8</a>; II. 4, 10, 11<br > +<br > +Grief, II. 448, 480<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Griesinger, W.,</span> II. 298<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Grubelsucht,</span> II. 284<br > +<br > +Guinea-pigs, epileptic, etc., II. 682-7<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Guislain,</span> II. 546<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Gurney, E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_209">209</a>; II. 117, 130, 469, 610<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Guyau,</span> II. 414, 469<br > +<br > +<br > +<a id="Habit"></a>Habit, <a href="#CHAPTER_IV136">Chapter IV</a>:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">due to plasticity of brain-matter, I. <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">depends on <i>paths</i> in nerve-centres, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">origination of, <a href="#Page_109">109-13</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mechanism of concatenated habits, <a href="#Page_114">114-8</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">they demand some sensation, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ethical and pedagogic maxims, <a href="#Page_121">121-7</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is the ground of association, <a href="#Page_566">566</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of memory, <a href="#Page_655">655</a></span><br > +<br > +Habits may inhibit instincts, II. 394;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Habit accounts for one large part of our knowledge, 632</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hall, G. S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_96">96-7</a>, <a href="#Page_558">558</a>, <a href="#Page_614">614</a>, <a href="#Page_616">616</a>; II. 155, 247, 281, 423<br > +<br > +Hallucination, sensation a veridical, II. 33;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of lost limbs, 38, 105;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of emotional feeling, 459</span><br > +<br > +<a id="Hallucinations">Hallucinations,</a> II. 114 ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hypnagogic, 124;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the brain-process in, 122 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">hypnotic, 604</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hamilton, W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_569">569</a>, <a href="#Page_578">578</a>, <a href="#Page_682">682</a>; II. 113<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hammond, E.,</span> II. 673<br > +<br > +Haploscopic method, II. 226<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Harless,</span> II. 497<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hartley,</span> I. <a href="#Page_553">553</a>, <a href="#Page_561">561</a>, <a href="#Page_564">564</a>, <a href="#Page_600">600</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hartmann, R.,</span> II. 416<br > +<br > +Hasheesh-delirium, II. 121<br > +<br > +<a id="Hearing">Hearing</a>, its cortical centre, I. <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br > +<br > +Heat, of mental work, I. <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hecker,</span> II. 480<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hegel,</span> I. <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_666">666</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Heidenhain,</span> I. <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Helmholtz, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_285">285</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on discrimination, <a href="#Page_504">504</a>, <a href="#Page_516">516-21</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">time as a category, <a href="#Page_637">637-8</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after-images, <a href="#Page_645">645</a>, <a href="#Page_648">648</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on color-contrast, II. 17 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on sensation, 33;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on cochlea, 170;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on convergence of eyes, 200;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">vision with inverted head, 213;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on what marks a sensation, 218 ff., 243-4;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on entoptic objects, 241-2;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on contrast in seen movement, 247;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on relief, 257;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on measurement of the field of view, 266 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on theory of space-perception, 279;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling of innervation, 493, 507, 510;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on conservation of energy, 667</span><br > +<br > +Hemiamblyopia, I. <a href="#Page_44">44</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Hemianopsia"></a>Hemianopsia, I. <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>; II. 73<br > +<br > +<a id="Hemispheres"></a>Hemispheres, their distinction from lower centres, I. <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their education, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">localization of function in, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the exclusive seat of consciousness, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effects of deprivation of, on frogs, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72-3</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on fishes, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on birds, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on rodents, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on dogs, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on <i>primates</i>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not devoid of connate paths, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their evolution from lower centres, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Henle, J.,</span> II. 445, 461, 481<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Herbart,</span> I. <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_603">603</a>, <a href="#Page_608">608</a>, <a href="#Page_626">626</a><br > +<br > +Hereditary transmission of acquired characters, see <i><a href="#Inheritance">inheritance</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hering, E.,</span> on attention, I. <a href="#Page_438">438</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on comparing weights, <a href="#Page_544">544</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on pure sensation, II. 4;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on color-contrast, 20 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on roomy character of sensations, 136 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on after-images and convergence, 200;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on distance of double images, 230;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on stereoscopy, 252;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reproduction in vision, 260 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on movements of closed eye, 510</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Herzen,</span> I. <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reaction-time from a corn, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on cerebral thermometry, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on swooning, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hitzig,</span> I. <a href="#Page_31">31</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hobbes, T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_573">573</a>, <a href="#Page_587">587</a>, <a href="#Page_594">594</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hodgson, R.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hodgson, S. H.,</span> on inertness of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_129">129-30</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on self, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on conceptual order, <a href="#Page_482">482</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association, <a href="#Page_572">572</a> ff., <a href="#Page_603">603</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on voluntary redintegration, <a href="#Page_588">588-9</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the 'present' in time, <a href="#Page_607">607</a></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Höffding, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_674">674</a>; II. 455<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Holbrook, M. H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_665">665</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Holmes, O. W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_582">582</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Holtei, von,</span> I. <a href="#Page_624">624</a><br > +<br > +Horopter, II. 226<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Horsley, V.