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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18c14ac --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #56089 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/56089) diff --git a/old/56089-8.txt b/old/56089-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index daf3b74..0000000 --- a/old/56089-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14123 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's An American Diplomat in China, by Paul S. Reinsch - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: An American Diplomat in China - -Author: Paul S. Reinsch - -Release Date: November 30, 2017 [EBook #56089] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA *** - - - - -Produced by ellinora, Graeme Mackreth and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - - AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT - IN CHINA - - - - -WRITINGS OF PAUL S. REINSCH - - - The Common Law in the Early American Colonies, 1899 - - World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century As Influenced by - The Oriental Situation, 1900 - - Colonial Government, 1902 - - Colonial Administration, 1905 - - American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, 1907 - - Intellectual Currents in the Far East, 1911 - - International Unions, 1911 - - Essentials of Government, 1920 (_Published in Chinese_) - - Secret Diplomacy, 1921 - - - - - AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT - IN CHINA - - - BY - - PAUL S. REINSCH - - AMERICAN MINISTER TO CHINA, - 1913-1919 - - - [Illustration] - - - GARDEN CITY, N.Y., AND TORONTO - - DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY - - 1922 - - - - - COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY - DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY - - ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION - INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN - - COPYRIGHT, 1921, 1922, BY ASIA PUBLISHING COMPANY IN THE - UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED - - PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES - AT - THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY, N.Y. - - _First Edition_ - - - - -CONTENTS - - -PART I OLD CHINA AND THE NEW REPUBLIC - - CHAPTER PAGE - - I. The Dictator-President of China 1 - - II. China of Many Persons 8 - - III. Old Confucianism in the New China 23 - - IV. A Glimpse Behind the Political Scenes 42 - - V. With Men Who Watch Politics 48 - - VI. China of Merchant-Adventurers 59 - - VII. Prompt Proposals for American Action 70 - - VIII. A Little Vision for China 80 - - IX. "Slow Americans" 95 - - X. Folk Ways and Officials 108 - - - PART II - THE PASSING OF YUAN SHIH-KAI - - XI. The War: Japan in Shantung 123 - - XII. The Famous Twenty-One Demands 129 - - XIII. Getting Together 150 - - XIV. War Days in Peking 161 - - XV. Emperor Yuan Shih-Kai 171 - - XVI. Downfall and Death of Yuan Shih-Kai 183 - - XVII. Republicans in the Saddle 198 - - - PART III - THE WAR AND CHINA - - XVIII. American Entrepreneurs in Peking 207 - - XIX. Guarding the "Open Door" 217 - - XX. Diary of Quiet Days. Autumn of 1916 230 - - XXI. China Breaks with Germany 241 - - XXII. China's Bosses Come to Peking 260 - - XXIII. An Emperor for a Day 272 - - XXIV. War With Germany: Readjustments 286 - - XXV. The Chinese Go A-Borrowing 296 - - - PART IV - LAST YEAR OF WAR AND AFTERMATH - - XXVI. The Lansing-Ishii Notes 307 - - XXVII. Amidst Troubles Peking Rejoices 317 - - XXVIII. A New World War Coming? 328 - - XXIX. Japan Shows Her Teeth 339 - - XXX. Bandits, Intriguers, and a House Divided 347 - - XXXI. Young Men in Peking, Old Men in Paris 358 - - XXXII. A Nation Strikes and Unites 368 - - XXXIII. Taking Leave of Peking 375 - - Index 391 - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -Through recent developments China has been put in the forefront of -international interest. The world is beginning to have an idea of its -importance. Those who have long known it, who have given attention -to its traditions and the sources of its social and industrial -strength, have the conviction that China will become a factor of the -first magnitude in the composition of the world of the twentieth -century. They have penetrated beyond the idea that China is a land -of topsy-turvy, the main function of which is to amuse the outsider -with unexpected social customs, and which, from a political point of -view, is in a state bordering upon chaos. When we ask ourselves what -are the elements which may constitute China's contribution to the -future civilization of the world, what are the characteristics which -render her civilization significant to all of us, we enter upon a -subject that would in itself require a volume merely to present in -outline. From the point of view of social action, there is the widely -diffused sense of popular equity which has enabled Chinese society for -these many centuries to govern itself, to maintain property rights, -personal honour and dignity without recourse to written law or set -tribunals, chiefly through an informal enforcement by society itself -acting through many agencies, of that underlying sense of proportion -and rightness which lives in the hearts of the people. From the point -of view of economic life, China presents the picture of a society in -which work has not been robbed of its joy, in which the satisfaction -of seeing the product of industry grow in the hands of the craftsman -still forms the chief reward of a labour performed with patient toil -but without heartbreaking drudgery. From the point of view of social -organization, China forms an extremely intricate organism in which -the specific relationship between definite individuals counts far -more than any general principles or ideas. Loyalty, piety, a sense of -fitness give meaning to the ceremonial of Chinese social life, which -is more than etiquette as a mere ornament of social intercourse in -that it bodies forth in visible form as every-day observances, the -relations and duties upon which society rests. From the point of view -of art, China stands for a refinement of quality which attests the -loving devotion of generations to the idea of a perfect product; in the -representative arts, calmness of perception has enabled the Chinese to -set a model for the artistic reproduction of the environments of human -life. In their conception of policy and world position, the Chinese -people have ever shown a readiness to base any claim to ascendancy -upon inherent excellence and virtue. They have not imposed upon their -neighbours any artificial authority, though they have proudly received -the homage and admiration due their noble culture. - -At this time, when the Far Eastern question is the chief subject-matter -of international conferences and negotiations, China stands before -the world in the eyes of those who really know her, not as a bankrupt -pleader for indulgence and assistance, but as a great unit of human -tradition and force which, heretofore somewhat over-disdainful of the -things through which other nations had won power and preference and -mechanical mastery, has lived a trifle carelessly in the assurance that -real strength must rest on inner virtue; China has made no use of the -arts of self-advertisement, but has felt within her the consciousness -of a great human force that must ultimately prevail over petty -intrigue and forceful aggression. The secular persistence of Chinese -civilization has given to the Chinese an inner strength and confidence -which make them bear up even when the aggressiveness of nations more -effectively organized for attack seems to render their position -well-nigh desperate. Can the world fail to realize that if this vast -society can continue to live according to its traditions of peace and -useful industry instead of being made the battleground of contending -Imperial interests, the peace of the world will be more truly advanced -than it may be by any covenants of formal contrivance? Declarations, -treaties, and leagues are all useful instruments, but unless the -nations agree without afterthought to respect the life and civilization -of China, all professions of world betterment would be belied in fact. -If China is to be looked upon as material for the imperialist policies -of others, peace conferences will discuss and resolve in vain. - -During the six years of my work in China I was constantly surrounded -by the evidences of the transition of Chinese life to new methods and -aims. In all its complex phases this enormous transformation passed -in review before my eyes, in all its deep significance, not only for -China and the Far East, but for the whole world. It was this that made -life and work in China at this time so intensely fascinating. A new -form of government had been adopted. As I represented the Republic -upon which it had been largely modeled, whose spirit the Chinese were -anxious to follow, it fell to me to counsel with Chinese leaders as -if I had been one of their number. The experience of a great American -commonwealth which had itself successfully endeavoured to raise its -organization to a higher plane was of unending assistance to me in -enabling me to see the Chinese problems as part of what right-thinking -men were struggling for throughout the world. The most discouraging -feature was, however, that the needs of China so often took the form of -emergencies in which it seemed futile to plan at long range, in which -immediate help was necessary. Where one was coöperating with a group of -men beset by overpowering difficulties of the moment, it often seemed -academic even to think of the general improvement of political and -economic organization, over a longer range of time. The old elements -of the Imperial régime, the traditional methods of basing authority on -something from above, the purely personal conception of politics with -the corruption incident upon the idea that members of clans must take -care of each other--which formerly was a virtue--all were the sources -of the outstanding difficulties that jutted everywhere into the plans -for a more highly and efficiently organized commonwealth. But it was -a pleasure to see the growing manifestation of a commonwealth spirit, -the organization of public opinion, and the clearer vision of the -demands of public service. Even among the officials the idea that the -Government was merely a taxing and office-holding organization was -giving way, especially among the younger men, to a desire that the -functions of government should be used for developmental purposes, in -helping the people towards better methods in agriculture and industry, -in encouraging improved communications and public works of many kinds. - -International action as seen from Peking during this period did not -have many reassuring qualities. In most cases it was based upon a -desire to lose no technical advantage of position; to yield not a whit, -no matter what general benefit might result through mutual concessions. -Each one was jealously guarding his position in which he had advanced -step by step. Some were willing to make common cause with others in -things that would not always commend themselves to a sense of equity, -in order that they might take still another step forward. During the -major part of this period one power employed every device of intrigue, -intimidation, corruption, and force in order to gain a position for -itself in flagrant disregard of the rights of the Chinese people -itself, and in oblivion of the rights of others. - -As to American policy, the difficulties which I encountered arose from -the fact that a great deal was expected of a country so powerful, which -had declared and always pursued a policy so just to China. Chinese -goodwill and confidence, and the real friendship of the Chinese people -toward America certainly tended to make easier any task America might -be ready to undertake. But America had no political aims and desired to -abstain particularly from anything verging on political interference, -even in behalf of those principles we so thoroughly believe in. -American relationships to China depended not on governmental action, -but on a spontaneous coöperation between the two peoples in matters of -education, commerce, and industry. - -Infinitely complex as were the questions of Chinese internal affairs -and of the privileges and desires of the various powers, yet to my mind -it was not a difficult problem to see what should be done in order -to put matters on a sound foundation. I had learned to have great -confidence in the ability of the Chinese to manage their own affairs -when let alone, particularly in commerce and industry. - -That was the first desideratum, to secure for them immunity from -the constant interference, open and secret, on the part of foreign -interests desirous of confusing Chinese affairs and drawing advantage -from such confusion. So far as American diplomatic action was -concerned, its essential task was to prevent such interference, and -to see to it that China could not be closed even by those indirect -methods which often accompany the most vociferous, ardent declarations -in favour of Chinese independence and sovereignty. We therefore had -to keep a close watch and to resist in specific detail any and all of -those innumerable efforts on the part of others to secure and fortify -a position of privilege. That was the negative side of our action. The -positive side, however, was entirely non-political. Americans sought -no position of tutordom or control. Only upon the free and spontaneous -invitation of the Chinese would they come to counsel and assist. - -The important thing was that Americans should continue to take a -hand in the education of China and the upbuilding of Chinese business -and enterprise. They had done this in the past, and would do it in -the future in the spirit of free coöperation, without desire to -exercise a tutelage over others, always rejoicing in any progress the -Chinese themselves made. Such activities must continue and increase. -Sound action in business and constructive work in industry should be -America's contribution to the solution of the specific difficulties of -China. The Chinese people were discouraged, confused, disillusioned; -but every centre, no matter how small, from which radiate sound -influences in education and business, is a source of strength and -progress. If Americans could be stopped from doing these things, or -impeded and obstructed in them, then there would nothing further -remain worth while for Americans to do. But if they could organize -enterprises, great and small, they would in the most direct and -effective manner give the encouragement and organizing impulse which -China needed so urgently. So the simple principle of American action -in China is this: By doing things in themselves worth while, Americans -will contribute most to the true liberation of the Chinese people. - -Never has one nation had a greater opportunity to act as counsellor and -friend to another and to help a vast and lovable people to realize its -striving for a better life. Coöperation freely sought, unconstrained, -spontaneous desire to model on institutions and methods which are -admired--that is the only way in which nations may mutually influence -each other without the coercion of political power and the cunning of -intrigue. That is a feeling which has existed in the hearts of the -Chinese toward America. The American people does not yet realize what a -treasure it possesses in this confidence. - - - - - PART I - - OLD CHINA AND THE - NEW REPUBLIC - -AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE DICTATOR-PRESIDENT OF CHINA - - -"My opponents are disloyal. They would pull down my government." He who -spoke was cordial in his manner as he thus off handedly epitomized his -theory of government. - -Yuan Shih-kai, President of the Chinese Republic, was short of stature -and thickset; but his expressive face, his quick gestures, his powerful -neck and bullet head, gave him the appearance of great energy. His -eyes, which were fine and clear, alive with interest and mobile, were -always brightly alert. They fixed themselves on the visitor with keen -penetration, yet never seemed hostile; they were full always of keen -interest. These eyes of his revealed how readily he followed--or -usually anticipated--the trend of the conversation, though he listened -with close attention, seemingly bringing his judgment to bear on each -new detail. Frenchmen saw in him a resemblance to Clemenceau; and this -is born out by his portrait which appears on the Chinese dollar. In -stature, facial expression, shape of head, contour of features as well -as in the manner of wearing his moustache, he did greatly resemble the -Tiger. - -I had noted these things when I was first presented to the President, -and I had felt also the almost ruthless power of the man. Republican -in title he was, but an autocrat at heart. All the old glittering -trappings of the empire he had preserved. Even the Chief of the -Military Department of the President's household, General Yin Chang, -whom Yuan had sent to fetch me in Imperial splendour, is a Manchu and -former Imperial commander. His one foreign language significantly -enough was German which he acquired when he was minister in Berlin. I -had passed between files of the huge guardsmen of Yuan Shih-kai, who -had Frederick the Great's fondness for tall men; and I found him in the -showy palace of the great Empress Dowager, standing in the main throne -hall to receive me. He was flanked by thirty generals of his household, -extended in wings at both sides of him, and their uniforms made it a -most impressive scene. - -But that was an occasion of state. Later, at a more informal interview, -accompanied only by Mr. Williams, secretary of the legation and Mr. -Peck, the Chinese secretary, observed Yuan's character more fully. -He had just expelled from parliament the democratic party (Kuo Min -Tang); then he had summarily dismissed the Parliament itself. Feeling, -perhaps, a possible loss of American goodwill he had sent for me to -explain his action. - -"It was not a good parliament, for it was made up largely of -inexperienced theorists and young politicians," he began. "They wished -to meddle with the Government as well as to legislate on all matters. -Their real function was to adopt a permanent constitution for the -Republic, but they made no headway with that." And with much truth he -added: "Our traditions are very different from your Western ones and -our affairs are very complex. We cannot safely apply your abstract -ideas of policy." - -Of his own work of stirring up, through emissaries, internal and -partisan controversies which prevented the new parliament from -effectively organizing, Yuan of course omitted to speak. Moreover, -he said little of the possibility of more closely coördinating the -executive and the legislative branches; so while he avowed his desire -to have a constitution forthwith, and to reconstitute Parliament by -more careful selections under a new electoral law, I found myself -thinking of his own career. His personal rule, his unscrupulous -advancement to power, with the incidental corruption and cold-blooded -executions that marked it, and his bitter personal feeling against all -political opponents--these were not qualities that make for stable -parliamentary government, which depends on allowing other people -frankly to advocate their opinions in the effort to gain adherents -enough to succeed in turn to political power. The failure to understand -this basic principle of democracy is the vice of Chinese politics. - -"As you see," Yuan beamed eagerly, "the Chinese Republic is a very -young baby. It must be nursed and kept from taking strong meat or -potent medicines like those prescribed by foreign doctors." This -metaphor he repeated with relish, his eyes sparkling as they sought -mine and those of the other listeners to get their expressions of -assent or reserve. - -A young baby indeed and childishly cared for! Here, for example, is a -decree published by Yuan Shih-kai on March 8, 1915. It indicates how -faith in his republicanism was penetrating to remote regions, and how -such faith was rewarded by him: - -"Ihsihaishun, Prince of the Koersin Banner, reported through the Board -for Mongolia and Tibet that Kuanchuk-chuaimupal, Hutukhtu of the -Banner, has led his followers to support the cause of the Republic and -requested that the said Hutukhtu be rewarded for his good sentiments. -The said Hutukhtu led his followers and vowed allegiance to the -Republic, which action shows that he clearly understands the good -cause. He is hereby allowed to ride in a yellow canopied carriage to -show our appreciation." - -This rather naïve emphasis on externals and on display is born of the -old imperialism, a more significant feature of Chinese political life -than it may seem. It colours most of the public ceremonies in China. -The state carriage which the President had sent to convey me to his -official residence in the Imperial City for the presentation of my -credentials, on November 17th, was highly ornate, enamelled in blue -with gold decorations. It was drawn by eight horses, with a cavalry -escort sent by the President and my own guard of mounted marines; the -legation staff of secretaries and attachés accompanied me in other -carriages. - -Thus in an old Imperial barouche and with an ex-Imperial military -officer, General Yin, at my side, I rolled on toward the abode of the -republican chief magistrate. We alighted at the monumental gate of an -enclosure that surrounds the lovely South Lake in the western part of -the Imperial City. On an island within this lake arose, tier above -tier, and roofed with bright tiles of blue and yellow, the palace -assigned by the Empress Dowager to Emperor Kwang Hsu; for long years, -until death took him, it was his abode in semi-captivity. This palace -was now the home of President Yuan. - -The remote origin of its buildings, their exquisite forms and brilliant -colouring, as contrasted with the sombreness of the lake at that -season, and the stirring events of which they have been the scene, -cannot fail to impress the visitor as he slowly glides across the -Imperial lake in the old-fashioned boat, with its formal little cabin, -curtained and upholstered, and with its lateral planks, up and down -which pass the men who propel the boat with long poles. - -Arrived at the palace, everything recalled the colourful court life -so recently departed. I was greeted by the master of ceremonies, Mr. -Lu Cheng-hsiang, and his associate, Mr. Alfred Sze, later Chinese -minister at London and Washington. The former soon after became -Minister for Foreign Affairs, while Mr. Sze was originally sent as -minister to England. These gentlemen escorted me through a series of -courts and halls, all spacious and impressive, until we reached the -old Imperial library, a very jewel of architecture in this remarkable -Eastern world of beauty. The library faces on a clear and deep pool -round which are grouped the court theatre and various throne rooms -and festival halls; all quiet and secluded--a charming place for -distinguished entertainments. The rustle of heavy silks, the play of -iridescent colour, the echoes of song and lute from the theatre--all -that exquisite oriental refinement still seems to linger. - -The library itself is the choicest of all these apartments. The perfect -sense of proportion expressed in the architecture, the quiet reserve -in all its decorations, the living literary reminiscence in the verses -written on the paper panels by the Imperial hand, all testify to a most -fastidious taste. - -Here we rested for a few minutes while word was carried to the -President, who was to receive my credentials. Then followed our walk -between the files of the huge guardsmen, our entrance to the large -audience chamber in the pretentious modern structure erected by the -Empress Dowager, and the presentation to Yuan Shih-kai, as he stood in -the centre, flanked by his generals. - -I was formally presented to the President by Mr. Sun Pao-chi, Minister -of Foreign Affairs; and Dr. Wellington Koo translated my brief address -and the President's reply. - -A military dictatorship had succeeded the old imperialism, that was -all. Yuan had made his reputation and gained his power as a military -commander. Yet there was about him nothing of the adventurer, nor any -suggestion of the field of battle. He seemed now to be an administrator -rather than a military captain. Certainly he had won power through -infinite patience, great knowledge of men, political insight, and, -above all, through playing always a safe if unscrupulous game. - -What is meant by governing in a republic he could not know. Without -high literary culture, although with a mind trained and well informed, -he had not seen foreign countries, nor had he any knowledge of foreign -languages. Therefore, he could have only a remote and vague notion of -the foreign institutions which China at this time was beginning to -imitate. He had no real knowledge or conception of the commonwealth -principle of government, nor of the true use and function of a -parliament, and particularly of a parliamentary opposition. He merely -accepted these as necessary evils to be held within as narrow limits as -possible. - -During the two and a half years from my coming to Peking until the -time of his death, Yuan Shih-kai left the enclosure of his palace only -twice. This reminds me of the American, with an introduction from the -State Department, who wired me from Shanghai asking me to arrange for -him to take a moving picture of Yuan "proceeding from his White House -to his Capitol." This enterprising Yankee would have had plenty of -time to meditate on the difference between oriental political customs -and our own if he had waited for Yuan Shih-kai to "proceed" from his -political hermitage. The President's seclusion was usually attributed -to fear of assassination, but if such fear was present in his mind, as -well it might have been, there was undoubtedly also the idea, taken -over from the Empire, that the holder of the highest political power -should not appear in public except on very unusual occasions. - -When he received me informally, he doffed the uniform of state and -always wore a long Chinese coat. He had retained the distinction and -refinement of Chinese manners, with a few additions from the West, such -as shaking hands. His cue he had abandoned in 1912, when he decided -to become President of the Republic. In the building which is now the -Foreign Office and where he was then residing, Yuan asked Admiral Tsai -Ting-kan whether his entry into the new era should not be outwardly -expressed by shedding the traditional adornment of the head which -though once a sign of bondage had become an emblem of nationality. -When Admiral Tsai advised strongly in favour of it, Yuan sent for a big -pair of scissors, and said to him: "It is your advice. You carry it -out." The Admiral, with a vigorous clip, transformed Yuan into a modern -man. - -But inwardly Yuan Shih-kai was not much changed thereby. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -CHINA OF MANY PERSONS - - -Yuan Shih-kai, a ruler whose power was personal, whose theories of -government were those of an absolute monarch, who believed that -in himself lay the hope of his people; China itself a nation of -individualists, among whom there was as yet no unifying national sense, -no inbred love of country, no traditions of personal responsibility -toward their government, no sense that they themselves shared in the -making of the laws which ordered their lives--these, I think, were the -first clear impressions I had of the land to which I came as envoy in -the early days of the Republic. - -Even the rivers and cities through which we passed on our way to Peking -seemed to deepen this feeling for me. The houseboats jammed together in -the harbour at Shanghai visualized it. Each of these boats sheltered -a family, who lived and moved and had their being, for the most part, -on its narrow decks. Each family was quite independent of the people -on the next boat. Each was immersed in the stern business of earning -bread. These houseboat people (so it seemed) had little in common with -each other, little in common with the life of the cities and villages -which they regularly visited. As a class they lived apart; and each -family was, for most of the time, isolated from the others. Their -life, I thought, was the civilization of China in miniature. Of course -such a figure applies only roughly. I mean merely to suggest that the -population of this vast country is not a homogeneous one in a political -sense. The unit of society is--as it has been for many centuries--the -family, not the state. This is changing now, and changing rapidly. -The seeds of democracy found fertile soil in China; but a civilization -which has been shaping itself through eighty centuries cannot be too -abruptly attacked. China is, after all, an ancient monarchy upon which -the republican form of government was rather suddenly imposed. It is -still in the period of adjustment. Such at least were my reactions as -we ascended the Hwang-pu River, on that October day in 1913, and drew -into the harbour basin which lies at the centre of Shanghai. - -In one of the hotels of the city we found the "Saturday Lunch Club" in -session. I was not a little surprised that this mid-day gastronomic -forum, which had but lately come into vogue in America, had become -so thoroughly acclimated in this distant port. But despite the many -nationalities represented at this international gathering, the language -was English. As to dress, many of the Chinese at the luncheon preferred -their dignified, long-flowing robes to Western coats and trousers. - -Dr. Wu Ting-fang was present in Chinese costume and a little purple -skull cap, and we sat down to talk together. He related the moves -made by President Yuan against the democratic party (Kuo Min Tang) -in parliament and said: "Yuan Shih-kai's sole aim is to get rid of -parliament. He has no conception of free government, is entirely a man -of personal authority. The air of absolutism surrounds him. Beware," -Dr. Wu admonished, "when you get behind those high walls of Peking. -The atmosphere is stagnant. It seems to overcome men and make them -reactionary. Nobody seems to resist that power!" - -Later I was accosted on a momentous matter by an American missionary. -He was not affiliated with any missionary society, but had organized -a so-called International Institute for a Mission among the Higher -Classes. His mien betrayed overburdening care, ominous presentiment, -and he said he had already submitted a grave matter to the Department -of State. It concerned the Saturday Lunch Club. Somewhat too -precipitately I spoke with gratification of its apparent success. "But, -sir," he interposed, "it was established and set in motion by the -consul-general!" - -As still I could not see wherein the difficulty lay, my visitor became -emphatic. - -"Do you not realize, sir, that my institute was established to bring -the different nationalities together, and that the formation of such a -club should have been left to me?" - -When I expressed my feeling that there was no end of work to be done -in the world in establishing relationships of goodwill; that every -accomplishment of this kind was to be received with gratitude, he -gave me up. I had thought, at first, that he was about to charge the -consul-general, at the very least, with embezzlement. - -That afternoon I inspected the student battalion of St. John's -University. This institution is modern, affiliated with the -Episcopalian Church, and many of its alumni are distinguished in public -life as well as in industrial enterprise and commerce. Of these I need -only mention Dr. W.W. Yen, Dr. Wellington Koo, Dr. Alfred Sze, and -Dr. Wang Chung-hui, later Chief Justice of China. Dr. Hawks Pott, the -president, introduced me to the assembled students as an old friend -of China. There I met Dr. Pott's wife, a Chinese lady, and several of -their daughters and sons, two of whom later fought in the Great War. - -A newspaper reporter brought me back abruptly to local matters. He -was the first to interview me in China. "Will you remove the American -marines," he queried, "from the Chienmen Tower?" - -A disturbing question! I was cautious, as I had not even known there -were marines posted on that ancient tower. Whether they ought to -be kept there was a matter to look into, along with other things -affecting the destiny of nations. - -I could not stop to see Shanghai then, but did so later. If one looks -deeply enough its excellences stand out. The private gardens, behind -high walls, show its charm; acres covered with glorious plants, shrubs, -and bushes; rows and groves of springtime trees radiant with blossoms; -the parks and the verandas of clubs where people resort of late -afternoons to take their tea; the glitter of Nanking Road at night, its -surge of humanity, the swarming life on river and creeks. This is the -real Shanghai, market and meeting place of the nations. - -Nanking came next, visited the 4th of November. Forlorn and woeful the -old capital lay in gray morning light as we entered. The semi-barbarous -troops of Chang Hsun lined its streets. They had sacked the town, -ostensibly suppressing the last vestiges of the "Revolution." General -Chang Hsun, an old imperialist, still clinging to ancient customs, had -espoused the cause of President Yuan. A rough soldier quite innocent -of modernity, he had taken Nanking, not really for the republican -government, but for immediate advantage to himself, and for his -soldiers to loot and burn. There they stood, huge, black-uniformed, -pig-tailed men, "guarding" the streets along which the native dwellers -were slinking sullenly and in fear. Everywhere charred walls without -roofs; the contents of houses broken and cast on the street; fragments -of shrapnel in the walls--withal a depressing picture of misery. - -Nanking, immense and primitive, had reverted partly to agriculture, and -for miles the houses of farmers line extensive fields. Three Japanese -men-of-war rode at anchor in mid-river; they had come to support the -representations of the Japanese consul over an injury suffered by a -Japanese barber during the disturbances. General Chang Hsun, forced to -offer reparation, had among other things to call ceremoniously on the -Japanese consul to express his formal regrets. This he did, saving his -face by arranging to call on all the foreign consuls the same day. - -Another bit of local colour: We were driven to the American consulate, -modestly placed on the edge of the agricultural region of Nanking, with -barns in the offing. The consul being absent on leave, the official in -charge greeted us. His wife related that a few days before thirty of -Chang's braves, armed to the teeth, had come to the house to see what -they might carry off. In her husband's absence Mrs. Gilbert met them -at the door and very quietly talked the matter over with them as to -what unending bother it would occasion everybody, particularly General -Chang, if his men should invade the American consulate, and how it -would be far better to think it over while she prepared some tea for -them. - -The men, at first fierce and unrelenting, looked at one another -puzzled, then found seats along the edge of the veranda. When the tea -came in, their spokesman said they recognized that theirs had been a -foolish enterprise. With expressions of civility and gratitude they -consumed their tea and went away--which shows what one American woman -can do in stilling the savage breast of a Chinese vandal by a quiet -word of reason. - -After the exhibition his men had made of themselves in Nanking, I had -no wish to call on His Excellency Chang Hsun. We arranged to take the -first train for Tientsin. Crossing the broad river by ferry, from its -deck friends pointed out Tiger Head and other famous landscapes, the -scenes of recent fighting and of clashes during the Revolution of -1911. In the sitting room of our special car on the Pukow railway, the -little company comprised Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, who went on with me -to Peking; Mr. Roy S. Anderson, an American uniquely informed about -the Chinese, and a Chinese governmental representative who accompanied -me. In a single afternoon Mr. Anderson gave me a complete view of -the existing situation in Chinese politics, relating many personal -incidents and characteristics. - -In Chinese politics the personal element is supreme. The key to the -ramifications of political influence lies in knowledge of persons; -their past history, affiliations and interests, friendships, enmities, -financial standing, their groupings and the interactions of the various -groups. Intensely human, there is little of the abstract in Chinese -social ethics. Their ideals of conduct are personal, while the remoter -loyalties to principle or patriotic duty are not strongly expressed -in action. In this immediate social cement is the strength by which -Chinese society has been able to exist for ages. - -The defect of this great quality is in the absence of any motive -whereby men may be carried beyond their narrower interests in -definitely conceived, broad public aims. When I came to China these -older methods prevailed more than at present; hence Mr. Anderson's -knowledge of the Chinese, wide as the nation and specific as to the -qualities of all its important men, enabled me to approach Chinese -affairs concretely, personally, and to lay aside for the time any -general and preconceived notions. It enabled me to see, also, how -matters of such vast consequence, as, for example, the Hwai River -famines, had been neglected for the short-sighted individual concerns -of Chinese politics. - -That afternoon we passed through the Hwai River region. An apparently -endless alluvial plain, it is inexhaustibly rich in depth and quality -of soil--_loess_, which has been carried down from the mountains and -deposited here for eons. Fitted by Nature to be one of the most fertile -garden spots on earth, Nature herself has spoiled it. The rivers, -swollen by torrential rains in the highlands, flood this great area -periodically, destroying all crops; for many years only two harvests -have been gathered out of a possible six, in some years there have been -none at all. - -Here the visitations of famine and plague are immemorial. The liberal -and effective assistance which the American Red Cross gave during -the last famine, in 1911, is gratefully remembered by the Chinese. -Beholding this region, so richly provided and lacking only a moderate, -systematic expenditure for engineering works to make it the source of -assured livelihood for at least twenty millions more than its present -population, I resolved that one of my first efforts would be to help -reclaim the vast estate. - -We arrived after dark in the province of Shantung--Shantung, which -was destined to play so large a part in my official life in China! -The crowds at stations were growing enormous, their greetings more -vociferous. An old friend appeared, Tsai Chu-tung, emissary of the -Provincial Governor and of the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs; he -had been a student under me, and, for a time, my Chinese secretary. -Past the stations with their military bands and metallic welcomes -and deputations appearing with cards, at all hours of the night, we -arrived at length at Tsinan, Shantung's capital. Here, in behalf of -the Governor, the young Commissioner Tsai, together with an official -deputation, formally greeted me; thence he accompanied me to Peking, -affording me another chance to hear from a very keen and highly trained -man an account of China's situation. - -Reaching Tientsin that afternoon, we were met by representatives of the -Civil Governor and by his band. There the American community, it seems, -had been stirred prematurely by news of my coming, and had visited -the station for two days in succession. The manager of the railway, a -Britisher, had confused the Consul-General by his error in date of my -arrival, starting too soon the entire machinery of reception, including -a parade by the Fifteenth United States Infantry. - -We had dinner that evening with Civil Governor Liu at his palace. Miles -of driving in rain through dark, narrow streets, ending with a vision -of huge walls and lantern-illuminated gates, found us in the inner -courts, and, finally, in the main hall of the antique, many-coloured -structure where the fat and friendly Governor received us. The heads -of the various provincial departments attended, together with the -President of the Assembly and the military aides. Young Mr. Li, the -Governor's secretary and interpreter for the after-dinner speechmakers, -performed the rare feat of rendering into either language an entire -speech at a time--and the speeches were not short. My Chinese secretary -commented on his brilliant translations, the perfect renderings of -the English into Chinese, and I could myself admire his mastery of -the English idiom. Such talent of translation is seldom displayed; -the discourse of speakers is usually limited to brief paragraphs, -continually checked by the renderings of the interpreters. Of course, -this interrupts the flow of thought and contact with one's hearers. -But the interpreter at this dinner even managed to translate jokes -and witticisms without losing the point. A play on words is most -difficult to carry into a foreign tongue, but the Chinese is so full -of opportunities for puns that a nimble interpreter will always find a -substitute. To the telling of a really funny situation the Chinese can -be relied on to respond. Their humour is not unlike the American, which -delights particularly in exposing undue pretensions. Interpreters, in -translating speeches to the general public, have sometimes resorted -to something of their own invention, in order to produce the expected -laugh. When they despair of making the foreign joke hit the bull's-eye, -they occasionally help things along by making personal remarks about -the speaker, whose gratifications at the hilarity produced is usually -unclouded by a knowledge of the method employed. - -Our departure from Tientsin was signalized by an unusual mark of -Chinese governmental courtesy. For the trip to Peking we found assigned -the palace car of the former Empress Dowager, and I was told that it -had not been used since her reign came to an end. Adapting a new -invention to old custom, the car's interior had been arranged as a -little palace chamber. The entrance doors were in a double set. Those -in the centre were to be opened only when the sovereign entered or -departed, the side doors being for ordinary use. Opposite the central -doors at the end of the salon stood a little throne, high and wide, -upholstered in Imperial yellow. The draperies and upholsteries of the -car were all of that colour, and it made, in its way, quite a showing -of splendour and departed greatness. - -As one approaches the capital city, the beautiful mountain forms of -the so-called Western Hills, which rise suddenly out of the plain -about ten miles beyond Peking and attain an altitude of from six to -seven thousand feet, present a striking contrast to the flat and -far-stretching Chihli plain. The towers and city walls of Peking, an -impressive and astounding apparition of strength and permanence, befit -this scene. Solemn and mysterious, memorable for their size, extent, -and general inevitableness of structure, they can be compared only with -the Pyramids, or with great mountains fashioned by the hand of Nature -herself. Looking down upon these plains, where so many races have -met, fought, worked, lived, and died, where there is one of the chief -meeting points of racial currents, these walls are in themselves the -symbols of a memorable and long-sustained civilization. - -As we approach more closely, the walls tower immediately above us as -the train skirts them for several miles, crosses a number of busy roads -leading to the southern gates of the city, and then suddenly slips -through an opening in the walls to the inside. We first pass through -the so-called Chinese city; this particular corner is no longer densely -populated, but is now left to gardens, fields, and burial places with -their monuments and pagodas. We only skirt the populous part of the -Chinese city. Soon we are brought immediately under the lofty walls -which separate the Chinese from the Manchu city, adjacent to it on -the north, but separated from it by an enormous wall one hundred feet -high, with a diameter of eighty feet. Where the two encircling walls -meet, towering bastions soar upward, and above the roadways rise high -gate-houses of many stories. The impassivity of these monumental -structures contrasts sharply with the swarming human life that surges -in the streets below. - -From Mr. Willys R. Peck, Chinese Secretary of the Legation, who had -met us at Tientsin and accompanied us to Peking, I learned more about -the recent events in the capital and the fight which Yuan Shih-Kai -was waging against the Parliament. At the station we were greeted by -a large concourse of civilian and military officials, and Mr. E.T. -Williams, Chargé d'Affaires since Mr. Calhoun's departure, acted as -introducer. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sun Pao-chi, a tall, -benevolent-looking man, wearing European dress and long chin whiskers, -and speaking a little English with more French and German, offered -his welcome and felicitations. Other high officials were there, many -members of the American community, and several representatives of -the parliament. It was a delight to see the fine-looking companies -of American marines, who among all troops in Peking are noted for -their well-groomed, smart, and soldierly appearance. Included for the -official welcome was a company of stalwart Chinese infantry, and one -of the Peking gendarmerie, which also is military in its organization. -The several bands vied with each other in playing national airs and -salutes, while thousands of spectators congregated. - -The central Tartar city gate (the Chienmen), was still in its original -form, and in passing through or under it one received an indelible -impression of the stupendous majesty and dignity which characterize -this unique capital. The curtain walls connecting the inner and outer -gates have since been removed. We drove through a side gate in the -curtain wall, finding ourselves in an impressive plaza overtowered by -the two lofty and beautiful gate-houses. Two small picturesque antique -temples flank the main entrance; one, dedicated to the God of War, was -a favourite place with the Empress Dowager, who stopped her cortège -there whenever she passed. From the flag-poles of these temples huge, -brilliantly coloured banners floated in the air. Atop the wall from -which the Chienmen Tower arises were American marines on guard and -looking down upon us. These, then, were the men whose presence up there -seemed to be interesting people so much. - -From the main gateway one looks straight up the avenue which forms the -central axis of Peking; it leads through many ornamental gates and -between stately buildings to the central throne halls of the Imperial -Palace. The city plan of Peking is a symmetrical one. This central -axis, running due north and south, passes through a succession of -important gateways, monuments, and seats of power. From it the city -expands regularly east and west; on the south the Chinese city, the -symmetry of its streets and alleyways more broken; and the Manchu city -on the north, with broad avenues leading to the principal gates, while -the large blocks between them are cut up more regularly by narrower -streets and alleyways. - -From the main south gate of the Chinese city the central line passes -along the principal business street to the central south gate of the -Tartar city--the imposing Chienmen--while eighty rods beyond this -stands the first outer gate of the Imperial City. Thence the central -line cuts the large square which lies immediately outside of the -Forbidden City, forming the main approach to the Imperial City. The -line then passes between pillars and huge stone lions through the -Forbidden City's first gate, cutting its inner parade ground and inner -gate, above which stands the throne from which the Emperor reviewed -his troops. Through the central enclosures, with the throne rooms -and coronation halls, three magnificent structures in succession, -the line passes, at the point where the thrones stand, into the -residential portion of the Forbidden City where the present Emperor -lives, and strikes the summit of Coal Hill, the highest point in -Peking. It bisects the temple where the dead bodies of Emperors reposed -before burial, and proceeds from the rear of the Imperial City by -its north gate through the ancient Bell Tower and Drum Tower. A more -awe-inspiring and majestic approach to a seat of power is not to be -seen in this world. We can well imagine, when tribute bearers came to -Peking and passed along this highway beset with imposing structures and -great monuments, that they were prepared to pay homage when finally -in the presence of the being to whose might all this was but an -introduction. - -But we did not follow along this path of sovereign power. After passing -through the Chienmen we turned directly to the right to enter the -Legation Quarter and to reach the American Legation, which nestles -immediately inside the Tartar wall in the shadow of the tall and -imposing Chienmen Tower. It is the first of the great establishments -along Legation Street, which is approached through a beautiful -many-coloured pailu, or street arch. - -No other American representative abroad has quite so easy a time -upon arrival at his post. We were going to a home prepared for -our reception, adequately furnished, and with a complete staff of -servants and attendants who were ready to serve luncheon immediately, -if required. In most cases, unfortunately, an American diplomatic -representative will for weeks or months have no place to lay his head -except in a hotel. Many American ministers and ambassadors have spent -fully one half the time during their first year of office in making -those necessary living arrangements which I found entirely complete at -Peking. That is the crucial period, too, when their minds should be -free for observing the situation in which they are to do their work. -May the time soon come when the nation realizes more fully the need of -dignified representation of its interests abroad. - -The residence of the minister I found simple but handsome, in stately -colonial renaissance style, its interior admirably combining the -spaciousness needed for official entertaining with the repose of a -real home. It is made of imported American materials, and a government -architect was expressly sent to put up the legation buildings. He had -been designing government structures in America, and the somewhat -stereotyped chancery and houses of the secretaries were popularly -called "the young post offices." But the minister's house, largely -due to the efforts of Mr. Rockhill, who was minister at the time, is -a masterpiece of appropriateness--all but the chimneys. It is related -that the architect, being unfamiliar with the ways of Chinese labourers -and frequently impatient with them, incurred their ill-will. When -Mr. Rockhill first occupied the residence, it was found the chimneys -would not draw; the disgruntled masons had quietly walled them up, in -order that the architect might "lose face," and the chimney from the -fireplace of the large dining room was so thoroughly blockaded that it -remained permanently out of commission. - -At a distance from the "compound," or enclosure, which surrounds the -minister's residence, fronting on a central plaza, there is a veritable -hamlet of additional houses occupied by secretaries, attachés, consular -students, and the clerical staff. It is a picturesque Chinese village, -with an antique temple and many separate houses, each with its garden -enclosed within high walls--a rescued bit of ancient China in the midst -of the European monotony of the Legation Quarter. It adjoins the Jade -Canal, opposite the hotel called "Sleeping Cars" by some unimaginative -director, but more fitly known as the Hotel of the Four Nations. At the -Water Gate, where the Jade Canal passes under the Tartar wall, is the -very point where the American marines first penetrated into the Tartar -city in 1900. - -The Chinese are remarkably free from self-consciousness, and therefore -are good actors; as one sees the thousands passing back and forth on -the streets, one feels that they, too, are all acting. Here are not -the headlong rush and elbowing scramble of the crowded streets of a -Western metropolis. All walk and ride with dignity, as if conscious of -a certain importance, representing in themselves not the eager purpose -presently to get to a certain place, but rather a leisurely flow of -existence, carrying traditions and memories of centuries in which -the present enterprise is but a minor incident. Foreign women have -sometimes been terrified by these vast, surging crowds; but no matter -how timid they be, a few rickshaw rides along the streets, a short -observation of the manners of these people, will make the faintest -hearted feel at home. Before long these Tartaric hordes cease to be -terrifying, and even the feeling that they are ethnological specimens -passes away; it is remarkable how soon one feels the humanity of it -all among these multitudes that seem to engulf but that never press or -crowd. - -Looking down upon a Chinese street, with multitudes of walkers and -runners passing back and forth, mingled among donkey carts, riders on -horse- or donkey-back, mule litters, rickshaws, camel caravans, flocks -of animals led to sale and slaughter, together with rapidly flying -automobiles--all gives the impression of perfect control of motion and -avoidance, of crowding and scuffling, and recalls the movements of -practised dancers on a crowded ballroom floor. A view of the crowds -which patiently wait at the great gateways for their turn to pass -through affords a constant source of amusement and delight. The line -slowly pushes through the gate like an endless string being threaded -through a needle. If there is mishap or collision, though voices of -protest may arise, they will never be those of the stoic, dignified -persons sitting in the rickshaws; it is against etiquette for the -passenger to excite himself about anything, and he leaves that to the -rickshaw man. All humanity and animaldom live and work together in -China, in almost undisturbed harmony and mutual understanding. - -Only occasionally a hubbub of altercation rises to the skies. In -these days the pigtails had only just been abolished. Under the old -conditions, the technique of personal combat was for each party to -grab the other by the cue and hold him there, while describing to him -his true character. During the first years of the reform era one might -still see men who were having a difference frantically grabbing at the -back of each other's heads where there was, however, no longer anything -to afford a secure hold. - -A great part of Chinese life is public. It is on the streets with -their innumerable restaurants; their wide-open bazaars of the trades; -their ambulent letter-writers and story-tellers with the curious ones -clustered about them; their itinerant markets; their gliding rickshaws; -their haphazard little shops filled with a profusion of ageless, -precious relics. There is the charm of all this and of the humanity -there swarming, with its good-natured consideration for the other -fellow, its constant movement, its excited chatter, its animation and -its pensiveness, and its occasional moments of heated but bloodless -combat. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA - - -"The whole Chinese people hold the doctrines of Confucius most sacred," -declared President Yuan Shih-kai in his decree of November 26, 1913, -which re-introduced much of the old state religion. He stopped a little -short of giving Confucianism the character of an established religion, -but ordered that the sacrificial rites and the biennial commemoration -exercises be restored. "I am strongly convinced," he said, "of the -importance of preserving the traditional beliefs of China." In this -he was upheld by the Confucian Society at Peking, in the organization -of which an American university graduate, Dr. Chen Huan-chang, was a -leading spirit. Mr. Chen's doctoral dissertation had dealt with the -economic principles of Confucius and his school; upon his return to -China his aim had been to make Confucianism the state religion under -the Republic. - -The Christian missionaries were agitated. They felt it to be a step -backward for the new republic to recognize any form of belief. -Yuan, however, said: "It is rather the ethic and moral principles -of Confucius, as a part of education, that the Government wishes -to emphasize." As there is nothing mystical or theological about -Confucianism, such a view is, indeed, quite tenable. - -Yuan Shih-kai again declared toward the end of December: "I have -decided to perform the worship of heaven on the day of the winter -solstice." - -This fell on the 23rd of December, and again excited discussion. -"It means that Yuan is edging toward the assumption of the Imperial -dignity," many said. - -I had a talk about this matter with the Minister of the Interior, Mr. -Chu Chi-chien, who was thoroughly informed concerning the details -of Confucian worship and the worship of Heaven; he had, in fact, an -inexhaustible fund of knowledge of Chinese traditions. Nevertheless, he -was a man of action, planning cities, building roads, and developing -industries. Comparatively young and entirely Chinese by education and -character, he had supremely that knowledge of the personalities of -Chinese politics which was necessary in his ministry. As a builder he -became the Baron Haussmann of Peking, widening and paving the avenues, -establishing parks, rearranging public places, in all of which he -did marvels within his short term of two years. He established the -National Museum of Peking, and converted a part of the Imperial City -into a public park which has become a centre of civic life theretofore -unknown in China. Mr. Chu's familiarity with religion, art, and -architecture--he was a living encyclopædia of archæology and art--and -his pleasure in reciting the history of some Chinese temple or palace -did not free him from a modern temptation. He would try to import too -many foreign elements in the improvements which he planned, so that -foreign friends of Chinese art had to keep close to him to prevent the -bringing in of incongruous Western forms which would have spoiled the -marvellous harmony of this great city. - -"It would be dangerous," Mr. Chu informed me, "for the republican -government to neglect the worship of Heaven. The entire farm population -observes the ceremonial relative to sowing, harvesting, and other -rural occupations according to the old calendar. Should the worship of -Heaven be omitted on the winter solstice day, now that the Government -has become established; and should there follow a leanness or entire -failure of crops, the Government would surely be held responsible by -the farmers throughout the land." - -"Of course," he added, smilingly, "the worship will not guarantee -good crops, but at any rate it will relieve the Government of -responsibility." - -I could not but reflect that, even in our own democracy, -administrations have been given credit and blame by reason of general -prosperity or of the lack of it, and that good crops certainly do help -the party in power. - -"In the ritual, we shall introduce some changes appropriate to -republicanism," Mr. Chu assured me. "I am myself designing a special -ceremonial dress to be worn by those participating, and the music -and liturgy will be somewhat changed." But it was difficult to see -wherein consisted the specific republican bias of the changes. Yuan -Shih-kai did proceed to the Temple of Heaven before daybreak on -December 23rd; in the dark of the morning the President drove to that -wonderfully dignified open-air sanctuary in its large sacred grove -along the southern wall of the Chinese city. He drove surrounded by -personal bodyguards over streets covered with yellow sand and lined -three-fold with soldiers stationed there the evening before. With him -were the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Master of Ceremonies, -the Censor General, the Minister of War, and a staff of other high -officials and generals. Arrived at the temple, he changed his uniform -for the sacrificial robes and hat, and, after ablutions, proceeded -together with all the other dignitaries to the great circular altar, -which he ascended. He was there joined by the sacrificial meat-bearers, -the silk and jade bearers, the cupbearers, and those who chanted -invocations. In succession the different ceremonial offerings were -brought forward and presented to Heaven with many series of bows. A -prayer was then offered, as follows: - - Heaven, Thou dost look down on us and givest us the nation. All-seeing - and all-hearing, everywhere, yet how near and how close: We come - before Thee on this winter solstice day when the air assumes a new - life; in spirit devout, and with ceremony old, we offer to Thee jade, - silk, and meat. May our prayer and offerings rise unto Thee together - with sweet incense. We sanctify ourselves and pray that Thou accept - our offerings. - -The first Confucian ceremony, which the President attended in person -at four o'clock in the morning, took place about two months later. A -complete rehearsal of the ceremony, with all details, had been held on -the preceding afternoon. Many foreigners were present. Passing from -the entrance of the Temple, between rows of immemorial ilex trees, -and through lofty porticoes, in one of which are preserved the famous -stone drums which date from the time of the Sage, the visitors entered -the innermost enclosure. It, too, is set with ancient trees, which, -however, leave the central portion open. The musical instruments were -placed on the platform in front of the main temple hall. Here the -ceremony itself was enacted, while the surface of the court was filled -with members of the Confucian Society, ranks of dignified long-gowned -men, members of the best classes of Peking. - -I was told that the music played on this occasion was a modification -of the classic strains which had from time immemorial been heard -here. Perfect knowledge of this music seems no longer to exist. The -music accompanying the ceremony was nevertheless attractive, produced -with jade plaques, flutes, long-stringed instruments resembling small -harps, but with strings of more uniform length, drums, and cymbals. -A dominant note was struck on one of the jade plaques, whereupon -all the instruments fell in with a humming sound, held for fully a -minute, which resembled the murmur of forest trees or the surging -of waves. There was no melody; only a succession of dominants, with -the accompaniment of this flow of sound surging up, then ebbing and -receding. One of the instruments is most curious, in the shape of a -leopard-like animal, in whose back there are closely set about twenty -small boards. At certain stages of the music a stick is rapidly passed -over these boards, giving a very peculiar punctuation to the strains -that are being played. - -The chief dignitaries officiating were Mr. Chu Chi-chien, the Minister -of the Interior, and Mr. Sun Pao-chi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, -gorgeous in their newly devised ceremonial costumes. The splendid and -dignified surroundings of the temple courts enhanced the ceremony, but -it depended for its effect on the manner of chanting, the music, and -the very dignified demeanour of all who participated. Quite apart from -the question of the advisability of a state religion or the possible -reactionary influences which such ceremonies might have, I could not -but feel that the refusal to cast off entirely such traditions was -inspired by sound instinct. - -Moreover, this revival came during the adoption of new ways. Chinese -ladies came out in general society for the first time on the night of -the 5th of February, at the Foreign Office ball. Many representatives -of the outlying dependencies of China were there in picturesque -costumes, invariably exhibiting a natural self-confidence which made -them seem entirely in place in these modern surroundings. The Foreign -Office building, planned by an American architect, contains on the main -floor an impressive suite of apartments so arranged as to give ample -space for large entertainments, while it affords every opportunity for -the more intimate gathering of smaller groups. Guests were promenading -through the long rows of apartments from the ballroom, where the -excellent Navy Band was playing for the dancers. - -The Chinese women gave no hint of being unaccustomed to such general -gatherings of society, but bore themselves with natural ease and -dignity. Nor did they conceal their somewhat amused interest in the -forms of the modern dance; for only a few of the younger Chinese -ladies had at that time acquired this Western art. The number of -votaries, however, increased rapidly during the next few years. - -From among the Tartars of the outlying regions this occasion was graced -by a Living Buddha from Mongolia, to whom the Chinese officials were -most attentive. Surrounded by a large retinue, he overtopped them -all, and his bodily girth seemed enormous. He found his way early in -the evening to a room where refreshments were being offered, took -possession of a table, and proceeded to divest himself of seven or -eight layers of outer garments. Thus reduced, he became a man of -more normal dimensions. Several of his servitors then went foraging -among the various tables, bringing choice dishes to which the Living -Buddha did all justice. Long after midnight reports still came to the -ballroom: "The Living Buddha is still eating." - -It seems remarkable that Chinese women should so readily adapt -themselves to wholly new situations. They have shown themselves capable -of leadership in social, political, and scientific matters; a great -many develop wide intellectual interests and manifest keen mental -powers. When I gave the Commencement address at the Women's Medical -College of Peking, the 13th of February, I was curious to see what -types of Chinese women would devote themselves to a medical education. -In this field Dr. King Ya-mei and Dr. Mary Stone are the pioneers. -With the advance of modern medicine in China many Chinese women have -adopted the career of nurses and of physicians. On this occasion the -women students of the middle school sang various selections, and I -was impressed with the cello-like quality of their alto voices. As -customary on such occasions my address was made through an interpreter. -The delivery of these chopped-off paragraphs can scarcely be inspiring, -yet Chinese audiences are so courteous and attentive that they never -give the speaker any suggestion of impatience. - -A luncheon at the Botanical Gardens was given the next day by the -Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Chang Chien. This institution, to -which a small and rather hungry-looking collection of animals is -appended, occupies an extensive area outside of the northwest gate, -and was formerly a park or pleasure garden of the Empress Dowager. A -modern-style building, erected for her use and composed of large main -apartments on each floor, with smaller side-chambers opening out from -them, was used for our luncheon party. Its walls were still hung with -pictures painted by the hand of the august lady, who loved to vary her -busy life by painting flowers. The conversation here was mostly on -Chinese art, there being among the guests an antiquarian expert, Chow, -who exhibited some fine scrolls of paintings. I noted that the Chinese -evinced the same interest in the writing appended to the paintings -(colophon) as in the picture itself. They seemed to admire especially -the ability, in some famous writers, of executing complicated strokes -without hesitation and with perfect control. When we were looking at a -page written by a famous Sung poet, Mr. Chow said: "He always finished -a stroke lightly, like his poems, still leaving something unsaid." - -Chinese handwriting has infinite power to express differences of -character and cultivation. It is closely associated with personality. -Some writing has the precision of a steel engraving; other examples, -again, show the sweep and assurance of a brush wielded by a Franz Hals. -It is the latter that the Chinese particularly admire; and even without -any knowledge of Chinese script one cannot but be impressed with its -artistic quality and its power to reveal personal characteristics. It -is still the great ambition of educated Chinese to write well--that is, -with force and individual expression. My host on this occasion was one -of the most noted calligraphers in China. Many emulated him; among them -a northern military governor who had risen from the ranks, but spent -laborious hours every day decorating huge scrolls with a few characters -he had learned, with which to gladden the hearts of his friends. - -The new things cropping out in Chinese life had their detractors. Mr. -and Mrs. Rockhill had come to Peking for a visit. Relieved of official -duties through a change in the administration, it was quite natural -that Mr. Rockhill should return where his principal intellectual -interests lay. Throughout our first conversation at dinner Mrs. -Rockhill affected a very reactionary view of things in China, praising -the Empire and making fun of all attempts at modernization. One would -have thought her not only a monarchist, but a believer in absolutism -of the old Czarist type. A woman so clever can make any point of view -seem reasonable. Mr. Rockhill did not express himself so strongly, but -he was evidently also filled with regret for the old days in China -which had passed. While we were together receiving guests at a dinner I -was giving Mr. Rockhill, some of the young Foreign Office counsellors -appeared in the distance, wearing conventional evening clothes. "How -horrible," Mr. Rockhill murmured, quite distressed. Not perceiving -anything unusual to which his expression of horror could refer, I -asked, "What?" "They ought to wear their native costume," he answered; -"European dress is intolerable on them, and it is so with all these -attempted imitations." - -The talk at another dinner, a small gathering including Mr. Rockhill, -Doctor Goodnow, and Dr. Henry C. Adams, revolved around conditions -in China and took a rather pessimistic tone. Doctor Adams had been -elaborating a system of unified accounting for the railways. "At every -turn," he said, "we seem to get into a blind alley leading up to a -place where some spider of corruption sits, the whole tribe manipulated -by a powerful head spider." - -This inheritance of corruption from the easy-going past, when the -larger portion of official incomes was made up of commissions and -fees, was recognized to be a great evil by all the more enlightened -Chinese officials. They attempted to combat it in behalf of efficient -administration but they could not quite perform the heroic task of -lifting the entire system bodily onto a new basis. Because the new -methods would require greatly increased salaries, the ideal of strict -accountability, honesty, and efficiency, could only be gradually -approached. Doctor Goodnow for his part contributed to the conversation -a sense of all the difficulties encountered by saying: "Here is a -hitherto non-political society which had vegetated along through -centuries held together by self-enforced social and moral bonds, -without set tribunals or formal sanction. Now it suddenly determines -to take over elections, legislatures, and other elements of our more -abstract and artificial Western system. I incline to believe that it -would be infinitely better if the institutional changes had been more -gradual, if the system of representation had been based rather on -existing social groupings and interests than on the abstract idea of -universal suffrage. These political abstractions as yet mean nothing to -the Chinese by way of actual experience." - -He also did not approve of the persistent desire of the democratic -party to establish something analogous to the English system of cabinet -government. He felt that far more political experience was needed for -working so delicate a system. "I am inclined to look to concentration -of power and responsibility in the hands of the President for more -satisfactory results," he said. - -Mr. Rockhill's fundamental belief was that it would be far better for -the world not to have meddled with China at all. "She should be allowed -to continue under her social system," he urged, "a system which has -stood the test of thousands of years; and to trust that the gradual -influence of example would bring about necessary modifications." He -had thorough confidence in the ability of Yuan Shih-kai, if allowed a -free hand, to govern China in accordance with her traditional ideas but -with a sufficient application of modern methods. He even considered the -strict press censorship applied by Yuan Shih-kai's government as proper -under the circumstances. - -Throughout this conversation, which dwelt mostly on difficulties, -shortcomings and corruption, there was, nevertheless, a notable -undercurrent of confidence in the Chinese _people_. These experienced -men whose work brought them into contact with specific evils, looked at -the Chinese, not from the ordinary viewpoint so usual with foreigners -who assume the utter hopelessness of the whole China business, but much -as they would consider the shortcomings of their own nation, with an -underlying faith in the inherent strength and virtue of the national -character. The idea of China being bankrupt was laughed to scorn by -Mr. Rockhill. "There are its vast natural and human resources," he -exclaimed. "The human resources are not just a quantity of crude -physical man power, but there is a very highly trained industrial -capacity in the handicrafts." But it is exactly when we realize the -stupendous possibilities of the country, her resources of material -wealth, her man power, her industrial skill, and her actual capital -that the difficulties which obstruct her development seem so deplorable. - -Mr. Liang Chi-chao gave a dinner at about this time, at which Doctor -Adams, Doctor Goodnow, President Judson of Chicago, and the ladies -were present. Mr. Liang had a cook who was a master in his art, able -to produce all that infinite variety of savory distinction with which -meat, vegetables, and pastry can be prepared by the Chinese. One -usually speaks of Chinese dinners as having from one hundred fifty -to two hundred courses. It would be more accurate, however, to speak -of so many dishes, as at all times there are a great many different -dishes on the table from which the guests make selection. The profusion -of food supplied at such a dinner is certainly astonishing. The -guests will take a taste here and there; but the greater part of it -is sent back to the household and retainers. It is a popular mistake -to believe that Chinese food is composed of unusual dishes. There are -indeed birdsnest soup, shark fins, and ducks' kidneys, but the real -excellence of Chinese cooking lies in the ability to prepare one thing, -such as chicken, or fish, in innumerable ways, with endless varieties -of crispness, consistency, and flavour. It is notable to what extent -meat predominates. Although there is always a variety of vegetables -and of fruit, the amount of meat consumed by the Chinese is certainly -astonishing to one who has classified them, as is usually done, as a -vegetarian people. - -The show of abundance at a Chinese banquet seems the fare of poverty -compared with the cargoes of delicacies served at the Imperial table. -It was a rule of the Imperial household that any dish which the Emperor -had at any time called for, must be served him at the principal meal -every day; as his reign lengthened the numbers of dishes at his table, -naturally, constantly increased. It is related that the dinner of the -Emperor Chen Lung required one hundred and twenty tables; and the -Empress Dowager, at the time of her death, had worked up to about -ninety-six tables. It is not to be wondered at that the Emperor's -kitchen had an army of three hundred cooks! At one time when the Duke -Tsai was discussing with me the financial situation of the Imperial -family, he remarked, with a deep sigh: "The Emperor has had to reduce -the number of his servants. For instance, at present he has only thirty -cooks." Not knowing of the custom described above, I was inclined to -consider that number quite adequate. I believe the little Emperor has -at the time I write reached the quota of about fifteen tables. - -At the hospitable board of Mr. Liang Chi-chao, while the dishes were -served in Chinese style and the food eaten with chopsticks, some -modifications of the usual dinner procedure had been made. The -etiquette of a Chinese meal requires that when a new set of dishes with -food has been placed in the centre of the table, the host, hostess, -and other members of the family survey what is there and pick out the -choicest morsels to lay on the plates of their guests. The guests then -reciprocate the courtesy, and the interchange of favours continues -throughout the dinner, giving the whole affair a most sociable aspect. -At Mr. Liang Chi-chao's table these courtesies were observed, but there -were special chopsticks provided for taking the food from the central -dishes and transferring it to a neighbour's or to one's own. - -The conversation after dinner wandered toward Chinese ethics. Mr. Liang -Chi-chao is one of the most competent authorities on this subject -and on its relations to Western thought and life. I ventured this -opinion: "While the high respect in which the elders are held by the -younger generation in China is a remarkably strong social cement, it is -discouraging to progress in that it gives the younger and more active -little chance to carry out their own ideas." - -"But the system does not," Mr. Liang rejoined, "necessarily work -to retard change; because it is, after all, society rather than -individuals which controls. With all proper respect for elders, the -younger element has ample opportunity to bring forward and carry out -ideas of social change." - -He regarded the principle of respect for elders and of ancestor worship -of fundamental importance; in addition to its direct social effects, -it gave to Chinese society all that the Western peoples derive from -the belief in immortality. The living individual feels a keen sense -of permanence through the continuity of a long line of ancestors, -whose influence perceptibly surrounds those actually living; moreover, -their own actions are raised to a higher plane, as seen not from the -narrow interests of the present, but in relation to the life of the -generations that are to succeed, in whom the character and action of -the individual now living will persist. - -This evening's entertainment, with its intimate Chinese setting -and its conversation dealing with the deeper relationships between -different civilizations, has remained a memorable experience for those -who attended it. Only recently it was thus recalled by one of the -guests: "Think of going to a dinner with the 'Secretary of Justice' in -Washington, and conversing about the immortality of the soul!" - -Interested to see how, despite the new ways in China, the old -Confucianism persisted, I determined upon a pilgrimage to the Confucian -shrines. Dr. Henry C. Adams invited me in November, 1914, to join him -on a trip to the sacred mountain, Taishan, in Shantung Province, and to -Chüfu, the home of Confucius. - -A small party was made up. I slipped away quietly in order to avoid -official attentions and to spare the local authorities all the bother -of formally entertaining a foreign representative. We arrived at -Taianfu early in the morning, where with the help of missionaries -chair-bearers had been secured to carry us up the mountain. - -The trip to these sacred heights is of an unusual character. The ascent -from the base is almost continuously over stair-ways. Up these steep -and difficult grades two sturdy chairmen, with a third as alternate, -will carry the traveller rapidly and with easy gait. The route is -fascinating not only because of the singular natural beauty of the -ravines through which it passes, and of the constantly broadening -prospects over the fruitful plains of Shantung from every eminence, but -because of the historic interest of the place; this is testified to by -innumerable temples, monuments, tablets, and inscriptions sculptured -in the living rock which line the path up the mountain. It must be -remembered that in the time of Confucius this was already a place -of pilgrimage of immemorial tradition; a place of special grandeur, -wherein the mind might be freed of its narrow needs and find its -place in the infinite. Many of its monuments refer to Confucius and -record his sayings as he stopped by the way to rest or to behold the -prospect. At one point, whence one looks off a steep precipice down to -the plain thousands of feet below, his saying, as reported, was: "Seen -from this height, man is indeed but a speck or insect." But not all -of his remarks were of this obvious nature, which justifies itself in -its appeal to the common mind, to be initiated into the truths of the -spirit. - -In these thousands of years many other sages, emperors, and statesmen -have ascended the sacred hill, also leaving memorials in the shape of -sculptured stones bearing their sentiments. It would be an agreeable -task for a vacation to read these inscriptions and to let the -imagination shadow forth again these unending pilgrimages extending -back to the dawn of history. - -The stairway leading up the mountain, which is about 6,000 feet high, -is often so steep that we had to guard against being overcome by -dizziness in looking down. Occasionally a stop is made at a wayside -temple, where tea is served in the shady courts. In the summer heat -these refuges must be especially grateful. We reached the temples that -crown the summit after a journey of about six hours. In a temple court -at the very top the servants who had preceded us had set up their -kitchen, and an ample luncheon was awaiting us there. - -At this altitude a cold and cutting wind was blowing. Yet we preferred -to stay outside of the temple buildings in order to enjoy the view -which is here unrolled, embracing a great portion of the whole province -of Shantung. I noted that the coolies did not seem impressed with the -sanctity of this majestic height, but used the temple courts as a -caravanserai. - -The descent is made rapidly, as the practised chair-bearers run -down the stairs with quick, sure steps--which gives the passenger -the sensation of skirting the mountainside in an aeroplane. When I -inquired whether accidents did not occasionally happen, they told me: -"Yes, but the last time when any one has fallen was about four hundred -years ago." As in the early days chair-bearers who had fallen were -killed, the tendency to fall was in the course of time eradicated. They -descend with a gliding motion that reminds one of the flight of birds. -The chair-bearers are united in a guild, and happen to be Mohammedans -by religion. - -The town of Taianfu, which lies at the foot of the mountain, is -notable for a very ancient and stately temple dedicated to the god -who represents the original nature worship which centres around Mount -Taishan, and which forms the historic basis for all religion in -China. The spacious temple courts, with their immemorial trees and -their forests of tall stone tablets bearing inscriptions dedicated by -emperors for thousands of years past, testify to the strength of the -native faith. The streets of the town, set at frequent intervals with -arches bearing sculptured animal forms, were lined with shops through -whose trellised windows, now that night had come, lights were shining, -revealing the activities within. These, with an occasional tall tower -or temple shadowing the gathering darkness, made this old town appear -full of romance and strange beauty. - -Sleeping on our car, we were by night carried to the railway station of -Chüfu; some seven miles farther on lies the town of the same name, the -home of Confucius. We hired donkey carts at the station; also, as the -ladies were anxious to have the experience of using the local passenger -vehicle, the wheel-barrow, we engaged a few of these; whereupon our -modest cavalcade proceeded first to the Confucian burial ground, to the -north of the city. On the way thither we were met by chair-bearers who -carried a portable throne and brought complimentary messages from the -Holy Duke. As the chair had been sent for my use, there was nothing for -it but to get in. Soon appeared, also, a string of mule carts drawn by -sleek and well-fed animals, contrasting with the bony and dishevelled -beasts we had hired. - -It was plain that the incognito was ended, and that the Duke had been -apprised of our coming. Then came the emissaries of the district -magistrate, offering further courtesies, such as a guard of honour; and -another delegation from the Duke brought a huge red envelope containing -an invitation for luncheon. We tried to decline all these civilities -and to stroll about quietly, in order to come entirely under the spell -of this place. But there was no more rambling and strolling for us. We -had to sit in our chairs and carts, and, after two polite declinations -of the luncheon invitation, alleging the shortness of our time and our -desire to see everything thoroughly, and asking leave to call on the -Duke later in the afternoon--we accepted the customary third issue of -the ducal invitation. - -Our procession was quite imposing as we passed on to the inner gate of -the cemetery. Covering about one and a half square miles, the enclosure -has been the burial ground of the Confucian family for at least three -thousand years, antedating Confucius himself. No other family in the -world has such memorials of its continuity. The simple dignity of a -huge marble slab set erect before the mound-covered grave marks the -burial place of the sage. The adjoining site of the house where his -disciples guarded his tomb for generations, but which ultimately -disappeared some two thousand years ago, also bears monuments and -inscriptions. - -Leaving the cemetery, a large cavalry escort sent by the district -magistrate joined our cavalcade of chairs, mule carts, and -wheelbarrows, together with crowds of the curious who trudged -along. The village streets were lined with people anxious to see -the strangers; but their curiosity had nothing intrusive. They were -friendly lookers-on, nodding a pleasant welcome should your eye catch -theirs. - -We passed through many gates of the ancient palace before we were -finally received by the Duke himself at the main inner doorway. He was -accompanied by the magistrate, and with these two we sat down to chat; -nearly an hour elapsed before we were summoned to the table. The meal, -which was made up of innumerable courses, lasted at least two hours, -during which we kept up an animated conversation concerning the more -recent history of the town and of the temple. - -The Duke was agitated because missionaries from Taianfu were trying to -acquire land in the town of Chüfu. He looked upon this intrusion as -unwarranted, saying that as his town was devoted to the memory of the -Chinese sage, it did not seem suitable that any foreign religion should -try to introduce its worship, and it would certainly result in local -ill-feeling. - -I tried to quiet his apprehensions by speaking of the educational work -of missionaries, of the fact that they, also, respected the great sage; -but it was hard to allay his opposition. - -The magistrate was jovial, laughing uproariously at the mildest joke. -When we arose from the table, the Duke took us to the apartments of the -Duchess, who was staying with the infant daughter recently born, their -first child. The Duchess was his second wife, and he was considerably -her senior. The little lady seemed to be particularly fond of cats, of -which at least forty were playing about her; one of these she presented -to Mrs. Adams. - -The great Temple of Confucius immediately adjoins the palace. Although -the afternoon was wearing on, we still had time to visit it and to -wander about in its noble courts. The pillars in the main halls are -adorned by marvellous sculpture, and the temple is remarkable for -the refined beauty of the structures composing it and for the serene -dignity of its aspect. Adjoining the main temple is an ancient well -near which stood the original house of Confucius. Stone reliefs -present in a long series the history of Confucius in pictures, and -there is a great collection of instruments used in performing the -classical music. But the chief charm of the temple lies in the vistas -afforded by its courts, set with magnificent trees and with the -monuments of the past seventy generations. - -It was dark when we had finished our visit to the temple. We bade -the Duke farewell, and our cavalcade, starting back to the station, -was now made picturesque by the flaring torches and the huge paper -lanterns which were carried alongside each chair and cart. Slowly the -procession wound its way back over the dark plains toward the lights -of the station platform and the emblems of a mechanical civilization -that contrasted at every point with the life we had seen. The Duke had -regretted having objected so strongly to the proposal to bring the -railway closer to the town, for it was of inconvenience to visitors; -but he felt, after all, that the great sage himself would always prefer -the peacefulness and quiet of the older civilization. - -I revisited Chüfu three years later, this time with Mr. Charles R. -Crane and Mrs. Reinsch, who had been unable to accompany me on the -first visit. The officials were expecting us, and everywhere we were -followed with attentions. Not satisfied with giving us two private -cars, the railway officials insisted that we have a special engine, -too. In the region of Chüfu we gathered an army of military escorts. -Arriving at the palace, the Duke greeted us with a child on either -arm. The little daughter was now over three, the son slightly over -one year old. I have never seen any one who appeared more devoted to -his children than the Duke. He always had them with him, carried them -about, playing with them and fondling them. When he and the Duchess -visited us in Peking he brought the two little ones, and they and my -small children played long together joyfully and to the amusement -of their elders. The Duke was tall, broad-shouldered, aristocratic -looking. While not credited with great ability, he was undoubtedly a -man of intelligence, although his education had been narrowly classical -and had not given him contact with the world's affairs. He was -seventy-third in line from the great sage. At that time he was engaged -especially with plans to create in Chüfu a university wherein the -Confucian tradition should be preserved in its purity, but which should -also teach modern science. - -Once during the revolution against the Manchus the Duke was considered -a possible successor to the throne. If the country had had a Chinese -family of great prominence in affairs, the transfer of the monarchy -to a Chinese house might have been accomplished, but the Duke was by -no means a man of action or a politician. Neither had the descendants -of the Ming, Sung, and Chow emperors, or of other Imperial houses, -sufficient prominence or genius for leadership to command national -attention. - -The title of the Holy Duke is the only one in China which remains -permanently the same. Under the empire, titles were granted, but in -each succeeding generation the rank was lowered by one grade until the -status of a commoner had again been reached. By this arrangement, under -which noble rank gradually "petered out," China escaped the creation of -a class or caste of nobility. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE POLITICAL SCENES - - -Modelling largely on American example, China is striving to create -truly representative political institutions. Personal rule, imperial -traditions, hamper the Chinese in their efforts, unguided as they -are by experience; moreover, they meet with foreign skepticism and -opposition. It is America's rôle not officiously to interfere in their -endeavours, but in every proper way to help them. - -The institutions a nation develops are largely its own business. -Other nations should not interfere. But in China all liberal-minded, -forward-looking men see in the United States a free government which -they not only wish to emulate, but to which they look for interest, -sympathy, and moral assistance. The results of their efforts are by -no means indifferent to us. Should they fail, should militarist and -absolutist elements gain the upper hand; particularly, should China -become an appendage to a foreign militarist autocracy, grave dangers -would arise. The ideals of the progressive Chinese are in keeping with -the peaceful, industrious traditions of China. With these traditions -Americans in China are closely allied. They do not seek, nor have they -need to seek, to control by political means the choice of the Chinese -people. On the other hand, it would be difficult for them to tolerate -any attempt to prevent the Chinese from freely following the model of -their choice, and from securing those mutually helpful relations with -Americans which they themselves desire. In this sense only, then, have -Americans a vital interest in Chinese politics. That personal rule and -imperial traditions, as well as military despotism, are still powerful -enough to hamper the will of the new Chinese democracy may be manifest -from a few instances that early came to my attention. - -The first case was that of Mr. C.T. Wang. When he related to me the -history of the dissolution of his party--he was and still is one of the -leaders of the democratic party (Kuo Min Tang)--he told me that he was -in great personal danger. Mr. Wang had been marked for execution as a -leader of the disbanded party and he was living in concealment as a -refugee. - -His call upon me, shortly after my arrival in Peking, was my first -direct contact with Chinese internal or party politics. He had greeted -me at the railway station upon my arrival, and now he told me the story -of Yuan Shih-kai's successful attempt to break down the opposition of -the parliament and to render that body entirely innocuous. Mr. Wang was -the Vice-President of the Senate, and through his party was associated -with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and General Huang Hsin, the men who had attempted -the revolution during the summer just passed. But Mr. Wang represented -the younger, more modern-minded elements in the party, who desired to -adopt the best institutions and practices of the West, but who did not -favour violent measures. - -Yuan Shih-kai had divided the majority party, in order in the end to -destroy its two sections. The most recent action in this fight was the -dissolution of the Kuo Min Tang, which was decreed by the President -on November 5th, on the ground that this body was implicated in, and -responsible for, the revolutionary movement against the President. The -President had approached the Tutuhs--or military governors, after the -downfall of Yuan Shih-kai called Tuchuns--in the various provinces -and had secured in advance an endorsement of his action. Of course, -this appeal ignored the constitutional character which the state was -supposed to have, and encouraged the military governors in thinking -that they were semi-independent rulers. After the death of Yuan their -sense of their own importance and independence grew apace. They -imitated him in looking upon their armies as their personal property. -Moreover, they seized control of the provincial taxes. From all this -arose that pseudo-feudalism of military despots, which is the baneful -heritage left by Yuan Shih-kai in China. - -I had already received, through the Department of State, an inquiry -from American friends concerning Mr. Wang's safety. He was graduated -from Yale University, was first among the American-returned students, -and favourably known among Americans in general. He had been the -president of the Chinese Y.M.C.A. and bore the reputation of being an -able, clean-handed, and conscientious man. I could not, of course, -know in how serious danger Mr. Wang found himself, nor could I make -any formal representations in a case where the facts were unknown. -However, through making inquiry as to whether any unfavourable action, -such as arrest, was contemplated, I hinted to the Government that any -harsh action against Mr. Wang would be noted. The very fact that a -well-disposed foreign nation is taking notice will tend to prevent rash -or high-handed action, which is frequently forced by some individual -hothead commander or official. When public attention has been directed -to the unjust treatment of a man, rash vindictiveness may be restrained -by wiser heads. - -A further example of the working of Chinese internal politics which -came under my observation at this time is shown in the method by which -Yuan Shih-kai politely imprisoned the Vice-President. - -From time to time Yuan Shih-kai had made efforts to induce the -Vice-President, General Li Yuan-hung, to come to Peking from Wuchang, -where he was stationed in command of troops. He had sent him messengers -and letters, protesting the need he felt of having General Li closely -by his side in order to profit by his support and advice on important -affairs. These polite invitations had been answered by General Li -in a most self-deprecatory tone; he could not aspire to the merit -and wisdom attributed to him by the President; he could be of but -little assistance in important affairs of state; it was far better -for him to stay in his position as commander at Wuchang, whence he -could effectively support the authority of the President and all his -beneficent works. - -This interchange of correspondence went on for some time. It was -evident that General Li did not wish to come to Peking. It was surmised -that the President did not like the prominence which the democratic -party had given to the name of General Li Yuang-hung, whom they had -heralded as a true republican and a man of popular sympathies. Probably -Yuan feared that General Li might be placed at the head of a new -political movement against the President's authority. - -The President not only sent messengers and letters of cordial -invitation, but he also rearranged the disposal of troops, with the -result that bodies of troops upon which Yuan Shih-kai could rely were -drawn around Wuchang with a constantly shortening radius. Finally in -December General Li realized that he had no alternative. He therefore -informed the latest messenger of Tuan that he could no longer resist -the repeated cordial invitations, and that while he was sharply -conscious of his shortcomings, he would endeavour to assist the chief -magistrate to the limit of his powers. - -He came to Peking in December, without troops of his own. The President -received him with the greatest cordiality, embracing him and vowing -that now the burden of responsibility was lightened for him; that he -must have his great associate and friend always close at hand, where -he could consult with him daily, in fact, any hour of the day and -night; he therefore invited General Li to make his home close to the -palace of Yuan, namely, on the little island in the South Lake in whose -many-coloured, gracefully formed halls, Emperor Kwang Hsu was for many -years kept a prisoner by the Empress Dowager. - -There General Li took his residence, knowing that his great friend the -first magistrate could not spare his presence at any hour of day or -night. - -The question arose whether the foreign representatives should call on -the newly arrived Vice-President. The Government tentatively suggested -that as hosts it might be proper for them to make the first call. -Whether or not this was done in the expectation that the suggestion -would not be accepted, it certainly was not the desire of Yuan Shih-kai -to encourage close relations between the Vice-President and any -outsiders. - -Although Yuan Shih-kai still allowed the rump parliament to exist, -he had undoubtedly decided at this time to dispose of it entirely. -A ready pretext was at hand, because, with the expulsion of the Kuo -Min Tang, the parliament no longer could muster a quorum. On November -13th, it was announced that a central administrative conference would -be created to act in an advisory capacity in matters of government. -It was plain that this body was intended to displace parliament. The -list of nominees was made up mostly of men of the old régime, literati -and ex-officials--the kind known among the Chinese as "skeletons"; -a group of high standing and very good reputation, but from which -little constructive action could be expected. Among them was a very -effective orator, Ma Liang, a member of the Roman Catholic Church. -He was a dignified, elderly man, who came to see me to talk about -reforestation and colonization of outlying regions. His contact with -Western civilization had been through the Jesuit College at Zikawei. -Another member was Dr. Yen Fu, who had won reputation by translating -a large number of scientific works into Chinese and creating a modern -scientific terminology in Chinese. Among other councillors with whom I -became well acquainted was Hsu Shih-chang, later President of China, -and Li Ching-hsi, a nephew of Li Hung-chang, who had been Viceroy of -Yunnan under the Empire. - -Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, the American Constitutional Advisor, often -discussed Chinese political affairs with me. It was his impression -that parliament had attempted to take over too much of Western -political practice without sufficiently considering its adaptability -to Chinese uses. He believed that the administrative power should not -be subject to constant interference by parliament, and that China -was not yet ready for the cabinet system. He therefore held a rather -conservative view favouring gradual development in the direction -of Western institutions, but not a wholesale adoption of the same. -The Yuan Shih-kai government took advantage of this attitude of the -American expert to give out, whenever it proposed a new arrangement -for strengthening its hold, that the matter had the approval of Doctor -Goodnow and other foreign advisers. However, these authorities were not -really consulted; that is, they were not brought into the important -conferences, nor given the chance to coöperate in the formulation -of vital projects. As a matter of form they were, of course, -"consulted"--but usually after the decisions had been made. They were -informed of what had been agreed upon; and then it was announced that -the approval of the advisers had been secured. Another example of -the bland self-sufficiency of Yuan Shih-kai and his government. They -believed in themselves; they considered that they were accountable only -to themselves; they had fundamentally the monarchic point of view in -all departments of public service. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -WITH MEN WHO WATCH POLITICS - - -I found in Peking several good observers of political life, especially -Dr. George Morrison, Mr. B. Lenox Simpson, and Mr. W.H. Donald. All -three had the training in observation and judgment which comes from -writing for responsible papers. Doctor Morrison was gifted with a -memory for details. Thus, he would say: "When I first visited New -York I lived in a little hall room on the third floor of 157 East -Twenty-ninth Street, with a landlady whose name was Simkins, who had -green eyes and a red nose and who charged me two dollars a week for my -room." He delighted in detailing minutely his daily doings. His sense -of infinite detail combined with his remarkable memory made Doctor -Morrison an encyclopædia of information about Chinese public men. He -knew their careers, their foibles and ambitions, and their personal -relationships. Like most British in China he was animated with a -sincere wish to see the Chinese get ahead, and was distressed by the -obstacles which a change for the better encountered at every step. -His own mind was of the analytical and critical type rather than the -constructive, and his greatest services were rendered as interpreter -of events and in giving to public men and the people a clear idea of -the significance of complex Chinese situations. "I am annoyed," he -would say, "because kindly old ladies persistently identify me with the -missionary Morrison who died in 1857." - -Mr. Donald's acquaintance with Chinese affairs had come through -close contact with the leaders of new China, with whom he coöperated -intimately in their military and political campaigns. He had a heart -for the Chinese, as if they had been his own people. He worried about -their troubles and fought their fights. Mr. Simpson, the noted writer -who uses the pen name "Putnam Weale," began active life as a member of -the Maritime Customs service, but he soon resigned, to devote himself -wholly to literary work. His masterly works of political analysis -were written in the period of the Russo-Japanese War, although his -best-known book came a little earlier--a book which long earned him the -ill-will and suspicion of many of the legations in Peking. He himself -disavows giving in "Indiscreet Letters from Peking" a recital of -actual facts. He told me: "I wished to give the psychology of a siege, -selecting from the abundant material significant facts and expressions, -but I was not in any sense attempting to chronicle events and personal -actions." - -Mr. Simpson has also written a series of novels dealing with Chinese -life. The short stories are the best; the longer ones, while -interesting in description and clever in dialogue, lack that intuitive -power of characterization which is found in the greatest novels, though -"Wang the Ninth" which has recently come from the press is an admirable -study of Chinese psychology and an excellent story as well. Though his -playful and cynical mind often led people to judge that he was working -solely for literary effect, it seemed to me he had a deep appreciation -of what China should mean to the world; he also had real sympathy for -the Chinese, and desired in every way to help them to realize the great -promise of their country and people. As a conversationalist Mr. Simpson -resembled Macaulay, in that his interludes of silence were infrequent. -Notwithstanding the brilliance of this conversation, luncheon parties -of men occasionally seemed to become restive under a monologue which -gave few others a chance to wedge in a word. - -Aside from these three British writers, many other men were following -with intelligent interest the course of events. Bishop Bashford, gifted -with a broad and statesmanlike mind, could always be trusted to give -passing events significant interpretations. Dr. W.A.P. Martin had then -reached an age at which the individual details of current affairs no -longer interested him. His intimate friend, Dr. Arthur H. Smith--a -rarely brilliant extemporaneous speaker--was full of witty and incisive -observations, often deeply pessimistic, though tempered with a deep -friendship for the Chinese people. - -Among the members of the diplomatic corps it was chiefly the Chinese -secretaries who busied themselves, out of professional interest with -the details of Chinese affairs, although they did not in all cases -exhibit a broad grasp of the situation. - -Mr. Willys R. Peck, Chinese secretary of the American Legation, born in -China, had a complete mastery of the difficult language of the country. -He could use it with a colloquial ease that contrasted most pleasantly -with the stilted and stiff enunciation of the ordinary foreigner -speaking Chinese. His tact in intercourse with the Chinese and his -judgment on character and political affairs could be relied on. Mr. -Peck took the place of Mr. E.T. Williams, who was called to Washington -as chief of the Far Eastern Division in the State Department. I -considered it great good fortune that there should be at the Department -a man so experienced and so familiar with Chinese affairs. - -It was my good fortune to have as first secretary of the legation a man -exceptionally qualified to cope with the difficulties and intricacies -of Chinese affairs. Not only are these affairs infinitely complex in -themselves, but they have been overlaid through many decades with a web -of foreign treaty provisions, which makes them still more baffling to -the stranger who tackles them. But Mr. J.V.A. MacMurray, the secretary, -was possessed of a keenly analytical, legally trained mind which was -able to cut through the most hopelessly tangled snarl of local custom, -national law, international agreement, and general equity. Also his -interest in things Chinese was so deep and genuine that his researches -were never perfunctory. The son of a soldier, he had an almost -religious devotion to the idea of public service. - -Among the ministers themselves, Sir John Jordan, actual Dean of the -Diplomatic Corps, was through long experience and careful attention -to affairs most fitted to speak with authority on things Chinese. I -was immediately greatly attracted to him and formed with him a close -acquaintanceship. This led to constant coöperation throughout the -difficult years that lay ahead. Sir John was a man of unusually long -and varied experience in China. He came first to the consular service, -then became minister resident in Korea, and his forty years of official -work had given him complete intimacy with Chinese affairs. Although he -speaks Chinese with fluency, in official interviews and conversations -he was always accompanied by his Chinese secretary and expressed -himself formally in English. As a matter of fact, few diplomats -ever use the Chinese language in official conversation. Because of -its infinite shades of meaning it is a complex and rather unprecise -medium, therefore misunderstandings are more readily avoided through -the concurrent use of another language. While Sir John understood -Chinese character and affairs and was sympathetic with the country in -which his life work had been spent, yet there dwelt in him no spirit -of easy compliance. When he considered it necessary, he could insist -so strongly and so emphatically upon the action he desired taken -that the Chinese often thought of him as harsh and unrelenting: yet -they always respected his essentially English spirit of fairness and -straightforwardness. - -Other colleagues with whom close relationships grew up were Don Luis -Pastor, the Spanish minister, a gentleman thoroughly American in -his ways and familiar through long residence in Washington with our -affairs; and Count Sforza, the Italian minister. To the latter China -seemed more or less a place of exile; he appeared bored and only -moderately interested in the affairs about him. But his legation--with -Countess Sforza, Madame Varè, whose Lombard beauty did not suggest her -Scotch origin; the Marquise Denti, with her quizzical, Mona Lisa-like -haunting smile, concealing great ennui; and the entirely girlish and -playful Countess Zavagli, a figure which might have stepped out of a -Watteau--was a most charming social centre. M. Beelaerts van Blokland, -the Netherlands minister, a man of clear-thinking, keen mind, and great -reasonableness, and the Austrian minister, M. von Rosthorn, a profound -Chinese scholar, who was then working on a Chinese history, were men of -whom I saw much during these years. - -There were few sinologists in Peking at this time. The successive -Chinese secretaries of the American Legation ranked high in this -respect. Of resident sinologists the most noted, Mr. (later Sir) Edward -Backhouse was a recluse, who never allowed himself to be seen in the -company of other people of a Western race. At the only period when I -had long conversations with him I found him much disturbed by wild -rumours current in the Chinese quarter to which I could not attach any -weight. Others whose knowledge of Chinese was exceptional were Mr. -Sidney Mayers, representative of the British China Corporation, who had -formerly been in the consular service; Doctor Gattrell, who had acted -as secretary of the American Group; Mr. W.B. Pettus, the director of -the Peking Language School; Mr. Simpson, already mentioned; and several -missionaries and professors at Peking University. - -Of the Chinese there were, of course, many with whom I could -profitably discuss the events of the day and gather suggestions and -interpretations of value. With all these men I conversed upon events, -relying for my information not on rumours or reports, but on the facts -which I could learn through the men directly concerned; or through -others well informed. The opinion which I formed from such various -sources about the political condition of China at this time, the spring -of 1914, may be stated as follows: - -The political authority of the Central Government in China rested upon -military organization. Other sources of authority, such as customary -submission on the one hand, and the support based upon the intelligent -coöperation of all classes of citizens in the achievement of the -purposes of government in accordance with public opinion on the other, -were only of secondary influence. It was therefore important to inquire -whether the military power was so organized as to afford a stabilizing -support to public authority. This did not seem to be the case. - -In the first place, the existence of a large army of doubtful -efficiency was in itself an evil, considering the then limited -resources of the Chinese State, and the fact that any attempt to reduce -the military forces to more reasonable dimensions met with stubborn -opposition. Whenever troops were disbanded they showed no tendency to -return to useful occupations: the ex-soldiers desired only to continue -to live upon the country, and, no longer serving the established -authority, they joined bandit gangs, rendering the interior of the -majority of the provinces insecure. - -The weakness of the army was strikingly demonstrated whenever an -attempt was made to use it to defend the country against either -external or internal enemies. In the campaign against the Mongols, the -Chinese troops had failed entirely; even within the country itself, -this huge army was not able to insure the fulfilment of that first -duty of a government--the protection of the lives and property of its -citizens. - -In the provinces of Honan and Hupei brigands, led by a person known as -"White Wolf," had for months been terrifying the population; ravaging -the countryside; sacking walled cities; murdering and outraging the -population; and in a number of instances had killed foreigners. Thus -far the army had been powerless to suppress these brigands; in fact, -evidence was at hand that the troops had repeatedly been so lax and -remiss that the only explanation of their conduct would seem to lie in -a secret connivance at the brigandage, and lack of coöperation among -the commanders of the troops. - -As the authority of the Central Government was commensurate with its -control over the tutuhs (tuchuns), or military governors, the attitude -of the latter toward the President had to be carefully watched; and it -was causing no small uneasiness that there did not seem to be perfect -agreement among these pillars of authority in the various provinces; -thus, friction had recently been reported between General Tuan -Chi-jui, the Minister of War, who was the acting tutuh of Hupei, and -General Feng Kuo-chang, the tutuh of Kiangsu, two of the most powerful -supporters of the President. - -None of the provinces of China, during the preceding three months, had -been free from brigandage, attempted rebellion, troubles resulting from -the disbanding of troops, and local riots. Conditions were worst in the -provinces of Honan and Hupei, in which the bands of "White Wolf" are -operating. - -These bands had assumed a distinctly anti-foreign attitude. In -Kansu there were constant Mohammedan uprisings, related to the open -rebellion in Tibet and Mongolia. Bandit movements had also occurred -in the provinces of Shansi, Shensi, Szechuan (super-added to revolts -of the troops), Anhui, Kiangsi, Hunan, Fukien, Kweichow, Yunnan, and -Kwangtung. Chekiang, Kwangsi, Shantung, and Chihli had been the least -molested. - -While the Government had been unable to fulfil its duty of protecting -the lives and property of its citizens, it was also unable to exercise -the elementary power of providing, through taxation, the means for its -own support. The maintenance of the army had eaten up the available -means and it had not been possible to secure sufficient money from -the provinces to meet the ordinary running expenses of the Central -Government. The remarkable resisting power of China is illustrated -by the fact that, notwithstanding the conditions of rebellion and -political unrest which characterized the year 1913, general commerce -remained so active that the collections of the Customs and of the -Salt Gabelle exceeded those of any previous year. These two sources -of revenue were sufficient to provide for the interest payments and -amortization of the long-term foreign loans then contracted; their -administration, under foreign control, had secured to the Central -Government the funds to meet these obligations and to avoid open -bankruptcy. - -All other forms of taxation were disorganized. The collection of the -land tax was in many places discontinued; records had been destroyed, -or the population took an attitude hostile to its collection. The -proceeds of the _likin_, as far as collected, were retained for -provincial use. Altogether, the Central Government received from the -provinces not more than 10 per cent. of the estimated income from these -sources under the last Imperial Budget for 1912. - -Meanwhile, the Central Government had been living from hand to mouth, -using the proceeds of foreign loans for administrative purposes, and -was kept going by taking cash advances upon foreign loan contracts made -for furnishing materials and for various concessions. In this way the -future had been discounted to a dangerous extent. - -The weakness of the financial administration of the Government was -found in all other branches of its activities. There was little -evidence of constructive capacity. - -In the ministries and departments of the Central Government the -greatest disorganization was apparent. In dealing with technical -questions the officials were often entirely at sea, not being trained -themselves in these matters, nor willing to make real use of the many -advisers who were engaged by the Government; there was no adequate -system of accounting; the departmental records were not well kept; -frequently the existence of a transaction was not known to the -officials most nearly concerned; past transactions, fully consummated, -had been forgotten; there was no centralization of governmental -knowledge; so a great deal of the public business was transacted in a -haphazard way, leading to a helpless opportunism of doing the things -most strongly urged and of grasping at small immediate advantages at -the cost of engagements long to be regretted. - -Ambitious schemes of general policy had been brought up, and elaborate -regulations promulgated, to all of which little attention was -subsequently paid. On the other hand, there had scarcely been one -single concrete result obtained in constructive work. - -The metropolitan Province of Chihli had been quiet and peaceful since -the outbreak of 1912. The Government here certainly had sufficient -authority to introduce constructive reforms, and the general conditions -for such action in this province had been relatively most favourable. -But not even in the case of Chihli Province had the taxation system -been rendered efficient; no efficient auditing methods had been -introduced in practice, although systems of auditing control had been -promulgated; educational institutions had been allowed to run down: in -short, under the most favourable conditions, no constructive work had -been accomplished. - -Nearly all attempts to do something of a constructive nature had been -immediately associated with foreign loans, often involving a cash -advance to the Government. It might, of course, be said that the great -difficulty of the Chinese Government was exactly that it lacked the -funds for carrying out constructive work; and that, therefore, only -such lines of improvement could be followed for which it had been -possible to secure foreign loans. - -This, however, was only partly true. A great many reforms could have -been accomplished without the increase of expenditure; indeed, they -would have resulted in a reduction of outlay. The fact seemed to be -that the Central Government, realizing how important foreign financial -support had been to it during the Revolution of 1913, was anxious to -secure more and more funds from abroad without counting the ultimate -cost. - -An opportunity for obtaining from abroad large sums of money, far -beyond any amount ever before dealt with by Chinese officials and -merchants, in itself had an unsettling effect upon methods of public -business. The old caution and economy, which kept the public debt -within narrow limits, had given way to a readiness to obtain funds -from abroad in enormous amounts, without apparently the realization -of the burden imposed upon China by way of the necessity of return in -the future through the results of labour and sacrifice of millions of -people. - -Nor had the old system, under which the inadequate salaries of -officials had ordinarily to be supplemented by extraneous illicit -gains, given way to a more efficient and business-like organization of -the public service under which officials would be able to devote their -undivided attention to the accomplishment of their regular allotted -tasks without spending their energy in contriving additional means of -obtaining income. - -In the case of certain classes of officials, the Government had -endeavoured to place their salaries at a figure sufficient to render -them independent of these practices; but the resources of the -Government were not adequate to enable it at once to place the entire -public service upon a basis of individual independence. It was also -true that certain among the closest advisers of the President were -commonly believed to have used their positions for the purpose of -accumulating vast private fortunes--a belief which, whether justified -or not, must be counted with in determining the standing of the -Government as enjoyed throughout the country. - -Thus the old hostility and lack of confidence, which formerly -characterized the relations between merchants and officials, continued -under the new system. - -Through the dissolution of the Parliament, the Government had destroyed -an organ which might, in the course of time, have established relations -of confidence between the great middle class of China and the -Government. - -As a statesman, the President emphasized in the first place the -requirements of order and of authority. To him it seemed that -Parliament, with its free discussion, with its opportunity for forming -political factions, opposing the men in authority, stood in the way of -the establishment of a lasting system of legal order. He, therefore, -dissolved first the national parliament, then the assemblies of the -provinces, and finally the local self-governing bodies. - -In each case inefficiency was justly complained of. The men in -the parliamentary bodies had often been self-seeking, factional, -and unpractical. But the President seemed to have no perception -of the true value of parliamentary action as a basis of public -authority; he considered opposition to the Government synonymous -with opposition to lawful authority. And in his ideas upon the -reconstitution of Parliament, as far as they had been announced, two -main principles dominated: first, that only men of mature experience -and of conservative ideas should be selected; and secondly, that the -activities of Parliament should be confined to discussing and giving -advice upon policies already determined upon by the Administration. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -CHINA OF MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS - - -The past may become in the human present more alive than ever. John -Richard Green finds in the old records of the guilds of Berwick an -enactment "that where many bodies are found side by side in one place -they may become one, and have one will, and in the dealings of one -with another have a strong and hearty love." In the history of the -Saxons, Edwin of Northumbria "caused stakes to be fixed in the highways -where he had seen a clear spring," and "brazen dishes were chained to -them, to refresh the weary sojourner, whose fatigues Edwin had himself -experienced." These things shine with the sun, and enlighten our work -to-day. The Maine woodsman sits on a stump whose rings number centuries -of growth. When Chinese children came to play with our children at the -Legation, I was always impressed by their dignity of demeanour and -their observance of the courtesies while their elders were present. -On the faces of these little heirs of the Holy Duke the composure of -eighty generations of culture and traditions sat freshly; and it by no -means alloyed their delight, which was unstinted, in American toys and -dolls. - -This transmutation of the old into new life is seen everywhere in -China. The day comes every morning fresh as a flower. But we know it -is old; it is an ancient day, white-clad and beautiful as the stars. -The Chinese peasant thrusts his stick of a plough many eons deep into -his ancestral soil. In north China it is loess soil, the most fertile -on the globe, brought down from the mountains for millenniums and -deposited to depths of from twenty to thirty feet. When there are no -floods the rain sinks deeply into this porous soil, meets the moisture -retained below, and draws up therefrom the inorganic salts that are -held dissolved. So its fertility is inexhaustible. - -But floods do come, as they have come unchecked for ages. In the Hwai -River region, with all this natural richness underfoot, the people are -poor, weak, famine-stricken, living in aggregations of shabby hovels -that are periodically swept away. Its crops, which should normally -be six in three years, average but two and three. This region is -only one example of several prodigious and extensive valleys choked -with fertility, yet with famine and pestilence raging through them, -cursed as they are by inundations that might be completely checked -at little engineering cost. With these regions reclaimed and the -border provinces colonized, China's crops alone would support double -her present population. The people of the Hwai region, secure and -affluent, might be easily increased by twenty million living heirs -of a fifty-centuries-old civilization. Indeed, a little vision and -scientific application would transform China. - -With what the ages have produced for the West--the old guild spirit -reviving, if you please, in the modern trust--the West can meet -the East. The true ministers and ambassadors to China are the -merchant-adventurers of the Western nations, bearing their goods, their -steel and tools, their unique engineering skill and works. It was not -for what the _entrepreneurs_ "could get out of" China, nor yet for -what China could get out of us, that my policy as American minister -was directed to this complementary meeting of two civilizations. It -was because I saw millions perishing wretchedly whose birthright in -the higher arts and amenities of living is at least as rich as our -own--perishing for lack of an organizing skill which it is the province -of the Western peoples to supply. It was because I knew, with their -admirable family life and local democratic institutions, it needed -only trunk-line railways to link together these close-set communities, -comprising one quarter of the earth's population, into as admirable a -central democracy. - -But how the West was then meeting the East came home to me on the -second morning of my stay in Peking. I entered the breakfast room, -where I found Doctor Hornbeck in a state of annoyance. He handed me the -morning copy of the _Journal de Peking_, a sheet published in French -and known to be subservient to Russian and French political interests -from which it got subventions. The article in question was a scurrilous -attack on me personally, and on American action in China generally. - -A Chinese journal in Shanghai had published a laudatory article -in which had been cited extracts from my published books. One of -these, taken from "World Politics," had happened to speak of French -subserviency to Russian policy in the Far East. The French journal -repeated these expressions as if they had been given out by me in an -interview upon arriving in China. As they were in fact taken from books -published more than ten years before, which had run the gauntlet of -French critical journals without ever having been taken as hostile to -France, I did not have any reason to worry, and the fume and fury of -the local journal rather amused me than otherwise. I could, however, -not help noting the temper of these attacks, their bitterness and the -utter rashness and lack of inquiry with which the charges were made. -It gave me early warning, considering its gross lack of courtesy to a -newcomer, who had entered the field in a spirit friendly to all, as to -what might be expected from some of our friendly rivals. When several -years later one of the ministers whose legation stood sponsor for this -sheet approached me with a request to use my influence to suppress a -Chinese paper which had attacked him, I regretted that it was not in my -power to be of assistance. - -The significance of the article lay of course in its attack upon -American policy, which was characterized as one of "bluff", and which -charged the United States with assuming a tone of superior virtue -in criticising others, and, while loudly professing friendship for -the Chinese, failing to shoulder any part of the responsibility in -actual affairs. The Y.M.C.A. and the Standard Oil Company were coupled -together as twin instruments of a nefarious and hypocritical policy. - -The _China Press_, the American newspaper of Shanghai, pointed out that -the attack of the French paper indicated what the American minister -would have to face, and observed that the success or failure of his -diplomatic mission must depend upon the readiness of the American -Government to take an active part in the rehabilitation of China. -Should America play the rôle of an altruistic but impotent friend, -and of a captious critic of the other powers, it could gain neither -sympathy nor respect. - -The American Government was at this time severely criticised for -its failure to endorse the Six-Power Consortium; it was urged that -the Administration had sacrificed the best opportunity for bringing -American goodwill to bear on Chinese public affairs, by exercising -a moderating and friendly influence in the council of the great -powers. On the other hand, it ought to be considered that a new -administration, when confronted with the sudden proposal that it -give _exclusive_ support to one special group of banks, might well -hesitate, particularly in view of the fact that the group in this case -consisted of only four New York houses. An earlier administration had -answered such an inquiry in a similar way. Considering the merits -of the question from the point of view of China, the action might -present itself in the light of a refusal to join with others in placing -upon the young republic the fetters of foreign financial control. -Moreover, the proceeds of the Reorganization Loan were actually not -used for the benefit of the Chinese people, but on the contrary this -financial support fastened the personal authority of Yuan Shih-kai -on the country and enabled him to carry on a successful fight against -parliament. That body never gave its approval to the loan. - -From my conversations with President Wilson before departing for my -post I had formed the conclusion that the President realized that -as America had withdrawn from a coöperative effort to assist in the -development of China, it was incumbent upon her to do her share -independently and to give specific moral and financial assistance; -in fact, I received the President's assurance of active support for -constructive work in China. In his conversation he dwelt, however, -more on the educational side and on political example and moral -encouragement, than on the matter of finance and commerce. - -It cannot be doubted that in China the withdrawal of the United -States from the Consortium was interpreted as an act of friendship -by all groups with the exception of that which was in control of the -Government at the time, which would have preferred to have the United -States at the council table of the Consortium Powers. Those opposed -to the Government were particularly strong in their commendation of -our refusal to join in an agreement which to them seemed far from -beneficial to China. But all parties without exception drew the -conclusion that the friendly action of the United States, which had -now rejected the method of international coöperation, would continue -independently of the others. In view of the power and resources of the -United States, it was hoped that there would be a greater participation -by the United States in Chinese industrial and commercial affairs, as -well as in administrative loans, than had hitherto existed. - -It is apparent from all this that the American position in China -was not free from difficulties. The covert antagonism of the five -Consortium Powers was continuous. We were isolated, and would be judged -by what we could do by ourselves. Should it turn out that we had -nothing to offer but sage advice, the strictures of our rivals might -in time come to carry a certain amount of conviction. - -So far as the Americans themselves were concerned, they were thoroughly -discouraged, and everywhere talked as if it were all up with American -enterprise in China. When I said: "No, it is only just beginning," -polite incredulity was the best I could expect. It is very probable -that the Americans who were so downcast saw in the appointment of -a literary and university man as minister to China an additional -indication that there was to be no special encouragement given to -American economic enterprise. Having long been familiar with the -underlying facts of the Far Eastern situation, I had entirely made -up my mind on the primary importance of American participation in -the industrial and economic development of China. No one could have -appreciated more highly than I did the important work done by American -missionaries, teachers, and medical men, in bringing to China a -conception of Western learning and life. But if China should have -to rely entirely on other nations for active support in the modern -development of her industries and resources, then our position in the -eyes of the Chinese nation could never come up to the opportunities -which Nature had given us through our geographic position and our -industrial strength. - -I had long discarded any narrow interpretation of diplomacy, but even -if I had adhered to the principle that the diplomat must busy himself -only with political matters, I should have had to admit that in China -political matters included commerce, finance, and industry. I did not, -of course, intend that the Legation should enter into a scramble for -concessions, but it was my purpose that it should maintain sympathetic -contact with Americans active in the economic life of China, and should -see to it that the desire of the Chinese to give them fair treatment -should not be defeated from any other source. - -When I thought of American enterprise in China I had less in mind the -making of government contracts, than the gaining of the confidence of -the Chinese people in the various provincial centres of enterprise -by extensive business undertakings, resting on a sound and broad -foundation. In China the people are vastly more important than the -Government, so that it is necessary to make up one's mind from the -start not to regard Peking as the end-all and be-all of one's activity, -but to interest one's self deeply in what is going on in all of those -important interior centres where the real power of government over the -people is exercised, and where the active organizations of the people -are located. - -The universal knowledge that America has no political aims in China, of -itself gives Americans the confidence of the Chinese and predisposes -the latter to favour intimate coöperation. Our policy is known to be -constructive and not to imply insidious dangers to their national life. -It would be discouraging to the Chinese, should Americans fail to take -a prominent part in the development of Chinese resources. To Americans -the idea of securing preëminence or predominance is foreign, but from -the very nature of their purely economic interest they have to resist -any attempt on the part of others to get exclusive rights or a position -of predominance, which could be utilized to restrict, or entirely to -extinguish, American opportunities. - -I was therefore resolved to give every legitimate encouragement to -constructive enterprise, whether it were in education, finance, -commerce, or industry.