diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | .gitattributes | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 5683-h.zip | bin | 0 -> 133035 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 5683-h/5683-h.htm | 7292 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 5683.txt | 6768 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 5683.zip | bin | 0 -> 126874 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | LICENSE.txt | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/ikcpr10.zip | bin | 0 -> 126458 bytes |
8 files changed, 14076 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/5683-h.zip b/5683-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d81ed7 --- /dev/null +++ b/5683-h.zip diff --git a/5683-h/5683-h.htm b/5683-h/5683-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a3dd14 --- /dev/null +++ b/5683-h/5683-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,7292 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <meta content="pg2html (binary v0.17)" name="linkgenerator" /> + <title> + The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .75em; margin-bottom: .75em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 5%; text-align: justify; font-size: 80%; font-style: italic;} + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + .xx-small {font-size: 60%;} + .x-small {font-size: 75%;} + .small {font-size: 85%;} + .large {font-size: 115%;} + .x-large {font-size: 130%;} + .indent5 { margin-left: 5%;} + .indent10 { margin-left: 10%;} + .indent15 { margin-left: 15%;} + .indent20 { margin-left: 20%;} + .indent25 { margin-left: 25%;} + .indent30 { margin-left: 30%;} + .indent35 { margin-left: 35%;} + .indent40 { margin-left: 40%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {position: absolute; right: 1%; font-size: 0.6em; + font-variant: normal; font-style: normal; + text-align: right; background-color: #FFFACD; + border: 1px solid; padding: 0.3em;text-indent: 0em;} + .side { float: left; font-size: 75%; width: 15%; padding-left: 0.8em; + border-left: dashed thin; text-align: left; + text-indent: 0; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; + font-weight: bold; color: black; background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} + .head { float: left; font-size: 90%; width: 98%; padding-left: 0.8em; + border-left: dashed thin; text-align: center; + text-indent: 0; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; + font-weight: bold; color: black; background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} + p.pfirst, p.noindent {text-indent: 0} + span.dropcap { float: left; margin: 0 0.1em 0 0; line-height: 0.8 } + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 100%; margin-left: 10%;} +</style> + </head> + <body> + <pre> +Project Gutenberg's The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: The Critique of Practical Reason + +Author: Immanuel Kant + +Release Date: May, 2004 [EBook #5683] +[This file was first posted on August 7, 2002] +Last Updated: December 10, 2018 + + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON *** + + +Etext produced by Matthew Stapleton + +HTML file produced by David Widger + + + + +</pre> + + <div style="height: 8em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON + </h1> + <h2> + By Immanuel Kant + </h2> + <h3> + 1788 + </h3> + <h4> + Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott + </h4> + <hr /> + <p> + <b>CONTENTS</b> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_PREF"> PREFACE. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason. + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0004"> <b>FIRST PART — ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL + REASON.</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0005"> <b>BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical + Reason.</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0001"> CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical + Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0007"> I. DEFINITION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0008"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0009"> II. THEOREM I. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0010"> III. THEOREM II. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0011"> REMARK I. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0012"> REMARK II. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0013"> IV. THEOREM II. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0014"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0015"> V. PROBLEM I. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0016"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0017"> VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL + REASON. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0018"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0019"> COROLLARY. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0020"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0021"> VIII. THEOREM IV. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0022"> REMARK. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0023"> REMARK II. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0024"> Practical Material Principles of Determination + taken as the Foundation of Morality, are: </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0025"> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0026"> I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental + Principles of Pure </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0027"> II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its + Practical use has to an Extension which is not possible to it in its + Speculative Use. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0002"> CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure + Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0029"> Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to + the Notions of Good </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0030"> Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement. + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0003"> CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical + Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0032"> Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure + Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0033"> <b>BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0004"> CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical + Reason Generally. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0005"> CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in + defining the Conception of the "Summum Bonum". </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0036"> I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0037"> II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of + Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0038"> III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in + its Union with the Speculative Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0039"> IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate + of Pure Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0040"> V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure + Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0041"> VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason + Generally. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0042"> VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension + of Pure Reason in a Practical point of view, without its Knowledge as + Speculative being enlarged at the same time? </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0043"> VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure + Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0044"> IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive + Faculties to his Practical Destination. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0045"> <b>SECOND PART. -- METHODOLOGY OF PURE PRACTICAL + REASON.</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0046"> Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_CONC"> CONCLUSION. </a> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_PREF" id="link2H_PREF"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PREFACE. + </h2> + <p> + This work is called the Critique of Practical Reason, not of the pure + practical reason, although its parallelism with the speculative critique + would seem to require the latter term. The reason of this appears + sufficiently from the treatise itself. Its business is to show that there + is pure practical reason, and for this purpose it criticizes the entire + practical faculty of reason. If it succeeds in this, it has no need to + criticize the pure faculty itself in order to see whether reason in making + such a claim does not presumptuously overstep itself (as is the case with + the speculative reason). For if, as pure reason, it is actually practical, + it proves its own reality and that of its concepts by fact, and all + disputation against the possibility of its being real is futile. + </p> + <p> + With this faculty, transcendental freedom is also established; freedom, + namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason required it in + its use of the concept of causality in order to escape the antinomy into + which it inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries + to think the unconditioned. Speculative reason could only exhibit this + concept (of freedom) problematically as not impossible to thought, without + assuring it any objective reality, and merely lest the supposed + impossibility of what it must at least allow to be thinkable should + endanger its very being and plunge it into an abyss of scepticism. + </p> + <p> + Inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an + apodeictic law of practical reason, it is the keystone of the whole system + of pure reason, even the speculative, and all other concepts (those of God + and immortality) which, as being mere ideas, remain in it unsupported, now + attach themselves to this concept, and by it obtain consistence and + objective reality; that is to say, their possibility is proved by the fact + that freedom actually exists, for this idea is revealed by the moral law. + </p> + <p> + Freedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the speculative + reason of which we know the possibility a priori (without, however, + understanding it), because it is the condition of the moral law which we + know. * The ideas of God and immortality, however, are not conditions of + the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary object of a will + determined by this law; that is to say, conditions of the practical use of + our pure reason. Hence, with respect to these ideas, we cannot affirm that + we know and understand, I will not say the actuality, but even the + possibility of them. However they are the conditions of the application of + the morally determined will to its object, which is given to it a priori, + viz., the summum bonum. Consequently in this practical point of view their + possibility must be assumed, although we cannot theoretically know and + understand it. To justify this assumption it is sufficient, in a practical + point of view, that they contain no intrinsic impossibility + (contradiction). Here we have what, as far as speculative reason is + concerned, is a merely subjective principle of assent, which, however, is + objectively valid for a reason equally pure but practical, and this + principle, by means of the concept of freedom, assures objective reality + and authority to the ideas of God and immortality. Nay, there is a + subjective necessity (a need of pure reason) to assume them. Nevertheless + the theoretical knowledge of reason is not hereby enlarged, but only the + possibility is given, which heretofore was merely a problem and now + becomes assertion, and thus the practical use of reason is connected with + the elements of theoretical reason. And this need is not a merely + hypothetical one for the arbitrary purposes of speculation, that we must + assume something if we wish in speculation to carry reason to its utmost + limits, but it is a need which has the force of law to assume something + without which that cannot be which we must inevitably set before us as the + aim of our action. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Lest any one should imagine that he finds an inconsistency + here when I call freedom the condition of the moral law, and + hereafter maintain in the treatise itself that the moral law + is the condition under which we can first become conscious + of freedom, I will merely remark that freedom is the ratio + essendi of the moral law, while the moral law is the ratio + cognoscendi of freedom. For had not the moral law been + previously distinctly thought in our reason, we should never + consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as + freedom, although it be not contradictory. But were there no + freedom it would be impossible to trace the moral law in + ourselves at all. +</pre> + <p> + It would certainly be more satisfactory to our speculative reason if it + could solve these problems for itself without this circuit and preserve + the solution for practical use as a thing to be referred to, but in fact + our faculty of speculation is not so well provided. Those who boast of + such high knowledge ought not to keep it back, but to exhibit it publicly + that it may be tested and appreciated. They want to prove: very good, let + them prove; and the critical philosophy lays its arms at their feet as the + victors. Quid statis? Nolint. Atqui licet esse beatis. As they then do not + in fact choose to do so, probably because they cannot, we must take up + these arms again in order to seek in the mortal use of reason, and to base + on this, the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility of + which speculation cannot adequately prove. + </p> + <p> + Here first is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, viz.: how + we deny objective reality to the supersensible use of the categories in + speculation and yet admit this reality with respect to the objects of pure + practical reason. This must at first seem inconsistent as long as this + practical use is only nominally known. But when, by a thorough analysis of + it, one becomes aware that the reality spoken of does not imply any + theoretical determination of the categories and extension of our knowledge + to the supersensible; but that what is meant is that in this respect an + object belongs to them, because either they are contained in the necessary + determination of the will a priori, or are inseparably connected with its + object; then this inconsistency disappears, because the use we make of + these concepts is different from what speculative reason requires. On the + other hand, there now appears an unexpected and very satisfactory proof of + the consistency of the speculative critical philosophy. For whereas it + insisted that the objects of experience as such, including our own + subject, have only the value of phenomena, while at the same time things + in themselves must be supposed as their basis, so that not everything + supersensible was to be regarded as a fiction and its concept as empty; so + now practical reason itself, without any concert with the speculative, + assures reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, + viz., freedom, although (as becomes a practical concept) only for + practical use; and this establishes on the evidence of a fact that which + in the former case could only be conceived. By this the strange but + certain doctrine of the speculative critical philosophy, that the thinking + subject is to itself in internal intuition only a phenomenon, obtains in + the critical examination of the practical reason its full confirmation, + and that so thoroughly that we should be compelled to adopt this doctrine, + even if the former had never proved it at all. * + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * The union of causality as freedom with causality as + rational mechanism, the former established by the moral law, + the latter by the law of nature in the same subject, namely, + man, is impossible, unless we conceive him with reference to + the former as a being in himself, and with reference to the + latter as a phenomenon- the former in pure consciousness, + the latter in empirical consciousness. Otherwise reason + inevitably contradicts itself. +</pre> + <p> + By this also I can understand why the most considerable objections which I + have as yet met with against the Critique turn about these two points, + namely, on the one side, the objective reality of the categories as + applied to noumena, which is in the theoretical department of knowledge + denied, in the practical affirmed; and on the other side, the paradoxical + demand to regard oneself qua subject of freedom as a noumenon, and at the + same time from the point of view of physical nature as a phenomenon in + one's own empirical consciousness; for as long as one has formed no + definite notions of morality and freedom, one could not conjecture on the + one side what was intended to be the noumenon, the basis of the alleged + phenomenon, and on the other side it seemed doubtful whether it was at all + possible to form any notion of it, seeing that we had previously assigned + all the notions of the pure understanding in its theoretical use + exclusively to phenomena. Nothing but a detailed criticism of the + practical reason can remove all this misapprehension and set in a clear + light the consistency which constitutes its greatest merit. + </p> + <p> + So much by way of justification of the proceeding by which, in this work, + the notions and principles of pure speculative reason which have already + undergone their special critical examination are, now and then, again + subjected to examination. This would not in other cases be in accordance + with the systematic process by which a science is established, since + matters which have been decided ought only to be cited and not again + discussed. In this case, however, it was not only allowable but necessary, + because reason is here considered in transition to a different use of + these concepts from what it had made of them before. Such a transition + necessitates a comparison of the old and the new usage, in order to + distinguish well the new path from the old one and, at the same time, to + allow their connection to be observed. Accordingly considerations of this + kind, including those which are once more directed to the concept of + freedom in the practical use of the pure reason, must not be regarded as + an interpolation serving only to fill up the gaps in the critical system + of speculative reason (for this is for its own purpose complete), or like + the props and buttresses which in a hastily constructed building are often + added afterwards; but as true members which make the connexion of the + system plain, and show us concepts, here presented as real, which there + could only be presented problematically. This remark applies especially to + the concept of freedom, respecting which one cannot but observe with + surprise that so many boast of being able to understand it quite well and + to explain its possibility, while they regard it only psychologically, + whereas if they had studied it in a transcendental point of view, they + must have recognized that it is not only indispensable as a problematical + concept, in the complete use of speculative reason, but also quite + incomprehensible; and if they afterwards came to consider its practical + use, they must needs have come to the very mode of determining the + principles of this, to which they are now so loth to assent. The concept + of freedom is the stone of stumbling for all empiricists, but at the same + time the key to the loftiest practical principles for critical moralists, + who perceive by its means that they must necessarily proceed by a rational + method. For this reason I beg the reader not to pass lightly over what is + said of this concept at the end of the Analytic. + </p> + <p> + I must leave it to those who are acquainted with works of this kind to + judge whether such a system as that of the practical reason, which is here + developed from the critical examination of it, has cost much or little + trouble, especially in seeking not to miss the true point of view from + which the whole can be rightly sketched. It presupposes, indeed, the + Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, but only in so far as + this gives a preliminary acquaintance with the principle of duty, and + assigns and justifies a definite formula thereof; in other respects it is + independent. * It results from the nature of this practical faculty itself + that the complete classification of all practical sciences cannot be + added, as in the critique of the speculative reason. For it is not + possible to define duties specially, as human duties, with a view to their + classification, until the subject of this definition (viz., man) is known + according to his actual nature, at least so far as is necessary with + respect to duty; this, however, does not belong to a critical examination + of the practical reason, the business of which is only to assign in a + complete manner the principles of its possibility, extent, and limits, + without special reference to human nature. The classification then belongs + to the system of science, not to the system of criticism. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 15</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work + has hit the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he + says that no new principle of morality is set forth in it, + but only a new formula. But who would think of introducing a + new principle of all morality and making himself as it were + the first discoverer of it, just as if all the world before + him were ignorant what duty was or had been in thorough- + going error? But whoever knows of what importance to a + mathematician a formula is, which defines accurately what is + to be done to work a problem, will not think that a formula + is insignificant and useless which does the same for all + duty in general. +</pre> + <p> + In the second part of the Analytic I have given, as I trust, a sufficient + answer to the objection of a truth-loving and acute critic * of the + Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals- a critic always worthy + of respect- the objection, namely, that the notion of good was not + established before the moral principle, as he thinks it ought to have + been. ** I have also had regard to many of the objections which have + reached me from men who show that they have at heart the discovery of the + truth, and I shall continue to do so (for those who have only their old + system before their eyes, and who have already settled what is to be + approved or disapproved, do not desire any explanation which might stand + in the way of their own private opinion.) + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * [See Kant's "Das mag in der Theoric ricktig seyn," etc. + Werke, vol. vii, p. 182.] + + ** It might also have been objected to me that I have not + first defined the notion of the faculty of desire, or of the + feeling of Pleasure, although this reproach would be unfair, + because this definition might reasonably be presupposed as + given in psychology. However, the definition there given + might be such as to found the determination of the faculty + of desire on the feeling of pleasure (as is commonly done), + and thus the supreme principle of practical philosophy would + be necessarily made empirical, which, however, remains to be + proved and in this critique is altogether refuted. It will, + therefore, give this definition here in such a manner as it + ought to be given, in order to leave this contested point + open at the beginning, as it should be. LIFE is the faculty + a being has of acting according to laws of the faculty of + desire. The faculty of DESIRE is the being's faculty of + becoming by means of its ideas the cause of the actual + existence of the objects of these ideas. PLEASURE is the + idea of the agreement of the object, or the action with the + subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of + causality of an idea in respect of the actuality of its + object (or with the determination of the forces of the + subject to action which produces it). I have no further need + for the purposes of this critique of notions borrowed from + psychology; the critique itself supplies the rest. It is + easily seen that the question whether the faculty of desire + is always based on pleasure, or whether under certain + conditions pleasure only follows the determination of + desire, is by this definition left undecided, for it is + composed only of terms belonging to the pure understanding, + i.e., of categories which contain nothing empirical. Such + precaution is very desirable in all philosophy and yet is + often neglected; namely, not to prejudge questions by + adventuring definitions before the notion has been + completely analysed, which is often very late. It may be + observed through the whole course of the critical philosophy + (of the theoretical as well as the practical reason) that + frequent opportunity offers of supplying defects in the old + dogmatic method of philosophy, and of correcting errors + which are not observed until we make such rational use of + these notions viewing them as a whole. +</pre> + <p> + When we have to study a particular faculty of the human mind in its + sources, its content, and its limits; then from the nature of human + knowledge we must begin with its parts, with an accurate and complete + exposition of them; complete, namely, so far as is possible in the present + state of our knowledge of its elements. But there is another thing to be + attended to which is of a more philosophical and architectonic character, + namely, to grasp correctly the idea of the whole, and from thence to get a + view of all those parts as mutually related by the aid of pure reason, and + by means of their derivation from the concept of the whole. This is only + possible through the most intimate acquaintance with the system; and those + who find the first inquiry too troublesome, and do not think it worth + their while to attain such an acquaintance, cannot reach the second stage, + namely, the general view, which is a synthetical return to that which had + previously been given analytically. It is no wonder then if they find + inconsistencies everywhere, although the gaps which these indicate are not + in the system itself, but in their own incoherent train of thought. + </p> + <p> + I have no fear, as regards this treatise, of the reproach that I wish to + introduce a new language, since the sort of knowledge here in question has + itself somewhat of an everyday character. Nor even in the case of the + former critique could this reproach occur to anyone who had thought it + through and not merely turned over the leaves. To invent new words where + the language has no lack of expressions for given notions is a childish + effort to distinguish oneself from the crowd, if not by new and true + thoughts, yet by new patches on the old garment. If, therefore, the + readers of that work know any more familiar expressions which are as + suitable to the thought as those seem to me to be, or if they think they + can show the futility of these thoughts themselves and hence that of the + expression, they would, in the first case, very much oblige me, for I only + desire to be understood: and, in the second case, they would deserve well + of philosophy. But, as long as these thoughts stand, I very much doubt + that suitable and yet more common expressions for them can be found. * + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * I am more afraid in the present treatise of occasional + misconception in respect of some expressions which I have + chosen with the greatest care in order that the notion to + which they point may not be missed. Thus, in the table of + categories of the Practical reason under the title of + Modality, the Permitted, and forbidden (in a practical + objective point of view, possible and impossible) have + almost the same meaning in common language as the next + category, duty and contrary to duty. Here, however, the + former means what coincides with, or contradicts, a merely + possible practical precept (for example, the solution of all + problems of geometry and mechanics); the latter, what is + similarly related to a law actually present in the reason; + and this distinction is not quite foreign even to common + language, although somewhat unusual. For example, it is + forbidden to an orator, as such, to forge new words or + constructions; in a certain degree this is permitted to a + poet; in neither case is there any question of duty. For if + anyone chooses to forfeit his reputation as an orator, no + one can prevent him. We have here only to do with the + distinction of imperatives into problematical, assertorial, + and apodeictic. Similarly in the note in which I have pared + the moral ideas of practical perfection in different + philosophical schools, I have distinguished the idea of + wisdom from that of holiness, although I have stated that + essentially and objectively they are the same. But in that + place I understand by the former only that wisdom to which + man (the Stoic) lays claim; therefore I take it subjectively + as an attribute alleged to belong to man. (Perhaps the + expression virtue, with which also the Stoic made great + show, would better mark the characteristic of his school.) + The expression of a postulate of pure practical reason might + give most occasion to misapprehension in case the reader + confounded it with the signification of the postulates in + pure mathematics, which carry apodeictic certainty with + them. These, however, postulate the possibility of an + action, the object of which has been previously recognized a + priori in theory as possible, and that with perfect + certainty. But the former postulates the possibility of an + object itself (God and the immortality of the soul) from + apodeictic practical laws, and therefore only for the + purposes of a practical reason. This certainty of the + postulated possibility then is not at all theoretic, and + consequently not apodeictic; that is to say, it is not a + known necessity as regards the object, but a necessary + supposition as regards the subject, necessary for the + obedience to its objective but practical laws. It is, + therefore, merely a necessary hypothesis. I could find no + better expression for this rational necessity, which is + subjective, but yet true and unconditional. +</pre> + <p> + In this manner, then, the a priori principles of two faculties of the + mind, the faculty of cognition and that of desire, would be found and + determined as to the conditions, extent, and limits of their use, and thus + a sure foundation be paid for a scientific system of philosophy, both + theoretic and practical. + </p> + <p> + Nothing worse could happen to these labours than that anyone should make + the unexpected discovery that there neither is, nor can be, any a priori + knowledge at all. But there is no danger of this. This would be the same + thing as if one sought to prove by reason that there is no reason. For we + only say that we know something by reason, when we are conscious that we + could have known it, even if it had not been given to us in experience; + hence rational knowledge and knowledge a priori are one and the same. It + is a clear contradiction to try to extract necessity from a principle of + experience (ex pumice aquam), and to try by this to give a judgement true + universality (without which there is no rational inference, not even + inference from analogy, which is at least a presumed universality and + objective necessity). To substitute subjective necessity, that is, custom, + for objective, which exists only in a priori judgements, is to deny to + reason the power of judging about the object, i.e., of knowing it, and + what belongs to it. It implies, for example, that we must not say of + something which often or always follows a certain antecedent state that we + can conclude from this to that (for this would imply objective necessity + and the notion of an a priori connexion), but only that we may expect + similar cases (just as animals do), that is that we reject the notion of + cause altogether as false and a mere delusion. As to attempting to remedy + this want of objective and consequently universal validity by saying that + we can see no ground for attributing any other sort of knowledge to other + rational beings, if this reasoning were valid, our ignorance would do more + for the enlargement of our knowledge than all our meditation. For, then, + on this very ground that we have no knowledge of any other rational beings + besides man, we should have a right to suppose them to be of the same + nature as we know ourselves to be: that is, we should really know them. I + omit to mention that universal assent does not prove the objective + validity of a judgement (i.e., its validity as a cognition), and although + this universal assent should accidentally happen, it could furnish no + proof of agreement with the object; on the contrary, it is the objective + validity which alone constitutes the basis of a necessary universal + consent. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 30</span> + </p> + <p> + Hume would be quite satisfied with this system of universal empiricism, + for, as is well known, he desired nothing more than that, instead of + ascribing any objective meaning to the necessity in the concept of cause, + a merely subjective one should be assumed, viz., custom, in order to deny + that reason could judge about God, freedom, and immortality; and if once + his principles were granted, he was certainly well able to deduce his + conclusions therefrom, with all logical coherence. But even Hume did not + make his empiricism so universal as to include mathematics. He holds the + principles of mathematics to be analytical; and if his were correct, they + would certainly be apodeictic also: but we could not infer from this that + reason has the faculty of forming apodeictic judgements in philosophy + also- that is to say, those which are synthetical judgements, like the + judgement of causality. But if we adopt a universal empiricism, then + mathematics will be included. + </p> + <p> + Now if this science is in contradiction with a reason that admits only + empirical principles, as it inevitably is in the antinomy in which + mathematics prove the infinite divisibility of space, which empiricism + cannot admit; then the greatest possible evidence of demonstration is in + manifest contradiction with the alleged conclusions from experience, and + we are driven to ask, like Cheselden's blind patient, "Which deceives me, + sight or touch?" (for empiricism is based on a necessity felt, rationalism + on a necessity seen). And thus universal empiricism reveals itself as + absolute scepticism. It is erroneous to attribute this in such an + unqualified sense to Hume, * since he left at least one certain touchstone + (which can only be found in a priori principles), although experience + consists not only of feelings, but also of judgements. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Names that designate the followers of a sect have always + been accompanied with much injustice; just as if one said, + "N is an Idealist." For although he not only admits, but + even insists, that our ideas of external things have actual + objects of external things corresponding to them, yet he + holds that the form of the intuition does not depend on them + but on the human mind. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">PREFACE ^paragraph 35</span> + </p> + <p> + However, as in this philosophical and critical age such empiricism can + scarcely be serious, and it is probably put forward only as an + intellectual exercise and for the purpose of putting in a clearer light, + by contrast, the necessity of rational a priori principles, we can only be + grateful to those who employ themselves in this otherwise uninstructive + labour. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + The theoretical use of reason was concerned with objects of the cognitive + faculty only, and a critical examination of it with reference to this use + applied properly only to the pure faculty of cognition; because this + raised the suspicion, which was afterwards confirmed, that it might easily + pass beyond its limits, and be lost among unattainable objects, or even + contradictory notions. It is quite different with the practical use of + reason. In this, reason is concerned with the grounds of determination of + the will, which is a faculty either to produce objects corresponding to + ideas, or to determine ourselves to the effecting of such objects (whether + the physical power is sufficient or not); that is, to determine our + causality. For here, reason can at least attain so far as to determine the + will, and has always objective reality in so far as it is the volition + only that is in question. The first question here then is whether pure + reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will, or whether it can + be a ground of determination only as dependent on empirical conditions. + Now, here there comes in a notion of causality justified by the critique + of the pure reason, although not capable of being presented empirically, + viz., that of freedom; and if we can now discover means of proving that + this property does in fact belong to the human will (and so to the will of + all rational beings), then it will not only be shown that pure reason can + be practical, but that it alone, and not reason empirically limited, is + indubitably practical; consequently, we shall have to make a critical + examination, not of pure practical reason, but only of practical reason + generally. For when once pure reason is shown to exist, it needs no + critical examination. For reason itself contains the standard for the + critical examination of every use of it. The critique, then, of practical + reason generally is bound to prevent the empirically conditioned reason + from claiming exclusively to furnish the ground of determination of the + will. If it is proved that there is a [practical] reason, its employment + is alone immanent; the empirically conditioned use, which claims + supremacy, is on the contrary transcendent and expresses itself in demands + and precepts which go quite beyond its sphere. This is just the opposite + of what might be said of pure reason in its speculative employment. + </p> + <p> + However, as it is still pure reason, the knowledge of which is here the + foundation of its practical employment, the general outline of the + classification of a critique of practical reason must be arranged in + accordance with that of the speculative. We must, then, have the Elements + and the Methodology of it; and in the former an Analytic as the rule of + truth, and a Dialectic as the exposition and dissolution of the illusion + in the judgements of practical reason. But the order in the subdivision of + the Analytic will be the reverse of that in the critique of the pure + speculative reason. For, in the present case, we shall commence with the + principles and proceed to the concepts, and only then, if possible, to the + senses; whereas in the case of the speculative reason we began with the + senses and had to end with the principles. The reason of this lies again + in this: that now we have to do with a will, and have to consider reason, + not in its relation to objects, but to this will and its causality. We + must, then, begin with the principles of a causality not empirically + conditioned, after which the attempt can be made to establish our notions + of the determining grounds of such a will, of their application to + objects, and finally to the subject and its sense faculty. We necessarily + begin with the law of causality from freedom, that is, with a pure + practical principle, and this determines the objects to which alone it can + be applied. + </p> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1</span> + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + FIRST PART — ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON. + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0001" id="link2HCH0001"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + I. DEFINITION. + </h2> + <p> + Practical principles are propositions which contain a general + determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They + are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject + as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or practical laws, when + the condition is recognized as objective, that is, valid for the will of + every rational being. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0008" id="link2H_4_0008"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <p> + Supposing that pure reason contains in itself a practical motive, that is, + one adequate to determine the will, then there are practical laws; + otherwise all practical principles will be mere maxims. In case the will + of a rational being is pathologically affected, there may occur a conflict + of the maxims with the practical laws recognized by itself. For example, + one may make it his maxim to let no injury pass unrevenged, and yet he may + see that this is not a practical law, but only his own maxim; that, on the + contrary, regarded as being in one and the same maxim a rule for the will + of every rational being, it must contradict itself. In natural philosophy + the principles of what happens, (e.g., the principle of equality of action + and reaction in the communication of motion) are at the same time laws of + nature; for the use of reason there is theoretical and determined by the + nature of the object. In practical philosophy, i.e., that which has to do + only with the grounds of determination of the will, the principles which a + man makes for himself are not laws by which one is inevitably bound; + because reason in practical matters has to do with the subject, namely, + with the faculty of desire, the special character of which may occasion + variety in the rule. The practical rule is always a product of reason, + because it prescribes action as a means to the effect. But in the case of + a being with whom reason does not of itself determine the will, this rule + is an imperative, i.e., a rule characterized by "shall," which expresses + the objective necessitation of the action and signifies that, if reason + completely determined the will, the action would inevitably take place + according to this rule. Imperatives, therefore, are objectively valid, and + are quite distinct from maxims, which are subjective principles. The + former either determine the conditions of the causality of the rational + being as an efficient cause, i.e., merely in reference to the effect and + the means of attaining it; or they determine the will only, whether it is + adequate to the effect or not. The former would be hypothetical + imperatives, and contain mere precepts of skill; the latter, on the + contrary, would be categorical, and would alone be practical laws. Thus + maxims are principles, but not imperatives. Imperatives themselves, + however, when they are conditional (i.e., do not determine the will simply + as will, but only in respect to a desired effect, that is, when they are + hypothetical imperatives), are practical precepts but not laws. Laws must + be sufficient to determine the will as will, even before I ask whether I + have power sufficient for a desired effect, or the means necessary to + produce it; hence they are categorical: otherwise they are not laws at + all, because the necessity is wanting, which, if it is to be practical, + must be independent of conditions which are pathological and are therefore + only contingently connected with the will. Tell a man, for example, that + he must be industrious and thrifty in youth, in order that he may not want + in old age; this is a correct and important practical precept of the will. + But it is easy to see that in this case the will is directed to something + else which it is presupposed that it desires; and as to this desire, we + must leave it to the actor himself whether he looks forward to other + resources than those of his own acquisition, or does not expect to be old, + or thinks that in case of future necessity he will be able to make shift + with little. Reason, from which alone can spring a rule involving + necessity, does, indeed, give necessity to this precept (else it would not + be an imperative), but this is a necessity dependent on subjective + conditions, and cannot be supposed in the same degree in all subjects. But + that reason may give laws it is necessary that it should only need to + presuppose itself, because rules are objectively and universally valid + only when they hold without any contingent subjective conditions, which + distinguish one rational being from another. Now tell a man that he should + never make a deceitful promise, this is a rule which only concerns his + will, whether the purposes he may have can be attained thereby or not; it + is the volition only which is to be determined a priori by that rule. If + now it is found that this rule is practically right, then it is a law, + because it is a categorical imperative. Thus, practical laws refer to the + will only, without considering what is attained by its causality, and we + may disregard this latter (as belonging to the world of sense) in order to + have them quite pure. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0009" id="link2H_4_0009"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II. THEOREM I. + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 15</span> + </h3> + <p> + All practical principles which presuppose an object (matter) of the + faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are empirical + and can furnish no practical laws. + </p> + <p> + By the matter of the faculty of desire I mean an object the realization of + which is desired. Now, if the desire for this object precedes the + practical rule and is the condition of our making it a principle, then I + say (in the first place) this principle is in that case wholly empirical, + for then what determines the choice is the idea of an object and that + relation of this idea to the subject by which its faculty of desire is + determined to its realization. Such a relation to the subject is called + the pleasure in the realization of an object. This, then, must be + presupposed as a condition of the possibility of determination of the + will. But it is impossible to know a priori of any idea of an object + whether it will be connected with pleasure or pain, or be indifferent. In + such cases, therefore, the determining principle of the choice must be + empirical and, therefore, also the practical material principle which + presupposes it as a condition. + </p> + <p> + In the second place, since susceptibility to a pleasure or pain can be + known only empirically and cannot hold in the same degree for all rational + beings, a principle which is based on this subjective condition may serve + indeed as a maxim for the subject which possesses this susceptibility, but + not as a law even to him (because it is wanting in objective necessity, + which must be recognized a priori); it follows, therefore, that such a + principle can never furnish a practical law. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0010" id="link2H_4_0010"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + III. THEOREM II. + </h2> + <p> + All material practical principles as such are of one and the same kind and + come under the general principle of self-love or private happiness. + </p> + <p> + Pleasure arising from the idea of the idea of the existence of a thing, in + so far as it is to determine the desire of this thing, is founded on the + susceptibility of the subject, since it depends on the presence of an + object; hence it belongs to sense (feeling), and not to understanding, + which expresses a relation of the idea to an object according to concepts, + not to the subject according to feelings. It is, then, practical only in + so far as the faculty of desire is determined by the sensation of + agreeableness which the subject expects from the actual existence of the + object. Now, a rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life + uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is happiness; and the + principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of the will + is the principle of self-love. All material principles, then, which place + the determining ground of the will in the pleasure or pain to be received + from the existence of any object are all of the same kind, inasmuch as + they all belong to the principle of self-love or private happiness. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> + <h3> + COROLLARY. + </h3> + <p> + All material practical rules place the determining principle of the will + in the lower desires; and if there were no purely formal laws of the will + adequate to determine it, then we could not admit any higher desire at + all. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0011" id="link2H_4_0011"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK I. + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 30</span> + </h3> + <p> + It is surprising that men, otherwise acute, can think it possible to + distinguish between higher and lower desires, according as the ideas which + are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin in the senses + or in the understanding; for when we inquire what are the determining + grounds of desire, and place them in some expected pleasantness, it is of + no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing object is derived, but + only how much it pleases. Whether an idea has its seat and source in the + understanding or not, if it can only determine the choice by presupposing + a feeling of pleasure in the subject, it follows that its capability of + determining the choice depends altogether on the nature of the inner + sense, namely, that this can be agreeably affected by it. However + dissimilar ideas of objects may be, though they be ideas of the + understanding, or even of the reason in contrast to ideas of sense, yet + the feeling of pleasure, by means of which they constitute the determining + principle of the will (the expected satisfaction which impels the activity + to the production of the object), is of one and the same kind, not only + inasmuch as it can only be known empirically, but also inasmuch as it + affects one and the same vital force which manifests itself in the faculty + of desire, and in this respect can only differ in degree from every other + ground of determination. Otherwise, how could we compare in respect of + magnitude two principles of determination, the ideas of which depend upon + different faculties, so as to prefer that which affects the faculty of + desire in the highest degree. The same man may return unread an + instructive book which he cannot again obtain, in order not to miss a + hunt; he may depart in the midst of a fine speech, in order not to be late + for dinner; he may leave a rational conversation, such as he otherwise + values highly, to take his place at the gaming-table; he may even repulse + a poor man whom he at other times takes pleasure in benefiting, because he + has only just enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the + theatre. If the determination of his will rests on the feeling of the + agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause, it is + all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected. The only + thing that concerns him, in order to decide his choice, is, how great, how + long continued, how easily obtained, and how often repeated, this + agreeableness is. Just as to the man who wants money to spend, it is all + the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain or washed out of the + sand, provided it is everywhere accepted at the same value; so the man who + cares only for the enjoyment of life does not ask whether the ideas are of + the understanding or the senses, but only how much and how great pleasure + they will give for the longest time. It is only those that would gladly + deny to pure reason the power of determining the will, without the + presupposition of any feeling, who could deviate so far from their own + exposition as to describe as quite heterogeneous what they have themselves + previously brought under one and the same principle. Thus, for example, it + is observed that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power, in + the consciousness of our strength of mind in overcoming obstacles which + are opposed to our designs, in the culture of our mental talents, etc.; + and we justly call these more refined pleasures and enjoyments, because + they are more in our power than others; they do not wear out, but rather + increase the capacity for further enjoyment of them, and while they + delight they at the same time cultivate. But to say on this account that + they determine the will in a different way and not through sense, whereas + the possibility of the pleasure presupposes a feeling for it implanted in + us, which is the first condition of this satisfaction; this is just as + when ignorant persons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so + subtle, so supersubtle that they almost make themselves giddy with it, and + then think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual and yet + extended being. If with Epicurus we make virtue determine the will only by + means of the pleasure it promises, we cannot afterwards blame him for + holding that this pleasure is of the same kind as those of the coarsest + senses. For we have no reason whatever to charge him with holding that the + ideas by which this feeling is excited in us belong merely to the bodily + senses. As far as can be conjectured, he sought the source of many of them + in the use of the higher cognitive faculty, but this did not prevent him, + and could not prevent him, from holding on the principle above stated, + that the pleasure itself which those intellectual ideas give us, and by + which alone they can determine the will, is just of the same kind. + Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher, and yet the most + rarely found. The ancient Greek schools give us more examples of it than + we find in our syncretistic age, in which a certain shallow and dishonest + system of compromise of contradictory principles is devised, because it + commends itself better to a public which is content to know something of + everything and nothing thoroughly, so as to please every party. + </p> + <p> + The principle of private happiness, however much understanding and reason + may be used in it, cannot contain any other determining principles for the + will than those which belong to the lower desires; and either there are no + [higher] desires at all, or pure reason must of itself alone be practical; + that is, it must be able to determine the will by the mere form of the + practical rule without supposing any feeling, and consequently without any + idea of the pleasant or unpleasant, which is the matter of the desire, and + which is always an empirical condition of the principles. Then only, when + reason of itself determines the will (not as the servant of the + inclination), it is really a higher desire to which that which is + pathologically determined is subordinate, and is really, and even + specifically, distinct from the latter, so that even the slightest + admixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and + superiority; just as in a mathematical demonstration the least empirical + condition would degrade and destroy its force and value. Reason, with its + practical law, determines the will immediately, not by means of an + intervening feeling of pleasure or pain, not even of pleasure in the law + itself, and it is only because it can, as pure reason, be practical, that + it is possible for it to be legislative. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0012" id="link2H_4_0012"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK II. + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 35</span> + </h3> + <p> + To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being, and + this, therefore, is inevitably a determining principle of its faculty of + desire. For we are not in possession originally of satisfaction with our + whole existence- a bliss which would imply a consciousness of our own + independent self-sufficiency this is a problem imposed upon us by our own + finite nature, because we have wants and these wants regard the matter of + our desires, that is, something that is relative to a subjective feeling + of pleasure or pain, which determines what we need in order to be + satisfied with our condition. But just because this material principle of + determination can only be empirically known by the subject, it is + impossible to regard this problem as a law; for a law being objective must + contain the very same principle of determination of the will in all cases + and for all rational beings. For, although the notion of happiness is in + every case the foundation of practical relation of the objects to the + desires, yet it is only a general name for the subjective determining + principles, and determines nothing specifically; whereas this is what + alone we are concerned with in this practical problem, which cannot be + solved at all without such specific determination. For it is every man's + own special feeling of pleasure and pain that decides in what he is to + place his happiness, and even in the same subject this will vary with the + difference of his wants according as this feeling changes, and thus a law + which is subjectively necessary (as a law of nature) is objectively a very + contingent practical principle, which can and must be very different in + different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law; since, in the + desire for happiness it is not the form (of conformity to law) that is + decisive, but simply the matter, namely, whether I am to expect pleasure + in following the law, and how much. Principles of self-love may, indeed, + contain universal precepts of skill (how to find means to accomplish one's + purpose), but in that case they are merely theoretical principles; * as, + for example, how he who would like to eat bread should contrive a mill; + but practical precepts founded on them can never be universal, for the + determining principle of the desire is based on the feeling pleasure and + pain, which can never be supposed to be universally directed to the same + objects. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Propositions which in mathematics or physics are called + practical ought properly to be called technical. For they + have nothing to do with the determination of the will; they + only point out how a certain effect is to be produced and + are, therefore, just as theoretical as any propositions + which express the connection of a cause with an effect. Now + whoever chooses the effect must also choose the cause. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 40</span> + </p> + <p> + Even supposing, however, that all finite rational beings were thoroughly + agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings of pleasure and pain, + and also as to the means which they must employ to attain the one and + avoid the other; still, they could by no means set up the principle of + self-love as a practical law, for this unanimity itself would be only + contingent. The principle of determination would still be only + subjectively valid and merely empirical, and would not possess the + necessity which is conceived in every law, namely, an objective necessity + arising from a priori grounds; unless, indeed, we hold this necessity to + be not at all practical, but merely physical, viz., that our action is as + inevitably determined by our inclination, as yawning when we see others + yawn. It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at + all, but only counsels for the service of our desires, than to raise + merely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws, which have + objective necessity, and not merely subjective, and which must be known by + reason a priori, not by experience (however empirically universal this may + be). Even the rules of corresponding phenomena are only called laws of + nature (e.g., the mechanical laws), when we either know them really a + priori, or (as in the case of chemical laws) suppose that they would be + known a priori from objective grounds if our insight reached further. But + in the case of merely subjective practical principles, it is expressly + made a condition that they rest, not on objective, but on subjective + conditions of choice, and hence that they must always be represented as + mere maxims, never as practical laws. This second remark seems at first + sight to be mere verbal refinement, but it defines the terms of the most + important distinction which can come into consideration in practical + investigations. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0013" id="link2H_4_0013"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IV. THEOREM II. + </h2> + <p> + A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal laws, + unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will, not by + their matter, but by their form only. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 45</span> + </p> + <p> + By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the will. This + object is either the determining ground of the will or it is not. In the + former case the rule of the will is subjected to an empirical condition + (viz., the relation of the determining idea to the feeling of pleasure and + pain), consequently it can not be a practical law. Now, when we abstract + from a law all matter, i.e., every object of the will (as a determining + principle), nothing is left but the mere form of a universal legislation. + Therefore, either a rational being cannot conceive his subjective + practical principles, that is, his maxims, as being at the same time + universal laws, or he must suppose that their mere form, by which they are + fitted for universal legislation, is alone what makes them practical laws. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0014" id="link2H_4_0014"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <p> + The commonest understanding can distinguish without instruction what form + of maxim is adapted for universal legislation, and what is not. Suppose, + for example, that I have made it my maxim to increase my fortune by every + safe means. Now, I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which is dead + and has left no writing about it. This is just the case for my maxim. I + desire then to know whether that maxim can also bold good as a universal + practical law. I apply it, therefore, to the present case, and ask whether + it could take the form of a law, and consequently whether I can by my + maxim at the same time give such a law as this, that everyone may deny a + deposit of which no one can produce a proof. I at once become aware that + such a principle, viewed as a law, would annihilate itself, because the + result would be that there would be no deposits. A practical law which I + recognise as such must be qualified for universal legislation; this is an + identical proposition and, therefore, self-evident. Now, if I say that my + will is subject to a practical law, I cannot adduce my inclination (e.g., + in the present case my avarice) as a principle of determination fitted to + be a universal practical law; for this is so far from being fitted for a + universal legislation that, if put in the form of a universal law, it + would destroy itself. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 50</span> + </p> + <p> + It is, therefore, surprising that intelligent men could have thought of + calling the desire of happiness a universal practical law on the ground + that the desire is universal, and, therefore, also the maxim by which + everyone makes this desire determine his will. For whereas in other cases + a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious; here, on the + contrary, if we attribute to the maxim the universality of a law, the + extreme opposite of harmony will follow, the greatest opposition and the + complete destruction of the maxim itself and its purpose. For, in that + case, the will of all has not one and the same object, but everyone has + his own (his private welfare), which may accidentally accord with the + purposes of others which are equally selfish, but it is far from sufficing + for a law; because the occasional exceptions which one is permitted to + make are endless, and cannot be definitely embraced in one universal rule. + In this manner, then, results a harmony like that which a certain + satirical poem depicts as existing between a married couple bent on going + to ruin, "O, marvellous harmony, what he wishes, she wishes also"; or like + what is said of the pledge of Francis I to the Emperor Charles V, "What my + brother Charles wishes that I wish also" (viz., Milan). Empirical + principles of determination are not fit for any universal external + legislation, but just as little for internal; for each man makes his own + subject the foundation of his inclination, and in the same subject + sometimes one inclination, sometimes another, has the preponderance. To + discover a law which would govern them all under this condition, namely, + bringing them all into harmony, is quite impossible. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0015" id="link2H_4_0015"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + V. PROBLEM I. + </h2> + <p> + Supposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the sufficient + determining principle of a will, to find the nature of the will which can + be determined by it alone. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 55</span> + </p> + <p> + Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason, and is, + therefore, not an object of the senses, and consequently does not belong + to the class of phenomena, it follows that the idea of it, which + determines the will, is distinct from all the principles that determine + events in nature according to the law of causality, because in their case + the determining principles must themselves be phenomena. Now, if no other + determining principle can serve as a law for the will except that + universal legislative form, such a will must be conceived as quite + independent of the natural law of phenomena in their mutual relation, + namely, the law of causality; such independence is called freedom in the + strictest, that is, in the transcendental, sense; consequently, a will + which can have its law in nothing but the mere legislative form of the + maxim is a free will. + </p> + <h3> + VI. PROBLEM II. + </h3> + <p> + Supposing that a will is free, to find the law which alone is competent to + determine it necessarily. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 60</span> + </p> + <p> + Since the matter of the practical law, i.e., an object of the maxim, can + never be given otherwise than empirically, and the free will is + independent on empirical conditions (that is, conditions belonging to the + world of sense) and yet is determinable, consequently a free will must + find its principle of determination in the law, and yet independently of + the matter of the law. But, besides the matter of the law, nothing is + contained in it except the legislative form. It is the legislative form, + then, contained in the maxim, which can alone constitute a principle of + determination of the [free] will. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0016" id="link2H_4_0016"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <p> + Thus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each + other. Now I do not ask here whether they are in fact distinct, or whether + an unconditioned law is not rather merely the consciousness of a pure + practical reason and the latter identical with the positive concept of + freedom; I only ask, whence begins our knowledge of the unconditionally + practical, whether it is from freedom or from the practical law? Now it + cannot begin from freedom, for of this we cannot be immediately conscious, + since the first concept of it is negative; nor can we infer it from + experience, for experience gives us the knowledge only of the law of + phenomena, and hence of the mechanism of nature, the direct opposite of + freedom. It is therefore the moral law, of which we become directly + conscious (as soon as we trace for ourselves maxims of the will), that + first presents itself to us, and leads directly to the concept of freedom, + inasmuch as reason presents it as a principle of determination not to be + outweighed by any sensible conditions, nay, wholly independent of them. + But how is the consciousness, of that moral law possible? We can become + conscious of pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure + theoretical principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason + prescribes them and to the elimination of all empirical conditions, which + it directs. The concept of a pure will arises out of the former, as that + of a pure understanding arises out of the latter. That this is the true + subordination of our concepts, and that it is morality that first + discovers to us the notion of freedom, hence that it is practical reason + which, with this concept, first proposes to speculative reason the most + insoluble problem, thereby placing it in the greatest perplexity, is + evident from the following consideration: Since nothing in phenomena can + be explained by the concept of freedom, but the mechanism of nature must + constitute the only clue; moreover, when pure reason tries to ascend in + the series of causes to the unconditioned, it falls into an antinomy which + is entangled in incomprehensibilities on the one side as much as the + other; whilst the latter (namely, mechanism) is at least useful in the + explanation of phenomena, therefore no one would ever have been so rash as + to introduce freedom into science, had not the moral law, and with it + practical reason, come in and forced this notion upon us. Experience, + however, confirms this order of notions. Suppose some one asserts of his + lustful appetite that, when the desired object and the opportunity are + present, it is quite irresistible. [Ask him]- if a gallows were erected + before the house where he finds this opportunity, in order that he should + be hanged thereon immediately after the gratification of his lust, whether + he could not then control his passion; we need not be long in doubt what + he would reply. Ask him, however- if his sovereign ordered him, on pain of + the same immediate execution, to bear false witness against an honourable + man, whom the prince might wish to destroy under a plausible pretext, + would he consider it possible in that case to overcome his love of life, + however great it may be. He would perhaps not venture to affirm whether he + would do so or not, but he must unhesitatingly admit that it is possible + to do so. He judges, therefore, that he can do a certain thing because he + is conscious that he ought, and he recognizes that he is free- a fact + which but for the moral law he would never have known. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 65</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0017" id="link2H_4_0017"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL REASON. + </h2> + <p> + Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as + a principle of universal legislation. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 70</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0018" id="link2H_4_0018"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <p> + Pure geometry has postulates which are practical propositions, but contain + nothing further than the assumption that we can do something if it is + required that we should do it, and these are the only geometrical + propositions that concern actual existence. They are, then, practical + rules under a problematical condition of the will; but here the rule says: + We absolutely must proceed in a certain manner. The practical rule is, + therefore, unconditional, and hence it is conceived a priori as a + categorically practical proposition by which the will is objectively + determined absolutely and immediately (by the practical rule itself, which + thus is in this case a law); for pure reason practical of itself is here + directly legislative. The will is thought as independent on empirical + conditions, and, therefore, as pure will determined by the mere form of + the law, and this principle of determination is regarded as the supreme + condition of all maxims. The thing is strange enough, and has no parallel + in all the rest of our practical knowledge. For the a priori thought of a + possible universal legislation which is therefore merely problematical, is + unconditionally commanded as a law without borrowing anything from + experience or from any external will. This, however, is not a precept to + do something by which some desired effect can be attained (for then the + will would depend on physical conditions), but a rule that determines the + will a priori only so far as regards the forms of its maxims; and thus it + is at least not impossible to conceive that a law, which only applies to + the subjective form of principles, yet serves as a principle of + determination by means of the objective form of law in general. We may + call the consciousness of this fundamental law a fact of reason, because + we cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason, e.g., the + consciousness of freedom (for this is not antecedently given), but it + forces itself on us as a synthetic a priori proposition, which is not + based on any intuition, either pure or empirical. It would, indeed, be + analytical if the freedom of the will were presupposed, but to presuppose + freedom as a positive concept would require an intellectual intuition, + which cannot here be assumed; however, when we regard this law as given, + it must be observed, in order not to fall into any misconception, that it + is not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of the pure reason, which + thereby announces itself as originally legislative (sic volo, sic jubeo). + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0019" id="link2H_4_0019"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + COROLLARY. + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 75</span> + </h3> + <p> + Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to man) a universal + law which we call the moral law. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0020" id="link2H_4_0020"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 80</span> + </h3> + <p> + The fact just mentioned is undeniable. It is only necessary to analyse the + judgement that men pass on the lawfulness of their actions, in order to + find that, whatever inclination may say to the contrary, reason, + incorruptible and self-constrained, always confronts the maxim of the will + in any action with the pure will, that is, with itself, considering itself + as a priori practical. Now this principle of morality, just on account of + the universality of the legislation which makes it the formal supreme + determining principle of the will, without regard to any subjective + differences, is declared by the reason to be a law for all rational + beings, in so far as they have a will, that is, a power to determine their + causality by the conception of rules; and, therefore, so far as they are + capable of acting according to principles, and consequently also according + to practical a priori principles (for these alone have the necessity that + reason requires in a principle). It is, therefore, not limited to men + only, but applies to all finite beings that possess reason and will; nay, + it even includes the Infinite Being as the supreme intelligence. In the + former case, however, the law has the form of an imperative, because in + them, as rational beings, we can suppose a pure will, but being creatures + affected with wants and physical motives, not a holy will, that is, one + which would be incapable of any maxim conflicting with the moral law. In + their case, therefore, the moral law is an imperative, which commands + categorically, because the law is unconditioned; the relation of such a + will to this law is dependence under the name of obligation, which implies + a constraint to an action, though only by reason and its objective law; + and this action is called duty, because an elective will, subject to + pathological affections (though not determined by them, and, therefore, + still free), implies a wish that arises from subjective causes and, + therefore, may often be opposed to the pure objective determining + principle; whence it requires the moral constraint of a resistance of the + practical reason, which may be called an internal, but intellectual, + compulsion. In the supreme intelligence the elective will is rightly + conceived as incapable of any maxim which could not at the same time be + objectively a law; and the notion of holiness, which on that account + belongs to it, places it, not indeed above all practical laws, but above + all practically restrictive laws, and consequently above obligation and + duty. This holiness of will is, however, a practical idea, which must + necessarily serve as a type to which finite rational beings can only + approximate indefinitely, and which the pure moral law, which is itself on + this account called holy, constantly and rightly holds before their eyes. + The utmost that finite practical reason can effect is to be certain of + this indefinite progress of one's maxims and of their steady disposition + to advance. This is virtue, and virtue, at least as a naturally acquired + faculty, can never be perfect, because assurance in such a case never + becomes apodeictic certainty and, when it only amounts to persuasion, is + very dangerous. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0021" id="link2H_4_0021"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VIII. THEOREM IV. + </h2> + <p> + The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of + all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy of the + elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on + the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof and to the morality of the + will. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 85</span> + </p> + <p> + In fact the sole principle of morality consists in the independence on all + matter of the law (namely, a desired object), and in the determination of + the elective will by the mere universal legislative form of which its + maxim must be capable. Now this independence is freedom in the negative + sense, and this self-legislation of the pure, and therefore practical, + reason is freedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral law expresses + nothing else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason; that is, + freedom; and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, and on + this condition only can they agree with the supreme practical law. If + therefore the matter of the volition, which can be nothing else than the + object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the + practical law, as the condition of its possibility, there results + heteronomy of the elective will, namely, dependence on the physical law + that we should follow some impulse or inclination. In that case the will + does not give itself the law, but only the precept how rationally to + follow pathological law; and the maxim which, in such a case, never + contains the universally legislative form, not only produces no + obligation, but is itself opposed to the principle of a pure practical + reason and, therefore, also to the moral disposition, even though the + resulting action may be conformable to the law. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0022" id="link2H_4_0022"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK. + </h2> + <p> + Hence a practical precept, which contains a material (and therefore + empirical) condition, must never be reckoned a practical law. For the law + of the pure will, which is free, brings the will into a sphere quite + different from the empirical; and as the necessity involved in the law is + not a physical necessity, it can only consist in the formal conditions of + the possibility of a law in general. All the matter of practical rules + rests on subjective conditions, which give them only a conditional + universality (in case I desire this or that, what I must do in order to + obtain it), and they all turn on the principle of private happiness. Now, + it is indeed undeniable that every volition must have an object, and + therefore a matter; but it does not follow that this is the determining + principle and the condition of the maxim; for, if it is so, then this + cannot be exhibited in a universally legislative form, since in that case + the expectation of the existence of the object would be the determining + cause of the choice, and the volition must presuppose the dependence of + the faculty of desire on the existence of something; but this dependence + can only be sought in empirical conditions and, therefore, can never + furnish a foundation for a necessary and universal rule. Thus, the + happiness of others may be the object of the will of a rational being. But + if it were the determining principle of the maxim, we must assume that we + find not only a rational satisfaction in the welfare of others, but also a + want such as the sympathetic disposition in some men occasions. But I + cannot assume the existence of this want in every rational being (not at + all in God). The matter, then, of the maxim may remain, but it must not be + the condition of it, else the maxim could not be fit for a law. Hence, the + mere form of law, which limits the matter, must also be a reason for + adding this matter to the will, not for presupposing it. For example, let + the matter be my own happiness. This (rule), if I attribute it to everyone + (as, in fact, I may, in the case of every finite being), can become an + objective practical law only if I include the happiness of others. + Therefore, the law that we should promote the happiness of others does not + arise from the assumption that this is an object of everyone's choice, but + merely from this, that the form of universality which reason requires as + the condition of giving to a maxim of self-love the objective validity of + a law is the principle that determines the will. Therefore it was not the + object (the happiness of others) that determined the pure will, but it was + the form of law only, by which I restricted my maxim, founded on + inclination, so as to give it the universality of a law, and thus to adapt + it to the practical reason; and it is this restriction alone, and not the + addition of an external spring, that can give rise to the notion of the + obligation to extend the maxim of my self-love to the happiness of others. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 90</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0023" id="link2H_4_0023"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + REMARK II. + </h2> + <p> + The direct opposite of the principle of morality is, when the principle of + private happiness is made the determining principle of the will, and with + this is to be reckoned, as I have shown above, everything that places the + determining principle which is to serve as a law, anywhere but in the + legislative form of the maxim. This contradiction, however, is not merely + logical, like that which would arise between rules empirically + conditioned, if they were raised to the rank of necessary principles of + cognition, but is practical, and would ruin morality altogether were not + the voice of reason in reference to the will so clear, so irrepressible, + so distinctly audible, even to the commonest men. It can only, indeed, be + maintained in the perplexing speculations of the schools, which are bold + enough to shut their ears against that heavenly voice, in order to support + a theory that costs no trouble. + </p> + <p> + Suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to attempt to + justify himself to you for having borne false witness, first by alleging + the, in his view, sacred duty of consulting his own happiness; then by + enumerating the advantages which he had gained thereby, pointing out the + prudence he had shown in securing himself against detection, even by + yourself, to whom he now reveals the secret, only in order that he may be + able to deny it at any time; and suppose he were then to affirm, in all + seriousness, that he has fulfilled a true human duty; you would either + laugh in his face, or shrink back from him with disgust; and yet, if a man + has regulated his principles of action solely with a view to his own + advantage, you would have nothing whatever to object against this mode of + proceeding. Or suppose some one recommends you a man as steward, as a man + to whom you can blindly trust all your affairs; and, in order to inspire + you with confidence, extols him as a prudent man who thoroughly + understands his own interest, and is so indefatigably active that he lets + slip no opportunity of advancing it; lastly, lest you should be afraid of + finding a vulgar selfishness in him, praises the good taste with which he + lives; not seeking his pleasure in money-making, or in coarse wantonness, + but in the enlargement of his knowledge, in instructive intercourse with a + select circle, and even in relieving the needy; while as to the means + (which, of course, derive all their value from the end), he is not + particular, and is ready to use other people's money for the purpose as if + it were his own, provided only he knows that he can do so safely, and + without discovery; you would either believe that the recommender was + mocking you, or that he had lost his senses. So sharply and clearly marked + are the boundaries of morality and self-love that even the commonest eye + cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to the one or the + other. The few remarks that follow may appear superfluous where the truth + is so plain, but at least they may serve to give a little more + distinctness to the judgement of common sense. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 95</span> + </p> + <p> + The principle of happiness may, indeed, furnish maxims, but never such as + would be competent to be laws of the will, even if universal happiness + were made the object. For since the knowledge of this rests on mere + empirical data, since every man's judgement on it depends very much on his + particular point of view, which is itself moreover very variable, it can + supply only general rules, not universal; that is, it can give rules which + on the average will most frequently fit, but not rules which must hold + good always and necessarily; hence, no practical laws can be founded on + it. Just because in this case an object of choice is the foundation of the + rule and must therefore precede it, the rule can refer to nothing but what + is [felt], and therefore it refers to experience and is founded on it, and + then the variety of judgement must be endless. This principle, therefore, + does not prescribe the same practical rules to all rational beings, + although the rules are all included under a common title, namely, that of + happiness. The moral law, however, is conceived as objectively necessary, + only because it holds for everyone that has reason and will. + </p> + <p> + The maxim of self-love (prudence) only advises; the law of morality + commands. Now there is a great difference between that which we are + advised to do and that to which we are obliged. + </p> + <p> + The commonest intelligence can easily and without hesitation see what, on + the principle of autonomy of the will, requires to be done; but on + supposition of heteronomy of the will, it is hard and requires knowledge + of the world to see what is to be done. That is to say, what duty is, is + plain of itself to everyone; but what is to bring true durable advantage, + such as will extend to the whole of one's existence, is always veiled in + impenetrable obscurity; and much prudence is required to adapt the + practical rule founded on it to the ends of life, even tolerably, by + making proper exceptions. But the moral law commands the most punctual + obedience from everyone; it must, therefore, not be so difficult to judge + what it requires to be done, that the commonest unpractised understanding, + even without worldly prudence, should fail to apply it rightly. + </p> + <p> + It is always in everyone's power to satisfy the categorical command of + morality; whereas it is seldom possible, and by no means so to everyone, + to satisfy the empirically conditioned precept of happiness, even with + regard to a single purpose. The reason is that in the former case there is + question only of the maxim, which must be genuine and pure; but in the + latter case there is question also of one's capacity and physical power to + realize a desired object. A command that everyone should try to make + himself happy would be foolish, for one never commands anyone to do what + he of himself infallibly wishes to do. We must only command the means, or + rather supply them, since he cannot do everything that he wishes. But to + command morality under the name of duty is quite rational; for, in the + first place, not everyone is willing to obey its precepts if they oppose + his inclinations; and as to the means of obeying this law, these need not + in this case be taught, for in this respect whatever he wishes to do he + can do. + </p> + <p> + He who has lost at play may be vexed at himself and his folly, but if he + is conscious of having cheated at play (although he has gained thereby), + he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law. + This must, therefore, be something different from the principle of private + happiness. For a man must have a different criterion when he is compelled + to say to himself: "I am a worthless fellow, though I have filled my + purse"; and when he approves himself, and says: "I am a prudent man, for I + have enriched my treasure." + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 100</span> + </p> + <p> + Finally, there is something further in the idea of our practical reason, + which accompanies the transgression of a moral law- namely, its ill + desert. Now the notion of punishment, as such, cannot be united with that + of becoming a partaker of happiness; for although he who inflicts the + punishment may at the same time have the benevolent purpose of directing + this punishment to this end, yet it must first be justified in itself as + punishment, i.e., as mere harm, so that if it stopped there, and the + person punished could get no glimpse of kindness hidden behind this + harshness, he must yet admit that justice was done him, and that his + reward was perfectly suitable to his conduct. In every punishment, as + such, there must first be justice, and this constitutes the essence of the + notion. Benevolence may, indeed, be united with it, but the man who has + deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this. + Punishment, then, is a physical evil, which, though it be not connected + with moral evil as a natural consequence, ought to be connected with it as + a consequence by the principles of a moral legislation. Now, if every + crime, even without regarding the physical consequence with respect to the + actor, is in itself punishable, that is, forfeits happiness (at least + partially), it is obviously absurd to say that the crime consisted just in + this, that he has drawn punishment on himself, thereby injuring his + private happiness (which, on the principle of self-love, must be the + proper notion of all crime). According to this view, the punishment would + be the reason for calling anything a crime, and justice would, on the + contrary, consist in omitting all punishment, and even preventing that + which naturally follows; for, if this were done, there would no longer be + any evil in the action, since the harm which otherwise followed it, and on + account of which alone the action was called evil, would now be prevented. + To look, however, on all rewards and punishments as merely the machinery + in the hand of a higher power, which is to serve only to set rational + creatures striving after their final end (happiness), this is to reduce + the will to a mechanism destructive of freedom; this is so evident that it + need not detain us. + </p> + <p> + More refined, though equally false, is the theory of those who suppose a + certain special moral sense, which sense and not reason determines the + moral law, and in consequence of which the consciousness of virtue is + supposed to be directly connected with contentment and pleasure; that of + vice, with mental dissatisfaction and pain; thus reducing the whole to the + desire of private happiness. Without repeating what has been said above, I + will here only remark the fallacy they fall into. In order to imagine the + vicious man as tormented with mental dissatisfaction by the consciousness + of his transgressions, they must first represent him as in the main basis + of his character, at least in some degree, morally good; just as he who is + pleased with the consciousness of right conduct must be conceived as + already virtuous. The notion of morality and duty must, therefore, have + preceded any regard to this satisfaction, and cannot be derived from it. A + man must first appreciate the importance of what we call duty, the + authority of the moral law, and the immediate dignity which the following + of it gives to the person in his own eyes, in order to feel that + satisfaction in the consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter + remorse that accompanies the consciousness of its transgression. It is, + therefore, impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction prior + to the knowledge of obligation, or to make it the basis of the latter. A + man must be at least half honest in order even to be able to form a + conception of these feelings. I do not deny that as the human will is, by + virtue of liberty, capable of being immediately determined by the moral + law, so frequent practice in accordance with this principle of + determination can, at least, produce subjectively a feeling of + satisfaction; on the contrary, it is a duty to establish and to cultivate + this, which alone deserves to be called properly the moral feeling; but + the notion of duty cannot be derived from it, else we should have to + suppose a feeling for the law as such, and thus make that an object of + sensation which can only be thought by the reason; and this, if it is not + to be a flat contradiction, would destroy all notion of duty and put in + its place a mere mechanical play of refined inclinations sometimes + contending with the coarser. + </p> + <p> + If now we compare our formal supreme principle of pure practical reason + (that of autonomy of the will) with all previous material principles of + morality, we can exhibit them all in a table in which all possible cases + are exhausted, except the one formal principle; and thus we can show + visibly that it is vain to look for any other principle than that now + proposed. In fact all possible principles of determination of the will are + either merely subjective, and therefore empirical, or are also objective + and rational; and both are either external or internal. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0024" id="link2H_4_0024"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the Foundation of + Morality, are: + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0025" id="link2H_4_0025"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 105</span> + </h2> + <h3> + SUBJECTIVE. + </h3> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + EXTERNAL INTERNAL + + Education Physical feeling +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 110</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + (Montaigne) (Epicurus) + + The civil Moral feeling + + Constitution (Hutcheson) + + (Mandeville) +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 115</span> + </p> + <h3> + OBJECTIVE. + </h3> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + INTERNAL EXTERNAL + + Perfection Will of God + + (Wolf and the (Crusius and other +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 120</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + Stoics) theological Moralists) +</pre> + <p> + Those of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable of + furnishing the universal principle of morality; but those in the lower + table are based on reason (for perfection as a quality of things, and the + highest perfection conceived as substance, that is, God, can only be + thought by means of rational concepts). But the former notion, namely, + that of perfection, may either be taken in a theoretic signification, and + then it means nothing but the completeness of each thing in its own kind + (transcendental), or that of a thing merely as a thing (metaphysical); and + with that we are not concerned here. But the notion of perfection in a + practical sense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of + purposes. This perfection, as a quality of man and consequently internal, + is nothing but talent and, what strengthens or completes this, skill. + Supreme perfection conceived as substance, that is God, and consequently + external (considered practically), is the sufficiency of this being for + all ends. Ends then must first be given, relatively to which only can the + notion of perfection (whether internal in ourselves or external in God) be + the determining principle of the will. But an end- being an object which + must precede the determination of the will by a practical rule and contain + the ground of the possibility of this determination, and therefore contain + also the matter of the will, taken as its determining principle- such an + end is always empirical and, therefore, may serve for the Epicurean + principle of the happiness theory, but not for the pure rational principle + of morality and duty. Thus, talents and the improvement of them, because + they contribute to the advantages of life; or the will of God, if + agreement with it be taken as the object of the will, without any + antecedent independent practical principle, can be motives only by reason + of the happiness expected therefrom. Hence it follows, first, that all the + principles here stated are material; secondly, that they include all + possible material principles; and, finally, the conclusion, that since + material principles are quite incapable of furnishing the supreme moral + law (as has been shown), the formal practical principle of the pure reason + (according to which the mere form of a universal legislation must + constitute the supreme and immediate determining principle of the will) is + the only one possible which is adequate to furnish categorical + imperatives, that is, practical laws (which make actions a duty), and in + general to serve as the principle of morality, both in criticizing conduct + and also in its application to the human will to determine it. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0026" id="link2H_4_0026"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure + </h2> + <p> + Practical Reason. + </p> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 125</span> + </h3> + <p> + This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical, that is, can of + itself determine the will independently of anything empirical; and this it + proves by a fact in which pure reason in us proves itself actually + practical, namely, the autonomy shown in the fundamental principle of + morality, by which reason determines the will to action. + </p> + <p> + It shows at the same time that this fact is inseparably connected with the + consciousness of freedom of the will, nay, is identical with it; and by + this the will of a rational being, although as belonging to the world of + sense it recognizes itself as necessarily subject to the laws of causality + like other efficient causes; yet, at the same time, on another side, + namely, as a being in itself, is conscious of existing in and being + determined by an intelligible order of things; conscious not by virtue of + a special intuition of itself, but by virtue of certain dynamical laws + which determine its causality in the sensible world; for it has been + elsewhere proved that if freedom is predicated of us, it transports us + into an intelligible order of things. + </p> + <p> + Now, if we compare with this the analytical part of the critique of pure + speculative reason, we shall see a remarkable contrast. There it was not + fundamental principles, but pure, sensible intuition (space and time), + that was the first datum that made a priori knowledge possible, though + only of objects of the senses. Synthetical principles could not be derived + from mere concepts without intuition; on the contrary, they could only + exist with reference to this intuition, and therefore to objects of + possible experience, since it is the concepts of the understanding, united + with this intuition, which alone make that knowledge possible which we + call experience. Beyond objects of experience, and therefore with regard + to things as noumena, all positive knowledge was rightly disclaimed for + speculative reason. This reason, however, went so far as to establish with + certainty the concept of noumena; that is, the possibility, nay, the + necessity, of thinking them; for example, it showed against all objections + that the supposition of freedom, negatively considered, was quite + consistent with those principles and limitations of pure theoretic reason. + But it could not give us any definite enlargement of our knowledge with + respect to such objects, but, on the contrary, cut off all view of them + altogether. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, the moral law, although it gives no view, yet gives us + a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world, and + the whole compass of our theoretical use of reason, a fact which points to + a pure world of the understanding, nay, even defines it positively and + enables us to know something of it, namely, a law. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 130</span> + </p> + <p> + This law (as far as rational beings are concerned) gives to the world of + sense, which is a sensible system of nature, the form of a world of the + understanding, that is, of a supersensible system of nature, without + interfering with its mechanism. Now, a system of nature, in the most + general sense, is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature + of rational beings in general is their existence under laws empirically + conditioned, which, from the point of view of reason, is heteronomy. The + supersensible nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their + existence according to laws which are independent of every empirical + condition and, therefore, belong to the autonomy of pure reason. And, + since the laws by which the existence of things depends on cognition are + practical, supersensible nature, so far as we can form any notion of it, + is nothing else than a system of nature under the autonomy of pure + practical reason. Now, the law of this autonomy is the moral law, which, + therefore, is the fundamental law of a supersensible nature, and of a pure + world of understanding, whose counterpart must exist in the world of + sense, but without interfering with its laws. We might call the former the + archetypal world (natura archetypa), which we only know in the reason; and + the latter the ectypal world (natura ectypa), because it contains the + possible effect of the idea of the former which is the determining + principle of the will. For the moral law, in fact, transfers us ideally + into a system in which pure reason, if it were accompanied with adequate + physical power, would produce the summum bonum, and it determines our will + to give the sensible world the form of a system of rational beings. + </p> + <p> + The least attention to oneself proves that this idea really serves as the + model for the determinations of our will. + </p> + <p> + When the maxim which I am disposed to follow in giving testimony is tested + by the practical reason, I always consider what it would be if it were to + hold as a universal law of nature. It is manifest that in this view it + would oblige everyone to speak the truth. For it cannot hold as a + universal law of nature that statements should be allowed to have the + force of proof and yet to be purposely untrue. Similarly, the maxim which + I adopt with respect to disposing freely of my life is at once determined, + when I ask myself what it should be, in order that a system, of which it + is the law, should maintain itself. It is obvious that in such a system no + one could arbitrarily put an end to his own life, for such an arrangement + would not be a permanent order of things. And so in all similar cases. + Now, in nature, as it actually is an object of experience, the free will + is not of itself determined to maxims which could of themselves be the + foundation of a natural system of universal laws, or which could even be + adapted to a system so constituted; on the contrary, its maxims are + private inclinations which constitute, indeed, a natural whole in + conformity with pathological (physical) laws, but could not form part of a + system of nature, which would only be possible through our will acting in + accordance with pure practical laws. Yet we are, through reason, conscious + of a law to which all our maxims are subject, as though a natural order + must be originated from our will. This law, therefore, must be the idea of + a natural system not given in experience, and yet possible through + freedom; a system, therefore, which is supersensible, and to which we give + objective reality, at least in a practical point of view, since we look on + it as an object of our will as pure rational beings. + </p> + <p> + Hence the distinction between the laws of a natural system to which the + will is subject, and of a natural system which is subject to a will (as + far as its relation to its free actions is concerned), rests on this, that + in the former the objects must be causes of the ideas which determine the + will; whereas in the latter the will is the cause of the objects; so that + its causality has its determining principle solely in the pure faculty of + reason, which may therefore be called a pure practical reason. + </p> + <p> + There are therefore two very distinct problems: how, on the one side, pure + reason can cognise objects a priori, and how on the other side it can be + an immediate determining principle of the will, that is, of the causality + of the rational being with respect to the reality of objects (through the + mere thought of the universal validity of its own maxims as laws). + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 135</span> + </p> + <p> + The former, which belongs to the critique of the pure speculative reason, + requires a previous explanation, how intuitions without which no object + can be given, and, therefore, none known synthetically, are possible a + priori; and its solution turns out to be that these are all only sensible + and, therefore, do not render possible any speculative knowledge which + goes further than possible experience reaches; and that therefore all the + principles of that pure speculative reason avail only to make experience + possible; either experience of given objects or of those that may be given + ad infinitum, but never are completely given. + </p> + <p> + The latter, which belongs to the critique of practical reason, requires no + explanation how the objects of the faculty of desire are possible, for + that being a problem of the theoretical knowledge of nature is left to the + critique of the speculative reason, but only how reason can determine the + maxims of the will; whether this takes place only by means of empirical + ideas as principles of determination, or whether pure reason can be + practical and be the law of a possible order of nature, which is not + empirically knowable. The possibility of such a supersensible system of + nature, the conception of which can also be the ground of its reality + through our own free will, does not require any a priori intuition (of an + intelligible world) which, being in this case supersensible, would be + impossible for us. For the question is only as to the determining + principle of volition in its maxims, namely, whether it is empirical, or + is a conception of the pure reason (having the legal character belonging + to it in general), and how it can be the latter. It is left to the + theoretic principles of reason to decide whether the causality of the will + suffices for the realization of the objects or not, this being an inquiry + into the possibility of the objects of the volition. Intuition of these + objects is therefore of no importance to the practical problem. We are + here concerned only with the determination of the will and the determining + principles of its maxims as a free will, not at all with the result. For, + provided only that the will conforms to the law of pure reason, then let + its power in execution be what it may, whether according to these maxims + of legislation of a possible system of nature any such system really + results or not, this is no concern of the critique, which only inquires + whether, and in what way, pure reason can be practical, that is directly + determine the will. + </p> + <p> + In this inquiry criticism may and must begin with pure practical laws and + their reality. But instead of intuition it takes as their foundation the + conception of their existence in the intelligible world, namely, the + concept of freedom. For this concept has no other meaning, and these laws + are only possible in relation to freedom of the will; but freedom being + supposed, they are necessary; or conversely freedom is necessary because + those laws are necessary, being practical postulates. It cannot be further + explained how this consciousness of the moral law, or, what is the same + thing, of freedom, is possible; but that it is admissible is well + established in the theoretical critique. + </p> + <p> + The exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason is now + finished; that is to say, it has been shown first, what it contains, that + it subsists for itself quite a priori and independent of empirical + principles; and next in what it is distinguished from all other practical + principles. With the deduction, that is, the justification of its + objective and universal validity, and the discernment of the possibility + of such a synthetical proposition a priori, we cannot expect to succeed so + well as in the case of the principles of pure theoretical reason. For + these referred to objects of possible experience, namely, to phenomena, + and we could prove that these phenomena could be known as objects of + experience only by being brought under the categories in accordance with + these laws; and consequently that all possible experience must conform to + these laws. But I could not proceed in this way with the deduction of the + moral law. For this does not concern the knowledge of the properties of + objects, which may be given to the reason from some other source; but a + knowledge which can itself be the ground of the existence of the objects, + and by which reason in a rational being has causality, i.e., pure reason, + which can be regarded as a faculty immediately determining the will. + </p> + <p> + Now all our human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at + fundamental powers or faculties, for the possibility of these cannot be + understood by any means, and just as little should it be arbitrarily + invented and assumed. Therefore, in the theoretic use of reason, it is + experience alone that can justify us in assuming them. But this expedient + of adducing empirical proofs, instead of a deduction from a priori sources + of knowledge, is denied us here in respect to the pure practical faculty + of reason. For whatever requires to draw the proof of its reality from + experience must depend for the grounds of its possibility on principles of + experience; and pure, yet practical, reason by its very notion cannot be + regarded as such. Further, the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason + of which we are a priori conscious, and which is apodeictically certain, + though it be granted that in experience no example of its exact fulfilment + can be found. Hence, the objective reality of the moral law cannot be + proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason, whether + speculative or empirically supported, and therefore, even if we renounced + its apodeictic certainty, it could not be proved a posteriori by + experience, and yet it is firmly established of itself. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 140</span> + </p> + <p> + But instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, + something else is found which was quite unexpected, namely, that this + moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the deduction of an + inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove, but of which + speculative reason was compelled at least to assume the possibility (in + order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the unconditioned in the + chain of causality, so as not to contradict itself)- I mean the faculty of + freedom. The moral law, which itself does not require a justification, + proves not merely the possibility of freedom, but that it really belongs + to beings who recognize this law as binding on themselves. The moral law + is in fact a law of the causality of free agents and, therefore, of the + possibility of a supersensible system of nature, just as the metaphysical + law of events in the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible + system of nature; and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy + was compelled to leave undetermined, namely, the law for a causality, the + concept of which in the latter was only negative; and therefore for the + first time gives this concept objective reality. + </p> + <p> + This sort of credential of the moral law, viz., that it is set forth as a + principle of the deduction of freedom, which is a causality of pure + reason, is a sufficient substitute for all a priori justification, since + theoretic reason was compelled to assume at least the possibility of + freedom, in order to satisfy a want of its own. For the moral law proves + its reality, so as even to satisfy the critique of the speculative reason, + by the fact that it adds a positive definition to a causality previously + conceived only negatively, the possibility of which was incomprehensible + to speculative reason, which yet was compelled to suppose it. For it adds + the notion of a reason that directly determines the will (by imposing on + its maxims the condition of a universal legislative form); and thus it is + able for the first time to give objective, though only practical, reality + to reason, which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed + speculatively with its ideas. It thus changes the transcendent use of + reason into an immanent use (so that reason is itself, by means of ideas, + an efficient cause in the field of experience). + </p> + <p> + The determination of the causality of beings in the world of sense, as + such, can never be unconditioned; and yet for every series of conditions + there must be something unconditioned, and therefore there must be a + causality which is determined wholly by itself. Hence, the idea of freedom + as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not found to be a want but, as + far as its possibility is concerned, an analytic principle of pure + speculative reason. But as it is absolutely impossible to find in + experience any example in accordance with this idea, because amongst the + causes of things as phenomena it would be impossible to meet with any + absolutely unconditioned determination of causality, we were only able to + defend our supposition that a freely acting cause might be a being in the + world of sense, in so far as it is considered in the other point of view + as a noumenon, showing that there is no contradiction in regarding all its + actions as subject to physical conditions so far as they are phenomena, + and yet regarding its causality as physically unconditioned, in so far as + the acting being belongs to the world of understanding, and in thus making + the concept of freedom the regulative principle of reason. By this + principle I do not indeed learn what the object is to which that sort of + causality is attributed; but I remove the difficulty, for, on the one + side, in the explanation of events in the world, and consequently also of + the actions of rational beings, I leave to the mechanism of physical + necessity the right of ascending from conditioned to condition ad + infinitum, while on the other side I keep open for speculative reason the + place which for it is vacant, namely, the intelligible, in order to + transfer the unconditioned thither. But I was not able to verify this + supposition; that is, to change it into the knowledge of a being so + acting, not even into the knowledge of the possibility of such a being. + This vacant place is now filled by pure practical reason with a definite + law of causality in an intelligible world (causality with freedom), + namely, the moral law. Speculative reason does not hereby gain anything as + regards its insight, but only as regards the certainty of its + problematical notion of freedom, which here obtains objective reality, + which, though only practical, is nevertheless undoubted. Even the notion + of causality- the application, and consequently the signification, of + which holds properly only in relation to phenomena, so as to connect them + into experiences (as is shown by the Critique of Pure Reason)- is not so + enlarged as to extend its use beyond these limits. For if reason sought to + do this, it would have to show how the logical relation of principle and + consequence can be used synthetically in a different sort of intuition + from the sensible; that is how a causa noumenon is possible. This it can + never do; and, as practical reason, it does not even concern itself with + it, since it only places the determining principle of causality of man as + a sensible creature (which is given) in pure reason (which is therefore + called practical); and therefore it employs the notion of cause, not in + order to know objects, but to determine causality in relation to objects + in general. It can abstract altogether from the application of this notion + to objects with a view to theoretical knowledge (since this concept is + always found a priori in the understanding even independently of any + intuition). Reason, then, employs it only for a practical purpose, and + hence we can transfer the determining principle of the will into the + intelligible order of things, admitting, at the same time, that we cannot + understand how the notion of cause can determine the knowledge of these + things. But reason must cognise causality with respect to the actions of + the will in the sensible world in a definite manner; otherwise, practical + reason could not really produce any action. But as to the notion which it + forms of its own causality as noumenon, it need not determine it + theoretically with a view to the cognition of its supersensible existence, + so as to give it significance in this way. For it acquires significance + apart from this, though only for practical use, namely, through the moral + law. Theoretically viewed, it remains always a pure a priori concept of + the understanding, which can be applied to objects whether they have been + given sensibly or not, although in the latter case it has no definite + theoretical significance or application, but is only a formal, though + essential, conception of the understanding relating to an object in + general. The significance which reason gives it through the moral law is + merely practical, inasmuch as the idea of the law of causality (of the + will) has self causality, or is its determining principle. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0027" id="link2H_4_0027"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its Practical use has to an Extension + which is not possible to it in its Speculative Use. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 145</span> + </p> + <p> + We have in the moral principle set forth a law of causality, the + determining principle of which is set above all the conditions of the + sensible world; we have it conceived how the will, as belonging to the + intelligible world, is determinable, and therefore have its subject (man) + not merely conceived as belonging to a world of pure understanding, and in + this respect unknown (which the critique of speculative reason enabled us + to do), but also defined as regards his causality by means of a law which + cannot be reduced to any physical law of the sensible world; and therefore + our knowledge is extended beyond the limits of that world, a pretension + which the Critique of Pure Reason declared to be futile in all + speculation. Now, how is the practical use of pure reason here to be + reconciled with the theoretical, as to the determination of the limits of + its faculty? + </p> + <p> + David Hume, of whom we may say that he commenced the assault on the claims + of pure reason, which made a thorough investigation of it necessary, + argued thus: The notion of cause is a notion that involves the necessity + of the connexion of the existence of different things (and that, in so far + as they are different), so that, given A, I know that something quite + distinct there from, namely B, must necessarily also exist. Now necessity + can be attributed to a connection, only in so far as it is known a priori, + for experience would only enable us to know of such a connection that it + exists, not that it necessarily exists. Now, it is impossible, says he, to + know a priori and as necessary the connection between one thing and + another (or between one attribute and another quite distinct) when they + have not been given in experience. Therefore the notion of a cause is + fictitious and delusive and, to speak in the mildest way, is an illusion, + only excusable inasmuch as the custom (a subjective necessity) of + perceiving certain things, or their attributes as often associated in + existence along with or in succession to one another, is insensibly taken + for an objective necessity of supposing such a connection in the objects + themselves; and thus the notion of a cause has been acquired + surreptitiously and not legitimately; nay, it can never be so acquired or + authenticated, since it demands a connection in itself vain, chimerical, + and untenable in presence of reason, and to which no object can ever + correspond. In this way was empiricism first introduced as the sole source + of principles, as far as all knowledge of the existence of things is + concerned (mathematics therefore remaining excepted); and with empiricism + the most thorough scepticism, even with regard to the whole science of + nature( as philosophy). For on such principles we can never conclude from + given attributes of things as existing to a consequence (for this would + require the notion of cause, which involves the necessity of such a + connection); we can only, guided by imagination, expect similar cases- an + expectation which is never certain, however often it has been fulfilled. + Of no event could we say: a certain thing must have preceded it, on which + it necessarily followed; that is, it must have a cause; and therefore, + however frequent the cases we have known in which there was such an + antecedent, so that a rule could be derived from them, yet we never could + suppose it as always and necessarily so happening; we should, therefore, + be obliged to leave its share to blind chance, with which all use of + reason comes to an end; and this firmly establishes scepticism in + reference to arguments ascending from effects to causes and makes it + impregnable. + </p> + <p> + Mathematics escaped well, so far, because Hume thought that its + propositions were analytical; that is, proceeded from one property to + another, by virtue of identity and, consequently, according to the + principle of contradiction. This, however, is not the case, since, on the + contrary, they are synthetical; and although geometry, for example, has + not to do with the existence of things, but only with their a priori + properties in a possible intuition, yet it proceeds just as in the case of + the causal notion, from one property (A) to another wholly distinct (B), + as necessarily connected with the former. Nevertheless, mathematical + science, so highly vaunted for its apodeictic certainty, must at last fall + under this empiricism for the same reason for which Hume put custom in the + place of objective necessity in the notion of cause and, in spite of all + its pride, must consent to lower its bold pretension of claiming assent a + priori and depend for assent to the universality of its propositions on + the kindness of observers, who, when called as witnesses, would surely not + hesitate to admit that what the geometer propounds as a theorem they have + always perceived to be the fact, and, consequently, although it be not + necessarily true, yet they would permit us to expect it to be true in the + future. In this manner Hume's empiricism leads inevitably to scepticism, + even with regard to mathematics, and consequently in every scientific + theoretical use of reason (for this belongs either to philosophy or + mathematics). Whether with such a terrible overthrow of the chief branches + of knowledge, common reason will escape better, and will not rather become + irrecoverably involved in this destruction of all knowledge, so that from + the same principles a universal scepticism should follow (affecting, + indeed, only the learned), this I will leave everyone to judge for + himself. + </p> + <p> + As regards my own labours in the critical examination of pure reason, + which were occasioned by Hume's sceptical teaching, but went much further + and embraced the whole field of pure theoretical reason in its synthetic + use and, consequently, the field of what is called metaphysics in general; + I proceeded in the following manner with respect to the doubts raised by + the Scottish philosopher touching the notion of causality. If Hume took + the objects of experience for things in themselves (as is almost always + done), he was quite right in declaring the notion of cause to be a + deception and false illusion; for as to things in themselves, and their + attributes as such, it is impossible to see why because A is given, B, + which is different, must necessarily be also given, and therefore he could + by no means admit such an a priori knowledge of things in themselves. + Still less could this acute writer allow an empirical origin of this + concept, since this is directly contradictory to the necessity of + connection which constitutes the essence of the notion of causality, hence + the notion was proscribed, and in its place was put custom in the + observation of the course of perceptions. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 150</span> + </p> + <p> + It resulted, however, from my inquiries, that the objects with which we + have to do in experience are by no means things in themselves, but merely + phenomena; and that although in the case of things in themselves it is + impossible to see how, if A is supposed, it should be contradictory that + B, which is quite different from A, should not also be supposed (i.e., to + see the necessity of the connection between A as cause and B as effect); + yet it can very well be conceived that, as phenomena, they may be + necessarily connected in one experience in a certain way (e.g., with + regard to time-relations); so that they could not be separated without + contradicting that connection, by means of which this experience is + possible in which they are objects and in which alone they are cognisable + by us. And so it was found to be in fact; so that I was able not only to + prove the objective reality of the concept of cause in regard to objects + of experience, but also to deduce it as an a priori concept by reason of + the necessity of the connection it implied; that is, to show the + possibility of its origin from pure understanding without any empirical + sources; and thus, after removing the source of empiricism, I was able + also to overthrow the inevitable consequence of this, namely, scepticism, + first with regard to physical science, and then with regard to mathematics + (in which empiricism has just the same grounds), both being sciences which + have reference to objects of possible experience; herewith overthrowing + the thorough doubt of whatever theoretic reason professes to discern. + </p> + <p> + But how is it with the application of this category of causality (and all + the others; for without them there can be no knowledge of anything + existing) to things which are not objects of possible experience, but lie + beyond its bounds? For I was able to deduce the objective reality of these + concepts only with regard to objects of possible experience. But even this + very fact, that I have saved them, only in case I have proved that objects + may by means of them be thought, though not determined a priori; this it + is that gives them a place in the pure understanding, by which they are + referred to objects in general (sensible or not sensible). If anything is + still wanting, it is that which is the condition of the application of + these categories, and especially that of causality, to objects, namely, + intuition; for where this is not given, the application with a view to + theoretic knowledge of the object, as a noumenon, is impossible and, + therefore, if anyone ventures on it, is (as in the Critique of Pure + Reason) absolutely forbidden. Still, the objective reality of the concept + (of causality) remains, and it can be used even of noumena, but without + our being able in the least to define the concept theoretically so as to + produce knowledge. For that this concept, even in reference to an object, + contains nothing impossible, was shown by this, that, even while applied + to objects of sense, its seat was certainly fixed in the pure + understanding; and although, when referred to things in themselves (which + cannot be objects of experience), it is not capable of being determined so + as to represent a definite object for the purpose of theoretic knowledge; + yet for any other purpose (for instance, a practical) it might be capable + of being determined so as to have such application. This could not be the + case if, as Hume maintained, this concept of causality contained something + absolutely impossible to be thought. + </p> + <p> + In order now to discover this condition of the application of the said + concept to noumena, we need only recall why we are not content with its + application to objects of experience, but desire also to apply it to + things in themselves. It will appear, then, that it is not a theoretic but + a practical purpose that makes this a necessity. In speculation, even if + we were successful in it, we should not really gain anything in the + knowledge of nature, or generally with regard to such objects as are + given, but we should make a wide step from the sensibly conditioned (in + which we have already enough to do to maintain ourselves, and to follow + carefully the chain of causes) to the supersensible, in order to complete + our knowledge of principles and to fix its limits; whereas there always + remains an infinite chasm unfilled between those limits and what we know; + and we should have hearkened to a vain curiosity rather than a + solid-desire of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + But, besides the relation in which the understanding stands to objects (in + theoretical knowledge), it has also a relation to the faculty of desire, + which is therefore called the will, and the pure will, inasmuch as pure + understanding (in this case called reason) is practical through the mere + conception of a law. The objective reality of a pure will, or, what is the + same thing, of a pure practical reason, is given in the moral law a + priori, as it were, by a fact, for so we may name a determination of the + will which is inevitable, although it does not rest on empirical + principles. Now, in the notion of a will the notion of causality is + already contained, and hence the notion of a pure will contains that of a + causality accompanied with freedom, that is, one which is not determinable + by physical laws, and consequently is not capable of any empirical + intuition in proof of its reality, but, nevertheless, completely justifies + its objective reality a priori in the pure practical law; not, indeed (as + is easily seen) for the purposes of the theoretical, but of the practical + use of reason. Now the notion of a being that has free will is the notion + of a causa noumenon, and that this notion involves no contradiction, we + are already assured by the fact- that inasmuch as the concept of cause has + arisen wholly from pure understanding, and has its objective reality + assured by the deduction, as it is moreover in its origin independent of + any sensible conditions, it is, therefore, not restricted to phenomena + (unless we wanted to make a definite theoretic use of it), but can be + applied equally to things that are objects of the pure understanding. But, + since this application cannot rest on any intuition (for intuition can + only be sensible), therefore, causa noumenon, as regards the theoretic use + of reason, although a possible and thinkable, is yet an empty notion. Now, + I do not desire by means of this to understand theoretically the nature of + a being, in so far as it has a pure will; it is enough for me to have + thereby designated it as such, and hence to combine the notion of + causality with that of freedom (and what is inseparable from it, the moral + law, as its determining principle). Now, this right I certainly have by + virtue of the pure, not-empirical origin of the notion of cause, since I + do not consider myself entitled to make any use of it except in reference + to the moral law which determines its reality, that is, only a practical + use. + </p> + <p> + If, with Hume, I had denied to the notion of causality all objective + reality in its [theoretic] use, not merely with regard to things in + themselves (the supersensible), but also with regard to the objects of the + senses, it would have lost all significance, and being a theoretically + impossible notion would have been declared to be quite useless; and since + what is nothing cannot be made any use of, the practical use of a concept + theoretically null would have been absurd. But, as it is, the concept of a + causality free from empirical conditions, although empty, i.e., without + any appropriate intuition), is yet theoretically possible, and refers to + an indeterminate object; but in compensation significance is given to it + in the moral law and consequently in a practical sense. I have, indeed, no + intuition which should determine its objective theoretic reality, but not + the less it has a real application, which is exhibited in concreto in + intentions or maxims; that is, it has a practical reality which can be + specified, and this is sufficient to justify it even with a view to + noumena. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 155</span> + </p> + <p> + Now, this objective reality of a pure concept of the understanding in the + sphere of the supersensible, once brought in, gives an objective reality + also to all the other categories, although only so far as they stand in + necessary connexion with the determining principle of the will (the moral + law); a reality only of practical application, which has not the least + effect in enlarging our theoretical knowledge of these objects, or the + discernment of their nature by pure reason. So we shall find also in the + sequel that these categories refer only to beings as intelligences, and in + them only to the relation of reason to the will; consequently, always only + to the practical, and beyond this cannot pretend to any knowledge of these + beings; and whatever other properties belonging to the theoretical + representation of supersensible things may be brought into connexion with + these categories, this is not to be reckoned as knowledge, but only as a + right (in a practical point of view, however, it is a necessity) to admit + and assume such beings, even in the case where we [conceive] supersensible + beings (e.g., God) according to analogy, that is, a purely rational + relation, of which we make a practical use with reference to what is + sensible; and thus the application to the supersensible solely in a + practical point of view does not give pure theoretic reason the least + encouragement to run riot into the transcendent. + </p> + <h3> + BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0002" id="link2HCH0002"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + By a concept of the practical reason I understand the idea of an object as + an effect possible to be produced through freedom. To be an object of + practical knowledge, as such, signifies, therefore, only the relation of + the will to the action by which the object or its opposite would be + realized; and to decide whether something is an object of pure practical + reason or not is only to discern the possibility or impossibility of + willing the action by which, if we had the required power (about which + experience must decide), a certain object would be realized. If the object + be taken as the determining principle of our desire, it must first be + known whether it is physically possible by the free use of our powers, + before we decide whether it is an object of practical reason or not. On + the other hand, if the law can be considered a priori as the determining + principle of the action, and the latter therefore as determined by pure + practical reason, the judgement whether a thing is an object of pure + practical reason or not does not depend at all on the comparison with our + physical power; and the question is only whether we should will an action + that is directed to the existence of an object, if the object were in our + power; hence the previous question is only as the moral possibility of the + action, for in this case it is not the object, but the law of the will, + that is the determining principle of the action. The only objects of + practical reason are therefore those of good and evil. For by the former + is meant an object necessarily desired according to a principle of reason; + by the latter one necessarily shunned, also according to a principle of + reason. + </p> + <p> + If the notion of good is not to be derived from an antecedent practical + law, but, on the contrary, is to serve as its foundation, it can only be + the notion of something whose existence promises pleasure, and thus + determines the causality of the subject to produce it, that is to say, + determines the faculty of desire. Now, since it is impossible to discern a + priori what idea will be accompanied with pleasure and what with pain, it + will depend on experience alone to find out what is primarily good or + evil. The property of the subject, with reference to which alone this + experiment can be made, is the feeling of pleasure and pain, a receptivity + belonging to the internal sense; thus that only would be primarily good + with which the sensation of pleasure is immediately connected, and that + simply evil which immediately excites pain. Since, however, this is + opposed even to the usage of language, which distinguishes the pleasant + from the good, the unpleasant from the evil, and requires that good and + evil shall always be judged by reason, and, therefore, by concepts which + can be communicated to everyone, and not by mere sensation, which is + limited to individual [subjects] and their susceptibility; and, since + nevertheless, pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any idea of an + object a priori, the philosopher who thought himself obliged to make a + feeling of pleasure the foundation of his practical judgements would call + that good which is a means to the pleasant, and evil, what is a cause of + unpleasantness and pain; for the judgement on the relation of means to + ends certainly belongs to reason. But, although reason is alone capable of + discerning the connexion of means with their ends (so that the will might + even be defined as the faculty of ends, since these are always determining + principles of the desires), yet the practical maxims which would follow + from the aforesaid principle of the good being merely a means, would never + contain as the object of the will anything good in itself, but only + something good for something; the good would always be merely the useful, + and that for which it is useful must always lie outside the will, in + sensation. Now if this as a pleasant sensation were to be distinguished + from the notion of good, then there would be nothing primarily good at + all, but the good would have to be sought only in the means to something + else, namely, some pleasantness. + </p> + <p> + It is an old formula of the schools: Nihil appetimus nisi sub ratione + boni; Nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali, and it is used often + correctly, but often also in a manner injurious to philosophy, because the + expressions boni and mali are ambiguous, owing to the poverty of language, + in consequence of which they admit a double sense, and, therefore, + inevitably bring the practical laws into ambiguity; and philosophy, which + in employing them becomes aware of the different meanings in the same + word, but can find no special expressions for them, is driven to subtile + distinctions about which there is subsequently no unanimity, because the + distinction could not be directly marked by any suitable expression. * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Besides this, the expression sub ratione boni is also + ambiguous. For it may mean: "We represent something to + ourselves as good, when and because we desire (will) it"; or + "We desire something because we represent it to ourselves as + good," so that either the desire determines the notion of + the object as a good, or the notion of good determines the + desire (the will); so that in the first case sub ratione + boni would mean, "We will something under the idea of the + good"; in the second, "In consequence of this idea," which, + as determining the volition, must precede it. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions which do + not allow this difference to be overlooked. It possesses two very distinct + concepts and especially distinct expressions for that which the Latins + express by a single word, bonum. For bonum it has das Gute [good], and das + Wohl [well, weal], for malum das Bose [evil], and das Ubel [ill, bad], or + das Well [woe]. So that we express two quite distinct judgements when we + consider in an action the good and evil of it, or our weal and woe (ill). + Hence it already follows that the above quoted psychological proposition + is at least very doubtful if it is translated: "We desire nothing except + with a view to our weal or woe"; on the other hand, if we render it thus: + "Under the direction of reason we desire nothing except so far as we + esteem it good or evil," it is indubitably certain and at the same time + quite clearly expressed. + </p> + <p> + Well or ill always implies only a reference to our condition, as pleasant + or unpleasant, as one of pleasure or pain, and if we desire or avoid an + object on this account, it is only so far as it is referred to our + sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or pain that it produces. But + good or evil always implies a reference to the will, as determined by the + law of reason, to make something its object; for it is never determined + directly by the object and the idea of it, but is a faculty of taking a + rule of reason for or motive of an action (by which an object may be + realized). Good and evil therefore are properly referred to actions, not + to the sensations of the person, and if anything is to be good or evil + absolutely (i.e., in every respect and without any further condition), or + is to be so esteemed, it can only be the manner of acting, the maxim of + the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil man + that can be so called, and not a thing. + </p> + <p> + However, then, men may laugh at the Stoic, who in the severest paroxysms + of gout cried out: "Pain, however thou tormentest me, I will never admit + that thou art an evil (kakov, malum)": he was right. A bad thing it + certainly was, and his cry betrayed that; but that any evil attached to + him thereby, this he had no reason whatever to admit, for pain did not in + the least diminish the worth of his person, but only that of his + condition. If he had been conscious of a single lie, it would have lowered + his pride, but pain served only to raise it, when he was conscious that he + had not deserved it by any unrighteous action by which he had rendered + himself worthy of punishment. + </p> + <p> + What we call good must be an object of desire in the judgement of every + rational man, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of everyone; + therefore, in addition to sense, this judgement requires reason. So it is + with truthfulness, as opposed to lying; so with justice, as opposed to + violence, &c. But we may call a thing a bad [or ill] thing, which yet + everyone must at the same time acknowledge to be good, sometimes directly, + sometimes indirectly. The man who submits to a surgical operation feels it + no doubt as a bad thing, but by their reason he and everyone acknowledge + it to be good. If a man who delights in annoying and vexing peaceable + people at last receives a right good beating, this is no doubt a bad + thing; but everyone approves it and regards it as a good thing, even + though nothing else resulted from it; nay, even the man who receives it + must in his reason acknowledge that he has met justice, because he sees + the proportion between good conduct and good fortune, which reason + inevitably places before him, here put into practice. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> + <p> + No doubt our weal and woe are of very great importance in the estimation + of our practical reason, and as far as our nature as sensible beings is + concerned, our happiness is the only thing of consequence, provided it is + estimated as reason especially requires, not by the transitory sensation, + but by the influence that this has on our whole existence, and on our + satisfaction therewith; but it is not absolutely the only thing of + consequence. Man is a being who, as belonging to the world of sense, has + wants, and so far his reason has an office which it cannot refuse, namely, + to attend to the interest of his sensible nature, and to form practical + maxims, even with a view to the happiness of this life, and if possible + even to that of a future. But he is not so completely an animal as to be + indifferent to what reason says on its own account, and to use it merely + as an instrument for the satisfaction of his wants as a sensible being. + For the possession of reason would not raise his worth above that of the + brutes, if it is to serve him only for the same purpose that instinct + serves in them; it would in that case be only a particular method which + nature had employed to equip man for the same ends for which it has + qualified brutes, without qualifying him for any higher purpose. No doubt + once this arrangement of nature has been made for him he requires reason + in order to take into consideration his weal and woe, but besides this he + possesses it for a higher purpose also, namely, not only to take into + consideration what is good or evil in itself, about which only pure + reason, uninfluenced by any sensible interest, can judge, but also to + distinguish this estimate thoroughly from the former and to make it the + supreme condition thereof. + </p> + <p> + In estimating what is good or evil in itself, as distinguished from what + can be so called only relatively, the following points are to be + considered. Either a rational principle is already conceived, as of itself + the determining principle of the will, without regard to possible objects + of desire (and therefore by the more legislative form of the maxim), and + in that case that principle is a practical a priori law, and pure reason + is supposed to be practical of itself. The law in that case determines the + will directly; the action conformed to it is good in itself; a will whose + maxim always conforms to this law is good absolutely in every respect and + is the supreme condition of all good. Or the maxim of the will is + consequent on a determining principle of desire which presupposes an + object of pleasure or pain, something therefore that pleases or + displeases, and the maxim of reason that we should pursue the former and + avoid the latter determines our actions as good relatively to our + inclination, that is, good indirectly, (i.e., relatively to a different + end to which they are means), and in that case these maxims can never be + called laws, but may be called rational practical precepts. The end + itself, the pleasure that we seek, is in the latter case not a good but a + welfare; not a concept of reason, but an empirical concept of an object of + sensation; but the use of the means thereto, that is, the action, is + nevertheless called good (because rational deliberation is required for + it), not however, good absolutely, but only relatively to our sensuous + nature, with regard to its feelings of pleasure and displeasure; but the + will whose maxim is affected thereby is not a pure will; this is directed + only to that in which pure reason by itself can be practical. + </p> + <p> + This is the proper place to explain the paradox of method in a critique of + practical reason, namely, that the concept of good and evil must not be + determined before the moral law (of which it seems as if it must be the + foundation), but only after it and by means of it. In fact, even if we did + not know that the principle of morality is a pure a priori law determining + the will, yet, that we may not assume principles quite gratuitously, we + must, at least at first, leave it undecided, whether the will has merely + empirical principles of determination, or whether it has not also pure a + priori principles; for it is contrary to all rules of philosophical method + to assume as decided that which is the very point in question. Supposing + that we wished to begin with the concept of good, in order to deduce from + it the laws of the will, then this concept of an object (as a good) would + at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining + principle of the will. Now, since this concept had not any practical a + priori law for its standard, the criterion of good or evil could not be + placed in anything but the agreement of the object with our feeling of + pleasure or pain; and the use of reason could only consist in determining + in the first place this pleasure or pain in connexion with all the + sensations of my existence, and in the second place the means of securing + to myself the object of the pleasure. Now, as experience alone can decide + what conforms to the feeling of pleasure, and by hypothesis the practical + law is to be based on this as a condition, it follows that the possibility + of a priori practical laws would be at once excluded, because it was + imagined to be necessary first of all to find an object the concept of + which, as a good, should constitute the universal though empirical + principle of determination of the will. But what it was necessary to + inquire first of all was whether there is not an a priori determining + principle of the will (and this could never be found anywhere but in a + pure practical law, in so far as this law prescribes to maxims merely + their form without regard to an object). Since, however, we laid the + foundation of all practical law in an object determined by our conceptions + of good and evil, whereas without a previous law that object could not be + conceived by empirical concepts, we have deprived ourselves beforehand of + the possibility of even conceiving a pure practical law. On the other + hand, if we had first investigated the latter analytically, we should have + found that it is not the concept of good as an object that determines the + moral law and makes it possible, but that, on the contrary, it is the + moral law that first determines the concept of good and makes it possible, + so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely. + </p> + <p> + This remark, which only concerns the method of ultimate ethical inquiries, + is of importance. It explains at once the occasion of all the mistakes of + philosophers with respect to the supreme principle of morals. For they + sought for an object of the will which they could make the matter and + principle of a law (which consequently could not determine the will + directly, but by means of that object referred to the feeling of pleasure + or pain; whereas they ought first to have searched for a law that would + determine the will a priori and directly, and afterwards determine the + object in accordance with the will). Now, whether they placed this object + of pleasure, which was to supply the supreme conception of goodness, in + happiness, in perfection, in moral [feeling], or in the will of God, their + principle in every case implied heteronomy, and they must inevitably come + upon empirical conditions of a moral law, since their object, which was to + be the immediate principle of the will, could not be called good or bad + except in its immediate relation to feeling, which is always empirical. It + is only a formal law- that is, one which prescribes to reason nothing more + than the form of its universal legislation as the supreme condition of its + maxims- that can be a priori a determining principle of practical reason. + The ancients avowed this error without concealment by directing all their + moral inquiries to the determination of the notion of the summum bonum, + which they intended afterwards to make the determining principle of the + will in the moral law; whereas it is only far later, when the moral law + has been first established for itself, and shown to be the direct + determining principle of the will, that this object can be presented to + the will, whose form is now determined a priori; and this we shall + undertake in the Dialectic of the pure practical reason. The moderns, with + whom the question of the summum bonum has gone out of fashion, or at least + seems to have become a secondary matter, hide the same error under vague + (expressions as in many other cases). It shows itself, nevertheless, in + their systems, as it always produces heteronomy of practical reason; and + from this can never be derived a moral law giving universal commands. + </p> + <p> + Now, since the notions of good and evil, as consequences of the a priori + determination of the will, imply also a pure practical principle, and + therefore a causality of pure reason; hence they do not originally refer + to objects (so as to be, for instance, special modes of the synthetic + unity of the manifold of given intuitions in one consciousness) like the + pure concepts of the understanding or categories of reason in its + theoretic employment; on the contrary, they presuppose that objects are + given; but they are all modes (modi) of a single category, namely, that of + causality, the determining principle of which consists in the rational + conception of a law, which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself, + thereby a priori proving itself practical. However, as the actions on the + one side come under a law which is not a physical law, but a law of + freedom, and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in the world of + intelligence, yet on the other side as events in the world of sense they + belong to phenomena; hence the determinations of a practical reason are + only possible in reference to the latter and, therefore, in accordance + with the categories of the understanding; not indeed with a view to any + theoretic employment of it, i.e., so as to bring the manifold of + (sensible) intuition under one consciousness a priori; but only to subject + the manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness of a practical + reason, giving it commands in the moral law, i.e., to a pure will a + priori. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 15</span> + </p> + <p> + These categories of freedom- for so we choose to call them in contrast to + those theoretic categories which are categories of physical nature- have + an obvious advantage over the latter, inasmuch as the latter are only + forms of thought which designate objects in an indefinite manner by means + of universal concept of every possible intuition; the former, on the + contrary, refer to the determination of a free elective will (to which + indeed no exactly corresponding intuition can be assigned, but which has + as its foundation a pure practical a priori law, which is not the case + with any concepts belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive + faculties); hence, instead of the form of intuition (space and time), + which does not lie in reason itself, but has to be drawn from another + source, namely, the sensibility, these being elementary practical concepts + have as their foundation the form of a pure will, which is given in reason + and, therefore, in the thinking faculty itself. From this it happens that + as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the + determination of the will, not with the physical conditions (of practical + ability) of the execution of one's purpose, the practical a priori + principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom are at once + cognitions, and have not to wait for intuitions in order to acquire + significance, and that for this remarkable reason, because they themselves + produce the reality of that to which they refer (the intention of the + will), which is not the case with theoretical concepts. Only we must be + careful to observe that these categories only apply to the practical + reason; and thus they proceed in order from those which are as yet subject + to sensible conditions and morally indeterminate to those which are free + from sensible conditions and determined merely by the moral law. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0029" id="link2H_4_0029"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good + </h2> + <p> + and Evil. + </p> + <h3> + I. QUANTITY. + </h3> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> + <p> + Subjective, according to maxims (practical opinions of the + </p> + <p> + individual) + </p> + <p> + Objective, according to principles (Precepts) + </p> + <p> + A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom + </p> + <p> + (laws) + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> + <h3> + II. QUALITY. + </h3> + <p> + Practical rules of action (praeceptivae) + </p> + <p> + Practical rules of omission (prohibitivae) + </p> + <p> + Practical rules of exceptions (exceptivae) + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 30</span> + </p> + <h3> + III. RELATION. + </h3> + <p> + To personality + </p> + <p> + To the condition of the person. + </p> + <p> + Reciprocal, of one person to the others of the others. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 35</span> + </p> + <h3> + IV. MODALITY. + </h3> + <p> + The Permitted and the Forbidden + </p> + <p> + Duty and the contrary to duty. + </p> + <p> + Perfect and imperfect duty. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 40</span> + </p> + <p> + It will at once be observed that in this table freedom is considered as a + sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of determination, in + regard to actions possible by it, which are phenomena in the world of + sense, and that consequently it is referred to the categories which + concern its physical possibility, whilst yet each category is taken so + universally that the determining principle of that causality can be placed + outside the world of sense in freedom as a property of a being in the + world of intelligence; and finally the categories of modality introduce + the transition from practical principles generally to those of morality, + but only problematically. These can be established dogmatically only by + the moral law. + </p> + <p> + I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table, since it + is intelligible enough of itself. A division of this kind based on + principles is very useful in any science, both for the sake of + thoroughness and intelligibility. Thus, for instance, we know from the + preceding table and its first number what we must begin from in practical + inquiries; namely, from the maxims which every one founds on his own + inclinations; the precepts which hold for a species of rational beings so + far as they agree in certain inclinations; and finally the law which holds + for all without regard to their inclinations, etc. In this way we survey + the whole plan of what has to be done, every question of practical + philosophy that has to be answered, and also the order that is to be + followed. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0030" id="link2H_4_0030"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 45</span> + </p> + <p> + It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of the + will. They themselves, however, are subject to a practical rule of reason + which, if it is pure reason, determines the will a priori relatively to + its object. Now, whether an action which is possible to us in the world of + sense, comes under the rule or not, is a question to be decided by the + practical judgement, by which what is said in the rule universally (in + abstracto) is applied to an action in concreto. But since a practical rule + of pure reason in the first place as practical concerns the existence of + an object, and in the second place as a practical rule of pure reason + implies necessity as regards the existence of the action and, therefore, + is a practical law, not a physical law depending on empirical principles + of determination, but a law of freedom by which the will is to be + determined independently on anything empirical (merely by the conception + of a law and its form), whereas all instances that can occur of possible + actions can only be empirical, that is, belong to the experience of + physical nature; hence, it seems absurd to expect to find in the world of + sense a case which, while as such it depends only on the law of nature, + yet admits of the application to it of a law of freedom, and to which we + can apply the supersensible idea of the morally good which is to be + exhibited in it in concreto. Thus, the judgement of the pure practical + reason is subject to the same difficulties as that of the pure theoretical + reason. The latter, however, had means at hand of escaping from these + difficulties, because, in regard to the theoretical employment, intuitions + were required to which pure concepts of the understanding could be + applied, and such intuitions (though only of objects of the senses) can be + given a priori and, therefore, as far as regards the union of the manifold + in them, conforming to the pure a priori concepts of the understanding as + schemata. On the other hand, the morally good is something whose object is + supersensible; for which, therefore, nothing corresponding can be found in + any sensible intuition. Judgement depending on laws of pure practical + reason seems, therefore, to be subject to special difficulties arising + from this, that a law of freedom is to be applied to actions, which are + events taking place in the world of sense, and which, so far, belong to + physical nature. + </p> + <p> + But here again is opened a favourable prospect for the pure practical + judgement. When I subsume under a pure practical law an action possible to + me in the world of sense, I am not concerned with the possibility of the + action as an event in the world of sense. This is a matter that belongs to + the decision of reason in its theoretic use according to the law of + causality, which is a pure concept of the understanding, for which reason + has a schema in the sensible intuition. Physical causality, or the + condition under which it takes place, belongs to the physical concepts, + the schema of which is sketched by transcendental imagination. Here, + however, we have to do, not with the schema of a case that occurs + according to laws, but with the schema of a law itself (if the word is + allowable here), since the fact that the will (not the action relatively + to its effect) is determined by the law alone without any other principle, + connects the notion of causality with quite different conditions from + those which constitute physical connection. + </p> + <p> + The physical law being a law to which the objects of sensible intuition, + as such, are subject, must have a schema corresponding to it- that is, a + general procedure of the imagination (by which it exhibits a priori to the + senses the pure concept of the understanding which the law determines). + But the law of freedom (that is, of a causality not subject to sensible + conditions), and consequently the concept of the unconditionally good, + cannot have any intuition, nor consequently any schema supplied to it for + the purpose of its application in concreto. Consequently the moral law has + no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical + objects (not the imagination); and the understanding for the purposes of + the judgement can provide for an idea of the reason, not a schema of the + sensibility, but a law, though only as to its form as law; such a law, + however, as can be exhibited in concreto in objects of the senses, and + therefore a law of nature. We can therefore call this law the type of the + moral law. + </p> + <p> + The rule of the judgement according to laws of pure practical reason is + this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place + by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself a part, you + could regard it as possible by your own will. Everyone does, in fact, + decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or evil. Thus, people + say: "If everyone permitted himself to deceive, when he thought it to his + advantage; or thought himself justified in shortening his life as soon as + he was thoroughly weary of it; or looked with perfect indifference on the + necessity of others; and if you belonged to such an order of things, would + you do so with the assent of your own will?" Now everyone knows well that + if he secretly allows himself to deceive, it does not follow that everyone + else does so; or if, unobserved, he is destitute of compassion, others + would not necessarily be so to him; hence, this comparison of the maxim of + his actions with a universal law of nature is not the determining + principle of his will. Such a law is, nevertheless, a type of the + estimation of the maxim on moral principles. If the maxim of the action is + not such as to stand the test of the form of a universal law of nature, + then it is morally impossible. This is the judgement even of common sense; + for its ordinary judgements, even those of experience, are always based on + the law of nature. It has it therefore always at hand, only that in cases + where causality from freedom is to be criticised, it makes that law of + nature only the type of a law of freedom, because, without something which + it could use as an example in a case of experience, it could not give the + law of a pure practical reason its proper use in practice. + </p> + <p> + It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as the + type of a supersensible system of things, provided I do not transfer to + the latter the intuitions, and what depends on them, but merely apply to + it the form of law in general (the notion of which occurs even in the + commonest use of reason, but cannot be definitely known a priori for any + other purpose than the pure practical use of reason); for laws, as such, + are so far identical, no matter from what they derive their determining + principles. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 50</span> + </p> + <p> + Further, since of all the supersensible absolutely nothing [is known] + except freedom (through the moral law), and this only so far as it is + inseparably implied in that law, and moreover all supersensible objects to + which reason might lead us, following the guidance of that law, have still + no reality for us, except for the purpose of that law, and for the use of + mere practical reason; and as reason is authorized and even compelled to + use physical nature (in its pure form as an object of the understanding) + as the type of the judgement; hence, the present remark will serve to + guard against reckoning amongst concepts themselves that which belongs + only to the typic of concepts. This, namely, as a typic of the judgement, + guards against the empiricism of practical reason, which founds the + practical notions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences + (so-called happiness). No doubt happiness and the infinite advantages + which would result from a will determined by self-love, if this will at + the same time erected itself into a universal law of nature, may certainly + serve as a perfectly suitable type of the morally good, but it is not + identical with it. The same typic guards also against the mysticism of + practical reason, which turns what served only as a symbol into a schema, + that is, proposes to provide for the moral concepts actual intuitions, + which, however, are not sensible (intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of + God), and thus plunges into the transcendent. What is befitting the use of + the moral concepts is only the rationalism of the judgement, which takes + from the sensible system of nature only what pure reason can also conceive + of itself, that is, conformity to law, and transfers into the + supersensible nothing but what can conversely be actually exhibited by + actions in the world of sense according to the formal rule of a law of + nature. However, the caution against empiricism of practical reason is + much more important; for mysticism is quite reconcilable with the purity + and sublimity of the moral law, and, besides, it is not very natural or + agreeable to common habits of thought to strain one's imagination to + supersensible intuitions; and hence the danger on this side is not so + general. Empiricism, on the contrary, cuts up at the roots the morality of + intentions (in which, and not in actions only, consists the high worth + that men can and ought to give to themselves), and substitutes for duty + something quite different, namely, an empirical interest, with which the + inclinations generally are secretly leagued; and empiricism, moreover, + being on this account allied with all the inclinations which (no matter + what fashion they put on) degrade humanity when they are raised to the + dignity of a supreme practical principle; and as these, nevertheless, are + so favourable to everyone's feelings, it is for that reason much more + dangerous than mysticism, which can never constitute a lasting condition + of any great number of persons. + </p> + <h3> + BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0003" id="link2HCH0003"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law + should directly determine the will. If the determination of the will takes + place in conformity indeed to the moral law, but only by means of a + feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to be presupposed in order that + the law may be sufficient to determine the will, and therefore not for the + sake of the law, then the action will possess legality, but not morality. + Now, if we understand by motive (elater animi) the subjective ground of + determination of the will of a being whose reason does not necessarily + conform to the objective law, by virtue of its own nature, then it will + follow, first, that no motives can be attributed to the Divine will, and + that the motives of the human will (as well as that of every created + rational being) can never be anything else than the moral law, and + consequently that the objective principle of determination must always and + alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of the + action, if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law, without + containing its spirit. * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * We may say of every action that conforms to the law, but + is not done for the sake of the law, that it is morally good + in the letter, not in the spirit (the intention). +</pre> + <p> + Since, then, for the purpose of giving the moral law influence over the + will, we must not seek for any other motives that might enable us to + dispense with the motive of the law itself, because that would produce + mere hypocrisy, without consistency; and it is even dangerous to allow + other motives (for instance, that of interest) even to co-operate along + with the moral law; hence nothing is left us but to determine carefully in + what way the moral law becomes a motive, and what effect this has upon the + faculty of desire. For as to the question how a law can be directly and of + itself a determining principle of the will (which is the essence of + morality), this is, for human reason, an insoluble problem and identical + with the question: how a free will is possible. Therefore what we have to + show a priori is not why the moral law in itself supplies a motive, but + what effect it, as such, produces (or, more correctly speaking, must + produce) on the mind. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + The essential point in every determination of the will by the moral law is + that being a free will it is determined simply by the moral law, not only + without the co-operation of sensible impulses, but even to the rejection + of all such, and to the checking of all inclinations so far as they might + be opposed to that law. So far, then, the effect of the moral law as a + motive is only negative, and this motive can be known a priori to be such. + For all inclination and every sensible impulse is founded on feeling, and + the negative effect produced on feeling (by the check on the inclinations) + is itself feeling; consequently, we can see a priori that the moral law, + as a determining principle of the will, must by thwarting all our + inclinations produce a feeling which may be called pain; and in this we + have the first, perhaps the only, instance in which we are able from a + priori considerations to determine the relation of a cognition (in this + case of pure practical reason) to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. + All the inclinations together (which can be reduced to a tolerable system, + in which case their satisfaction is called happiness) constitute + self-regard (solipsismus). This is either the self-love that consists in + an excessive fondness for oneself (philautia), or satisfaction with + oneself (arrogantia). The former is called particularly selfishness; the + latter self-conceit. Pure practical reason only checks selfishness, + looking on it as natural and active in us even prior to the moral law, so + far as to limit it to the condition of agreement with this law, and then + it is called rational self-love. But self-conceit reason strikes down + altogether, since all claims to self-esteem which precede agreement with + the moral law are vain and unjustifiable, for the certainty of a state of + mind that coincides with this law is the first condition of personal worth + (as we shall presently show more clearly), and prior to this conformity + any pretension to worth is false and unlawful. Now the propensity to + self-esteem is one of the inclinations which the moral law checks, + inasmuch as that esteem rests only on morality. Therefore the moral law + breaks down self-conceit. But as this law is something positive in itself, + namely, the form of an intellectual causality, that is, of freedom, it + must be an object of respect; for, by opposing the subjective antagonism + of the inclinations, it weakens self-conceit; and since it even breaks + down, that is, humiliates, this conceit, it is an object of the highest + respect and, consequently, is the foundation of a positive feeling which + is not of empirical origin, but is known a priori. Therefore respect for + the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual cause, and + this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori and the necessity + of which we can perceive. + </p> + <p> + In the preceding chapter we have seen that everything that presents itself + as an object of the will prior to the moral law is by that law itself, + which is the supreme condition of practical reason, excluded from the + determining principles of the will which we have called the + unconditionally good; and that the mere practical form which consists in + the adaptation of the maxims to universal legislation first determines + what is good in itself and absolutely, and is the basis of the maxims of a + pure will, which alone is good in every respect. However, we find that our + nature as sensible beings is such that the matter of desire (objects of + inclination, whether of hope or fear) first presents itself to us; and our + pathologically affected self, although it is in its maxims quite unfit for + universal legislation; yet, just as if it constituted our entire self, + strives to put its pretensions forward first, and to have them + acknowledged as the first and original. This propensity to make ourselves + in the subjective determining principles of our choice serve as the + objective determining principle of the will generally may be called + self-love; and if this pretends to be legislative as an unconditional + practical principle it may be called self-conceit. Now the moral law, + which alone is truly objective (namely, in every respect), entirely + excludes the influence of self-love on the supreme practical principle, + and indefinitely checks the self-conceit that prescribes the subjective + conditions of the former as laws. Now whatever checks our self-conceit in + our own judgement humiliates; therefore the moral law inevitably humbles + every man when he compares with it the physical propensities of his + nature. That, the idea of which as a determining principle of our will + humbles us in our self-consciousness, awakes respect for itself, so far as + it is itself positive and a determining principle. Therefore the moral law + is even subjectively a cause of respect. Now since everything that enters + into self-love belongs to inclination, and all inclination rests on + feelings, and consequently whatever checks all the feelings together in + self-love has necessarily, by this very circumstance, an influence on + feeling; hence we comprehend how it is possible to perceive a priori that + the moral law can produce an effect on feeling, in that it excludes the + inclinations and the propensity to make them the supreme practical + condition, i.e., self-love, from all participation in the supreme + legislation. This effect is on one side merely negative, but on the other + side, relatively to the restricting principle of pure practical reason, it + is positive. No special kind of feeling need be assumed for this under the + name of a practical or moral feeling as antecedent to the moral law and + serving as its foundation. + </p> + <p> + The negative effect on feeling (unpleasantness) is pathological, like + every influence on feeling and like every feeling generally. But as an + effect of the consciousness of the moral law, and consequently in relation + to a supersensible cause, namely, the subject of pure practical reason + which is the supreme lawgiver, this feeling of a rational being affected + by inclinations is called humiliation (intellectual self-depreciation); + but with reference to the positive source of this humiliation, the law, it + is respect for it. There is indeed no feeling for this law; but inasmuch + as it removes the resistance out of the way, this removal of an obstacle + is, in the judgement of reason, esteemed equivalent to a positive help to + its causality. Therefore this feeling may also be called a feeling of + respect for the moral law, and for both reasons together a moral feeling. + </p> + <p> + While the moral law, therefore, is a formal determining principle of + action by practical pure reason, and is moreover a material though only + objective determining principle of the objects of action as called good + and evil, it is also a subjective determining principle, that is, a motive + to this action, inasmuch as it has influence on the morality of the + subject and produces a feeling conducive to the influence of the law on + the will. There is here in the subject no antecedent feeling tending to + morality. For this is impossible, since every feeling is sensible, and the + motive of moral intention must be free from all sensible conditions. On + the contrary, while the sensible feeling which is at the bottom of all our + inclinations is the condition of that impression which we call respect, + the cause that determines it lies in the pure practical reason; and this + impression therefore, on account of its origin, must be called, not a + pathological but a practical effect. For by the fact that the conception + of the moral law deprives self-love of its influence, and self-conceit of + its illusion, it lessens the obstacle to pure practical reason and + produces the conception of the superiority of its objective law to the + impulses of the sensibility; and thus, by removing the counterpoise, it + gives relatively greater weight to the law in the judgement of reason (in + the case of a will affected by the aforesaid impulses). Thus the respect + for the law is not a motive to morality, but is morality itself + subjectively considered as a motive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by + rejecting all the rival pretensions of self-love, gives authority to the + law, which now alone has influence. Now it is to be observed that as + respect is an effect on feeling, and therefore on the sensibility, of a + rational being, it presupposes this sensibility, and therefore also the + finiteness of such beings on whom the moral law imposes respect; and that + respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being, or to any + being free from all sensibility, in whom, therefore, this sensibility + cannot be an obstacle to practical reason. + </p> + <p> + This feeling (which we call the moral feeling) is therefore produced + simply by reason. It does not serve for the estimation of actions nor for + the foundation of the objective moral law itself, but merely as a motive + to make this of itself a maxim. But what name could we more suitably apply + to this singular feeling which cannot be compared to any pathological + feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind that it seems to be at the disposal + of reason only, and that pure practical reason. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> + <p> + Respect applies always to persons only- not to things. The latter may + arouse inclination, and if they are animals (e.g., horses, dogs, etc.), + even love or fear, like the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey; but never + respect. Something that comes nearer to this feeling is admiration, and + this, as an affection, astonishment, can apply to things also, e.g., lofty + mountains, the magnitude, number, and distance of the heavenly bodies, the + strength and swiftness of many animals, etc. But all this is not respect. + A man also may be an object to me of love, fear, or admiration, even to + astonishment, and yet not be an object of respect. His jocose humour, his + courage and strength, his power from the rank he has amongst others, may + inspire me with sentiments of this kind, but still inner respect for him + is wanting. Fontenelle says, "I bow before a great man, but my mind does + not bow." I would add, before an humble plain man, in whom I perceive + uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am conscious of in + myself,- my mind bows whether I choose it or not, and though I bear my + head never so high that he may not forget my superior rank. Why is this? + Because his example exhibits to me a law that humbles my self-conceit when + I compare it with my conduct: a law, the practicability of obedience to + which I see proved by fact before my eyes. Now, I may even be conscious of + a like degree of uprightness, and yet the respect remains. For since in + man all good is defective, the law made visible by an example still + humbles my pride, my standard being furnished by a man whose + imperfections, whatever they may be, are not known to me as my own are, + and who therefore appears to me in a more favourable light. Respect is a + tribute which we cannot refuse to merit, whether we will or not; we may + indeed outwardly withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly. + </p> + <p> + Respect is so far from being a feeling of pleasure that we only + reluctantly give way to it as regards a man. We try to find out something + that may lighten the burden of it, some fault to compensate us for the + humiliation which such an example causes. Even the dead are not always + secure from this criticism, especially if their example appears + inimitable. Even the moral law itself in its solemn majesty is exposed to + this endeavour to save oneself from yielding it respect. Can it be thought + that it is for any other reason that we are so ready to reduce it to the + level of our familiar inclination, or that it is for any other reason that + we all take such trouble to make it out to be the chosen precept of our + own interest well understood, but that we want to be free from the + deterrent respect which shows us our own unworthiness with such severity? + Nevertheless, on the other hand, so little is there pain in it that if + once one has laid aside self-conceit and allowed practical influence to + that respect, he can never be satisfied with contemplating the majesty of + this law, and the soul believes itself elevated in proportion as it sees + the holy law elevated above it and its frail nature. No doubt great + talents and activity proportioned to them may also occasion respect or an + analogous feeling. It is very proper to yield it to them, and then it + appears as if this sentiment were the same thing as admiration. But if we + look closer we shall observe that it is always uncertain how much of the + ability is due to native talent, and how much to diligence in cultivating + it. Reason represents it to us as probably the fruit of cultivation, and + therefore as meritorious, and this notably reduces our self-conceit, and + either casts a reproach on us or urges us to follow such an example in the + way that is suitable to us. This respect, then, which we show to such a + person (properly speaking, to the law that his example exhibits) is not + mere admiration; and this is confirmed also by the fact that when the + common run of admirers think they have learned from any source the badness + of such a man's character (for instance Voltaire's) they give up all + respect for him; whereas the true scholar still feels it at least with + regard to his talents, because he is himself engaged in a business and a + vocation which make imitation of such a man in some degree a law. + </p> + <p> + Respect for the moral law is, therefore, the only and the undoubted moral + motive, and this feeling is directed to no object, except on the ground of + this law. The moral law first determines the will objectively and directly + in the judgement of reason; and freedom, whose causality can be determined + only by the law, consists just in this, that it restricts all + inclinations, and consequently self-esteem, by the condition of obedience + to its pure law. This restriction now has an effect on feeling, and + produces the impression of displeasure which can be known a priori from + the moral law. Since it is so far only a negative effect which, arising + from the influence of pure practical reason, checks the activity of the + subject, so far as it is determined by inclinations, and hence checks the + opinion of his personal worth (which, in the absence of agreement with the + moral law, is reduced to nothing); hence, the effect of this law on + feeling is merely humiliation. We can, therefore, perceive this a priori, + but cannot know by it the force of the pure practical law as a motive, but + only the resistance to motives of the sensibility. But since the same law + is objectively, that is, in the conception of pure reason, an immediate + principle of determination of the will, and consequently this humiliation + takes place only relatively to the purity of the law; hence, the lowering + of the pretensions of moral self-esteem, that is, humiliation on the + sensible side, is an elevation of the moral, i.e., practical, esteem for + the law itself on the intellectual side; in a word, it is respect for the + law, and therefore, as its cause is intellectual, a positive feeling which + can be known a priori. For whatever diminishes the obstacles to an + activity furthers this activity itself. Now the recognition of the moral + law is the consciousness of an activity of practical reason from objective + principles, which only fails to reveal its effect in actions because + subjective (pathological) causes hinder it. Respect for the moral law then + must be regarded as a positive, though indirect, effect of it on feeling, + inasmuch as this respect weakens the impeding influence of inclinations by + humiliating self-esteem; and hence also as a subjective principle of + activity, that is, as a motive to obedience to the law, and as a principle + of the maxims of a life conformable to it. From the notion of a motive + arises that of an interest, which can never be attributed to any being + unless it possesses reason, and which signifies a motive of the will in so + far as it is conceived by the reason. Since in a morally good will the law + itself must be the motive, the moral interest is a pure interest of + practical reason alone, independent of sense. On the notion of an interest + is based that of a maxim. This, therefore, is morally good only in case it + rests simply on the interest taken in obedience to the law. All three + notions, however, that of a motive, of an interest, and of a maxim, can be + applied only to finite beings. For they all suppose a limitation of the + nature of the being, in that the subjective character of his choice does + not of itself agree with the objective law of a practical reason; they + suppose that the being requires to be impelled to action by something, + because an internal obstacle opposes itself. Therefore they cannot be + applied to the Divine will. + </p> + <p> + There is something so singular in the unbounded esteem for the pure moral + law, apart from all advantage, as it is presented for our obedience by + practical reason, the voice of which makes even the boldest sinner tremble + and compels him to hide himself from it, that we cannot wonder if we find + this influence of a mere intellectual idea on the feelings quite + incomprehensible to speculative reason and have to be satisfied with + seeing so much of this a priori that such a feeling is inseparably + connected with the conception of the moral law in every finite rational + being. If this feeling of respect were pathological, and therefore were a + feeling of pleasure based on the inner sense, it would be in vain to try + to discover a connection of it with any idea a priori. But [it] is a + feeling that applies merely to what is practical, and depends on the + conception of a law, simply as to its form, not on account of any object, + and therefore cannot be reckoned either as pleasure or pain, and yet + produces an interest in obedience to the law, which we call the moral + interest, just as the capacity of taking such an interest in the law (or + respect for the moral law itself) is properly the moral feeling. + </p> + <p> + The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law, yet + combined with an inevitable constraint put upon all inclinations, though + only by our own reason, is respect for the law. The law that demands this + respect and inspires it is clearly no other than the moral (for no other + precludes all inclinations from exercising any direct influence on the + will). An action which is objectively practical according to this law, to + the exclusion of every determining principle of inclination, is duty, and + this by reason of that exclusion includes in its concept practical + obligation, that is, a determination to actions, however reluctantly they + may be done. The feeling that arises from the consciousness of this + obligation is not pathological, as would be a feeling produced by an + object of the senses, but practical only, that is, it is made possible by + a preceding (objective) determination of the will and a causality of the + reason. As submission to the law, therefore, that is, as a command + (announcing constraint for the sensibly affected subject), it contains in + it no pleasure, but on the contrary, so far, pain in the action. On the + other hand, however, as this constraint is exercised merely by the + legislation of our own reason, it also contains something elevating, and + this subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical reason is + the sole cause of it, may be called in this respect self-approbation, + since we recognize ourselves as determined thereto solely by the law + without any interest, and are now conscious of a quite different interest + subjectively produced thereby, and which is purely practical and free; and + our taking this interest in an action of duty is not suggested by any + inclination, but is commanded and actually brought about by reason through + the practical law; whence this feeling obtains a special name, that of + respect. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 15</span> + </p> + <p> + The notion of duty, therefore, requires in the action, objectively, + agreement with the law, and, subjectively in its maxim, that respect for + the law shall be the sole mode in which the will is determined thereby. + And on this rests the distinction between the consciousness of having + acted according to duty and from duty, that is, from respect for the law. + The former (legality) is possible even if inclinations have been the + determining principles of the will; but the latter (morality), moral + worth, can be placed only in this, that the action is done from duty, that + is, simply for the sake of the law. * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * If we examine accurately the notion of respect for persons + as it has been already laid down, we shall perceive that it + always rests on the consciousness of a duty which an example + shows us, and that respect, therefore, can never have any + but a moral ground, and that it is very good and even, in a + psychological point of view, very useful for the knowledge + of mankind, that whenever we use this expression we should + attend to this secret and marvellous, yet often recurring, + regard which men in their judgement pay to the moral law. +</pre> + <p> + It is of the greatest importance to attend with the utmost exactness in + all moral judgements to the subjective principle of all maxims, that all + the morality of actions may be placed in the necessity of acting from duty + and from respect for the law, not from love and inclination for that which + the actions are to produce. For men and all created rational beings moral + necessity is constraint, that is obligation, and every action based on it + is to be conceived as a duty, not as a proceeding previously pleasing, or + likely to be pleasing to us of our own accord. As if indeed we could ever + bring it about that without respect for the law, which implies fear, or at + least apprehension of transgression, we of ourselves, like the independent + Deity, could ever come into possession of holiness of will by the + coincidence of our will with the pure moral law becoming as it were part + of our nature, never to be shaken (in which case the law would cease to be + a command for us, as we could never be tempted to be untrue to it). + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> + <p> + The moral law is in fact for the will of a perfect being a law of + holiness, but for the will of every finite rational being a law of duty, + of moral constraint, and of the determination of its actions by respect + for this law and reverence for its duty. No other subjective principle + must be assumed as a motive, else while the action might chance to be such + as the law prescribes, yet, as does not proceed from duty, the intention, + which is the thing properly in question in this legislation, is not moral. + </p> + <p> + It is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and from + sympathetic good will, or to be just from love of order; but this is not + yet the true moral maxim of our conduct which is suitable to our position + amongst rational beings as men, when we pretend with fanciful pride to set + ourselves above the thought of duty, like volunteers, and, as if we were + independent on the command, to want to do of our own good pleasure what we + think we need no command to do. We stand under a discipline of reason and + in all our maxims must not forget our subjection to it, nor withdraw + anything therefrom, or by an egotistic presumption diminish aught of the + authority of the law (although our own reason gives it) so as to set the + determining principle of our will, even though the law be conformed to, + anywhere else but in the law itself and in respect for this law. Duty and + obligation are the only names that we must give to our relation to the + moral law. We are indeed legislative members of a moral kingdom rendered + possible by freedom, and presented to us by reason as an object of + respect; but yet we are subjects in it, not the sovereign, and to mistake + our inferior position as creatures, and presumptuously to reject the + authority of the moral law, is already to revolt from it in spirit, even + though the letter of it is fulfilled. + </p> + <p> + With this agrees very well the possibility of such a command as: Love God + above everything, and thy neighbour as thyself. * For as a command it + requires respect for a law which commands love and does not leave it to + our own arbitrary choice to make this our principle. Love to God, however, + considered as an inclination (pathological love), is impossible, for He is + not an object of the senses. The same affection towards men is possible no + doubt, but cannot be commanded, for it is not in the power of any man to + love anyone at command; therefore it is only practical love that is meant + in that pith of all laws. To love God means, in this sense, to like to do + His commandments; to love one's neighbour means to like to practise all + duties towards him. But the command that makes this a rule cannot command + us to have this disposition in actions conformed to duty, but only to + endeavour after it. For a command to like to do a thing is in itself + contradictory, because if we already know of ourselves what we are bound + to do, and if further we are conscious of liking to do it, a command would + be quite needless; and if we do it not willingly, but only out of respect + for the law, a command that makes this respect the motive of our maxim + would directly counteract the disposition commanded. That law of all laws, + therefore, like all the moral precepts of the Gospel, exhibits the moral + disposition in all its perfection, in which, viewed as an ideal of + holiness, it is not attainable by any creature, but yet is the pattern + which we should strive to approach, and in an uninterrupted but infinite + progress become like to. In fact, if a rational creature could ever reach + this point, that he thoroughly likes to do all moral laws, this would mean + that there does not exist in him even the possibility of a desire that + would tempt him to deviate from them; for to overcome such a desire always + costs the subject some sacrifice and therefore requires self-compulsion, + that is, inward constraint to something that one does not quite like to + do; and no creature can ever reach this stage of moral disposition. For, + being a creature, and therefore always dependent with respect to what he + requires for complete satisfaction, he can never be quite free from + desires and inclinations, and as these rest on physical causes, they can + never of themselves coincide with the moral law, the sources of which are + quite different; and therefore they make it necessary to found the mental + disposition of one's maxims on moral obligation, not on ready inclination, + but on respect, which demands obedience to the law, even though one may + not like it; not on love, which apprehends no inward reluctance of the + will towards the law. Nevertheless, this latter, namely, love to the law + (which would then cease to be a command, and then morality, which would + have passed subjectively into holiness, would cease to be virtue) must be + the constant though unattainable goal of his endeavours. For in the case + of what we highly esteem, but yet (on account of the consciousness of our + weakness) dread, the increased facility of satisfying it changes the most + reverential awe into inclination, and respect into love; at least this + would be the perfection of a disposition devoted to the law, if it were + possible for a creature to attain it. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * This law is in striking contrast with the principle of + private happiness which some make the supreme principle of + morality. This would be expressed thus: Love thyself above + everything, and God and thy neighbour for thine own sake. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> + <p> + This reflection is intended not so much to clear up the evangelical + command just cited, in order to prevent religious fanaticism in regard to + love of God, but to define accurately the moral disposition with regard + directly to our duties towards men, and to check, or if possible prevent, + a merely moral fanaticism which infects many persons. The stage of + morality on which man (and, as far as we can see, every rational creature) + stands is respect for the moral law. The disposition that he ought to have + in obeying this is to obey it from duty, not from spontaneous inclination, + or from an endeavour taken up from liking and unbidden; and this proper + moral condition in which he can always be is virtue, that is, moral + disposition militant, and not holiness in the fancied possession of a + perfect purity of the disposition of the will. It is nothing but moral + fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit that is infused into the mind by + exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, by which men + are led into the delusion that it is not duty, that is, respect for the + law, whose yoke (an easy yoke indeed, because reason itself imposes it on + us) they must bear, whether they like it or not, that constitutes the + determining principle of their actions, and which always humbles them + while they obey it; fancying that those actions are expected from them, + not from duty, but as pure merit. For not only would they, in imitating + such deeds from such a principle, not have fulfilled the spirit of the law + in the least, which consists not in the legality of the action (without + regard to principle), but in the subjection of the mind to the law; not + only do they make the motives pathological (seated in sympathy or + self-love), not moral (in the law), but they produce in this way a vain, + high-flying, fantastic way of thinking, flattering themselves with a + spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor bridle, for + which no command is needed, and thereby forgetting their obligation, which + they ought to think of rather than merit. Indeed actions of others which + are done with great sacrifice, and merely for the sake of duty, may be + praised as noble and sublime, but only so far as there are traces which + suggest that they were done wholly out of respect for duty and not from + excited feelings. If these, however, are set before anyone as examples to + be imitated, respect for duty (which is the only true moral feeling) must + be employed as the motive- this severe holy precept which never allows our + vain self-love to dally with pathological impulses (however analogous they + may be to morality), and to take a pride in meritorious worth. Now if we + search we shall find for all actions that are worthy of praise a law of + duty which commands, and does not leave us to choose what may be agreeable + to our inclinations. This is the only way of representing things that can + give a moral training to the soul, because it alone is capable of solid + and accurately defined principles. + </p> + <p> + If fanaticism in its most general sense is a deliberate over stepping of + the limits of human reason, then moral fanaticism is such an over stepping + of the bounds that practical pure reason sets to mankind, in that it + forbids us to place the subjective determining principle of correct + actions, that is, their moral motive, in anything but the law itself, or + to place the disposition which is thereby brought into the maxims in + anything but respect for this law, and hence commands us to take as the + supreme vital principle of all morality in men the thought of duty, which + strikes down all arrogance as well as vain self-love. + </p> + <p> + If this is so, it is not only writers of romance or sentimental educators + (although they may be zealous opponents of sentimentalism), but sometimes + even philosophers, nay, even the severest of all, the Stoics, that have + brought in moral fanaticism instead of a sober but wise moral discipline, + although the fanaticism of the latter was more heroic, that of the former + of an insipid, effeminate character; and we may, without hypocrisy, say of + the moral teaching of the Gospel, that it first, by the purity of its + moral principle, and at the same time by its suitability to the + limitations of finite beings, brought all the good conduct of men under + the discipline of a duty plainly set before their eyes, which does not + permit them to indulge in dreams of imaginary moral perfections; and that + it also set the bounds of humility (that is, self-knowledge) to + self-conceit as well as to self-love, both which are ready to mistake + their limits. + </p> + <p> + Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or + insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not to move the + will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror, + but merely holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the + mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a + law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly + counter-work it; what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be + found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kindred with + the inclinations; a root to be derived from which is the indispensable + condition of the only worth which men can give themselves? + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 30</span> + </p> + <p> + It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself (as a + part of the world of sense), a power which connects him with an order of + things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the + same time commands the whole sensible world, and with it the empirically + determinable existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all + ends (which totality alone suits such unconditional practical laws as the + moral). This power is nothing but personality, that is, freedom and + independence on the mechanism of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty + of a being which is subject to special laws, namely, pure practical laws + given by its own reason; so that the person as belonging to the sensible + world is subject to his own personality as belonging to the intelligible + [supersensible] world. It is then not to be wondered at that man, as + belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to its + second and highest characteristic only with reverence, and its laws with + the highest respect. + </p> + <p> + On this origin are founded many expressions which designate the worth of + objects according to moral ideas. The moral law is holy (inviolable). Man + is indeed unholy enough, but he must regard humanity in his own person as + holy. In all creation every thing one chooses and over which one has any + power, may be used merely as means; man alone, and with him every rational + creature, is an end in himself. By virtue of the autonomy of his freedom + he is the subject of the moral law, which is holy. Just for this reason + every will, even every person's own individual will, in relation to + itself, is restricted to the condition of agreement with the autonomy of + the rational being, that is to say, that it is not to be subject to any + purpose which cannot accord with a law which might arise from the will of + the passive subject himself; the latter is, therefore, never to be + employed merely as means, but as itself also, concurrently, an end. We + justly attribute this condition even to the Divine will, with regard to + the rational beings in the world, which are His creatures, since it rests + on their personality, by which alone they are ends in themselves. + </p> + <p> + This respect-inspiring idea of personality which sets before our eyes the + sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at the same time it + shows us the want of accord of our conduct with it and thereby strikes + down self-conceit, is even natural to the commonest reason and easily + observed. Has not every even moderately honourable man sometimes found + that, where by an otherwise inoffensive lie he might either have withdrawn + himself from an unpleasant business, or even have procured some advantages + for a loved and well-deserving friend, he has avoided it solely lest he + should despise himself secretly in his own eyes? When an upright man is in + the greatest distress, which he might have avoided if he could only have + disregarded duty, is he not sustained by the consciousness that he has + maintained humanity in its proper dignity in his own person and honoured + it, that he has no reason to be ashamed of himself in his own sight, or to + dread the inward glance of self-examination? This consolation is not + happiness, it is not even the smallest part of it, for no one would wish + to have occasion for it, or would, perhaps, even desire a life in such + circumstances. But he lives, and he cannot endure that he should be in his + own eyes unworthy of life. This inward peace is therefore merely negative + as regards what can make life pleasant; it is, in fact, only the escaping + the danger of sinking in personal worth, after everything else that is + valuable has been lost. It is the effect of a respect for something quite + different from life, something in comparison and contrast with which life + with all its enjoyment has no value. He still lives only because it is his + duty, not because he finds anything pleasant in life. + </p> + <p> + Such is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason; it is no + other than the pure moral law itself, inasmuch as it makes us conscious of + the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and subjectively produces + respect for their higher nature in men who are also conscious of their + sensible existence and of the consequent dependence of their + pathologically very susceptible nature. Now with this motive may be + combined so many charms and satisfactions of life that even on this + account alone the most prudent choice of a rational Epicurean reflecting + on the greatest advantage of life would declare itself on the side of + moral conduct, and it may even be advisable to join this prospect of a + cheerful enjoyment of life with that supreme motive which is already + sufficient of itself; but only as a counterpoise to the attractions which + vice does not fail to exhibit on the opposite side, and not so as, even in + the smallest degree, to place in this the proper moving power when duty is + in question. For that would be just the same as to wish to taint the + purity of the moral disposition in its source. The majesty of duty has + nothing to do with enjoyment of life; it has its special law and its + special tribunal, and though the two should be never so well shaken + together to be given well mixed, like medicine, to the sick soul, yet they + will soon separate of themselves; and if they do not, the former will not + act; and although physical life might gain somewhat in force, the moral + life would fade away irrecoverably. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 35</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0032" id="link2H_4_0032"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + By the critical examination of a science, or of a portion of it, which + constitutes a system by itself, I understand the inquiry and proof why it + must have this and no other systematic form, when we compare it with + another system which is based on a similar faculty of knowledge. Now + practical and speculative reason are based on the same faculty, so far as + both are pure reason. Therefore the difference in their systematic form + must be determined by the comparison of both, and the ground of this must + be assigned. + </p> + <p> + The Analytic of pure theoretic reason had to do with the knowledge of such + objects as may have been given to the understanding, and was obliged + therefore to begin from intuition and consequently (as this is always + sensible) from sensibility; and only after that could advance to concepts + (of the objects of this intuition), and could only end with principles + after both these had preceded. On the contrary, since practical reason has + not to do with objects so as to know them, but with its own faculty of + realizing them (in accordance with the knowledge of them), that is, with a + will which is a causality, inasmuch as reason contains its determining + principle; since, consequently, it has not to furnish an object of + intuition, but as practical reason has to furnish only a law (because the + notion of causality always implies the reference to a law which determines + the existence of the many in relation to one another); hence a critical + examination of the Analytic of reason, if this is to be practical reason + (and this is properly the problem), must begin with the possibility of + practical principles a priori. Only after that can it proceed to concepts + of the objects of a practical reason, namely, those of absolute good and + evil, in order to assign them in accordance with those principles (for + prior to those principles they cannot possibly be given as good and evil + by any faculty of knowledge), and only then could the section be concluded + with the last chapter, that, namely, which treats of the relation of the + pure practical reason to the sensibility and of its necessary influence + thereon, which is a priori cognisable, that is, of the moral sentiment. + Thus the Analytic of the practical pure reason has the whole extent of the + conditions of its use in common with the theoretical, but in reverse + order. The Analytic of pure theoretic reason was divided into + transcendental Aesthetic and transcendental Logic, that of the practical + reversely into Logic and Aesthetic of pure practical reason (if I may, for + the sake of analogy merely, use these designations, which are not quite + suitable). This logic again was there divided into the Analytic of + concepts and that of principles: here into that of principles and + concepts. The Aesthetic also had in the former case two parts, on account + of the two kinds of sensible intuition; here the sensibility is not + considered as a capacity of intuition at all, but merely as feeling (which + can be a subjective ground of desire), and in regard to it pure practical + reason admits no further division. + </p> + <p> + It is also easy to see the reason why this division into two parts with + its subdivision was not actually adopted here (as one might have been + induced to attempt by the example of the former critique). For since it is + pure reason that is here considered in its practical use, and consequently + as proceeding from a priori principles, and not from empirical principles + of determination, hence the division of the analytic of pure practical + reason must resemble that of a syllogism; namely, proceeding from the + universal in the major premiss (the moral principle), through a minor + premiss containing a subsumption of possible actions (as good or evil) + under the former, to the conclusion, namely, the subjective determination + of the will (an interest in the possible practical good, and in the maxim + founded on it). He who has been able to convince himself of the truth of + the positions occurring in the Analytic will take pleasure in such + comparisons; for they justly suggest the expectation that we may perhaps + some day be able to discern the unity of the whole faculty of reason + (theoretical as well as practical) and be able to derive all from one + principle, which, is what human reason inevitably demands, as it finds + complete satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of its + knowledge. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 40</span> + </p> + <p> + If now we consider also the contents of the knowledge that we can have of + a pure practical reason, and by means of it, as shown by the Analytic, we + find, along with a remarkable analogy between it and the theoretical, no + less remarkable differences. As regards the theoretical, the faculty of a + pure rational cognition a priori could be easily and evidently proved by + examples from sciences (in which, as they put their principles to the test + in so many ways by methodical use, there is not so much reason as in + common knowledge to fear a secret mixture of empirical principles of + cognition). But, that pure reason without the admixture of any empirical + principle is practical of itself, this could only be shown from the + commonest practical use of reason, by verifying the fact, that every man's + natural reason acknowledges the supreme practical principle as the supreme + law of his will- a law completely a priori and not depending on any + sensible data. It was necessary first to establish and verify the purity + of its origin, even in the judgement of this common reason, before science + could take it in hand to make use of it, as a fact, that is, prior to all + disputation about its possibility, and all the consequences that may be + drawn from it. But this circumstance may be readily explained from what + has just been said; because practical pure reason must necessarily begin + with principles, which therefore must be the first data, the foundation of + all science, and cannot be derived from it. It was possible to effect this + verification of moral principles as principles of a pure reason quite + well, and with sufficient certainty, by a single appeal to the judgement + of common sense, for this reason, that anything empirical which might slip + into our maxims as a determining principle of the will can be detected at + once by the feeling of pleasure or pain which necessarily attaches to it + as exciting desire; whereas pure practical reason positively refuses to + admit this feeling into its principle as a condition. The heterogeneity of + the determining principles (the empirical and rational) is clearly + detected by this resistance of a practically legislating reason against + every admixture of inclination, and by a peculiar kind of sentiment, + which, however, does not precede the legislation of the practical reason, + but, on the contrary, is produced by this as a constraint, namely, by the + feeling of a respect such as no man has for inclinations of whatever kind + but for the law only; and it is detected in so marked and prominent a + manner that even the most uninstructed cannot fail to see at once in an + example presented to him, that empirical principles of volition may indeed + urge him to follow their attractions, but that he can never be expected to + obey anything but the pure practical law of reason alone. + </p> + <p> + The distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine of + morality, in the former of which empirical principles constitute the + entire foundation, while in the second they do not form the smallest part + of it, is the first and most important office of the Analytic of pure + practical reason; and it must proceed in it with as much exactness and, so + to speak, scrupulousness, as any geometer in his work. The philosopher, + however, has greater difficulties to contend with here (as always in + rational cognition by means of concepts merely without construction), + because he cannot take any intuition as a foundation (for a pure + noumenon). He has, however, this advantage that, like the chemist, he can + at any time make an experiment with every man's practical reason for the + purpose of distinguishing the moral (pure) principle of determination from + the empirical; namely, by adding the moral law (as a determining + principle) to the empirically affected will (e.g., that of the man who + would be ready to lie because he can gain something thereby). It is as if + the analyst added alkali to a solution of lime in hydrochloric acid, the + acid at once forsakes the lime, combines with the alkali, and the lime is + precipitated. Just in the same way, if to a man who is otherwise honest + (or who for this occasion places himself only in thought in the position + of an honest man), we present the moral law by which he recognises the + worthlessness of the liar, his practical reason (in forming a judgement of + what ought to be done) at once forsakes the advantage, combines with that + which maintains in him respect for his own person (truthfulness), and the + advantage after it has been separated and washed from every particle of + reason (which is altogether on the side of duty) is easily weighed by + everyone, so that it can enter into combination with reason in other + cases, only not where it could be opposed to the moral law, which reason + never forsakes, but most closely unites itself with. + </p> + <p> + But it does not follow that this distinction between the principle of + happiness and that of morality is an opposition between them, and pure + practical reason does not require that we should renounce all claim to + happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we should take no + account of happiness. It may even in certain respects be a duty to provide + for happiness; partly, because (including skill, wealth, riches) it + contains means for the fulfilment of our duty; partly, because the absence + of it (e.g., poverty) implies temptations to transgress our duty. But it + can never be an immediate duty to promote our happiness, still less can it + be the principle of all duty. Now, as all determining principles of the + will, except the law of pure practical reason alone (the moral law), are + all empirical and, therefore, as such, belong to the principle of + happiness, they must all be kept apart from the supreme principle of + morality and never be incorporated with it as a condition; since this + would be to destroy all moral worth just as much as any empirical + admixture with geometrical principles would destroy the certainty of + mathematical evidence, which in Plato's opinion is the most excellent + thing in mathematics, even surpassing their utility. + </p> + <p> + Instead, however, of the deduction of the supreme principle of pure + practical reason, that is, the explanation of the possibility of such a + knowledge a priori, the utmost we were able to do was to show that if we + saw the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, we should also + see not merely the possibility, but even the necessity, of the moral law + as the supreme practical law of rational beings, to whom we attribute + freedom of causality of their will; because both concepts are so + inseparably united that we might define practical freedom as independence + of the will on anything but the moral law. But we cannot perceive the + possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, especially in the world + of sense; we are fortunate if only we can be sufficiently assured that + there is no proof of its impossibility, and are now, by the moral law + which postulates it, compelled and therefore authorized to assume it. + However, there are still many who think that they can explain this freedom + on empirical principles, like any other physical faculty, and treat it as + a psychological property, the explanation of which only requires a more + exact study of the nature of the soul and of the motives of the will, and + not as a transcendental predicate of the causality of a being that belongs + to the world of sense (which is really the point). They thus deprive us of + the grand revelation which we obtain through practical reason by means of + the moral law, the revelation, namely, of a supersensible world by the + realization of the otherwise transcendent concept of freedom, and by this + deprive us also of the moral law itself, which admits no empirical + principle of determination. Therefore it will be necessary to add + something here as a protection against this delusion and to exhibit + empiricism in its naked superficiality. + </p> + <p> + The notion of causality as physical necessity, in opposition to the same + notion as freedom, concerns only the existence of things so far as it is + determinable in time, and, consequently, as phenomena, in opposition to + their causality as things in themselves. Now if we take the attributes of + existence of things in time for attributes of things in themselves (which + is the common view), then it is impossible to reconcile the necessity of + the causal relation with freedom; they are contradictory. For from the + former it follows that every event, and consequently every action that + takes place at a certain point of time, is a necessary result of what + existed in time preceding. Now as time past is no longer in my power, + hence every action that I perform must be the necessary result of certain + determining grounds which are not in my power, that is, at the moment in + which I am acting I am never free. Nay, even if I assume that my whole + existence is independent on any foreign cause (for instance, God), so that + the determining principles of my causality, and even of my whole + existence, were not outside myself, yet this would not in the least + transform that physical necessity into freedom. For at every moment of + time I am still under the necessity of being determined to action by that + which is not in my power, and the series of events infinite a parte + priori, which I only continue according to a pre-determined order and + could never begin of myself, would be a continuous physical chain, and + therefore my causality would never be freedom. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 45</span> + </p> + <p> + If, then, we would attribute freedom to a being whose existence is + determined in time, we cannot except him from the law of necessity as to + all events in his existence and, consequently, as to his actions also; for + that would be to hand him over to blind chance. Now as this law inevitably + applies to all the causality of things, so far as their existence is + determinable in time, it follows that if this were the mode in which we + had also to conceive the existence of these things in themselves, freedom + must be rejected as a vain and impossible conception. Consequently, if we + would still save it, no other way remains but to consider that the + existence of a thing, so far as it is determinable in time, and therefore + its causality, according to the law of physical necessity, belong to + appearance, and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in + itself. This is certainly inevitable, if we would retain both these + contradictory concepts together; but in application, when we try to + explain their combination in one and the same action, great difficulties + present themselves which seem to render such a combination impracticable. + </p> + <p> + When I say of a man who commits a theft that, by the law of causality, + this deed is a necessary result of the determining causes in preceding + time, then it was impossible that it could not have happened; how then can + the judgement, according to the moral law, make any change, and suppose + that it could have been omitted, because the law says that it ought to + have been omitted; that is, how can a man be called quite free at the same + moment, and with respect to the same action in which he is subject to an + inevitable physical necessity? Some try to evade this by saying that the + causes that determine his causality are of such a kind as to agree with a + comparative notion of freedom. According to this, that is sometimes called + a free effect, the determining physical cause of which lies within the + acting thing itself, e.g., that which a projectile performs when it is in + free motion, in which case we use the word freedom, because while it is in + flight it is not urged by anything external; or as we call the motion of a + clock a free motion, because it moves its hands itself, which therefore do + not require to be pushed by external force; so although the actions of man + are necessarily determined by causes which precede in time, we yet call + them free, because these causes are ideas produced by our own faculties, + whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances, and hence actions + are wrought according to our own pleasure. This is a wretched subterfuge + with which some persons still let themselves be put off, and so think they + have solved, with a petty word- jugglery, that difficult problem, at the + solution of which centuries have laboured in vain, and which can therefore + scarcely be found so completely on the surface. In fact, in the question + about the freedom which must be the foundation of all moral laws and the + consequent responsibility, it does not matter whether the principles which + necessarily determine causality by a physical law reside within the + subject or without him, or in the former case whether these principles are + instinctive or are conceived by reason, if, as is admitted by these men + themselves, these determining ideas have the ground of their existence in + time and in the antecedent state, and this again in an antecedent, etc. + Then it matters not that these are internal; it matters not that they have + a psychological and not a mechanical causality, that is, produce actions + by means of ideas and not by bodily movements; they are still determining + principles of the causality of a being whose existence is determinable in + time, and therefore under the necessitation of conditions of past time, + which therefore, when the subject has to act, are no longer in his power. + This may imply psychological freedom (if we choose to apply this term to a + merely internal chain of ideas in the mind), but it involves physical + necessity and, therefore, leaves no room for transcendental freedom, which + must be conceived as independence on everything empirical, and, + consequently, on nature generally, whether it is an object of the internal + sense considered in time only, or of the external in time and space. + Without this freedom (in the latter and true sense), which alone is + practical a priori, no moral law and no moral imputation are possible. + Just for this reason the necessity of events in time, according to the + physical law of causality, may be called the mechanism of nature, although + we do not mean by this that things which are subject to it must be really + material machines. We look here only to the necessity of the connection of + events in a time-series as it is developed according to the physical law, + whether the subject in which this development takes place is called + automaton materiale when the mechanical being is moved by matter, or with + Leibnitz spirituale when it is impelled by ideas; and if the freedom of + our will were no other than the latter (say the psychological and + comparative, not also transcendental, that is, absolute), then it would at + bottom be nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once + it is wound up, accomplishes its motions of itself. + </p> + <p> + Now, in order to remove in the supposed case the apparent contradiction + between freedom and the mechanism of nature in one and the same action, we + must remember what was said in the Critique of Pure Reason, or what + follows therefrom; viz., that the necessity of nature, which cannot + co-exist with the freedom of the subject, appertains only to the + attributes of the thing that is subject to time-conditions, consequently + only to those of the acting subject as a phenomenon; that therefore in + this respect the determining principles of every action of the same reside + in what belongs to past time and is no longer in his power (in which must + be included his own past actions and the character that these may + determine for him in his own eyes as a phenomenon). But the very same + subject, being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in + himself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not subject to + time-conditions, and regards himself as only determinable by laws which he + gives himself through reason; and in this his existence nothing is + antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action, and in + general every modification of his existence, varying according to his + internal sense, even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being + is in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but the + result, and never to be regarded as the determining principle, of his + causality as a noumenon. In this view now the rational being can justly + say of every unlawful action that he performs, that he could very well + have left it undone; although as appearance it is sufficiently determined + in the past, and in this respect is absolutely necessary; for it, with all + the past which determines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of his + character which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he imputes + the causality of those appearances to himself as a cause independent on + sensibility. + </p> + <p> + With this agree perfectly the judicial sentences of that wonderful faculty + in us which we call conscience. A man may use as much art as he likes in + order to paint to himself an unlawful act, that he remembers, as an + unintentional error, a mere oversight, such as one can never altogether + avoid, and therefore as something in which he was carried away by the + stream of physical necessity, and thus to make himself out innocent, yet + he finds that the advocate who speaks in his favour can by no means + silence the accuser within, if only he is conscious that at the time when + he did this wrong he was in his senses, that is, in possession of his + freedom; and, nevertheless, he accounts for his error from some bad + habits, which by gradual neglect of attention he has allowed to grow upon + him to such a degree that he can regard his error as its natural + consequence, although this cannot protect him from the blame and reproach + which he casts upon himself. This is also the ground of repentance for a + long past action at every recollection of it; a painful feeling produced + by the moral sentiment, and which is practically void in so far as it + cannot serve to undo what has been done. (Hence Priestley, as a true and + consistent fatalist, declares it absurd, and he deserves to be commended + for this candour more than those who, while they maintain the mechanism of + the will in fact, and its freedom in words only, yet wish it to be thought + that they include it in their system of compromise, although they do not + explain the possibility of such moral imputation.) But the pain is quite + legitimate, because when the law of our intelligible [supersensible] + existence (the moral law) is in question, reason recognizes no distinction + of time, and only asks whether the event belongs to me, as my act, and + then always morally connects the same feeling with it, whether it has + happened just now or long ago. For in reference to the supersensible + consciousness of its existence (i.e., freedom) the life of sense is but a + single phenomenon, which, inasmuch as it contains merely manifestations of + the mental disposition with regard to the moral law (i.e., of the + character), must be judged not according to the physical necessity that + belongs to it as phenomenon, but according to the absolute spontaneity of + freedom. It may therefore be admitted that, if it were possible to have so + profound an insight into a man's mental character as shown by internal as + well as external actions as to know all its motives, even the smallest, + and likewise all the external occasions that can influence them, we could + calculate a man's conduct for the future with as great certainty as a + lunar or solar eclipse; and nevertheless we may maintain that the man is + free. In fact, if we were capable of a further glance, namely, an + intellectual intuition of the same subject (which indeed is not granted to + us, and instead of it we have only the rational concept), then we should + perceive that this whole chain of appearances in regard to all that + concerns the moral laws depends on the spontaneity of the subject as a + thing in itself, of the determination of which no physical explanation can + be given. In default of this intuition, the moral law assures us of this + distinction between the relation of our actions as appearance to our + sensible nature, and the relation of this sensible nature to the + supersensible substratum in us. In this view, which is natural to our + reason, though inexplicable, we can also justify some judgements which we + passed with all conscientiousness, and which yet at first sight seem quite + opposed to all equity. There are cases in which men, even with the same + education which has been profitable to others, yet show such early + depravity, and so continue to progress in it to years of manhood, that + they are thought to be born villains, and their character altogether + incapable of improvement; and nevertheless they are judged for what they + do or leave undone, they are reproached for their faults as guilty; nay, + they themselves (the children) regard these reproaches as well founded, + exactly as if in spite of the hopeless natural quality of mind ascribed to + them, they remained just as responsible as any other man. This could not + happen if we did not suppose that whatever springs from a man's choice (as + every action intentionally performed undoubtedly does) has as its + foundation a free causality, which from early youth expresses its + character in its manifestations (i.e., actions). These, on account of the + uniformity of conduct, exhibit a natural connection, which however does + not make the vicious quality of the will necessary, but on the contrary, + is the consequence of the evil principles voluntarily adopted and + unchangeable, which only make it so much the more culpable and deserving + of punishment. There still remains a difficulty in the combination of + freedom with the mechanism of nature in a being belonging to the world of + sense; a difficulty which, even after all the foregoing is admitted, + threatens freedom with complete destruction. But with this danger there is + also a circumstance that offers hope of an issue still favourable to + freedom; namely, that the same difficulty presses much more strongly (in + fact as we shall presently see, presses only) on the system that holds the + existence determinable in time and space to be the existence of things in + themselves; it does not therefore oblige us to give up our capital + supposition of the ideality of time as a mere form of sensible intuition, + and consequently as a mere manner of representation which is proper to the + subject as belonging to the world of sense; and therefore it only requires + that this view be reconciled with this idea. + </p> + <p> + The difficulty is as follows: Even if it is admitted that the + supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action, + although, as a subject also belonging to the world of sense, he is under + mechanical conditions with respect to the same action, still, as soon as + we allow that God as universal first cause is also the cause of the + existence of substance (a proposition which can never be given up without + at the same time giving up the notion of God as the Being of all beings, + and therewith giving up his all sufficiency, on which everything in + theology depends), it seems as if we must admit that a man's actions have + their determining principle in something which is wholly out of his power- + namely, in the causality of a Supreme Being distinct from himself and on + whom his own existence and the whole determination of his causality are + absolutely dependent. In point of fact, if a man's actions as belonging to + his modifications in time were not merely modifications of him as + appearance, but as a thing in itself, freedom could not be saved. Man + would be a marionette or an automaton, like Vaucanson's, prepared and + wound up by the Supreme Artist. Self-consciousness would indeed make him a + thinking automaton; but the consciousness of his own spontaneity would be + mere delusion if this were mistaken for freedom, and it would deserve this + name only in a comparative sense, since, although the proximate + determining causes of its motion and a long series of their determining + causes are internal, yet the last and highest is found in a foreign hand. + Therefore I do not see how those who still insist on regarding time and + space as attributes belonging to the existence of things in themselves, + can avoid admitting the fatality of actions; or if (like the otherwise + acute Mendelssohn) they allow them to be conditions necessarily belonging + to the existence of finite and derived beings, but not to that of the + infinite Supreme Being, I do not see on what ground they can justify such + a distinction, or, indeed, how they can avoid the contradiction that meets + them, when they hold that existence in time is an attribute necessarily + belonging to finite things in themselves, whereas God is the cause of this + existence, but cannot be the cause of time (or space) itself (since this + must be presupposed as a necessary a priori condition of the existence of + things); and consequently as regards the existence of these things. His + causality must be subject to conditions and even to the condition of time; + and this would inevitably bring in everything contradictory to the notions + of His infinity and independence. On the other hand, it is quite easy for + us to draw the distinction between the attribute of the divine existence + of being independent on all time-conditions, and that of a being of the + world of sense, the distinction being that between the existence of a + being in itself and that of a thing in appearance. Hence, if this ideality + of time and space is not adopted, nothing remains but Spinozism, in which + space and time are essential attributes of the Supreme Being Himself, and + the things dependent on Him (ourselves, therefore, included) are not + substances, but merely accidents inhering in Him; since, if these things + as His effects exist in time only, this being the condition of their + existence in themselves, then the actions of these beings must be simply + His actions which He performs in some place and time. Thus, Spinozism, in + spite of the absurdity of its fundamental idea, argues more consistently + than the creation theory can, when beings assumed to be substances, and + beings in themselves existing in time, are regarded as effects of a + Supreme Cause, and yet as not [belonging] to Him and His action, but as + separate substances. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>1|CHAPTER</i>3 ^paragraph 50</span> + </p> + <p> + The above-mentioned difficulty is resolved briefly and clearly as follows: + If existence in time is a mere sensible mode of representation belonging + to thinking beings in the world and consequently does not apply to them as + things in themselves, then the creation of these beings is a creation of + things in themselves, since the notion of creation does not belong to the + sensible form of representation of existence or to causality, but can only + be referred to noumena. Consequently, when I say of beings in the world of + sense that they are created, I so far regard them as noumena. As it would + be a contradiction, therefore, to say that God is a creator of + appearances, so also it is a contradiction to say that as creator He is + the cause of actions in the world of sense, and therefore as appearances, + although He is the cause of the existence of the acting beings (which are + noumena). If now it is possible to affirm freedom in spite of the natural + mechanism of actions as appearances (by regarding existence in time as + something that belongs only to appearances, not to things in themselves), + then the circumstance that the acting beings are creatures cannot make the + slightest difference, since creation concerns their supersensible and not + their sensible existence, and, therefore, cannot be regarded as the + determining principle of the appearances. It would be quite different if + the beings in the world as things in themselves existed in time, since in + that case the creator of substance would be at the same time the author of + the whole mechanism of this substance. + </p> + <p> + Of so great importance is the separation of time (as well as space) from + the existence of things in themselves which was effected in the Critique + of the Pure Speculative Reason. + </p> + <p> + It may be said that the solution here proposed involves great difficulty + in itself and is scarcely susceptible of a lucid exposition. But is any + other solution that has been attempted, or that may be attempted, easier + and more intelligible? Rather might we say that the dogmatic teachers of + metaphysics have shown more shrewdness than candour in keeping this + difficult point out of sight as much as possible, in the hope that if they + said nothing about it, probably no one would think of it. If science is to + be advanced, all difficulties must be laid open, and we must even search + for those that are hidden, for every difficulty calls forth a remedy, + which cannot be discovered without science gaining either in extent or in + exactness; and thus even obstacles become means of increasing the + thoroughness of science. On the other hand, if the difficulties are + intentionally concealed, or merely removed by palliatives, then sooner or + later they burst out into incurable mischiefs, which bring science to ruin + in an absolute scepticism. + </p> + <p> + Since it is, properly speaking, the notion of freedom alone amongst all + the ideas of pure speculative reason that so greatly enlarges our + knowledge in the sphere of the supersensible, though only of our practical + knowledge, I ask myself why it exclusively possesses so great fertility, + whereas the others only designate the vacant space for possible beings of + the pure understanding, but are unable by any means to define the concept + of them. I presently find that as I cannot think anything without a + category, I must first look for a category for the rational idea of + freedom with which I am now concerned; and this is the category of + causality; and although freedom, a concept of the reason, being a + transcendent concept, cannot have any intuition corresponding to it, yet + the concept of the understanding- for the synthesis of which the former + demands the unconditioned- (namely, the concept of causality) must have a + sensible intuition given, by which first its objective reality is assured. + Now, the categories are all divided into two classes- the mathematical, + which concern the unity of synthesis in the conception of objects, and the + dynamical, which refer to the unity of synthesis in the conception of the + existence of objects. The former (those of magnitude and quality) always + contain a synthesis of the homogeneous, and it is not possible to find in + this the unconditioned antecedent to what is given in sensible intuition + as conditioned in space and time, as this would itself have to belong to + space and time, and therefore be again still conditioned. Whence it + resulted in the Dialectic of Pure Theoretic Reason that the opposite + methods of attaining the unconditioned and the totality of the conditions + were both wrong. The categories of the second class (those of causality + and of the necessity of a thing) did not require this homogeneity (of the + conditioned and the condition in synthesis), since here what we have to + explain is not how the intuition is compounded from a manifold in it, but + only how the existence of the conditioned object corresponding to it is + added to the existence of the condition (added, namely, in the + understanding as connected therewith); and in that case it was allowable + to suppose in the supersensible world the unconditioned antecedent to the + altogether conditioned in the world of sense (both as regards the causal + connection and the contingent existence of things themselves), although + this unconditioned remained indeterminate, and to make the synthesis + transcendent. Hence, it was found in the Dialectic of the Pure Speculative + Reason that the two apparently opposite methods of obtaining for the + conditioned the unconditioned were not really contradictory, e.g., in the + synthesis of causality to conceive for the conditioned in the series of + causes and effects of the sensible world, a causality which has no + sensible condition, and that the same action which, as belonging to the + world of sense, is always sensibly conditioned, that is, mechanically + necessary, yet at the same time may be derived from a causality not + sensibly conditioned- being the causality of the acting being as belonging + to the supersensible world- and may consequently be conceived as free. + Now, the only point in question was to change this may be into is; that + is, that we should be able to show in an actual case, as it were by a + fact, that certain actions imply such a causality (namely, the + intellectual, sensibly unconditioned), whether they are actual or only + commanded, that is, objectively necessary in a practical sense. We could + not hope to find this connexion in actions actually given in experience as + events of the sensible world, since causality with freedom must always be + sought outside the world of sense in the world of intelligence. But things + of sense are the only things offered to our perception and observation. + Hence, nothing remained but to find an incontestable objective principle + of causality which excludes all sensible conditions: that is, a principle + in which reason does not appeal further to something else as a determining + ground of its causality, but contains this determining ground itself by + means of that principle, and in which therefore it is itself as pure + reason practical. Now, this principle had not to be searched for or + discovered; it had long been in the reason of all men, and incorporated in + their nature, and is the principle of morality. Therefore, that + unconditioned causality, with the faculty of it, namely, freedom, is no + longer merely indefinitely and problematically thought (this speculative + reason could prove to be feasible), but is even as regards the law of its + causality definitely and assertorially known; and with it the fact that a + being (I myself), belonging to the world of sense, belongs also to the + supersensible world, this is also positively known, and thus the reality + of the supersensible world is established and in practical respects + definitely given, and this definiteness, which for theoretical purposes + would be transcendent, is for practical purposes immanent. We could not, + however, make a similar step as regards the second dynamical idea, namely, + that of a necessary being. We could not rise to it from the sensible world + without the aid of the first dynamical idea. For if we attempted to do so, + we should have ventured to leave at a bound all that is given to us, and + to leap to that of which nothing is given us that can help us to effect + the connection of such a supersensible being with the world of sense + (since the necessary being would have to be known as given outside + ourselves). On the other hand, it is now obvious that this connection is + quite possible in relation to our own subject, inasmuch as I know myself + to be on the one side as an intelligible [supersensible] being determined + by the moral law (by means of freedom), and on the other side as acting in + the world of sense. It is the concept of freedom alone that enables us to + find the unconditioned and intelligible for the conditioned and sensible + without going out of ourselves. For it is our own reason that by means of + the supreme and unconditional practical law knows that itself and the + being that is conscious of this law (our own person) belong to the pure + world of understanding, and moreover defines the manner in which, as such, + it can be active. In this way it can be understood why in the whole + faculty of reason it is the practical reason only that can help us to pass + beyond the world of sense and give us knowledge of a supersensible order + and connection, which, however, for this very reason cannot be extended + further than is necessary for pure practical purposes. + </p> + <p> + Let me be permitted on this occasion to make one more remark, namely, that + every step that we make with pure reason, even in the practical sphere + where no attention is paid to subtle speculation, nevertheless accords + with all the material points of the Critique of the Theoretical Reason as + closely and directly as if each step had been thought out with deliberate + purpose to establish this confirmation. Such a thorough agreement, wholly + unsought for and quite obvious (as anyone can convince himself, if he will + only carry moral inquiries up to their principles), between the most + important proposition of practical reason and the often seemingly too + subtle and needless remarks of the Critique of the Speculative Reason, + occasions surprise and astonishment, and confirms the maxim already + recognized and praised by others, namely, that in every scientific inquiry + we should pursue our way steadily with all possible exactness and + frankness, without caring for any objections that may be raised from + outside its sphere, but, as far as we can, to carry out our inquiry + truthfully and completely by itself. Frequent observation has convinced me + that, when such researches are concluded, that which in one part of them + appeared to me very questionable, considered in relation to other + extraneous doctrines, when I left this doubtfulness out of sight for a + time and only attended to the business in hand until it was completed, at + last was unexpectedly found to agree perfectly with what had been + discovered separately without the least regard to those doctrines, and + without any partiality or prejudice for them. Authors would save + themselves many errors and much labour lost (because spent on a delusion) + if they could only resolve to go to work with more frankness. + </p> + <h3> + BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>1 + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0033" id="link2H_4_0033"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0004" id="link2HCH0004"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally. + </h2> + <p> + Pure reason always has its dialetic, whether it is considered in its + speculative or its practical employment; for it requires the absolute + totality of the 'conditions of what is given conditioned, and this can + only be found in things in themselves. But as all conceptions of things in + themselves must be referred to intuitions, and with us men these can never + be other than sensible and hence can never enable us to know objects as + things in themselves but only as appearances, and since the unconditioned + can never be found in this chain of appearances which consists only of + conditioned and conditions; thus from applying this rational idea of the + totality of the conditions (in other words of the unconditioned) to + appearances, there arises an inevitable illusion, as if these latter were + things in themselves (for in the absence of a warning critique they are + always regarded as such). This illusion would never be noticed as delusive + if it did not betray itself by a conflict of reason with itself, when it + applies to appearances its fundamental principle of presupposing the + unconditioned to everything conditioned. By this, however, reason is + compelled to trace this illusion to its source, and search how it can be + removed, and this can only be done by a complete critical examination of + the whole pure faculty of reason; so that the antinomy of the pure reason + which is manifest in its dialectic is in fact the most beneficial error + into which human reason could ever have fallen, since it at last drives us + to search for the key to escape from this labyrinth; and when this key is + found, it further discovers that which we did not seek but yet had need + of, namely, a view into a higher and an immutable order of things, in + which we even now are, and in which we are thereby enabled by definite + precepts to continue to live according to the highest dictates of reason. + </p> + <p> + It may be seen in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason how in its + speculative employment this natural dialectic is to be solved, and how the + error which arises from a very natural illusion may be guarded against. + But reason in its practical use is not a whit better off. As pure + practical reason, it likewise seeks to find the unconditioned for the + practically conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural wants), + and this is not as the determining principle of the will, but even when + this is given (in the moral law) it seeks the unconditioned totality of + the object of pure practical reason under the name of the summum bonum. + </p> + <p> + To define this idea practically, i.e., sufficiently for the maxims of our + rational conduct, is the business of practical wisdom, and this again as a + science is philosophy, in the sense in which the word was understood by + the ancients, with whom it meant instruction in the conception in which + the summum bonum was to be placed, and the conduct by which it was to be + obtained. It would be well to leave this word in its ancient signification + as a doctrine of the summum bonum, so far as reason endeavours to make + this into a science. For on the one hand the restriction annexed would + suit the Greek expression (which signifies the love of wisdom), and yet at + the same time would be sufficient to embrace under the name of philosophy + the love of science: that is to say, of all speculative rational + knowledge, so far as it is serviceable to reason, both for that conception + and also for the practical principle determining our conduct, without + letting out of sight the main end, on account of which alone it can be + called a doctrine of practical wisdom. On the other hand, it would be no + harm to deter the self-conceit of one who ventures to claim the title of + philosopher by holding before him in the very definition a standard of + self-estimation which would very much lower his pretensions. For a teacher + of wisdom would mean something more than a scholar who has not come so far + as to guide himself, much less to guide others, with certain expectation + of attaining so high an end: it would mean a master in the knowledge of + wisdom, which implies more than a modest man would claim for himself. Thus + philosophy as well as wisdom would always remain an ideal, which + objectively is presented complete in reason alone, while subjectively for + the person it is only the goal of his unceasing endeavours; and no one + would be justified in professing to be in possession of it so as to assume + the name of philosopher who could not also show its infallible effects in + his own person as an example (in his self-mastery and the unquestioned + interest that he takes pre-eminently in the general good), and this the + ancients also required as a condition of deserving that honourable title. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>1 ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + We have another preliminary remark to make respecting the dialectic of the + pure practical reason, on the point of the definition of the summum bonum + (a successful solution of which dialectic would lead us to expect, as in + case of that of the theoretical reason, the most beneficial effects, + inasmuch as the self-contradictions of pure practical reason honestly + stated, and not concealed, force us to undertake a complete critique of + this faculty). + </p> + <p> + The moral law is the sole determining principle of a pure will. But since + this is merely formal (viz., as prescribing only the form of the maxim as + universally legislative), it abstracts as a determining principle from all + matter that is to say, from every object of volition. Hence, though the + summum bonum may be the whole object of a pure practical reason, i.e., a + pure will, yet it is not on that account to be regarded as its determining + principle; and the moral law alone must be regarded as the principle on + which that and its realization or promotion are aimed at. This remark is + important in so delicate a case as the determination of moral principles, + where the slightest misinterpretation perverts men's minds. For it will + have been seen from the Analytic that, if we assume any object under the + name of a good as a determining principle of the will prior to the moral + law and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle, this would + always introduce heteronomy and crush out the moral principle. + </p> + <p> + It is, however, evident that if the notion of the summum bonum includes + that of the moral law as its supreme condition, then the summum bonum + would not merely be an object, but the notion of it and the conception of + its existence as possible by our own practical reason would likewise be + the determining principle of the will, since in that case the will is in + fact determined by the moral law which is already included in this + conception, and by no other object, as the principle of autonomy requires. + This order of the conceptions of determination of the will must not be + lost sight of, as otherwise we should misunderstand ourselves and think we + had fallen into a contradiction, while everything remains in perfect + harmony. + </p> + <h3> + BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2HCH0005" id="link2HCH0005"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the Conception of + the "Summum Bonum". + </h2> + <p> + The conception of the summum itself contains an ambiguity which might + occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it. The summum may mean + either the supreme (supremum) or the perfect (consummatum). The former is + that condition which is itself unconditioned, i.e., is not subordinate to + any other (originarium); the second is that whole which is not a part of a + greater whole of the same kind (perfectissimum). It has been shown in the + Analytic that virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition + of all that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our + pursuit of happiness, and is therefore the supreme good. But it does not + follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the desires + of rational finite beings; for this requires happiness also, and that not + merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes himself an end, but + even in the judgement of an impartial reason, which regards persons in + general as ends in themselves. For to need happiness, to deserve it, and + yet at the same time not to participate in it, cannot be consistent with + the perfect volition of a rational being possessed at the same time of all + power, if, for the sake of experiment, we conceive such a being. Now + inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the + summum bonum in a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact + proportion to morality (which is the worth of the person, and his + worthiness to be happy) constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world; + hence this summum bonum expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which, + however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has + no condition above it; whereas happiness, while it is pleasant to the + possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good, but + always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition. + </p> + <p> + When two elements are necessarily united in one concept, they must be + connected as reason and consequence, and this either so that their unity + is considered as analytical (logical connection), or as synthetical (real + connection) the former following the law of identity, the latter that of + causality. The connection of virtue and happiness may therefore be + understood in two ways: either the endeavour to be virtuous and the + rational pursuit of happiness are not two distinct actions, but absolutely + identical, in which case no maxim need be made the principle of the + former, other than what serves for the latter; or the connection consists + in this, that virtue produces happiness as something distinct from the + consciousness of virtue, as a cause produces an effect. + </p> + <p> + The ancient Greek schools were, properly speaking, only two, and in + determining the conception of the summum bonum these followed in fact one + and the same method, inasmuch as they did not allow virtue and happiness + to be regarded as two distinct elements of the summum bonum, and + consequently sought the unity of the principle by the rule of identity; + but they differed as to which of the two was to be taken as the + fundamental notion. The Epicurean said: "To be conscious that one's maxims + lead to happiness is virtue"; the Stoic said: "To be conscious of one's + virtue is happiness." With the former, Prudence was equivalent to + morality; with the latter, who chose a higher designation for virtue, + morality alone was true wisdom. + </p> + <p> + While we must admire the men who in such early times tried all imaginable + ways of extending the domain of philosophy, we must at the same time + lament that their acuteness was unfortunately misapplied in trying to + trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous notions, those of + happiness and virtue. But it agrees with the dialectical spirit of their + times (and subtle minds are even now sometimes misled in the same way) to + get rid of irreconcilable differences in principle by seeking to change + them into a mere contest about words, and thus apparently working out the + identity of the notion under different names, and this usually occurs in + cases where the combination of heterogeneous principles lies so deep or so + high, or would require so complete a transformation of the doctrines + assumed in the rest of the philosophical system, that men are afraid to + penetrate deeply into the real difference and prefer treating it as a + difference in questions of form. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 5</span> + </p> + <p> + While both schools sought to trace out the identity of the practical + principles of virtue and happiness, they were not agreed as to the way in + which they tried to force this identity, but were separated infinitely + from one another, the one placing its principle on the side of sense, the + other on that of reason; the one in the consciousness of sensible wants, + the other in the independence of practical reason on all sensible grounds + of determination. According to the Epicurean, the notion of virtue was + already involved in the maxim: "To promote one's own happiness"; according + to the Stoics, on the other hand, the feeling of happiness was already + contained in the consciousness of virtue. Now whatever is contained in + another notion is identical with part of the containing notion, but not + with the whole, and moreover two wholes may be specifically distinct, + although they consist of the same parts; namely if the parts are united + into a whole in totally different ways. The Stoic maintained that the + virtue was the whole summum bonum, and happiness only the consciousness of + possessing it, as making part of the state of the subject. The Epicurean + maintained that happiness was the whole summum bonum, and virtue only the + form of the maxim for its pursuit; viz., the rational use of the means for + attaining it. + </p> + <p> + Now it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and those of + private happiness are quite heterogeneous as to their supreme practical + principle, and, although they belong to one summum bonum which together + they make possible, yet they are so far from coinciding that they restrict + and check one another very much in the same subject. Thus the question: + "How is the summum bonum practically possible?" still remains an unsolved + problem, notwithstanding all the attempts at coalition that have hitherto + been made. The Analytic has, however, shown what it is that makes the + problem difficult to solve; namely, that happiness and morality are two + specifically distinct elements of the summum bonum and, therefore, their + combination cannot be analytically cognised (as if the man that seeks his + own happiness should find by mere analysis of his conception that in so + acting he is virtuous, or as if the man that follows virtue should in the + consciousness of such conduct find that he is already happy ipso facto), + but must be a synthesis of concepts. Now since this combination is + recognised as a priori, and therefore as practically necessary, and + consequently not as derived from experience, so that the possibility of + the summum bonum does not rest on any empirical principle, it follows that + the deduction [legitimation] of this concept must be transcendental. It is + a priori (morally) necessary to produce the summum bonum by freedom of + will: therefore the condition of its possibility must rest solely on a + priori principles of cognition. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0036" id="link2H_4_0036"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 10</span> + </p> + <p> + In the summum bonum which is practical for us, i.e., to be realized by our + will, virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily combined, so that + the one cannot be assumed by pure practical reason without the other also + being attached to it. Now this combination (like every other) is either + analytical or synthetical. It has been shown that it cannot be analytical; + it must then be synthetical and, more particularly, must be conceived as + the connection of cause and effect, since it concerns a practical good, + i.e., one that is possible by means of action; consequently either the + desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim + of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is + absolutely impossible, because (as was proved in the Analytic) maxims + which place the determining principle of the will in the desire of + personal happiness are not moral at all, and no virtue can be founded on + them. But the second is also impossible, because the practical connection + of causes and effects in the world, as the result of the determination of + the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the will, but on + the knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical power to use them for + one's purposes; consequently we cannot expect in the world by the most + punctilious observance of the moral laws any necessary connection of + happiness with virtue adequate to the summum bonum. Now, as the promotion + of this summum bonum, the conception of which contains this connection, is + a priori a necessary object of our will and inseparably attached to the + moral law, the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the + latter. If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules, then + the moral law also which commands us to promote it is directed to vain + imaginary ends and must consequently be false. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0037" id="link2H_4_0037"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + The antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar conflict + between freedom and physical necessity in the causality of events in the + world. It was solved by showing that there is no real contradiction when + the events and even the world in which they occur are regarded (as they + ought to be) merely as appearances; since one and the same acting being, + as an appearance (even to his own inner sense), has a causality in the + world of sense that always conforms to the mechanism of nature, but with + respect to the same events, so far as the acting person regards himself at + the same time as a noumenon (as pure intelligence in an existence not + dependent on the condition of time), he can contain a principle by which + that causality acting according to laws of nature is determined, but which + is itself free from all laws of nature. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 15</span> + </p> + <p> + It is just the same with the foregoing antinomy of pure practical reason. + The first of the two propositions, "That the endeavour after happiness + produces a virtuous mind," is absolutely false; but the second, "That a + virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness," is not absolutely false, + but only in so far as virtue is considered as a form of causality in the + sensible world, and consequently only if I suppose existence in it to be + the only sort of existence of a rational being; it is then only + conditionally false. But as I am not only justified in thinking that I + exist also as a noumenon in a world of the understanding, but even have in + the moral law a purely intellectual determining principle of my causality + (in the sensible world), it is not impossible that morality of mind should + have a connection as cause with happiness (as an effect in the sensible + world) if not immediate yet mediate (viz., through an intelligent author + of nature), and moreover necessary; while in a system of nature which is + merely an object of the senses, this combination could never occur except + contingently and, therefore, could not suffice for the summum bonum. + </p> + <p> + Thus, notwithstanding this seeming conflict of practical reason with + itself, the summum bonum, which is the necessary supreme end of a will + morally determined, is a true object thereof; for it is practically + possible, and the maxims of the will which as regards their matter refer + to it have objective reality, which at first was threatened by the + antinomy that appeared in the connection of morality with happiness by a + general law; but this was merely from a misconception, because the + relation between appearances was taken for a relation of the things in + themselves to these appearances. + </p> + <p> + When we find ourselves obliged to go so far, namely, to the connection + with an intelligible world, to find the possibility of the summum bonum, + which reason points out to all rational beings as the goal of all their + moral wishes, it must seem strange that, nevertheless, the philosophers + both of ancient and modern times have been able to find happiness in + accurate proportion to virtue even in this life (in the sensible world), + or have persuaded themselves that they were conscious thereof. For + Epicurus as well as the Stoics extolled above everything the happiness + that springs from the consciousness of living virtuously; and the former + was not so base in his practical precepts as one might infer from the + principles of his theory, which he used for explanation and not for + action, or as they were interpreted by many who were misled by his using + the term pleasure for contentment; on the contrary, he reckoned the most + disinterested practice of good amongst the ways of enjoying the most + intimate delight, and his scheme of pleasure (by which he meant constant + cheerfulness of mind) included the moderation and control of the + inclinations, such as the strictest moral philosopher might require. He + differed from the Stoics chiefly in making this pleasure the motive, which + they very rightly refused to do. For, on the one hand, the virtuous + Epicurus, like many well-intentioned men of this day who do not reflect + deeply enough on their principles, fell into the error of presupposing the + virtuous disposition in the persons for whom he wished to provide the + springs to virtue (and indeed the upright man cannot be happy if he is not + first conscious of his uprightness; since with such a character the + reproach that his habit of thought would oblige him to make against + himself in case of transgression and his moral self-condemnation would rob + him of all enjoyment of the pleasantness which his condition might + otherwise contain). But the question is: How is such a disposition + possible in the first instance, and such a habit of thought in estimating + the worth of one's existence, since prior to it there can be in the + subject no feeling at all for moral worth? If a man is virtuous without + being conscious of his integrity in every action, he will certainly not + enjoy life, however favourable fortune may be to him in its physical + circumstances; but can we make him virtuous in the first instance, in + other words, before he esteems the moral worth of his existence so highly, + by praising to him the peace of mind that would result from the + consciousness of an integrity for which he has no sense? + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, however, there is here an occasion of a vitium + subreptionis, and as it were of an optical illusion, in the + self-consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one feels- + an illusion which even the most experienced cannot altogether avoid. The + moral disposition of mind is necessarily combined with a consciousness + that the will is determined directly by the law. Now the consciousness of + a determination of the faculty of desire is always the source of a + satisfaction in the resulting action; but this pleasure, this satisfaction + in oneself, is not the determining principle of the action; on the + contrary, the determination of the will directly by reason is the source + of the feeling of pleasure, and this remains a pure practical not sensible + determination of the faculty of desire. Now as this determination has + exactly the same effect within in impelling to activity, that a feeling of + the pleasure to be expected from the desired action would have had, we + easily look on what we ourselves do as something which we merely passively + feel, and take the moral spring for a sensible impulse, just as it happens + in the so-called illusion of the senses (in this case the inner sense). It + is a sublime thing in human nature to be determined to actions immediately + by a purely rational law; sublime even is the illusion that regards the + subjective side of this capacity of intellectual determination as + something sensible and the effect of a special sensible feeling (for an + intellectual feeling would be a contradiction). It is also of great + importance to attend to this property of our personality and as much as + possible to cultivate the effect of reason on this feeling. But we must + beware lest by falsely extolling this moral determining principle as a + spring, making its source lie in particular feelings of pleasure (which + are in fact only results), we degrade and disfigure the true genuine + spring, the law itself, by putting as it were a false foil upon it. + Respect, not pleasure or enjoyment of happiness, is something for which it + is not possible that reason should have any antecedent feeling as its + foundation (for this would always be sensible and pathological); and + consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the law is by no + means analogous to the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to the + faculty of desire it produces the same effect, but from different sources: + it is only by this mode of conception, however, that we can attain what we + are seeking, namely, that actions be done not merely in accordance with + duty (as a result of pleasant feelings), but from duty, which must be the + true end of all moral cultivation. + </p> + <p> + Have we not, however, a word which does not express enjoyment, as + happiness does, but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence, an + analogue of the happiness which must necessarily accompany the + consciousness of virtue? Yes this word is self-contentment which in its + proper signification always designates only a negative satisfaction in + one's existence, in which one is conscious of needing nothing. Freedom and + the consciousness of it as a faculty of following the moral law with + unyielding resolution is independence of inclinations, at least as motives + determining (though not as affecting) our desire, and so far as I am + conscious of this freedom in following my moral maxims, it is the only + source of an unaltered contentment which is necessarily connected with it + and rests on no special feeling. This may be called intellectual + contentment. The sensible contentment (improperly so-called) which rests + on the satisfaction of the inclinations, however delicate they may be + imagined to be, can never be adequate to the conception of it. For the + inclinations change, they grow with the indulgence shown them, and always + leave behind a still greater void than we had thought to fill. Hence they + are always burdensome to a rational being, and, although he cannot lay + them aside, they wrest from him the wish to be rid of them. Even an + inclination to what is right (e.g., to beneficence), though it may much + facilitate the efficacy of the moral maxims, cannot produce any. For in + these all must be directed to the conception of the law as a determining + principle, if the action is to contain morality and not merely legality. + Inclination is blind and slavish, whether it be of a good sort or not, + and, when morality is in question, reason must not play the part merely of + guardian to inclination, but disregarding it altogether must attend simply + to its own interest as pure practical reason. This very feeling of + compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes the deliberation on the + question of duty and becomes a determining principle, is even annoying to + right thinking persons, brings their deliberate maxims into confusion, and + makes them wish to be delivered from it and to be subject to lawgiving + reason alone. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 20</span> + </p> + <p> + From this we can understand how the consciousness of this faculty of a + pure practical reason produces by action (virtue) a consciousness of + mastery over one's inclinations, and therefore of independence of them, + and consequently also of the discontent that always accompanies them, and + thus a negative satisfaction with one's state, i.e., contentment, which is + primarily contentment with one's own person. Freedom itself becomes in + this way (namely, indirectly) capable of an enjoyment which cannot be + called happiness, because it does not depend on the positive concurrence + of a feeling, nor is it, strictly speaking, bliss, since it does not + include complete independence of inclinations and wants, but it resembles + bliss in so far as the determination of one's will at least can hold + itself free from their influence; and thus, at least in its origin, this + enjoyment is analogous to the self-sufficiency which we can ascribe only + to the Supreme Being. + </p> + <p> + From this solution of the antinomy of practical pure reason, it follows + that in practical principles we may at least conceive as possible a + natural and necessary connection between the consciousness of morality and + the expectation of a proportionate happiness as its result, though it does + not follow that we can know or perceive this connection; that, on the + other hand, principles of the pursuit of happiness cannot possibly produce + morality; that, therefore, morality is the supreme good (as the first + condition of the summum bonum), while happiness constitutes its second + element, but only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned, but + necessary consequence of the former. Only with this subordination is the + summum bonum the whole object of pure practical reason, which must + necessarily conceive it as possible, since it commands us to contribute to + the utmost of our power to its realization. But since the possibility of + such connection of the conditioned with its condition belongs wholly to + the supersensual relation of things and cannot be given according to the + laws of the world of sense, although the practical consequences of the + idea belong to the world of sense, namely, the actions that aim at + realizing the summum bonum; we will therefore endeavour to set forth the + grounds of that possibility, first, in respect of what is immediately in + our power, and then, secondly, in that which is not in our power, but + which reason presents to us as the supplement of our impotence, for the + realization of the summum bonum (which by practical principles is + necessary). + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0038" id="link2H_4_0038"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its Union with the + Speculative Reason. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 25</span> + </p> + <p> + By primacy between two or more things connected by reason, I understand + the prerogative, belonging to one, of being the first determining + principle in the connection with all the rest. In a narrower practical + sense it means the prerogative of the interest of one in so far as the + interest of the other is subordinated to it, while it is not postponed to + any other. To every faculty of the mind we can attribute an interest, that + is, a principle, that contains the condition on which alone the former is + called into exercise. Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the + interest of all the powers of the mind and is determined by its own. The + interest of its speculative employment consists in the cognition of the + object pushed to the highest a priori principles: that of its practical + employment, in the determination of the will in respect of the final and + complete end. As to what is necessary for the possibility of any + employment of reason at all, namely, that its principles and affirmations + should not contradict one another, this constitutes no part of its + interest, but is the condition of having reason at all; it is only its + development, not mere consistency with itself, that is reckoned as its + interest. + </p> + <p> + If practical reason could not assume or think as given anything further + than what speculative reason of itself could offer it from its own + insight, the latter would have the primacy. But supposing that it had of + itself original a priori principles with which certain theoretical + positions were inseparably connected, while these were withdrawn from any + possible insight of speculative reason (which, however, they must not + contradict); then the question is: Which interest is the superior (not + which must give way, for they are not necessarily conflicting), whether + speculative reason, which knows nothing of all that the practical offers + for its acceptance, should take up these propositions and (although they + transcend it) try to unite them with its own concepts as a foreign + possession handed over to it, or whether it is justified in obstinately + following its own separate interest and, according to the canonic of + Epicurus, rejecting as vain subtlety everything that cannot accredit its + objective reality by manifest examples to be shown in experience, even + though it should be never so much interwoven with the interest of the + practical (pure) use of reason, and in itself not contradictory to the + theoretical, merely because it infringes on the interest of the + speculative reason to this extent, that it removes the bounds which this + latter had set to itself, and gives it up to every nonsense or delusion of + imagination? + </p> + <p> + In fact, so far as practical reason is taken as dependent on pathological + conditions, that is, as merely regulating the inclinations under the + sensible principle of happiness, we could not require speculative reason + to take its principles from such a source. Mohammed's paradise, or the + absorption into the Deity of the theosophists and mystics would press + their monstrosities on the reason according to the taste of each, and one + might as well have no reason as surrender it in such fashion to all sorts + of dreams. But if pure reason of itself can be practical and is actually + so, as the consciousness of the moral law proves, then it is still only + one and the same reason which, whether in a theoretical or a practical + point of view, judges according to a priori principles; and then it is + clear that although it is in the first point of view incompetent to + establish certain propositions positively, which, however, do not + contradict it, then, as soon as these propositions are inseparably + attached to the practical interest of pure reason, it must accept them, + though it be as something offered to it from a foreign source, something + that has not grown on its own ground, but yet is sufficiently + authenticated; and it must try to compare and connect them with everything + that it has in its power as speculative reason. It must remember, however, + that these are not additions to its insight, but yet are extensions of its + employment in another, namely, a practical aspect; and this is not in the + least opposed to its interest, which consists in the restriction of wild + speculation. + </p> + <p> + Thus, when pure speculative and pure practical reason are combined in one + cognition, the latter has the primacy, provided, namely, that this + combination is not contingent and arbitrary, but founded a priori on + reason itself and therefore necessary. For without this subordination + there would arise a conflict of reason with itself; since, if they were + merely co-ordinate, the former would close its boundaries strictly and + admit nothing from the latter into its domain, while the latter would + extend its bounds over everything and when its needs required would seek + to embrace the former within them. Nor could we reverse the order and + require pure practical reason to be subordinate to the speculative, since + all interest is ultimately practical, and even that of speculative reason + is conditional, and it is only in the practical employment of reason that + it is complete. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 30</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0039" id="link2H_4_0039"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + The realization of the summum bonum in the world is the necessary object + of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this will the perfect + accordance of the mind with the moral law is the supreme condition of the + summum bonum. This then must be possible, as well as its object, since it + is contained in the command to promote the latter. Now, the perfect + accordance of the will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of + which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of + his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically + necessary, it can only be found in a progress in infinitum towards that + perfect accordance, and on the principles of pure practical reason it is + necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our + will. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 35</span> + </p> + <p> + Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an + endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational + being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum, + then, practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality + of the soul; consequently this immortality, being inseparably connected + with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (by which I + mean a theoretical proposition, not demonstrable as such, but which is an + inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical law. + </p> + <p> + This principle of the moral destination of our nature, namely, that it is + only in an endless progress that we can attain perfect accordance with the + moral law, is of the greatest use, not merely for the present purpose of + supplementing the impotence of speculative reason, but also with respect + to religion. In default of it, either the moral law is quite degraded from + its holiness, being made out to be indulgent and conformable to our + convenience, or else men strain their notions of their vocation and their + expectation to an unattainable goal, hoping to acquire complete holiness + of will, and so they lose themselves in fanatical theosophic dreams, which + wholly contradict self-knowledge. In both cases the unceasing effort to + obey punctually and thoroughly a strict and inflexible command of reason, + which yet is not ideal but real, is only hindered. For a rational but + finite being, the only thing possible is an endless progress from the + lower to higher degrees of moral perfection. The Infinite Being, to whom + the condition of time is nothing, sees in this to us endless succession a + whole of accordance with the moral law; and the holiness which his command + inexorably requires, in order to be true to his justice in the share which + He assigns to each in the summum bonum, is to be found in a single + intellectual intuition of the whole existence of rational beings. All that + can be expected of the creature in respect of the hope of this + participation would be the consciousness of his tried character, by which + from the progress he has hitherto made from the worse to the morally + better, and the immutability of purpose which has thus become known to + him, he may hope for a further unbroken continuance of the same, however + long his existence may last, even beyond this life, * and thus he may + hope, not indeed here, nor in any imaginable point of his future + existence, but only in the endlessness of his duration (which God alone + can survey) to be perfectly adequate to his will (without indulgence or + excuse, which do not harmonize with justice). + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * It seems, nevertheless, impossible for a creature to have + the conviction of his unwavering firmness of mind in the + progress towards goodness. On this account the Christian + religion makes it come only from the same Spirit that works + sanctification, that is, this firm purpose, and with it the + consciousness of steadfastness in the moral progress. But + naturally one who is conscious that he has persevered + through a long portion of his life up to the end in the + progress to the better, and this genuine moral motives, may + well have the comforting hope, though not the certainty, + that even in an existence prolonged beyond this life he will + continue in these principles; and although he is never + justified here in his own eyes, nor can ever hope to be so + in the increased perfection of his nature, to which he looks + forward, together with an increase of duties, nevertheless + in this progress which, though it is directed to a goal + infinitely remote, yet is in God's sight regarded as + equivalent to possession, he may have a prospect of a + blessed future; for this is the word that reason employs to + designate perfect well-being independent of all contingent + causes of the world, and which, like holiness, is an idea + that can be contained only in an endless progress and its + totality, and consequently is never fully attained by a + creature. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 40</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0040" id="link2H_4_0040"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + In the foregoing analysis the moral law led to a practical problem which + is prescribed by pure reason alone, without the aid of any sensible + motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the first and + principle element of the summum bonum, viz., morality; and, as this can be + perfectly solved only in eternity, to the postulate of immortality. The + same law must also lead us to affirm the possibility of the second element + of the summum bonum, viz., happiness proportioned to that morality, and + this on grounds as disinterested as before, and solely from impartial + reason; that is, it must lead to the supposition of the existence of a + cause adequate to this effect; in other words, it must postulate the + existence of God, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the + summum bonum (an object of the will which is necessarily connected with + the moral legislation of pure reason). We proceed to exhibit this + connection in a convincing manner. + </p> + <p> + Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world with whom + everything goes according to his wish and will; it rests, therefore, on + the harmony of physical nature with his whole end and likewise with the + essential determining principle of his will. Now the moral law as a law of + freedom commands by determining principles, which ought to be quite + independent of nature and of its harmony with our faculty of desire (as + springs). But the acting rational being in the world is not the cause of + the world and of nature itself. There is not the least ground, therefore, + in the moral law for a necessary connection between morality and + proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of + it, and therefore dependent on it, and which for that reason cannot by his + will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly + harmonize, as far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical + principles. Nevertheless, in the practical problem of pure reason, i.e., + the necessary pursuit of the summum bonum, such a connection is postulated + as necessary: we ought to endeavour to promote the summum bonum, which, + therefore, must be possible. Accordingly, the existence of a cause of all + nature, distinct from nature itself and containing the principle of this + connection, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is + also postulated. Now this supreme cause must contain the principle of the + harmony of nature, not merely with a law of the will of rational beings, + but with the conception of this law, in so far as they make it the supreme + determining principle of the will, and consequently not merely with the + form of morals, but with their morality as their motive, that is, with + their moral character. Therefore, the summum bonum is possible in the + world only on the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality + corresponding to moral character. Now a being that is capable of acting on + the conception of laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the + causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is his + will; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed as + a condition of the summum bonum is a being which is the cause of nature by + intelligence and will, consequently its author, that is God. It follows + that the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the + best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original + good, that is to say, of the existence of God. Now it was seen to be a + duty for us to promote the summum bonum; consequently it is not merely + allowable, but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that + we should presuppose the possibility of this summum bonum; and as this is + possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably + connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally + necessary to assume the existence of God. + </p> + <p> + It must be remarked here that this moral necessity is subjective, that is, + it is a want, and not objective, that is, itself a duty, for there cannot + be a duty to suppose the existence of anything (since this concerns only + the theoretical employment of reason). Moreover, it is not meant by this + that it is necessary to suppose the existence of God as a basis of all + obligation in general (for this rests, as has been sufficiently proved, + simply on the autonomy of reason itself). What belongs to duty here is + only the endeavour to realize and promote the summum bonum in the world, + the possibility of which can therefore be postulated; and as our reason + finds it not conceivable except on the supposition of a supreme + intelligence, the admission of this existence is therefore connected with + the consciousness of our duty, although the admission itself belongs to + the domain of speculative reason. Considered in respect of this alone, as + a principle of explanation, it may be called a hypothesis, but in + reference to the intelligibility of an object given us by the moral law + (the summum bonum), and consequently of a requirement for practical + purposes, it may be called faith, that is to say a pure rational faith, + since pure reason (both in its theoretical and practical use) is the sole + source from which it springs. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 45</span> + </p> + <p> + From this deduction it is now intelligible why the Greek schools could + never attain the solution of their problem of the practical possibility of + the summum bonum, because they made the rule of the use which the will of + man makes of his freedom the sole and sufficient ground of this + possibility, thinking that they had no need for that purpose of the + existence of God. No doubt they were so far right that they established + the principle of morals of itself independently of this postulate, from + the relation of reason only to the will, and consequently made it the + supreme practical condition of the summum bonum; but it was not therefore + the whole condition of its possibility. The Epicureans had indeed assumed + as the supreme principle of morality a wholly false one, namely that of + happiness, and had substituted for a law a maxim of arbitrary choice + according to every man's inclination; they proceeded, however, + consistently enough in this, that they degraded their summum bonum + likewise, just in proportion to the meanness of their fundamental + principle, and looked for no greater happiness than can be attained by + human prudence (including temperance and moderation of the inclinations), + and this as we know would be scanty enough and would be very different + according to circumstances; not to mention the exceptions that their + maxims must perpetually admit and which make them incapable of being laws. + The Stoics, on the contrary, had chosen their supreme practical principle + quite rightly, making virtue the condition of the summum bonum; but when + they represented the degree of virtue required by its pure law as fully + attainable in this life, they not only strained the moral powers of the + man whom they called the wise beyond all the limits of his nature, and + assumed a thing that contradicts all our knowledge of men, but also and + principally they would not allow the second element of the summum bonum, + namely, happiness, to be properly a special object of human desire, but + made their wise man, like a divinity in his consciousness of the + excellence of his person, wholly independent of nature (as regards his own + contentment); they exposed him indeed to the evils of life, but made him + not subject to them (at the same time representing him also as free from + moral evil). They thus, in fact, left out the second element of the summum + bonum namely, personal happiness, placing it solely in action and + satisfaction with one's own personal worth, thus including it in the + consciousness of being morally minded, in which they Might have been + sufficiently refuted by the voice of their own nature. + </p> + <p> + The doctrine of Christianity, * even if we do not yet consider it as a + religious doctrine, gives, touching this point, a conception of the summum + bonum (the kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the strictest demand of + practical reason. The moral law is holy (unyielding) and demands holiness + of morals, although all the moral perfection to which man can attain is + still only virtue, that is, a rightful disposition arising from respect + for the law, implying consciousness of a constant propensity to + transgression, or at least a want of purity, that is, a mixture of many + spurious (not moral) motives of obedience to the law, consequently a + self-esteem combined with humility. In respect, then, of the holiness + which the Christian law requires, this leaves the creature nothing but a + progress in infinitum, but for that very reason it justifies him in hoping + for an endless duration of his existence. The worth of a character + perfectly accordant with the moral law is infinite, since the only + restriction on all possible happiness in the judgement of a wise and all + powerful distributor of it is the absence of conformity of rational beings + to their duty. But the moral law of itself does not promise any happiness, + for according to our conceptions of an order of nature in general, this is + not necessarily connected with obedience to the law. Now Christian + morality supplies this defect (of the second indispensable element of the + summum bonum) by representing the world in which rational beings devote + themselves with all their soul to the moral law, as a kingdom of God, in + which nature and morality are brought into a harmony foreign to each of + itself, by a holy Author who makes the derived summum bonum possible. + Holiness of life is prescribed to them as a rule even in this life, while + the welfare proportioned to it, namely, bliss, is represented as + attainable only in an eternity; because the former must always be the + pattern of their conduct in every state, and progress towards it is + already possible and necessary in this life; while the latter, under the + name of happiness, cannot be attained at all in this world (so far as our + own power is concerned), and therefore is made simply an object of hope. + Nevertheless, the Christian principle of morality itself is not + theological (so as to be heteronomy), but is autonomy of pure practical + reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and His will the + foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of the summum bonum, + on condition of following these laws, and it does not even place the + proper spring of this obedience in the desired results, but solely in the + conception of duty, as that of which the faithful observance alone + constitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy consequences. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * It is commonly held that the Christian precept of morality + has no advantage in respect of purity over the moral + conceptions of the Stoics; the distinction between them is, + however, very obvious. The Stoic system made the + consciousness of strength of mind the pivot on which all + moral dispositions should turn; and although its disciples + spoke of duties and even defined them very well, yet they + placed the spring and proper determining principle of the + will in an elevation of the mind above the lower springs of + the senses, which owe their power only to weakness of mind. + With them therefore, virtue was a sort of heroism in the + wise man raising himself above the animal nature of man, is + sufficient for Himself, and, while he prescribes duties to + others, is himself raised above them, and is not subject to + any temptation to transgress the moral law. All this, + however, they could not have done if they had conceived this + law in all its purity and strictness, as the precept of the + Gospel does. When I give the name idea to a perfection to + which nothing adequate can be given in experience, it does + not follow that the moral ideas are thing transcendent, that + is something of which we could not even determine the + concept adequately, or of which it is uncertain whether + there is any object corresponding to it at all, as is the + case with the ideas of speculative reason; on the contrary, + being types of practical perfection, they serve as the + indispensable rule of conduct and likewise as the standard + of comparison. Now if I consider Christian morals on their + philosophical side, then compared with the ideas of the + Greek schools, they would appear as follows: the ideas of + the Cynics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Christians + are: simplicity of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness. + In respect of the way of attaining them, the Greek schools + were distinguished from one another thus that the Cynics + only required common sense, the others the path of science, + but both found the mere use of natural powers sufficient for + the purpose. Christian morality, because its precept is + framed (as a moral precept must be) so pure and unyielding, + takes from man all confidence that he can be fully adequate + to it, at least in this life, but again sets it up by + enabling us to hope that if we act as well as it is in our + power to do, then what is not in our power will come in to + our aid from another source, whether we know how this may be + or not. Aristotle and Plato differed only as to the origin + of our moral conceptions. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 50</span> + </p> + <p> + In this manner, the moral laws lead through the conception of the summum + bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to religion, + that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as + sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of a foreign and + contingent in themselves, but as essential laws of every free will in + itself, which, nevertheless, must be regarded as commands of the Supreme + Being, because it is only from a morally perfect (holy and good) and at + the same time all-powerful will, and consequently only through harmony + with this will, that we can hope to attain the summum bonum which the + moral law makes it our duty to take as the object of our endeavours. Here + again, then, all remains disinterested and founded merely on duty; neither + fear nor hope being made the fundamental springs, which if taken as + principles would destroy the whole moral worth of actions. The moral law + commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate + object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than + by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the + world; and although the conception of the summum bonum as a whole, in + which the greatest happiness is conceived as combined in the most exact + proportion with the highest degree of moral perfection (possible in + creatures), includes my own happiness, yet it is not this that is the + determining principle of the will which is enjoined to promote the summum + bonum, but the moral law, which, on the contrary, limits by strict + conditions my unbounded desire of happiness. + </p> + <p> + Hence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should make + ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. It is only + when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of participating + some day in happiness in proportion as we have endeavoured to be not + unworthy of it. + </p> + <p> + A man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of it is + in harmony with the summum bonum. We can now easily see that all + worthiness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the summum + bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest (which belongs to one's + state), namely, the participation of happiness. Now it follows from this + that morality should never be treated as a doctrine of happiness, that is, + an instruction how to become happy; for it has to do simply with the + rational condition (conditio sine qua non) of happiness, not with the + means of attaining it. But when morality has been completely expounded + (which merely imposes duties instead of providing rules for selfish + desires), then first, after the moral desire to promote the summum bonum + (to bring the kingdom of God to us) has been awakened, a desire founded on + a law, and which could not previously arise in any selfish mind, and when + for the behoof of this desire the step to religion has been taken, then + this ethical doctrine may be also called a doctrine of happiness because + the hope of happiness first begins with religion only. + </p> + <p> + We can also see from this that, when we ask what is God's ultimate end in + creating the world, we must not name the happiness of the rational beings + in it, but the summum bonum, which adds a further condition to that wish + of such beings, namely, the condition of being worthy of happiness, that + is, the morality of these same rational beings, a condition which alone + contains the rule by which only they can hope to share in the former at + the hand of a wise Author. For as wisdom, theoretically considered, + signifies the knowledge of the summum bonum and, practically, the + accordance of the will with the summum bonum, we cannot attribute to a + supreme independent wisdom an end based merely on goodness. For we cannot + conceive the action of this goodness (in respect of the happiness of + rational beings) as suitable to the highest original good, except under + the restrictive conditions of harmony with the holiness * of his will. + Therefore, those who placed the end of creation in the glory of God + (provided that this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a desire to be + praised) have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For nothing glorifies + God more than that which is the most estimable thing in the world, respect + for his command, the observance of the holy duty that his law imposes on + us, when there is added thereto his glorious plan of crowning such a + beautiful order of things with corresponding happiness. If the latter (to + speak humanly) makes Him worthy of love, by the former He is an object of + adoration. Even men can never acquire respect by benevolence alone, though + they may gain love, so that the greatest beneficence only procures them + honour when it is regulated by worthiness. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 55</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * In order to make these characteristics of these + conceptions clear, I add the remark that whilst we ascribe + to God various attributes, the quality of which we also find + applicable to creatures, only that in Him they are raised to + the highest degree, e.g., power, knowledge, presence, + goodness, etc., under the designations of omnipotence, + omniscience, omnipresence, etc., there are three that are + ascribed to God exclusively, and yet without the addition of + greatness, and which are all moral He is the only holy, the + only blessed, the only wise, because these conceptions + already imply the absence of limitation. In the order of + these attributes He is also the holy lawgiver (and creator), + the good governor (and preserver) and the just judge, three + attributes which include everything by which God is the + object of religion, and in conformity with which the + metaphysical perfections are added of themselves in the + reason. +</pre> + <p> + That in the order of ends, man (and with him every rational being) is an + end in himself, that is, that he can never be used merely as a means by + any (not even by God) without being at the same time an end also himself, + that therefore humanity in our person must be holy to ourselves, this + follows now of itself because he is the subject of the moral law, in other + words, of that which is holy in itself, and on account of which and in + agreement with which alone can anything be termed holy. For this moral law + is founded on the autonomy of his will, as a free will which by its + universal laws must necessarily be able to agree with that to which it is + to submit itself. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0041" id="link2H_4_0041"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason Generally. + </h2> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 60</span> + </p> + <p> + They all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a postulate + but a law, by which reason determines the will directly, which will, + because it is so determined as a pure will, requires these necessary + conditions of obedience to its precept. These postulates are not + theoretical dogmas but, suppositions practically necessary; while then + they do [not] extend our speculative knowledge, they give objective + reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their + reference to what is practical), and give it a right to concepts, the + possibility even of which it could not otherwise venture to affirm. + </p> + <p> + These postulates are those of immortality, freedom positively considered + (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the intelligible + world), and the existence of God. The first results from the practically + necessary condition of a duration adequate to the complete fulfilment of + the moral law; the second from the necessary supposition of independence + of the sensible world, and of the faculty of determining one's will + according to the law of an intelligible world, that is, of freedom; the + third from the necessary condition of the existence of the summum bonum in + such an intelligible world, by the supposition of the supreme independent + good, that is, the existence of God. + </p> + <p> + Thus the fact that respect for the moral law necessarily makes the summum + bonum an object of our endeavours, and the supposition thence resulting of + its objective reality, lead through the postulates of practical reason to + conceptions which speculative reason might indeed present as problems, but + could never solve. Thus it leads: 1. To that one in the solution of which + the latter could do nothing but commit paralogisms (namely, that of + immortality), because it could not lay hold of the character of + permanence, by which to complete the psychological conception of an + ultimate subject necessarily ascribed to the soul in self-consciousness, + so as to make it the real conception of a substance, a character which + practical reason furnishes by the postulate of a duration required for + accordance with the moral law in the summum bonum, which is the whole end + of practical reason. 2. It leads to that of which speculative reason + contained nothing but antinomy, the solution of which it could only found + on a notion problematically conceivable indeed, but whose objective + reality it could not prove or determine, namely, the cosmological idea of + an intelligible world and the consciousness of our existence in it, by + means of the postulate of freedom (the reality of which it lays down by + virtue of the moral law), and with it likewise the law of an intelligible + world, to which speculative reason could only point, but could not define + its conception. 3. What speculative reason was able to think, but was + obliged to leave undetermined as a mere transcendental ideal, viz., the + theological conception of the first Being, to this it gives significance + (in a practical view, that is, as a condition of the possibility of the + object of a will determined by that law), namely, as the supreme principle + of the summum bonum in an intelligible world, by means of moral + legislation in it invested with sovereign power. + </p> + <p> + Is our knowledge, however, actually extended in this way by pure practical + reason, and is that immanent in practical reason which for the speculative + was only transcendent? Certainly, but only in a practical point of view. + For we do not thereby take knowledge of the nature of our souls, nor of + the intelligible world, nor of the Supreme Being, with respect to what + they are in themselves, but we have merely combined the conceptions of + them in the practical concept of the summum bonum as the object of our + will, and this altogether a priori, but only by means of the moral law, + and merely in reference to it, in respect of the object which it commands. + But how freedom is possible, and how we are to conceive this kind of + causality theoretically and positively, is not thereby discovered; but + only that there is such a causality is postulated by the moral law and in + its behoof. It is the same with the remaining ideas, the possibility of + which no human intelligence will ever fathom, but the truth of which, on + the other hand, no sophistry will ever wrest from the conviction even of + the commonest man. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 65</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0042" id="link2H_4_0042"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure Reason in a + Practical point of view, without its Knowledge as Speculative being + enlarged at the same time? + </h2> + <h3> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 70</span> + </h3> + <p> + In order not to be too abstract, we will answer this question at once in + its application to the present case. In order to extend a pure cognition + practically, there must be an a priori purpose given, that is, an end as + object (of the will), which independently of all theological principle is + presented as practically necessary by an imperative which determines the + will directly (a categorical imperative), and in this case that is the + summum bonum. This, however, is not possible without presupposing three + theoretical conceptions (for which, because they are mere conceptions of + pure reason, no corresponding intuition can be found, nor consequently by + the path of theory any objective reality); namely, freedom, immortality, + and God. Thus by the practical law which commands the existence of the + highest good possible in a world, the possibility of those objects of pure + speculative reason is postulated, and the objective reality which the + latter could not assure them. By this the theoretical knowledge of pure + reason does indeed obtain an accession; but it consists only in this, that + those concepts which otherwise it had to look upon as problematical + (merely thinkable) concepts, are now shown assertorially to be such as + actually have objects; because practical reason indispensably requires + their existence for the possibility of its object, the summum bonum, which + practically is absolutely necessary, and this justifies theoretical reason + in assuming them. But this extension of theoretical reason is no extension + of speculative, that is, we cannot make any positive use of it in a + theoretical point of view. For as nothing is accomplished in this by + practical reason, further than that these concepts are real and actually + have their (possible) objects, and nothing in the way of intuition of them + is given thereby (which indeed could not be demanded), hence the admission + of this reality does not render any synthetical proposition possible. + Consequently, this discovery does not in the least help us to extend this + knowledge of ours in a speculative point of view, although it does in + respect of the practical employment of pure reason. The above three ideas + of speculative reason are still in themselves not cognitions; they are + however (transcendent) thoughts, in which there is nothing impossible. + Now, by help of an apodeictic practical law, being necessary conditions of + that which it commands to be made an object, they acquire objective + reality; that is, we learn from it that they have objects, without being + able to point out how the conception of them is related to an object, and + this, too, is still not a cognition of these objects; for we cannot + thereby form any synthetical judgement about them, nor determine their + application theoretically; consequently, we can make no theoretical + rational use of them at all, in which use all speculative knowledge of + reason consists. Nevertheless, the theoretical knowledge, not indeed of + these objects, but of reason generally, is so far enlarged by this, that + by the practical postulates objects were given to those ideas, a merely + problematical thought having by this means first acquired objective + reality. There is therefore no extension of the knowledge of given + supersensible objects, but an extension of theoretical reason and of its + knowledge in respect of the supersensible generally; inasmuch as it is + compelled to admit that there are such objects, although it is not able to + define them more closely, so as itself to extend this knowledge of the + objects (which have now been given it on practical grounds, and only for + practical use). For this accession, then, pure theoretical reason, for + which all those ideas are transcendent and without object, has simply to + thank its practical faculty. In this they become immanent and + constitutive, being the source of the possibility of realizing the + necessary object of pure practical reason (the summum bonum); whereas + apart from this they are transcendent, and merely regulative principles of + speculative reason, which do not require it to assume a new object beyond + experience, but only to bring its use in experience nearer to + completeness. But when once reason is in possession of this accession, it + will go to work with these ideas as speculative reason (properly only to + assure the certainty of its practical use) in a negative manner: that is, + not extending but clearing up its knowledge so as on one side to keep off + anthropomorphism, as the source of superstition, or seeming extension of + these conceptions by supposed experience; and on the other side + fanaticism, which promises the same by means of supersensible intuition or + feelings of the like kind. All these are hindrances to the practical use + of pure reason, so that the removal of them may certainly be considered an + extension of our knowledge in a practical point of view, without + contradicting the admission that for speculative purposes reason has not + in the least gained by this. + </p> + <p> + Every employment of reason in respect of an object requires pure concepts + of the understanding (categories), without which no object can be + conceived. These can be applied to the theoretical employment of reason, + i.e., to that kind of knowledge, only in case an intuition (which is + always sensible) is taken as a basis, and therefore merely in order to + conceive by means of- them an object of possible experience. Now here what + have to be thought by means of the categories in order to be known are + ideas of reason, which cannot be given in any experience. Only we are not + here concerned with the theoretical knowledge of the objects of these + ideas, but only with this, whether they have objects at all. This reality + is supplied by pure practical reason, and theoretical reason has nothing + further to do in this but to think those objects by means of categories. + This, as we have elsewhere clearly shown, can be done well enough without + needing any intuition (either sensible or supersensible) because the + categories have their seat and origin in the pure understanding, simply as + the faculty of thought, before and independently of any intuition, and + they always only signify an object in general, no matter in what way it + may be given to us. Now when the categories are to be applied to these + ideas, it is not possible to give them any object in intuition; but that + such an object actually exists, and consequently that the category as a + mere form of thought is here not empty but has significance, this is + sufficiently assured them by an object which practical reason presents + beyond doubt in the concept of the summum bonum, the reality of the + conceptions which are required for the possibility of the summum bonum; + without, however, effecting by this accession the least extension of our + knowledge on theoretical principles. + </p> + <p> + When these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the kingdom of God), + and of immortality are further determined by predicates taken from our own + nature, we must not regard this determination as a sensualizing of those + pure rational ideas (anthropomorphism), nor as a transcendent knowledge of + supersensible objects; for these predicates are no others than + understanding and will, considered too in the relation to each other in + which they must be conceived in the moral law, and therefore, only so far + as a pure practical use is made of them. As to all the rest that belongs + to these conceptions psychologically, that is, so far as we observe these + faculties of ours empirically in their exercise (e.g., that the + understanding of man is discursive, and its notions therefore not + intuitions but thoughts, that these follow one another in time, that his + will has its satisfaction always dependent on the existence of its object, + etc., which cannot be the case in the Supreme Being), from all this we + abstract in that case, and then there remains of the notions by which we + conceive a pure intelligence nothing more than just what is required for + the possibility of conceiving a moral law. There is then a knowledge of + God indeed, but only for practical purposes, and, if we attempt to extend + it to a theoretical knowledge, we find an understanding that has + intuitions, not thoughts, a will that is directed to objects on the + existence of which its satisfaction does not in the least depend (not to + mention the transcendental predicates, as, for example, a magnitude of + existence, that is duration, which, however, is not in time, the only + possible means we have of conceiving existence as magnitude). Now these + are all attributes of which we can form no conception that would help to + the knowledge of the object, and we learn from this that they can never be + used for a theory of supersensible beings, so that on this side they are + quite incapable of being the foundation of a speculative knowledge, and + their use is limited simply to the practice of the moral law. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 75</span> + </p> + <p> + This last is so obvious, and can be proved so clearly by fact, that we may + confidently challenge all pretended natural theologians (a singular name) + * to specify (over and above the merely ontological predicates) one single + attribute, whether of the understanding or of the will, determining this + object of theirs, of which we could not show incontrovertibly that, if we + abstract from it everything anthropomorphic, nothing would remain to us + but the mere word, without our being able to connect with it the smallest + notion by which we could hope for an extension of theoretical knowledge. + But as to the practical, there still remains to us of the attributes of + understanding and will the conception of a relation to which objective + reality is given by the practical law (which determines a priori precisely + this relation of the understanding to the will). When once this is done, + then reality is given to the conception of the object of a will morally + determined (the conception of the summum bonum), and with it to the + conditions of its possibility, the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, + but always only relatively to the practice of the moral law (and not for + any speculative purpose). + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * Learning is properly only the whole content of the + historical sciences. Consequently it is only the teacher of + revealed theology that can be called a learned theologian. + If, however, we choose to call a man learned who is in + possession of the rational sciences (mathematics and + philosophy), although even this would be contrary to the + signification of the word (which always counts as learning + only that which one must be "learned" and which, therefore, + he cannot discover of himself by reason), even in that case + the philosopher would make too poor a figure with his + knowledge of God as a positive science to let himself be + called on that account a learned man. +</pre> + <p> + According to these remarks it is now easy to find the answer to the + weighty question whether the notion of God is one belonging to physics + (and therefore also to metaphysics, which contains the pure a priori + principles of the former in their universal import) or to morals. If we + have recourse to God as the Author of all things, in order to explain the + arrangements of nature or its changes, this is at least not a physical + explanation, and is a complete confession that our philosophy has come to + an end, since we are obliged to assume something of which in itself we + have otherwise no conception, in order to be able to frame a conception of + the possibility of what we see before our eyes. Metaphysics, however, + cannot enable us to attain by certain inference from the knowledge of this + world to the conception of God and to the proof of His existence, for this + reason, that in order to say that this world could be produced only by a + God (according to the conception implied by this word) we should know this + world as the most perfect whole possible; and for this purpose should also + know all possible worlds (in order to be able to compare them with this); + in other words, we should be omniscient. It is absolutely impossible, + however, to know the existence of this Being from mere concepts, because + every existential proposition, that is, every proposition that affirms the + existence of a being of which I frame a concept, is a synthetic + proposition, that is, one by which I go beyond that conception and affirm + of it more than was thought in the conception itself; namely, that this + concept in the understanding has an object corresponding to it outside the + understanding, and this it is obviously impossible to elicit by any + reasoning. There remains, therefore, only one single process possible for + reason to attain this knowledge, namely, to start from the supreme + principle of its pure practical use (which in every case is directed + simply to the existence of something as a consequence of reason) and thus + determine its object. Then its inevitable problem, namely, the necessary + direction of the will to the summum bonum, discovers to us not only the + necessity of assuming such a First Being in reference to the possibility + of this good in the world, but, what is most remarkable, something which + reason in its progress on the path of physical nature altogether failed to + find, namely, an accurately defined conception of this First Being. As we + can know only a small part of this world, and can still less compare it + with all possible worlds, we may indeed from its order, design, and + greatness, infer a wise, good, powerful, etc., Author of it, but not that + He is all-wise, all-good, all-powerful, etc. It may indeed very well be + granted that we should be justified in supplying this inevitable defect by + a legitimate and reasonable hypothesis; namely, that when wisdom, + goodness, etc, are displayed in all the parts that offer themselves to our + nearer knowledge, it is just the same in all the rest, and that it would + therefore be reasonable to ascribe all possible perfections to the Author + of the world, but these are not strict logical inferences in which we can + pride ourselves on our insight, but only permitted conclusions in which we + may be indulged and which require further recommendation before we can + make use of them. On the path of empirical inquiry then (physics), the + conception of God remains always a conception of the perfection of the + First Being not accurately enough determined to be held adequate to the + conception of Deity. (With metaphysic in its transcendental part nothing + whatever can be accomplished.) + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 80</span> + </p> + <p> + When I now try to test this conception by reference to the object of + practical reason, I find that the moral principle admits as possible only + the conception of an Author of the world possessed of the highest + perfection. He must be omniscient, in order to know my conduct up to the + inmost root of my mental state in all possible cases and into all future + time; omnipotent, in order to allot to it its fitting consequences; + similarly He must be omnipresent, eternal, etc. Thus the moral law, by + means of the conception of the summum bonum as the object of a pure + practical reason, determines the concept of the First Being as the Supreme + Being; a thing which the physical (and in its higher development the + metaphysical), in other words, the whole speculative course of reason, was + unable to effect. The conception of God, then, is one that belongs + originally not to physics, i.e., to speculative reason, but to morals. The + same may be said of the other conceptions of reason of which we have + treated above as postulates of it in its practical use. + </p> + <p> + In the history of Grecian philosophy we find no distinct traces of a pure + rational theology earlier than Anaxagoras; but this is not because the + older philosophers had not intelligence or penetration enough to raise + themselves to it by the path of speculation, at least with the aid of a + thoroughly reasonable hypothesis. What could have been easier, what more + natural, than the thought which of itself occurs to everyone, to assume + instead of several causes of the world, instead of an indeterminate degree + of perfection, a single rational cause having all perfection? But the + evils in the world seemed to them to be much too serious objections to + allow them to feel themselves justified in such a hypothesis. They showed + intelligence and penetration then in this very point, that they did not + allow themselves to adopt it, but on the contrary looked about amongst + natural causes to see if they could not find in them the qualities and + power required for a First Being. But when this acute people had advanced + so far in their investigations of nature as to treat even moral questions + philosophically, on which other nations had never done anything but talk, + then first they found a new and practical want, which did not fail to give + definiteness to their conception of the First Being: and in this the + speculative reason played the part of spectator, or at best had the merit + of embellishing a conception that had not grown on its own ground, and of + applying a series of confirmations from the study of nature now brought + forward for the first time, not indeed to strengthen the authority of this + conception (which was already established), but rather to make a show with + a supposed discovery of theoretical reason. + </p> + <p> + From these remarks, the reader of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason + will be thoroughly convinced how highly necessary that laborious deduction + of the categories was, and how fruitful for theology and morals. For if, + on the one hand, we place them in pure understanding, it is by this + deduction alone that we can be prevented from regarding them, with Plato, + as innate, and founding on them extravagant pretensions to theories of the + supersensible, to which we can see no end, and by which we should make + theology a magic lantern of chimeras; on the other hand, if we regard them + as acquired, this deduction saves us from restricting, with Epicurus, all + and every use of them, even for practical purposes, to the objects and + motives of the senses. But now that the Critique has shown by that + deduction, first, that they are not of empirical origin, but have their + seat and source a priori in the pure understanding; secondly, that as they + refer to objects in general independently of the intuition of them, hence, + although they cannot effect theoretical knowledge, except in application + to empirical objects, yet when applied to an object given by pure + practical reason they enable us to conceive the supersensible definitely, + only so far, however, as it is defined by such predicates as are + necessarily connected with the pure practical purpose given a priori and + with its possibility. The speculative restriction of pure reason and its + practical extension bring it into that relation of equality in which + reason in general can be employed suitably to its end, and this example + proves better than any other that the path to wisdom, if it is to be made + sure and not to be impassable or misleading, must with us men inevitably + pass through science; but it is not till this is complete that we can be + convinced that it leads to this goal. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 85</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0043" id="link2H_4_0043"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason. + </h2> + <p> + A want or requirement of pure reason in its speculative use leads only to + a hypothesis; that of pure practical reason to a postulate; for in the + former case I ascend from the result as high as I please in the series of + causes, not in order to give objective reality to the result (e.g., the + causal connection of things and changes in the world), but in order + thoroughly to satisfy my inquiring reason in respect of it. Thus I see + before me order and design in nature, and need not resort to speculation + to assure myself of their reality, but to explain them I have to + presuppose a Deity as their cause; and then since the inference from an + effect to a definite cause is always uncertain and doubtful, especially to + a cause so precise and so perfectly defined as we have to conceive in God, + hence the highest degree of certainty to which this pre-supposition can be + brought is that it is the most rational opinion for us men. * On the other + hand, a requirement of pure practical reason is based on a duty, that of + making something (the summum bonum) the object of my will so as to promote + it with all my powers; in which case I must suppose its possibility and, + consequently, also the conditions necessary thereto, namely, God, freedom, + and immortality; since I cannot prove these by my speculative reason, + although neither can I refute them. This duty is founded on something that + is indeed quite independent of these suppositions and is of itself + apodeictically certain, namely, the moral law; and so far it needs no + further support by theoretical views as to the inner constitution of + things, the secret final aim of the order of the world, or a presiding + ruler thereof, in order to bind me in the most perfect manner to act in + unconditional conformity to the law. But the subjective effect of this + law, namely, the mental disposition conformed to it and made necessary by + it, to promote the practically possible summum bonum, this pre-supposes at + least that the latter is possible, for it would be practically impossible + to strive after the object of a conception which at bottom was empty and + had no object. Now the above-mentioned postulates concern only the + physical or metaphysical conditions of the possibility of the summum + bonum; in a word, those which lie in the nature of things; not, however, + for the sake of an arbitrary speculative purpose, but of a practically + necessary end of a pure rational will, which in this case does not choose, + but obeys an inexorable command of reason, the foundation of which is + objective, in the constitution of things as they must be universally + judged by pure reason, and is not based on inclination; for we are in + nowise justified in assuming, on account of what we wish on merely + subjective grounds, that the means thereto are possible or that its object + is real. This, then, is an absolutely necessary requirement, and what it + pre-supposes is not merely justified as an allowable hypothesis, but as a + postulate in a practical point of view; and admitting that the pure moral + law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a rule of prudence), + the righteous man may say: "I will that there be a God, that my existence + in this world be also an existence outside the chain of physical causes + and in a pure world of the understanding, and lastly, that my duration be + endless; I firmly abide by this, and will not let this faith be taken from + me; for in this instance alone my interest, because I must not relax + anything of it, inevitably determines my judgement, without regarding + sophistries, however unable I may be to answer them or to oppose them with + others more plausible. ** + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * But even here we should not be able to allege a + requirement of reason, if we had not before our eyes a + problematical, but yet inevitable, conception of reason, + namely, that of an absolutely necessary being. This + conception now seeks to be defined, and this, in addition to + the tendency to extend itself, is the objective ground of a + requirement of speculative reason, namely, to have a more + precise definition of the conception of a necessary being + which is to serve as the first cause of other beings, so as + to make these latter knowable by some means. Without such + antecedent necessary problems there are no requirements- at + least not of pure reason- the rest are requirements of + inclination. +</pre> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 90</span> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + ** In the Deutsches Museum, February, 1787, there is a + dissertation by a very subtle and clear-headed man, the late + Wizenmann, whose early death is to be lamented, in which he + disputes the right to argue from a want to the objective + reality of its object, and illustrates the point by the + example of a man in love, who having fooled himself into an + idea of beauty, which is merely a chimera of his own brain, + would fain conclude that such an object really exists + somewhere. I quite agree with him in this, in all cases + where the want is founded on inclination, which cannot + necessarily postulate the existence of its object even for + the man that is affected by it, much less can it contain a + demand valid for everyone, and therefore it is merely a + subjective ground of the wish. But in the present case we + have a want of reason springing from an objective + determining principle of the will, namely, the moral law, + which necessarily binds every rational being, and therefore + justifies him in assuming a priori in nature the conditions + proper for it, and makes the latter inseparable from the + complete practical use of reason. It is a duty to realize + the summum bonum to the utmost of our power, therefore it + must be possible, consequently it is unavoidable for every + rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for + its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as + the moral law, in connection with which alone it is valid. +</pre> + <p> + In order to prevent misconception in the use of a notion as yet so unusual + as that of a faith of pure practical reason, let me be permitted to add + one more remark. It might almost seem as if this rational faith were here + announced as itself a command, namely, that we should assume the summum + bonum as possible. But a faith that is commanded is nonsense. Let the + preceding analysis, however, be remembered of what is required to be + supposed in the conception of the summum bonum, and it will be seen that + it cannot be commanded to assume this possibility, and no practical + disposition of mind is required to admit it; but that speculative reason + must concede it without being asked, for no one can affirm that it is + impossible in itself that rational beings in the world should at the same + time be worthy of happiness in conformity with the moral law and also + possess this happiness proportionately. Now in respect of the first + element of the summum bonum, namely, that which concerns morality, the + moral law gives merely a command, and to doubt the possibility of that + element would be the same as to call in question the moral law itself. But + as regards the second element of that object, namely, happiness perfectly + proportioned to that worthiness, it is true that there is no need of a + command to admit its possibility in general, for theoretical reason has + nothing to say against it; but the manner in which we have to conceive + this harmony of the laws of nature with those of freedom has in it + something in respect of which we have a choice, because theoretical reason + decides nothing with apodeictic certainty about it, and in respect of this + there may be a moral interest which turns the scale. + </p> + <p> + I had said above that in a mere course of nature in the world an accurate + correspondence between happiness and moral worth is not to be expected and + must be regarded as impossible, and that therefore the possibility of the + summum bonum cannot be admitted from this side except on the supposition + of a moral Author of the world. I purposely reserved the restriction of + this judgement to the subjective conditions of our reason, in order not to + make use of it until the manner of this belief should be defined more + precisely. The fact is that the impossibility referred to is merely + subjective, that is, our reason finds it impossible for it to render + conceivable in the way of a mere course of nature a connection so exactly + proportioned and so thoroughly adapted to an end, between two sets of + events happening according to such distinct laws; although, as with + everything else in nature that is adapted to an end, it cannot prove, that + is, show by sufficient objective reason, that it is not possible by + universal laws of nature. + </p> + <p> + Now, however, a deciding principle of a different kind comes into play to + turn the scale in this uncertainty of speculative reason. The command to + promote the summum bonum is established on an objective basis (in + practical reason); the possibility of the same in general is likewise + established on an objective basis (in theoretical reason, which has + nothing to say against it). But reason cannot decide objectively in what + way we are to conceive this possibility; whether by universal laws of + nature without a wise Author presiding over nature, or only on supposition + of such an Author. Now here there comes in a subjective condition of + reason, the only way theoretically possible for it, of conceiving the + exact harmony of the kingdom of nature with the kingdom of morals, which + is the condition of the possibility of the summum bonum; and at the same + time the only one conducive to morality (which depends on an objective law + of reason). Now since the promotion of this summum bonum, and therefore + the supposition of its possibility, are objectively necessary (though only + as a result of practical reason), while at the same time the manner in + which we would conceive it rests with our own choice, and in this choice a + free interest of pure practical reason decides for the assumption of a + wise Author of the world; it is clear that the principle that herein + determines our judgement, though as a want it is subjective, yet at the + same time being the means of promoting what is objectively (practically) + necessary, is the foundation of a maxim of belief in a moral point of + view, that is, a faith of pure practical reason. This, then, is not + commanded, but being a voluntary determination of our judgement, conducive + to the moral (commanded) purpose, and moreover harmonizing with the + theoretical requirement of reason, to assume that existence and to make it + the foundation of our further employment of reason, it has itself sprung + from the moral disposition of mind; it may therefore at times waver even + in the well-disposed, but can never be reduced to unbelief. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 95</span> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0044" id="link2H_4_0044"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties to his Practical + Destination. + </h2> + <p> + If human nature is destined to endeavour after the summum bonum, we must + suppose also that the measure of its cognitive faculties, and particularly + their relation to one another, is suitable to this end. Now the Critique + of Pure Speculative Reason proves that this is incapable of solving + satisfactorily the most weighty problems that are proposed to it, although + it does not ignore the natural and important hints received from the same + reason, nor the great steps that it can make to approach to this great + goal that is set before it, which, however, it can never reach of itself, + even with the help of the greatest knowledge of nature. Nature then seems + here to have provided us only in a step-motherly fashion with the faculty + required for our end. + </p> + <p> + <span class="side">BOOK<i>2|CHAPTER</i>2 ^paragraph 100</span> + </p> + <p> + Suppose, now, that in this matter nature had conformed to our wish and had + given us that capacity of discernment or that enlightenment which we would + gladly possess, or which some imagine they actually possess, what would in + all probability be the consequence? Unless our whole nature were at the + same time changed, our inclinations, which always have the first word, + would first of all demand their own satisfaction, and, joined with + rational reflection, the greatest possible and most lasting satisfaction, + under the name of happiness; the moral law would afterwards speak, in + order to keep them within their proper bounds, and even to subject them + all to a higher end, which has no regard to inclination. But instead of + the conflict that the moral disposition has now to carry on with the + inclinations, in which, though after some defeats, moral strength of mind + may be gradually acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would + stand unceasingly before our eyes (for what we can prove perfectly is to + us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of our eyes). + Transgression of the law, would, no doubt, be avoided; what is commanded + would be done; but the mental disposition, from which actions ought to + proceed, cannot be infused by any command, and in this case the spur of + action is ever active and external, so that reason has no need to exert + itself in order to gather strength to resist the inclinations by a lively + representation of the dignity of the law: hence most of the actions that + conformed to the law would be done from fear, a few only from hope, and + none at all from duty, and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in + the eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the + world depends, would cease to exist. As long as the nature of man remains + what it is, his conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism, in + which, as in a puppet-show, everything would gesticulate well, but there + would be no life in the figures. Now, when it is quite otherwise with us, + when with all the effort of our reason we have only a very obscure and + doubtful view into the future, when the Governor of the world allows us + only to conjecture his existence and his majesty, not to behold them or + prove them clearly; and on the other hand, the moral law within us, + without promising or threatening anything with certainty, demands of us + disinterested respect; and only when this respect has become active and + dominant, does it allow us by means of it a prospect into the world of the + supersensible, and then only with weak glances: all this being so, there + is room for true moral disposition, immediately devoted to the law, and a + rational creature can become worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that + corresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his actions. Thus + what the study of nature and of man teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may + well be true here also; that the unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is + not less worthy of admiration in what it has denied than in what it has + granted. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0045" id="link2H_4_0045"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + SECOND PART. + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0046" id="link2H_4_0046"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. + </h2> + <p> + By the methodology of pure practical reason we are not to understand the + mode of proceeding with pure practical principles (whether in study or in + exposition), with a view to a scientific knowledge of them, which alone is + what is properly called method elsewhere in theoretical philosophy (for + popular knowledge requires a manner, science a method, i.e., a process + according to principles of reason by which alone the manifold of any + branch of knowledge can become a system). On the contrary, by this + methodology is understood the mode in which we can give the laws of pure + practical reason access to the human mind and influence on its maxims, + that is, by which we can make the objectively practical reason + subjectively practical also. + </p> + <p> + Now it is clear enough that those determining principles of the will which + alone make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth, namely, the + direct conception of the law and the objective necessity of obeying it as + our duty, must be regarded as the proper springs of actions, since + otherwise legality of actions might be produced, but not morality of + character. But it is not so clear; on the contrary, it must at first sight + seem to every one very improbable that even subjectively that exhibition + of pure virtue can have more power over the human mind, and supply a far + stronger spring even for effecting that legality of actions, and can + produce more powerful resolutions to prefer the law, from pure respect for + it, to every other consideration, than all the deceptive allurements of + pleasure or of all that may be reckoned as happiness, or even than all + threatenings of pain and misfortune. Nevertheless, this is actually the + case, and if human nature were not so constituted, no mode of presenting + the law by roundabout ways and indirect recommendations would ever produce + morality of character. All would be simple hypocrisy; the law would be + hated, or at least despised, while it was followed for the sake of one's + own advantage. The letter of the law (legality) would be found in our + actions, but not the spirit of it in our minds (morality); and as with all + our efforts we could not quite free ourselves from reason in our + judgement, we must inevitably appear in our own eyes worthless, depraved + men, even though we should seek to compensate ourselves for this + mortification before the inner tribunal, by enjoying the pleasure that a + supposed natural or divine law might be imagined to have connected with it + a sort of police machinery, regulating its operations by what was done + without troubling itself about the motives for doing it. + </p> + <p> + It cannot indeed be denied that in order to bring an uncultivated or + degraded mind into the track of moral goodness some preparatory guidance + is necessary, to attract it by a view of its own advantage, or to alarm it + by fear of loss; but as soon as this mechanical work, these + leading-strings have produced some effect, then we must bring before the + mind the pure moral motive, which, not only because it is the only one + that can be the foundation of a character (a practically consistent habit + of mind with unchangeable maxims), but also because it teaches a man to + feel his own dignity, gives the mind a power unexpected even by himself, + to tear himself from all sensible attachments so far as they would fain + have the rule, and to find a rich compensation for the sacrifice he + offers, in the independence of his rational nature and the greatness of + soul to which he sees that he is destined. We will therefore show, by such + observations as every one can make, that this property of our minds, this + receptivity for a pure moral interest, and consequently the moving force + of the pure conception of virtue, when it is properly applied to the human + heart, is the most powerful spring and, when a continued and punctual + observance of moral maxims is in question, the only spring of good + conduct. It must, however, be remembered that if these observations only + prove the reality of such a feeling, but do not show any moral improvement + brought about by it, this is no argument against the only method that + exists of making the objectively practical laws of pure reason + subjectively practical, through the mere force of the conception of duty; + nor does it prove that this method is a vain delusion. For as it has never + yet come into vogue, experience can say nothing of its results; one can + only ask for proofs of the receptivity for such springs, and these I will + now briefly present, and then sketch the method of founding and + cultivating genuine moral dispositions. + </p> + <p> + When we attend to the course of conversation in mixed companies, + consisting not merely of learned persons and subtle reasoners, but also of + men of business or of women, we observe that, besides story-telling and + jesting, another kind of entertainment finds a place in them, namely, + argument; for stories, if they are to have novelty and interest, are soon + exhausted, and jesting is likely to become insipid. Now of all argument + there is none in which persons are more ready to join who find any other + subtle discussion tedious, none that brings more liveliness into the + company, than that which concerns the moral worth of this or that action + by which the character of some person is to be made out. Persons, to whom + in other cases anything subtle and speculative in theoretical questions is + dry and irksome, presently join in when the question is to make out the + moral import of a good or bad action that has been related, and they + display an exactness, a refinement, a subtlety, in excogitating everything + that can lessen the purity of purpose, and consequently the degree of + virtue in it, which we do not expect from them in any other kind of + speculation. In these criticisms, persons who are passing judgement on + others often reveal their own character: some, in exercising their + judicial office, especially upon the dead, seem inclined chiefly to defend + the goodness that is related of this or that deed against all injurious + charges of insincerity, and ultimately to defend the whole moral worth of + the person against the reproach of dissimulation and secret wickedness; + others, on the contrary, turn their thoughts more upon attacking this + worth by accusation and fault finding. We cannot always, however, + attribute to these latter the intention of arguing away virtue altogether + out of all human examples in order to make it an empty name; often, on the + contrary, it is only well-meant strictness in determining the true moral + import of actions according to an uncompromising law. Comparison with such + a law, instead of with examples, lowers self-conceit in moral matters very + much, and not merely teaches humility, but makes every one feel it when he + examines himself closely. Nevertheless, we can for the most part observe, + in those who defend the purity of purpose in giving examples that where + there is the presumption of uprightness they are anxious to remove even + the least spot, lest, if all examples had their truthfulness disputed, and + if the purity of all human virtue were denied, it might in the end be + regarded as a mere phantom, and so all effort to attain it be made light + of as vain affectation and delusive conceit. + </p> + <p> + I do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made use of + this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the most subtle + examination of the practical questions that are thrown up; and why they + have not, after first laying the foundation of a purely moral catechism, + searched through the biographies of ancient and modern times with the view + of having at hand instances of the duties laid down, in which, especially + by comparison of similar actions under different circumstances, they might + exercise the critical judgement of their scholars in remarking their + greater or less moral significance. This is a thing in which they would + find that even early youth, which is still unripe for speculation of other + kinds, would soon Become very acute and not a little interested, because + it feels the progress of its faculty of judgement; and, what is most + important, they could hope with confidence that the frequent practice of + knowing and approving good conduct in all its purity, and on the other + hand of remarking with regret or contempt the least deviation from it, + although it may be pursued only as a sport in which children may compete + with one another, yet will leave a lasting impression of esteem on the one + hand and disgust on the other; and so, by the mere habit of looking on + such actions as deserving approval or blame, a good foundation would be + laid for uprightness in the future course of life. Only I wish they would + spare them the example of so-called noble (super-meritorious) actions, in + which our sentimental books so much abound, and would refer all to duty + merely, and to the worth that a man can and must give himself in his own + eyes by the consciousness of not having transgressed it, since whatever + runs up into empty wishes and longings after inaccessible perfection + produces mere heroes of romance, who, while they pique themselves on their + feeling for transcendent greatness, release themselves in return from the + observance of common and every-day obligations, which then seem to them + petty and insignificant. * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * It is quite proper to extol actions that display a great, + unselfish, sympathizing mind or humanity. But, in this case, + we must fix attention not so much on the elevation of soul, + which is very fleeting and transitory, as on the subjection + of the heart to duty, from which a more enduring impression + may be expected, because this implies principle (whereas the + former only implies ebullitions). One need only reflect a + little and he will always find a debt that he has by some + means incurred towards the human race (even if it were only + this, by the inequality of men in the civil constitution, + enjoys advantages on account of which others must be the + more in want), which will prevent the thought of duty from + being repressed by the self-complacent imagination of merit. +</pre> + <p> + But if it is asked: "What, then, is really pure morality, by which as a + touchstone we must test the moral significance of every action," then I + must admit that it is only philosophers that can make the decision of this + question doubtful, for to common sense it has been decided long ago, not + indeed by abstract general formulae, but by habitual use, like the + distinction between the right and left hand. We will then point out the + criterion of pure virtue in an example first, and, imagining that it is + set before a boy, of say ten years old, for his judgement, we will see + whether he would necessarily judge so of himself without being guided by + his teacher. Tell him the history of an honest man whom men want to + persuade to join the calumniators of an innocent and powerless person (say + Anne Boleyn, accused by Henry VIII of England). He is offered advantages, + great gifts, or high rank; he rejects them. This will excite mere + approbation and applause in the mind of the hearer. Now begins the + threatening of loss. Amongst these traducers are his best friends, who now + renounce his friendship; near kinsfolk, who threaten to disinherit him (he + being without fortune); powerful persons, who can persecute and harass him + in all places and circumstances; a prince, who threatens him with loss of + freedom, yea, loss of life. Then to fill the measure of suffering, and + that he may feel the pain that only the morally good heart can feel very + deeply, let us conceive his family threatened with extreme distress and + want, entreating him to yield; conceive himself, though upright, yet with + feelings not hard or insensible either to compassion or to his own + distress; conceive him, I say, at the moment when he wishes that he had + never lived to see the day that exposed him to such unutterable anguish, + yet remaining true to his uprightness of purpose, without wavering or even + doubting; then will my youthful hearer be raised gradually from mere + approval to admiration, from that to amazement, and finally to the + greatest veneration, and a lively wish that he himself could be such a man + (though certainly not in such circumstances). Yet virtue is here worth so + much only because it costs so much, not because it brings any profit. All + the admiration, and even the endeavour to resemble this character, rest + wholly on the purity of the moral principle, which can only be strikingly + shown by removing from the springs of action everything that men may + regard as part of happiness. Morality, then, must have the more power over + the human heart the more purely it is exhibited. Whence it follows that, + if the law of morality and the image of holiness and virtue are to + exercise any influence at all on our souls, they can do so only so far as + they are laid to heart in their purity as motives, unmixed with any view + to prosperity, for it is in suffering that they display themselves most + nobly. Now that whose removal strengthens the effect of a moving force + must have been a hindrance, consequently every admixture of motives taken + from our own happiness is a hindrance to the influence of the moral law on + the heart. I affirm further that even in that admired action, if the + motive from which it was done was a high regard for duty, then it is just + this respect for the law that has the greatest influence on the mind of + the spectator, not any pretension to a supposed inward greatness of mind + or noble meritorious sentiments; consequently duty, not merit, must have + not only the most definite, but, when it is represented in the true light + of its inviolability, the most penetrating, influence on the mind. + </p> + <p> + It is more necessary than ever to direct attention to this method in our + times, when men hope to produce more effect on the mind with soft, tender + feelings, or high-flown, puffing-up pretensions, which rather wither the + heart than strengthen it, than by a plain and earnest representation of + duty, which is more suited to human imperfection and to progress in + goodness. To set before children, as a pattern, actions that are called + noble, magnanimous, meritorious, with the notion of captivating them by + infusing enthusiasm for such actions, is to defeat our end. For as they + are still so backward in the observance of the commonest duty, and even in + the correct estimation of it, this means simply to make them fantastical + romancers betimes. But, even with the instructed and experienced part of + mankind, this supposed spring has, if not an injurious, at least no + genuine, moral effect on the heart, which, however, is what it was desired + to produce. + </p> + <p> + All feelings, especially those that are to produce unwonted exertions, + must accomplish their effect at the moment they are at their height and + before the calm down; otherwise they effect nothing; for as there was + nothing to strengthen the heart, but only to excite it, it naturally + returns to its normal moderate tone and, thus, falls back into its + previous languor. Principles must be built on conceptions; on any other + basis there can only be paroxysms, which can give the person no moral + worth, nay, not even confidence in himself, without which the highest good + in man, consciousness of the morality of his mind and character, cannot + exist. Now if these conceptions are to become subjectively practical, we + must not rest satisfied with admiring the objective law of morality, and + esteeming it highly in reference to humanity, but we must consider the + conception of it in relation to man as an individual, and then this law + appears in a form indeed that is highly deserving of respect, but not so + pleasant as if it belonged to the element to which he is naturally + accustomed; but on the contrary as often compelling him to quit this + element, not without self-denial, and to betake himself to a higher, in + which he can only maintain himself with trouble and with unceasing + apprehension of a relapse. In a word, the moral law demands obedience, + from duty not from predilection, which cannot and ought not to be + presupposed at all. + </p> + <p> + Let us now see, in an example, whether the conception of an action, as a + noble and magnanimous one, has more subjective moving power than if the + action is conceived merely as duty in relation to the solemn law of + morality. The action by which a man endeavours at the greatest peril of + life to rescue people from shipwreck, at last losing his life in the + attempt, is reckoned on one side as duty, but on the other and for the + most part as a meritorious action, but our esteem for it is much weakened + by the notion of duty to himself which seems in this case to be somewhat + infringed. More decisive is the magnanimous sacrifice of life for the + safety of one's country; and yet there still remains some scruple whether + it is a perfect duty to devote one's self to this purpose spontaneously + and unbidden, and the action has not in itself the full force of a pattern + and impulse to imitation. But if an indispensable duty be in question, the + transgression of which violates the moral law itself, and without regard + to the welfare of mankind, and as it were tramples on its holiness (such + as are usually called duties to God, because in Him we conceive the ideal + of holiness in substance), then we give our most perfect esteem to the + pursuit of it at the sacrifice of all that can have any value for the + dearest inclinations, and we find our soul strengthened and elevated by + such an example, when we convince ourselves by contemplation of it that + human nature is capable of so great an elevation above every motive that + nature can oppose to it. Juvenal describes such an example in a climax + which makes the reader feel vividly the force of the spring that is + contained in the pure law of duty, as duty: + </p> + <p> + Esto bonus miles, tutor bonus, arbiter idem + </p> + <p> + Integer; ambiguae si quando citabere testis + </p> + <p> + Incertaeque rei, Phalaris licet imperet ut sis + </p> + <p> + Falsus, et admoto dictet periuria tauro, + </p> + <p> + Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori, + </p> + <p> + Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas. * + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + * [Juvenal, Satirae, "Be you a good soldier, a faithful + tutor, an uncorrupted umpire also; if you are summoned as a + witness in a doubtful and uncertain thing, though Phalaris + should command that you should be false, and should dictate + perjuries with the bull brought to you, believe it the + highest impiety to prefer life to reputation, and for the + sake of life, to lose the causes of living."] +</pre> + <p> + When we can bring any flattering thought of merit into our action, then + the motive is already somewhat alloyed with self-love and has therefore + some assistance from the side of the sensibility. But to postpone + everything to the holiness of duty alone, and to be conscious that we can + because our own reason recognises this as its command and says that we + ought to do it, this is, as it were, to raise ourselves altogether above + the world of sense, and there is inseparably involved in the same a + consciousness of the law, as a spring of a faculty that controls the + sensibility; and although this is not always attended with effect, yet + frequent engagement with this spring, and the at first minor attempts at + using it, give hope that this effect may be wrought, and that by degrees + the greatest, and that a purely moral interest in it may be produced in + us. + </p> + <p> + The method then takes the following course. At first we are only concerned + to make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural employment + accompanying all our own free actions, as well as the observation of those + of others, and to make it as it were a habit, and to sharpen this + judgement, asking first whether the action conforms objectively to the + moral law, and to what law; and we distinguish the law that merely + furnishes a principle of obligation from that which is really obligatory + (leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus); as, for instance, the law of + what men's wants require from me, as contrasted with that which their + rights demand, the latter of which prescribes essential, the former only + non-essential duties; and thus we teach how to distinguish different kinds + of duties which meet in the same action. The other point to which + attention must be directed is the question whether the action was also + (subjectively) done for the sake of the moral law, so that it not only is + morally correct as a deed, but also, by the maxim from which it is done, + has moral worth as a disposition. Now there is no doubt that this + practice, and the resulting culture of our reason in judging merely of the + practical, must gradually produce a certain interest even in the law of + reason, and consequently in morally good actions. For we ultimately take a + liking for a thing, the contemplation of which makes us feel that the use + of our cognitive faculties is extended; and this extension is especially + furthered by that in which we find moral correctness, since it is only in + such an order of things that reason, with its faculty of determining a + priori on principle what ought to be done, can find satisfaction. An + observer of nature takes liking at last to objects that at first offended + his senses, when he discovers in them the great adaptation of their + organization to design, so that his reason finds food in its + contemplation. So Leibnitz spared an insect that he had carefully examined + with the microscope, and replaced it on its leaf, because he had found + himself instructed by the view of it and had, as it were, received a + benefit from it. + </p> + <p> + But this employment of the faculty of judgement, which makes us feel our + own cognitive powers, is not yet the interest in actions and in their + morality itself. It merely causes us to take pleasure in engaging in such + criticism, and it gives to virtue or the disposition that conforms to + moral laws a form of beauty, which is admired, but not on that account + sought after (laudatur et alget); as everything the contemplation of which + produces a consciousness of the harmony of our powers of conception, and + in which we feel the whole of our faculty of knowledge (understanding and + imagination) strengthened, produces a satisfaction, which may also be + communicated to others, while nevertheless the existence of the object + remains indifferent to us, being only regarded as the occasion of our + becoming aware of the capacities in us which are elevated above mere + animal nature. Now, however, the second exercise comes in, the living + exhibition of morality of character by examples, in which attention is + directed to purity of will, first only as a negative perfection, in so far + as in an action done from duty no motives of inclination have any + influence in determining it. By this the pupil's attention is fixed upon + the consciousness of his freedom, and although this renunciation at first + excites a feeling of pain, nevertheless, by its withdrawing the pupil from + the constraint of even real wants, there is proclaimed to him at the same + time a deliverance from the manifold dissatisfaction in which all these + wants entangle him, and the mind is made capable of receiving the + sensation of satisfaction from other sources. The heart is freed and + lightened of a burden that always secretly presses on it, when instances + of pure moral resolutions reveal to the man an inner faculty of which + otherwise he has no right knowledge, the inward freedom to release himself + from the boisterous importunity of inclinations, to such a degree that + none of them, not even the dearest, shall have any influence on a + resolution, for which we are now to employ our reason. Suppose a case + where I alone know that the wrong is on my side, and although a free + confession of it and the offer of satisfaction are so strongly opposed by + vanity, selfishness, and even an otherwise not illegitimate antipathy to + the man whose rights are impaired by me, I am nevertheless able to discard + all these considerations; in this there is implied a consciousness of + independence on inclinations and circumstances, and of the possibility of + being sufficient for myself, which is salutary to me in general for other + purposes also. And now the law of duty, in consequence of the positive + worth which obedience to it makes us feel, finds easier access through the + respect for ourselves in the consciousness of our freedom. When this is + well established, when a man dreads nothing more than to find himself, on + self-examination, worthless and contemptible in his own eyes, then every + good moral disposition can be grafted on it, because this is the best, + nay, the only guard that can keep off from the mind the pressure of + ignoble and corrupting motives. + </p> + <p> + I have only intended to point out the most general maxims of the + methodology of moral cultivation and exercise. As the manifold variety of + duties requires special rules for each kind, and this would be a prolix + affair, I shall be readily excused if in a work like this, which is only + preliminary, I content myself with these outlines. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_CONC" id="link2H_CONC"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CONCLUSION. + </h2> + <p> + Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, + the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens + above and the moral law within. I have not to search for them and + conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or were in the + transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect + them directly with the consciousness of my existence. The former begins + from the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and enlarges my + connection therein to an unbounded extent with worlds upon worlds and + systems of systems, and moreover into limitless times of their periodic + motion, its beginning and continuance. The second begins from my invisible + self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, + but which is traceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern + that I am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary + connection, as I am also thereby with all those visible worlds. The former + view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates as it were my + importance as an animal creature, which after it has been for a short time + provided with vital power, one knows not how, must again give back the + matter of which it was formed to the planet it inhabits (a mere speck in + the universe). The second, on the contrary, infinitely elevates my worth + as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me + a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world, at + least so far as may be inferred from the destination assigned to my + existence by this law, a destination not restricted to conditions and + limits of this life, but reaching into the infinite. + </p> + <p> + But though admiration and respect may excite to inquiry, they cannot + supply the want of it. What, then, is to be done in order to enter on this + in a useful manner and one adapted to the loftiness of the subject? + Examples may serve in this as a warning and also for imitation. The + contemplation of the world began from the noblest spectacle that the human + senses present to us, and that our understanding can bear to follow in + their vast reach; and it ended- in astrology. Morality began with the + noblest attribute of human nature, the development and cultivation of + which give a prospect of infinite utility; and ended- in fanaticism or + superstition. So it is with all crude attempts where the principal part of + the business depends on the use of reason, a use which does not come of + itself, like the use of the feet, by frequent exercise, especially when + attributes are in question which cannot be directly exhibited in common + experience. But after the maxim had come into vogue, though late, to + examine carefully beforehand all the steps that reason purposes to take, + and not to let it proceed otherwise than in the track of a previously well + considered method, then the study of the structure of the universe took + quite a different direction, and thereby attained an incomparably happier + result. The fall of a stone, the motion of a sling, resolved into their + elements and the forces that are manifested in them, and treated + mathematically, produced at last that clear and henceforward unchangeable + insight into the system of the world which, as observation is continued, + may hope always to extend itself, but need never fear to be compelled to + retreat. + </p> + <p> + This example may suggest to us to enter on the same path in treating of + the moral capacities of our nature, and may give us hope of a like good + result. We have at hand the instances of the moral judgement of reason. By + analysing these into their elementary conceptions, and in default of + mathematics adopting a process similar to that of chemistry, the + separation of the empirical from the rational elements that may be found + in them, by repeated experiments on common sense, we may exhibit both + pure, and learn with certainty what each part can accomplish of itself, so + as to prevent on the one hand the errors of a still crude untrained + judgement, and on the other hand (what is far more necessary) the + extravagances of genius, by which, as by the adepts of the philosopher's + stone, without any methodical study or knowledge of nature, visionary + treasures are promised and the true are thrown away. In one word, science + (critically undertaken and methodically directed) is the narrow gate that + leads to the true doctrine of practical wisdom, if we understand by this + not merely what one ought to do, but what ought to serve teachers as a + guide to construct well and clearly the road to wisdom which everyone + should travel, and to secure others from going astray. Philosophy must + always continue to be the guardian of this science; and although the + public does not take any interest in its subtle investigations, it must + take an interest in the resulting doctrines, which such an examination + first puts in a clear light. + </p> + <h3> + THE END + </h3> + <div style="height: 6em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <pre> + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON *** + +***** This file should be named 5683-h.htm or 5683-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/5/6/8/5683/ + +Etext produced by Matthew Stapleton + +HTML file produced by David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from +the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method +you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is +owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he +has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the +Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments +must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you +prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax +returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and +sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the +address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to +the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies +you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he +does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License. You must require such a user to return or +destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium +and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of +Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any +money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the +electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days +of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free +distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: +Dr. Gregory B. Newby +Chief Executive and Director +gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + +http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + + + +</pre> + + </body> +</html> diff --git a/5683.txt b/5683.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79438fb --- /dev/null +++ b/5683.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6768 @@ +Project Gutenberg's The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: The Critique of Practical Reason + +Author: Immanuel Kant + +Posting Date: July 15, 2013 [EBook #5683] +Release Date: May, 2004 +[This file was first posted on August 7, 2002] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON *** + + + + +Produced by Matthew Stapleton + + + + + + + + 1788 + + THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON + + by Immanuel Kant + + translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott + + +PREFACE. + +This work is called the Critique of Practical Reason, not of the +pure practical reason, although its parallelism with the speculative +critique would seem to require the latter term. The reason of this +appears sufficiently from the treatise itself. Its business is to show +that there is pure practical reason, and for this purpose it +criticizes the entire practical faculty of reason. If it succeeds in +this, it has no need to criticize the pure faculty itself in order +to see whether reason in making such a claim does not presumptuously +overstep itself (as is the case with the speculative reason). For +if, as pure reason, it is actually practical, it proves its own +reality and that of its concepts by fact, and all disputation +against the possibility of its being real is futile. + +With this faculty, transcendental freedom is also established; +freedom, namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason +required it in its use of the concept of causality in order to +escape the antinomy into which it inevitably falls, when in the +chain of cause and effect it tries to think the unconditioned. +Speculative reason could only exhibit this concept (of freedom) +problematically as not impossible to thought, without assuring it +any objective reality, and merely lest the supposed impossibility of +what it must at least allow to be thinkable should endanger its very +being and plunge it into an abyss of scepticism. + +Inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an +apodeictic law of practical reason, it is the keystone of the whole +system of pure reason, even the speculative, and all other concepts +(those of God and immortality) which, as being mere ideas, remain in +it unsupported, now attach themselves to this concept, and by it +obtain consistence and objective reality; that is to say, their +possibility is proved by the fact that freedom actually exists, for +this idea is revealed by the moral law. + +Freedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the +speculative reason of which we know the possibility a priori (without, +however, understanding it), because it is the condition of the moral +law which we know. * The ideas of God and immortality, however, are +not conditions of the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary +object of a will determined by this law; that is to say, conditions of +the practical use of our pure reason. Hence, with respect to these +ideas, we cannot affirm that we know and understand, I will not say +the actuality, but even the possibility of them. However they are +the conditions of the application of the morally determined will to +its object, which is given to it a priori, viz., the summum bonum. +Consequently in this practical point of view their possibility must be +assumed, although we cannot theoretically know and understand it. To +justify this assumption it is sufficient, in a practical point of +view, that they contain no intrinsic impossibility (contradiction). +Here we have what, as far as speculative reason is concerned, is a +merely subjective principle of assent, which, however, is +objectively valid for a reason equally pure but practical, and this +principle, by means of the concept of freedom, assures objective +reality and authority to the ideas of God and immortality. Nay, +there is a subjective necessity (a need of pure reason) to assume +them. Nevertheless the theoretical knowledge of reason is not hereby +enlarged, but only the possibility is given, which heretofore was +merely a problem and now becomes assertion, and thus the practical use +of reason is connected with the elements of theoretical reason. And +this need is not a merely hypothetical one for the arbitrary +purposes of speculation, that we must assume something if we wish in +speculation to carry reason to its utmost limits, but it is a need +which has the force of law to assume something without which that +cannot be which we must inevitably set before us as the aim of our +action. + + + + {PREFACE ^paragraph 5} + +* Lest any one should imagine that he finds an inconsistency here +when I call freedom the condition of the moral law, and hereafter +maintain in the treatise itself that the moral law is the condition +under which we can first become conscious of freedom, I will merely +remark that freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, while the +moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. For had not the moral +law been previously distinctly thought in our reason, we should +never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as +freedom, although it be not contradictory. But were there no freedom +it would be impossible to trace the moral law in ourselves at all. + + + +It would certainly be more satisfactory to our speculative reason if +it could solve these problems for itself without this circuit and +preserve the solution for practical use as a thing to be referred +to, but in fact our faculty of speculation is not so well provided. +Those who boast of such high knowledge ought not to keep it back, +but to exhibit it publicly that it may be tested and appreciated. They +want to prove: very good, let them prove; and the critical +philosophy lays its arms at their feet as the victors. Quid statis? +Nolint. Atqui licet esse beatis. As they then do not in fact choose to +do so, probably because they cannot, we must take up these arms +again in order to seek in the mortal use of reason, and to base on +this, the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility of +which speculation cannot adequately prove. + +Here first is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, viz.: +how we deny objective reality to the supersensible use of the +categories in speculation and yet admit this reality with respect to +the objects of pure practical reason. This must at first seem +inconsistent as long as this practical use is only nominally known. +But when, by a thorough analysis of it, one becomes aware that the +reality spoken of does not imply any theoretical determination of +the categories and extension of our knowledge to the supersensible; +but that what is meant is that in this respect an object belongs to +them, because either they are contained in the necessary determination +of the will a priori, or are inseparably connected with its object; +then this inconsistency disappears, because the use we make of these +concepts is different from what speculative reason requires. On the +other hand, there now appears an unexpected and very satisfactory +proof of the consistency of the speculative critical philosophy. For +whereas it insisted that the objects of experience as such, +including our own subject, have only the value of phenomena, while +at the same time things in themselves must be supposed as their basis, +so that not everything supersensible was to be regarded as a fiction +and its concept as empty; so now practical reason itself, without +any concert with the speculative, assures reality to a supersensible +object of the category of causality, viz., freedom, although (as +becomes a practical concept) only for practical use; and this +establishes on the evidence of a fact that which in the former case +could only be conceived. By this the strange but certain doctrine of +the speculative critical philosophy, that the thinking subject is to +itself in internal intuition only a phenomenon, obtains in the +critical examination of the practical reason its full confirmation, +and that so thoroughly that we should be compelled to adopt this +doctrine, even if the former had never proved it at all. * + + + + {PREFACE ^paragraph 10} + +* The union of causality as freedom with causality as rational +mechanism, the former established by the moral law, the latter by +the law of nature in the same subject, namely, man, is impossible, +unless we conceive him with reference to the former as a being in +himself, and with reference to the latter as a phenomenon- the +former in pure consciousness, the latter in empirical consciousness. +Otherwise reason inevitably contradicts itself. + + + +By this also I can understand why the most considerable objections +which I have as yet met with against the Critique turn about these two +points, namely, on the one side, the objective reality of the +categories as applied to noumena, which is in the theoretical +department of knowledge denied, in the practical affirmed; and on +the other side, the paradoxical demand to regard oneself qua subject +of freedom as a noumenon, and at the same time from the point of +view of physical nature as a phenomenon in one's own empirical +consciousness; for as long as one has formed no definite notions of +morality and freedom, one could not conjecture on the one side what +was intended to be the noumenon, the basis of the alleged +phenomenon, and on the other side it seemed doubtful whether it was at +all possible to form any notion of it, seeing that we had previously +assigned all the notions of the pure understanding in its +theoretical use exclusively to phenomena. Nothing but a detailed +criticism of the practical reason can remove all this +misapprehension and set in a clear light the consistency which +constitutes its greatest merit. + +So much by way of justification of the proceeding by which, in +this work, the notions and principles of pure speculative reason which +have already undergone their special critical examination are, now and +then, again subjected to examination. This would not in other cases be +in accordance with the systematic process by which a science is +established, since matters which have been decided ought only to be +cited and not again discussed. In this case, however, it was not +only allowable but necessary, because reason is here considered in +transition to a different use of these concepts from what it had +made of them before. Such a transition necessitates a comparison of +the old and the new usage, in order to distinguish well the new path +from the old one and, at the same time, to allow their connection to +be observed. Accordingly considerations of this kind, including +those which are once more directed to the concept of freedom in the +practical use of the pure reason, must not be regarded as an +interpolation serving only to fill up the gaps in the critical +system of speculative reason (for this is for its own purpose +complete), or like the props and buttresses which in a hastily +constructed building are often added afterwards; but as true members +which make the connexion of the system plain, and show us concepts, +here presented as real, which there could only be presented +problematically. This remark applies especially to the concept of +freedom, respecting which one cannot but observe with surprise that so +many boast of being able to understand it quite well and to explain +its possibility, while they regard it only psychologically, whereas if +they had studied it in a transcendental point of view, they must +have recognized that it is not only indispensable as a problematical +concept, in the complete use of speculative reason, but also quite +incomprehensible; and if they afterwards came to consider its +practical use, they must needs have come to the very mode of +determining the principles of this, to which they are now so loth to +assent. The concept of freedom is the stone of stumbling for all +empiricists, but at the same time the key to the loftiest practical +principles for critical moralists, who perceive by its means that they +must necessarily proceed by a rational method. For this reason I beg +the reader not to pass lightly over what is said of this concept at +the end of the Analytic. + +I must leave it to those who are acquainted with works of this +kind to judge whether such a system as that of the practical reason, +which is here developed from the critical examination of it, has +cost much or little trouble, especially in seeking not to miss the +true point of view from which the whole can be rightly sketched. It +presupposes, indeed, the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of +Morals, but only in so far as this gives a preliminary acquaintance +with the principle of duty, and assigns and justifies a definite +formula thereof; in other respects it is independent. * It results +from the nature of this practical faculty itself that the complete +classification of all practical sciences cannot be added, as in the +critique of the speculative reason. For it is not possible to define +duties specially, as human duties, with a view to their +classification, until the subject of this definition (viz., man) is +known according to his actual nature, at least so far as is +necessary with respect to duty; this, however, does not belong to a +critical examination of the practical reason, the business of which is +only to assign in a complete manner the principles of its possibility, +extent, and limits, without special reference to human nature. The +classification then belongs to the system of science, not to the +system of criticism. + + {PREFACE ^paragraph 15} + + + +* A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work has hit +the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he says that no new +principle of morality is set forth in it, but only a new formula. +But who would think of introducing a new principle of all morality and +making himself as it were the first discoverer of it, just as if all +the world before him were ignorant what duty was or had been in +thorough-going error? But whoever knows of what importance to a +mathematician a formula is, which defines accurately what is to be +done to work a problem, will not think that a formula is insignificant +and useless which does the same for all duty in general. + + + +In the second part of the Analytic I have given, as I trust, a +sufficient answer to the objection of a truth-loving and acute +critic * of the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals- a +critic always worthy of respect- the objection, namely, that the +notion of good was not established before the moral principle, as he +thinks it ought to have been. *(2) I have also had regard to many of +the objections which have reached me from men who show that they have +at heart the discovery of the truth, and I shall continue to do so +(for those who have only their old system before their eyes, and who +have already settled what is to be approved or disapproved, do not +desire any explanation which might stand in the way of their own +private opinion.) + + + + {PREFACE ^paragraph 20} + +* [See Kant's "Das mag in der Theoric ricktig seyn," etc. Werke, +vol. vii, p. 182.] + +*(2) It might also have been objected to me that I have not first +defined the notion of the faculty of desire, or of the feeling of +Pleasure, although this reproach would be unfair, because this +definition might reasonably be presupposed as given in psychology. +However, the definition there given might be such as to found the +determination of the faculty of desire on the feeling of pleasure +(as is commonly done), and thus the supreme principle of practical +philosophy would be necessarily made empirical, which, however, +remains to be proved and in this critique is altogether refuted. It +will, therefore, give this definition here in such a manner as it +ought to be given, in order to leave this contested point open at +the beginning, as it should be. LIFE is the faculty a being has of +acting according to laws of the faculty of desire. The faculty of +DESIRE is the being's faculty of becoming by means of its ideas the +cause of the actual existence of the objects of these ideas. +PLEASURE is the idea of the agreement of the object, or the action +with the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of +causality of an idea in respect of the actuality of its object (or +with the determination of the forces of the subject to action which +produces it). I have no further need for the purposes of this critique +of notions borrowed from psychology; the critique itself supplies +the rest. It is easily seen that the question whether the faculty of +desire is always based on pleasure, or whether under certain +conditions pleasure only follows the determination of desire, is by +this definition left undecided, for it is composed only of terms +belonging to the pure understanding, i.e., of categories which contain +nothing empirical. Such precaution is very desirable in all philosophy +and yet is often neglected; namely, not to prejudge questions by +adventuring definitions before the notion has been completely +analysed, which is often very late. It may be observed through the +whole course of the critical philosophy (of the theoretical as well as +the practical reason) that frequent opportunity offers of supplying +defects in the old dogmatic method of philosophy, and of correcting +errors which are not observed until we make such rational use of these +notions viewing them as a whole. + + + +When we have to study a particular faculty of the human mind in +its sources, its content, and its limits; then from the nature of +human knowledge we must begin with its parts, with an accurate and +complete exposition of them; complete, namely, so far as is possible +in the present state of our knowledge of its elements. But there is +another thing to be attended to which is of a more philosophical and +architectonic character, namely, to grasp correctly the idea of the +whole, and from thence to get a view of all those parts as mutually +related by the aid of pure reason, and by means of their derivation +from the concept of the whole. This is only possible through the +most intimate acquaintance with the system; and those who find the +first inquiry too troublesome, and do not think it worth their while +to attain such an acquaintance, cannot reach the second stage, namely, +the general view, which is a synthetical return to that which had +previously been given analytically. It is no wonder then if they +find inconsistencies everywhere, although the gaps which these +indicate are not in the system itself, but in their own incoherent +train of thought. + +I have no fear, as regards this treatise, of the reproach that I +wish to introduce a new language, since the sort of knowledge here +in question has itself somewhat of an everyday character. Nor even +in the case of the former critique could this reproach occur to anyone +who had thought it through and not merely turned over the leaves. To +invent new words where the language has no lack of expressions for +given notions is a childish effort to distinguish oneself from the +crowd, if not by new and true thoughts, yet by new patches on the +old garment. If, therefore, the readers of that work know any more +familiar expressions which are as suitable to the thought as those +seem to me to be, or if they think they can show the futility of these +thoughts themselves and hence that of the expression, they would, in +the first case, very much oblige me, for I only desire to be +understood: and, in the second case, they would deserve well of +philosophy. But, as long as these thoughts stand, I very much doubt +that suitable and yet more common expressions for them can be found. * + + {PREFACE ^paragraph 25} + + + +* I am more afraid in the present treatise of occasional +misconception in respect of some expressions which I have chosen +with the greatest care in order that the notion to which they point +may not be missed. Thus, in the table of categories of the Practical +reason under the title of Modality, the Permitted, and forbidden (in a +practical objective point of view, possible and impossible) have +almost the same meaning in common language as the next category, +duty and contrary to duty. Here, however, the former means what +coincides with, or contradicts, a merely possible practical precept +(for example, the solution of all problems of geometry and mechanics); +the latter, what is similarly related to a law actually present in the +reason; and this distinction is not quite foreign even to common +language, although somewhat unusual. For example, it is forbidden to +an orator, as such, to forge new words or constructions; in a +certain degree this is permitted to a poet; in neither case is there +any question of duty. For if anyone chooses to forfeit his +reputation as an orator, no one can prevent him. We have here only +to do with the distinction of imperatives into problematical, +assertorial, and apodeictic. Similarly in the note in which I have +pared the moral ideas of practical perfection in different +philosophical schools, I have distinguished the idea of wisdom from +that of holiness, although I have stated that essentially and +objectively they are the same. But in that place I understand by the +former only that wisdom to which man (the Stoic) lays claim; therefore +I take it subjectively as an attribute alleged to belong to man. +(Perhaps the expression virtue, with which also the Stoic made great show, +would better mark the characteristic of his school.) The expression of +a postulate of pure practical reason might give most occasion to +misapprehension in case the reader confounded it with the +signification of the postulates in pure mathematics, which carry +apodeictic certainty with them. These, however, postulate the +possibility of an action, the object of which has been previously +recognized a priori in theory as possible, and that with perfect +certainty. But the former postulates the possibility of an object +itself (God and the immortality of the soul) from apodeictic practical +laws, and therefore only for the purposes of a practical reason. +This certainty of the postulated possibility then is not at all +theoretic, and consequently not apodeictic; that is to say, it is +not a known necessity as regards the object, but a necessary +supposition as regards the subject, necessary for the obedience to its +objective but practical laws. It is, therefore, merely a necessary +hypothesis. I could find no better expression for this rational +necessity, which is subjective, but yet true and unconditional. + + + +In this manner, then, the a priori principles of two faculties of +the mind, the faculty of cognition and that of desire, would be +found and determined as to the conditions, extent, and limits of their +use, and thus a sure foundation be paid for a scientific system of +philosophy, both theoretic and practical. + +Nothing worse could happen to these labours than that anyone +should make the unexpected discovery that there neither is, nor can +be, any a priori knowledge at all. But there is no danger of this. +This would be the same thing as if one sought to prove by reason +that there is no reason. For we only say that we know something by +reason, when we are conscious that we could have known it, even if +it had not been given to us in experience; hence rational knowledge +and knowledge a priori are one and the same. It is a clear +contradiction to try to extract necessity from a principle of +experience (ex pumice aquam), and to try by this to give a judgement +true universality (without which there is no rational inference, not +even inference from analogy, which is at least a presumed universality +and objective necessity). To substitute subjective necessity, that is, +custom, for objective, which exists only in a priori judgements, is to +deny to reason the power of judging about the object, i.e., of knowing +it, and what belongs to it. It implies, for example, that we must +not say of something which often or always follows a certain +antecedent state that we can conclude from this to that (for this +would imply objective necessity and the notion of an a priori +connexion), but only that we may expect similar cases (just as animals +do), that is that we reject the notion of cause altogether as false +and a mere delusion. As to attempting to remedy this want of objective +and consequently universal validity by saying that we can see no +ground for attributing any other sort of knowledge to other rational +beings, if this reasoning were valid, our ignorance would do more +for the enlargement of our knowledge than all our meditation. For, +then, on this very ground that we have no knowledge of any other +rational beings besides man, we should have a right to suppose them to +be of the same nature as we know ourselves to be: that is, we should +really know them. I omit to mention that universal assent does not +prove the objective validity of a judgement (i.e., its validity as a +cognition), and although this universal assent should accidentally +happen, it could furnish no proof of agreement with the object; on the +contrary, it is the objective validity which alone constitutes the +basis of a necessary universal consent. + + {PREFACE ^paragraph 30} + +Hume would be quite satisfied with this system of universal +empiricism, for, as is well known, he desired nothing more than +that, instead of ascribing any objective meaning to the necessity in +the concept of cause, a merely subjective one should be assumed, viz., +custom, in order to deny that reason could judge about God, freedom, +and immortality; and if once his principles were granted, he was +certainly well able to deduce his conclusions therefrom, with all +logical coherence. But even Hume did not make his empiricism so +universal as to include mathematics. He holds the principles of +mathematics to be analytical; and if his were correct, they would +certainly be apodeictic also: but we could not infer from this that +reason has the faculty of forming apodeictic judgements in +philosophy also- that is to say, those which are synthetical +judgements, like the judgement of causality. But if we adopt a +universal empiricism, then mathematics will be included. + +Now if this science is in contradiction with a reason that admits +only empirical principles, as it inevitably is in the antinomy in +which mathematics prove the infinite divisibility of space, which +empiricism cannot admit; then the greatest possible evidence of +demonstration is in manifest contradiction with the alleged +conclusions from experience, and we are driven to ask, like +Cheselden's blind patient, "Which deceives me, sight or touch?" (for +empiricism is based on a necessity felt, rationalism on a necessity +seen). And thus universal empiricism reveals itself as absolute +scepticism. It is erroneous to attribute this in such an unqualified +sense to Hume, * since he left at least one certain touchstone (which +can only be found in a priori principles), although experience +consists not only of feelings, but also of judgements. + + + +* Names that designate the followers of a sect have always been +accompanied with much injustice; just as if one said, "N is an +Idealist." For although he not only admits, but even insists, that our +ideas of external things have actual objects of external things +corresponding to them, yet he holds that the form of the intuition +does not depend on them but on the human mind. + + + + {PREFACE ^paragraph 35} + +However, as in this philosophical and critical age such empiricism +can scarcely be serious, and it is probably put forward only as an +intellectual exercise and for the purpose of putting in a clearer +light, by contrast, the necessity of rational a priori principles, +we can only be grateful to those who employ themselves in this +otherwise uninstructive labour. + +INTRODUCTION + + INTRODUCTION. + + + + Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason. + + + +The theoretical use of reason was concerned with objects of the +cognitive faculty only, and a critical examination of it with +reference to this use applied properly only to the pure faculty of +cognition; because this raised the suspicion, which was afterwards +confirmed, that it might easily pass beyond its limits, and be lost +among unattainable objects, or even contradictory notions. It is quite +different with the practical use of reason. In this, reason is +concerned with the grounds of determination of the will, which is a +faculty either to produce objects corresponding to ideas, or to +determine ourselves to the effecting of such objects (whether the +physical power is sufficient or not); that is, to determine our +causality. For here, reason can at least attain so far as to determine +the will, and has always objective reality in so far as it is the +volition only that is in question. The first question here then is +whether pure reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will, or +whether it can be a ground of determination only as dependent on +empirical conditions. Now, here there comes in a notion of causality +justified by the critique of the pure reason, although not capable +of being presented empirically, viz., that of freedom; and if we can +now discover means of proving that this property does in fact belong +to the human will (and so to the will of all rational beings), then it +will not only be shown that pure reason can be practical, but that +it alone, and not reason empirically limited, is indubitably +practical; consequently, we shall have to make a critical examination, +not of pure practical reason, but only of practical reason +generally. For when once pure reason is shown to exist, it needs no +critical examination. For reason itself contains the standard for +the critical examination of every use of it. The critique, then, of +practical reason generally is bound to prevent the empirically +conditioned reason from claiming exclusively to furnish the ground +of determination of the will. If it is proved that there is a +[practical] reason, its employment is alone immanent; the +empirically conditioned use, which claims supremacy, is on the +contrary transcendent and expresses itself in demands and precepts +which go quite beyond its sphere. This is just the opposite of what +might be said of pure reason in its speculative employment. + +However, as it is still pure reason, the knowledge of which is +here the foundation of its practical employment, the general outline +of the classification of a critique of practical reason must be +arranged in accordance with that of the speculative. We must, then, +have the Elements and the Methodology of it; and in the former an +Analytic as the rule of truth, and a Dialectic as the exposition and +dissolution of the illusion in the judgements of practical reason. But +the order in the subdivision of the Analytic will be the reverse of +that in the critique of the pure speculative reason. For, in the +present case, we shall commence with the principles and proceed to the +concepts, and only then, if possible, to the senses; whereas in the +case of the speculative reason we began with the senses and had to end +with the principles. The reason of this lies again in this: that now +we have to do with a will, and have to consider reason, not in its +relation to objects, but to this will and its causality. We must, +then, begin with the principles of a causality not empirically +conditioned, after which the attempt can be made to establish our +notions of the determining grounds of such a will, of their +application to objects, and finally to the subject and its sense +faculty. We necessarily begin with the law of causality from +freedom, that is, with a pure practical principle, and this determines +the objects to which alone it can be applied. + +BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 + + FIRST PART. + + + + ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON. + + + + BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. + + + + CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 5} + + + + I. DEFINITION. + + + +Practical principles are propositions which contain a general +determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. +They are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by +the subject as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or +practical laws, when the condition is recognized as objective, that +is, valid for the will of every rational being. + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 10} + + REMARK. + + + +Supposing that pure reason contains in itself a practical motive, +that is, one adequate to determine the will, then there are +practical laws; otherwise all practical principles will be mere +maxims. In case the will of a rational being is pathologically +affected, there may occur a conflict of the maxims with the +practical laws recognized by itself. For example, one may make it +his maxim to let no injury pass unrevenged, and yet he may see that +this is not a practical law, but only his own maxim; that, on the +contrary, regarded as being in one and the same maxim a rule for the +will of every rational being, it must contradict itself. In natural +philosophy the principles of what happens, (e.g., the principle of +equality of action and reaction in the communication of motion) are at +the same time laws of nature; for the use of reason there is +theoretical and determined by the nature of the object. In practical +philosophy, i.e., that which has to do only with the grounds of +determination of the will, the principles which a man makes for +himself are not laws by which one is inevitably bound; because +reason in practical matters has to do with the subject, namely, with +the faculty of desire, the special character of which may occasion +variety in the rule. The practical rule is always a product of reason, +because it prescribes action as a means to the effect. But in the case +of a being with whom reason does not of itself determine the will, +this rule is an imperative, i.e., a rule characterized by "shall," +which expresses the objective necessitation of the action and +signifies that, if reason completely determined the will, the action +would inevitably take place according to this rule. Imperatives, +therefore, are objectively valid, and are quite distinct from +maxims, which are subjective principles. The former either determine +the conditions of the causality of the rational being as an +efficient cause, i.e., merely in reference to the effect and the means +of attaining it; or they determine the will only, whether it is +adequate to the effect or not. The former would be hypothetical +imperatives, and contain mere precepts of skill; the latter, on the +contrary, would be categorical, and would alone be practical laws. +Thus maxims are principles, but not imperatives. Imperatives +themselves, however, when they are conditional (i.e., do not determine +the will simply as will, but only in respect to a desired effect, that +is, when they are hypothetical imperatives), are practical precepts +but not laws. Laws must be sufficient to determine the will as will, +even before I ask whether I have power sufficient for a desired +effect, or the means necessary to produce it; hence they are +categorical: otherwise they are not laws at all, because the necessity +is wanting, which, if it is to be practical, must be independent of +conditions which are pathological and are therefore only +contingently connected with the will. Tell a man, for example, that he +must be industrious and thrifty in youth, in order that he may not +want in old age; this is a correct and important practical precept +of the will. But it is easy to see that in this case the will is +directed to something else which it is presupposed that it desires; +and as to this desire, we must leave it to the actor himself whether +he looks forward to other resources than those of his own acquisition, +or does not expect to be old, or thinks that in case of future +necessity he will be able to make shift with little. Reason, from +which alone can spring a rule involving necessity, does, indeed, +give necessity to this precept (else it would not be an imperative), +but this is a necessity dependent on subjective conditions, and cannot +be supposed in the same degree in all subjects. But that reason may +give laws it is necessary that it should only need to presuppose +itself, because rules are objectively and universally valid only +when they hold without any contingent subjective conditions, which +distinguish one rational being from another. Now tell a man that he +should never make a deceitful promise, this is a rule which only +concerns his will, whether the purposes he may have can be attained +thereby or not; it is the volition only which is to be determined a +priori by that rule. If now it is found that this rule is +practically right, then it is a law, because it is a categorical +imperative. Thus, practical laws refer to the will only, without +considering what is attained by its causality, and we may disregard +this latter (as belonging to the world of sense) in order to have them +quite pure. + + + + II. THEOREM I. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 15} + + + +All practical principles which presuppose an object (matter) of +the faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are +empirical and can furnish no practical laws. + +By the matter of the faculty of desire I mean an object the +realization of which is desired. Now, if the desire for this object +precedes the practical rule and is the condition of our making it a +principle, then I say (in the first place) this principle is in that +case wholly empirical, for then what determines the choice is the idea +of an object and that relation of this idea to the subject by which +its faculty of desire is determined to its realization. Such a +relation to the subject is called the pleasure in the realization of +an object. This, then, must be presupposed as a condition of the +possibility of determination of the will. But it is impossible to know +a priori of any idea of an object whether it will be connected with +pleasure or pain, or be indifferent. In such cases, therefore, the +determining principle of the choice must be empirical and, +therefore, also the practical material principle which presupposes +it as a condition. + +In the second place, since susceptibility to a pleasure or pain +can be known only empirically and cannot hold in the same degree for +all rational beings, a principle which is based on this subjective +condition may serve indeed as a maxim for the subject which +possesses this susceptibility, but not as a law even to him (because +it is wanting in objective necessity, which must be recognized a +priori); it follows, therefore, that such a principle can never +furnish a practical law. + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 20} + + III. THEOREM II. + + + +All material practical principles as such are of one and the same +kind and come under the general principle of self-love or private +happiness. + +Pleasure arising from the idea of the idea of the existence of a +thing, in so far as it is to determine the desire of this thing, is +founded on the susceptibility of the subject, since it depends on +the presence of an object; hence it belongs to sense (feeling), and +not to understanding, which expresses a relation of the idea to an +object according to concepts, not to the subject according to +feelings. It is, then, practical only in so far as the faculty of +desire is determined by the sensation of agreeableness which the +subject expects from the actual existence of the object. Now, a +rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life +uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is happiness; and the +principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of +the will is the principle of self-love. All material principles, then, +which place the determining ground of the will in the pleasure or pain +to be received from the existence of any object are all of the same +kind, inasmuch as they all belong to the principle of self-love or +private happiness. + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 25} + + COROLLARY. + + + +All material practical rules place the determining principle of +the will in the lower desires; and if there were no purely formal laws +of the will adequate to determine it, then we could not admit any +higher desire at all. + + + + REMARK I. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 30} + + + +It is surprising that men, otherwise acute, can think it possible to +distinguish between higher and lower desires, according as the ideas +which are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin +in the senses or in the understanding; for when we inquire what are +the determining grounds of desire, and place them in some expected +pleasantness, it is of no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing +object is derived, but only how much it pleases. Whether an idea has +its seat and source in the understanding or not, if it can only +determine the choice by presupposing a feeling of pleasure in the +subject, it follows that its capability of determining the choice +depends altogether on the nature of the inner sense, namely, that this +can be agreeably affected by it. However dissimilar ideas of objects +may be, though they be ideas of the understanding, or even of the +reason in contrast to ideas of sense, yet the feeling of pleasure, +by means of which they constitute the determining principle of the +will (the expected satisfaction which impels the activity to the +production of the object), is of one and the same kind, not only +inasmuch as it can only be known empirically, but also inasmuch as +it affects one and the same vital force which manifests itself in +the faculty of desire, and in this respect can only differ in degree +from every other ground of determination. Otherwise, how could we +compare in respect of magnitude two principles of determination, the +ideas of which depend upon different faculties, so as to prefer that +which affects the faculty of desire in the highest degree. The same +man may return unread an instructive book which he cannot again +obtain, in order not to miss a hunt; he may depart in the midst of a +fine speech, in order not to be late for dinner; he may leave a +rational conversation, such as he otherwise values highly, to take his +place at the gaming-table; he may even repulse a poor man whom he at +other times takes pleasure in benefiting, because he has only just +enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the theatre. If +the determination of his will rests on the feeling of the +agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause, it +is all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected. +The only thing that concerns him, in order to decide his choice, is, +how great, how long continued, how easily obtained, and how often +repeated, this agreeableness is. Just as to the man who wants money to +spend, it is all the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain +or washed out of the sand, provided it is everywhere accepted at the +same value; so the man who cares only for the enjoyment of life does +not ask whether the ideas are of the understanding or the senses, +but only how much and how great pleasure they will give for the +longest time. It is only those that would gladly deny to pure reason +the power of determining the will, without the presupposition of any +feeling, who could deviate so far from their own exposition as to +describe as quite heterogeneous what they have themselves previously +brought under one and the same principle. Thus, for example, it is +observed that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power, in +the consciousness of our strength of mind in overcoming obstacles +which are opposed to our designs, in the culture of our mental +talents, etc.; and we justly call these more refined pleasures and +enjoyments, because they are more in our power than others; they do +not wear out, but rather increase the capacity for further enjoyment +of them, and while they delight they at the same time cultivate. But +to say on this account that they determine the will in a different way +and not through sense, whereas the possibility of the pleasure +presupposes a feeling for it implanted in us, which is the first +condition of this satisfaction; this is just as when ignorant +persons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so subtle, +so supersubtle that they almost make themselves giddy with it, and +then think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual +and yet extended being. If with Epicurus we make virtue determine +the will only by means of the pleasure it promises, we cannot +afterwards blame him for holding that this pleasure is of the same +kind as those of the coarsest senses. For we have no reason whatever +to charge him with holding that the ideas by which this feeling is +excited in us belong merely to the bodily senses. As far as can be +conjectured, he sought the source of many of them in the use of the +higher cognitive faculty, but this did not prevent him, and could +not prevent him, from holding on the principle above stated, that +the pleasure itself which those intellectual ideas give us, and by +which alone they can determine the will, is just of the same kind. +Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher, and yet the +most rarely found. The ancient Greek schools give us more examples +of it than we find in our syncretistic age, in which a certain shallow +and dishonest system of compromise of contradictory principles is +devised, because it commends itself better to a public which is +content to know something of everything and nothing thoroughly, so +as to please every party. + +The principle of private happiness, however much understanding and +reason may be used in it, cannot contain any other determining +principles for the will than those which belong to the lower +desires; and either there are no [higher] desires at all, or pure +reason must of itself alone be practical; that is, it must be able +to determine the will by the mere form of the practical rule without +supposing any feeling, and consequently without any idea of the +pleasant or unpleasant, which is the matter of the desire, and which +is always an empirical condition of the principles. Then only, when +reason of itself determines the will (not as the servant of the +inclination), it is really a higher desire to which that which is +pathologically determined is subordinate, and is really, and even +specifically, distinct from the latter, so that even the slightest +admixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and +superiority; just as in a mathematical demonstration the least +empirical condition would degrade and destroy its force and value. +Reason, with its practical law, determines the will immediately, not +by means of an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain, not even of +pleasure in the law itself, and it is only because it can, as pure +reason, be practical, that it is possible for it to be legislative. + + + + REMARK II. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 35} + + + +To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational +being, and this, therefore, is inevitably a determining principle of +its faculty of desire. For we are not in possession originally of +satisfaction with our whole existence- a bliss which would imply a +consciousness of our own independent self-sufficiency this is a +problem imposed upon us by our own finite nature, because we have +wants and these wants regard the matter of our desires, that is, +something that is relative to a subjective feeling of pleasure or +pain, which determines what we need in order to be satisfied with +our condition. But just because this material principle of +determination can only be empirically known by the subject, it is +impossible to regard this problem as a law; for a law being +objective must contain the very same principle of determination of the +will in all cases and for all rational beings. For, although the +notion of happiness is in every case the foundation of practical +relation of the objects to the desires, yet it is only a general +name for the subjective determining principles, and determines nothing +specifically; whereas this is what alone we are concerned with in this +practical problem, which cannot be solved at all without such specific +determination. For it is every man's own special feeling of pleasure +and pain that decides in what he is to place his happiness, and even +in the same subject this will vary with the difference of his wants +according as this feeling changes, and thus a law which is +subjectively necessary (as a law of nature) is objectively a very +contingent practical principle, which can and must be very different +in different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law; since, in +the desire for happiness it is not the form (of conformity to law) +that is decisive, but simply the matter, namely, whether I am to +expect pleasure in following the law, and how much. Principles of +self-love may, indeed, contain universal precepts of skill (how to +find means to accomplish one's purpose), but in that case they are +merely theoretical principles; * as, for example, how he who would +like to eat bread should contrive a mill; but practical precepts +founded on them can never be universal, for the determining principle +of the desire is based on the feeling pleasure and pain, which can +never be supposed to be universally directed to the same objects. + + + +* Propositions which in mathematics or physics are called practical +ought properly to be called technical. For they have nothing to do +with the determination of the will; they only point out how a certain +effect is to be produced and are, therefore, just as theoretical as +any propositions which express the connection of a cause with an +effect. Now whoever chooses the effect must also choose the cause. + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 40} + +Even supposing, however, that all finite rational beings were +thoroughly agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings of +pleasure and pain, and also as to the means which they must employ +to attain the one and avoid the other; still, they could by no means +set up the principle of self-love as a practical law, for this +unanimity itself would be only contingent. The principle of +determination would still be only subjectively valid and merely +empirical, and would not possess the necessity which is conceived in +every law, namely, an objective necessity arising from a priori +grounds; unless, indeed, we hold this necessity to be not at all +practical, but merely physical, viz., that our action is as inevitably +determined by our inclination, as yawning when we see others yawn. +It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at +all, but only counsels for the service of our desires, than to raise +merely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws, which have +objective necessity, and not merely subjective, and which must be +known by reason a priori, not by experience (however empirically +universal this may be). Even the rules of corresponding phenomena +are only called laws of nature (e.g., the mechanical laws), when we +either know them really a priori, or (as in the case of chemical laws) +suppose that they would be known a priori from objective grounds if +our insight reached further. But in the case of merely subjective +practical principles, it is expressly made a condition that they rest, +not on objective, but on subjective conditions of choice, and hence +that they must always be represented as mere maxims, never as +practical laws. This second remark seems at first sight to be mere +verbal refinement, but it defines the terms of the most important +distinction which can come into consideration in practical +investigations. + + + + IV. THEOREM II. + + + +A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal +laws, unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will, +not by their matter, but by their form only. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 45} + +By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the +will. This object is either the determining ground of the will or it +is not. In the former case the rule of the will is subjected to an +empirical condition (viz., the relation of the determining idea to the +feeling of pleasure and pain), consequently it can not be a +practical law. Now, when we abstract from a law all matter, i.e., +every object of the will (as a determining principle), nothing is left +but the mere form of a universal legislation. Therefore, either a +rational being cannot conceive his subjective practical principles, +that is, his maxims, as being at the same time universal laws, or he +must suppose that their mere form, by which they are fitted for +universal legislation, is alone what makes them practical laws. + + + + REMARK. + + + +The commonest understanding can distinguish without instruction what +form of maxim is adapted for universal legislation, and what is not. +Suppose, for example, that I have made it my maxim to increase my +fortune by every safe means. Now, I have a deposit in my hands, the +owner of which is dead and has left no writing about it. This is +just the case for my maxim. I desire then to know whether that maxim +can also bold good as a universal practical law. I apply it, +therefore, to the present case, and ask whether it could take the form +of a law, and consequently whether I can by my maxim at the same +time give such a law as this, that everyone may deny a deposit of +which no one can produce a proof. I at once become aware that such a +principle, viewed as a law, would annihilate itself, because the +result would be that there would be no deposits. A practical law which +I recognise as such must be qualified for universal legislation; +this is an identical proposition and, therefore, self-evident. Now, if +I say that my will is subject to a practical law, I cannot adduce my +inclination (e.g., in the present case my avarice) as a principle of +determination fitted to be a universal practical law; for this is so +far from being fitted for a universal legislation that, if put in +the form of a universal law, it would destroy itself. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 50} + +It is, therefore, surprising that intelligent men could have thought +of calling the desire of happiness a universal practical law on the +ground that the desire is universal, and, therefore, also the maxim by +which everyone makes this desire determine his will. For whereas in +other cases a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious; +here, on the contrary, if we attribute to the maxim the universality +of a law, the extreme opposite of harmony will follow, the greatest +opposition and the complete destruction of the maxim itself and its +purpose. For, in that case, the will of all has not one and the same +object, but everyone has his own (his private welfare), which may +accidentally accord with the purposes of others which are equally +selfish, but it is far from sufficing for a law; because the +occasional exceptions which one is permitted to make are endless, +and cannot be definitely embraced in one universal rule. In this +manner, then, results a harmony like that which a certain satirical +poem depicts as existing between a married couple bent on going to +ruin, "O, marvellous harmony, what he wishes, she wishes also"; or +like what is said of the pledge of Francis I to the Emperor Charles V, +"What my brother Charles wishes that I wish also" (viz., Milan). +Empirical principles of determination are not fit for any universal +external legislation, but just as little for internal; for each man +makes his own subject the foundation of his inclination, and in the +same subject sometimes one inclination, sometimes another, has the +preponderance. To discover a law which would govern them all under +this condition, namely, bringing them all into harmony, is quite +impossible. + + + + V. PROBLEM I. + + + +Supposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the +sufficient determining principle of a will, to find the nature of +the will which can be determined by it alone. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 55} + + Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason, and +is, therefore, not an object of the senses, and consequently does +not belong to the class of phenomena, it follows that the idea of +it, which determines the will, is distinct from all the principles +that determine events in nature according to the law of causality, +because in their case the determining principles must themselves be +phenomena. Now, if no other determining principle can serve as a law +for the will except that universal legislative form, such a will +must be conceived as quite independent of the natural law of phenomena +in their mutual relation, namely, the law of causality; such +independence is called freedom in the strictest, that is, in the +transcendental, sense; consequently, a will which can have its law +in nothing but the mere legislative form of the maxim is a free will. + + + + VI. PROBLEM II. + + + +Supposing that a will is free, to find the law which alone is +competent to determine it necessarily. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 60} + +Since the matter of the practical law, i.e., an object of the maxim, +can never be given otherwise than empirically, and the free will is +independent on empirical conditions (that is, conditions belonging +to the world of sense) and yet is determinable, consequently a free +will must find its principle of determination in the law, and yet +independently of the matter of the law. But, besides the matter of the +law, nothing is contained in it except the legislative form. It is the +legislative form, then, contained in the maxim, which can alone +constitute a principle of determination of the [free] will. + + + + REMARK. + + + +Thus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply +each other. Now I do not ask here whether they are in fact distinct, +or whether an unconditioned law is not rather merely the consciousness +of a pure practical reason and the latter identical with the +positive concept of freedom; I only ask, whence begins our knowledge +of the unconditionally practical, whether it is from freedom or from +the practical law? Now it cannot begin from freedom, for of this we +cannot be immediately conscious, since the first concept of it is +negative; nor can we infer it from experience, for experience gives us +the knowledge only of the law of phenomena, and hence of the mechanism +of nature, the direct opposite of freedom. It is therefore the moral +law, of which we become directly conscious (as soon as we trace for +ourselves maxims of the will), that first presents itself to us, and +leads directly to the concept of freedom, inasmuch as reason +presents it as a principle of determination not to be outweighed by +any sensible conditions, nay, wholly independent of them. But how is +the consciousness, of that moral law possible? We can become conscious +of pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure theoretical +principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes +them and to the elimination of all empirical conditions, which it +directs. The concept of a pure will arises out of the former, as +that of a pure understanding arises out of the latter. That this is +the true subordination of our concepts, and that it is morality that +first discovers to us the notion of freedom, hence that it is +practical reason which, with this concept, first proposes to +speculative reason the most insoluble problem, thereby placing it in +the greatest perplexity, is evident from the following +consideration: Since nothing in phenomena can be explained by the +concept of freedom, but the mechanism of nature must constitute the +only clue; moreover, when pure reason tries to ascend in the series of +causes to the unconditioned, it falls into an antinomy which is +entangled in incomprehensibilities on the one side as much as the +other; whilst the latter (namely, mechanism) is at least useful in the +explanation of phenomena, therefore no one would ever have been so +rash as to introduce freedom into science, had not the moral law, +and with it practical reason, come in and forced this notion upon +us. Experience, however, confirms this order of notions. Suppose +some one asserts of his lustful appetite that, when the desired object +and the opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible. [Ask +him]- if a gallows were erected before the house where he finds this +opportunity, in order that he should be hanged thereon immediately +after the gratification of his lust, whether he could not then control +his passion; we need not be long in doubt what he would reply. Ask +him, however- if his sovereign ordered him, on pain of the same +immediate execution, to bear false witness against an honourable +man, whom the prince might wish to destroy under a plausible +pretext, would he consider it possible in that case to overcome his +love of life, however great it may be. He would perhaps not venture to +affirm whether he would do so or not, but he must unhesitatingly admit +that it is possible to do so. He judges, therefore, that he can do a +certain thing because he is conscious that he ought, and he recognizes +that he is free- a fact which but for the moral law he would never +have known. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 65} + + + + VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL REASON. + + + +Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold +good as a principle of universal legislation. + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 70} + + REMARK. + + + +Pure geometry has postulates which are practical propositions, but +contain nothing further than the assumption that we can do something +if it is required that we should do it, and these are the only +geometrical propositions that concern actual existence. They are, +then, practical rules under a problematical condition of the will; but +here the rule says: We absolutely must proceed in a certain manner. +The practical rule is, therefore, unconditional, and hence it is +conceived a priori as a categorically practical proposition by which +the will is objectively determined absolutely and immediately (by +the practical rule itself, which thus is in this case a law); for pure +reason practical of itself is here directly legislative. The will is +thought as independent on empirical conditions, and, therefore, as +pure will determined by the mere form of the law, and this principle +of determination is regarded as the supreme condition of all maxims. +The thing is strange enough, and has no parallel in all the rest of +our practical knowledge. For the a priori thought of a possible +universal legislation which is therefore merely problematical, is +unconditionally commanded as a law without borrowing anything from +experience or from any external will. This, however, is not a +precept to do something by which some desired effect can be attained +(for then the will would depend on physical conditions), but a rule +that determines the will a priori only so far as regards the forms +of its maxims; and thus it is at least not impossible to conceive that +a law, which only applies to the subjective form of principles, yet +serves as a principle of determination by means of the objective +form of law in general. We may call the consciousness of this +fundamental law a fact of reason, because we cannot reason it out from +antecedent data of reason, e.g., the consciousness of freedom (for +this is not antecedently given), but it forces itself on us as a +synthetic a priori proposition, which is not based on any intuition, +either pure or empirical. It would, indeed, be analytical if the +freedom of the will were presupposed, but to presuppose freedom as a +positive concept would require an intellectual intuition, which cannot +here be assumed; however, when we regard this law as given, it must be +observed, in order not to fall into any misconception, that it is +not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of the pure reason, which +thereby announces itself as originally legislative (sic volo, sic +jubeo). + + + + COROLLARY. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 75} + + + +Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to man) a +universal law which we call the moral law. + + + + REMARK. + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 80} + +The fact just mentioned is undeniable. It is only necessary to +analyse the judgement that men pass on the lawfulness of their +actions, in order to find that, whatever inclination may say to the +contrary, reason, incorruptible and self-constrained, always +confronts the maxim of the will in any action with the pure will, that +is, with itself, considering itself as a priori practical. Now this +principle of morality, just on account of the universality of the +legislation which makes it the formal supreme determining principle of +the will, without regard to any subjective differences, is declared by +the reason to be a law for all rational beings, in so far as they have +a will, that is, a power to determine their causality by the +conception of rules; and, therefore, so far as they are capable of +acting according to principles, and consequently also according to +practical a priori principles (for these alone have the necessity that +reason requires in a principle). It is, therefore, not limited to +men only, but applies to all finite beings that possess reason and +will; nay, it even includes the Infinite Being as the supreme +intelligence. In the former case, however, the law has the form of +an imperative, because in them, as rational beings, we can suppose a +pure will, but being creatures affected with wants and physical +motives, not a holy will, that is, one which would be incapable of any +maxim conflicting with the moral law. In their case, therefore, the +moral law is an imperative, which commands categorically, because +the law is unconditioned; the relation of such a will to this law is +dependence under the name of obligation, which implies a constraint to +an action, though only by reason and its objective law; and this +action is called duty, because an elective will, subject to +pathological affections (though not determined by them, and, +therefore, still free), implies a wish that arises from subjective +causes and, therefore, may often be opposed to the pure objective +determining principle; whence it requires the moral constraint of a +resistance of the practical reason, which may be called an internal, +but intellectual, compulsion. In the supreme intelligence the elective +will is rightly conceived as incapable of any maxim which could not at +the same time be objectively a law; and the notion of holiness, +which on that account belongs to it, places it, not indeed above all +practical laws, but above all practically restrictive laws, and +consequently above obligation and duty. This holiness of will is, +however, a practical idea, which must necessarily serve as a type to +which finite rational beings can only approximate indefinitely, and +which the pure moral law, which is itself on this account called holy, +constantly and rightly holds before their eyes. The utmost that finite +practical reason can effect is to be certain of this indefinite +progress of one's maxims and of their steady disposition to advance. +This is virtue, and virtue, at least as a naturally acquired +faculty, can never be perfect, because assurance in such a case +never becomes apodeictic certainty and, when it only amounts to +persuasion, is very dangerous. + + + + VIII. THEOREM IV. + + + +The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and +of all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy +of the elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, +but is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof and to the +morality of the will. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 85} + +In fact the sole principle of morality consists in the +independence on all matter of the law (namely, a desired object), +and in the determination of the elective will by the mere universal +legislative form of which its maxim must be capable. Now this +independence is freedom in the negative sense, and this +self-legislation of the pure, and therefore practical, reason is +freedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral law expresses nothing +else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason; that is, freedom; +and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, and on this +condition only can they agree with the supreme practical law. If +therefore the matter of the volition, which can be nothing else than +the object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the +practical law, as the condition of its possibility, there results +heteronomy of the elective will, namely, dependence on the physical +law that we should follow some impulse or inclination. In that case +the will does not give itself the law, but only the precept how +rationally to follow pathological law; and the maxim which, in such +a case, never contains the universally legislative form, not only +produces no obligation, but is itself opposed to the principle of a +pure practical reason and, therefore, also to the moral disposition, +even though the resulting action may be conformable to the law. + + + + REMARK. + + + +Hence a practical precept, which contains a material (and +therefore empirical) condition, must never be reckoned a practical +law. For the law of the pure will, which is free, brings the will into +a sphere quite different from the empirical; and as the necessity +involved in the law is not a physical necessity, it can only consist +in the formal conditions of the possibility of a law in general. All +the matter of practical rules rests on subjective conditions, which +give them only a conditional universality (in case I desire this or +that, what I must do in order to obtain it), and they all turn on +the principle of private happiness. Now, it is indeed undeniable +that every volition must have an object, and therefore a matter; but +it does not follow that this is the determining principle and the +condition of the maxim; for, if it is so, then this cannot be +exhibited in a universally legislative form, since in that case the +expectation of the existence of the object would be the determining +cause of the choice, and the volition must presuppose the dependence +of the faculty of desire on the existence of something; but this +dependence can only be sought in empirical conditions and, +therefore, can never furnish a foundation for a necessary and +universal rule. Thus, the happiness of others may be the object of the +will of a rational being. But if it were the determining principle +of the maxim, we must assume that we find not only a rational +satisfaction in the welfare of others, but also a want such as the +sympathetic disposition in some men occasions. But I cannot assume the +existence of this want in every rational being (not at all in God). +The matter, then, of the maxim may remain, but it must not be the +condition of it, else the maxim could not be fit for a law. Hence, the +mere form of law, which limits the matter, must also be a reason for +adding this matter to the will, not for presupposing it. For +example, let the matter be my own happiness. This (rule), if I +attribute it to everyone (as, in fact, I may, in the case of every +finite being), can become an objective practical law only if I include +the happiness of others. Therefore, the law that we should promote the +happiness of others does not arise from the assumption that this is an +object of everyone's choice, but merely from this, that the form of +universality which reason requires as the condition of giving to a +maxim of self-love the objective validity of a law is the principle +that determines the will. Therefore it was not the object (the +happiness of others) that determined the pure will, but it was the +form of law only, by which I restricted my maxim, founded on +inclination, so as to give it the universality of a law, and thus to +adapt it to the practical reason; and it is this restriction alone, +and not the addition of an external spring, that can give rise to +the notion of the obligation to extend the maxim of my self-love to +the happiness of others. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 90} + + + + REMARK II. + + + +The direct opposite of the principle of morality is, when the +principle of private happiness is made the determining principle of +the will, and with this is to be reckoned, as I have shown above, +everything that places the determining principle which is to serve +as a law, anywhere but in the legislative form of the maxim. This +contradiction, however, is not merely logical, like that which would +arise between rules empirically conditioned, if they were raised to +the rank of necessary principles of cognition, but is practical, and +would ruin morality altogether were not the voice of reason in +reference to the will so clear, so irrepressible, so distinctly +audible, even to the commonest men. It can only, indeed, be maintained +in the perplexing speculations of the schools, which are bold enough +to shut their ears against that heavenly voice, in order to support +a theory that costs no trouble. + +Suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to +attempt to justify himself to you for having borne false witness, +first by alleging the, in his view, sacred duty of consulting his +own happiness; then by enumerating the advantages which he had +gained thereby, pointing out the prudence he had shown in securing +himself against detection, even by yourself, to whom he now reveals +the secret, only in order that he may be able to deny it at any +time; and suppose he were then to affirm, in all seriousness, that +he has fulfilled a true human duty; you would either laugh in his +face, or shrink back from him with disgust; and yet, if a man has +regulated his principles of action solely with a view to his own +advantage, you would have nothing whatever to object against this mode +of proceeding. Or suppose some one recommends you a man as steward, as +a man to whom you can blindly trust all your affairs; and, in order to +inspire you with confidence, extols him as a prudent man who +thoroughly understands his own interest, and is so indefatigably +active that he lets slip no opportunity of advancing it; lastly, +lest you should be afraid of finding a vulgar selfishness in him, +praises the good taste with which he lives; not seeking his pleasure +in money-making, or in coarse wantonness, but in the enlargement of +his knowledge, in instructive intercourse with a select circle, and +even in relieving the needy; while as to the means (which, of +course, derive all their value from the end), he is not particular, +and is ready to use other people's money for the purpose as if it were +his own, provided only he knows that he can do so safely, and +without discovery; you would either believe that the recommender was +mocking you, or that he had lost his senses. So sharply and clearly +marked are the boundaries of morality and self-love that even the +commonest eye cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to +the one or the other. The few remarks that follow may appear +superfluous where the truth is so plain, but at least they may serve +to give a little more distinctness to the judgement of common sense. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 95} + +The principle of happiness may, indeed, furnish maxims, but never +such as would be competent to be laws of the will, even if universal +happiness were made the object. For since the knowledge of this +rests on mere empirical data, since every man's judgement on it +depends very much on his particular point of view, which is itself +moreover very variable, it can supply only general rules, not +universal; that is, it can give rules which on the average will most +frequently fit, but not rules which must hold good always and +necessarily; hence, no practical laws can be founded on it. Just +because in this case an object of choice is the foundation of the rule +and must therefore precede it, the rule can refer to nothing but +what is [felt], and therefore it refers to experience and is founded +on it, and then the variety of judgement must be endless. This +principle, therefore, does not prescribe the same practical rules to +all rational beings, although the rules are all included under a +common title, namely, that of happiness. The moral law, however, is +conceived as objectively necessary, only because it holds for everyone +that has reason and will. + +The maxim of self-love (prudence) only advises; the law of +morality commands. Now there is a great difference between that +which we are advised to do and that to which we are obliged. + +The commonest intelligence can easily and without hesitation see +what, on the principle of autonomy of the will, requires to be done; +but on supposition of heteronomy of the will, it is hard and +requires knowledge of the world to see what is to be done. That is +to say, what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone; but what is to +bring true durable advantage, such as will extend to the whole of +one's existence, is always veiled in impenetrable obscurity; and +much prudence is required to adapt the practical rule founded on it to +the ends of life, even tolerably, by making proper exceptions. But the +moral law commands the most punctual obedience from everyone; it must, +therefore, not be so difficult to judge what it requires to be done, +that the commonest unpractised understanding, even without worldly +prudence, should fail to apply it rightly. + +It is always in everyone's power to satisfy the categorical +command of morality; whereas it is seldom possible, and by no means so +to everyone, to satisfy the empirically conditioned precept of +happiness, even with regard to a single purpose. The reason is that in +the former case there is question only of the maxim, which must be +genuine and pure; but in the latter case there is question also of +one's capacity and physical power to realize a desired object. A +command that everyone should try to make himself happy would be +foolish, for one never commands anyone to do what he of himself +infallibly wishes to do. We must only command the means, or rather +supply them, since he cannot do everything that he wishes. But to +command morality under the name of duty is quite rational; for, in the +first place, not everyone is willing to obey its precepts if they +oppose his inclinations; and as to the means of obeying this law, +these need not in this case be taught, for in this respect whatever he +wishes to do he can do. + +He who has lost at play may be vexed at himself and his folly, but +if he is conscious of having cheated at play (although he has gained +thereby), he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself +with the moral law. This must, therefore, be something different +from the principle of private happiness. For a man must have a +different criterion when he is compelled to say to himself: "I am a +worthless fellow, though I have filled my purse"; and when he approves +himself, and says: "I am a prudent man, for I have enriched my +treasure." + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 100} + +Finally, there is something further in the idea of our practical +reason, which accompanies the transgression of a moral law- namely, +its ill desert. Now the notion of punishment, as such, cannot be +united with that of becoming a partaker of happiness; for although +he who inflicts the punishment may at the same time have the +benevolent purpose of directing this punishment to this end, yet it +must first be justified in itself as punishment, i.e., as mere harm, +so that if it stopped there, and the person punished could get no +glimpse of kindness hidden behind this harshness, he must yet admit +that justice was done him, and that his reward was perfectly +suitable to his conduct. In every punishment, as such, there must +first be justice, and this constitutes the essence of the notion. +Benevolence may, indeed, be united with it, but the man who has +deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this. +Punishment, then, is a physical evil, which, though it be not +connected with moral evil as a natural consequence, ought to be +connected with it as a consequence by the principles of a moral +legislation. Now, if every crime, even without regarding the +physical consequence with respect to the actor, is in itself +punishable, that is, forfeits happiness (at least partially), it is +obviously absurd to say that the crime consisted just in this, that he +has drawn punishment on himself, thereby injuring his private +happiness (which, on the principle of self-love, must be the proper +notion of all crime). According to this view, the punishment would +be the reason for calling anything a crime, and justice would, on +the contrary, consist in omitting all punishment, and even +preventing that which naturally follows; for, if this were done, there +would no longer be any evil in the action, since the harm which +otherwise followed it, and on account of which alone the action was +called evil, would now be prevented. To look, however, on all +rewards and punishments as merely the machinery in the hand of a +higher power, which is to serve only to set rational creatures +striving after their final end (happiness), this is to reduce the will +to a mechanism destructive of freedom; this is so evident that it need +not detain us. + +More refined, though equally false, is the theory of those who +suppose a certain special moral sense, which sense and not reason +determines the moral law, and in consequence of which the +consciousness of virtue is supposed to be directly connected with +contentment and pleasure; that of vice, with mental dissatisfaction +and pain; thus reducing the whole to the desire of private +happiness. Without repeating what has been said above, I will here +only remark the fallacy they fall into. In order to imagine the +vicious man as tormented with mental dissatisfaction by the +consciousness of his transgressions, they must first represent him +as in the main basis of his character, at least in some degree, +morally good; just as he who is pleased with the consciousness of +right conduct must be conceived as already virtuous. The notion of +morality and duty must, therefore, have preceded any regard to this +satisfaction, and cannot be derived from it. A man must first +appreciate the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the +moral law, and the immediate dignity which the following of it gives +to the person in his own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in +the consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter remorse +that accompanies the consciousness of its transgression. It is, +therefore, impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction +prior to the knowledge of obligation, or to make it the basis of the +latter. A man must be at least half honest in order even to be able to +form a conception of these feelings. I do not deny that as the human +will is, by virtue of liberty, capable of being immediately determined +by the moral law, so frequent practice in accordance with this +principle of determination can, at least, produce subjectively a +feeling of satisfaction; on the contrary, it is a duty to establish +and to cultivate this, which alone deserves to be called properly +the moral feeling; but the notion of duty cannot be derived from it, +else we should have to suppose a feeling for the law as such, and thus +make that an object of sensation which can only be thought by the +reason; and this, if it is not to be a flat contradiction, would +destroy all notion of duty and put in its place a mere mechanical play +of refined inclinations sometimes contending with the coarser. + +If now we compare our formal supreme principle of pure practical +reason (that of autonomy of the will) with all previous material +principles of morality, we can exhibit them all in a table in which +all possible cases are exhausted, except the one formal principle; and +thus we can show visibly that it is vain to look for any other +principle than that now proposed. In fact all possible principles of +determination of the will are either merely subjective, and +therefore empirical, or are also objective and rational; and both +are either external or internal. + + + +Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the +Foundation of Morality, are: + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 105} + + + + SUBJECTIVE. + + + + EXTERNAL INTERNAL + + Education Physical feeling + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 110} + + (Montaigne) (Epicurus) + + The civil Moral feeling + + Constitution (Hutcheson) + + (Mandeville) + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 115} + + OBJECTIVE. + + + + INTERNAL EXTERNAL + + Perfection Will of God + + (Wolf and the (Crusius and other + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 120} + + Stoics) theological Moralists) + + + +Those of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable +of furnishing the universal principle of morality; but those in the +lower table are based on reason (for perfection as a quality of +things, and the highest perfection conceived as substance, that is, +God, can only be thought by means of rational concepts). But the +former notion, namely, that of perfection, may either be taken in a +theoretic signification, and then it means nothing but the +completeness of each thing in its own kind (transcendental), or that +of a thing merely as a thing (metaphysical); and with that we are +not concerned here. But the notion of perfection in a practical +sense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of +purposes. This perfection, as a quality of man and consequently +internal, is nothing but talent and, what strengthens or completes +this, skill. Supreme perfection conceived as substance, that is God, +and consequently external (considered practically), is the sufficiency +of this being for all ends. Ends then must first be given, +relatively to which only can the notion of perfection (whether +internal in ourselves or external in God) be the determining principle +of the will. But an end- being an object which must precede the +determination of the will by a practical rule and contain the ground +of the possibility of this determination, and therefore contain also +the matter of the will, taken as its determining principle- such an +end is always empirical and, therefore, may serve for the Epicurean +principle of the happiness theory, but not for the pure rational +principle of morality and duty. Thus, talents and the improvement of +them, because they contribute to the advantages of life; or the will +of God, if agreement with it be taken as the object of the will, +without any antecedent independent practical principle, can be motives +only by reason of the happiness expected therefrom. Hence it +follows, first, that all the principles here stated are material; +secondly, that they include all possible material principles; and, +finally, the conclusion, that since material principles are quite +incapable of furnishing the supreme moral law (as has been shown), the +formal practical principle of the pure reason (according to which the +mere form of a universal legislation must constitute the supreme and +immediate determining principle of the will) is the only one +possible which is adequate to furnish categorical imperatives, that +is, practical laws (which make actions a duty), and in general to +serve as the principle of morality, both in criticizing conduct and +also in its application to the human will to determine it. + + + +I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure +Practical Reason. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 125} + + + +This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical, that is, +can of itself determine the will independently of anything +empirical; and this it proves by a fact in which pure reason in us +proves itself actually practical, namely, the autonomy shown in the +fundamental principle of morality, by which reason determines the will +to action. + +It shows at the same time that this fact is inseparably connected +with the consciousness of freedom of the will, nay, is identical +with it; and by this the will of a rational being, although as +belonging to the world of sense it recognizes itself as necessarily +subject to the laws of causality like other efficient causes; yet, +at the same time, on another side, namely, as a being in itself, is +conscious of existing in and being determined by an intelligible order +of things; conscious not by virtue of a special intuition of itself, +but by virtue of certain dynamical laws which determine its +causality in the sensible world; for it has been elsewhere proved that +if freedom is predicated of us, it transports us into an +intelligible order of things. + +Now, if we compare with this the analytical part of the critique +of pure speculative reason, we shall see a remarkable contrast. +There it was not fundamental principles, but pure, sensible +intuition (space and time), that was the first datum that made a +priori knowledge possible, though only of objects of the senses. +Synthetical principles could not be derived from mere concepts without +intuition; on the contrary, they could only exist with reference to +this intuition, and therefore to objects of possible experience, since +it is the concepts of the understanding, united with this intuition, +which alone make that knowledge possible which we call experience. +Beyond objects of experience, and therefore with regard to things as +noumena, all positive knowledge was rightly disclaimed for speculative +reason. This reason, however, went so far as to establish with +certainty the concept of noumena; that is, the possibility, nay, the +necessity, of thinking them; for example, it showed against all +objections that the supposition of freedom, negatively considered, was +quite consistent with those principles and limitations of pure +theoretic reason. But it could not give us any definite enlargement of +our knowledge with respect to such objects, but, on the contrary, +cut off all view of them altogether. + +On the other hand, the moral law, although it gives no view, yet +gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the +sensible world, and the whole compass of our theoretical use of +reason, a fact which points to a pure world of the understanding, nay, +even defines it positively and enables us to know something of it, +namely, a law. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 130} + +This law (as far as rational beings are concerned) gives to the +world of sense, which is a sensible system of nature, the form of a +world of the understanding, that is, of a supersensible system of +nature, without interfering with its mechanism. Now, a system of +nature, in the most general sense, is the existence of things under +laws. The sensible nature of rational beings in general is their +existence under laws empirically conditioned, which, from the point of +view of reason, is heteronomy. The supersensible nature of the same +beings, on the other hand, is their existence according to laws +which are independent of every empirical condition and, therefore, +belong to the autonomy of pure reason. And, since the laws by which +the existence of things depends on cognition are practical, +supersensible nature, so far as we can form any notion of it, is +nothing else than a system of nature under the autonomy of pure +practical reason. Now, the law of this autonomy is the moral law, +which, therefore, is the fundamental law of a supersensible nature, +and of a pure world of understanding, whose counterpart must exist +in the world of sense, but without interfering with its laws. We might +call the former the archetypal world (natura archetypa), which we only +know in the reason; and the latter the ectypal world (natura +ectypa), because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the +former which is the determining principle of the will. For the moral +law, in fact, transfers us ideally into a system in which pure reason, +if it were accompanied with adequate physical power, would produce the +summum bonum, and it determines our will to give the sensible world +the form of a system of rational beings. + +The least attention to oneself proves that this idea really serves +as the model for the determinations of our will. + +When the maxim which I am disposed to follow in giving testimony +is tested by the practical reason, I always consider what it would +be if it were to hold as a universal law of nature. It is manifest +that in this view it would oblige everyone to speak the truth. For +it cannot hold as a universal law of nature that statements should +be allowed to have the force of proof and yet to be purposely +untrue. Similarly, the maxim which I adopt with respect to disposing +freely of my life is at once determined, when I ask myself what it +should be, in order that a system, of which it is the law, should +maintain itself. It is obvious that in such a system no one could +arbitrarily put an end to his own life, for such an arrangement +would not be a permanent order of things. And so in all similar cases. +Now, in nature, as it actually is an object of experience, the free +will is not of itself determined to maxims which could of themselves +be the foundation of a natural system of universal laws, or which +could even be adapted to a system so constituted; on the contrary, its +maxims are private inclinations which constitute, indeed, a natural +whole in conformity with pathological (physical) laws, but could not +form part of a system of nature, which would only be possible +through our will acting in accordance with pure practical laws. Yet we +are, through reason, conscious of a law to which all our maxims are +subject, as though a natural order must be originated from our will. +This law, therefore, must be the idea of a natural system not given in +experience, and yet possible through freedom; a system, therefore, +which is supersensible, and to which we give objective reality, at +least in a practical point of view, since we look on it as an object +of our will as pure rational beings. + +Hence the distinction between the laws of a natural system to +which the will is subject, and of a natural system which is subject to +a will (as far as its relation to its free actions is concerned), +rests on this, that in the former the objects must be causes of the +ideas which determine the will; whereas in the latter the will is +the cause of the objects; so that its causality has its determining +principle solely in the pure faculty of reason, which may therefore be +called a pure practical reason. + +There are therefore two very distinct problems: how, on the one +side, pure reason can cognise objects a priori, and how on the other +side it can be an immediate determining principle of the will, that +is, of the causality of the rational being with respect to the reality +of objects (through the mere thought of the universal validity of +its own maxims as laws). + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 135} + +The former, which belongs to the critique of the pure speculative +reason, requires a previous explanation, how intuitions without +which no object can be given, and, therefore, none known +synthetically, are possible a priori; and its solution turns out to be +that these are all only sensible and, therefore, do not render +possible any speculative knowledge which goes further than possible +experience reaches; and that therefore all the principles of that pure +speculative reason avail only to make experience possible; either +experience of given objects or of those that may be given ad +infinitum, but never are completely given. + +The latter, which belongs to the critique of practical reason, +requires no explanation how the objects of the faculty of desire are +possible, for that being a problem of the theoretical knowledge of +nature is left to the critique of the speculative reason, but only how +reason can determine the maxims of the will; whether this takes +place only by means of empirical ideas as principles of determination, +or whether pure reason can be practical and be the law of a possible +order of nature, which is not empirically knowable. The possibility of +such a supersensible system of nature, the conception of which can +also be the ground of its reality through our own free will, does +not require any a priori intuition (of an intelligible world) which, +being in this case supersensible, would be impossible for us. For +the question is only as to the determining principle of volition in +its maxims, namely, whether it is empirical, or is a conception of the +pure reason (having the legal character belonging to it in general), +and how it can be the latter. It is left to the theoretic principles +of reason to decide whether the causality of the will suffices for the +realization of the objects or not, this being an inquiry into the +possibility of the objects of the volition. Intuition of these objects +is therefore of no importance to the practical problem. We are here +concerned only with the determination of the will and the +determining principles of its maxims as a free will, not at all with +the result. For, provided only that the will conforms to the law of +pure reason, then let its power in execution be what it may, whether +according to these maxims of legislation of a possible system of +nature any such system really results or not, this is no concern of +the critique, which only inquires whether, and in what way, pure +reason can be practical, that is directly determine the will. + +In this inquiry criticism may and must begin with pure practical +laws and their reality. But instead of intuition it takes as their +foundation the conception of their existence in the intelligible +world, namely, the concept of freedom. For this concept has no other +meaning, and these laws are only possible in relation to freedom of +the will; but freedom being supposed, they are necessary; or +conversely freedom is necessary because those laws are necessary, +being practical postulates. It cannot be further explained how this +consciousness of the moral law, or, what is the same thing, of +freedom, is possible; but that it is admissible is well established in +the theoretical critique. + +The exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason is now +finished; that is to say, it has been shown first, what it +contains, that it subsists for itself quite a priori and independent +of empirical principles; and next in what it is distinguished from all +other practical principles. With the deduction, that is, the +justification of its objective and universal validity, and the +discernment of the possibility of such a synthetical proposition a +priori, we cannot expect to succeed so well as in the case of the +principles of pure theoretical reason. For these referred to objects +of possible experience, namely, to phenomena, and we could prove +that these phenomena could be known as objects of experience only by +being brought under the categories in accordance with these laws; +and consequently that all possible experience must conform to these +laws. But I could not proceed in this way with the deduction of the +moral law. For this does not concern the knowledge of the properties +of objects, which may be given to the reason from some other source; +but a knowledge which can itself be the ground of the existence of the +objects, and by which reason in a rational being has causality, +i.e., pure reason, which can be regarded as a faculty immediately +determining the will. + +Now all our human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at +fundamental powers or faculties, for the possibility of these cannot +be understood by any means, and just as little should it be +arbitrarily invented and assumed. Therefore, in the theoretic use of +reason, it is experience alone that can justify us in assuming them. +But this expedient of adducing empirical proofs, instead of a +deduction from a priori sources of knowledge, is denied us here in +respect to the pure practical faculty of reason. For whatever requires +to draw the proof of its reality from experience must depend for the +grounds of its possibility on principles of experience; and pure, +yet practical, reason by its very notion cannot be regarded as such. +Further, the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason of which we +are a priori conscious, and which is apodeictically certain, though it +be granted that in experience no example of its exact fulfilment can +be found. Hence, the objective reality of the moral law cannot be +proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason, +whether speculative or empirically supported, and therefore, even if +we renounced its apodeictic certainty, it could not be proved a +posteriori by experience, and yet it is firmly established of itself. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 140} + +But instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral +principle, something else is found which was quite unexpected, namely, +that this moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the +deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove, +but of which speculative reason was compelled at least to assume the +possibility (in order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the +unconditioned in the chain of causality, so as not to contradict +itself)- I mean the faculty of freedom. The moral law, which itself +does not require a justification, proves not merely the possibility of +freedom, but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this law +as binding on themselves. The moral law is in fact a law of the +causality of free agents and, therefore, of the possibility of a +supersensible system of nature, just as the metaphysical law of events +in the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible system of +nature; and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy was +compelled to leave undetermined, namely, the law for a causality, +the concept of which in the latter was only negative; and therefore +for the first time gives this concept objective reality. + +This sort of credential of the moral law, viz., that it is set forth +as a principle of the deduction of freedom, which is a causality of +pure reason, is a sufficient substitute for all a priori +justification, since theoretic reason was compelled to assume at least +the possibility of freedom, in order to satisfy a want of its own. For +the moral law proves its reality, so as even to satisfy the critique +of the speculative reason, by the fact that it adds a positive +definition to a causality previously conceived only negatively, the +possibility of which was incomprehensible to speculative reason, which +yet was compelled to suppose it. For it adds the notion of a reason +that directly determines the will (by imposing on its maxims the +condition of a universal legislative form); and thus it is able for +the first time to give objective, though only practical, reality to +reason, which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed +speculatively with its ideas. It thus changes the transcendent use +of reason into an immanent use (so that reason is itself, by means +of ideas, an efficient cause in the field of experience). + +The determination of the causality of beings in the world of +sense, as such, can never be unconditioned; and yet for every series +of conditions there must be something unconditioned, and therefore +there must be a causality which is determined wholly by itself. Hence, +the idea of freedom as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not found +to be a want but, as far as its possibility is concerned, an +analytic principle of pure speculative reason. But as it is absolutely +impossible to find in experience any example in accordance with this +idea, because amongst the causes of things as phenomena it would be +impossible to meet with any absolutely unconditioned determination +of causality, we were only able to defend our supposition that a +freely acting cause might be a being in the world of sense, in so +far as it is considered in the other point of view as a noumenon, +showing that there is no contradiction in regarding all its actions as +subject to physical conditions so far as they are phenomena, and yet +regarding its causality as physically unconditioned, in so far as +the acting being belongs to the world of understanding, and in thus +making the concept of freedom the regulative principle of reason. By +this principle I do not indeed learn what the object is to which +that sort of causality is attributed; but I remove the difficulty, +for, on the one side, in the explanation of events in the world, and +consequently also of the actions of rational beings, I leave to the +mechanism of physical necessity the right of ascending from +conditioned to condition ad infinitum, while on the other side I +keep open for speculative reason the place which for it is vacant, +namely, the intelligible, in order to transfer the unconditioned +thither. But I was not able to verify this supposition; that is, to +change it into the knowledge of a being so acting, not even into the +knowledge of the possibility of such a being. This vacant place is now +filled by pure practical reason with a definite law of causality in an +intelligible world (causality with freedom), namely, the moral law. +Speculative reason does not hereby gain anything as regards its +insight, but only as regards the certainty of its problematical notion +of freedom, which here obtains objective reality, which, though only +practical, is nevertheless undoubted. Even the notion of causality- +the application, and consequently the signification, of which holds +properly only in relation to phenomena, so as to connect them into +experiences (as is shown by the Critique of Pure Reason)- is not so +enlarged as to extend its use beyond these limits. For if reason +sought to do this, it would have to show how the logical relation of +principle and consequence can be used synthetically in a different +sort of intuition from the sensible; that is how a causa noumenon is +possible. This it can never do; and, as practical reason, it does +not even concern itself with it, since it only places the +determining principle of causality of man as a sensible creature +(which is given) in pure reason (which is therefore called practical); +and therefore it employs the notion of cause, not in order to know +objects, but to determine causality in relation to objects in general. +It can abstract altogether from the application of this notion to +objects with a view to theoretical knowledge (since this concept is +always found a priori in the understanding even independently of any +intuition). Reason, then, employs it only for a practical purpose, and +hence we can transfer the determining principle of the will into the +intelligible order of things, admitting, at the same time, that we +cannot understand how the notion of cause can determine the +knowledge of these things. But reason must cognise causality with +respect to the actions of the will in the sensible world in a definite +manner; otherwise, practical reason could not really produce any +action. But as to the notion which it forms of its own causality as +noumenon, it need not determine it theoretically with a view to the +cognition of its supersensible existence, so as to give it +significance in this way. For it acquires significance apart from +this, though only for practical use, namely, through the moral law. +Theoretically viewed, it remains always a pure a priori concept of the +understanding, which can be applied to objects whether they have +been given sensibly or not, although in the latter case it has no +definite theoretical significance or application, but is only a +formal, though essential, conception of the understanding relating +to an object in general. The significance which reason gives it +through the moral law is merely practical, inasmuch as the idea of +the law of causality (of the will) has self causality, or is +its determining principle. + + + +II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its Practical use has to an +Extension which is not possible to it in its Speculative Use. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 145} + + + +We have in the moral principle set forth a law of causality, the +determining principle of which is set above all the conditions of +the sensible world; we have it conceived how the will, as belonging +to the intelligible world, is determinable, and therefore have +its subject (man) not merely conceived as belonging to a world of +pure understanding, and in this respect unknown (which the critique of +speculative reason enabled us to do), but also defined as regards +his causality by means of a law which cannot be reduced to any +physical law of the sensible world; and therefore our knowledge is +extended beyond the limits of that world, a pretension which the +Critique of Pure Reason declared to be futile in all speculation. Now, +how is the practical use of pure reason here to be reconciled with the +theoretical, as to the determination of the limits of its faculty? + +David Hume, of whom we may say that he commenced the assault on +the claims of pure reason, which made a thorough investigation of it +necessary, argued thus: The notion of cause is a notion that +involves the necessity of the connexion of the existence of +different things (and that, in so far as they are different), so that, +given A, I know that something quite distinct there from, namely B, +must necessarily also exist. Now necessity can be attributed to a +connection, only in so far as it is known a priori, for experience +would only enable us to know of such a connection that it exists, +not that it necessarily exists. Now, it is impossible, says he, to +know a priori and as necessary the connection between one thing and +another (or between one attribute and another quite distinct) when +they have not been given in experience. Therefore the notion of a +cause is fictitious and delusive and, to speak in the mildest way, +is an illusion, only excusable inasmuch as the custom (a subjective +necessity) of perceiving certain things, or their attributes as +often associated in existence along with or in succession to one +another, is insensibly taken for an objective necessity of supposing +such a connection in the objects themselves; and thus the notion of +a cause has been acquired surreptitiously and not legitimately; nay, +it can never be so acquired or authenticated, since it demands a +connection in itself vain, chimerical, and untenable in presence of +reason, and to which no object can ever correspond. In this way was +empiricism first introduced as the sole source of principles, as far +as all knowledge of the existence of things is concerned +(mathematics therefore remaining excepted); and with empiricism the +most thorough scepticism, even with regard to the whole science of +nature( as philosophy). For on such principles we can never conclude +from given attributes of things as existing to a consequence (for this +would require the notion of cause, which involves the necessity of +such a connection); we can only, guided by imagination, expect similar +cases- an expectation which is never certain, however often it has +been fulfilled. Of no event could we say: a certain thing must have +preceded it, on which it necessarily followed; that is, it must have a +cause; and therefore, however frequent the cases we have known in +which there was such an antecedent, so that a rule could be derived +from them, yet we never could suppose it as always and necessarily +so happening; we should, therefore, be obliged to leave its share to +blind chance, with which all use of reason comes to an end; and this +firmly establishes scepticism in reference to arguments ascending from +effects to causes and makes it impregnable. + +Mathematics escaped well, so far, because Hume thought that its +propositions were analytical; that is, proceeded from one property +to another, by virtue of identity and, consequently, according to +the principle of contradiction. This, however, is not the case, since, +on the contrary, they are synthetical; and although geometry, for +example, has not to do with the existence of things, but only with +their a priori properties in a possible intuition, yet it proceeds +just as in the case of the causal notion, from one property (A) to +another wholly distinct (B), as necessarily connected with the former. +Nevertheless, mathematical science, so highly vaunted for its +apodeictic certainty, must at last fall under this empiricism for +the same reason for which Hume put custom in the place of objective +necessity in the notion of cause and, in spite of all its pride, +must consent to lower its bold pretension of claiming assent a +priori and depend for assent to the universality of its propositions +on the kindness of observers, who, when called as witnesses, would +surely not hesitate to admit that what the geometer propounds as a +theorem they have always perceived to be the fact, and, +consequently, although it be not necessarily true, yet they would +permit us to expect it to be true in the future. In this manner Hume's +empiricism leads inevitably to scepticism, even with regard to +mathematics, and consequently in every scientific theoretical use of +reason (for this belongs either to philosophy or mathematics). Whether +with such a terrible overthrow of the chief branches of knowledge, +common reason will escape better, and will not rather become +irrecoverably involved in this destruction of all knowledge, so that +from the same principles a universal scepticism should follow +(affecting, indeed, only the learned), this I will leave everyone to +judge for himself. + +As regards my own labours in the critical examination of pure +reason, which were occasioned by Hume's sceptical teaching, but went +much further and embraced the whole field of pure theoretical reason +in its synthetic use and, consequently, the field of what is called +metaphysics in general; I proceeded in the following manner with +respect to the doubts raised by the Scottish philosopher touching +the notion of causality. If Hume took the objects of experience for +things in themselves (as is almost always done), he was quite right in +declaring the notion of cause to be a deception and false illusion; +for as to things in themselves, and their attributes as such, it is +impossible to see why because A is given, B, which is different, +must necessarily be also given, and therefore he could by no means +admit such an a priori knowledge of things in themselves. Still less +could this acute writer allow an empirical origin of this concept, +since this is directly contradictory to the necessity of connection +which constitutes the essence of the notion of causality, hence the +notion was proscribed, and in its place was put custom in the +observation of the course of perceptions. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 150} + +It resulted, however, from my inquiries, that the objects with which +we have to do in experience are by no means things in themselves, +but merely phenomena; and that although in the case of things in +themselves it is impossible to see how, if A is supposed, it should be +contradictory that B, which is quite different from A, should not also +be supposed (i.e., to see the necessity of the connection between A as +cause and B as effect); yet it can very well be conceived that, as +phenomena, they may be necessarily connected in one experience in a +certain way (e.g., with regard to time-relations); so that they +could not be separated without contradicting that connection, by means +of which this experience is possible in which they are objects and +in which alone they are cognisable by us. And so it was found to be in +fact; so that I was able not only to prove the objective reality of +the concept of cause in regard to objects of experience, but also to +deduce it as an a priori concept by reason of the necessity of the +connection it implied; that is, to show the possibility of its +origin from pure understanding without any empirical sources; and +thus, after removing the source of empiricism, I was able also to +overthrow the inevitable consequence of this, namely, scepticism, +first with regard to physical science, and then with regard to +mathematics (in which empiricism has just the same grounds), both +being sciences which have reference to objects of possible experience; +herewith overthrowing the thorough doubt of whatever theoretic +reason professes to discern. + +But how is it with the application of this category of causality +(and all the others; for without them there can be no knowledge of +anything existing) to things which are not objects of possible +experience, but lie beyond its bounds? For I was able to deduce the +objective reality of these concepts only with regard to objects of +possible experience. But even this very fact, that I have saved +them, only in case I have proved that objects may by means of them +be thought, though not determined a priori; this it is that gives them +a place in the pure understanding, by which they are referred to +objects in general (sensible or not sensible). If anything is still +wanting, it is that which is the condition of the application of these +categories, and especially that of causality, to objects, namely, +intuition; for where this is not given, the application with a view to +theoretic knowledge of the object, as a noumenon, is impossible and, +therefore, if anyone ventures on it, is (as in the Critique of Pure +Reason) absolutely forbidden. Still, the objective reality of the +concept (of causality) remains, and it can be used even of noumena, +but without our being able in the least to define the concept +theoretically so as to produce knowledge. For that this concept, +even in reference to an object, contains nothing impossible, was shown +by this, that, even while applied to objects of sense, its seat was +certainly fixed in the pure understanding; and although, when referred +to things in themselves (which cannot be objects of experience), it is +not capable of being determined so as to represent a definite object +for the purpose of theoretic knowledge; yet for any other purpose (for +instance, a practical) it might be capable of being determined so as +to have such application. This could not be the case if, as Hume +maintained, this concept of causality contained something absolutely +impossible to be thought. + +In order now to discover this condition of the application of the +said concept to noumena, we need only recall why we are not content +with its application to objects of experience, but desire also to +apply it to things in themselves. It will appear, then, that it is not +a theoretic but a practical purpose that makes this a necessity. In +speculation, even if we were successful in it, we should not really +gain anything in the knowledge of nature, or generally with regard +to such objects as are given, but we should make a wide step from +the sensibly conditioned (in which we have already enough to do to +maintain ourselves, and to follow carefully the chain of causes) to +the supersensible, in order to complete our knowledge of principles +and to fix its limits; whereas there always remains an infinite +chasm unfilled between those limits and what we know; and we should +have hearkened to a vain curiosity rather than a solid-desire of +knowledge. + +But, besides the relation in which the understanding stands to +objects (in theoretical knowledge), it has also a relation to the +faculty of desire, which is therefore called the will, and the pure +will, inasmuch as pure understanding (in this case called reason) is +practical through the mere conception of a law. The objective +reality of a pure will, or, what is the same thing, of a pure +practical reason, is given in the moral law a priori, as it were, by a +fact, for so we may name a determination of the will which is +inevitable, although it does not rest on empirical principles. Now, in +the notion of a will the notion of causality is already contained, and +hence the notion of a pure will contains that of a causality +accompanied with freedom, that is, one which is not determinable by +physical laws, and consequently is not capable of any empirical +intuition in proof of its reality, but, nevertheless, completely +justifies its objective reality a priori in the pure practical law; +not, indeed (as is easily seen) for the purposes of the theoretical, +but of the practical use of reason. Now the notion of a being that has +free will is the notion of a causa noumenon, and that this notion +involves no contradiction, we are already assured by the fact- that +inasmuch as the concept of cause has arisen wholly from pure +understanding, and has its objective reality assured by the deduction, +as it is moreover in its origin independent of any sensible +conditions, it is, therefore, not restricted to phenomena (unless we +wanted to make a definite theoretic use of it), but can be applied +equally to things that are objects of the pure understanding. But, +since this application cannot rest on any intuition (for intuition can +only be sensible), therefore, causa noumenon, as regards the theoretic +use of reason, although a possible and thinkable, is yet an empty +notion. Now, I do not desire by means of this to understand +theoretically the nature of a being, in so far as it has a pure +will; it is enough for me to have thereby designated it as such, and +hence to combine the notion of causality with that of freedom (and +what is inseparable from it, the moral law, as its determining +principle). Now, this right I certainly have by virtue of the pure, +not-empirical origin of the notion of cause, since I do not consider +myself entitled to make any use of it except in reference to the moral +law which determines its reality, that is, only a practical use. + +If, with Hume, I had denied to the notion of causality all objective +reality in its [theoretic] use, not merely with regard to things in +themselves (the supersensible), but also with regard to the objects of +the senses, it would have lost all significance, and being a +theoretically impossible notion would have been declared to be quite +useless; and since what is nothing cannot be made any use of, the +practical use of a concept theoretically null would have been +absurd. But, as it is, the concept of a causality free from +empirical conditions, although empty, i.e., without any appropriate +intuition), is yet theoretically possible, and refers to an +indeterminate object; but in compensation significance is given to +it in the moral law and consequently in a practical sense. I have, +indeed, no intuition which should determine its objective theoretic +reality, but not the less it has a real application, which is +exhibited in concreto in intentions or maxims; that is, it has a +practical reality which can be specified, and this is sufficient to +justify it even with a view to noumena. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 155} + +Now, this objective reality of a pure concept of the understanding +in the sphere of the supersensible, once brought in, gives an +objective reality also to all the other categories, although only so +far as they stand in necessary connexion with the determining +principle of the will (the moral law); a reality only of practical +application, which has not the least effect in enlarging our +theoretical knowledge of these objects, or the discernment of their +nature by pure reason. So we shall find also in the sequel that +these categories refer only to beings as intelligences, and in them +only to the relation of reason to the will; consequently, always +only to the practical, and beyond this cannot pretend to any knowledge +of these beings; and whatever other properties belonging to the +theoretical representation of supersensible things may be brought into +connexion with these categories, this is not to be reckoned as +knowledge, but only as a right (in a practical point of view, however, +it is a necessity) to admit and assume such beings, even in the case +where we [conceive] supersensible beings (e.g., God) according to +analogy, that is, a purely rational relation, of which we make a +practical use with reference to what is sensible; and thus the +application to the supersensible solely in a practical point of view +does not give pure theoretic reason the least encouragement to run +riot into the transcendent. + +BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 + +CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason. + + + +By a concept of the practical reason I understand the idea of an +object as an effect possible to be produced through freedom. To be +an object of practical knowledge, as such, signifies, therefore, +only the relation of the will to the action by which the object or its +opposite would be realized; and to decide whether something is an +object of pure practical reason or not is only to discern the +possibility or impossibility of willing the action by which, if we had +the required power (about which experience must decide), a certain +object would be realized. If the object be taken as the determining +principle of our desire, it must first be known whether it is +physically possible by the free use of our powers, before we decide +whether it is an object of practical reason or not. On the other hand, +if the law can be considered a priori as the determining principle +of the action, and the latter therefore as determined by pure +practical reason, the judgement whether a thing is an object of pure +practical reason or not does not depend at all on the comparison +with our physical power; and the question is only whether we should +will an action that is directed to the existence of an object, if +the object were in our power; hence the previous question is only as +the moral possibility of the action, for in this case it is not the +object, but the law of the will, that is the determining principle +of the action. The only objects of practical reason are therefore +those of good and evil. For by the former is meant an object +necessarily desired according to a principle of reason; by the +latter one necessarily shunned, also according to a principle of +reason. + +If the notion of good is not to be derived from an antecedent +practical law, but, on the contrary, is to serve as its foundation, it +can only be the notion of something whose existence promises pleasure, +and thus determines the causality of the subject to produce it, that +is to say, determines the faculty of desire. Now, since it is +impossible to discern a priori what idea will be accompanied with +pleasure and what with pain, it will depend on experience alone to +find out what is primarily good or evil. The property of the +subject, with reference to which alone this experiment can be made, is +the feeling of pleasure and pain, a receptivity belonging to the +internal sense; thus that only would be primarily good with which +the sensation of pleasure is immediately connected, and that simply +evil which immediately excites pain. Since, however, this is opposed +even to the usage of language, which distinguishes the pleasant from +the good, the unpleasant from the evil, and requires that good and +evil shall always be judged by reason, and, therefore, by concepts +which can be communicated to everyone, and not by mere sensation, +which is limited to individual [subjects] and their susceptibility; +and, since nevertheless, pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any +idea of an object a priori, the philosopher who thought himself +obliged to make a feeling of pleasure the foundation of his +practical judgements would call that good which is a means to the +pleasant, and evil, what is a cause of unpleasantness and pain; for +the judgement on the relation of means to ends certainly belongs to +reason. But, although reason is alone capable of discerning the +connexion of means with their ends (so that the will might even be +defined as the faculty of ends, since these are always determining +principles of the desires), yet the practical maxims which would +follow from the aforesaid principle of the good being merely a +means, would never contain as the object of the will anything good +in itself, but only something good for something; the good would +always be merely the useful, and that for which it is useful must +always lie outside the will, in sensation. Now if this as a pleasant +sensation were to be distinguished from the notion of good, then there +would be nothing primarily good at all, but the good would have to +be sought only in the means to something else, namely, some +pleasantness. + +It is an old formula of the schools: Nihil appetimus nisi sub +ratione boni; Nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali, and it is used +often correctly, but often also in a manner injurious to philosophy, +because the expressions boni and mali are ambiguous, owing to the +poverty of language, in consequence of which they admit a double +sense, and, therefore, inevitably bring the practical laws into +ambiguity; and philosophy, which in employing them becomes aware of +the different meanings in the same word, but can find no special +expressions for them, is driven to subtile distinctions about which +there is subsequently no unanimity, because the distinction could +not be directly marked by any suitable expression. * + + + +* Besides this, the expression sub ratione boni is also ambiguous. +For it may mean: "We represent something to ourselves as good, when +and because we desire (will) it"; or "We desire something because we +represent it to ourselves as good," so that either the desire +determines the notion of the object as a good, or the notion of good +determines the desire (the will); so that in the first case sub +ratione boni would mean, "We will something under the idea of the +good"; in the second, "In consequence of this idea," which, as +determining the volition, must precede it. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 5} + + + +The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions +which do not allow this difference to be overlooked. It possesses +two very distinct concepts and especially distinct expressions for +that which the Latins express by a single word, bonum. For bonum it +has das Gute [good], and das Wohl [well, weal], for malum das Bose +[evil], and das Ubel [ill, bad], or das Well [woe]. So that we express +two quite distinct judgements when we consider in an action the good +and evil of it, or our weal and woe (ill). Hence it already follows +that the above quoted psychological proposition is at least very +doubtful if it is translated: "We desire nothing except with a view to +our weal or woe"; on the other hand, if we render it thus: "Under +the direction of reason we desire nothing except so far as we esteem +it good or evil," it is indubitably certain and at the same time quite +clearly expressed. + +Well or ill always implies only a reference to our condition, as +pleasant or unpleasant, as one of pleasure or pain, and if we desire +or avoid an object on this account, it is only so far as it is +referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or pain +that it produces. But good or evil always implies a reference to the +will, as determined by the law of reason, to make something its +object; for it is never determined directly by the object and the idea +of it, but is a faculty of taking a rule of reason for or motive of an +action (by which an object may be realized). Good and evil therefore +are properly referred to actions, not to the sensations of the person, +and if anything is to be good or evil absolutely (i.e., in every +respect and without any further condition), or is to be so esteemed, +it can only be the manner of acting, the maxim of the will, and +consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil man that +can be so called, and not a thing. + +However, then, men may laugh at the Stoic, who in the severest +paroxysms of gout cried out: "Pain, however thou tormentest me, I will +never admit that thou art an evil (kakov, malum)": he was right. A bad +thing it certainly was, and his cry betrayed that; but that any evil +attached to him thereby, this he had no reason whatever to admit, +for pain did not in the least diminish the worth of his person, but +only that of his condition. If he had been conscious of a single +lie, it would have lowered his pride, but pain served only to raise +it, when he was conscious that he had not deserved it by any +unrighteous action by which he had rendered himself worthy of +punishment. + +What we call good must be an object of desire in the judgement of +every rational man, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of +everyone; therefore, in addition to sense, this judgement requires +reason. So it is with truthfulness, as opposed to lying; so with +justice, as opposed to violence, &c. But we may call a thing a bad [or +ill] thing, which yet everyone must at the same time acknowledge to be +good, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. The man who submits to +a surgical operation feels it no doubt as a bad thing, but by their +reason he and everyone acknowledge it to be good. If a man who +delights in annoying and vexing peaceable people at last receives a +right good beating, this is no doubt a bad thing; but everyone +approves it and regards it as a good thing, even though nothing else +resulted from it; nay, even the man who receives it must in his reason +acknowledge that he has met justice, because he sees the proportion +between good conduct and good fortune, which reason inevitably +places before him, here put into practice. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 10} + +No doubt our weal and woe are of very great importance in the +estimation of our practical reason, and as far as our nature as +sensible beings is concerned, our happiness is the only thing of +consequence, provided it is estimated as reason especially requires, +not by the transitory sensation, but by the influence that this has on +our whole existence, and on our satisfaction therewith; but it is +not absolutely the only thing of consequence. Man is a being who, as +belonging to the world of sense, has wants, and so far his reason +has an office which it cannot refuse, namely, to attend to the +interest of his sensible nature, and to form practical maxims, even +with a view to the happiness of this life, and if possible even to +that of a future. But he is not so completely an animal as to be +indifferent to what reason says on its own account, and to use it +merely as an instrument for the satisfaction of his wants as a +sensible being. For the possession of reason would not raise his worth +above that of the brutes, if it is to serve him only for the same +purpose that instinct serves in them; it would in that case be only +a particular method which nature had employed to equip man for the +same ends for which it has qualified brutes, without qualifying him +for any higher purpose. No doubt once this arrangement of nature has +been made for him he requires reason in order to take into +consideration his weal and woe, but besides this he possesses it for a +higher purpose also, namely, not only to take into consideration +what is good or evil in itself, about which only pure reason, +uninfluenced by any sensible interest, can judge, but also to +distinguish this estimate thoroughly from the former and to make it +the supreme condition thereof. + +In estimating what is good or evil in itself, as distinguished +from what can be so called only relatively, the following points are +to be considered. Either a rational principle is already conceived, as +of itself the determining principle of the will, without regard to +possible objects of desire (and therefore by the more legislative form +of the maxim), and in that case that principle is a practical a priori +law, and pure reason is supposed to be practical of itself. The law in +that case determines the will directly; the action conformed to it +is good in itself; a will whose maxim always conforms to this law is +good absolutely in every respect and is the supreme condition of all +good. Or the maxim of the will is consequent on a determining +principle of desire which presupposes an object of pleasure or pain, +something therefore that pleases or displeases, and the maxim of +reason that we should pursue the former and avoid the latter +determines our actions as good relatively to our inclination, that is, +good indirectly, (i.e., relatively to a different end to which they are +means), and in that case these maxims can never be called laws, but +may be called rational practical precepts. The end itself, the +pleasure that we seek, is in the latter case not a good but a welfare; +not a concept of reason, but an empirical concept of an object of +sensation; but the use of the means thereto, that is, the action, is +nevertheless called good (because rational deliberation is required +for it), not however, good absolutely, but only relatively to our +sensuous nature, with regard to its feelings of pleasure and +displeasure; but the will whose maxim is affected thereby is not a +pure will; this is directed only to that in which pure reason by +itself can be practical. + +This is the proper place to explain the paradox of method in a +critique of practical reason, namely, that the concept of good and +evil must not be determined before the moral law (of which it seems as +if it must be the foundation), but only after it and by means of it. +In fact, even if we did not know that the principle of morality is a +pure a priori law determining the will, yet, that we may not assume +principles quite gratuitously, we must, at least at first, leave it +undecided, whether the will has merely empirical principles of +determination, or whether it has not also pure a priori principles; +for it is contrary to all rules of philosophical method to assume as +decided that which is the very point in question. Supposing that we +wished to begin with the concept of good, in order to deduce from it +the laws of the will, then this concept of an object (as a good) would +at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining +principle of the will. Now, since this concept had not any practical a +priori law for its standard, the criterion of good or evil could not +be placed in anything but the agreement of the object with our feeling +of pleasure or pain; and the use of reason could only consist in +determining in the first place this pleasure or pain in connexion with +all the sensations of my existence, and in the second place the +means of securing to myself the object of the pleasure. Now, as +experience alone can decide what conforms to the feeling of +pleasure, and by hypothesis the practical law is to be based on this +as a condition, it follows that the possibility of a priori +practical laws would be at once excluded, because it was imagined to +be necessary first of all to find an object the concept of which, as a +good, should constitute the universal though empirical principle of +determination of the will. But what it was necessary to inquire +first of all was whether there is not an a priori determining +principle of the will (and this could never be found anywhere but in a +pure practical law, in so far as this law prescribes to maxims +merely their form without regard to an object). Since, however, we +laid the foundation of all practical law in an object determined by +our conceptions of good and evil, whereas without a previous law +that object could not be conceived by empirical concepts, we have +deprived ourselves beforehand of the possibility of even conceiving +a pure practical law. On the other hand, if we had first +investigated the latter analytically, we should have found that it +is not the concept of good as an object that determines the moral +law and makes it possible, but that, on the contrary, it is the +moral law that first determines the concept of good and makes it +possible, so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely. + +This remark, which only concerns the method of ultimate ethical +inquiries, is of importance. It explains at once the occasion of all +the mistakes of philosophers with respect to the supreme principle +of morals. For they sought for an object of the will which they +could make the matter and principle of a law (which consequently could +not determine the will directly, but by means of that object +referred to the feeling of pleasure or pain; whereas they ought +first to have searched for a law that would determine the will a +priori and directly, and afterwards determine the object in accordance +with the will). Now, whether they placed this object of pleasure, +which was to supply the supreme conception of goodness, in +happiness, in perfection, in moral [feeling], or in the will of God, +their principle in every case implied heteronomy, and they must +inevitably come upon empirical conditions of a moral law, since +their object, which was to be the immediate principle of the will, +could not be called good or bad except in its immediate relation to +feeling, which is always empirical. It is only a formal law- that +is, one which prescribes to reason nothing more than the form of its +universal legislation as the supreme condition of its maxims- that can +be a priori a determining principle of practical reason. The +ancients avowed this error without concealment by directing all +their moral inquiries to the determination of the notion of the summum +bonum, which they intended afterwards to make the determining +principle of the will in the moral law; whereas it is only far +later, when the moral law has been first established for itself, and +shown to be the direct determining principle of the will, that this +object can be presented to the will, whose form is now determined a +priori; and this we shall undertake in the Dialectic of the pure +practical reason. The moderns, with whom the question of the summum +bonum has gone out of fashion, or at least seems to have become a +secondary matter, hide the same error under vague (expressions as in +many other cases). It shows itself, nevertheless, in their systems, as +it always produces heteronomy of practical reason; and from this can +never be derived a moral law giving universal commands. + +Now, since the notions of good and evil, as consequences of the a +priori determination of the will, imply also a pure practical +principle, and therefore a causality of pure reason; hence they do not +originally refer to objects (so as to be, for instance, special +modes of the synthetic unity of the manifold of given intuitions in +one consciousness) like the pure concepts of the understanding or +categories of reason in its theoretic employment; on the contrary, +they presuppose that objects are given; but they are all modes +(modi) of a single category, namely, that of causality, the +determining principle of which consists in the rational conception +of a law, which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself, thereby +a priori proving itself practical. However, as the actions on the +one side come under a law which is not a physical law, but a law of +freedom, and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in the world +of intelligence, yet on the other side as events in the world of sense +they belong to phenomena; hence the determinations of a practical +reason are only possible in reference to the latter and, therefore, in +accordance with the categories of the understanding; not indeed with a +view to any theoretic employment of it, i.e., so as to bring the +manifold of (sensible) intuition under one consciousness a priori; but +only to subject the manifold of desires to the unity of +consciousness of a practical reason, giving it commands in the moral +law, i.e., to a pure will a priori. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 15} + +These categories of freedom- for so we choose to call them in +contrast to those theoretic categories which are categories of +physical nature- have an obvious advantage over the latter, inasmuch +as the latter are only forms of thought which designate objects in +an indefinite manner by means of universal concept of every possible +intuition; the former, on the contrary, refer to the determination +of a free elective will (to which indeed no exactly corresponding +intuition can be assigned, but which has as its foundation a pure +practical a priori law, which is not the case with any concepts +belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive faculties); hence, +instead of the form of intuition (space and time), which does not +lie in reason itself, but has to be drawn from another source, namely, +the sensibility, these being elementary practical concepts have as +their foundation the form of a pure will, which is given in reason +and, therefore, in the thinking faculty itself. From this it happens +that as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the +determination of the will, not with the physical conditions (of +practical ability) of the execution of one's purpose, the practical +a priori principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom +are at once cognitions, and have not to wait for intuitions in order +to acquire significance, and that for this remarkable reason, +because they themselves produce the reality of that to which they +refer (the intention of the will), which is not the case with +theoretical concepts. Only we must be careful to observe that these +categories only apply to the practical reason; and thus they proceed +in order from those which are as yet subject to sensible conditions +and morally indeterminate to those which are free from sensible +conditions and determined merely by the moral law. + + + +Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good +and Evil. + + + + I. QUANTITY. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 20} + + Subjective, according to maxims (practical opinions of the + + individual) + + Objective, according to principles (Precepts) + + A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom + + (laws) + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 25} + + + + II. QUALITY. + + Practical rules of action (praeceptivae) + + Practical rules of omission (prohibitivae) + + Practical rules of exceptions (exceptivae) + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 30} + + + + III. RELATION. + + To personality + + To the condition of the person. + + Reciprocal, of one person to the others of the others. + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 35} + + IV. MODALITY. + + The Permitted and the Forbidden + + Duty and the contrary to duty. + + Perfect and imperfect duty. + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 40} + +It will at once be observed that in this table freedom is considered +as a sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of +determination, in regard to actions possible by it, which are +phenomena in the world of sense, and that consequently it is +referred to the categories which concern its physical possibility, +whilst yet each category is taken so universally that the +determining principle of that causality can be placed outside the +world of sense in freedom as a property of a being in the world of +intelligence; and finally the categories of modality introduce the +transition from practical principles generally to those of morality, +but only problematically. These can be established dogmatically only +by the moral law. + +I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table, +since it is intelligible enough of itself. A division of this kind +based on principles is very useful in any science, both for the sake +of thoroughness and intelligibility. Thus, for instance, we know +from the preceding table and its first number what we must begin +from in practical inquiries; namely, from the maxims which every one +founds on his own inclinations; the precepts which hold for a +species of rational beings so far as they agree in certain +inclinations; and finally the law which holds for all without regard +to their inclinations, etc. In this way we survey the whole plan of +what has to be done, every question of practical philosophy that has +to be answered, and also the order that is to be followed. + + + +Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement. + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 45} + +It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of +the will. They themselves, however, are subject to a practical rule of +reason which, if it is pure reason, determines the will a priori +relatively to its object. Now, whether an action which is possible +to us in the world of sense, comes under the rule or not, is a +question to be decided by the practical judgement, by which what is +said in the rule universally (in abstracto) is applied to an action in +concreto. But since a practical rule of pure reason in the first place +as practical concerns the existence of an object, and in the second +place as a practical rule of pure reason implies necessity as +regards the existence of the action and, therefore, is a practical +law, not a physical law depending on empirical principles of +determination, but a law of freedom by which the will is to be +determined independently on anything empirical (merely by the +conception of a law and its form), whereas all instances that can +occur of possible actions can only be empirical, that is, belong to +the experience of physical nature; hence, it seems absurd to expect to +find in the world of sense a case which, while as such it depends only +on the law of nature, yet admits of the application to it of a law +of freedom, and to which we can apply the supersensible idea of the +morally good which is to be exhibited in it in concreto. Thus, the +judgement of the pure practical reason is subject to the same +difficulties as that of the pure theoretical reason. The latter, +however, had means at hand of escaping from these difficulties, +because, in regard to the theoretical employment, intuitions were +required to which pure concepts of the understanding could be applied, +and such intuitions (though only of objects of the senses) can be +given a priori and, therefore, as far as regards the union of the +manifold in them, conforming to the pure a priori concepts of the +understanding as schemata. On the other hand, the morally good is +something whose object is supersensible; for which, therefore, nothing +corresponding can be found in any sensible intuition. Judgement +depending on laws of pure practical reason seems, therefore, to be +subject to special difficulties arising from this, that a law of +freedom is to be applied to actions, which are events taking place +in the world of sense, and which, so far, belong to physical nature. + +But here again is opened a favourable prospect for the pure +practical judgement. When I subsume under a pure practical law an +action possible to me in the world of sense, I am not concerned with +the possibility of the action as an event in the world of sense. +This is a matter that belongs to the decision of reason in its +theoretic use according to the law of causality, which is a pure +concept of the understanding, for which reason has a schema in the +sensible intuition. Physical causality, or the condition under which +it takes place, belongs to the physical concepts, the schema of +which is sketched by transcendental imagination. Here, however, we +have to do, not with the schema of a case that occurs according to +laws, but with the schema of a law itself (if the word is allowable +here), since the fact that the will (not the action relatively to +its effect) is determined by the law alone without any other +principle, connects the notion of causality with quite different +conditions from those which constitute physical connection. + +The physical law being a law to which the objects of sensible +intuition, as such, are subject, must have a schema corresponding to +it- that is, a general procedure of the imagination (by which it +exhibits a priori to the senses the pure concept of the +understanding which the law determines). But the law of freedom +(that is, of a causality not subject to sensible conditions), and +consequently the concept of the unconditionally good, cannot have +any intuition, nor consequently any schema supplied to it for the +purpose of its application in concreto. Consequently the moral law has +no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical +objects (not the imagination); and the understanding for the +purposes of the judgement can provide for an idea of the reason, not a +schema of the sensibility, but a law, though only as to its form as +law; such a law, however, as can be exhibited in concreto in objects +of the senses, and therefore a law of nature. We can therefore call +this law the type of the moral law. + +The rule of the judgement according to laws of pure practical reason +is this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to +take place by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself +a part, you could regard it as possible by your own will. Everyone +does, in fact, decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or +evil. Thus, people say: "If everyone permitted himself to deceive, +when he thought it to his advantage; or thought himself justified in +shortening his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of it; or +looked with perfect indifference on the necessity of others; and if +you belonged to such an order of things, would you do so with the +assent of your own will?" Now everyone knows well that if he +secretly allows himself to deceive, it does not follow that everyone +else does so; or if, unobserved, he is destitute of compassion, others +would not necessarily be so to him; hence, this comparison of the +maxim of his actions with a universal law of nature is not the +determining principle of his will. Such a law is, nevertheless, a type +of the estimation of the maxim on moral principles. If the maxim of +the action is not such as to stand the test of the form of a universal +law of nature, then it is morally impossible. This is the judgement +even of common sense; for its ordinary judgements, even those of +experience, are always based on the law of nature. It has it therefore +always at hand, only that in cases where causality from freedom is +to be criticised, it makes that law of nature only the type of a law +of freedom, because, without something which it could use as an +example in a case of experience, it could not give the law of a pure +practical reason its proper use in practice. + +It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as +the type of a supersensible system of things, provided I do not +transfer to the latter the intuitions, and what depends on them, but +merely apply to it the form of law in general (the notion of which +occurs even in the commonest use of reason, but cannot be definitely +known a priori for any other purpose than the pure practical use of +reason); for laws, as such, are so far identical, no matter from +what they derive their determining principles. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 50} + +Further, since of all the supersensible absolutely nothing [is +known] except freedom (through the moral law), and this only so far as +it is inseparably implied in that law, and moreover all +supersensible objects to which reason might lead us, following the +guidance of that law, have still no reality for us, except for the +purpose of that law, and for the use of mere practical reason; and +as reason is authorized and even compelled to use physical nature +(in its pure form as an object of the understanding) as the type of +the judgement; hence, the present remark will serve to guard against +reckoning amongst concepts themselves that which belongs only to the +typic of concepts. This, namely, as a typic of the judgement, guards +against the empiricism of practical reason, which founds the practical +notions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences (so-called +happiness). No doubt happiness and the infinite advantages which would +result from a will determined by self-love, if this will at the same +time erected itself into a universal law of nature, may certainly +serve as a perfectly suitable type of the morally good, but it is +not identical with it. The same typic guards also against the +mysticism of practical reason, which turns what served only as a +symbol into a schema, that is, proposes to provide for the moral +concepts actual intuitions, which, however, are not sensible +(intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of God), and thus plunges into the +transcendent. What is befitting the use of the moral concepts is +only the rationalism of the judgement, which takes from the sensible +system of nature only what pure reason can also conceive of itself, +that is, conformity to law, and transfers into the supersensible +nothing but what can conversely be actually exhibited by actions in +the world of sense according to the formal rule of a law of nature. +However, the caution against empiricism of practical reason is much +more important; for mysticism is quite reconcilable with the purity +and sublimity of the moral law, and, besides, it is not very natural +or agreeable to common habits of thought to strain one's imagination +to supersensible intuitions; and hence the danger on this side is +not so general. Empiricism, on the contrary, cuts up at the roots +the morality of intentions (in which, and not in actions only, +consists the high worth that men can and ought to give to themselves), +and substitutes for duty something quite different, namely, an +empirical interest, with which the inclinations generally are secretly +leagued; and empiricism, moreover, being on this account allied with +all the inclinations which (no matter what fashion they put on) +degrade humanity when they are raised to the dignity of a supreme +practical principle; and as these, nevertheless, are so favourable +to everyone's feelings, it is for that reason much more dangerous than +mysticism, which can never constitute a lasting condition of any great +number of persons. + +BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 + + CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason. + + + +What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral +law should directly determine the will. If the determination of the +will takes place in conformity indeed to the moral law, but only by +means of a feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to be +presupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to determine the +will, and therefore not for the sake of the law, then the action +will possess legality, but not morality. Now, if we understand by +motive (elater animi) the subjective ground of determination of the +will of a being whose reason does not necessarily conform to the +objective law, by virtue of its own nature, then it will follow, +first, that no motives can be attributed to the Divine will, and that +the motives of the human will (as well as that of every created +rational being) can never be anything else than the moral law, and +consequently that the objective principle of determination must always +and alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of +the action, if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law, +without containing its spirit. * + + + +* We may say of every action that conforms to the law, but is not +done for the sake of the law, that it is morally good in the letter, +not in the spirit (the intention). + + + +Since, then, for the purpose of giving the moral law influence +over the will, we must not seek for any other motives that might +enable us to dispense with the motive of the law itself, because +that would produce mere hypocrisy, without consistency; and it is even +dangerous to allow other motives (for instance, that of interest) even +to co-operate along with the moral law; hence nothing is left us but +to determine carefully in what way the moral law becomes a motive, and +what effect this has upon the faculty of desire. For as to the +question how a law can be directly and of itself a determining +principle of the will (which is the essence of morality), this is, for +human reason, an insoluble problem and identical with the question: +how a free will is possible. Therefore what we have to show a priori +is not why the moral law in itself supplies a motive, but what +effect it, as such, produces (or, more correctly speaking, must +produce) on the mind. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 5} + +The essential point in every determination of the will by the +moral law is that being a free will it is determined simply by the +moral law, not only without the co-operation of sensible impulses, but +even to the rejection of all such, and to the checking of all +inclinations so far as they might be opposed to that law. So far, +then, the effect of the moral law as a motive is only negative, and +this motive can be known a priori to be such. For all inclination +and every sensible impulse is founded on feeling, and the negative +effect produced on feeling (by the check on the inclinations) is +itself feeling; consequently, we can see a priori that the moral +law, as a determining principle of the will, must by thwarting all our +inclinations produce a feeling which may be called pain; and in this +we have the first, perhaps the only, instance in which we are able +from a priori considerations to determine the relation of a +cognition (in this case of pure practical reason) to the feeling of +pleasure or displeasure. All the inclinations together (which can be +reduced to a tolerable system, in which case their satisfaction is +called happiness) constitute self-regard (solipsismus). This is either +the self-love that consists in an excessive fondness for oneself +(philautia), or satisfaction with oneself (arrogantia). The former +is called particularly selfishness; the latter self-conceit. Pure +practical reason only checks selfishness, looking on it as natural and +active in us even prior to the moral law, so far as to limit it to the +condition of agreement with this law, and then it is called rational +self-love. But self-conceit reason strikes down altogether, since +all claims to self-esteem which precede agreement with the moral law +are vain and unjustifiable, for the certainty of a state of mind +that coincides with this law is the first condition of personal +worth (as we shall presently show more clearly), and prior to this +conformity any pretension to worth is false and unlawful. Now the +propensity to self-esteem is one of the inclinations which the moral +law checks, inasmuch as that esteem rests only on morality. +Therefore the moral law breaks down self-conceit. But as this law is +something positive in itself, namely, the form of an intellectual +causality, that is, of freedom, it must be an object of respect; +for, by opposing the subjective antagonism of the inclinations, it +weakens self-conceit; and since it even breaks down, that is, +humiliates, this conceit, it is an object of the highest respect +and, consequently, is the foundation of a positive feeling which is +not of empirical origin, but is known a priori. Therefore respect +for the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual +cause, and this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori +and the necessity of which we can perceive. + +In the preceding chapter we have seen that everything that +presents itself as an object of the will prior to the moral law is +by that law itself, which is the supreme condition of practical +reason, excluded from the determining principles of the will which +we have called the unconditionally good; and that the mere practical +form which consists in the adaptation of the maxims to universal +legislation first determines what is good in itself and absolutely, +and is the basis of the maxims of a pure will, which alone is good +in every respect. However, we find that our nature as sensible +beings is such that the matter of desire (objects of inclination, +whether of hope or fear) first presents itself to us; and our +pathologically affected self, although it is in its maxims quite unfit +for universal legislation; yet, just as if it constituted our entire +self, strives to put its pretensions forward first, and to have them +acknowledged as the first and original. This propensity to make +ourselves in the subjective determining principles of our choice serve +as the objective determining principle of the will generally may be +called self-love; and if this pretends to be legislative as an +unconditional practical principle it may be called self-conceit. Now +the moral law, which alone is truly objective (namely, in every +respect), entirely excludes the influence of self-love on the +supreme practical principle, and indefinitely checks the +self-conceit that prescribes the subjective conditions of the former +as laws. Now whatever checks our self-conceit in our own judgement +humiliates; therefore the moral law inevitably humbles every man +when he compares with it the physical propensities of his nature. +That, the idea of which as a determining principle of our will humbles +us in our self-consciousness, awakes respect for itself, so far as +it is itself positive and a determining principle. Therefore the moral +law is even subjectively a cause of respect. Now since everything that +enters into self-love belongs to inclination, and all inclination +rests on feelings, and consequently whatever checks all the feelings +together in self-love has necessarily, by this very circumstance, an +influence on feeling; hence we comprehend how it is possible to +perceive a priori that the moral law can produce an effect on feeling, +in that it excludes the inclinations and the propensity to make them +the supreme practical condition, i.e., self-love, from all +participation in the supreme legislation. This effect is on one side +merely negative, but on the other side, relatively to the +restricting principle of pure practical reason, it is positive. No +special kind of feeling need be assumed for this under the name of a +practical or moral feeling as antecedent to the moral law and +serving as its foundation. + +The negative effect on feeling (unpleasantness) is pathological, +like every influence on feeling and like every feeling generally. +But as an effect of the consciousness of the moral law, and +consequently in relation to a supersensible cause, namely, the subject +of pure practical reason which is the supreme lawgiver, this feeling +of a rational being affected by inclinations is called humiliation +(intellectual self-depreciation); but with reference to the positive +source of this humiliation, the law, it is respect for it. There is +indeed no feeling for this law; but inasmuch as it removes the +resistance out of the way, this removal of an obstacle is, in the +judgement of reason, esteemed equivalent to a positive help to its +causality. Therefore this feeling may also be called a feeling of +respect for the moral law, and for both reasons together a moral +feeling. + +While the moral law, therefore, is a formal determining principle of +action by practical pure reason, and is moreover a material though +only objective determining principle of the objects of action as +called good and evil, it is also a subjective determining principle, +that is, a motive to this action, inasmuch as it has influence on +the morality of the subject and produces a feeling conducive to the +influence of the law on the will. There is here in the subject no +antecedent feeling tending to morality. For this is impossible, +since every feeling is sensible, and the motive of moral intention +must be free from all sensible conditions. On the contrary, while +the sensible feeling which is at the bottom of all our inclinations is +the condition of that impression which we call respect, the cause that +determines it lies in the pure practical reason; and this impression +therefore, on account of its origin, must be called, not a +pathological but a practical effect. For by the fact that the +conception of the moral law deprives self-love of its influence, and +self-conceit of its illusion, it lessens the obstacle to pure +practical reason and produces the conception of the superiority of its +objective law to the impulses of the sensibility; and thus, by +removing the counterpoise, it gives relatively greater weight to the +law in the judgement of reason (in the case of a will affected by +the aforesaid impulses). Thus the respect for the law is not a +motive to morality, but is morality itself subjectively considered +as a motive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by rejecting all the +rival pretensions of self-love, gives authority to the law, which now +alone has influence. Now it is to be observed that as respect is an +effect on feeling, and therefore on the sensibility, of a rational +being, it presupposes this sensibility, and therefore also the +finiteness of such beings on whom the moral law imposes respect; and +that respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being, or +to any being free from all sensibility, in whom, therefore, this +sensibility cannot be an obstacle to practical reason. + +This feeling (which we call the moral feeling) is therefore produced +simply by reason. It does not serve for the estimation of actions +nor for the foundation of the objective moral law itself, but merely +as a motive to make this of itself a maxim. But what name could we +more suitably apply to this singular feeling which cannot be +compared to any pathological feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind +that it seems to be at the disposal of reason only, and that pure +practical reason. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 10} + +Respect applies always to persons only- not to things. The latter +may arouse inclination, and if they are animals (e.g., horses, dogs, +etc.), even love or fear, like the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey; +but never respect. Something that comes nearer to this feeling is +admiration, and this, as an affection, astonishment, can apply to +things also, e.g., lofty mountains, the magnitude, number, and +distance of the heavenly bodies, the strength and swiftness of many +animals, etc. But all this is not respect. A man also may be an object +to me of love, fear, or admiration, even to astonishment, and yet +not be an object of respect. His jocose humour, his courage and +strength, his power from the rank he has amongst others, may inspire +me with sentiments of this kind, but still inner respect for him is +wanting. Fontenelle says, "I bow before a great man, but my mind +does not bow." I would add, before an humble plain man, in whom I +perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am +conscious of in myself,- my mind bows whether I choose it or not, +and though I bear my head never so high that he may not forget my +superior rank. Why is this? Because his example exhibits to me a law +that humbles my self-conceit when I compare it with my conduct: a law, +the practicability of obedience to which I see proved by fact before +my eyes. Now, I may even be conscious of a like degree of uprightness, +and yet the respect remains. For since in man all good is defective, +the law made visible by an example still humbles my pride, my standard +being furnished by a man whose imperfections, whatever they may be, +are not known to me as my own are, and who therefore appears to me +in a more favourable light. Respect is a tribute which we cannot +refuse to merit, whether we will or not; we may indeed outwardly +withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly. + +Respect is so far from being a feeling of pleasure that we only +reluctantly give way to it as regards a man. We try to find +out something that may lighten the burden of it, some fault +to compensate us for the humiliation which such an example +causes. Even the dead are not always secure from this criticism, +especially if their example appears inimitable. Even the moral law +itself in its solemn majesty is exposed to this endeavour to save +oneself from yielding it respect. Can it be thought that it is for any +other reason that we are so ready to reduce it to the level of our +familiar inclination, or that it is for any other reason that we all +take such trouble to make it out to be the chosen precept of our own +interest well understood, but that we want to be free from the +deterrent respect which shows us our own unworthiness with such +severity? Nevertheless, on the other hand, so little is there pain +in it that if once one has laid aside self-conceit and allowed +practical influence to that respect, he can never be satisfied with +contemplating the majesty of this law, and the soul believes itself +elevated in proportion as it sees the holy law elevated above it and +its frail nature. No doubt great talents and activity proportioned +to them may also occasion respect or an analogous feeling. It is +very proper to yield it to them, and then it appears as if this +sentiment were the same thing as admiration. But if we look closer +we shall observe that it is always uncertain how much of the ability +is due to native talent, and how much to diligence in cultivating +it. Reason represents it to us as probably the fruit of cultivation, +and therefore as meritorious, and this notably reduces our +self-conceit, and either casts a reproach on us or urges us to +follow such an example in the way that is suitable to us. This +respect, then, which we show to such a person (properly speaking, to +the law that his example exhibits) is not mere admiration; and this is +confirmed also by the fact that when the common run of admirers +think they have learned from any source the badness of such a man's +character (for instance Voltaire's) they give up all respect for +him; whereas the true scholar still feels it at least with regard to +his talents, because he is himself engaged in a business and a +vocation which make imitation of such a man in some degree a law. + +Respect for the moral law is, therefore, the only and the +undoubted moral motive, and this feeling is directed to no object, +except on the ground of this law. The moral law first determines the +will objectively and directly in the judgement of reason; and freedom, +whose causality can be determined only by the law, consists just in +this, that it restricts all inclinations, and consequently +self-esteem, by the condition of obedience to its pure law. This +restriction now has an effect on feeling, and produces the +impression of displeasure which can be known a priori from the moral +law. Since it is so far only a negative effect which, arising from the +influence of pure practical reason, checks the activity of the +subject, so far as it is determined by inclinations, and hence +checks the opinion of his personal worth (which, in the absence of +agreement with the moral law, is reduced to nothing); hence, the +effect of this law on feeling is merely humiliation. We can, +therefore, perceive this a priori, but cannot know by it the force +of the pure practical law as a motive, but only the resistance to +motives of the sensibility. But since the same law is objectively, +that is, in the conception of pure reason, an immediate principle of +determination of the will, and consequently this humiliation takes +place only relatively to the purity of the law; hence, the lowering of +the pretensions of moral self-esteem, that is, humiliation on the +sensible side, is an elevation of the moral, i.e., practical, esteem +for the law itself on the intellectual side; in a word, it is +respect for the law, and therefore, as its cause is intellectual, a +positive feeling which can be known a priori. For whatever +diminishes the obstacles to an activity furthers this activity itself. +Now the recognition of the moral law is the consciousness of an +activity of practical reason from objective principles, which only +fails to reveal its effect in actions because subjective +(pathological) causes hinder it. Respect for the moral law then must +be regarded as a positive, though indirect, effect of it on feeling, +inasmuch as this respect weakens the impeding influence of +inclinations by humiliating self-esteem; and hence also as a subjective +principle of activity, that is, as a motive to obedience to the law, +and as a principle of the maxims of a life conformable to it. From the +notion of a motive arises that of an interest, which can never be +attributed to any being unless it possesses reason, and which +signifies a motive of the will in so far as it is conceived by the +reason. Since in a morally good will the law itself must be the +motive, the moral interest is a pure interest of practical reason +alone, independent of sense. On the notion of an interest is based +that of a maxim. This, therefore, is morally good only in case it +rests simply on the interest taken in obedience to the law. All +three notions, however, that of a motive, of an interest, and of a +maxim, can be applied only to finite beings. For they all suppose a +limitation of the nature of the being, in that the subjective +character of his choice does not of itself agree with the objective +law of a practical reason; they suppose that the being requires to +be impelled to action by something, because an internal obstacle +opposes itself. Therefore they cannot be applied to the Divine will. + +There is something so singular in the unbounded esteem for the +pure moral law, apart from all advantage, as it is presented for our +obedience by practical reason, the voice of which makes even the +boldest sinner tremble and compels him to hide himself from it, that +we cannot wonder if we find this influence of a mere intellectual idea +on the feelings quite incomprehensible to speculative reason and +have to be satisfied with seeing so much of this a priori that such +a feeling is inseparably connected with the conception of the moral +law in every finite rational being. If this feeling of respect were +pathological, and therefore were a feeling of pleasure based on the +inner sense, it would be in vain to try to discover a connection of it +with any idea a priori. But [it] is a feeling that applies merely to +what is practical, and depends on the conception of a law, simply as +to its form, not on account of any object, and therefore cannot be +reckoned either as pleasure or pain, and yet produces an interest in +obedience to the law, which we call the moral interest, just as the +capacity of taking such an interest in the law (or respect for the +moral law itself) is properly the moral feeling. + +The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law, yet +combined with an inevitable constraint put upon all inclinations, +though only by our own reason, is respect for the law. The law that +demands this respect and inspires it is clearly no other than the +moral (for no other precludes all inclinations from exercising any +direct influence on the will). An action which is objectively +practical according to this law, to the exclusion of every determining +principle of inclination, is duty, and this by reason of that +exclusion includes in its concept practical obligation, that is, a +determination to actions, however reluctantly they may be done. The +feeling that arises from the consciousness of this obligation is not +pathological, as would be a feeling produced by an object of the +senses, but practical only, that is, it is made possible by a +preceding (objective) determination of the will and a causality of the +reason. As submission to the law, therefore, that is, as a command +(announcing constraint for the sensibly affected subject), it contains +in it no pleasure, but on the contrary, so far, pain in the action. On +the other hand, however, as this constraint is exercised merely by the +legislation of our own reason, it also contains something elevating, +and this subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical +reason is the sole cause of it, may be called in this respect +self-approbation, since we recognize ourselves as determined thereto +solely by the law without any interest, and are now conscious of a +quite different interest subjectively produced thereby, and which is +purely practical and free; and our taking this interest in an action +of duty is not suggested by any inclination, but is commanded and +actually brought about by reason through the practical law; whence +this feeling obtains a special name, that of respect. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 15} + +The notion of duty, therefore, requires in the action, +objectively, agreement with the law, and, subjectively in its maxim, +that respect for the law shall be the sole mode in which the will is +determined thereby. And on this rests the distinction between the +consciousness of having acted according to duty and from duty, that +is, from respect for the law. The former (legality) is possible even +if inclinations have been the determining principles of the will; +but the latter (morality), moral worth, can be placed only in this, +that the action is done from duty, that is, simply for the sake of the +law. * + + + +* If we examine accurately the notion of respect for persons as it +has been already laid down, we shall perceive that it always rests +on the consciousness of a duty which an example shows us, and that +respect, therefore, can never have any but a moral ground, and that it +is very good and even, in a psychological point of view, very useful +for the knowledge of mankind, that whenever we use this expression +we should attend to this secret and marvellous, yet often recurring, +regard which men in their judgement pay to the moral law. + + + +It is of the greatest importance to attend with the utmost exactness +in all moral judgements to the subjective principle of all maxims, +that all the morality of actions may be placed in the necessity of +acting from duty and from respect for the law, not from love and +inclination for that which the actions are to produce. For men and all +created rational beings moral necessity is constraint, that is +obligation, and every action based on it is to be conceived as a duty, +not as a proceeding previously pleasing, or likely to be pleasing to +us of our own accord. As if indeed we could ever bring it about that +without respect for the law, which implies fear, or at least +apprehension of transgression, we of ourselves, like the independent +Deity, could ever come into possession of holiness of will by the +coincidence of our will with the pure moral law becoming as it were +part of our nature, never to be shaken (in which case the law would +cease to be a command for us, as we could never be tempted to be +untrue to it). + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 20} + +The moral law is in fact for the will of a perfect being a law of +holiness, but for the will of every finite rational being a law of +duty, of moral constraint, and of the determination of its actions +by respect for this law and reverence for its duty. No other +subjective principle must be assumed as a motive, else while the +action might chance to be such as the law prescribes, yet, as does not +proceed from duty, the intention, which is the thing properly in +question in this legislation, is not moral. + +It is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and +from sympathetic good will, or to be just from love of order; but this +is not yet the true moral maxim of our conduct which is suitable to +our position amongst rational beings as men, when we pretend with +fanciful pride to set ourselves above the thought of duty, like +volunteers, and, as if we were independent on the command, to want +to do of our own good pleasure what we think we need no command to do. +We stand under a discipline of reason and in all our maxims must not +forget our subjection to it, nor withdraw anything therefrom, or by an +egotistic presumption diminish aught of the authority of the law +(although our own reason gives it) so as to set the determining +principle of our will, even though the law be conformed to, anywhere +else but in the law itself and in respect for this law. Duty and +obligation are the only names that we must give to our relation to the +moral law. We are indeed legislative members of a moral kingdom +rendered possible by freedom, and presented to us by reason as an +object of respect; but yet we are subjects in it, not the sovereign, +and to mistake our inferior position as creatures, and +presumptuously to reject the authority of the moral law, is already to +revolt from it in spirit, even though the letter of it is fulfilled. + +With this agrees very well the possibility of such a command as: +Love God above everything, and thy neighbour as thyself. * For as a +command it requires respect for a law which commands love and does not +leave it to our own arbitrary choice to make this our principle. +Love to God, however, considered as an inclination (pathological +love), is impossible, for He is not an object of the senses. The +same affection towards men is possible no doubt, but cannot be +commanded, for it is not in the power of any man to love anyone at +command; therefore it is only practical love that is meant in that +pith of all laws. To love God means, in this sense, to like to do +His commandments; to love one's neighbour means to like to practise +all duties towards him. But the command that makes this a rule +cannot command us to have this disposition in actions conformed to +duty, but only to endeavour after it. For a command to like to do a +thing is in itself contradictory, because if we already know of +ourselves what we are bound to do, and if further we are conscious +of liking to do it, a command would be quite needless; and if we do it +not willingly, but only out of respect for the law, a command that +makes this respect the motive of our maxim would directly counteract +the disposition commanded. That law of all laws, therefore, like all +the moral precepts of the Gospel, exhibits the moral disposition in +all its perfection, in which, viewed as an ideal of holiness, it is +not attainable by any creature, but yet is the pattern which we should +strive to approach, and in an uninterrupted but infinite progress +become like to. In fact, if a rational creature could ever reach +this point, that he thoroughly likes to do all moral laws, this +would mean that there does not exist in him even the possibility of +a desire that would tempt him to deviate from them; for to overcome +such a desire always costs the subject some sacrifice and therefore +requires self-compulsion, that is, inward constraint to something that +one does not quite like to do; and no creature can ever reach this +stage of moral disposition. For, being a creature, and therefore +always dependent with respect to what he requires for complete +satisfaction, he can never be quite free from desires and +inclinations, and as these rest on physical causes, they can never +of themselves coincide with the moral law, the sources of which are +quite different; and therefore they make it necessary to found the +mental disposition of one's maxims on moral obligation, not on ready +inclination, but on respect, which demands obedience to the law, +even though one may not like it; not on love, which apprehends no +inward reluctance of the will towards the law. Nevertheless, this +latter, namely, love to the law (which would then cease to be a +command, and then morality, which would have passed subjectively +into holiness, would cease to be virtue) must be the constant though +unattainable goal of his endeavours. For in the case of what we highly +esteem, but yet (on account of the consciousness of our weakness) +dread, the increased facility of satisfying it changes the most +reverential awe into inclination, and respect into love; at least this +would be the perfection of a disposition devoted to the law, if it +were possible for a creature to attain it. + + + +* This law is in striking contrast with the principle of private +happiness which some make the supreme principle of morality. This +would be expressed thus: Love thyself above everything, and God and +thy neighbour for thine own sake. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 25} + + + +This reflection is intended not so much to clear up the +evangelical command just cited, in order to prevent religious +fanaticism in regard to love of God, but to define accurately the +moral disposition with regard directly to our duties towards men, +and to check, or if possible prevent, a merely moral fanaticism +which infects many persons. The stage of morality on which man (and, +as far as we can see, every rational creature) stands is respect for +the moral law. The disposition that he ought to have in obeying this +is to obey it from duty, not from spontaneous inclination, or from +an endeavour taken up from liking and unbidden; and this proper +moral condition in which he can always be is virtue, that is, moral +disposition militant, and not holiness in the fancied possession of +a perfect purity of the disposition of the will. It is nothing but +moral fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit that is infused into the +mind by exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, +by which men are led into the delusion that it is not duty, that is, +respect for the law, whose yoke (an easy yoke indeed, because reason +itself imposes it on us) they must bear, whether they like it or +not, that constitutes the determining principle of their actions, +and which always humbles them while they obey it; fancying that +those actions are expected from them, not from duty, but as pure +merit. For not only would they, in imitating such deeds from such a +principle, not have fulfilled the spirit of the law in the least, +which consists not in the legality of the action (without regard to +principle), but in the subjection of the mind to the law; not only +do they make the motives pathological (seated in sympathy or +self-love), not moral (in the law), but they produce in this way a +vain, high-flying, fantastic way of thinking, flattering themselves +with a spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor +bridle, for which no command is needed, and thereby forgetting their +obligation, which they ought to think of rather than merit. Indeed +actions of others which are done with great sacrifice, and merely +for the sake of duty, may be praised as noble and sublime, but only so +far as there are traces which suggest that they were done wholly out +of respect for duty and not from excited feelings. If these, +however, are set before anyone as examples to be imitated, respect for +duty (which is the only true moral feeling) must be employed as the +motive- this severe holy precept which never allows our vain self-love +to dally with pathological impulses (however analogous they may be +to morality), and to take a pride in meritorious worth. Now if we +search we shall find for all actions that are worthy of praise a law +of duty which commands, and does not leave us to choose what may be +agreeable to our inclinations. This is the only way of representing +things that can give a moral training to the soul, because it alone is +capable of solid and accurately defined principles. + +If fanaticism in its most general sense is a deliberate over +stepping of the limits of human reason, then moral fanaticism is +such an over stepping of the bounds that practical pure reason sets to +mankind, in that it forbids us to place the subjective determining +principle of correct actions, that is, their moral motive, in anything +but the law itself, or to place the disposition which is thereby +brought into the maxims in anything but respect for this law, and +hence commands us to take as the supreme vital principle of all +morality in men the thought of duty, which strikes down all +arrogance as well as vain self-love. + +If this is so, it is not only writers of romance or sentimental +educators (although they may be zealous opponents of +sentimentalism), but sometimes even philosophers, nay, even the +severest of all, the Stoics, that have brought in moral fanaticism +instead of a sober but wise moral discipline, although the +fanaticism of the latter was more heroic, that of the former of an +insipid, effeminate character; and we may, without hypocrisy, say of +the moral teaching of the Gospel, that it first, by the purity of +its moral principle, and at the same time by its suitability to the +limitations of finite beings, brought all the good conduct of men +under the discipline of a duty plainly set before their eyes, which +does not permit them to indulge in dreams of imaginary moral +perfections; and that it also set the bounds of humility (that is, +self-knowledge) to self-conceit as well as to self-love, both which +are ready to mistake their limits. + +Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing +charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not +to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural +aversion or terror, but merely holdest forth a law which of itself +finds entrance into the mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence +(though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are +dumb, even though they secretly counter-work it; what origin is +there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble +descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations; a +root to be derived from which is the indispensable condition of the +only worth which men can give themselves? + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 30} + +It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself +(as a part of the world of sense), a power which connects him with +an order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a +world which at the same time commands the whole sensible world, and +with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time, as well +as the sum total of all ends (which totality alone suits such +unconditional practical laws as the moral). This power is nothing +but personality, that is, freedom and independence on the mechanism of +nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of a being which is subject to +special laws, namely, pure practical laws given by its own reason; +so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to +his own personality as belonging to the intelligible [supersensible] +world. It is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to both +worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to its second and +highest characteristic only with reverence, and its laws with the +highest respect. + +On this origin are founded many expressions which designate the +worth of objects according to moral ideas. The moral law is holy +(inviolable). Man is indeed unholy enough, but he must regard humanity +in his own person as holy. In all creation every thing one chooses and +over which one has any power, may be used merely as means; man +alone, and with him every rational creature, is an end in himself. +By virtue of the autonomy of his freedom he is the subject of the +moral law, which is holy. Just for this reason every will, even +every person's own individual will, in relation to itself, is +restricted to the condition of agreement with the autonomy of the +rational being, that is to say, that it is not to be subject to any +purpose which cannot accord with a law which might arise from the will +of the passive subject himself; the latter is, therefore, never to +be employed merely as means, but as itself also, concurrently, an end. +We justly attribute this condition even to the Divine will, with +regard to the rational beings in the world, which are His creatures, +since it rests on their personality, by which alone they are ends in +themselves. + +This respect-inspiring idea of personality which sets before our +eyes the sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at +the same time it shows us the want of accord of our conduct with it +and thereby strikes down self-conceit, is even natural to the +commonest reason and easily observed. Has not every even moderately +honourable man sometimes found that, where by an otherwise inoffensive +lie he might either have withdrawn himself from an unpleasant +business, or even have procured some advantages for a loved and +well-deserving friend, he has avoided it solely lest he should despise +himself secretly in his own eyes? When an upright man is in the +greatest distress, which he might have avoided if he could only have +disregarded duty, is he not sustained by the consciousness that he has +maintained humanity in its proper dignity in his own person and +honoured it, that he has no reason to be ashamed of himself in his own +sight, or to dread the inward glance of self-examination? This +consolation is not happiness, it is not even the smallest part of +it, for no one would wish to have occasion for it, or would, +perhaps, even desire a life in such circumstances. But he lives, and +he cannot endure that he should be in his own eyes unworthy of life. +This inward peace is therefore merely negative as regards what can +make life pleasant; it is, in fact, only the escaping the danger of +sinking in personal worth, after everything else that is valuable +has been lost. It is the effect of a respect for something quite +different from life, something in comparison and contrast with which +life with all its enjoyment has no value. He still lives only +because it is his duty, not because he finds anything pleasant in +life. + +Such is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason; it +is no other than the pure moral law itself, inasmuch as it makes us +conscious of the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and +subjectively produces respect for their higher nature in men who are +also conscious of their sensible existence and of the consequent +dependence of their pathologically very susceptible nature. Now with +this motive may be combined so many charms and satisfactions of life +that even on this account alone the most prudent choice of a +rational Epicurean reflecting on the greatest advantage of life +would declare itself on the side of moral conduct, and it may even +be advisable to join this prospect of a cheerful enjoyment of life +with that supreme motive which is already sufficient of itself; but +only as a counterpoise to the attractions which vice does not fail +to exhibit on the opposite side, and not so as, even in the smallest +degree, to place in this the proper moving power when duty is in +question. For that would be just the same as to wish to taint the +purity of the moral disposition in its source. The majesty of duty has +nothing to do with enjoyment of life; it has its special law and its +special tribunal, and though the two should be never so well shaken +together to be given well mixed, like medicine, to the sick soul, +yet they will soon separate of themselves; and if they do not, the +former will not act; and although physical life might gain somewhat in +force, the moral life would fade away irrecoverably. + + + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 35} + +Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. + + + +By the critical examination of a science, or of a portion of it, +which constitutes a system by itself, I understand the inquiry and +proof why it must have this and no other systematic form, when we +compare it with another system which is based on a similar faculty +of knowledge. Now practical and speculative reason are based on the +same faculty, so far as both are pure reason. Therefore the difference +in their systematic form must be determined by the comparison of both, +and the ground of this must be assigned. + +The Analytic of pure theoretic reason had to do with the knowledge +of such objects as may have been given to the understanding, and was +obliged therefore to begin from intuition and consequently (as this is +always sensible) from sensibility; and only after that could advance +to concepts (of the objects of this intuition), and could only end +with principles after both these had preceded. On the contrary, +since practical reason has not to do with objects so as to know +them, but with its own faculty of realizing them (in accordance with +the knowledge of them), that is, with a will which is a causality, +inasmuch as reason contains its determining principle; since, +consequently, it has not to furnish an object of intuition, but as +practical reason has to furnish only a law (because the notion of +causality always implies the reference to a law which determines the +existence of the many in relation to one another); hence a critical +examination of the Analytic of reason, if this is to be practical +reason (and this is properly the problem), must begin with the +possibility of practical principles a priori. Only after that can it +proceed to concepts of the objects of a practical reason, namely, +those of absolute good and evil, in order to assign them in accordance +with those principles (for prior to those principles they cannot +possibly be given as good and evil by any faculty of knowledge), and +only then could the section be concluded with the last chapter, +that, namely, which treats of the relation of the pure practical +reason to the sensibility and of its necessary influence thereon, +which is a priori cognisable, that is, of the moral sentiment. Thus +the Analytic of the practical pure reason has the whole extent of +the conditions of its use in common with the theoretical, but in +reverse order. The Analytic of pure theoretic reason was divided +into transcendental Aesthetic and transcendental Logic, that of the +practical reversely into Logic and Aesthetic of pure practical +reason (if I may, for the sake of analogy merely, use these +designations, which are not quite suitable). This logic again was +there divided into the Analytic of concepts and that of principles: +here into that of principles and concepts. The Aesthetic also had in +the former case two parts, on account of the two kinds of sensible +intuition; here the sensibility is not considered as a capacity of +intuition at all, but merely as feeling (which can be a subjective +ground of desire), and in regard to it pure practical reason admits no +further division. + +It is also easy to see the reason why this division into two parts +with its subdivision was not actually adopted here (as one might +have been induced to attempt by the example of the former critique). +For since it is pure reason that is here considered in its practical +use, and consequently as proceeding from a priori principles, and +not from empirical principles of determination, hence the division +of the analytic of pure practical reason must resemble that of a +syllogism; namely, proceeding from the universal in the major +premiss (the moral principle), through a minor premiss containing a +subsumption of possible actions (as good or evil) under the former, to +the conclusion, namely, the subjective determination of the will (an +interest in the possible practical good, and in the maxim founded on +it). He who has been able to convince himself of the truth of the +positions occurring in the Analytic will take pleasure in such +comparisons; for they justly suggest the expectation that we may +perhaps some day be able to discern the unity of the whole faculty +of reason (theoretical as well as practical) and be able to derive all +from one principle, which, is what human reason inevitably demands, as +it finds complete satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of +its knowledge. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 40} + +If now we consider also the contents of the knowledge that we can +have of a pure practical reason, and by means of it, as shown by the +Analytic, we find, along with a remarkable analogy between it and +the theoretical, no less remarkable differences. As regards the +theoretical, the faculty of a pure rational cognition a priori could +be easily and evidently proved by examples from sciences (in which, as +they put their principles to the test in so many ways by methodical +use, there is not so much reason as in common knowledge to fear a +secret mixture of empirical principles of cognition). But, that pure +reason without the admixture of any empirical principle is practical +of itself, this could only be shown from the commonest practical use +of reason, by verifying the fact, that every man's natural reason +acknowledges the supreme practical principle as the supreme law of his +will- a law completely a priori and not depending on any sensible +data. It was necessary first to establish and verify the purity of its +origin, even in the judgement of this common reason, before science +could take it in hand to make use of it, as a fact, that is, prior +to all disputation about its possibility, and all the consequences +that may be drawn from it. But this circumstance may be readily +explained from what has just been said; because practical pure +reason must necessarily begin with principles, which therefore must be +the first data, the foundation of all science, and cannot be derived +from it. It was possible to effect this verification of moral +principles as principles of a pure reason quite well, and with +sufficient certainty, by a single appeal to the judgement of common +sense, for this reason, that anything empirical which might slip +into our maxims as a determining principle of the will can be detected +at once by the feeling of pleasure or pain which necessarily +attaches to it as exciting desire; whereas pure practical reason +positively refuses to admit this feeling into its principle as a +condition. The heterogeneity of the determining principles (the +empirical and rational) is clearly detected by this resistance of a +practically legislating reason against every admixture of inclination, +and by a peculiar kind of sentiment, which, however, does not +precede the legislation of the practical reason, but, on the contrary, +is produced by this as a constraint, namely, by the feeling of a +respect such as no man has for inclinations of whatever kind but for +the law only; and it is detected in so marked and prominent a manner +that even the most uninstructed cannot fail to see at once in an +example presented to him, that empirical principles of volition may +indeed urge him to follow their attractions, but that he can never +be expected to obey anything but the pure practical law of reason +alone. + +The distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine +of morality, in the former of which empirical principles constitute +the entire foundation, while in the second they do not form the +smallest part of it, is the first and most important office of the +Analytic of pure practical reason; and it must proceed in it with as +much exactness and, so to speak, scrupulousness, as any geometer in +his work. The philosopher, however, has greater difficulties to +contend with here (as always in rational cognition by means of +concepts merely without construction), because he cannot take any +intuition as a foundation (for a pure noumenon). He has, however, this +advantage that, like the chemist, he can at any time make an +experiment with every man's practical reason for the purpose of +distinguishing the moral (pure) principle of determination from the +empirical; namely, by adding the moral law (as a determining +principle) to the empirically affected will (e.g., that of the man who +would be ready to lie because he can gain something thereby). It is as +if the analyst added alkali to a solution of lime in hydrochloric +acid, the acid at once forsakes the lime, combines with the alkali, +and the lime is precipitated. Just in the same way, if to a man who is +otherwise honest (or who for this occasion places himself only in +thought in the position of an honest man), we present the moral law by +which he recognises the worthlessness of the liar, his practical +reason (in forming a judgement of what ought to be done) at once +forsakes the advantage, combines with that which maintains in him +respect for his own person (truthfulness), and the advantage after +it has been separated and washed from every particle of reason +(which is altogether on the side of duty) is easily weighed by +everyone, so that it can enter into combination with reason in other +cases, only not where it could be opposed to the moral law, which +reason never forsakes, but most closely unites itself with. + +But it does not follow that this distinction between the principle +of happiness and that of morality is an opposition between them, and +pure practical reason does not require that we should renounce all +claim to happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we +should take no account of happiness. It may even in certain respects +be a duty to provide for happiness; partly, because (including +skill, wealth, riches) it contains means for the fulfilment of our +duty; partly, because the absence of it (e.g., poverty) implies +temptations to transgress our duty. But it can never be an immediate +duty to promote our happiness, still less can it be the principle of +all duty. Now, as all determining principles of the will, except the +law of pure practical reason alone (the moral law), are all +empirical and, therefore, as such, belong to the principle of +happiness, they must all be kept apart from the supreme principle of +morality and never be incorporated with it as a condition; since +this would be to destroy all moral worth just as much as any empirical +admixture with geometrical principles would destroy the certainty of +mathematical evidence, which in Plato's opinion is the most +excellent thing in mathematics, even surpassing their utility. + +Instead, however, of the deduction of the supreme principle of +pure practical reason, that is, the explanation of the possibility +of such a knowledge a priori, the utmost we were able to do was to +show that if we saw the possibility of the freedom of an efficient +cause, we should also see not merely the possibility, but even the +necessity, of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational +beings, to whom we attribute freedom of causality of their will; +because both concepts are so inseparably united that we might define +practical freedom as independence of the will on anything but the +moral law. But we cannot perceive the possibility of the freedom of an +efficient cause, especially in the world of sense; we are fortunate if +only we can be sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its +impossibility, and are now, by the moral law which postulates it, +compelled and therefore authorized to assume it. However, there are +still many who think that they can explain this freedom on empirical +principles, like any other physical faculty, and treat it as a +psychological property, the explanation of which only requires a +more exact study of the nature of the soul and of the motives of the +will, and not as a transcendental predicate of the causality of a +being that belongs to the world of sense (which is really the +point). They thus deprive us of the grand revelation which we obtain +through practical reason by means of the moral law, the revelation, +namely, of a supersensible world by the realization of the otherwise +transcendent concept of freedom, and by this deprive us also of the +moral law itself, which admits no empirical principle of +determination. Therefore it will be necessary to add something here as +a protection against this delusion and to exhibit empiricism in its +naked superficiality. + +The notion of causality as physical necessity, in opposition to +the same notion as freedom, concerns only the existence of things so +far as it is determinable in time, and, consequently, as phenomena, in +opposition to their causality as things in themselves. Now if we +take the attributes of existence of things in time for attributes of +things in themselves (which is the common view), then it is impossible +to reconcile the necessity of the causal relation with freedom; they +are contradictory. For from the former it follows that every event, +and consequently every action that takes place at a certain point of +time, is a necessary result of what existed in time preceding. Now +as time past is no longer in my power, hence every action that I +perform must be the necessary result of certain determining grounds +which are not in my power, that is, at the moment in which I am acting +I am never free. Nay, even if I assume that my whole existence is +independent on any foreign cause (for instance, God), so that the +determining principles of my causality, and even of my whole +existence, were not outside myself, yet this would not in the least +transform that physical necessity into freedom. For at every moment of +time I am still under the necessity of being determined to action by +that which is not in my power, and the series of events infinite a +parte priori, which I only continue according to a pre-determined +order and could never begin of myself, would be a continuous +physical chain, and therefore my causality would never be freedom. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 45} + +If, then, we would attribute freedom to a being whose existence is +determined in time, we cannot except him from the law of necessity +as to all events in his existence and, consequently, as to his actions +also; for that would be to hand him over to blind chance. Now as +this law inevitably applies to all the causality of things, so far +as their existence is determinable in time, it follows that if this +were the mode in which we had also to conceive the existence of +these things in themselves, freedom must be rejected as a vain and +impossible conception. Consequently, if we would still save it, no +other way remains but to consider that the existence of a thing, so +far as it is determinable in time, and therefore its causality, +according to the law of physical necessity, belong to appearance, +and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in itself. +This is certainly inevitable, if we would retain both these +contradictory concepts together; but in application, when we try to +explain their combination in one and the same action, great +difficulties present themselves which seem to render such a +combination impracticable. + +When I say of a man who commits a theft that, by the law of +causality, this deed is a necessary result of the determining causes +in preceding time, then it was impossible that it could not have +happened; how then can the judgement, according to the moral law, make +any change, and suppose that it could have been omitted, because the +law says that it ought to have been omitted; that is, how can a man be +called quite free at the same moment, and with respect to the same +action in which he is subject to an inevitable physical necessity? +Some try to evade this by saying that the causes that determine his +causality are of such a kind as to agree with a comparative notion +of freedom. According to this, that is sometimes called a free effect, +the determining physical cause of which lies within the acting thing +itself, e.g., that which a projectile performs when it is in free +motion, in which case we use the word freedom, because while it is +in flight it is not urged by anything external; or as we call the +motion of a clock a free motion, because it moves its hands itself, +which therefore do not require to be pushed by external force; so +although the actions of man are necessarily determined by causes which +precede in time, we yet call them free, because these causes are ideas +produced by our own faculties, whereby desires are evoked on +occasion of circumstances, and hence actions are wrought according +to our own pleasure. This is a wretched subterfuge with which some +persons still let themselves be put off, and so think they have +solved, with a petty word- jugglery, that difficult problem, at the +solution of which centuries have laboured in vain, and which can +therefore scarcely be found so completely on the surface. In fact, +in the question about the freedom which must be the foundation of +all moral laws and the consequent responsibility, it does not matter +whether the principles which necessarily determine causality by a +physical law reside within the subject or without him, or in the +former case whether these principles are instinctive or are +conceived by reason, if, as is admitted by these men themselves, these +determining ideas have the ground of their existence in time and in +the antecedent state, and this again in an antecedent, etc. Then it +matters not that these are internal; it matters not that they have a +psychological and not a mechanical causality, that is, produce actions +by means of ideas and not by bodily movements; they are still +determining principles of the causality of a being whose existence +is determinable in time, and therefore under the necessitation of +conditions of past time, which therefore, when the subject has to act, +are no longer in his power. This may imply psychological freedom (if +we choose to apply this term to a merely internal chain of ideas in +the mind), but it involves physical necessity and, therefore, leaves +no room for transcendental freedom, which must be conceived as +independence on everything empirical, and, consequently, on nature +generally, whether it is an object of the internal sense considered in +time only, or of the external in time and space. Without this +freedom (in the latter and true sense), which alone is practical a +priori, no moral law and no moral imputation are possible. Just for +this reason the necessity of events in time, according to the physical +law of causality, may be called the mechanism of nature, although we +do not mean by this that things which are subject to it must be really +material machines. We look here only to the necessity of the +connection of events in a time-series as it is developed according +to the physical law, whether the subject in which this development +takes place is called automaton materiale when the mechanical being is +moved by matter, or with Leibnitz spirituale when it is impelled by +ideas; and if the freedom of our will were no other than the latter +(say the psychological and comparative, not also transcendental, +that is, absolute), then it would at bottom be nothing better than the +freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, accomplishes +its motions of itself. + +Now, in order to remove in the supposed case the apparent +contradiction between freedom and the mechanism of nature in one and +the same action, we must remember what was said in the Critique of +Pure Reason, or what follows therefrom; viz., that the necessity of +nature, which cannot co-exist with the freedom of the subject, +appertains only to the attributes of the thing that is subject to +time-conditions, consequently only to those of the acting subject as a +phenomenon; that therefore in this respect the determining +principles of every action of the same reside in what belongs to +past time and is no longer in his power (in which must be included his +own past actions and the character that these may determine for him in +his own eyes as a phenomenon). But the very same subject, being on the +other side conscious of himself as a thing in himself, considers his +existence also in so far as it is not subject to time-conditions, +and regards himself as only determinable by laws which he gives +himself through reason; and in this his existence nothing is +antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action, and +in general every modification of his existence, varying according to +his internal sense, even the whole series of his existence as a +sensible being is in the consciousness of his supersensible +existence nothing but the result, and never to be regarded as the +determining principle, of his causality as a noumenon. In this view +now the rational being can justly say of every unlawful action that he +performs, that he could very well have left it undone; although as +appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past, and in this +respect is absolutely necessary; for it, with all the past which +determines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of his character +which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he imputes the +causality of those appearances to himself as a cause independent on +sensibility. + +With this agree perfectly the judicial sentences of that wonderful +faculty in us which we call conscience. A man may use as much art as +he likes in order to paint to himself an unlawful act, that he +remembers, as an unintentional error, a mere oversight, such as one +can never altogether avoid, and therefore as something in which he was +carried away by the stream of physical necessity, and thus to make +himself out innocent, yet he finds that the advocate who speaks in his +favour can by no means silence the accuser within, if only he is +conscious that at the time when he did this wrong he was in his +senses, that is, in possession of his freedom; and, nevertheless, he +accounts for his error from some bad habits, which by gradual +neglect of attention he has allowed to grow upon him to such a +degree that he can regard his error as its natural consequence, +although this cannot protect him from the blame and reproach which +he casts upon himself. This is also the ground of repentance for a +long past action at every recollection of it; a painful feeling +produced by the moral sentiment, and which is practically void in so +far as it cannot serve to undo what has been done. (Hence Priestley, +as a true and consistent fatalist, declares it absurd, and he deserves +to be commended for this candour more than those who, while they +maintain the mechanism of the will in fact, and its freedom in words +only, yet wish it to be thought that they include it in their system +of compromise, although they do not explain the possibility of such +moral imputation.) But the pain is quite legitimate, because when +the law of our intelligible [supersensible] existence (the moral +law) is in question, reason recognizes no distinction of time, and +only asks whether the event belongs to me, as my act, and then +always morally connects the same feeling with it, whether it has +happened just now or long ago. For in reference to the supersensible +consciousness of its existence (i.e., freedom) the life of sense is +but a single phenomenon, which, inasmuch as it contains merely +manifestations of the mental disposition with regard to the moral +law (i.e., of the character), must be judged not according to the +physical necessity that belongs to it as phenomenon, but according +to the absolute spontaneity of freedom. It may therefore be admitted +that, if it were possible to have so profound an insight into a +man's mental character as shown by internal as well as external +actions as to know all its motives, even the smallest, and likewise +all the external occasions that can influence them, we could calculate +a man's conduct for the future with as great certainty as a lunar or +solar eclipse; and nevertheless we may maintain that the man is +free. In fact, if we were capable of a further glance, namely, an +intellectual intuition of the same subject (which indeed is not +granted to us, and instead of it we have only the rational concept), +then we should perceive that this whole chain of appearances in regard +to all that concerns the moral laws depends on the spontaneity of +the subject as a thing in itself, of the determination of which no +physical explanation can be given. In default of this intuition, the +moral law assures us of this distinction between the relation of our +actions as appearance to our sensible nature, and the relation of this +sensible nature to the supersensible substratum in us. In this view, +which is natural to our reason, though inexplicable, we can also +justify some judgements which we passed with all conscientiousness, +and which yet at first sight seem quite opposed to all equity. There +are cases in which men, even with the same education which has been +profitable to others, yet show such early depravity, and so continue +to progress in it to years of manhood, that they are thought to be +born villains, and their character altogether incapable of +improvement; and nevertheless they are judged for what they do or +leave undone, they are reproached for their faults as guilty; nay, +they themselves (the children) regard these reproaches as well +founded, exactly as if in spite of the hopeless natural quality of +mind ascribed to them, they remained just as responsible as any +other man. This could not happen if we did not suppose that whatever +springs from a man's choice (as every action intentionally performed +undoubtedly does) has as its foundation a free causality, which from +early youth expresses its character in its manifestations (i.e., +actions). These, on account of the uniformity of conduct, exhibit a +natural connection, which however does not make the vicious quality of +the will necessary, but on the contrary, is the consequence of the +evil principles voluntarily adopted and unchangeable, which only +make it so much the more culpable and deserving of punishment. There +still remains a difficulty in the combination of freedom with the +mechanism of nature in a being belonging to the world of sense; a +difficulty which, even after all the foregoing is admitted, +threatens freedom with complete destruction. But with this danger +there is also a circumstance that offers hope of an issue still +favourable to freedom; namely, that the same difficulty presses much +more strongly (in fact as we shall presently see, presses only) on the +system that holds the existence determinable in time and space to be +the existence of things in themselves; it does not therefore oblige us +to give up our capital supposition of the ideality of time as a mere +form of sensible intuition, and consequently as a mere manner of +representation which is proper to the subject as belonging to the +world of sense; and therefore it only requires that this view be +reconciled with this idea. + +The difficulty is as follows: Even if it is admitted that the +supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action, +although, as a subject also belonging to the world of sense, he is +under mechanical conditions with respect to the same action, still, as +soon as we allow that God as universal first cause is also the cause +of the existence of substance (a proposition which can never be +given up without at the same time giving up the notion of God as the +Being of all beings, and therewith giving up his all sufficiency, on +which everything in theology depends), it seems as if we must admit +that a man's actions have their determining principle in something +which is wholly out of his power- namely, in the causality of a +Supreme Being distinct from himself and on whom his own existence +and the whole determination of his causality are absolutely dependent. +In point of fact, if a man's actions as belonging to his modifications +in time were not merely modifications of him as appearance, but as a +thing in itself, freedom could not be saved. Man would be a marionette +or an automaton, like Vaucanson's, prepared and wound up by the +Supreme Artist. Self-consciousness would indeed make him a thinking +automaton; but the consciousness of his own spontaneity would be +mere delusion if this were mistaken for freedom, and it would +deserve this name only in a comparative sense, since, although the +proximate determining causes of its motion and a long series of +their determining causes are internal, yet the last and highest is +found in a foreign hand. Therefore I do not see how those who still +insist on regarding time and space as attributes belonging to the +existence of things in themselves, can avoid admitting the fatality of +actions; or if (like the otherwise acute Mendelssohn) they allow +them to be conditions necessarily belonging to the existence of finite +and derived beings, but not to that of the infinite Supreme Being, I +do not see on what ground they can justify such a distinction, or, +indeed, how they can avoid the contradiction that meets them, when +they hold that existence in time is an attribute necessarily belonging +to finite things in themselves, whereas God is the cause of this +existence, but cannot be the cause of time (or space) itself (since +this must be presupposed as a necessary a priori condition of the +existence of things); and consequently as regards the existence of +these things. His causality must be subject to conditions and even +to the condition of time; and this would inevitably bring in +everything contradictory to the notions of His infinity and +independence. On the other hand, it is quite easy for us to draw the +distinction between the attribute of the divine existence of being +independent on all time-conditions, and that of a being of the world +of sense, the distinction being that between the existence of a +being in itself and that of a thing in appearance. Hence, if this +ideality of time and space is not adopted, nothing remains but +Spinozism, in which space and time are essential attributes of the +Supreme Being Himself, and the things dependent on Him (ourselves, +therefore, included) are not substances, but merely accidents inhering +in Him; since, if these things as His effects exist in time only, this +being the condition of their existence in themselves, then the actions +of these beings must be simply His actions which He performs in some +place and time. Thus, Spinozism, in spite of the absurdity of its +fundamental idea, argues more consistently than the creation theory +can, when beings assumed to be substances, and beings in themselves +existing in time, are regarded as effects of a Supreme Cause, and +yet as not [belonging] to Him and His action, but as separate +substances. + + {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 50} + +The above-mentioned difficulty is resolved briefly and clearly as +follows: If existence in time is a mere sensible mode of +representation belonging to thinking beings in the world and +consequently does not apply to them as things in themselves, then +the creation of these beings is a creation of things in themselves, +since the notion of creation does not belong to the sensible form of +representation of existence or to causality, but can only be +referred to noumena. Consequently, when I say of beings in the world +of sense that they are created, I so far regard them as noumena. As it +would be a contradiction, therefore, to say that God is a creator of +appearances, so also it is a contradiction to say that as creator He +is the cause of actions in the world of sense, and therefore as +appearances, although He is the cause of the existence of the acting +beings (which are noumena). If now it is possible to affirm freedom in +spite of the natural mechanism of actions as appearances (by regarding +existence in time as something that belongs only to appearances, not +to things in themselves), then the circumstance that the acting beings +are creatures cannot make the slightest difference, since creation +concerns their supersensible and not their sensible existence, and, +therefore, cannot be regarded as the determining principle of the +appearances. It would be quite different if the beings in the world as +things in themselves existed in time, since in that case the creator +of substance would be at the same time the author of the whole +mechanism of this substance. + +Of so great importance is the separation of time (as well as +space) from the existence of things in themselves which was effected +in the Critique of the Pure Speculative Reason. + +It may be said that the solution here proposed involves great +difficulty in itself and is scarcely susceptible of a lucid +exposition. But is any other solution that has been attempted, or that +may be attempted, easier and more intelligible? Rather might we say +that the dogmatic teachers of metaphysics have shown more shrewdness +than candour in keeping this difficult point out of sight as much as +possible, in the hope that if they said nothing about it, probably +no one would think of it. If science is to be advanced, all +difficulties must be laid open, and we must even search for those that +are hidden, for every difficulty calls forth a remedy, which cannot be +discovered without science gaining either in extent or in exactness; +and thus even obstacles become means of increasing the thoroughness of +science. On the other hand, if the difficulties are intentionally +concealed, or merely removed by palliatives, then sooner or later they +burst out into incurable mischiefs, which bring science to ruin in +an absolute scepticism. + +Since it is, properly speaking, the notion of freedom alone amongst all +the ideas of pure speculative reason that so greatly enlarges our +knowledge in the sphere of the supersensible, though only of our +practical knowledge, I ask myself why it exclusively possesses so great +fertility, whereas the others only designate the vacant space for +possible beings of the pure understanding, but are unable by any means +to define the concept of them. I presently find that as I cannot think +anything without a category, I must first look for a category for the +rational idea of freedom with which I am now concerned; and this is the +category of causality; and although freedom, a concept of the reason, +being a transcendent concept, cannot have any intuition corresponding to +it, yet the concept of the understanding- for the synthesis of which the +former demands the unconditioned- (namely, the concept of causality) +must have a sensible intuition given, by which first its objective +reality is assured. Now, the categories are all divided into two +classes- the mathematical, which concern the unity of synthesis in the +conception of objects, and the dynamical, which refer to the unity of +synthesis in the conception of the existence of objects. The former +(those of magnitude and quality) always contain a synthesis of the +homogeneous, and it is not possible to find in this the unconditioned +antecedent to what is given in sensible intuition as conditioned in +space and time, as this would itself have to belong to space and time, +and therefore be again still conditioned. Whence it resulted in the +Dialectic of Pure Theoretic Reason that the opposite methods of +attaining the unconditioned and the totality of the conditions were both +wrong. The categories of the second class (those of causality and of the +necessity of a thing) did not require this homogeneity (of the +conditioned and the condition in synthesis), since here what we have to +explain is not how the intuition is compounded from a manifold in it, +but only how the existence of the conditioned object corresponding to it +is added to the existence of the condition (added, namely, in the +understanding as connected therewith); and in that case it was allowable +to suppose in the supersensible world the unconditioned antecedent to +the altogether conditioned in the world of sense (both as regards the +causal connection and the contingent existence of things themselves), +although this unconditioned remained indeterminate, and to make the +synthesis transcendent. Hence, it was found in the Dialectic of the Pure +Speculative Reason that the two apparently opposite methods of obtaining +for the conditioned the unconditioned were not really contradictory, +e.g., in the synthesis of causality to conceive for the conditioned in +the series of causes and effects of the sensible world, a causality +which has no sensible condition, and that the same action which, as +belonging to the world of sense, is always sensibly conditioned, that +is, mechanically necessary, yet at the same time may be derived from a +causality not sensibly conditioned- being the causality of the acting +being as belonging to the supersensible world- and may consequently be +conceived as free. Now, the only point in question was to change this +may be into is; that is, that we should be able to show in an actual +case, as it were by a fact, that certain actions imply such a causality +(namely, the intellectual, sensibly unconditioned), whether they are +actual or only commanded, that is, objectively necessary in a practical +sense. We could not hope to find this connexion in actions actually +given in experience as events of the sensible world, since causality +with freedom must always be sought outside the world of sense in the +world of intelligence. But things of sense are the only things offered +to our perception and observation. Hence, nothing remained but to find +an incontestable objective principle of causality which excludes all +sensible conditions: that is, a principle in which reason does not +appeal further to something else as a determining ground of its +causality, but contains this determining ground itself by means of that +principle, and in which therefore it is itself as pure reason practical. +Now, this principle had not to be searched for or discovered; it had +long been in the reason of all men, and incorporated in their nature, +and is the principle of morality. Therefore, that unconditioned +causality, with the faculty of it, namely, freedom, is no longer merely +indefinitely and problematically thought (this speculative reason could +prove to be feasible), but is even as regards the law of its causality +definitely and assertorially known; and with it the fact that a being (I +myself), belonging to the world of sense, belongs also to the +supersensible world, this is also positively known, and thus the reality +of the supersensible world is established and in practical respects +definitely given, and this definiteness, which for theoretical purposes +would be transcendent, is for practical purposes immanent. We could not, +however, make a similar step as regards the second dynamical idea, +namely, that of a necessary being. We could not rise to it from the +sensible world without the aid of the first dynamical idea. For if we +attempted to do so, we should have ventured to leave at a bound all that +is given to us, and to leap to that of which nothing is given us that +can help us to effect the connection of such a supersensible being with +the world of sense (since the necessary being would have to be known as +given outside ourselves). On the other hand, it is now obvious that this +connection is quite possible in relation to our own subject, inasmuch as +I know myself to be on the one side as an intelligible [supersensible] +being determined by the moral law (by means of freedom), and on the +other side as acting in the world of sense. It is the concept of freedom +alone that enables us to find the unconditioned and intelligible for the +conditioned and sensible without going out of ourselves. For it is our +own reason that by means of the supreme and unconditional practical law +knows that itself and the being that is conscious of this law (our own +person) belong to the pure world of understanding, and moreover defines +the manner in which, as such, it can be active. In this way it can be +understood why in the whole faculty of reason it is the practical reason +only that can help us to pass beyond the world of sense and give us +knowledge of a supersensible order and connection, which, however, for +this very reason cannot be extended further than is necessary for pure +practical purposes. + +Let me be permitted on this occasion to make one more remark, +namely, that every step that we make with pure reason, even in the +practical sphere where no attention is paid to subtle speculation, +nevertheless accords with all the material points of the Critique of +the Theoretical Reason as closely and directly as if each step had +been thought out with deliberate purpose to establish this +confirmation. Such a thorough agreement, wholly unsought for and quite +obvious (as anyone can convince himself, if he will only carry moral +inquiries up to their principles), between the most important +proposition of practical reason and the often seemingly too subtle and +needless remarks of the Critique of the Speculative Reason, +occasions surprise and astonishment, and confirms the maxim already +recognized and praised by others, namely, that in every scientific +inquiry we should pursue our way steadily with all possible +exactness and frankness, without caring for any objections that may be +raised from outside its sphere, but, as far as we can, to carry out +our inquiry truthfully and completely by itself. Frequent +observation has convinced me that, when such researches are concluded, +that which in one part of them appeared to me very questionable, +considered in relation to other extraneous doctrines, when I left this +doubtfulness out of sight for a time and only attended to the business +in hand until it was completed, at last was unexpectedly found to +agree perfectly with what had been discovered separately without the +least regard to those doctrines, and without any partiality or +prejudice for them. Authors would save themselves many errors and much +labour lost (because spent on a delusion) if they could only resolve +to go to work with more frankness. + +BOOK_2|CHAPTER_1 + + BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason. + + + +CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally. + + + +Pure reason always has its dialetic, whether it is considered in its +speculative or its practical employment; for it requires the +absolute totality of the 'conditions of what is given conditioned, and +this can only be found in things in themselves. But as all conceptions +of things in themselves must be referred to intuitions, and with us +men these can never be other than sensible and hence can never +enable us to know objects as things in themselves but only as +appearances, and since the unconditioned can never be found in this +chain of appearances which consists only of conditioned and +conditions; thus from applying this rational idea of the totality of +the conditions (in other words of the unconditioned) to appearances, +there arises an inevitable illusion, as if these latter were things in +themselves (for in the absence of a warning critique they are always +regarded as such). This illusion would never be noticed as delusive if +it did not betray itself by a conflict of reason with itself, when +it applies to appearances its fundamental principle of presupposing +the unconditioned to everything conditioned. By this, however, +reason is compelled to trace this illusion to its source, and search +how it can be removed, and this can only be done by a complete +critical examination of the whole pure faculty of reason; so that +the antinomy of the pure reason which is manifest in its dialectic +is in fact the most beneficial error into which human reason could +ever have fallen, since it at last drives us to search for the key +to escape from this labyrinth; and when this key is found, it +further discovers that which we did not seek but yet had need of, +namely, a view into a higher and an immutable order of things, in +which we even now are, and in which we are thereby enabled by definite +precepts to continue to live according to the highest dictates of +reason. + +It may be seen in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason how in its +speculative employment this natural dialectic is to be solved, and how +the error which arises from a very natural illusion may be guarded +against. But reason in its practical use is not a whit better off. +As pure practical reason, it likewise seeks to find the +unconditioned for the practically conditioned (which rests on +inclinations and natural wants), and this is not as the determining +principle of the will, but even when this is given (in the moral +law) it seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure +practical reason under the name of the summum bonum. + +To define this idea practically, i.e., sufficiently for the maxims +of our rational conduct, is the business of practical wisdom, and this +again as a science is philosophy, in the sense in which the word was +understood by the ancients, with whom it meant instruction in the +conception in which the summum bonum was to be placed, and the conduct +by which it was to be obtained. It would be well to leave this word in +its ancient signification as a doctrine of the summum bonum, so far as +reason endeavours to make this into a science. For on the one hand the +restriction annexed would suit the Greek expression (which signifies +the love of wisdom), and yet at the same time would be sufficient to +embrace under the name of philosophy the love of science: that is to +say, of all speculative rational knowledge, so far as it is +serviceable to reason, both for that conception and also for the +practical principle determining our conduct, without letting out of +sight the main end, on account of which alone it can be called a +doctrine of practical wisdom. On the other hand, it would be no harm +to deter the self-conceit of one who ventures to claim the title of +philosopher by holding before him in the very definition a standard of +self-estimation which would very much lower his pretensions. For a +teacher of wisdom would mean something more than a scholar who has not +come so far as to guide himself, much less to guide others, with +certain expectation of attaining so high an end: it would mean a +master in the knowledge of wisdom, which implies more than a modest +man would claim for himself. Thus philosophy as well as wisdom would +always remain an ideal, which objectively is presented complete in +reason alone, while subjectively for the person it is only the goal of +his unceasing endeavours; and no one would be justified in +professing to be in possession of it so as to assume the name of +philosopher who could not also show its infallible effects in his +own person as an example (in his self-mastery and the unquestioned +interest that he takes pre-eminently in the general good), and this +the ancients also required as a condition of deserving that honourable +title. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 5} + +We have another preliminary remark to make respecting the +dialectic of the pure practical reason, on the point of the definition +of the summum bonum (a successful solution of which dialectic would +lead us to expect, as in case of that of the theoretical reason, the +most beneficial effects, inasmuch as the self-contradictions of pure +practical reason honestly stated, and not concealed, force us to +undertake a complete critique of this faculty). + +The moral law is the sole determining principle of a pure will. +But since this is merely formal (viz., as prescribing only the form of +the maxim as universally legislative), it abstracts as a determining +principle from all matter that is to say, from every object of +volition. Hence, though the summum bonum may be the whole object of +a pure practical reason, i.e., a pure will, yet it is not on that +account to be regarded as its determining principle; and the moral law +alone must be regarded as the principle on which that and its +realization or promotion are aimed at. This remark is important in +so delicate a case as the determination of moral principles, where the +slightest misinterpretation perverts men's minds. For it will have +been seen from the Analytic that, if we assume any object under the +name of a good as a determining principle of the will prior to the +moral law and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle, +this would always introduce heteronomy and crush out the moral +principle. + +It is, however, evident that if the notion of the summum bonum +includes that of the moral law as its supreme condition, then the +summum bonum would not merely be an object, but the notion of it and +the conception of its existence as possible by our own practical +reason would likewise be the determining principle of the will, +since in that case the will is in fact determined by the moral law +which is already included in this conception, and by no other +object, as the principle of autonomy requires. This order of the +conceptions of determination of the will must not be lost sight of, as +otherwise we should misunderstand ourselves and think we had fallen +into a contradiction, while everything remains in perfect harmony. + +BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 + + CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the + + Conception of the "Summum Bonum". + + + +The conception of the summum itself contains an ambiguity which +might occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it. The +summum may mean either the supreme (supremum) or the perfect +(consummatum). The former is that condition which is itself +unconditioned, i.e., is not subordinate to any other (originarium); +the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the +same kind (perfectissimum). It has been shown in the Analytic that +virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of all +that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our pursuit +of happiness, and is therefore the supreme good. But it does not +follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the +desires of rational finite beings; for this requires happiness also, +and that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes +himself an end, but even in the judgement of an impartial reason, +which regards persons in general as ends in themselves. For to need +happiness, to deserve it, and yet at the same time not to +participate in it, cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a +rational being possessed at the same time of all power, if, for the +sake of experiment, we conceive such a being. Now inasmuch as virtue +and happiness together constitute the possession of the summum bonum +in a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion +to morality (which is the worth of the person, and his worthiness to +be happy) constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world; hence this +summum bonum expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which, however, +virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has no +condition above it; whereas happiness, while it is pleasant to the +possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good, +but always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition. + +When two elements are necessarily united in one concept, they must +be connected as reason and consequence, and this either so that +their unity is considered as analytical (logical connection), or as +synthetical (real connection) the former following the law of +identity, the latter that of causality. The connection of virtue and +happiness may therefore be understood in two ways: either the +endeavour to be virtuous and the rational pursuit of happiness are not +two distinct actions, but absolutely identical, in which case no maxim +need be made the principle of the former, other than what serves for +the latter; or the connection consists in this, that virtue produces +happiness as something distinct from the consciousness of virtue, as a +cause produces an effect. + +The ancient Greek schools were, properly speaking, only two, and +in determining the conception of the summum bonum these followed in +fact one and the same method, inasmuch as they did not allow virtue +and happiness to be regarded as two distinct elements of the summum +bonum, and consequently sought the unity of the principle by the +rule of identity; but they differed as to which of the two was to be +taken as the fundamental notion. The Epicurean said: "To be +conscious that one's maxims lead to happiness is virtue"; the Stoic +said: "To be conscious of one's virtue is happiness." With the former, +Prudence was equivalent to morality; with the latter, who chose a +higher designation for virtue, morality alone was true wisdom. + +While we must admire the men who in such early times tried all +imaginable ways of extending the domain of philosophy, we must at +the same time lament that their acuteness was unfortunately misapplied +in trying to trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous +notions, those of happiness and virtue. But it agrees with the +dialectical spirit of their times (and subtle minds are even now +sometimes misled in the same way) to get rid of irreconcilable +differences in principle by seeking to change them into a mere contest +about words, and thus apparently working out the identity of the +notion under different names, and this usually occurs in cases where +the combination of heterogeneous principles lies so deep or so high, +or would require so complete a transformation of the doctrines assumed +in the rest of the philosophical system, that men are afraid to +penetrate deeply into the real difference and prefer treating it as +a difference in questions of form. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 5} + +While both schools sought to trace out the identity of the practical +principles of virtue and happiness, they were not agreed as to the way +in which they tried to force this identity, but were separated +infinitely from one another, the one placing its principle on the side +of sense, the other on that of reason; the one in the consciousness of +sensible wants, the other in the independence of practical reason on +all sensible grounds of determination. According to the Epicurean, the +notion of virtue was already involved in the maxim: "To promote +one's own happiness"; according to the Stoics, on the other hand, +the feeling of happiness was already contained in the consciousness of +virtue. Now whatever is contained in another notion is identical +with part of the containing notion, but not with the whole, and +moreover two wholes may be specifically distinct, although they +consist of the same parts; namely if the parts are united into a whole +in totally different ways. The Stoic maintained that the virtue was +the whole summum bonum, and happiness only the consciousness of +possessing it, as making part of the state of the subject. The +Epicurean maintained that happiness was the whole summum bonum, and +virtue only the form of the maxim for its pursuit; viz., the +rational use of the means for attaining it. + +Now it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and +those of private happiness are quite heterogeneous as to their supreme +practical principle, and, although they belong to one summum bonum +which together they make possible, yet they are so far from coinciding +that they restrict and check one another very much in the same +subject. Thus the question: "How is the summum bonum practically +possible?" still remains an unsolved problem, notwithstanding all +the attempts at coalition that have hitherto been made. The Analytic +has, however, shown what it is that makes the problem difficult to +solve; namely, that happiness and morality are two specifically +distinct elements of the summum bonum and, therefore, their +combination cannot be analytically cognised (as if the man that +seeks his own happiness should find by mere analysis of his conception +that in so acting he is virtuous, or as if the man that follows virtue +should in the consciousness of such conduct find that he is already +happy ipso facto), but must be a synthesis of concepts. Now since this +combination is recognised as a priori, and therefore as practically +necessary, and consequently not as derived from experience, so that +the possibility of the summum bonum does not rest on any empirical +principle, it follows that the deduction [legitimation] of this +concept must be transcendental. It is a priori (morally) necessary +to produce the summum bonum by freedom of will: therefore the +condition of its possibility must rest solely on a priori principles +of cognition. + + + + I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason. + + + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 10} + +In the summum bonum which is practical for us, i.e., to be +realized by our will, virtue and happiness are thought as +necessarily combined, so that the one cannot be assumed by pure +practical reason without the other also being attached to it. Now this +combination (like every other) is either analytical or synthetical. It +has been shown that it cannot be analytical; it must then be +synthetical and, more particularly, must be conceived as the +connection of cause and effect, since it concerns a practical good, +i.e., one that is possible by means of action; consequently either the +desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the +maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is +absolutely impossible, because (as was proved in the Analytic) +maxims which place the determining principle of the will in the desire +of personal happiness are not moral at all, and no virtue can be +founded on them. But the second is also impossible, because the +practical connection of causes and effects in the world, as the result +of the determination of the will, does not depend upon the moral +dispositions of the will, but on the knowledge of the laws of nature +and the physical power to use them for one's purposes; consequently we +cannot expect in the world by the most punctilious observance of the +moral laws any necessary connection of happiness with virtue +adequate to the summum bonum. Now, as the promotion of this summum +bonum, the conception of which contains this connection, is a priori a +necessary object of our will and inseparably attached to the moral +law, the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the +latter. If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules, +then the moral law also which commands us to promote it is directed to +vain imaginary ends and must consequently be false. + + + + II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason. + + + +The antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar +conflict between freedom and physical necessity in the causality of +events in the world. It was solved by showing that there is no real +contradiction when the events and even the world in which they occur +are regarded (as they ought to be) merely as appearances; since one +and the same acting being, as an appearance (even to his own inner +sense), has a causality in the world of sense that always conforms +to the mechanism of nature, but with respect to the same events, so +far as the acting person regards himself at the same time as a +noumenon (as pure intelligence in an existence not dependent on the +condition of time), he can contain a principle by which that causality +acting according to laws of nature is determined, but which is +itself free from all laws of nature. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 15} + +It is just the same with the foregoing antinomy of pure practical +reason. The first of the two propositions, "That the endeavour after +happiness produces a virtuous mind," is absolutely false; but the +second, "That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness," is +not absolutely false, but only in so far as virtue is considered as +a form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently only if +I suppose existence in it to be the only sort of existence of a +rational being; it is then only conditionally false. But as I am not +only justified in thinking that I exist also as a noumenon in a +world of the understanding, but even have in the moral law a purely +intellectual determining principle of my causality (in the sensible +world), it is not impossible that morality of mind should have a +connection as cause with happiness (as an effect in the sensible +world) if not immediate yet mediate (viz., through an intelligent +author of nature), and moreover necessary; while in a system of nature +which is merely an object of the senses, this combination could +never occur except contingently and, therefore, could not suffice +for the summum bonum. + +Thus, notwithstanding this seeming conflict of practical reason with +itself, the summum bonum, which is the necessary supreme end of a will +morally determined, is a true object thereof; for it is practically +possible, and the maxims of the will which as regards their matter +refer to it have objective reality, which at first was threatened by +the antinomy that appeared in the connection of morality with +happiness by a general law; but this was merely from a +misconception, because the relation between appearances was taken +for a relation of the things in themselves to these appearances. + +When we find ourselves obliged to go so far, namely, to the +connection with an intelligible world, to find the possibility of +the summum bonum, which reason points out to all rational beings as +the goal of all their moral wishes, it must seem strange that, +nevertheless, the philosophers both of ancient and modern times have +been able to find happiness in accurate proportion to virtue even in +this life (in the sensible world), or have persuaded themselves that +they were conscious thereof. For Epicurus as well as the Stoics +extolled above everything the happiness that springs from the +consciousness of living virtuously; and the former was not so base +in his practical precepts as one might infer from the principles of +his theory, which he used for explanation and not for action, or as +they were interpreted by many who were misled by his using the term +pleasure for contentment; on the contrary, he reckoned the most +disinterested practice of good amongst the ways of enjoying the most +intimate delight, and his scheme of pleasure (by which he meant +constant cheerfulness of mind) included the moderation and control +of the inclinations, such as the strictest moral philosopher might +require. He differed from the Stoics chiefly in making this pleasure +the motive, which they very rightly refused to do. For, on the one +hand, the virtuous Epicurus, like many well-intentioned men of this +day who do not reflect deeply enough on their principles, fell into +the error of presupposing the virtuous disposition in the persons +for whom he wished to provide the springs to virtue (and indeed the +upright man cannot be happy if he is not first conscious of his +uprightness; since with such a character the reproach that his habit +of thought would oblige him to make against himself in case of +transgression and his moral self-condemnation would rob him of all +enjoyment of the pleasantness which his condition might otherwise +contain). But the question is: How is such a disposition possible in +the first instance, and such a habit of thought in estimating the +worth of one's existence, since prior to it there can be in the +subject no feeling at all for moral worth? If a man is virtuous +without being conscious of his integrity in every action, he will +certainly not enjoy life, however favourable fortune may be to him +in its physical circumstances; but can we make him virtuous in the +first instance, in other words, before he esteems the moral worth of +his existence so highly, by praising to him the peace of mind that +would result from the consciousness of an integrity for which he has +no sense? + +On the other hand, however, there is here an occasion of a vitium +subreptionis, and as it were of an optical illusion, in the +self-consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one +feels- an illusion which even the most experienced cannot altogether +avoid. The moral disposition of mind is necessarily combined with a +consciousness that the will is determined directly by the law. Now the +consciousness of a determination of the faculty of desire is always +the source of a satisfaction in the resulting action; but this +pleasure, this satisfaction in oneself, is not the determining +principle of the action; on the contrary, the determination of the +will directly by reason is the source of the feeling of pleasure, +and this remains a pure practical not sensible determination of the +faculty of desire. Now as this determination has exactly the same +effect within in impelling to activity, that a feeling of the pleasure +to be expected from the desired action would have had, we easily +look on what we ourselves do as something which we merely passively +feel, and take the moral spring for a sensible impulse, just as it +happens in the so-called illusion of the senses (in this case the +inner sense). It is a sublime thing in human nature to be determined +to actions immediately by a purely rational law; sublime even is the +illusion that regards the subjective side of this capacity of +intellectual determination as something sensible and the effect of a +special sensible feeling (for an intellectual feeling would be a +contradiction). It is also of great importance to attend to this +property of our personality and as much as possible to cultivate the +effect of reason on this feeling. But we must beware lest by falsely +extolling this moral determining principle as a spring, making its +source lie in particular feelings of pleasure (which are in fact +only results), we degrade and disfigure the true genuine spring, the +law itself, by putting as it were a false foil upon it. Respect, not +pleasure or enjoyment of happiness, is something for which it is not +possible that reason should have any antecedent feeling as its +foundation (for this would always be sensible and pathological); and +consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the law is by +no means analogous to the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to +the faculty of desire it produces the same effect, but from +different sources: it is only by this mode of conception, however, +that we can attain what we are seeking, namely, that actions be done +not merely in accordance with duty (as a result of pleasant feelings), +but from duty, which must be the true end of all moral cultivation. + +Have we not, however, a word which does not express enjoyment, as +happiness does, but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence, an +analogue of the happiness which must necessarily accompany the +consciousness of virtue? Yes this word is self-contentment which in +its proper signification always designates only a negative +satisfaction in one's existence, in which one is conscious of +needing nothing. Freedom and the consciousness of it as a faculty of +following the moral law with unyielding resolution is independence +of inclinations, at least as motives determining (though not as +affecting) our desire, and so far as I am conscious of this freedom in +following my moral maxims, it is the only source of an unaltered +contentment which is necessarily connected with it and rests on no +special feeling. This may be called intellectual contentment. The +sensible contentment (improperly so-called) which rests on the +satisfaction of the inclinations, however delicate they may be +imagined to be, can never be adequate to the conception of it. For the +inclinations change, they grow with the indulgence shown them, and +always leave behind a still greater void than we had thought to +fill. Hence they are always burdensome to a rational being, and, +although he cannot lay them aside, they wrest from him the wish to +be rid of them. Even an inclination to what is right (e.g., to +beneficence), though it may much facilitate the efficacy of the +moral maxims, cannot produce any. For in these all must be directed to +the conception of the law as a determining principle, if the action is +to contain morality and not merely legality. Inclination is blind +and slavish, whether it be of a good sort or not, and, when morality +is in question, reason must not play the part merely of guardian to +inclination, but disregarding it altogether must attend simply to +its own interest as pure practical reason. This very feeling of +compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes the deliberation on the +question of duty and becomes a determining principle, is even annoying +to right thinking persons, brings their deliberate maxims into +confusion, and makes them wish to be delivered from it and to be +subject to lawgiving reason alone. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 20} + +From this we can understand how the consciousness of this faculty of +a pure practical reason produces by action (virtue) a consciousness of +mastery over one's inclinations, and therefore of independence of +them, and consequently also of the discontent that always +accompanies them, and thus a negative satisfaction with one's state, +i.e., contentment, which is primarily contentment with one's own +person. Freedom itself becomes in this way (namely, indirectly) +capable of an enjoyment which cannot be called happiness, because it +does not depend on the positive concurrence of a feeling, nor is it, +strictly speaking, bliss, since it does not include complete +independence of inclinations and wants, but it resembles bliss in so +far as the determination of one's will at least can hold itself free +from their influence; and thus, at least in its origin, this enjoyment +is analogous to the self-sufficiency which we can ascribe only to +the Supreme Being. + +From this solution of the antinomy of practical pure reason, it +follows that in practical principles we may at least conceive as +possible a natural and necessary connection between the +consciousness of morality and the expectation of a proportionate +happiness as its result, though it does not follow that we can know or +perceive this connection; that, on the other hand, principles of the +pursuit of happiness cannot possibly produce morality; that, +therefore, morality is the supreme good (as the first condition of the +summum bonum), while happiness constitutes its second element, but +only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned, but necessary +consequence of the former. Only with this subordination is the +summum bonum the whole object of pure practical reason, which must +necessarily conceive it as possible, since it commands us to +contribute to the utmost of our power to its realization. But since +the possibility of such connection of the conditioned with its +condition belongs wholly to the supersensual relation of things and +cannot be given according to the laws of the world of sense, +although the practical consequences of the idea belong to the world of +sense, namely, the actions that aim at realizing the summum bonum; +we will therefore endeavour to set forth the grounds of that +possibility, first, in respect of what is immediately in our power, +and then, secondly, in that which is not in our power, but which +reason presents to us as the supplement of our impotence, for the +realization of the summum bonum (which by practical principles is +necessary). + + + + III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its + + Union with the Speculative Reason. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 25} + + + +By primacy between two or more things connected by reason, I +understand the prerogative, belonging to one, of being the first +determining principle in the connection with all the rest. In a +narrower practical sense it means the prerogative of the interest of +one in so far as the interest of the other is subordinated to it, +while it is not postponed to any other. To every faculty of the mind +we can attribute an interest, that is, a principle, that contains +the condition on which alone the former is called into exercise. +Reason, as the faculty of principles, determines the interest of all +the powers of the mind and is determined by its own. The interest of +its speculative employment consists in the cognition of the object +pushed to the highest a priori principles: that of its practical +employment, in the determination of the will in respect of the final +and complete end. As to what is necessary for the possibility of any +employment of reason at all, namely, that its principles and +affirmations should not contradict one another, this constitutes no +part of its interest, but is the condition of having reason at all; it +is only its development, not mere consistency with itself, that is +reckoned as its interest. + +If practical reason could not assume or think as given anything +further than what speculative reason of itself could offer it from its +own insight, the latter would have the primacy. But supposing that +it had of itself original a priori principles with which certain +theoretical positions were inseparably connected, while these were +withdrawn from any possible insight of speculative reason (which, +however, they must not contradict); then the question is: Which +interest is the superior (not which must give way, for they are not +necessarily conflicting), whether speculative reason, which knows +nothing of all that the practical offers for its acceptance, should +take up these propositions and (although they transcend it) try to +unite them with its own concepts as a foreign possession handed over +to it, or whether it is justified in obstinately following its own +separate interest and, according to the canonic of Epicurus, rejecting +as vain subtlety everything that cannot accredit its objective reality +by manifest examples to be shown in experience, even though it +should be never so much interwoven with the interest of the +practical (pure) use of reason, and in itself not contradictory to the +theoretical, merely because it infringes on the interest of the +speculative reason to this extent, that it removes the bounds which +this latter had set to itself, and gives it up to every nonsense or +delusion of imagination? + +In fact, so far as practical reason is taken as dependent on +pathological conditions, that is, as merely regulating the +inclinations under the sensible principle of happiness, we could not +require speculative reason to take its principles from such a +source. Mohammed's paradise, or the absorption into the Deity of the +theosophists and mystics would press their monstrosities on the reason +according to the taste of each, and one might as well have no reason +as surrender it in such fashion to all sorts of dreams. But if pure +reason of itself can be practical and is actually so, as the +consciousness of the moral law proves, then it is still only one and +the same reason which, whether in a theoretical or a practical point +of view, judges according to a priori principles; and then it is clear +that although it is in the first point of view incompetent to +establish certain propositions positively, which, however, do not +contradict it, then, as soon as these propositions are inseparably +attached to the practical interest of pure reason, it must accept +them, though it be as something offered to it from a foreign source, +something that has not grown on its own ground, but yet is +sufficiently authenticated; and it must try to compare and connect +them with everything that it has in its power as speculative reason. +It must remember, however, that these are not additions to its +insight, but yet are extensions of its employment in another, +namely, a practical aspect; and this is not in the least opposed to +its interest, which consists in the restriction of wild speculation. + +Thus, when pure speculative and pure practical reason are combined +in one cognition, the latter has the primacy, provided, namely, that +this combination is not contingent and arbitrary, but founded a priori +on reason itself and therefore necessary. For without this +subordination there would arise a conflict of reason with itself; +since, if they were merely co-ordinate, the former would close its +boundaries strictly and admit nothing from the latter into its domain, +while the latter would extend its bounds over everything and when +its needs required would seek to embrace the former within them. Nor +could we reverse the order and require pure practical reason to be +subordinate to the speculative, since all interest is ultimately +practical, and even that of speculative reason is conditional, and +it is only in the practical employment of reason that it is complete. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 30} + + + + IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of + + Pure Practical Reason. + + + +The realization of the summum bonum in the world is the necessary +object of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this will the +perfect accordance of the mind with the moral law is the supreme +condition of the summum bonum. This then must be possible, as well +as its object, since it is contained in the command to promote the +latter. Now, the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law +is holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible +world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, +nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only +be found in a progress in infinitum towards that perfect accordance, +and on the principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to +assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 35} + +Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an +endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational +being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum, +then, practically is only possible on the supposition of the +immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality, being +inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure +practical reason (by which I mean a theoretical proposition, not +demonstrable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an +unconditional a priori practical law. + +This principle of the moral destination of our nature, namely, +that it is only in an endless progress that we can attain perfect +accordance with the moral law, is of the greatest use, not merely +for the present purpose of supplementing the impotence of +speculative reason, but also with respect to religion. In default of +it, either the moral law is quite degraded from its holiness, being +made out to be indulgent and conformable to our convenience, or else +men strain their notions of their vocation and their expectation to an +unattainable goal, hoping to acquire complete holiness of will, and so +they lose themselves in fanatical theosophic dreams, which wholly +contradict self-knowledge. In both cases the unceasing effort to +obey punctually and thoroughly a strict and inflexible command of +reason, which yet is not ideal but real, is only hindered. For a +rational but finite being, the only thing possible is an endless +progress from the lower to higher degrees of moral perfection. The +Infinite Being, to whom the condition of time is nothing, sees in this +to us endless succession a whole of accordance with the moral law; and +the holiness which his command inexorably requires, in order to be +true to his justice in the share which He assigns to each in the +summum bonum, is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of the +whole existence of rational beings. All that can be expected of the +creature in respect of the hope of this participation would be the +consciousness of his tried character, by which from the progress he +has hitherto made from the worse to the morally better, and the +immutability of purpose which has thus become known to him, he may +hope for a further unbroken continuance of the same, however long +his existence may last, even beyond this life, * and thus he may +hope, not indeed here, nor in any imaginable point of his future +existence, but only in the endlessness of his duration (which God +alone can survey) to be perfectly adequate to his will (without +indulgence or excuse, which do not harmonize with justice). + + + +* It seems, nevertheless, impossible for a creature to have the +conviction of his unwavering firmness of mind in the progress +towards goodness. On this account the Christian religion makes it come +only from the same Spirit that works sanctification, that is, this +firm purpose, and with it the consciousness of steadfastness in the +moral progress. But naturally one who is conscious that he has +persevered through a long portion of his life up to the end in the +progress to the better, and this genuine moral motives, may well +have the comforting hope, though not the certainty, that even in an +existence prolonged beyond this life he will continue in these +principles; and although he is never justified here in his own eyes, +nor can ever hope to be so in the increased perfection of his +nature, to which he looks forward, together with an increase of +duties, nevertheless in this progress which, though it is directed +to a goal infinitely remote, yet is in God's sight regarded as +equivalent to possession, he may have a prospect of a blessed +future; for this is the word that reason employs to designate +perfect well-being independent of all contingent causes of the +world, and which, like holiness, is an idea that can be contained only +in an endless progress and its totality, and consequently is never +fully attained by a creature. + + + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 40} + +V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason. + + + +In the foregoing analysis the moral law led to a practical problem +which is prescribed by pure reason alone, without the aid of any +sensible motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the +first and principle element of the summum bonum, viz., morality; +and, as this can be perfectly solved only in eternity, to the +postulate of immortality. The same law must also lead us to affirm the +possibility of the second element of the summum bonum, viz., happiness +proportioned to that morality, and this on grounds as disinterested as +before, and solely from impartial reason; that is, it must lead to the +supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect; in +other words, it must postulate the existence of God, as the +necessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum (an +object of the will which is necessarily connected with the moral +legislation of pure reason). We proceed to exhibit this connection +in a convincing manner. + +Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world with +whom everything goes according to his wish and will; it rests, +therefore, on the harmony of physical nature with his whole end and +likewise with the essential determining principle of his will. Now the +moral law as a law of freedom commands by determining principles, +which ought to be quite independent of nature and of its harmony +with our faculty of desire (as springs). But the acting rational being +in the world is not the cause of the world and of nature itself. There +is not the least ground, therefore, in the moral law for a necessary +connection between morality and proportionate happiness in a being +that belongs to the world as part of it, and therefore dependent on +it, and which for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this +nature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly harmonize, as far as +his happiness is concerned, with his practical principles. +Nevertheless, in the practical problem of pure reason, i.e., the +necessary pursuit of the summum bonum, such a connection is postulated +as necessary: we ought to endeavour to promote the summum bonum, +which, therefore, must be possible. Accordingly, the existence of a +cause of all nature, distinct from nature itself and containing the +principle of this connection, namely, of the exact harmony of +happiness with morality, is also postulated. Now this supreme cause +must contain the principle of the harmony of nature, not merely with a +law of the will of rational beings, but with the conception of this +law, in so far as they make it the supreme determining principle of +the will, and consequently not merely with the form of morals, but +with their morality as their motive, that is, with their moral +character. Therefore, the summum bonum is possible in the world only +on the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality corresponding +to moral character. Now a being that is capable of acting on the +conception of laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the +causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is +his will; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be +presupposed as a condition of the summum bonum is a being which is the +cause of nature by intelligence and will, consequently its author, +that is God. It follows that the postulate of the possibility of the +highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the +reality of a highest original good, that is to say, of the existence +of God. Now it was seen to be a duty for us to promote the summum +bonum; consequently it is not merely allowable, but it is a +necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should +presuppose the possibility of this summum bonum; and as this is +possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably +connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally +necessary to assume the existence of God. + +It must be remarked here that this moral necessity is subjective, +that is, it is a want, and not objective, that is, itself a duty, +for there cannot be a duty to suppose the existence of anything (since +this concerns only the theoretical employment of reason). Moreover, it +is not meant by this that it is necessary to suppose the existence +of God as a basis of all obligation in general (for this rests, as has +been sufficiently proved, simply on the autonomy of reason itself). +What belongs to duty here is only the endeavour to realize and promote +the summum bonum in the world, the possibility of which can +therefore be postulated; and as our reason finds it not conceivable +except on the supposition of a supreme intelligence, the admission +of this existence is therefore connected with the consciousness of our +duty, although the admission itself belongs to the domain of +speculative reason. Considered in respect of this alone, as a +principle of explanation, it may be called a hypothesis, but in +reference to the intelligibility of an object given us by the moral +law (the summum bonum), and consequently of a requirement for +practical purposes, it may be called faith, that is to say a pure +rational faith, since pure reason (both in its theoretical and +practical use) is the sole source from which it springs. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 45} + +From this deduction it is now intelligible why the Greek schools +could never attain the solution of their problem of the practical +possibility of the summum bonum, because they made the rule of the use +which the will of man makes of his freedom the sole and sufficient +ground of this possibility, thinking that they had no need for that +purpose of the existence of God. No doubt they were so far right +that they established the principle of morals of itself +independently of this postulate, from the relation of reason only to +the will, and consequently made it the supreme practical condition +of the summum bonum; but it was not therefore the whole condition of +its possibility. The Epicureans had indeed assumed as the supreme +principle of morality a wholly false one, namely that of happiness, +and had substituted for a law a maxim of arbitrary choice according to +every man's inclination; they proceeded, however, consistently +enough in this, that they degraded their summum bonum likewise, just +in proportion to the meanness of their fundamental principle, and +looked for no greater happiness than can be attained by human prudence +(including temperance and moderation of the inclinations), and this as +we know would be scanty enough and would be very different according +to circumstances; not to mention the exceptions that their maxims must +perpetually admit and which make them incapable of being laws. The +Stoics, on the contrary, had chosen their supreme practical +principle quite rightly, making virtue the condition of the summum +bonum; but when they represented the degree of virtue required by +its pure law as fully attainable in this life, they not only +strained the moral powers of the man whom they called the wise +beyond all the limits of his nature, and assumed a thing that +contradicts all our knowledge of men, but also and principally they +would not allow the second element of the summum bonum, namely, +happiness, to be properly a special object of human desire, but made +their wise man, like a divinity in his consciousness of the excellence +of his person, wholly independent of nature (as regards his own +contentment); they exposed him indeed to the evils of life, but made +him not subject to them (at the same time representing him also as +free from moral evil). They thus, in fact, left out the second element +of the summum bonum namely, personal happiness, placing it solely in +action and satisfaction with one's own personal worth, thus +including it in the consciousness of being morally minded, in which +they Might have been sufficiently refuted by the voice of their own +nature. + +The doctrine of Christianity, * even if we do not yet consider it +as a religious doctrine, gives, touching this point, a conception of +the summum bonum (the kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the +strictest demand of practical reason. The moral law is holy +(unyielding) and demands holiness of morals, although all the moral +perfection to which man can attain is still only virtue, that is, a +rightful disposition arising from respect for the law, implying +consciousness of a constant propensity to transgression, or at least a +want of purity, that is, a mixture of many spurious (not moral) +motives of obedience to the law, consequently a self-esteem combined +with humility. In respect, then, of the holiness which the Christian +law requires, this leaves the creature nothing but a progress in +infinitum, but for that very reason it justifies him in hoping for +an endless duration of his existence. The worth of a character +perfectly accordant with the moral law is infinite, since the only +restriction on all possible happiness in the judgement of a wise and +all powerful distributor of it is the absence of conformity of +rational beings to their duty. But the moral law of itself does not +promise any happiness, for according to our conceptions of an order of +nature in general, this is not necessarily connected with obedience to +the law. Now Christian morality supplies this defect (of the second +indispensable element of the summum bonum) by representing the world +in which rational beings devote themselves with all their soul to +the moral law, as a kingdom of God, in which nature and morality are +brought into a harmony foreign to each of itself, by a holy Author who +makes the derived summum bonum possible. Holiness of life is +prescribed to them as a rule even in this life, while the welfare +proportioned to it, namely, bliss, is represented as attainable only +in an eternity; because the former must always be the pattern of their +conduct in every state, and progress towards it is already possible +and necessary in this life; while the latter, under the name of +happiness, cannot be attained at all in this world (so far as our +own power is concerned), and therefore is made simply an object of +hope. Nevertheless, the Christian principle of morality itself is +not theological (so as to be heteronomy), but is autonomy of pure +practical reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and +His will the foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of +the summum bonum, on condition of following these laws, and it does +not even place the proper spring of this obedience in the desired +results, but solely in the conception of duty, as that of which the +faithful observance alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain those +happy consequences. + + + +* It is commonly held that the Christian precept of morality has no +advantage in respect of purity over the moral conceptions of the +Stoics; the distinction between them is, however, very obvious. The +Stoic system made the consciousness of strength of mind the pivot on +which all moral dispositions should turn; and although its disciples +spoke of duties and even defined them very well, yet they placed the +spring and proper determining principle of the will in an elevation of +the mind above the lower springs of the senses, which owe their +power only to weakness of mind. With them therefore, virtue was a sort +of heroism in the wise man raising himself above the animal nature +of man, is sufficient for Himself, and, while he prescribes duties +to others, is himself raised above them, and is not subject to any +temptation to transgress the moral law. All this, however, they +could not have done if they had conceived this law in all its purity +and strictness, as the precept of the Gospel does. When I give the +name idea to a perfection to which nothing adequate can be given in +experience, it does not follow that the moral ideas are thing +transcendent, that is something of which we could not even determine +the concept adequately, or of which it is uncertain whether there is +any object corresponding to it at all, as is the case with the ideas +of speculative reason; on the contrary, being types of practical +perfection, they serve as the indispensable rule of conduct and +likewise as the standard of comparison. Now if I consider Christian +morals on their philosophical side, then compared with the ideas of +the Greek schools, they would appear as follows: the ideas of the +Cynics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Christians are: simplicity +of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness. In respect of the way of +attaining them, the Greek schools were distinguished from one +another thus that the Cynics only required common sense, the others +the path of science, but both found the mere use of natural powers +sufficient for the purpose. Christian morality, because its precept is +framed (as a moral precept must be) so pure and unyielding, takes from +man all confidence that he can be fully adequate to it, at least in +this life, but again sets it up by enabling us to hope that if we +act as well as it is in our power to do, then what is not in our power +will come in to our aid from another source, whether we know how +this may be or not. Aristotle and Plato differed only as to the origin +of our moral conceptions. + + + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 50} + +In this manner, the moral laws lead through the conception of the +summum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to +religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine +commands, not as sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of +a foreign and contingent in themselves, but as essential laws of every +free will in itself, which, nevertheless, must be regarded as commands +of the Supreme Being, because it is only from a morally perfect +(holy and good) and at the same time all-powerful will, and +consequently only through harmony with this will, that we can hope +to attain the summum bonum which the moral law makes it our duty to +take as the object of our endeavours. Here again, then, all remains +disinterested and founded merely on duty; neither fear nor hope +being made the fundamental springs, which if taken as principles would +destroy the whole moral worth of actions. The moral law commands me to +make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all +my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the +harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the world; +and although the conception of the summum bonum as a whole, in which +the greatest happiness is conceived as combined in the most exact +proportion with the highest degree of moral perfection (possible in +creatures), includes my own happiness, yet it is not this that is +the determining principle of the will which is enjoined to promote the +summum bonum, but the moral law, which, on the contrary, limits by +strict conditions my unbounded desire of happiness. + +Hence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should +make ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. It +is only when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of +participating some day in happiness in proportion as we have +endeavoured to be not unworthy of it. + +A man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of +it is in harmony with the summum bonum. We can now easily see that all +worthiness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the +summum bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest (which belongs +to one's state), namely, the participation of happiness. Now it +follows from this that morality should never be treated as a +doctrine of happiness, that is, an instruction how to become happy; +for it has to do simply with the rational condition (conditio sine qua +non) of happiness, not with the means of attaining it. But when +morality has been completely expounded (which merely imposes duties +instead of providing rules for selfish desires), then first, after the +moral desire to promote the summum bonum (to bring the kingdom of +God to us) has been awakened, a desire founded on a law, and which +could not previously arise in any selfish mind, and when for the +behoof of this desire the step to religion has been taken, then this +ethical doctrine may be also called a doctrine of happiness because +the hope of happiness first begins with religion only. + +We can also see from this that, when we ask what is God's ultimate +end in creating the world, we must not name the happiness of the +rational beings in it, but the summum bonum, which adds a further +condition to that wish of such beings, namely, the condition of +being worthy of happiness, that is, the morality of these same +rational beings, a condition which alone contains the rule by which +only they can hope to share in the former at the hand of a wise +Author. For as wisdom, theoretically considered, signifies the +knowledge of the summum bonum and, practically, the accordance of +the will with the summum bonum, we cannot attribute to a supreme +independent wisdom an end based merely on goodness. For we cannot +conceive the action of this goodness (in respect of the happiness of +rational beings) as suitable to the highest original good, except +under the restrictive conditions of harmony with the holiness * of +his will. Therefore, those who placed the end of creation in the glory +of God (provided that this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a +desire to be praised) have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For +nothing glorifies God more than that which is the most estimable thing +in the world, respect for his command, the observance of the holy duty +that his law imposes on us, when there is added thereto his glorious +plan of crowning such a beautiful order of things with corresponding +happiness. If the latter (to speak humanly) makes Him worthy of +love, by the former He is an object of adoration. Even men can never +acquire respect by benevolence alone, though they may gain love, so +that the greatest beneficence only procures them honour when it is +regulated by worthiness. + + + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 55} + +* In order to make these characteristics of these conceptions +clear, I add the remark that whilst we ascribe to God various +attributes, the quality of which we also find applicable to creatures, +only that in Him they are raised to the highest degree, e.g., power, +knowledge, presence, goodness, etc., under the designations of +omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, etc., there are three that are +ascribed to God exclusively, and yet without the addition of +greatness, and which are all moral He is the only holy, the only +blessed, the only wise, because these conceptions already imply the +absence of limitation. In the order of these attributes He is also the +holy lawgiver (and creator), the good governor (and preserver) and the +just judge, three attributes which include everything by which God +is the object of religion, and in conformity with which the +metaphysical perfections are added of themselves in the reason. + + + +That in the order of ends, man (and with him every rational being) +is an end in himself, that is, that he can never be used merely as a +means by any (not even by God) without being at the same time an end +also himself, that therefore humanity in our person must be holy to +ourselves, this follows now of itself because he is the subject of the +moral law, in other words, of that which is holy in itself, and on +account of which and in agreement with which alone can anything be +termed holy. For this moral law is founded on the autonomy of his +will, as a free will which by its universal laws must necessarily be +able to agree with that to which it is to submit itself. + + + + VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason Generally. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 60} + + + +They all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a +postulate but a law, by which reason determines the will directly, +which will, because it is so determined as a pure will, requires these +necessary conditions of obedience to its precept. These postulates are +not theoretical dogmas but, suppositions practically necessary; +while then they do [not] extend our speculative knowledge, they give +objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by +means of their reference to what is practical), and give it a right to +concepts, the possibility even of which it could not otherwise venture +to affirm. + +These postulates are those of immortality, freedom positively +considered (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the +intelligible world), and the existence of God. The first results +from the practically necessary condition of a duration adequate to the +complete fulfilment of the moral law; the second from the necessary +supposition of independence of the sensible world, and of the +faculty of determining one's will according to the law of an +intelligible world, that is, of freedom; the third from the +necessary condition of the existence of the summum bonum in such an +intelligible world, by the supposition of the supreme independent +good, that is, the existence of God. + +Thus the fact that respect for the moral law necessarily makes the +summum bonum an object of our endeavours, and the supposition thence +resulting of its objective reality, lead through the postulates of +practical reason to conceptions which speculative reason might +indeed present as problems, but could never solve. Thus it leads: 1. +To that one in the solution of which the latter could do nothing but +commit paralogisms (namely, that of immortality), because it could not +lay hold of the character of permanence, by which to complete the +psychological conception of an ultimate subject necessarily ascribed +to the soul in self-consciousness, so as to make it the real +conception of a substance, a character which practical reason +furnishes by the postulate of a duration required for accordance +with the moral law in the summum bonum, which is the whole end of +practical reason. 2. It leads to that of which speculative reason +contained nothing but antinomy, the solution of which it could only +found on a notion problematically conceivable indeed, but whose +objective reality it could not prove or determine, namely, the +cosmological idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of +our existence in it, by means of the postulate of freedom (the reality +of which it lays down by virtue of the moral law), and with it +likewise the law of an intelligible world, to which speculative reason +could only point, but could not define its conception. 3. What +speculative reason was able to think, but was obliged to leave +undetermined as a mere transcendental ideal, viz., the theological +conception of the first Being, to this it gives significance (in a +practical view, that is, as a condition of the possibility of the +object of a will determined by that law), namely, as the supreme +principle of the summum bonum in an intelligible world, by means of +moral legislation in it invested with sovereign power. + +Is our knowledge, however, actually extended in this way by pure +practical reason, and is that immanent in practical reason which for +the speculative was only transcendent? Certainly, but only in a +practical point of view. For we do not thereby take knowledge of the +nature of our souls, nor of the intelligible world, nor of the Supreme +Being, with respect to what they are in themselves, but we have merely +combined the conceptions of them in the practical concept of the +summum bonum as the object of our will, and this altogether a +priori, but only by means of the moral law, and merely in reference to +it, in respect of the object which it commands. But how freedom is +possible, and how we are to conceive this kind of causality +theoretically and positively, is not thereby discovered; but only that +there is such a causality is postulated by the moral law and in its +behoof. It is the same with the remaining ideas, the possibility of +which no human intelligence will ever fathom, but the truth of +which, on the other hand, no sophistry will ever wrest from the +conviction even of the commonest man. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 65} + + + +VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure + + Reason in a Practical point of view, without its + + Knowledge as Speculative being enlarged at + + the same time? + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 70} + + + +In order not to be too abstract, we will answer this question at +once in its application to the present case. In order to extend a pure +cognition practically, there must be an a priori purpose given, that +is, an end as object (of the will), which independently of all +theological principle is presented as practically necessary by an +imperative which determines the will directly (a categorical +imperative), and in this case that is the summum bonum. This, however, +is not possible without presupposing three theoretical conceptions +(for which, because they are mere conceptions of pure reason, no +corresponding intuition can be found, nor consequently by the path +of theory any objective reality); namely, freedom, immortality, and +God. Thus by the practical law which commands the existence of the +highest good possible in a world, the possibility of those objects +of pure speculative reason is postulated, and the objective reality +which the latter could not assure them. By this the theoretical +knowledge of pure reason does indeed obtain an accession; but it +consists only in this, that those concepts which otherwise it had to +look upon as problematical (merely thinkable) concepts, are now +shown assertorially to be such as actually have objects; because +practical reason indispensably requires their existence for the +possibility of its object, the summum bonum, which practically is +absolutely necessary, and this justifies theoretical reason in +assuming them. But this extension of theoretical reason is no +extension of speculative, that is, we cannot make any positive use +of it in a theoretical point of view. For as nothing is accomplished +in this by practical reason, further than that these concepts are real +and actually have their (possible) objects, and nothing in the way +of intuition of them is given thereby (which indeed could not be +demanded), hence the admission of this reality does not render any +synthetical proposition possible. Consequently, this discovery does +not in the least help us to extend this knowledge of ours in a +speculative point of view, although it does in respect of the +practical employment of pure reason. The above three ideas of +speculative reason are still in themselves not cognitions; they are +however (transcendent) thoughts, in which there is nothing impossible. +Now, by help of an apodeictic practical law, being necessary +conditions of that which it commands to be made an object, they +acquire objective reality; that is, we learn from it that they have +objects, without being able to point out how the conception of them is +related to an object, and this, too, is still not a cognition of these +objects; for we cannot thereby form any synthetical judgement about +them, nor determine their application theoretically; consequently, +we can make no theoretical rational use of them at all, in which use +all speculative knowledge of reason consists. Nevertheless, the +theoretical knowledge, not indeed of these objects, but of reason +generally, is so far enlarged by this, that by the practical +postulates objects were given to those ideas, a merely problematical +thought having by this means first acquired objective reality. There +is therefore no extension of the knowledge of given supersensible +objects, but an extension of theoretical reason and of its knowledge +in respect of the supersensible generally; inasmuch as it is compelled +to admit that there are such objects, although it is not able to +define them more closely, so as itself to extend this knowledge of the +objects (which have now been given it on practical grounds, and only +for practical use). For this accession, then, pure theoretical reason, +for which all those ideas are transcendent and without object, has +simply to thank its practical faculty. In this they become immanent +and constitutive, being the source of the possibility of realizing the +necessary object of pure practical reason (the summum bonum); +whereas apart from this they are transcendent, and merely regulative +principles of speculative reason, which do not require it to assume +a new object beyond experience, but only to bring its use in +experience nearer to completeness. But when once reason is in +possession of this accession, it will go to work with these ideas as +speculative reason (properly only to assure the certainty of its +practical use) in a negative manner: that is, not extending but +clearing up its knowledge so as on one side to keep off +anthropomorphism, as the source of superstition, or seeming +extension of these conceptions by supposed experience; and on the +other side fanaticism, which promises the same by means of +supersensible intuition or feelings of the like kind. All these are +hindrances to the practical use of pure reason, so that the removal of +them may certainly be considered an extension of our knowledge in a +practical point of view, without contradicting the admission that +for speculative purposes reason has not in the least gained by this. + +Every employment of reason in respect of an object requires pure +concepts of the understanding (categories), without which no object +can be conceived. These can be applied to the theoretical employment +of reason, i.e., to that kind of knowledge, only in case an +intuition (which is always sensible) is taken as a basis, and +therefore merely in order to conceive by means of- them an object of +possible experience. Now here what have to be thought by means of +the categories in order to be known are ideas of reason, which +cannot be given in any experience. Only we are not here concerned with +the theoretical knowledge of the objects of these ideas, but only with +this, whether they have objects at all. This reality is supplied by +pure practical reason, and theoretical reason has nothing further to +do in this but to think those objects by means of categories. This, as +we have elsewhere clearly shown, can be done well enough without +needing any intuition (either sensible or supersensible) because the +categories have their seat and origin in the pure understanding, +simply as the faculty of thought, before and independently of any +intuition, and they always only signify an object in general, no +matter in what way it may be given to us. Now when the categories +are to be applied to these ideas, it is not possible to give them +any object in intuition; but that such an object actually exists, +and consequently that the category as a mere form of thought is here +not empty but has significance, this is sufficiently assured them by +an object which practical reason presents beyond doubt in the +concept of the summum bonum, the reality of the conceptions which +are required for the possibility of the summum bonum; without, +however, effecting by this accession the least extension of our +knowledge on theoretical principles. + + + +When these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the kingdom of +God), and of immortality are further determined by predicates taken +from our own nature, we must not regard this determination as a +sensualizing of those pure rational ideas (anthropomorphism), nor as a +transcendent knowledge of supersensible objects; for these +predicates are no others than understanding and will, considered too +in the relation to each other in which they must be conceived in the +moral law, and therefore, only so far as a pure practical use is +made of them. As to all the rest that belongs to these conceptions +psychologically, that is, so far as we observe these faculties of ours +empirically in their exercise (e.g., that the understanding of man +is discursive, and its notions therefore not intuitions but +thoughts, that these follow one another in time, that his will has its +satisfaction always dependent on the existence of its object, etc., +which cannot be the case in the Supreme Being), from all this we +abstract in that case, and then there remains of the notions by +which we conceive a pure intelligence nothing more than just what is +required for the possibility of conceiving a moral law. There is +then a knowledge of God indeed, but only for practical purposes, +and, if we attempt to extend it to a theoretical knowledge, we find an +understanding that has intuitions, not thoughts, a will that is +directed to objects on the existence of which its satisfaction does +not in the least depend (not to mention the transcendental predicates, +as, for example, a magnitude of existence, that is duration, which, +however, is not in time, the only possible means we have of conceiving +existence as magnitude). Now these are all attributes of which we +can form no conception that would help to the knowledge of the object, +and we learn from this that they can never be used for a theory of +supersensible beings, so that on this side they are quite incapable of +being the foundation of a speculative knowledge, and their use is +limited simply to the practice of the moral law. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 75} + +This last is so obvious, and can be proved so clearly by fact, +that we may confidently challenge all pretended natural theologians (a +singular name) * to specify (over and above the merely ontological +predicates) one single attribute, whether of the understanding or of +the will, determining this object of theirs, of which we could not +show incontrovertibly that, if we abstract from it everything +anthropomorphic, nothing would remain to us but the mere word, without +our being able to connect with it the smallest notion by which we +could hope for an extension of theoretical knowledge. But as to the +practical, there still remains to us of the attributes of +understanding and will the conception of a relation to which objective +reality is given by the practical law (which determines a priori +precisely this relation of the understanding to the will). When once +this is done, then reality is given to the conception of the object of +a will morally determined (the conception of the summum bonum), and +with it to the conditions of its possibility, the ideas of God, +freedom, and immortality, but always only relatively to the practice +of the moral law (and not for any speculative purpose). + + + +* Learning is properly only the whole content of the historical +sciences. Consequently it is only the teacher of revealed theology +that can be called a learned theologian. If, however, we choose to +call a man learned who is in possession of the rational sciences +(mathematics and philosophy), although even this would be contrary +to the signification of the word (which always counts as learning only +that which one must be "learned" and which, therefore, he cannot +discover of himself by reason), even in that case the philosopher +would make too poor a figure with his knowledge of God as a positive +science to let himself be called on that account a learned man. + + + +According to these remarks it is now easy to find the answer to +the weighty question whether the notion of God is one belonging to +physics (and therefore also to metaphysics, which contains the pure +a priori principles of the former in their universal import) or to +morals. If we have recourse to God as the Author of all things, in +order to explain the arrangements of nature or its changes, this is at +least not a physical explanation, and is a complete confession that +our philosophy has come to an end, since we are obliged to assume +something of which in itself we have otherwise no conception, in order +to be able to frame a conception of the possibility of what we see +before our eyes. Metaphysics, however, cannot enable us to attain by +certain inference from the knowledge of this world to the conception +of God and to the proof of His existence, for this reason, that in +order to say that this world could be produced only by a God +(according to the conception implied by this word) we should know this +world as the most perfect whole possible; and for this purpose +should also know all possible worlds (in order to be able to compare +them with this); in other words, we should be omniscient. It is +absolutely impossible, however, to know the existence of this Being +from mere concepts, because every existential proposition, that is, +every proposition that affirms the existence of a being of which I +frame a concept, is a synthetic proposition, that is, one by which I +go beyond that conception and affirm of it more than was thought in +the conception itself; namely, that this concept in the +understanding has an object corresponding to it outside the +understanding, and this it is obviously impossible to elicit by any +reasoning. There remains, therefore, only one single process +possible for reason to attain this knowledge, namely, to start from +the supreme principle of its pure practical use (which in every case +is directed simply to the existence of something as a consequence of +reason) and thus determine its object. Then its inevitable problem, +namely, the necessary direction of the will to the summum bonum, +discovers to us not only the necessity of assuming such a First +Being in reference to the possibility of this good in the world, +but, what is most remarkable, something which reason in its progress +on the path of physical nature altogether failed to find, namely, an +accurately defined conception of this First Being. As we can know only +a small part of this world, and can still less compare it with all +possible worlds, we may indeed from its order, design, and +greatness, infer a wise, good, powerful, etc., Author of it, but not +that He is all-wise, all-good, all-powerful, etc. It may indeed very +well be granted that we should be justified in supplying this +inevitable defect by a legitimate and reasonable hypothesis; namely, +that when wisdom, goodness, etc, are displayed in all the parts that +offer themselves to our nearer knowledge, it is just the same in all +the rest, and that it would therefore be reasonable to ascribe all +possible perfections to the Author of the world, but these are not +strict logical inferences in which we can pride ourselves on our +insight, but only permitted conclusions in which we may be indulged +and which require further recommendation before we can make use of +them. On the path of empirical inquiry then (physics), the +conception of God remains always a conception of the perfection of the +First Being not accurately enough determined to be held adequate to +the conception of Deity. (With metaphysic in its transcendental part +nothing whatever can be accomplished.) + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 80} + +When I now try to test this conception by reference to the object of +practical reason, I find that the moral principle admits as possible +only the conception of an Author of the world possessed of the highest +perfection. He must be omniscient, in order to know my conduct up to +the inmost root of my mental state in all possible cases and into +all future time; omnipotent, in order to allot to it its fitting +consequences; similarly He must be omnipresent, eternal, etc. Thus the +moral law, by means of the conception of the summum bonum as the +object of a pure practical reason, determines the concept of the First +Being as the Supreme Being; a thing which the physical (and in its +higher development the metaphysical), in other words, the whole +speculative course of reason, was unable to effect. The conception +of God, then, is one that belongs originally not to physics, i.e., +to speculative reason, but to morals. The same may be said of the +other conceptions of reason of which we have treated above as +postulates of it in its practical use. + +In the history of Grecian philosophy we find no distinct traces of a +pure rational theology earlier than Anaxagoras; but this is not +because the older philosophers had not intelligence or penetration +enough to raise themselves to it by the path of speculation, at +least with the aid of a thoroughly reasonable hypothesis. What could +have been easier, what more natural, than the thought which of +itself occurs to everyone, to assume instead of several causes of +the world, instead of an indeterminate degree of perfection, a +single rational cause having all perfection? But the evils in the +world seemed to them to be much too serious objections to allow them +to feel themselves justified in such a hypothesis. They showed +intelligence and penetration then in this very point, that they did +not allow themselves to adopt it, but on the contrary looked about +amongst natural causes to see if they could not find in them the +qualities and power required for a First Being. But when this acute +people had advanced so far in their investigations of nature as to +treat even moral questions philosophically, on which other nations had +never done anything but talk, then first they found a new and +practical want, which did not fail to give definiteness to their +conception of the First Being: and in this the speculative reason +played the part of spectator, or at best had the merit of embellishing +a conception that had not grown on its own ground, and of applying a +series of confirmations from the study of nature now brought forward +for the first time, not indeed to strengthen the authority of this +conception (which was already established), but rather to make a +show with a supposed discovery of theoretical reason. + + + +From these remarks, the reader of the Critique of Pure Speculative +Reason will be thoroughly convinced how highly necessary that +laborious deduction of the categories was, and how fruitful for +theology and morals. For if, on the one hand, we place them in pure +understanding, it is by this deduction alone that we can be +prevented from regarding them, with Plato, as innate, and founding +on them extravagant pretensions to theories of the supersensible, to +which we can see no end, and by which we should make theology a +magic lantern of chimeras; on the other hand, if we regard them as +acquired, this deduction saves us from restricting, with Epicurus, all +and every use of them, even for practical purposes, to the objects and +motives of the senses. But now that the Critique has shown by that +deduction, first, that they are not of empirical origin, but have +their seat and source a priori in the pure understanding; secondly, +that as they refer to objects in general independently of the +intuition of them, hence, although they cannot effect theoretical +knowledge, except in application to empirical objects, yet when +applied to an object given by pure practical reason they enable us +to conceive the supersensible definitely, only so far, however, as +it is defined by such predicates as are necessarily connected with the +pure practical purpose given a priori and with its possibility. The +speculative restriction of pure reason and its practical extension +bring it into that relation of equality in which reason in general can +be employed suitably to its end, and this example proves better than +any other that the path to wisdom, if it is to be made sure and not to +be impassable or misleading, must with us men inevitably pass +through science; but it is not till this is complete that we can be +convinced that it leads to this goal. + + + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 85} + + VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason. + + + +A want or requirement of pure reason in its speculative use leads +only to a hypothesis; that of pure practical reason to a postulate; +for in the former case I ascend from the result as high as I please in +the series of causes, not in order to give objective reality to the +result (e.g., the causal connection of things and changes in the +world), but in order thoroughly to satisfy my inquiring reason in +respect of it. Thus I see before me order and design in nature, and +need not resort to speculation to assure myself of their reality, +but to explain them I have to presuppose a Deity as their cause; and +then since the inference from an effect to a definite cause is +always uncertain and doubtful, especially to a cause so precise and so +perfectly defined as we have to conceive in God, hence the highest +degree of certainty to which this pre-supposition can be brought is +that it is the most rational opinion for us men. * On the other hand, +a requirement of pure practical reason is based on a duty, that of +making something (the summum bonum) the object of my will so as to +promote it with all my powers; in which case I must suppose its +possibility and, consequently, also the conditions necessary +thereto, namely, God, freedom, and immortality; since I cannot prove +these by my speculative reason, although neither can I refute them. +This duty is founded on something that is indeed quite independent +of these suppositions and is of itself apodeictically certain, namely, +the moral law; and so far it needs no further support by theoretical +views as to the inner constitution of things, the secret final aim +of the order of the world, or a presiding ruler thereof, in order to +bind me in the most perfect manner to act in unconditional +conformity to the law. But the subjective effect of this law, +namely, the mental disposition conformed to it and made necessary by +it, to promote the practically possible summum bonum, this +pre-supposes at least that the latter is possible, for it would be +practically impossible to strive after the object of a conception +which at bottom was empty and had no object. Now the above-mentioned +postulates concern only the physical or metaphysical conditions of the +possibility of the summum bonum; in a word, those which lie in the +nature of things; not, however, for the sake of an arbitrary +speculative purpose, but of a practically necessary end of a pure +rational will, which in this case does not choose, but obeys an +inexorable command of reason, the foundation of which is objective, in +the constitution of things as they must be universally judged by +pure reason, and is not based on inclination; for we are in nowise +justified in assuming, on account of what we wish on merely subjective +grounds, that the means thereto are possible or that its object is +real. This, then, is an absolutely necessary requirement, and what +it pre-supposes is not merely justified as an allowable hypothesis, +but as a postulate in a practical point of view; and admitting that +the pure moral law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a +rule of prudence), the righteous man may say: "I will that there be +a God, that my existence in this world be also an existence outside +the chain of physical causes and in a pure world of the understanding, +and lastly, that my duration be endless; I firmly abide by this, and +will not let this faith be taken from me; for in this instance alone +my interest, because I must not relax anything of it, inevitably +determines my judgement, without regarding sophistries, however unable +I may be to answer them or to oppose them with others more +plausible. *(2) + + + +* But even here we should not be able to allege a requirement of +reason, if we had not before our eyes a problematical, but yet +inevitable, conception of reason, namely, that of an absolutely +necessary being. This conception now seeks to be defined, and this, in +addition to the tendency to extend itself, is the objective ground +of a requirement of speculative reason, namely, to have a more precise +definition of the conception of a necessary being which is to serve as +the first cause of other beings, so as to make these latter knowable +by some means. Without such antecedent necessary problems there are no +requirements- at least not of pure reason- the rest are requirements +of inclination. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 90} + +*(2) In the Deutsches Museum, February, 1787, there is a +dissertation by a very subtle and clear-headed man, the late +Wizenmann, whose early death is to be lamented, in which he disputes +the right to argue from a want to the objective reality of its object, +and illustrates the point by the example of a man in love, who +having fooled himself into an idea of beauty, which is merely a +chimera of his own brain, would fain conclude that such an object +really exists somewhere. I quite agree with him in this, in all +cases where the want is founded on inclination, which cannot +necessarily postulate the existence of its object even for the man +that is affected by it, much less can it contain a demand valid for +everyone, and therefore it is merely a subjective ground of the +wish. But in the present case we have a want of reason springing +from an objective determining principle of the will, namely, the moral +law, which necessarily binds every rational being, and therefore +justifies him in assuming a priori in nature the conditions proper for +it, and makes the latter inseparable from the complete practical use +of reason. It is a duty to realize the summum bonum to the utmost of +our power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it is +unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is +necessary for its objective possibility. The assumption is as +necessary as the moral law, in connection with which alone it is +valid. + + + +In order to prevent misconception in the use of a notion as yet so +unusual as that of a faith of pure practical reason, let me be +permitted to add one more remark. It might almost seem as if this +rational faith were here announced as itself a command, namely, that +we should assume the summum bonum as possible. But a faith that is +commanded is nonsense. Let the preceding analysis, however, be +remembered of what is required to be supposed in the conception of the +summum bonum, and it will be seen that it cannot be commanded to +assume this possibility, and no practical disposition of mind is +required to admit it; but that speculative reason must concede it +without being asked, for no one can affirm that it is impossible in +itself that rational beings in the world should at the same time be +worthy of happiness in conformity with the moral law and also +possess this happiness proportionately. Now in respect of the first +element of the summum bonum, namely, that which concerns morality, the +moral law gives merely a command, and to doubt the possibility of that +element would be the same as to call in question the moral law itself. +But as regards the second element of that object, namely, happiness +perfectly proportioned to that worthiness, it is true that there is no +need of a command to admit its possibility in general, for theoretical +reason has nothing to say against it; but the manner in which we +have to conceive this harmony of the laws of nature with those of +freedom has in it something in respect of which we have a choice, +because theoretical reason decides nothing with apodeictic certainty +about it, and in respect of this there may be a moral interest which +turns the scale. + +I had said above that in a mere course of nature in the world an +accurate correspondence between happiness and moral worth is not to be +expected and must be regarded as impossible, and that therefore the +possibility of the summum bonum cannot be admitted from this side +except on the supposition of a moral Author of the world. I +purposely reserved the restriction of this judgement to the subjective +conditions of our reason, in order not to make use of it until the +manner of this belief should be defined more precisely. The fact is +that the impossibility referred to is merely subjective, that is, +our reason finds it impossible for it to render conceivable in the way +of a mere course of nature a connection so exactly proportioned and so +thoroughly adapted to an end, between two sets of events happening +according to such distinct laws; although, as with everything else +in nature that is adapted to an end, it cannot prove, that is, show by +sufficient objective reason, that it is not possible by universal laws +of nature. + +Now, however, a deciding principle of a different kind comes into +play to turn the scale in this uncertainty of speculative reason. +The command to promote the summum bonum is established on an objective +basis (in practical reason); the possibility of the same in general is +likewise established on an objective basis (in theoretical reason, +which has nothing to say against it). But reason cannot decide +objectively in what way we are to conceive this possibility; whether +by universal laws of nature without a wise Author presiding over +nature, or only on supposition of such an Author. Now here there comes +in a subjective condition of reason, the only way theoretically +possible for it, of conceiving the exact harmony of the kingdom of +nature with the kingdom of morals, which is the condition of the +possibility of the summum bonum; and at the same time the only one +conducive to morality (which depends on an objective law of reason). +Now since the promotion of this summum bonum, and therefore the +supposition of its possibility, are objectively necessary (though only +as a result of practical reason), while at the same time the manner in +which we would conceive it rests with our own choice, and in this +choice a free interest of pure practical reason decides for the +assumption of a wise Author of the world; it is clear that the +principle that herein determines our judgement, though as a want it is +subjective, yet at the same time being the means of promoting what +is objectively (practically) necessary, is the foundation of a maxim +of belief in a moral point of view, that is, a faith of pure practical +reason. This, then, is not commanded, but being a voluntary +determination of our judgement, conducive to the moral (commanded) +purpose, and moreover harmonizing with the theoretical requirement +of reason, to assume that existence and to make it the foundation of +our further employment of reason, it has itself sprung from the +moral disposition of mind; it may therefore at times waver even in the +well-disposed, but can never be reduced to unbelief. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 95} + + + + IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties + + to his Practical Destination. + + + +If human nature is destined to endeavour after the summum bonum, +we must suppose also that the measure of its cognitive faculties, +and particularly their relation to one another, is suitable to this +end. Now the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason proves that this is +incapable of solving satisfactorily the most weighty problems that are +proposed to it, although it does not ignore the natural and +important hints received from the same reason, nor the great steps +that it can make to approach to this great goal that is set before it, +which, however, it can never reach of itself, even with the help of +the greatest knowledge of nature. Nature then seems here to have +provided us only in a step-motherly fashion with the faculty required +for our end. + + {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 100} + +Suppose, now, that in this matter nature had conformed to our wish +and had given us that capacity of discernment or that enlightenment +which we would gladly possess, or which some imagine they actually +possess, what would in all probability be the consequence? Unless +our whole nature were at the same time changed, our inclinations, +which always have the first word, would first of all demand their +own satisfaction, and, joined with rational reflection, the greatest +possible and most lasting satisfaction, under the name of happiness; +the moral law would afterwards speak, in order to keep them within +their proper bounds, and even to subject them all to a higher end, +which has no regard to inclination. But instead of the conflict that +the moral disposition has now to carry on with the inclinations, in +which, though after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be +gradually acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would +stand unceasingly before our eyes (for what we can prove perfectly +is to us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of +our eyes). Transgression of the law, would, no doubt, be avoided; what +is commanded would be done; but the mental disposition, from which +actions ought to proceed, cannot be infused by any command, and in +this case the spur of action is ever active and external, so that +reason has no need to exert itself in order to gather strength to +resist the inclinations by a lively representation of the dignity of +the law: hence most of the actions that conformed to the law would +be done from fear, a few only from hope, and none at all from duty, +and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the eyes of +supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world +depends, would cease to exist. As long as the nature of man remains +what it is, his conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism, +in which, as in a puppet-show, everything would gesticulate well, +but there would be no life in the figures. Now, when it is quite +otherwise with us, when with all the effort of our reason we have only +a very obscure and doubtful view into the future, when the Governor of +the world allows us only to conjecture his existence and his +majesty, not to behold them or prove them clearly; and on the other +hand, the moral law within us, without promising or threatening +anything with certainty, demands of us disinterested respect; and only +when this respect has become active and dominant, does it allow us +by means of it a prospect into the world of the supersensible, and +then only with weak glances: all this being so, there is room for true +moral disposition, immediately devoted to the law, and a rational +creature can become worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that +corresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his +actions. Thus what the study of nature and of man teaches us +sufficiently elsewhere may well be true here also; that the +unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration +in what it has denied than in what it has granted. + +PART_2|METHODOLOGY + + SECOND PART. + + + + Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. + + + +By the methodology of pure practical reason we are not to understand +the mode of proceeding with pure practical principles (whether in +study or in exposition), with a view to a scientific knowledge of +them, which alone is what is properly called method elsewhere in +theoretical philosophy (for popular knowledge requires a manner, +science a method, i.e., a process according to principles of reason by +which alone the manifold of any branch of knowledge can become a +system). On the contrary, by this methodology is understood the mode +in which we can give the laws of pure practical reason access to the +human mind and influence on its maxims, that is, by which we can +make the objectively practical reason subjectively practical also. + +Now it is clear enough that those determining principles of the will +which alone make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth, +namely, the direct conception of the law and the objective necessity +of obeying it as our duty, must be regarded as the proper springs of +actions, since otherwise legality of actions might be produced, but +not morality of character. But it is not so clear; on the contrary, it +must at first sight seem to every one very improbable that even +subjectively that exhibition of pure virtue can have more power over +the human mind, and supply a far stronger spring even for effecting +that legality of actions, and can produce more powerful resolutions to +prefer the law, from pure respect for it, to every other +consideration, than all the deceptive allurements of pleasure or of +all that may be reckoned as happiness, or even than all threatenings +of pain and misfortune. Nevertheless, this is actually the case, and +if human nature were not so constituted, no mode of presenting the law +by roundabout ways and indirect recommendations would ever produce +morality of character. All would be simple hypocrisy; the law would be +hated, or at least despised, while it was followed for the sake of +one's own advantage. The letter of the law (legality) would be found +in our actions, but not the spirit of it in our minds (morality); +and as with all our efforts we could not quite free ourselves from +reason in our judgement, we must inevitably appear in our own eyes +worthless, depraved men, even though we should seek to compensate +ourselves for this mortification before the inner tribunal, by +enjoying the pleasure that a supposed natural or divine law might be +imagined to have connected with it a sort of police machinery, +regulating its operations by what was done without troubling itself +about the motives for doing it. + +It cannot indeed be denied that in order to bring an uncultivated or +degraded mind into the track of moral goodness some preparatory +guidance is necessary, to attract it by a view of its own advantage, +or to alarm it by fear of loss; but as soon as this mechanical work, +these leading-strings have produced some effect, then we must bring +before the mind the pure moral motive, which, not only because it is +the only one that can be the foundation of a character (a +practically consistent habit of mind with unchangeable maxims), but +also because it teaches a man to feel his own dignity, gives the +mind a power unexpected even by himself, to tear himself from all +sensible attachments so far as they would fain have the rule, and to +find a rich compensation for the sacrifice he offers, in the +independence of his rational nature and the greatness of soul to which +he sees that he is destined. We will therefore show, by such +observations as every one can make, that this property of our minds, +this receptivity for a pure moral interest, and consequently the +moving force of the pure conception of virtue, when it is properly +applied to the human heart, is the most powerful spring and, when a +continued and punctual observance of moral maxims is in question, +the only spring of good conduct. It must, however, be remembered +that if these observations only prove the reality of such a feeling, +but do not show any moral improvement brought about by it, this is +no argument against the only method that exists of making the +objectively practical laws of pure reason subjectively practical, +through the mere force of the conception of duty; nor does it prove +that this method is a vain delusion. For as it has never yet come into +vogue, experience can say nothing of its results; one can only ask for +proofs of the receptivity for such springs, and these I will now +briefly present, and then sketch the method of founding and +cultivating genuine moral dispositions. + + {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 5} + +When we attend to the course of conversation in mixed companies, +consisting not merely of learned persons and subtle reasoners, but +also of men of business or of women, we observe that, besides +story-telling and jesting, another kind of entertainment finds a place +in them, namely, argument; for stories, if they are to have novelty +and interest, are soon exhausted, and jesting is likely to become +insipid. Now of all argument there is none in which persons are more +ready to join who find any other subtle discussion tedious, none +that brings more liveliness into the company, than that which concerns +the moral worth of this or that action by which the character of +some person is to be made out. Persons, to whom in other cases +anything subtle and speculative in theoretical questions is dry and +irksome, presently join in when the question is to make out the +moral import of a good or bad action that has been related, and they +display an exactness, a refinement, a subtlety, in excogitating +everything that can lessen the purity of purpose, and consequently the +degree of virtue in it, which we do not expect from them in any +other kind of speculation. In these criticisms, persons who are +passing judgement on others often reveal their own character: some, in +exercising their judicial office, especially upon the dead, seem +inclined chiefly to defend the goodness that is related of this or +that deed against all injurious charges of insincerity, and ultimately +to defend the whole moral worth of the person against the reproach +of dissimulation and secret wickedness; others, on the contrary, +turn their thoughts more upon attacking this worth by accusation and +fault finding. We cannot always, however, attribute to these latter +the intention of arguing away virtue altogether out of all human +examples in order to make it an empty name; often, on the contrary, it +is only well-meant strictness in determining the true moral import +of actions according to an uncompromising law. Comparison with such +a law, instead of with examples, lowers self-conceit in moral +matters very much, and not merely teaches humility, but makes every +one feel it when he examines himself closely. Nevertheless, we can for +the most part observe, in those who defend the purity of purpose in +giving examples that where there is the presumption of uprightness +they are anxious to remove even the least spot, lest, if all +examples had their truthfulness disputed, and if the purity of all +human virtue were denied, it might in the end be regarded as a mere +phantom, and so all effort to attain it be made light of as vain +affectation and delusive conceit. + +I do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made +use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the +most subtle examination of the practical questions that are thrown up; +and why they have not, after first laying the foundation of a purely +moral catechism, searched through the biographies of ancient and +modern times with the view of having at hand instances of the duties +laid down, in which, especially by comparison of similar actions under +different circumstances, they might exercise the critical judgement of +their scholars in remarking their greater or less moral +significance. This is a thing in which they would find that even early +youth, which is still unripe for speculation of other kinds, would +soon Become very acute and not a little interested, because it feels +the progress of its faculty of judgement; and, what is most important, +they could hope with confidence that the frequent practice of +knowing and approving good conduct in all its purity, and on the other +hand of remarking with regret or contempt the least deviation from it, +although it may be pursued only as a sport in which children may +compete with one another, yet will leave a lasting impression of +esteem on the one hand and disgust on the other; and so, by the mere +habit of looking on such actions as deserving approval or blame, a +good foundation would be laid for uprightness in the future course +of life. Only I wish they would spare them the example of so-called +noble (super-meritorious) actions, in which our sentimental books so +much abound, and would refer all to duty merely, and to the worth that +a man can and must give himself in his own eyes by the consciousness +of not having transgressed it, since whatever runs up into empty +wishes and longings after inaccessible perfection produces mere heroes +of romance, who, while they pique themselves on their feeling for +transcendent greatness, release themselves in return from the +observance of common and every-day obligations, which then seem to +them petty and insignificant. * + + + +* It is quite proper to extol actions that display a great, +unselfish, sympathizing mind or humanity. But, in this case, we must +fix attention not so much on the elevation of soul, which is very +fleeting and transitory, as on the subjection of the heart to duty, +from which a more enduring impression may be expected, because this +implies principle (whereas the former only implies ebullitions). One +need only reflect a little and he will always find a debt that he +has by some means incurred towards the human race (even if it were +only this, by the inequality of men in the civil constitution, +enjoys advantages on account of which others must be the more in +want), which will prevent the thought of duty from being repressed +by the self-complacent imagination of merit. + + + + {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 10} + +But if it is asked: "What, then, is really pure morality, by which +as a touchstone we must test the moral significance of every +action," then I must admit that it is only philosophers that can +make the decision of this question doubtful, for to common sense it +has been decided long ago, not indeed by abstract general formulae, +but by habitual use, like the distinction between the right and left +hand. We will then point out the criterion of pure virtue in an +example first, and, imagining that it is set before a boy, of say +ten years old, for his judgement, we will see whether he would +necessarily judge so of himself without being guided by his teacher. +Tell him the history of an honest man whom men want to persuade to +join the calumniators of an innocent and powerless person (say Anne +Boleyn, accused by Henry VIII of England). He is offered advantages, +great gifts, or high rank; he rejects them. This will excite mere +approbation and applause in the mind of the hearer. Now begins the +threatening of loss. Amongst these traducers are his best friends, who +now renounce his friendship; near kinsfolk, who threaten to disinherit +him (he being without fortune); powerful persons, who can persecute +and harass him in all places and circumstances; a prince, who +threatens him with loss of freedom, yea, loss of life. Then to fill +the measure of suffering, and that he may feel the pain that only +the morally good heart can feel very deeply, let us conceive his +family threatened with extreme distress and want, entreating him to +yield; conceive himself, though upright, yet with feelings not hard or +insensible either to compassion or to his own distress; conceive +him, I say, at the moment when he wishes that he had never lived to +see the day that exposed him to such unutterable anguish, yet +remaining true to his uprightness of purpose, without wavering or even +doubting; then will my youthful hearer be raised gradually from mere +approval to admiration, from that to amazement, and finally to the +greatest veneration, and a lively wish that he himself could be such a +man (though certainly not in such circumstances). Yet virtue is here +worth so much only because it costs so much, not because it brings any +profit. All the admiration, and even the endeavour to resemble this +character, rest wholly on the purity of the moral principle, which can +only be strikingly shown by removing from the springs of action +everything that men may regard as part of happiness. Morality, then, +must have the more power over the human heart the more purely it is +exhibited. Whence it follows that, if the law of morality and the +image of holiness and virtue are to exercise any influence at all on +our souls, they can do so only so far as they are laid to heart in +their purity as motives, unmixed with any view to prosperity, for it +is in suffering that they display themselves most nobly. Now that +whose removal strengthens the effect of a moving force must have +been a hindrance, consequently every admixture of motives taken from +our own happiness is a hindrance to the influence of the moral law +on the heart. I affirm further that even in that admired action, if +the motive from which it was done was a high regard for duty, then +it is just this respect for the law that has the greatest influence on +the mind of the spectator, not any pretension to a supposed inward +greatness of mind or noble meritorious sentiments; consequently +duty, not merit, must have not only the most definite, but, when it is +represented in the true light of its inviolability, the most +penetrating, influence on the mind. + +It is more necessary than ever to direct attention to this method in +our times, when men hope to produce more effect on the mind with soft, +tender feelings, or high-flown, puffing-up pretensions, which rather +wither the heart than strengthen it, than by a plain and earnest +representation of duty, which is more suited to human imperfection and +to progress in goodness. To set before children, as a pattern, actions +that are called noble, magnanimous, meritorious, with the notion of +captivating them by infusing enthusiasm for such actions, is to defeat +our end. For as they are still so backward in the observance of the +commonest duty, and even in the correct estimation of it, this means +simply to make them fantastical romancers betimes. But, even with +the instructed and experienced part of mankind, this supposed spring +has, if not an injurious, at least no genuine, moral effect on the +heart, which, however, is what it was desired to produce. + +All feelings, especially those that are to produce unwonted +exertions, must accomplish their effect at the moment they are at +their height and before the calm down; otherwise they effect +nothing; for as there was nothing to strengthen the heart, but only to +excite it, it naturally returns to its normal moderate tone and, thus, +falls back into its previous languor. Principles must be built on +conceptions; on any other basis there can only be paroxysms, which can +give the person no moral worth, nay, not even confidence in himself, +without which the highest good in man, consciousness of the morality +of his mind and character, cannot exist. Now if these conceptions +are to become subjectively practical, we must not rest satisfied +with admiring the objective law of morality, and esteeming it highly +in reference to humanity, but we must consider the conception of it in +relation to man as an individual, and then this law appears in a +form indeed that is highly deserving of respect, but not so pleasant +as if it belonged to the element to which he is naturally +accustomed; but on the contrary as often compelling him to quit this +element, not without self-denial, and to betake himself to a higher, +in which he can only maintain himself with trouble and with +unceasing apprehension of a relapse. In a word, the moral law +demands obedience, from duty not from predilection, which cannot and +ought not to be presupposed at all. + +Let us now see, in an example, whether the conception of an +action, as a noble and magnanimous one, has more subjective moving +power than if the action is conceived merely as duty in relation to +the solemn law of morality. The action by which a man endeavours at +the greatest peril of life to rescue people from shipwreck, at last +losing his life in the attempt, is reckoned on one side as duty, but +on the other and for the most part as a meritorious action, but our +esteem for it is much weakened by the notion of duty to himself +which seems in this case to be somewhat infringed. More decisive is +the magnanimous sacrifice of life for the safety of one's country; and +yet there still remains some scruple whether it is a perfect duty to +devote one's self to this purpose spontaneously and unbidden, and +the action has not in itself the full force of a pattern and impulse +to imitation. But if an indispensable duty be in question, the +transgression of which violates the moral law itself, and without +regard to the welfare of mankind, and as it were tramples on its +holiness (such as are usually called duties to God, because in Him +we conceive the ideal of holiness in substance), then we give our most +perfect esteem to the pursuit of it at the sacrifice of all that can +have any value for the dearest inclinations, and we find our soul +strengthened and elevated by such an example, when we convince +ourselves by contemplation of it that human nature is capable of so +great an elevation above every motive that nature can oppose to it. +Juvenal describes such an example in a climax which makes the reader +feel vividly the force of the spring that is contained in the pure law +of duty, as duty: + + + + {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 15} + + Esto bonus miles, tutor bonus, arbiter idem + + Integer; ambiguae si quando citabere testis + + Incertaeque rei, Phalaris licet imperet ut sis + + Falsus, et admoto dictet periuria tauro, + + Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori, + + {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 20} + + Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas. * + + + +* [Juvenal, Satirae, "Be you a good soldier, a faithful tutor, an +uncorrupted umpire also; if you are summoned as a witness in a +doubtful and uncertain thing, though Phalaris should command that +you should be false, and should dictate perjuries with the bull +brought to you, believe it the highest impiety to prefer life to +reputation, and for the sake of life, to lose the causes of living."] + + + +When we can bring any flattering thought of merit into our action, +then the motive is already somewhat alloyed with self-love and has +therefore some assistance from the side of the sensibility. But to +postpone everything to the holiness of duty alone, and to be conscious +that we can because our own reason recognises this as its command +and says that we ought to do it, this is, as it were, to raise +ourselves altogether above the world of sense, and there is +inseparably involved in the same a consciousness of the law, as a +spring of a faculty that controls the sensibility; and although this +is not always attended with effect, yet frequent engagement with +this spring, and the at first minor attempts at using it, give hope +that this effect may be wrought, and that by degrees the greatest, and +that a purely moral interest in it may be produced in us. + + {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 25} + +The method then takes the following course. At first we are only +concerned to make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural +employment accompanying all our own free actions, as well as the +observation of those of others, and to make it as it were a habit, and +to sharpen this judgement, asking first whether the action conforms +objectively to the moral law, and to what law; and we distinguish +the law that merely furnishes a principle of obligation from that +which is really obligatory (leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus); +as, for instance, the law of what men's wants require from me, as +contrasted with that which their rights demand, the latter of which +prescribes essential, the former only non-essential duties; and thus +we teach how to distinguish different kinds of duties which meet in +the same action. The other point to which attention must be directed +is the question whether the action was also (subjectively) done for +the sake of the moral law, so that it not only is morally correct as a +deed, but also, by the maxim from which it is done, has moral worth as +a disposition. Now there is no doubt that this practice, and the +resulting culture of our reason in judging merely of the practical, +must gradually produce a certain interest even in the law of reason, +and consequently in morally good actions. For we ultimately take a +liking for a thing, the contemplation of which makes us feel that +the use of our cognitive faculties is extended; and this extension +is especially furthered by that in which we find moral correctness, +since it is only in such an order of things that reason, with its +faculty of determining a priori on principle what ought to be done, +can find satisfaction. An observer of nature takes liking at last to +objects that at first offended his senses, when he discovers in them +the great adaptation of their organization to design, so that his +reason finds food in its contemplation. So Leibnitz spared an insect +that he had carefully examined with the microscope, and replaced it on +its leaf, because he had found himself instructed by the view of it +and had, as it were, received a benefit from it. + +But this employment of the faculty of judgement, which makes us feel +our own cognitive powers, is not yet the interest in actions and in +their morality itself. It merely causes us to take pleasure in +engaging in such criticism, and it gives to virtue or the +disposition that conforms to moral laws a form of beauty, which is +admired, but not on that account sought after (laudatur et alget); +as everything the contemplation of which produces a consciousness of +the harmony of our powers of conception, and in which we feel the +whole of our faculty of knowledge (understanding and imagination) +strengthened, produces a satisfaction, which may also be +communicated to others, while nevertheless the existence of the object +remains indifferent to us, being only regarded as the occasion of +our becoming aware of the capacities in us which are elevated above +mere animal nature. Now, however, the second exercise comes in, the +living exhibition of morality of character by examples, in which +attention is directed to purity of will, first only as a negative +perfection, in so far as in an action done from duty no motives of +inclination have any influence in determining it. By this the +pupil's attention is fixed upon the consciousness of his freedom, +and although this renunciation at first excites a feeling of pain, +nevertheless, by its withdrawing the pupil from the constraint of even +real wants, there is proclaimed to him at the same time a +deliverance from the manifold dissatisfaction in which all these wants +entangle him, and the mind is made capable of receiving the +sensation of satisfaction from other sources. The heart is freed and +lightened of a burden that always secretly presses on it, when +instances of pure moral resolutions reveal to the man an inner faculty +of which otherwise he has no right knowledge, the inward freedom to +release himself from the boisterous importunity of inclinations, to +such a degree that none of them, not even the dearest, shall have +any influence on a resolution, for which we are now to employ our +reason. Suppose a case where I alone know that the wrong is on my +side, and although a free confession of it and the offer of +satisfaction are so strongly opposed by vanity, selfishness, and +even an otherwise not illegitimate antipathy to the man whose rights +are impaired by me, I am nevertheless able to discard all these +considerations; in this there is implied a consciousness of +independence on inclinations and circumstances, and of the possibility +of being sufficient for myself, which is salutary to me in general for +other purposes also. And now the law of duty, in consequence of the +positive worth which obedience to it makes us feel, finds easier +access through the respect for ourselves in the consciousness of our +freedom. When this is well established, when a man dreads nothing more +than to find himself, on self-examination, worthless and +contemptible in his own eyes, then every good moral disposition can be +grafted on it, because this is the best, nay, the only guard that +can keep off from the mind the pressure of ignoble and corrupting +motives. + +I have only intended to point out the most general maxims of the +methodology of moral cultivation and exercise. As the manifold variety +of duties requires special rules for each kind, and this would be a +prolix affair, I shall be readily excused if in a work like this, +which is only preliminary, I content myself with these outlines. + +PART_2|CONCLUSION + + CONCLUSION. + + + +Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and +awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the +starry heavens above and the moral law within. I have not to search +for them and conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or +were in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before +me and connect them directly with the consciousness of my existence. +The former begins from the place I occupy in the external world of +sense, and enlarges my connection therein to an unbounded extent +with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and moreover into +limitless times of their periodic motion, its beginning and +continuance. The second begins from my invisible self, my personality, +and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but which is +traceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern that I +am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary +connection, as I am also thereby with all those visible worlds. The +former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates as it +were my importance as an animal creature, which after it has been +for a short time provided with vital power, one knows not how, must +again give back the matter of which it was formed to the planet it +inhabits (a mere speck in the universe). The second, on the +contrary, infinitely elevates my worth as an intelligence by my +personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent +of animality and even of the whole sensible world, at least so far +as may be inferred from the destination assigned to my existence by +this law, a destination not restricted to conditions and limits of +this life, but reaching into the infinite. + +But though admiration and respect may excite to inquiry, they cannot +supply the want of it. What, then, is to be done in order to enter +on this in a useful manner and one adapted to the loftiness of the +subject? Examples may serve in this as a warning and also for +imitation. The contemplation of the world began from the noblest +spectacle that the human senses present to us, and that our +understanding can bear to follow in their vast reach; and it ended- in +astrology. Morality began with the noblest attribute of human +nature, the development and cultivation of which give a prospect of +infinite utility; and ended- in fanaticism or superstition. So it is +with all crude attempts where the principal part of the business +depends on the use of reason, a use which does not come of itself, +like the use of the feet, by frequent exercise, especially when +attributes are in question which cannot be directly exhibited in +common experience. But after the maxim had come into vogue, though +late, to examine carefully beforehand all the steps that reason +purposes to take, and not to let it proceed otherwise than in the +track of a previously well considered method, then the study of the +structure of the universe took quite a different direction, and +thereby attained an incomparably happier result. The fall of a +stone, the motion of a sling, resolved into their elements and the +forces that are manifested in them, and treated mathematically, +produced at last that clear and henceforward unchangeable insight into +the system of the world which, as observation is continued, may hope +always to extend itself, but need never fear to be compelled to +retreat. + +This example may suggest to us to enter on the same path in treating +of the moral capacities of our nature, and may give us hope of a +like good result. We have at hand the instances of the moral judgement +of reason. By analysing these into their elementary conceptions, and +in default of mathematics adopting a process similar to that of +chemistry, the separation of the empirical from the rational +elements that may be found in them, by repeated experiments on +common sense, we may exhibit both pure, and learn with certainty +what each part can accomplish of itself, so as to prevent on the one +hand the errors of a still crude untrained judgement, and on the other +hand (what is far more necessary) the extravagances of genius, by +which, as by the adepts of the philosopher's stone, without any +methodical study or knowledge of nature, visionary treasures are +promised and the true are thrown away. In one word, science +(critically undertaken and methodically directed) is the narrow gate +that leads to the true doctrine of practical wisdom, if we +understand by this not merely what one ought to do, but what ought +to serve teachers as a guide to construct well and clearly the road to +wisdom which everyone should travel, and to secure others from going +astray. Philosophy must always continue to be the guardian of this +science; and although the public does not take any interest in its +subtle investigations, it must take an interest in the resulting +doctrines, which such an examination first puts in a clear light. + + + THE END + + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON *** + +***** This file should be named 5683.txt or 5683.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/5/6/8/5683/ + +Produced by Matthew Stapleton + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. diff --git a/5683.zip b/5683.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..34a6f34 --- /dev/null +++ b/5683.zip diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d3d87d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #5683 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5683) diff --git a/old/ikcpr10.zip b/old/ikcpr10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..937352c --- /dev/null +++ b/old/ikcpr10.zip |