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Horwicz,</span> I. <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325-7</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Howe, S. G.,</span> II. 358<br > +<br > +Human intellect, compared with that of brute, II. 348 ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">depends on association by similarity, 353 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">various orders of, 360;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">what brain-peculiarity it depends on, 366, 638</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hume,</span> I. <a href="#Page_254">254</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on personal identity, <a href="#Page_351">351-3</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">association, <a href="#Page_597">597</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">due to brain-laws, <a href="#Page_564">564</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on mental images, II. 45-6;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on belief, 295-6, 302;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on pleasure and will, 558</span><br > +<br > +Hunting instinct, II. 411<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Huxley,</span> I. <a href="#Page_130">130-1</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>; II. 46<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Hyatt, A.,</span> II. 102<br > +<br > +Hylozoism, see <i><a href="#Mind-Stuff_theory">Mind-stuff theory</a></i><br > +<br > +Hyperæsthesia, in hypnotism, II. 609<br > +<br > +<a id="Hypnotism">Hypnotism</a>, I. <a href="#Page_407">407</a>; II. 128, 351;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">general account of, Chapter XXVII;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">methods, II. 593;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theories of, 596;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">symptoms of trance, 602 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">post-hypnotic suggestion, 618</span><br > +<br > +<a id="Hysterics">Hysterics</a>, their so-called anæsthesias, and unconsciousness, I. <a href="#Page_202">202</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<br > +<a id="Ideal_objects"></a>Ideal objects, eternal and necessary relations between, II. 639, 661.<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Conceptions">conception</a></i></span><br > +<br > +'Ideas,' the theory of, I. <a href="#Page_230">230</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">confounded with objects, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>, <a href="#Page_521">521</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">they do not exist as parts of our thought, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_553">553</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">platonic, <a href="#Page_462">462</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">abstract, <a href="#Page_468">468</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">universal, <a href="#Page_473">473</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">never come twice the same, <a href="#Page_480">480-1</a></span><br > +<br > +Ideation, no distinct centres for, I. <a href="#Page_564">564</a>; II. 78<br > +<br > +Identity, sense of, I. <a href="#Page_459">459</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">three principles of, <a href="#Page_460">460</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not the foundation of likeness, <a href="#Page_492">492</a></span><br > +<br > +Identity, personal, I. <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">based on ordinary judgment of sameness, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">due to resemblance and continuity of our feelings, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lotze on, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">only relatively true, <a href="#Page_372">372</a></span><br > +<br > +Ideo-motor action the type of all volition, II. 522<br > +<br > +Idiosyncrasy, II. 631<br > +<br > +'Idomenians,' II. 214<br > +<br > +Illusions, II. 85 ff., 129, 232 ff., 243-66.<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Hallucinations">hallucination</a></i></span><br > +<br > +Images, double, in vision, II. 225-30<br > +<br > +Images, mental, not lost in mental blindness, etc., I. <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>; II. 73<br > +<br > +Images, are usually vague, II. 45;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">visual, 51 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">auditory, 160;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">motor, 61;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">tactile, 165;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">between sleep and waking, 124-6</span><br > +<br > +Imagination, Chapter XVIII:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">it differs in individuals, II. 51 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sometimes leaves an after-image, 67;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the cerebral process of, 68 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not locally distinct from that of sensation, 73;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is <i>figured</i>, 82</span><br > +<br > +Imitation, II. 408<br > +<br > +Immortality, I. <a href="#Page_348">348-9</a><br > +<br > +Impulses, morbid, II. 542 ff. See <i><a href="#Instinct">instincts</a></i><br > +<br > +Impulsiveness of all consciousness, II. 526 ff.<br > +<br > +<a id="Inattention">Inattention</a>, I. <a href="#Page_404">404</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Increase, serial, I. <a href="#Page_490">490</a><br > +<br > +Indeterminism, II. 569 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Ingersoll, R.,</span> II. 469<br > +<br > +<a id="Inheritance"></a>Inheritance of acquired characters, II. 367, 678 ff.<br > +<br > +Inhibition, I. <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>; II. 126, 373;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of instincts, 391, 394;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of one cortical process by another, 583</span><br > +<br > +Innervation, feeling of, II. 236, 493;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">it is unnecessary, 494 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">no evidence for it, 499, 518</span><br > +<br > +Innervation, collateral, see <i><a href="#Vicarious_function">vicarious function</a></i><br > +<br > +Insane delusions, I. <a href="#Page_375">375</a>; II. 113<br > +<br > +<a id="Insistent_ideas">Insistent ideas,</a> II. 545<br > +<br > +<a id="Instinct">Instinct.</a> Chapter XXIV;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defined, II. 384;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is a reflex impulse, 385 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is neither blind nor invariable, 389;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">contrary instincts in same animal, 392;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">man has more than other mammals, 393, 441;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their transitoriness, 398;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">special instincts, 404-441;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the origin of instincts, 678</span><br > +<br > +'Integration' of feelings, Spencer's theory of, I. <a href="#Page_151">151</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<a id="Intelligence">Intelligence,</a> the test of its presence, I. <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of lower brain-centres, <a href="#Page_78">78</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Intention to speak, I. <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Interest">Interest</a>, I. <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a> ff., <a href="#Page_402">402-3</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a>, <a href="#Page_515">515</a> ff., <a href="#Page_572">572</a>, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>; II. 312 ff., 344-5, 634<br > +<br > +Intermediaries, the axiom of skipped, II. 646<br > +<br > +Introspection, I. <a href="#Page_185">185</a><br > +<br > +Inverted head, vision with, II. 213<br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Jackson_Hughlings"></a>Jackson, Hughlings,</span> I. <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>; II. 125-6<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Janet, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_385">385</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Janet, Paul,</span> I. <a href="#Page_625">625</a>; II. 40-1<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Janet_Pierre">Janet, Pierre,</a></span> I. <a href="#Page_203">203</a> ff., <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a> ff., <a href="#Page_682">682</a>; II. 456, 614<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Jastrow,</span> I. <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_543">543</a>, <a href="#Page_545">545</a>; II. 44, 135, 180<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Jevons, W. S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_406">406</a><br > +<br > +Joints, their sensibility, II. 189 ff.<br > +<br > +Judgments, existential, II. 290<br > +<br > +Justice, II. 673<br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Kandinsky_V"></a>Kandinsky, V.,</span> II. 70, 116<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Kant,</span> I. <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his 'transcendental' deduction of the categories, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his paralogisms, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">criticised, <a href="#Page_363">363-6</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time, <a href="#Page_642">642</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on symmetrical figures, II. 150;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space, 273 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the real, 296;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on synthetic judgments <i>a priori</i>, 661,</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and their relation to experience, 664</span><br > +<br > +Kinæsthetic feelings, II. 488 ff., 493<br > +<br > +'Kleptomania,' II. 425<br > +<br > +Knee-jerk, II. 380<br > +<br > +<a id="Knowing">Knowing</a>, I. <a href="#Page_216">216</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">psychology assumes it, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not reducible to any other relation, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>, <a href="#Page_688">688</a></span><br > +<br > +Knowledge, two kinds of, I. <a href="#Page_221">221</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of Self not essential to, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the relativity of, II. 9 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the genesis of, 630 ff.