[1] Fully a year before going to China I had -expressed my view of the nature of American policy there, saying that -a united China, master of its own land, developing its resources, open -to all nations of the world equally for commercial and industrial -activity, should be the chief desideratum. - -Among the specific American interests already existing in China, that -of missionary and educational work had at this time to be given the -first rank. There are two factors which have made it possible for this -work to achieve a really notable influence. The one is that it is -plainly the result of individual impulse on the part of a great many -people animated by friendly motives, and not the result of a concerted -plan of propaganda. The second factor is the spirit of helpfulness and -coöperation which permeates this work. There is no trace of a desire to -establish a permanent tutelage. An institution like the Y.M.C.A. acts -with the sole thought of helping the Chinese to a better organization -of their own social and educational life. The sooner they are able -to manage for themselves, the better it seems to please the American -teachers, who may remain for a while as friendly counsellors, but who -make no effort to set up a permanent hierarchy of supervision. The -Chinese have an intense respect for their educators, and it has been -the good fortune of many Americans--men like Dr. W.A.P. Martin and Dr. -Chas. D. Tenney--to win the devoted loyalty of innumerable Chinese -through their activity as teachers. - -Among commercial enterprises the Standard Oil Company was carrying -petroleum to all parts of China. It had introduced the use of the -petroleum lamp, had extended the length of the day to the hundreds -of millions of Chinese, and even its emptied tin cans had become -ubiquitous in town and country, because of the manifold uses to which -these receptacles could be put. For efficiency and close contact with -the people, the Chinese organization of this great company was indeed -admirable. - -A similar result had been obtained by the British-American Tobacco -Company, which, although organized in England under British law, is -American by majority ownership, business methods, and personnel. -The cigarette had been made of universal use, and had been adapted -to the taste and purchasing ability of the masses. Though there -were several American commission firms of good standing, none had -the extensive trade and financial importance of the great British -houses. Several American firm names established in China early in the -nineteenth century, like that of Frazar & Company, had become British -in ownership. The only American bank was the International Banking -Corporation, which at this time confined itself to exchange business -and did not differ in its policy or operations from the common run of -treaty port banks. - -If national standing in China were to be determined by the holding -of government concessions, America was at this time, indeed, poorly -equipped. The Bethlehem Steel Corporation had in 1910 concluded a -contract with the Imperial Government for the construction of vessels -to the value of $20,000,000. When I came to China, a vice-president -of the corporation, Mr. Archibald Johnston, was in Peking, ready -to arrange with the republican government for a continuance of the -contract. The American banking group was a partner in the Hukuang -Railways, in which it shared with the British, French, and German -groups. An American engineer was employed at the time in making a -survey of a portion of the proposed line along the Yangtse River. The -American group also held the concession for the Chinchow-Aigun Railway -in Manchuria, the execution of which had been blocked by Russia and -Japan. The group further participated with the three other groups above -mentioned in the option for a currency loan. The only activity going on -at this time in connection with these various contracts, on the part of -America, was the survey of the Hukuang railway line west of Ichang. - -For some time the practice had grown up, on the part of European -powers, to urge the Chinese to employ, as advisers, men reputed to have -expert knowledge in certain fields. The most noted adviser at this time -was Dr. George Morrison, who had gained a reputation in interpreting -Far Eastern affairs as Peking correspondent for the London _Times_ -during and after the critical period of 1900. A fresh group of advisers -had just been added under the terms of the Reorganization Loan. Each -power therein represented had insisted that the Chinese appoint at -least one of its nationals as an adviser. The American Government had -never urged China to make such an appointment. But when President Eliot -visited China in 1913, Chinese officials expressed to him the wish -that a prominent American should be retained as adviser to the Chinese -Government. President Eliot suggested that the Carnegie Endowment might -propose certain experts from whom the Chinese Government could then -make a selection. This method was actually followed, and as a result -Prof. F.J. Goodnow of Columbia University, a recognized authority -on constitutional law, had been retained by the Chinese Government -and was at this time already in residence at Peking. The Ministry of -Communications on its part had sought a man familiar with railway -accounting, and had called upon the late Prof. Henry C. Adams, the -noted economist and railway expert of Michigan University. - -The important administrative positions of Inspector General of Customs -and of Foreign Inspector of the Salt Revenue were held by two British -officials. The salt administration had come within the purview of -international supervision through the Reorganization Loan agreement; -and, as America was not a party to that loan, the appointment of -Americans to any positions in this service was frowned upon by several -of the partners. The Inspector, Sir Richard Dane, an official of long -experience in India, however, adopted the policy of not confining the -appointments to subjects of the Consortium Powers. He had retained -several Americans, in whom he seemed to place great confidence. In the -Customs Service, Americans did not hold the number of positions to -which they were relatively entitled. This was undoubtedly due to the -fact that very few people in the United States knew that such positions -in China are open to Americans; moreover, many of those Americans -who were actually appointed had become impatient with the relatively -slow advancement in this service and had been attracted by other -opportunities. There were, however, a number of highly reputed and -efficient American officials in the Customs Service. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[Footnote 1: The leading British paper of China had this to say -concerning the modern functions of diplomacy: "It is characteristic of -Doctor Reinsch and his outlook upon China that he should mark a point -of progress in the fact that the legations are ceasing to be merely -political centres, and that, instead of politics being the one and only -object of their existence, they are now establishing relations of all -kinds of mutual helpfulness in vital phases of national reorganization. -In this connection, we may see an increase in the number of experts -who will come, unofficially for the most part, to study conditions and -gather data which may be available as a sure foundation for progress." -I may say in passing that the British papers in China, throughout the -period of my work there, were almost uniformly fair and friendly, and -gave credit for honest efforts to improve conditions.] - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -PROMPT PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN ACTION - - -The Chinese were not slow in showing what conclusions they deduced -from the withdrawal of the American Government from the Six-Power -Consortium. On November 27th, two cabinet ministers called on me for -a private conversation. Following this interview Mr. Chang Chien, -recognized master of antique Chinese learning, but also Minister of -Industries and Commerce, came to me. I will relate the substance of -what passed on these two occasions, beginning with Mr. Chang. - -Chang Chien carried off first honours in the great metropolitan -examinations of Peking under the old régime in 1899. He is a scholar -_par excellence_ of the Chinese classics, and his chirography is so -famous that he has been able to support a college out of the proceeds -of a sale of examples of his writing. But he has not rested satisfied -with the ancient learning. In the region of his home, Nan Tung-chow, on -the banks of the Yangtse, he has established schools, factories, and -experiment stations for the improvement of agriculture and industry. -He had financial reverses. People at this time still doubted whether -he would be permanently successful, although they admitted that he -had given impetus to many improvements. Since then his enterprises -have flourished and multiplied. He has become a great national figure, -whose words, spoken from an honest desire for right public action, -have decisive weight with the nation. While he still represents the -old belief that the superior man of perfect literary training should -be able successfully to undertake any enterprise and to solve any -practical difficulty--which belief is contrary to the demands of our -complex modern life for specialization--yet he has succeeded in bending -his intelligence to thoroughly modern tasks. - -As would be expected from his high culture as a Chinese scholar, -Mr. Chang Chien is a man of refinement and distinction of manners, -than which nothing could be more considerate and more dignified. The -Chinese are exceedingly sensitive to the thought and feeling of any -one in whose company they happen to be; if their host is busy or -preoccupied, no matter how politely he may receive them, they will -nevertheless sense his difficulty and will cut their visit short. They -also have great tact in turning a conversation or avoiding discussions -they are not ready for, and they can do this in a manner which makes -it impossible to force a discussion without impolite insistence. -The smoothness and velvetiness of Chinese manners, together with -the absence of all servile assent and the maintenance of complete -independence of discussion, are marvellous and bear evidence to -thousands of years of social training. - -Mr. Chang Chien was particularly interested in river and harbour -development, and in plans for the drainage of those regions of -China which are subject to periodical floods. It was contemplated -to establish a special conservancy bureau under whose care surveys -for important projects were to be undertaken. I questioned Mr. Chang -concerning the status of the Hwai River conservancy scheme for the -prevention of floods in the northern portion of the provinces of -Kiangsu and Anhui, the region from which he came. - -"I have already established a special engineering school," he replied, -"in order to train men for this work. A large part of the survey has -been made, and it can be entirely completed by a further expenditure of -35,000 taels. - -"Besides the enormous benefit of such a work to all the adjoining -agricultural lands," he continued, "there would be reclaimed nearly -3,000,000 acres which could now not be used at all, although their soil -is inexhaustibly fertile. The land thus reclaimed would be salable -immediately for at least $40 an acre. Would not this alone be ample -security for a large conservancy loan? $25,000,000 would do the work." - -Mr. Chang was also interested in the establishment of a commercial and -industrial bank, in copartnership with American capitalists. "Such a -bank," he said, "would assist in furnishing the capital for the works -of internal improvement." - -It was quite plain that Mr. Chang looked upon a bank as an institution -which would invest its capital in such enterprises--a conception which -was then quite current among the Chinese. They had not yet fully -realized that in the modern organization of credit a bank may act as a -depository and may make temporary loans, but more permanent investments -must ultimately be placed with individual capitalists, with banks -acting only as underwriting and selling agencies. - -As we talked about the execution of these large and useful projects, -Mr. Chang repeatedly made expressions such as this: "I prefer American -coöperation. I am ready to employ American experts to work out the -plans and to act as supervisors. But please to bear in mind, these -works may not be undertaken without raising a large part of the needed -funds in the United States or in other countries." - -When the two cabinet ministers called they brought no interpreter. "The -matters about which we wish to talk," they said, "are so important that -we wish to keep the discussion confined to as few persons as possible. -We bring the ideas of President Yuan Shih-kai and his government with -respect to what Americans might do in China." - -They first gave me a review of the recent development of the -Russo-Japanese entente with respect to Manchuria and Mongolia. They -expressed their belief that an understanding existed between these -powers to treat outer Mongolia as a region within which Russian -control should not be obstructed, and, _vice versa_, to allow a free -hand to Japan, not only in southern Manchuria, but also in eastern -Mongolia. Continuous activity of the Japanese in south China, in -stirring up opposition to the Central Government, indicated a desire -to weaken China, and, if possible, to divide it against itself. The -extraordinary efforts made by Japan to increase her naval establishment -were also particularly mentioned. The impression their discourse -conveyed was that Japan was engaged in a strong forward policy in -China, and that in this she had the countenance and support of Russia. - -My visitors then passed on to the reasons why the Chinese entertained -the hope that America would give them its moral support to the extent -of opposing the inroads made by Japan and Russia, and of coöperating -with Great Britain and other powers favourable to the Open Door policy -in preventing attempts to break up the Chinese Republic. They fully -realized the improbability of an alliance between China and the United -States, but laid stress on the parallel interests of the two countries, -and particularly on the sympathy engendered through following the -principles of democratic government. Having become a republic, the -Chinese Government is brought into peculiarly close relationship to -the United States; it sees in the United States its most sincere and -unselfish friend, and realizes the importance of American moral support. - -Descending to particulars, the ministers pointed out that while China -appreciated and valued the friendly interest and counsel of the United -States, it was disappointing that so very little had been done by -America, while the European Powers and Japan should have taken such a -very important part in the development of the resources of China. They -said that the Chinese Government and people were desirous of affording -the Americans unusual opportunities, should they be ready to coöperate. - -Taking up specific enterprises, they stated that the Government was -quite willing to ratify and carry out the contract made in 1910 by -the Imperial Government with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Under -this contract they intended to build vessels adapted for commercial -purposes, but convertible into warships somewhat like the vessels of -the Russian Volunteer Fleet. The establishment of a steamship line to -the United States, directly or by way of the Panama Canal, was greatly -desired by the Government. - -It was recalled that at the time the naval mission of Prince Tsao -visited the United States, the matter of lending American experts -as instructors for the Chinese navy came up for discussion, and -such assistance was promised by the American Administration under -President Taft. The assistance contemplated was to be instructional and -technical, not involving matters of policy or suggesting a political -alliance, and of a nature such as had been in the past given by other -nations, particularly Great Britain. The ministers stated that the -Chinese Government still intended to avail itself of this assistance -should the need for it arise, and that American coöperation in a matter -like this was preferred because of the political disinterestedness of -the American Government. - -The ministers then took up more purely industrial enterprises, and -dwelt particularly on plans for river and harbour improvement, -mentioning the Hwai River region and other districts where agricultural -pursuits are interrupted by destructive floods. As the Central -Government contemplated the establishment of a national bureau to -provide for these matters, the ministers suggested that the American -Government would be invited to give its assistance by lending experts -to plan and conduct the proposed works. They expressed their belief -that the experience of Americans in such enterprises had qualified them -above any other nation for coping with these problems of China. - -Other matters were taken up, such as the possible creation of a -tobacco monopoly, from which the ministers expected both increased -revenue and a more effective organization of tobacco production -throughout China. It was not their desire to oust the British-American -Tobacco Company, but they suggested that an arrangement would be made -whereby this company might act as the selling agent of the Chinese -Government. - -Another subject was the exploration of China for petroleum. They stated -that the Government wished that the development of oil fields should -be undertaken. On account of the manner in which some other nations -were wont to extend the scope of any concessions of this kind so as -to establish general claims of preference, particularly as to railway -rights, the Government much preferred to take up this matter with -Americans. - -It was apparent that these men entertained high hopes of American -activity in China, and that they were ready to do their part in making -the conditions favourable. Their minds were alive with plans of -development. Both because of American experience with similar problems -and of the American spirit of fairness, they believed that great -benefit would result if Americans were to become prominently active -in the vast industrial transformation which they anticipated in the -immediate future. - -As this conversation passed from topic to topic, touching on proposals -of moment, I could not but feel that a new spirit had surely arisen -in China. It would have been inconceivable under the old régime for -high officials, trained in the traditional formalism and reticent -with inherited distrust of the foreigner, to approach a foreign -representative thus frankly, laying before him concrete proposals for -joint action. In the past, as we know, it was the foreigners who had -desired changes and new enterprises and who had in and out of season -pressed them upon the reluctant and inert Chinese officials. But here -were men who realized that it is the function of the Government to -plan and to initiate; and they were ready to go to any length in making -advances to a country in whose motives they had full confidence. - -It was impossible not to be fascinated by the prospects that were here -unfolded. A country of vast resources in natural wealth, labour, power, -and even in capital, was turning toward a new form of organization in -which all these forces were to be made to work in larger units, over -greater areas and with more intensive methods than ever before. The -merely local point of view was giving way to the national outlook. -National resources and industries were looked at not from the point of -view alone of any local group interested but of the unity of national -life and effort. To know that in this great task of reorganization, -Americans would be most welcome as associates and directors; that -they were spontaneously and sincerely desired in order that all these -materials and resources might the more readily be built into a great -and effective unity of national life--that, indeed, could not fail -to be a cause for pride and gratification to an American. The only -disturbing thought was the question whether Americans were ready to -appreciate the importance of the opportunity here offered. Yet there -could be no doubt that every energy must be applied in order to make -them realize the unprecedented nature of the opportunities and the -importance to America herself of the manner in which these materials -were to be organized so as to promote general human welfare rather than -selfish exploitation and political ambition. - -The Russian efforts to strengthen their position in Mongolia, to which -these two visitors had alluded, had at this time brought fruit in the -form of an agreement with China to have the "autonomy" of Mongolia -recognized. A result and byplay of these negotiations came to the -notice of the foreign representatives in Peking at a meeting of the -diplomatic corps on December 11th. The meeting was at the British -Legation, to which Sir John Jordan had by this time returned. - -The head of the large establishment of the Russian Legation was a -young man, Mr. Krupenski. Trained under some of the ablest diplomats -of Russia and having spent many years in Peking as secretary, he had -manifestly not been selected by chance. With his English secretary -he occupied his vast house alone, being unmarried. He entertained -brilliantly, ably seconded therein by the Russo-Asiatic Bank across the -way. Besides his thorough understanding of the Chinese, Mr. Krupenski -had a valuable quality in his ability to shed all the odium that -might attach to the policy of his government, as a duck sheds water. -He appeared at times greatly to enjoy mystifying his colleagues, to -judge by his amused and unconcerned expression when he knew they were -guessing as to what his last move might mean. Mr. Krupenski is tall, -florid, unmistakably Russian. During my first visit with him he plunged -_in medias res_ concerning China. Though he probably wondered what move -I might contemplate after the Manchurian proposals of Mr. Knox and -America's withdrawal from the Six-Power Group, he gave no hint of his -feelings, which undoubtedly did not contemplate me as likely to become -an intimate associate in policies. When I left him I knew that here -was a man, surrounded by competent experts in finance, language, and -law, who could play with the intricacies of Chinese affairs and take -advantage of opportunities and situations of which others would not -even have an inkling. - -At the meeting of December 11th the Russian minister stated that he -desired to make an announcement, and proceeded to tell his colleagues -quite blandly that his government had decided to withdraw the legation -guards and other Russian troops from north China, and that they -suggested to the other governments to take similar action. - -This announcement caused surprise all around the table. Questions came -from all directions: "Is this action to be immediate?" "What is the -purpose of your government?" "What substitute for this protection do -you suggest?" These and many more. The Russian minister seemed amused -by the excitement he had caused. He allowed none of the questioners -to worry him in the least, or to draw him out. With a quizzical and -non-committal smile he let the anxious surmises of his colleagues -run off his back. He shrugged his shoulders and said: "These are the -instructions of my government. Their purpose--I do not know." When the -meeting adjourned, small groups walked off in different directions, all -still intently discussing the meaning of this move. So, the legation -guards were really very important! The first question put to me in -Shanghai had related to them, and here I found the diplomatic corps -thrown into excitement by the announcement that Russia was withdrawing -her guard. - -When I arrived at the Legation, where Mrs. Reinsch was receiving and -where visitors in large numbers were taking tea and dancing to the -music of the marine band, the news had evidently already preceded me, -for several people asked me what had happened; and Putnam Weale and -W.C. Donald, the British press representatives, were full of surmises. -The interpretation generally accepted was that the Russians, and -possibly the Japanese, were trying to put the other powers in a hole; -if they did not withdraw their legation guards they might displease the -Chinese Government, after what Russia had done; if they did withdraw -them, they would give an advantage to Russia and Japan, powers who, on -account of their proximity to China, could send large bodies of troops -upon short notice. - -From the attitude of the diplomats it had been apparent that the -proposal of the Russians would not prove acceptable. For weeks the -press was filled with attempts to gauge the true bearing of the -Russian proposal. Looked at from this distance after the Great War, -it is hard to imagine how so relatively unimportant a matter could -cause excitement. Of course, the removal of the legation guard was -not considered so important in itself, but it was of moment as an -indication of what Russia might plan with respect to the further -advance of her influence in China. - -Probably Russia's action did not really contemplate any far-reaching -consequences. The Russians were urging the Chinese Government to -make an arrangement for Mongolian "autonomy," which could not but -be intensely distasteful to the Chinese. The Russians had to offer -something in return; with thorough knowledge of the old type of the -Chinese official mind, they selected something which would not cost -them anything, but which would be most gratifying to the Chinese -Government. The Government looked upon the presence of foreign troops -in Peking and in Chihli Province as incompatible with its dignity. -Therefore, the Russian Government knew that through withdrawing its -troops and calling upon the other governments to do likewise, an -opportunity would be given the Chinese Government to claim an important -victory, and the bitterness of renunciation with respect to Mongolia -would thus be somewhat tempered. Yuan Shih-kai and the Government as -such would probably take that view; but the Chinese as individuals were -not likely thus to consider the presence of foreign troops an unmixed -evil. These guards tended to stabilize the situation, also to prevent -unconscionable acts or high-handed inroads by any individual powers. So -far as the people of China were concerned, Russia might not gather much -credit through this move. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -A LITTLE VISION FOR CHINA - - -I have said that a little vision and the application of American -scientific methods would transform China. Chang Chien had instanced the -Hwai River valley, and the ease with which it might be made to bloom -as the most fertile tract on the globe. China boasts the most skilled -horticulturists and truck-farmers of any nation, and they breed its -thousands of species of vegetables and flowering plants and shrubs. It -is said of the Chinese gardener, that if there is a sick or weakened -plant, he "listens and hears its cry," and nurses it into health like -a mother. But now the multitudes in the flood-ridden districts must -periodically expect the scarification of their gorgeous acres, the -bearing away of their dwellings and loved ones on the remorseless -floods. - -Americans had for some time been aware of the possibilities of -delivering from their curse these garden spots of earth. The American -Red Cross, after giving $400,000 for relief of the severe famine in -1911, was advised by its representatives how such calamities might be -prevented, and it set an American engineer at making surveys in the -Hwai regions and suggesting suitable engineering works. Chang Chien, -with his native school of engineers, was also investigating the flood -conditions, just about the time the American group of financiers left -the Six-Power Consortium. It might be expected that this American group -would be reluctant immediately to start further enterprises in China; -indeed, that it might even discourage others from starting. Hence I -thought it essential to propose only such undertakings as would come -naturally from past relationships or would help develop some American -interest already established in China. I was attracted by this plan, -sound, useful, and meritorious, to redeem the Hwai River region. - -I found that the Chinese did not wish to take up this matter with any -other nation than the United States, for they feared the territorial -ambitions of the other powers and their desire to establish "spheres of -influence" in China. To send in engineers, to drain and irrigate, meant -close contacts; it might mean control over internal resources within -the regions affected, for by way of security the foreign creditor would -demand a mortgage upon the lands to be improved. Then there was the -Grand Canal, a navigable watercourse, which would come within the scope -of such works, and would give the foreign engineers and capitalists a -direct means of penetrating the interior. Jealous of foreign political -control in their domestic affairs, the Chinese were guarding their -rights. But the American policy was traditionally non-aggressive, and I -found that to fair-minded Americans the Chinese would grant concessions -which no other nation might hope to secure. - -I therefore asked through the Department of State what the American Red -Cross might continue to do. Would it take steps toward the choosing -of a reputable and efficient American engineering firm and have this -firm supported by American capitalists, who might lend the Chinese -Government the funds needed to reclaim the rich Hwai River region? -The Red Cross responded favourably. I thereupon sought out Mr. Chang -Chien, the scholar and minister, and got from him a definite agreement -to entrust to the American Red Cross the selection of engineers and -capitalists to carry out this great reform upon conditions laid down. - -The minister and I had frequent conferences. We discussed carefully -the engineering contracts, the conditions of the loan, the security. -Every sentence in the proposed agreement had been weighed, every -word carefully chosen; finally, on January 27, 1914, it was signed -by Chang Chien as minister, and by myself in behalf of the American -Red Cross. The J.G. White Corporation was chosen to finance the -preliminary survey. Thus there were sent to China during the next -summer three experts: Colonel (later Major General) Sibert, of the -Panama Canal Commission; Mr. Arthur P. Davis, director of the United -States Reclamation Service; and Prof. D.W. Mead, of the University of -Wisconsin, an expert in hydraulic engineering. - -Here was a beginning of great promise, and in a new direction. - -But American enterprise had already affected the daily life of the -Chinese in the field opened up by the Standard Oil Company. In fact, -the lamp of Standard Oil had lighted China. - -Now enter Mr. Yamaza, the Japanese minister. Japan, who had no oil in -her lamp, wished to explore for it in China; so did other nations. But -the American oil company, in a way which I shall detail, had gotten -the concession. Moreover, the Bethlehem Steel Corporation had agreed -for $20,000,000 to build a merchant fleet for China, convertible into -cruisers--this to take the place of an old imperial contract for -warships. At China's express request, and not at all because they were -in that business, the Bethlehem people also consented to apply three -millions of the whole sum to improve a Chinese port. Together with the -Hwai River enterprise these American activities had put Japan on the -alert. The Japanese press had distorted their significance, and now in -the small Bethlehem contract Mr. Yamaza began to see things--a future -Chinese mistress of the Asian seas, perhaps, and the Chinese littoral -all besprinkled with naval ports. One evening Mr. Yamaza spoke to me -about it, and at length; it was plain that his government meant some -move. - -Now Mr. Yamaza and his first secretary, Mr. Midzuno, were both -unusually clever men. They drank a great deal. The minister explained -that he did this for reasons of health, because, unless there were -something he could give up if he should be taken sick, it might be -very bad for him. I recall how Mr. Midzuno entertained a party at -dinner by detailing his notable collection of expressions in various -languages, of equivalents to the German term "Katzenjammer." Both of -these men had previous Chinese experience and were intimately familiar -with Chinese affairs. Yamaza was a man of great shrewdness; being under -the influence of liquor seemed rather to sharpen his understanding. -Taciturn and speaking in hesitating sentences, he would never commit -himself to anything, but would deploy the conversation with great -skill, in order to give his interlocutor every chance to do that very -thing. - -On the evening of this conversation we were guests of the manager -of the Russo-Asiatic Bank. An amateur theatrical performance was in -progress--three French "one-acters," the chief being "The Man Who -Married a Dumb Wife," by Anatole France. Peking foreign society was -there in force; the majority were gathered in the large salon where the -stage was set, others promenading or conversing in small groups. In the -intermission between two plays I encountered the Japanese minister, -and, finding that he desired to talk, wandered with him to the smoking -room, where we pre-empted a corner, whence during a long conversation -we would catch now and then the echoes from the salon as the action on -the stage rose to a more excited pitch. - -Mr. Yamaza was more talkative than I had ever seen him. As was his -custom, he had consumed ardent waters quite freely, but, as always, -his mind was clear and alert. "In Shensi and Chihli provinces," he -opened up, "the exertions of Japanese nationals in the matter of the -concession to the Standard Oil Company have given them a right to be -considered. I have been contending to the Chinese that Japan has a -prior interest in the oil field of Shensi Province. Do you not know -that Japanese engineers were formerly employed there?" - -On my part, I expressed surprise that the Japanese papers should make -so much noise about the American oil concession, whereas it was quite -natural that Americans, who had done business in China for over a -century, should occasionally go into new lines of enterprise. - -But it soon became manifest that Mr. Yamaza was thinking of the -Bethlehem Steel contract. "I must tell you," he said, "of the -strategical importance of Fukien Province to my country." Then followed -a long exposition. "China," he concluded, "has promised not to alienate -this province to any other power, and Japan has repeatedly asserted an -interest in that region." - -He then repeated various surmises and reports concerning the nature -of the Bethlehem contract. I told him quite specifically the nature -of the agreement and about its long previous existence. Mr. Johnston, -vice-president of the Bethlehem company, at the request of the Chinese -Government had viewed various naval ports with the purpose of making an -estimate of improvements which were most needed. I could not admit any -sinister significance in this visit nor concede that Americans were not -free to engage in port construction in any part of China. - -While I had not been unguarded in my statements, I had assuredly not -looked upon a conversation in such circumstances as a formal one. -Yet I soon found out that a memorandum upon it was presented to the -Department of State by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, during -an interview with Secretary Bryan on the question of harbour works in -Fukien. I shall revert to this matter later. - -A peculiarity of Chinese psychology was evinced after the Standard Oil -contract had been signed. One year was given to select specific areas -within which oil production was to be carried on as a joint enterprise -of the Chinese Government and the American company, the ratio of -property interest of the two partners being 45 to 55. The contract -undoubtedly offered an opportunity for securing the major share in -the development of any petroleum resources which might be discovered -in China; for, once such a partnership has been established and the -work under it carried out in an acceptable manner, an extension of the -privileges obtained may confidently be looked for. But in itself the -contract signed in February, 1914, was only a beginning. It denoted the -securing of a bare legal right; and in China a government decree or -concession is not in itself all-powerful. If its motives are suspected, -if it has been obtained by pressure or in secrecy, if its terms are not -understood or are believed to imply unjust burdens to certain provinces -or to the people at large, then popular opposition will arise. This may -not affect the legal character of the grant or the responsibility of -the Government, but it will seriously obstruct the ready and profitable -carrying out of the business. The obverse of this situation--the -getting of a contract "on the square" and the demonstration that it is -fair and just--finds every influence willing to coöperate. - -But when the Standard Oil Company's contract had been signed, not much -was publicly known about it save in general terms. Rival interests -began to portray it as involving inroads upon the rights of the Chinese -people, especially of the provinces of Shensi and Chihli. Stories of -bribery were circulated in the papers. In the negotiations concluded -at Peking no particular attention had been paid to local opinion, the -suspicions of provincials were stirred, and an outcry speedily arose. - -The representatives of the Standard Oil Company had left Peking. I -informed the company that its interests were endangered. Its response -was to send to Peking Mr. Roy S. Anderson, the American whose intimate -knowledge of Chinese affairs has been referred to. Mr. Anderson held -sessions with those who had objected, especially with the provincials -of Shensi who were resident in Peking. He discussed with them the terms -of the contract, pointing out the benefit to the provinces through the -development of a large industry there. The Chinese always respond to -reasonable discussion, and not many days later the very associations -which had protested most vigorously against the agreement waited upon -the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce with their congratulations. -They promised the aid of the province in carrying out the contract. Had -the contract not been straightforward and fair in its terms and free of -undue influence in its making, such active support could not have been -had. - -It was then that the Chinese Government created an Oil Development -Bureau, together with a River Conservancy Bureau for drainage works, -including those projected in the Hwai River region. Of the new Oil -Development Bureau the Prime Minister, Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling, on his -resignation from the cabinet in March, accepted the position as chief. -He had been both Premier and concurrently Minister of Finance. Tall, -good-looking, with full face and shining black hair, Mr. Hsiung speaks -with great fluency in a high-pitched voice. Though he was a member of -the Chin Pu Tang, or progressive party, he had been selected Premier by -Yuan Shih-kai, who was fighting the democratic party (Kuo Min Tang), -probably because he believed that parliament would reject him and he -could then blame that body for obstructive tactics. It accepted him, -and Yuan took another path to overthrow parliament. In his career Mr. -Hsiung had been aided by the counsel and coöperation of his wife, who -is exceptionally capable. Well-intentioned, broad-minded, given to -Western methods, the Premier was handicapped during his term through -relative inexperience in administrative and financial matters. He was -pitted against men of shrewdness as politicians and of deep immersion -in financial manipulations. - -As chief of the Oil Development Bureau, Mr. Hsiung's first task was -that of pointing out to the Japanese minister, Mr. Yamaza, whom the -Japanese interests immediately pressed forward, that no monopoly of -exploitation had been granted to the Standard Oil Company, for within a -year the company would have to select specific and limited areas within -the two provinces where production was to be carried on. - -"The grant to Americans," the Japanese minister thereupon remarked, -"seems to indicate that China does not care much about the -international friendship of Japan." - -Mr. Hsiung's reply was that this was a business arrangement, and the -nationals of other countries as well--Great Britain, France, and -Germany--had sought such concessions in the recent past. To the inquiry -whether a similar agreement would be concluded with Japan for other -provinces, the director replied that it would not at this time be -convenient. - -"Then I hereby notify you," Mr. Yamaza rejoined, "that in all -likelihood I shall take up this matter with the Minister for Foreign -Affairs." - -Mr. Yamaza referred to the Japanese engineers who at one time worked -in the oil fields of Shensi Province; whereupon Mr. Hsiung recalled -that American and German engineers had formerly been employed in the -Hanyehping iron enterprise; yet when that company made a loan agreement -with Japanese interests, no objections had been made either by America -or Germany. - -This conversation illustrates the manner in which attempts are -often made to establish prior claims with regard to enterprises -in China by alleging a prior desire or the prior employment of -individuals--considerations which would nowhere else be considered -as establishing a preference or inchoate option. It is as much as -to say that by merely expressing a wish for a thing one has already -established a prior right to it should it be given out. - -The making of two important contracts with the Chinese Government -naturally attracted attention. Of the British press the _North China -Daily News_ repeated the judgment of its Peking correspondent: "The -Americans deserve their success, for they have worked for it steadily -and consistently." - -The _Daily News_ attributed this success primarily to the fact that -since the days of Secretary Hay, American enterprise in China had been -consistently pacific and benevolent. "In no country in the world," it -declared, "can more be done through friendship and for friendship's -sake than in China." - -The German press, while inclined to be critical, still admitted the -fairness of the contracts and the probable benefit to be derived -therefrom by China, and spoke in disapproval of the Japanese -attitude assumed toward the new oil enterprise. Later a long article -appeared in the chief German paper in China (_Ostasiatische Lloyd_), -in which the existence of a very far-reaching policy of economic -penetration by America was surmised. The writer imagined that all the -factors--educational, financial, and industrial--were being guided -according to a complicated but harmonious plan to achieve the actual -predominance of American interests in China. - -The German minister, Von Haxthausen, spoke to me about this article. "I -hope," he said, "that you will not conclude that its views are those of -myself and my legation." - -I assured him that I felt highly flattered that anybody should have -conceived that American action proceeded with such careful planning and -such cunning grasp of all details. - -The Franco-Russian semi-official sheet, the _Journal de Pekin_, -continued its carping attitude against all American enterprise. It -lumped together the Y.M.C.A., missionaries, Standard Oil, and the -British-American Tobacco Company as engaged in a nefarious effort to -gain ascendency for American influence in China. It failed, however, to -surmise the subtle plan suggested in the German paper, but presupposed -an instinctive coöperation of all these American agencies. This paper -was occasionally stirred to great waves of indignation, as when it -discovered that the Y.M.C.A. was undermining Chinese religious morale -and destroying the sanctity of holy places by establishing a bathing -pool in one of the temples. This deplorable desecration, which wrung -from the breast of the Belgian editor of the Franco-Russian sheet moans -of outraged virtue, had for its substance the fact that in the large -monastery of Wo Fu Ssu--in the foothills fifteen miles from Peking, -where the Y.M.C.A. had summer quarters--a large pool in the residential -part of the enclosures was actually used for a dip on hot mornings. But -no Chinese had ever hinted that his feelings were lacerated. - -The American papers and Americans generally were somewhat encouraged -by this constructive action. In the Chinese Press the veteran -American lawyer, T.R. Jernigan, said: "It is clear that the Wilson -Administration will use its influence to further the extension of the -business of American merchants whether they act in a corporate capacity -or otherwise." - -On the side of finance as well as industry the Chinese courted American -interest. The Minister of Finance and Mr. Liang Shih-yi were frequently -my guests; and we conversed particularly on the financial situation. -Both took a view quite different from the traditional Chinese official -attitude. They desired to have the Government make itself useful and -take the lead in organizing both national credit and industry. They -considered it possible to develop Chinese domestic credit to an extent -that would materially supply the financial needs of the Government. -Unfortunately, the great system of banking which had been built up by -the Shansi Bankers' Guild was very inadequate to modern needs. Banking -had rested wholly on personal knowledge of the character and credit of -borrowers; no collateral was used, there was no dealing in corporate -securities. - -When China came into contact with the business methods of Western -nations, this system could not help in developing new enterprises. -That task fell largely to the foreign banks established in the treaty -ports, who had no vision of the possibilities of internal development -in China. The Shansi bankers, on their part, unable to adapt themselves -to new conditions, saw their field of action gradually limited, their -business falling off. These banks lost their grip on affairs. They -felt themselves in need of financial assistance from the Government. -The Minister of Finance was considering whether these old institutions -might not be transformed into modern and adequate agencies of Chinese -domestic credit. He and other native financiers became interested -in the national banking system through which, in the United States, -quantities of public debentures had been absorbed to furnish a sound -basis for a currency. - -It seemed impossible to utilize the Shansi banks as the main prop of a -modern system. A new organization, such as the Bank of China, planned -on modern lines, might be strengthened by American financial support -and technical assistance. Mr. Liang Shih-yi was willing to give to -American interests an important share in the management of the Bank -of China in return for a strengthening loan. A New York contractor, -Mr. G.M. Gest, was at this time in Peking on a pleasure tour with his -family. Impressed with the need for the launching of new financial and -industrial enterprises in China, his first thought had been to secure a -concession to build a system of tramways in Peking. Chinese officials -had previously told me of an existing Chinese contract which might -be turned over to Americans. I was not very enthusiastic about this -particular enterprise, because I feared it might destroy the unique -character of Peking street life, without great business success or much -benefit to anybody. - -On inquiring further we found that French interests had just signed a -loan contract which covered, among other things, the Peking tramways. - -The financing was curious; the proceeds were presumably to be used -to complete the port works at Pukow, on the Yangtse River, and to -establish the tramways of Peking. However, it was plain that the loan -had been made really for administrative or political purposes, its -industrial character being secondary, as the work was indefinitely -postponed. This subterfuge of so-called "industrial loans," of which -the proceeds were to be used for politics, was later very extensively -resorted to, particularly in the Japanese loans of 1918. - -Learning of this state of affairs, Mr. Gest turned his attention to the -problem of Chinese domestic financing, and at the close of his short -residence in Peking he had obtained an option for the Bank of China -loan contract, which he followed up with energy upon his return to the -United States. - -American attention had been drawn to the contracts for the Hwai River -conservancy and for petroleum exploration, and American commercial -journals and bankers were again giving thought to the financing of -projects in China. To show the attitude of New York bankers at this -time, of their difficulties, doubts, and inclinations, I shall cite -portions of a letter written me by Mr. Willard Straight, dated April -29, 1914. While I did not agree with Mr. Straight on several matters -of detail, especially the withdrawal from the Consortium, we were both -agreed as to the importance of continued American participation in -Chinese finance and industry. The letter follows: - - As regards the Hwai River conservancy, you have doubtless already been - advised that the Red Cross has made an arrangement with J.G. White & - Company, whereby an engineering board will be despatched to China to - make a detailed survey. The matter of financing was brought to the - Group, who felt it impossible satisfactorily to discuss this question - without more definite information regarding actual conditions and the - probable cost of the work contemplated. - - When, upon receipt of the report of the engineering board, we take up - the discussion of the financial problem, the suggestions contained in - your letter of the 24th of March will be very valuable. It might, as - you say, be comparatively easy to issue a loan of ten million dollars - at almost any time. That would depend, however, not on the size but on - the nature of the loan. There is no market for Chinese securities in - this country at this time, and it would be difficult if not impossible - for the bankers to create one within any reasonable time without the - active and intelligent support or at least the declared approval of - the Government.... - - When the American Group first entered upon negotiations for the - Hukuang loan, conditions in this country were good. Business men were - looking abroad for new trade openings, the Taft Administration was - anxious to encourage the extension of foreign trade and the Chinese - Governmental Bubble had not been pricked. During our four years of - experience a not inconsiderable public interest in China and her - development was aroused, and had we issued the Reorganization Loan, as - we had hoped to do, in February, 1913, we probably could have sold our - twenty-million-dollar share to investors throughout the country. This - we would have been able to do despite the revolution and uncertain - governmental conditions in China, because of public confidence due to - the support of our own and the other interested governments. - - Neither Mr. Taft nor Mr. Knox ever promised to send American - battleships to threaten China, or to land marines to occupy Chinese - territory, in case of default in interest payments. The public was - misled by no false statements, but there was, nevertheless, a general - belief that our Government was actively interested in the preservation - of China's credit and in the development of that country. - - This, as I told you in our conversation at the Century Club, was - changed by the President's declaration of March 19, 1913. The fact - that the President and the State Department felt that China, as a - young republic, was entitled to extraordinary consideration and - sympathy; the fact that our Government recognized Yuan Shih-kai's - political machine, and the fact that the Administration subsequently - gave out some general expressions regarding the Government's interest - in the development of American trade, did not in any way restore in - the mind of the investor the confidence which had been destroyed by - the specific condemnation of the activities of the only American - banking group which had had the enterprise, the courage, and the - patience to enter and remain in the Chinese field and which, despite - its unpopularity among certain yellow journals and a number of Western - Congressmen, stood for integrity, fair dealing, and sound business in - the minds of the bond-purchasing public, upon whose readiness to buy - the success of any bond issue must depend. - - This confidence which would have enabled us to sell Chinese bonds had - been created by four years of hard work on the part of the bankers and - the Government. Once destroyed, it can be restored only by general - governmental declarations, which will probably have to be stronger - than any of those made by the Taft Administration, or, in the absence - thereof, by effective, consistent, and repeated specific proof of - the Government's willingness to assist and encourage our merchants, - contractors, and bankers. As you know, it is more difficult to correct - a bad impression than it is originally to create a good one. - - I quite appreciate that it will be difficult for the President to take - any action which would seem to be a reversal of his former position, - but I hope that the last paragraph of his declaration of last March, - in which he stated that he would urge "all the legislative measures - necessary to assure to contractors, engineers, etc., the banking and - other financial facilities which they now lack" may be interpreted and - developed along lines which will permit him actively to support the - Red Cross plan. - - If the Administration will publicly evidence its interest in and its - support of this project during the next few months, so that when the - matter is finally brought up to the bankers for decision they may - be able to feel that the public has become interested and assured - that our Government is behind the plan, it may prove to be the means - by which we can again enter China. This I have pointed out to Miss - Boardman who, I feel sure, fully understands the situation. - - I sincerely trust that your great interest and your energy in - endeavouring to extend our interests in China may have an effect - upon our own Administration. I believe the bankers will always be - willing to help if they are able to do so, but we are not, like our - Continental friends, anxiously looking for chances to invest abroad, - especially at the present time when we have so many troubles of our - own, and instead of being merely shown the opportunity, we must be - persuaded in the first place that it is sound business and in the - second place that it is our patriotic duty to undertake it. And we - must feel, in addition, that if we should undertake it our enterprise - and energy will not serve merely to rouse a storm of jealousy on the - part of those who will not assume any risks themselves, but who cry - "monopoly" as soon as an interest capable of handling foreign business - is given the active support of our Government. - - I am sorry that it is impossible to give a more optimistic picture, - but I assure you that I shall do all in my power to support you and - your efforts, which I sincerely trust may be attended with the success - they deserve. - -The intelligent support promised in this letter continued until the -untimely death of Mr. Straight in Paris, while he was with the American -Peace Commission. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -"SLOW AMERICANS" - - -"The Americans are altogether too slow!" - -This exclamation from a Chinese seemed amusing. It came on the evening -of the red dust-storm that enveloped Peking, during one of the long -after-dinner conversations with Liang Shih-yi and Chow Tsu-chi; and it -was the latter who thus gave vent to his impatience. - -Liang Shih-yi, the "Pierpont Morgan of China," Chief Secretary to the -President, was credited as being, next to Yuan Shih-kai, the ablest and -most influential man in Peking. Mr. Liang is highly educated according -to Chinese literary standards, and while he has not studied Western -science, he has a keen, incisive mind which enables him readily to -understand Western conditions and methods. His outstanding quality is -a faculty for organization. He built up the Chinese Communications -Service on the administrative and financial side. He declined taking -office as a minister, but usually controlled the action of the cabinet -through his influence over important subordinates, and managed all -financial affairs for Yuan Shih-kai. Cantonese, short of stature and -thickset, with a massive Napoleonic head, he speaks little, but his -side remarks indicate that he is always ahead of the discussion, which -is also shown by his searching questions. When directly questioned -himself, he will always give a lucid and consecutive account of any -matter. He did not rise above the level of Chinese official practice -in the matter of using money to obtain political ends. To some he was -the father of deceit and corruption, to others the god of wealth, while -still others revered in him his great genius for organization. While -by no means a romantic figure, he thoroughly stimulated a romantic -interest among others, who attributed to him almost superhuman cunning -and ability. - -When the noted Sheng Hsuan-huai became Minister of Communications in -1911, he used his influence and cunning to thwart Liang and throw him -out of the mastery of the Board of Communications, known as the fattest -organ of the Government. Mr. Liang stood his ground, and his influence -greatly increased because of his ability to withstand so strong an -attack. During the revolution Liang Shih-yi was also very influential -in the Grand Council, attaching himself more and more strongly to Yuan -Shih-kai. Always satisfied with the substance of power without its -outward show, he steadfastly declined to become a responsible minister, -and worked from the vantage ground of the Secretariat of the President. -His life has frequently been endangered. He gained the hatred of -the democratic party, with which he was once associated, because he -aided Yuan in playing his complicated game of first confusing, then -destroying, parliament. Nor were the Progressives (Chin Pu Tang) -enamoured of him. Of great personal courage, he was indifferent to -the blame and ridicule which for a while almost all newspapers heaped -upon him. As he was still in a comparatively inferior position when -these attacks began, they rather helped him by calling attention to his -abilities and his personal importance. Thus his opponents advertised -him. In possession of all the intricacies of the situation, when the -parliamentarians first came to Peking, he sat back inconspicuously, -and, supplied with influence and money, moulded the political situation -as if it had been wax. - -Of all the cabinet, Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, Minister of Communications, -was personally most familiar with American affairs, having lived for -several years in Washington and New York in an official capacity. -He speaks English fluently and prefers American methods. He hates -unnecessary ceremony. Whenever he called upon me I had almost to -engage in personal combat with him to be permitted to accompany him to -the outer door, as is due to a high dignitary in China. He believes in -learning improved methods from reliable foreigners, and will go as far -as any Chinese in giving foreigners whom he trusts a free hand, though -he would not yield to any one a power of supreme control. On this -occasion he talked about the reorganization of the Bank of China, and -the possibility of floating domestic bonds among Chinese capitalists. -Mr. Chow was chanting a jeremiad about how the Chinese had been led to -give valuable concessions to Americans, which had not been developed, -and how this had brought only embarrassment and trouble to China. - -We spoke, also, of the original Hankow-Canton railway concession which -the Americans tried to sell to King Leopold; of the Knox neutralization -plan, and of the Chinchow-Aigun railway concession, the only effect of -which had been to strengthen the grip of Russia and Japan on Manchuria. -When the Americans, as a mark of special confidence and trust, had -received the option on a currency loan with the chance to reorganize -Chinese currency, they had straight-way invited Great Britain, -Germany, and France into the game. "Thus they saddled China with the -International Consortium," Chow Tsu-chi moaned. And so on went the -recital, through many lesser and larger enterprises that had proved -abortive. - -One had to confess that in China we certainly had not taken Fortune by -the forelock, nor even had we clung to her skirts. Mr. Chow Tsu-chi -was especially grieved at the circuitous and dilatory methods of the -Four-Power Group which held the contract to build the Hukuang railways. -"The thirty millions of dollars originally provided has been almost -entirely spent," he complained, "without producing more than two -hundred miles of actual construction; and there is constant wrangling -among the partners concerning engineering standards. Moreover, -everything has to be referred from Peking to London, thence to New -York, Paris, Berlin, and back and forth among them all, until it is -necessary to look up reams of files to know what it is all about. And -it may all have been about the purchase of a flat car." - -I knew well enough that Americans, too, were much discouraged at the -cumbersome progress of the Hukuang railway enterprise. The engineering -rights on the section west from Ichang up into Szechuan Province had -been assigned to America, and Mr. W. Randolph was at this time making -a survey. He had great energy and unlimited belief in the future -importance and profitableness of this line. But beyond the initial -survey the available funds would not go, and no new financing could -be obtained--this for a railway to gain access to an inland empire of -forty millions of people! - -In the American enterprises which had been launched recently, however, -there was no little activity. The Standard Oil Company with commendable -expedition, if perhaps with undue lavishness of men and supplies, -sent to China geological experts of the first order, together with -large staffs of engineers, drilling experts, and all needed machinery. -The geologists were soon off toward the prospective oil regions in -Chihli and Shensi provinces. In Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling's bureau and in -the Standard Oil offices the outfitting of expeditions, the purchase -of supplies, and the selection of a large Chinese personnel proceeded -apace. Everyone was hopeful. - -With the Hwai River conservancy matter, also, negotiations had gone -rapidly in the United States. The American National Red Cross and the -engineering firm of J.G. White & Company had agreed to finance the -preliminary survey. The American Congress in May passed an act lending -the services of an army engineer for the preliminary survey. Colonel -Sibert of the Panama Canal Commission was designated as chairman of the -engineering board. The outlook was favourable, action had been taken -promptly. - -The excitement stirred up among the Japanese by the sojourn in China of -the Bethlehem Steel Company's vice-president, Mr. Archibald Johnston, -now had a further sequel. The text of an alleged contract between the -Chinese Government and the Bethlehem Steel Company was circulated early -in May--by interested persons--which included among other provisions -arrangements for construction of a naval base in Fukien Province. -The bogus quality of the report was at once manifest. Through some -influence, however, it was assiduously pushed forward in the press; -it became the basis of a legend, which even got into the books of -otherwise well-informed writers as authentic. It was on the subject of -this spurious paper that the Japanese ambassador at Washington called -on Secretary Bryan for information. Thus the matter of the possible -building of a naval base in Fukien for the Chinese Government by -American contractors became a matter of State Department note. I was -informed that the Japanese ambassador at Washington had left a summary -of the conversation, of March 12th, between the Japanese minister at -Peking and myself. Apparently the Japanese were attempting to get -around my refusal to acknowledge that American enterprise in China -could in any way be limited by the declarations or agreements of other -powers than the United States. - -The State Department inquired whether the newly reported contract for -a loan of $30,000,000 was identical with the older contract of the -Bethlehem Steel Company. I was informed that the Japanese Government -did not object to the loan, but to the construction of any new naval -base in Fukien, and that the Department had been told that the Chinese -Government itself did not wish to construct there because of the -Japanese objection. It was intimated to me that I might encourage the -Chinese in the idea that such building, while legitimate, would be -unwise. - -I reported to the Department that the original Bethlehem contract had -no connection with the spurious document recently circulated; that -only a very small sum was to be devoted to harbour work in China, the -location of which had not been fixed; and that the execution of the -entire contract had been postponed because of financial conditions. -While the Chinese Government was not contemplating any construction -at this time, I stated that the attempt of any other government to -establish a claim of special rights of supervision must be considered -derogatory to Chinese sovereignty and to American rights of equal -opportunity; I urged, therefore, that we avoid any action or statement -which would admit such a claim, or which would in any way encourage -the making of it. The Chinese Government has never admitted that its -right to plan the defence of its coastline is subject to veto by any -other government. Such admission on our part that Japan has the right -to claim special interests in Fukien would shake the confidence of the -Chinese in our seriousness and consistency, and in our determination to -protect our legitimate interests in an undivided China, freely open to -the commerce of all nations, where Americans can do business without -asking permission of any other outsiders. - -Dr. Chen Chin-tao was then acting as Financial Commissioner of the -Chinese Government in Europe and America. The danger of a further -growth of the idea of spheres of influence in China had been -accentuated. Railway concessions had been allocated to different -nations according to territorial areas where the respective countries -claimed certain priorities; if concessions were made otherwise, the -combined influence of the powers seeking special spheres was used to -defeat them. To meet this danger a plan was developed for granting a -large construction contract to an international syndicate made up -of British, American, French, and German companies, who would divide -the construction on some basis other than localized national spheres -of influence. Doctor Chen, with an American assistant, was charged to -take up this proposal with various companies. On the part of France and -Germany, contractors and governments seemed favourable to the idea. -In Great Britain the firm approached was Paulding & Company, who had -already in the preceding year received a railway concession in China -extending through the Province of Hunan and to the south thereof. This -firm would readily coöperate, but the British Government objected. -It would accept the principle of the international company only on -condition that all lines traversing the Yangtse Valley should be -constructed by the British participant in the syndicate. - -This suggests the extent to which the sphere-of-influence doctrine -dominated at this time the thought and action of the British Foreign -Office. - -The American Government, on its part, took exception to the size and -duration of the concession, which it feared might gain a monopolistic -character. Probably the difficulty would have been cleared up, since, -after all, a specific and limited, though considerable grant, was -intended. But the preliminary discussion had not resulted in agreement -before the Great War supervened. - -When Mr. Gest returned to the United States, he took up the matter -of a loan to China with American financial interests, but they -hesitated to act until the American Government expressed its approval -and willingness to give support. Mr. Gest thereupon laid siege to -the Department of State. He succeeded on the 3rd of June in securing -from the Secretary a letter to the effect that the Department would -be gratified to have China receive any substantial assistance from -Americans in the nature of a loan upon terms similar to the present -agreement. "This Government," the letter stated, "will, in accordance -with its usual policy, give all proper diplomatic support to any -legitimate enterprise of that character." - -There had been much talk about the supposed determination of the -Department of State to let American interests abroad shift for -themselves, quite without encouragement or special protection. -The letter, though moderate in language, nevertheless attracted -great attention and was taken to indicate a change of heart in the -Administration. I may say at this point that the Department of State -never at any time failed to back me in efforts to develop and protect -American interests in China. But it was not always able, especially -later on, when overburdened with the work of the war, to follow up -matters which it had approved, when the opposition or indifference of -other departments put other claims in the forefront. - -I had for a season observed and worked with American commercial -interests in China. I had definite conclusions as to what was needed in -the way of organization to encourage American trade. The great defect -lay in the absence of financial institutions for handling foreign -loans, and for assisting in foreign industrial development, helpful to -American commerce. The only American bank in China, the International -Banking Corporation, then confined itself strictly to exchange business -and to dealing in commercial paper; it had developed no policy -of responding to local industrial needs and helping in the inner -development of China. All the foreign banks had wholly the treaty-port -point of view. They thought not at all of developing the interior -regions upon which the commerce of the treaty ports after all depends. -They were satisfied with scooping off the cream of international -commercial transactions and exchange operations. - -I strongly favoured creating banking institutions which would broadly -represent American capital from various regions of our country, and -would respond to the urgent need of China for a modern organization of -local credit. - -There were but few American commission houses. In most cases -American-manufactured goods were handled by houses of other -nationality, who often gave scant attention to promoting American trade -and used American products only when those of their own nation could -not be obtained. It seemed worth while to establish additional trading -companies, especially coöperative organizations among exporters, -after the fashion of the "Representation for British Manufacturers, -Ltd." Further, I strongly urged the American Government to station a -commercial attaché in China. I was gratified by the appointment during -the year of a commercial attaché in the person of Consul-General Julean -Arnold, an official of great intelligence, wide knowledge, and untiring -energy. - -The Chinese cabinet, which had been under a provisional premier for -several months, was finally reorganized in June, 1914. The chief change -in the cabinet was the appointment of Mr. Liang Tun-yen as Minister -of Communications, and the shifting of Mr. Chow Tsu-chi from that -position to the Ministry of Finance. With these new ministers American -contractors and financiers had much to do. Premier Hsiung Hsi-ling had -withdrawn in February, and with him the two other members of the Chin -Pu Tang or progressive party. These political leaders had served Yuan's -purpose by aiding him to dissolve parliament; they could now be spared. -But a new premier was not immediately found. Yuan at length prevailed -on Mr. Hsu Shi-chang to take the premiership in June. The title of -premier was changed to secretary of state. - -I met Mr. Liang Tun-yen for the first time on June 2nd, at a luncheon -given by Mr. B. Lenox Simpson, whose landlord he was. Mr. Liang is -tall, aristocratic-looking, with a fine, intellectual face. He speaks -English perfectly, as he received his earlier education in the -United States. Then, as on frequent occasions in subsequent years, he -expressed himself in a deeply pessimistic strain. He complained of -recent inroads attempted by the French in Yunnan, and of the methods -they employed to strengthen their hold. But this was only one cause for -pessimism. In the future of his country he saw "no prospect of strong -national action," or of "any sort of effective help from the outside." -He considered the upper classes "incapable of sacrifices and vigorous -action." He had recommended in 1901, he told me, that, instead of -paying an indemnity, the Chinese should be allowed to spend an equal -amount of public funds in sending abroad young men to be educated. All -young Chinese, he said, should be sent abroad quite early, "before they -have become corrupted." - -When Mr. Liang Tun-yen assumed office, it was announced that he would -subject the Ministry of Communications to a thorough cleansing. This -implied that the ministry had been corrupt and systematically so, under -the control of Mr. Liang Shih-yi. Outsiders watched for indications of -how that astute manager would handle the new opposition. - -Mr. Yeh Kung-cho, able and expert, had been chief of the Railway -Bureau; he became a vice minister, but as he was a lieutenant of Liang -Shih-yi's, it was understood that this position would probably be an -empty dignity. A friend of Mr. Liang Tun-yen's, a highly respected -engineer of American education, was appointed as the other vice -minister. With no formal or open breach between the different factions, -maneuvring and counter-manoeuvring there undoubtedly was. The -influence of Mr. Liang Shih-yi, however, seemed not seriously shaken. -He had organized the Chinese railway experts and engineers in a railway -association, keeping in touch with them through Mr. Yeh Kung-cho. Thus -he held in his hands the main lines of influence. Also, he continued to -head the Bank of Communications, which is the fiscal agency for the -Railway Board. So again it seemed that the opposition could not get at -the source of this unusual man's power. - -Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, as Minister of Finance, warmly urged the idea that -the Americans, to whom the Government had shown itself so friendly, -reciprocate by making a loan to the Chinese Government. He planned a -loan of $40,000,000 for the purpose of refunding the entire floating -indebtedness of his government. Hopes had been entertained that the -Standard Oil Company would use its influence in bringing about such a -loan, but that company was not willing to go outside of the special -business of its contract with China. The option which had been given -to Mr. Gest had not yet resulted in any completed transaction in -the United States. So accustomed were the Chinese to the readiness -of any nationality which held important concessions, in turn to -support the Chinese Government financially, that they could not -understand how America, with professions of great friendship and just -now substantially favoured by the Chinese, should not be ready to -reciprocate. The soundness of the desire of the Americans to have every -transaction stand on its own bottom and not to use financial support as -a bait to obtain concessions, could, of course, be appreciated by the -Chinese. But at times their urgent needs made them impatient. - -The news of the assassination at Sarajevo reached us on July 1st. As -this happened to be, though we did not then suspect it, the eve of a -terrible convulsion in which all accepted conditions of life, national -and international, were shattered and unsettled, I shall here insert -parts of the memorandum which I drew up for my guidance at this time: - - It is evident that China finds herself in a critical situation, in - the sense that the fundamental character of her political life and - the direction of her political development are now being decided. - While a vast community living under a complicated social system, - which embodies the experience of thousands of years, cannot change - its methods of a sudden and will undoubtedly for a long time continue - to differ radically from Western political societies, yet it admits - of no doubt that a new era of development has begun and that certain - essential alternatives are being faced. Such alternatives are - the continued unity of the nation or its division; its continued - independence or the direct dominance of one or more foreign suzerains; - its commercial unity or its division into spheres of influence; the - tendency of its institutions of government, whether in the direction - of the absolutism of Russia and Japan, or the republicanism of the - United States; and the character of its educational and legal system, - either dominated by the ideas of America and England or of continental - Europe or Japan. From these, there also follow important alternatives - in industrial and commercial policy. - - Under these circumstances, it is of great moment whether the Chinese - Government will remain free, with the assistance of influences - friendly to the development of China's nationality, to preserve the - unity of the Chinese State and to develop its institutions; or whether - its financial distress, combined with the plottings of a revolutionary - opposition, will deliver it into the hands of those who are not - favourable to the growth of China's national life. - - The United States of America enjoys a position of great advantage - for assisting the Chinese Government and influencing its development - in the direction of free national life. The lack of a desire for - political interference, the real sympathy felt in America with the - strivings of the Chinese people, and cultural, educational, and - charitable work unselfishly performed, have given the United States - the undivided confidence of China. It is certainly true that the - Chinese people are anxious to follow in the footsteps of the United - States if they may only be permitted to do so. - - Any development of enterprise which increases American commercial - interest in China is incidentally favourable to Chinese independence; - because, through the enlistment of neutral interests, the desire - of outsiders for political control can be counterbalanced. The - organizing of an American investment bank and similar agencies for the - development of American commerce in China, participation of American - capital in railway building, and the development of mines and oil - fields through American companies and under American business methods - would all be welcomed by China as the strengthening of a favourable - influence. Different Chinese ministers have repeatedly said to me - that at this time China is in need of the active assistance of those - who are amicably disposed and that China is willing to do her part in - coöperating, and in extending advantages, if only such active support - is forthcoming. If American capital, industry, and commerce are not - ready at this time to give that comparatively slight assistance to - China which the situation calls for, it is likely that American action - in China in the future will be on a far more modest basis than present - possibilities promise. - -The war, of course, brought many changes in China. Much of the good -work which had been started was either destroyed or long delayed. It -marked the end of one phase of China's development. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -FOLK WAYS AND OFFICIALS - - -Several voices whispered: "It's Prince Pu Lun." - -It was at President Yuan Shih-kai's reception, New Year's Day, 1914; -the diplomatic corps and high officials were there. The Empress -Dowager's residence, now occupied by the President, was the scene. -From the side rooms, whither we had withdrawn for refreshments after -exchanging greetings with the President, we looked out into the main -hall and saw that its floor had been entirely cleared, and a solitary -figure in a general's uniform was proceeding across the floor toward -the President. Walking alone and unattended, the representative of the -Chinese Imperial Family had come to bring its felicitations to the -President of the Republic. For the first time since the abdication, the -Imperial Family was publicly taking notice of him who had displaced it -in power. - -When the guests began to depart I gathered up my party and left the -hall, together with Admiral Tsai Ting-kan. Outside was Prince Pu Lun, -still solitary, walking with sad and pensive regard. We overtook him. -I talked pleasantly with him on such non-committal matters as the -Imperial collection of art, which was at this time being brought from -Mukden. He seemed quite appreciative of this attention. I took him with -me to the outer palace gate where his own carriage met him. - -Except the automobiles used inside of the palace enclosure, few were -then to be found in Peking; soon, with improved roads, many hundreds -came. The Empress Dowager before her death had acquired a large -collection of these foreign vehicles, which interested her greatly; -but up to the time of her death the Board of Ceremonies had not -succeeded in solving the problem how she might ride in an automobile -in which there would also be, in sitting posture, one of her servants, -the chauffeur. If they had had more time, I imagine that they might -have found some way by which the chauffeur could kneel in driving the -Imperial car, but, as it was, the poor Empress Dowager never had the -pleasure of the swift rides she so much coveted. - - * * * * * - -Many popular superstitions still prevailed in parts of the provinces. -The military attaché of the American Legation, Major Bowley, who later -did distinguished service in the Great War as general of artillery, -was active in visiting the military commanders in different parts of -China and in observing their actions and getting their views. He had -just returned from such a trip to Kiangsi Province, and related how -one of the generals there strove to improve his morale by drinking the -blood of enemies who had been killed. He spared Major Bowley a cupful -of this precious liquid, which was to be taken before breakfast. It is -startling to discover among the people so highly civilized as are the -Chinese occasional remnants of barbarous doctrines and practices. There -is an inverted homoeopathy in Chinese popular belief--to the effect -that "equals strengthen equals"; thus, to eat muscle develops strength, -to eat tripe aids the digestion, to eat heart or drink blood develops -courage, and so on. - - * * * * * - -One evening, at a dinner at Mr. Liang Shih-yi's house a spirited -discussion developed between the host and Mr. Anderson. The latter had -related a local custom of the Soochow region according to which it was -permissible for a community or a crowd of people to bite to death any -person who was thoroughly disapproved of by all. Apparently the method -of execution was in itself a guaranty of universal condemnation, as a -great many people would have to coöperate to effect the desired result -by this method. Mr. Liang protested that the expression "bite to death" -was in this case used only metaphorically, and there followed a long -debate on Chinese folk customs. - - * * * * * - -A dinner with General Kiang, Commander of the Peking Gendarmerie, -afforded another sidelight on Chinese character. We had already -been seated, when an unusually tall Chinese entered, wearing -Chinese civilian dress. He was introduced as Tutuh Yin (General Yin -Chang-heng), and I learned that he had just returned from Szechuan, -where he had become governor during the revolution, after putting to -death the Imperial Governor-General, Chao Er-feng. General Yin was of -striking appearance, with strong features, and vigorous in gesture. -Now, it is the custom at Chinese dinners, particularly when military -are present, to engage in extensive drinkings of health. The Chinese, -who are usually very abstemious, drink wine that resembles sherry, and -also a liqueur-like rice wine, which latter is potent. The proposer -of the toast raises his little cup and drains it in one draught; the -guest to whom he addresses himself is expected to do likewise; both say -"Gambey" (a challenge to empty the cup). General Yin, who seemed in -high spirits, was on his legs half the time "gambeying" to the other -guests, especially to myself and the other Americans, the military -attaché, the Chinese secretary, the commandant of the guard, and other -officers. General Yin must have performed this courtesy at least forty -times in the course of the evening, which with the attentions paid us -by the other members of the table round, amounted to a considerable -challenge of one's capacity. It must, however, be confessed that I -largely shirked this test, in company with the amiable General Yin -Chang, my Manchu neighbour, by irrigating a large plant in front of us -with the liquid dedicated to friendship. - -I saw General Yin Chang next morning. He asked whether I knew what -had been the matter with Tutuh Yin the night before. I said that he -seemed very animated and carried his liquor very well. General Yin -then told me that after I had left, the Tutuh Yin had sat down with -him and talked seriously and intently, revealing his deep worry lest -Yuan Shih-kai should have him executed. He stated that Chao Er-hsun, -the brother of the murdered Viceroy, was in Peking, and with other men -using every influence to destroy him. "So," the Manchu general said, -"his bravado was just a cover for his worries." - -Next day Yin Tutuh called on me at my residence. He expressed deep -regret for having taken so much wine on the evening of the dinner. He -said: "It is not my custom, but I was excited and worried because of -the uncertainty of my affairs." He then launched forth into a literary -discussion of Confucianism in its bearing upon modern thought. Not -knowing that he was a student of the classics, I was surprised when -he revealed this side of his nature. As a matter of fact, he greatly -resembled the men of the Renaissance who combined harsh and cruel -qualities with a deep love of literature. The last time I saw the Tutuh -Yin, more than five years later, he presented me with his written -works. There were gathered about twenty members of the Confucian -Society, and the conversation again turned around the permanent -qualities of Confucianism. When the concept of the "unknowable" was -referred to, General Yin cited at length Herbert Spencer's views -thereon. He said: "The greatness of Confucius lies in the fact that he -centred his attention on those things which we know and can control, -and that he aimed at the highest development of human action on this -common-sense basis. He leaves the dreams about the unknowable to -others." - -Among our guests at a dinner was Dr. King Ya-mei, a Chinese lady -noted for her wide information and cleverness. We spoke about the -recent advance of Russia in Mongolia. "Who can resist Russia!" she -exclaimed. Like all thinking Chinese, she was deeply worried about the -difficulties confronting her nation on all sides. Dr. C.C. Wang, who -was also present, spoke of the lack of continuity in developing expert -knowledge, because of the frequent shifts which are made in the public -service. - -Dr. King Ya-mei then told an amusing incident, which shows how natural -community action and passive resistance are to the Chinese. In an -orphan asylum at Tientsin a new set of regulations had been issued, but -the orphans had paid no attention to them. After a good many children -had been called to order without result, a meeting was convoked by -the principal. When the orphans were asked why they did not obey -the regulations, their spokesman said: "We are perfectly satisfied -with the old regulations, and have no desire to change them."--"But -the new regulations have been made by your teachers," rejoined the -superintendent, "and they must be obeyed."--"We do not think," the -spokesman replied, "that they are an improvement, and we propose to -obey the old rules."--"But, then you shall be punished severely."--"If -you try to punish us, we shall all go away; and then what will become -of the orphan asylum?" - -They had reasoned it out that they were an important part of the -institution. That orphans should conceive the idea to go on strike -shows how normal and self-evident that mode of social action seems in -China. - - * * * * * - -I was visited by the newly appointed Chinese minister to Japan, Mr. Lu -Tsung-yu, who later became quite notorious in China in connection with -the loans of 1918. He was accompanied by Doctor Tsur, the president -of Tsing Hua College and a leading American-returned student. -Mr. Lu is a slight man of suave manners, keen intelligence, and a -love of manipulation. On this occasion he developed the idea that -coöperation between the United States, China, and Japan was possible -and desirable, as these three countries had many parallel interests. -It was his opinion that Japan could not create an extensive settlement -in Manchuria. He had been stationed in that region several years -when Hsu Hsi-chang was viceroy; and he told me that he had observed -that the Japanese came as officials, soldiers, or railway employees, -or in connection with mining enterprises: but they did not seem to -have any impulse to settle in the country as farmers, and as small -merchants they could scarcely compete with the Chinese. Mr. Lu had been -educated in Japan, being one of the first batch of Chinese students -at Waseda University; together with Tsao Ju-lin, at this time Vice -Minister of Foreign Affairs, who also later played an important part -in Chino-Japanese affairs; and Chang Chung-hsiang, the Chief Justice -of China at that time, a man who exercised considerable influence in -introducing into China the Japanese idea of judicial procedure and -organization and who became Chinese minister in Tokyo in 1916. This -trio of associates was popularly known as "the Three Diamonds." - - * * * * * - -An important meeting of the diplomatic corps dealt with the procedure -in the matter of claims against the Chinese Government on account of -damage suffered during the revolution. The Japanese, French, and German -representatives were inclined to insist that the Chinese Government -be held responsible for all losses which could in any way be said to -have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the revolution. In line -with the traditional policy of fairness and moderation followed by the -United States I strongly urged that only losses directly and physically -traceable to violent action should be paid, eliminating such uncertain -and contingent matters as anticipated profits. The British minister -gave support to this view; his legation, too, had not encouraged the -filing of indirect claims. After much discussion, the suggestion was -accepted in the form proposed. By this action were ruled out indirect -claims to the amount of nearly four million dollars, which had already -been listed and included by some of the legations in their totals. - - * * * * * - -The British Legation, in which diplomatic meetings are held, is an old -palace, formerly the residence of a Manchu prince, which was purchased -by the British Government at the time when legations were first -established at Peking. Fortunately, the fine architectural forms of -the old structure had been retained sufficiently to leave this group -of buildings justly proportioned, beautifully decorated, and free from -jarring foreign notes. One passes to the minister's residence through -two lofty, open halls, with tiled roofs and richly coloured eaves. The -residential buildings are Chinese without and semi-European within, -Chinese decorative elements having been allowed to remain in the inner -spaces. The diplomatic meetings always took place in the dining room, -where a huge portrait of Queen Victoria, from the middle period of her -reign, impassively--not without symbolic significance--looked down upon -the company. - -There were at this time about sixteen legations in Peking, so that -the meetings were not too large for intimate conversation. The -proceedings were usually carried on in the English language, partly out -of deference to the Dean, and partly because English has come quite -naturally to be the international language of the Far East. - -The diplomatic corps in Peking meets frequently, and it has more -comprehensive and complicated business than falls to such a body in any -other capital. Matters of diplomatic routine occupy only a subsidiary -place. Because of the system of extra-territoriality under which -foreign residents remain exempt from Chinese law and subject only -to that of their own respective nation, the foreign representatives -in China are constantly concerned with the internal affairs of that -country. The effects of any legislation by the Chinese Government upon -foreign residents have to be considered by the diplomatic corps: if -the most punctilious minister discovers that the measure in question -in any way transgresses that absolute immunity from local law which is -claimed, then objection will be made, and the unanimous consent, which -is necessary to approve of such matters, is difficult or impossible to -obtain. - -Questions of taxation are constantly before the diplomatic corps, as -the Chinese local officials quite naturally attempt to find some way to -make the foreigners bear at least part of the taxation of a government -whose general protection they demand. The methods of proving claims and -collecting indemnities give rise to much discussion, whenever there has -been some outbreak of revolutionary activity. As certain revenues have -been pledged for international loans, the diplomatic corps will object -to the Chinese Government using these revenues at all before they have -been released as not needed for defraying the debt charges. One of the -most fruitful causes of irritation comes from attempts frequently made -by one or the other minister to "hold up" the funds belonging to the -Chinese until they have fulfilled some particular demand which he had -made. The fact that it may be an entirely extraneous and irrelevant -matter, such as the appointment of a national of the minister to a -Chinese government job, does not seem to disturb the man who thinks -he has found a clever way to achieve his purpose. The international -settlement at Shanghai and the régime of foreign troops in Peking -and along the Mukden Railway also give rise to a great many problems -which are referred to the diplomatic corps. From questions involving -the recognition of the Government itself to such matters as the -advisability of bambooing prisoners at Shanghai, no question seems to -be too big or little to come before this body. - -The discussions tend rather to avoid general issues and to confine -themselves to a statement and explanation of the position taken by each -government. Occasionally the stubborn and unreasonable adherence of one -or two representatives to what is considered by others as an unduly -severe and exacting position, leads to joint efforts in an attempt to -make a more fair and liberal policy prevail. The discussions are not -infrequently longer than is necessary; the main points are lost sight -of, and discussion becomes entangled, because one side may be talking -of one thing, whereas the other has quite a different matter in view. -Until it is discovered that there is no real difference or only a -difference in form, much valuable time may be consumed. At times, these -conferences remind one of a university faculty meeting. - - * * * * * - -Weeks were filled with innumerable conferences on matters of business. -In China it rarely happens that the decision lies with only one -official. In order to have a proposal accepted, a great many men -have to be consulted and won over. Impatient representatives, backed -by strong national force, have frequently tried to cut short this -procedure, and, planting themselves before the official whose assent -they needed, have "pounded the table" until a promise was obtained. -They sometimes succeeded by so powerfully getting on the nerves of the -Chinese official that he saw no way to save his peace of mind but by -giving in. At one time I expressed great surprise to the Minister of -Finance, because, instead of insisting that reasonable arrangements for -the renewal of a certain short-term loan should be made, he had given -the representative in question--the agent of a munition company--a -large order for additional materials which were not needed, only to -secure an extension of time. He said, in self-defence: "The manners of -the man were so abominable that I could not stand it any longer." - -However, the method of the strong arm and mailed fist, while it has -produced results in China, has also carried in itself the elements -of its own defeat. The Chinese may make a concession under such -circumstances, but they will thereafter have no interest whatsoever in -facilitating the business in question; on the contrary, it is likely -to be delayed and obstructed at every point, so that it can be carried -out only through constant pressure and show of force. The people of -China have a strong and widespread sense of equity. He who proposes a -reasonable arrangement and gives himself the trouble to talk it over -with officials and other men concerned, in the spirit of arriving at -a solution fair to all, will build on a sound foundation. Whenever -foreign interests have acted on this principle, the results have been -far more fruitful of good than where things have been carried through -with a high hand by demand and threat, without reasoning or give and -take. But to sit in conference with various people on all the phases -of any proposal is a great consumer of time. One is kept busy day and -night in following the roads and trails that lead to the final meeting -of minds from which action is to result. - - * * * * * - -I had a visit from the Tuchun Tien, of Kalgan, after my return from -America in the fall of 1918. I found that the Tuchun was in very bad -grace at the American Legation. He had interfered with an automobile -service which an American had tried to establish between Kalgan and -Urga, in Mongolia, and had in other ways shown an apparent hostility to -legitimate American enterprise. As the writing of notes had not secured -any satisfactory results, I began to probe into the situation to find -what lay back of the attitude of the general. - -I found that he was "blood-brother" of Mr. Pan Fu, whom in turn I -numbered among my friends. I therefore consulted Mr. Pan Fu about -the situation. He said that there must be some misunderstanding, as -the General was certainly not animated by any feeling of hostility -to America; but that it was possible that the particular American -in Kalgan had rubbed him the wrong way. So he promised to write the -General a long letter. - -A short time later he called on me and reported that General Tien -had written him that he was soon coming to Peking and would be very -glad to meet me. The Tuchun soon called on me, with Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, -and we had a most friendly talk. Very little was said about any past -difficulties in Kalgan, but a great deal about future prospects of -goodwill and mutual help. In fact, our friendship was quite firmly -established, and there was no further room for misunderstanding. - -Tuchun Tien was an open-faced, friendly looking person who, though he -had straggling side whiskers unusual with the Chinese, had nothing of -the berserker in his bearing. Our conversation was long and cordial. -When it had already lasted more than an hour, Mr. Chow looked at me -apologetically and said, in English: "We had better let him talk, it -does him good." As for myself, I was glad to hear his views. - - * * * * * - -Mrs. Reinsch and I gave a dinner to Mr. Robert Gailey of the Y.M.C.A. -on the eve of his departure for America. About thirty guests were -present, all members of the American mission societies in Peking. I had -just entered the reception room to be ready to welcome our guests when -much to my surprise Prince Pu Lun was ushered in. It was evident that -there had been some mistake about invitations, but as there appeared -to be no other dinner given at the Legation, I made no effort to clear -up the error and tried to make him thoroughly welcome. I had the table -rearranged so as to seat the Prince between two ladies both of whom -spoke Chinese very well. He appeared to be surprised at the composition -of the company and the absence of wines, but was apparently well -entertained by his neighbours. When the dinner was about half through, -Kao, the head boy, came to the back of my chair and whispered to me: -"Mrs. Lee's boy outside. Say Prince belong Mrs. Lee dinner." So after -dinner I felt in duty bound to tell the Prince that Mrs. Lee had sent -word that she would be very happy if he could come to her house in the -course of the evening. - -After a short conversation, in which he told me about his children -of whom he is very fond, the Prince departed, to recoup himself at -the house of the navy doctor for the abstinences laid upon him at the -minister's dinner. - - - - -PART II - -THE PASSING OF YUAN SHIH-KAI - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -THE WAR: JAPAN IN SHANTUNG - - -On August 8, 1914, Japanese war vessels appeared near Tsingtau. Japan -suggested on August 10th that the British Government might call for -the coöperation of Japan under the terms of the Alliance. In view of -possible consequences the British Government hesitated to make the -call; the British in China considered it important that independent -action by Japan in that country should be precluded. - -Acting on its own account on August 15th, the Japanese Government sent -the Shantung ultimatum to Germany. The British Government was then -informed of the action taken. The German representative at Peking -had discussed informally with the Foreign Office the possibility of -immediately returning Kiaochow directly to China; but the Chinese -Government was now pointedly warned by the Japanese that no such action -would be permitted. - -The Chinese Government then also seriously considered the policy of -declaring war on Germany. It would have been as easy for the Chinese, -as for any one else, to take Kiaochow from the Germans, but Japan was -ready and anticipated them. In fact, the Japanese minister stated to -the Chinese Foreign Office on August 20th that the Kiaochow matter -no longer concerned the Chinese Government, which, he trusted, would -remain absolutely passive in regard to it. The ultimatum to Germany, -limited to August 23rd, demanded the delivery, at a date not later than -September 15th of the leased territory of Kiaochow to the Japanese -Government, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to -China." - -Basing its action upon the language of this ultimatum, the American -Government on August 19th made a communication to the Japanese Foreign -Office, noting with satisfaction that Japan demanded the surrender of -Kiaochow with the purpose of restoring that tract to China, and that it -was seeking no territorial aggrandizement in China. - -On my return to Peking on September 30th, I found the Chinese in a -state of natural excitement over the action taken by Japan. By this -time the Japanese had invested Tsingtau; the British, who had also -sent a contingent of troops, were kept by the Japanese in a very -subsidiary position. The scope of Japan's plans was more fully revealed -on September 29th, when the Chinese Government was informed that -"military necessity" required the Japanese Government to place troops -along the entire railway in Shantung Province. As this railway had -never had German military guards, and as the portion near Tsingtau was -already held by Japanese troops, the military necessity of such further -occupation was by no means apparent. - -Mr. Liang Tun-yen, Minister of Communications, called on me on -October 1st, expressing deep concern over the action of the Japanese -in Shantung. He stated his conviction that, in departing from the -necessary military operations around Tsingtau, it was Japan's plan -to stir up trouble in the interior of China with a view to more -extensive occupation of Chinese territory. From Japanese sources he -had information to the effect that the Japanese militarists were -not satisfied with the reduction of Tsingtau, but wished to take -advantage of this opportunity to secure a solid footing--political -and military--within the interior of China. He was further informed -that they were ready to let loose large numbers of bandits and other -irresponsible persons to coöperate with revolutionary elements in an -attempt to create widespread uprisings, in order to furnish a pretext -for military interference. When I called attention to the declarations -regarding Kiaochow in Japan's ultimatum to Germany, the minister shook -his head and said: "Unfortunately, Japanese policy cannot be judged -by such professions, but only by the acts of the last twenty years, -which make up a series of broken pledges and attacks upon the rights of -China." - -President Yuan Shih-kai had wished to see me; so I called on him -informally on October 2nd. In stronger terms than Minister Liang he -set forth his apprehensions. "From information in my possession," -he stated, "I am convinced that the Japanese have a definite and -far-reaching plan for using the European crisis to further an attempt -to lap the foundations of control over China. In this, the control of -Shantung through the possession of the port and the railway is to be -the foundation stone. Their policy was made quite apparent through the -threatened occupation of the entire Shantung Railway, which goes far -beyond anything the Germans ever attempted in Shantung Province. It -will bring the Japanese military forces to the very heart of China." - -Thereupon Yuan Shih-kai requested that I ask President Wilson to use -his good offices in conferring with the British Government, in order to -prevail upon Japan to restrict her action in Shantung to the military -necessities involved in the capture of Tsingtau, according to the -original assurances given the Chinese Government. I communicated this -request to the President through the Department of State. - -With great promptness, however, the Japanese executed the plan they -had adopted. They informed the Chinese that, being judges of their own -military necessities, they would occupy the railway by _force majeure_ -immediately, but would leave its administration in Chinese hands--with -the stipulation that Japanese conductors be placed on the trains. The -Chinese found no means to resist this arrangement. - -Mr. Eki Hioki, successor of Minister Yamaza, had arrived during the -summer. He had for many years been minister in Chile, where I had met -him in 1910; remembering his genial and sociable qualities, I was happy -to renew this acquaintance. Mr. Hioki differed from his predecessor in -his readiness to talk freely and abundantly. In our first conversation, -when the relations between the United States and Japan came up, he -adduced the customary argument that as the United States was preventing -the Japanese from settling in America, we could not in fairness -object if Japan tried to develop her activities and influence on the -Asian continent. I could honestly assure him that American goodwill -did go out in full measure to any legitimate development of Japanese -enterprise and prosperity, but we also had duties toward our own -citizens, who had been active in Chinese trade for more than 130 years, -as well as toward China herself. We could not be expected to approve -any action which would not respect the rights of these. - -The Chinese people were becoming more and more alarmed about Japan in -Shantung. The large number of petitions and manifestoes which came to -me, as the representative of a friendly nation, from various parts of -China, gave me an idea of how widespread was this anxiety. Some of -these protests were written with the blood of the petitioner. - -Count Okuma's declaration, that a large increase in the military forces -of Japan was needed to preserve peace in the Far East, was interpreted -as meaning that Japan would take the present opportunity to make -good her actual domination throughout eastern Asia. The Chinese felt -that any understanding with Japan would inevitably lead to the total -subjection of China to the political dominance of her neighbour. They -distrust all professions of Japanese friendship. Whenever I tried to -argue that a frank understanding between China and Japan was desirable, -I was told that China could not trust Japan; that Japan must not -be judged by her professions, but by her past acts, all of which -show a determined policy of political advance veiled by reassuring -declarations. - -Thus the Chinese feared Japanese intrigue at every point. They -believed that revolutionary activities, as in the past, were getting -encouragement from Japan. The Japanese were ready to take advantage -of and to aggravate any weakness which might exist in Chinese social -and political life. They would fasten like leeches upon any sore spot. -The tendency toward rebellion and brigandage, the counterfeiting of -banknotes, the corruption of officials, the undermining of the credit -of important private and public enterprises, the furnishing of more -dangerous drugs when opium was forbidden--in connection with such -mischiefs individual Japanese had been active to the great damage of -the Chinese. But though it would be unjust, of course, to charge up -this meddling to the Japanese nation as a whole the connivance of their -militarist government was a fact. - -The British looked upon the new adventure of Japan with a decided lack -of enthusiasm. While welcoming the losses inflicted on their enemy in -war, they were evidently fearful of the results which might come from -Shantung. - -It was plain that the Russians, too, while allied with Japan, were -quite aware of the dangers inherent in the Chinese situation. Taken -with recent Japanese advances in Inner Mongolia, a situation was -created in northern China which would be regarded as dangerous by the -Russians. Discussing the unrest in China, the Russian minister said to -me significantly: "The situation itself does not impress me as serious; -the only serious thing about it is that the Japanese say it is serious." - -In fine, the general temper and direction of Japanese action was -not relished by the allies of Japan. Japan had taken advantage of a -conflict which was primarily European, into the rigour of which she did -not enter, for the purpose of gathering up the possessions of Germany -in the Far East and the Pacific at a time when they could be but -weakly defended. - -This policy of Japan deeply affected American prospects and enterprise -in China, as, also, that of the other leading nations. Since the -American attitude of goodwill toward China had in the past been -understood by the Chinese to imply a readiness to give them a certain -support in times of need, large hopes were entertained as to what the -United States would do. Rich and powerful beyond measure, she would, -in the minds of the Chinese, help China to maintain her integrity, -independence, and sovereignty. Other nations, not a little jealous of -the past goodwill of the Chinese toward us, were not slow to point -out that American friendship was a bubble which vanished before such -concrete difficulties as the violation of China's neutrality. But -the Chinese, after all, saw that it did not lie within the sphere of -its action for the United States to come to the rescue with direct -political and military support. True, the Chinese had encouraged -American activities in China. They had looked upon them as a safeguard -to their own national life. Since they were conducted in a fair spirit -and without political afterthought, the Chinese did hope and expect -as a minimum that Americans would stand by their guns and not let -themselves be excluded by political intrigue or other means from their -share in the development and activities of China. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, 1915 - - -"Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get control of China." -In these words President Yuan Shih-kai summed up the situation when I -made my first call on him after returning from Europe in September. -Many Chinese friends came to see me and tell me their fears. Admiral -Tsai said: "Here are the beginnings of another Manchuria. Aggressive -Japan in Shantung is different from any European tenant." - -Events had moved rapidly. Tsingtau had been taken, German control had -been wholly eliminated from the leasehold and the railway. The Chinese -Government notified Japan that permission to use part of the Province -of Shantung for military operations would be withdrawn, since occasion -for it had disappeared. This the Japanese seized upon as a calculated -and malignant insult; it was made the excuse for presentation of the -demands. - -The blow fell on January 18th. The Japanese minister sought a private -interview with Yuan Shih-kai. This meeting took place at night. -With a mien of great mystery and importance the minister opened -the discussion. He enjoined absolute secrecy on pain of serious -consequences before handing Yuan the text of the demands. He made -therewith an oral statement of the considerations which favoured the -granting of them. - -The Chinese, fearing greater evils, did their best to guard the secret. -They could not, however, keep in complete ignorance those whose -interests would have been vitally affected; also memoranda of important -conversations had to be set down. As soon as I received the first -inkling of what was going on, I impressed it on the Chinese that, since -the subjects under discussion intimately affected American rights in -China, I should be kept fully informed in order that my government, -relying on the treaties and understandings concerning Chinese -independence, could take necessary steps to safeguard its interests. -The Chinese were of course ready to comply with my request. My -intercourse with Chinese cabinet ministers and Foreign Office members -was not confined to formal interviews and dinners. We exchanged many -visits during which we conversed far into the night, without wasting -time over formalities or official camouflage. - -In the conversation in which he presented the twenty-one demands, the -Japanese minister dropped several significant hints. - -The minister then spoke of the Chinese revolutionists "who have very -close relations with many Japanese outside of the Government, and -have means and influence"; further, "it may not be possible for the -Japanese Government to restrain such people from stirring up trouble -in China unless the Chinese Government shall give some positive proof -of friendship." The majority of the Japanese people, he continued, -were opposed to President Yuan Shih-kai. "They believe," he went on, -"that the President is strongly anti-Japanese, and that his government -befriends the distant countries (Europe and America) and antagonizes -the neighbour. If the President will now grant these demands, the -Japanese people will be convinced that his feeling is friendly, and it -will then be possible for the Japanese Government to give assistance to -President Yuan." Yuan sat silent throughout this ominous conversation. -The blow stunned him. He could only say: "You cannot expect me to say -anything to-night." - -Quite aside from the substance of the twenty-one demands, the threats -and promises implied in this statement convinced the Chinese leaders -that Japan was contemplating a policy of extensive interference in the -domestic affairs and political controversies in China, making use of -these as a leverage to attain its own desires. The Chinese considered -it an ominous fact that the paper on which the demands were written was -watermarked with dreadnoughts and machine guns. They believed that the -use of this particular paper was not purely accidental. Such details -mean a good deal with people who are accustomed to say unpleasant -things by hints or suggestions rather than by direct statements. - -A Japanese press reporter called at the Legation on January 19th, and -related his troubles to one of the secretaries. The Japanese minister -refused absolutely, he said, to say anything about what passed between -him and the President; therefore he had sought the American Legation, -which might have knowledge which could help him. With his assumed -naïveté the man possibly hoped to get a hint as to whether a "leak" -had occurred between the Chinese and the American minister. But it was -not until January 22nd that I learned the astonishing nature of the -Japanese proposals. Calling on one of the Chinese ministers on current -business, I found him perturbed. He finally confided to me, almost with -tears, that Japan had made categorical demands which, if conceded, -would destroy the independence of his country and reduce her to a -servile state. He then told me in general terms their nature, saying: -"Control of natural resources, finances, army! What will be left to -China! Our people are being punished for their peacefulness and sense -of justice." The blow evidently had come with stunning force, and the -counsellors of the President had not been able to overcome the first -terrified surprise, or to develop any idea as to how the crisis might -be met. - -An ice festival was being given on the next evening at the American -guard skating rink. Mr. B. Lenox Simpson sought me out and accosted me -quite dramatically, with the words: "While we are gambolling here, -the sovereignty of the country is passing like a cloud to the east. It -is Korea over again." He had received accurate information as to the -general character of the demands. Two days later the representative of -the London _Times_, who had been out of town, asked me casually: "Has -anything happened?" "You may discover that something has happened," I -replied, "if you look about." That evening he returned to me with all -that he could gather. - -Although these correspondents, as well as the Associated Press -representative, telegraphed the astounding news to their papers, -nothing was published for two weeks either in America or in England. -The Associated Press withheld the report because its truth was -categorically denied by the Japanese ambassador at Washington. Its -Peking representative was directed to send "facts, not rumours." On -January 27th it was given out "on the highest authority" both at Tokyo -and at Washington that information purporting to outline the basis of -negotiations was "absolutely without foundation." Only gradually the -truth dawned on the British and American press. The British censor had -held up the reports for a fortnight, but on February 5th Mr. Simpson -wrote me in a hasty note: "My editors are in communication with me, and -we have beaten the censors." From 25th January on, the demands began -to be discussed confidentially among members of the diplomatic corps -but publicly by the press in Peking. As the impossibility of keeping -the matter secret locally was now universally granted from this time -high Chinese officials consulted with me almost daily about their -difficulties. The acceptance of these demands, of course, would have -effectively put an end to the equal opportunities hitherto enjoyed in -China by American citizens; I therefore made it my duty to watch the -negotiations with great care. - -The Japanese were avoiding any interference with the formal -"integrity, sovereignty, and independence" of China; they were -developing special interests, similar to those enjoyed by Japan in -Manchuria, in other parts of China as well, particularly in the -provinces of Shantung and Fukien. They could place the Chinese state -as a whole in vassalage, through exercising control over its military -establishment and over the most important parts of its administration. -There would be three centres from which Japanese influence would be -exercised--Manchuria, Shantung, and Fukien. Manchuria was to be made -more completely a reserved area for Japanese capital and colonization, -but with administrative control wielded through advisers and through -priority in the matter of loans. In Shantung, the interest formerly -belonging to Germany was to be taken over and expanded. A priority -of right in Fukien was demanded, both in investment and development; -this would effectively bar other nations and would assimilate this -province to Manchuria. The northern sphere of Japan was to be expanded -by including Inner Mongolia. From the Shantung sphere influence could -be made to radiate to the interior by means of railway extensions -to Honan and Shansi. Similarly, from the Fukien sphere, railway -concessions would carry Japanese influence into the provinces of -Kiangsi, Hupei, and Kwangtung. The Japanese interest already existing -in the Hanyehping iron and coal enterprise, which was a mortgage with -right to purchase pig iron at certain rates, was to be consolidated -into a Japanese-controlled company. Added to these was the significant -demand that outsiders be denied the right to work any mines in the -neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping company without its -consent; nor were they to be permitted, lacking such consent, to carry -out any undertaking that might directly or indirectly affect the -interests of that company. This astonishing proposal sought to make the -Japanese concern the arbiter of industrial enterprise in the middle -Yangtse Valley. - -Group V consisted of the sweeping demands which would have virtually -deprived the Chinese Government of the substance of control over -its own affairs. The employment of effective Japanese advisers in -political, financial, and military affairs; the joint Chino-Japanese -organization of the police forces in important places; the purchase -from Japan of a fixed amount of munitions of war--50 per cent. or more; -and the establishment of Chino-Japanese jointly worked arsenals, were -embraced in these demands. The latter involved effective control over -the armament and military organization of China. - -So stunned was the Chinese Government by the Japanese stroke that it -missed its first opportunity. It might have immediately given notice to -the friendly Treaty Powers of the demands, which affected their equal -rights in China, as well as the administrative independence of the -Chinese Government. - -A member of the Foreign Office consulted me about the best method -of dealing with the demands; I expressed the opinion--which was not -given by way of advice--that the detailed negotiation of individual -demands, with a view of granting only the least objectionable, would be -likely to give most force to considerations of equity. Time would be -gained; the other nations interested would come to realize what was at -stake. If certain liberal grants and concessions should be made, China -could then with greater force refuse to create rights and privileges -incompatible with her sovereignty. The situation would then be more -fully and clearly understood by foreign nations. - -As the negotiations proceeded the Japanese minister hinted to the -Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Japanese public looked askance -at the present Chinese administration, because of the hostility -often demonstrated by Yuan Shih-kai; still, this feeling might be -conciliated. It might even be possible for the Japanese Government to -give President Yuan assistance against rebel activities. The sinister -quality of this hint was fully appreciated. It was at this point that -the Japanese minister used the simile which promptly became famous -throughout the Far East. He employed this picturesque language: "The -present crisis throughout the world virtually forces my government to -take far-reaching action. When there is a fire in a jeweller's shop, -the neighbours cannot be expected to refrain from helping themselves." - -Notwithstanding powerful efforts on the part of Japan to enforce -silence by menacing China and by muzzling the press in Japan, accurate -information got abroad; whereupon the Japanese Government presented to -the powers an expurgated version of its demands, from which the more -objectionable articles were omitted. Later on, it was admitted that -the demands of Group V had been "discussed," and statements were again -issued on "the highest authority" that these so-called demands were -merely overtures or suggestions, which violated no treaty and involved -no infringement of Chinese territory and sovereignty. The Japanese -Legation in Peking asked local correspondents to send out a similar -statement, which, however, was refused by them, as the true nature of -the demands was already known. - -The British, who had more extensive interests at stake than any other -foreign nation, had shown agitation. British residents and officials -expressed deep concern because their government, being necessarily -preoccupied with events in Europe, could not give full attention to -the Far East. As the action of Japan had been taken under the ægis -of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it seemed to the British that this -was being used to nullify any influence which Great Britain might -exercise, as against a plan on the part of Japan to seize control of -the immense resources of China and of her military establishment.