</span><br > +<br > +Knowledge-<i>about</i>, I. <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">König,</span> I. <a href="#Page_542">542</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Kries, von,</span> I. <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_547">547</a>; II. 253<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Krishaber,</span> I. <a href="#Page_377">377</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Kussmaul, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_684">684</a><br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Ladd_G_T"></a>Ladd, G. T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_687">687</a>; II. 3, 311<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lamarck,</span> II. 678<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Landry,</span> II. 490, 492<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lange, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lange, C.,</span> II. 443, 449, 455, 457, 460, 462<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lange, K.,</span> II. 111<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lange, L.,</span> on reaction-time, muscular and sensorial, I. <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lange, N.,</span> on muscular element in imagination, I. <a href="#Page_444">444</a><br > +<br > +Language, as a human function, II. 356-8<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Laromiguèire,</span> I. <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br > +<br > +Laughter, II. 480<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lazarus,</span> I. <a href="#Page_624">624</a>, <a href="#Page_626">626</a>; II. 84, 97, 369, 429<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Le Conte, Joseph,</span> II. 228, 252, 265<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Léonie,</span> M. Janet's trance-subject, I. <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Levy, W. H.,</span> II. 204<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lewes,</span> on frog's sp. cord, I. <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on thought as a sort of algebra, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on 'preperception,' <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on muscular feeling, II. 199;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on begging in pup, 400;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on lapsed intelligence, 678</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lewinski,</span> II. 192<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Liberatore,</span> II. 670<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Liebman, O.,</span> on brain as a machine, I. <a href="#Page_10">10</a>; II. 34<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Liégeois, J.,</span> II. 594, 606<br > +<br > +Light, effects of, on movement, II. 379<br > +<br > +<a id="Likeness">Likeness</a>, I. <a href="#Page_528">528</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lindsay, T. L.,</span> II. 421<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lipps,</span> on 'unconscious' sensations, I. <a href="#Page_175">175</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on theory of ideas, <a href="#Page_603">603</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">time-perception, <a href="#Page_632">632</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on muscular feeling, II. 200;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on distance, 221;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on visual illusions, 251, 264;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space-perception, 280;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reality, 297;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on effort, 575</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lissauer,</span> I. <a href="#Page_50">50</a><br > +<br > +Local signs, II. 155 ff., 167<br > +<br > +Localization, in hemispheres, I. <a href="#Page_30">30</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Localization, II. 153 ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of one sensible object in another, II. 31 ff., 183 ff., 195 ff.</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Locke, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a>, <a href="#Page_553">553</a>, <a href="#Page_563">563</a>, <a href="#Page_679">679</a>; II. 210, 306, 644, 662-4<br > +<br > +'Locksley Hall,' I. <a href="#Page_567">567</a><br > +<br > +Locomotion, instinct of, II. 405<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Loeb,</span> I. <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>; II. 255, 516, 628<br > +<br > +<a id="Logic">Logic</a>, II. 647<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lombard, J. S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lombard, W.,</span> II. 380<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lotze,</span> I. <a href="#Page_214">214</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on immortality, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on personal identity, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_442">442-3</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on fusion and discrimination of sensations, <a href="#Page_522">522</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on local signs, II. 157, 495;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on volition, 523-4</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Louis V.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br > +<br > +Love, sexual, II. 437, 543;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">parental, 439;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bain's explanation of, 551</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Lowell, J. R.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_582">582</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Luciani,</span> I. <a href="#Page_44">44-5-6-7</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a><br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="McCosh"></a>McCosh,</span> I. <a href="#Page_501">501</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mach, E.,</span> on attention, I. <a href="#Page_436">436</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space-feeling, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time feeling, <a href="#Page_616">616</a>, <a href="#Page_635">635</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on motion-contrast, II. 247;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on optical inversion, 255;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on probability, 258;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling of innervation, 509, 511</span><br > +<br > +Magnitude of differences, I. <a href="#Page_530">530</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Malebranche,</span> II. 9<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Manouvrier,</span> II. 496<br > +<br > +Mania, transitory, II. 460<br > +<br > +Man's intellectual distinction from brutes, II. 348 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mansel, H. L.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mantegazza, P.,</span> II. 447, 479, 481<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Marcus Aurelius,</span> I. <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>; II. 675<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Marillier, L.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_445">445</a>; II. 514<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Marique,</span> I. <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Martin, H. N.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_99">99</a>; II. 3<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Martineau, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_484">484</a> ff., <a href="#Page_506">506</a>; II. 9<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Maudsley, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_656">656</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Maury, A.,</span> II. 83, 124, 127<br > +<br > +Mechanical philosophy, the, II. 666 ff.<br > +<br > +Mechanism <i>vs.</i> intelligence, I. <a href="#Page_8">8-14</a><br > +<br > +Mediate comparison, I. <a href="#Page_489">489</a><br > +<br > +Mediumship, I. <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mehner,</span> I. <a href="#Page_618">618</a><br > +<br > +Memory, <a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">Chapter XVI</a>:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">it depends on material conditions, I. <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the essential function of the hemispheres, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">lapses of, <a href="#Page_373">373</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in hysterics, <a href="#Page_384">384</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">favored by attention, <a href="#Page_427">427</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">primary, <a href="#Page_638">638</a>, <a href="#Page_643">643</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">analysis of the phenomenon of Memory, <a href="#Page_648">648</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the return of a mental image is not memory, <a href="#Page_619">619</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">memory's causes, <a href="#Page_653">653</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the result of association, <a href="#Page_654">654</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">conditions of good memory, <a href="#Page_659">659</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">brute retentiveness, <a href="#Page_660">660</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">multiple associations, <a href="#Page_662">662</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">improvement of memory, <a href="#Page_667">667</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its usefulness depends on forgetting much, <a href="#Page_680">680</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its decay, <a href="#Page_683">683</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">metaphysical explanations of it, <a href="#Page_687">687</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Mentality, the mark of its presence, I. <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br > +<br > +Mental operations, simultaneous, I. <a href="#Page_408">408</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mercier, C.,</span> on inertness of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on inhibition, II. 583</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Merkel,</span> I. <a href="#Page_542">542-3-4</a><br > +<br > +Metaphysical principles, II. 669 ff.<br > +<br > +Metaphysics, I. <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a><br > +<br > +Meyer's experiment on color-contrast, II. 21<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Meyer, G. H.,</span> II. 66, 97-8<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Meynert, T.,</span> his brain-scheme, I. <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mill, James,</span> I. <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a>, <a href="#Page_499">499</a>, <a href="#Page_597">597</a>, <a href="#Page_651">651</a>, <a href="#Page_653">653</a>; II. 77<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mill, J. S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on unity of self, <a href="#Page_356">356-9</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on abstract ideas, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">methods of inquiry, <a href="#Page_590">590</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on infinitude and association, <a href="#Page_600">600</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space, II. 271;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on belief, 285, 822;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reasoning, 331;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the order of Nature, 634;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on arithmetical propositions, 654</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mills, C. K.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_60">60</a><br > +<br > +Mimicry, its effects on emotion, II. 463-6<br > +<br > +Mind, depends on brain-conditions, I. <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_553">553</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the mark of its presence, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">difficulty of stating its connection with brain, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">what psychology means by it, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></span><br > +<br > +<a id="Mind-Stuff_theory">Mind-Stuff theory</a>, <a href="#CHAPTER_VI">Chapter VI</a>:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">a postulate of evolution, I. <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">some proofs of it, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">author's interpretation of them, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">feelings cannot mix, <a href="#Page_157">157</a> ff., II. 2, 103</span><br > +<br > +Miser, associationist explanation of the, II. 423 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mitchell, J. K.,</span> II. 616<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mitchell, S. W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_381">381</a>; II. 38-9, 380<br > +<br > +Modesty, II. 435<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Moll, A.,</span> II. 616<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Molyneux,</span> II. 210<br > +<br > +Monadism, I. <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br > +<br > +Monism, I. <a href="#Page_366">366-7</a><br > +<br > +Monkey's cortical centres, I. <a href="#Page_34">34-5</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Montgomery, E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_158">158</a><br > +<br > +Moral principles, II. 639, 672<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Morris, G. S.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_365">365</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mosso,</span> on blood-supply to brain, I. <a href="#Page_97">97-9</a><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">plethysmographic researches, II. 378;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on fear, 419, 483</span><br > +<br > +Motor centres, I. <a href="#Page_31">31</a> ff.<br > +<br > +'Motor circle,' II. 583<br > +<br > +Motor strands, I. <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">for special muscles, I. <a href="#Page_64">64</a></span><br > +<br > +Motor type of imagination, II. 61<br > +<br > +Movement, perception of, by sensory surfaces, II. 171 ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">part played by, in vision, 197, 203, 234-7</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the, Production of, Chap. XXII</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">requires guiding sensations, 490</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">illusory perception of, during anæsthesia, 489;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">results from every kind of consciousness, 526</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mozart,</span> I. <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Müller, G. E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456-8</a>; II. 198, 280, 491, 502, 508, 517<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Müller, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_68">68</a>; II. 640<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Müller, J. J.,</span> II. 213<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Müller, Max,</span> I. <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Munk, H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_41">41-3-4-5-6</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57-8-9</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Münsterberg,</span> on Meynert's scheme, I. <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reaction times with intellectual operation, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>:</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association, <a href="#Page_562">562</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time-perception, <a href="#Page_620">620</a>, <a href="#Page_637">637</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on imagination, II. 74;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on muscular sensibility, 189;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on volition, 505;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling of innervation, 514;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association, 590</span><br > +<br > +Muscles, how represented in nerve-centres, I. <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br > +<br > +Muscle-reading, II. 525<br > +<br > +Muscular sense, its cortical centre, I. <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its existence, II. 189 ff., 197 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its insignificance in space-perception, 197-203, 234-7</span><br > +<br > +Music, its accidental genesis, II. 627; 687<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Mussey,</span> II. 543<br > +<br > +Mutilations, inherited, II. 627<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Myers, F. W. H.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_400">400</a>; II. 133<br > +<br > +Mysophobia, II. 435, 545<br > +<br > +<br > +<a id="Nature_the_order_of"></a>Nature, the order of, its incongruence with that of our thought, II. 634 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Naunyn,</span> I. <a href="#Page_55">55</a><br > +<br > +Necessary truths are all truths of comparison, II. 641 ff., 651, 662.<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Experience">experience</a>, <a href="#A_priori">a priori connections</a>,</i> etc.</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Neiglick,</span> I. <a href="#Page_543">543</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Neural_process">Neural process</a>, in perception. I. <a href="#Page_78">78</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in habit, <a href="#Page_105">105</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in association, <a href="#Page_566">566</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in memory, <a href="#Page_655">655</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in imagination, II. 68 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in perception, 82 ff., 103 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in hallucination, 122 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in space-perception, 143;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in emotion, 474;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in volition, 580 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in association, 587 ff.</span><br > +<br > +Nitrous oxide intoxication, II. 284<br > +<br > +Nonsense, how it escapes detection, I. <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br > +<br > +Normal position in vision, II. 238<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Nothnagel,</span> I. <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60-1</a><br > +<br > +Number, II. 653<br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Obersteiner"></a>Obersteiner,</span> I. <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a><br > +<br > +Object, use of the word, I. <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">confusion of, with thought that knows it, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></span><br > +<br > +Objective world, known before self, I. <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its primitive unity, <a href="#Page_487">487-8</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ditto, II. 8</span><br > +<br > +Objects <i>versus</i> ideas, I. <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br > +<br > +Old-fogyism, II. 110<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Orchansky,</span> I. <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br > +<br > +'Overtone' (psychic), I. <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281-2</a><br > +<br > +<br > +<a id="Pain"></a>Pain, I. <a href="#Page_143">143</a>,<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its relations to the will, II. 549 ff., 583-4</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Paneth,</span> I. <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br > +<br > +Parallelism, theory of, between mental and cerebral phenomena, see <i><a href="#Automaton-Theory">Automaton-theory</a></i><br > +<br > +Paresis of external rectus muscle, II. 236, 507<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Parinaud,</span> II. 71<br > +<br > +Partiality of mind, see <i><a href="#Interest">interest</a>, <a href="#Teleology">teleology</a>, <a href="#Intelligence">intelligence</a>, <a href="#Selection">selection</a>, <a href="#Essences">essences</a></i><br > +<br > +Past time, known in a present feeling, I. <a href="#Page_627">627</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the immediate past is a portion of the present duration-block, <a href="#Page_608">608</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Patellar reflex, II. 380<br > +<br > +Paths through cortex, I. <a href="#Page_71">71</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their formation, <a href="#Page_107">107-12</a>; II. 584 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">association depends on them, 567 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">memory depends on them, 655 ff., 661, 686</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Paulhan, F.