[2] -It was believed that some sort of communication relating to the demands -had been made to the British Foreign Office before January 18th. When -the expurgated summary came out, the _Times_ of London on February -12th published an editorial article describing Japan's proposals as -reasonable and worthy of acceptance; it was understood in Peking that -this approval related to the summary, not to the demands as actually -made. But the Chinese officials were apprehensive lest a ready -acquiescence of public opinion in the less obnoxious demands might -encourage Japan to press the more strongly for the whole list. As late -as February 19th, the State Department informed me that it inferred -that the demands under Group V were not being urged. The full text of -the actual demands as originally made had now been communicated to the -various foreign offices; but because of the discrepancy between the two -statements, they were inclined to believe that Japan was not really -urging the articles of Group V. - -The Japanese minister had at first demanded the acceptance in -principle of the entire twenty-one proposals. This was declined by -the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. When the Japanese asked -that Mr. Lu express a general opinion on each proposal, he readily -indicated which of them the Chinese Government considered as possible -subjects for negotiation. Forthwith the Japanese minister replied that -the expression of opinion by Minister Lu was unsatisfactory; that -negotiations could not continue unless it were radically modified. Mr. -Lu was evasive and Mr. Hioki on February 18th became more peremptory; -he informed Mr. Lu that the negotiations might not be confined to the -first four groups--that the whole twenty-one demands must be negotiated -upon. - -Thereupon I telegraphed inviting President Wilson's personal attention -to the proposals which affected the rights and legitimate prospects of -Americans in China. The President had already written me in a letter of -February 8th: "I have had the feeling that any direct advice to China, -or direct intervention on her behalf in the present negotiations, would -really do her more harm than good, inasmuch as it would very likely -provoke the jealousy and excite the hostility of Japan, which would -first be manifested against China herself.... For the present I am -watching the situation very carefully indeed, ready to step in at any -point where it is wise to do so." - -Shantung was first taken up in the negotiations. The negotiators -were: the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lu Tseng-tsiang; -the vice-minister, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin; the Japanese minister, Mr. Eki -Hioki; and Mr. Obata, Counsellor of Legation. Vice-Minister Tsao had -been educated in Japan, and was generally considered as friendly to -that country. The Japanese minister, genial in manner and insistent -in business, was aided by a counsellor noted for tenacity of purpose -and for a grim dourness. Point by point the demands on Shantung and -Manchuria were sifted. By the preamble to Group II, in the original -version, Japan claimed a "special position" in south Manchuria and -in eastern Inner Mongolia. The Chinese took decided objection. The -Japanese minister complained on March 6th of slow progress, giving -thenceforward frequent hints that force might be resorted to. Finally, -on March 11th, the Chinese were informed that a Japanese fleet had -sailed for ports in China under sealed orders. - -After agreeing to important concessions in Manchuria and Shantung, -the Chinese determined to resist further demands. Just here the -American Government gave the Japanese ambassador at Washington its -opinion that certain clauses in the demands contravened existing treaty -provisions. For the Japanese ambassador had offered a supplementary -memorandum which substantially gave the proposals of Group V as -"requests for friendly consideration." They were "mere suggestions" to -the Chinese! This method of disarming foreign opposition imposed one -disadvantage--it would hereafter hardly do actually to use military -force to coerce China into accepting the "friendly suggestions" -contained in Group V. The only chance of getting these concessions -was to keep the other governments in uncertainty as to the actual -demands, that they might not take them seriously, and meanwhile to -bring pressure to bear in order to force Peking to accept these very -proposals. The Chinese would feel themselves abandoned by the public -opinion of the world. - -The Japanese increased their military forces in Manchuria and Shantung -during the second half of March; for a time the movement stopped the -ordinary traffic on the Shantung Railway. - -The new troops were "merely to relieve those now stationed in -Chinese territory," it was stated. Military compulsion was clearly -foreshadowed; and thus beset, the Chinese had by the end of March -almost entirely accepted the Japanese demands in Shantung and -Manchuria. I had a long interview with President Yuan Shih-kai on March -23rd. He seemed greatly worried but was still good-humoured. He said: -"The buzzing gnats disturb my sleep, but they have not yet carried -off my rice. So I can live." Then growing serious he went on: "I am -prepared to make all possible concessions. But they must not diminish -Chinese independence. Japan's acts may force upon me a different -policy." - -I wondered whether he was actually contemplating armed resistance. -"Against any action taken by Japan, America will not protest, so -the Japanese officials tell us. But the Japanese have often tried -to discourage the Chinese by such statements," he added. "They say: -'America has no interest in the Chinese'; or, 'America cannot help you -even if she wishes to.'" - -Yuan felt that if America could only say, gently but firmly: "Such -matters concerning foreign rights in China, in which we have an -interest by treaties, policy, and traditions, cannot be discussed -without our participation," the danger would largely dissolve. - -Certain possible solutions were now suggested by the Department of -State. They aimed to bestow desired benefits on Japan, but also to -protect China and the interests of other nations in China. Personally, -I felt that the demands of Group V should be wholly eliminated. Any -version of them would tangle, would more inextricably snarl, the -already complicated relationships of foreign powers in China, and choke -all constructive American action. - -The Japanese demands respecting Manchuria were substantially complied -with during early April; and the Chinese thought this part of the -negotiations closed. Not so the Japanese; they manoeuvred to keep -open the Manchurian question on points of detail. Meanwhile, they -persistently injected Group V into the negotiations. - -For over two months the negotiations had now gone on with two or three -long conferences every week. The furnishing of war materials, Fukien -Province, and pointed references to a "certain power"--meaning the -United States--occupied the Japanese part of the discussion on April -6th. The Japanese minister was strikingly peremptory in manner. Because -of the pretensions of this "certain power" he must insist on the -demands regarding harbours and dockyards. Control, direct or indirect, -of any naval base in Fukien must be frustrated, for the sake both of -China and of Japan. The present American administration might withdraw -its "pretensions"; but what if they should be resumed in future? The -only safe course was to exclude this power from any possibility of -getting such a foothold. Meanwhile, local Japanese-edited papers harped -upon the great influence which Ambassador Chinda was alleged to wield -over Secretary Bryan. It would be futile to hope, they insisted, that -America might in any way assert herself in support of China. - -At this time I informed the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs that -should the attitude or policy of the United States be mentioned by any -foreign representative, and should statements be made as to what the -American Government would or would not admit, demand, or insist upon, -the Chinese Government would be more than justified in taking up such a -matter directly with the representative of the United States, through -whom alone authoritative statements as to the action of his government -could be made. - -The American Government had filed with the Japanese strong objections -to the granting of any special preference to any one nation in Fukien. -It had also emphasized the right of its citizens to make contracts with -the central and provincial Chinese governments, without interference -and without being regarded as unfriendly by a third power. So far as -harbours and naval bases were concerned, as stated previously, the -American Government did not object to any arrangement whereby China -would withhold such concessions _from any and all_ foreign powers. But -Japan needed to allege some reason for making special demands with -respect to Fukien; therefore it alleged the machinations of a "certain -power." - -No cause for apprehension existed. The talk of "pretensions" related to -the Bethlehem Steel Company's contract, made five years earlier, which -did not, however, touch Fukien, although a spurious version of the -contract, circulated in Peking shortly before, gave this impression. -An unfounded report spread by interested parties was thus made the -basis for a demand against the Chinese Government. - -Meanwhile, what the Japanese had put forth for foreign consumption -in the way of news was being compared with what was actually done -in Peking. This annoyed the Japanese press, not so much because its -government had been caught in the act of trying to mislead its own -allies, as because timely publicity and strong public opinion abroad -were defeating the attempt to impose its demands on the Chinese. The -Chinese relied on public opinion. It was their great desire, as they -often said to me, that although the American people and its government -might not furnish material assistance it should at least know the -facts about the attack made on Chinese liberty; for they saw in the -public opinion of the world, and especially of the United States, the -force which would ultimately prevail. Even with Yuan Shih-kai, man of -authority though he was, this hope existed. Mr. Lu, the Minister for -Foreign Affairs, said to me: "All that China hopes is that America and -the world may know and judge." - -Finally the _Japan Mail_, a semi-official Tokyo paper, published on -April 1st the full text of the Japanese demands in English. Thus was -admitted as a matter of course what had been categorically denied upon -"the highest authority." While the secret negotiations were going -on there was a byplay on the part of many official and non-official -Japanese, who were evidently trying to create an atmosphere of -antagonism to the Western nations. I received daily reports of -conversations in private interviews, at dinners, and on semi-public -occasions, in which Japanese were reminding the Chinese of all possible -grievances against the West, and picturing to them the strength and -importance that a Chino-Japanese alliance would have. Thus it was said -many times: "Think of all the places from which we are at present -excluded. Should we stand together, who could close the door in our -face?" Or again: "Are you not weary of the domineering attitude of the -foreign ministers in Peking? They do not pound the table in Tokyo. They -would be sent home if they did." It was constantly repeated that all -would be well if only China would let Japan reorganize her material and -military resources. Visions of millions under arms, splendidly drilled -and equipped--an invincible Chinese army officered by Japanese--were -conjured up. To all such siren songs, however, the Chinese remained -deaf. - -A complete deadlock developed toward the end of April. The Chinese -desired to dispose of the grants concerning Manchuria. The Japanese -would not agree to anything definite without including the demands -under Group V. As a prelude to an ultimatum, the Japanese minister on -April 26th presented "demands" with respect to Shantung and Mongolia, -unchanged except for the wording of the preamble; this substituted -the term "economic relations" for "special position." With respect to -Hanyehping, they were softened to provide that the Chinese might not -convert the company into a state-owned concern, nor cause it to borrow -foreign capital other than Japanese. Certain railway concessions were -to be granted, and the most important demands under Group V were to be -embodied into a protocol statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. - -Mr. Lu pointed out that the railway grants sought conflicted with the -concessions already given to British interests; Mr. Hioki then proposed -that China grant these same concessions to Japan, letting Japan "fight -it out" with Great Britain. With respect to Fukien, China was to state, -in an exchange of notes, that no foreign nation might build dockyards -or naval bases there, nor should foreign capital be borrowed for that -purpose. Japan, therefore, abandoned her attempt to secure preferential -rights in Fukien Province. - -The Minister for Foreign Affairs handed his answer to the Japanese -minister on May 1st. The demands under Group V, Mr. Hioki was -informed, could not possibly be accepted by a sovereign power. With -respect to the other demands, a specific answer was given very closely -approaching acceptance of the demands as revised by Japan. No railway -concessions were made, however, and it included certain technical -modifications with respect to the Manchurian demands. Everything asked -with respect to Shantung was granted, with the counter-proposal that -China take part in the negotiations between Japan and Germany. - -This was conciliatory; nevertheless, the Japanese were moving their -troops. Everything indicated extreme measures. Japan's reservists in -Mukden had been ordered to their station, Japanese residents in Peking -were warned to hold themselves ready. At Tsinanfu, new entrenchments -were being built. When it was known that an ultimatum would be -delivered, the Chinese officials were perplexed and undecided. Should -they await its delivery, or try to placate the Japanese by further -concessions? The Chinese find it hard to obey a demand backed by -force; they are used to arrangements based on persuasion, reason, and -custom. To submit to positive foreign dictation would be the greatest -conceivable _diminutio capitis_ for the Government. Chinese officials -visited me frequently. They seemed comforted in discussing their -difficulties and fears. I could not, of course, give them advice, but -I expressed my personal conviction that Japan could hardly find it -feasible to include Group V--which she had explained to the powers as -suggestions of friendship--in an ultimatum. - -The position of the American minister throughout these negotiations had -not been easy. The United States was the only power that had its hands -free. The Chinese expected its resentment and strong opposition to any -arrangements conflicting with Chinese independence and the equal rights -of Americans in China. I could reiterate our repeated declarations of -policy and allow the Chinese to draw their own conclusions as to how -far our national interests were involved. But when the minister I saw -most frequently would ask: "But what will you do to maintain these -rights you have so often asserted?" I had to be particularly careful -not to express my own judgment as to what our course of action should -be, in order not to arouse any hopes among the Chinese as to what my -government would do. Instructions had been slow in coming. - -It was my personal opinion that America had a sufficiently vital -interest to insist on being consulted on every phase of these -negotiations. The Chinese had hoped that America might lead Great -Britain and France in a united, friendly, but positive insistence -that the demands be settled only by common consent of all the powers -concerned. But the situation was complex. The state of Europe was -critical. The most I could do, and the least I owed the Chinese, was -to give a sympathetic hearing to whatever they wished to discuss with -me, and to give them my carefully weighed opinion. Our own national -interests were closely involved. It was my positive duty to keep close -watch of what was going on. While not taking the responsibility of -giving advice to the Chinese, I could give them an idea as to how the -tactical situation, as it developed from week to week, impressed me. -Dr. Wellington Koo all through this time acted as liaison officer -between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself, although I also -saw many other members of the Ministry. In discussing the consecutive -phases of the negotiations, as they developed, Doctor Koo and I had -many interesting hours over diplomatic tactics and analysis, in which -I admired his keenness of perception. Some objection was hinted by the -Japanese Legation to Doctor Koo's frequent visits to my office and -house, but his coming and going continued, as was proper. - -Councils were held daily at the President's residence from May 1st on. -Informally, the ministers of the Entente Powers advised the Chinese -not to attempt armed resistance to Japan; I believe the Government -never seriously contemplated this, although some military leaders -talked about it. Indeed, violent scenes took place in the Council; -it was urged that submission would mean national disintegration. It -would rob the Government of all authority and public support, while -resistance would rally the nation. The advance of Japan might be -obstructed until the end of the Great War; then European help would -come. They pressed the President with arguments that Japan might, -indeed, occupy larger parts of China; but this would not create rights, -it would expose Japan to universal condemnation. However, in the -existing circumstances of World War, the Government feared that to defy -Japan would mean dismemberment for China. - -Then President Yuan Shih-kai and the Foreign Office made their mistake. -They were panic-stricken at thought of an ultimatum. They were ready to -throw tactical advantage to the winds. Losing sight of the advantage -held by China in opposing the demands of Group V, they offered -concessions on points contained therein, particularly in connection -with the employment of advisers. - -But when the Foreign Office emissary came to the Japanese Legation with -these additional proposals and the Japanese minister saw how far the -Chinese could be driven, he stated calmly that the last instructions -of his government left no alternative; the ultimatum would have to be -presented. This was done on May 7th at three o'clock in the afternoon. - -The Chinese might have foreseen that the demands of Group V would not -be included in the ultimatum. Nevertheless, they were astonished at -their omission, and annoyed at unnecessarily committing themselves -the day before. At first sight, the terms of the ultimatum seemed to -dispose of these ominous demands. In the first sense of their relief -from a long strain, the Chinese understood the stipulation of the -ultimatum that "the demands of Group V will be detached from the -present negotiations, and discussed separately in the future," as an -adroit way of abandoning these troublesome questions. They were soon -to learn that their hopes were not in accord with the ideas of the -Japanese. - -Why, when the Chinese were virtually ready to agree to all the demands -actually included in the ultimatum, should the Japanese not have -accepted the concessions, even if they fell slightly short of what -was asked? Thus they would avoid the odium of having threatened a -friendly government with force; a matter which, furthermore, would in -its nature tend to weaken the legal and equitable force of the rights -to be acquired. The Japanese made two fundamental mistakes. The first -was in their disingenuous denials and misrepresentation of the true -character of the demands; the second, in the actual use of an ultimatum -threatening force. That these mistakes were serious is now quite -generally recognized in Japan. Why they were made in the first place is -more difficult to explain. - -Possibly, in the light of subsequent events, when Yuan Shih-kai -realized that he must unavoidably make extensive concessions, he may -have sought a certain _quid pro quo_ in the form of Japanese support -for his personal ambitions. This would accord with the hint dropped by -the Japanese minister at the beginning of the negotiations. If this -explanation be correct, one might possibly understand that Yuan himself -in his inmost thought preferred that he should be forced to accept -these demands through an ultimatum. The possibility of such motives may -have to be considered, yet from my knowledge of the negotiations from -beginning to end, I must consider utterly fanciful the charge made by -Yuan's enemies that it was he who originally conceived the idea of the -twenty-one demands, in order that he might secure Japanese support for -his subsequent policies and ambitions. - -A reason for the harsh measure of the Japanese Government is -admissible. The Japanese may have feared that public opinion throughout -the world, which was disapproving the character and scope of these -negotiations, would encourage the Chinese to hold out in matters of -detail and gradually to raise new difficulties. Moreover, the men who -wielded the power of Japan were believers in military prestige and -may have expected good results from basing their new rights in China -directly on military power. - -The ultimatum gave the Chinese Government a little over forty-eight -hours, that is, until 6 P.M. on May 9th, for an answer. On May 8th, the -cabinet and Council of State met in a session which lasted nearly all -day, finally deciding that the ultimatum must be accepted in view of -the military threats of Japan. - -In their reply to the ultimatum a serious tactical mistake was made. -I had been informed that it would be accepted in simple and brief -language; that the Chinese Government would say it had made certain -grants to the Japanese, which would be enumerated, making no mention -of Group V. Toward evening of the 9th a member of the Foreign Office -came to me, quite agitated, saying that the Japanese Legation insisted -that the demands of Group V be specifically reserved for future -discussion. "What form," I asked, "has the Chinese answer taken?" -"This," he replied: "'The Chinese Government, etc., hereby accepts, -with the exception of the five articles of Group V, all the articles -of Group I, etc.' But," he added, "when the draft was submitted to the -Japanese Legation, they insisted that after the words 'Group V' there -be added the clause 'which are postponed for later negotiation.'" It -had been thought necessary, my visitor explained, to state in the -reply that something had been refused, in order to save the face of -the Government. But it is perfectly plain that if Group V had not been -mentioned at all, the Japanese would have found it hard to insist upon -its being kept open; for it could not be avowed before other nations as -part of the matter covered by the ultimatum. As it was, the demands in -Group V were given the character of unfinished business, to be taken up -at a future date. Thus portentously, they continued to hang over the -heads of the Chinese. - -Partly in an exchange of notes, partly in a convention, the concessions -exacted through the ultimatum were granted. None of these was ever -ratified by the parliamentary body, as the Constitution requires. -Because of their origin and of this lack of proper ratification, the -Chinese people have looked upon the agreements of 1915 as invalid. - -The State Department had cabled on May 6th counselling patience and -mutual forbearance to both governments. The advice was needed by Japan, -but the instructions came too late; the ultimatum had been presented. I -should have found that its delivery would have seemed like whispering a -gentle admonition through the keyhole after the door had been slammed -to. - -The Department cabled on May 11th an identical note to both -governments, which I delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on -the 13th. It was published in the Peking papers on the 24th, together -with a telegram from Tokyo asserting "on the highest authority" that -the report of the existence of such a note was only another instance of -machinations designed to cause political friction. - -When he received the note Minister Lu said that he had tried throughout -to safeguard the treaty rights of other nations, with which China's -own rights were bound up. To a question from him I replied that -the American Government was not now protesting against any special -proposal, but insisted that the rights referred to in the note be given -complete protection in the definitive provisions of the Treaty. The -newly acquired privileges of the Japanese in Manchuria were touched on -in the conversation; I pointed out that any rights of residence granted -to the Japanese, by operation of the most-favoured-nation clause, would -accrue in like terms to all other nations having treaties with China; -they ought to be informed, therefore, of all the terms of the agreement -affecting such rights. On May 15th the Department confirmed this view -by cabled instructions, which I followed with a formal note to the -Minister for Foreign Affairs. - -It appeared that the Chinese Government was comforted by an expression -in which the United States in clear terms reasserted its adhesion to -the fundamental principles of American policy in the Far East. - -So ended the famous negotiations of the Twenty-one Demands. Japan -had gained from the unrepresentative authorities at Peking certain -far-reaching concessions. But in China the people, as an anciently -organized society, are vastly more important than any political -government. The people of China had not consented. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[Footnote 2: For instance, Putnam Weale wrote: "Though Englishmen -believe that the gallant Japanese are entitled to a recompense just -as much now as they were in 1905 for what they have done, Englishmen -do not and cannot subscribe to the doctrine that Japan is to dominate -China by extorting a whole ring-fence of industrial concessions and -administrative privileges which will ultimately shut out even allies -from obtaining equal opportunities.... In China, though they are -willing to be reduced to second place and even driven out by fair -competition, they will fight in a way your correspondents do not yet -dream of to secure that no diplomacy of the jiujitsu order injures them -or their Chinese friends."] - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -GETTING TOGETHER - - -There arrived in Peking in the fall of 1915 the members of a commission -sent by the Rockefeller Foundation, to formulate definite plans for a -great scientific and educational enterprise in China. They were Dr. -Simon Flexner, of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, of -New York; Dr. George A. Welch, of Johns Hopkins University; and Doctor -Buttrick, the secretary of the Foundation. By early September, 1919, -the cornerstone of the Rockefeller Hospital and Medical School in -Peking had been laid. - -The China Medical Board had acquired the palace of a Manchu prince. -When their plans were first being formulated, the owner had just died, -and this magnificent property could have been bought for $75,000 Mex. -I cabled to New York at the time, advising quick action, but the -organization had not been sufficiently completed to make the purchase. -When, four months later, they were ready to buy, the price had risen -to $250,000. The fact that a rich institution desired to acquire the -property had undoubtedly helped to enhance the price; but real property -was then so rapidly rising in value all over Peking, especially in -central locations, that the price asked, as a matter of fact, was not -excessive, and a similar site could not have been secured for less. -A still further increase of values throughout the central portion of -the city was soon recorded; in fact, in many localities of China land -values have risen after the manner of an American boom town. - -The stately halls of the palace had been dismantled and torn down -because they did not suit the uses of the hospital. The materials -recovered, however, were in themselves of great value. The Board had -decided, in consonance with the judgment of the architects, that -the Chinese style of architecture should be used, modified only -sufficiently to answer the modern purpose of the buildings. - -We gathered on a sunny day of early September, when the air of Peking -has the fresh balminess of spring, to dedicate the cornerstone of the -first building to be erected. Admiral Knight, who was visiting us at -the time, accompanied me. Mr. Alston, the British chargé; Dr. Frank -Billings, who had just returned from Russia where he had been chairman -of the American Red Cross; and other representatives of the American -and British community were present, together with many Chinese. Mr. Fan -Yuen-lin, Minister of Education, represented the Chinese Government, -and Bishop Norris, of the Anglican Church, offered prayer. I made a -brief address in which I paid tribute to the achievements of American -and British medical missionaries, and expressed my high idea of the -value and significance, for science and human welfare, of the great -institution here to be established. - -Incidentally, it had seemed to me--and I so expressed to Doctors Welch -and Flexner during their visit--that much of value might be found in -the Chinese _materia medica_. In my own experience there had been so -many instances where relief had been afforded in apparently hopeless -cases that I thought it worthy of special study. For example, a new -chauffeur whom I had engaged accompanied my old chauffeur in the -machine one day; as he jumped out, his arm was caught between the door -and a telegraph pole and crushed. We immediately had him taken to the -hospital, where the doctors decided that only an immediate operation -afforded any prospect of saving his arm, and that even a successful -operation was doubtful. I was told that evening that his mother had -taken the young man away, notwithstanding the entreaties of our Chinese -legation personnel. We gave him up for lost. But within six weeks he -reported for his position, only admitting: "My arm is still a little -weak." A Chinese doctor had cured him with poultices. - -Similar cases often came to my attention. Mr. Chow Tzu-chi had -frequently suffered severely from rheumatism. He had tried every -scientific remedy without avail. One day I was glad to find him chipper -and in fine spirits. He said, "I am cured"; and he told me that a -Chinese doctor had fixed golden needles in different parts of his -body. Within a day his pains had disappeared. The empirical knowledge -accumulated by Chinese doctors through thousands of years may be worth -something. - -In their hours of leisure from the scientific tasks of their mission, -the members of the Rockefeller board saw much of Chinese life on -the lighter as well as its more serious side. One evening we went -together to a Chinese restaurant where we met some native friends and -had an excellent dinner, of the best that Peking cooking affords. The -American guests were delighted with the turmoil in the courts of a -Peking restaurant. We were entertained after dinner by a well-known -prestidigitator. This man often performs in Peking, where he is -known among foreigners by the name of Ega Lang Tang. These words -mean nothing, being only an arbitrary formula which he uses in his -incantations. His tricks, many and astounding, culminate when, after -turning a somersault, he suddenly produces out of nothing a glass bowl -as large as a washtub two feet in diameter filled with water in which -shoals of fish are gaily swimming about. - -In another way American initiative of an educational nature was -welcomed in Peking. Among officials and literary men were many who were -interested in the scientific study of economic and political subjects. -With them and with American and European friends I had often discussed -the desirability of establishing an association devoted to such work. -The old literary learning which had up to a very recent time organized -and given cohesion to Chinese intellectual life had largely lost its -power to satisfy men, whereas the scientific learning of the West -had not yet become sufficiently strong to act as the chief bond of -intellectual fellowship. - -As all political and social action, and all systematic effort in -industry and commerce, depend on intellectual forces, it is evident -that disorganization and confusion would soon threaten Chinese life -unless centres were formed in which the old could be brought into -harmonious and organic relationship with the new, so as to focus -intellectual effort. Such centres would wield great influence. - -With the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lu Tsen-tsiang, and a number -of other friends who were equally impressed with the need for such a -centre of thought and discussion, we decided in November, 1917, to take -steps toward forming a Chinese Social and Political Science Association. - -The first meeting was held at the residence of the Minister for Foreign -Affairs on December 5, 1915, when plans were discussed. In an address -which I made on this occasion I expressed my idea of the significance -of the society as follows: - -"The founding of the Society is an indication of the entry of China -into full coöperation in modern scientific work. This initial step -foreshadows a continuous effort through which the experience and -knowledge of China will be made scientifically available to the world -at large. The voice of China will be heard, her experience considered, -and her institutions understood by the world at large; she will be -represented in the scientific councils. At home the work of such an -association, if successful, should result in a clearer conception of -national character and destiny. The knowledge gained by its work would -be of great value in constructive administrative reform. But its -greatest service would lie in the manner in which it would contribute -to a more deep and more definite national self-consciousness...." - -Virtually all the Chinese officials, of modern education, as well as -many teachers and publicists, interested themselves in the new society. -The idea was supported by men of all nations; alongside of Americans -like Doctor Goodnow, Doctors W.W. and W.F. Willoughby, and Dr. Henry -C. Adams, were the British, Dr. George Morrison, Sir Robert Bredon, -Professor Bevan, and Mr. B. Lenox Simpson; the French, M. Mazot and -M. Padoux; the Russians, M. Konovalov and Baron Staël-Holstein; and -the Japanese, Professor Ariga. The society thereafter held regular -meetings, at which valuable addresses and discussions were given; it -published a quarterly review, and it established the first library in -Peking for the use of officials, students, and the public in general. - -Through the assistance of the Prime Minister, Mr. Hsu Hsi-chang, a -portion of the Imperial City was set aside for use by the library--a -centrally situated enclosure, called the Court of the Guardian -Gods. This had been used as a depository for all the paraphernalia -of Imperial ceremonies, such as lanterns, banners, emblems, state -carriages, and catafalques. When I first visited it, large stores of -these objects still remained. They were not of a substantial kind, but -such as are constructed or made over specially for each occasion; and, -while they were quite interesting, they had no intrinsic value. That -the officials and the Imperial Family should combine to set aside so -valuable an area for a modern scientific purpose was an indication that -China is moving. - -Attached to the French Legation was the brilliant sinologist Paul -Pelliot, whose explorations in Turkestan had secured such great -treasures for the French museums and the Bibliothèque Nationale. -Though he acted officially as military attaché, M. Pelliot really had a -far broader function, being liaison officer between French and Chinese -culture. - -Before the war the Germans had an educational attaché. On account of -the close relationship between Chinese and American education through -the thousands of American returned students, I strongly urged the -appointment of an attaché who could give his attention to educational -affairs. I was so pressed with other business that hundreds of -invitations to address educational bodies throughout China had to go -unaccepted. If there had been an assistant who could have met the -Chinese on these occasions, he could have been exceedingly helpful to -them. But I was told from Washington that there was no provision for an -attaché with such functions. - -The intimate feeling of coöperation between the British and American -communities expressed itself in many meetings, in some of which the -Chinese, too, participated. Thus, on December 8, 1917, there was held a -reception of the English-speaking returned students. The Minister for -Foreign Affairs; a number of his counsellors; the British minister, Sir -John Jordan, and his staff; the American Legation; the missionaries; -all who had received their education in the United States or Great -Britain, were here present. It was a large company that gathered in the -hall of the Y.M.C.A., including a great many Chinese women. - -The hum of the preliminary conversation was suddenly interrupted by -a loud voice issuing from a young man who had hoisted himself on a -chair in the centre of the room. He proceeded to give directions for -the systematic promotion of sociability and conversation. The Chinese -guests were to join hands and form a circle around the room, facing -inward; within that circle the British and American guests were to -join hands, forming a circle facing outward. At the given word the -outer circle was to revolve to the right, the inner circle to the -left. At the word "halt," everyone was to engage his or her vis-à-vis -in conversation. To eliminate every risk of stalemate, the topics for -conversation were given out, one for each stop of the revolving line, -the last being: "My Greatest Secret." - -The young man who proposed this thoroughly American system of breaking -the ice had just come out from Wisconsin, and it was his business to -secure the proper mixing in miscellaneous gatherings. The British -seemed at first somewhat aghast at the prospect of this rotary and -perambulatory conversation; yet they quite readily fell in with the -idea, and when the first word of halt was given, I noticed Sir John -duly making conversation with a simpering little Chinese girl opposite -him. - -A little later, in December, there was formed an Anglo-American -Club, which celebrated its début with a dinner at the Hotel of Four -Nations. This was the beginning of the closest relationship that has -ever existed between the Americans and British in the Far East. In my -brief speech I expressed my genuine feeling of satisfaction that this -coöperation should have come about. - -My relations with educational authorities and activities in Peking were -most pleasant. When Commencement was celebrated at Peking University -I had the distinction of an honorary LL.D. conferred upon me. This -courtesy was performed in a very graceful manner by Doctor Lowry, my -wise and experienced friend, under whose presidency this institution -had been built up from small beginnings. I was so interested in the -promise of this American university in the capital of China that -I consented to act as a member of the Board, and I had interested -myself in its development as far as my official duties would permit. -To my great satisfaction, the university had at this time become -interdenominational, representing four of the Christian mission -societies active in China. A liberal spirit pervaded the university, -inspiring its members with a desire to serve China by spreading the -light of learning, without narrow denominational limitations, relying -on Christian spirit and character to exert its influence without undue -insistence on dogma. By a pleasant coincidence, I on that very date -received a cablegram telling me that my alma mater, the University of -Wisconsin, had also given me the honorary LL.D. - -An opportunity for general meetings of Americans and British, -including, also, other residents of Peking, interested in things of the -mind, was afforded by a lecture course arranged by the Peking Language -School. I opened the course with an address on the conservation of -the artistic past of China, which was given at the residence of the -British minister. Sir John Jordan in his introductory remarks said -that the time was at hand when foreigners residing in China would take -a far deeper and more intimate interest in Chinese civilization than -they had done before. I spoke of the danger of losing the expertness -and the creative impulse of Chinese art and of the readiness it had -always shown in the past to develop new forms, methods, and beauties. -Subsequent lectures were given alternately at my residence and at the -theatre of the British Legation, and the entire course emphasized our -common interest in Chinese civilization. - -During the height of the student movement in 1919 the Peking police -closed the offices of the _Yi Shih Pao_ (Social Welfare), a liberal -paper in Peking. The paper had made itself disliked by publishing news -of the Japanese negotiations and criticizing the militarist faction. -A number of Americans had previously interested themselves in the -paper, because of its liberal tendencies and because of its devotion to -social welfare work; they proposed to take it over, but the transfer -had not yet been carried out. The Chinese editor of the paper appealed -to me to assist him in the liberation of an associate who had been -imprisoned. As no legal American interest at the time existed in the -paper, however, it was not possible to use my good offices in its -behalf, although I had at all times made the Chinese officials know -that the suppression of free speech in the press was a very undesirable -procedure. The suppression of the _Yi Shih Pao_ was a result of the -desire of the reactionary faction in Peking to choke every expression -favourable to the national movement; they had been encouraged to -imitate the stringent press regulations of Japan. - -Later on the Americans completed their purchase of the _Yi Shih Pao_. -The question as to how far American protection should be extended over -newspapers printed in Chinese, but owned by Americans, then came up -for decision. As Americans had become interested in the _bona fide_ -enterprise of publishing newspapers in Chinese, it was not apparent -how such protection as is given to others for their legitimate -interests could be refused in this case. I therefore recommended to -the Department of State that no distinction be made against such -enterprises, and several vernacular papers were subsequently registered -in American consulates. - -When I told the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that American -registry had been given the _Yi Shih Pao_, I informed him of the -character of the American press laws, under which newspapers are in -normal times entirely free from censorship, but are responsible in -law for any misstatements of fact injurious to individuals. Many of -the reactionary officials had persistently opposed the idea of having -American-registered vernacular papers in China. But, manifestly, they -could not make any valid protest against such an arrangement. In fact, -we never had any expression of official displeasure; on the contrary, -nothing could have been more welcome to the people of China and to the -great majority of officials than to know that vernacular papers were to -be published in China by Americans. - -The publication in Peking of news from abroad was much facilitated -by wireless. Early in 1919 I entertained at lunch several American -newspapermen, with whom I had a conference on the press and news -situation in the Far East. They were Mr. Fleisher, of the _Japan -Advertiser_; Mr. McClatchey, of the _Sacramento Bee_; Mr. Sharkey, of -the Associated Press; and Mr. Carl Crow, representative of the American -Committee on Public Information. Mr. Walter Rogers, an expert in this -matter, had been in Peking shortly before. - -The great difficulty with which we were confronted in any attempt to -develop the news service between China and the United States was the -expense of telegraphing by cable, which made it impossible to transmit -an adequate news service. We were therefore all agreed that it was -essential to use the wireless and that every effort should be made for -arrangements whereby the wireless system of the American Government -would carry news messages at a reasonable rate. - -The importance of a direct news service was demonstrated during the -war, when under an arrangement by the Committee on Public Information -a budget of news was sent by wireless daily to the Far East. For -the first time in history had there been anything approaching a -fairly complete statement of what was going on in the United States. -The service of news of the Peace Conference was also particularly -appreciated by everybody in China. China had never been so close to -Europe before. - -The only agency supplying news in China is Reuter's. Its news budget -is made up in London. It proceeds to Spain, Morocco, and down the west -coast of Africa to the Cape; thence up the east coast of Egypt, Persia, -India, and Ceylon. At each of the main stations on the way items of -only local interest there are withdrawn. What is left at Ceylon as of -interest to the Far East is sent on to Singapore and Hong-Kong, as well -as by another route to Australia. It is quite natural that with such -a source and such a routing, this service should carry next to nothing -about America. I once had it observed for a whole month in June, 1916, -when the only American item carried was that Mr. Bryan had shed tears -at the National Democratic Convention! - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -WAR DAYS IN PEKING - - -During my first absence in America Mr. Peck had been appointed consul -at Tsingtau, and Dr. Charles D. Tenney had been sent as his successor. -My predecessor, Mr. W.J. Calhoun, in a letter concerning Doctor -Tenney, bore witness to his unusual acquaintanceship with the Chinese -and knowledge of Chinese affairs. Speaking of Doctor Tenney's joy in -returning to China, Mr. Calhoun remarked: "There is a strange thing -about foreigners who have lived very long in China: they never seem to -be contented anywhere else. They are apparently bitten by some kind -of bug which infuses a virus into their blood, and makes life in that -country the only thing endurable." - -Existence of a state of war deeply affected social life in Peking. -The mutual enemies could, of course, not see each other. Their social -movements, therefore, were considerably restricted. The neutrals, -however, having relations with both sides, were if anything more -busy socially than at other times. Dinners had to be given in sets, -one for the Entente Allies, the other for the Central Powers. The -Austrian minister decided that as his country was at war and his -people were suffering, he would not accept any dinner invitations at -all, except for small parties _en famille_. The other representatives -of belligerent powers kept up their social life on a reduced scale. -Dancing was gradually restricted, and finally passed out almost -entirely. - -Mr. Rockhill had died at Honolulu in December, 1914. He had been -retained by President Yuan as his personal adviser, and was returning -to China from a brief visit to the United States. I felt the loss of a -man of such unusual ability and experience, to whom China had been the -most interesting country in the world. In all the difficulties which -followed, his advice would have been of great value to the Chinese -President and Government. - -The report of the Engineers' Commission which investigated the -Hwai River Conservancy project made that enterprise look even more -attractive than I had anticipated. The value of the redeemed land alone -would be more than enough to pay the cost of the improvements. I felt -that the work would give great credit to the American name. Not only -would it assure the livelihood of multitudes through the redemption -of millions of the most fertile acres in China, but it would give -to the Chinese a living example of how, by scientific methods, the -very foundations of their life could be improved. During the winter -of 1914-15 a terrible famine was again devastating that region, -threatening hundreds of thousands of peasants with extinction. Never -had the sum of twenty millions of dollars produced such benefits as -would be assured here. But after urgent appeals to the Department in -Washington, the National Red Cross, and the Rockefeller Foundation, it -was found impossible to secure the necessary capital during the year of -the option. The best I could do was to ask for an extension, which was -granted, although the Chinese themselves were impatient to see the work -begun. - -We received reports during the first winter of the war about the -suffering endured by German and Austrian prisoners in Siberia. They -had been captured during the summer and early autumn, and transported -to Siberia in their summer uniforms. Subjected to the intense cold -of a Siberian winter, they were herded in barracks unprovided with -ordinary necessities; these were sealed to exclude the cold and all -kinds of disease were soon rampant. The Legation at Peking, being -nearest to Siberia, superintended the relief work there of the -American Red Cross; there was also a German relief organization (called -_Hilfsaktion_), of which a capable and enterprising woman of Austrian -descent, Madame Von Hanneken, was the moving spirit. The Legation's -work increased; innumerable appeals came to it directly, and in lending -its good offices to the German association care had to be taken that -no use of it be made that could be properly objected to. Madame Von -Hanneken was on friendly terms with the Russian Legation, which gave -her society needed facilities. Its direct representatives were European -neutrals, chiefly Danes and Swedes. The work of the American Red Cross -among the war prisoners in Siberia, as well as the efforts of the -Y.M.C.A. to introduce among them industrial and artistic activities to -alleviate their lot, make a story of unselfish effort. - -I tried to encourage the Chinese to build good roads. The Imperial -roads around Peking were surfaced with huge flagstones which, through -rain and climate, had lost alignment; they tilted and sloped at angles -like the logs of a corduroy road. Vehicles might not pass them, while -the Chinese carts picked their way as best they could over low-lying -dirt tracks by the side of these magnificent causeways. The Chinese -proverbial description of them is: "Ten years of heaven and a thousand -years of hell." The country thoroughfares have worn deep; it is a -Chinese paradox that the rivers usually flow above and the highways lie -below the surface of the land. In the _loess_ regions the roads are -often cut thirty or forty feet deep into the soil. - -I first suggested the building of a road from Tientsin to Peking, but -the railways did not encourage this enterprise, and it was delayed -several years. Mr. E.W. Frazar, an American merchant from Japan who -accompanied me to Tokyo in 1915, had successfully established motor-car -services in Japan. He had come to north China to establish a branch -of his firm there; he was willing to get American capital for road -building and to make a contract therefor with the Chinese Government. -This particular contract was not concluded, but an impetus had been -given to the idea among the Chinese, and the building of roads was -gradually taken up, beginning with highways around Peking. The leading -men became interested when they began to realize its effect on real -estate values. - -Governor-General Harrison of the Philippine Islands spent a week in -Peking, sightseeing, making many purchases of antiques and Peking -products. He was much taken with the Chinese rugs and ordered a number -of huge carpets to be made for the Malacañan Palace. We both strongly -felt that something should be done to prevent the total disappearance -of the American flag from the Pacific, and this we knew would occur -if the existing companies carried out their threats of retrenchment -and withdrawal. Had one been able to foresee the enormous demand for -shipping which was soon to arise, he might have outdistanced the -richest of existing millionaires. The Chinese Government did give to -an American a contract to establish a Chino-American steamship line, -with a government guarantee of $3,000,000; unfortunately, it shared -the all-too-common fate of American undertakings in China and was not -carried out. - -The lunar New Year of the Chinese Calendar was changed to the -Republican (Min Kuo) New Year. On January 1st Peking was given a festal -aspect. The Central Park, a part of the old Imperial City, had been -opened to the public, and under innumerable flags crowds streamed along -the pathways, stopping at booths to buy souvenirs and toys, or entering -the always popular eating places where both foreign and Chinese music -is played by bands large and small. On various public places fairs were -held; extensive settlements of booths built of bamboo poles and matting -sprang up overnight. There, curios, pictures, brass utensils, wood -carvings, gold fishes, ming eggs, birdcages, and other objects useful -and ornamental were on sale. Wandering troops of actors and acrobats -performed in enclosures to which the public was admitted for a small -fee. Before one of these stockades I saw a large sign reading: "Chow -and Chang--champion magicians educated _from_ America." So, even here, -American education was valued. The art collection in the Imperial City -was open at half the usual admission fee; the grounds of the Temple -of Agriculture and of the Temple of Heaven were crowded with holiday -visitors, and at all theatres were special performances. For three or -four days the city wore a holiday aspect. - -But the old New Year was not abandoned. On the days before the lunar -year ended the streets became alive with shoppers preparing for the -grand annual feasting. Quantities of fattened ducks, pigs, chickens, -and fishes, loads of baked things and sweets were transported in -carts, rickshaws, and all sorts of vehicles or by hand, everyone -chattering and smiling in happy anticipation. The Chinese New Year is -the traditional time for settling all outstanding accounts. Slates -are wiped clean, partnerships are wound up, and all balances settled. -When New Year's eve comes, having strained themselves to meet their -obligations, all cast dull care aside. Families and clans gather for a -gargantuan feasting, the abundance and duration of which outdistances -anything seen in the West. - -The official celebration of the Republican New Year at the President's -Palace had to be modified. Because of the war the diplomatic corps -could not be received as a unit. It was therefore arranged that the -President receive the foreign representatives in three groups: the -Allies, the Neutrals, and the Central Powers. High Chinese officials -and picturesque Mongolian dignitaries were received on the first day, -the diplomatic representatives on the second. As the President chatted -informally with each minister, Madam Yuan received in an adjoining -apartment, talking quite naturally with the ladies of the party about -such feminine matters as the size of families and the choice of dress -materials. - -A short time ago a young American teacher, Hicks, was murdered and -his two companions seriously wounded while they were ascending the -Yangtse River in a boat. The attack was at the dead of night; the -survivors recalled only flaring torches and swarthy faces, although -they believed that their assailants wore some sort of uniform. The -Chinese Government disavowed responsibility, considering it an ordinary -robbery, and asserting that if the assailants wore uniforms they must -have been insurgents, as no regular troops were near that place. The -crime was revolting, destructive of the sense of security of foreign -travellers, and I insisted absolutely on payment of an indemnity. -Money payment is by no means satisfactory; it does give the injured -parties redress and testifies to the desire of the Central Government -to protect foreigners, but does not bring the consequences of the crime -home to the really guilty parties. I therefore always tried to have the -personal responsibility in such matters followed up and specifically -determined; in this case it was impossible. The Chinese Government -finally agreed to the very handsome indemnity of $25,000 for the death -of young Hicks, the largest pecuniary award for loss of life ever made -in China. It was an ironical circumstance that just after this had been -settled, an American driving his automobile at excessive speed in the -Peking streets struck and killed an old Chinese woman. When I stated to -the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I would ask this man to pay $300 -to the relatives, he replied with a twinkle: "How much was it we paid -you for the last American who was killed?" - -However, he did not really intend to dispute the reasonableness of -even so enormous a difference. Foreigners in China, on account of -their employment as managers or head teachers, necessarily have to be -considered, from a purely pecuniary point of view, to have a value far -above the average. Moreover, should large indemnities be paid for -the death of poor people among the Chinese, they would be constantly -tempted to let themselves be injured or even killed, in order to -provide for their families. - -Among the Chinese who visited me during the first year of the war were -the military and civil governors of Chekiang Province. Contrary to -tradition, both were natives of the province they governed, and good -governors, too. The civil governor, Mr. Chu Ying-kuang, who was under -forty, was a man of great public spirit and wisdom, eager to discuss -constructive ideas and effective methods in government and industry. -Governor Chu wrote me a letter of thanks, which may be considered an -example of Chinese epistolary style. It ran: - - During my short stay in the Capital I hurriedly visited your - Excellency and was so fortunate as to draw upon the stores of - your magnificence and gain the advantage of your instruction. My - appreciation cannot be expressed in words. You also treated me with - extraordinary kindness in preparing for me an elaborate banquet. - Your kindness and courtesy were heaped high and your treasures were - lavishly displayed. My gratitude is graven on my heart and my hope and - prayer is that the splendour of your merit may daily grow brighter and - that your prosperity may mount as high as the clouds. - - I, your younger brother, left Peking on the 29th of last month for the - South, and on February 2nd arrived at Hangchou. The whole journey was - peaceful so that your embroidered thoughts need not be exercised. I - reflect fondly on your refined conversation and cannot forget it for - an instant. I respectfully offer this inch-long casket to express my - sincere gratitude and hope that you will favour it with a glance. - - Respectfully wishing you daily blessings, - - Your younger brother. - -The new German minister, Admiral von Hintze, arrived shortly after -the New Year. I saw him frequently after his first visit, as he had -few colleagues with whom, under the conditions of war, he could meet. -In order to avoid capture as an enemy, Admiral von Hintze had come -from the United States incognito, as a supercargo on a Norwegian -vessel. He had been minister in Mexico, and before that the Emperor's -representative at the court of the Czar, and was a man of wide -knowledge of European affairs and of diplomatic intrigue. For a man -of his intelligence, he was inclined to give undue weight to rumours. -Peking was amused shortly after his arrival when he sent orders to the -Germans resident in all parts of the capital to hold themselves ready -to come into the Legation Quarter immediately upon notice being given. -He had read books on the troubles of 1900 and on the assassination of -his predecessor, Baron Kettler; he therefore saw dire menaces where -everything seemed quite normal to older residents. Especially, he -imagined himself surrounded by emissaries and retainers of the enemy. -Several times he would say to me: "My first 'boy' is excellent. He -could not be better. The Japanese pay him well, so he has to do his -best to hold his job." - -Being himself a clever man and familiar with opinion outside of -Germany, Admiral Hintze thoroughly disapproved of the acts of -unnecessary violence by which the Germans had forfeited the good -opinion of the world, especially the sinking of the _Lusitania_ and the -execution of Edith Cavell. "What a mistake," he exclaimed, "for the -sake of one woman! Why not hold her in a prison somewhere in Germany -until the war is over?" The stupidity of such acts deeply offended him. -Had he become Minister for Foreign Affairs at an earlier date, some -bad mistakes might have been avoided. When the first reports of the -resumption of exacerbated submarine warfare were received, he remarked -to me: "Do not believe these reports that Germany will resume unlimited -submarine warfare. I can assure you that they will not be foolish -enough to do such a thing." - -I noticed soon after Admiral Hintze's arrival that his relations with -his Austrian colleague were not the most cordial; these two seemed -to coöperate with difficulty. They were men entirely different in -temperament. The German was a man of the world, inspired with the -ideal of German military power and looking on international politics -as a keen and clever intellectual game. Concerning Hindenburg, he said -to me: "There is a man who makes no excuses for his existence." The -Austrian minister was a man of scholarly impulse, with a broad sympathy -for humankind, deploring the shallow game of politics, and hoping for -a more humane and reasonable system of government than that of the -political state. - -Mr. Sun Pao-chi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, resigned on January 28th -to head the Audit Board, and was succeeded by Mr. Lu Tseng-tsiang. -Mr. Lu had enjoyed an extensive experience in Europe. He had acquired -a thorough mastery of French and married a Belgian lady, to whom he -was deeply devoted. Like his predecessor, he abstained from internal -politics. He was called to office when the exceedingly difficult -negotiations with Japan concerning the twenty-one demands were begun, -and it became his duty to carry through a very painful and ungrateful -task. Mr. Lu was interested in general political affairs in their -broader aspects, and gave special attention to international law. - -I was frequently a guest at the house of Mr. Liang Tun-yen, the -Minister of Communications. He was easy-going, prepared to talk -business there rather than at the Ministry, where I would see him -frequently also, about the Hukuang railways. The engineer of the -British section was steadfastly trying to secure standards of British -engineering and manufacture, to which it would be difficult for -American manufacturers to conform. The Legation was beset with protests -concerning orders for materials which Americans did not like, since -they embodied the special practice of one partner to the contract. Thus -matters of a technical nature had to be argued between the Legation and -the Ministry of Communications. Mr. Liang himself was not a railway -expert. For example, he once spoke enthusiastically about clearing up -the Grand Canal, exclaiming: "then you could go from Peking to Shanghai -in a houseboat." We often fell back on the more general features -of the political situation in China, concerning which Mr. Liang -displayed a gentle skepticism for all proposed reforms. With respect -to railroad concessions, he was hostile to the idea of percentage -construction contracts, believing it dangerous to measure the returns -of an engineering firm by the sum expended on the works. I argued that -since the professional standing of such a firm was involved it could -not afford to run up the cost of the works merely to increase its own -commission. But I did not overcome his skepticism. - - - - -CHAPTER XV - -EMPEROR YUAN SHIH-KAI - - -"Yuan Shih-kai is trying to make himself emperor, we hear from Peking," -Mr. E.T. Williams remarked to me at the Department of State when I saw -him there in July, 1915. The report said that an imperialist movement -in behalf of Yuan Shih-kai had been launched in Peking. As there had -been frequent reports during the year of such attempts to set up an -empire, I was not at first inclined to give much credence to the -rumours. - -Upon my return to San Francisco in September, this time to take steamer -for China, I met Dr. Wellington Koo, who had just come on a special -mission. I had been confidentially informed that he would probably be -designated as minister to the United States, to take the place of Mr. -Shah. The Department of State had directed me to delay my departure in -order to confer with Doctor Koo upon recent developments in China. On -the day we spent together we went over all that had happened since my -absence. The reports which had already been received that a movement -had been started to make Yuan Shih-kai emperor I then considered -improbable, in view of all the difficulties which the enterprise must -encounter, both internationally and from the Chinese opposition. Doctor -Koo confirmed this feeling and said that Yuan Shih-kai himself was very -doubtful. He mentioned the Goodnow memorandum, however, as a possible -factor. I was considerably surprised later to discover that the main -object of Doctor Koo's mission was to sound public opinion in America -and Europe concerning the assumption of the imperial dignity by Yuan -Shih-kai, and to prepare the ground for it. During my return voyage -to China the matter quickly came to a head, so that when I arrived in -Peking on October 1st I was confronted with an entirely new situation. - -To understand the movement it is necessary to review briefly the -significant facts of Peking politics during the summer of 1915. A -concerted effort had been made to combat the Liang Shih-yi faction. -The opposition centred in the so-called Anhui Party, which was largely -militaristic, but in which civilian leaders like the Premier, Hsu -Shih-chang, the Chief Secretary of the cabinet, Yang Shih-chi, the -Minister of Finance, as well as the Minister of Communications, were -prominent. - -Charges of corruption were lodged against Chang Hu, Vice-Minister -of Finance; Yeh Kung-cho, Vice-Minister of Communications; and the -Director of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Including these, twenty-two -high officials were impeached during July, besides several provincial -governors. The Anhui Party was trying to eliminate radically the -influence of the so-called Communications Party, which had tried to -maintain itself through the vice-ministers and counsellors of several -important ministries, the chiefs of which were Anhui men. - -It appears that several Anhui leaders were involved in a movement to -establish a monarchy, with Yuan Shih-kai as emperor. Care was exercised -in picking the Committee of Ten to make a preliminary draft of the -Permanent Constitution; it was believed by many that influences were -at work for putting into that instrument provisions for reëstablishing -the monarchy. Report had it that on July 7th General Feng Kuo-chang, -military governor at Nanking, had urged that the President assume the -throne, for which he was rebuked by Yuan in severe terms. Dr. Frank -J. Goodnow, the American constitutional adviser, returned to Peking -in mid-July for a short stay; he was asked on behalf of the President -to prepare a memorandum on the comparative adaptability of the -republican and monarchical forms of government to Chinese conditions. -Doctor Goodnow complied. As a matter of general theory, he took the -view that the monarchical form might be considered better suited to -the traditions and the actual political development of the Chinese. He -saw special merit in the fact that under the monarchical system, the -succession to power would be regulated so that it could not be made an -ever-recurring object of contention. On the expediency of an actual -return at the time from the republic to the monarchy Doctor Goodnow -expressly refrained from pronouncing a judgment. The memorandum was -prepared simply for the personal information of the President. Advisers -had been so generally treated as academic ornaments that Doctor Goodnow -did not suspect that in this case his memorandum would be made the -starting point and basis of positive action. - -Meanwhile, Mr. Liang Shih-yi and his group, seeing their power -threatened, decided to do something extreme to recover the lead. They -concluded that the monarchical movement was inevitable; thereupon -they seem to have persuaded Yuan Shih-kai that the movement could be -properly handled and brought to early and successful issue only through -their superior experience and knowledge. It was they who arranged for -the memorandum of Doctor Goodnow. They had remained in the background -until the middle of August, when an open monarchical propaganda began, -based avowedly on the opinions expressed by the American adviser and -thus given a very respectable and impartial appearance. - -They formed the Peace Planning Society (Chou An Hui). Its aim was -to investigate the advantages and disadvantages accruing from the -republican form of government. Doctor Goodnow's views were widely -heralded as categorically giving preference to monarchy for China, -notwithstanding disclaimers which he now issued. The fact that an -American expert should pronounce this judgment was cited as especially -strong evidence in favour of the monarchical form, since it came from a -citizen of the foremost republic in the world. - -It became known in early September that the movement was in the hands -of capable organizers. Notwithstanding Yuan Shih-kai's repeated -disclaimers, he failed to take positive action to suppress the -agitation; he was therefore believed to be at least in a receptive -mood. The high officials in Peking with few exceptions had become -favourable to the movement. The Vice-President, General Li Tuan-hung, -was at first opposed, but even he appeared to be reconciled at last, -being not entirely a free agent. The members of the Anhui faction, now -that the lead had been taken out of their hands, were less enthusiastic -for the change. Several political leaders began to withdraw from -affairs. General Tuan Chi-jui, the Minister of War, and Mr. Liang -Chi-chao, the Minister of Education, resigned, undoubtedly because -of their tacit disapproval of the movement, although other reasons -were alleged.[3] The Premier and Mr. Liang Tung-yen, the Minister -of Communications, though not on principle opposed, considered that -on account of his previous allegiance to the Imperial Family, Yuan -Shih-kai could not with propriety assume the Imperial office. Within -the inner circles of the movement there was no question of the desire -of the President to have it put through. For a time, early in -September, he was even thinking of forcing the matter, but began to be -apprehensive regarding the action of certain foreign powers who might -attach difficult conditions to their recognition of the new régime. - -It was suggested that the Legislative Council might simply confer -the title of emperor on the President, and the constitution might -then be amended to make the presidency hereditary. Thus, it was -naïvely believed, legal continuity could be preserved sufficiently -to obviate the necessity of seeking a new recognition. A republic -with a hereditary president seemed to some politicians the key to the -difficulty. This proposal served to direct the minds of those who were -managing the movement to the importance of letting a representative -body participate in it, and of not carrying it through by a _coup -d'état_. - -On my return to China Mr. Chow Tsu-chi and other leaders waited on me, -saying that present uncertainties involved such drawbacks to peace -and prosperity that from all the provinces the strongest appeals were -coming, to prevail upon Yuan to sanction the movement. Mr. Chow went -so far as to say: "There is such a strong demand for this step that we -shall have great trouble if it is not taken. There will be military -uprisings." When I looked incredulous, Mr. Chow proceeded: "Yes, -indeed, the people can only understand a personal headship, and they -want it, so that the country may be settled." Though I took this all -with a grain of salt, I was surprised at the apparent unanimity with -which the inevitableness of the change seemed to be accepted. When I -asked how the President would reconcile such a step with the oath he -had taken to support a republican government, I was told that this was, -indeed, the great obstacle; that probably it could not be overcome -unless the whole nation insisted and made it a point of duty that Yuan -Shih-kai continue to govern the state under the new form. - -The attempt to reëstablish the monarchy seemed to me a step backward. -I had always felt that, whereas the Chinese had no experience with -elective representative institutions, nevertheless they were locally so -largely self-governed that they were fitted by experience and tradition -to evolve some form of provincial and national representation. Yet I -was strongly convinced that it is under any circumstances injudicious -for one nation or the officials of one nation to assume that they can -determine what is the best form of government for another nation. The -fundamental principle of self-government is that every people shall -work out that problem for itself, usually through many troubles and -with many relapses to less perfect methods. - -The Legation had during my absence asked for instructions about a -possible eventual decision to recognize the new form of government. -It had suggested that acceptability to the people, and, consequently, -ability to preserve order, should be among the factors determining our -attitude. This position had been approved by the State Department. -In the many conversations I had with the President and members of -the cabinet, I confined myself to expressing the opinion that the -Government would strengthen itself and gain respect at home and abroad -in such measure as it made real use of representative institutions and -encouraged local self-government. - -The Council of State on 6th October passed a law instituting a -national referendum on the question. Each district was to elect one -representative. The delegates from each province were to meet at the -respective provincial capitals and to ballot upon the question. The -election was fixed for the 5th of November, the date for balloting -on the principal issue on November 15th. Those desiring constructive -and progressive action had allied themselves with the monarchical -movement. They hoped to strengthen constitutional practice and -administrative efficiency after the personal ambitions of Yuan Shih-kai -had been realized. With Yuan in the exalted position of Emperor, Mr. -Chow Tsu-chi explained to me, the government itself would be in -the hands of the prime minister and cabinet; they would carry it on -constitutionally and in harmony with the legislative branch. As Mr. -Chow put it: "We shall make Yuan the Buddha in the temple." - -The original promoters of the movement were not wholly pleased with -the efforts to engraft on it principles of constitutional practice -and popular consent. As certain military leaders might resort to a -_coup d'état_ on October 10th, the anniversary of the outbreak of -the revolution in 1911, the review of troops set for that date was -countermanded. - -Mr. Liang Shih-yi and Mr. Chow Tsu-chi afterward explained to me -their preference for the monarchical form. Mr. Liang said: "Chinese -traditions and customs, official and commercial, emphasize personal -relationships. Abstract forms of thinking, in terms of institutions -and general legal principles, are not understood by our people. Under -an emperor, authority would sit more securely, so that it would be -possible to carry through a fundamental financial reform such as that -of the land tax. The element of personal loyalty and responsibility is -necessary to counteract the growth of corruption among officials. The -Chinese cannot conceive of personal duties toward a pure abstraction." - -With President Yuan Shih-kai I had a long interview on October 4th. -He assumed complete indifference as to the popular vote soon to be -taken. "If the vote is favourable to the existing system," he said, -"matters will simply remain as they are; a vote for the monarchy would, -on the contrary, bring up many questions of organization. I favour a -representative parliament, with full liberty of discussion but with -limited powers over finance." Education and expert guidance in the -work of the Government were other things about which he was planning. -"There is a general lack of useful employment," he added with some -hilarity, "on the part of the numerous advisers who hover around the -departments. With an administrative reorganization all this will -be changed. These experts will be put to work in helping to develop -administrative activities." And he reverted to his favourite simile of -the infant: "Even if we feel that all their medicine may not be good -for the child, yet we shall let them take it by the hand to help it to -walk." - -It was plain that Yuan Shih-kai, while seeming very detached, was -trying to justify the proposed change on the ground of making the -Government more efficient and giving it also a representative character. - -Doubtless Yuan Shih-kai had thought originally that the Japanese would -not obstruct the movement, though ever since the time of his service -in Korea he had not been favourably regarded by them. His supporters, -indeed, claimed that the assurances first given to Yuan by the -Japanese were strong enough to warrant him in expecting their support -throughout. By the end of October, however, the Japanese Government -came to the conclusion that the project to put Yuan Shih-kai on the -throne should, if possible, be stopped. - -A communication came from Japan to the United States, Great Britain, -France, and Russia, which expressed concern because the monarchical -movement in China was likely to create disturbances and endanger -foreign interests. Japan invited the other powers to join in advising -the Chinese President against continuing this policy. The American -Government declined this invitation, because it did not desire to -interfere in the internal affairs of another country. The other powers, -however, fell in with the Japanese suggestion, and on October 29th the -Japanese Chargé, and the British, French, and Russian ministers, called -at the Foreign Office and individually gave "friendly counsel" to the -effect that it would be desirable to stop the monarchical movement. - -The British minister asked whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs -thought disturbances could surely be prevented; whereat the Chinese -rejoiced, believing it a friendly hint that everything would be -well, provided no disturbances should take place. As the machinery -for holding the elections had been set in motion, the Chinese leaders -believed that any action to stop them would bring discredit and loss of -prestige. - -The final voting in the convention of district delegates at Peking, -on December 9th, registered a unanimous desire from the elections of -November 5th to have Yuan Shih-kai assume the imperial dignity. Mr. -Chow Tsu-chi remarked to me: "We tried to get some people to vote in -the negative just for appearance's sake, but they would not do it." -Prince Pu-Lun made the speech nominating Yuan as emperor, which earned -him the resentment of the Manchus. On the basis of these elections, the -acting Parliament passed a resolution bestowing on Yuan Shih-kai the -imperial title, and calling upon him to take up the duties therewith -connected. He twice rejected the proposal, but when it was sent to him -the third time he submitted, having exhausted the traditional forms of -polite refusal. - -When Yuan was actually elected Emperor, the Entente Powers were -puzzled. They announced that they would await developments. The -Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed them that there would -be some delay, as many preparations were still required before the -promulgation of the empire could be made. But it was generally believed -that the movement had reached fruition. The Russian and French -ministers had already expressed themselves privately as favourable -to recognition. The German and Austrian ministers hastened to offer -Yuan their felicitations, which embarrassed the Chinese not a little. -The majority of foreign representatives at Peking were favourable to -recognizing the new order on January 1st, when the promulgation was -to be made. Messages of devotion and sometimes of fulsome praise came -to the Emperor-elect (already called Ta Huang Ti) from foreigners. -Foreign advisers, including the Japanese but not the Americans, set -forth their devotion in glowing phrases. Doctor Ariga, the Japanese -adviser, expressed his feelings in the traditional language of imperial -ceremony. It was even announced that the new emperor had been prayed -for in foreign Christian churches. I could not, however, verify any -such case. - -Suddenly, on Christmas Day, came the report that an opposition movement -had been started in Yunnan Province. - -A young general, Tsai Ao, who had for a time lived in Peking where he -held an administrative post, had left the capital during the summer -and had coöperated with Liang Chi-chao, after the latter resigned -his position as Minister of Education. Liang Chi-chao attacked the -monarchical movement in the press, writing from the foreign concession -at Tientsin. General Tsai Ao returned to his native Yunnan, and from -that mountain fastness launched a military expedition which was opposed -to the Emperor-elect. - -So the dead unanimity was suddenly disrupted. Now voices of opposition -came from all sides. The Chinese are fatalists. The movement to -carry Yuan into imperial power had seemed to them irresistible; many -had therefore suppressed their doubts and fears. But when an open -opposition was started they flocked to the new standard and everywhere -there appeared dissenters. - -A small mutiny took place in Shantung early in December. In the -Japanese papers it was called "premature." - -A night attack was executed near Shanghai on the settlement boundary, -which was participated in by several Japanese. Being easily suppressed, -it was not thought important. - -Yuan Shih-kai had long been in training for the emperorship, he loved -to use the methods of thought and expression of legendary monarchs. -Keeping close to national traditions in the days of his power he always -took care to use words indicative of self-deprecation and consideration -for his subordinates. The members of the cabinet repaired on December -13th to the President's house to offer their congratulations. -Replying, the Emperor-elect said: "I should rather be condoled with -than congratulated; for I am giving up my personal freedom and that -of my descendants for the public service. I would find far greater -satisfaction in leisurely farming and fishing on my Honan estate than -in this constant tussling with problems of state." - -When one of the ministers suggested that there should be a great -celebration of the new departure, Yuan Shih-kai replied: "It would be -better not to think of celebrating and of glory at the present time, -but only of work, and work, and work. My government should be improved -and soundly established. In that case, glory will ultimately come, but -otherwise, if artificially enacted, it is bound to be shortlived." - -These sayings were reported by his faithful ministers as being quite in -keeping with the character of a self-sacrificing, benevolent monarch. - -The empire to be established was to be quite _comme il faut_; it -was to have a complete ornamentation of newly made nobility. The -Vice-President was to have the title of prince, and there were to be -innumerable marquises, counts, and barons. The military governors -and members of cabinet were to become dukes and marquises, while -the barons would be as many as the sands of the sea. The attitude -of Vice-President Li Yuan-hung was not quite plain. Aside from the -princedom he was also offered the marriage of one of his sons to one -of Yuan's daughters. One of his wives seemed especially fascinated by -these glittering honours; she was said to have virtually prevailed upon -General Li to resign himself to the situation. The President was very -kind to him and had supplied him with a bodyguard which watched his -every movement--for Yuan Shih-kai's information. - -New styles of robes for the Emperor and for his high officials and -attendants were designed under direction of Mr. Chu Chi-chien. They -were fashioned after the ceremonial robes of the Japanese Imperial -House. The great coronation halls in the Imperial City were thoroughly -cleansed and repainted. New carpets were ordered; the making of -a nicely upholstered throne was entrusted to Talati's, a general -merchandise house in Peking, which fact greatly amused Countess -Ahlefeldt. - -Meanwhile, with foresight and astuteness, General Tsai Ao and Liang -Chi-chao were planning their movement against Yuan. By establishing the -first independent government in the remote province of Yunnan they made -sure that Yuan Shih-kai would be unable to vindicate his authority over -all China at an early time. With Yunnan as starting point, it was hoped -that the provinces of Kweichow, Kuangsi, and Szechuan could be induced -to associate themselves with the anti-monarchist movement. Though -Canton had a large garrison of Yuan's troops, it was hoped that inroads -would be made even there. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[Footnote 3: Mr. Liang Chi-chao wrote a characteristic letter of -resignation to the President: - -"On a previous occasion, I had the honour to apply to Your Excellency -for leave to resign and in answer to my request, Your Excellency -granted me two months' sick leave. This shows the magnanimity and -kindness of Your Excellency toward me. - -"The recent state of my health is by no means improved. The 'pulses' -in my body have become swollen and I am often attacked by fits of -dizziness. My appearance looks healthy, but my energy and spirit have -become exhausted. Different medicines have been prescribed by the -doctors, but none has proved effective. My ill-health has been chiefly -caused by my doctors' 'misuse of medicine.' I have lately been often -attacked by fits of cold, which cause me sleepless nights. I am quite -aware of the gravity of my disease and unless I give up all worldly -affairs, I am afraid that my illness will be beyond hope of cure. - -"In different places in America, the climate is mild and good for -invalids. I have now made up my mind to sail for the new continent to -recuperate my health. There I shall consult the best physicians for the -care of my health. I am longing to spend a vacation in perfect ease -and freedom from worldly cares in order to recuperate my health. I am -sailing immediately. I hereby respectfully bring this to the notice of -Your Excellency." - -He did not, however, proceed to America.] - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -DOWNFALL AND DEATH OF YUAN SHIH-KAI - - -Everybody thought that the monarchy was to be proclaimed on New Year's -Day, 1916. Disaffection, it was realized, though hitherto confined to -a remote province, might spread; delay was dangerous. Business in the -Yangtse Valley and elsewhere was dull. Merchants blamed the Central -Government, and murmurings were heard. General Feng Kuo-chang, who had -at first encouraged Yuan Shih-kai, now reserved his independence of -action. - -The revolt remained localized in Yunnan throughout January. With -the rise of an opposition, Yuan was now more ready to accentuate -the constitutional character of the new monarchy. His Minister of -Finance, Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, told me that a constitutional convention -would be convoked when the monarchy was proclaimed. This would provide -a representative assembly and a responsible cabinet. Constructive -reforms were to be announced. No further patents of nobility were to be -awarded, the titles already granted would be treated as purely military -honours. - -If Yuan and his advisers had acted boldly at this time in promulgating -the monarchy, recognition by a number of powers would probably -have followed, especially as the continuity of the personnel of -the Government made recognition easier. But hesitation and delay -strengthened the opposition. Yunnanese troops had by the end of January -penetrated into the neighbouring provinces of Szechuan and Kuangsi. To -learn what was going on in these provinces I sent the military attaché, -Major Newell, up the Yangtse River to Szechuan, and the naval attaché, -Lieut.-Commander Hutchins, to Canton. Efforts of the generals loyal to -Yuan to expel the Yunnanese from Szechuan Province were unsuccessful. - -After the peculiarly complex manner of Chinese political relationships, -Yunnan began to exercise an influence in Szechuan Province which was -to last for years. The Yunnanese were protected by natural barriers -of mountains; to make headway against them was difficult, even had -the troops of the President shown greater energy. How hollow was -the unanimity which had been proclaimed in the November elections -now became thoroughly apparent. Encouraged by the open opposition, -ill-will against Yuan Shih-kai began to be shown in other localities, -particularly in Hunan and in the southernmost provinces, Kuangsi and -Kuangtung. Rivalries hitherto held in check by Yuan's strong hand also -came to the fore. In central China the two men holding the greatest -military power, Generals Feng Kuo-chang and Chang Hsun, began to -cherish resentment against the President; for, in exchanging notes upon -meeting, they discovered that Yuan had set each of them to watch the -other. - -Even now the monarchical movement might have gained strength from -the moderates, who feared the Japanese. They did not wish to see the -national unity disrupted. "Get a constitution and a representative -legislature," they advised Yuan Shih-kai; "put in play a constructive -programme of state action; reform the finances and the audit, simplify -the taxes, extend works of public use, build roads, reclaim lands, -develop agriculture and industry, and all might yet be well." Mr. Liang -Shih-yi and Mr. Chow Tsu-chi hoped, once the question of succession was -definitely settled, to "put in commission" the dictatorial power of -Yuan. As Mr. Chow this time put it: "Yuan will have the seat of honour -but others will order the meal." - -Toward the end of January the formal proclamation of the empire was -further postponed. Mr. Chow Tsu-chi was to go on a special mission to -Japan, probably to induce the Japanese Government to be more favourable -to the new monarchy, and to bear handsome concessions to the Japanese. -But the Japanese Government declared that for personal reasons the -Emperor of Japan could not receive a Chinese embassy at that time. -Possibly various other concessionaire governments intimated to Japan -that they did not expect her to entertain any special proposals at this -time. Nevertheless, the Japanese must have made strong representations -to cause Yuan Shih-kai, who was a decisive and determined man, to risk -all by hesitating at this critical moment. - -To present some Americans I called on Yuan Shih-kai on February 16th. -Mr. and Mrs. Ulysses S. Grant were visiting Peking, and Yuan was -glad to have me present the son of the famous American President who -had himself visited China and established cordial relations with Li -Hung-chang, Yuan's great master. Significantly the President said to -Mr. Grant: "Your honoured father had great power, but he could safely -resign it to others when the time came. You have great political -experience in the West." It was quite a little party, including -the newly appointed commercial attaché, Mr. Julean H. Arnold; the -commandant of the guard, Colonel Wendell C. Neville; and two young -writers, Miss Emerson and Miss Weil, who have since devoted themselves -to Far Eastern studies and literary work. While the Emperor-elect -betrayed traces of strain and worry, he had his accustomed genial -manners. Apropos of the commercial attaché and the commandant he made -a little pleasantry about commerce and war coming hand in hand. After -a brief interview the visitors were taken by the master of ceremonies -to see the gardens, while I remained with Yuan Shih-kai for a long -conversation. This was interpreted by Doctor Tenney and by Dr. Hawkling -L. Yen, of the Foreign Office; it was understood by us all that the -conversation was personal and unofficial. - -"I have not sought new honours and responsibilities, but now that a -course of action has been formally decided upon, it is my duty to carry -it out," Yuan said. "The people coöperated in this, I desire that they -shall coöperate at all times." - -I asked how soon he would announce definitely his constitutional -policy. I had some doubt as to how far he intended to apply any, -and his answer was evasive. "It is hard," he replied, "to make a -constitution before the monarchy is actually reëstablished. Then, -too, if the Emperor heads the Government, the powers of departments -under him would need to be more restricted than under a republic." His -advisers, it seemed, were unduly optimistic in expecting Yuan to stand -squarely for constitutional government, with power devolving on the -parliament and the different departments. I reminded him of the British -monarchy in its various historic forms to refute his idea. - -"Well," he responded, "the new constitution must wait for a People's -Convention. This is soon to be called; its action must not be in any -way anticipated." - -He then fell back on his record, stating that he had pressed the Manchu -Government to adopt a constitution. He also referred to the title -chosen for his reign, "Hung Hsien," which means "great constitutional -era." - -A mandate of February 22nd announced the postponement of formal -accession to the throne. Mr. C.C. Wu, who brought me information -concerning certain state plans of Yuan Shih-kai, said that this mandate -would put an end to the innumerable petitions sent to accelerate the -formal coronation. He added that essentially the Government, so far as -domestic matters were concerned, was already a monarchy, that only in -its international aspects had it failed to assume this character. - -Suddenly, on March 18th, the Province of Kuangsi demanded the -cancellation of the monarchy; events were moving more rapidly. - -At this juncture I had to decide whether to allow the Lee Higginson -loan to be completed without a caution or warning, or to assume -responsibility of virtually stopping that transaction. As soon as it -became clear that open opposition to Yuan Shih-kai's government was no -longer confined to one province and its immediate sphere of influence, -it seemed no longer proper for any American institution to furnish -money to the Chinese Government. Many appeals had been made by the -Opposition based on the demand that, since the country was divided, no -loans should be made to the Government. In ordinary circumstances the -protests of factions would not have weight, but when several provinces -expressed their disapproval of a basic governmental policy the case was -different. To have to counsel delay in execution of the loan agreement -was intensely disappointing to me, fervently as I had wished the -American financiers to participate in Chinese finance, in order that -credit and resources might be organized and developed for the benefit -of all. Unfortunately, in the lull after the disposal of the twenty-one -demands the Chinese had immediately embarked on this doubtful political -enterprise, consuming precious energies and money. The sums spent on -military expeditions, in favourably attuning doubtful military leaders, -and in the creation of the alleged unanimous consent through a popular -vote, had been thrown away. They merely added to the burdens carried by -the Chinese people. - -With the disaffection of yet more provinces the Government on March -22nd promulgated a decree cancelling the monarchy, and announcing that -Yuan Shih-kai would retain the Presidency of the Republic. - -This sudden and unilateral concession, without a guaranteed _quid pro -quo_ by way of submission to the Central Government by the revolting -forces, came as a surprise. Doubtless the step was taken because -the President feared that the Province of Kuangtung, whose military -governor had urged him to compromise, would join the revolutionaries. -Moreover, the former Secretary of State, Hsu Shih-chang, who had been -in retirement, advised it. The Anhui Party in Peking saw an opportunity -to regain control and oust the Cantonese leaders, in whose hands the -monarchical movement had been since August. The President believed -that the return of such men as Hsu Shih-chang and Tuan Chi-jui would -strengthen him in the eyes of the revolutionists. Hsu Shih-chang -personally had lived up to the canons of Confucian morality in failing -to approve the action of Yuan Shih-kai when he tried to assume the rank -of his former master, the Emperor. This gained him universal respect -in China. But his impelling motive was personal loyalty to the old -Imperial Family rather than attachment to its government. - -Of course, the cancellation of the monarchy failed to satisfy the -revolutionists. They interpreted it as a confession of weakness and -defeat. Nor was it more welcome to the adherents of the President -in the provinces, especially the military, who felt that he was -surrendering without getting anything in return. Thus the President -lost his friends and failed to placate his enemies. Had the southern -leaders been content, the chastened Yuan might have been satisfied to -be formal head of a constitutional government. But they were not. His -authority and prestige had been too gravely compromised; revolutionists -were appearing in various parts of China; Tsingtau was being used as -a base for revolutionary activities in the Province of Shantung with -connivance of the Japanese authorities. The Peking Government was -thrown into confusion. The official world was apprehensive as to what -the President would do, while the foreign community feared military -riots. - -The leaders of the so-called Anhui Party had evidently expected that -it would be easy to proscribe the Cantonese leaders, Liang Shih-yi, -Chow Tsu-chi, lately Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, and Chu -Chi-chien, Minister of the Interior, and have them banished or -executed. But contrary to their expectations these men did not at -that critical time take to the woods. To the amusement of everyone, -the leaders of the other party then became frightened and began to -remove their families from Peking and to plan for places of safety -for themselves. With somewhat grim humour, Minister Chu Chi-chien -declared that as conditions in Peking were perfectly normal, and as any -unwarranted show of nervousness by officials would tend unnecessarily -to disturb the populace, officials would no longer be permitted to -remove their families from the city. - -It now became a question whether Yuan Shih-kai could remain even as -President. I had a conversation with Mr. Hioki, the Japanese minister, -who spoke at length about the shortcomings of Yuan, and his tendency to -use all the functions of state, including particularly the financial, -to satisfy his personal ambitions. Mr. Hioki did not believe that Yuan -Shih-kai could possibly restore his authority. The month of April was -a period of great depression in Peking. All constructive work, and -even planning therefor, had been entirely suspended. The new ministry -came in on April 24th, under General Tuan Chi-jui as Minister of War. -This fact indicated shiftings of power, as General Tuan had never -supported the President in his imperialist ambitions. The Cantonese -leaders stepped out of the Government, maintaining their influence -thereafter by the familiar methods of Liang Shih-yi. Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, -who belonged to the Communications Party, but had been specializing -in establishing closer relations with the Japanese, became Minister -of Communications. The President agreed to turn over to the cabinet -full governmental powers, and to make the ministers responsible to the -national parliament, which was to be summoned forthwith. Yuan ceased -his personal control over all important branches of the Administration. -The control of the army was transferred from the President to the -Board of War. He was stripped of all military forces but his Honanese -bodyguard, which numbered about twenty thousand. - -The name of Yuan Shih-kai, however, was retained as a symbol of -authority, for all the military leaders owed him allegiance. Mr. Liang -Shih-yi, as president of the Bank of Communications, still controlled -the finances, and his associate, Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, was placed in charge -of the Bank of China. - -The Government was driven to such extremes by its financial needs that -in May the cabinet declared a moratorium suspending specie payments -on notes of the government banks. The term "moratorium," which had -just then come into prominence in Europe, was greeted by the Chinese -financiers as the password to save them--a respectable name for -what was otherwise not so honourable. Through this step, whatever -confidence still remained in Yuan Shih-kai was dissipated. Because of -the complex nature of Chinese affairs peculiar consequences followed. -Thus, the postal administration offices and those of certain railways -independently announced that they would not accept notes but would -demand payment in silver. - -All reports of local troubles coming from reliable sources in various -parts of China spoke of the participation of Japanese in revolutionary -activities. Specific reports from Shantung indicated that the -revolutionaries there were favoured by the Japanese. At Tsingtau -bandits had come over from Manchuria and were openly drilling early -in May under the noses of the Japanese military. About a thousand -of these rebels left Tsingtau on May 4th over the Shantung railway, -carrying machine guns to the centre of the province, where they took -part in the disturbances. Meanwhile, the same railway, under Japanese -control, had refused to carry Chinese government troops on the ground -that neutrality must be maintained. When questioned about the rebels -transported, the railway officials stated that the rebels must have -been in civilian clothes and must have carried their armament as -baggage. - -It is not clear whether the Japanese were systematically working -for the establishment of an independent government in the south, or -whether they were merely covertly encouraging opposition to the Central -Government, to foment division and unrest. But the plans of Japan for -gaining a dominant position in China were certainly favoured by the -final breakdown of the authority of Yuan Shih-kai. - -Japanese correspondents at this time started the report that Chinese -merchants in the Yangtse Valley were so provoked with Americans for -making a loan to the Chinese Government--the Lee Higginson loan--that -they were planning a boycott against American goods. The Japanese -paper, _Shun Tim Shih Pao_, incidentally drew on its imagination, and -published a yarn to the effect that in addition to the $5,000,000 loan -already agreed to, the American firm had promised to hand over to the -Peking authorities $15,000,000 before the end of July. As a matter -of fact, beyond the original payment of $1,000,000, nothing was ever -paid over. The Chinese did not take up the suggestion of a boycott; -although, had the making of the loan proceeded, such a result might -have followed. In Peking, on the other hand, the Japanese tried to -impress upon Chinese officials that the non-completion of the Lee -Higginson loan offered new proof that Americans could not be relied -upon when it came to a showdown. - -Throughout this difficult period the European Allied Powers felt that -they lacked a free hand, and that any joint action undertaken might -easily assume such form as to create a Japanese hegemony. The Japanese -at all times urged that as they were on the spot it would be only -natural to entrust them with the representation of the interests of the -Allies. Many representative Europeans in China plainly intimated to us -the hope that the American Government might show a strong interest in -Chinese affairs, and might not fail to insist on the maintenance of -existing treaty rights and of Chinese sovereignty. - -I knew from the Chinese who saw him daily that Yuan Shih-kai suffered -under the strain of his troubles and disappointment. As early as March -Mr. Liang Tun-yen besought me to visit the President and give him -encouragement, as worry and despair were breaking him down. Yuan had -lived a sedentary life of intense work and great responsibility. He -had developed Bright's disease, but his strong constitution had fought -it off. Now when great trouble beset him his strength failed. Mr. Chow -Tzu-chi remarked to me: "The President's power of quick decision has -left him; he is helpless in the troublesome alternatives that confront -him. Formerly it was 'yes' or 'no' in an instant, to my proposals. Now -he ruminates, and wavers, and changes a decision many times." Yuan -contemplated resignation, and seemed taken with the idea of visiting -America. I was sounded as to giving him safe conduct and asylum. The -Opposition, it seemed, would make no objection to his leaving the -country. He was confined to his room during the latter half of May, but -continued to give his personal attention to telegrams and important -correspondence. In the first days of June his health seemed to improve. -I went with my family to Peitaiho to instal them in their summer -residence, and to rest for a few days. I had left a special code with -Mr. MacMurray, in which the word _Pan_ stood for Yuan Shih-kai. I was -shocked on the afternoon of June 6th to receive the brief telegram: -"Pan is dead." - -By the night train I returned to the capital. Yuan's sons, the -ex-Premier Hsu Shih-chang, and several officials close to the -President, were with him when he died. During the night he had made -solemn declaration to the ex-Premier that it had not been his wish -to become Emperor; he had been deceived into believing that the step -was demanded by the public, and was necessary to the country. After -saying this he seemed exhausted, and continued to sink until the end -came. He had weakened himself and further aggravated his illness by -indiscriminately taking medicine prescribed by a foreign physician -together with all sorts of Chinese remedies which his women urged upon -him. - -The ministers of the Allied Powers at once called on General Tuan to -inquire whether the Government was prepared to prevent disorders. Some -time previously the Japanese minister had asked me whether I would -consider it suitable for the diplomatic corps, in the event of danger -of disturbances, to make such an inquiry. I felt it unnecessary and -undesirable, as it might cause apprehension among the public. - -The German and Austrian commandants were included in the conference to -agree on measures of protection--probably the only instance during the -war where the belligerents of both sides met to consider common action. -Subsequently the Belgian minister requested the American Legation to -take over the patrol of the city wall immediately back of the Belgian -Legation, which had thus far had German sentinels. It illustrates the -complexity of all things in China that, as late as 1916, German troops -were concerned in the formal protection of the Belgian Legation. - -Yuan Shih-kai before his death wrote a declaration to the effect -that in the event of his disability the Presidency should devolve on -General Li Yuan-hung. The accession of the Vice-President was announced -immediately. The members of the cabinet, as well as Prince Pu-Lun, as -chairman of the State Council, waited on President Li on the 7th of -June; with a simple ceremonial, including three deferential bows, the -cabinet expressed its allegiance to the new President. He was accepted -peaceably and with unanimity by all the provinces. - -General Tuan Chi-jui and Mr. Liang Shih-yi coöperated in arranging -for the transfer of authority to the new President. That this was done -so quietly and in so orderly a fashion caused the foreigners to regard -Chinese republicanism with much higher respect. - -The body of Yuan was not transferred from Peking to his Honan home -until June 28th, when the mausoleum on the ancestral estate was ready. -As part of the Imperial movement, Yuan Shih-kai had previously begun -the construction of this large tomb. The commemorative ceremony took -place on the 26th in Peking. The great hall of the Presidential palace, -where we had often witnessed New Year receptions and other festivities, -was used. There were gathered the foreign representatives with their -staffs and the high officials of the Chinese Republic. It was a strange -mingling of old and new. The President's body lay on a high catafalque, -in the very place where he had so often received us. In front of the -entrance to the inner apartments stood rows of tables bearing the usual -funeral offerings as well as the weapons, clothes, and other objects of -personal use of the departed. Here were gorgeous Mandarin coats of the -old régime, including the famous Yellow Jacket, and generals' uniforms -of the new, and innumerable decorations sent by all the countries -bestowing such honours; also tall riding boots, soft Chinese slippers, -long native pipes and foreign smoking sets, swords, and pistols. - -The service was a litany conducted by Lama priests from temples -in Peking and Mongolia. Some of the priests wore a huge headdress -resembling a dragoon's helmet; others, a large round hat not unlike -that of a cardinal. As they intoned the ritual their deep voices rolled -as if they issued from an underground cavern. The music accompanying -the singing was Chinese, supplied by flutes and stringed instruments; -but at the beginning the President's band had played a Western funeral -march. The second part of the service consisted of the burning of -incense in memory of the departed. First, the sons of Yuan, wearing -the white garments of mourners, came forth from an inner apartment and -took their station before the catafalque. They prostrated themselves, -struck their foreheads heavily against the floor, and wailed with loud -voices. Yuan Ko-ting, as chief mourner, offered sacrifice. Meanwhile, -the women of the Presidential household peered through the windows of -the apartments which opened into the central hall. - -When the sons of Yuan had withdrawn, the singing of the priests was -taken up again, now in a different key and accompanied by the tinkling -of many bells clear as silver, but some of them as deep as the sea. -Buddhist prayers were intoned in voices sonorous and deep as the grave. -The new President next offered sacrifice at the bier of his predecessor. - -What contrasts of character and aims, what mingling of old and new -forces, what a rush of incongruous ideas and practices were typified in -this ceremony, with all its accompaniments! And these were embodied, -too, in the personality of the dead leader and in his successor! - -The foreign representatives next paid their respect to the memory of -Yuan. We rose and each in turn deposited before the catafalque a huge -wreath, and returned after making the customary three bows of high -ceremony. Following the diplomats came the Secretary of State and high -Chinese officials, as well as the foreign advisers. - -The procession to the railway station, on June 28th, testified to -the genius of the Chinese for pageantry. They had preserved some of -the colour and brilliance of an Imperial procession, and what was -remarkable, had so arranged the parade that the modern elements--troops -in modern uniform, brass bands, officials in evening dress, and -diplomats in their varied uniforms--myself alone wearing ordinary -civilian dress--did not impart to the pageant a jarring note. In fact, -throughout the ceremony at the palace and the subsequent procession, -there was a gratifying absence of dissonance, notwithstanding the -multifariousness of the elements included. - -The huge catafalque upon which the body of Yuan lay was borne by a -hundred men by means of a complicated arrangement of poles. It was -covered with crimson silk embroidered in gold; its imperial splendour -accentuated the tragedy of the occasion. Old Chinese funeral customs, -such as the throwing into the air of paper resembling money, were -observed. Heading the procession rode twenty heralds, then followed -in succession three large detachments of infantry, bearing their arms -reversed. Between each two detachments marched a band. After the -infantry came Chinese musicians, playing weirdly plaintive strains -on their flutes. Then came the beautiful and fascinating part of the -cortège--a large squadron of riders in old Chinese costume, carrying -huge banners, long triangular pennants, and fretted streamers of many -colours, which, as they floated gracefully in the air, made a charming -picture. The Chinese have a genius for using banners with dazzling -effect. Then followed lancers escorting an empty state carriage; -Buddhist monks beating drums and cymbals; the President's band; long -lines of bearers with sacrificial vessels preceding the sedan chair -in which was set the soul tablet of Yuan; then still other lines of -men bearing the food offerings, the mementoes of Yuan's personal life, -and the wreaths, all from the funeral ceremony of two days before. -High officials came next, on foot, in military uniform or civilian -full dress, and here indeed the frock coats and top hats did seem -somewhat out of keeping. A throng of white-clad mourners preceded the -catafalque; the sons of Yuan walked under a white canopy. Yuan Ko-ting -in the midst of it all seemed a pathetic figure. - -The vast throngs that lined the route behind lines of troops looked -on in respectful silence. There was no sign of grief, rather mute -indifference. Yuan had not won the heart of the people, who regarded -him as a masterful individual dwelling in remote seclusion whose -contact with them came through taxes and executions. I believe a -Chinese crowd is incapable of the enthusiastic hero-worship which great -political leaders in the Occident receive. The people have not yet come -to look upon such men as their leaders. The Peking population, imbued -still with traditions of imperial splendour and the remoteness and -semi-divinity of their rulers, are as yet only onlookers at the pageant -of history. - -The tragedy of the great man who had died as a consequence of his -ambition made this occasion impressive to the foreigners present, -even to the most cynical. It was the last act in one of the most -striking dramas of intrigue, achievement, and defeat. The foreign -representatives left the cortège before it issued from the southernmost -gate of the Imperial City, stopping while the mourners and the -catafalque moved past. A piece of paper money thrown into the air -to pacify the spirits fell on me, and I kept it as a characteristic -memento. I walked back to the Legation Quarter with the Russian -minister, Prince Koudacheff, who, like myself, was deeply impressed; we -agreed that in ceremony and pageantry the Chinese stand supreme. - -Thus, with the fluttering of bright banners and the wailing of the reed -flutes, another crowded chapter in the history of the new China drew to -its close. - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -REPUBLICANS IN THE SADDLE - - -The passing of Yuan Shih-kai left the ground clear for the nurturing of -a real republic in China. Would those in control be real republicans, -or would they be merely politicians? Politics, with all that this term -implies in modern times, was exotic, its importation into China might -have disastrous results. Concentration on industry, on local government -by the Chinese people, and the building up from these of a sound -and democratic national consciousness were needed. It was upon this -foundation that Li Yuan-hung might have founded his rule. - -His first reception to foreign ministers was given by President Li -Yuan-hung shortly after the funeral of Yuan Shih-kai. Li had removed -from the island in the Imperial City before the death of Yuan; and this -was a step toward freedom, though he had continued to be surrounded -with guards ostensibly for his protection, but really there to watch -him and restrict his movements. His friends were still apprehensive -for his safety, and I was repeatedly approached with inquiries as to -whether in case of need I should receive him at the American Legation, -or possibly, even, send a guard detachment to bring him in. The latter -I could not do; but, while it is not proper to give specific assurances -of protection in advance, I could say that it was customary to grant -asylum to political refugees. I learned that some Americans were ready -to try a rescue of the Vice-President should his situation become -perilous. Upon the death of Yuan Shih-kai, General Li's situation of -uncertainty and danger was ended at least for a while. - -He received the diplomats in a private residence, whence he did not -remove to the palace for several months. The ceremony was simple. -The foreign representatives were introduced in three groups: Allies, -Neutrals, and Central Powers. The President received us standing, -attended by his ministers and twelve generals, all in uniform. -General Tuan Chi-jui looked disconsolate, standing with bent head and -with epaulets sloping down on his chest. I do not know whether his -spirit was as sad as his outward demeanour, but he probably saw many -difficulties ahead. The President made a few remarks of a friendly -nature, but throughout he looked far more serious than was his wont; -and his face was not wreathed in smiles. - -On the afternoon of the day of Yuan's funeral I visited the new -President informally; passing through several interior courts where -soldiers were on guard and through a smiling flower garden I came -into the library, simply furnished, where the President was working. -Piles of papers and books on the desk and side tables indicated that -he had been seeking information from many sources. We spent an hour -or so discussing the political situation. He felt relieved at being -no longer guarded and confined; but his newly acquired state had not -changed his simplicity of manner. Quite in his usual optimistic mood, -he said: "I have found a way to secure the coöperation of all factions. -I will declare the Provisional Constitution of 1912 to be in force, and -summon the old parliament; but its membership should be reduced by one -half; it is too unwieldy. It will be summoned for this purpose only and -to finish the Constitution; the reduction will come by amending the -parliamentary election law." - -I asked the President whether he did not consider it impossible thus to -limit the function of the parliament, when once it was summoned. Would -it not, I asked, almost certainly try to assume a controlling power in -the Government, and would not this, in the absence of mature leaders, -cause confusion? - -"No," the President insisted; "the parliament will be confined to the -specific function indicated by me." - -As the community of Americans at Shanghai had repeatedly invited -me to come to that city, I carried out a long-delayed intention by -journeying southward to celebrate the Fourth of July there. My chief -engagement--following, among others, an address at the Commencement -exercises at St. John's University, an American University Club lunch, -a reception given in my honour on the Flagship _Brooklyn_--was an -address before the American Chamber of Commerce at dinner in the Palace -Hotel, on July 1st. I spoke about the requirements of the new period -upon which American commercial interests in the Far East were entering. -In European countries and Japan, I said, the relation between the -Government and the large industries and banking institutions is close. -Together they develop national enterprise abroad. Not so in America. -The Government and the concentrated capital of the United States do -not act as a unit in foreign affairs. We believe that it is better to -leave the initiative to private enterprise, confining the action of the -Government to protecting opportunities for commerce abroad. In their -work of organization, American merchants and representatives have the -function of discovering, testing, and approving commercial policies and -projects which are to be executed with home capital. On their wisdom -and experience in China, New York and Chicago have to rely. - -At the reception given by the Consul-General in Shanghai on the Fourth -of July, I met Mr. Tang Shao-yi, the Kuo Min Tang leader who had -been Premier and Minister of Finance in the first cabinet under the -Republic. I found him unprepared to assume any responsible part in -politics, although the prominence of his opposition to Yuan Shih-kai -might have made him ready to help. As President Li had urged him to -come to Peking, Mr. Tang said he would go when parliament had been -reconvoked. But I apprehended and understood from others that he was -loth to go because his enemies in Peking were still too powerful. - -After a brief vacation at the summer residence of my family at -Peitaiho, whither I had proceeded on the U.S. ship _Cincinnati_, I -returned to Peking on the 27th of July, as much business awaited me -there. - -A change of government took place. The appointment of a new cabinet -was announced on June 30, 1916, with a personnel completely different -from that under Yuan Shih-kai. Mr. Tang did not leave Shanghai. A -provisional cabinet was therefore constituted under General Tuan -Chi-jui, Dr. Chen Chin-tao acting as Minister of Finance and Mr. Hsu -Shih-ying as Minister of Communications. I had long known Doctor -Chen, who had received his education in the United States and had -lived abroad many years as Financial Commissioner of the Chinese -Government. He was one of the few men in Chinese official life familiar -with Western finance and banking--a scholarly man, slow and somewhat -heavy in speech and manner, studious, and desirous of carrying modern -methods of efficiency and careful audit into all branches of the -Administration. Everyone met him with confidence. - -The southern leaders did not come to Peking because they wished -their complete ascendency to be recognized before taking part in the -Government. Their demands that the Constitution of 1912 be revived -and that Parliament be restored had been complied with. They further -insisted on punishment for the leaders of the monarchical movement. -Accordingly, on July 13th a mandate was issued providing for the -arrest and trial of eight public men, including Liang Shih-yi, Chu -Chi-chien, and Chow Tsu-chi. All of these men happened to be beyond -the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government, so the mandate had the -effect only of a decree of exile. General Tuan, the Premier, smilingly -remarked in cabinet meeting that if the monarchists were really to be -punished, few men in public life would go free. - -With an entirely new personnel of government, all threads of -negotiations, past and present, had to be taken up anew. I was already -acquainted with the Premier and with Doctor Chen, but the other cabinet -members I had met casually or not at all. With Doctor Chen and his -associate of the Ministry of Finance, Mr. Hsu Un-yuen, who had been -appointed managing director of the Bank of China, and with General Hsu -Shu-cheng, the Premier's chief assistant, I frequently talked over -the financial situation of China. The monarchical movement had been -defeated, the Republic more firmly established; now, they suggested, it -was highly appropriate for America to support China financially. They -requested that the loan contract made by Lee, Higginson & Company be -carried out, and further steps taken for strengthening and organizing -Chinese credit. - -I told the Premier about the railway and canal negotiations. He wished -to encourage American participation in Chinese development, but did not -commit himself on the new American proposals. On the matter of a loan -he reënforced the position taken by the Minister of Finance and General -Hsu. General Tuan had won the confidence of the Chinese people through -his disapproval of Yuan's monarchical ambitions, and now occupied a -strong position. "I do not expect much good," he said, "from the return -of parliament; there will be endless party struggles and interference -with the Administration. But as to this curious modern method of -governing through talk, which fundamentally I see no virtue in, I am -willing to give it a fair trial." - -When I called on the Minister of Communications, I took care that the -conversation should be, not on business, but on literature and the -surroundings of Peking. He liked calligraphy; also, he had written -short literary pieces, one of which was a poetical description of the -Summer Palace. After a pleasant hour with tea the minister escorted me -not only through all the various gates of the inner courts, but to the -very door of my carriage. One of my colleagues on his initial visit -to the minister had a less fortunate experience. The interview, which -concerned a certain action long delayed, was somewhat spirited, for the -diplomat insisted with great emphasis that something be done forthwith. -By contrast the minister made me specially welcome, pleased that I -did not immediately descend upon him with demands. When, thereafter, -matters of business had to be taken up, there was the same cordiality, -even when difficult things were discussed. - -During the first month of its renewed life, beginning the 1st of -August, the parliament did nothing to justify the unfavourable -expectations of its critics. It was not rash or irresponsible, its -members subordinated their private and partisan views to the urgent -needs of national unity and coöperation. The military party pursued -a waiting policy, seeming ready to give parliament a chance to show -what it could do. Meanwhile, the financial situation of the Government -became difficult, as the provinces had not yet been prevailed upon to -give adequate support. - -Among the newly arrived leaders of the democratic party whose abilities -and character I was appraising was Mr. Sun Hung-yi, the Minister of the -Interior. I went to him, passing through narrow and crooked streets to -his house in a remote part of the city. It was surrounded by military -guards, carriages, and automobiles. The courts swarmed with people; -soldiers were lounging about, while countless long-coated individuals -hurried to and fro or sat in conversation in the rooms or on porches. -Mr. Sun, who met me in an interior apartment, was tall, broad faced, -with sparse whiskers and hair standing up rebelliously in wisps. He -wore a long brown coat, bestowing little care on his appearance. -"The parliament," he said, "cannot confine itself to its principal -task, the finishing of the Constitution; it must also control public -administration." - -A contest for power was inevitable, it seemed, between the Premier and -the parliament. - -Mr. Sun was a typical politician. Here he was, his innumerable -retainers about him, all intent on the game, while he was cunningly -deploying his forces for tactical advantage in politics. He betrayed no -ideas of statesmanship, only a desire for party dominance; though later -he did show signs of developing a broader vision. - -I also met Mr. Ku Chung-hsiu, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, -a most complacent and oily person, who would be recognized the world -over as the suave political manipulator. - -Of such calibre, then, were the men who, under President Li Yuan-hung, -were to lay the foundations of the new government. - - - - -PART III - -THE WAR AND CHINA - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII - -AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURS IN PEKING - - -As the second year of the Hwai River conservancy option was about to -expire, something positive had to be done in order to make an actual -beginning on this work. Mr. W.F. Carey, whose various enterprises have -already been referred to, had arrived in Peking in December, 1915, with -his family and a large staff. He brought over his whole organization, -for his firm's arrangements with the New York capitalists made him -feel ready, not only to negotiate, but to start work. He had completed -extensive railway construction work in Canada and the United States; -his organization was ready for China. He was a man accustomed to -attacking his work with full force and getting it out of the way. He -knew there was plenty of work to do in China, and he was ready to start -doing it without delay. - -Tested and highly recommended as the conservancy undertaking had been -by the engineering commission under Colonel Sibert, the financiers -associated with the Siems-Carey Company yet hesitated. It was then -suggested that they do part of the work and reserve an option on the -entire enterprise. The negotiations with Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, Minister of -Finance, developed that the only part which might be dissociated from -the whole was the restoration of the Grand Canal. But it would hardly -be profitable to undertake this unless at least the whole portion from -the Yangtse River to Techow were to be made navigable. Enough traffic -might then be counted upon to afford by means of tolls security for -the loan, together with certain tracts of land which would be drained. -A period of four months was given to investigate the feasibility and -cost of this work, while the option on the more extensive enterprise of -the Hwai River conservancy was extended. - -The men representing American firms who came with Mr. Carey created -in Peking the impression of an onslaught of American enterprise. The -International Banking Corporation and the American International -Corporation had sent a new representative. The firm of Anderson, Meyer -& Company, hitherto Danish, had been acquired by American capital, and -a representative had been sent to Peking. Social life in the American -colony was visibly enlivened by this influx. It was amusing to see -how large groups of people from St. Paul, Kansas City, Chicago, and -various Eastern towns, suddenly planted in these entirely foreign -surroundings, could in an incredibly short time make themselves -thoroughly comfortable, and establish intimate relations with their -new neighbours. The various American representatives took large houses -in the city outside of the Legation Quarter, where they entertained a -great deal. - -But by the legal talent mustered for the negotiations the Chinese were -rather taken aback. Not much given to legal refinements, nor to setting -down in the written contract detailed provisions for every imaginable -contingency, the meticulous care of the American legal draughtsmen -impressed the Chinese as savouring of suspicion. - -Their own business arrangements are more simple and general, with -reliance on a mutual sense of equity; moreover, all contracts with -foreigners had hitherto been made in a less technical manner. An -American lawyer would not be satisfied with this. He would think of -the other corporation lawyers at home, sitting in their offices on -the thirty-fifth floor, to whom the ordinary Chinese way of drawing -up contracts would seem criminally lax. To overcome the concealed -resentment of the Chinese took time, together with much talk about -how the common interest would be promoted by completely defining all -responsibilities assumed. The argument which really impressed them was -that other foreign nations had frequently interpreted simply drawn -contracts entirely to the disadvantage of the Chinese. - -Mr. Carey, also, did not personally believe in much legal refinement, -but bowed to the mature judgment of the profession. He had won his way -from the ranks, and his Irish originality had not been befogged with -theoretical discussion. He immediately felt at home with the frank and -human Chinese, and constantly had many of them at his house, where they -partook of true American hospitality and shared in frolics of dancing -and poker. The Chinese are fond of this American game, in which human -nature plays so large a part; the impassiveness of their countenance -lends itself admirably to the tactics of poker. It was amusing to hear -Liang Shih-yi, who otherwise spoke not a word of English, enunciate -from behind a pile of chips, in staccato tones: "Full house,"--"Two -pair." This eminent financier was a worthy match for any poker expert. - -Mr. Carey brought his unwarped intelligence to bear with great -freshness on Chinese affairs, which he discussed in the language -of an American contractor and business man who reduced everything -to terms of getting something done. To observe how a man of his -training, instincts, and tradition, so utterly different from the -Chinese, remained in constant, intimate intercourse and joyous mutual -understanding with them, made one believe that there must be real bonds -of sympathy between Americans and the Chinese. Mr. Carey abbreviated -many of the Chinese names, thus making them far more pronounceable. Mr. -Chen Pan-ping, the Minister of Agriculture, thus became Ping-pong; the -Secretary of State, Hsu Shih-chang, was Susie. - -When the preliminary contract for the Grand Canal had been signed, Mr. -Carey and all his associates departed for Shantung and Kiangsu under -the guidance of Mr. Pan Fu, a young capitalist and official from -Shantung Province, who was anxious to have the constructive work begun -early. - -A mistake made by Americans in other parts of the world was not avoided -in China. Several of the new organizations that came in at this time -and during the war made their entry with a considerable blare of -trumpets and pounding of gongs, announcing the millions that were -backing them and describing the manner in which they would rip things -up generally when they got started. As a great part of international -business is diplomacy, such methods of blatant advertisement are not -best calculated to facilitate the early operations of a new enterprise. -They raise expectations of "easy money" in the people dealt with, -and they engender cynicism and rock-ribbed opposition on the part of -competitors. Great enterprises in foreign trade are usually built up -with quieter methods. My observations on this score by no means refer -to all new American enterprise in China, but there was enough of -this sort of brass-band work to give people an idea that it was the -approved method of American entry into foreign markets. The subsequent -flattening out of several of these loudly heralded ventures did not -help matters. - -I had on February 29th a long interview with Dr. Jeme Tien-yow, an -American-educated engineer, who had won repute through the survey -and construction of the Peking-Kalgan Railway, of which he was chief -engineer. He was looked upon as a living example of what the Chinese -could do for themselves in engineering. At this time he was managing -director of the Hukuang railways. I had had extensive correspondence -with him, directly and through the Consul-General at Hankow with -respect to the engineering standards to be applied on his lines, as it -was difficult to find a middle ground between the American and British -manufacturers and those of other nations concerned. Doctor Jeme was -on the whole favourable to America, but clung to European standards, -much to the disadvantage of American equipment. We went over all the -disputed points with regard to solid cast wheels or tread wheels, -shapes of box cars, types of engines, and so on--a curiously technical -conversation for a foreign minister to hold with a railway director as -a matter of official business. Doctor Jeme was slow, undemonstrative, -quite willing to discuss, but not ready to yield any point in which -he thoroughly believed. The argument cleared up some matters and left -others the subject of continued correspondence. - -I was trying to induce the American group to take the lead in -furnishing funds so that the building of the Szechuan line of -the Hukuang railways could be undertaken. I also hoped that, -notwithstanding the war, the British and French groups might continue -to furnish enough funds to complete the line from Hankow to Canton. - -Doubtless the greatest national need of China was the completion of -these trunk lines, both to connect the north and south of the country, -and to open a land route to Szechuan Province, which could then be -reached only by boat on the Yangtse, subject to all contingencies of -an uncertain and dangerous navigation. It should not have required -argument to induce the capitalists to advance money for a short -railway which would open an inland empire of forty millions of people, -especially when they had already bound themselves by contract to -furnish the funds. - -The $30,000,000 originally advanced had been spent, without more than -two hundred miles of actual construction to show for the vast sum. This -was due partly to the need of buying out earlier Chinese companies -at extravagant figures, but also in large part to the cumbersome and -expensive organization of this international enterprise. Only by -actually finishing one of these basically important lines and putting -it in operation could the money already expended be made to count. - -At home the group seemed favourable to going ahead to the completion -of the work. Mr. Willard Straight in February went to London to seek -the consent of the British and French partners. But beyond settling -some minor details about alignments no definite result was secured. -Chinese development was blocked disastrously through this failure to -complete the existing contracts. In comparison with the amounts spent -in Europe by America, the cost of entirely carrying out this enormously -important work would have been infinitesimal; a thousandth part of our -war expense would have permanently changed the face of China. - -Indeed, completion of such an enterprise would far transcend -mere business. What the Chinese needed was the organization of -their national life. In every particular this depended upon -communications--trunk lines north and south, east and west--which would -have largely overcome obstacles to Chinese progress. The nation's mind, -instead of being focussed on building up, unifying, and organizing the -different parts of the country, remained localized and scattered. A -thousand times the energy needed to achieve this unique work was spent -by us in Europe. That is part of the cost of war. - -Mr. Charles Denby, interested in automobile manufacture, called one -morning and asked that I take a motor ride up the Tartar City Wall--a -thing which had never before been attempted. I yielded to the idea, and -without further inquiry joined him, together with the commandant of -the guard, Colonel W.C. Neville. Leaving the rear gate of the Legation -and approaching the broad ramp leading up to the wall, I was surprised -to see gathered there all the American marines, as well as many other -people, including motion-picture men. I had not counted on this -publicity; it was, however, too late to have any regrets, so we were -whisked up the steep incline and took a ride on the top of the great -wall. This first automobile ascension of the monumental structure -excited a good deal of attention. A British paper tried to raise a -laugh by ironically criticizing the British minister for not supporting -British industry by taking air flights, or doing other things which -might serve to attract attention to national products. I did not mind -what was said, as I had enjoyed the excitement of the ride. - -Mr. Carey's party had by this time finished its survey. Laborious -negotiations had gone on for an acceptable contract to improve the -ancient Grand Canal. Mr. Carey also sought a contract for the building -of railways. These matters were entrusted to Mr. Roy S. Anderson, -who carried on the detailed negotiations. I had given Mr. Carey an -introduction to the various officials concerned, and had from time -to time supported his efforts, but did not take part in the details. -The business was carried on with Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, the Minister of -Communications, while the canal matter lay with Mr. Chen Pan-ping, -Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, a younger man, educated in Japan -and a member of the Christian Church. Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, the Minister -of Finance, and Mr. Liang Shih-yi, wielded a directing influence in -the negotiations. I was careful to abstain from anything which could -possibly savour of pressure, or a desire to take advantage of the -difficult financial necessities of the Government. The contracts were -made not on the basis of any temporary or local interest, but to -furnish a foundation for long-continued constructive work. - -The Chinese Government gave to the American concern the right to build -fifteen hundred miles of railway, to be selected from five alignments -mentioned in the contract. Mr. Carey started for America on May 18th, -to secure ratification of the agreements. With him he took the most -favourable concessions which the Chinese Government had ever granted to -foreigners. All the most advantageous provisions of former contracts -had been embodied; the American contractors were to get a commission of -10 per cent. on the cost of construction and equipment, and were to -share, also, in the profits of operation. A broad policy of development -was adopted, embracing the encouragement of industries along the -railways to be built. - -The Chinese Government, accustomed to financial support from nations -which had valuable concessions, hoped that the Americans would now -offer such assistance. The concessions were in no sense made dependent -upon loans, but collateral loan negotiations were proceeding, and Mr. -Carey took with him proposals concerning loans and securities offered. -His associates made every effort to secure a loan to China, but as -they now turned over their holdings to the American International -Corporation, and as the latter was negotiating to take over the -American group agreements with Great Britain, Russia, France, and -Japan, the matter became hopelessly tangled up with international -affairs and no action resulted. The Americans understood that Japan -would coöperate in a joint loan but would oppose any separate action -by the United States. American finance was still too provincial to -act independently in such a matter. Also it would approach each piece -of business as a separate unit, not ready to exert itself in behalf -of a loan in order to create a more favourable situation for other -transactions. European and Japanese combinations in China took a -different view; they were organized to represent a broad national -interest in Chinese business. While the attitude of individual American -corporations corresponded to the individualism of our business, yet the -national commercial interest of America was bound to suffer because -an organization did not exist which was broadly representative, which -would look upon all parts of Chinese commerce and finance in their -interrelation, and gather from every individual exertion favourable -cumulative effects in other fields of enterprise. - -In yet another respect American practice was unsuited to the conditions -of business in China. After negotiating in a painstaking manner for -months, the corporation's representatives had finally signed a formal -agreement that was more advantageous than any ever granted before. The -results of this successful negotiation were set before the home office, -which took the position that its hands were still completely free. The -provisions of the contract were minutely reëxamined; on several points -it was concluded that still more favourable arrangements might be made. -The representatives were instructed to reopen the negotiations, making -the consent of the home corporation dependent on the acceptance of -these additional terms. - -Such a method could not be used in China more than once. The -Chinese expect that when an agreement is arrived at with business -representatives in Peking, it will be adhered to, unless very radical -changes of conditions occur. They have been dealing on this basis with -the agents of European corporations, whose experience is considered -by their home offices as entitling them to handle the details of the -negotiations without reporting minutely to home officials far less -informed than they. To disavow the activity of a local representative -in China, except under absolute necessity, is to discredit the whole -negotiation. The representative who should wield great influence is -suddenly reduced to the dimensions of a clerk with whom the Chinese -will not take up anything of importance thereafter. - -That the Americans would not make a loan disappointed the Chinese -officials. They were used to looking for financial support to -powerful groups, who desired or had obtained concessions. When, in -addition, proposals came for many changes in the signed contracts, the -displeasure of the Chinese knew no limits. The storm broke just before -the funeral of Yuan Shih-kai. I was appealed to for aid in predisposing -the Chinese officials to look upon the new proposals with more favour. -The Minister of Communications as well as Mr. Chu Chi-chien, the -Minister of the Interior, whom I interviewed, were dejected because -the loan had been so abruptly refused. They had counted on America to -take part in Chinese finance, in order that the Chinese Government -might not be entirely at the mercy of the Five-Power Consortium, or -rather of Japan, which was now the only active member of that group. -I tried to explain the action of the Americans on the basis of sound -business practice. I pointed out that in the United States, capital, -industry, and commerce are not mobilized for foreign enterprise as is -the case with the big foreign banking institutions of Europe. I tried -to encourage them to set American firms to doing constructive work in -China, and assured them that out of such relationships there would -naturally grow a readiness to afford financial support. - -They did not dispute my point, but, in the words of Cleveland, they -felt themselves confronted by a condition, not a theory. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX - -GUARDING THE "OPEN DOOR" - - -Negotiations had been proceeding all through the autumn of 1916, -between the Corporation and the Chinese Government, concerning the -modifications which the former desired to introduce into the Grand -Canal contract signed in May. The negotiations on the part of the -Chinese were in the hands of the Minister of Agriculture, and of Mr. -Pan Fu, a young Shantung capitalist and official of progressive ideas. -As the Minister of Agriculture was not well disposed, it was found -difficult to get him to agree to the additional advantages which the -Corporation desired to secure before finally ratifying the contract. -Shortly before Christmas, however, a basis of agreement had been -reached. Just at this time there came from America the astonishing -news that the American corporation had invited Japanese capitalists to -coöperate in this contract, on condition that such coöperation would be -acceptable to the Chinese Government. - -The representatives of the American corporation in Peking had no -thought nor inkling whatsoever of this change in policy. The step had -been taken without warning and without consulting either the American -Government or the representatives of the company in China. It may be -imagined in what position it left the latter, to whom the Chinese had -entrusted these important rights solely because of the confidence -they had in Americans, both as to their ability to carry through -an enterprise of this kind, and as to their complete freedom from -all political afterthought. Unmindful of the fiduciary relationship -which their representatives had established in China, the American -corporation, without first sounding the Chinese and without giving -any intimation to the American Government--through whose approval and -support they had been able to gain these rights--turned around and made -an agreement to bring the subjects of another nation into the contract. -It is to be doubted if the nationals of any other country would have -acted in this manner. - -If the action had been taken out of deference to rights which the -Japanese might claim in the future as a part of a sphere of influence -to be asserted in Shantung, then indeed it was one of superlative -international courtesy. New York bankers, however, were at this time -still notoriously the most timid beings known to experience, when -it came to matters of foreign investment. To make up for this they -did, when they once got started, throw away American money in amazing -quantities on reckless foreign enterprises in Europe and South America. - -What made this action so inexcusable was not that Japanese coöperation -had been invited or accepted, but that the one enterprise selected for -such coöperation was the one in which America, through the National -Red Cross, had long been interested and which had been committed to -Americans as a special mark of confidence. One might have thought that -goodwill to the Japanese might have been amply demonstrated had our -people declared their complete readiness to coöperate on any one of -the numerous unfinished enterprises which the Japanese controlled in -Manchuria and elsewhere. - -It was no easy task for the representatives of the American corporation -to tell the Chinese what had been done in New York. The proviso that -the arrangement was conditional upon its being acceptable to the -Chinese was of course pathetically ineffectual, because after the -arrangement made in New York the Chinese could certainly not refuse -to accept any outside partners without giving very serious offence -to them. I told the Chinese that we wished them to act with perfect -freedom and consult their own best interests in dealing with the -American corporation. But the Premier met all my explanations with: -"What can we do? The corporation has tied our hands." - -The Chinese had shown special favour and bestowed their contracts -upon the American nation; by their own act Americans had changed this -disposal in such a way as to let in a third party. Personally, I had -not the least objection to the Japanese or any other nation; although -it seemed that in China coöperation with the Chinese would be the -normal method. Yet my experience with the Hukuang railways had made me -very doubtful of the practical advantages of international coöperation -in industry. It is a cumbersome, expensive way of doing business, -full of delay and circumlocution. I felt that the different nations -should mutually facilitate each other's enterprises and coöperate in -constructive planning from which all might derive advantage; but I felt -strongly that individual enterprises should be managed by a particular -group or corporation without complicated international machinery. - -The railway concessions made to the Siems-Carey Company, which were -to be financed by the American International Corporation, were also -making trouble. Protests were made by the Russian Legation with regard -to the alignment from Tatungfu toward Lanchow; these rested upon an old -assurance given by the Chinese to Russia that any line northward or -eastward from Peking and Kalgan should first invite Russian capital. -But the protests had a weak leg to stand on, for the proposed line led -southwestward from Kalgan, away from Russia's dominions. They had the -less force in that the European Powers could not at this time furnish -money for the construction of the much-needed railways which had been -committed to their care; the more need, therefore, that America, which -had means, should build other necessary railways to provide China with -inter-provincial transit. - -But that was the method of diplomacy--to hunt about for some ground of -protest to the Chinese Government, in order to obtain from it a few -counterbalancing advantages. The American policy of equal opportunity -had the verbal agreement of the other important powers, but we had -to be vigilant if Americans were to be protected in their right to -do business in various parts of China on the basis of this policy. -Everywhere we met attempts to solidify the inchoate desires and lusts -to secure exclusive rights, until the "spheres of influence" should be -firmly outlined. - -I always took the position with the Russian minister that the American -concession in this case did not conflict with any promise given to -Russia. He spoke to me about the wish of Russia to use Mongolia as a -protective barrier. If Mongolia were to be developed through railways -and colonization, he felt that friction between Russia and China might -come about through this mutual approach of large populations. To keep -so vast a territory barren and unproductive just to serve as frontier -marches seemed to me unjustifiable. But I did not dispute the policy, -rather insisting that a railway that connected one of the eighteen -provinces of China with another could have but remote bearing on the -fears expressed by my Russian colleague. I told him the survey would go -on, but whether the road would be built would depend upon the judgment -of the engineers as to whether it would be commercially profitable. The -conversations were very leisurely. He did not say so, but I could see -that the minister fully expected the Americans to go ahead, while he -would use his protests as a means of getting some "compensation" out of -the Chinese. - -I was therefore not a little surprised when on one of my visits to him -the Russian minister met me with a quizzical smile, and handed me a -telegram which he had just received from Washington. The dispatch was -from the Russian ambassador, and read in substance as follows: - - A representative of the American International Corporation has - just called on me. He stated that the corporation regretted beyond - measure that the impression had been given that it might contemplate - undertakings in China which would be unwelcome to the Russian - Government, and to which the latter would object. He stated that it - was far from the intention of the corporation to do anything in China - that would thus be objectionable to the Russian Government. - -Never was the ground cut from under any one exerting himself to -safeguard the interests of others as was done in this case. There was -nothing to do but to say: "They are very courteous, and wish to save -your susceptibility. They would probably not ask for any branches in -the direction of Urga, and confine themselves just to building the main -line to Kansu." The Russian minister did not take an undue advantage of -me. - -The next protest came from the French Legation. They had dug up a note -sent them on September 26, 1914, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs -of that time. This note, conveying an entirely unnecessary gift by -that good-natured minister, had been kept secret; it acknowledged the -handsome manner assumed by the French minister during the negotiations -about a small frontier incident. Just to show absence of ill feeling, -the Foreign Minister assured the French minister that in case in future -any mining or railway enterprises were to be undertaken in the Province -of Kwangsi, French capital would be consulted first. It was a grim joke -that an official should thus light-heartedly and without _quid pro -quo_ sign away important rights in contravention to all the announced -policies of his and other governments, including that to which the -grant was made. The French protest related to the southern part of the -line from Chuchow in Honan, to Chinchow, on the coast of Kwangsi. - -I took the stand that the note which had turned up was contrary to the -expressed policy of the various governments concerned, and could have -no bearing on the relations of American citizens with China; moreover, -it had been secret, and neither the public nor any other government -knew about it. As the French minister whom the Chinese had asked the -French Government to withdraw because of his domineering attitude was -not at this time complacent in this or any other matter, I suggested -that the Department of State take up this question directly with the -French Minister for Foreign Affairs. I expressed the hope that the -French, our military and diplomatic associates, would wish particularly -to adhere "to the letter and the spirit of the declarations of equal -commercial opportunities." - -The Continental Commercial Bank Loan had been announced in November, -1916. I was happy that this result had been achieved. An advance of -only $5,000,000 was made, but even that small sum was an important -aid to the Chinese Government. The fact that a big Western financial -institution had taken up relations with China was promising. What -foreign banking there was in New York was tangled up with European -interests, followed the lead of London, and had not manifested much -readiness to exert itself for the development of American interests -abroad. - -The French protested this loan because it carried the security of the -tobacco and wine tax which had been assigned to some previous French -loans. I saw Doctor Chen, and Count Martel called on me. I took the -position that as the French loan--which was small in amount and would -require only a very minor portion of the proceeds of the tax--remained -entitled to be the first lien, the French interests were in no way -prejudiced. I imagine, what they really objected to was the eventual -appointment of an American auditor or co-inspector for this revenue. As -this, however, would go to strengthen the security for their loan, I -do not see that they had any reason for complaint. The representative -of the French bank which was interested saw me and made a tentative -suggestion that if adviserships were established the French might take -the wine tax, and the Americans the tobacco tax. I felt, however, that -the hands of the Chinese were perfectly free when the loan was made; -there could be no objection, except on the supposition that wherever -the Chinese do business, no matter how small, with respect to any -subject matter, they impliedly give a lien on all future dealings. To -the general suggestion of American-French coöperation in matters for -which both parties could find capital, I was by no means averse. - -In this same month the affairs relating to the Standard Oil Company's -exploration were finally wound up. The geological experts they sent -over had not "struck" oil enough to pay. Drilling expeditions had come -over, which by the spring of 1915 had found traces of oil, and the -Chinese were considering giving them further areas for investigation. -But as they wished to modify their contract relating to production and -refining activities, Mr. E.W. Bemis, vice-president of the company, -came on and negotiated for a whole summer with the officials. He left -without concluding an agreement. Not only had he received the support -of the Legation at Peking and of the American Government, but the -Chinese were anxious to extend the privileges of exploration; his -decision to abandon the negotiations must therefore have been based -on a total change of policy. The company had apparently decided not -to develop production in China, but to continue merely its marketing -business. It was to be expected that competitors would be discouraged -from undertaking similar explorations. Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling, ex-Premier -and chief of the National Oil Administration, called on me at this time -and gave me an account of his final negotiations with the company. He -had offered to establish a joint Chinese and American enterprise if -more extensive search should reveal oil deposits of great value. - -The mineral situation in China was being surveyed during this time -by representatives of the New York Orient Mines Company, Mr. John -W. Finch, Dr. F. Bain, and Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, Jr. The attitude -of these men, whose training as observers and clean-cut scientific -methods gave their conclusions a particular cogency and definiteness, -interested me. They had found that the iron deposits of China were not -so extensive as is usually supposed. They believed, also, that the -market for iron products could only gradually be developed with the -growth of the general industry. They had analyzed the organization of -the Hanyehping Iron Works, and learned that its lack of success was due -to faulty planning, which necessitated the bringing of both the coal -and iron ore from a distance to the central point of manufacture. They -believed that for the time there was room for only one first-class iron -and steel enterprise in China. As smaller enterprises would hardly pay, -they favoured a national industrial plant, to be equipped on a scale to -assure every advantage of short transport and economic production. The -Premier gave them permission to investigate China's ore deposits, with -a view to suggesting a basis upon which a national industry could be -founded with temporary American financial assistance. - -The Chinese Government had fully decided to adhere to its policy of -nationalizing the iron deposits, and the decree already issued by Yuan -Shih-kai was to be reënacted by parliament. The Chinese were eager to -establish a national steel industry. It should help supply the national -needs for iron products, with the aid, if necessary, of foreign -capital. They would not take the sole assistance of the Japanese, -because they knew that in that case the Chinese industry would be -confined to the production of pig-iron and would become the slave of -the steel industry of Japan. China would furnish raw materials; Japan, -the finished products. - -Another secret agreement, this time with Japan, came to light. A loan -of 3,000,000 yen had been concluded with Japanese banks in the latter -part of 1916, and the secret agreement attached thereto gave Japanese -interests the right to meet the lowest price of any competitor in -bidding on any materials for the Chinese telephone and telegraph -service. Of course, this would have destroyed the equal opportunity -for other nationals in this business. The contract had been signed -by a notoriously corrupt official, who was completely under Japanese -influence and had since fled to escape prosecution for corruption. - -I protested strongly. I told the Minister of Communications that the -provision was monopolistic, therefore in conflict with the treaties. -His answer disavowed the existence of the provision. But I knew it did -exist among the original agreements; nevertheless, the awards actually -made at this time, after my protest, were in accordance with the bids -submitted, and with the recommendations of the experts. - -In a talk I had with the Premier during the spring of 1917 I advised -him to take up quickly the offer of the American International -Corporation to float the first bond issue of $6,000,000 on the -railway to be constructed by the Siems-Carey Company. The Ministry of -Communications was obstructing it, acting under Japanese influences. I -told the Premier that Mr. Carey's authority to conclude the loan might -be revoked at any time, whereupon he promised to instruct the acting -Vice-Minister of Communications to complete the transaction forthwith. - -The Ministry of Communications was then in charge of one Chuan Liang, -who had, in fact, long been considered as representing the Japanese -element. He had married a Japanese woman. Chuan refused obstinately, -first, to take up the negotiations, then, to advance them when they -were begun. The rate of interest and terms of issue offered were fair, -considering existing market values; but the American company agreed to -make a concession and raise the issue price. - -Chuan continued to be stubborn. I spoke to the Premier, General Tuan, -about it; President Li himself gave his support, and the orders to -make the loan were thus reënforced. Still delay. After General Tuan's -retirement, Dr. Wu Ting-fang as acting Premier again issued orders, -which were repeated for the third time by General Chiang when he, in -turn, displaced Doctor Wu. All these high officials concurred. Yet, in -an astounding manner, the acting vice-minister, together with a ring of -petty officials in his ministry and in the cabinet office, blocked the -carrying out of the orders issued by the President, the Premier, and -the whole cabinet. - -But Dr. Wu Ting-fang was anxious to see the contract carried out. He -suggested that I write a note demanding its execution, which I did on -June 6th. Wu intended to have the successive orders published in the -_Government Gazette_, and, thus published, to be communicated to me -officially by the Foreign Office in response to my note. But the petty -ring delayed the publication. Meanwhile, the answer of the acting -vice-minister was prepared and inserted in the _Government Gazette_ -on the 27th, before the Foreign Office could communicate it to me. It -presented unfairly the proposals of the American company, its language -was almost insulting. - -During all this time the high Chinese officials, who were my friends, -were at a loss to explain to me how this subordinate's defiance of -their orders could be successful. They intimated that the obstruction -must be due to Japanese influence exercised in opposition to American -enterprise in China. We noted that immediately upon publication of -the vice-minister's answer and before we knew about it ourselves, a -secretary of the Japanese Legation quite officiously expressed to one -of the American secretaries his surprise at such a publication. - -But by this act the vice-minister had overstepped the mark. The -leaders of the Communications party, who were holding aloof from -politics with General Tuan, strongly condemned Chuan, who had always -been dependent on them. He showed a remarkable change. He even sent -emissaries to me, pleading for forgiveness and stating that he was in -no way animated by hostility to American interests, but had acted on an -honest though mistaken view of the transaction. - -Calling on me on July 2nd, he repeated his apology. On the 30th of June -the Ministry of Communications had formally accepted the offer of funds -by the American company. Thereafter negotiations were again interrupted -by political changes and disturbances. - -This incident will serve to illustrate the complexity of Chinese -affairs, and the condition of disorganization in which the Chinese -Government was at this time. - -The creation of a Chino-American Industrial Bank was the subject of -many discussions I had with Chinese officials and financiers. This -occupied a good deal of my attention during 1918, while Mr. Hsu -Un-yuen, after his retirement from the presidency of the Bank of China, -was devoting his time to working out a plan and securing the support -of prominent Chinese for this undertaking. Mr. Hsu Sing-loh was also -working on it independently; Mr. Hsu was secretary of the Minister -of Finance, educated in England, and exceptionally well informed. In -December of 1918 I accompanied Mr. Hsu to the house of Mr. Yang, a -capitalist interested in the China Merchants Steamship Company, where -we met with the Premier, Mr. Chien Neng-hsun, and Mr. Chou Hsueh-hsi, -who had recently been Minister of Finance. Here we talked over matters -of banking and finance, with Mr. Chou leading the conversation. He was -sure the Government would give a favourable charter that would enlist -the necessary capital. Chinese ideas about an industrial bank were -vague; in some mysterious way it was thought that it could produce -capital for developing industries, or, rather, could manifold its -capital for such uses. Three industries were ready--cotton, steel, -and scientific agriculture--for an extensive development. He did not -know how bad it is for a bank to lock up its capital in long-time -commitments. I asked those present as to how ready the Chinese public -would be to absorb the long-term bonds. Mr. Chou thought they would -take them, if strongly backed, at a relatively low interest. All -desired to go ahead. Ultimately the bank was founded, but by another -group. - -Before parting on that day our wealthy host brought forth from the -strong-boxes many great treasures of Chinese art, including paintings -of the Sung and Ming periods. China boasts only one museum. Only -through seeing such private collections can one form an estimate of the -richness and extent of Chinese art treasures. For an hour I looked on -delightedly while one after another of these precious works of Chinese -painting were unrolled before us. Chinese pictures are very modest. -They come out when called, but retire again readily to the quiet -of the storeroom. Also, darkness has not the dulling effect on the -water-colours used by Chinese painters that it exercises upon pictures -done in oils. - -Incidentally, Minister Chow and other prominent officials had been -interested in a savings bank combined with a lottery, which announced -the sale of so-called premium bonds. There were to be quarterly -drawings, at which a certain number of the bonds would receive prizes, -ranging as high as $100,000. Mr. Chow explained to me that it would be -futile for a Chinese savings bank to offer a matter of 5 or 6 per cent. -interest for funds. Nobody would heed it, because of the profitableness -of commercial enterprise. In order to strike public attention and -to cause people to bring their money for deposit, the inducement -of winning a large amount must be provided. The assurance that the -original deposit itself would not be lost, but would ultimately be -repaid, would be the second attraction. - -The minister said that it was the plan of the bank to reduce the amount -of prizes and to increase their number so that gradually the payment of -a reasonable interest would be approached, as the people got accustomed -to the idea of placing their funds in such an institution. The fact -that this country, whose people are so frugal and parsimonious and -where there is so much accumulated capital, should hitherto have been -without savings banks appears remarkable to a stranger. But the high -return on commercial loans, and the ever-present gambling instinct of -the Chinese, account to some extent for this absence. - - - - -CHAPTER XX - -A DIARY OF QUIET DAYS, AUTUMN OF 1916 - - -_September 3_: Judge Elbert H. Gary has just been in Peking for ten -days with Mrs. Gary and a small party. I took them to call on President -Li who is now living in a private residence with extensive rockeries -and gardens, in the East City. We threaded our way to a central -pavilion where the President received us. He talked amiably about his -desire to see the great resources of China developed with American -coöperation. In the evening I gave a dinner to Judge Gary and the new -Ministers of Finance and Communications. Charles A. Coolidge, the -Boston architect, was also present. On the following day I arranged for -the American guests to see the Winter Palace; Mr. Coolidge afterward -said to me that the trip through the palace grounds had been the -most interesting experience of his life from the point of view of -architectural beauty. Someone with Judge Gary told me that every lunch, -afternoon reception, and dinner engagement, for the entire stay in -Japan, was already arranged for, together with many engagements for -breakfast; adding: "The Japanese certainly know a great man when they -see him, more than the Chinese." As a matter of fact, the Chinese are -so unartificial that they do not think of organizing their hospitality -to any distinguished guest. What they do is quite spontaneous; they are -truly hospitable, but they do not understand the first elements of the -art of advertising. - -_September 9_: I took a trip to Dajessu with the Austrian minister. -This temple lies about twelve miles beyond the summer palace. We walked -part of the way; a Chinese fell in with us, and, as is customary, -opened conversation. Without seeming unduly inquisitive he elicited -information about the size of our families, our age, income, and the -cost of our clothing, the material of which he greatly admired. When -the Austrian minister told him that he had about four hundred men under -him, our companion looked rather dubious, and finally asked: "Why, -then, if you have so many attendants, are you walking?" The explanation -that we preferred to walk did not seem to remove his doubts. He told us -in turn all the details of his family and business affairs. - -We spent the week-end at the beautiful temple, from which we took -walks to the surrounding mountainside. A deserted temple on a high -hill overlooking the valley is picturesque as any castle on the Rhine. -We ascended to the summer residence of Mr. Hsu Un-yuen, a temple -perched on a precipitous spur of the main mountain range. The temple -had evidently been erected originally for a semi-residential purpose, -though it was in a quite inaccessible place, where neither worshippers -nor vacationists would ordinarily have sought it out. We found Mr. Hsu -and his wife enjoying the magnificent view from a terrace opening out -from the living apartments. - -_September 13_: I gave a dinner to Mr. C.T. Wang, the vice-president -of the senate, and a few representative members of parliament. We -engaged in a general after-dinner discussion of politics. Most of the -men present were Progressives. They argued volubly. The arguments -and illustrations were such as one would hear in a Western country. -I missed, as usual, a thorough discussion of underlying facts, -traditions, and practices of Chinese life, out of which institutions -should develop. I mentioned this; Mr. Wang said that they needed -a guiding principle of organization, which they must get from the -experience of constitutional countries. The question uppermost was -the proposed election of provincial governors by the people of the -respective provinces, instead of their appointment by the Central -Government. Most of those present considered this change necessary, -as through union and mutual support the appointive military governors -could exercise great power and defeat the aims of Parliament. - -_September 14_: Failing to get financial assistance from America, -the Chinese have been considering Japanese offers of loans. Dr. -Chen Chin-tao, forced by the situation and the importunities of the -ministers, who need money, has signed a preliminary agreement for a -loan of eighty million yen, on which an advance of five million yen is -to be paid over immediately. - -_September 18_: The House of Representatives to-day in secret session -discussed the Japanese loan. I am informed that it was strongly -attacked on the ground that certain mines in Hunan Province had been -pledged to secure the advance. The Minister of Finance was not present, -the vice-minister appearing to answer questions. The minister was -violently condemned for signing the preliminary agreement without -the consent of parliament. The argument was made that it related to -an advance, but not to the main loan itself. That argument was not -considered valid. - -_September 19_: Negotiations were concluded with the Minister of -Communications for a satisfactory adjustment of the American railway -contract. Most of the proposals made were accepted, so that the -American corporation ought certainly to be thoroughly well satisfied, -considering all the changes and difficulties that have occurred since -the original contract was made. That of the 17th May was allowed -to stand, the changes being introduced by way of annexes. After -the Chinese have thus gone to the limit of making the undertaking -attractive to Americans, it is to be hoped that there will be no -further delay; that, at least, some important constructive work will be -done by Americans. - -_September 21_: We welcomed a little son to-day in the family. I do -not know that any children were born to any American minister in Peking -before our little daughter Pauline came, in February, 1915. The two -little ones were born into a strange world in which parents may well -fear for the health of their children, because of frequent epidemics. -Still, aside from such visitations, the Peking climate seems to be most -favourable to children; they thrive and grow apace. Claire, the eldest -daughter, aside from a terrible attack of appendicitis in which Dr. -M.A. Stewart, of the Navy, saved her life, has been the very spirit of -health. The faithful Chinese servants surround the children with every -care. - -_October 3_: I gave a men's dinner, attended by the ministers of -Portugal, Russia, and Japan, and by Mr. Obata, the Japanese counsellor; -Count Martel, the French first secretary; Mr. Aglen, Inspector-General -of Customs; Mr. Alston, the British counsellor; Mr. Herrera de Huerta, -formerly Mexican Chargé; Mr. Mitrophanow, of the Russian Legation; -Doctor Willoughby, Doctor McElroy of Princeton, and other guests. It -was really a dinner of welcome to the new Japanese minister, Baron -Hayashi, who has recently arrived to take the place of Mr. Hioki. It -was probably thought better to displace the minister upon whom had -fallen the disagreeable duty of forcing through the Twenty-one Demands -of 1915. Baron Hayashi, who had been ambassador in Italy, brings a long -diplomatic experience and very careful methods. He is very silent, -speaks little except when few or only one other person are present. In -a larger company or at a meeting, he gives the impression of detachment -and deep reflection. In social intercourse he is more retiring than his -predecessor. He impresses me as a thoughtful, fair-minded man. - -_October 4_: I am told that a guest at last night's dinner, a visitor -from a distant country, complained because he had not been ranked with -the ministers. As I had no information, nor have it now, that he was -entitled to such ranking, I shall not worry. This is the first instance -of any dissatisfaction with the seating. My predecessor related to -me that a secretary of the British Legation once took his sudden -departure before dinner for this reason. I have not always closely -adhered to rank in seating, particularly at dinners where there are -Chinese, in order to avoid a grouping which should make conversation -impossible; but in such cases, of course, I always speak to whichever -guest is slightly prejudiced by the arrangement and explain the reason -to him. I have never noticed the least sign of displeasure. At a very -formal dinner, it is of course always safer to follow rank and let the -conversation take care of itself. Any enjoyment people get out of such -a dinner they set down as pure profit, anyhow. - -_October 7_: Ambassador and Mrs. Guthrie arrived to-day. They will be -our guests for several weeks. Mr. Guthrie has not been very well, so -has come for a rest. We spent the day together, talking over Chinese -and Japanese affairs and relations. We agree on most points. - -In the evening we dined at the officers' mess, after which there was -dancing. Mrs. Ollie James and Mrs. Hall of Washington came with the -Guthries. They were at the dinner, at which great cheer prevailed. -Colonel Neville, the new commandant of the marines, radiates good -fellowship. He is sociable, efficient, and ready to coöperate in all -good causes. His officers and men seem to revere him, and a very fine -spirit reigns in the marine compound. - -_October 11_: I presented Ambassador Guthrie to the President, who -had invited us for luncheon. We were only six at the table. Mr. Quo -Tai-chi, the youthful English-speaking secretary of the President, -interpreted. The President had many questions to ask about Japan. -Then, he spoke quite hopefully about the outlook in China. Financial -difficulties will be overcome through coöperation of parliament and -the cabinet, so that the Government may count on popular consent to an -increase in taxes. - -President Li now occupies the palace where Yuan Shih-kai had lived. We -met in a small apartment in the building constructed for the Empress -Dowager, which was tastefully furnished in the best Chinese style. - -_October 13_: The dinner season has fully set in. There are dinners -every night, and will be, throughout the winter. This evening we -entertained for the Guthries, having Prince Koudacheff, Baron Hayashi, -and the wives of the Russian and Danish ministers, who are themselves -absent. - -_October 23_: The Political Science Association met at my house. The -Minister for Foreign Affairs presided. Doctor W.W. Willoughby and -Senator Yen Fu, the noted scholar, read papers. Over a hundred men were -in attendance--the cream of the Western-educated officials, as well as -European and American members. - -_October 29_: The Guthries left yesterday. To-day arrived General and -Mrs. Liggett, who will be our guests for a few days. General Liggett is -tall and impressive-looking. We had a long initial conversation about -the effects of the war in the Far East. The Philippines are beginning -to be prosperous on account of the war demand for their products. - -_October 31_: I presented General Liggett to President Li. In a long -conversation the President was frank in his statement concerning the -international difficulties of China. He expressed himself in strong -terms as desirous of close coöperation with America. I gathered that -he feared that certain foreign influences might stir up trouble -between the parliament and the Government, and otherwise seek to cause -embarrassment. - -_November 3_: I went with a small party to the mountain temple -Djetaissu. Mrs. Chadbourne, the sister of my friend Mr. Charles R. -Crane; Miss Ellen Lamotte the writer; Mr. and Mrs. Burns of Shanghai; -and Mr. Charles Stevenson Smith, of the Associated Press, took this -excursion riding on donkeys, with many spills as the animals slipped on -the rocky road. The temple is near the top, commanding a magnificent -view of the plains and of the higher mountains farther inland. It rises -tier above tier, its platforms shaded by huge trees, with enchanting -vistas of architecture and a broad sweep of view in all directions. - -_November 9_: The Continental Commercial Bank Loan is announced. I am -happy that this result has been achieved. An advance of only $5,000,000 -will be made, but even that small sum will be an important aid to the -Chinese Government. The fact that a big Western financial institution -has taken up relations with China is promising. What foreign banking -there is in New York is tangled up with European interests, follows the -lead of London, and has not manifested much readiness to exert itself -for the development of American interests abroad. - -_November 10_: I attended the balloting for the election of the -Vice-President of the Republic, at a joint session of the two houses -of parliament. While no speeches were made, with the exception of -brief discussion on points of order, yet it was of interest to see -the general aspect of parliament. The procedure, certainly, was -business-like. Balloting was by written and signed vote; after each -ballot, the individual votes are read off from the tribune. I had the -impression that a true election was going on. General Feng Kuo-chang, -the Military Governor of Kiangsu, had the lead from the start, which -was gradually increased by the balloting until finally he got the -necessary majority. I could not stay until the result was announced, -when there was a demonstration to honour the nominee. But I saw before -me a body which had evidently mastered the procedure of parliamentary -action, so that things were done with a smoothness and ease which -implied long experience. Many people witnessed the election, among them -several of my colleagues. I had a brief conversation with Mr. C.T. -Wang, who was hopeful that, now the Vice-Presidential succession was -settled legally and peacefully, the future of the Republic was assured. - -General Feng has occupied a pivotal position at his post at Nanking. He -is shrewd and clever. Like a boy standing over the centre of a seesaw, -he used his weight to balance either side according as the pendulum -movement required. He was at first believed to have given Yuan Shih-kai -encouragement to be emperor, but when asked to express himself, had -allowed the report that he was neutral to gain currency; then, as -the opposition gained strength, he added his weight with gradually -increasing force to its side, although never at any stage coming out -with positive statements. His selection was an attempt to form a -compromise between the militarist and the progressive parties. - -_November 10_: I took a long excursion with Prince Koudacheff. We rode -to the foothills by automobile, then climbed to the top of a lofty -range back of his temple, where one can promenade for six or eight -miles along the crest of the ridge with glorious views of mountain -country on either side. - -_November 15_: I had a long conversation with Baron Hayashi to-day. - -_November 20_: Admiral and Mrs. Winterhalter arrived for a few days' -visit. The Admiral is tall, gray-haired, strong-featured, of energetic -movements. He has always manifested a deep interest in what is going on -in China; we sat down for a long talk immediately after his arrival. - -_November 22_: I presented the Admiral to President Li and we had -a pleasant conversation, although the President was not quite so -expansive and confidential as during my last call. As we made the -rounds of calls on the cabinet ministers, I took the conversation -beyond the ordinary civilities, so as to give the visitor an -opportunity of getting more insight into the affairs now engaging our -attention; also, to use this valuable time for an exchange of ideas -with the Chinese leaders. - -_November 25_: The French are protesting against the Continental -Commercial Bank Loan, in so far as the security is concerned. The -security of the tobacco and wine tax had been assigned to some previous -French loans. I saw Doctor Chen, and Count Martel called on me. I -take the position that as the French loan--which is small in amount -and will require only a very minor portion of the proceeds of the -tax--remains entitled to be the first lien, the French interests are in -no way prejudiced. I imagine what they really object to is the eventual -appointment of an American auditor or co-inspector for this revenue. As -this, however, would still strengthen the security for their loan, I -do not see that they have any reason for complaint. The representative -of the French bank which is interested, saw me and made a tentative -suggestion that if advisorships were established, the French might take -the wine tax, and the Americans the tobacco tax. I feel, however, that -the hands of the Chinese were perfectly free when the loan was made; -there can be no objection, except on the supposition that whenever the -Chinese do business, no matter how small, with respect to any subject -matter, they impliedly give a lien on all future dealings. - -_December 4_: I called on Doctor Morrison to take a look at his -library. This unusual collection contains about twenty thousand books -in European languages, dealing with China. The rare editions of early -works are almost completely represented. Doctor Morrison, who lives in -a Chinese-style house, has built a fireproof building for his books. -He has devoted the last fifteen years to getting them together, and -I believe has spent the larger part of his income on them. Recently -he married a lady who had been for a while his secretary. They now -have a little boy. I am told that his marriage and fatherhood have -greatly augmented Doctor Morrison's standing and influence among -the Chinese. A bachelor does not fit into their scheme of life. We -repaired to his study, and for a long time were discussing affairs. -We spoke particularly about the railway situation and the fact that -construction on all the lines contracted for has practically been -stopped. This is an enormous disadvantage to the Chinese. They have to -pay heavy interest charges on the initial loans, for which there is as -yet no income-paying property to show, but only surveys and partial -construction. We agreed that the Four-Power bankers, for instance, have -a very weak case if China should decide to cancel their contract for -non-performance, as money to continue the building is not forthcoming. -On the British concession of the Pukow-Singyang Railway, on which -virtually no work has yet been done, the Government nevertheless has to -pay interest on a million dollars of capital that has been advanced. - -_December 7_: I visited Prince Koudacheff, the Russian minister. I -jokingly asked him whether he found that the Chinese thought of the -Russians as half-Asiatic, therefore as brothers. "No," he replied; -"they count us with you and with the other Europeans, as a scourge and -pestilence." In this conversation the Prince uttered a prophecy. "As a -result of this war," he said, "the empire will be abolished in Germany." - -(Neither of us at this time dreamed of the enormous subversions and -convulsions which were soon to take place in Russia.) - -_December 8_: I called on President Li in order to present a personal -letter from President Wilson, in which the latter sends his good -wishes. We discussed the American loan policy. The President, like -other Chinese, finds it difficult to understand why America, with -her great capital strength and industrial development, is so slow in -taking advantage of opportunities for investment and development in -China. The President said: "Americans love pioneering. In China there -is pioneering to do, with the added advantage of having a ready labour -supply and local capital, which may be enlisted. Why are they so slow -to come in?" I agree with him that it is difficult to understand. - -_December 16_: Mr. Victor Murdock is in Peking, bringing a breeze -of American good-fellowship, and a vision unobstructed by theories. -He finds China interesting, but, I fear, he will suffer the usual -disability of the passing visitor, that is, he will see the -unfavourable aspects of Chinese life and will not stay long enough to -appreciate the deeper virtues. - - * * * * * - -This diary account of some of the happenings during the fall of 1916 -contains nothing of the daily work of conferences, discussions, -interviews, dictations dealing with the innumerable problems that come -up from the consulates, or that arise in the capital directly, or -referring to general policies which are hammered out and formed for -action. - -A great part of the work of a legation is concerned with foreseeing -trouble and trying to avoid it. Such work usually does not appear at -all in the record. In a country where conditions are complicated as -they are in China, where there is such a crisscrossing of influences, -it is easy to make a mistake if constant care be not exercised to keep -informed of every detail and to head off trouble. - - - - -CHAPTER XXI - -CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY - - -The time came for the United States to sever relations with the German -Kaiser's government. I had taken advantage of the clear sunshine and -mild air on Sunday, February 4, 1917, to visit Doctor Morrison at his -cottage outside of Peking near the race-course. After lunch a messenger -came from the Legation, bringing word that an important cablegram had -arrived and was being decoded. I returned to town, and at the Legation -Mr. White handed me the decoded message which said that the American -Government had not only broken off diplomatic relations with Germany, -but that it trusted the neutral powers would associate themselves -with the American Government in this action of protest against an -intolerable practice; this would make for the peace of the world. I was -instructed to communicate all this to the Chinese Government. - -After a conference with the first secretary, Mr. MacMurray, and the -Chinese secretary, Doctor Tenney, I made an engagement to see the -President and the Premier on that same evening. I felt justified in -assuming that the invitation to the neutrals to join the United States -was more than a pious wish and that there was some probability that -the European neutrals would support our protest. As to China I had -already informed the Government that we could reasonably expect support -there. I therefore considered it to be the policy of the Government to -assure a common demonstration on the part of all neutral powers, strong -enough to bring Germany to a halt. So far as my action was concerned, -I therefore saw the plain duty to prevail upon China to associate -herself with the American action as proposed by my government. - -I found President Li Yuan-hung resting after dinner in his palace -and in an amiably expectant mood. With him was Mr. Quo Tai-chi, his -English secretary. He was plainly startled by the prospect of having to -consider so serious a matter, and did not at first say anything, but -sat silently thinking. His doubts and objections were revealed rather -through questions than by direct statements. "What is the present state -of the war, and what the relative strength or degree of exhaustion of -the belligerent parties?" "Could the Allies, even with the assistance -of the United States, win a decisive victory?" Finally, he said: "The -effect of such a far-reaching international act upon the internal -situation in China will have to be carefully considered." - -The President's secretary appeared strongly impressed with the -favourable aspects of our proposal, so that he began to argue a little -with the President. On my part, I pointed out the effects which a -positive act of international assertion in behalf of a just cause and -well-disposed associates would have upon China by taking attention off -her endless factional conflicts. When I touched upon the ethical phases -of the matter, the President fully agreed with me. I had particularly -impressed upon him the need of prompt action in order that counsels -might not be confused by adverse influences from without. - -We next drove to the residence of the Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, -who was then playing an important part in the politics Of China. -I recalled my first interview with him when he had received me in -a dingy room, himself wearing a frowzy long coat and exhibiting a -general air of tedium and lack of energy. There was no suggestion of -the military man about him. The qualities upon which General Tuan's -great influence is founded become apparent only upon a longer and more -intimate acquaintance. Despite his real indolence, his wisdom, his -fundamental honesty, and his readiness to shield his subordinates and -to assume responsibility himself have made this quiet and unobtrusive -man the most prominent leader among the Chinese militarists. His -interest centres chiefly in the education of military officers. He is -no politician and is bored by political theory. He is always ready to -turn over the handling of affairs to subordinates, by whom he is often -led into a course which he might not himself have chosen. This, coupled -with extraordinary stubbornness, accounts for his influence often -tending to be disastrous to his country. His personality, however, with -its simplicity and pensiveness, and his real wisdom when he lets his -own nature guide him, make him one of the attractive figures of China. - -Though in himself the principal influence in the Government, Tuan -left all details to his assistants, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin and General Hsu -Shu-cheng. He preferred to play chess. He was, however, always ready -to shoulder responsibility for what his subordinates had done. Often -when he was deep in a game of Chinese chess, his mind focussed on the -complexities of this difficult pastime, General Hsu would approach -him with some proposal. Giving only half an ear to it, the Premier -would respond, "All right" (_How how_). When, later, the results of -the action thus taken turned out to be bad and the Premier asked for -an explanation, he was reminded that he had himself authorized it. -He would then faintly recollect, and would make a gesture toward his -shoulder, which indicated that--very well--he took the responsibility. - -But on this occasion General Tuan was all attention. He had with -him Mr. C.C. Wu of the Foreign Office, who continued throughout -these negotiations to act as interpreter. The circumstance that the -Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, was ill and had to -be represented by his son, and that in all important interviews both -the Premier and young Mr. Wu were present, greatly facilitated the -business and saved time which would have been needed to carry on -parallel conversations in the Foreign Office and with the Premier. -General Tuan was far from accepting the proposal at first sight. "It -would be wise for Germany to modify her submarine policy," he stated, -"because in land warfare she could press her opponents so seriously -that her absolute defeat would be difficult unless the United States -entered the war." He appeared to contemplate the possibility of China -taking so unprecedented a step as the breaking of relations with a -great power with less concern than did the President. We arranged for a -longer discussion on the following day. - -Far into that night I was in conference with the legation staff, and -with certain non-official Americans and Britishers of great influence -among the Chinese. These men looked with enthusiasm upon the idea of -an association with the United States, aligning against Germany the -vast population of China. While the energies and resources of China -were not sufficiently mobilized to be of immediate use in the war, -yet by systematic preparation they might bring an enormous accession -of strength to the Allies if the war should last long. We felt, -also, that through positive alliance with the declared policy of the -United States, China would greatly strengthen herself internally and -externally. - -Dr. John C. Ferguson addressed himself directly to the Premier and -the President; his thorough knowledge of Chinese enabled him to -bring home to them the essential points in favour of prompt action. -Mr. Roy S. Anderson and Mr. W.H. Donald, an Australian acting as -editor of the _Far Eastern Review_, who were close to the members of -the Communications Party and the Kuo Min Tang, addressed themselves -especially to the leaders in parliament. Dr. G.E. Morrison, the British -adviser of the President of China, had long worked to have China join -in the war: he quietly used all his influence with the President and -high officials, in order to make them understand what was at stake. -Other Americans and British newspapermen, like Charles Stevenson Smith -and Sam Blythe, who happened to be in Peking, all tirelessly working in -their own way with men whose confidence they enjoyed, urged the policy -proposed by America. These men made a spontaneous appeal based upon the -fundamental justice of the policy of resisting an intolerable practice, -and on the beneficent effect which a great issue like this would have -in pulling the Chinese nation together and in making it realize its -status as a member of the family of nations. However, what counted most -with the Chinese was the fact that America had acted, and had invited -China to take a similar step. - -At a second long interview with the President, he asked me: "Would not -a positive active foreign policy, particularly if it should lead to -war, strengthen the militarist party?" - -I replied that in my opinion such a contingency would strengthen -decisively the Central Government, enabling it to keep the military in -their proper place as an organ of the state and preventing the further -growth of the pseudo-feudalism inherited from Yuan Shih-kai. - -"But would the American Government assist China in bearing the -responsibilities of such a step?" - -Before replying to this question, I had to cable the Department of -State for instructions as to what assurances I would be authorized to -give to the Chinese Government in the event of their taking the action -suggested by the United States. Unfortunately, as was several times the -case during some critical situation, the cable connection was broken -and I failed to get any reply to assist me during the negotiations. - -With a map the Premier and I, later that afternoon, analyzed the -military situation of the European Powers. From the analogy of the -American Civil War, I expressed to him the belief that Germany could -not resist the enormous pressure from all sides. "What," the Premier -asked, "may be expected of America by way of direct military action? -Bear in mind that I wish for nothing more than for a strong America, -able to exercise a guiding influence in the affairs of the world." - -My positive belief that America would, if necessary, follow the -severance of relations with the strongest kind of military action -interested him. America had been represented to the Chinese as a big, -over-rich country which lacked energy for a supreme military effort. - -"What, then, will happen at the conclusion of the war?" he asked. - -The fact that Japan had already made efforts to assure for herself the -right to speak for China was worrying the Chinese. With the Premier, -as with the President, the idea that, through breaking with Germany, -China could assure herself of an independent position at the peace -table, had much weight. Both men also faced the possibility of being -drawn into the war. The Premier appeared to regard this with a certain -degree of positive satisfaction; to the President it seemed a less -agreeable prospect. I made it plain that the American proposal did not -go beyond breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany, and, that -by taking that step, China would effectually rebuke and discourage -the illegal and inhuman acts of Germany on the high seas, keeping her -hands entirely free as to future action. Should further steps be later -needed, the road would be open. - -Intensive discussions were going on all day Monday and deep into the -night among the Chinese officials and the leaders of parliament. I -received calls on Tuesday from many Chinese leaders who wished to talk -over the situation. The progressive, modern-minded, and forward-looking -among the Chinese readily supported the idea that China should range -herself alongside the United States in this action. Admiral Tsai -Ting-kan, who was very close to the President, laboured in company with -Doctor Morrison to bring before Li Yuan-hung all the considerations -favouring positive action. The President, however, still adhered to his -idea that it was safer for China to remain entirely neutral. - -In the cabinet, Dr. Chen Chin-tao, the Minister of Finance, and Mr. -C.C. Wu, representing the Minister for Foreign Affairs, from the -earliest moment associated themselves with those of the opinion -that China must act, and they led the younger officials. In the Kuo -Min Tang, Mr. C.T. Wang, vice-president of the senate; Dr. Wang -Chung-hui, the leading jurist of China; and General Niu Yung-chien, -of revolutionary fame, were the first to become active. The Peking -_Gazette_, with its brilliant editor, Eugene Chen, came out strongly -in favour of following the United States. A powerful public opinion -was quietly forming among the Chinese. The Young China party was -beginning to see the advantage which lay in having China emerge from -her passivity. - -When I returned from a dinner with the Alstons at the British Legation -on Tuesday night, Mr. C.C. Wu brought me word from the cabinet that -it would be quite impossible to take action unless the American -Government could adequately assure China assistance in bearing the -responsibilities which she might incur, without impairment of her -sovereign rights and the independent control of her national forces. - -The Chinese ministers had in mind two things: In the first place, the -need of financial assistance, in order to make it possible for China -eventually to participate in the war, if that should be desired; and, -second, the prevention of all arrangements whereby Chinese natural -resources, military forces, arsenals, or ships, would be placed -under foreign control incompatible with her undiminished national -independence. - -All through Wednesday I struggled with this difficult problem. I had -to act on my own responsibility, as I could not reach the Department -of State by cable. If all the influences unfavourable to the action -proposed were given time to assert themselves, the American proposal -would be obstructed and probably defeated. The Chinese Government -would act only on such assurances as I could feel justified in giving -to them at this time; if I gave them none, no action would be taken. -It seemed almost a matter of course, should China follow the lead of -the American Government, that the latter would not allow China to -suffer through lack of all possible support in aiding China to bear -the responsibilities she assumed, and in preventing action from any -quarter which would impose on China new burdens because of her break -with Germany. Unable to interpret my instructions otherwise than that a -joint protest of the neutrals had actually been planned by the American -Government, and feeling that the effect upon Germany of the American -protest depended on the early concurrence of the important neutral -powers, I considered prompt action essential. I was sure that all sorts -of unfavourable and obstructive influences would presently get to work -in Peking. - -When discussion had reached its limit, on the afternoon of February -7th, I felt it necessary to draw up a note concerning the attitude of -the American Government. The tenor of this note I communicated to the -Premier and the Foreign Office, with the understanding that I should -send the note if favourable action were decided upon by the Chinese -Government. - -I believed that without such assurances the instructions of the -American Government could not be carried out, and that it would act -in all respects in a manner consonant with its position as a powerful -government and as a leader of protest among the neutrals; moreover, -that its relations with those who gave support in a policy of such -fundamental importance would be determined by principles of equity -and justice. I felt that the United States could not be less liberal -toward a country coming to its support than toward those countries -which the American Government was now going to help. It was only these -self-evident conclusions which I cautiously expressed in my note. The -text of this note, in its essential part, had the following form: - - Excellency: - - In our recent conversation concerning the policy of your Government in - associating itself with the United States in active opposition to the - unrestricted submarine warfare by which Germany is indiscriminately - jeopardizing the lives of neutral citizens, you have with entire - frankness pointed out to me that, whereas the Chinese Government is - in principle disposed to adopt the suggestion of the President of - the United States in that regard, it nevertheless finds itself in a - position in which it would not feel safe in so doing unless assured - that it could obtain from American sources such financial and other - assistance as would enable it to take the measures appropriate to the - situation which would thus be created. - - With like candour I have stated to you that I have recommended to my - Government that in the event of the Chinese Government's associating - itself with the President's suggestion, the Government of the United - States should take measures to put at its disposition the funds - immediately required for the purposes you have indicated, and should - take steps with a view to such a funding of the Boxer Indemnity as - would for the time being make available for the purposes of the - Chinese Government at least the major portion of the current indemnity - instalments; and I have indicated to you my personal conviction that - my Government would be found just and liberal in effecting this or - other such arrangements to enable the Chinese Government to meet - the responsibilities which it might assume upon the suggestion of - the President. I should not be wholly frank with you, however, if I - were to fail to point out that the exact nature of any assistance - to be given or any measure to be taken must be determined through - consultation of various administrative organs, in some cases including - reference to Congress, in order to make effective such arrangements - as might have been agreed to in principle between the executive - authorities of the two countries; and I therefore could not in good - faith make in behalf of my Government any definite commitments upon - your suggestions at the present time. - - I do, however, feel warranted in assuming the responsibility of - assuring you in behalf of my Government that by the methods you have - suggested, or otherwise, adequate means will be devised to enable - China to fulfill the responsibilities consequent upon associating - herself with the action of the United States Government, without any - impairment of her national independence and of her control of her - military establishment and general administration. - -Final presentation of everything that had to be considered in making a -decision was arranged with the Premier for Wednesday evening. I found -General Tuan alone. We spoke awhile about the news of the day, then -I began to go into the main matter. But General Tuan appeared weary -and worried. This may have been the reason for the failure of the -interpreters to make smooth connection: I suggested, as the Premier had -had an excessively long day, that we meet again the following morning. -It was arranged for ten o'clock at the cabinet office, just before the -Thursday morning cabinet conference. - -I had just dined with Mr. C.T. Wang and a number of parliamentary -leaders. They were keen on the policy of following the United States. -They had seen President Li during the day; he was still full of -doubts, but stated that he would leave the decision in the hands of -the cabinet, and would abide by the results. Mr. Wang believed that -the President was gradually coming around to the American point of -view, and that his acceptance of it would be the stronger and heartier -because of the conscientious doubts which he was overcoming. - -The negotiations of these three days had gone on quietly. The men upon -whom rested the responsibility of making the decision were constantly -in conference. Several men of influence worked with officials of the -Government and leaders in parliament. But the outside foreign public -was not fully alive to what was going on, and those who knew and were -interested generally believed that ancient China would not take so -unprecedented a step. The Japanese minister, Baron Hayashi, was absent -from Peking. The German official representatives apparently had no idea -that any radical action could come from the Chinese Government. - -I arrived at the cabinet office on Thursday morning, at ten, and was -shown to the room where the Premier was to receive me. As he had told -me that Mr. C.C. Wu would be present to interpret, I had not brought -an interpreter for this informal and intimate interview. The Premier -soon entered unattended and we sat down together, smoking cigarettes, -and observing an enforced silence, as Mr. Wu had not appeared. We -were without an interpreter, but even in such circumstances the -perfection of Chinese manners allows no embarrassment to arise. We had -been sitting in mute thought a little while, when Admiral Chen, the -Minister of the Navy, came in; he spoke English quite well, so that -our conversation could begin; soon we were in the midst of earnest -discussion. Within another ten minutes Dr. Chen Chin-tao, the Minister -of Finance, arrived, and shortly after him came Mr. C.C. Wu. Thus, -quite by chance, I had the opportunity of talking over these momentous -matters jointly with the representatives of the four departments of -government most nearly concerned: Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, and -Navy. - -We could now once more thoroughly go over all doubts and objections, -and look at the proposed policy in all its manifold aspects and -probable results. In this intense and earnest conversation no formal -interpreting was needed. Whoever replied to my remarks would first -repeat in Chinese what I had said for the benefit of the Premier. When -the Premier had spoken, Mr. Wu would interpret his thought for me. All -the others addressed me directly in English. I advanced arguments on -every point, of which the following is a memorandum: - - The American Government has taken the present action because the - wilful disregard of neutral rights went to the extent of imperilling - not only neutral property, but the lives of our citizens. In this - matter the interests of China are entirely parallel to those of the - United States; both nations are peaceful and see in the maintenance - of international right and peaceful conditions a vital guarantee of - their national safety. Through association with the United States, - China would enter upon this controversy with a position consonant with - every tradition and interest of her national life, a position which - would have to be respected by friends and foes alike, as dictated by - the highest principles which could guide national action. By taking - this action, China would improve her independent standing among the - nations, she would have to be consulted during the course of the - controversy and at the conclusion of the war; she would, in all this, - be most closely associated with that nation which she has always - looked upon as peculiarly friendly and just to her. In addition to - these arguments, many favourable results were discussed which China - would obtain in international diplomacy. - - Many arguments were advanced by the Chinese officials in doubt of - the policy suggested; it was stated that China had not led up to - a breach with Germany by notes of protest, such as had made the - action of the United States seem natural and unavoidable; Germany - had of late years always been considerate in her treatment of China, - a sudden breach might seem treacherous; it might also be taken by - Japan as so surprising an action as to give a favourable pretext for - pressing the dreaded demands of Group V. It was also apparent that - the representatives of the European Allies were not in a position to - give China, at the present time, any advice favourable to the action - suggested. - - I pointed out in turn that were the action suggested once taken by - China, the representatives of the Allied Powers would have no choice - but to applaud it, which some of them, at least, would do from the - fulness of their hearts. As far as Japan was concerned, the situation - would be such as to indicate that that country, too, would decide - to express approval of the action. Having taken a definite position - on this side of the controversy, without yet entirely associating - herself with the Allies, China would be in a position to command their - goodwill; any interference with China's sovereign rights would be - rendered more difficult because of the situation thus created. It was - almost inconceivable that coercive action should be taken against the - friend who had declared himself. Moreover, the United States having - taken the initiative in inviting China to participate in the protest, - it would be unlikely that any action could be taken over the head of - the United States or without consulting the American Government. - - As to the suddenness of the action suggested, I urged that the - action of the German Government in announcing unrestricted submarine - warfare was itself so astounding in its disregard of neutral rights - that no action taken in reply could be considered too drastic. It - was virtually a threat to kill Chinese citizens navigating certain - portions of the high seas; and injury could be prevented only by - taking a determined and forceful position. - -We continued our discussion until nearly twelve o'clock, when I took -my leave, thanking the ministers for their courtesy and goodwill. The -cabinet sat until six in the evening. Shortly after six I received a -telephone call from Mr. C.C. Wu, who said: "I am very happy to tell -you that the cabinet has decided to make a protest to Germany, and -to indicate that diplomatic relations will be broken off unless the -present submarine warfare is abandoned." - -It is interesting to remember, as the publication of the Russian secret -archives has shown, that on this very day the Japanese Minister for -Foreign 'Affairs was urging the Russian ambassador at Tokyo to get from -his government assurances of various benefits (including Shantung) -to come to Japan if she undertook the supposedly difficult task of -inducing China to join the Allies. Japan was thus asking a commission -for persuading the Chinese to join the Allies, although they were -willing to do so freely of their own accord, as their action this day -showed. - -The Chinese had made a great decision. These men had acted -independently upon their judgment of what was just and in the best -interests of their own nation. It was the act of a free government, -without a shadow of attempt at pressure, without a thought of exacting -compensations on their part. When it is considered in comparison with -the manner in which some other governments entered the war, it will -stand as an honour to China for all time. Incidentally, this was -China's first independent participation in world politics. She had -stepped out of her age-long aloofness and taken her place among the -modern nations. - -I now sent the note to the Chinese Government which contained the -simple assurance of fair treatment by the United States. In return I -received this promise: - - In case an act should be performed by the German Government which - should be considered by the American Government as a sufficient cause - for a declaration of war, the Chinese Government will at least break - off its diplomatic relations with Germany. - -In his formal note to me, dated February 9th, the Minister for Foreign -Affairs declared: - - The Chinese Government being in accord with the principles set forth - in Your Excellency's note and firmly associating itself with the - Government of the United States of America, has taken similar action - by protesting energetically to the German Government against the - new measures of blockade. The Chinese Government also proposes to - take such action in the future as will be deemed necessary for the - maintenance of the principles of international law. - -On the same day a formal note of protest was dispatched to the German -minister. - -The entire cabinet reported on February 10th to a secret session of -parliament on the diplomatic action it had taken. The report was well -received; only a few questions were asked concerning the procedure -which had been followed. Parliament did not take a vote on this matter, -as it was considered to be an action by the cabinet within the range of -its legal functions. - -A wave of exultation passed over the country. There seemed to be -hope for harmony among factions; the self-respect of the Government -was visibly heightened. That China had without coercion or sordid -inducement taken a definite stand on so momentous a matter inspired the -Chinese with new hope. In coming to the support of international right, -they felt that they were strengthening the forces which make for the -independence of their own country. - -Expressing themselves unofficially the representatives of the Allied -governments during these negotiations cautiously favoured the step -proposed. When the decision had once been taken, the approval of the -Chinese action was unanimous. My Belgian colleague remarked to me: -"The air has been cleared, a weight has been lifted off China and the -powers. The stock of America has risen 100 per cent." - -Mr. Sam Blythe gave a dinner on the evening of February 9th, at which -Dr. George Morrison and many other American and British friends were -present. The dinner became a celebration. Greeting me, Doctor Morrison -said: "This is the greatest thing ever accomplished in China. It means -a new era. It will make the Chinese nationally self-conscious; and -that, not for narrow, selfish purposes, but to vindicate human rights." - -But the thing was not yet accomplished. I knew well enough that the -decision of the Central Government would not be immediately accepted -in all parts of China. Opposition might crop out. In certain regions -men of strong German sympathies were in control, or political intrigues -to cause embarrassment and difficulties to the Central Government were -going on. All China must understand and support the decision taken by -the Government. - -Of the leaders in the provinces the Vice-President, General Feng, at -Nanking, was most important; as the blunder had been committed of not -consulting him, he was predisposed against the decision; moreover, -General Feng had several German advisers in whom he placed confidence, -and who had given him a strong notion of German invincibility. - -Fortunately, Mr. Sam Blythe was going to stop at Nanking on his way to -Shanghai, in order as a journalist to interview the Vice-President. -Blythe argued the matter out with him. He found that General Feng -really felt injured. This was smoothed over. With Mr. W.H. Donald as -an able second, Sam Blythe impressed upon the General that China had -merely been asked to break off relations, which did not imply going to -war. After a long and serious conversation, with some side-flashes from -Sam Blythe, the Vice-President declared himself fully satisfied, and he -came out in favour of the Government's policy. (Thus, as has often been -the case, an unofficial visit by private individuals accomplished the -good results.) - -In other ways and by other persons, different leaders were visited and -familiarized with the underlying reasons for the act of the Central -Government. These influences interplayed with cumulative effect; no -concerted opposition was formed; by a sort of football "interference" -the policy to condemn German submarine warfare, and, if necessary, to -break relations with Germany, scored its touchdown. - -Intelligent teamwork and American energy were in a fair way to give -China the backing she needed, having first assured her concerted -action with the United States. At a diplomatic dinner which I gave -the Minister for Foreign Affairs in February, the absorbing talk was -about the diplomatic action taken by China. Count Martel and M. Pelliot -of the French Legation, Miles Lampson of the British Legation, Mr. -Konovalov, Russia's financial adviser for China, and other Allied -representatives all came to me during the evening to say how enormously -gratified they were at the initiative of the United States and the -stand taken by China. For once nobody could disapprove of Chinese -action. - -The Japanese also expressed approval, but immediately tried to get -China to take the further step of declaring war, and the French -minister, too, worked actively for this. Japan was eager to recover the -lead. A great campaign of intrigue and counter-intrigue resulted among -the various factions in China which threatened to destroy the unifying -and inspiring effects of China's action. The question of joining the -Allies out and out was thrown into politics. From all this most of the -ministers held aloof. When Liang Chi-chao sounded me on this question, -I told him, while lacking instructions from my government, that I -thought the rupture of diplomatic relations would be enough, if it -should come to that. Within a few days instructions came from the State -Department to the same effect. - -During March I repeatedly saw Vice-President Feng and President Li. -Feng, small and slender, intelligent in appearance, bald, with keen but -shifty eyes, was courtesy itself. I was specially delighted with the -refinement and musical quality of his diction. I went over the whole -ground with him, satisfying him, especially, on the question of the -specific American objections to the German U-boats. "I approve heartily -and completely," he finally assured me, "of the proposed break with -Germany." - -I found that General Li was not only in favour of breaking with -Germany, but of an internal break with his own premier, General Tuan. -"I cannot trust him," said Li; "he wishes to eliminate me from real -power." This friction within distressed me not a little, as I had -sincerely hoped that these two men would come to coöperate. - -Then I saw Dr. Wu Ting-fang. Besides being China's foreign minister, -Doctor Wu is a spiritualist. When I entered, he followed his usual -bent, bundled the morning's business details over to the counsellor -in attendance, and devoted himself to philosophizing. Spiritualism, -longevity, and the advantages of a vegetarian diet, were to him topics -for real thought and speculation. In mystic language, he remarked: -"There is an aura gradually spreading from Europe over the entire -surface of the world. It enters the brains of the people and penetrates -them, making them war-mad. We are having the first signs here." - -By March 10th, submarine warfare had not been modified. Parliament then -formally approved the breach of diplomatic relations with Germany. - -I had almost belaboured the department for instructions during the -progress of our work. But it was not until the 13th of March, the very -day the break of diplomatic relations was formally notified, that the -instructions came. These rather implied that the circular inviting -coöperation on the part of the neutral powers had been too strongly -acted upon by me. I could not but be inwardly amused. - -When a government takes a step involving life and death and all the -interests of its own and of general civilization; when, in connection -therewith, it calls upon other powers to associate themselves with -it--it ought to be safe to presume that the government means what -it says. It should see that the action it invokes involves great -sacrifices, and it must not invoke it lightly. A responsible official -would not be justified in interpreting such a note in a platonic sense. - -At once questions of finance arose. Ancient China had taken her -brave step in modern world affairs. She might now have to go to war. -That would take money, and money would be needed to guard such a -contingency--indeed, internally and externally China had need to put -her financial house in order. Yuan Shih-kai's imperialism had left a -burden of debt. The Republic required strengthening by a new system of -national credit and by the building up of its natural resources. Now -the public debt was relatively still small, the rate of taxation upon -the hundreds of millions of citizens low. The situation was basically -sound. The question had been asked since last summer: Would America -supply China with an investment loan of a hundred millions, thus -delivering her of lenders who were seeking to dominate her and to split -her up into "spheres of influence"? - -Minister Wellington Koo, who had journeyed to the United States in -behalf of Yuan Shih-kai's imperial ambitions, now worked for the -Republic there. I suggested at first that the firm of Lee, Higginson -& Company, which still held its option, should complete its loan. -This was not done. Then other capitalists were approached and in -November, 1916, Doctor Koo arranged for a large loan with Mr. John J. -Abbott, president of the Continental and Commercial Savings Bank of -Chicago. Mr. Abbott, wishing to study the Chinese financial situation, -arrived in Peking during April, 1917, bringing his lawyer. I got him -acquainted with the Chinese ministers, and took him and Mr. Joy Morton, -also of Chicago, to lunch with President Li and Dr. Chen Chin-tao and -Hsu Un-yuen. The President said: "I will back all financial legislation -which American experts may find necessary for the proper organization -of China's credit." - -Doctor Chen was arrested and put in prison through the plotting of his -enemies, but Hsu Un-yuen remained, with his sound financial training. -Finally Mr. Abbott proposed an ingenious scheme, with the wine and -tobacco taxes as the basis--for every $1,000,000 of annual revenue -there should be a loan of $5,000,000; if the taxes amounted to ten -millions, they would serve as security for a loan of fifty millions. -Mr. Abbott left behind him a plan for reorganizing these taxes, and a -promise to take up at any time the question of loans on this basis, in -addition to five millions lent the preceding November and an option for -twenty-five millions more. - - - - -CHAPTER XXII - -CHINA'S BOSSES COME TO PEKING - - -I have noted that Dr. Chen Chin-tao, Chinese Minister of Finance, was -put in prison. Doctor Chen had administered Chinese finances strictly -and well, in a most difficult period. For the military governors or -Tuchuns, who were the real bosses of China's vast population, he was -too honest and too strict. The Tuchuns looked upon the Minister of -Finance as in duty bound to procure funds for them by hook or crook. - -When the government banks were broken and had declared a moratorium, -their large over-issues of notes were worth only one half their face -value. Working with Doctor Chen was Hsu Un-yuen, managing director -of the Bank of China. Mr. Hsu managed judiciously to bring the notes -of his bank virtually to par. The Tuchuns, aided by the pro-Japanese -clique, which formed part of the Premier's entourage, attacked both Hsu -and Doctor Chen. For the latter the cabal laid a trap. It was made to -appear that he gave support to a certain company in return for having -his brother employed. So the cabal, using this pretext to satisfy their -grievances, got him arrested and jailed, thus ending his negotiations -with the Chicago bank of John J. Abbott. President Li was interested -and distressed. When I asked Premier Tuan about Doctor Chen, he -smilingly stated that he should have a chance to clear himself. - -Meanwhile, the breach between the Premier and the President widened. -To strengthen himself in his policy of favouring a declaration of war, -the Premier called all the Tuchuns to Peking for a conference. Nine -governors-general came, and all the other provinces sent delegates. -General Tuan was successful with them, and by April 28th they had -decided to support his war policy. - -The Tuchun of Shantung was bulky, coarse-looking. I had some idea of -his views on representative government from his inaugural address -to the Shantung Assembly. "Gentlemen," the Tuchun said with genial -frankness, "you resemble birds who are in a large cage together. If -you behave well, and sing songs that are pleasing, we shall feed you; -otherwise, you shall have to go without food." - -Several of the Tuchuns called on me by appointment, and later I gave -them a formal reception, at which I saw all who had come to Peking, -observed their personalities, and tried to fathom the source of their -personal prominence and power. I talked with them individually and in -groups, chiefly about the progress of the war and the relative strength -of the combatants. My guests were full of smiles and good cheer, -particularly did the Tuchun of Fukien radiate joy. In their sociability -they were true Chinese, and here, where they had been received with -the military honours due to their position and in the spirit of -hospitality, they could show themselves in a more amiable light than -when maintaining their power in their provinces. To a brief speech of -welcome which I made when they had all arrived General Hsu Shu-cheng -replied with a most emphatic expression of friendship for America. - -That so many of these governors should have risen from the lowliest -position was indeed strong evidence of the underlying democracy of -Chinese life. But that a mere handful of men should wield such power, -each in his province, did not bespeak strength in representative -government. - -Some of the military commanders were men of education, although most of -them had risen from very modest surroundings: Yen Hsi-shan, of Shansi; -Chu Jui, of Chekiang; Tang Chi-yao, of Yunnan; Chen Kuang-yuan, of -Kiangsi; Ni Tze-chung, of Anhwei; Li Shun, of Nanking, a fisherman's -son; Li Ho-chi of Fukien, Tien Chung-yu of Kalgan, both of middle-class -families--all these were fair scholars. General Wu Pei-fu, who rose -from the post of a private in the Chino-Japanese War, had through great -intelligence and industry acquired a good education, as likewise had -General Feng Yu-hsiang; both of these generals professed the Christian -religion. President Feng Kuo-chang came of a poor family, and as a -young man played a fiddle in a small local theatre. - -Among the other Tuchuns were many to whom the Chinese applied the -proverb: "A good man will never become a soldier." These men, indeed, -deserve credit for having risen from their original state as coolies, -bandits, or horse-thieves, but they often owe their prominence to -qualities which by no means make for the good of the state. Chang -Tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria, commenced his career as a bandit; he -was pardoned by Chao Er-shun, and became a government officer. Chang -Huai-chi was a coolie, and never got much education. Tsao Kun, of -Chihli, was a huckster. Wang Chan-yuan was a hostler. The trio, Chang -Hsun, Lu Yung-ting, and Mu Yung-hsing, headed the so-called Black Flag -Band; at one time the partners put up fifty thousand taels to enable -Chang Hsun to buy himself an office and become respectable. But he -spent it all in high living. With the antecedents of some of these men -one marvels not only at the position they have acquired, but at the -personal polish and air of refinement of many of them. - -All of them dealt with political power as a commodity, secured -through the use of money and soldiers. They were somewhat like the -_condottieri_ of the Italian renaissance, looking ahead only to the -goal of their personal ambition for wealth and power. Even among these -militarists, however, there were those who gave some attention to -matters of public policy, and the idea of national welfare and unity -had begun to dawn upon their consciousness. Moreover, in them I felt -a mixture of the old and the new. They had suddenly come into great -power, thought in terms of airplanes and modern armaments, but had as -yet few other modern ideas to inspire their action with anything beyond -personal motives. In their human qualities, however, several of them -excelled; and some, even, showed a real spirit of public service and -ability as administrators. - -The Japanese Government was still trying to get China into the war, -and its minister called on President Li to urge it. I talked on May -9th with the President, who said that he favoured a declaration of war -provided parliament was not overridden in the process. Then I saw the -Premier. "If parliament is obstinate," General Tuan said bluntly, "it -will be dissolved." - -I told him it would make a very bad impression in the United States and -with other Western powers if parliament were ignored in so important -a matter. I knew that parliament did not oppose declaring war, but -desired to control the war policy. "But," the Premier urged, "the -opposition of parliament disregards national interests. It desires -merely to secure partisan advantage." Tuan discussed the attitude of -Japan. "The Japanese have assured me," he declared, "that if I follow a -strong policy I may count on their support. Now circumstances force the -Chinese Government to be friendly to Japan. Of course, I will not give -up any valuable rights to anybody, and I will strengthen China in every -way so that resistance may be offered to any attempted injustice." - -Ironically, he asked whether confidence could be placed in the southern -leaders of the Kuo Min Tang. "I have proof," he continued, "that both -Sun Yat-sen and Tsen Liang-kuang have given written assurances to the -Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai that if either of them becomes -President of China he will conclude a treaty granting to Japan rights -of supervision of military and administrative affairs more extensive -than those sought in Group V of the twenty-one demands." So each party -believed the worst of the other. - -Events were tending to a climax. The Government was demoralized. Doctor -Chen was in prison; Mr. Li Ching-hsi, a nephew of Li Hung-chang, -who was to take Chen's place, would not assume office while affairs -remained so unsettled. The Ministry of Communications was in charge of -an underling. The Minister of Education, who also acted as Minister of -the Interior, was seriously ill. The Kuo Min Tang ministers had lost -their influence with their party in parliament because of their failure -effectively to oppose the Tuchuns' policy. It was believed that the -Tuchuns, with the followers of General Tuan, were planning a _coup_ -against Parliament. - -In the midst of this I had a personal chat with Chen Lu, the -Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, at an evening reception at the -British Legation. I told him of my surprise that the Tuchuns, instead -of attending to the urgent business in their provinces, should be -gathered here, interfering with the Central Government. I let it be -distinctly understood that any movement to overthrow parliament in -order to carry out the war policy could not be expected to receive the -sympathy of the United States. The vice-minister was in close touch -with the Tuchuns. I expected that he would repeat my remarks to them. -He did. - -As I was leaving the Chancery a few evenings later Mr. Roy Anderson -appeared with the news that something was happening and drove me over -to the railway station. We went through the Chenmen gate. Along the -main street were many carts rapidly driven, loaded with military stores -and household goods. Automobiles were rushing by them to the station. -On the platform was a turmoil of troops busily transferring the various -military possessions to cars. In a parlour car our friends the Tuchuns -were assembling. I left Mr. Anderson there to observe and to get -information. - -It appeared that the Tuchuns had all of a sudden decided to leave -Peking for their various capitals, taking their bodyguards with them. -Two or three were to remain in Tientsin a little longer to watch -developments. Their precipitous exit seemed to indicate that President -Li had at last got the upper hand. - -As a farewell courtesy to Doctor Willoughby, the American legal -adviser, the President had invited him and me to luncheon on the -following day. President Li was cheerful. The discomfiture of the -Tuchuns filled him with glee. "All danger is passed," he announced; "I -will dismiss General Tuan, appoint a new cabinet, and have parliament -decide the war question without compulsion." - -In order to inform myself as to what was behind the President's -confidence, I asked him what he had to put in the place of his cabinet -and General Tuan, and whether he believed that the Government could be -carried on without the concurrence of that important party. - -"Oh, yes," the President assured me, "it is all arranged." - -Pressing him a little further, and asking upon whom, in particular, he -was relying, to my unspeakable surprise, he said: "General Chang Hsun -will assist me." - -Now General Chang Hsun was an old-time bandit and militarist. His ideas -were devoid of any understanding of representative institutions. It -passed my power of imagination to see how reliance could be placed in -this general for the vindication of parliament. As I looked dubious, -the President repeated: "Yes, you may believe me. I can rely on General -Chang Hsun." - -It was not what Chang Hsun stood for that the President relied on, but -on his enmity to General Tuan. Li Yuan-hung, though quite modern in his -conception of government, in this instance followed a strong Chinese -instinct which aims to prevail by setting off strong individuals -against each other. - -After I had heard that the dismissal of General Tuan had been -announced, General Chin Yun-peng called on me. He was agitated and much -worried. "Do you not think that General Tuan should leave Peking?" he -asked. "His enemies will undoubtedly wish to take his life." - -I tried to cheer him up by telling him that in a modern government -such ups and downs must be expected. "Let the other side now develop -their policy, and show what they can do; let General Tuan use this time -for quiet recuperation, after the strain he has been through. Then," -I said, "the time will come again when Tuan will be called back to -power." The eyes of the good general lit up with gratitude. General Ni -Tze-chung, most notorious and active among the military party, declared -on the 26th of May that the dismissal of General Tuan had been illegal. -His province of Anhwei disapproved; it would act independently of the -Central Government. - -This was the crucial point in the development of the situation. - -Expert observers said that had the President immediately dismissed -Ni and ordered his punishment, appointing a junior commander in his -place, the rest of the militarists would have fallen away from Ni, and -the President could have dealt with them individually. Instead, he was -persuaded to send a conciliatory letter to General Ni. - -This, of course, confirmed the leadership of Ni over the military -party; further, it encouraged the majority of the Tuchuns to declare -their independence. - -A so-called provisional government was set up at Tientsin. The older -and wiser heads of the military party, men like General Tuan Chi-jui -and Mr. Hsu Shih-chang, held themselves entirely aloof from this new -organization. - -General Ni Tze-chung was the leading spirit. By dint of force the -so-called government helped itself to the deposits of the Chinese -Government in the Tientsin branch of the Bank of China. The men greatly -in evidence were the members of the pro-Japanese clique, Mr. Tsao -Ju-lin and General Hsu Shu-cheng. General Aoki, the Japanese military -adviser to the Government, was also on the ground. - -In Peking a paralysis crept over the Government. The President lost his -advantage as quickly as he had gained it. On the railways all orders -of the Tuchuns for transportation were implicitly obeyed. When at this -time the question of the movement of revolutionary troops and their -stationing at Tientsin and along the railway came up, the Japanese -minister persisted in the position that it would be highly undesirable -to make any objection on the ground of any possible conflict with the -protection of the railway by foreign troops. Two months before, the -Japanese Legation had strongly objected to the stationing of a few -government troops along the same railway. - -The President issued a mandate inviting Chang Hsun to Peking as -arbitrator. - -When I interviewed the President, he looked disconsolate His youthful -English secretary, Mr. Kuo, tried his best to give a more cheerful -and confident note to Li's conversation, but Doctor Tenney, who was -with me, easily compared the President's doleful Chinese with the more -buoyant English translation. - -The plan of the Tuchuns was directed toward isolating and strangling -Peking. They controlled the railways leading there, and were preventing -the shipment of foodstuffs. The ministry that controlled the railways, -it must be remembered, was controlled by Japanese influence. -Constitutional government in China was paralyzed through the lack of -military and financial authority. - -The war issue worried the Chinese. First, they feared that the -militarist party would take advantage of it, through the support of -Japanese influence, to fasten its hold upon China; second, that China -might by the Allies be made a field in which to seek compensations. -But if local political troubles had not entirely upset the situation, -it might have been possible to arrange for a joint declaration of the -powers that would have allayed suspicion and made it feasible for China -to enter the war with a sense of security. - -Dr. Wu Ting-fang, acting on the suggestion of Mr. Lenox Simpson and -liberal-minded Chinese publicists, made a move to have the American -Government do something. He sent advices to Minister Koo in Washington -telling him about General Ni and his leadership of the revolt of the -Tuchuns. The southern provinces were still loyal to the President and -parliament, and the civil and commercial population disapproved of the -rebellion. President Wilson and Secretary Lansing were asked to make -a statement in behalf of representative government in China. This was -followed by a direct appeal to President Wilson. - -But the American Government had already instructed me on the 5th of -June to communicate to the Chinese Government a statement evincing -a sincere desire for internal political harmony. The question of -China's entry into the war, it said, was secondary to continuing the -political unity of China and the laying aside of factional disputes. I -accompanied it orally with a personal statement that the United States -conceived the war to be one for the principles of democracy; that it -would deplore any construction of its invitation which would lend -itself to the idea that it contemplated any coercion or restriction -upon Chinese freedom of action. I made plain that no matter how much -the United States wished the coöperation of China in the war, it did -not desire to bring this about by using the political dissensions or -working with any one faction in disregard of parliament. - -General Tuan Chi-jui at once stated to Doctor Ferguson, who -unofficially informed him of the American note at Tientsin, that he -had totally withdrawn from all politics. The Chinese press gave a very -favourable reception to the note; the Chinese people welcomed America's -advice. General Feng Kuo-chang, later when he had become President, -spoke of the note to me, and remarked on the salutary influence it had -wielded upon public opinion in China. - -While the political dissensions in the Chinese state were too -personal to be overcome by any friendly suggestions from the outside, -nevertheless the American note had set up a standard for all the -Chinese. It had, furthermore, given convincing proof of the fact -that the true interests of China were impartially weighed by the -American Government, and were not entirely subordinated to any war -policy which America might desire to advance. From all parts of China -came expressions of gratitude and satisfaction that the American -Government should have spoken to China so justly and truly. The Chinese -appreciated the spirit of justice of the American Government in not -desiring to have the war issue used for the purposes of enabling any -faction or party to override the free determination of the Chinese -Government and people. As America was itself at war and would therefore -have welcomed coöperation, this just policy particularly impressed the -Chinese. - -The Japanese press both in Japan and China immediately launched forth -into a bitter invective against the American action. The United States -should have consulted Japan. Its action constituted interference in the -domestic affairs of China. "If China listens to advice from America," -a Japanese major-general declared in an excited speech at a dinner in -Peking on the 7th of June, "she will have Japan to deal with." - -The Japanese ambassador at Washington protested informally. Had not -Secretary Bryan, in a note dated the 13th of March, 1915, recognized -the special and close relations, political and economic, between Japan -and China? It was impossible that the American minister at Peking was -taking a part in political affairs in China, but the Japanese public -was sensitive about the note sent by the American Government to China. -Would it not be useful if the American Government would confirm Mr. -Bryan's statement? - -The reply to this communication did not come until the 6th of July. -Mr. Bryan's statement, the reply said, referred only to the special -relations created by territorial contiguity in certain parts of China. -Even with respect to them it in no way admitted that the United States -might not in future be justified in expressing itself relative to -questions that might arise between China and Japan. The United States -could not be indifferent to matters affecting the welfare of the -Chinese people, such as the unrest in China. - -The first detachments of Chang Hsun's troops arrived in Peking on -the 9th of June. Chang Hsun's theory was that it is the business of -a trooper to make himself terrible. These wild horsemen, wearing -loose-fitting black uniforms, with their cues rolled up on the back of -the head, rode about Peking with the air of conquerors. The "Mediator" -was coming with sufficient military force to back his judgment. - -When General Chang himself arrived, the streets from the railway -station to the Mediator's house in the Manchu city were entirely shut -off. Mounted troopers blocked the way as my automobile came along a -side street to cross one of these thoroughfares. They nearly collided -with the front of my machine, drew their guns, and would not budge. To -explain to them my right to pass would have meant sending someone to -the Foreign Office; even then in order to go on I might have to run -over them, for the Foreign Office, undoubtedly, meant nothing at all to -them. I told my companion not to let them know my position. We tried to -pass through on the ground that we had business on the other side, but -they reared their horses up and down, and nearly came into the machine -with us. We were held up until the great man had arrived and had raced -from the station to his residence. - -When I was with Dr. Wu Ting-fang a few days later the card of a -secretary of the cabinet was brought in. I knew that he was trying to -induce Doctor Wu to sign a decree dissolving parliament. I had heard in -the morning that President Li had finally caved in; for Chang Hsun's -first prescription for restoring China was to declare that parliament -must be dissolved. The President relied on Chang's assistance. He -could not help himself, he must accept the dictation of the man he had -summoned. - -I rejoined a friend who awaited me outside in the automobile. He had -just overheard the chauffeur of the cabinet secretary and the doorman -of the Foreign Office. The chauffeur had said: "Is your old man going -to sign up? You had better see to it that he does, else something might -happen to him." - -These subordinates were keeping their eyes open. - -The Japanese minister, on whom I called that morning, said to me: -"General Chang's mediation is the last hope of peace. It is desirable -that parliament be gotten rid of, it is obstructive, and makes the -doing of business well-nigh impossible." - -Dr. Wu Ting-fang stood out against countersigning the mandate -that would dissolve the parliament. In matters of spiritualism, -vegetarianism, and longevity, I had perhaps not always been able to -take him quite seriously. But I admired his quiet courage in not -allowing himself to be bowled over, after even President Li had given -in. Before daylight on the 13th of June Doctor Wu was roused from his -bed and now asked to countersign a Presidential mandate designating the -jovial General Chiang Chao-tsung, commander of the Peking gendarmerie, -to act as Premier, and accepting Doctor Wu's resignation. Before -daybreak General Chiang signed the mandate dissolving parliament. The -President consented to its issue, for he had been told it would be -impossible to prevent disturbances in Peking unless this were done. - -So wore on the early summer of 1917. Affairs seemed to have arrived at -a stalemate. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIII - -AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY - - -My family had gone to Peitaiho for the summer. I was staying at the -residence alone with Mr. F.L. Belin, who had recently come to Peking to -join my staff. I slept rather late on Sunday, July 1st, as the morning -was cool. When Kao, the first boy, came in to take orders he appeared -excited and cried: "Emperor has come back again!" - -I did not immediately grasp the significance of this astonishing -announcement; but he went on volubly telling me that it was true, that -the Emperor had returned, that all the people were hanging out the -yellow dragon flag. I sent out for information and soon learned that -the little emperor, in some mysterious way, had been restored during -the night. - -The monarchical movement came as a complete surprise to everybody, -for it was entirely the personal act of General Chang Hsun. The men -whose names were recited in his proclamations as assisting him had -known nothing about it; it was undreamed of even by those who found -themselves forced to assist, such as the Chief of Staff and the heads -of the gendarmerie and of the police. - -Kang Yu-wei, the "Modern Sage" of China, arrived in Peking on June -29th, and with him the restoration was planned. Kang Yu-wei, who had -been the leader of the first reform movement in 1898, when he made a -stand against absolutism, had always remained a consistent believer in -constitutional monarchy. He encouraged Chang Hsun with philosophical -theory, and wrote all his edicts for him. The two believed that the -Imperial restoration would immediately bring to the active support of -the Government all the military governors, whose true sentiments were -notoriously imperialistic. Their consent was taken for granted, and the -edicts, as drawn up, expressly assumed that it had been given. - -It became known to me that Chang Hsun had also discussed the -possibility of an Imperial restoration with the Japanese minister. The -latter expressed the opinion that the movement should not be undertaken -without first making sure of the assent of the chief military leaders. -Chang Hsun had no doubt of this support; he evidently regarded the -advice of the Japanese minister as encouraging, and believed that his -movement would have diplomatic countenance. - -Chang Hsun had his intimate advisers, particularly Kang Yu-wei, draw -up the requisite Imperial edicts on the 30th of June. In these it was -stated that leading governors, like Feng Kuo-chang, Lu Yung-ting, and -others of equal prominence, had petitioned for the restoration of the -monarchy. Lists of appointments to the highest positions in the Central -Government and the provinces were prepared. The existing military -governors were in most cases reappointed. In the Central Government -the important men designated were Hsu Shih-chang as Guardian of the -Emperor, Liang Tun-yen as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Chu Chi-pao -as Minister of the Interior. Wang Shih-chen was retained as Chief of -the General Staff. - -As an amazing instance of how consent was taken for granted, it was -recited in an Imperial edict that President Li Yuan-hung had himself -petitioned for the reëstablishment of the Empire; this edict appointed -Li a duke of the first class. - -So soon as these edicts were prepared and ready for presentation, a -dinner was arranged for the evening of the same day, to which the heads -of the Peking military and police establishments were invited. They -met at the Kiangsu Guild Hall. After great quantities of wine had been -consumed, Chang Hsun broached his project for the salvation of China, -stating that all preparations had been made and that military and -diplomatic support was assured. Then, pointing to the Chief of Staff, -he said: "Of course, you are supporting the movement." - -General Wang, completely taken aback, saw no way to refuse--since -he was in the presence of an accomplished fact. In the same way the -consent of General Chiang, head of the gendarmerie, and of General Wu, -head of the police, was obtained. - -Thus the enterprise was launched. Chang Hsun directed General Wang and -four others to proceed immediately to the residence of President Li, -to wake him up, and to obtain his consent to a memorial asking for -reëstablishment of the monarchy. Chang Hsun himself proceeded to the -Imperial City. Not being able to obtain the support of the Imperial -dukes for his movement, he had lavishly bribed the eunuchs in charge of -the palace, who opened the gates for him and his retinue, and took him -to the private residence of the young Emperor. Chang Hsun prostrated -himself, and informed the Emperor that the whole nation demanded his -return to the throne. Thereupon he took the frightened boy to the great -throne room, and, in the presence of his retainers and members of the -Imperial Family, who had been summoned, formally enthroned the Emperor. -Then the edicts which had been prepared were formally sealed. - -As may be imagined, there were some comic incidents. A rather -distinguished man had been summoned by the Premier to discuss with the -President his assumption of one of the cabinet portfolios. A Chinese -friend of mine who had just heard of the restoration saw him at the -hotel about ten o'clock in the morning. On being asked what was his -errand in Peking, the distinguished personage stated confidentially -that he was awaiting a carriage to take him to the President's palace. -"There is no President," he was told. "This is now an Empire; the -Emperor was enthroned at four o'clock this morning." The great man's -astonishment was amusing. - -As the military chiefs were deceived on the preceding night, so Peking -was deceived for one day. As the news spread, the population showed an -almost joyous excitement. Everywhere the yellow dragon flags appeared, -soon the entire city took on a festive appearance. Revived memories -of past splendour seemingly made the population of Peking imperialist -to a man. But the height of this movement was reached as early as the -morning of the 2nd of July. - -I had avoided receiving General Chang Hsun. Mr. Liang Tung-yen came to -assume office as Minister for Foreign Affairs; I also abstained from -seeing him, as well as the rest of General Chang's ministers, asking -Doctor Tenney to talk with those who presented themselves. Mr. Liang -had always been an imperialist, and was in high spirits, believing that -at last China was saved. He had been led to believe that the foreign -diplomats would readily recognize the restoration. - -Strong doubts as to the character of the movement became manifest on -Monday, the 2nd of July. Tuan Chi-jui did not figure in the Imperial -official lists. When asked about this, Chang Hsun declared that -General Tuan was unimportant, having no troops under his command. But -Liang Chi-chao had been playing cards with friends at about 2 A.M. on -the fateful night, when the news was telephoned to Tientsin. Liang -immediately went to General Tuan's residence, where the latter was -similarly engaged at cards. General Tuan, who was thoroughly weary of -public affairs, was difficult to rouse; he begged to be spared the -trouble of thinking of what might be occurring in Peking. More details -came in, and it became apparent what a thoroughly one-man affair the -movement was. Then Tuan roused himself. - -Tuan was at that time actually only a private citizen, without -authority or command. But I learned later that Liang Chi-chao had gone -to Japanese friends for funds to enlist the military against the -Imperial movement, and he got 1,000,000 yen as a loan to himself and -General Tuan for this purpose. It was to be treated as a government -loan upon restoration of normal conditions. - -The two proceeded on Tuesday to Machang, where the Eighth Division had -been encamped since the attempt to overawe President Li Yuan-hung. -General Tuan, it was stated, felt nervous as to the outcome of his -venture, but he called the commanders, declaring that he had always -been opposed to a restoration of the monarchy, and that it was now -being attempted by a single general. To resist this act he proposed to -take command of the republican troops. - -General Tuan was at once recognized as commander-in-chief. President -Li, on his part, did not yield to the importunities of Chang Hsun. -He gave out an absolute denial of the statement that he favoured the -restoration. After issuing a mandate that turned over the Presidential -powers to the Vice-President and appointed General Tuan Chi-jui Premier -and Commander-in-Chief, he took refuge in the Legation Quarter. I sent -a personal representative to General Tuan at Tientsin, who declared -that he already had complete control of the military situation and -could finish Chang Hsun inside of ten days. - -As hostilities threatened in and around Peking, and as the danger of -looting was always present, I discussed the precautions to be taken -with several of my colleagues, and agreed with the Japanese minister -that we would each bring a company of reinforcements from Tientsin. -Meanwhile, the movements of Tuan's troops began. To hinder their -advance, Chang Hsun's men broke the railway at a point about one third -of the way from Peking to Tientsin. - -Certain members of the diplomatic corps urged that we give notice that -no fighting should take place on or near the railways. As we had made -no objection to the bringing in of Chang Hsun's troops and to their -being stationed in Peking and along the railway, I took the position -that we were not justified in objecting to the troops of the government -to which we were accredited taking necessary action against Chang Hsun. -We might, however, insist upon the right of keeping the railway open. -This met with approval. On the 5th of July a demand was made upon the -belligerent generals that the railway must be kept open, and that at -least one train be allowed to pass in each direction every day. - -The damaged line was reconstructed, and on July 6th, the American -infantry arrived in Peking; on the 7th, the first trains travelled -between Peking and Tientsin--one train actually passing between the -armies during a battle. Fighting went on during these days between the -troops of General Tuan, directly commanded by General Tuan Chi-kwei, -and Chang Hsun's forces; there was much firing but small loss of life, -and the latter's forces were finally driven back toward Peking. The -troops of General Tsao Kun also advanced upon Peking from the west. - -Mr. Grant, of the National Printing Bureau, on Friday rushed into the -legation compound in his automobile, with the report that looting -was going on in the southern part of the city. We ascended the wall. -From the Chenmen Tower we saw excited groups moving up and down the -main streets, but nothing was happening save the bringing in of a few -wounded men. To investigate the cause of the excitement I went with -Mr. Belin in our private rickshaws to the Chinese city, passing to the -end of the broad Chenmen thoroughfare. The street was still crowded, -the people were excited though well behaved; the shops all had their -shutters up. Near the south end of the street some shopkeepers posted -in front of their shops told us that the return of Chang Hsun's troops -from outside the walls had been reported. Looting had been expected but -had not taken place. We proceeded to the Temple of Heaven, where great -crowds were walking about among the tents of the troops. On returning, -we entered a shop to look at some antiques, remaining half an hour. -When we came out our rickshaws had disappeared. Doctor Ferguson joined -us as we searched for our men. Suddenly, Belin shouted to a rickshaw -man, who with a dozen others was conveying some of Chang Hsun's petty -officers southward. We insisted that the non-commissioned officer -occupying the rickshaw get out, and he finally complied. - -The rickshaws had been requisitioned by these bandits. Upon our -return to the Legation, my rickshaw-runner had just arrived, excited -to the point of tears. Our two coolies had drawn the men who -originally commandeered them up to the Imperial City; there they were -requisitioned again to convey other men back to the Temple of Heaven. -But my man, when opposite the entrance to Legation Street, had upset -his bandit into the road and made a quick entry into the Legation -Quarter, where the angry and sputtering trooper dared not follow him. -That the rickshaws belonging to foreigners should thus be pressed into -service shows the disregard which these troopers had for everything but -their own desires. - -As we returned to the Legation we noticed a wonderful colour effect. -Coal-black clouds were banked against the western sky, above which were -lighter clouds or angry shreds of flaming colour. Against this the dark -walls and towers of Peking stood out in sharp relief. In the streets -the crowds still surged, in restless expectancy. Suddenly the sunset -light disappeared; the sky became black with clouds; a sharp gust of -wind whirled the dust of the Chinese city northward; then came a flash -of lightning, a clap of thunder, and a heavy downpour, which cooled the -excited heads and drove all to shelter. The late afternoon had been -weird and fantastic, and appeared to presage the happening of still -stranger things. - -I was lunching with a friend at his race-course house on Sunday, the -8th of July, when word was brought to me that a certain Colonel Hu, -coming from Chang Hsun, had persuaded the French minister that the city -was in imminent danger of sacking, fighting, and general disturbances. -The only salvation, Colonel Hu had said, lay in asking Hsu Shi-chang to -come from Tientsin to mediate. The French minister thereupon induced -his Entente colleagues to agree to transmit a note to General Tuan -Chi-jui urging him to prevail upon Hsu Chi-Chang to come as mediator. -This seemed to me ill-advised. It meant, at a time when Chang Hsun -was already as good as defeated, that he would be solemnly treated as -entitled to dictate the terms and personnel of mediation by influential -members of the diplomatic corps. I returned to Peking and saw my -colleagues, urging my opinion strongly. The British chargé withdrew his -consent; he had just received a telegram from his consul in Tientsin -reporting that General Tuan was absolutely opposed to mediation. The -action contemplated was not taken, though Chang Hsun persisted in his -attempts to gain recognition from the diplomatic corps. The French -minister, who hated Dr. Wu Ting-fang--this would explain his support -of Chang Hsun--gradually came to see the obverse side of his policy as -certain Germanic affiliations of Chang Hsun became known. - -Kang Yu-wei presented himself at my house on the 8th, seeking refuge, -and I assigned him rooms in one of our compounds. He informed me that -Chang Hsun had had full assurances of support on the part of Hsu -Chi-Chang and other important monarchists. Next day he informed me that -Prince Tsai Tze was anxious to consult me. - -I arranged to have the Prince come to the house assigned to Mr. Kang, -where I had two hours' conversation with the Manchu and the sage. -Kang Yu-wei commenced with a long disquisition on the advantages of a -constitutional monarchy. He wished to explain his action and to prove -to me that he was not a reactionary, but was aiming only for progress -under the monarchical form, which he considered most suitable to China. - -All this time the Prince was silent. He seemed greatly depressed, not -inclined to say anything at first. After inquiries about his health, I -asked him what he would like to say to me. With eyes of real sadness -he looked me full in the face, saying: "What shall we do? My house has -been drawn into this affair without our consent. It has been forced on -us. We did not wish to depart from the agreements we had made with the -Republic. But Chang Hsun would not listen to us. He thought he saw the -only way. Now what shall we do?" - -I told him that I appreciated the difficulty in which the Imperial -Family found itself, but that I of course could not know the details -of the situation sufficiently to give any opinion. One thing, however, -seemed to me certain: if the leaders of the republican government knew -the true attitude of the Imperial Family, and if the Emperor would -formally and absolutely dissociate himself from the movement of Chang -Hsun, I believed that they would not make the Imperial Family suffer. -I asked him whether they had considered having the Emperor issue a -decree, absolutely and for all time renouncing all rights to the throne -and declaring his complete fealty to the Republic. - -The Prince regarded me aghast. "Oh, _no_! No matter how desirable -that might be from many points of view, it is not in the power of the -Emperor to do it. The rights he has inherited are not his. They came -to him in trust from his ancestors. He will have to maintain them, and -hand them on to his descendants. He, and we of his family, shall not -do anything to make these rights prevail against the State, but as the -sons of our ancestors, we cannot repudiate them." - -Never had I been so deeply impressed with the complexity of Chinese -affairs as by this answer--an Imperial family maintaining traditions -of empire in the midst of a republic, an emperor continuing to reside -in the Imperial Palace, a neighbour of the republican President in his -residence, and yet no desire to enter again into politics and to grasp -the sovereign power! I could now understand why the Chinese had allowed -the Emperor to remain in the palace; it was the house of his ancestors, -from which he might not be driven. That common reverence was the one -point of understanding between Chinese and Manchus. - -Prince Tsai Tze evidently still hoped that Hsu Shih-Chang, the loyal -friend of the Imperial Family, might be brought to Peking to mediate, -and that he might be prevailed upon to preserve the favourable -treatment hitherto accorded the Imperial Family. I could not give -Prince Tsai Tze any encouragement on this point, on which I had very -definite opinions, but had to content myself with general expressions -of sincere sympathy with the strange fate of this family. - -The question of mediation was again taken up by the diplomatic corps -on the afternoon of this day. Some of the ministers feared that the -city would suffer greatly if things should be allowed to go on. I was -strongly of the opinion that our interference in this matter could -have no good result, but would only further confuse and complicate the -situation. For once, the Chinese must settle it themselves, regardless -of any incidental inconvenience. From what I knew of the strength -of the contending forces and of the whole situation, I had no doubt -whatsoever that if left alone the republican forces would be easily -successful and that there would be no disturbances. I was on principle -against any action which would be in substance intervening in behalf of -a general who had attacked the Republic and whom nothing could now save -from overthrow except such diplomatic action. - -I was approached on the 10th of July by a representative of General -Chiang, chief of the gendarmerie. He stated that it was desired to -bring Chang Hsun into the American Legation, for his own safety though -against his will, and that an agreement to this effect had been made -among the different commanders. I stated that in the circumstances it -would be better for the diplomatic corps to discuss what protection -could be extended to Chang Hsun. An informal meeting was held, at which -the British chargé agreed that he would receive Chang Hsun if he were -brought in. - -The legations were notified by General Tuan, late in the afternoon of -July 11th, that during the night the troops would move against Chang -Hsun's forces in the city, and bombardment of the Temple of Heaven and -the quarters near the Imperial City held by Chang Hsun would begin at -dawn on the 12th of July. In conjunction with the commandant of the -legation guard, I sent notice to the American residents in the quarters -particularly affected, directing them to seek safety. Eighteen refugees -came to the Legation, where they were cared for during the day at the -Students' Mess. A company of the Fifteenth Infantry, which had been -brought up from Tientsin, was encamped in the compound in front of my -residence, to which their tents and military equipment imparted an -aspect of great military preparedness. - -I was awakened at daybreak on July 12th by the sound of artillery and -rifle fire. As the fighting commenced people went out of curiosity -upon the city wall. But stray bullets frequently fell on the wall, and -the commandant ordered it cleared. Unfortunately, several of these -onlookers--among them three Americans--were injured. During the battle -I received word from the Imperial tutors that the Dowager Empresses -were preparing to bring the Emperor to my residence. Since the 9th of -July they had wished to remove the Emperor to this legation for safety. -While the Empresses and some of the dukes desired this, the eunuchs -under Chang Hsun's influence opposed the removal. The Prince Regent, -also influenced by Chang Hsun, took the same view. Thus on various -occasions the eunuchs, whose existence had almost been forgotten, came -out on the stage of action in this curious affair. - -About eleven o'clock, while the firing was at its height and after -several bombs had been dropped from aeroplanes upon the Imperial City, -telephone messages came to the effect that several friends of the -Imperial Family and Doctor Ferguson of the Red Cross were about to -rescue the Emperor from danger and bring him to the Legation. I had the -house prepared. Half an hour later two automobiles with the Red Cross -flag flying entered the legation compound. Mr. Belin ran to the door, -expecting to see the Emperor and Empress emerging from the automobiles, -but he returned with only Mr. Sun Pao-chi, who was shivering with -excitement. I took him to the reception room and comforted him with -tea. He still expected the Emperor to come. The automobiles left again -for the Imperial Palace, but as the aeroplanes had ceased dropping -bombs and the artillery fire was decreasing in violence, the people in -the palace decided against carrying out the flight. - -As I sat in the library all through the forenoon receiving reports and -giving directions, there was a constant hissing of bullets and shells -overhead. No shell dropped in our legation, although two or three fell -in the British. The Chinese artillery fire was remarkably accurate. -Sitting there and listening to the tumult of shouting and firing from -the Chenmen gate and the volleys of guns and artillery exceeding in -volume of sound any Fourth of July I had ever experienced, I felt -thankful to have seen a day when the Chinese would stand up and fight -out a big issue. I soon found that the battle was not commensurate with -its sound. - -Shortly before noon Chang Hsun was brought to the Dutch Legation, -accompanied by a German employé of the Chinese police. Chang Hsun had -been persuaded to come by his generals almost with the use of force. -He was still under the illusion that he could mediate. When the Dutch -minister informed him that this was impossible, he wished to return to -his troops. This, of course, could not be permitted. - -Firing was violent from dawn until nearly noon. The field guns, machine -guns, and rifles filled the air with enormous tumult, but from eleven -o'clock on the firing gradually diminished, and it entirely ceased at -four in the afternoon. Immediately thereafter I proceeded by motor car -to the various centres of fighting. I found that Chang Hsun's house had -been struck by several shells and that the indirect artillery firing -of the government troops had been managed with considerable accuracy. -The human dead had already been removed from the neighbourhood although -numerous carcasses of horses remained. Thence I proceeded to the Temple -of Heaven, where I was astonished to find Chang Hsun's troops encamped -with all their guns and artillery, eating, drinking, and talking in -the best of spirits. They told me that five of their men had been -killed, and that their bodies were still there. The absence of visible -results from the enormous expenditure of ammunition during the day was -astonishing. I found, however, that the method of fighting employed -by the troops was to creep up as closely as possible behind a high -wall, and fire into the air in the general direction where the enemy -might be. Hence, the bystanders were in rather greater danger than the -combatants themselves. In fact, the total number of killed as a result -of the fighting of July 12th was twenty-six; seventy-six were seriously -wounded, and more than half of these were civilians. - -The Chang Hsun contingents in the Temple of Heaven had hoisted the -republican flag at 10 A.M. An agreement was reached by which they were -to be paid $60 per man upon the delivery of their arms. Chang Hsun's -troops about the Imperial City held out for a larger payment. To my -astonishment, as late as Saturday, the 14th of July, I saw fully armed -soldiers of Chang Hsun on guard at the central police headquarters. -Asking the reason for this--for Chang Hsun's troops were supposedly -routed in pitched battle on the 12th of July--I was told that the -commanders had not yet settled upon the sum these contingents were to -be paid. Eighty dollars per man was finally agreed upon, and by the -15th of July Chang Hsun's troops, deprived of their arms and their -pigtails, had left Peking with their money, and were on their way to -their rural homes in Shantung. - -The dragon flags disappeared on the 12th of July as suddenly as they -had appeared on the 2nd. The city quickly resumed its ordinary life. - -The swift failure of Chang Hsun's enterprise was due to no inherent -weakness of monarchical sentiment in north China. In fact, monarchist -leanings among the northern military party are quite well known. It -had been assumed that such a movement would be launched, and, if it -had been more prudently planned and prepared, it might easily have -succeeded, at least for a time. Its total failure was due to the fact -that Chang Hsun, counting on monarchist tendencies among the northern -military men, neglected to make those preparatory negotiations which -would have turned the potential support into real strength. While -this is true, there can be no doubt that Chang Hsun's failure gave -an enormous setback to the cause of monarchism in China. After two -failures to reëstablish the empire, ambitious men will think many times -before embarking on such a venture again. Which is to say that the -efforts to restore the Empire actually served to entrench more deeply -the republican form of government. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIV - -WAR WITH GERMANY: READJUSTMENTS - - -"It has been decided by the Chinese Government to declare war; on this -very day the decision has been formally adopted by the cabinet." - -Thus General Tuan Chi-jui, then Premier, conveyed to me on the 2nd of -August the news of China's further entrance into world politics. I -had known about this from other sources. General Tuan had announced -it as his policy when I visited him on the 14th of July. He had then -stated that Vice-President Feng Kuo-cheng would assume the functions of -President, which President Li would relinquish, and that it would be a -war government. - -The American Government had held to its view that China should not be -pressed to declare war. It believed that the breaking off of diplomatic -relations, for the time being, was sufficient contribution to our -cause in the war. But the Japanese, aided especially by the French, -had strongly urged the Chinese Government to join them. Not until much -later did the Chinese learn of secret treaties made between France, -Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, giving assurance to the Japanese that -no effective resistance would be offered by those powers to anything -which Japan might desire in China at the end of the war. - -In their ignorance of these secret arrangements, the Chinese thought -that association with the war powers would put them on the footing of -an ally. Also, doubtless, the militarist party surrounding Tuan hoped -to increase its power through war activities. For my part, I allowed -the Chinese to feel that the American Government, desiring them to -decide this question according to their own best judgment, hoped that a -way might be found to bring the war situation into harmony with justice -to China. - -When he announced the cabinet's decision, Premier Tuan took up with -me the matter of finance. He evidently expected that the American -Government, or the Consortium, together with independent banks, would -now furnish China the money needed for her war preparations. The powers -were considering what assurances to offer. In previous discussions with -Chinese officials I had repeatedly dwelt on the fact that should China -take this step, she would be entitled to specific and strong assurances -from the powers guaranteeing her political and administrative -integrity, in terms that could not easily be evaded in future. I had -made continued efforts to effect an agreement upon a declaration -favourable to the full maintenance of the sovereign rights of China. My -conversations with the Japanese minister during 1916 and 1917 had this -in view. Now that China was considering entry into the war, I again -suggested the desirability of such a declaration, and hinted to the -Chinese officials that they might be successful upon this occasion in -obtaining a statement which would fortify the sovereign rights of China -and prevent the further growth of special privileges and spheres of -influence. - -My colleagues all appeared to be favourable to the idea. It would -undoubtedly have been possible for the Chinese Government to secure -such a specific and effective declaration. Instead, however, of taking -advantage of the position which their readiness to declare war gave -them, and boldly proposing such a declaration as a necessary condition, -they became tangled up in long discussions. The substance originally -proposed was worn down to a rather empty formula. - -The first proposal was that the governments should declare their -policy to "favour the independent development of China, and in no way -to seek in China, either singly or jointly, advantages of the nature -of territorial or preferential rights, whether local or general." -The Chinese had suggested, in addition, a statement that the other -governments would accord to China their full assistance, in order -to "help it obtain the enjoyment of the advantages resulting from -the equality of powers in their international relations." As finally -adopted, the declaration simply gave assurance of friendly support -in "allowing China to benefit in its international relations from -the situation, and from the regard due a great country." Vague and -unmeaning as it was, the latter term was undoubtedly flattering to -Chinese _amour propre_. These assurances were given to China on August -14th, and the United States participated in them. - -China's internal political situation had not improved greatly as a -result of the overthrow of the monarchical movement. On his return -to Peking as restorer of the republican government, General Tuan had -the chance to rally all elements in Chinese politics to a policy of -constructive action. With whom would he ally himself? As his distrust -of the Kuo Min Tang was great, he constituted his new government -without regard to that party, and sought instead to govern through -a combination of the Chin Pu Tang and the so-called Communications -Party. Of the latter the real leaders, Liang Shih-yi and his immediate -associates, were still living in exile under the mandate issued -by President Li. Mr. Tsao Ju-lin controlled the new wing of the -Communications Party, and he had a disproportionate prominence through -Japanese support. Both he and Liang Chi-chao, the leader of the Chin -Pu Tang, were under the Japanese thumb. This influence could thus -act strongly and extensively on Chinese affairs. It was a Japanese -loan that had facilitated the overthrow of Chang Hsun and made the -leadership of General Tuan possible. - -These two factions, while they supported General Tuan, were mutually -antagonistic. Mr. Liang Chi-chao is a literary man and a theorist. -Long befriended by the Japanese, he doubtless believed himself to be -a patriotic Chinese who was ready to use Japanese aid, but would not -surrender any essential national rights. Not being a man of affairs, -he may not always have seen the bearing upon the ultimate independence -of China of the measures which he proposed. Some Chinese as well as -foreigners thought him merely the venal instrument of Japan; others -regarded him as essentially honest, but subject to being misled because -of his theories. As Minister of Finance, his administration tended to -bring about a great increase of Japanese influence in China. - -Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, cynical, practical-minded, and keen, is a different -type of man. He was closely associated with Mr. Lu Tsung-yu, himself -the most pliable instrument of Japanese policy in China. Mr. Tsao -was educated in Japan; one or more of his wives were Japanese, and -in business and pleasure he was constantly in Japanese company. He -was out-spokenly skeptical about his own country and about republican -institutions. - -The Government felt dependent upon assistance from abroad, for it had -financial difficulties due to inherited burdens and present military -expenses. It was made to believe that assistance could come only from -the Japanese. The Americans had left the Consortium four years ago; -they had every opportunity to interest themselves in China, but they -had done nothing substantial beyond the loan of the Chicago bank. In -China, the margin between tolerable existence and financial stress is -so narrow that a few million dollars may wield an enormous influence -for good or bad. - -These needs were accentuated because the southern republicans were -holding aloof. They felt themselves excluded from the Government; they -doubted General Tuan's honesty of purpose, and they planned to remain -independent of the central authorities. From Shanghai Mr. C.T. Wang, -the most prominent of the younger republicans, wrote that Tuan Chi-jui -and his cabinet represented the reactionary element; that they were -strongly backed by undesirable foreign influence, and that the latter -would virtually control the Government. He ascribed to General Tuan -the ambition of paving the way to make himself emperor. The opposition -to Tuan, he said, would continue the fight until the Chinese Republic -was indeed a republic. As to American action in China, he noted that -America plays the game as a gentleman, therefore it is likely to be -outmanoeuvred by another country less squeamish about its methods. -Another letter from Mr. C.C. Wu, dated July 19, 1917, I will give -textually, in part: - - ... When General Tuan arrived at the head of his troops in Peking, he - had a good opportunity to gain the goodwill and coöperation of the - whole country if he had proclaimed his adherence to the constitution - at present in force, and to reassemble the dissolved parliament - in order that the Permanent Constitution may be completed and the - organization of the future parliament provided for; in other words, - that the basis for a legal and constitutional government may be - found. Unfortunately, other counsels seem to have prevailed. Another - assembly, without any semblance of legality, is to be convened and - the future regulation of the Republic is to be left in its hands. - This will only mean fresh internal dissension and strife. It is to be - admitted that there is much fault to be found with the old parliament, - but as I once told General Tuan, it is the name, the signboard, of - parliament that we must respect. - - Meanwhile, the papers are full of the inquiry which the Entente Powers - are alleged to have made in regard to the declaration of war against - Germany, and the reply made by the Waichiao Pu that the step will be - taken almost immediately. Now, it is unnecessary to tell you of my - opinion in regard to this question ever since the interview we had on - that fateful Sunday in February, of my firm conviction of the many - advantages, both material and moral, that such a step would confer on - China, nor of the efforts I have exerted in the cause. And my week's - stay in Shanghai has not altered my opinion. At the same time I agree - entirely with the view expressed in the note you recently presented - to the Waichiao Pu on behalf of your government to the effect that - the paramount need of the moment is the consolidation of the country - and the establishment of an effective and responsible government, and - that, compared with this, the demarche against Germany, desirable - though it is, is of secondary importance. Indeed, it is nothing short - of ridiculous to declare war against a foreign power when every man - and every resource has to be kept in hand to meet possible civil - strife and when the authority of the Central Government is effective - in only a doubtful half of the country. It is difficult to see - what benefit the Entente Powers expect to derive by urging such a - government to take such a step, a step which is detrimental to the - best interests of China and contrary to the good advice tendered by - the U.S., with whom Great Britain, at least, associated herself. It - is enough to make one almost suspect that it is for these very two - reasons that the war measure is being urged on the Government. - -Quite plainly, the southern leaders believed that the party of General -Tuan was in its war policy animated with the purpose of building up -its power at the expense of the rest of the country--particularly -of subduing the southern republicans. Even less unselfish purposes -were attributed to those who based their policy on foreign financial -support. In a speech in Parliament, Senator Kuang Yen-pao makes the -officials who contract ill-advised public loans say: "We are planning -for the conservation of the property of our sons and grandsons; why -should we have compunctions about driving the whole people to the land -of death? What matters the woe of the whole nation by the side of the -joy and happiness of our own families?" But the southern leaders did -not disavow the act of the Central Government in declaring war. Their -political opposition continued; but they accepted the international -action of Peking as binding on the whole country. - -In such matters China has not the hard-and-fast ideas of sovereign -authority and legality which reign in the West. It was therefore -possible for a local government to be independent in most matters, -and yet to allow itself to be guided by the central authority in -some. A declaration of independence by no means implies that there -are no relationships whatever between the recalcitrant ones and the -central authorities. For this reason, too, the visit of a foreign -representative to any one of the governors who had declared his -independence would not, as in other countries, be regarded as an -affront to the Central Government. Circumstances might occur under -which the Central Government itself might favour such a visit, as -incidentally relieving the strain. I felt quite free to send attachés -of the Legation to the governors of disaffected provinces, and should -quite freely have gone myself. - -In all my interviews with high officials the prime subject was finance. -Not that China, as an associate in the war, was to get such aid--which -was taken as a matter of course--but how it was forthcoming supplied -the only question. Mr. Liang Chi-chao, Minister of Finance, who called -on me on the 4th of August, talked in favour of a big loan by the -Consortium. With this he hoped that the United States would again -associate itself. When he spoke of independent American loans, I called -his attention to the difficulty of concluding them or of calling up -the option under the Chicago loan, unless there were a parliament -whose authority was recognized by the country. Shortly after this I -saw the Acting President, General Feng. "China," he said--undoubtedly -to tell me something pleasant, but also because all Chinese do prefer -association with America--"China has followed the United States in the -policy of declaring war upon Germany. Now will not the United States -independently finance China? Or, if that is out of the question, then, -surely America will join the Consortium since that is the only way the -Chinese Government can be safely and effectively supported." - -"The republican form of government," he vowed, "is now eternally secure -in China." I could not but remember his previous monarchist leanings. -The Acting President spoke of General Tuan. "I have a very cordial -understanding with the Premier," he assured me. - -I went to the Premier on the 21st of August. In this discussion the -Chinese iron industry came up. The Premier asked: "Why not go ahead -with the development of mining and iron manufacture? Create a national -Chinese iron industry, and it will form the basis of a general loan -for industrial purposes." He thought, at first, that the Chinese -Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce should summon experts and start -the enterprise. I told him about the enormous technical difficulties -of such a project. Then he seemed to recognize that a contract with an -experienced and powerful organization, which could be held responsible, -would be more effective in establishing a national iron industry for -China. "I am not sure about the ore deposits near Nanking," he added; -"they may not be included in such coöperative enterprises." - -I suspected that he was trying to get financial support from another -source, and was leaving his hands free to make them a grant there. I -put in a _caveat_ against any grant of iron ores to foreign nationals. -Americans had in the past been invariably informed that iron deposits -could not be leased or granted to individuals because they had been -reserved for national uses. - -I visited General Tuan on August 22nd and found him more talkative, -more anxious to discuss the general aspects of policies than ever -before. "We must first of all establish the authority of the Central -Government," he said; "this can be done only through a defeat of the -opposition. My purpose is that military organization in China be made -national and unified, in order that the peace of the country shall not -at all times be upset by local military commanders. The military power -thus unified I intend to take entirely out of politics and confine it -to its specific military purposes. At present the military is used in -factional and political disputes. When this is no longer possible, then -we shall leave the public mind in civil life entirely free to settle -all questions of the Constitution and of the public policy." - -I believe the Premier was sincere in these views, and in his efforts -to vindicate the authority of the National Government, but he thought -only in terms of military authority. He did not realize what the -organization of public opinion and of a civilian administration -require. His opponents feared that a consolidated military power would -be used by him, after all, to accomplish the reëstablishment of a -military dictatorship, such as that of Yuan Shih-kai. - -The personal wisdom and integrity of General Tuan commanded respect, -but he was not fortunate in selecting his assistants. Both in Peking -and in the provinces his immediate advisers gave him trouble. When he -appointed General Fu Liang-tso governor of Hunan Province, he expected -the ready settlement of all difficulties there; General Fu would know -how to handle the situation. But the people of Hunan did not welcome -General Fu. Soon his authority and that of the Central Government were -questioned throughout that province. But the Premier never disavowed or -deserted his representatives. He was loyal to them, which accounts for -the strong personal influence which Tuan enjoyed. - -The country could not be unified, of course, until railways were built, -and representatives of the Chinese Government often approached me to -ascertain Whether some action could not be taken in regard to the -Hankow-Canton Railway, long delayed in construction. This trunk line -would have joined the north and south. A trip from Peking to Canton by -existing routes took from ten days to two weeks: by direct railway it -should be possible to make it in two days. Not only the movement of -passengers, but of mail and freight, would stimulate an intercourse -that would be sure to overcome separatist tendencies. But China had -entrusted the building of this railway to foreigners, who had played -with the concession, had lost it, and, after reacquiring part of it, -were now delaying its execution. Europe was preoccupied with the war. -And now that China was herself entering the war, it seemed a prime need -of national preparedness to have this comparatively short remaining -gap in the communications of China filled out. Good friends of America -among the officials--among them Mr. Pan Fu, Mr. T.C. Sun, the managing -director of the Siems-Carey railway offices, and Mr. J.C. Ho--argued -with me, as did their superiors, to have America lead in completing -this essential highway of commerce. - - - - -CHAPTER XXV - -THE CHINESE GO A-BORROWING - - -The time was come for China to put money in her purse. She was sure she -could do it, and sure that the United States, her great, rich sponsor -and friend, would help her to the means commensurate with her needs -of development for war. A suggestion to this effect had been made to -the Chinese minister at Washington by the Department of State. It was -undreamt of that no assistance whatever could be given to China. - -During the fall of 1917 all my powers were devoted to securing for our -Far Eastern associate in the war the best form of American assistance. -I wished to avoid, if possible, a loss of the chance for giving Chinese -financial affairs a sound basis. Above all, it was essential to aid -in steering China beyond earshot of the financial sirens that were -luring her upon the Japanese rocks. China invited American leadership, -relied upon it. No other nation in the circumstances could justly take -exception to it. It involved no vast enterprise of immediately raising -a huge army in China, but of preparing the way for such mobilization, -if need should arise. This could be done by facilitating works which -would endure and which would contribute to the welfare of China and -the world, war or no war. It meant building means of communication -and improving the food supply. It meant reconstruction after the war. -It meant an expenditure of money that would be infinitesimal compared -with the sums spent in Europe. America had lent billions to the Entente -Allies; the hundred millions that would have served to make China fit -were a mere trifle. Nor was it necessary to insist upon independent -American action in this matter. America's leadership in behalf of the -common interest and in coöperation with her associates could produce -the results desired of putting the situation in the Far East on a -sound basis. I had always desired American independent enterprise -in individual cases, free from all entanglements and semi-political -arrangements with other nations, whose favour, fortunately, we did -not require. But in the great task of the World War joint action with -others was natural, and action in China, given only positive American -leadership, could have produced fine results. The war powers did get -together for some action. They suspended the Boxer indemnity payments -for China, and she got the benefit of the twentieth of _ad valorem_ -duty which the treaties provided; on the basis of reckonings two -decades back, the 5 per cent. had really shrunk to 3. To restore the -rate fixed by the treaties was hardly a beginning of justice. - -Here was China, ready, willing to take her part in the war. What should -she do? In America the slogan: "Food Will Win the War" was in vogue, -and China could furnish food. She could supply coolies, millions if -necessary, as workmen and as soldiers. The war had proved that the -training of men as soldiers could be a matter, not of years, but of -months. Plans were drawn up, at first for hundreds of thousands of -Chinese soldiers, then for half a million. - -I urged my proposals on the State Department. The Canton-Hankow -Railway needed finishing. The Chinese arsenals and shipyards could be -refitted. I asked the consular officers and attachés for a rapid survey -of China's food resources; their returns showed that a large surplus -could be produced, if steps were taken at once to assure a market. -The Chinese have a genius for growing food; among them they have the -world's most skilful gardeners. But they needed added credit if they -were to put in more seed and harvest bigger crops. In these estimates -Professor Tuck of Cornell, who was up in Manchuria, and Professor -Bailey, in Nanking, gave their expert aid. - -England and her European allies, it was determined, had "gone broke"; -if there was to be a Consortium of lenders to China, would America -lead the way? Liang Chi-chao, Minister of Finance, proposed it. There -was China's public credit, with such vast human and material resources -as to stagger belief, waiting to be organized. There was the supreme -opportunity to send scattering all of the promoters of the unseemly -scramble to get special advantages through Chinese financial deals. I -spared no pains--for four years, indeed, I had laboured for this very -thing--to impress upon America the new vision of a developed China. Two -things halted action. Outside influences working in America itself were -aimed to stop the free play of financial enterprise in China; next, -there was the provincialism of the New York financiers. They would only -follow where other nations led. - -Then there was the alternative--coöperation between the war powers. By -hoops and barrages of steel we were bound to our brothers of Britain, -France, and Italy; Japan was an allied and associated power; at every -point our gold and war bonds were mingled with theirs. We were powerful -enough to hold our associates to a policy of developing China for the -benefit of all participants; an end might be put there to "special -interests." I suggested a new consortium on this basis. - -I went to the Chinese President. "I know," he declared, "that America -will spare no means whereby China may carry out her purpose to stand by -the side of the Allies on the battlefields of Europe." - -From the President I went to the Premier. By this time he was not so -friendly. Time had elapsed; the glitter of Japanese money had been made -to catch his eye. I inquired concerning the Japanese loan of 20,000,000 -yen, and incidental arrangements connected therewith. "Does not China -need to keep a credit balance in a foreign country," he asked; "and -would not the same arrangements be made with the United States if a -loan were made there?" Curiously, he added, "There is no need, yet, -of convoking parliament; no time has been set for it." A militarist -leader, he was being comforted by hopes of Japanese backing. But he was -quite willing to send a big army to Europe. - -The Japanese were alive to this situation. Professor Hori was sent -to lecture on finance before an association which Liang Chi-chao had -helped form. The theme of his opening lecture was the bankruptcy of the -Western powers. China must rely on Japan for money. Following Hori came -a commission of ten officials from Tokyo to study Chinese financial -administration. Then came Doctor Kobayashi to act as Japan's expert -in China. Prominent posts, it was freely said, were to be created for -"currency reform," posts which would be held by Japanese. Later on -Baron Sakatani came, to study Chinese finance. - -From Japan came loans and offers of loans. They lent 10,000,000 yen -through the Yokohama Specie Bank. This was merely an advance on a -future reorganization loan. Then a loan, labelled "Industrial," of -20,000,000 yen, was made through the Bank of Communications. Two -Japanese financial cliques sprang up and flourished. Liang sat at -the receipt of customs at the Ministry of Finance, dealing with the -Yokohama Specie Bank; the other clique, headed by Tsao Ju-lin and Lu -Tsung-yu, played in with the tri-fold group of the Industrial Bank -of Japan, the Bank of Chosen, and the Bank of Taiwan (Formosa). With -the loan dubbed "Industrial"--this to evade the provisions of the -reorganization loan--came Japanese advisorships in the Chinese Bank of -Communications. Not by the remotest chance would the loan be used by -the bank to strengthen its depreciated notes. It went for politics and -the military. - -The Japanese financiers coolly calculated that the British and French -banks would fail to take up their option on the currency reform loan, -which they had held since 1911. That would leave the field clear for -Japan. The French and British legations got busy about this, and so did -we. As a consequence the American Government resumed its interest in -currency reform in China, and the sigh of relief was almost audible. -I called on Minister Liang. Did he not remember the Treaty of 1903 -and America's long-continued interest in Chinese currency betterment? -There was the Jenks-Conant Monetary Commission; there were the long -negotiations conducted by Willard Straight, and the resultant Currency -Loan Agreement of 1911. "I remember all these things," Liang responded; -"America should lead in this matter. Our banknote issues are being -shot to pieces by local issuance of worthless paper. The Tuchuns have -bent the national banks to their purposes. The books of the banks must -be kept and made public. I suggest appointing three principal foreign -experts on a reform of the entire currency. Let them be an American, a -European, and a Japanese." - -The currency loan option was extended until the following April. - -But Japan had other shots in her locker. Suddenly the Japanese press -bristled with news of a projected "arms alliance" with China. It -sounded almost menacing. The Tai Hei Company, originally organized -by the Japanese Government to supply arms to Russia, was going to -furnish China with her armament. General Tuan said that he had long -been urged to buy a "limited amount" of war material from Japan. -The Japanese minister chimed in with the statement that, inasmuch -as the United States refused to sell steel to Japan--under the war -trade restriction--the time was come for Japan to control China's ore -deposits. "Japan is to sell China arms. Why may she not have the raw -materials for them?" he asked. - -The disproportion involved in this demand served to amuse the Chinese. -The deposits on which Japan's eyes were fixed amounted to from forty to -fifty million tons of ore--enough to make several guns. - -Along with these negotiations came proposals to establish Japanese -military and arsenal advisorships. - -I asked the Premier about these reports. I told him we could not -object to the purchase of arms by China from any source whatever. -But in negotiations for loans and concessions the United States had -held unswervingly to the principle of the "open door" and no special -privileges. As it sought no control of this kind, it was equally -interested that none should be given to any other power. - -"Have you not," the Premier asked me, "found me always candid and -true?" Most sincerely I assured him I had. - -"Then," he replied, "we have bought of Japan 40,000 rifles, 160 machine -guns, and 80 field guns. There will be no incidental commitments. I can -rely implicitly on my military associates [General Hsu Shu-cheng, the -Vice-Minister of War; Ching Yun-peng, Acting Chief of Staff; and Fu -Liang-tso, Tuchun of Hunan]. They would not sanction such a thing." - -But the next day I got positive evidence that they had. The -negotiations were in full blast for Japanese military advisorships, -control of the Nanking Arsenal, and rights to specific iron deposits. -I saw General Hsu, telling him everything before giving him a chance -to answer. I was not then solely concerned about the encroachment on -Chinese independence. American and European interests had been told: -"Hands off the national iron ore reserve; all remaining iron deposits -are to be held for the nation." Respecting this decision, we had told -our people that concessions for iron ores could not be obtained. We -could not in justice to them now consent to a change of policy, without -protecting our interests. Japan had already one half of China's iron -ore deposits. Was she to get the rest? Also, were Chinese armaments -to be standardized without consulting the experts of the Allied -Governments, so that the arms might be used in the present war? - -"We have been hard pressed," General Hsu explained. "The Japanese -wished us to do something for them and we need the arms. They will be -of the larger calibre, such as China's armament now has. The Japanese -did demand the assignment of new ore deposits; they needed security for -the contract. They compromised by reducing the amount of ore we are -to furnish. But we must supply it under a contract of 1916, between -the Japanese and a company formed by Chow Tsu-chi, whereby a million -dollars was paid in advance on iron ores from deposits near Nanking. -This is the best we can do. They demanded at first the grant of new ore -deposits." - -"I should like to visit you more often," General Hsu remarked later; -"but my movements are closely watched." I stated I hoped he entertained -no fear that would keep him from seeing the minister of a friendly -power at any time he wished. - -The real trouble lay in the rivalries between the north and south. -The Premier and General Hsu were willing to barter the nation's -birthright in the form of concessions in order to impose an internal -unity of their own making. For China was torn. The situation in -October, 1917--how different from that of April and May, 1915, when -the twenty-one demands came to their climax! Then the Chinese people -and Government were united as one man. The sentiment of the nation was -now the same; nearly all the members of the Government were unchanged, -yet a small pro-Japanese minority were in the saddle. The men who -had Japanese funds under their control had the advantage over the -mass of officials. They succeeded in muzzling the Chinese press. By -Japanese insistence, aided in this case by the French minister--some -of the Chinese papers had criticized his attitude--news of diplomatic -negotiations had been absolutely suppressed. Without information, -the public was disturbed and confused. The editor of the Japanese -_Kokumin_, Mr. Tokutomi, in an interview in Peking, advocated still -more stringent press control. Japan was using the war to displace -the influence of her associates in China and to make her own power -predominant. - -Bad as the situation was it might have been saved by an adequate loan -from America. Liang's first proposal was for a reorganization loan -of $200,000,000, which was vetoed by Europe; this shrivelled to the -mess of pottage of 10,000,000 yen offered by the Yokohama Specie Bank. -General Hsu had unfolded to me in September a comprehensive scheme of -equipping 500,000 soldiers, and providing for the immediate transport -of at least 500,000 to Europe, further detachments were to go as fast -as ships could be had. Later came more specific plans for 1,000,000 -men, out of which the best contingents were to be sent to France. It -was planned ultimately to send the whole million, if needed. Then came -a modified proposal for outfitting 500,000 men and the completion of -the industrial plants needed for war materials and ships. The European -ministers were all anxious to secure China's active participation; the -French Legation, through its military attaché, was coöperating with -special energy in planning for the eventual use of Chinese forces. From -my conversations with the President, the Premier, and his most active -assistant, there was no doubt that the Chinese were in earnest. Now it -was all simmering down to a few millions of Japanese money, supplied -for politics and internal dissension, with Japan seeking special -advantages. - -Work was to be done. The United States could still bring relief and -a strong call for united action into this troubled situation without -giving just cause for complaint or for taking offence. The French were -especially desirous of bringing the Chinese actually into the war. -The Belgians wished the mobilization of Chinese material resources, -particularly foodstuffs. The British were in general accord, though -they doubted whether Chinese troops could be soon transported to the -theatre of war. Dr. George Morrison who had just gone over the whole -situation with the President and cabinet, came to me saying: "The -Chinese will apply to you for advice. You have a freer hand than the -British minister." - -But an event of profound significance was impending, and it interrupted -my efforts along these constructive lines. It was at this time that -the results of Japan's efforts to reach an agreement with the State -Department in Washington became known to China. - - - - -PART IV - -LAST YEAR OF WAR AND AFTERMATH - - - - -CHAPTER XXVI - -THE LANSING-ISHII NOTES - - -It was in rather an indirect way that I learned of the secret -negotiations which had been going on between the head of the State -Department in Washington and the Japanese Government. Since these -negotiations concerned some of the most vital problems in the whole -Chinese situation, it was surprising that everyone had been kept in -ignorance of them. I learned of them, I confess with mingled emotions, -from none other than Baron Hayashi himself. I called on him on the -evening of November 4th; and, after going over the matter of routine -which I had wished to take up with him, I remained chatting pleasantly -with him. In the course of our talk the Baron remarked: "I have just -received some information that is quite important, and I want you to -know about it. Let me get the cablegram." - -He brought a paper and handed it over to me without comment. It -was a cablegram from Tokyo that informed him of the signing of -the Lansing-Ishii notes, and gave a summary of their text. The -first paragraph contained the vital clause: "The Government of the -United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, -particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." This -naturally struck me in the face with stunning force, before I had time -to weigh its meaning in relation to the remainder of the declaration. -I read the dispatch twice and made an effort to impress its salient -points on my memory, and then turned to my Japanese colleague -attempting to retain my composure. - -"Yes," I managed to say, "this is quite interesting. It is somewhat in -line with conversations we have had, yet differs in some respects." - -I forced myself to remain a little longer and tried to continue the -matter-of-fact conversation which this astounding piece of news had -interrupted. When I finally took my leave, I was uncertain whether -Baron Hayashi did or did not know that I had been unaware of this -exchange of notes. Hurrying to the Legation, I dispatched a cablegram -to the Department asking that I be informed. - -It had been agreed, so the cable from Tokyo had stated, that an -announcement of the parley should not be given out until November 7th. -But the Japanese minister had already informed the Chinese Foreign -Office on Sunday night; and early on Monday its representative called -to get my version of the matter. - -No word had been sent me. It was inexcusable to fail to give the local -representative the earliest possible information, and I intimated as -much in my cablegram to the Secretary of State. As the Foreign Office -had been fully informed, I could only state to my visitor that I was -not authorized to deliver the text until later, and that I was myself -still considering the full import of the document, which in certain -respects followed lines of policy that had been discussed in the past. - -As I could plainly see, the notes had been paraded in the Chinese -Foreign Office as yielding important concessions from the United -States and as a diplomatic triumph for Japan. I knew nothing of the -motives which had animated the President and Secretary of State when -they agreed to the paper. I could not explain its purposes; but when -my visitor asked: "Does this paper recognize the paramount position of -Japan in China?" I could and did answer with an emphatic "No." Beyond -that I said nothing. - -All that day and the next reports streamed in from many quarters that -the Japanese were "crowing over their victory" in their talks with -the Chinese. More Chinese officials and many Americans applied at the -Legation for authentic word. But no help came from the Department of -State. Indeed no word reached me until the morning of the 7th. - -It cannot be said that the American secrecy pledge was not -punctiliously observed--even to the extent of keeping in ignorance -the American minister, who would have to bear the brunt of the -consequences of this diplomatic manoeuvre. The Japanese, meanwhile, -had given the note not only to the Chinese Government several days in -advance, but--was it out of abhorrence for secret diplomacy?--even -before the notes had been signed their text was communicated to the -representatives of Great Britain, Russia, France, and Italy. This was -done at Tokyo. - -It is not surprising that this procedure produced upon the Chinese the -impression that the Japanese had got what they wanted. They thought the -declarations made by the United States contained admission of a special -position held by Japan in China, not desired by the latter, but forced -through by the military and political power of Japan. - -The reception given the note by Far Eastern experts and by the public -indicated that it would be interpreted in widely varying fashion. The -first impression only gradually gave way to a calmer judgment when -the specific terms of the notes were carefully read and the ambiguous -character of the instrument was realized. In the first place, the -Japanese Legation, in translating for the benefit of the Chinese -Ministry, had used for "special interest" a Chinese term which implied -the idea of "special position." Doctor Tenney's more direct translation -of the term was without this extra shade. The Department authorized -me to deliver an explanatory note to the effect that the interests -referred to were of an economic, not a political, nature. It referred -to "Japan's commercial and industrial enterprises in China"; these, it -added, "manifestly have, on account of the geographical relation of -the two countries, a certain advantage over similar enterprises on the -part of citizens or subjects of any other country." - -I could not avoid the feeling that the form which the exchange of -notes at Washington had taken was unfortunate. It was indeed desirable -that the friendly attitude of the United States toward all Japan's -economic activities in China should be stated strongly. This had been -the tenor of the conversations between successive Japanese ministers -and myself, which had been communicated to the State Department. It was -necessary, if the Japanese really entertained it, to disabuse them of -the conception that the political influence of the United States was -being used to discourage close business relationships between China and -Japan, and to frown upon Japanese enterprises in China. On the basis -of such an understanding, it was hoped that Japan would join with the -United States in agreeing that special privileges in any part of China, -or any sort of economic advantage, would not be sought by political -means; that the Manchurian régime, to be more specific, would not -extend to other parts of China. - -But the notes definitely stated that Japan would not use her special -interests in a way to "discriminate against the trade of other nations, -or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in -the treaties with other powers." This might give rise to the idea that -"special interests" did not refer merely to specific economic interests -and enterprises. It might include also a certain political influence or -preference. - -The Japanese minister, though disclaiming a reading which would imply -a paramount interest, evidently saw in the notes an endorsement of the -principle of spheres of influence. "The notes speak for themselves," he -said in an interview on the 8th of November; "they simply again place -on record the acknowledged attitude of the United States and Japan -toward China. They are simply a restatement of an old position. Even -the term 'special interests' is doubtless used in the same sense here -as in the past. Several other countries have territory that borders on -China; this fact gives them a special interest in these parts of China -which they touch. In exactly the same way, Japan has special rights in -China." - -The non-official Japanese statements claimed much more than this. They -did "crow over" the Chinese. Was not here a vindication of distinct -priority enjoyed by Japan in China? In Japan the veteran Okuma, who -is never backward in airing his opinions in the press, also seemed to -have a rather broad idea of the notes. "Hitherto," he said, "America's -activities in China were often imprudent and thoughtless. For instance, -Secretary Knox's proposal to neutralize the Manchurian Railway was, -indeed, a reckless move. The United States also relegated Japan to the -background when she sent the note of June 7th to China, advising that -country concerning domestic peace. Thus America disregarded Japan's -special position in China. We may understand that she will not repeat -such follies, in the light of the new convention." - -Of course, there is nothing in the notes to interfere with the -fullest and freest interchange of communications between the American -Government and the Chinese, on any topic whatever. - -In reporting his conversation on the notes with the Japanese Minister -for Foreign Affairs before they were signed, the Russian ambassador -at Tokyo hit it off in this way: "Nevertheless, I gain the impression -from the words of the minister that he is conscious of the possibility -of misunderstandings, also, in the future; but is of the opinion that -in such a case Japan would have at her disposal better means than the -United States for carrying into effect her interpretation." - -To show how different people were affected, I shall cite from some -letters. Dr. George Morrison wrote to a friend from southern China: -"Relays of Chinese have thronged to see the American consul, all -sounding one note--that they have been betrayed by America. After all -her valiant protestations, what earthly good did America gain by making -such a concession to Japan, giving recognition to that which every -American and Englishman in China had been endeavouring to prevent? -Carried to its logical conclusion this agreement gives recognition not -only to Japan's 'special interests' in Manchuria, but also to those -in Fukien Province which lies in 'geographical proximity' to Formosa. -Surely the British will now claim recognition of similar rights in -Kwangsi Province. It is all very deplorable." - -Another Britisher, Mr. W.H. Donald, took a different view. "When I saw -the notes," he wrote, "I was delighted, because I read into them the -fact that America had, to use an Americanism, 'put one over' Japan. -Ishii went to America to get acquiescence in Japan's predominance in -China; to get America to admit Japan's hegemony of the Pacific. He -got neither. Instead, he had to reaffirm adherence to the previous -undertakings--undertakings which were discarded when Japan put in her -twenty-one demands." - -The Chinese papers generally pronounced the notes inconsistent. The -_Chung Hua Hsin Pao_ saw no need for having the "special interests" of -Japan particularly recognized any more than those of other nations, -like Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States, all of -which have territory adjacent to China. The paper thought that the -assurance that Japan seeks no special rights or privileges, should be -taken at its face value when the point of the whole agreement was the -recognition of "special interests" enjoyed by Japan. The tenor of the -note, therefore, appeared to favour "special interests," consequently -the division of China into spheres of influence--contrary to the -traditional policy of the United States. - -Personally, from my knowledge of the situation in the Far East, I could -not see any urgent reason for making this declaration. I learned later -that the notes had been drawn up in consultation between the President -and the Secretary of State, without other reference to the Department -of State and without the knowledge of its staff. Also, the Secretary -had acted upon the belief and understanding that the first statement -concerning special interests was simply a self-evident axiom, but that -its restatement would clarify the situation. Certainly, on the other -hand, the positive affirmative pledge against "the acquisition by any -government of any special rights or privileges" was clearer and went -further than any previous declaration. - -To safeguard its rights under any construction that might be given -to the document, the Chinese Government declared that it could not -recognize any agreement relating to China entered into between other -powers. - -I have said that I could not see the need of these notes. Failing to -receive instructions which I sought from the Department of State, -I continued to take the position that the policy of the American -Government remained unchanged with respect to the existence of a -special position or special privileges on the part of any other -power in China. But the immediate effect of the notes on the Chinese -Government was to make its high officials feel that nothing very -positive could be expected from the United States by way of assistance -out of the nation's difficulties. - -The general and continuing effect of the notes was seen in the -behaviour of the Japanese in China. The Japanese papers boldly -declared that Japan would interpret the term "special interests" in -a way to suit herself, and that it implied the supremacy of Japanese -political influence in China. The thrusting forward of this View did -not strengthen the government of General Tuan. Several more provinces -followed those which had declared their independence with acts that -made their allegiance at least doubtful. General Tuan's appointee as -military governor of Hunan suffered defeat at the hands of the southern -troops. The governors of the Yangtse Valley, under the leadership of -General Li Shun, addressed to the Government pointed inquiries about -financial dealings with the Japanese and the purchase of arms, which -was reported to involve an arms alliance. - -As the attacks were directed at him personally, General Tuan felt that -he must resign. Notwithstanding an outward show of amity, General Feng -Kuo-chang and the Premier had actually not agreed. The Premier wished -to make war on the south and conquer it. The Acting President, on the -other hand, was in constant correspondence with southern leaders in an -attempt to bring about reconciliation. Tuan sent in his resignation. -The Japanese worked for his retention. The President did ask him to -reconsider, but his resignation finally took effect on the 20th of -November. General Wang Shih-chen, who was close to the President as -chief of staff, became acting premier. But Tsao Ju-lin, who headed the -Japanese clique, was retained. - -Peace and unity did not result. The northern Tuchuns gathered at -Tientsin on December 4th, and decided to push the war against the south -with 200,000 men. This was to be made a pretext for getting more funds. - -I kept in touch with General Tuan, in whose personal character and -honesty of purpose in wishing China to take part in the war I placed -reliance. Also his friend, Mr. Chu Ying-kuang, who had made a fine -record as civilian governor of Chekiang, had kept his eye mainly on -this goal. Through them I kept in touch with all of the Chinese who -fostered such action. If the Chinese of their own initiative should -create services for supplying urgent needs of the Allies, and should -train a model division for use on the battlefields of Europe, I -felt that the United States and her associates would find a way to -transport them to Europe. General Tuan was now free of politics. In -the conversations I had with the Premier and his associates, the idea -of a special organization for preparedness was talked over. The upshot -of this was the creation of a War Participation Office, with General -Tuan as its president. The Office was to make constructive plans for -developing resources useful in the war, and for training troops for -Europe. - -Meanwhile, the Japanese were "cutting loose" in Shantung. Quite openly -they were trying to set up an administration in what they called the -railway zone. The agreements between China and Germany contained no -provision for such a zone. The Germans merely had the railway itself, -and certain specific mining enterprises, together with the port of -Tsingtao. A general priority in the mining districts within a zone -of ten miles along each side of the railway had been abandoned some -time previous to the war. Now the Japanese asserted in this "zone" -general administrative power, including policing, taxation, forestry, -and education. With this encroachment, the Chinese noted evidences of -Japanese toleration of revolutionary and bandit activities wherever -they served the purposes of the invaders. - -People came frequently from Shantung to see me in order to lay before -me their complaints and petitions. They were distressed, but I could -not help them, save where American rights were involved. The Shantung -men reported that the Japanese were making the Lansing-Ishii notes the -basis of their propaganda, stating that Japan's special position had -now been recognized. This penetration into the interior of one of the -provinces of China proper by a foreign political administration was -undoubtedly the most serious attack ever made on Chinese sovereignty. - -A member of the Chinese Foreign Office called on me on the 21st of -December, and spoke earnestly about the Japanese inroads in Shantung. -He said nothing could stop the Japanese. Their minister had stated that -it would be difficult to change an ordinance signed by the Premier and -sanctioned by the Emperor. - -Among both Chinese officials and the general public all was -discouragement and depression. The first effect of the Lansing-Ishii -notes, the strong influence exercised by the pro-Japanese clique in the -government because of the financial backing they got, the knowledge -that such backing had to be bought with valuable national concessions, -the increasing disunion between north and south, the general despair -of any constructive and unifying policy being possible, made the -Chinese individually and collectively paralysed with doubt, fear, and a -feeling of impotence. It was plain that Japanese influences, making a -politico-commercial campaign in China, were everywhere actively taking -advantage of this demoralized state of the public mind and intensifying -it through their manipulations. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVII - -AMIDST TROUBLES PEKING REJOICES - - -The Armistice meant the end of the Great War. Would it also mean the -end of sinister intrigue in China? - -In the joy of the world victory everybody felt so. But when I returned -to Peking early in October, 1918, I found that things had gone from bad -to worse. Money had been squandered on war expeditions which had torn -the country, not united it. The unofficial Japanese financial agent, -Mr. Nishihara, a borer in the rotten trunk of Chinese finance, had -been at work all summer. The fact of his loan negotiations was denied -to the very last by the Japanese Legation. Suddenly, on October 1st, -Japan's Minister of Finance announced that his government had arranged -a number of loans to the Chinese. They involved commitments in the sum -of 320,000,000 yen, ostensibly to build railways and iron works; of -this amount 40,000,000 yen would be immediately advanced. - -The earlier loans had all gone to the inept militarists. The advances -on these so-called industrial loans were in the same way dissipated -in partisanship, division, distraction. The new parliament had been -elected. It was to elect a new president. Money was poured into the -contest between Feng, the Acting President, and Hsu Shih-chang. -General Tuan had his army of small political adherents, who battened -on the funds supplied by the chief manipulators. They formed the Anfu -Club--from _An_hui, the province of the army clique, and _Fu_kien, the -province whence the navy drew most of its admirals. - -The inner military ring was operating from the War Participation -Bureau, which had preëmpted the control of finance, natural resources, -and police. The ministries were powerless. The Government was debauched -with the easy money from Japan. With a sardonic grin, the Japanese -offered to lend China 200,000,000 paper yen, not redeemable, on which -the Chinese Government should base a gold-note issue. On this paper of -the Bank of Korea China should repay Japan, with interest annually. - -Using the militarists, they tried hard to put it through. But the -foreign press, and such Chinese papers as dared, succeeded in laughing -it down. Redeemable in Korean or Japanese banknotes, which the Chinese -never use in daily trade, the proposed government gold notes could -not have been forced into circulation. They would only have worse -confounded the already existing monetary confusion. - -The police terrorized and bullied the papers that opposed Japan's -loan negotiations and printed the facts about them. Nearly a dozen -were suppressed. The Anfu gang had cowed the Government and people in -north China. Without moral and legal authority, it made the Government -impotent in its prime functions, such as levying taxes and protecting -lives. - -The diplomatic corps had to consider whether the customs and salt -revenues should be released to such a government. The best interests -not only of China, but of all the friendly nations, including -Japan herself, were being blighted. The prostitution of the War -Participation Bureau by the gold-lust of the militarists, with Japan -as pander, fostered the brawls of faction and disunion. Public opinion -was throttled and the corrupt elements found no organized popular -opposition. - -Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of Finance, advocated the spurious gold-note -project, which had been dubbed the "gold-brick scheme." Tsao had -represented that the diplomatic corps had approved this scheme. Four -ministers jointly informed the Chinese Government that Mr. Tsao's -methods tended to destroy confidence between the Government and the -legations, and one minister said his legation would thenceforward -accept no statement coming from the Minister of Finance until the -Foreign Office had vouched for its truth. - -The Finance Minister unblushingly tried to suspend the renewal of the -currency loan option until the foreign banks should consent to the -gold-note scheme. Here I protested, saying that under the Currency Loan -Agreement the American Government had a right to be consulted before -any such proposals could be considered. - -His Excellency Hsu Shih-chang was elected President--a veteran -statesman of the old régime. In my first interview with him he -complained: "I am trying to deal with the south; but they have nobody -to bind them together and represent them. We are demobilizing most of -our superfluous troops, but I am worried because the Government lacks -financial support." - -I talked with him again often. General Li Shun, of Nanking, had been -asked to mediate. The southern leaders needed to be "grubstaked" to pay -off their troops, then an agreement with them could be reached. The -President's solution smacked of buying them off. But this would not -end the militarist intriguing. President Hsu issued on October 25th a -peace mandate, taking President Wilson's statement about reconstituting -international unity as his point of departure. The President had cabled -this to Hsu when he was inaugurated. The press was reporting that the -British and American ministers were working for internal peace; our -mediation would have been popular. It would have pulled the leaders of -north and south out of their impasse. President Hsu cabled back to Mr. -Wilson: "Though we are separated by a great distance, yet I feel your -influence as if we were face to face." - -President Hsu had gotten a report from Dr. George E. Morrison, who had -returned from investigations in south China. Doctor Morrison made the -point that internal strife must be ended if China was to do anything -in the Great War and to hold up her rights strongly at the Peace -Conference. I will quote this report somewhat at length: - - China under the advice of several of her more powerful ministers looks - to Japan for guidance, Japan having in an incredibly short space - of time, by the energy and patriotism of her united people and the - wisdom of her rulers, raised herself to an important position among - the nations. But Japan is no longer one of the great world powers. - Japan lacks experience of modern war. Her army and navy are much out - of date. Her troops have no experience of the marvellous methods of - modern war. She has no submarine service, she has no air service. - Her government, created after the model of Germany, her kaiserism, - her Prussian militarism, are fast becoming obsolete. Compared with - the great powers of Great Britain, America, France, and Italy, the - strength of Japan is meagre. Japan at the end of the European war is - a third-rate power. Her government is the only military autocracy - existing in the world to-day, and for that reason Japan will occupy a - unique position at any peace conference. Japan is the only one of the - Allied nations who has failed to take any adequate part in the great - world struggle. - - For China, a republic, to seek the guidance of the only existing - autocratic military government in the world to-day has at least the - appearance of inconsistency. Such action is viewed with suspicion by - all those in China who are aspiring to a democratic government--a - government by the people for the people. - - If intervention is to be prevented, there must be early restoration - of democratic government, early reconciliation. As the simplest and - quickest way in which this can be effected, I suggest that your - Excellency invite the President of the United States to act as - mediator, to bring together representatives of the two great parties - of state in China that they may hear and weigh each other's view and - agree to a compromise. There is no loss of face in doing this. - - During my recent visit to the south I gave expression to Chinese views - to all the leading men with whom I had the opportunity of discussing - the question of peace and reconciliation in China. All without - exception expressed their belief and confidence that an invitation to - the President of the United States to act as mediator would be a wise - act and one that promised the easiest solution of the grave conflict - which at present divides into hostile camps this fair land of China. - -Japan persisted in her work, the United States remained indifferent. - -The people of China got tired of all this. As a matter of fact, China -was divided only on the surface. Deep down into the life of the people -political controversies had not penetrated. They went on, placid and -industrious, regardless of the bickerings of politicians. Chinese -revolutions and declarations of independence might be bruited to the -world, which might think China had plunged into anarchy. As a people -the Chinese are freer from governmental interference than any nation -living. If the entire Central Government should suddenly disappear from -the face of the earth, it would make little difference in China. Yet -the long continuance of political conflicts lets foreign intrigue into -the national quarrels, and so reacts dangerously. - -The people as a whole wished the nation to be a unit. But the -professional militarists had to be paid off. After the President had -issued his peace mandate, he asked that I see him. "If decisive action -for peace is taken," he asked, "may we depend on the United States -to back us in getting funds to pay off these large bodies of troops? -If not, will she not lead in a reorganization loan joined by several -powers?" - -I asked the American Government for the funds desired. If they came -conditionally upon the reunion of China, the responsible military -governors and civilian leaders north and south would have the means -to be rid of the predatory and parasitic bands. Japan then roused -herself. She approached the governments of the United States, France, -Great Britain, and Italy on October 23rd, asking that they work toward -a peace settlement with the leaders both north and south. The American -Government approved, adding that China needed money, but that no funds -would be afforded her until a reunited government was seated. - -Meanwhile, the temper of the Chinese people was sounded in a -gratifying way. John Mott asked the Y.M.C.A. in China to raise $100,000 -for the War Works Drive. I sat at dinner one evening with Liang Shih-yi -and Chow Tsu-chi, and said: "A drive is going on in the United States -to aid all the war works undertaken for the benefit of the soldiers at -the front. Do you suppose that some of our friends in China would wish -to contribute?" They both replied: "Yes, we are sure they would." - -Two days elapsed. Chow Tsu-chi called, told me they had formed a -National War Works Committee, and that local committees were being -formed in every provincial capital. They raised, not $100,000, but more -than $1,000,000! - -It was the more remarkable because this way of contributing to a public -purpose had never been tried in China. Only the _Shun Tien Shih Pao_ of -Peking, Japanese-controlled, threw cold water on the movement, saying -that to be sending money to Europe while so many provinces in China -themselves needed aid was peculiar. - -The representatives of the Associated Powers met on October 18th. -They felt that participation in the war had not united China; a -clique had perverted it to factional uses. Each representative, it -was agreed, should present instances in which the Central Government -or local officials had obstructed action or been remiss. At the next -meeting, on the 28th, I had prepared a memorandum of instances; this -was made the basis of a statement. A conference was to be held with -the President of China, to be quite friendly, but to make manifest -the grave shortcomings due to political vices. Thus, it was thought, -the responsible and conscientious elements in the Government would -be fortified against the clique that had invaded it. The Foreign -Minister, however, asked that the conference be deferred, in order that -the Government might strive to bring its action more completely into -accord with its real desire. There was no threat in our suggestion. But -publicists often overlooked its true object, and treated it as if it -had been a condemnation of China rather than of the controlling clique -in the Government. - -Joy and cheerfulness greeted the news of the Armistice. The American -Legation Band was the first to celebrate, with a detachment of marines -it paraded the legation compounds; only the Japanese Legation sentinel -failed to salute it; he had failed to gather its purport. At Sir John -Jordan's personal invitation I joined the British Legation's impromptu -festivities that night, with some members of my staff. Responding to -Sir John's remarks of welcome, I spoke of the trinity of democratic -peoples, the British, French, and Americans, as destined to lead the -world to a fuller understanding of free institutions and popular rights. - -In the continuous round of festivities and celebrations the foreign -and Chinese communities joined whole-heartedly, with dinners, -receptions, special meetings of societies, and finally a great national -celebration on the 28th of November. We gave a reception on the 20th -to the ministers of the Associated Powers. As each minister arrived, -the national air of his country was played by the Marine Band. When -the Russian minister came in, the band, without special instructions, -played the old Russian Imperial hymn. Prince Koudacheff was moved, for -this anthem was now outlawed in his country; he came to me in tears. -Next day he showed me a song with music which he had suggested for -adoption by the Siberian Government as the Russian national hymn. But -at the solemn service held on the Sunday following, when the national -airs of the different countries were played, when the turn came for the -Russian hymn a pause was noted. Those conducting the service had ruled -out the old Imperial hymn. As there was apparently no music available -as a substitute, poor Russia had to go unsaluted. - -From early in the morning of the national celebration, Chinese troops -marched toward the Imperial City, where they lined the spacious -interior courts. The legation guards followed. Multitudes of Europeans -and Chinese flocked to the palace, where the diplomats were gathered, -all but myself resplendent in gorgeous uniforms. The neutral ministers, -too, were in attendance. The European adviser had found a precedent -among peace celebrations in Europe, such as that after the Danish War -and the Franco-Prussian War, in accordance with which the neutral -ministers might attend, though peace was not fully concluded. Also, -it was argued that the Chinese were celebrating the cessation of -hostilities, and the participation of friendly representatives might be -invited. - -Whispered controversy was heard among the ministers. The representative -of France, seeing senior neutral representatives ahead of him, said -this occasion was different, and demanded that the rank of precedence -be changed. Time was too short for so thorny a problem. We agreed to -say nothing at all, but to walk in a group forming itself spontaneously. - -We gathered in the pavilion of the Ta Ho-men, the gate which leads into -the court immediately before the main Coronation Hall of the Imperial -City. Here, in the very inner sanctuary of the thousand-year-old -imperialism of China, the victory of freedom was celebrated. The square -was massed with troops, Chinese and foreign. On the ascending terraces -stood thousands of guests, the military and officials in uniform; over -the balustrades waved forests of flags of the Associated Nations, as -well as long floating banners with Chinese inscriptions in gold. - -After the President had ascended the steps to the music of bands -of the nations, bowed to all the flags, and made his address, -aeroplanes appeared, dropping innumerable Chinese flags and messages -of felicitation printed in gold on red; then they continued to circle -above the Imperial City. While the military were marching to the gate, -rockets were sent skyward; exploding, they released paper figures of -animals, as well as soldiers and weapons of war, which floated a long -time in the air. When the President left the Tung Hua Palace, where he -had received thousands of guests, the aeroplanes preceded him on his -ride to his own residence. - -We celebrated Thanksgiving that afternoon in American fashion with -a religious service, the American colony and many British and -other Allied residents attending, as well as the ministers of the -Associated Powers with their staffs. Premier Chien Neng-hsun dined -the diplomatic corps and welcomed President Wilson's proposal for a -league of nations. President Hsu invited us on November 30th, and then -the French minister, who still was troubled with the question of the -non-belligerents, objected to the neutral ministers being there at all. -If they went, he said, he would not go. The British minister and I -devised, as we thought, a way out. Would the neutral ministers view the -Allied ministers as guests of honour on this occasion? The secretary -to the Foreign Minister was chosen to ask them. Unfortunately, the -neutrals took it as a demand rather than an inquiry. Then the fat was -in the fire--the neutral ministers would not attend the dinner. This -was the one discordant note in our celebrations. - -In order to enable the Central Government to get along at all, the -diplomatic corps agreed to the release of surplus salt revenues to the -extent of $5,300,000. President Hsu on the 16th of November ordered -immediate cessation of hostilities in the Chinese interior. The -northern leaders were still war-like, but accepted his decision. The -British, French, American, Japanese, and Italian representatives and -myself met on the 22nd to uphold President Hsu's attitude. We took -up the Japanese proposals, deciding that identical representations -be made at Peking and Canton. My colleagues asked me to draft an -_aide mémoire_ which was to accompany the oral representations. -Japan objected to including in it the American suggestion that no -financial advances would be made now but that a reunited China would -get support from the powers. The Japanese banks had bound themselves -to make further payments to China, it was said. The _aide mémoire_ -deplored disunion, disavowed wishing to intervene, and hoped that, -"while refraining from taking any steps which might obstruct peace, -both parties would seek without delay, by frank confidence, the means -of obtaining reconciliation." In the clause about obstructing peace -I had in mind such acts as the election of a northern militarist as -Vice-President. This, though in itself a peaceful act, would have -raised an insurmountable obstacle to peace. - -Five powers were represented in an audience before the President on -December 2nd, the British minister speaking. The northern military -leaders had held a conference at Tientsin. If, as reported, they wished -to demand that Tuan be reinstalled as Premier, and that Tsao Kun, -Military Governor of Chihli, be elected Vice-President, it would have -embittered the south. The public therefore welcomed the representations -of the powers. The American reference to loans was omitted; -nevertheless, the situation produced made it no longer possible for any -one country to lend money to either faction without putting itself in -an equivocal position. - -The Japanese felt moved on the 3rd of December to publish a statement -about Chinese finance. Japan could not discourage financial and -economic enterprises of its nationals in China, the statement read, "so -long as these enterprises are the natural and legitimate outgrowth of -special relations between the two neighbouring and friendly nations. At -the same time they fully realize that under the existing conditions of -domestic strife in China loans are liable to create misunderstandings -and to interfere with peace in China. Accordingly, the Japanese -Government has decided to withhold such financial assistance to China -as is likely in their opinion to add to the complications of her -internal situation." - -This declaration left great latitude in the making of loans, yet -it did, in fact, acknowledge the appropriateness of the American -position. I asked Baron Hayashi about it. What exceptions would be -made? The Baron was not very definite but said _bona fide_ industrial -loans were meant. "Most decidedly," he added in reply to my continued -questioning, "I favour the strictest scrutiny of each loan, and mutual -information among the governments about such transactions." He gave -me plainly to understand that he did not approve, and had opposed, -certain deals attempted by his countrymen in the semi-official group. -I gathered his thorough disapproval of direct interference by the -military in international affairs; but the military were in power in -Japan, and its diplomats were helpless. - -In accordance with its main suggestion, the American Government -followed with a memorandum about financing China, sent to Great -Britain, France, and Japan. It had already proposed a new consortium, -including virtually all parties interested in each national group. The -Currency Reform Loan should come first, with the shares of the British -and French groups carried by the Americans and Japanese so long as the -former could not furnish funds. Industrial as well as administrative -loans should be included, and thus removed from the sphere of -destructive competition. - -The danger that industrial loans might be converted to political ends -was patent. Yet in my recommendations I felt it difficult to avoid -evils of monopoly, unless independent enterprises involving loans -should be admitted. - -The British and French banking representatives plainly wished to have -America lead in the international financial reorganization of China. -Japan, as its minister often said, desired the United States to reënter -the Consortium--but he meant the old Consortium, in which Japan had -the leadership. Japan did not readily take to the idea of the new -Consortium. It declared that it favoured the proposal "on principle," -but found it necessary to weigh every detail with considerable -minuteness. This caused great delay. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVIII - -A NEW WORLD WAR COMING? - - -The old World War ended with the Armistice. Was a new one looming? - -If one came it would break in China--of that we were convinced. -Unless it settled China's problems the Peace Conference would fall -disastrously short of safeguarding the world against a renewal of -its titanic conflict. In China the powers were rivals, each with its -jealously guarded sphere of influence. In the extravagant language -of fancy, Ku Hung-ming thus pictured to me the situation: "China's -political ship, built in the eclipse and rigged with curses black, has -been boarded by the pirates of the world. In their dark rivalries they -may scuttle it and all sink together, but not until they have first -plundered and burned civilization as we know it." - -Should any action be taken which might be interpreted as a recognition -of a special position for Japan in China, whether in the form of a -so-called Monroe Doctrine or a "regional understanding" or in any other -way, forces would be set in motion that in a generation would be beyond -controlling. In comparison with this tremendous issue, even the complex -re-alignments of Central Europe fell into relative unimportance. The -same fatal result was sure to follow any further accentuation of -spheres of influence. - -We in China realized this, and in deadly earnest we worked out a plan -of joint preventive action by the powers, which would unite them -instead of leaving them in fatal rivalry. The root of all evil is in -the love of money. It was local financing by single exploiting powers -in spheres protected by political influence that was the evil. If, -instead, the finance of the world could be made to back a united -China, there would be a great constructive development, from which all -would benefit far in excess of selfish profits garnered in a corner. -We planned a system of joint international finance. That, despite -its drawbacks, would destroy the localization of foreign political -influence. The plan in its relations to the Chinese Government was -worked out with everyone that we could reach competent to give advice. -There were the official and business representatives of Great Britain -and France; the Chinese cabinet ministers and other officials, and all -of the American representatives, including the commercial attachés -Julean Arnold and P.P. Whitham, and the American advisers, Dr. W.W. -Willoughby, Dr. W.C. Dennis, and Mr. J.E. Baker of the Department of -Railways. Day and night the conferences went on informally; by day and -night these matters were threshed out. Japanese experts, too, were -consulted. - -The time seemed propitious. The Armistice brought the hope that the -powers would coöperate. The separatist political aims in China might -be overcome, together with the sinister intrigue for dismembering or -dominating that mighty nation of freemen. Could foreign financial -action and influence in China be gathered up into a unit? Could it be -made to build for the whole of China, not tear it down in its several -parts? At all events, we hammered out a plan to make this possible. - -Foreigners had gone deeply into railway loans, making their chief -investments there. Hence we made the plan of unified financial support -apply, first of all, to the railway service. The operating of the -different Chinese lines according to the respective national loans -was a curse; it was evil politics, and it broke down the railway -service. Foreign experts, acting as servants of the Chinese Government, -might unify the Chinese railroads, though of this Liang Shih-yi, -Chow Tsu-chi, and Yeh Kung-cho--who knew most about Chinese railway -affairs--had their doubts. It would pile up the overhead expenses, they -thought. The railways could be managed thriftily only by the Chinese. -The foreign banking interests, too, might try to be depositories for -the railway funds, as they were already for the customs and salt -revenues. Thus Chinese capital would pay tribute to foreign capital. If -still other revenues were thus absorbed, as might be feared, national -economy would be fettered too much. - -Therefore they proposed a Chinese banking group. It would help in the -financing and could be made the depository of funds. - -These men sympathized, however, with the main purpose of the suggested -arrangement for unification. Foreign expertship on the railways, also, -was highly valued by Chinese railwaymen trained in the West. True, -Mr. Sidney Mayers somewhat frightened them by his proposals. This -British industrial representative of long experience in China proposed -internationalizing each separate line by putting on it an international -group of experts. The Chinese objected; it would mean giving all the -important positions to a large staff of foreign officials. Of this they -had had enough in the Customs. - -It was necessary to dissociate banking from building; such a union -would mean monopoly and fierce attacks upon it by all outside -interests. With the financing separate, the contracting might be left -free to all competitors, bidding low and resting their bids upon their -repute and responsibility. - -So long as it remained possible for different countries to acquire -special privileges in distinct spheres, promises of "integrity and -sovereignty" would be nothing but empty words. No matter how much they -might promise that they would not discriminate against the trade of -other nations, the fact remains that established position in itself -constitutes preference. - -The favoured nations might more honestly say: "Give us our special -position and we will give you all the equal opportunity you ask." - -Foreign influence could safely be wielded only as a trusteeship -for China and the world, without any vested political interests or -economic advantages secured through political pressure. But Chinese -administration was lax. I urged the Chinese officials to set their -house in order, to put their public accounting on an efficient plane; -even if necessary to employ foreign experts to do this. They said: -"Yes, if the United States will lead," for a long record of square -dealing had endeared our business men to the Chinese. - -But Americans had been slow in China. Two years had fled, and the -Grand Canal was not yet restored as promised. The half million dollars -advanced had been spent on preliminary surveys. Silver had risen; -American gold bought only one half what it had before. Overhead expense -was high, and for the preliminary work more than the half-million was -needed. The Chinese were disappointed, grief-stricken; they began to be -suspicious. - -The Japanese-controlled papers redoubled their attacks on Americans. -Pretty soon a Japanese journal at Tsinanfu assaulted the name and -character of President Wilson. I had an understanding with my Japanese -colleague that all press misstatement should be corrected. I saw him -about this attack on the head of a friendly nation. He promised to -look into it. After ten days I wrote inquiring again. Under the press -laws of Japan, he responded, a paper could indeed be punished for -libellous attack upon the head of a foreign state, provided that such -head happened to be in Japan at the time. As this paper was notoriously -under the domination of the Japanese authorities, amenable to their -very breath and whisper, I failed to see how the minister should find -it hard to bring it to book. I merely called for a retraction where the -Japanese, if a Chinese-owned paper so scurrilously had attacked the -Japanese Emperor, would have asked for total suppression. The Japanese -minister said he would "further consider the matter" and would see what -he could do. A mild apology and retraction were eventually published. - -The action of the Japanese in China, official and unofficial, during -the war, had aroused the deepest resentment among the Chinese, who -were on the verge of despair. The Chinese people were being whirled -in the vortex of old and new. The old organization was beginning to -crumble; the new had not yet taken shape. It was easy to find spots -of weakness and corruption, aggravation of which would bring about an -actual demoralization of social and political life and the obstruction -of every improvement; bandits could be furnished with arms; weak -persons craving a stimulant could be drugged with morphia; the credit -of native institutions could be ruined; and the most corrupt elements -in the government encouraged. For the original weaknesses and evils the -outside influence was not responsible, but it was culpable for making -them its instruments for the achievement of its aims of political -dominion. - -A vast system whose object was the drugging of China with morphia, -which utilized the petty Japanese hucksters and traders throughout the -country, was exposed in the "opium blacklist" published by the British -papers in China. Specific proof was adduced in each case. Often the -blacklist extended over two pages of a paper. Obviously these Japanese -druggists, photographers, and the whole outfit of small-fry traders -could not traffic in morphia without the connivance of the Japanese -Government and the support of semi-official Japanese interests. The -Japanese post offices were used for its distribution in China. Chinese -police interference with the thousands of Japanese purveyors was ruled -out under the exterritoriality agreements. In Korea, the Japanese opium -grown officially for "medicinal uses" was produced far in excess of -medicinal needs, and through the ports of Dairen and Tsingtao large -quantities of morphia came into China. - -The Japanese-controlled press at first answered the blacklist with -charges of _tu quoque_; but when they defamed the American missionary -hospitals, alleging that they were centres for distributing narcotic -drugs, nobody among the Chinese paid further attention to them. The -blacklists mapped graphically the thickly sown morphia "joints" -around the police station of the Japanese settlement at Tientsin and -the responsibility was brought home to Japan. An official Japanese -announcement was evoked that no effort would be spared to stop the -"regrettable, secret, illicit traffic." - -In Shantung Japanese civil administration had been set up along the -railway without a scintilla of right. It was later withdrawn for new -concessions and privileges wrung from the Peking Government. The -Japanese were old masters of this trick. Seize something which you -do not really want, and restore it to its owner if he will give you -something you do want. Then what you want you get, but it is not -"stolen," and can be kept with smug immunity. The arrangements in -Shantung were made secretly, riding roughshod over Chinese rights, -and intended to sterilize in advance the enactments of the Peace -Conference. If a foreign power should wish to own the Pennsylvania -Railway system, and should actually come into the United States and -occupy it, the parallel would be exact with what Japan did in Shantung. -After taking the Shantung Railway and holding it, the Japanese stoutly -claimed an "economic right" to it. The whole course of Japan in China -during the Great War alarmed both Chinese and foreigners. I may not -name the responsible and fair-minded writer of a letter from which I -quote: - - It would be in the highest degree unfortunate if the present - fortuitous and temporary possession of the Leased Territory and - Shantung Railway by Japan should be confirmed by the final Treaty of - Peace, for not only would China's sovereignty in Shantung be in danger - of impairment, but the trading rights of Chinese, Americans, and - Europeans would undoubtedly be prejudiced. - - Another consideration that has the greatest weight with the writer is - that the principles for which the United States entered the European - War and on behalf of which the United States, in common with the - whole world, has paid an unthinkable price in gold and blood, make - unbearable a continuance, not to say accentuation, of the old system - of foreign intrigue in China. It is unbearable that one result of the - victory bought in part with American lives should be the extension - of Japanese power in China, when such extension means the further - strengthening of the domination of a monarchical and imperialistic - foreign nation over China, a result constituting in its own sphere a - complete negation of the objects for which the United States devoted - its entire resources in the war against Germany. - -Dr. Sun Yat Sen wrote me at Shanghai on the 19th of November, referring -both to internal and external troubles, and the union of militarists, -foreign and Chinese: - - Through you alone will the President and the people of the United - States see the true state of affairs in China. Your responsibility - is indeed great. Whether Democracy or Militarism triumphs in China - largely depends upon Your Excellency's moral support of our helpless - people at this stage. - -These words show the Chinese belief in the sheer force of public -opinion, and their wish that the Chinese situation be known and -understood abroad. This achieved, the evils under which China groans -and travails would shrivel. - -We built up our solution of unity for China. In carefully weighed -dispatches I sent it to the American Government, and cabled the -President a statement of China's vital relation to future peace. I was -constrained to condemn Japan's policy, quite deliberately, summing up -the evidence accumulated in the course of five years. I had come to the -Far East admiring the Japanese, friendly to them--my published writings -show this abundantly. I did not lose my earnest goodwill toward the -Japanese people but I could not shut my eyes to Japanese imperialist -politics with its unconscionably ruthless and underhanded actions and -its fundamental lack of every idea of fair play. The continuance -of such methods could only bring disaster; their abandonment is a -condition of peace and real welfare. The aims and methods of Japan's -military policy in the Continent of Asia can bring good to no one, -least of all to the Japanese people, notwithstanding any temporary -gains. Such ambitions cannot permanently succeed. - -A cure can come only when such evils are clearly recognized. -Lip-service to political liberalism might mislead the casually -regardful outside world. To those face to face with what Japanese -militarism was doing to continental Asia there was left no doubt of its -sinister quality. Japan herself needs to be delivered from it, for it -has used the Japanese people, their art and their civilization, for its -own evil ends. More than that, it threatens the peace of the world. If -talk of "a better understanding" presupposes the continuance of such -aims and motives as have actuated Japanese political plot during the -past few years, it is futile. What is needed is a change of heart. - -Here is the substance of the memorandum upon which my cablegram to the -President was based: - - In 1915, coercion was applied and China was forced by threats to - solidify and extend the privileged position of Japan in Manchuria - and Mongolia and to agree prospectively to a like régime in Shantung - together with the beginnings of a special position in Fukien Province. - After this there was a change of methods although the policy tended to - the same end--domination over China. - - Instead of coercion, Japan applied secret and corrupt influence - through alliance with purchasable officials kept in office by Japanese - support. The latter insidious policy is more dangerous because it gave - the appearance that rights are duly acquired through grant of the - Chinese Government; no demands or ultimatums are necessary because - corrupt officials strongly supported by Japanese finance, acting - absolutely in secret channels, suppressing all public discussion with - the strong arm of the police, are able to deliver contractual rights - regular in form, though of corrupt secret origin and evil tendency. - - Japan has used every possible means to demoralize China by creating - and sustaining trouble; by supporting and financing the most - objectionable elements, particularly a group of corrupt and vicious - military governors akin to bandits in their methods; by employing - instigators of trouble; by protection given to bandits; by the - introduction of morphia and opium; by the corruption of officials - through loans, bribes, and threats; by the wrecking of native banks - and the debauching of local currency; by illegal export of the copper - currency of the people; by local attempts to break down the salt - administration; by persistent efforts to prevent China from going into - the war and then seeing to it that China was never in a position to - render to the common cause such aid as would be in her power and as - she would willingly render if left to herself: finally, by utilizing - the war and the preoccupation of the Allies for enmeshing China in the - terms of a secret military alliance. - - As a result of these methods and manipulations, Japan has gained the - following advantages: a consolidation of her special position in - Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, and the foundation of the same in - Shantung and Fukien; control in the matter of Chinese finance through - the control of the Bank of Communications and the Bureau of Public - Printing and the appointment of a high financial adviser together with - the adoption of the unsound gold-note scheme happily not yet put in - force. She has secured extensive railway concessions in Manchuria, - Shantung, Chihli, and Kiangsu; mining rights in various provinces; - and special monopolistic rights through the Kirin forestry loan, the - telephone loan, and others. Through the secret military convention - Japan attempts not only to control the military policy of China but - incidentally national resources such as iron deposits. All these - arrangements are so secretly made that in most cases not even the - Foreign Office is in possession of the documents relating thereto. - Together with this goes the persistent assertion of special interests - which are interpreted as giving a position of predominance. - - This is a strong indictment and I feel the fullest responsibility in - making these statements. Fundamentally friendly to the Japanese as my - published expressions show, I have been forced through the experience - of five years to the conclusion that the methods applied by the - Japanese military masters can lead only to evil and destruction and - also that they will not be stopped by any consideration of fairness - and justice but only by the definite knowledge that such action will - not be tolerated. - - As a steady stream of information from every American official in - China and from every other source as well as my own experience have - made this conclusion inevitable, I owe the duty to state it to the - American Government in no uncertain terms. Nor is this said in any - spirit of bitterness against the Japanese people but from the - conviction that the policy pursued by their military masters can - in the end bring only misery and woe to them and the world. During - all this period it has not been possible for the European powers - or the United States to do anything for China. The United States, - though assisting all other Allies financially, could not contribute - one dollar toward maintaining the financial independence of China - as undivided attention was needed to the requirements of the west - front. The Lansing-Ishii notes, undoubtedly intended to express a - friendly attitude toward any legitimate aspirations of Japan while - safeguarding the rights of China, were perverted by the Japanese into - an acknowledgment of their privileged position in China. Now at last, - when the pressure has been released, America as well as the European - countries must face the issue which has been created, that is, whether - a vast, peaceable, and industrious population whose most articulate - desire is to be allowed to develop their own life in the direction of - free and just government, shall become material to be moulded by the - secret plottings of a foreign military despotism into an instrument of - its power. If it is said that the aims of Japan are now but economic - and in just response to the needs of Japan's expanding population, it - must be remembered that every advantage is gained and maintained by - political and military pressure and that it is exploited by the same - means in a fashion, taking no account of the rights of other foreign - nations or of the Chinese themselves. Divested of their political - character and military aims the economic activities of Japan would - arouse no opposition. - - Only the refusal to accept the results of Japanese secret manipulation - in China during the last four years, particularly, the establishment - of Japanese political influence and a special privilege position in - Shantung can avert the result of either making China a dependence of a - reckless and boundlessly ambitious military caste which would destroy - the peace of the entire world, or bringing on a military struggle - inevitable from the establishment of rival spheres of interest and - local privilege in China. - - Peace is conditioned on the abolition for the present and future - of all localized privileges. China must be freed from all foreign - political influence exercised within her borders, railways controlled - by foreign governments, and preferential arrangements supported by - political power. If this is done, China will readily master her own - trouble, particularly if the military bandits hitherto upheld by Japan - shall no longer have the countenance of any foreign power. - - The advantages enumerated above were gained by Japan when she was - professedly acting as the trustee of the Associated Powers in the - Far East, and they could not have been obtained at all but for the - sacrifices made by them in Europe. They are therefore not the - exclusive concern of any one power. With respect to Shantung the - German rights there lapsed, together with all Chino-German treaties, - upon the declaration of war. A succession of treaty rights from - Germany to Japan is therefore not possible, and the recognition of - a special position of Japan in Shantung could only proceed from - a new act to which conceivably some weak Chinese officials might - be induced but which would be contrary to the frequently declared - aims of international policy in China and which would amount to the - definitive establishment of exclusive spheres of influence in China - leading in turn to the more vigorous development of such exclusive - spheres by other nations. The present situation of affairs offers the - last opportunity by common consent to avert threatening disaster by - removing the root of conflict in China. - - Never before has an opportunity for leadership toward the welfare - of humanity presented itself equal to that which invites America in - China at the present time. The Chinese people ask for no better fate - than to be allowed freedom to follow in the footsteps of America; - every device of intrigue and corruption as well as coercion is being - employed to force them in a different direction, including constant - misrepresentation of American policies and aims which, however, has - not as yet prejudiced the Chinese. Nor is it necessary for America to - exercise any political influence. If it were only known that America - in concert with the liberal powers would not tolerate the enslavement - of China either by foreign or native militarists the natural - propensity of the Chinese to follow liberal inclinations would guide - this vast country toward free government and propitious development of - peaceful industrial activities, even through difficulties unavoidable - in the transition of so vast and ancient a society to new methods of - action. - - But if China should be disappointed in her confidence at the present - time the consequences of such disillusionment on her moral and - political development would be disastrous, and we instead of looking - across the Pacific toward a peaceable, industrial nation, sympathetic - with our ideals, would be confronted with a vast materialistic - military organization under ruthless control. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIX - -JAPAN SHOWS HER TEETH - - -Mr. Obata had succeeded Baron Hayashi as Japanese minister in -December. He was a dour, silent man who had been much in China, as -consular officer and in the Legation. He had sat with Mr. Hioki in the -conferences in which the twenty-one demands were pressed on China. -He was known to be a very direct representative, in the diplomatic -service, of the militarist masters of Japan. His appointment was to -the Chinese ominous of a continuance of aggressive tactics. A wail of -indignation went up from the Chinese press, but Mr. Obata remained. In -my personal relations with this secretive man I thought I saw gradually -emerging a broader and more humane outlook. - -The new Japanese minister called on the 2nd of February, 1919, at -the Foreign Office and expressed resentment at the attitude of the -Chinese delegation at Paris. The Chinese representatives had said they -were willing to publish all the secret agreements which the diplomacy -of Nippon had been weaving around China. Japan objected. The sacred -treaties between China and Japan were not to be divulged without the -consent of both parties. If China was so anxious to purge herself of -secret diplomacy, let her publish first the agreement of September -24, 1918, which gave the special privileges of Germany in Shantung to -Japan. The displeasure of the Japanese in Paris was reënforced by Mr. -Obata in Peking by what the Chinese took to be a veiled threat. "Great -Britain," said he, "is preoccupied with internal disorders. She cannot -assist China. But Japan is fully able to assist, as she has a navy of -500,000 tons, and an army of more than a million men ready for action." - -The Shantung agreement had been the consummation of the -Japanese-controlled Minister of Communications. The Chinese Foreign -Office was not consulted when the Chinese minister at Tokyo signed it, -and it had not been ratified by the Chinese Government. The Chinese -people viewed it merely as a draft, and demanded its cancellation with -the return to Japan of the moneys received under it by the politicians. - -Mr. Obata's threat, which the Chinese took to be an attempt to -intimidate the Chinese delegation at Paris, evoked a deluge of -telegraphic messages urging the President and the Government by all -possible means to back their delegates. These expressions came from -men of all parties. Chen Lu, Acting Foreign Minister, tried in vain -to minimize the effect of the interview. Called before the Chamber of -Representatives in secret session, he said that the newspaper reports -had been "somewhat exaggerated," and added: "In this time when the -right and justice of the Allied Powers have definitely destroyed -militarism and despotism, we Chinese, although as yet a weak country, -may consider every menace of foreign aggression as a thing of the past, -and accept it with a smile." - -The Government at first cabled the Paris delegation not to make -the secret treaties public; they were not held to be valid by the -Chinese Government, and publication might lend them force. Later, -the Government cabled, leaving it entirely to the discretion of the -delegates. The diplomatic commission of the Chin Pu Tang recommended -this. Meanwhile, Mr. Liang Chi-chao had gone to France. He meant to go -by way of the United States, where I had prepared for him an itinerary -and letters of introduction. Then his intimate associate, Tang -Hua-lung, was assassinated in Vancouver. Liang, fearful of a similar -fate, went straight to France, evading the Kuo Min Tang sympathizers in -America. Ex-Premier Hsiung Hsi-ling told me that Liang was to inform -the Chinese delegates unofficially about the state of things in China. - -This was so bad that the American recommendation that the powers keep -their money away from either party until China was reunited looked -more and more desirable. An influential and responsible Chinese, who -talked with me about the clique that ran the War Participation Bureau, -made this statement: "The danger to China is in the efforts of Tuan's -militarists. Japan is giving them money to build up an army. With this -they will try to overawe the President and force him to fall in with -their aims. The negotiations for peace with the south will cease; the -war with the south will go on." - -One of the most burning questions both to private individuals and -the press was how to oblige Japan and her officials to cease their -support of the northern militarists by the sending of money and -arms. Certainly a fire was built under them. The Japanese minister -called on me on the 9th of January to say that his government would -now join in a declaration on financial assistance to China. He had -to make reservations about the loan of 20,000,000 yen, pledged in -connection with the secret military agreement, also as to the so-called -"industrial" loans. The secret loan arrangement had been made with -three Japanese banks: the Bank of Chosen, the Industrial Bank of Japan, -and the Bank of Formosa, by the War Participation Bureau. With this, -the minister said, he could not interfere. Also, his government was -in principle favouring a restriction of the sale of arms, as America -recommended; but it would be best for the powers to say nothing -about it, as their joint statement would be taken as an attempt to -restrain Japan, which was the only country able to furnish arms to -China. Besides, the War Participation Bureau had a troublesome private -contract for arms with the Tayeh Company, which the Government felt it -couldn't interfere with. So there you are, as Henry James would put it. - -I told the Japanese minister that we were not proposing any platonic -arrangement as Americans were both able and willing to furnish arms -to the Chinese under legitimate contracts, if the American Government -would permit it. Moreover, as to the transaction of those three -Japanese banks--since the Government of Japan had an interest both in -them and in the munitions company mentioned, their alliance with the -War Participation Bureau would be dissociated with difficulty in the -public mind from the Japanese Government. - -The War Participation Bureau clique was actually getting ready to equip -an army against the south while the North-and-South Peace Conference -was sitting at Shanghai. Tang Shao-yi, chief peace representative of -the south, formally remonstrated to the British minister, as dean of -the diplomatic corps, against such doings of this "Bureau" and its -Japanese support. - -Now, the Bureau had been established as its name implied, to facilitate -participation of China in the Great War. Japan's financial support -of it was ostensibly given also in behalf of the other Allies. If it -were to be prostituted to the fomenting of civil war the others as -well could not escape responsibility. A meeting was held on the 12th -of February by the Allied and Associated ministers. Several strongly -urged that outside money continually given for recruiting of troops was -opposed to the aim of restoring settled conditions in China and to the -policy of the joint declaration of December. The Japanese minister was -silent. He said he must await instructions. - -He informed me on February 21st that Japan had called a halt on the -shipping of ammunition and equipment to the War Participation Bureau, -but the payment of the balance of the loan could not be stopped. Just -then, as it happened, an American firm would soon be ready to begin -delivery of a certain amount of equipment in China, contracted for in -good faith during the previous August. America had proposed a joint -declaration against the furnishing of arms, which Japan had blocked. As -the declaration had not been made, I could not then stop the American -delivery though I did so later. But America would still be only too -glad to join in the declaration as proposed. - -As the Japanese were still paying the loan funds into the War -Participation Bureau, another diplomatic "indignation meeting" was -held about it on March 6th. The Japanese minister said his banks could -not help paying over those funds, but he had suggested to the Chinese -Government that it might be well, in the circumstances, to refrain from -drawing the money; Japan could not object to this. Forthwith one of the -ministers spoke up: "Then let us all make this recommendation which -Japan has made." - -At this the Japanese minister was taken aback, almost shocked. He had -always argued that the War Participation Bureau was a Chinese internal -affair, not one in which the powers that had helped form it should -presume to dip. But the suggestion was quickly adopted. As a result, -the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United -States, all solemnly called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, -expressing their opinion that to draw the war participation funds was -not advisable, as it constituted an obstacle to internal peace. - -But Japan's advice had been merely for the record, not at all to -be acted upon. Soon there came over to Sir John Jordan an informal -memorandum from the Foreign Office, taking the Japanese line of thought -that the War Participation Bureau was China's internal affair. It -might be construed as an intimation that we were meddling. Indeed, two -Chinese of high position told me that the President and the Premier had -held up the memorandum for several days for fear that it might give -offense, until the Minister of War absolutely insisted upon its being -sent. - -Through these two men I sent a quiet intimation to the President that -withdrawal of the memorandum would prevent unpleasant feelings among -men who were sincerely friendly to him and to China. The memorandum was -pulled back without delay; thereupon all the Chinese officials, except -the few directly connected with the War Participation Bureau, rejoiced. - -The five representatives who signed the original declaration of -December met again on the 11th of March, because the French minister -had instructions favouring action upon the Bureau. The Japanese -minister advanced his arguments about its being China's business, -not ours. But the others took the view that as it was an Allied war -institution and Japan had dealt directly with it, it was quasi-external -in character. "Is it not quite clear," protested the Japanese minister, -"that the loan was purely a commercial affair, made by certain banks, -and not controlled by the Japanese Government?" How, then, it was asked -in reply, does it happen that in connection with this loan, officers of -the Japanese army had been assigned to the War Participation Bureau as -advisers and instructors; was it customary to make such extraordinary -arrangements in connection with a purely commercial transaction? - -"I am not sufficiently informed," Mr. Obata responded evasively. "I -shall have to refer to the reports of these transactions." - -The position of Japan in this matter was so patently equivocal that -it was amusing. We decided that we should make it plain that as this -bureau was created to further our common purposes, we could not -acquiesce in any political action or in the use of any money which -would tend to prolong internal strife. - -The Japanese minister on the 1st of March had notified the Chinese -Government that no further deliveries of arms would be made to the War -Participation Bureau pending the termination of the North-and-South -Peace Conference at Shanghai. We proposed to follow this up with joint -action. Certain representatives were uninstructed, though they favoured -frowning on the arms imports. Finally eight powers united "effectively -to restrain their subjects and citizens from importing into China arms -and munitions of war until the establishment of a government whose -authority is recognized throughout the whole country." This included -the delivery of arms under contracts already made but not executed. I -could then warn the American firm not to execute its contract for the -time being, and I did so. - -From time to time, since the early spring of 1918, Baron Sakatani, -Japanese ex-Minister of Finance, had been in Peking. Mr. Liang -Chi-chao, when as Minister of Finance he made his Japanese loans, had -held out the possibility of the appointment of a Japanese financial -advisor. The Baron was an old acquaintance of mine and I held him -in high regard; but, in view of the fact that I could not consider -this time a proper one for settling the matter of the financial -advisorships, I had to distinguish between my personal feelings for him -and the official stand which I might have to take. A Japanese friend -wrote me in connection with Baron Sakatani's visit to China: "A section -of our capitalists have been given every facility to make money and -to lend it to China; with the money squeezed from them, the military -bureaucrats have been corrupting party men and sending them to China -and elsewhere, to exploit the warring nations while they are busy with -the war. The civilian officials and militarists cannot think anything -except in terms of German fear or admiration. If such Japanese are -employed by the Peking government, it will forever alienate Chinese -sympathies from anything we may propose." - -Baron Sakatani from the first had nursed the ambition of being made -currency adviser to the Chinese Government; by January, 1919, it -appeared that his wish was to be fulfilled. The Japanese minister -announced that the other nations had agreed to the Baron's appointment. -I had not agreed to it. I had heard nothing whatever about it and had -consistently and energetically opposed any action of this sort. I -considered that it would permanently determine the course to be taken -with regard to currency loans, and would preclude the possibility of -any consultation with the United States. I requested the Minister of -Finance to defer the appointment until I could consult my government. -The next development came on the 20th when the Japanese minister -handed me a memorandum which referred to the personal goodwill I had -expressed to Baron Hayashi and which went on to state that the proposed -appointment of Baron Sakatani had been sanctioned by Mr. Lansing in -Washington. - -I cabled to Washington, receiving therefrom on the 30th instructions -saying that the appointment of a currency adviser should be settled -only after full consultation by all concerned, and that Mr. Lansing had -not committed himself to any other understanding. I sent a note to the -Minister of Finance, stating that as one of the parties to the Currency -Loan Agreement, the United States wished that action be postponed -until further consideration could be given. I was immediately assured -that the position taken would be considered as final. As a personal -friend I regretted that Baron Sakatani could not be retained, but in -so important a matter it was impossible to stand aside while action -was rushed through which would be prejudicial to the long-established -interests of the powers who were, at the time, preoccupied with -after-war problems. - - - - -CHAPTER XXX - -BANDITS, INTRIGUERS, AND A HOUSE DIVIDED - - -There is a phase of Chinese life which I should touch upon if the -picture I am trying to give of the China I knew is to be complete. - -Brigandage is an established institution in China, where it has -operated so long that people have become accustomed to it and take -it for granted as a natural visitation. At this time there was a -vicious circle around which brigands and troops and rich citizens and -villagers were travelling, one in pursuit of the other. The brigands -were recruited from disbanded soldiers--men who had lost connection -with their family and clan. Often their families had been wiped out -by famine, flood, or disease, or had been killed in the revolution. -At other times the individual may have lost touch through a fault -of his own causing him to be cast out. It is very difficult for an -isolated person, without family and clan connections, to reëstablish -himself. The easiest way is to enlist in the army. If that cannot be -done, he becomes a brigand. Brigands foregather in provinces where the -administration is lax or in remote regions difficult to reach. They lie -in ambush and seize wealthy persons, who are carried off to the hills -and released only when ransom is paid. In this way, a considerable -tax is levied on accumulated wealth. This money the brigands spend -among the villagers where they happen to be. Meanwhile, the Provincial -Governor bethinks himself that a certain brigade or division has -not been paid for a long time and therefore might cause trouble, -so he announces what is called a "country cleansing campaign." The -situation is so intolerable that the general sees himself forced to -go to extremes, and to send his troops with orders to exterminate the -brigands. They proceed to the infested regions; the brigands, having -meanwhile got wind of these movements, depart for healthier climes, -leaving the troops to quarter themselves on the villagers, who are by -them relieved of the money which they have made out of the brigands. -Some brigands may be unfortunate enough to be caught; some will be shot -as an example, and others will be allowed to enlist. When the soldiers -have dwelt for a while among the villagers, they report that the -bands have now been fully suppressed and that the country is cleaned. -They are then recalled to headquarters; their general reports to the -governor, and is appropriately rewarded. Meanwhile, the brigands return -from their safer haunts and begin again to catch wealthy people, whom -they relieve of their surplus liquidable property. And so the circle -revolves interminably. - -A little more efficiency in China would deliver it of much of its -intriguing and all of its banditry. Returning to Peking from a trip -to the Philippines I found that Mr. Kyle, an American engineer on the -Siems-Carey railway survey, and Mr. Purcell, another employé, had been -seized by bandits in a remote part of Honan. The bandits took a large -sum of silver these men were carrying to pay off the surveying parties -farther up toward Szechuan, then they decided to hold Kyle and Purcell -for ransom. - -Doctor Tenney, the Chinese secretary, was in Kaifengfu, stirring up -the provincial governor to hurry the release of the men. The company -was quite ready to pay the ransom, and I could easily have induced -the Chinese Government to pay it. I was advised that this would be -the only certain way of rescuing the men, but I felt it would be -a dangerous precedent; as the bandits would then go on taking and -holding foreigners for ransom. Mr. Kyle was neither young nor robust. -I feared for the strenuous life and the worry he was undergoing, but -waited two weeks for the Central and the Provincial Government, which -I made responsible, to get them back. One night, Mr. Purcell escaped. -I then through Doctor Tenney notified the Governor-General that he -must surround the entire region where the bandits were, telling them -emphatically that if anything happened to Mr. Kyle the band would be -hunted down and exterminated. - -The threat was "got across" to the bandits, and with it a promise that -those instrumental in restoring the captive would escape punishment -and in some way be rewarded. After a week's further suspense Mr. -Kyle was delivered to the pursuing troops and forthwith returned to -Peking. The chief of the band was rewarded with a commission in the -army; his henchmen were enlisted as soldiers. But those who had no -part in the delivery were one by one caught and executed. So, in the -end, a salutary example was set to keep bandits from interfering with -foreigners. - -Mr. Kyle moved with the band every night in their mountainous and -inaccessible region. Over divides they went from valley to valley. Mr. -Kyle kept his normal health, but complained that they had not let him -sleep. He snored so loudly, the bandits told him, that they feared he -would attract the notice of the troops; so, during the final ten days, -he had not had a solid hour of sleep. But he made up his mind that he -would keep his mental equipoise and his physical fitness in order to -live through the experience. - -Two woman missionaries had been taken at about the same time by bandits -in Shantung Province. But they were released after a few days. The -missionaries of the society they belonged to circulated a pamphlet -somewhat later, pointing out the superior efficacy of prayer over -diplomatic intervention. In response to prayer these two teachers had -been freed within a week; whereas all our diplomatic efforts had not -yet secured the release of the American engineer. - -Fear of foreign displeasure lost the Chinese the chance to get the -services of a great engineer. Before going to the Philippines I had -been visited by Mr. Ostrougoff, Minister of Railways in Kerensky's -time, who had inaugurated the Russian agreement under which Mr. John -F. Stevens was given the task of helping to reorganize the Russian -railways. The work had been prevented by disturbed conditions. Admiral -Kolchak, together with Alexis Staal, had also called on me, with -others who had faith in the beginnings of a representative political -organization in Siberia. I recall Kolchak's fine, serious face, and his -manner which was that of a man under the strain imposed by duties that -transcend any mere personal interest. On my return, John F. Stevens -came to Peking for a month. He was discouraged by the Russian and -Siberian situation. The general breakdown, the social revolution, and -the establishment of soviets had demolished the chances for carrying -out his railway plans in Russia. No organized authority had backed -him. In Peking he studied the Chinese railway situation. In his quiet, -thorough-going way, he looked into the whole question for China; it was -not long before he had great confidence in its possibilities. I felt -it would be a godsend if a man of his genius for original planning and -constructive work, proved in the great Panama Canal project; a man, -moreover, who had intimate experience of American railway operation, -could work out with the Chinese a systematic plan for developing their -railway service. The Chinese would have eagerly welcomed this chance, -but they were not free. The engagement of one foreigner would have -brought demands to employ many more. - -This was in the spring of 1918. I called on Mr. Liang Shih-yi to greet -him on his return from exile. "The urgent thing," he said, "is to -put a stop to military interference with the civil government. The -question of a parliament is not quite so important, but, as it has been -put to the fore, it must be solved first. My solution is to elect a -new parliament under the old law. Then reduce the army and separate -military from civilian affairs." - -Liang described to me the characteristics of the nine chief southern -leaders. They were rivals, they had their hostilities; no three leaders -would agree. Two would come to an understanding, and the rest would -turn and rend them. Finally, he predicted that Hsu Shih-chang would be -the most likely candidate for President, Tuan having declined. - -In Hunan the northern and southern troops were still fighting and -inflicting suffering on the people there; General Chang Chin-yao, -in particular, an opium-smoking gambler and corrupter, the military -governor of Hunan; his troops destroyed certain property belonging to -missionaries. American and British residents of Changsha, the capital, -petitioned the British and American ministers for protection to foreign -life and property. I had learned that the governor put no bridle on -his troops. With my British and Japanese colleagues I insisted that -commanding officers be held personally and individually responsible -for injuries to foreigners. We pointed out that Chang, especially, -was under observation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs delivered -a warning, and Admiral Knight, whom I had fully advised, ordered a -gunboat to Changsha. - -Meanwhile, the War Participation Bureau, created to aid the Associated -Powers in the Great War, was watched by Japan. Because of it they made -their special military convention of which General Tuan had spoken -to me, using the revolution in Russia and the rise of Bolshevism as -their pretext. The Japanese militarist element in the Government was -active and urgent, and General Aoki at Peking and General Tanaka at -Tokyo were leaving no stone unturned to aid them. They sought at first -a general military alliance. The Chinese would not consider anything -so sweeping. Then the unrest in Siberia was made the basis of more -limited coöperation. In March a preliminary entente was formed; China -and Japan would consider in common the measures to be taken to cope -with the Russian situation and to take part in the present war, and the -means and conditions of coöperation would be arranged by the military -and naval authorities of both countries. - -War participation in general was thus put into the purview of mutual -agreement between Japan and China. While no general military alliance -was concluded, nevertheless the Japanese could now control what was to -be done by China in the war. It meant that China would do nothing. - -The terms of the military and naval conventions on methods of -coöperating, concluded the 16th of May, flexibly permitted Japan in -certain circumstances to control Chinese railways and resources. The -whole thing was managed secretly. The public became suspicious of the -results, since the chief arrangements were made not by the cabinet or -the Foreign Office, but by the military and naval representatives. -Would China longer freely coöperate with the other Allies? Would she -not be under Japan's strict leadership? Was not this the entering wedge -for a complete control of Chinese military affairs by Japan? Would not -Chinese militarism be strengthened and made obedient to Japanese policy? - -Japan's acts in Shantung gave these questions pertinence. There she was -expropriating by eminent domain; in Tsingtau the Japanese authorities -thus acquired about twelve square miles of land, including the shore -of Kiaochow Bay for several miles, which gave control of every land -approach and every possible steamship and railway terminal in this -port. Plainly, Japan was carrying out a policy of permanent occupation. - -While the Chino-Japanese entente was being negotiated, -Japanese-controlled papers in China were preaching enmity to the white -race. In May a Japanese parliamentary party visited China, making -speeches calculated to stir racial feeling. The burden of the appeals -was that, after the war, European nations would try to fasten their -control more firmly on China, hence the yellow race should now unite in -timely opposition. - -Mr. Nishihara, close associate of the Japanese Premier, General -Terauchi, was unofficially doing the financial business of Japan in -China. The Japanese Legation could deny that negotiations were going -on, while Japanese interests were actively influencing the financial -measures of the Peking Government. A large loan was proposed, to be -secured on the tobacco and wine revenues. They were the security for -the existing American loan, with option for further advances. I asked -Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of Finance, about this and his answer was: "The -United States is not giving to China the assistance she gives to her -other associates in the war. The American bankers have not completed -their contract. It is necessary for China to look elsewhere." - -Mr. Tsao said he would at any time consider American proposals and give -them as favourable treatment as to any other nation. I asked assurances -that before anything further was done on the basis of the tobacco and -wine revenues, the American bank have a chance to consider a proposal -from the Chinese Government under its option. The minister had denied -that the revenues were now in any way involved; but at this request he -sidestepped. I made the most of his denial, placing it on record in a -note to the Foreign Office. The French minister took action similar -to mine. Tsao was not only Minister of Finance; he was concurrently -Minister of Communications. Both departments, therefore, were under the -thumb of Japan. - -I have rather rapidly sketched the state of affairs within China up -to July of 1918. I wished a personal discussion of the situation -with the officials at Washington--my first since America's entrance -into the war. I left Peking for the United States after another long -interview with General Tuan, who had become Premier. On June 27th the -Premier stated to me his policy and motives with frankness. "If we stop -military action," he said, "that would be interpreted as weakness. The -south would only make more extravagant demands, and further encroach on -northern territory. Force that is adequate--that answers the question. -For this we need money. If home revenues are not enough, then we must -have foreign loans. That will restore national unity, which, in turn, -will make repayment easy. The army will be reformed. The people will -get protection, and the country will prosper." - -This policy was wise, inevitable, he thought. But it suited a class of -inept generals who systematically made war at home, with only moderate -risk of actual fighting. Their methods involved money more than -bayonets. - -"When you return from America," Tuan said at parting, "everything will -be settled, and the south will recognize our authority." - -A sea-borne war expedition, sent to conquer the south, was in his mind. -I could not but express my conviction of the impossibility of such an -achievement but he was obstinate. - -I divided my time in America between Washington and New York, save for -a visit to my mother. In four weeks I saw representatives of most of -the great interests, public and private, involved in China. I by no -means stopped with the State Department. I saw the Secretary of War -and the Adjutant General, on questions dealing with the recruiting -of troops to be stationed in China; the Intelligence Division of the -War Department and of the Navy, as well as the Committee on Public -Information; the Secretary of Commerce, and officials of the War -Trade Board and War Industries Board, about restrictions on commerce -and American commercial developments in China, together with the men -of the Shipping Board about trans-Pacific lines. Among great private -organizations I conferred with members of the National City Bank; J.P. -Morgan & Company; the Guaranty Trust Company of New York; Kuhn, Loeb & -Company; the General Electric and American Locomotive companies; the -Standard Oil Company of New York; the International Banking Corporation -and American International Corporation; the Chase National Bank; -the Siems-Carey Company; Pacific Development Corporation, and the -Continental & Commercial Bank of Chicago. - -The American policy with respect to Russia and Siberia had not been -determined, and in interviews with President Wilson the Siberian -problem, to which I had been very close, as well as Chinese finance, -were subjects of particular attention. I showed to the President how -the Chinese got loans for alleged industrial purposes; then, with the -connivance of the lenders, instead of building railways and telephone -systems, they diverted them to political or partisan ends. Thus Chinese -credit and the authority of the Government were progressively weakened. -Then foreigners would encroach, and in some fields American opportunity -was in danger of being restricted or lost entirely. I wished to see -the United States backing financially a sound programme of Chinese -reorganization. That would accord with our traditions. But jealousies -and friction were to be eliminated, hence I favoured the forming of an -International Public Loan Consortium. - -This would support the credit of the Chinese Government and put Chinese -finance on a sound basis. Such a consortium would claim priority in -making all administrative or political loans; but monopoly should -be avoided by leaving contracts for building and supplies open to -competition, and by letting outside financiers make industrial loans. -Of course, the Consortium as the chief backer of China should have full -information about industrial loans, and each government should engage -to scrutinize all loans made by its nationals for industries. All this, -at his request, went to the President in a memorandum submitted on the -14th of August. - -With respect to Siberia and Russia, my information led me to believe -that the Russian people might still be influenced to remain friendly -to the Allies, so as to prevent the growth of German control. I had in -mind, not intervention, but economic assistance. I urged a commission -that would aid the Russian people to import the commodities they -needed most. The Russian Coöperative societies were anxious for just -such assistance; thus, their leaders believed, further unfavourable -developments could be prevented. I knew the Russians to be universally -friendly; any movement initiated by America would be received with -extreme goodwill. - -President Wilson seemed to wish something like this to be carried -out. He even discussed with me what men were most likely to succeed -in organizing so huge an enterprise. But he feared to place a -representative of "big business" in such a position; men would suspect -selfish national motives. I felt that he wished America to lead in -giving the Russian people such aid in reorganizing their economic life -as would permanently benefit them and preserve them for our common -cause. - -After many, many departments and boards were consulted, I found they -were not thinking of China. Their chief problem was to train the -American army and transport it to the western front. They did not care -to get Chinese contingents there. This was the critical moment of -the war. By comparison other interests shrivelled. As for financial -advances to China, the Government found that China entered the war -after the law authorizing advances was passed. A new law would be -needed. To propose it would bring up the whole question of war policy. -The temper of the day was to concentrate every effort on the greatest -immediate show of strength on the west front. I appreciated all this, -but I deeply regretted that a tiny rivulet out of the vast streams of -financial strength directed to Europe could not pass to China. Even -one thousandth part of the funds given to Europe, invested in building -up China, would have prevented many disheartening and disastrous -developments. For every dollar tenfold in value would have been gained -in fortifying Chinese ability to help in the war and in the post-bellum -recovery. - - - - -CHAPTER XXXI - -YOUNG MEN IN PEKING, OLD MEN IN PARIS - - -A crowd of students appeared before the legation gate on the 5th of May -clamouring to see me. I was absent, that day, on a trip to the temple -above Men Tou-kou and so missed seeing them. Their demonstration, as -it turned out afterward, was the first step in the widespread student -movement which was to make history. Their patriotic fervour had, on -that morning, been brought to the boiling point by the first inkling of -the Paris decision on Shantung. - -The first reaction of the Chinese people as a whole to this news was -one of dumb dismay. It was a stunning, paralyzing blow. It seemed -that all the brazen intrigue through which Japan had been seeking to -strengthen her hold on Shantung, all the cunning by which she had -prepared the basis of her claim to permanent possession of the German -rights, had been endorsed by the Versailles Conference. - -The Chinese people, discouraged in Peking, had centred their hopes on -Paris. When hints of a possible acceptance of Japan's demands were -received in Peking, the first impulse of the students was to see the -American minister, to ask him whether this news was true, and to see -what he had to say. I escaped a severe ordeal. - -When they were told that I was absent there was at first a hum of -voices, then came the cry: "To the house of the traitor!" They meant -the house of Tsao Ju-lin, where the schemers had assembled to make the -contracts which China hated. Tsao Ju-lin, the smooth little plotter -whom most people regarded as the guiding spirit of the humiliating -business, was the most despised; but they associated with him Chang -Ching-hsiang, who had been Chinese minister at Tokyo when the secret -treaties were drawn up. The students rushed over to the house and -broke down the door and trooped inside. They found both men there. No -time was lost, either on the part of the students or their prey. The -students breaking up chairs and tables and using pieces of them for -weapons went after the two diplomats. Tsao, still smooth and slippery, -managed to escape through a window and into a narrow alley where he -eluded his pursuers. Chang, however, was beaten into insensibility. -Lu Tsung-yu, the other plotter whom the students would have "treated -rough", was not to be found. - -For four days we were without foreign news. The first brief telegraphic -intimation of the Paris decision was followed by the cutting of the -wires; Japanese agents, the people surmised, did this to prevent the -universal Chinese protest from influencing the decision or causing its -review. - -Primarily the cause of the student violence lay in the proximity of the -fourth anniversary of the Japanese ultimatum of 1915; but they were -also anxious and stirred because of the reported action of the old men -at Paris. - -While other telegraphic communication was cut off I got information of -what was actually done by wireless. I found it hard to believe that -President Wilson would be compliant to the Japanese demands, in View -of the complete and insistent information the American Government had -had from me and all other American officials in China as to what would -result from such action. The Shantung decision constituted a wrong -of far-reaching effect; no general benefits bestowed by a league of -nations could outweigh it. Indeed, as I stated to the Government, it -destroyed all confidence in a league of nations which had such an ugly -fact as its cornerstone. - -To any one who had watched, day by day, month by month, the -unconscionable plotting for these claims, the decision was a lamentable -denial of every principle put forward during the war. President Wilson -brushed aside the unanimous opinion of the American experts, it would -seem, for two reasons: first, he believed that if only the League were -established, all difficulties of detail could easily be resolved; and, -second, he had not given enough attention to the Shantung question to -realize that this was not a matter of detail, but a fundamental issue. - -President Wilson tried to make himself and others believe that with the -acceptance of the Treaty and Covenant, the Shantung question would be -solved through fulfilment by Japan of its promise "to restore Shantung -Peninsula to China with full sovereignty," reserving only economic -rights. This was his primary misconception. The ownership by a foreign -government of a trunk railway reaching from a first-class port to -the heart of China could not be correctly termed an economic right. -Political control of such "economic rights" was exactly what American -policy had tried to prevent for decades. The President submitted, also, -in the apparent fear that Japanese delegates might follow the lead of -the Italians and leave the Conference. Colonel House, it appears, was -frightened into this belief and communicated it to President Wilson; -the two believed the League was endangered, and that every sacrifice -must be made to save it. - -The fear was quite unfounded. I had seen indications enough, of which -I had told the Government, that the Japanese set enormous store upon -their membership in the Conference and their position in Paris. As a -military, naval, and financial power, Japan could certainly not be put -in the first class, notwithstanding the tactical advantages which the -war had brought her. She would never forego the first-class status -bestowed by the arrangements of the Peace Conference. The Japanese had -not the remotest idea of throwing these advantages to the wind. The -impression they produced on Colonel House simply proved their capacity -for bluffing. Had President Wilson taken the trouble to understand -the situation, he could without difficulty, by the use of friendly -firmness, have secured a very different solution. As a matter of fact, -it is now well known that the Japanese were ready to agree to an -arrangement whereby the German rights in China should accrue to the -Allied and Associated Powers jointly with an early reversion to China. - -Probably nowhere else in the world had expectations of America's -leadership at Paris been raised so high as in China. The Chinese -trusted America, they trusted the frequent declarations of principle -uttered by President Wilson, whose words had reached China in its -remotest parts. The more intense was their disappointment and -disillusionment due to the decisions of the old men that controlled -the Peace Conference. It sickened and disheartened me to think how the -Chinese people would receive this blow which meant the blasting of -their hopes and the destruction of their confidence in the equity of -nations. - -In the universal despair I feared a revulsion of feeling against -America; not because we were more to blame than others for the unjust -decision, but because the Chinese had entertained a deeper belief in -our power, influence, and loyalty to principle. They would hardly -understand so abject and complete a surrender. Foreign papers, also, -placed the chief responsibility on the United States. The British in -China felt that their government had been forced into the unfortunate -secret agreements with Japan when it could not help itself, because of -the German danger and the difficulties Japan might raise by going over -to the other side. The United States, whose hands were free, could have -saved us all, they said, by insisting on the right solution. They had -really hoped for this; their saying so now in their editorials and in -private conversation was in no spirit of petty hostility, but they had -to give vent to their feelings. I feared the Chinese might feel that -they had been betrayed in the house of their friends, but they met the -blow with sturdy spirit. They never wounded my feelings by anything -approaching an upbraiding of the United States for the part that -President Wilson played at Paris. They expressed to me their terrible -dejection, but said merely that President Wilson must have encountered -very great difficulties which they could know nothing about. - -They all knew, of course, that the case of China had been weakened -by the treaties made through the connivance of Tsao Ju-lin and his -associates in the fall of 1918. Their resentment was turned toward -Japan, which had thus taken advantage of the war and the weakness of -China, and against the Chinese politicians who had become Japan's tools. - -The Americans in China, as well as the British and the Chinese, were -deeply dejected during these difficult weeks. From the moment America -entered the war there had been a triumphant confidence that all this -sacrifice and suffering would establish just principles of world -action, under which mankind could live more happily and in greater -security. That hope was now all but crushed. - -In commemoration of the soldier dead, the American community gathered -on May 30th, Decoration Day. It fell to me to make the address, in -which I spoke of those recently stationed in Peking who had died during -the war. Especially, I spoke of the fruitful career of Major Willard -Straight. It was remarkable how many officers of the Marine Guard -recently in Peking had gone through the brunt of the war and had been -distinguished in their service. I spoke of General Neville, General -Bowley, Commander Hutchins, Colonel Newell, and Colonel Holcombe, all -of whom had been in the thick of it, and rejoiced in their record and -the fact that though they passed through the valley of death they had -been spared. My eyes often rested on the sad face of Mrs. Deering, -transfigured with the mother's pride in that heroic son whose war -letters, published by her, are one of the intimately human memorials of -the great struggle. - -I was impressed with how inadequately this wonderful country of -China and the promise of its people were understood in America. I -knew the difficulties and dangers to be overcome there, and I felt -that Americans well-disposed toward China would take a hand in its -development. But the "folks back home," especially the interests that -controlled the economic life of America, remained blind and deaf, -lavishing their money in Europe. - -I had spent my energies freely, withholding assistance from none who -deserved it, although I could easily have limited my official action -within narrower and more convenient bounds. In developments that would -mean a slow lift of this fine old civilization to a modern plane real -American interests had come in. Foundations had been laid in the -Canal Contract, the China Medical Board, the railway concessions, the -creation of a Chino-American bank, and many other enterprises. America -stood no longer with empty hands; she could not be confronted with the -gibe so often used before: "It is easy for you to suggest generous -action, for you have nothing to contribute." - -With these as beginnings, I arrived at the conclusion that more, -possibly, could be done by way of arousing American interests in Far -Eastern affairs by going to the United States than by staying in China. -I feared, also, that if I remained away from America too long, it would -be difficult readily to get in touch again with affairs there. - -For such reasons, I came to the decision that I should send my -resignation to the President. I did not wish to run away from a -difficult and disagreeable situation. Indeed, until the first effects -of the Paris decision had been overcome, I would not leave. Beyond that -time, I had no desire to remain. Like the Chinese, I at that time still -believed that President Wilson had probably met tremendous difficulties -of which I had no knowledge. At any rate, it was far from my purpose to -embarrass him or the Government through my action. Therefore, the only -motive I gave for my resignation was my desire to return to the United -States. However, in my letter to the President I tried to express in -moderate but serious terms my view of the situation and of the action -which had been taken at Paris. This letter follows: - - June 7, 1919. - - Dear Mr. President: - - I have the honour to place in your hands my resignation as minister to - China and to request that I may be relieved of the duties of this post - as soon as convenient to yourself and to the Secretary of State. My - reason for this action is that I am wearied after nearly six years of - continuous strain, that I feel that the interests of my family demand - my return to the United States, and that I should like to reënter - affairs at home without making my absence so long as to break off all - of the most important relationships. - - I desire to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me, - and it shall be my greatest desire to continue in the future to - coöperate in helping to realize those great purposes of national and - international policy which you have so clearly and strongly put before - the American nation and the world. - - In making this communication to you I cannot but refer to recent - developments with respect China. The general outlook is indeed most - discouraging, and it seems impossible to accomplish anything here - at present or until the home governments are willing to face the - situation and to act. It is not difficulties that deter me, and I - should stay at my post if it were necessary and if I did not think - that I could be of more use in the United States than in China at the - present time. But in fact, the situation requires that the American - people should be made to realize what is at stake here for us in - order that they may give the necessary backing to the Government for - support in any action which the developments here may Inquire. Unless - the American people realize this and the Government feels strong - enough to take adequate action, the fruits of one hundred and forty - years of American work in China will inevitably be lost. Our people - will be permitted to exist here only on the sufferance of others, and - the great opportunity which has been held out to us by the Chinese - people to assist in the development of education and free institutions - will be gone beyond recall. In its stead there will come a sinister - situation dominated by the unscrupulous methods of the reactionary - military régime centred in Tokyo, absolutist in tendency, cynical of - the principles of free government and human progress. If this force, - with all the methods it is accustomed to apply, remains unopposed - there will be created in the Far East the greatest engine of military - oppression and dominance that the world has yet seen. Nor can we - avoid the conclusion that the brunt of evil results will fall on the - United States, as is already foreshadowed by the bitter hostility and - abnormal vituperativeness of the Japanese press with regard to America. - - The United States and Great Britain will have to stand together in - this matter; I do not think this is realized as fully by Britishers - at home as by those out here. If Russia can become an independent - representative government its interests would parallel ours. The - forces of public opinion and strength which can thus be mobilized are - entirely sufficient to control the situation here and to keep it from - assuming the menacing character which is threatened at present; but - this can only be done if the situation is clearly seen and if it is - realized that the military party of Japan will continue its present - methods and purposes which have proved so successful until it becomes - a dead wall of firm, quiet opposition. There will be a great deal of - talk of friendship for China, of restoration of Shantung, of loyalty - to the League of Nations, but it will be dangerous to accept this and - to stop questioning what are the methods actually applied; as long as - they exist the menace is growing all the time. We cannot rest secure - on treaties nor even on the League of Nations without this checking - up of the facts. Otherwise these instruments would only make the game - a little more complicated but not change its essential character. - The menace can be avoided only if it is made plain to Japan that her - purposes are unmistakable and that the methods utilized to effect - them will by no means be tolerated. Such purposes are the stirring - up of trouble and revolution, encouragement of bandits and pirates, - morphia, financial corruption, misleading of the press, refusal of - just satisfaction when Americans are injured in order to gain prestige - for absolute power, and chief of all official duplicity, such as - the disavowal of knowledge when loans are being made to the Chinese - Government by leading Japanese banks and the subsequent statement by - the Japanese minister that these loans were private arrangements by - "merchants." - - If continuous support could be given not only to the activities of - American merchants but to the constructive forces in Chinese national - life itself these purposes and methods would not have the chance to - flourish and succeed which they now enjoy. - - During the war our action in the support of constructive forces - in China necessarily could not be effective, as our energies were - required elsewhere. Yet I believe that a great opportunity was missed - when China had broken of relations with Germany. The very least - recognition of her sentiments, support and efforts, on our part, would - have changed the entire situation. But while millions upon millions - were paid to the least important of the countries of Europe not a cent - was forthcoming for China. This lack of support drove Tuan and his - followers into the arms of the pro-Japanese agents. Instead of support - we gave China the Lansing-Ishii Note. - - Throughout this period the Japanese game has still been in the stage - of bluff; while Germany seemed at her strongest in the war, indeed the - Japanese were perhaps making their veiled threats with a feeling that - if they should ally themselves with a strong Germany the two would - be invincible; but even at that time a portion of the American navy - detached could have checkmated Japan. Since the complete breakdown of - Germany the case of Japan has been carried through solely on bluff - though perhaps it may be that the Japanese militarists have succeeded - in convincing themselves that their establishment is formidable. But - it is plain that they would be absolutely powerless in the face of a - stoppage of commerce and a navy demonstration on the part of any one - of the great powers. No one desires to think of this contingency, but - it is plain that after the breakdown of Germany it was not feasible - for Japan to use force nor could she have suffered a greater damage - than to exclude herself from the Peace Conference where she had - everything to gain and nothing to lose. In ten years there may be a - very different situation. Then also our people, having grown wise, - will be sure to shout: "Why was not this stopped while there was yet - time?" It seems to me necessary that someone in the Government ought - to give attention primarily to China and the Far Eastern situation. - It is very difficult to get any attention for China. I mean any - continuous attention that results in getting something actually - done. Everything else seems to come first because Europe seems so - much nearer; and yet the destinies of Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, and - Greece are infinitesimal in their importance to the future of America - compared With those of China. - - During my service here I have constantly suffered from this lack of - continuous attention at home to the Far Eastern situation. It has - reacted on the consular service; the interpreter service which is - absolutely necessary to make our consular corps in China effective - has been starved, as no new appointments have been made. In my own - case promises of assistance which had been given repeatedly went - unfulfilled. In this matter I have not the least personal feeling. - I know the result is not due to the personal neglect or ill-will of - any man or group of men, only it seems to me to indicate a general - sentiment of the unimportance of Far Eastern affairs, which ought to - be remedied. I repeat that these statements are not made in a spirit - of complaint; all individual members of the Department of State have - shown nothing but consideration and readiness to assist, but there - has been lacking a concentrated interest in China, which ought to be - represented in some one of the high officials, designated to follow - up Far Eastern affairs and accorded influence commensurate with - responsibilities in this matter. - - - - -CHAPTER XXXII - -A NATION STRIKES AND UNITES - - -The students of Peking "started something." For the first time in -thousands of years public opinion was aroused and organized in China. -Through the action of the students, with whom the merchants made common -cause, before and after the Shantung decision, China found herself. - -The Japanese papers insisted steadfastly that these student -disturbances had been brought on at the "instigation of certain -countries." But instigation was not needed. If foreigners had wished -to make trouble in this way, they would have been kept extremely -busy trying to keep pace with the Chinese themselves. You do not -have to instigate a man to resist a pillager who is trying to break -into his house. Those who started this tremendous movement toward -nationalism--for that is what it grew into--were students in the -government schools and in the private schools of Peking and Tientsin. -In the beginning the students were alone in the agitation, but not for -long. Throughout the agitators were referred to as "students," but this -term came to be used in a broad sense; it came to mean Young China, -including all of the youth of the land who had been educated in modern -schools. - -China is the home of the strike and the boycott; but never before -had these weapons been employed on such a scale. The merchants and -students of north China met during the second half of May, declared a -general boycott of Japanese goods, and demanded the dismissal of the -three men called traitors, the notorious agents in the Chino-Japanese -negotiations. The boycott spread rapidly, a spontaneous expression of -deep resentment. But the movement strove also to control and purify -the action of the Chinese Government. The instrument for this was the -strike--passive resistance--the stopping of the wheels of commerce and -industry till the will of the people was listened to. - -The popular sense of equity, which in China asserts itself naturally -in strikes, responded everywhere. Unless the Government dismissed the -three offenders, merchants would close their shops. Teachers, students, -shopkeepers, chauffeurs, dockhands, all classes of workmen would -strike. All China, indeed, would go on strike. - -The movement gained momentum like an avalanche thundering down a -mountain. Its fury was first of all concentrated on the attempt to -force the dismissal of the three officials who were, in the popular -mind, guilty of trading away the national birthright. The organization -of the uprising seemed to be almost spontaneous. Active little groups, -similar to the Committees of Correspondence in the time of Adams and -Franklin, sprang up in all parts of China. The masses of the people -were marshalled for action. From the ten thousand students who had -originally struck in Shanghai the movement expanded swiftly until it -included merchants and chambers of commerce and dozens of other bodies -in every walk of life. Associations of servants were formed under the -title of The Industrial National Salvation Society. Even Japanese -bankers were put under the ban by the Chinese financiers; finally the -boycott went so far that it blacklisted the foreign goods which were -brought to Chinese ports by Japanese steamers. - -In Peking, fifty groups of student speakers were sent out to appeal -to the public. General Tuan Chi-jui, who, among others, was held -responsible by the students for the nation's troubles, stoutly stood by -his subordinates. The militarists in general, feeling that the student -movement was not favourable to them, prevailed on the Government to try -to suppress it. Martial law was proclaimed, and students trying to -speak were arrested. The students were undaunted and working en masse. -The Government soon saw that it could imprison them, but that it was -powerless to stem the tide of feeling they were creating. Thundering -from all parts of the country, it was recognized that the students -could, if they chose, turn the entire people against the Government. -By June 4th, nearly a thousand students were under forcible detention -in Peking; those recently arrested had wisely provided themselves with -knapsacks stocked with food before taking their lecture trips. - -Then the girl students came forth. They fully shared the patriotic -feelings of their brothers. Seven hundred girls from the Peking schools -assembled and marched to the President's palace to request the release -of the young men under arrest. - -The Government made a technical mistake. When the student feeling -seemed to be a little on the ebb, the Government took occasion to issue -a decree trying to white-wash Tsao Ju-lin and his confederates. That -fanned the flame which ultimately swept all over China. - -Weakening, the Government offered the students release if they would -return to work and make no further trouble. The students saw their -advantage, and stated that they had no wish to leave their prisons, if -it meant promising to abstain from expressing their opinion in future; -moreover, they would not leave until the Government had apologized for -their unjust arrest. - -The jailing of this large number of the youth of China finally -brought such ill-concealed opposition that the Government complied -with the students' ultimatum. An apology was offered them, whereupon -the students returned to their colleges and their work. But they -continued their street lectures, calling upon the people to join in a -powerful expression of national opinion through which their country's -institutions and policies might be put on a sounder basis, and Japanese -aggression powerfully resisted. - -In Shanghai the boycott and the strike of the shopkeepers were in full -force. Their shops were closed, they threatened to pay no taxes unless -the "traitors" were ousted. American officials at Shanghai sent me -alarming reports. The British there, particularly those of the official -class, were inclined to repress the movement. - -The Japanese, who were feeling the full force of the popular thrust, -tried to brand it anti-foreign and to reawaken memories of the Boxer -period. Some of the influential British in Shanghai, frightened by the -successful efforts of the merchants and students among the industrial -workers, began to call them anti-foreign, too. I was told that the -municipal council in Shanghai might take very stringent action against -the boycott and strike. The British minister had gone to the seashore, -and I sent him word that the situation was serious. - -It would have been the height of folly had either we or the British -let ourselves be dragged into the disturbance, which was directed -solely against the Japanese, and was fortunately not our concern, -and in no sense anti-foreign. I sent specific instructions to the -consulate-general at Shanghai advising the American community neither -to encourage nor oppose this movement, which was the affair of the -Chinese. The Americans saw the point clearly, and realized how -undesirable it would be to entangle the municipal council in the -business. I told the Consul-General that, illegal and overt acts -excepted, the foreign authorities in China had nothing to do with the -strike; being happily free of Chinese ill-will, we wished to remain -free. In order to avoid all danger of more general trouble, Americans -exerted considerable influence with the Chinese leaders to cause them -to abstain from action that would tend to involve foreigners generally. -They responded willingly. - -By this time even the mafoos (horse boys) at the Shanghai Race Club -were on strike. A run on the Bank of Communications was started because -Tsao Ju-lin was associated with it. More and more serious grew the -situation, but the demand on the Government remained unchanged: "When -the three traitors are dismissed, the strike will be called off; -otherwise, still more people will strike." - -The Government finally yielded on the 11th of June. The insistent -demand had come from all parts of China that the three unpopular -officials go in disgrace. The Peking Government complied. But the great -public in Shanghai was not content until the British minister and I -gave confirmation of the report that the mandate of dismissal had been -issued. Then the strike was off. - -However, the boycott against Japanese goods continued unabated. Yet -it must not be supposed that the movement, which at the beginning was -distinctly turned against Japan, was either essentially anti-Japanese -or purely oppositional and negative. Quite early, its true, positive, -national Chinese character stood revealed. The Japanese had stung the -Chinese national pride to the quick. It turned against them, not in a -spirit of blind hostility, but only in so far as the Japanese stood in -the way of the national Chinese regeneration. - -Out of this unprecedented popular uprising several momentous facts -emerged. First, public opinion must be so awakened that it would be -a continuing force, so organized that it would at all times have the -means of expressing its will, so that it would be able to compel the -Government to resist further encroachments on China's rights. That -would take time; but it could be done, the strike and boycott proved -that. For the first time in her history China had roused herself and -wrung from her government a specific surrender. That lesson sank deep. -The leaders realized that this single act was merely a very small -beginning. But the important thing was that it did constitute a -beginning. - -The second important result was the sudden focussing of attention on -the means by which native Chinese industry might be built up. The -boycott of Japanese goods had had a positive as well as a negative -side. Indeed it had been stated positively all along. The people were -not told to refrain from buying Japanese goods; they were advised to -avoid buying goods of an inferior quality--which would be interpreted -to mean Japanese products, of course--and they were pointedly urged to -patronize home industries. The people responded with a will. They did -buy the wares produced by their own factories. It gave great impetus to -the development of Chinese industry, and gave both the manufacturers -and the Government a clue as to what a definite campaign for the -stimulation of the home industries might accomplish. - -While we were talking together informally at a meeting of the -diplomatic corps, the French minister, M. Boppe, remarked: "We are in -the presence of the most astounding and important thing that has ever -happened--the organization of a national public opinion in China for -positive action." - -Thus out of the evil of the Paris decision came an inspiring national -awakening of the Chinese people, a welding together for joint thought -and joint action. All ranks of the population were affected. When -to avoid foreign complications student delegates went among the -workers of a factory in Shanghai to persuade them not to strike, the -workers asked: "Do you think we have no feeling for our country, nor -indignation against the traitors?" - -About the evil of the Shantung decision the foreign communities were -unanimous, nor did they feel that they ought to be silent. They were on -the ground; they knew the inevitable consequences that would follow the -rigid application of the decision. They spoke out. Sir Edward Walker, -chairman of the Commercial Bank of Canada, gave an address on June 6th -before the Anglo-American Association of Peking, dealing particularly -with the needs of transportation. What the completion of two or three -trunk lines would mean to China he fully realized. After his address -the British minister and I, who were honorary members, took our leave, -as it had been intimated that the Association would discuss the -Shantung matter. The meeting then adopted a resolution which expressed -the conviction of Americans and British in China in this wise: - - We express our solemn conviction that this decision will create - conditions that must inevitably bring about extreme discord between - the Chinese people and Japan, and raise a most serious hindrance - to the development of the economic interests of China and other - countries. A settlement which perpetuates the conditions created by - Germany's aggression in Shantung in 1898, conditions that led to - similar action on the part of other states, that were contributing - causes to the disorders in North China in 1900, and that made - inevitable the Russo-Japanese war, cannot make for peace in the Far - East, for political stability in China itself, or for development of - trade and commerce equally open to all. - - Further, the evil consequences of conditions which are not only - subversive of the principle of national self-determination, but also - a denial of the policy of the open door and of the principle of - equality of opportunity, will be greatly accentuated if Japan, a near - neighbour, be now substituted for Germany, whose centre of political - and economic activities was on the other side of the globe. - - Therefore we, the members of the Peking Anglo-American Association, - resolve that representations be made to the British and American - Governments urging that the states taking part in the Peace Conference - devise and carry through a just settlement which will not endanger the - safety of China and the peace of the world. - - - - -CHAPTER XXXIII - -TAKING LEAVE OF PEKING - - -The Government was now confronted with the question of whether its -delegates at Paris should or should not sign the Treaty and Covenant. -The Chinese people were opposed to signing, for with China's signature -would go specific recognition of the transfer of German rights to -Japan. They had learned one great lesson: that to make concessions to -foreign powers never got them out of trouble, but only aggravated it. -If the Peking officials in 1898 had turned a deaf ear to the German -demands, despite threats of naval demonstrations, the Germans could -never have secured the things which the Chinese actually gave them. The -Chinese people now said: "Never again!" - -I was informed on the 28th of May that nearly all the officials in -Peking were agreed that the Treaty should be signed. Knowledge of -their readiness to capitulate brought the national movement of the -Chinese people to its height almost immediately, in opposition to the -reactionary militarist control. By the 1st of July, a gentleman from -the immediate entourage of the President, who often came to see me on -the latter's behalf, told me that the President had instructed the -delegates at Paris not to sign the Treaty. They did not sign it then, -and steadfastly resisted all efforts to make them sign it later. - -When the student troubles were at their height, on the 2nd of June -I was at the Legation late one evening to answer some cablegrams. I -was interrupted by an American woman teacher who with five Chinese -schoolgirls came to my office in a state of great excitement. The girls -had stood with a crowd for forty-eight hours asking admission to the -President's palace to present their grievance. They had endured these -hardships as bravely as any of the young men, but they were now alarmed -because two of the student leaders had been seized and taken inside the -palace. The girls feared their execution, and begged me to intercede. -As I could not quiet their apprehensions, I finally said I would direct -that an inquiry be made at the palace. By telephone I learned that the -students were being detained because they had been too forward in their -demonstrations, but that nothing untoward would happen to them. The -girls, happy and thankful at this reassurance, went home. - -No one could fail to sympathize with the aims and ideals of the -students, who were striving for national freedom and regeneration. I, -too, felt a strong sympathy, though I, of course, abstained from all -direct contact with the movement, as it was a purely Chinese matter. -Nevertheless, the Japanese papers reported quite in detail how I -had organized the student movement, and how I had spent $2,000,000 -in getting it under way. As everybody knew how spontaneous and -irrepressible the movement of the students was, these items excited -only amusement. - -Pessimism reigned among liberal-minded people in early June. They -feared that followers of General Tuan would insist upon putting him -back into the Premiership, in which case there would be no escape from -another revolution to oppose him, with the general demoralization -and waste of national resources which would attend it. The second -_aide mémoire_ of the associated representatives was presented to the -President by Sir John Jordan on the 5th of June; it conveyed the hope -that China's internal difficulties might now come to an end, that -the peace conference at Shanghai might be resumed and successfully -concluded without delay, and it stated that meanwhile military -measures should not be resumed. The friendly advice encouraged the -liberal elements, particularly the express desire that there should -be no further fighting. It was felt that the President's hands were -strengthened for peace. - -Dr. Chiang Monlin, Acting Chancellor of Peking University in the -absence of Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei, went to Shanghai because the militarist -faction wished to hold him responsible for the acts of the students. -He was, indeed, one of their chief counsellors, but he counselled -wisdom and moderation. He told me that the leaders were conscious of -much progress in organizing public opinion, but that at least ten -years of further work and experience would be necessary before there -could be any approach to a public opinion consciously and unceasingly -active in support, or in proper restraint, of the Government. "All we -ask," Doctor Chiang said, "is ten years' time--freedom from outside -interference--then the New China will be organized." - -I visited General Tuan, finding him calm but stubborn as usual. I -asked him whether, if the students should call on him, he would go out -to speak to them. "I would certainly do that," he replied; "I am in -sympathy with them, but I feel that they are often misled by people -whose motives are not disinterested." I told him that I believed the -students would gladly follow him and make him their leader if they -could be assured that he would not be controlled by counsellors who had -not the true welfare of China at heart. - -This movement of the Chinese people impressed me the more vividly in -the light of a letter from R.F. Johnston on July 3rd which led me to -hark back to the days of the old Empire. Mr. Johnston was a tutor of -the young Emperor, and he inclosed a translation of a Chinese poem -which the Emperor had written out for me. It bore the Imperial seals, -and was dated: "Eleventh year of Hsuan Tung, sixth month, fifth day." -Here is the first verse: - - The red bows unbent, - Were received and deposited. - I have here an admirable guest, - And with all my heart I bestow one on him. - The bells and drums have been arranged in order, - And all the morning will I feast him. - -Shortly after, in a talk I had with Mr. Johnston, he told me that the -little Emperor had himself conceived the idea of writing something for -me. Johnston had suggested a certain poem but it did not satisfy his -pupil, who finally made his own selection. He said to his tutor: "I -want to imagine that the American minister is coming to the palace as -my guest." - -The young Emperor, Mr. Johnston said, was interested in everything -that went on in the political and social life of the capital, and read -the papers every day. I attributed his interest in my doings to the -fact that the Emperor shared the love for America that is general in -China; but, also, I think the repeated likelihood of being taken to -the American Legation for refuge and shelter had impressed itself very -strongly on his youthful mind, so that it seemed to him a haven of -escape from all terror and danger. - -Reports came at the end of July that President Wilson was defending -the Shantung settlement, by stating that it conferred on Japan no -political rights but only economic privileges. Had Mr. Wilson given -attention to the details of the question, as reported over and over -again in telegrams and dispatches from the Legation and consulates in -China, he could not have harboured such a misunderstanding. In this -instance the President based his action rather on vague assurances -given by Japan, the actual bearing of which he did not know. The term -"economic privileges" can hardly apply to such matters as control -of the port of Tsingtao and the Shantung Railway, and to a general -commercial preference in Shantung Province; yet these were plainly what -Japan wished to retain. Her pledge "to return Shantung Peninsula with -full sovereignty" sounded satisfactory, but it was never defined to -cover more than the 150 square miles of agricultural and mountain land -which the Germans had held as a leasehold, exclusive of Tsingtao port. -That important harbour the Japanese intended to retain, as well as the -terminals, railway, and mines. - -The refusal of the Chinese to sign the Paris Treaty afforded an -opportunity for saving Shantung to China. But if the German rights -were to be confirmed to Japan under the term of "economic privileges," -we should soon find that these economic privileges meant an end of -independent American enterprise in Shantung Province. Japan had used -such "economic privileges" in Manchuria. We were amply warned what to -expect from an extension of that policy to other parts of China. - -President Wilson stated later that the League would prevent Japan from -assuming full sovereignty over Shantung. Here he again misunderstood. -Japan had no idea of asking for sovereignty over Shantung; she had -absolutely no right to it, and did not need it for carrying out her -plans, so long as she could retain the politico-economic rights awarded -at Paris. - -I reiterated these statements in my telegrams to Washington. I -explained again that ownership by a foreign government of port -facilities and of a railway leading into the interior of China, -together with exclusive commercial preferences, are economic rights -so fortified politically that they constitute political control--as -Manchuria shows--without the name. In fact, they could be safely -accompanied with most profuse protestations to respect Chinese -sovereignty. - -The question of political sovereignty was beside the mark. It had -been broached, as I have pointed out, to make the world believe that -something was being returned. "Returning Shantung Peninsula with full -sovereignty" was a big phrase and it had an imposing sound. But the -sovereignty of Shantung was not involved, it had never been either -German or Japanese: it had always been Chinese. The 150 square miles of -unimportant land outside the port of Tsingtao might be "returned with -full sovereignty," but nobody cared for that. To talk of sovereignty -merely obscured the issue. - -Dr. Sun Yat-sen was just then busying himself with the task of -drawing up projects for the further economic development of China -with international participation, and I corresponded with him. In -one of my letters I considered how rapid and sweeping the industrial -transformation of China should be. I wrote: - - I believe that we should at all times keep in mind the fact that we - are not dealing with a new country, but with one in which social - arrangements are exceedingly intricate and in which a long-tested - system of agricultural and industrial organization exists. It is to - my mind most important that the transition to new methods of industry - and labour should not be sudden but that the old values should be - gradually transmuted. It is highly important that artistic ability, - such as exists, for instance, in silk and porcelain manufacture, - should be maintained and protected, and not superseded by cheaper - processes. The one factor in modern organization which the Chinese - must learn to understand better is the corporation, and the fiduciary - relationship which the officers of the corporation ought to occupy - with respect to the stockholders. If the Chinese cannot learn to use - the corporation properly, the organization of the national credit - cannot be effected. Here, too, it is necessary that the principle of - personal honesty which was fostered under the old system should not - be lost, but transferred to the new methods of doing business. So, - at every point where we are planning for a better and more efficient - organization, it seems necessary to hold on to the values created in - the past, and not to disturb the balance of Chinese society by too - sudden changes. - -Among his suggestions for constructive works, Dr. Sun Yat-sen had -spoken of a northern port, somewhere on the coast of Chihli Province, -which should have water deep enough to admit large ocean-going -ships. The port of Tientsin is not adequate: it is far up river, -and lacks satisfactory anchorage where the river empties into the -sea. Chinwangtao is a far better port, but so exposed that enormous -expenditure would be needed to improve it; and its capacity, even then, -would be too small. I asked Mr. Paul P. Whitham, special commissioner -of the Department of Commerce, to go to the Chihli coast to see -whether about half way between Tientsin and Chinwangtao a satisfactory -port site might be found. He succeeded in finding a site where, with -comparatively moderate expense, a deep-sea port could be built. It -was easy to see the transformation in north China commerce that this -would bring about. Here would be an outlet for a rich and extensive -hinterland, including the Province of Chihli and all the region to the -north and northwest of it, particularly inner Mongolia and western -Manchuria. I talked the matter over with the civil governor and other -provincial leaders of Chihli Province, also with the representatives -of Governor Li Hsun of Nanking, besides certain members of the Central -Government. They greatly favoured the project, and before many weeks -preliminary surveys were made. It was to be known as the Great Northern -Port. - -I visited Sir John Jordan on August 14th telling him of my resignation, -at which he expressed regret; but he admitted that he could understand -why I wished to return to the United States. He, too, wished to be -relieved of his duties as soon as possible. I had on that day a very -full talk about Shantung with Mr. Yoshizawa, Japanese Chargé, in which -we considered ways which might render the Shantung arrangement more -satisfactory, especially if Tsingtao should be made into a genuine -international settlement. But I emphasized the importance of the return -of the railway. - -The negotiations for the new Consortium had been going on for some -time. The Japanese proposed that the Consortium should not apply to -Manchuria and eastern Mongolia. The Japanese-controlled press had -attacked the first proposal of this Consortium, as Japan purposed -during the war to achieve complete leadership of foreign finance in -China. If the United States would join the _old_ Consortium, Japan -would have been pleased, for there she led. But ordinarily the -financial power of Japan is of distinctly secondary importance, and the -abnormal conditions of the war could not last. Now Japan approved of -the new Consortium in principle, but continued to procrastinate when a -decision on details was required. - -My resignation was accepted in a cablegram received on the 18th of -August, the President expressing formally his regret that I should find -it necessary to insist upon relinquishing my post. Even now, when I -knew how decidedly the President had misjudged the Chinese situation, -notwithstanding my insistent and detailed warnings, I had no desire -to advertise differences in policy. The Japanese press, I knew, would -consider my resignation due to the defeat of my "policy" to have -America maintain her honourable and trusted position in China. I did -not wish to favour this sort of interpretation by a controversy with -the administration. - -The Chinese understood the situation quite completely. When I told -the President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Premier, and -non-official Chinese friends, they seemed discouraged at the prospect -of my leaving China at this juncture. I had the good fortune to make -many friendships in China with men whose loyalty and truthfulness could -be relied upon. Though seemingly distressed at the idea of my going, -they knew I only hoped it might enable the work of developing close -relations between the two countries to continue more effectively. I -wished to bring about positive practical action. The spirit of the -American policies and declarations was admirable, but not enough -individual and specific American activity in China accompanied them. - -Mr. Fu, Acting Minister of Education, and a number of his associates -visited me on the 25th of August, to consider arrangements for exchange -professorships in American and Chinese universities. I had always -favoured bringing young Chinese scholars into lectureships in American -universities, to make accessible to the American public the treasures -of Chinese literature, philosophy, and art. President Yuan Shih-kai had -supported this idea, and, but for the unfortunate monarchical movement, -would have done much to promote intellectual contact between the United -States and China. His successors shared his sentiments, and only the -turmoil in Peking's political life prevented their working out plans in -detail. - -General Hsu Shu-cheng called on me from time to time and told me about -his Mongolian venture. When the War Participation Bureau became plainly -obsolete its name was changed to "Northwest Frontier Defence Bureau." -Everybody knew against whom this Bureau was to "defend" China, though -there was talk about Bolshevik activity in Mongolia, also of the -designs of General Semenoff to create a Pan-Mongolian state. General -Hsu unfolded in his talks with me very large schemes for developing -Mongolia, including a colonial bank, the building of highways for -motor transport, the digging of artesian wells, and the establishment -of model farms. He would, he said, also promote the completion of -the railway from Kalgan to Urga, and would even extend it to Chinese -Turkestan. Report had it that the Japanese had promised General Hsu -an advance of $50,000,000 for his enterprises. But he told me that he -would carry them out with capital entirely subscribed in China. The -President and other Peking leaders, it was said, apprehensive of the -direction the overflowing energies of General Hsu might take next, -bethought themselves of the undeveloped reaches of Mongolia. There -would be the field ample enough for his ebullient nature. All this -time the Japanese were carefully watching any factor that might become -active in Mongolia, including General Semenoff, General Chang Tso-lin, -the Viceroy of Manchuria, and General Hsu Shu-cheng. Whatever might -happen there, they undoubtedly intended that it should fit in with -their policy of imposing their influence upon that dependency. - -Mrs. Reinsch and my family had sailed from Chinwangtao on the 12th -of June for Honolulu, where they were to spend the summer. As my -resignation had already gone forward, it was a farewell to Peking for -Mrs. Reinsch, who was reluctant to leave the city which she had enjoyed -so much. A series of farewell luncheons, dinners, and receptions began -for me in August which, with the heavy work of winding up the business -of my office, filled the remaining weeks with activity every day from -sunrise until after midnight. When President Hsu Shih-chang entertained -me for the last time, he said: "The Chinese look to you to be a friend -and guide to them, and we hope your action and influence may continue -for many decades." On the next day he invited me, through Mr. Chow -Tsu-chi, to act as counsellor to the Chinese Government, with residence -in America. - -I left Peking on the evening of September 13th. All my colleagues with -members of their staffs, the high Chinese officials, and a throng of -other people, had gathered at the station to say "good-bye." Drawn up -on the platform were companies of the American marines, the Indian -troops of the British Legation Guard, and Chinese troops. With the -Acting Premier, Mr. Kung Shin-Chan, I inspected them, accepted their -salute, and made a few farewell remarks to the faithful marines. As -the American band played "Auld Lang Syne," the train moved out of the -station, and the thousands of faces of those who had come to see me -off became blurred in the distance, leaving impressed on my mind a -composite face, friendly, eager, urging to endeavour. - -My friend, Chow Tsu-chi, accompanied me as far as Tientsin where -I parted with him. It had, all in all, been a truly heart-warming -leave-taking. I felt that the spontaneous expressions of deep -confidence both on the part of my countrymen and of the Chinese would -remain with me as the best reward for any exertions and efforts I had -made. - -Dr. Charles D. Tenney, American Chargé d'Affaires after my departure, -wrote the following report to the Secretary of State concerning the -farewell hospitalities: - - I have the honour to state that the departure from Peking of the - Honourable Paul S. Reinsch, American Minister to China, whose - resignation has been accepted by the President, was made the occasion - of gratifying manifestations of cordiality toward the United States - and of the highest popular and official esteem for the retiring - Minister. - - Mr. Reinsch was naturally the guest of honour at numerous dinners - and receptions in the period just preceding his departure, at which - the Chinese present expressed the deepest appreciation of his - diversified activities during the six years of his tenure of office. - Published references to Mr. Reinsch's career as American Minister, - also, refer to his many-sided interest in and efforts to promote the - joint commercial, industrial, and educational interests of China - and the United States, in addition to the usual duty of fostering - international unity between the two nations. It was made strikingly - evident that the Government and people of this Republic have come - earnestly to desire and expect a policy of vigorous advancement of - these interests by the United States in China. The feeling of all was - epitomized by President Hsu Shih-chang, who, at Mr. Reinsch's farewell - interview, asserted his profound belief that the latter's activities - as Minister had advanced and strengthened in a very real way all - those economic and social relations that to-day bind the governments - and peoples of China and the United States in close friendship, at - the same time expressing his hope that on his return to the United - States Mr. Reinsch would abate none of his efforts toward these ends, - but that in his altered capacity he would continue to work in the - interests of China. - - Mr. Reinsch left Peking on the evening of the thirteenth instant and - the scene at the railway station was of an unusual and gratifying - description. Although it is not customary for guards of honour to - be tendered by other legations on the departure of ministers, - on this occasion there was present a detachment from the British - Legation Guard, and there were also present detachments from the - American Legation Guard, the Peking police force and the Peking - gendarmerie, with military music. The Acting Premier came in person - to the station to bid farewell to Mr. Reinsch and there were present - a thousand persons, including Chinese officials, foreign diplomats, - representatives of all varieties of institutions and societies, and - personal friends of all nationalities. - -I had turned over arrangements for my trip through Japan to Mr. Willing -Spencer, the First Secretary, who had consulted with Mr. Tokugawa, -of the Japanese Legation. Their main difficulty had been the fact -that Korea was under quarantine because of the cholera. An amusing -experience ensued. In order to avoid any risk of delay I agreed to be -inoculated; this was done deferentially by a little physician who came -from the Japanese Legation. At Shimonoseki our steamer arrived in the -early morning, and was held in quarantine. The inspecting officers who -boarded said I should be permitted to land almost immediately. However, -they left and said a launch would be sent for me before noon. As the -evening train would be the last that could make my connection with the -steamer at Yokohama, I waited somewhat nervously for the launch. It -was three o'clock before the officers returned, saying that my baggage -could now be taken ashore; soon they disappeared with the baggage, but -left me still on the boat. I wired the embassy at Tokyo, telling them -of my predicament. The train was to leave at half-past seven, and no -launch had appeared at six. - -Suddenly out of the evening mist covering the bay a little launch -emerged, and an official I had not seen before boarded and asked me -to accompany him. Descending to the launch with my two servants, I -was surprised to notice that it did not head toward Shimonoseki, but -took the opposite direction. I remonstrated, but the officer, smiling -reassuringly, said: "It will be all right." Then the two inspecting -officers appeared from below; smiling and bowing they told me we were -going to the Isolation Hospital! - -And to the Isolation Hospital we went. There in the central reception -room I was introduced to the chief, who, after a brief exchange of -civilities, announced, "Now, everything is all right." - -We took the launch, and arrived at Shimonoseki with still a quarter -of an hour to spare before the train departed, whereon a special -compartment had been reserved for me. Everything was now clear. The -Japanese passengers on the steamer were as little pleased at being -detained there as I was. Had a foreigner, even a foreign minister, been -taken off the ship to Shimonoseki, a small riot might be looked for. -So the word was passed around that I was being taken to the Isolation -Hospital, where nobody had any particular wish to go. I could not but -admire the resourcefulness of these little officials, and to feel -thankful to them for all the trouble they took to solve this knotty -problem without doing violence to any of their quarantine regulations. - -I had only one day in Tokyo. A luncheon had been arranged for me -at the house of Baron Okura, where I went with Ambassador Morris -and met several Japanese gentlemen, among them Mr. Hanihara, just -made Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Baron Shidehara, the new -Ambassador to the United States. We took lunch on an open veranda, -overlooking delightful gardens, and after an animated conversation -I took my leave and hurried to Yokohama, with the same agreeable -impression of Japanese hospitality that I had received six years -before, on my first arrival in the Far East. - - -THE END - - - - -INDEX - - - Abbott, John J., 256, 260 - - Adams, Dr. Henry C., 30, 32, 35, 68, 154 - - Administrative Conference, 46 - - Advice from America, 269 - - Advisers, Foreign, 47, 68 - - Aglen, Sir Francis, 233 - - Aide mémoire of December 2, 1918, 326 - - Alston, Mr., 151, 233 - - American activity, 75 - - American aims in China, 65 - - American Chamber of Commerce, 200 - - American coöperation, 72, 73 - - American enterprise in China, 64, 65, 82, 88, 91, 102, 106, 128, 200, - 207, 210, 214, 226 - - American International Corporation, 208, 217, 219, 225 - - American Legation, 19 - - American Marines, 17, 18 - - American minister, 143, 309, 319, 358, 378, 385 - - American Red Cross, 14, 80, 81, 151, 163, 218 - - American University Club, 200 - - American-French coöperation, 223 - - Ancestor worship, 34 - - Anderson, Meyer & Co., 208 - - Anderson, Roy S., 12, 85, 109, 213, 244, 264 - - Anfu Club, 317 - - Anglo-American Association, 156, 374 - - Anglo-American friendship, 155 - - Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 135 - - Anhui Party, 188 - - Anti-foreign propaganda, 141 - - Aoki, General, 267, 351 - - Ariga, Professor, 154 - - Armistice, 317 - - Arms, Importation of, 342 - - Army, 53, 189 - - Arnold, Julean, 103, 185, 329 - - Arsenals, 297 - - Associated Press, 132 - - Authority, 177 - - Automobiles, 108, 117 - - - Backhouse, Edward, 52 - - Bain, Dr. F., 224 - - Baker, J.E., 329 - - Bandits, 190, 347 - - Bank of China, 90, 91, 97, 202 - - Bank of Communications, 190, 299, 372 - - Banking, 102 - - Bashford, Bishop, 50 - - Battle of Peking, 284 - - Beelaerts, van Blokland, M., 52 - - Belin, F.L., 272, 277, 283 - - Bemis, E.W., 223 - - Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 67, 82, 84, 99, 140 - - Bevan, Professor, 154 - - Billings, Dr. Frank, 151 - - "Bite to death," 110 - - Blood of enemies, 109 - - Blythe, Sam L., 245, 255 - - Boardman, Miss, 93 - - Bolshevism, 351 - - Botanical Gardens, 29 - - Bowley, Major, 109, 362 - - Boxer indemnity payments, 297 - - Bredon, Sir Robert, 154 - - Brigands, 54, 347 - - British Legation, 114 - - British minister, 325, 371 - - British-American Tobacco Company, 66, 67, 75, 89 - - Bryan, Secretary, 84, 140, 269, 270 - - Business representatives, 215 - - Buttrick, Dr., 150 - - - Calhoun, W.J., 161 - - Carey, W.F., 207, 208, 209, 213 - - Central Government, 54, 55, 56, 292, 293, 321 - - Chadbourne, Mrs., 235 - - Chang Chien, 29, 70, 71, 80, 81 - - Chang Chin-yao, 351 - - Chang Chung-hsiang, 113, 359 - - Chang Hsun, General, 11, 184, 262, 265, 267, 270, 272, 274, 283 - - Chang Hu, 172 - - Chang Tso-lin, 262, 384 - - Chen Chin-tao, Dr., 100, 201, 202, 222, 232, 247, 251, 257, 260, 264 - - Chen, Eugene, 247 - - Chen Huan-chang, Dr., 23 - - Chen Lu, 340 - - Chen Pan-ping, 213 - - Chiang, Dr. Monlin, 377 - - Chien Neng-hsun, 227, 325 - - Chienmen, 17 - - Chin Pu Tang, 96, 103, 288, 340 - - Chin Yun-peng, General, 266, 301 - - China Medical Board, 150, 363 - - China Press, 62 - - Chinchow-Aigun Railway, 67, 97 - - Chinda, Ambassador, 140 - - Chinese art, 29, 157, 228 - - Chinese dinners, 32, 33, 152 - - Chinese ethics, 34 - - Chinese life, 22, 49 - - Chinese handwriting, 29 - - Chinese industry, 373 - - Chinese iron industry, 224, 293 - - Chinese language, 51 - - Chinese manners, 71 - - Chinese _materia medica_, 151 - - Chinese musicians, 196 - - Chinese navy, 74 - - Chinese politics, 13, 42, 53 - - Chinese Social and Political Science Association, 153, 235 - - Chinese traditions, 177 - - Chinese women, 27, 28 - - Chino-American Bank, 227, 363 - - Chino-American steamship line, 164 - - Chino-Japanese entente, 352 - - Chinwangtao, 381 - - Chou Hsueh-hsi, 227 - - Chow Tsu-chi, 95, 96, 105, 118, 152, 175, 176, 179, 183, 184, 190, 192, - 201, 207, 213, 322, 330, 385 - - Chu Chi-chien, 24, 27, 182, 189, 201, 215 - - Chu Jui, 167, 261 - - Chu Ying-kuang, 167, 314 - - Chuan Liang, 225 - - Chuchow Chinchow Railway, 221 - - Chüfu, 35, 37, 40, 41 - - Chung Hua Hsin Pao, 311 - - Claims, 113, 166 - - Coal Hill, 19 - - Communications, Ministry of, 104 - - Confucian family, 38 - - Confucian Society, 26, 111 - - Confucianism, 23, 26, 35, 111 - - Consortium, 62, 63, 69, 70, 80, 97, 216, 239, 287, 298, 327, 355, 382 - - Constitution, 199 - - Continental & Commercial Bank loan, 222, 236, 238, 256 - - Coolidge, Charles A., 320 - - Corruption, 57, 291 - - Crane, Charles R., 40 - - Currency loan, 97 - - Currency loan agreement, 319, 346 - - Currency reform loan, 327 - - Customs, 55, 68, 69 - - - Dane, Sir Richard, 68 - - Davis, Arthur P., 82 - - Decoration Day, 362 - - Deering, Mrs., 362 - - Democratic party, 43, 45, 86, 96, 203 - - Denby, Charles, 211 - - Denials, diplomatic, 132, 135 - - Dennis, Dr. W.C., 329 - - Department of State, 101, 102, 148, 171, 176, 258, 297, 307, 313, 354 - - Diplomacy and commerce, 65 - - Diplomatic corps in Peking, 114 - - Diplomatic tactics, 116 - - Disorganization, 56 - - Donald, W.H., 48, 78, 244, 255, 312 - - Dragon flags, 275 - - - Economic development, 380 - - Eliot, President, 68 - - Emerson, Miss, 185 - - Emperor, 283, 377 - - Empress Dowager, 15, 18, 29, 33, 108 - - Equal opportunity, 100 - - Extra-territoriality, 114 - - - Famine, 50, 162 - - Fan Yuen-lin, 151 - - Farewell, 384 - - Feng Kuo-chang, General, 54, 172, 183, 184, 236, 237, 255, 258, 262, - 292, 314 - - Feng Yu-hsiang, 262 - - Ferguson, Dr. John C., 244, 268, 283 - - Festivities, 323 - - Fifteenth United States Infantry, 14, 282 - - Finance, 89, 105, 214, 296, 317, 326, 345, 355 - - Finch, John W., 224 - - Fleisher, B.W., 159 - - Flexner, Dr. Simon, 150, 151 - - Forbidden City, 18, 19 - - Foreign Office ball, 27 - - Frazar, E.W., 163 - - Frazar & Company, 67 - - French interests, 222 - - French minister, 302, 325, 344, 353 - - Fu Liang-tso, 294 - - Fukien, 84, 99, 100, 133, 139, 140 - - Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai, 194 - - - Gailey, Robert, 118 - - Gary, Judge Elbert H., 230 - - Gattrell, Dr., 52 - - Gest, G.M., 90, 101, 105 - - Gilbert, Mrs., 12 - - Gold-note scheme, 318 - - Goodnow, Dr. F.J., 30, 31, 32, 47, 68, 154, 172 - - Grand Canal, 81, 170, 207, 213, 217, 331 - - Grant, Ulysses S., Jr., 185 - - Great northern port, 381 - - Group V demands, 134, 135, 138, 139, 142, 143, 145, 147 - - Guthrie, Ambassador, 234 - - - Han Yeh Ping Co., 87, 224 - - Hanihara, Mr., 387 - - Hankow-Canton line, 97, 294, 297 - - Harrison, Governor-General, 164 - - Hayashi, Baron, 233, 237, 250, 307, 327, 339, 346 - - Haxthausen, Von, Baron, 88 - - Herrera de Huerta, M., 233 - - Hicks claim, 166 - - Hilfsaktion, 163 - - Hintze, Admiral von, 167 - - Hioki, Mr. Eki, 126, 129, 136, 137, 142, 189, 233 - - Ho, J.C., 295 - - Holcombe, Lieut.-Colonel, 362 - - Holy Duke, 37, 38, 40, 41, 59 - - Honorary LL.D., 157 - - Hornbeck, Dr. Stanley K., 12, 61 - - House, Colonel, 360 - - Hsiung Hsi-ling, 86, 98, 103, 223, 341 - - Hsu Shih-chang, 47, 103, 154, 172, 192, 266, 273, 279, 281, 317, 319, - 325, 344, 351, 385 - - Hsu Shih-ying, 201 - - Hsu Shu-cheng, General, 202, 243, 301, 302, 383 - - Hsu Sing-loh, 227 - - Hsu Un-yuen, 202, 227, 231, 257, 260 - - Hukuang Railways, 67, 97, 169, 210, 211, 294, 297 - - Hunan, 351 - - Hutchins, Lieut.-Commander, 183, 184, 362 - - Hwai River conservancy, 13, 60, 71, 74, 80, 98, 162, 207 - - - Immortality, 34 - - Imperial City, 24, 164, 323 - - Imperial Family, 154, 280 - - Imperial movement of Yuan Shih-kai, 171-179 - - Imperial Palace, 18, 281, 283 - - Imperial restoration, 1917, 272 - - Industrial Bank, 72, 227, 263 - - Industrial Bank of Japan, 299, 341 - - Industrial loans, 341 - - International Banking Corporation, 47, 74, 102, 208 - - International railway syndicate, 101 - - Iron deposits, 224 - - - _Japan Mail_, 141 - - Japanese activity, 73 - - Japanese coöperation, 217 - - Japanese diplomats, 83 - - Japanese hegemony, 191 - - Japanese in Manchuria, 113 - - Japanese in Shantung, 124, 126 - - Japanese loan, 232 - - Japanese methods, 335 - - Japanese minister, 287, 310, 331, 339, 344, 346 - - Japanese morphia, 332 - - Japanese opposition to Yuan, 178 - - Japanese papers, 269, 331, 352, 365, 382 - - Japanese post offices, 332 - - Jeme Tien-yew, Dr., 210 - - Jenks-Conant Monetary Commission, 300 - - Jernigan, T.R., 89 - - Johnston, Archibald, 67, 99 - - Johnston, R.F., 377 - - Jordan, Sir John, 51, 77, 155, 157, 323, 376 - - _Journal de Pekin_, 61, 88 - - Judson, President, 32 - - - Kalgan-Urga route, 117, 219 - - Kang Yu-wei, 272, 279 - - Kiang, General, 110, 271 - - King Ya-mei, Dr., 28, 112 - - Knight, Admiral, 151, 351 - - Knox, Secretary, 311 - - Kobayashi, Dr., 299 - - Kolchak, Admiral, 350 - - Konovalov, M., 154 - - Koo, Dr. Wellington, 5, 10, 144, 171, 256, 268 - - Korea, 332 - - Koudacheff, Prince, 197, 220, 237, 239, 323 - - Krupenski, M., 77, 127 - - Ku Chung-hsiu, 204 - - Kuangsi, 186, 221 - - Kuangtung, 187 - - Kung Shin-chan, 384 - - Kuo Min Tang, 2, 9, 43, 46, 86, 200, 203, 244, 247, 263, 264, 288, 340 - - Kyle, Mr., 348, 349 - - - Lama priests, 194 - - Lansing, Secretary, 268, 346 - - Lansing Ishii Notes, 307, 337, 366 - - Lee Higginson loan, 187, 191, 202 - - Legal talent, 208 - - Legation guards, 77 - - Legation Quarter, 19 - - Li Ching-hsi, 264 - - Li Ho-chi, 262 - - Li Shun, 262, 314, 319, 381 - - Li Yuan-hung, General, 44, 45, 174, 181, 193, 198, 235, 237, 239, 242, - 258, 265, 273, 276 - - Liang Chi-chao, 32, 33, 174, 275, 288, 289, 292, 298, 299, 340, 345 - - Liang Chi-chao, resignation of, 174 - - Liang Shih-yi, 89, 90, 95, 109, 172, 173, 184, 188, 190, 193, 201, - 209, 213, 288, 322, 330, 350 - - Liang Tun-yen, 103, 104, 124, 169, 192, 273, 275 - - Library, 238 - - Liggett, General, 235 - - Living Buddha, 28 - - Liu, Civil Governor, 14 - - Loans, 287, 303, 317, 326, 345 - - Localized privileges, 337 - - London _Times_, 136 - - Lowry, Dr., 156 - - Lu Tsung-hsiang, 4, 136, 137, 141, 148, 153, 169 - - Lu Tsung-yu, 112, 299, 359 - - _Lusitania_, 168 - - - Ma Liang, 46 - - MacMurray, J.V.A., 50, 241 - - Mailed fist, 117 - - Manchuria, 133, 137 - - Martel, Count, 22, 233, 257 - - Martin, Dr. W.A.P., 50, 66 - - Mayers, Sidney, 52, 330 - - Mazot, M., 154 - - McClatchey, C.K., 159 - - Mead, Professor D.W., 82 - - Medical missions, 28 - - Midzuno, Mr., 82 - - Militarists, 318 - - Missionaries, 23, 39, 66, 333, 349 - - Mongolia, 76, 79, 383 - - Moratorium, 190 - - Morris, Ambassador, 387 - - Morrison, Dr. George E., 48, 68, 154, 238, 244, 246, 255, 304, 312, - 319, 320 - - Morton, Joy, 257 - - Murdock, Mr. Victor, 240 - - Music, 26 - - - Nan Tung-chow, 70 - - Nanking, 11, 293 - - Nanking Road, 11 - - Naval base, 99 - - Neville, Colonel Wendell C., 185, 212, 234, 362 - - New China, 30 - - New Year, 164, 165, 183 - - Newell, Major, 183, 362 - - News from abroad, 158 - - News service, 159 - - Newspapers, 157 - - Ni Tze-chung, General, 266 - - Nishihara, Mr., 353 - - Nobility, 181 - - Norris, Bishop, 151 - - North China _Daily News_, 88 - - Note of May 13, 1915, 148 - - - Obata Mr., 137, 339, 340, 344 - - Oil Development Bureau, 86 - - Okuma, Count, 126, 311 - - Open Door policy, 73 - - Orphans strike, 112 - - _Ostasiatische Lloyd_, 88 - - Ostrougoff, Mr., 350 - - - Padoux, M., 154 - - Pan Fu, 117, 208, 217, 395 - - Paris, Chinese delegation at, 339 - - Parliament, 2, 3, 43, 46, 58, 199, 204, 231, 236, 263, 350 - - Pastor, Don Luis, 51 - - Paulding & Company, 101 - - Peace Planning Society, 173 - - Peace Conference, 360 - - Peace Conference at Shanghai, 345 - - Peck, Willys R., 2, 17, 50, 161 - - Peitaiho, 201 - - Peking, 18, 52 - - Peking, city walls of, 16 - - Peking _Gazette_, 247 - - Peking Language School, 157 - - Peking tramways, 91 - - Peking University, 156 - - Peking-Kalgan Railway, 210 - - Pelliot, Paul, 154, 257 - - People's Convention, 186 - - Pettus, W.B., 52 - - Political discussions, 269 - - Pott, Dr. Hawks, 10 - - Prisoners in Siberia, 162 - - Progressive party, 103 - - Provisional Constitution of 1912, 199, 201 - - Pu Lun, Prince, 108, 118 - - Putnam Weale, 49, 78, 136 - - - Quo Tai-chi, 234, 242 - - - Railway contract, 142, 213, 232 - - Railway guards, 267 - - Railway unification, 329 - - Randolph, W., 98 - - Rank in seating, 234 - - Rank of precedence, 324 - - Real property value, 150 - - Recognition, question of, 176 - - "Regional understanding," 328 - - Reinsch, Mrs., 40, 78, 118, 384 - - Reorganization Loan, 62 - - Republicanism, 3, 25, 31, 42, 198, 290 - - Resignation, A Chinese, 174 - - Resignation, letter of, 364 - - Resources, 76 - - Revolutionists, 130 - - Roads, 163 - - Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, 150 - - Rockhill, W.W., 20, 30, 31, 32, 161 - - Rogers, Walter, 159 - - Rosthorn, von, M., 52 - - Russia and Siberia, 355, 356 - - Russian ambassador at Tokyo, 311 - - Russo-Asiatic Bank, 77, 83 - - Russo-Japanese entente, 72 - - - Salt Revenue, 55, 68 - - Sakatani, Baron, 345, 346 - - Sarajevo, 105 - - Saturday Lunch Club, 9 - - Savings banks, 228 - - Secret agreements, 361 - - Sforza, Count, 52 - - Shanghai, 9, 115, 200, 371, 373 - - Shansi Bankers' Guild, 90 - - Shantung, 14, 35, 123, 129, 180, 188, 190, 209, 218, 251, 315, 333, - 337, 338, 340, 352, 359, 374, 378, 379 - - Shantung railway, 125, 190, 379 - - Sheng Hsuan-huai, 96 - - Shidehara, Baron, 387 - - Shimonoseki, 386 - - Shun Tien Shih Pao, 191, 322 - - Sibert, Colonel, 92, 99, 207 - - Siems-Carey Company, 207, 219, 225 - - Simpson, B. Lenox, 48, 49, 52, 103, 131, 132, 154 - - Sinologists, 52 - - Smith, Dr. Arthur H., 50 - - Smith, Charles Stevenson, 235, 245 - - Social life, 208 - - Southern party, 291 - - Special interests, 100, 309, 312 - - Spencer, Willing, 386 - - Spheres of interest, 100, 219, 221, 309, 312 - - Spiritualism, Dr. Wu, 258 - - St. John's University, 10, 200 - - Staël-Holstein, Baron, 154 - - Standard Oil Company, 62, 66, 83, 84, 85, 89, 98, 105, 223 - - Statement of 5th of June, 268 - - Stevens, John F., 350 - - Stewart, Dr. M.A., 233 - - Stone, Dr. Mary, 28 - - Straight, Williard, 91, 94, 212, 300 - - Strike and boycott, 372 - - Strikes, 369 - - Student movement, 358, 368, 375 - - Sun Hung-yi, 203 - - Sun Pao-chi, 5, 17, 27, 169 - - Sun, T.C., 295 - - Sun Yat-sen, Dr., 43, 263, 334, 380 - - Surplus salt revenue, 325 - - Sze, Alfred, 4, 10 - - Szechuan, 211 - - - Taft, President, 74 - - Taishan, 35, 37, 39 - - Tanaka, General, 351 - - Tang Shao-yi, 200, 201 - - Tartar City Wall, 211 - - Taxation, 55, 115 - - Telephone and telegraph agreement, 225 - - Temple of Confucius, 39 - - Temple of Heaven, 25, 277, 282, 284 - - Tenney, Dr. Charles D., 66, 161, 241, 309, 348, 385 - - Terauchi, General, 353 - - Thanksgiving, 325 - - Tien Chung-yu, Tuchun, 117, 262 - - Tientsin, 14 - - Tobacco and wine revenue, 353 - - Tobacco and wine tax, 222 - - Tokugawa, Mr., 386 - - Tokutomi, Mr., 303 - - Troops, foreign, 79, 115 - - Tsai, Duke, 33, 279, 281 - - Tsai Ao, 180, 182 - - Tsai Chu-tung, 14 - - Tsai Ting-kan, Admiral, 6, 108, 129, 246 - - Tsai, Dr. Yuan-pei, 377 - - Tsao Ju-lin, 113, 137, 189, 213, 243, 267, 288, 289, 299, 314, 318, - 353, 358, 362, 370 - - Tsao Kun, 262, 277, 326 - - Tsing Hua College, 112, 113 - - Tsur, Dr. T.T., 112 - - Tuchuns, 43, 54, 261, 264, 265 - - Tuan Chi-Jui, General, 54, 174, 188, 189, 193, 199, 202, 226, 242, 243, - 250, 260, 265, 266, 268, 275, 276, 282, 286, 288, 293, 298, 300, 313, - 317, 354, 369, 376 - - Twenty-one demands, 129, 149 - - - Ultimatum, 143, 145, 146, 147 - - - Versailles Conference, 358 - - - Walker, Sir Edward, 373 - - Wang, Dr. C.C., 112 - - Wang Chung-hui, Dr., 10, 247 - - Wang, C.T., 43, 231, 247, 250, 290 - - Wang Shih-chen, 273, 314 - - War Participation Office, 315, 318, 341, 342, 343, 351, 383 - - War Works Drive, 322 - - Weil, Miss, 185 - - Welch, Dr. George A., 150, 151 - - Western Hills, 16 - - White, Corporation, J.G., 82, 98 - - White Wolf, 54 - - Whitham, W.P., 329, 381 - - Williams, E.T., 2, 17, 50 - - Willoughby, Dr. W.F., 154 - - Willoughby, Dr. W.W., 233, 235, 265, 329 - - Wilson, President, 63, 89, 125, 239, 268, 308, 319, 331, 356, 360, - 362, 363, 378, 379 - - Winterhalter, Admiral, 237 - - Wireless telegraph, 159 - - Wu Fu Ssu, 89 - - Women's Medical College, 28 - - Worship of heaven, 23, 24, 25 - - Wu Pei-fu, 262 - - Wu, C.C., 186, 243, 247, 251, 253, 290 - - Wu Ting-fang, Dr., 9, 226, 258, 268, 270, 279 - - - Y.M.C.A., 62, 66, 88, 89, 118, 155, 163 - - Yamaza, Mr., 82, 83, 87 - - Yang Shih-chi, 172 - - Yangtse, 211 - - Yangtse Valley, 133 - - Yeh Kung-cho, 104, 172, 330 - - Yen Fu, Dr., 46, 235 - - Yen, Mr. Hawkling L., 185 - - Yen Hsi-shan, 261 - - Yen, Dr. W.W., 10 - - Yi Shih Pao, 157 - - Ying Chang, General, 2, 4, 110 - - Yin Chang-heng, General, 110, 111 - - Yokohama Specie Bank, 299 - - Yoshizawa, Mr., 381 - - Young China, 368 - - Yuan, Madame, 165 - - Yuan Ko-ting, 195, 196 - - Yuan Shih-kai, 1, 3, 5, 8, 23, 25, 31, 43, 47, 58, 72, 79, 95, 108, - 125, 129, 134, 138, 145, 146, 171, 172, 174, 177, 180, 184, 185, 192, - 193, 383 - - Yunnan, 180, 182, 183, 184 - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's An American Diplomat in China, by Paul S. 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Reinsch - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: An American Diplomat in China - -Author: Paul S. Reinsch - -Release Date: November 30, 2017 [EBook #56089] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA *** - - - - -Produced by ellinora, Graeme Mackreth and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - -</pre> - -<div class="hidehand"> -<p class="center"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" alt="cover" /> -</p></div> - - - - - -<p class="ph2" style="margin-bottom: 5em;"> -AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT<br /> -IN CHINA -</p> - - - -<div class="bbox1"> -<div class="bbox"> -<p class="center"> WRITINGS OF PAUL S. REINSCH</p> -</div> - -<blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">The Common Law in the Early American Colonies, 1899</span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century As Influenced -by The Oriental Situation, 1900</span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Colonial Government, 1902</span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Colonial Administration, 1905</span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, 1907</span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Intellectual Currents in the Far East, 1911</span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">International Unions, 1911</span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Essentials of Government, 1920</span><br /> (<i>Published in Chinese</i>)</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Secret Diplomacy, 1921</span></p></blockquote> -</div> - - - -<p class="ph1" style="margin-top: 5em;"> -AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT<br /> -IN CHINA</p> - -<p class="ph5">BY</p> - -<p class="ph3">PAUL S. REINSCH</p> - -<p class="ph5">AMERICAN MINISTER TO CHINA<br /> -1913-1919</p> - - - -<p class="ph5" style="margin-top: 10em;">GARDEN CITY, N.Y., AND TORONTO</p> - -<p class="ph4">DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY<br /> - -1922 -</p> - - - - -<p class="ph5" style="margin-top: 10em;">COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY</p> -<p class="ph5">DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY</p> - -<p class="ph6">ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION<br /> -INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN</p> - -<p class="ph6">COPYRIGHT, 1921, 1922, BY ASIA PUBLISHING COMPANY IN THE<br /> -UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED<br /> -PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES<br /> -AT<br /> -THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY, N.Y.<br /> -<i>First Edition</i></p> - - - - - -<p class="ph2">CONTENTS</p> - - - - - -<table summary="toc" width="60%"> -<tr> -<td align="right"><small>CHAPTER</small> -</td> -<td> -</td> -<td align="right"><small>PAGE</small> -</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> -</td> -<td colspan="3" align="center"><a href="#PART_I">PART I</a> -</td> -<td> -</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td > -</td> -<td colspan="3" align="center">OLD CHINA AND THE NEW REPUBLIC -</td> -<td> -</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">I.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">The Dictator-President of China</a></td> -<td class="tdr"> <a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">II.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">China of Many Persons</a></td> -<td class="tdr"> <a href="#Page_8">8</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">III.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">Old Confucianism in the New China</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_23">23</a></td></tr> - - -<tr><td class="tdr">IV.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">A Glimpse Behind the Political Scenes</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_42">42</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">V.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">With Men Who Watch Politics</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_48">48</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">VI.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">China of Merchant-Adventurers</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_59">59</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">VII.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">Prompt Proposals for American Action</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_70">70</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">VIII. </td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">A Little Vision for China</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_80">80</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">IX.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">"Slow Americans"</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_95">95</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">X.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">Folk Ways and Officials</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_108">108</a></td></tr> - -<tr> -<td> -</td> -<td colspan="3" align="center"><a href="#PART_II">PART II</a> -</td> -<td> -</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> -</td> -<td colspan="3" align="center">THE PASSING OF YUAN SHIH-KAI -</td> -<td> -</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XI.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">The War: Japan in Shantung</a></td> -<td class="tdr"> <a href="#Page_123">123</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XII.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">The Famous Twenty-One Demands</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_129">129</a></td></tr> - - -<tr><td class="tdr">XIII. </td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">Getting Together</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_150">150</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XIV.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">War Days in Peking</a></td> -<td class="tdr"> <a href="#Page_161">161</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XV.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">Emperor Yuan Shih-Kai</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_171">171</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XVI.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">Downfall and Death of Yuan Shih-Kai</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_183">183</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XVII.</td> -<td class="tdl"> <a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">Republicans in the Saddle</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_198">198</a></td></tr> - -<tr> -<td> -</td> -<td colspan="3" align="center"><a href="#PART_III">PART III</a> -</td> -<td> -</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> -</td> -<td colspan="3" align="center">THE WAR AND CHINA -</td> -<td> -</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XVIII.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">American Entrepreneurs in Peking</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_207">207</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XIX.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIX">Guarding the "Open Door"</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_217">217</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XX.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XX">Diary of Quiet Days. Autumn of 1916</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_230">230</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXI.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXI">China Breaks with Germany</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_241">241</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXII.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXII">China's Bosses Come to Peking</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_260">260</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXIII.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXIII">An Emperor for a Day</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_272">272</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXIV.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXIV">War With Germany: Readjustments</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_286">286</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXV.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXV">The Chinese Go A-Borrowing</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_296">296</a></td></tr> - -<tr> -<td> -</td> -<td colspan="3" align="center"><a href="#PART_IV">PART IV</a> -</td> -<td> -</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> -</td> -<td colspan="3" align="center">LAST YEAR OF WAR AND AFTERMATH -</td> -<td> -</td> -</tr> - - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXVI.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXVI">The Lansing-Ishii Notes</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_307">307</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXVII.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXVII">Amidst Troubles Peking Rejoices</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_317">317</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXVIII.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXVIII">A New World War Coming?</a></td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_328">328</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXIX.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXIX">Japan Shows Her Teeth</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_339">339</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXX.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXX">Bandits, Intriguers, and a House Divided</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_347">347</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXXI.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXXI">Young Men in Peking, Old Men in Paris</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_358">358</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXXII.</td> -<td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXXII">A Nation Strikes and Unites</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_368">368</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="tdr">XXXIII.</td> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXXIII">Taking Leave of Peking</a></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_375">375</a></td></tr> - -<tr> -<td > -</td> -<td class="tdl" ><a href="#INDEX"><span class="smcap">Index</span></a> -</td> -<td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_391">391</a> -</td> -</tr> -</table> - - - - - -<p class="ph2">INTRODUCTION</p> - - -<p>Through recent developments China has been put in the forefront of -international interest. The world is beginning to have an idea of its -importance. Those who have long known it, who have given attention -to its traditions and the sources of its social and industrial -strength, have the conviction that China will become a factor of the -first magnitude in the composition of the world of the twentieth -century. They have penetrated beyond the idea that China is a land -of topsy-turvy, the main function of which is to amuse the outsider -with unexpected social customs, and which, from a political point of -view, is in a state bordering upon chaos. When we ask ourselves what -are the elements which may constitute China's contribution to the -future civilization of the world, what are the characteristics which -render her civilization significant to all of us, we enter upon a -subject that would in itself require a volume merely to present in -outline. From the point of view of social action, there is the widely -diffused sense of popular equity which has enabled Chinese society for -these many centuries to govern itself, to maintain property rights, -personal honour and dignity without recourse to written law or set -tribunals, chiefly through an informal enforcement by society itself -acting through many agencies, of that underlying sense of proportion -and rightness which lives in the hearts of the people. From the point -of view of economic life, China presents the picture of a society in -which work has not been robbed of its joy, in which the satisfaction -of seeing the product of industry grow in the hands of the craftsman -still forms the chief reward of a labour performed with patient toil -but without heartbreaking drudgery. From the point of view of social -organization, China forms an extremely intricate organism in which -the specific relationship between definite individuals counts far -more than any general principles or ideas. Loyalty, piety, a sense of -fitness give meaning to the ceremonial of Chinese social life, which -is more than etiquette as a mere ornament of social intercourse in -that it bodies forth in visible form as every-day observances, the -relations and duties upon which society rests. From the point of view -of art, China stands for a refinement of quality which attests the -loving devotion of generations to the idea of a perfect product; in the -representative arts, calmness of perception has enabled the Chinese to -set a model for the artistic reproduction of the environments of human -life. In their conception of policy and world position, the Chinese -people have ever shown a readiness to base any claim to ascendancy -upon inherent excellence and virtue. They have not imposed upon their -neighbours any artificial authority, though they have proudly received -the homage and admiration due their noble culture.</p> - -<p>At this time, when the Far Eastern question is the chief subject-matter -of international conferences and negotiations, China stands before -the world in the eyes of those who really know her, not as a bankrupt -pleader for indulgence and assistance, but as a great unit of human -tradition and force which, heretofore somewhat over-disdainful of the -things through which other nations had won power and preference and -mechanical mastery, has lived a trifle carelessly in the assurance that -real strength must rest on inner virtue; China has made no use of the -arts of self-advertisement, but has felt within her the consciousness -of a great human force that must ultimately prevail over petty -intrigue and forceful aggression. The secular persistence of Chinese -civilization has given to the Chinese an inner strength and confidence -which make them bear up even when the aggressiveness of nations more -effectively organized for attack seems to render their position -well-nigh desperate. Can the world fail to realize that if this vast -society can continue to live according to its traditions of peace and -useful industry instead of being made the battleground of contending -Imperial interests, the peace of the world will be more truly advanced -than it may be by any covenants of formal contrivance? Declarations, -treaties, and leagues are all useful instruments, but unless the -nations agree without afterthought to respect the life and civilization -of China, all professions of world betterment would be belied in fact. -If China is to be looked upon as material for the imperialist policies -of others, peace conferences will discuss and resolve in vain.</p> - -<p>During the six years of my work in China I was constantly surrounded -by the evidences of the transition of Chinese life to new methods and -aims. In all its complex phases this enormous transformation passed -in review before my eyes, in all its deep significance, not only for -China and the Far East, but for the whole world. It was this that made -life and work in China at this time so intensely fascinating. A new -form of government had been adopted. As I represented the Republic -upon which it had been largely modeled, whose spirit the Chinese were -anxious to follow, it fell to me to counsel with Chinese leaders as -if I had been one of their number. The experience of a great American -commonwealth which had itself successfully endeavoured to raise its -organization to a higher plane was of unending assistance to me in -enabling me to see the Chinese problems as part of what right-thinking -men were struggling for throughout the world. The most discouraging -feature was, however, that the needs of China so often took the form of -emergencies in which it seemed futile to plan at long range, in which -immediate help was necessary. Where one was coöperating with a group of -men beset by overpowering difficulties of the moment, it often seemed -academic even to think of the general improvement of political and -economic organization, over a longer range of time. The old elements -of the Imperial régime, the traditional methods of basing authority on -something from above, the purely personal conception of politics with -the corruption incident upon the idea that members of clans must take -care of each other—which formerly was a virtue—all were the sources -of the outstanding difficulties that jutted everywhere into the plans -for a more highly and efficiently organized commonwealth. But it was -a pleasure to see the growing manifestation of a commonwealth spirit, -the organization of public opinion, and the clearer vision of the -demands of public service. Even among the officials the idea that the -Government was merely a taxing and office-holding organization was -giving way, especially among the younger men, to a desire that the -functions of government should be used for developmental purposes, in -helping the people towards better methods in agriculture and industry, -in encouraging improved communications and public works of many kinds.</p> - -<p>International action as seen from Peking during this period did not -have many reassuring qualities. In most cases it was based upon a -desire to lose no technical advantage of position; to yield not a whit, -no matter what general benefit might result through mutual concessions. -Each one was jealously guarding his position in which he had advanced -step by step. Some were willing to make common cause with others in -things that would not always commend themselves to a sense of equity, -in order that they might take still another step forward. During the -major part of this period one power employed every device of intrigue, -intimidation, corruption, and force in order to gain a position for -itself in flagrant disregard of the rights of the Chinese people -itself, and in oblivion of the rights of others.</p> - -<p>As to American policy, the difficulties which I encountered arose from -the fact that a great deal was expected of a country so powerful, which -had declared and always pursued a policy so just to China. Chinese -goodwill and confidence, and the real friendship of the Chinese people -toward America certainly tended to make easier any task America might -be ready to undertake. But America had no political aims and desired to -abstain particularly from anything verging on political interference, -even in behalf of those principles we so thoroughly believe in. -American relationships to China depended not on governmental action, -but on a spontaneous coöperation between the two peoples in matters of -education, commerce, and industry.</p> - -<p>Infinitely complex as were the questions of Chinese internal affairs -and of the privileges and desires of the various powers, yet to my mind -it was not a difficult problem to see what should be done in order -to put matters on a sound foundation. I had learned to have great -confidence in the ability of the Chinese to manage their own affairs -when let alone, particularly in commerce and industry.</p> - -<p>That was the first desideratum, to secure for them immunity from -the constant interference, open and secret, on the part of foreign -interests desirous of confusing Chinese affairs and drawing advantage -from such confusion. So far as American diplomatic action was -concerned, its essential task was to prevent such interference, and -to see to it that China could not be closed even by those indirect -methods which often accompany the most vociferous, ardent declarations -in favour of Chinese independence and sovereignty. We therefore had -to keep a close watch and to resist in specific detail any and all of -those innumerable efforts on the part of others to secure and fortify -a position of privilege. That was the negative side of our action. The -positive side, however, was entirely non-political. Americans sought -no position of tutordom or control. Only upon the free and spontaneous -invitation of the Chinese would they come to counsel and assist.</p> - -<p>The important thing was that Americans should continue to take a -hand in the education of China and the upbuilding of Chinese business -and enterprise. They had done this in the past, and would do it in -the future in the spirit of free coöperation, without desire to -exercise a tutelage over others, always rejoicing in any progress the -Chinese themselves made. Such activities must continue and increase. -Sound action in business and constructive work in industry should be -America's contribution to the solution of the specific difficulties of -China. The Chinese people were discouraged, confused, disillusioned; -but every centre, no matter how small, from which radiate sound -influences in education and business, is a source of strength and -progress. If Americans could be stopped from doing these things, or -impeded and obstructed in them, then there would nothing further -remain worth while for Americans to do. But if they could organize -enterprises, great and small, they would in the most direct and -effective manner give the encouragement and organizing impulse which -China needed so urgently. So the simple principle of American action -in China is this: By doing things in themselves worth while, Americans -will contribute most to the true liberation of the Chinese people.</p> - -<p>Never has one nation had a greater opportunity to act as counsellor and -friend to another and to help a vast and lovable people to realize its -striving for a better life. Coöperation freely sought, unconstrained, -spontaneous desire to model on institutions and methods which are -admired—that is the only way in which nations may mutually influence -each other without the coercion of political power and the cunning of -intrigue. That is a feeling which has existed in the hearts of the -Chinese toward America. The American people does not yet realize what a -treasure it possesses in this confidence.</p> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="ph2"> -<a name="PART_I" id="PART_I">PART I</a></p> -<p class="center"> -OLD CHINA AND THE<br /> -NEW REPUBLIC -</p> - - - - - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a></p> - -<p class="center">THE DICTATOR-PRESIDENT OF CHINA</p> - - -<p>"My opponents are disloyal. They would pull down my government." He who -spoke was cordial in his manner as he thus off handedly epitomized his -theory of government.</p> - -<p>Yuan Shih-kai, President of the Chinese Republic, was short of stature -and thickset; but his expressive face, his quick gestures, his powerful -neck and bullet head, gave him the appearance of great energy. His -eyes, which were fine and clear, alive with interest and mobile, were -always brightly alert. They fixed themselves on the visitor with keen -penetration, yet never seemed hostile; they were full always of keen -interest. These eyes of his revealed how readily he followed—or -usually anticipated—the trend of the conversation, though he listened -with close attention, seemingly bringing his judgment to bear on each -new detail. Frenchmen saw in him a resemblance to Clemenceau; and this -is born out by his portrait which appears on the Chinese dollar. In -stature, facial expression, shape of head, contour of features as well -as in the manner of wearing his moustache, he did greatly resemble the -Tiger.</p> - -<p>I had noted these things when I was first presented to the President, -and I had felt also the almost ruthless power of the man. Republican -in title he was, but an autocrat at heart. All the old glittering -trappings of the empire he had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> preserved. Even the Chief of the -Military Department of the President's household, General Yin Chang, -whom Yuan had sent to fetch me in Imperial splendour, is a Manchu and -former Imperial commander. His one foreign language significantly -enough was German which he acquired when he was minister in Berlin. I -had passed between files of the huge guardsmen of Yuan Shih-kai, who -had Frederick the Great's fondness for tall men; and I found him in the -showy palace of the great Empress Dowager, standing in the main throne -hall to receive me. He was flanked by thirty generals of his household, -extended in wings at both sides of him, and their uniforms made it a -most impressive scene.</p> - -<p>But that was an occasion of state. Later, at a more informal interview, -accompanied only by Mr. Williams, secretary of the legation and Mr. -Peck, the Chinese secretary, observed Yuan's character more fully. -He had just expelled from parliament the democratic party (Kuo Min -Tang); then he had summarily dismissed the Parliament itself. Feeling, -perhaps, a possible loss of American goodwill he had sent for me to -explain his action.</p> - -<p>"It was not a good parliament, for it was made up largely of -inexperienced theorists and young politicians," he began. "They wished -to meddle with the Government as well as to legislate on all matters. -Their real function was to adopt a permanent constitution for the -Republic, but they made no headway with that." And with much truth he -added: "Our traditions are very different from your Western ones and -our affairs are very complex. We cannot safely apply your abstract -ideas of policy."</p> - -<p>Of his own work of stirring up, through emissaries, internal and -partisan controversies which prevented the new parliament from -effectively organizing, Yuan of course omitted to speak. Moreover, -he said little of the possibility of more closely coördinating the -executive and the legislative branches; so while he avowed his desire -to have a constitu<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span>tion forthwith, and to reconstitute Parliament by -more careful selections under a new electoral law, I found myself -thinking of his own career. His personal rule, his unscrupulous -advancement to power, with the incidental corruption and cold-blooded -executions that marked it, and his bitter personal feeling against all -political opponents—these were not qualities that make for stable -parliamentary government, which depends on allowing other people -frankly to advocate their opinions in the effort to gain adherents -enough to succeed in turn to political power. The failure to understand -this basic principle of democracy is the vice of Chinese politics.</p> - -<p>"As you see," Yuan beamed eagerly, "the Chinese Republic is a very -young baby. It must be nursed and kept from taking strong meat or -potent medicines like those prescribed by foreign doctors." This -metaphor he repeated with relish, his eyes sparkling as they sought -mine and those of the other listeners to get their expressions of -assent or reserve.</p> - -<p>A young baby indeed and childishly cared for! Here, for example, is a -decree published by Yuan Shih-kai on March 8, 1915. It indicates how -faith in his republicanism was penetrating to remote regions, and how -such faith was rewarded by him:</p> - -<p>"Ihsihaishun, Prince of the Koersin Banner, reported through the Board -for Mongolia and Tibet that Kuanchuk-chuaimupal, Hutukhtu of the -Banner, has led his followers to support the cause of the Republic and -requested that the said Hutukhtu be rewarded for his good sentiments. -The said Hutukhtu led his followers and vowed allegiance to the -Republic, which action shows that he clearly understands the good -cause. He is hereby allowed to ride in a yellow canopied carriage to -show our appreciation."</p> - -<p>This rather naïve emphasis on externals and on display is born of the -old imperialism, a more significant feature of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> Chinese political life -than it may seem. It colours most of the public ceremonies in China. -The state carriage which the President had sent to convey me to his -official residence in the Imperial City for the presentation of my -credentials, on November 17th, was highly ornate, enamelled in blue -with gold decorations. It was drawn by eight horses, with a cavalry -escort sent by the President and my own guard of mounted marines; the -legation staff of secretaries and attachés accompanied me in other -carriages.</p> - -<p>Thus in an old Imperial barouche and with an ex-Imperial military -officer, General Yin, at my side, I rolled on toward the abode of the -republican chief magistrate. We alighted at the monumental gate of an -enclosure that surrounds the lovely South Lake in the western part of -the Imperial City. On an island within this lake arose, tier above -tier, and roofed with bright tiles of blue and yellow, the palace -assigned by the Empress Dowager to Emperor Kwang Hsu; for long years, -until death took him, it was his abode in semi-captivity. This palace -was now the home of President Yuan.</p> - -<p>The remote origin of its buildings, their exquisite forms and brilliant -colouring, as contrasted with the sombreness of the lake at that -season, and the stirring events of which they have been the scene, -cannot fail to impress the visitor as he slowly glides across the -Imperial lake in the old-fashioned boat, with its formal little cabin, -curtained and upholstered, and with its lateral planks, up and down -which pass the men who propel the boat with long poles.</p> - -<p>Arrived at the palace, everything recalled the colourful court life -so recently departed. I was greeted by the master of ceremonies, Mr. -Lu Cheng-hsiang, and his associate, Mr. Alfred Sze, later Chinese -minister at London and Washington. The former soon after became -Minister for Foreign Affairs, while Mr. Sze was originally sent as -minister to England. These gentlemen escorted me through a series of -courts and halls, all spacious and impressive, until we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> reached the -old Imperial library, a very jewel of architecture in this remarkable -Eastern world of beauty. The library faces on a clear and deep pool -round which are grouped the court theatre and various throne rooms -and festival halls; all quiet and secluded—a charming place for -distinguished entertainments. The rustle of heavy silks, the play of -iridescent colour, the echoes of song and lute from the theatre—all -that exquisite oriental refinement still seems to linger.</p> - -<p>The library itself is the choicest of all these apartments. The perfect -sense of proportion expressed in the architecture, the quiet reserve -in all its decorations, the living literary reminiscence in the verses -written on the paper panels by the Imperial hand, all testify to a most -fastidious taste.</p> - -<p>Here we rested for a few minutes while word was carried to the -President, who was to receive my credentials. Then followed our walk -between the files of the huge guardsmen, our entrance to the large -audience chamber in the pretentious modern structure erected by the -Empress Dowager, and the presentation to Yuan Shih-kai, as he stood in -the centre, flanked by his generals.</p> - -<p>I was formally presented to the President by Mr. Sun Pao-chi, Minister -of Foreign Affairs; and Dr. Wellington Koo translated my brief address -and the President's reply.</p> - -<p>A military dictatorship had succeeded the old imperialism, that was -all. Yuan had made his reputation and gained his power as a military -commander. Yet there was about him nothing of the adventurer, nor any -suggestion of the field of battle. He seemed now to be an administrator -rather than a military captain. Certainly he had won power through -infinite patience, great knowledge of men, political insight, and, -above all, through playing always a safe if unscrupulous game.</p> - -<p>What is meant by governing in a republic he could not know. Without -high literary culture, although with a mind<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> trained and well informed, -he had not seen foreign countries, nor had he any knowledge of foreign -languages. Therefore, he could have only a remote and vague notion of -the foreign institutions which China at this time was beginning to -imitate. He had no real knowledge or conception of the commonwealth -principle of government, nor of the true use and function of a -parliament, and particularly of a parliamentary opposition. He merely -accepted these as necessary evils to be held within as narrow limits as -possible.</p> - -<p>During the two and a half years from my coming to Peking until the -time of his death, Yuan Shih-kai left the enclosure of his palace only -twice. This reminds me of the American, with an introduction from the -State Department, who wired me from Shanghai asking me to arrange for -him to take a moving picture of Yuan "proceeding from his White House -to his Capitol." This enterprising Yankee would have had plenty of -time to meditate on the difference between oriental political customs -and our own if he had waited for Yuan Shih-kai to "proceed" from his -political hermitage. The President's seclusion was usually attributed -to fear of assassination, but if such fear was present in his mind, as -well it might have been, there was undoubtedly also the idea, taken -over from the Empire, that the holder of the highest political power -should not appear in public except on very unusual occasions.</p> - -<p>When he received me informally, he doffed the uniform of state and -always wore a long Chinese coat. He had retained the distinction and -refinement of Chinese manners, with a few additions from the West, such -as shaking hands. His cue he had abandoned in 1912, when he decided -to become President of the Republic. In the building which is now the -Foreign Office and where he was then residing, Yuan asked Admiral Tsai -Ting-kan whether his entry into the new era should not be outwardly -expressed by shedding the traditional adornment of the head which -though once a sign of bondage had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> become an emblem of nationality. -When Admiral Tsai advised strongly in favour of it, Yuan sent for a big -pair of scissors, and said to him: "It is your advice. You carry it -out." The Admiral, with a vigorous clip, transformed Yuan into a modern -man.</p> - -<p>But inwardly Yuan Shih-kai was not much changed thereby.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a></p> - -<p class="center">CHINA OF MANY PERSONS</p> - - -<p>Yuan Shih-kai, a ruler whose power was personal, whose theories of -government were those of an absolute monarch, who believed that -in himself lay the hope of his people; China itself a nation of -individualists, among whom there was as yet no unifying national sense, -no inbred love of country, no traditions of personal responsibility -toward their government, no sense that they themselves shared in the -making of the laws which ordered their lives—these, I think, were the -first clear impressions I had of the land to which I came as envoy in -the early days of the Republic.