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_670">670</a>; II. 64, 476<br > +<br > +<a id="Pedagogic_remarks">Pedagogic remarks</a>: I. <a href="#Page_121">121-7</a>; II. 110, 401-2, 409, 463, 466<br > +<br > +Perception. Chapter XIX:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with sensation, II. 1, 76;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involves reproductive processes, 78;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is of <i>probable</i> objects, 82 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not an unconscious inference, 111 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rapidity of, 131</span><br > +<br > +Perception-time, II. 131<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Perez, B.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_446">446</a>; II. 416<br > +<br > +Personal equation, I. <a href="#Page_413">413</a><br > +<br > +Personality, alterations of, I. <a href="#Page_373">373</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Pflüger,</span> on frog's spinal cord, I. <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br > +<br > +Philosophies, their test, II. 312<br > +<br > +Phosphorus and thought, I. <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Phrenology">Phrenology</a>, I. <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Pick, E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_669">669</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Pitres,</span> I. <a href="#Page_206">206</a><br > +<br > +Planchette-writing, I. <a href="#Page_208">208-9</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Plasticity, as basis of habit, defined, I. <a href="#Page_105">105</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Platner,</span> II. 208<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Plato,</span> I. <a href="#Page_462">462</a><br > +<br > +Play, II. 427<br > +<br > +Pleasure, as related to will, I. <a href="#Page_143">143</a>; II. 549, 583-4<br > +<br > +<a id="Points_identical">Points, identical,</a> theory of, II. 222 ff.<br > +<br > +Possession, Spirit-, I. <a href="#Page_393">393</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Post-hypnotic suggestion, II. 613<br > +<br > +Practical interests, their effects on discrimination, I. <a href="#Page_515">515</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Prayer, I. <a href="#Page_316">316</a><br > +<br > +'Preperception,' I. <a href="#Page_439">439</a><br > +<br > +Present, the present moment, I. <a href="#Page_606">606</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Preyer,</span> II. 403<br > +<br > +Probability determines what object shall be perceived, II. 82, 104, 258, 260-3<br > +<br > +Problematic conceptions, I. <a href="#Page_463">463</a><br > +<br > +Problems, the process of solution of, I. <a href="#Page_584">584</a><br > +<br > +Projection of sensations, eccentric, II. 31 ff.<br > +<br > +<a id="Projection">Projection</a>, theory of, II. 228<br > +<br > +Psychologist's fallacy, the, see <i><a href="#Fallacy_the_Psychologists">Fallacy</a></i><br > +<br > +Psychophysic law, I. <a href="#Page_539">539</a><br > +<br > +Pugnacity, II. 409<br > +<br > +Pure Ego, I. <a href="#Page_342">342</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Putnam, J. J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br > +<br > +<br > +<a id="Questioning_mania"></a>Questioning mania, II. 284<br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Rabier"></a>Rabier,</span> I. <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_604">604</a><br > +<br > +Rational propositions, II. 644<br > +<br > +Rationality is based on apprehension of series, II. 659<br > +<br > +Rationality, postulates of, II. 670, 677<br > +<br > +Rationality, sense of, I. <a href="#Page_260">260-4</a>; II. 647<br > +<br > +<a id="Reaction-time">Reaction-time</a>, I. <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">simple, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">what it measures is not conscious thought, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lange's distinction between muscular and sensorial, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its variations, <a href="#Page_94">94-7</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">influenced by expectant attention, <a href="#Page_427">427</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after intellectual process, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after discrimination, <a href="#Page_523">523</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after association, <a href="#Page_557">557</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">after perception, II. 131</span><br > +<br > +Real size and shape of visual objects, II. 179, 237 ff.<br > +<br > +<a id="Reality">Reality</a>, the Perception of, Chapter XXI;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not a distinct content of consciousness, II. 286;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">various orders of, 287 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">every object has <i>some</i> kind of reality, 291 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the choice of, 290;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">practical, 293 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">means relation to the self, 295-8;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation of sensations to, 299;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of emotions, 306</span><br > +<br > +Reason, I. <a href="#Page_551">551</a>. See <i><a href="#Logic">Logic</a></i><br > +<br > +Reasoning, Chapter XXII;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its definition, II. 325;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involves the picking out of essences, or sagacity, 329;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and abstraction, 332;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its utility depends on the peculiar constitution of this world, 337 ff., 651;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">depends on association by similarity, 345</span><br > +<br > +Recall, I. <a href="#Page_578">578</a>, <a href="#Page_654">654</a><br > +<br > +'Recepts,' II. 327, 349, 351<br > +<br > +<a id="Recognition">Recognition,</a> I. <a href="#Page_673">673</a><br > +<br > +Recollection, voluntary, I. <a href="#Page_585">585</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Redintegration, I. <a href="#Page_569">569</a><br > +<br > +'Reductives,' II. 125, 291<br > +<br > +Reflex acts, I. <a href="#Page_12">12</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reaction-time measures one, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">concatenated habits are constituted by a chain of, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Reid, Thomas,</span> I. <a href="#Page_609">609</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>; II. 214, 216, 218, 240, 309<br > +<br > +Relating principle, I. <a href="#Page_687">687-8</a><br > +<br > +Relation, feelings of, I. <a href="#Page_243">243</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">space-relations, II. 148 ff.</span><br > +<br > +Relations, inward, between ideas, II. 639, 642, 661, 671;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the principle of transferred, 646</span><br > +<br > +Relief, II. 254-7. See <i><a href="#Third_dimension">third dimension</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Renouvier, Ch.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_551">551</a>; II. 309<br > +<br > +Reproduction in memory, I. <a href="#Page_574">574</a> ff., <a href="#Page_654">654</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">voluntary, <a href="#Page_585">585</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Resemblance, I. <a href="#Page_528">528</a><br > +<br > +Respiration, effects of sensory stimuli upon, II. 376<br > +<br > +Restitution of function, I. <a href="#Page_67">67</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Restoration of function, I. <a href="#Page_67">67</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Retention in memory, I. <a href="#Page_653">653</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Retentiveness, organic, I. <a href="#Page_659">659</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">it is unchangeable, <a href="#Page_663">663</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Retinal image, II. 92<br > +<br > +Retinal sensibility, see <i><a href="#Vision">vision</a>, <a href="#Space">space</a>, <a href="#Points_identical">identical points</a>, <a href="#Third_dimension">third dimension</a>, <a href="#Projection">projection</a>,</i> etc.<br > +<br > +Revival in memory, I. <a href="#Page_574">574</a> ff., <a href="#Page_654">654</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Reynolds, Mary,</span> I. <a href="#Page_381">381</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Ribot, Th.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_375">375</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on attention, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a>, <a href="#Page_680">680</a>, 682</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Richet, Ch.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_638">638</a>, <a href="#Page_644">644-6-7</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Riehl, A.,</span> II. 32<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Robertson, G. C.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_461">461</a>; II. 86<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Romanes, G. J.,</span> II. 95, 132, 327-9, 349, 351, 355, 397<br > +<br > +Romantic and classic, II. 469<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Rosenthal,</span> I. <a href="#Page_78">78</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Ross, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_56">56-7</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Royce, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_374">374</a>; II. 316-7<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Royer-Collard,</span> I. <a href="#Page_609">609</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Rutherford,</span> II. 170<br > +<br > +<br > +<a id="Sagacity"></a>Sagacity, II. 331, 343<br > +<br > +Sameness, I. <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>; II. 650<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Schaefer, W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Schiff, M.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Schmid,</span> I. <a href="#Page_683">683</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Schmidt, H. D.,</span> II. 399-400<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Schneider, G. H.,</span> on Habits, I. <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118-20</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on perception of motion, II. 173;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on evolution of movements, 380;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on instincts, 387-8, 411, 418, 439</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Schopenhauer,</span> II. 33, 273<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Schrader,</span> I. <a href="#Page_72">72</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Science, the genesis of, II. 665-9<br > +<br > +Sea-sickness, susceptibility to, an accident, II. 627<br > +<br > +Seat of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of Soul, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of sensations, no original, II. 34</span><br > +<br > +Sciences, the natural, the factors of their production, II. 633 ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">a Turkish cadi upon, 640;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">postulate things with unchangeable properties, 656</span><br > +<br > +Sciences, the pure, they express results of comparison exclusively, II. 641;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">classifications, 646;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">logic, 647;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mathematics, 653</span><br > +<br > +Secretiveness, II. 432<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Seguin,</span> I. <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Selection">Selection</a>, a cardinal function of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_284">284</a> ff., <a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Page_594">594</a>; II. 584;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of visual reality, II. 177 ff., 237;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of reality in general, 290, 294;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of essential quality, 333, 370, 634</span><br > +<br > +Self, consciousness of, <a href="#CHAPTER_X">Chap. X</a>:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not primary, I. <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the empirical self, I. <a href="#Page_291">291</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its constituents, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the material self, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the social self, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the spiritual self, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">resolvable into feelings localized in head, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">consciousness of personal identity, <a href="#Page_330">330</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its alterations, <a href="#Page_373">373</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Self-feeling, I. <a href="#Page_305">305</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Self-love, I. <a href="#Page_317">317</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the name for active impulses and emotions towards certain <i>objects</i>; we do not love our bare principle of individuality, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></span><br > +<br > +Self-seeking, I. <a href="#Page_307">307</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Selves, their rivalry, I. <a href="#Page_309">309</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Semi-reflex acts, I. <a href="#Page_13">13</a><br > +<br > +Sensation, does attention increase its strength? I. <a href="#Page_425">425</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">terminus of thought, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></span><br > +<br > +Sensation, Chapter XVII;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distinguished from perception, II. 1, 76;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its cognitive function, 3;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">pure sensation an abstraction, 3;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the terminus of thought, 7</span><br > +<br > +Sensations, are not compounds, I. <a href="#Page_158">158</a> ff.; II. 2;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their supposed combination by a higher principle, I. <a href="#Page_687">687</a>; II. 27-30;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their influence on each other, II. 28-30;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their eccentric projection, 31 ff., 195 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their localization inside of one another, 183 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their relation to reality, 299 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to emotions, 453;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their fusion, see <i><a href="#Mind-Stuff_theory">Mind-stuff theory</a></i></span><br > +<br > +Sensationalism, I. <a href="#Page_243">243</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">criticised by spiritualism, <a href="#Page_687">687</a></span><br > +<br > +Sensationalism, II. 5;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the field of space-perception, criticised, 216 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its difficulties, 231-7;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defended, 237 ff., 517</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Sergi,</span> II. 34<br > +<br > +Serial increase, I. <a href="#Page_490">490</a>; II. 644<br > +<br > +Series, II. 644-51, 659 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Seth, A.,</span> II. 4<br > +<br > +Sexual function, I. <a href="#Page_22">22</a><br > +<br > +Shadows, colored, II. 25<br > +<br > +Shame, II. 435<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Shoemaker,</span> Dr., I. <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br > +<br > +Shyness, II. 430<br > +<br > +<a id="Sight"></a>Sight, its cortical centre, I. <a href="#Page_41">41</a> ff., <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br > +<br > +Sign-making, a differentia of man, II. 356<br > +<br > +Signs, local, II. 155 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Sigwart, C.,</span> II. 634-6<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Sikorsky,</span> II. 465<br > +<br > +Similarity, I. <a href="#Page_528">528</a><br > +<br > +Similarity, association by, I. <a href="#Page_578">578</a>; II. 345, 353<br > +<br > +Skin, discrimination of points on, I. <a href="#Page_512">512</a><br > +<br > +Sleep, partial consciousness during, I. <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br > +<br > +Sociability, II. 430<br > +<br > +Somnambulism, see <i><a href="#Hypnotism">hypnotism</a>, <a href="#Hysterics">hysterics</a></i><br > +<br > +Soul, theory of the, I. <a href="#Page_180">180</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">inaccessibility of, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its essence is to think (according to Descartes), <a href="#Page_200">200</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">seat of, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">arguments for its existence, <a href="#Page_343">343</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">an unnecessary hypothesis for psychology, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with transcendental Ego, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">a relating principle, <a href="#Page_499">499</a></span><br > +<br > +<a id="Space">Space,</a> the perception of, Chapter XX;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">primitive extensity in three dimensions, II. 134-9;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">spatial order, 145;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">space-relations, 148;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">localization in, 153 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">how real space is mentally constructed, 166 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">part played by movement in, 171-6;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">measurement of extensions, 177 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">synthesis of originally chaotic sensations of extension, 181 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">part played by articular surfaces in, 189 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">by muscles, 197 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">how the blind perceive space, 203 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">visual space, 211-268;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of identical points, 222;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of projection, 228;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">difficulties of sensation-theory expounded and replied to, 231-268;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">historical sketch of opinion, 270 ff.