</p> - -<p>Even the rivers and cities through which we passed on our way to Peking -seemed to deepen this feeling for me. The houseboats jammed together in -the harbour at Shanghai visualized it. Each of these boats sheltered -a family, who lived and moved and had their being, for the most part, -on its narrow decks. Each family was quite independent of the people -on the next boat. Each was immersed in the stern business of earning -bread. These houseboat people (so it seemed) had little in common with -each other, little in common with the life of the cities and villages -which they regularly visited. As a class they lived apart; and each -family was, for most of the time, isolated from the others. Their -life, I thought, was the civilization of China in miniature. Of course -such a figure applies only roughly. I mean merely to suggest that the -population of this vast country is not a homogeneous one in a political -sense. The unit of society is—as it has been for many centuries—the -family,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> not the state. This is changing now, and changing rapidly. -The seeds of democracy found fertile soil in China; but a civilization -which has been shaping itself through eighty centuries cannot be too -abruptly attacked. China is, after all, an ancient monarchy upon which -the republican form of government was rather suddenly imposed. It is -still in the period of adjustment. Such at least were my reactions as -we ascended the Hwang-pu River, on that October day in 1913, and drew -into the harbour basin which lies at the centre of Shanghai.</p> - -<p>In one of the hotels of the city we found the "Saturday Lunch Club" in -session. I was not a little surprised that this mid-day gastronomic -forum, which had but lately come into vogue in America, had become -so thoroughly acclimated in this distant port. But despite the many -nationalities represented at this international gathering, the language -was English. As to dress, many of the Chinese at the luncheon preferred -their dignified, long-flowing robes to Western coats and trousers.</p> - -<p>Dr. Wu Ting-fang was present in Chinese costume and a little purple -skull cap, and we sat down to talk together. He related the moves -made by President Yuan against the democratic party (Kuo Min Tang) -in parliament and said: "Yuan Shih-kai's sole aim is to get rid of -parliament. He has no conception of free government, is entirely a man -of personal authority. The air of absolutism surrounds him. Beware," -Dr. Wu admonished, "when you get behind those high walls of Peking. -The atmosphere is stagnant. It seems to overcome men and make them -reactionary. Nobody seems to resist that power!"</p> - -<p>Later I was accosted on a momentous matter by an American missionary. -He was not affiliated with any missionary society, but had organized -a so-called International Institute for a Mission among the Higher -Classes. His mien betrayed overburdening care, ominous presentiment, -and he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> said he had already submitted a grave matter to the Department -of State. It concerned the Saturday Lunch Club. Somewhat too -precipitately I spoke with gratification of its apparent success. "But, -sir," he interposed, "it was established and set in motion by the -consul-general!"</p> - -<p>As still I could not see wherein the difficulty lay, my visitor became -emphatic.</p> - -<p>"Do you not realize, sir, that my institute was established to bring -the different nationalities together, and that the formation of such a -club should have been left to me?"</p> - -<p>When I expressed my feeling that there was no end of work to be done -in the world in establishing relationships of goodwill; that every -accomplishment of this kind was to be received with gratitude, he -gave me up. I had thought, at first, that he was about to charge the -consul-general, at the very least, with embezzlement.</p> - -<p>That afternoon I inspected the student battalion of St. John's -University. This institution is modern, affiliated with the -Episcopalian Church, and many of its alumni are distinguished in public -life as well as in industrial enterprise and commerce. Of these I need -only mention Dr. W.W. Yen, Dr. Wellington Koo, Dr. Alfred Sze, and -Dr. Wang Chung-hui, later Chief Justice of China. Dr. Hawks Pott, the -president, introduced me to the assembled students as an old friend -of China. There I met Dr. Pott's wife, a Chinese lady, and several of -their daughters and sons, two of whom later fought in the Great War.</p> - -<p>A newspaper reporter brought me back abruptly to local matters. He -was the first to interview me in China. "Will you remove the American -marines," he queried, "from the Chienmen Tower?"</p> - -<p>A disturbing question! I was cautious, as I had not even known there -were marines posted on that ancient tower. Whether they ought to -be kept there was a matter to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> look into, along with other things -affecting the destiny of nations.</p> - -<p>I could not stop to see Shanghai then, but did so later. If one looks -deeply enough its excellences stand out. The private gardens, behind -high walls, show its charm; acres covered with glorious plants, shrubs, -and bushes; rows and groves of springtime trees radiant with blossoms; -the parks and the verandas of clubs where people resort of late -afternoons to take their tea; the glitter of Nanking Road at night, its -surge of humanity, the swarming life on river and creeks. This is the -real Shanghai, market and meeting place of the nations.</p> - -<p>Nanking came next, visited the 4th of November. Forlorn and woeful the -old capital lay in gray morning light as we entered. The semi-barbarous -troops of Chang Hsun lined its streets. They had sacked the town, -ostensibly suppressing the last vestiges of the "Revolution." General -Chang Hsun, an old imperialist, still clinging to ancient customs, had -espoused the cause of President Yuan. A rough soldier quite innocent -of modernity, he had taken Nanking, not really for the republican -government, but for immediate advantage to himself, and for his -soldiers to loot and burn. There they stood, huge, black-uniformed, -pig-tailed men, "guarding" the streets along which the native dwellers -were slinking sullenly and in fear. Everywhere charred walls without -roofs; the contents of houses broken and cast on the street; fragments -of shrapnel in the walls—withal a depressing picture of misery.</p> - -<p>Nanking, immense and primitive, had reverted partly to agriculture, and -for miles the houses of farmers line extensive fields. Three Japanese -men-of-war rode at anchor in mid-river; they had come to support the -representations of the Japanese consul over an injury suffered by a -Japanese barber during the disturbances. General Chang Hsun, forced to -offer reparation, had among other things to call<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> ceremoniously on the -Japanese consul to express his formal regrets. This he did, saving his -face by arranging to call on all the foreign consuls the same day.</p> - -<p>Another bit of local colour: We were driven to the American consulate, -modestly placed on the edge of the agricultural region of Nanking, with -barns in the offing. The consul being absent on leave, the official in -charge greeted us. His wife related that a few days before thirty of -Chang's braves, armed to the teeth, had come to the house to see what -they might carry off. In her husband's absence Mrs. Gilbert met them -at the door and very quietly talked the matter over with them as to -what unending bother it would occasion everybody, particularly General -Chang, if his men should invade the American consulate, and how it -would be far better to think it over while she prepared some tea for -them.</p> - -<p>The men, at first fierce and unrelenting, looked at one another -puzzled, then found seats along the edge of the veranda. When the tea -came in, their spokesman said they recognized that theirs had been a -foolish enterprise. With expressions of civility and gratitude they -consumed their tea and went away—which shows what one American woman -can do in stilling the savage breast of a Chinese vandal by a quiet -word of reason.</p> - -<p>After the exhibition his men had made of themselves in Nanking, I had -no wish to call on His Excellency Chang Hsun. We arranged to take the -first train for Tientsin. Crossing the broad river by ferry, from its -deck friends pointed out Tiger Head and other famous landscapes, the -scenes of recent fighting and of clashes during the Revolution of -1911. In the sitting room of our special car on the Pukow railway, the -little company comprised Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, who went on with me -to Peking; Mr. Roy S. Anderson, an American uniquely informed about -the Chinese, and a Chinese governmental representative who accompanied -me. In a single afternoon Mr. Anderson gave<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> me a complete view of -the existing situation in Chinese politics, relating many personal -incidents and characteristics.</p> - -<p>In Chinese politics the personal element is supreme. The key to the -ramifications of political influence lies in knowledge of persons; -their past history, affiliations and interests, friendships, enmities, -financial standing, their groupings and the interactions of the various -groups. Intensely human, there is little of the abstract in Chinese -social ethics. Their ideals of conduct are personal, while the remoter -loyalties to principle or patriotic duty are not strongly expressed -in action. In this immediate social cement is the strength by which -Chinese society has been able to exist for ages.</p> - -<p>The defect of this great quality is in the absence of any motive -whereby men may be carried beyond their narrower interests in -definitely conceived, broad public aims. When I came to China these -older methods prevailed more than at present; hence Mr. Anderson's -knowledge of the Chinese, wide as the nation and specific as to the -qualities of all its important men, enabled me to approach Chinese -affairs concretely, personally, and to lay aside for the time any -general and preconceived notions. It enabled me to see, also, how -matters of such vast consequence, as, for example, the Hwai River -famines, had been neglected for the short-sighted individual concerns -of Chinese politics.</p> - -<p>That afternoon we passed through the Hwai River region. An apparently -endless alluvial plain, it is inexhaustibly rich in depth and quality -of soil—<i>loess</i>, which has been carried down from the mountains and -deposited here for eons. Fitted by Nature to be one of the most fertile -garden spots on earth, Nature herself has spoiled it. The rivers, -swollen by torrential rains in the highlands, flood this great area -periodically, destroying all crops; for many years only two harvests -have been gathered out of a possible six, in some years there have been -none at all.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span></p> - -<p>Here the visitations of famine and plague are immemorial. The liberal -and effective assistance which the American Red Cross gave during -the last famine, in 1911, is gratefully remembered by the Chinese. -Beholding this region, so richly provided and lacking only a moderate, -systematic expenditure for engineering works to make it the source of -assured livelihood for at least twenty millions more than its present -population, I resolved that one of my first efforts would be to help -reclaim the vast estate.</p> - -<p>We arrived after dark in the province of Shantung—Shantung, which -was destined to play so large a part in my official life in China! -The crowds at stations were growing enormous, their greetings more -vociferous. An old friend appeared, Tsai Chu-tung, emissary of the -Provincial Governor and of the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs; he -had been a student under me, and, for a time, my Chinese secretary. -Past the stations with their military bands and metallic welcomes -and deputations appearing with cards, at all hours of the night, we -arrived at length at Tsinan, Shantung's capital. Here, in behalf of -the Governor, the young Commissioner Tsai, together with an official -deputation, formally greeted me; thence he accompanied me to Peking, -affording me another chance to hear from a very keen and highly trained -man an account of China's situation.</p> - -<p>Reaching Tientsin that afternoon, we were met by representatives of the -Civil Governor and by his band. There the American community, it seems, -had been stirred prematurely by news of my coming, and had visited -the station for two days in succession. The manager of the railway, a -Britisher, had confused the Consul-General by his error in date of my -arrival, starting too soon the entire machinery of reception, including -a parade by the Fifteenth United States Infantry.</p> - -<p>We had dinner that evening with Civil Governor Liu at his palace. Miles -of driving in rain through dark, narrow streets, ending with a vision -of huge walls and lantern-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span>illuminated gates, found us in the inner -courts, and, finally, in the main hall of the antique, many-coloured -structure where the fat and friendly Governor received us. The heads -of the various provincial departments attended, together with the -President of the Assembly and the military aides. Young Mr. Li, the -Governor's secretary and interpreter for the after-dinner speechmakers, -performed the rare feat of rendering into either language an entire -speech at a time—and the speeches were not short. My Chinese secretary -commented on his brilliant translations, the perfect renderings of -the English into Chinese, and I could myself admire his mastery of -the English idiom. Such talent of translation is seldom displayed; -the discourse of speakers is usually limited to brief paragraphs, -continually checked by the renderings of the interpreters. Of course, -this interrupts the flow of thought and contact with one's hearers. -But the interpreter at this dinner even managed to translate jokes -and witticisms without losing the point. A play on words is most -difficult to carry into a foreign tongue, but the Chinese is so full -of opportunities for puns that a nimble interpreter will always find a -substitute. To the telling of a really funny situation the Chinese can -be relied on to respond. Their humour is not unlike the American, which -delights particularly in exposing undue pretensions. Interpreters, in -translating speeches to the general public, have sometimes resorted -to something of their own invention, in order to produce the expected -laugh. When they despair of making the foreign joke hit the bull's-eye, -they occasionally help things along by making personal remarks about -the speaker, whose gratifications at the hilarity produced is usually -unclouded by a knowledge of the method employed.</p> - -<p>Our departure from Tientsin was signalized by an unusual mark of -Chinese governmental courtesy. For the trip to Peking we found assigned -the palace car of the former Empress Dowager, and I was told that it -had not been used<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> since her reign came to an end. Adapting a new -invention to old custom, the car's interior had been arranged as a -little palace chamber. The entrance doors were in a double set. Those -in the centre were to be opened only when the sovereign entered or -departed, the side doors being for ordinary use. Opposite the central -doors at the end of the salon stood a little throne, high and wide, -upholstered in Imperial yellow. The draperies and upholsteries of the -car were all of that colour, and it made, in its way, quite a showing -of splendour and departed greatness.</p> - -<p>As one approaches the capital city, the beautiful mountain forms of -the so-called Western Hills, which rise suddenly out of the plain -about ten miles beyond Peking and attain an altitude of from six to -seven thousand feet, present a striking contrast to the flat and -far-stretching Chihli plain. The towers and city walls of Peking, an -impressive and astounding apparition of strength and permanence, befit -this scene. Solemn and mysterious, memorable for their size, extent, -and general inevitableness of structure, they can be compared only with -the Pyramids, or with great mountains fashioned by the hand of Nature -herself. Looking down upon these plains, where so many races have -met, fought, worked, lived, and died, where there is one of the chief -meeting points of racial currents, these walls are in themselves the -symbols of a memorable and long-sustained civilization.</p> - -<p>As we approach more closely, the walls tower immediately above us as -the train skirts them for several miles, crosses a number of busy roads -leading to the southern gates of the city, and then suddenly slips -through an opening in the walls to the inside. We first pass through -the so-called Chinese city; this particular corner is no longer densely -populated, but is now left to gardens, fields, and burial places with -their monuments and pagodas. We only skirt the populous part of the -Chinese city. Soon we are brought immediately under<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> the lofty walls -which separate the Chinese from the Manchu city, adjacent to it on -the north, but separated from it by an enormous wall one hundred feet -high, with a diameter of eighty feet. Where the two encircling walls -meet, towering bastions soar upward, and above the roadways rise high -gate-houses of many stories. The impassivity of these monumental -structures contrasts sharply with the swarming human life that surges -in the streets below.</p> - -<p>From Mr. Willys R. Peck, Chinese Secretary of the Legation, who had -met us at Tientsin and accompanied us to Peking, I learned more about -the recent events in the capital and the fight which Yuan Shih-Kai -was waging against the Parliament. At the station we were greeted by -a large concourse of civilian and military officials, and Mr. E.T. -Williams, Chargé d'Affaires since Mr. Calhoun's departure, acted as -introducer. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sun Pao-chi, a tall, -benevolent-looking man, wearing European dress and long chin whiskers, -and speaking a little English with more French and German, offered -his welcome and felicitations. Other high officials were there, many -members of the American community, and several representatives of -the parliament. It was a delight to see the fine-looking companies -of American marines, who among all troops in Peking are noted for -their well-groomed, smart, and soldierly appearance. Included for the -official welcome was a company of stalwart Chinese infantry, and one -of the Peking gendarmerie, which also is military in its organization. -The several bands vied with each other in playing national airs and -salutes, while thousands of spectators congregated.</p> - -<p>The central Tartar city gate (the Chienmen), was still in its original -form, and in passing through or under it one received an indelible -impression of the stupendous majesty and dignity which characterize -this unique capital. The curtain walls connecting the inner and outer -gates have since been removed. We drove through a side gate in the -curtain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> wall, finding ourselves in an impressive plaza overtowered by -the two lofty and beautiful gate-houses. Two small picturesque antique -temples flank the main entrance; one, dedicated to the God of War, was -a favourite place with the Empress Dowager, who stopped her cortège -there whenever she passed. From the flag-poles of these temples huge, -brilliantly coloured banners floated in the air. Atop the wall from -which the Chienmen Tower arises were American marines on guard and -looking down upon us. These, then, were the men whose presence up there -seemed to be interesting people so much.</p> - -<p>From the main gateway one looks straight up the avenue which forms the -central axis of Peking; it leads through many ornamental gates and -between stately buildings to the central throne halls of the Imperial -Palace. The city plan of Peking is a symmetrical one. This central -axis, running due north and south, passes through a succession of -important gateways, monuments, and seats of power. From it the city -expands regularly east and west; on the south the Chinese city, the -symmetry of its streets and alleyways more broken; and the Manchu city -on the north, with broad avenues leading to the principal gates, while -the large blocks between them are cut up more regularly by narrower -streets and alleyways.</p> - -<p>From the main south gate of the Chinese city the central line passes -along the principal business street to the central south gate of the -Tartar city—the imposing Chienmen—while eighty rods beyond this -stands the first outer gate of the Imperial City. Thence the central -line cuts the large square which lies immediately outside of the -Forbidden City, forming the main approach to the Imperial City. The -line then passes between pillars and huge stone lions through the -Forbidden City's first gate, cutting its inner parade ground and inner -gate, above which stands the throne from which the Emperor reviewed -his troops.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> Through the central enclosures, with the throne rooms -and coronation halls, three magnificent structures in succession, -the line passes, at the point where the thrones stand, into the -residential portion of the Forbidden City where the present Emperor -lives, and strikes the summit of Coal Hill, the highest point in -Peking. It bisects the temple where the dead bodies of Emperors reposed -before burial, and proceeds from the rear of the Imperial City by -its north gate through the ancient Bell Tower and Drum Tower. A more -awe-inspiring and majestic approach to a seat of power is not to be -seen in this world. We can well imagine, when tribute bearers came to -Peking and passed along this highway beset with imposing structures and -great monuments, that they were prepared to pay homage when finally -in the presence of the being to whose might all this was but an -introduction.</p> - -<p>But we did not follow along this path of sovereign power. After passing -through the Chienmen we turned directly to the right to enter the -Legation Quarter and to reach the American Legation, which nestles -immediately inside the Tartar wall in the shadow of the tall and -imposing Chienmen Tower. It is the first of the great establishments -along Legation Street, which is approached through a beautiful -many-coloured pailu, or street arch.</p> - -<p>No other American representative abroad has quite so easy a time -upon arrival at his post. We were going to a home prepared for -our reception, adequately furnished, and with a complete staff of -servants and attendants who were ready to serve luncheon immediately, -if required. In most cases, unfortunately, an American diplomatic -representative will for weeks or months have no place to lay his head -except in a hotel. Many American ministers and ambassadors have spent -fully one half the time during their first year of office in making -those necessary living arrangements which I found entirely complete at -Peking. That is the crucial period, too, when their minds should be -free for observing the situation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> in which they are to do their work. -May the time soon come when the nation realizes more fully the need of -dignified representation of its interests abroad.</p> - -<p>The residence of the minister I found simple but handsome, in stately -colonial renaissance style, its interior admirably combining the -spaciousness needed for official entertaining with the repose of a -real home. It is made of imported American materials, and a government -architect was expressly sent to put up the legation buildings. He had -been designing government structures in America, and the somewhat -stereotyped chancery and houses of the secretaries were popularly -called "the young post offices." But the minister's house, largely -due to the efforts of Mr. Rockhill, who was minister at the time, is -a masterpiece of appropriateness—all but the chimneys. It is related -that the architect, being unfamiliar with the ways of Chinese labourers -and frequently impatient with them, incurred their ill-will. When -Mr. Rockhill first occupied the residence, it was found the chimneys -would not draw; the disgruntled masons had quietly walled them up, in -order that the architect might "lose face," and the chimney from the -fireplace of the large dining room was so thoroughly blockaded that it -remained permanently out of commission.</p> - -<p>At a distance from the "compound," or enclosure, which surrounds the -minister's residence, fronting on a central plaza, there is a veritable -hamlet of additional houses occupied by secretaries, attachés, consular -students, and the clerical staff. It is a picturesque Chinese village, -with an antique temple and many separate houses, each with its garden -enclosed within high walls—a rescued bit of ancient China in the midst -of the European monotony of the Legation Quarter. It adjoins the Jade -Canal, opposite the hotel called "Sleeping Cars" by some unimaginative -director, but more fitly known as the Hotel of the Four Nations. At the -Water Gate, where the Jade Canal passes under the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> Tartar wall, is the -very point where the American marines first penetrated into the Tartar -city in 1900.</p> - -<p>The Chinese are remarkably free from self-consciousness, and therefore -are good actors; as one sees the thousands passing back and forth on -the streets, one feels that they, too, are all acting. Here are not -the headlong rush and elbowing scramble of the crowded streets of a -Western metropolis. All walk and ride with dignity, as if conscious of -a certain importance, representing in themselves not the eager purpose -presently to get to a certain place, but rather a leisurely flow of -existence, carrying traditions and memories of centuries in which -the present enterprise is but a minor incident. Foreign women have -sometimes been terrified by these vast, surging crowds; but no matter -how timid they be, a few rickshaw rides along the streets, a short -observation of the manners of these people, will make the faintest -hearted feel at home. Before long these Tartaric hordes cease to be -terrifying, and even the feeling that they are ethnological specimens -passes away; it is remarkable how soon one feels the humanity of it -all among these multitudes that seem to engulf but that never press or -crowd.</p> - -<p>Looking down upon a Chinese street, with multitudes of walkers and -runners passing back and forth, mingled among donkey carts, riders on -horse- or donkey-back, mule litters, rickshaws, camel caravans, flocks -of animals led to sale and slaughter, together with rapidly flying -automobiles—all gives the impression of perfect control of motion and -avoidance, of crowding and scuffling, and recalls the movements of -practised dancers on a crowded ballroom floor. A view of the crowds -which patiently wait at the great gateways for their turn to pass -through affords a constant source of amusement and delight. The line -slowly pushes through the gate like an endless string being threaded -through a needle. If there is mishap or collision, though voices of -protest may arise, they will never be those of the stoic, dignified -persons<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> sitting in the rickshaws; it is against etiquette for the -passenger to excite himself about anything, and he leaves that to the -rickshaw man. All humanity and animaldom live and work together in -China, in almost undisturbed harmony and mutual understanding.</p> - -<p>Only occasionally a hubbub of altercation rises to the skies. In -these days the pigtails had only just been abolished. Under the old -conditions, the technique of personal combat was for each party to -grab the other by the cue and hold him there, while describing to him -his true character. During the first years of the reform era one might -still see men who were having a difference frantically grabbing at the -back of each other's heads where there was, however, no longer anything -to afford a secure hold.</p> - -<p>A great part of Chinese life is public. It is on the streets with -their innumerable restaurants; their wide-open bazaars of the trades; -their ambulent letter-writers and story-tellers with the curious ones -clustered about them; their itinerant markets; their gliding rickshaws; -their haphazard little shops filled with a profusion of ageless, -precious relics. There is the charm of all this and of the humanity -there swarming, with its good-natured consideration for the other -fellow, its constant movement, its excited chatter, its animation and -its pensiveness, and its occasional moments of heated but bloodless -combat.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a></p> - -<p class="center">OLD CONFUCIANISM IN THE NEW CHINA</p> - - -<p>"The whole Chinese people hold the doctrines of Confucius most sacred," -declared President Yuan Shih-kai in his decree of November 26, 1913, -which re-introduced much of the old state religion. He stopped a little -short of giving Confucianism the character of an established religion, -but ordered that the sacrificial rites and the biennial commemoration -exercises be restored. "I am strongly convinced," he said, "of the -importance of preserving the traditional beliefs of China." In this -he was upheld by the Confucian Society at Peking, in the organization -of which an American university graduate, Dr. Chen Huan-chang, was a -leading spirit. Mr. Chen's doctoral dissertation had dealt with the -economic principles of Confucius and his school; upon his return to -China his aim had been to make Confucianism the state religion under -the Republic.</p> - -<p>The Christian missionaries were agitated. They felt it to be a step -backward for the new republic to recognize any form of belief. -Yuan, however, said: "It is rather the ethic and moral principles -of Confucius, as a part of education, that the Government wishes -to emphasize." As there is nothing mystical or theological about -Confucianism, such a view is, indeed, quite tenable.</p> - -<p>Yuan Shih-kai again declared toward the end of December: "I have -decided to perform the worship of heaven on the day of the winter -solstice."</p> - -<p>This fell on the 23rd of December, and again excited discussion. -"It means that Yuan is edging toward the assumption of the Imperial -dignity," many said.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span></p> - -<p>I had a talk about this matter with the Minister of the Interior, Mr. -Chu Chi-chien, who was thoroughly informed concerning the details -of Confucian worship and the worship of Heaven; he had, in fact, an -inexhaustible fund of knowledge of Chinese traditions. Nevertheless, he -was a man of action, planning cities, building roads, and developing -industries. Comparatively young and entirely Chinese by education and -character, he had supremely that knowledge of the personalities of -Chinese politics which was necessary in his ministry. As a builder he -became the Baron Haussmann of Peking, widening and paving the avenues, -establishing parks, rearranging public places, in all of which he -did marvels within his short term of two years. He established the -National Museum of Peking, and converted a part of the Imperial City -into a public park which has become a centre of civic life theretofore -unknown in China. Mr. Chu's familiarity with religion, art, and -architecture—he was a living encyclopædia of archæology and art—and -his pleasure in reciting the history of some Chinese temple or palace -did not free him from a modern temptation. He would try to import too -many foreign elements in the improvements which he planned, so that -foreign friends of Chinese art had to keep close to him to prevent the -bringing in of incongruous Western forms which would have spoiled the -marvellous harmony of this great city.</p> - -<p>"It would be dangerous," Mr. Chu informed me, "for the republican -government to neglect the worship of Heaven. The entire farm population -observes the ceremonial relative to sowing, harvesting, and other -rural occupations according to the old calendar. Should the worship of -Heaven be omitted on the winter solstice day, now that the Government -has become established; and should there follow a leanness or entire -failure of crops, the Government would surely be held responsible by -the farmers throughout the land."</p> - -<p>"Of course," he added, smilingly, "the worship will not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> guarantee -good crops, but at any rate it will relieve the Government of -responsibility."</p> - -<p>I could not but reflect that, even in our own democracy, -administrations have been given credit and blame by reason of general -prosperity or of the lack of it, and that good crops certainly do help -the party in power.</p> - -<p>"In the ritual, we shall introduce some changes appropriate to -republicanism," Mr. Chu assured me. "I am myself designing a special -ceremonial dress to be worn by those participating, and the music -and liturgy will be somewhat changed." But it was difficult to see -wherein consisted the specific republican bias of the changes. Yuan -Shih-kai did proceed to the Temple of Heaven before daybreak on -December 23rd; in the dark of the morning the President drove to that -wonderfully dignified open-air sanctuary in its large sacred grove -along the southern wall of the Chinese city. He drove surrounded by -personal bodyguards over streets covered with yellow sand and lined -three-fold with soldiers stationed there the evening before. With him -were the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Master of Ceremonies, -the Censor General, the Minister of War, and a staff of other high -officials and generals. Arrived at the temple, he changed his uniform -for the sacrificial robes and hat, and, after ablutions, proceeded -together with all the other dignitaries to the great circular altar, -which he ascended. He was there joined by the sacrificial meat-bearers, -the silk and jade bearers, the cupbearers, and those who chanted -invocations. In succession the different ceremonial offerings were -brought forward and presented to Heaven with many series of bows. A -prayer was then offered, as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Heaven, Thou dost look down on us and givest us the nation. All-seeing -and all-hearing, everywhere, yet how near and how close: We come -before Thee on this winter solstice day when the air assumes a new -life; in spirit devout, and with ceremony old, we offer to Thee jade, -silk,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> and meat. May our prayer and offerings rise unto Thee together -with sweet incense. We sanctify ourselves and pray that Thou accept -our offerings.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The first Confucian ceremony, which the President attended in person -at four o'clock in the morning, took place about two months later. A -complete rehearsal of the ceremony, with all details, had been held on -the preceding afternoon. Many foreigners were present. Passing from -the entrance of the Temple, between rows of immemorial ilex trees, -and through lofty porticoes, in one of which are preserved the famous -stone drums which date from the time of the Sage, the visitors entered -the innermost enclosure. It, too, is set with ancient trees, which, -however, leave the central portion open. The musical instruments were -placed on the platform in front of the main temple hall. Here the -ceremony itself was enacted, while the surface of the court was filled -with members of the Confucian Society, ranks of dignified long-gowned -men, members of the best classes of Peking.</p> - -<p>I was told that the music played on this occasion was a modification -of the classic strains which had from time immemorial been heard -here. Perfect knowledge of this music seems no longer to exist. The -music accompanying the ceremony was nevertheless attractive, produced -with jade plaques, flutes, long-stringed instruments resembling small -harps, but with strings of more uniform length, drums, and cymbals. -A dominant note was struck on one of the jade plaques, whereupon -all the instruments fell in with a humming sound, held for fully a -minute, which resembled the murmur of forest trees or the surging -of waves. There was no melody; only a succession of dominants, with -the accompaniment of this flow of sound surging up, then ebbing and -receding. One of the instruments is most curious, in the shape of a -leopard-like animal, in whose back there are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> closely set about twenty -small boards. At certain stages of the music a stick is rapidly passed -over these boards, giving a very peculiar punctuation to the strains -that are being played.</p> - -<p>The chief dignitaries officiating were Mr. Chu Chi-chien, the Minister -of the Interior, and Mr. Sun Pao-chi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, -gorgeous in their newly devised ceremonial costumes. The splendid and -dignified surroundings of the temple courts enhanced the ceremony, but -it depended for its effect on the manner of chanting, the music, and -the very dignified demeanour of all who participated. Quite apart from -the question of the advisability of a state religion or the possible -reactionary influences which such ceremonies might have, I could not -but feel that the refusal to cast off entirely such traditions was -inspired by sound instinct.</p> - -<p>Moreover, this revival came during the adoption of new ways. Chinese -ladies came out in general society for the first time on the night of -the 5th of February, at the Foreign Office ball. Many representatives -of the outlying dependencies of China were there in picturesque -costumes, invariably exhibiting a natural self-confidence which made -them seem entirely in place in these modern surroundings. The Foreign -Office building, planned by an American architect, contains on the main -floor an impressive suite of apartments so arranged as to give ample -space for large entertainments, while it affords every opportunity for -the more intimate gathering of smaller groups. Guests were promenading -through the long rows of apartments from the ballroom, where the -excellent Navy Band was playing for the dancers.</p> - -<p>The Chinese women gave no hint of being unaccustomed to such general -gatherings of society, but bore themselves with natural ease and -dignity. Nor did they conceal their somewhat amused interest in the -forms of the modern dance;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> for only a few of the younger Chinese -ladies had at that time acquired this Western art. The number of -votaries, however, increased rapidly during the next few years.</p> - -<p>From among the Tartars of the outlying regions this occasion was graced -by a Living Buddha from Mongolia, to whom the Chinese officials were -most attentive. Surrounded by a large retinue, he overtopped them -all, and his bodily girth seemed enormous. He found his way early in -the evening to a room where refreshments were being offered, took -possession of a table, and proceeded to divest himself of seven or -eight layers of outer garments. Thus reduced, he became a man of -more normal dimensions. Several of his servitors then went foraging -among the various tables, bringing choice dishes to which the Living -Buddha did all justice. Long after midnight reports still came to the -ballroom: "The Living Buddha is still eating."</p> - -<p>It seems remarkable that Chinese women should so readily adapt -themselves to wholly new situations. They have shown themselves capable -of leadership in social, political, and scientific matters; a great -many develop wide intellectual interests and manifest keen mental -powers. When I gave the Commencement address at the Women's Medical -College of Peking, the 13th of February, I was curious to see what -types of Chinese women would devote themselves to a medical education. -In this field Dr. King Ya-mei and Dr. Mary Stone are the pioneers. -With the advance of modern medicine in China many Chinese women have -adopted the career of nurses and of physicians. On this occasion the -women students of the middle school sang various selections, and I -was impressed with the cello-like quality of their alto voices. As -customary on such occasions my address was made through an interpreter. -The delivery of these chopped-off paragraphs can scarcely be inspiring, -yet Chinese audiences are so courteous and attentive that they never -give the speaker any suggestion of impatience.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span></p> - -<p>A luncheon at the Botanical Gardens was given the next day by the -Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Chang Chien. This institution, to -which a small and rather hungry-looking collection of animals is -appended, occupies an extensive area outside of the northwest gate, -and was formerly a park or pleasure garden of the Empress Dowager. A -modern-style building, erected for her use and composed of large main -apartments on each floor, with smaller side-chambers opening out from -them, was used for our luncheon party. Its walls were still hung with -pictures painted by the hand of the august lady, who loved to vary her -busy life by painting flowers. The conversation here was mostly on -Chinese art, there being among the guests an antiquarian expert, Chow, -who exhibited some fine scrolls of paintings. I noted that the Chinese -evinced the same interest in the writing appended to the paintings -(colophon) as in the picture itself. They seemed to admire especially -the ability, in some famous writers, of executing complicated strokes -without hesitation and with perfect control. When we were looking at a -page written by a famous Sung poet, Mr. Chow said: "He always finished -a stroke lightly, like his poems, still leaving something unsaid."</p> - -<p>Chinese handwriting has infinite power to express differences of -character and cultivation. It is closely associated with personality. -Some writing has the precision of a steel engraving; other examples, -again, show the sweep and assurance of a brush wielded by a Franz Hals. -It is the latter that the Chinese particularly admire; and even without -any knowledge of Chinese script one cannot but be impressed with its -artistic quality and its power to reveal personal characteristics. It -is still the great ambition of educated Chinese to write well—that is, -with force and individual expression. My host on this occasion was one -of the most noted calligraphers in China. Many emulated him; among them -a northern military governor who had risen from the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> ranks, but spent -laborious hours every day decorating huge scrolls with a few characters -he had learned, with which to gladden the hearts of his friends.</p> - -<p>The new things cropping out in Chinese life had their detractors. Mr. -and Mrs. Rockhill had come to Peking for a visit. Relieved of official -duties through a change in the administration, it was quite natural -that Mr. Rockhill should return where his principal intellectual -interests lay. Throughout our first conversation at dinner Mrs. -Rockhill affected a very reactionary view of things in China, praising -the Empire and making fun of all attempts at modernization. One would -have thought her not only a monarchist, but a believer in absolutism -of the old Czarist type. A woman so clever can make any point of view -seem reasonable. Mr. Rockhill did not express himself so strongly, but -he was evidently also filled with regret for the old days in China -which had passed. While we were together receiving guests at a dinner I -was giving Mr. Rockhill, some of the young Foreign Office counsellors -appeared in the distance, wearing conventional evening clothes. "How -horrible," Mr. Rockhill murmured, quite distressed. Not perceiving -anything unusual to which his expression of horror could refer, I -asked, "What?" "They ought to wear their native costume," he answered; -"European dress is intolerable on them, and it is so with all these -attempted imitations."</p> - -<p>The talk at another dinner, a small gathering including Mr. Rockhill, -Doctor Goodnow, and Dr. Henry C. Adams, revolved around conditions -in China and took a rather pessimistic tone. Doctor Adams had been -elaborating a system of unified accounting for the railways. "At every -turn," he said, "we seem to get into a blind alley leading up to a -place where some spider of corruption sits, the whole tribe manipulated -by a powerful head spider."</p> - -<p>This inheritance of corruption from the easy-going past, when the -larger portion of official incomes was made up<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> of commissions and -fees, was recognized to be a great evil by all the more enlightened -Chinese officials. They attempted to combat it in behalf of efficient -administration but they could not quite perform the heroic task of -lifting the entire system bodily onto a new basis. Because the new -methods would require greatly increased salaries, the ideal of strict -accountability, honesty, and efficiency, could only be gradually -approached. Doctor Goodnow for his part contributed to the conversation -a sense of all the difficulties encountered by saying: "Here is a -hitherto non-political society which had vegetated along through -centuries held together by self-enforced social and moral bonds, -without set tribunals or formal sanction. Now it suddenly determines -to take over elections, legislatures, and other elements of our more -abstract and artificial Western system. I incline to believe that it -would be infinitely better if the institutional changes had been more -gradual, if the system of representation had been based rather on -existing social groupings and interests than on the abstract idea of -universal suffrage. These political abstractions as yet mean nothing to -the Chinese by way of actual experience."</p> - -<p>He also did not approve of the persistent desire of the democratic -party to establish something analogous to the English system of cabinet -government. He felt that far more political experience was needed for -working so delicate a system. "I am inclined to look to concentration -of power and responsibility in the hands of the President for more -satisfactory results," he said.</p> - -<p>Mr. Rockhill's fundamental belief was that it would be far better for -the world not to have meddled with China at all. "She should be allowed -to continue under her social system," he urged, "a system which has -stood the test of thousands of years; and to trust that the gradual -influence of example would bring about necessary modifications." He -had thorough confidence in the ability of Yuan Shih-kai, if<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> allowed a -free hand, to govern China in accordance with her traditional ideas but -with a sufficient application of modern methods. He even considered the -strict press censorship applied by Yuan Shih-kai's government as proper -under the circumstances.</p> - -<p>Throughout this conversation, which dwelt mostly on difficulties, -shortcomings and corruption, there was, nevertheless, a notable -undercurrent of confidence in the Chinese <i>people</i>. These experienced -men whose work brought them into contact with specific evils, looked at -the Chinese, not from the ordinary viewpoint so usual with foreigners -who assume the utter hopelessness of the whole China business, but much -as they would consider the shortcomings of their own nation, with an -underlying faith in the inherent strength and virtue of the national -character. The idea of China being bankrupt was laughed to scorn by -Mr. Rockhill. "There are its vast natural and human resources," he -exclaimed. "The human resources are not just a quantity of crude -physical man power, but there is a very highly trained industrial -capacity in the handicrafts." But it is exactly when we realize the -stupendous possibilities of the country, her resources of material -wealth, her man power, her industrial skill, and her actual capital -that the difficulties which obstruct her development seem so deplorable.</p> - -<p>Mr. Liang Chi-chao gave a dinner at about this time, at which Doctor -Adams, Doctor Goodnow, President Judson of Chicago, and the ladies -were present. Mr. Liang had a cook who was a master in his art, able -to produce all that infinite variety of savory distinction with which -meat, vegetables, and pastry can be prepared by the Chinese. One -usually speaks of Chinese dinners as having from one hundred fifty -to two hundred courses. It would be more accurate, however, to speak -of so many dishes, as at all times there are a great many different -dishes on the table from which the guests make selection. The profusion -of food supplied at such a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> dinner is certainly astonishing. The -guests will take a taste here and there; but the greater part of it -is sent back to the household and retainers. It is a popular mistake -to believe that Chinese food is composed of unusual dishes. There are -indeed birdsnest soup, shark fins, and ducks' kidneys, but the real -excellence of Chinese cooking lies in the ability to prepare one thing, -such as chicken, or fish, in innumerable ways, with endless varieties -of crispness, consistency, and flavour. It is notable to what extent -meat predominates. Although there is always a variety of vegetables -and of fruit, the amount of meat consumed by the Chinese is certainly -astonishing to one who has classified them, as is usually done, as a -vegetarian people.</p> - -<p>The show of abundance at a Chinese banquet seems the fare of poverty -compared with the cargoes of delicacies served at the Imperial table. -It was a rule of the Imperial household that any dish which the Emperor -had at any time called for, must be served him at the principal meal -every day; as his reign lengthened the numbers of dishes at his table, -naturally, constantly increased. It is related that the dinner of the -Emperor Chen Lung required one hundred and twenty tables; and the -Empress Dowager, at the time of her death, had worked up to about -ninety-six tables. It is not to be wondered at that the Emperor's -kitchen had an army of three hundred cooks! At one time when the Duke -Tsai was discussing with me the financial situation of the Imperial -family, he remarked, with a deep sigh: "The Emperor has had to reduce -the number of his servants. For instance, at present he has only thirty -cooks." Not knowing of the custom described above, I was inclined to -consider that number quite adequate. I believe the little Emperor has -at the time I write reached the quota of about fifteen tables.</p> - -<p>At the hospitable board of Mr. Liang Chi-chao, while the dishes were -served in Chinese style and the food eaten with chopsticks, some -modifications of the usual dinner procedure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> had been made. The -etiquette of a Chinese meal requires that when a new set of dishes with -food has been placed in the centre of the table, the host, hostess, -and other members of the family survey what is there and pick out the -choicest morsels to lay on the plates of their guests. The guests then -reciprocate the courtesy, and the interchange of favours continues -throughout the dinner, giving the whole affair a most sociable aspect. -At Mr. Liang Chi-chao's table these courtesies were observed, but there -were special chopsticks provided for taking the food from the central -dishes and transferring it to a neighbour's or to one's own.</p> - -<p>The conversation after dinner wandered toward Chinese ethics. Mr. Liang -Chi-chao is one of the most competent authorities on this subject -and on its relations to Western thought and life. I ventured this -opinion: "While the high respect in which the elders are held by the -younger generation in China is a remarkably strong social cement, it is -discouraging to progress in that it gives the younger and more active -little chance to carry out their own ideas."</p> - -<p>"But the system does not," Mr. Liang rejoined, "necessarily work -to retard change; because it is, after all, society rather than -individuals which controls. With all proper respect for elders, the -younger element has ample opportunity to bring forward and carry out -ideas of social change."</p> - -<p>He regarded the principle of respect for elders and of ancestor worship -of fundamental importance; in addition to its direct social effects, -it gave to Chinese society all that the Western peoples derive from -the belief in immortality. The living individual feels a keen sense -of permanence through the continuity of a long line of ancestors, -whose influence perceptibly surrounds those actually living; moreover, -their own actions are raised to a higher plane, as seen not from the -narrow interests of the present, but in relation to the life of the -generations that are to succeed, in whom the character and action of -the individual now living will persist.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span></p> - -<p>This evening's entertainment, with its intimate Chinese setting -and its conversation dealing with the deeper relationships between -different civilizations, has remained a memorable experience for those -who attended it. Only recently it was thus recalled by one of the -guests: "Think of going to a dinner with the 'Secretary of Justice' in -Washington, and conversing about the immortality of the soul!"</p> - -<p>Interested to see how, despite the new ways in China, the old -Confucianism persisted, I determined upon a pilgrimage to the Confucian -shrines. Dr. Henry C. Adams invited me in November, 1914, to join him -on a trip to the sacred mountain, Taishan, in Shantung Province, and to -Chüfu, the home of Confucius.</p> - -<p>A small party was made up. I slipped away quietly in order to avoid -official attentions and to spare the local authorities all the bother -of formally entertaining a foreign representative. We arrived at -Taianfu early in the morning, where with the help of missionaries -chair-bearers had been secured to carry us up the mountain.</p> - -<p>The trip to these sacred heights is of an unusual character. The ascent -from the base is almost continuously over stair-ways. Up these steep -and difficult grades two sturdy chairmen, with a third as alternate, -will carry the traveller rapidly and with easy gait. The route is -fascinating not only because of the singular natural beauty of the -ravines through which it passes, and of the constantly broadening -prospects over the fruitful plains of Shantung from every eminence, but -because of the historic interest of the place; this is testified to by -innumerable temples, monuments, tablets, and inscriptions sculptured -in the living rock which line the path up the mountain. It must be -remembered that in the time of Confucius this was already a place -of pilgrimage of immemorial tradition; a place of special grandeur, -wherein the mind might be freed of its narrow needs and find its -place in the infinite. Many of its monuments refer to Confucius and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> -record his sayings as he stopped by the way to rest or to behold the -prospect. At one point, whence one looks off a steep precipice down to -the plain thousands of feet below, his saying, as reported, was: "Seen -from this height, man is indeed but a speck or insect." But not all -of his remarks were of this obvious nature, which justifies itself in -its appeal to the common mind, to be initiated into the truths of the -spirit.</p> - -<p>In these thousands of years many other sages, emperors, and statesmen -have ascended the sacred hill, also leaving memorials in the shape of -sculptured stones bearing their sentiments. It would be an agreeable -task for a vacation to read these inscriptions and to let the -imagination shadow forth again these unending pilgrimages extending -back to the dawn of history.</p> - -<p>The stairway leading up the mountain, which is about 6,000 feet high, -is often so steep that we had to guard against being overcome by -dizziness in looking down. Occasionally a stop is made at a wayside -temple, where tea is served in the shady courts. In the summer heat -these refuges must be especially grateful. We reached the temples that -crown the summit after a journey of about six hours. In a temple court -at the very top the servants who had preceded us had set up their -kitchen, and an ample luncheon was awaiting us there.</p> - -<p>At this altitude a cold and cutting wind was blowing. Yet we preferred -to stay outside of the temple buildings in order to enjoy the view -which is here unrolled, embracing a great portion of the whole province -of Shantung. I noted that the coolies did not seem impressed with the -sanctity of this majestic height, but used the temple courts as a -caravanserai.</p> - -<p>The descent is made rapidly, as the practised chair-bearers run -down the stairs with quick, sure steps—which gives the passenger -the sensation of skirting the mountainside in an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> aeroplane. When I -inquired whether accidents did not occasionally happen, they told me: -"Yes, but the last time when any one has fallen was about four hundred -years ago." As in the early days chair-bearers who had fallen were -killed, the tendency to fall was in the course of time eradicated. They -descend with a gliding motion that reminds one of the flight of birds. -The chair-bearers are united in a guild, and happen to be Mohammedans -by religion.</p> - -<p>The town of Taianfu, which lies at the foot of the mountain, is -notable for a very ancient and stately temple dedicated to the god -who represents the original nature worship which centres around Mount -Taishan, and which forms the historic basis for all religion in -China. The spacious temple courts, with their immemorial trees and -their forests of tall stone tablets bearing inscriptions dedicated by -emperors for thousands of years past, testify to the strength of the -native faith. The streets of the town, set at frequent intervals with -arches bearing sculptured animal forms, were lined with shops through -whose trellised windows, now that night had come, lights were shining, -revealing the activities within. These, with an occasional tall tower -or temple shadowing the gathering darkness, made this old town appear -full of romance and strange beauty.</p> - -<p>Sleeping on our car, we were by night carried to the railway station of -Chüfu; some seven miles farther on lies the town of the same name, the -home of Confucius. We hired donkey carts at the station; also, as the -ladies were anxious to have the experience of using the local passenger -vehicle, the wheel-barrow, we engaged a few of these; whereupon our -modest cavalcade proceeded first to the Confucian burial ground, to the -north of the city. On the way thither we were met by chair-bearers who -carried a portable throne and brought complimentary messages from the -Holy Duke. As the chair had been sent for my use, there was nothing for -it but to get in. Soon appeared, also, a string of mule carts drawn by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> -sleek and well-fed animals, contrasting with the bony and dishevelled -beasts we had hired.</p> - -<p>It was plain that the incognito was ended, and that the Duke had been -apprised of our coming. Then came the emissaries of the district -magistrate, offering further courtesies, such as a guard of honour; and -another delegation from the Duke brought a huge red envelope containing -an invitation for luncheon. We tried to decline all these civilities -and to stroll about quietly, in order to come entirely under the spell -of this place. But there was no more rambling and strolling for us. We -had to sit in our chairs and carts, and, after two polite declinations -of the luncheon invitation, alleging the shortness of our time and our -desire to see everything thoroughly, and asking leave to call on the -Duke later in the afternoon—we accepted the customary third issue of -the ducal invitation.</p> - -<p>Our procession was quite imposing as we passed on to the inner gate of -the cemetery. Covering about one and a half square miles, the enclosure -has been the burial ground of the Confucian family for at least three -thousand years, antedating Confucius himself. No other family in the -world has such memorials of its continuity. The simple dignity of a -huge marble slab set erect before the mound-covered grave marks the -burial place of the sage. The adjoining site of the house where his -disciples guarded his tomb for generations, but which ultimately -disappeared some two thousand years ago, also bears monuments and -inscriptions.</p> - -<p>Leaving the cemetery, a large cavalry escort sent by the district -magistrate joined our cavalcade of chairs, mule carts, and -wheelbarrows, together with crowds of the curious who trudged -along. The village streets were lined with people anxious to see -the strangers; but their curiosity had nothing intrusive. They were -friendly lookers-on, nodding a pleasant welcome should your eye catch -theirs.</p> - -<p>We passed through many gates of the ancient palace before<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> we were -finally received by the Duke himself at the main inner doorway. He was -accompanied by the magistrate, and with these two we sat down to chat; -nearly an hour elapsed before we were summoned to the table. The meal, -which was made up of innumerable courses, lasted at least two hours, -during which we kept up an animated conversation concerning the more -recent history of the town and of the temple.</p> - -<p>The Duke was agitated because missionaries from Taianfu were trying to -acquire land in the town of Chüfu. He looked upon this intrusion as -unwarranted, saying that as his town was devoted to the memory of the -Chinese sage, it did not seem suitable that any foreign religion should -try to introduce its worship, and it would certainly result in local -ill-feeling.</p> - -<p>I tried to quiet his apprehensions by speaking of the educational work -of missionaries, of the fact that they, also, respected the great sage; -but it was hard to allay his opposition.</p> - -<p>The magistrate was jovial, laughing uproariously at the mildest joke. -When we arose from the table, the Duke took us to the apartments of the -Duchess, who was staying with the infant daughter recently born, their -first child. The Duchess was his second wife, and he was considerably -her senior. The little lady seemed to be particularly fond of cats, of -which at least forty were playing about her; one of these she presented -to Mrs. Adams.</p> - -<p>The great Temple of Confucius immediately adjoins the palace. Although -the afternoon was wearing on, we still had time to visit it and to -wander about in its noble courts. The pillars in the main halls are -adorned by marvellous sculpture, and the temple is remarkable for -the refined beauty of the structures composing it and for the serene -dignity of its aspect. Adjoining the main temple is an ancient well -near which stood the original house of Confucius.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> Stone reliefs -present in a long series the history of Confucius in pictures, and -there is a great collection of instruments used in performing the -classical music. But the chief charm of the temple lies in the vistas -afforded by its courts, set with magnificent trees and with the -monuments of the past seventy generations.</p> - -<p>It was dark when we had finished our visit to the temple. We bade -the Duke farewell, and our cavalcade, starting back to the station, -was now made picturesque by the flaring torches and the huge paper -lanterns which were carried alongside each chair and cart. Slowly the -procession wound its way back over the dark plains toward the lights -of the station platform and the emblems of a mechanical civilization -that contrasted at every point with the life we had seen. The Duke had -regretted having objected so strongly to the proposal to bring the -railway closer to the town, for it was of inconvenience to visitors; -but he felt, after all, that the great sage himself would always prefer -the peacefulness and quiet of the older civilization.</p> - -<p>I revisited Chüfu three years later, this time with Mr. Charles R. -Crane and Mrs. Reinsch, who had been unable to accompany me on the -first visit. The officials were expecting us, and everywhere we were -followed with attentions. Not satisfied with giving us two private -cars, the railway officials insisted that we have a special engine, -too. In the region of Chüfu we gathered an army of military escorts. -Arriving at the palace, the Duke greeted us with a child on either -arm. The little daughter was now over three, the son slightly over -one year old. I have never seen any one who appeared more devoted to -his children than the Duke. He always had them with him, carried them -about, playing with them and fondling them. When he and the Duchess -visited us in Peking he brought the two little ones, and they and my -small children played long together joyfully and to the amusement -of their elders. The Duke was tall, broad-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span>shouldered, aristocratic -looking. While not credited with great ability, he was undoubtedly a -man of intelligence, although his education had been narrowly classical -and had not given him contact with the world's affairs. He was -seventy-third in line from the great sage. At that time he was engaged -especially with plans to create in Chüfu a university wherein the -Confucian tradition should be preserved in its purity, but which should -also teach modern science.</p> - -<p>Once during the revolution against the Manchus the Duke was considered -a possible successor to the throne. If the country had had a Chinese -family of great prominence in affairs, the transfer of the monarchy -to a Chinese house might have been accomplished, but the Duke was by -no means a man of action or a politician. Neither had the descendants -of the Ming, Sung, and Chow emperors, or of other Imperial houses, -sufficient prominence or genius for leadership to command national -attention.</p> - -<p>The title of the Holy Duke is the only one in China which remains -permanently the same. Under the empire, titles were granted, but in -each succeeding generation the rank was lowered by one grade until the -status of a commoner had again been reached. By this arrangement, under -which noble rank gradually "petered out," China escaped the creation of -a class or caste of nobility.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a></p> - -<p class="center">A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE POLITICAL SCENES</p> - - -<p>Modelling largely on American example, China is striving to create -truly representative political institutions. Personal rule, imperial -traditions, hamper the Chinese in their efforts, unguided as they -are by experience; moreover, they meet with foreign skepticism and -opposition. It is America's rôle not officiously to interfere in their -endeavours, but in every proper way to help them.</p> - -<p>The institutions a nation develops are largely its own business. -Other nations should not interfere. But in China all liberal-minded, -forward-looking men see in the United States a free government which -they not only wish to emulate, but to which they look for interest, -sympathy, and moral assistance. The results of their efforts are by -no means indifferent to us. Should they fail, should militarist and -absolutist elements gain the upper hand; particularly, should China -become an appendage to a foreign militarist autocracy, grave dangers -would arise. The ideals of the progressive Chinese are in keeping with -the peaceful, industrious traditions of China. With these traditions -Americans in China are closely allied. They do not seek, nor have they -need to seek, to control by political means the choice of the Chinese -people. On the other hand, it would be difficult for them to tolerate -any attempt to prevent the Chinese from freely following the model of -their choice, and from securing those mutually helpful relations with -Americans which they themselves desire. In this sense only, then, have -Americans a vital interest in Chinese politics. That personal rule and -imperial traditions, as well as military des<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span>potism, are still powerful -enough to hamper the will of the new Chinese democracy may be manifest -from a few instances that early came to my attention.</p> - -<p>The first case was that of Mr. C.T. Wang. When he related to me the -history of the dissolution of his party—he was and still is one of the -leaders of the democratic party (Kuo Min Tang)—he told me that he was -in great personal danger. Mr. Wang had been marked for execution as a -leader of the disbanded party and he was living in concealment as a -refugee.</p> - -<p>His call upon me, shortly after my arrival in Peking, was my first -direct contact with Chinese internal or party politics. He had greeted -me at the railway station upon my arrival, and now he told me the story -of Yuan Shih-kai's successful attempt to break down the opposition of -the parliament and to render that body entirely innocuous. Mr. Wang was -the Vice-President of the Senate, and through his party was associated -with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and General Huang Hsin, the men who had attempted -the revolution during the summer just passed. But Mr. Wang represented -the younger, more modern-minded elements in the party, who desired to -adopt the best institutions and practices of the West, but who did not -favour violent measures.</p> - -<p>Yuan Shih-kai had divided the majority party, in order in the end to -destroy its two sections. The most recent action in this fight was the -dissolution of the Kuo Min Tang, which was decreed by the President -on November 5th, on the ground that this body was implicated in, and -responsible for, the revolutionary movement against the President. The -President had approached the Tutuhs—or military governors, after the -downfall of Yuan Shih-kai called Tuchuns—in the various provinces -and had secured in advance an endorsement of his action. Of course, -this appeal ignored the constitutional character which the state was -supposed to have, and encouraged the military governors in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> thinking -that they were semi-independent rulers. After the death of Yuan their -sense of their own importance and independence grew apace. They -imitated him in looking upon their armies as their personal property. -Moreover, they seized control of the provincial taxes. From all this -arose that pseudo-feudalism of military despots, which is the baneful -heritage left by Yuan Shih-kai in China.</p> - -<p>I had already received, through the Department of State, an inquiry -from American friends concerning Mr. Wang's safety. He was graduated -from Yale University, was first among the American-returned students, -and favourably known among Americans in general. He had been the -president of the Chinese Y.M.C.A. and bore the reputation of being an -able, clean-handed, and conscientious man. I could not, of course, -know in how serious danger Mr. Wang found himself, nor could I make -any formal representations in a case where the facts were unknown. -However, through making inquiry as to whether any unfavourable action, -such as arrest, was contemplated, I hinted to the Government that any -harsh action against Mr. Wang would be noted. The very fact that a -well-disposed foreign nation is taking notice will tend to prevent rash -or high-handed action, which is frequently forced by some individual -hothead commander or official. When public attention has been directed -to the unjust treatment of a man, rash vindictiveness may be restrained -by wiser heads.</p> - -<p>A further example of the working of Chinese internal politics which -came under my observation at this time is shown in the method by which -Yuan Shih-kai politely imprisoned the Vice-President.</p> - -<p>From time to time Yuan Shih-kai had made efforts to induce the -Vice-President, General Li Yuan-hung, to come to Peking from Wuchang, -where he was stationed in command of troops. He had sent him messengers -and letters, protesting the need he felt of having General Li closely -by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> his side in order to profit by his support and advice on important -affairs. These polite invitations had been answered by General Li -in a most self-deprecatory tone; he could not aspire to the merit -and wisdom attributed to him by the President; he could be of but -little assistance in important affairs of state; it was far better -for him to stay in his position as commander at Wuchang, whence he -could effectively support the authority of the President and all his -beneficent works.</p> - -<p>This interchange of correspondence went on for some time. It was -evident that General Li did not wish to come to Peking. It was surmised -that the President did not like the prominence which the democratic -party had given to the name of General Li Yuang-hung, whom they had -heralded as a true republican and a man of popular sympathies. Probably -Yuan feared that General Li might be placed at the head of a new -political movement against the President's authority.</p> - -<p>The President not only sent messengers and letters of cordial -invitation, but he also rearranged the disposal of troops, with the -result that bodies of troops upon which Yuan Shih-kai could rely were -drawn around Wuchang with a constantly shortening radius. Finally in -December General Li realized that he had no alternative. He therefore -informed the latest messenger of Tuan that he could no longer resist -the repeated cordial invitations, and that while he was sharply -conscious of his shortcomings, he would endeavour to assist the chief -magistrate to the limit of his powers.</p> - -<p>He came to Peking in December, without troops of his own. The President -received him with the greatest cordiality, embracing him and vowing -that now the burden of responsibility was lightened for him; that he -must have his great associate and friend always close at hand, where -he could consult with him daily, in fact, any hour of the day<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> and -night; he therefore invited General Li to make his home close to the -palace of Yuan, namely, on the little island in the South Lake in whose -many-coloured, gracefully formed halls, Emperor Kwang Hsu was for many -years kept a prisoner by the Empress Dowager.</p> - -<p>There General Li took his residence, knowing that his great friend the -first magistrate could not spare his presence at any hour of day or -night.</p> - -<p>The question arose whether the foreign representatives should call on -the newly arrived Vice-President. The Government tentatively suggested -that as hosts it might be proper for them to make the first call. -Whether or not this was done in the expectation that the suggestion -would not be accepted, it certainly was not the desire of Yuan Shih-kai -to encourage close relations between the Vice-President and any -outsiders.</p> - -<p>Although Yuan Shih-kai still allowed the rump parliament to exist, -he had undoubtedly decided at this time to dispose of it entirely. -A ready pretext was at hand, because, with the expulsion of the Kuo -Min Tang, the parliament no longer could muster a quorum. On November -13th, it was announced that a central administrative conference would -be created to act in an advisory capacity in matters of government. -It was plain that this body was intended to displace parliament. The -list of nominees was made up mostly of men of the old régime, literati -and ex-officials—the kind known among the Chinese as "skeletons"; -a group of high standing and very good reputation, but from which -little constructive action could be expected. Among them was a very -effective orator, Ma Liang, a member of the Roman Catholic Church. -He was a dignified, elderly man, who came to see me to talk about -reforestation and colonization of outlying regions. His contact with -Western civilization had been through the Jesuit College at Zikawei. -Another member was Dr. Yen Fu, who had won reputation by trans<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span>lating -a large number of scientific works into Chinese and creating a modern -scientific terminology in Chinese. Among other councillors with whom I -became well acquainted was Hsu Shih-chang, later President of China, -and Li Ching-hsi, a nephew of Li Hung-chang, who had been Viceroy of -Yunnan under the Empire.</p> - -<p>Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, the American Constitutional Advisor, often -discussed Chinese political affairs with me. It was his impression -that parliament had attempted to take over too much of Western -political practice without sufficiently considering its adaptability -to Chinese uses. He believed that the administrative power should not -be subject to constant interference by parliament, and that China -was not yet ready for the cabinet system. He therefore held a rather -conservative view favouring gradual development in the direction -of Western institutions, but not a wholesale adoption of the same. -The Yuan Shih-kai government took advantage of this attitude of the -American expert to give out, whenever it proposed a new arrangement -for strengthening its hold, that the matter had the approval of Doctor -Goodnow and other foreign advisers. However, these authorities were not -really consulted; that is, they were not brought into the important -conferences, nor given the chance to coöperate in the formulation -of vital projects. As a matter of form they were, of course, -"consulted"—but usually after the decisions had been made. They were -informed of what had been agreed upon; and then it was announced that -the approval of the advisers had been secured. Another example of -the bland self-sufficiency of Yuan Shih-kai and his government. They -believed in themselves; they considered that they were accountable only -to themselves; they had fundamentally the monarchic point of view in -all departments of public service.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a></p> - -<p class="center">WITH MEN WHO WATCH POLITICS</p> - - -<p>I found in Peking several good observers of political life, especially -Dr. George Morrison, Mr. B. Lenox Simpson, and Mr. W.H. Donald. All -three had the training in observation and judgment which comes from -writing for responsible papers. Doctor Morrison was gifted with a -memory for details. Thus, he would say: "When I first visited New -York I lived in a little hall room on the third floor of 157 East -Twenty-ninth Street, with a landlady whose name was Simkins, who had -green eyes and a red nose and who charged me two dollars a week for my -room." He delighted in detailing minutely his daily doings. His sense -of infinite detail combined with his remarkable memory made Doctor -Morrison an encyclopædia of information about Chinese public men. He -knew their careers, their foibles and ambitions, and their personal -relationships. Like most British in China he was animated with a -sincere wish to see the Chinese get ahead, and was distressed by the -obstacles which a change for the better encountered at every step. -His own mind was of the analytical and critical type rather than the -constructive, and his greatest services were rendered as interpreter -of events and in giving to public men and the people a clear idea of -the significance of complex Chinese situations. "I am annoyed," he -would say, "because kindly old ladies persistently identify me with the -missionary Morrison who died in 1857."</p> - -<p>Mr. Donald's acquaintance with Chinese affairs had come through -close contact with the leaders of new China, with whom he coöperated -intimately in their military and politi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span>cal campaigns. He had a heart -for the Chinese, as if they had been his own people. He worried about -their troubles and fought their fights. Mr. Simpson, the noted writer -who uses the pen name "Putnam Weale," began active life as a member of -the Maritime Customs service, but he soon resigned, to devote himself -wholly to literary work. His masterly works of political analysis -were written in the period of the Russo-Japanese War, although his -best-known book came a little earlier—a book which long earned him the -ill-will and suspicion of many of the legations in Peking. He himself -disavows giving in "Indiscreet Letters from Peking" a recital of -actual facts. He told me: "I wished to give the psychology of a siege, -selecting from the abundant material significant facts and expressions, -but I was not in any sense attempting to chronicle events and personal -actions."</p> - -<p>Mr. Simpson has also written a series of novels dealing with Chinese -life. The short stories are the best; the longer ones, while -interesting in description and clever in dialogue, lack that intuitive -power of characterization which is found in the greatest novels, though -"Wang the Ninth" which has recently come from the press is an admirable -study of Chinese psychology and an excellent story as well. Though his -playful and cynical mind often led people to judge that he was working -solely for literary effect, it seemed to me he had a deep appreciation -of what China should mean to the world; he also had real sympathy for -the Chinese, and desired in every way to help them to realize the great -promise of their country and people. As a conversationalist Mr. Simpson -resembled Macaulay, in that his interludes of silence were infrequent. -Notwithstanding the brilliance of this conversation, luncheon parties -of men occasionally seemed to become restive under a monologue which -gave few others a chance to wedge in a word.</p> - -<p>Aside from these three British writers, many other men<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> were following -with intelligent interest the course of events. Bishop Bashford, gifted -with a broad and statesmanlike mind, could always be trusted to give -passing events significant interpretations. Dr. W.A.P. Martin had then -reached an age at which the individual details of current affairs no -longer interested him. His intimate friend, Dr. Arthur H. Smith—a -rarely brilliant extemporaneous speaker—was full of witty and incisive -observations, often deeply pessimistic, though tempered with a deep -friendship for the Chinese people.</p> - -<p>Among the members of the diplomatic corps it was chiefly the Chinese -secretaries who busied themselves, out of professional interest with -the details of Chinese affairs, although they did not in all cases -exhibit a broad grasp of the situation.</p> - -<p>Mr. Willys R. Peck, Chinese secretary of the American Legation, born in -China, had a complete mastery of the difficult language of the country. -He could use it with a colloquial ease that contrasted most pleasantly -with the stilted and stiff enunciation of the ordinary foreigner -speaking Chinese. His tact in intercourse with the Chinese and his -judgment on character and political affairs could be relied on. Mr. -Peck took the place of Mr. E.T. Williams, who was called to Washington -as chief of the Far Eastern Division in the State Department. I -considered it great good fortune that there should be at the Department -a man so experienced and so familiar with Chinese affairs.</p> - -<p>It was my good fortune to have as first secretary of the legation a man -exceptionally qualified to cope with the difficulties and intricacies -of Chinese affairs. Not only are these affairs infinitely complex in -themselves, but they have been overlaid through many decades with a web -of foreign treaty provisions, which makes them still more baffling to -the stranger who tackles them. But Mr. J.V.A. MacMurray, the secretary, -was possessed of a keenly analytical, legally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> trained mind which was -able to cut through the most hopelessly tangled snarl of local custom, -national law, international agreement, and general equity. Also his -interest in things Chinese was so deep and genuine that his researches -were never perfunctory. The son of a soldier, he had an almost -religious devotion to the idea of public service.</p> - -<p>Among the ministers themselves, Sir John Jordan, actual Dean of the -Diplomatic Corps, was through long experience and careful attention -to affairs most fitted to speak with authority on things Chinese. I -was immediately greatly attracted to him and formed with him a close -acquaintanceship. This led to constant coöperation throughout the -difficult years that lay ahead. Sir John was a man of unusually long -and varied experience in China. He came first to the consular service, -then became minister resident in Korea, and his forty years of official -work had given him complete intimacy with Chinese affairs. Although he -speaks Chinese with fluency, in official interviews and conversations -he was always accompanied by his Chinese secretary and expressed -himself formally in English. As a matter of fact, few diplomats -ever use the Chinese language in official conversation. Because of -its infinite shades of meaning it is a complex and rather unprecise -medium, therefore misunderstandings are more readily avoided through -the concurrent use of another language. While Sir John understood -Chinese character and affairs and was sympathetic with the country in -which his life work had been spent, yet there dwelt in him no spirit -of easy compliance. When he considered it necessary, he could insist -so strongly and so emphatically upon the action he desired taken -that the Chinese often thought of him as harsh and unrelenting: yet -they always respected his essentially English spirit of fairness and -straightforwardness.</p> - -<p>Other colleagues with whom close relationships grew up were Don Luis -Pastor, the Spanish minister, a gentleman<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> thoroughly American in -his ways and familiar through long residence in Washington with our -affairs; and Count Sforza, the Italian minister. To the latter China -seemed more or less a place of exile; he appeared bored and only -moderately interested in the affairs about him. But his legation—with -Countess Sforza, Madame Varè, whose Lombard beauty did not suggest her -Scotch origin; the Marquise Denti, with her quizzical, Mona Lisa-like -haunting smile, concealing great ennui; and the entirely girlish and -playful Countess Zavagli, a figure which might have stepped out of a -Watteau—was a most charming social centre. M. Beelaerts van Blokland, -the Netherlands minister, a man of clear-thinking, keen mind, and great -reasonableness, and the Austrian minister, M. von Rosthorn, a profound -Chinese scholar, who was then working on a Chinese history, were men of -whom I saw much during these years.</p> - -<p>There were few sinologists in Peking at this time. The successive -Chinese secretaries of the American Legation ranked high in this -respect. Of resident sinologists the most noted, Mr. (later Sir) Edward -Backhouse was a recluse, who never allowed himself to be seen in the -company of other people of a Western race. At the only period when I -had long conversations with him I found him much disturbed by wild -rumours current in the Chinese quarter to which I could not attach any -weight. Others whose knowledge of Chinese was exceptional were Mr. -Sidney Mayers, representative of the British China Corporation, who had -formerly been in the consular service; Doctor Gattrell, who had acted -as secretary of the American Group; Mr. W.B. Pettus, the director of -the Peking Language School; Mr. Simpson, already mentioned; and several -missionaries and professors at Peking University.</p> - -<p>Of the Chinese there were, of course, many with whom I could -profitably discuss the events of the day and gather suggestions and -interpretations of value. With all these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> men I conversed upon events, -relying for my information not on rumours or reports, but on the facts -which I could learn through the men directly concerned; or through -others well informed. The opinion which I formed from such various -sources about the political condition of China at this time, the spring -of 1914, may be stated as follows:</p> - -<p>The political authority of the Central Government in China rested upon -military organization. Other sources of authority, such as customary -submission on the one hand, and the support based upon the intelligent -coöperation of all classes of citizens in the achievement of the -purposes of government in accordance with public opinion on the other, -were only of secondary influence. It was therefore important to inquire -whether the military power was so organized as to afford a stabilizing -support to public authority. This did not seem to be the case.</p> - -<p>In the first place, the existence of a large army of doubtful -efficiency was in itself an evil, considering the then limited -resources of the Chinese State, and the fact that any attempt to reduce -the military forces to more reasonable dimensions met with stubborn -opposition. Whenever troops were disbanded they showed no tendency to -return to useful occupations: the ex-soldiers desired only to continue -to live upon the country, and, no longer serving the established -authority, they joined bandit gangs, rendering the interior of the -majority of the provinces insecure.</p> - -<p>The weakness of the army was strikingly demonstrated whenever an -attempt was made to use it to defend the country against either -external or internal enemies. In the campaign against the Mongols, the -Chinese troops had failed entirely; even within the country itself, -this huge army was not able to insure the fulfilment of that first -duty of a government—the protection of the lives and property of its -citizens.</p> - -<p>In the provinces of Honan and Hupei brigands, led by a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> person known as -"White Wolf," had for months been terrifying the population; ravaging -the countryside; sacking walled cities; murdering and outraging the -population; and in a number of instances had killed foreigners. Thus -far the army had been powerless to suppress these brigands; in fact, -evidence was at hand that the troops had repeatedly been so lax and -remiss that the only explanation of their conduct would seem to lie in -a secret connivance at the brigandage, and lack of coöperation among -the commanders of the troops.</p> - -<p>As the authority of the Central Government was commensurate with its -control over the tutuhs (tuchuns), or military governors, the attitude -of the latter toward the President had to be carefully watched; and it -was causing no small uneasiness that there did not seem to be perfect -agreement among these pillars of authority in the various provinces; -thus, friction had recently been reported between General Tuan -Chi-jui, the Minister of War, who was the acting tutuh of Hupei, and -General Feng Kuo-chang, the tutuh of Kiangsu, two of the most powerful -supporters of the President.</p> - -<p>None of the provinces of China, during the preceding three months, had -been free from brigandage, attempted rebellion, troubles resulting from -the disbanding of troops, and local riots. Conditions were worst in the -provinces of Honan and Hupei, in which the bands of "White Wolf" are -operating.</p> - -<p>These bands had assumed a distinctly anti-foreign attitude. In -Kansu there were constant Mohammedan uprisings, related to the open -rebellion in Tibet and Mongolia. Bandit movements had also occurred -in the provinces of Shansi, Shensi, Szechuan (super-added to revolts -of the troops), Anhui, Kiangsi, Hunan, Fukien, Kweichow, Yunnan, and -Kwangtung. Chekiang, Kwangsi, Shantung, and Chihli had been the least -molested.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span></p> - -<p>While the Government had been unable to fulfil its duty of protecting -the lives and property of its citizens, it was also unable to exercise -the elementary power of providing, through taxation, the means for its -own support. The maintenance of the army had eaten up the available -means and it had not been possible to secure sufficient money from -the provinces to meet the ordinary running expenses of the Central -Government. The remarkable resisting power of China is illustrated -by the fact that, notwithstanding the conditions of rebellion and -political unrest which characterized the year 1913, general commerce -remained so active that the collections of the Customs and of the -Salt Gabelle exceeded those of any previous year. These two sources -of revenue were sufficient to provide for the interest payments and -amortization of the long-term foreign loans then contracted; their -administration, under foreign control, had secured to the Central -Government the funds to meet these obligations and to avoid open -bankruptcy.</p> - -<p>All other forms of taxation were disorganized. The collection of the -land tax was in many places discontinued; records had been destroyed, -or the population took an attitude hostile to its collection. The -proceeds of the <i>likin</i>, as far as collected, were retained for -provincial use. Altogether, the Central Government received from the -provinces not more than 10 per cent. of the estimated income from these -sources under the last Imperial Budget for 1912.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the Central Government had been living from hand to mouth, -using the proceeds of foreign loans for administrative purposes, and -was kept going by taking cash advances upon foreign loan contracts made -for furnishing materials and for various concessions. In this way the -future had been discounted to a dangerous extent.</p> - -<p>The weakness of the financial administration of the Government was -found in all other branches of its activities. There was little -evidence of constructive capacity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span></p> - -<p>In the ministries and departments of the Central Government the -greatest disorganization was apparent. In dealing with technical -questions the officials were often entirely at sea, not being trained -themselves in these matters, nor willing to make real use of the many -advisers who were engaged by the Government; there was no adequate -system of accounting; the departmental records were not well kept; -frequently the existence of a transaction was not known to the -officials most nearly concerned; past transactions, fully consummated, -had been forgotten; there was no centralization of governmental -knowledge; so a great deal of the public business was transacted in a -haphazard way, leading to a helpless opportunism of doing the things -most strongly urged and of grasping at small immediate advantages at -the cost of engagements long to be regretted.</p> - -<p>Ambitious schemes of general policy had been brought up, and elaborate -regulations promulgated, to all of which little attention was -subsequently paid. On the other hand, there had scarcely been one -single concrete result obtained in constructive work.</p> - -<p>The metropolitan Province of Chihli had been quiet and peaceful since -the outbreak of 1912. The Government here certainly had sufficient -authority to introduce constructive reforms, and the general conditions -for such action in this province had been relatively most favourable. -But not even in the case of Chihli Province had the taxation system -been rendered efficient; no efficient auditing methods had been -introduced in practice, although systems of auditing control had been -promulgated; educational institutions had been allowed to run down: in -short, under the most favourable conditions, no constructive work had -been accomplished.</p> - -<p>Nearly all attempts to do something of a constructive nature had been -immediately associated with foreign loans, often involving a cash -advance to the Government. It might, of course, be said that the great -difficulty of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> Chinese Government was exactly that it lacked the -funds for carrying out constructive work; and that, therefore, only -such lines of improvement could be followed for which it had been -possible to secure foreign loans.</p> - -<p>This, however, was only partly true. A great many reforms could have -been accomplished without the increase of expenditure; indeed, they -would have resulted in a reduction of outlay. The fact seemed to be -that the Central Government, realizing how important foreign financial -support had been to it during the Revolution of 1913, was anxious to -secure more and more funds from abroad without counting the ultimate -cost.</p> - -<p>An opportunity for obtaining from abroad large sums of money, far -beyond any amount ever before dealt with by Chinese officials and -merchants, in itself had an unsettling effect upon methods of public -business. The old caution and economy, which kept the public debt -within narrow limits, had given way to a readiness to obtain funds -from abroad in enormous amounts, without apparently the realization -of the burden imposed upon China by way of the necessity of return in -the future through the results of labour and sacrifice of millions of -people.</p> - -<p>Nor had the old system, under which the inadequate salaries of -officials had ordinarily to be supplemented by extraneous illicit -gains, given way to a more efficient and business-like organization of -the public service under which officials would be able to devote their -undivided attention to the accomplishment of their regular allotted -tasks without spending their energy in contriving additional means of -obtaining income.</p> - -<p>In the case of certain classes of officials, the Government had -endeavoured to place their salaries at a figure sufficient to render -them independent of these practices; but the resources of the -Government were not adequate to enable it at once to place the entire -public service upon a basis of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> individual independence. It was also -true that certain among the closest advisers of the President were -commonly believed to have used their positions for the purpose of -accumulating vast private fortunes—a belief which, whether justified -or not, must be counted with in determining the standing of the -Government as enjoyed throughout the country.</p> - -<p>Thus the old hostility and lack of confidence, which formerly -characterized the relations between merchants and officials, continued -under the new system.</p> - -<p>Through the dissolution of the Parliament, the Government had destroyed -an organ which might, in the course of time, have established relations -of confidence between the great middle class of China and the -Government.</p> - -<p>As a statesman, the President emphasized in the first place the -requirements of order and of authority. To him it seemed that -Parliament, with its free discussion, with its opportunity for forming -political factions, opposing the men in authority, stood in the way of -the establishment of a lasting system of legal order. He, therefore, -dissolved first the national parliament, then the assemblies of the -provinces, and finally the local self-governing bodies.</p> - -<p>In each case inefficiency was justly complained of. The men in -the parliamentary bodies had often been self-seeking, factional, -and unpractical. But the President seemed to have no perception -of the true value of parliamentary action as a basis of public -authority; he considered opposition to the Government synonymous -with opposition to lawful authority. And in his ideas upon the -reconstitution of Parliament, as far as they had been announced, two -main principles dominated: first, that only men of mature experience -and of conservative ideas should be selected; and secondly, that the -activities of Parliament should be confined to discussing and giving -advice upon policies already determined upon by the Administration.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a></p> - -<p class="center">CHINA OF MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS</p> - - -<p>The past may become in the human present more alive than ever. John -Richard Green finds in the old records of the guilds of Berwick an -enactment "that where many bodies are found side by side in one place -they may become one, and have one will, and in the dealings of one -with another have a strong and hearty love." In the history of the -Saxons, Edwin of Northumbria "caused stakes to be fixed in the highways -where he had seen a clear spring," and "brazen dishes were chained to -them, to refresh the weary sojourner, whose fatigues Edwin had himself -experienced." These things shine with the sun, and enlighten our work -to-day. The Maine woodsman sits on a stump whose rings number centuries -of growth. When Chinese children came to play with our children at the -Legation, I was always impressed by their dignity of demeanour and -their observance of the courtesies while their elders were present. -On the faces of these little heirs of the Holy Duke the composure of -eighty generations of culture and traditions sat freshly; and it by no -means alloyed their delight, which was unstinted, in American toys and -dolls.</p> - -<p>This transmutation of the old into new life is seen everywhere in -China. The day comes every morning fresh as a flower. But we know it -is old; it is an ancient day, white-clad and beautiful as the stars. -The Chinese peasant thrusts his stick of a plough many eons deep into -his ancestral soil. In north China it is loess soil, the most fertile -on the globe, brought down from the mountains for millenniums and -deposited to depths of from twenty to thirty feet. When<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> there are no -floods the rain sinks deeply into this porous soil, meets the moisture -retained below, and draws up therefrom the inorganic salts that are -held dissolved. So its fertility is inexhaustible.</p> - -<p>But floods do come, as they have come unchecked for ages. In the Hwai -River region, with all this natural richness underfoot, the people are -poor, weak, famine-stricken, living in aggregations of shabby hovels -that are periodically swept away. Its crops, which should normally -be six in three years, average but two and three. This region is -only one example of several prodigious and extensive valleys choked -with fertility, yet with famine and pestilence raging through them, -cursed as they are by inundations that might be completely checked -at little engineering cost. With these regions reclaimed and the -border provinces colonized, China's crops alone would support double -her present population. The people of the Hwai region, secure and -affluent, might be easily increased by twenty million living heirs -of a fifty-centuries-old civilization. Indeed, a little vision and -scientific application would transform China.</p> - -<p>With what the ages have produced for the West—the old guild spirit -reviving, if you please, in the modern trust—the West can meet -the East. The true ministers and ambassadors to China are the -merchant-adventurers of the Western nations, bearing their goods, their -steel and tools, their unique engineering skill and works. It was not -for what the <i>entrepreneurs</i> "could get out of" China, nor yet for -what China could get out of us, that my policy as American minister -was directed to this complementary meeting of two civilizations. It -was because I saw millions perishing wretchedly whose birthright in -the higher arts and amenities of living is at least as rich as our -own—perishing for lack of an organizing skill which it is the province -of the Western peoples to supply. It was because I knew, with their -admirable family life and local democratic institutions, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> needed -only trunk-line railways to link together these close-set communities, -comprising one quarter of the earth's population, into as admirable a -central democracy.</p> - -<p>But how the West was then meeting the East came home to me on the -second morning of my stay in Peking. I entered the breakfast room, -where I found Doctor Hornbeck in a state of annoyance. He handed me the -morning copy of the <i>Journal de Peking</i>, a sheet published in French -and known to be subservient to Russian and French political interests -from which it got subventions. The article in question was a scurrilous -attack on me personally, and on American action in China generally.</p> - -<p>A Chinese journal in Shanghai had published a laudatory article -in which had been cited extracts from my published books. One of -these, taken from "World Politics," had happened to speak of French -subserviency to Russian policy in the Far East. The French journal -repeated these expressions as if they had been given out by me in an -interview upon arriving in China. As they were in fact taken from books -published more than ten years before, which had run the gauntlet of -French critical journals without ever having been taken as hostile to -France, I did not have any reason to worry, and the fume and fury of -the local journal rather amused me than otherwise. I could, however, -not help noting the temper of these attacks, their bitterness and the -utter rashness and lack of inquiry with which the charges were made. -It gave me early warning, considering its gross lack of courtesy to a -newcomer, who had entered the field in a spirit friendly to all, as to -what might be expected from some of our friendly rivals. When several -years later one of the ministers whose legation stood sponsor for this -sheet approached me with a request to use my influence to suppress a -Chinese paper which had attacked him, I regretted that it was not in my -power to be of assistance.</p> - -<p>The significance of the article lay of course in its attack<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> upon -American policy, which was characterized as one of "bluff", and which -charged the United States with assuming a tone of superior virtue -in criticising others, and, while loudly professing friendship for -the Chinese, failing to shoulder any part of the responsibility in -actual affairs. The Y.M.C.A. and the Standard Oil Company were coupled -together as twin instruments of a nefarious and hypocritical policy.</p> - -<p>The <i>China Press</i>, the American newspaper of Shanghai, pointed out that -the attack of the French paper indicated what the American minister -would have to face, and observed that the success or failure of his -diplomatic mission must depend upon the readiness of the American -Government to take an active part in the rehabilitation of China. -Should America play the rôle of an altruistic but impotent friend, -and of a captious critic of the other powers, it could gain neither -sympathy nor respect.</p> - -<p>The American Government was at this time severely criticised for -its failure to endorse the Six-Power Consortium; it was urged that -the Administration had sacrificed the best opportunity for bringing -American goodwill to bear on Chinese public affairs, by exercising -a moderating and friendly influence in the council of the great -powers. On the other hand, it ought to be considered that a new -administration, when confronted with the sudden proposal that it -give <i>exclusive</i> support to one special group of banks, might well -hesitate, particularly in view of the fact that the group in this case -consisted of only four New York houses. An earlier administration had -answered such an inquiry in a similar way. Considering the merits -of the question from the point of view of China, the action might -present itself in the light of a refusal to join with others in placing -upon the young republic the fetters of foreign financial control. -Moreover, the proceeds of the Reorganization Loan were actually not -used for the benefit of the Chinese people, but on the contrary this -financial support fastened the personal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> authority of Yuan Shih-kai -on the country and enabled him to carry on a successful fight against -parliament. That body never gave its approval to the loan.</p> - -<p>From my conversations with President Wilson before departing for my -post I had formed the conclusion that the President realized that -as America had withdrawn from a coöperative effort to assist in the -development of China, it was incumbent upon her to do her share -independently and to give specific moral and financial assistance; -in fact, I received the President's assurance of active support for -constructive work in China. In his conversation he dwelt, however, -more on the educational side and on political example and moral -encouragement, than on the matter of finance and commerce.</p> - -<p>It cannot be doubted that in China the withdrawal of the United -States from the Consortium was interpreted as an act of friendship -by all groups with the exception of that which was in control of the -Government at the time, which would have preferred to have the United -States at the council table of the Consortium Powers. Those opposed -to the Government were particularly strong in their commendation of -our refusal to join in an agreement which to them seemed far from -beneficial to China. But all parties without exception drew the -conclusion that the friendly action of the United States, which had -now rejected the method of international coöperation, would continue -independently of the others. In view of the power and resources of the -United States, it was hoped that there would be a greater participation -by the United States in Chinese industrial and commercial affairs, as -well as in administrative loans, than had hitherto existed.</p> - -<p>It is apparent from all this that the American position in China -was not free from difficulties. The covert antagonism of the five -Consortium Powers was continuous. We were isolated, and would be judged -by what we could do by ourselves. Should it turn out that we had -nothing to offer but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> sage advice, the strictures of our rivals might -in time come to carry a certain amount of conviction.</p> - -<p>So far as the Americans themselves were concerned, they were thoroughly -discouraged, and everywhere talked as if it were all up with American -enterprise in China. When I said: "No, it is only just beginning," -polite incredulity was the best I could expect. It is very probable -that the Americans who were so downcast saw in the appointment of -a literary and university man as minister to China an additional -indication that there was to be no special encouragement given to -American economic enterprise. Having long been familiar with the -underlying facts of the Far Eastern situation, I had entirely made -up my mind on the primary importance of American participation in -the industrial and economic development of China. No one could have -appreciated more highly than I did the important work done by American -missionaries, teachers, and medical men, in bringing to China a -conception of Western learning and life. But if China should have -to rely entirely on other nations for active support in the modern -development of her industries and resources, then our position in the -eyes of the Chinese nation could never come up to the opportunities -which Nature had given us through our geographic position and our -industrial strength.</p> - -<p>I had long discarded any narrow interpretation of diplomacy, but even -if I had adhered to the principle that the diplomat must busy himself -only with political matters, I should have had to admit that in China -political matters included commerce, finance, and industry. I did not, -of course, intend that the Legation should enter into a scramble for -concessions, but it was my purpose that it should maintain sympathetic -contact with Americans active in the economic life of China, and should -see to it that the desire of the Chinese to give them fair treatment -should not be defeated from any other source.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span></p> - -<p>When I thought of American enterprise in China I had less in mind the -making of government contracts, than the gaining of the confidence of -the Chinese people in the various provincial centres of enterprise -by extensive business undertakings, resting on a sound and broad -foundation. In China the people are vastly more important than the -Government, so that it is necessary to make up one's mind from the -start not to regard Peking as the end-all and be-all of one's activity, -but to interest one's self deeply in what is going on in all of those -important interior centres where the real power of government over the -people is exercised, and where the active organizations of the people -are located.</p> - -<p>The universal knowledge that America has no political aims in China, of -itself gives Americans the confidence of the Chinese and predisposes -the latter to favour intimate coöperation. Our policy is known to be -constructive and not to imply insidious dangers to their national life. -It would be discouraging to the Chinese, should Americans fail to take -a prominent part in the development of Chinese resources. To Americans -the idea of securing preëminence or predominance is foreign, but from -the very nature of their purely economic interest they have to resist -any attempt on the part of others to get exclusive rights or a position -of predominance, which could be utilized to restrict, or entirely to -extinguish, American opportunities.</p> - -<p>I was therefore resolved to give every legitimate encouragement to -constructive enterprise, whether it were in education, finance, -commerce, or industry.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Fully a year before going to China I had -expressed my view of the nature<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> of American policy there, saying that -a united China, master of its own land, developing its resources, open -to all nations of the world equally for commercial and industrial -activity, should be the chief desideratum.</p> - -<p>Among the specific American interests already existing in China, that -of missionary and educational work had at this time to be given the -first rank. There are two factors which have made it possible for this -work to achieve a really notable influence. The one is that it is -plainly the result of individual impulse on the part of a great many -people animated by friendly motives, and not the result of a concerted -plan of propaganda. The second factor is the spirit of helpfulness and -coöperation which permeates this work. There is no trace of a desire to -establish a permanent tutelage. An institution like the Y.M.C.A. acts -with the sole thought of helping the Chinese to a better organization -of their own social and educational life. The sooner they are able -to manage for themselves, the better it seems to please the American -teachers, who may remain for a while as friendly counsellors, but who -make no effort to set up a permanent hierarchy of supervision. The -Chinese have an intense respect for their educators, and it has been -the good fortune of many Americans—men like Dr. W.A.P. Martin and Dr. -Chas. D. Tenney—to win the devoted loyalty of innumerable Chinese -through their activity as teachers.</p> - -<p>Among commercial enterprises the Standard Oil Company was carrying -petroleum to all parts of China. It had introduced the use of the -petroleum lamp, had extended the length of the day to the hundreds -of millions of Chinese, and even its emptied tin cans had become -ubiquitous in town and country, because of the manifold uses to which -these receptacles could be put. For efficiency and close contact with -the people, the Chinese organization of this great company was indeed -admirable.</p> - -<p>A similar result had been obtained by the British-Ameri<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span>can Tobacco -Company, which, although organized in England under British law, is -American by majority ownership, business methods, and personnel. -The cigarette had been made of universal use, and had been adapted -to the taste and purchasing ability of the masses. Though there -were several American commission firms of good standing, none had -the extensive trade and financial importance of the great British -houses. Several American firm names established in China early in the -nineteenth century, like that of Frazar & Company, had become British -in ownership. The only American bank was the International Banking -Corporation, which at this time confined itself to exchange business -and did not differ in its policy or operations from the common run of -treaty port banks.</p> - -<p>If national standing in China were to be determined by the holding -of government concessions, America was at this time, indeed, poorly -equipped. The Bethlehem Steel Corporation had in 1910 concluded a -contract with the Imperial Government for the construction of vessels -to the value of $20,000,000. When I came to China, a vice-president -of the corporation, Mr. Archibald Johnston, was in Peking, ready -to arrange with the republican government for a continuance of the -contract. The American banking group was a partner in the Hukuang -Railways, in which it shared with the British, French, and German -groups. An American engineer was employed at the time in making a -survey of a portion of the proposed line along the Yangtse River. The -American group also held the concession for the Chinchow-Aigun Railway -in Manchuria, the execution of which had been blocked by Russia and -Japan. The group further participated with the three other groups above -mentioned in the option for a currency loan. The only activity going on -at this time in connection with these various contracts, on the part of -America, was the survey of the Hukuang railway line west of Ichang.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span></p> - -<p>For some time the practice had grown up, on the part of European -powers, to urge the Chinese to employ, as advisers, men reputed to have -expert knowledge in certain fields. The most noted adviser at this time -was Dr. George Morrison, who had gained a reputation in interpreting -Far Eastern affairs as Peking correspondent for the London <i>Times</i> -during and after the critical period of 1900. A fresh group of advisers -had just been added under the terms of the Reorganization Loan. Each -power therein represented had insisted that the Chinese appoint at -least one of its nationals as an adviser. The American Government had -never urged China to make such an appointment. But when President Eliot -visited China in 1913, Chinese officials expressed to him the wish -that a prominent American should be retained as adviser to the Chinese -Government. President Eliot suggested that the Carnegie Endowment might -propose certain experts from whom the Chinese Government could then -make a selection. This method was actually followed, and as a result -Prof. F.J. Goodnow of Columbia University, a recognized authority -on constitutional law, had been retained by the Chinese Government -and was at this time already in residence at Peking. The Ministry of -Communications on its part had sought a man familiar with railway -accounting, and had called upon the late Prof. Henry C. Adams, the -noted economist and railway expert of Michigan University.</p> - -<p>The important administrative positions of Inspector General of Customs -and of Foreign Inspector of the Salt Revenue were held by two British -officials. The salt administration had come within the purview of -international supervision through the Reorganization Loan agreement; -and, as America was not a party to that loan, the appointment of -Americans to any positions in this service was frowned upon by several -of the partners. The Inspector, Sir Richard Dane, an official of long -experience in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> India, however, adopted the policy of not confining the -appointments to subjects of the Consortium Powers. He had retained -several Americans, in whom he seemed to place great confidence. In the -Customs Service, Americans did not hold the number of positions to -which they were relatively entitled. This was undoubtedly due to the -fact that very few people in the United States knew that such positions -in China are open to Americans; moreover, many of those Americans -who were actually appointed had become impatient with the relatively -slow advancement in this service and had been attracted by other -opportunities. There were, however, a number of highly reputed and -efficient American officials in the Customs Service.</p> - - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The leading British paper of China had this to say -concerning the modern functions of diplomacy: "It is characteristic of -Doctor Reinsch and his outlook upon China that he should mark a point -of progress in the fact that the legations are ceasing to be merely -political centres, and that, instead of politics being the one and only -object of their existence, they are now establishing relations of all -kinds of mutual helpfulness in vital phases of national reorganization. -In this connection, we may see an increase in the number of experts -who will come, unofficially for the most part, to study conditions and -gather data which may be available as a sure foundation for progress." -I may say in passing that the British papers in China, throughout the -period of my work there, were almost uniformly fair and friendly, and -gave credit for honest efforts to improve conditions.</p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span></p> - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a></p> - -<p class="center">PROMPT PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN ACTION</p> - - -<p>The Chinese were not slow in showing what conclusions they deduced -from the withdrawal of the American Government from the Six-Power -Consortium. On November 27th, two cabinet ministers called on me for -a private conversation. Following this interview Mr. Chang Chien, -recognized master of antique Chinese learning, but also Minister of -Industries and Commerce, came to me. I will relate the substance of -what passed on these two occasions, beginning with Mr. Chang.</p> - -<p>Chang Chien carried off first honours in the great metropolitan -examinations of Peking under the old régime in 1899. He is a scholar -<i>par excellence</i> of the Chinese classics, and his chirography is so -famous that he has been able to support a college out of the proceeds -of a sale of examples of his writing. But he has not rested satisfied -with the ancient learning. In the region of his home, Nan Tung-chow, on -the banks of the Yangtse, he has established schools, factories, and -experiment stations for the improvement of agriculture and industry. -He had financial reverses. People at this time still doubted whether -he would be permanently successful, although they admitted that he -had given impetus to many improvements. Since then his enterprises -have flourished and multiplied. He has become a great national figure, -whose words, spoken from an honest desire for right public action, -have decisive weight with the nation. While he still represents the -old belief that the superior man of perfect literary training should -be able successfully to undertake any enterprise and to solve any -practical difficulty—which belief is contrary to the de<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span>mands of our -complex modern life for specialization—yet he has succeeded in bending -his intelligence to thoroughly modern tasks.</p> - -<p>As would be expected from his high culture as a Chinese scholar, -Mr. Chang Chien is a man of refinement and distinction of manners, -than which nothing could be more considerate and more dignified. The -Chinese are exceedingly sensitive to the thought and feeling of any -one in whose company they happen to be; if their host is busy or -preoccupied, no matter how politely he may receive them, they will -nevertheless sense his difficulty and will cut their visit short. They -also have great tact in turning a conversation or avoiding discussions -they are not ready for, and they can do this in a manner which makes -it impossible to force a discussion without impolite insistence. -The smoothness and velvetiness of Chinese manners, together with -the absence of all servile assent and the maintenance of complete -independence of discussion, are marvellous and bear evidence to -thousands of years of social training.</p> - -<p>Mr. Chang Chien was particularly interested in river and harbour -development, and in plans for the drainage of those regions of -China which are subject to periodical floods. It was contemplated -to establish a special conservancy bureau under whose care surveys -for important projects were to be undertaken. I questioned Mr. Chang -concerning the status of the Hwai River conservancy scheme for the -prevention of floods in the northern portion of the provinces of -Kiangsu and Anhui, the region from which he came.</p> - -<p>"I have already established a special engineering school," he replied, -"in order to train men for this work. A large part of the survey has -been made, and it can be entirely completed by a further expenditure of -35,000 taels.</p> - -<p>"Besides the enormous benefit of such a work to all the adjoining -agricultural lands," he continued, "there would be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> reclaimed nearly -3,000,000 acres which could now not be used at all, although their soil -is inexhaustibly fertile. The land thus reclaimed would be salable -immediately for at least $40 an acre. Would not this alone be ample -security for a large conservancy loan? $25,000,000 would do the work."</p> - -<p>Mr. Chang was also interested in the establishment of a commercial and -industrial bank, in copartnership with American capitalists. "Such a -bank," he said, "would assist in furnishing the capital for the works -of internal improvement."</p> - -<p>It was quite plain that Mr. Chang looked upon a bank as an institution -which would invest its capital in such enterprises—a conception which -was then quite current among the Chinese. They had not yet fully -realized that in the modern organization of credit a bank may act as a -depository and may make temporary loans, but more permanent investments -must ultimately be placed with individual capitalists, with banks -acting only as underwriting and selling agencies.</p> - -<p>As we talked about the execution of these large and useful projects, -Mr. Chang repeatedly made expressions such as this: "I prefer American -coöperation. I am ready to employ American experts to work out the -plans and to act as supervisors. But please to bear in mind, these -works may not be undertaken without raising a large part of the needed -funds in the United States or in other countries."</p> - -<p>When the two cabinet ministers called they brought no interpreter. "The -matters about which we wish to talk," they said, "are so important that -we wish to keep the discussion confined to as few persons as possible. -We bring the ideas of President Yuan Shih-kai and his government with -respect to what Americans might do in China."</p> - -<p>They first gave me a review of the recent development of the -Russo-Japanese entente with respect to Manchuria and Mongolia. They -expressed their belief that an understanding existed between these -powers to treat outer Mongolia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> as a region within which Russian -control should not be obstructed, and, <i>vice versa</i>, to allow a free -hand to Japan, not only in southern Manchuria, but also in eastern -Mongolia. Continuous activity of the Japanese in south China, in -stirring up opposition to the Central Government, indicated a desire -to weaken China, and, if possible, to divide it against itself. The -extraordinary efforts made by Japan to increase her naval establishment -were also particularly mentioned. The impression their discourse -conveyed was that Japan was engaged in a strong forward policy in -China, and that in this she had the countenance and support of Russia.</p> - -<p>My visitors then passed on to the reasons why the Chinese entertained -the hope that America would give them its moral support to the extent -of opposing the inroads made by Japan and Russia, and of coöperating -with Great Britain and other powers favourable to the Open Door policy -in preventing attempts to break up the Chinese Republic. They fully -realized the improbability of an alliance between China and the United -States, but laid stress on the parallel interests of the two countries, -and particularly on the sympathy engendered through following the -principles of democratic government. Having become a republic, the -Chinese Government is brought into peculiarly close relationship to -the United States; it sees in the United States its most sincere and -unselfish friend, and realizes the importance of American moral support.</p> - -<p>Descending to particulars, the ministers pointed out that while China -appreciated and valued the friendly interest and counsel of the United -States, it was disappointing that so very little had been done by -America, while the European Powers and Japan should have taken such a -very important part in the development of the resources of China. They -said that the Chinese Government and people were desirous of affording -the Americans unusual opportunities, should they be ready to coöperate.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span></p> - -<p>Taking up specific enterprises, they stated that the Government was -quite willing to ratify and carry out the contract made in 1910 by -the Imperial Government with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Under -this contract they intended to build vessels adapted for commercial -purposes, but convertible into warships somewhat like the vessels of -the Russian Volunteer Fleet. The establishment of a steamship line to -the United States, directly or by way of the Panama Canal, was greatly -desired by the Government.