</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Spalding, D. A.,</span> II. 396, 398, 400, 406<br > +<br > +Span of consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_640">640</a><br > +<br > +Speech, the 'centre' of, I. <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its misleading influence in psychology, I. <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">thought possible without it, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">See <i><a href="#Aphasia">Aphasia</a>, <a href="#Phrenology">Phrenology</a></i></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Spencer,</span> his formula of 'adjustment,' I. <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on formation of paths in nerve-centres, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on chasm between mind and matter, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on origin of consciousness, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on 'integration' of nervous shocks, <a href="#Page_151">151-3</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feelings of relation, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on unity of self, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on conceivability, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on abstraction, <a href="#Page_506">506</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on association, <a href="#Page_600">600</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time perception, <a href="#Page_622">622</a>, <a href="#Page_639">639</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on memory, <a href="#Page_649">649</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on recognition, <a href="#Page_673">673</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling and perception, II. 113, 180;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space-perception, 272, 282;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on genesis of emotions, 478 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on free-will, 576;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on inheritance of acquired peculiarities, 620 ff., 679;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on 'equilibration,' 627;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on genesis of cognition, 643;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on that of sociality and pity, 685</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Spinoza,</span> II. 288<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Spir, A.,</span> II. 665, 677<br > +<br > +'Spirit-control,' I. <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br > +<br > +Spiritualist theory of the self, I. <a href="#Page_342">342</a>; II. 5<br > +<br > +Spiritualists, I. <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Stanley, Henry M.,</span> II. 310<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Starr, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br > +<br > +Statistical method in psychology, I. <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Steiner,</span> I. <a href="#Page_72">72-3</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Steinthal,</span> I. <a href="#Page_604">604</a>; II. 107-9<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Stepanoff,</span> II. 170<br > +<br > +Stereoscope, II. 87<br > +<br > +Stereoscopy, II. 223, 252. See <i><a href="#Third_dimension">third dimension</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Sternberg,</span> II. 105, 515<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Stevens,</span> I. <a href="#Page_617">617</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Stevens, E. W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_397">397</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Story, Jean,</span> I. <a href="#Page_263">263</a><br > +<br > +Stream of Thought, <a href="#CHAPTER_IX">Chapter IX</a>:<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">schematic representations of, I. <a href="#Page_279">279-82</a></span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Stricker, S.,</span> II. 62 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Strümpell, A.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Strümpell,</span> Prof., II. 353<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Stuart, D.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Stumpf. C,</span> on attention, I. <a href="#Page_426">426</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on difference, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on fusion of impressions, <a href="#Page_522">522</a>, <a href="#Page_530">530-3</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on strong and weak sensations, <a href="#Page_547">547</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on relativity of knowledge, II. 11;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on sensations of extent, 219, 221</span><br > +<br > +Subjective sensations, I. <a href="#Page_516">516</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Substance, spiritual, I. <a href="#Page_345">345</a><br > +<br > +Substantive states of mind, I. <a href="#Page_243">243</a><br > +<br > +Substitution of parts for wholes in reasoning, II. 330;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of the same for the same, 650</span><br > +<br > +Subsumption, the principle of mediate, II. 648<br > +<br > +Succession, not known by successive feelings, I. <a href="#Page_628">628</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>vs.</i> duration, <a href="#Page_609">609</a></span><br > +<br > +Suggestion, in hypnotism, II. 598-601;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">post-hypnotic, 613</span><br > +<br > +Suicide, I. <a href="#Page_317">317</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Sully, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_191">191</a>; II. 79, 221, 272, 281, 322, 425<br > +<br > +Summation of stimuli, I. <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of elements of feeling, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the latter is inadmissible, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></span><br > +<br > +Superposition, in space-measurements, II. 177, 266 ff.<br > +<br > +Symbols as substitutes for reality, II. 305<br > +<br > +Sympathy, II. 410<br > +<br > +Synthetic judgments <i>a priori</i>, II. 661-2<br > +<br > +Systems, philosophic, sentimental, and mechanical, II. 665-7<br > +<br > +<br > +<a id="Tactile_centre"></a>Tactile centre, I. <a href="#Page_58">58</a><br > +<br > +Tactile images, II. 65<br > +<br > +Tactile sensibility, its cortical centre, I. <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Taine, H.,</span> on unity of self, I. <a href="#Page_355">355</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on alterations of ditto, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on recollecting, <a href="#Page_658">658</a>, <a href="#Page_670">670</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">On projection of sensations, II. 33;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on images, 48, and their 'reduction,' 125-6;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reality, 291</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Tàkacs,</span> II. 490<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Tarde, G.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_263">263</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Taylor, C. F.,</span> II. 99<br > +<br > +Tedium, I. <a href="#Page_626">626</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Teleology">Teleology,</a> created by consciousness, I. <a href="#Page_140">140-1</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">essence of intelligence, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involved in the fact of essences, II. 335;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its barrenness in the natural sciences, 665</span><br > +<br > +Tendency, feelings of, I. <a href="#Page_250">250-4</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Thackeray, W. M.,</span> II. 434<br > +<br > +Thermometry, cerebral, I. <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br > +<br > +'Thing,' II. 184, 259<br > +<br > +Thinking, the consciousness of, I. <a href="#Page_300">300</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Thinking principle, I. <a href="#Page_342">342</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Third_dimension">Third dimension</a> of space, II. 134 ff., 212 ff., 220<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Thompson, D. G.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_354">354</a>; II. 662<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Thomson, Allen,</span> I. <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br > +<br > +Thought, synonym for consciousness at large, I. <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the stream of, <a href="#CHAPTER_IX">Chapter IX</a>:</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">it tends to personal form, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">same thought never comes twice, <a href="#Page_231">231</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sense in which it is continuous, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">can be carried on in any terms, <a href="#Page_260">260-8</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">what constitutes its rational character, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">is cognitive, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not made up of parts, <a href="#Page_276">276</a> ff., II. 79 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">always partial to some of its objects, I. <a href="#Page_284">284</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the consciousness of it as a process, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the present thought is the thinker, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">depends on material conditions, <a href="#Page_553">553</a></span><br > +<br > +'Thought reading,' II. 525<br > +<br > +Time, occupied by neural and mental processes, see <i><a href="#Reaction-time">reaction-time</a></i><br > +<br > +Time, unconscious registration of, I. <a href="#Page_201">201</a><br > +<br > +Time, the perception of, <a href="#CHAPTER_XV512">Chapter XV</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">begins with duration, I. <a href="#Page_609">609</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with perception of space, <a href="#Page_610">610</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">empty time not perceived, <a href="#Page_619">619</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its discrete flow, <a href="#Page_621">621</a>, <a href="#Page_637">637</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">long intervals conceived symbolically, <a href="#Page_622">622</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">variations in our estimate of its length, <a href="#Page_623">623</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">cerebral process underlying, <a href="#Page_627">627</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Tischer,</span> I. <a href="#Page_524">524</a>, <a href="#Page_527">527</a><br > +<br > +Touch, cortical centre for, I. <a href="#Page_58">58</a><br > +<br > +Trance, see <i><a href="#Hypnotism">hypnotism</a></i><br > +<br > +Transcendentalist theory of the Self, I. <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">criticised, <a href="#Page_363">363</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Transitive states of mind, I. <a href="#Page_243">243</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Tschisch, von,</span> I. <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_560">560</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Tuke, D. H.,</span> II. 130, 413<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Taylor, E. B.,</span> II. 304<br > +<br > +Tympanic membrane, its tactile sensibility, II. 140<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Tyndall,</span> I. <a href="#Page_147">147-8</a><br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Ueberweg"></a>Ueberweg,</span> I. <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br > +<br > +Unconscious states of Mind, proofs of their existence, I. <a href="#Page_164">164</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Objections, <a href="#Page_164">164</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Unconsciousness, I. <a href="#Page_199">199</a> ff.;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in hysterics, <a href="#Page_202">202</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of useless sensations, <a href="#Page_517">517</a> ff.</span><br > +<br > +Understanding of a sentence, I. <a href="#Page_281">281</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Units">Units, psychic,</a> I. <a href="#Page_151">151</a><br > +<br > +Unity of original object, I. <a href="#Page_487">487-8</a>; II. 8, 183 ff.<br > +<br > +<a id="Universal_conceptions">Universal conceptions,</a> I. <a href="#Page_473">473</a>. See <i><a href="#General_propositions">general propositions</a></i><br > +<br > +Unreality, the feeling of, II. 298<br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Valentin"></a>Valentin,</span> I. <a href="#Page_557">557</a><br > +<br > +Varying concomitants, law of dissociation by, I. <a href="#Page_506">506</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Vennum, Lurancy,</span> I. <a href="#Page_397">397</a><br > +<br > +Ventriloquism, II. 184<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Verdon, R.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_685">685</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Vertigo">Vertigo,</a> II. 89;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mental vertigo, 309;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">optical, 506</span><br > +<br > +<a id="Vicarious_function">Vicarious function</a> of brain-parts, I. <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>; II. 592<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Vierordt,</span> I. <a href="#Page_616">616</a> ff.; II. 154, 172<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Vintschgau,</span> I. <a href="#Page_95">95-6</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Vision">Vision</a> with head upside down, II. 213<br > +<br > +Visual centre in brain, I. <a href="#Page_41">41</a> ff.<br > +<br > +Visual space, II. 211 ff.<br > +<br > +Visualizing power, II. 51-60<br > +<br > +Vocalization, II. 407<br > +<br > +Volition, see <i><a href="#Will">Will</a></i><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Volkmann. A. W.,</span> II. 198, 252 ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Volkmann, W. von Volkmar,</span> I. <a href="#Page_627">627</a>, <a href="#Page_629">629</a>, <a href="#Page_631">631</a>; II. 276<br > +<br > +Voluminousness, primitive, of sensations, II. 184<br > +<br > +Voluntary thinking, I. <a href="#Page_583">583</a><br > +<br > +Vulgarity of mind, II. 370<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Vulpian,</span> I. <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Wahle"></a>Wahle,</span> I. <a href="#Page_493">493</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Waitz, Th.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_632">632</a>; II. 436<br > +<br > +Walking, in child, II. 405<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Walter. J. E.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_214">214</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Ward, J.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_548">548</a>, <a href="#Page_562">562</a>, <a href="#Page_629">629</a>, <a href="#Page_633">633</a>; II. 282<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Warren, J. W.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_97">97</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Wayland,</span> I. <a href="#Page_347">347</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Weber, E. H.,</span> his 'law,' I. <a href="#Page_537">537</a> ff.<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">On space-perception on skin, II. 141-2;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on muscular feeling, 198</span><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Weed, T.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_665">665</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Weissmann, A.,</span> II. 684 ff.<br > +<br > +Wernicke's convolution, I. <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54-5</a><br > +<br > +'<span class="smcap">Wheatstone</span>'s experiment,' II. 326-7<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Wigan,</span> Dr., I. <a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href="#Page_675">675</a>; II. 566-7<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Wilbrand,</span> I. <a href="#Page_50">50-1</a><br > +<br > +<a id="Will">Will</a>, Chapter XXVI;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">involves memory of past acts, and nothing else but consent that they shall occur again, II. 487-518;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the memory may involve images of either resident or remote effects of the movement, 518-22;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ideo-motor action, 522-8;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">action after deliberation, 528;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">decision, 531;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">effort, 535;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the explosive will, 537;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the obstructed will, 546;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation of will to pleasure and pain, 549 ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to attention, 561;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">terminates in an 'idea', 567;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the question of its indeterminism, 569;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">psychology must assume determinism, 576;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">neural processes concerned in education of the will, 579 ff.</span><br > +<br > +Will, relations of, to Belief, II. 320<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Wills, Jas.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br > +<br > +Witchcraft, II. 309<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Wolfe, H. K.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_674">674</a>, <a href="#Page_679">679</a><br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Wolff, Chr.,</span> I. <a href="#Page_409">409</a>, <a href="#Page_651">651</a><br > +<br > +World, the peculiar constitution of the, II. 337, 647, 651-2<br > +<br > +Writing, automatic, I. <a href="#Page_393">393</a> ff.<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap">Wundt,</span> on frontal lobes, I. <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;<br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on reaction-time, <a href="#Page_89">89-94</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a> ff., <a href="#Page_525">525</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on introspective method, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on self-consciousness, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on perception of strokes of sound, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on perception of simultaneous events, <a href="#Page_411">411</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on Weber's law, <a href="#Page_534">534</a> ff.;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">association-time, <a href="#Page_557">557</a>, <a href="#Page_560">560</a>;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on time-perception, <a href="#Page_608">608</a>, <a href="#Page_612">612</a> ff., <a href="#Page_620">620</a>, <a href="#Page_634">634</a>.</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on local signs, II. 155-7;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on eyeball-muscles, 200;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on sensations, 219;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on paresis of ext. rectus, 236;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on contrast, 250;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on certain illusions, 264;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on feeling of innervation, 266, 493;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on space as synthesis, 276;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on emotions, 481;</span><br > +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on dichotomic form of thought, 654</span><br > +<br > +<br > +<span class="smcap"><a id="Zollner"></a>Zöllner</span>'s pattern, II. 232<br > </p> -<hr class="full" /> - - - - - - - +<hr class="full" > <div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 57628 ***</div> </body> </html> + |