</p> - -<p>It was recalled that at the time the naval mission of Prince Tsao -visited the United States, the matter of lending American experts -as instructors for the Chinese navy came up for discussion, and -such assistance was promised by the American Administration under -President Taft. The assistance contemplated was to be instructional and -technical, not involving matters of policy or suggesting a political -alliance, and of a nature such as had been in the past given by other -nations, particularly Great Britain. The ministers stated that the -Chinese Government still intended to avail itself of this assistance -should the need for it arise, and that American coöperation in a matter -like this was preferred because of the political disinterestedness of -the American Government.</p> - -<p>The ministers then took up more purely industrial enterprises, and -dwelt particularly on plans for river and harbour improvement, -mentioning the Hwai River region and other districts where agricultural -pursuits are interrupted by destructive floods. As the Central -Government contemplated the establishment of a national bureau to -provide for these matters, the ministers suggested that the American -Government would be invited to give its assistance by lending experts -to plan and conduct the proposed works. They expressed their belief -that the experience of Americans in such enterprises had qualified them -above any other nation for coping with these problems of China.</p> - -<p>Other matters were taken up, such as the possible creation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> of a -tobacco monopoly, from which the ministers expected both increased -revenue and a more effective organization of tobacco production -throughout China. It was not their desire to oust the British-American -Tobacco Company, but they suggested that an arrangement would be made -whereby this company might act as the selling agent of the Chinese -Government.</p> - -<p>Another subject was the exploration of China for petroleum. They stated -that the Government wished that the development of oil fields should -be undertaken. On account of the manner in which some other nations -were wont to extend the scope of any concessions of this kind so as -to establish general claims of preference, particularly as to railway -rights, the Government much preferred to take up this matter with -Americans.</p> - -<p>It was apparent that these men entertained high hopes of American -activity in China, and that they were ready to do their part in making -the conditions favourable. Their minds were alive with plans of -development. Both because of American experience with similar problems -and of the American spirit of fairness, they believed that great -benefit would result if Americans were to become prominently active -in the vast industrial transformation which they anticipated in the -immediate future.</p> - -<p>As this conversation passed from topic to topic, touching on proposals -of moment, I could not but feel that a new spirit had surely arisen -in China. It would have been inconceivable under the old régime for -high officials, trained in the traditional formalism and reticent -with inherited distrust of the foreigner, to approach a foreign -representative thus frankly, laying before him concrete proposals for -joint action. In the past, as we know, it was the foreigners who had -desired changes and new enterprises and who had in and out of season -pressed them upon the reluctant and inert Chinese officials. But here -were men who realized that it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> the function of the Government to -plan and to initiate; and they were ready to go to any length in making -advances to a country in whose motives they had full confidence.</p> - -<p>It was impossible not to be fascinated by the prospects that were here -unfolded. A country of vast resources in natural wealth, labour, power, -and even in capital, was turning toward a new form of organization in -which all these forces were to be made to work in larger units, over -greater areas and with more intensive methods than ever before. The -merely local point of view was giving way to the national outlook. -National resources and industries were looked at not from the point of -view alone of any local group interested but of the unity of national -life and effort. To know that in this great task of reorganization, -Americans would be most welcome as associates and directors; that -they were spontaneously and sincerely desired in order that all these -materials and resources might the more readily be built into a great -and effective unity of national life—that, indeed, could not fail -to be a cause for pride and gratification to an American. The only -disturbing thought was the question whether Americans were ready to -appreciate the importance of the opportunity here offered. Yet there -could be no doubt that every energy must be applied in order to make -them realize the unprecedented nature of the opportunities and the -importance to America herself of the manner in which these materials -were to be organized so as to promote general human welfare rather than -selfish exploitation and political ambition.</p> - -<p>The Russian efforts to strengthen their position in Mongolia, to which -these two visitors had alluded, had at this time brought fruit in the -form of an agreement with China to have the "autonomy" of Mongolia -recognized. A result and byplay of these negotiations came to the -notice of the foreign representatives in Peking at a meeting of the -diplomatic corps on December 11th. The meeting was at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> the British -Legation, to which Sir John Jordan had by this time returned.</p> - -<p>The head of the large establishment of the Russian Legation was a -young man, Mr. Krupenski. Trained under some of the ablest diplomats -of Russia and having spent many years in Peking as secretary, he had -manifestly not been selected by chance. With his English secretary -he occupied his vast house alone, being unmarried. He entertained -brilliantly, ably seconded therein by the Russo-Asiatic Bank across the -way. Besides his thorough understanding of the Chinese, Mr. Krupenski -had a valuable quality in his ability to shed all the odium that -might attach to the policy of his government, as a duck sheds water. -He appeared at times greatly to enjoy mystifying his colleagues, to -judge by his amused and unconcerned expression when he knew they were -guessing as to what his last move might mean. Mr. Krupenski is tall, -florid, unmistakably Russian. During my first visit with him he plunged -<i>in medias res</i> concerning China. Though he probably wondered what move -I might contemplate after the Manchurian proposals of Mr. Knox and -America's withdrawal from the Six-Power Group, he gave no hint of his -feelings, which undoubtedly did not contemplate me as likely to become -an intimate associate in policies. When I left him I knew that here -was a man, surrounded by competent experts in finance, language, and -law, who could play with the intricacies of Chinese affairs and take -advantage of opportunities and situations of which others would not -even have an inkling.</p> - -<p>At the meeting of December 11th the Russian minister stated that he -desired to make an announcement, and proceeded to tell his colleagues -quite blandly that his government had decided to withdraw the legation -guards and other Russian troops from north China, and that they -suggested to the other governments to take similar action.</p> - -<p>This announcement caused surprise all around the table.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> Questions came -from all directions: "Is this action to be immediate?" "What is the -purpose of your government?" "What substitute for this protection do -you suggest?" These and many more. The Russian minister seemed amused -by the excitement he had caused. He allowed none of the questioners -to worry him in the least, or to draw him out. With a quizzical and -non-committal smile he let the anxious surmises of his colleagues -run off his back. He shrugged his shoulders and said: "These are the -instructions of my government. Their purpose—I do not know." When the -meeting adjourned, small groups walked off in different directions, all -still intently discussing the meaning of this move. So, the legation -guards were really very important! The first question put to me in -Shanghai had related to them, and here I found the diplomatic corps -thrown into excitement by the announcement that Russia was withdrawing -her guard.</p> - -<p>When I arrived at the Legation, where Mrs. Reinsch was receiving and -where visitors in large numbers were taking tea and dancing to the -music of the marine band, the news had evidently already preceded me, -for several people asked me what had happened; and Putnam Weale and -W.C. Donald, the British press representatives, were full of surmises. -The interpretation generally accepted was that the Russians, and -possibly the Japanese, were trying to put the other powers in a hole; -if they did not withdraw their legation guards they might displease the -Chinese Government, after what Russia had done; if they did withdraw -them, they would give an advantage to Russia and Japan, powers who, on -account of their proximity to China, could send large bodies of troops -upon short notice.</p> - -<p>From the attitude of the diplomats it had been apparent that the -proposal of the Russians would not prove acceptable. For weeks the -press was filled with attempts to gauge the true bearing of the -Russian proposal. Looked at from this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> distance after the Great War, -it is hard to imagine how so relatively unimportant a matter could -cause excitement. Of course, the removal of the legation guard was -not considered so important in itself, but it was of moment as an -indication of what Russia might plan with respect to the further -advance of her influence in China.</p> - -<p>Probably Russia's action did not really contemplate any far-reaching -consequences. The Russians were urging the Chinese Government to -make an arrangement for Mongolian "autonomy," which could not but -be intensely distasteful to the Chinese. The Russians had to offer -something in return; with thorough knowledge of the old type of the -Chinese official mind, they selected something which would not cost -them anything, but which would be most gratifying to the Chinese -Government. The Government looked upon the presence of foreign troops -in Peking and in Chihli Province as incompatible with its dignity. -Therefore, the Russian Government knew that through withdrawing its -troops and calling upon the other governments to do likewise, an -opportunity would be given the Chinese Government to claim an important -victory, and the bitterness of renunciation with respect to Mongolia -would thus be somewhat tempered. Yuan Shih-kai and the Government as -such would probably take that view; but the Chinese as individuals were -not likely thus to consider the presence of foreign troops an unmixed -evil. These guards tended to stabilize the situation, also to prevent -unconscionable acts or high-handed inroads by any individual powers. So -far as the people of China were concerned, Russia might not gather much -credit through this move.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a></p> - -<p class="center">A LITTLE VISION FOR CHINA</p> - - -<p>I have said that a little vision and the application of American -scientific methods would transform China. Chang Chien had instanced the -Hwai River valley, and the ease with which it might be made to bloom -as the most fertile tract on the globe. China boasts the most skilled -horticulturists and truck-farmers of any nation, and they breed its -thousands of species of vegetables and flowering plants and shrubs. It -is said of the Chinese gardener, that if there is a sick or weakened -plant, he "listens and hears its cry," and nurses it into health like -a mother. But now the multitudes in the flood-ridden districts must -periodically expect the scarification of their gorgeous acres, the -bearing away of their dwellings and loved ones on the remorseless -floods.</p> - -<p>Americans had for some time been aware of the possibilities of -delivering from their curse these garden spots of earth. The American -Red Cross, after giving $400,000 for relief of the severe famine in -1911, was advised by its representatives how such calamities might be -prevented, and it set an American engineer at making surveys in the -Hwai regions and suggesting suitable engineering works. Chang Chien, -with his native school of engineers, was also investigating the flood -conditions, just about the time the American group of financiers left -the Six-Power Consortium. It might be expected that this American group -would be reluctant immediately to start further enterprises in China; -indeed, that it might even discourage others from starting. Hence I -thought it essential to propose only such undertakings as would come -naturally from past relationships or would help<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> develop some American -interest already established in China. I was attracted by this plan, -sound, useful, and meritorious, to redeem the Hwai River region.</p> - -<p>I found that the Chinese did not wish to take up this matter with any -other nation than the United States, for they feared the territorial -ambitions of the other powers and their desire to establish "spheres of -influence" in China. To send in engineers, to drain and irrigate, meant -close contacts; it might mean control over internal resources within -the regions affected, for by way of security the foreign creditor would -demand a mortgage upon the lands to be improved. Then there was the -Grand Canal, a navigable watercourse, which would come within the scope -of such works, and would give the foreign engineers and capitalists a -direct means of penetrating the interior. Jealous of foreign political -control in their domestic affairs, the Chinese were guarding their -rights. But the American policy was traditionally non-aggressive, and I -found that to fair-minded Americans the Chinese would grant concessions -which no other nation might hope to secure.</p> - -<p>I therefore asked through the Department of State what the American Red -Cross might continue to do. Would it take steps toward the choosing -of a reputable and efficient American engineering firm and have this -firm supported by American capitalists, who might lend the Chinese -Government the funds needed to reclaim the rich Hwai River region? -The Red Cross responded favourably. I thereupon sought out Mr. Chang -Chien, the scholar and minister, and got from him a definite agreement -to entrust to the American Red Cross the selection of engineers and -capitalists to carry out this great reform upon conditions laid down.</p> - -<p>The minister and I had frequent conferences. We discussed carefully -the engineering contracts, the conditions of the loan, the security. -Every sentence in the proposed agreement had been weighed, every -word carefully chosen;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> finally, on January 27, 1914, it was signed -by Chang Chien as minister, and by myself in behalf of the American -Red Cross. The J.G. White Corporation was chosen to finance the -preliminary survey. Thus there were sent to China during the next -summer three experts: Colonel (later Major General) Sibert, of the -Panama Canal Commission; Mr. Arthur P. Davis, director of the United -States Reclamation Service; and Prof. D.W. Mead, of the University of -Wisconsin, an expert in hydraulic engineering.</p> - -<p>Here was a beginning of great promise, and in a new direction.</p> - -<p>But American enterprise had already affected the daily life of the -Chinese in the field opened up by the Standard Oil Company. In fact, -the lamp of Standard Oil had lighted China.</p> - -<p>Now enter Mr. Yamaza, the Japanese minister. Japan, who had no oil in -her lamp, wished to explore for it in China; so did other nations. But -the American oil company, in a way which I shall detail, had gotten -the concession. Moreover, the Bethlehem Steel Corporation had agreed -for $20,000,000 to build a merchant fleet for China, convertible into -cruisers—this to take the place of an old imperial contract for -warships. At China's express request, and not at all because they were -in that business, the Bethlehem people also consented to apply three -millions of the whole sum to improve a Chinese port. Together with the -Hwai River enterprise these American activities had put Japan on the -alert. The Japanese press had distorted their significance, and now in -the small Bethlehem contract Mr. Yamaza began to see things—a future -Chinese mistress of the Asian seas, perhaps, and the Chinese littoral -all besprinkled with naval ports. One evening Mr. Yamaza spoke to me -about it, and at length; it was plain that his government meant some -move.</p> - -<p>Now Mr. Yamaza and his first secretary, Mr. Midzuno,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> were both -unusually clever men. They drank a great deal. The minister explained -that he did this for reasons of health, because, unless there were -something he could give up if he should be taken sick, it might be -very bad for him. I recall how Mr. Midzuno entertained a party at -dinner by detailing his notable collection of expressions in various -languages, of equivalents to the German term "Katzenjammer." Both of -these men had previous Chinese experience and were intimately familiar -with Chinese affairs. Yamaza was a man of great shrewdness; being under -the influence of liquor seemed rather to sharpen his understanding. -Taciturn and speaking in hesitating sentences, he would never commit -himself to anything, but would deploy the conversation with great -skill, in order to give his interlocutor every chance to do that very -thing.</p> - -<p>On the evening of this conversation we were guests of the manager -of the Russo-Asiatic Bank. An amateur theatrical performance was in -progress—three French "one-acters," the chief being "The Man Who -Married a Dumb Wife," by Anatole France. Peking foreign society was -there in force; the majority were gathered in the large salon where the -stage was set, others promenading or conversing in small groups. In the -intermission between two plays I encountered the Japanese minister, -and, finding that he desired to talk, wandered with him to the smoking -room, where we pre-empted a corner, whence during a long conversation -we would catch now and then the echoes from the salon as the action on -the stage rose to a more excited pitch.</p> - -<p>Mr. Yamaza was more talkative than I had ever seen him. As was his -custom, he had consumed ardent waters quite freely, but, as always, -his mind was clear and alert. "In Shensi and Chihli provinces," he -opened up, "the exertions of Japanese nationals in the matter of the -concession to the Standard Oil Company have given them a right to be -considered. I have been contending to the Chinese that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> Japan has a -prior interest in the oil field of Shensi Province. Do you not know -that Japanese engineers were formerly employed there?"</p> - -<p>On my part, I expressed surprise that the Japanese papers should make -so much noise about the American oil concession, whereas it was quite -natural that Americans, who had done business in China for over a -century, should occasionally go into new lines of enterprise.</p> - -<p>But it soon became manifest that Mr. Yamaza was thinking of the -Bethlehem Steel contract. "I must tell you," he said, "of the -strategical importance of Fukien Province to my country." Then followed -a long exposition. "China," he concluded, "has promised not to alienate -this province to any other power, and Japan has repeatedly asserted an -interest in that region."</p> - -<p>He then repeated various surmises and reports concerning the nature -of the Bethlehem contract. I told him quite specifically the nature -of the agreement and about its long previous existence. Mr. Johnston, -vice-president of the Bethlehem company, at the request of the Chinese -Government had viewed various naval ports with the purpose of making an -estimate of improvements which were most needed. I could not admit any -sinister significance in this visit nor concede that Americans were not -free to engage in port construction in any part of China.</p> - -<p>While I had not been unguarded in my statements, I had assuredly not -looked upon a conversation in such circumstances as a formal one. -Yet I soon found out that a memorandum upon it was presented to the -Department of State by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, during -an interview with Secretary Bryan on the question of harbour works in -Fukien. I shall revert to this matter later.</p> - -<p>A peculiarity of Chinese psychology was evinced after the Standard Oil -contract had been signed. One year was given to select specific areas -within which oil production was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> to be carried on as a joint enterprise -of the Chinese Government and the American company, the ratio of -property interest of the two partners being 45 to 55. The contract -undoubtedly offered an opportunity for securing the major share in -the development of any petroleum resources which might be discovered -in China; for, once such a partnership has been established and the -work under it carried out in an acceptable manner, an extension of the -privileges obtained may confidently be looked for. But in itself the -contract signed in February, 1914, was only a beginning. It denoted the -securing of a bare legal right; and in China a government decree or -concession is not in itself all-powerful. If its motives are suspected, -if it has been obtained by pressure or in secrecy, if its terms are not -understood or are believed to imply unjust burdens to certain provinces -or to the people at large, then popular opposition will arise. This may -not affect the legal character of the grant or the responsibility of -the Government, but it will seriously obstruct the ready and profitable -carrying out of the business. The obverse of this situation—the -getting of a contract "on the square" and the demonstration that it is -fair and just—finds every influence willing to coöperate.</p> - -<p>But when the Standard Oil Company's contract had been signed, not much -was publicly known about it save in general terms. Rival interests -began to portray it as involving inroads upon the rights of the Chinese -people, especially of the provinces of Shensi and Chihli. Stories of -bribery were circulated in the papers. In the negotiations concluded -at Peking no particular attention had been paid to local opinion, the -suspicions of provincials were stirred, and an outcry speedily arose.</p> - -<p>The representatives of the Standard Oil Company had left Peking. I -informed the company that its interests were endangered. Its response -was to send to Peking Mr. Roy S. Anderson, the American whose intimate -knowledge of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> Chinese affairs has been referred to. Mr. Anderson held -sessions with those who had objected, especially with the provincials -of Shensi who were resident in Peking. He discussed with them the terms -of the contract, pointing out the benefit to the provinces through the -development of a large industry there. The Chinese always respond to -reasonable discussion, and not many days later the very associations -which had protested most vigorously against the agreement waited upon -the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce with their congratulations. -They promised the aid of the province in carrying out the contract. Had -the contract not been straightforward and fair in its terms and free of -undue influence in its making, such active support could not have been -had.</p> - -<p>It was then that the Chinese Government created an Oil Development -Bureau, together with a River Conservancy Bureau for drainage works, -including those projected in the Hwai River region. Of the new Oil -Development Bureau the Prime Minister, Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling, on his -resignation from the cabinet in March, accepted the position as chief. -He had been both Premier and concurrently Minister of Finance. Tall, -good-looking, with full face and shining black hair, Mr. Hsiung speaks -with great fluency in a high-pitched voice. Though he was a member of -the Chin Pu Tang, or progressive party, he had been selected Premier by -Yuan Shih-kai, who was fighting the democratic party (Kuo Min Tang), -probably because he believed that parliament would reject him and he -could then blame that body for obstructive tactics. It accepted him, -and Yuan took another path to overthrow parliament. In his career Mr. -Hsiung had been aided by the counsel and coöperation of his wife, who -is exceptionally capable. Well-intentioned, broad-minded, given to -Western methods, the Premier was handicapped during his term through -relative inexperience in administrative and financial matters. He was -pitted against<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> men of shrewdness as politicians and of deep immersion -in financial manipulations.</p> - -<p>As chief of the Oil Development Bureau, Mr. Hsiung's first task was -that of pointing out to the Japanese minister, Mr. Yamaza, whom the -Japanese interests immediately pressed forward, that no monopoly of -exploitation had been granted to the Standard Oil Company, for within a -year the company would have to select specific and limited areas within -the two provinces where production was to be carried on.</p> - -<p>"The grant to Americans," the Japanese minister thereupon remarked, -"seems to indicate that China does not care much about the -international friendship of Japan."</p> - -<p>Mr. Hsiung's reply was that this was a business arrangement, and the -nationals of other countries as well—Great Britain, France, and -Germany—had sought such concessions in the recent past. To the inquiry -whether a similar agreement would be concluded with Japan for other -provinces, the director replied that it would not at this time be -convenient.</p> - -<p>"Then I hereby notify you," Mr. Yamaza rejoined, "that in all -likelihood I shall take up this matter with the Minister for Foreign -Affairs."</p> - -<p>Mr. Yamaza referred to the Japanese engineers who at one time worked -in the oil fields of Shensi Province; whereupon Mr. Hsiung recalled -that American and German engineers had formerly been employed in the -Hanyehping iron enterprise; yet when that company made a loan agreement -with Japanese interests, no objections had been made either by America -or Germany.</p> - -<p>This conversation illustrates the manner in which attempts are -often made to establish prior claims with regard to enterprises -in China by alleging a prior desire or the prior employment of -individuals—considerations which would nowhere else be considered -as establishing a preference or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> inchoate option. It is as much as -to say that by merely expressing a wish for a thing one has already -established a prior right to it should it be given out.</p> - -<p>The making of two important contracts with the Chinese Government -naturally attracted attention. Of the British press the <i>North China -Daily News</i> repeated the judgment of its Peking correspondent: "The -Americans deserve their success, for they have worked for it steadily -and consistently."</p> - -<p>The <i>Daily News</i> attributed this success primarily to the fact that -since the days of Secretary Hay, American enterprise in China had been -consistently pacific and benevolent. "In no country in the world," it -declared, "can more be done through friendship and for friendship's -sake than in China."</p> - -<p>The German press, while inclined to be critical, still admitted the -fairness of the contracts and the probable benefit to be derived -therefrom by China, and spoke in disapproval of the Japanese -attitude assumed toward the new oil enterprise. Later a long article -appeared in the chief German paper in China (<i>Ostasiatische Lloyd</i>), -in which the existence of a very far-reaching policy of economic -penetration by America was surmised. The writer imagined that all the -factors—educational, financial, and industrial—were being guided -according to a complicated but harmonious plan to achieve the actual -predominance of American interests in China.</p> - -<p>The German minister, Von Haxthausen, spoke to me about this article. "I -hope," he said, "that you will not conclude that its views are those of -myself and my legation."</p> - -<p>I assured him that I felt highly flattered that anybody should have -conceived that American action proceeded with such careful planning and -such cunning grasp of all details.</p> - -<p>The Franco-Russian semi-official sheet, the <i>Journal de Pekin</i>, -continued its carping attitude against all American enterprise. It -lumped together the Y.M.C.A., mission<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span>aries, Standard Oil, and the -British-American Tobacco Company as engaged in a nefarious effort to -gain ascendency for American influence in China. It failed, however, to -surmise the subtle plan suggested in the German paper, but presupposed -an instinctive coöperation of all these American agencies. This paper -was occasionally stirred to great waves of indignation, as when it -discovered that the Y.M.C.A. was undermining Chinese religious morale -and destroying the sanctity of holy places by establishing a bathing -pool in one of the temples. This deplorable desecration, which wrung -from the breast of the Belgian editor of the Franco-Russian sheet moans -of outraged virtue, had for its substance the fact that in the large -monastery of Wo Fu Ssu—in the foothills fifteen miles from Peking, -where the Y.M.C.A. had summer quarters—a large pool in the residential -part of the enclosures was actually used for a dip on hot mornings. But -no Chinese had ever hinted that his feelings were lacerated.</p> - -<p>The American papers and Americans generally were somewhat encouraged -by this constructive action. In the Chinese Press the veteran -American lawyer, T.R. Jernigan, said: "It is clear that the Wilson -Administration will use its influence to further the extension of the -business of American merchants whether they act in a corporate capacity -or otherwise."</p> - -<p>On the side of finance as well as industry the Chinese courted American -interest. The Minister of Finance and Mr. Liang Shih-yi were frequently -my guests; and we conversed particularly on the financial situation. -Both took a view quite different from the traditional Chinese official -attitude. They desired to have the Government make itself useful and -take the lead in organizing both national credit and industry. They -considered it possible to develop Chinese domestic credit to an extent -that would materially supply the financial needs of the Government. -Unfortunately, the great system of banking which had been built up<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> by -the Shansi Bankers' Guild was very inadequate to modern needs. Banking -had rested wholly on personal knowledge of the character and credit of -borrowers; no collateral was used, there was no dealing in corporate -securities.</p> - -<p>When China came into contact with the business methods of Western -nations, this system could not help in developing new enterprises. -That task fell largely to the foreign banks established in the treaty -ports, who had no vision of the possibilities of internal development -in China. The Shansi bankers, on their part, unable to adapt themselves -to new conditions, saw their field of action gradually limited, their -business falling off. These banks lost their grip on affairs. They -felt themselves in need of financial assistance from the Government. -The Minister of Finance was considering whether these old institutions -might not be transformed into modern and adequate agencies of Chinese -domestic credit. He and other native financiers became interested -in the national banking system through which, in the United States, -quantities of public debentures had been absorbed to furnish a sound -basis for a currency.</p> - -<p>It seemed impossible to utilize the Shansi banks as the main prop of a -modern system. A new organization, such as the Bank of China, planned -on modern lines, might be strengthened by American financial support -and technical assistance. Mr. Liang Shih-yi was willing to give to -American interests an important share in the management of the Bank -of China in return for a strengthening loan. A New York contractor, -Mr. G.M. Gest, was at this time in Peking on a pleasure tour with his -family. Impressed with the need for the launching of new financial and -industrial enterprises in China, his first thought had been to secure a -concession to build a system of tramways in Peking. Chinese officials -had previously told me of an existing Chinese contract which might -be turned over to Americans. I was not very enthusiastic about this -particular enterprise, because I feared<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> it might destroy the unique -character of Peking street life, without great business success or much -benefit to anybody.</p> - -<p>On inquiring further we found that French interests had just signed a -loan contract which covered, among other things, the Peking tramways.</p> - -<p>The financing was curious; the proceeds were presumably to be used -to complete the port works at Pukow, on the Yangtse River, and to -establish the tramways of Peking. However, it was plain that the loan -had been made really for administrative or political purposes, its -industrial character being secondary, as the work was indefinitely -postponed. This subterfuge of so-called "industrial loans," of which -the proceeds were to be used for politics, was later very extensively -resorted to, particularly in the Japanese loans of 1918.</p> - -<p>Learning of this state of affairs, Mr. Gest turned his attention to the -problem of Chinese domestic financing, and at the close of his short -residence in Peking he had obtained an option for the Bank of China -loan contract, which he followed up with energy upon his return to the -United States.</p> - -<p>American attention had been drawn to the contracts for the Hwai River -conservancy and for petroleum exploration, and American commercial -journals and bankers were again giving thought to the financing of -projects in China. To show the attitude of New York bankers at this -time, of their difficulties, doubts, and inclinations, I shall cite -portions of a letter written me by Mr. Willard Straight, dated April -29, 1914. While I did not agree with Mr. Straight on several matters -of detail, especially the withdrawal from the Consortium, we were both -agreed as to the importance of continued American participation in -Chinese finance and industry. The letter follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>As regards the Hwai River conservancy, you have doubtless already been -advised that the Red Cross has made an arrangement with J.G. White & -Company, whereby an engineering board will be despatched to China to -make a detailed survey. The matter of financing was brought to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> -Group, who felt it impossible satisfactorily to discuss this question -without more definite information regarding actual conditions and the -probable cost of the work contemplated.</p> - -<p>When, upon receipt of the report of the engineering board, we take up -the discussion of the financial problem, the suggestions contained in -your letter of the 24th of March will be very valuable. It might, as -you say, be comparatively easy to issue a loan of ten million dollars -at almost any time. That would depend, however, not on the size but on -the nature of the loan. There is no market for Chinese securities in -this country at this time, and it would be difficult if not impossible -for the bankers to create one within any reasonable time without the -active and intelligent support or at least the declared approval of -the Government....</p> - -<p>When the American Group first entered upon negotiations for the -Hukuang loan, conditions in this country were good. Business men were -looking abroad for new trade openings, the Taft Administration was -anxious to encourage the extension of foreign trade and the Chinese -Governmental Bubble had not been pricked. During our four years of -experience a not inconsiderable public interest in China and her -development was aroused, and had we issued the Reorganization Loan, as -we had hoped to do, in February, 1913, we probably could have sold our -twenty-million-dollar share to investors throughout the country. This -we would have been able to do despite the revolution and uncertain -governmental conditions in China, because of public confidence due to -the support of our own and the other interested governments.</p> - -<p>Neither Mr. Taft nor Mr. Knox ever promised to send American -battleships to threaten China, or to land marines to occupy Chinese -territory, in case of default in interest payments. The public was -misled by no false statements, but there was, nevertheless, a general -belief that our Government was actively interested in the preservation -of China's credit and in the development of that country.</p> - -<p>This, as I told you in our conversation at the Century Club, was -changed by the President's declaration of March 19, 1913. The fact -that the President and the State Department felt that China, as a -young republic, was entitled to extraordinary consideration and -sympathy; the fact that our Government recognized Yuan Shih-kai's -political machine, and the fact that the Administration subsequently -gave out some general expressions regarding the Government's interest -in the development of American trade, did not in any way restore in -the mind of the investor the confidence which had been destroyed by -the specific condemnation of the activities of the only American -banking group which had had the enterprise, the courage, and the -patience to enter and remain in the Chinese field and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> which, despite -its unpopularity among certain yellow journals and a number of Western -Congressmen, stood for integrity, fair dealing, and sound business in -the minds of the bond-purchasing public, upon whose readiness to buy -the success of any bond issue must depend.</p> - -<p>This confidence which would have enabled us to sell Chinese bonds had -been created by four years of hard work on the part of the bankers and -the Government. Once destroyed, it can be restored only by general -governmental declarations, which will probably have to be stronger -than any of those made by the Taft Administration, or, in the absence -thereof, by effective, consistent, and repeated specific proof of -the Government's willingness to assist and encourage our merchants, -contractors, and bankers. As you know, it is more difficult to correct -a bad impression than it is originally to create a good one.</p> - -<p>I quite appreciate that it will be difficult for the President to take -any action which would seem to be a reversal of his former position, -but I hope that the last paragraph of his declaration of last March, -in which he stated that he would urge "all the legislative measures -necessary to assure to contractors, engineers, etc., the banking and -other financial facilities which they now lack" may be interpreted and -developed along lines which will permit him actively to support the -Red Cross plan.</p> - -<p>If the Administration will publicly evidence its interest in and its -support of this project during the next few months, so that when the -matter is finally brought up to the bankers for decision they may -be able to feel that the public has become interested and assured -that our Government is behind the plan, it may prove to be the means -by which we can again enter China. This I have pointed out to Miss -Boardman who, I feel sure, fully understands the situation.</p> - -<p>I sincerely trust that your great interest and your energy in -endeavouring to extend our interests in China may have an effect -upon our own Administration. I believe the bankers will always be -willing to help if they are able to do so, but we are not, like our -Continental friends, anxiously looking for chances to invest abroad, -especially at the present time when we have so many troubles of our -own, and instead of being merely shown the opportunity, we must be -persuaded in the first place that it is sound business and in the -second place that it is our patriotic duty to undertake it. And we -must feel, in addition, that if we should undertake it our enterprise -and energy will not serve merely to rouse a storm of jealousy on the -part of those who will not assume any risks themselves, but who cry -"monopoly" as soon as an interest capable of handling foreign business -is given the active support of our Government.</p> - -<p>I am sorry that it is impossible to give a more optimistic picture, -but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> I assure you that I shall do all in my power to support you and -your efforts, which I sincerely trust may be attended with the success -they deserve.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The intelligent support promised in this letter continued until the -untimely death of Mr. Straight in Paris, while he was with the American -Peace Commission.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a></p> - -<p class="center">"SLOW AMERICANS"</p> - - -<p>"The Americans are altogether too slow!"</p> - -<p>This exclamation from a Chinese seemed amusing. It came on the evening -of the red dust-storm that enveloped Peking, during one of the long -after-dinner conversations with Liang Shih-yi and Chow Tsu-chi; and it -was the latter who thus gave vent to his impatience.</p> - -<p>Liang Shih-yi, the "Pierpont Morgan of China," Chief Secretary to the -President, was credited as being, next to Yuan Shih-kai, the ablest and -most influential man in Peking. Mr. Liang is highly educated according -to Chinese literary standards, and while he has not studied Western -science, he has a keen, incisive mind which enables him readily to -understand Western conditions and methods. His outstanding quality is -a faculty for organization. He built up the Chinese Communications -Service on the administrative and financial side. He declined taking -office as a minister, but usually controlled the action of the cabinet -through his influence over important subordinates, and managed all -financial affairs for Yuan Shih-kai. Cantonese, short of stature and -thickset, with a massive Napoleonic head, he speaks little, but his -side remarks indicate that he is always ahead of the discussion, which -is also shown by his searching questions. When directly questioned -himself, he will always give a lucid and consecutive account of any -matter. He did not rise above the level of Chinese official practice -in the matter of using money to obtain political ends. To some he was -the father of deceit and corruption, to others the god of wealth, while -still others revered in him his great genius for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> organization. While -by no means a romantic figure, he thoroughly stimulated a romantic -interest among others, who attributed to him almost superhuman cunning -and ability.</p> - -<p>When the noted Sheng Hsuan-huai became Minister of Communications in -1911, he used his influence and cunning to thwart Liang and throw him -out of the mastery of the Board of Communications, known as the fattest -organ of the Government. Mr. Liang stood his ground, and his influence -greatly increased because of his ability to withstand so strong an -attack. During the revolution Liang Shih-yi was also very influential -in the Grand Council, attaching himself more and more strongly to Yuan -Shih-kai. Always satisfied with the substance of power without its -outward show, he steadfastly declined to become a responsible minister, -and worked from the vantage ground of the Secretariat of the President. -His life has frequently been endangered. He gained the hatred of -the democratic party, with which he was once associated, because he -aided Yuan in playing his complicated game of first confusing, then -destroying, parliament. Nor were the Progressives (Chin Pu Tang) -enamoured of him. Of great personal courage, he was indifferent to -the blame and ridicule which for a while almost all newspapers heaped -upon him. As he was still in a comparatively inferior position when -these attacks began, they rather helped him by calling attention to his -abilities and his personal importance. Thus his opponents advertised -him. In possession of all the intricacies of the situation, when the -parliamentarians first came to Peking, he sat back inconspicuously, -and, supplied with influence and money, moulded the political situation -as if it had been wax.</p> - -<p>Of all the cabinet, Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, Minister of Communications, -was personally most familiar with American affairs, having lived for -several years in Washington and New York in an official capacity. -He speaks English fluently and prefers American methods. He hates -un<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span>necessary ceremony. Whenever he called upon me I had almost to -engage in personal combat with him to be permitted to accompany him to -the outer door, as is due to a high dignitary in China. He believes in -learning improved methods from reliable foreigners, and will go as far -as any Chinese in giving foreigners whom he trusts a free hand, though -he would not yield to any one a power of supreme control. On this -occasion he talked about the reorganization of the Bank of China, and -the possibility of floating domestic bonds among Chinese capitalists. -Mr. Chow was chanting a jeremiad about how the Chinese had been led to -give valuable concessions to Americans, which had not been developed, -and how this had brought only embarrassment and trouble to China.</p> - -<p>We spoke, also, of the original Hankow-Canton railway concession which -the Americans tried to sell to King Leopold; of the Knox neutralization -plan, and of the Chinchow-Aigun railway concession, the only effect of -which had been to strengthen the grip of Russia and Japan on Manchuria. -When the Americans, as a mark of special confidence and trust, had -received the option on a currency loan with the chance to reorganize -Chinese currency, they had straight-way invited Great Britain, -Germany, and France into the game. "Thus they saddled China with the -International Consortium," Chow Tsu-chi moaned. And so on went the -recital, through many lesser and larger enterprises that had proved -abortive.</p> - -<p>One had to confess that in China we certainly had not taken Fortune by -the forelock, nor even had we clung to her skirts. Mr. Chow Tsu-chi -was especially grieved at the circuitous and dilatory methods of the -Four-Power Group which held the contract to build the Hukuang railways. -"The thirty millions of dollars originally provided has been almost -entirely spent," he complained, "without producing more than two -hundred miles of actual construction; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> there is constant wrangling -among the partners concerning engineering standards. Moreover, -everything has to be referred from Peking to London, thence to New -York, Paris, Berlin, and back and forth among them all, until it is -necessary to look up reams of files to know what it is all about. And -it may all have been about the purchase of a flat car."</p> - -<p>I knew well enough that Americans, too, were much discouraged at the -cumbersome progress of the Hukuang railway enterprise. The engineering -rights on the section west from Ichang up into Szechuan Province had -been assigned to America, and Mr. W. Randolph was at this time making -a survey. He had great energy and unlimited belief in the future -importance and profitableness of this line. But beyond the initial -survey the available funds would not go, and no new financing could -be obtained—this for a railway to gain access to an inland empire of -forty millions of people!</p> - -<p>In the American enterprises which had been launched recently, however, -there was no little activity. The Standard Oil Company with commendable -expedition, if perhaps with undue lavishness of men and supplies, -sent to China geological experts of the first order, together with -large staffs of engineers, drilling experts, and all needed machinery. -The geologists were soon off toward the prospective oil regions in -Chihli and Shensi provinces. In Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling's bureau and in -the Standard Oil offices the outfitting of expeditions, the purchase -of supplies, and the selection of a large Chinese personnel proceeded -apace. Everyone was hopeful.</p> - -<p>With the Hwai River conservancy matter, also, negotiations had gone -rapidly in the United States. The American National Red Cross and the -engineering firm of J.G. White & Company had agreed to finance the -preliminary survey. The American Congress in May passed an act lending -the services of an army engineer for the preliminary survey.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> Colonel -Sibert of the Panama Canal Commission was designated as chairman of the -engineering board. The outlook was favourable, action had been taken -promptly.</p> - -<p>The excitement stirred up among the Japanese by the sojourn in China of -the Bethlehem Steel Company's vice-president, Mr. Archibald Johnston, -now had a further sequel. The text of an alleged contract between the -Chinese Government and the Bethlehem Steel Company was circulated early -in May—by interested persons—which included among other provisions -arrangements for construction of a naval base in Fukien Province. -The bogus quality of the report was at once manifest. Through some -influence, however, it was assiduously pushed forward in the press; -it became the basis of a legend, which even got into the books of -otherwise well-informed writers as authentic. It was on the subject of -this spurious paper that the Japanese ambassador at Washington called -on Secretary Bryan for information. Thus the matter of the possible -building of a naval base in Fukien for the Chinese Government by -American contractors became a matter of State Department note. I was -informed that the Japanese ambassador at Washington had left a summary -of the conversation, of March 12th, between the Japanese minister at -Peking and myself. Apparently the Japanese were attempting to get -around my refusal to acknowledge that American enterprise in China -could in any way be limited by the declarations or agreements of other -powers than the United States.</p> - -<p>The State Department inquired whether the newly reported contract for -a loan of $30,000,000 was identical with the older contract of the -Bethlehem Steel Company. I was informed that the Japanese Government -did not object to the loan, but to the construction of any new naval -base in Fukien, and that the Department had been told that the Chinese -Government itself did not wish to construct there because of the -Japanese objection. It was intimated to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> me that I might encourage the -Chinese in the idea that such building, while legitimate, would be -unwise.</p> - -<p>I reported to the Department that the original Bethlehem contract had -no connection with the spurious document recently circulated; that -only a very small sum was to be devoted to harbour work in China, the -location of which had not been fixed; and that the execution of the -entire contract had been postponed because of financial conditions. -While the Chinese Government was not contemplating any construction -at this time, I stated that the attempt of any other government to -establish a claim of special rights of supervision must be considered -derogatory to Chinese sovereignty and to American rights of equal -opportunity; I urged, therefore, that we avoid any action or statement -which would admit such a claim, or which would in any way encourage -the making of it. The Chinese Government has never admitted that its -right to plan the defence of its coastline is subject to veto by any -other government. Such admission on our part that Japan has the right -to claim special interests in Fukien would shake the confidence of the -Chinese in our seriousness and consistency, and in our determination to -protect our legitimate interests in an undivided China, freely open to -the commerce of all nations, where Americans can do business without -asking permission of any other outsiders.</p> - -<p>Dr. Chen Chin-tao was then acting as Financial Commissioner of the -Chinese Government in Europe and America. The danger of a further -growth of the idea of spheres of influence in China had been -accentuated. Railway concessions had been allocated to different -nations according to territorial areas where the respective countries -claimed certain priorities; if concessions were made otherwise, the -combined influence of the powers seeking special spheres was used to -defeat them. To meet this danger a plan was developed for granting a -large construction contract to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> an international syndicate made up -of British, American, French, and German companies, who would divide -the construction on some basis other than localized national spheres -of influence. Doctor Chen, with an American assistant, was charged to -take up this proposal with various companies. On the part of France and -Germany, contractors and governments seemed favourable to the idea. -In Great Britain the firm approached was Paulding & Company, who had -already in the preceding year received a railway concession in China -extending through the Province of Hunan and to the south thereof. This -firm would readily coöperate, but the British Government objected. -It would accept the principle of the international company only on -condition that all lines traversing the Yangtse Valley should be -constructed by the British participant in the syndicate.</p> - -<p>This suggests the extent to which the sphere-of-influence doctrine -dominated at this time the thought and action of the British Foreign -Office.</p> - -<p>The American Government, on its part, took exception to the size and -duration of the concession, which it feared might gain a monopolistic -character. Probably the difficulty would have been cleared up, since, -after all, a specific and limited, though considerable grant, was -intended. But the preliminary discussion had not resulted in agreement -before the Great War supervened.</p> - -<p>When Mr. Gest returned to the United States, he took up the matter -of a loan to China with American financial interests, but they -hesitated to act until the American Government expressed its approval -and willingness to give support. Mr. Gest thereupon laid siege to -the Department of State. He succeeded on the 3rd of June in securing -from the Secretary a letter to the effect that the Department would -be gratified to have China receive any substantial assistance from -Americans in the nature of a loan upon terms similar to the present -agreement. "This Govern<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span>ment," the letter stated, "will, in accordance -with its usual policy, give all proper diplomatic support to any -legitimate enterprise of that character."</p> - -<p>There had been much talk about the supposed determination of the -Department of State to let American interests abroad shift for -themselves, quite without encouragement or special protection. -The letter, though moderate in language, nevertheless attracted -great attention and was taken to indicate a change of heart in the -Administration. I may say at this point that the Department of State -never at any time failed to back me in efforts to develop and protect -American interests in China. But it was not always able, especially -later on, when overburdened with the work of the war, to follow up -matters which it had approved, when the opposition or indifference of -other departments put other claims in the forefront.</p> - -<p>I had for a season observed and worked with American commercial -interests in China. I had definite conclusions as to what was needed in -the way of organization to encourage American trade. The great defect -lay in the absence of financial institutions for handling foreign -loans, and for assisting in foreign industrial development, helpful to -American commerce. The only American bank in China, the International -Banking Corporation, then confined itself strictly to exchange business -and to dealing in commercial paper; it had developed no policy -of responding to local industrial needs and helping in the inner -development of China. All the foreign banks had wholly the treaty-port -point of view. They thought not at all of developing the interior -regions upon which the commerce of the treaty ports after all depends. -They were satisfied with scooping off the cream of international -commercial transactions and exchange operations.</p> - -<p>I strongly favoured creating banking institutions which would broadly -represent American capital from various<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> regions of our country, and -would respond to the urgent need of China for a modern organization of -local credit.</p> - -<p>There were but few American commission houses. In most cases -American-manufactured goods were handled by houses of other -nationality, who often gave scant attention to promoting American trade -and used American products only when those of their own nation could -not be obtained. It seemed worth while to establish additional trading -companies, especially coöperative organizations among exporters, -after the fashion of the "Representation for British Manufacturers, -Ltd." Further, I strongly urged the American Government to station a -commercial attaché in China. I was gratified by the appointment during -the year of a commercial attaché in the person of Consul-General Julean -Arnold, an official of great intelligence, wide knowledge, and untiring -energy.</p> - -<p>The Chinese cabinet, which had been under a provisional premier for -several months, was finally reorganized in June, 1914. The chief change -in the cabinet was the appointment of Mr. Liang Tun-yen as Minister -of Communications, and the shifting of Mr. Chow Tsu-chi from that -position to the Ministry of Finance. With these new ministers American -contractors and financiers had much to do. Premier Hsiung Hsi-ling had -withdrawn in February, and with him the two other members of the Chin -Pu Tang or progressive party. These political leaders had served Yuan's -purpose by aiding him to dissolve parliament; they could now be spared. -But a new premier was not immediately found. Yuan at length prevailed -on Mr. Hsu Shi-chang to take the premiership in June. The title of -premier was changed to secretary of state.</p> - -<p>I met Mr. Liang Tun-yen for the first time on June 2nd, at a luncheon -given by Mr. B. Lenox Simpson, whose landlord he was. Mr. Liang is -tall, aristocratic-looking, with a fine, intellectual face. He speaks -English perfectly,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> as he received his earlier education in the -United States. Then, as on frequent occasions in subsequent years, he -expressed himself in a deeply pessimistic strain. He complained of -recent inroads attempted by the French in Yunnan, and of the methods -they employed to strengthen their hold. But this was only one cause for -pessimism. In the future of his country he saw "no prospect of strong -national action," or of "any sort of effective help from the outside." -He considered the upper classes "incapable of sacrifices and vigorous -action." He had recommended in 1901, he told me, that, instead of -paying an indemnity, the Chinese should be allowed to spend an equal -amount of public funds in sending abroad young men to be educated. All -young Chinese, he said, should be sent abroad quite early, "before they -have become corrupted."</p> - -<p>When Mr. Liang Tun-yen assumed office, it was announced that he would -subject the Ministry of Communications to a thorough cleansing. This -implied that the ministry had been corrupt and systematically so, under -the control of Mr. Liang Shih-yi. Outsiders watched for indications of -how that astute manager would handle the new opposition.</p> - -<p>Mr. Yeh Kung-cho, able and expert, had been chief of the Railway -Bureau; he became a vice minister, but as he was a lieutenant of Liang -Shih-yi's, it was understood that this position would probably be an -empty dignity. A friend of Mr. Liang Tun-yen's, a highly respected -engineer of American education, was appointed as the other vice -minister. With no formal or open breach between the different factions, -manœuvring and counter-manœuvring there undoubtedly was. The -influence of Mr. Liang Shih-yi, however, seemed not seriously shaken. -He had organized the Chinese railway experts and engineers in a railway -association, keeping in touch with them through Mr. Yeh Kung-cho. Thus -he held in his hands the main lines of influence. Also, he continued to -head the Bank of Com<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span>munications, which is the fiscal agency for the -Railway Board. So again it seemed that the opposition could not get at -the source of this unusual man's power.</p> - -<p>Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, as Minister of Finance, warmly urged the idea that -the Americans, to whom the Government had shown itself so friendly, -reciprocate by making a loan to the Chinese Government. He planned a -loan of $40,000,000 for the purpose of refunding the entire floating -indebtedness of his government. Hopes had been entertained that the -Standard Oil Company would use its influence in bringing about such a -loan, but that company was not willing to go outside of the special -business of its contract with China. The option which had been given -to Mr. Gest had not yet resulted in any completed transaction in -the United States. So accustomed were the Chinese to the readiness -of any nationality which held important concessions, in turn to -support the Chinese Government financially, that they could not -understand how America, with professions of great friendship and just -now substantially favoured by the Chinese, should not be ready to -reciprocate. The soundness of the desire of the Americans to have every -transaction stand on its own bottom and not to use financial support as -a bait to obtain concessions, could, of course, be appreciated by the -Chinese. But at times their urgent needs made them impatient.</p> - -<p>The news of the assassination at Sarajevo reached us on July 1st. As -this happened to be, though we did not then suspect it, the eve of a -terrible convulsion in which all accepted conditions of life, national -and international, were shattered and unsettled, I shall here insert -parts of the memorandum which I drew up for my guidance at this time:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>It is evident that China finds herself in a critical situation, in -the sense that the fundamental character of her political life and -the direction of her political development are now being decided. -While a vast community living under a complicated social system, -which embodies the experience<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> of thousands of years, cannot change -its methods of a sudden and will undoubtedly for a long time continue -to differ radically from Western political societies, yet it admits -of no doubt that a new era of development has begun and that certain -essential alternatives are being faced. Such alternatives are -the continued unity of the nation or its division; its continued -independence or the direct dominance of one or more foreign suzerains; -its commercial unity or its division into spheres of influence; the -tendency of its institutions of government, whether in the direction -of the absolutism of Russia and Japan, or the republicanism of the -United States; and the character of its educational and legal system, -either dominated by the ideas of America and England or of continental -Europe or Japan. From these, there also follow important alternatives -in industrial and commercial policy.</p> - -<p>Under these circumstances, it is of great moment whether the Chinese -Government will remain free, with the assistance of influences -friendly to the development of China's nationality, to preserve the -unity of the Chinese State and to develop its institutions; or whether -its financial distress, combined with the plottings of a revolutionary -opposition, will deliver it into the hands of those who are not -favourable to the growth of China's national life.</p> - -<p>The United States of America enjoys a position of great advantage -for assisting the Chinese Government and influencing its development -in the direction of free national life. The lack of a desire for -political interference, the real sympathy felt in America with the -strivings of the Chinese people, and cultural, educational, and -charitable work unselfishly performed, have given the United States -the undivided confidence of China. It is certainly true that the -Chinese people are anxious to follow in the footsteps of the United -States if they may only be permitted to do so.</p> - -<p>Any development of enterprise which increases American commercial -interest in China is incidentally favourable to Chinese independence; -because, through the enlistment of neutral interests, the desire -of outsiders for political control can be counterbalanced. The -organizing of an American investment bank and similar agencies for the -development of American commerce in China, participation of American -capital in railway building, and the development of mines and oil -fields through American companies and under American business methods -would all be welcomed by China as the strengthening of a favourable -influence. Different Chinese ministers have repeatedly said to me -that at this time China is in need of the active assistance of those -who are amicably disposed and that China is willing to do her part in -coöperating, and in extending advantages, if only such active support -is forthcoming. If American capital, industry,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> and commerce are not -ready at this time to give that comparatively slight assistance to -China which the situation calls for, it is likely that American action -in China in the future will be on a far more modest basis than present -possibilities promise.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The war, of course, brought many changes in China. Much of the good -work which had been started was either destroyed or long delayed. It -marked the end of one phase of China's development.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a></p> - -<p class="center">FOLK WAYS AND OFFICIALS</p> - - -<p>Several voices whispered: "It's Prince Pu Lun."</p> - -<p>It was at President Yuan Shih-kai's reception, New Year's Day, 1914; -the diplomatic corps and high officials were there. The Empress -Dowager's residence, now occupied by the President, was the scene. -From the side rooms, whither we had withdrawn for refreshments after -exchanging greetings with the President, we looked out into the main -hall and saw that its floor had been entirely cleared, and a solitary -figure in a general's uniform was proceeding across the floor toward -the President. Walking alone and unattended, the representative of the -Chinese Imperial Family had come to bring its felicitations to the -President of the Republic. For the first time since the abdication, the -Imperial Family was publicly taking notice of him who had displaced it -in power.</p> - -<p>When the guests began to depart I gathered up my party and left the -hall, together with Admiral Tsai Ting-kan. Outside was Prince Pu Lun, -still solitary, walking with sad and pensive regard. We overtook him. -I talked pleasantly with him on such non-committal matters as the -Imperial collection of art, which was at this time being brought from -Mukden. He seemed quite appreciative of this attention. I took him with -me to the outer palace gate where his own carriage met him.</p> - -<p>Except the automobiles used inside of the palace enclosure, few were -then to be found in Peking; soon, with improved roads, many hundreds -came. The Empress Dowager before her death had acquired a large -collection of these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> foreign vehicles, which interested her greatly; -but up to the time of her death the Board of Ceremonies had not -succeeded in solving the problem how she might ride in an automobile -in which there would also be, in sitting posture, one of her servants, -the chauffeur. If they had had more time, I imagine that they might -have found some way by which the chauffeur could kneel in driving the -Imperial car, but, as it was, the poor Empress Dowager never had the -pleasure of the swift rides she so much coveted.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Many popular superstitions still prevailed in parts of the provinces. -The military attaché of the American Legation, Major Bowley, who later -did distinguished service in the Great War as general of artillery, -was active in visiting the military commanders in different parts of -China and in observing their actions and getting their views. He had -just returned from such a trip to Kiangsi Province, and related how -one of the generals there strove to improve his morale by drinking the -blood of enemies who had been killed. He spared Major Bowley a cupful -of this precious liquid, which was to be taken before breakfast. It is -startling to discover among the people so highly civilized as are the -Chinese occasional remnants of barbarous doctrines and practices. There -is an inverted homœopathy in Chinese popular belief—to the effect -that "equals strengthen equals"; thus, to eat muscle develops strength, -to eat tripe aids the digestion, to eat heart or drink blood develops -courage, and so on.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>One evening, at a dinner at Mr. Liang Shih-yi's house a spirited -discussion developed between the host and Mr. Anderson. The latter had -related a local custom of the Soochow region according to which it was -permissible for a community or a crowd of people to bite to death any -person who was thoroughly disapproved of by all. Apparently<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> the method -of execution was in itself a guaranty of universal condemnation, as a -great many people would have to coöperate to effect the desired result -by this method. Mr. Liang protested that the expression "bite to death" -was in this case used only metaphorically, and there followed a long -debate on Chinese folk customs.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>A dinner with General Kiang, Commander of the Peking Gendarmerie, -afforded another sidelight on Chinese character. We had already -been seated, when an unusually tall Chinese entered, wearing -Chinese civilian dress. He was introduced as Tutuh Yin (General Yin -Chang-heng), and I learned that he had just returned from Szechuan, -where he had become governor during the revolution, after putting to -death the Imperial Governor-General, Chao Er-feng. General Yin was of -striking appearance, with strong features, and vigorous in gesture. -Now, it is the custom at Chinese dinners, particularly when military -are present, to engage in extensive drinkings of health. The Chinese, -who are usually very abstemious, drink wine that resembles sherry, and -also a liqueur-like rice wine, which latter is potent. The proposer -of the toast raises his little cup and drains it in one draught; the -guest to whom he addresses himself is expected to do likewise; both say -"Gambey" (a challenge to empty the cup). General Yin, who seemed in -high spirits, was on his legs half the time "gambeying" to the other -guests, especially to myself and the other Americans, the military -attaché, the Chinese secretary, the commandant of the guard, and other -officers. General Yin must have performed this courtesy at least forty -times in the course of the evening, which with the attentions paid us -by the other members of the table round, amounted to a considerable -challenge of one's capacity. It must, however, be confessed that I -largely shirked this test, in company with the amiable General Yin -Chang, my Manchu<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> neighbour, by irrigating a large plant in front of us -with the liquid dedicated to friendship.</p> - -<p>I saw General Yin Chang next morning. He asked whether I knew what -had been the matter with Tutuh Yin the night before. I said that he -seemed very animated and carried his liquor very well. General Yin -then told me that after I had left, the Tutuh Yin had sat down with -him and talked seriously and intently, revealing his deep worry lest -Yuan Shih-kai should have him executed. He stated that Chao Er-hsun, -the brother of the murdered Viceroy, was in Peking, and with other men -using every influence to destroy him. "So," the Manchu general said, -"his bravado was just a cover for his worries."</p> - -<p>Next day Yin Tutuh called on me at my residence. He expressed deep -regret for having taken so much wine on the evening of the dinner. He -said: "It is not my custom, but I was excited and worried because of -the uncertainty of my affairs." He then launched forth into a literary -discussion of Confucianism in its bearing upon modern thought. Not -knowing that he was a student of the classics, I was surprised when -he revealed this side of his nature. As a matter of fact, he greatly -resembled the men of the Renaissance who combined harsh and cruel -qualities with a deep love of literature. The last time I saw the Tutuh -Yin, more than five years later, he presented me with his written -works. There were gathered about twenty members of the Confucian -Society, and the conversation again turned around the permanent -qualities of Confucianism. When the concept of the "unknowable" was -referred to, General Yin cited at length Herbert Spencer's views -thereon. He said: "The greatness of Confucius lies in the fact that he -centred his attention on those things which we know and can control, -and that he aimed at the highest development of human action on this -common-sense basis. He leaves the dreams about the unknowable to -others."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span></p> - -<p>Among our guests at a dinner was Dr. King Ya-mei, a Chinese lady -noted for her wide information and cleverness. We spoke about the -recent advance of Russia in Mongolia. "Who can resist Russia!" she -exclaimed. Like all thinking Chinese, she was deeply worried about the -difficulties confronting her nation on all sides. Dr. C.C. Wang, who -was also present, spoke of the lack of continuity in developing expert -knowledge, because of the frequent shifts which are made in the public -service.</p> - -<p>Dr. King Ya-mei then told an amusing incident, which shows how natural -community action and passive resistance are to the Chinese. In an -orphan asylum at Tientsin a new set of regulations had been issued, but -the orphans had paid no attention to them. After a good many children -had been called to order without result, a meeting was convoked by -the principal. When the orphans were asked why they did not obey -the regulations, their spokesman said: "We are perfectly satisfied -with the old regulations, and have no desire to change them."—"But -the new regulations have been made by your teachers," rejoined the -superintendent, "and they must be obeyed."—"We do not think," the -spokesman replied, "that they are an improvement, and we propose to -obey the old rules."—"But, then you shall be punished severely."—"If -you try to punish us, we shall all go away; and then what will become -of the orphan asylum?"</p> - -<p>They had reasoned it out that they were an important part of the -institution. That orphans should conceive the idea to go on strike -shows how normal and self-evident that mode of social action seems in -China.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>I was visited by the newly appointed Chinese minister to Japan, Mr. Lu -Tsung-yu, who later became quite notorious in China in connection with -the loans of 1918. He was accompanied by Doctor Tsur, the president -of Tsing Hua<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> College and a leading American-returned student. -Mr. Lu is a slight man of suave manners, keen intelligence, and a -love of manipulation. On this occasion he developed the idea that -coöperation between the United States, China, and Japan was possible -and desirable, as these three countries had many parallel interests. -It was his opinion that Japan could not create an extensive settlement -in Manchuria. He had been stationed in that region several years -when Hsu Hsi-chang was viceroy; and he told me that he had observed -that the Japanese came as officials, soldiers, or railway employees, -or in connection with mining enterprises: but they did not seem to -have any impulse to settle in the country as farmers, and as small -merchants they could scarcely compete with the Chinese. Mr. Lu had been -educated in Japan, being one of the first batch of Chinese students -at Waseda University; together with Tsao Ju-lin, at this time Vice -Minister of Foreign Affairs, who also later played an important part -in Chino-Japanese affairs; and Chang Chung-hsiang, the Chief Justice -of China at that time, a man who exercised considerable influence in -introducing into China the Japanese idea of judicial procedure and -organization and who became Chinese minister in Tokyo in 1916. This -trio of associates was popularly known as "the Three Diamonds."</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>An important meeting of the diplomatic corps dealt with the procedure -in the matter of claims against the Chinese Government on account of -damage suffered during the revolution. The Japanese, French, and German -representatives were inclined to insist that the Chinese Government -be held responsible for all losses which could in any way be said to -have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the revolution. In line -with the traditional policy of fairness and moderation followed by the -United States I strongly urged that only losses directly and physically -traceable to violent action should be paid, eliminating such uncertain -and contingent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> matters as anticipated profits. The British minister -gave support to this view; his legation, too, had not encouraged the -filing of indirect claims. After much discussion, the suggestion was -accepted in the form proposed. By this action were ruled out indirect -claims to the amount of nearly four million dollars, which had already -been listed and included by some of the legations in their totals.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The British Legation, in which diplomatic meetings are held, is an old -palace, formerly the residence of a Manchu prince, which was purchased -by the British Government at the time when legations were first -established at Peking. Fortunately, the fine architectural forms of -the old structure had been retained sufficiently to leave this group -of buildings justly proportioned, beautifully decorated, and free from -jarring foreign notes. One passes to the minister's residence through -two lofty, open halls, with tiled roofs and richly coloured eaves. The -residential buildings are Chinese without and semi-European within, -Chinese decorative elements having been allowed to remain in the inner -spaces. The diplomatic meetings always took place in the dining room, -where a huge portrait of Queen Victoria, from the middle period of her -reign, impassively—not without symbolic significance—looked down upon -the company.</p> - -<p>There were at this time about sixteen legations in Peking, so that -the meetings were not too large for intimate conversation. The -proceedings were usually carried on in the English language, partly out -of deference to the Dean, and partly because English has come quite -naturally to be the international language of the Far East.</p> - -<p>The diplomatic corps in Peking meets frequently, and it has more -comprehensive and complicated business than falls to such a body in any -other capital. Matters of diplomatic routine occupy only a subsidiary -place. Because of the system of extra-territoriality under which -foreign residents<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> remain exempt from Chinese law and subject only -to that of their own respective nation, the foreign representatives -in China are constantly concerned with the internal affairs of that -country. The effects of any legislation by the Chinese Government upon -foreign residents have to be considered by the diplomatic corps: if -the most punctilious minister discovers that the measure in question -in any way transgresses that absolute immunity from local law which is -claimed, then objection will be made, and the unanimous consent, which -is necessary to approve of such matters, is difficult or impossible to -obtain.</p> - -<p>Questions of taxation are constantly before the diplomatic corps, as -the Chinese local officials quite naturally attempt to find some way to -make the foreigners bear at least part of the taxation of a government -whose general protection they demand. The methods of proving claims and -collecting indemnities give rise to much discussion, whenever there has -been some outbreak of revolutionary activity. As certain revenues have -been pledged for international loans, the diplomatic corps will object -to the Chinese Government using these revenues at all before they have -been released as not needed for defraying the debt charges. One of the -most fruitful causes of irritation comes from attempts frequently made -by one or the other minister to "hold up" the funds belonging to the -Chinese until they have fulfilled some particular demand which he had -made. The fact that it may be an entirely extraneous and irrelevant -matter, such as the appointment of a national of the minister to a -Chinese government job, does not seem to disturb the man who thinks -he has found a clever way to achieve his purpose. The international -settlement at Shanghai and the régime of foreign troops in Peking -and along the Mukden Railway also give rise to a great many problems -which are referred to the diplomatic corps. From questions involving -the recognition of the Government itself to such matters as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> the -advisability of bambooing prisoners at Shanghai, no question seems to -be too big or little to come before this body.</p> - -<p>The discussions tend rather to avoid general issues and to confine -themselves to a statement and explanation of the position taken by each -government. Occasionally the stubborn and unreasonable adherence of one -or two representatives to what is considered by others as an unduly -severe and exacting position, leads to joint efforts in an attempt to -make a more fair and liberal policy prevail. The discussions are not -infrequently longer than is necessary; the main points are lost sight -of, and discussion becomes entangled, because one side may be talking -of one thing, whereas the other has quite a different matter in view. -Until it is discovered that there is no real difference or only a -difference in form, much valuable time may be consumed. At times, these -conferences remind one of a university faculty meeting.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Weeks were filled with innumerable conferences on matters of business. -In China it rarely happens that the decision lies with only one -official. In order to have a proposal accepted, a great many men -have to be consulted and won over. Impatient representatives, backed -by strong national force, have frequently tried to cut short this -procedure, and, planting themselves before the official whose assent -they needed, have "pounded the table" until a promise was obtained. -They sometimes succeeded by so powerfully getting on the nerves of the -Chinese official that he saw no way to save his peace of mind but by -giving in. At one time I expressed great surprise to the Minister of -Finance, because, instead of insisting that reasonable arrangements for -the renewal of a certain short-term loan should be made, he had given -the representative in question—the agent of a munition company—a -large order for additional materials which were not needed, only to -secure an extension of time. He said, in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> self-defence: "The manners of -the man were so abominable that I could not stand it any longer."</p> - -<p>However, the method of the strong arm and mailed fist, while it has -produced results in China, has also carried in itself the elements -of its own defeat. The Chinese may make a concession under such -circumstances, but they will thereafter have no interest whatsoever in -facilitating the business in question; on the contrary, it is likely -to be delayed and obstructed at every point, so that it can be carried -out only through constant pressure and show of force. The people of -China have a strong and widespread sense of equity. He who proposes a -reasonable arrangement and gives himself the trouble to talk it over -with officials and other men concerned, in the spirit of arriving at -a solution fair to all, will build on a sound foundation. Whenever -foreign interests have acted on this principle, the results have been -far more fruitful of good than where things have been carried through -with a high hand by demand and threat, without reasoning or give and -take. But to sit in conference with various people on all the phases -of any proposal is a great consumer of time. One is kept busy day and -night in following the roads and trails that lead to the final meeting -of minds from which action is to result.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>I had a visit from the Tuchun Tien, of Kalgan, after my return from -America in the fall of 1918. I found that the Tuchun was in very bad -grace at the American Legation. He had interfered with an automobile -service which an American had tried to establish between Kalgan and -Urga, in Mongolia, and had in other ways shown an apparent hostility to -legitimate American enterprise. As the writing of notes had not secured -any satisfactory results, I began to probe into the situation to find -what lay back of the attitude of the general.</p> - -<p>I found that he was "blood-brother" of Mr. Pan Fu, whom<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> in turn I -numbered among my friends. I therefore consulted Mr. Pan Fu about -the situation. He said that there must be some misunderstanding, as -the General was certainly not animated by any feeling of hostility -to America; but that it was possible that the particular American -in Kalgan had rubbed him the wrong way. So he promised to write the -General a long letter.</p> - -<p>A short time later he called on me and reported that General Tien -had written him that he was soon coming to Peking and would be very -glad to meet me. The Tuchun soon called on me, with Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, -and we had a most friendly talk. Very little was said about any past -difficulties in Kalgan, but a great deal about future prospects of -goodwill and mutual help. In fact, our friendship was quite firmly -established, and there was no further room for misunderstanding.</p> - -<p>Tuchun Tien was an open-faced, friendly looking person who, though he -had straggling side whiskers unusual with the Chinese, had nothing of -the berserker in his bearing. Our conversation was long and cordial. -When it had already lasted more than an hour, Mr. Chow looked at me -apologetically and said, in English: "We had better let him talk, it -does him good." As for myself, I was glad to hear his views.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Mrs. Reinsch and I gave a dinner to Mr. Robert Gailey of the Y.M.C.A. -on the eve of his departure for America. About thirty guests were -present, all members of the American mission societies in Peking. I had -just entered the reception room to be ready to welcome our guests when -much to my surprise Prince Pu Lun was ushered in. It was evident that -there had been some mistake about invitations, but as there appeared -to be no other dinner given at the Legation, I made no effort to clear -up the error and tried to make him thoroughly welcome. I had the table -rearranged so as to seat the Prince between two ladies both of whom<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> -spoke Chinese very well. He appeared to be surprised at the composition -of the company and the absence of wines, but was apparently well -entertained by his neighbours. When the dinner was about half through, -Kao, the head boy, came to the back of my chair and whispered to me: -"Mrs. Lee's boy outside. Say Prince belong Mrs. Lee dinner." So after -dinner I felt in duty bound to tell the Prince that Mrs. Lee had sent -word that she would be very happy if he could come to her house in the -course of the evening.</p> - -<p>After a short conversation, in which he told me about his children -of whom he is very fond, the Prince departed, to recoup himself at -the house of the navy doctor for the abstinences laid upon him at the -minister's dinner.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="PART_II" id="PART_II">PART II</a></p> - -<p class="center">THE PASSING OF YUAN SHIH-KAI</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a></p> - -<p class="center">THE WAR: JAPAN IN SHANTUNG</p> - - -<p>On August 8, 1914, Japanese war vessels appeared near Tsingtau. Japan -suggested on August 10th that the British Government might call for -the coöperation of Japan under the terms of the Alliance. In view of -possible consequences the British Government hesitated to make the -call; the British in China considered it important that independent -action by Japan in that country should be precluded.</p> - -<p>Acting on its own account on August 15th, the Japanese Government sent -the Shantung ultimatum to Germany. The British Government was then -informed of the action taken. The German representative at Peking -had discussed informally with the Foreign Office the possibility of -immediately returning Kiaochow directly to China; but the Chinese -Government was now pointedly warned by the Japanese that no such action -would be permitted.</p> - -<p>The Chinese Government then also seriously considered the policy of -declaring war on Germany. It would have been as easy for the Chinese, -as for any one else, to take Kiaochow from the Germans, but Japan was -ready and anticipated them. In fact, the Japanese minister stated to -the Chinese Foreign Office on August 20th that the Kiaochow matter -no longer concerned the Chinese Government, which, he trusted, would -remain absolutely passive in regard to it. The ultimatum to Germany, -limited to August 23rd, demanded the delivery, at a date not later than -September 15th of the leased territory of Kiaochow to the Japanese<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> -Government, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to -China."</p> - -<p>Basing its action upon the language of this ultimatum, the American -Government on August 19th made a communication to the Japanese Foreign -Office, noting with satisfaction that Japan demanded the surrender of -Kiaochow with the purpose of restoring that tract to China, and that it -was seeking no territorial aggrandizement in China.</p> - -<p>On my return to Peking on September 30th, I found the Chinese in a -state of natural excitement over the action taken by Japan. By this -time the Japanese had invested Tsingtau; the British, who had also -sent a contingent of troops, were kept by the Japanese in a very -subsidiary position. The scope of Japan's plans was more fully revealed -on September 29th, when the Chinese Government was informed that -"military necessity" required the Japanese Government to place troops -along the entire railway in Shantung Province. As this railway had -never had German military guards, and as the portion near Tsingtau was -already held by Japanese troops, the military necessity of such further -occupation was by no means apparent.</p> - -<p>Mr. Liang Tun-yen, Minister of Communications, called on me on -October 1st, expressing deep concern over the action of the Japanese -in Shantung. He stated his conviction that, in departing from the -necessary military operations around Tsingtau, it was Japan's plan -to stir up trouble in the interior of China with a view to more -extensive occupation of Chinese territory. From Japanese sources he -had information to the effect that the Japanese militarists were -not satisfied with the reduction of Tsingtau, but wished to take -advantage of this opportunity to secure a solid footing—political -and military—within the interior of China. He was further informed -that they were ready to let loose large numbers of bandits and other -irresponsible persons to coöperate with revolutionary elements in an -attempt to create wide<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span>spread uprisings, in order to furnish a pretext -for military interference. When I called attention to the declarations -regarding Kiaochow in Japan's ultimatum to Germany, the minister shook -his head and said: "Unfortunately, Japanese policy cannot be judged -by such professions, but only by the acts of the last twenty years, -which make up a series of broken pledges and attacks upon the rights of -China."</p> - -<p>President Yuan Shih-kai had wished to see me; so I called on him -informally on October 2nd. In stronger terms than Minister Liang he -set forth his apprehensions. "From information in my possession," -he stated, "I am convinced that the Japanese have a definite and -far-reaching plan for using the European crisis to further an attempt -to lap the foundations of control over China. In this, the control of -Shantung through the possession of the port and the railway is to be -the foundation stone. Their policy was made quite apparent through the -threatened occupation of the entire Shantung Railway, which goes far -beyond anything the Germans ever attempted in Shantung Province. It -will bring the Japanese military forces to the very heart of China."</p> - -<p>Thereupon Yuan Shih-kai requested that I ask President Wilson to use -his good offices in conferring with the British Government, in order to -prevail upon Japan to restrict her action in Shantung to the military -necessities involved in the capture of Tsingtau, according to the -original assurances given the Chinese Government. I communicated this -request to the President through the Department of State.</p> - -<p>With great promptness, however, the Japanese executed the plan they -had adopted. They informed the Chinese that, being judges of their own -military necessities, they would occupy the railway by <i>force majeure</i> -immediately, but would leave its administration in Chinese hands—with -the stipulation that Japanese conductors be placed on the trains. The -Chinese found no means to resist this arrangement.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span></p> - -<p>Mr. Eki Hioki, successor of Minister Yamaza, had arrived during the -summer. He had for many years been minister in Chile, where I had met -him in 1910; remembering his genial and sociable qualities, I was happy -to renew this acquaintance. Mr. Hioki differed from his predecessor in -his readiness to talk freely and abundantly. In our first conversation, -when the relations between the United States and Japan came up, he -adduced the customary argument that as the United States was preventing -the Japanese from settling in America, we could not in fairness -object if Japan tried to develop her activities and influence on the -Asian continent. I could honestly assure him that American goodwill -did go out in full measure to any legitimate development of Japanese -enterprise and prosperity, but we also had duties toward our own -citizens, who had been active in Chinese trade for more than 130 years, -as well as toward China herself. We could not be expected to approve -any action which would not respect the rights of these.</p> - -<p>The Chinese people were becoming more and more alarmed about Japan in -Shantung. The large number of petitions and manifestoes which came to -me, as the representative of a friendly nation, from various parts of -China, gave me an idea of how widespread was this anxiety. Some of -these protests were written with the blood of the petitioner.</p> - -<p>Count Okuma's declaration, that a large increase in the military forces -of Japan was needed to preserve peace in the Far East, was interpreted -as meaning that Japan would take the present opportunity to make -good her actual domination throughout eastern Asia. The Chinese felt -that any understanding with Japan would inevitably lead to the total -subjection of China to the political dominance of her neighbour. They -distrust all professions of Japanese friendship. Whenever I tried to -argue that a frank understanding between China and Japan was desirable, -I was told that China could not trust Japan; that Japan must not -be judged by her pro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span>fessions, but by her past acts, all of which -show a determined policy of political advance veiled by reassuring -declarations.</p> - -<p>Thus the Chinese feared Japanese intrigue at every point. They -believed that revolutionary activities, as in the past, were getting -encouragement from Japan. The Japanese were ready to take advantage -of and to aggravate any weakness which might exist in Chinese social -and political life. They would fasten like leeches upon any sore spot. -The tendency toward rebellion and brigandage, the counterfeiting of -banknotes, the corruption of officials, the undermining of the credit -of important private and public enterprises, the furnishing of more -dangerous drugs when opium was forbidden—in connection with such -mischiefs individual Japanese had been active to the great damage of -the Chinese. But though it would be unjust, of course, to charge up -this meddling to the Japanese nation as a whole the connivance of their -militarist government was a fact.</p> - -<p>The British looked upon the new adventure of Japan with a decided lack -of enthusiasm. While welcoming the losses inflicted on their enemy in -war, they were evidently fearful of the results which might come from -Shantung.</p> - -<p>It was plain that the Russians, too, while allied with Japan, were -quite aware of the dangers inherent in the Chinese situation. Taken -with recent Japanese advances in Inner Mongolia, a situation was -created in northern China which would be regarded as dangerous by the -Russians. Discussing the unrest in China, the Russian minister said to -me significantly: "The situation itself does not impress me as serious; -the only serious thing about it is that the Japanese say it is serious."</p> - -<p>In fine, the general temper and direction of Japanese action was -not relished by the allies of Japan. Japan had taken advantage of a -conflict which was primarily European, into the rigour of which she did -not enter, for the purpose of gathering up the possessions of Germany -in the Far East<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> and the Pacific at a time when they could be but -weakly defended.</p> - -<p>This policy of Japan deeply affected American prospects and enterprise -in China, as, also, that of the other leading nations. Since the -American attitude of goodwill toward China had in the past been -understood by the Chinese to imply a readiness to give them a certain -support in times of need, large hopes were entertained as to what the -United States would do. Rich and powerful beyond measure, she would, -in the minds of the Chinese, help China to maintain her integrity, -independence, and sovereignty. Other nations, not a little jealous of -the past goodwill of the Chinese toward us, were not slow to point -out that American friendship was a bubble which vanished before such -concrete difficulties as the violation of China's neutrality. But -the Chinese, after all, saw that it did not lie within the sphere of -its action for the United States to come to the rescue with direct -political and military support. True, the Chinese had encouraged -American activities in China. They had looked upon them as a safeguard -to their own national life. Since they were conducted in a fair spirit -and without political afterthought, the Chinese did hope and expect -as a minimum that Americans would stand by their guns and not let -themselves be excluded by political intrigue or other means from their -share in the development and activities of China.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a></p> - -<p class="center">THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, 1915</p> - - -<p>"Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get control of China." -In these words President Yuan Shih-kai summed up the situation when I -made my first call on him after returning from Europe in September. -Many Chinese friends came to see me and tell me their fears. Admiral -Tsai said: "Here are the beginnings of another Manchuria. Aggressive -Japan in Shantung is different from any European tenant."</p> - -<p>Events had moved rapidly. Tsingtau had been taken, German control had -been wholly eliminated from the leasehold and the railway. The Chinese -Government notified Japan that permission to use part of the Province -of Shantung for military operations would be withdrawn, since occasion -for it had disappeared. This the Japanese seized upon as a calculated -and malignant insult; it was made the excuse for presentation of the -demands.</p> - -<p>The blow fell on January 18th. The Japanese minister sought a private -interview with Yuan Shih-kai. This meeting took place at night. -With a mien of great mystery and importance the minister opened -the discussion. He enjoined absolute secrecy on pain of serious -consequences before handing Yuan the text of the demands. He made -therewith an oral statement of the considerations which favoured the -granting of them.</p> - -<p>The Chinese, fearing greater evils, did their best to guard the secret. -They could not, however, keep in complete ignorance those whose -interests would have been vitally affected; also memoranda of important -conversations had to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> be set down. As soon as I received the first -inkling of what was going on, I impressed it on the Chinese that, since -the subjects under discussion intimately affected American rights in -China, I should be kept fully informed in order that my government, -relying on the treaties and understandings concerning Chinese -independence, could take necessary steps to safeguard its interests. -The Chinese were of course ready to comply with my request. My -intercourse with Chinese cabinet ministers and Foreign Office members -was not confined to formal interviews and dinners. We exchanged many -visits during which we conversed far into the night, without wasting -time over formalities or official camouflage.</p> - -<p>In the conversation in which he presented the twenty-one demands, the -Japanese minister dropped several significant hints.</p> - -<p>The minister then spoke of the Chinese revolutionists "who have very -close relations with many Japanese outside of the Government, and -have means and influence"; further, "it may not be possible for the -Japanese Government to restrain such people from stirring up trouble -in China unless the Chinese Government shall give some positive proof -of friendship." The majority of the Japanese people, he continued, -were opposed to President Yuan Shih-kai. "They believe," he went on, -"that the President is strongly anti-Japanese, and that his government -befriends the distant countries (Europe and America) and antagonizes -the neighbour. If the President will now grant these demands, the -Japanese people will be convinced that his feeling is friendly, and it -will then be possible for the Japanese Government to give assistance to -President Yuan." Yuan sat silent throughout this ominous conversation. -The blow stunned him. He could only say: "You cannot expect me to say -anything to-night."</p> - -<p>Quite aside from the substance of the twenty-one demands, the threats -and promises implied in this statement<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> convinced the Chinese leaders -that Japan was contemplating a policy of extensive interference in the -domestic affairs and political controversies in China, making use of -these as a leverage to attain its own desires. The Chinese considered -it an ominous fact that the paper on which the demands were written was -watermarked with dreadnoughts and machine guns. They believed that the -use of this particular paper was not purely accidental. Such details -mean a good deal with people who are accustomed to say unpleasant -things by hints or suggestions rather than by direct statements.</p> - -<p>A Japanese press reporter called at the Legation on January 19th, and -related his troubles to one of the secretaries. The Japanese minister -refused absolutely, he said, to say anything about what passed between -him and the President; therefore he had sought the American Legation, -which might have knowledge which could help him. With his assumed -naïveté the man possibly hoped to get a hint as to whether a "leak" -had occurred between the Chinese and the American minister. But it was -not until January 22nd that I learned the astonishing nature of the -Japanese proposals. Calling on one of the Chinese ministers on current -business, I found him perturbed. He finally confided to me, almost with -tears, that Japan had made categorical demands which, if conceded, -would destroy the independence of his country and reduce her to a -servile state. He then told me in general terms their nature, saying: -"Control of natural resources, finances, army! What will be left to -China! Our people are being punished for their peacefulness and sense -of justice." The blow evidently had come with stunning force, and the -counsellors of the President had not been able to overcome the first -terrified surprise, or to develop any idea as to how the crisis might -be met.</p> - -<p>An ice festival was being given on the next evening at the American -guard skating rink. Mr. B. Lenox Simpson sought me out and accosted me -quite dramatically, with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> the words: "While we are gambolling here, -the sovereignty of the country is passing like a cloud to the east. It -is Korea over again." He had received accurate information as to the -general character of the demands. Two days later the representative of -the London <i>Times</i>, who had been out of town, asked me casually: "Has -anything happened?" "You may discover that something has happened," I -replied, "if you look about." That evening he returned to me with all -that he could gather.</p> - -<p>Although these correspondents, as well as the Associated Press -representative, telegraphed the astounding news to their papers, -nothing was published for two weeks either in America or in England. -The Associated Press withheld the report because its truth was -categorically denied by the Japanese ambassador at Washington. Its -Peking representative was directed to send "facts, not rumours." On -January 27th it was given out "on the highest authority" both at Tokyo -and at Washington that information purporting to outline the basis of -negotiations was "absolutely without foundation." Only gradually the -truth dawned on the British and American press. The British censor had -held up the reports for a fortnight, but on February 5th Mr. Simpson -wrote me in a hasty note: "My editors are in communication with me, and -we have beaten the censors." From 25th January on, the demands began -to be discussed confidentially among members of the diplomatic corps -but publicly by the press in Peking. As the impossibility of keeping -the matter secret locally was now universally granted from this time -high Chinese officials consulted with me almost daily about their -difficulties. The acceptance of these demands, of course, would have -effectively put an end to the equal opportunities hitherto enjoyed in -China by American citizens; I therefore made it my duty to watch the -negotiations with great care.</p> - -<p>The Japanese were avoiding any interference with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> formal -"integrity, sovereignty, and independence" of China; they were -developing special interests, similar to those enjoyed by Japan in -Manchuria, in other parts of China as well, particularly in the -provinces of Shantung and Fukien. They could place the Chinese state -as a whole in vassalage, through exercising control over its military -establishment and over the most important parts of its administration. -There would be three centres from which Japanese influence would be -exercised—Manchuria, Shantung, and Fukien. Manchuria was to be made -more completely a reserved area for Japanese capital and colonization, -but with administrative control wielded through advisers and through -priority in the matter of loans. In Shantung, the interest formerly -belonging to Germany was to be taken over and expanded. A priority -of right in Fukien was demanded, both in investment and development; -this would effectively bar other nations and would assimilate this -province to Manchuria. The northern sphere of Japan was to be expanded -by including Inner Mongolia. From the Shantung sphere influence could -be made to radiate to the interior by means of railway extensions -to Honan and Shansi. Similarly, from the Fukien sphere, railway -concessions would carry Japanese influence into the provinces of -Kiangsi, Hupei, and Kwangtung. The Japanese interest already existing -in the Hanyehping iron and coal enterprise, which was a mortgage with -right to purchase pig iron at certain rates, was to be consolidated -into a Japanese-controlled company. Added to these was the significant -demand that outsiders be denied the right to work any mines in the -neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping company without its -consent; nor were they to be permitted, lacking such consent, to carry -out any undertaking that might directly or indirectly affect the -interests of that company. This astonishing proposal sought to make the -Japanese concern the arbiter of industrial enterprise in the middle -Yangtse Valley.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span></p> - -<p>Group V consisted of the sweeping demands which would have virtually -deprived the Chinese Government of the substance of control over -its own affairs. The employment of effective Japanese advisers in -political, financial, and military affairs; the joint Chino-Japanese -organization of the police forces in important places; the purchase -from Japan of a fixed amount of munitions of war—50 per cent. or more; -and the establishment of Chino-Japanese jointly worked arsenals, were -embraced in these demands. The latter involved effective control over -the armament and military organization of China.</p> - -<p>So stunned was the Chinese Government by the Japanese stroke that it -missed its first opportunity. It might have immediately given notice to -the friendly Treaty Powers of the demands, which affected their equal -rights in China, as well as the administrative independence of the -Chinese Government.</p> - -<p>A member of the Foreign Office consulted me about the best method -of dealing with the demands; I expressed the opinion—which was not -given by way of advice—that the detailed negotiation of individual -demands, with a view of granting only the least objectionable, would be -likely to give most force to considerations of equity. Time would be -gained; the other nations interested would come to realize what was at -stake. If certain liberal grants and concessions should be made, China -could then with greater force refuse to create rights and privileges -incompatible with her sovereignty. The situation would then be more -fully and clearly understood by foreign nations.</p> - -<p>As the negotiations proceeded the Japanese minister hinted to the -Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Japanese public looked askance -at the present Chinese administration, because of the hostility -often demonstrated by Yuan Shih-kai; still, this feeling might be -conciliated. It might even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> be possible for the Japanese Government to -give President Yuan assistance against rebel activities. The sinister -quality of this hint was fully appreciated. It was at this point that -the Japanese minister used the simile which promptly became famous -throughout the Far East. He employed this picturesque language: "The -present crisis throughout the world virtually forces my government to -take far-reaching action. When there is a fire in a jeweller's shop, -the neighbours cannot be expected to refrain from helping themselves."</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding powerful efforts on the part of Japan to enforce -silence by menacing China and by muzzling the press in Japan, accurate -information got abroad; whereupon the Japanese Government presented to -the powers an expurgated version of its demands, from which the more -objectionable articles were omitted. Later on, it was admitted that -the demands of Group V had been "discussed," and statements were again -issued on "the highest authority" that these so-called demands were -merely overtures or suggestions, which violated no treaty and involved -no infringement of Chinese territory and sovereignty. The Japanese -Legation in Peking asked local correspondents to send out a similar -statement, which, however, was refused by them, as the true nature of -the demands was already known.</p> - -<p>The British, who had more extensive interests at stake than any other -foreign nation, had shown agitation. British residents and officials -expressed deep concern because their government, being necessarily -preoccupied with events in Europe, could not give full attention to -the Far East. As the action of Japan had been taken under the ægis -of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it seemed to the British that this -was being used to nullify any influence which Great Britain might -exercise, as against a plan on the part of Japan to seize control of -the immense resources of China and of her<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> military establishment.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -It was believed that some sort of communication relating to the demands -had been made to the British Foreign Office before January 18th. When -the expurgated summary came out, the <i>Times</i> of London on February -12th published an editorial article describing Japan's proposals as -reasonable and worthy of acceptance; it was understood in Peking that -this approval related to the summary, not to the demands as actually -made. But the Chinese officials were apprehensive lest a ready -acquiescence of public opinion in the less obnoxious demands might -encourage Japan to press the more strongly for the whole list. As late -as February 19th, the State Department informed me that it inferred -that the demands under Group V were not being urged. The full text of -the actual demands as originally made had now been communicated to the -various foreign offices; but because of the discrepancy between the two -statements, they were inclined to believe that Japan was not really -urging the articles of Group V.</p> - -<p>The Japanese minister had at first demanded the acceptance in -principle of the entire twenty-one proposals. This was declined by -the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. When the Japanese asked -that Mr. Lu express a general opinion on each proposal, he readily -indicated which of them the Chinese Government considered as possible -subjects for negotiation. Forthwith the Japanese minister replied that -the expression of opinion by Minister Lu was unsatisfactory; that -negotiations could not continue unless it were radically modified. Mr. -Lu was evasive and Mr. Hioki on February 18th became more peremptory; -he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> informed Mr. Lu that the negotiations might not be confined to the -first four groups—that the whole twenty-one demands must be negotiated -upon.</p> - -<p>Thereupon I telegraphed inviting President Wilson's personal attention -to the proposals which affected the rights and legitimate prospects of -Americans in China. The President had already written me in a letter of -February 8th: "I have had the feeling that any direct advice to China, -or direct intervention on her behalf in the present negotiations, would -really do her more harm than good, inasmuch as it would very likely -provoke the jealousy and excite the hostility of Japan, which would -first be manifested against China herself.... For the present I am -watching the situation very carefully indeed, ready to step in at any -point where it is wise to do so."</p> - -<p>Shantung was first taken up in the negotiations. The negotiators -were: the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lu Tseng-tsiang; -the vice-minister, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin; the Japanese minister, Mr. Eki -Hioki; and Mr. Obata, Counsellor of Legation. Vice-Minister Tsao had -been educated in Japan, and was generally considered as friendly to -that country. The Japanese minister, genial in manner and insistent -in business, was aided by a counsellor noted for tenacity of purpose -and for a grim dourness. Point by point the demands on Shantung and -Manchuria were sifted. By the preamble to Group II, in the original -version, Japan claimed a "special position" in south Manchuria and -in eastern Inner Mongolia. The Chinese took decided objection. The -Japanese minister complained on March 6th of slow progress, giving -thenceforward frequent hints that force might be resorted to. Finally, -on March 11th, the Chinese were informed that a Japanese fleet had -sailed for ports in China under sealed orders.</p> - -<p>After agreeing to important concessions in Manchuria and Shantung, -the Chinese determined to resist further demands.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> Just here the -American Government gave the Japanese ambassador at Washington its -opinion that certain clauses in the demands contravened existing treaty -provisions. For the Japanese ambassador had offered a supplementary -memorandum which substantially gave the proposals of Group V as -"requests for friendly consideration." They were "mere suggestions" to -the Chinese! This method of disarming foreign opposition imposed one -disadvantage—it would hereafter hardly do actually to use military -force to coerce China into accepting the "friendly suggestions" -contained in Group V. The only chance of getting these concessions -was to keep the other governments in uncertainty as to the actual -demands, that they might not take them seriously, and meanwhile to -bring pressure to bear in order to force Peking to accept these very -proposals. The Chinese would feel themselves abandoned by the public -opinion of the world.</p> - -<p>The Japanese increased their military forces in Manchuria and Shantung -during the second half of March; for a time the movement stopped the -ordinary traffic on the Shantung Railway.</p> - -<p>The new troops were "merely to relieve those now stationed in -Chinese territory," it was stated. Military compulsion was clearly -foreshadowed; and thus beset, the Chinese had by the end of March -almost entirely accepted the Japanese demands in Shantung and -Manchuria. I had a long interview with President Yuan Shih-kai on March -23rd. He seemed greatly worried but was still good-humoured. He said: -"The buzzing gnats disturb my sleep, but they have not yet carried -off my rice. So I can live." Then growing serious he went on: "I am -prepared to make all possible concessions. But they must not diminish -Chinese independence. Japan's acts may force upon me a different -policy."</p> - -<p>I wondered whether he was actually contemplating armed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> resistance. -"Against any action taken by Japan, America will not protest, so -the Japanese officials tell us. But the Japanese have often tried -to discourage the Chinese by such statements," he added. "They say: -'America has no interest in the Chinese'; or, 'America cannot help you -even if she wishes to.'"</p> - -<p>Yuan felt that if America could only say, gently but firmly: "Such -matters concerning foreign rights in China, in which we have an -interest by treaties, policy, and traditions, cannot be discussed -without our participation," the danger would largely dissolve.</p> - -<p>Certain possible solutions were now suggested by the Department of -State. They aimed to bestow desired benefits on Japan, but also to -protect China and the interests of other nations in China. Personally, -I felt that the demands of Group V should be wholly eliminated. Any -version of them would tangle, would more inextricably snarl, the -already complicated relationships of foreign powers in China, and choke -all constructive American action.</p> - -<p>The Japanese demands respecting Manchuria were substantially complied -with during early April; and the Chinese thought this part of the -negotiations closed. Not so the Japanese; they manœuvred to keep -open the Manchurian question on points of detail. Meanwhile, they -persistently injected Group V into the negotiations.</p> - -<p>For over two months the negotiations had now gone on with two or three -long conferences every week. The furnishing of war materials, Fukien -Province, and pointed references to a "certain power"—meaning the -United States—occupied the Japanese part of the discussion on April -6th. The Japanese minister was strikingly peremptory in manner. Because -of the pretensions of this "certain power" he must insist on the -demands regarding harbours and dockyards. Control, direct or indirect, -of any naval base in Fukien must be frustrated, for the sake both of -China and of Japan.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> The present American administration might withdraw -its "pretensions"; but what if they should be resumed in future? The -only safe course was to exclude this power from any possibility of -getting such a foothold. Meanwhile, local Japanese-edited papers harped -upon the great influence which Ambassador Chinda was alleged to wield -over Secretary Bryan. It would be futile to hope, they insisted, that -America might in any way assert herself in support of China.</p> - -<p>At this time I informed the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs that -should the attitude or policy of the United States be mentioned by any -foreign representative, and should statements be made as to what the -American Government would or would not admit, demand, or insist upon, -the Chinese Government would be more than justified in taking up such a -matter directly with the representative of the United States, through -whom alone authoritative statements as to the action of his government -could be made.</p> - -<p>The American Government had filed with the Japanese strong objections -to the granting of any special preference to any one nation in Fukien. -It had also emphasized the right of its citizens to make contracts with -the central and provincial Chinese governments, without interference -and without being regarded as unfriendly by a third power. So far as -harbours and naval bases were concerned, as stated previously, the -American Government did not object to any arrangement whereby China -would withhold such concessions <i>from any and all</i> foreign powers. But -Japan needed to allege some reason for making special demands with -respect to Fukien; therefore it alleged the machinations of a "certain -power."</p> - -<p>No cause for apprehension existed. The talk of "pretensions" related to -the Bethlehem Steel Company's contract, made five years earlier, which -did not, however, touch Fukien, although a spurious version of the -contract, circulated in Peking shortly before, gave this impression. -An<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> unfounded report spread by interested parties was thus made the -basis for a demand against the Chinese Government.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, what the Japanese had put forth for foreign consumption -in the way of news was being compared with what was actually done -in Peking. This annoyed the Japanese press, not so much because its -government had been caught in the act of trying to mislead its own -allies, as because timely publicity and strong public opinion abroad -were defeating the attempt to impose its demands on the Chinese. The -Chinese relied on public opinion. It was their great desire, as they -often said to me, that although the American people and its government -might not furnish material assistance it should at least know the -facts about the attack made on Chinese liberty; for they saw in the -public opinion of the world, and especially of the United States, the -force which would ultimately prevail. Even with Yuan Shih-kai, man of -authority though he was, this hope existed. Mr. Lu, the Minister for -Foreign Affairs, said to me: "All that China hopes is that America and -the world may know and judge."</p> - -<p>Finally the <i>Japan Mail</i>, a semi-official Tokyo paper, published on -April 1st the full text of the Japanese demands in English. Thus was -admitted as a matter of course what had been categorically denied upon -"the highest authority." While the secret negotiations were going -on there was a byplay on the part of many official and non-official -Japanese, who were evidently trying to create an atmosphere of -antagonism to the Western nations. I received daily reports of -conversations in private interviews, at dinners, and on semi-public -occasions, in which Japanese were reminding the Chinese of all possible -grievances against the West, and picturing to them the strength and -importance that a Chino-Japanese alliance would have. Thus it was said -many times: "Think of all the places from which we are at present -excluded. Should we stand together, who could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> close the door in our -face?" Or again: "Are you not weary of the domineering attitude of the -foreign ministers in Peking? They do not pound the table in Tokyo. They -would be sent home if they did." It was constantly repeated that all -would be well if only China would let Japan reorganize her material and -military resources. Visions of millions under arms, splendidly drilled -and equipped—an invincible Chinese army officered by Japanese—were -conjured up. To all such siren songs, however, the Chinese remained -deaf.</p> - -<p>A complete deadlock developed toward the end of April. The Chinese -desired to dispose of the grants concerning Manchuria. The Japanese -would not agree to anything definite without including the demands -under Group V. As a prelude to an ultimatum, the Japanese minister on -April 26th presented "demands" with respect to Shantung and Mongolia, -unchanged except for the wording of the preamble; this substituted -the term "economic relations" for "special position." With respect to -Hanyehping, they were softened to provide that the Chinese might not -convert the company into a state-owned concern, nor cause it to borrow -foreign capital other than Japanese. Certain railway concessions were -to be granted, and the most important demands under Group V were to be -embodied into a protocol statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.</p> - -<p>Mr. Lu pointed out that the railway grants sought conflicted with the -concessions already given to British interests; Mr. Hioki then proposed -that China grant these same concessions to Japan, letting Japan "fight -it out" with Great Britain. With respect to Fukien, China was to state, -in an exchange of notes, that no foreign nation might build dockyards -or naval bases there, nor should foreign capital be borrowed for that -purpose. Japan, therefore, abandoned her attempt to secure preferential -rights in Fukien Province.</p> - -<p>The Minister for Foreign Affairs handed his answer to the Japanese -minister on May 1st. The demands under Group<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> V, Mr. Hioki was -informed, could not possibly be accepted by a sovereign power. With -respect to the other demands, a specific answer was given very closely -approaching acceptance of the demands as revised by Japan. No railway -concessions were made, however, and it included certain technical -modifications with respect to the Manchurian demands. Everything asked -with respect to Shantung was granted, with the counter-proposal that -China take part in the negotiations between Japan and Germany.</p> - -<p>This was conciliatory; nevertheless, the Japanese were moving their -troops. Everything indicated extreme measures. Japan's reservists in -Mukden had been ordered to their station, Japanese residents in Peking -were warned to hold themselves ready. At Tsinanfu, new entrenchments -were being built. When it was known that an ultimatum would be -delivered, the Chinese officials were perplexed and undecided. Should -they await its delivery, or try to placate the Japanese by further -concessions? The Chinese find it hard to obey a demand backed by -force; they are used to arrangements based on persuasion, reason, and -custom. To submit to positive foreign dictation would be the greatest -conceivable <i>diminutio capitis</i> for the Government. Chinese officials -visited me frequently. They seemed comforted in discussing their -difficulties and fears. I could not, of course, give them advice, but -I expressed my personal conviction that Japan could hardly find it -feasible to include Group V—which she had explained to the powers as -suggestions of friendship—in an ultimatum.</p> - -<p>The position of the American minister throughout these negotiations had -not been easy. The United States was the only power that had its hands -free. The Chinese expected its resentment and strong opposition to any -arrangements conflicting with Chinese independence and the equal rights -of Americans in China. I could reiterate our repeated declarations of -policy and allow the Chinese to draw their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> own conclusions as to how -far our national interests were involved. But when the minister I saw -most frequently would ask: "But what will you do to maintain these -rights you have so often asserted?" I had to be particularly careful -not to express my own judgment as to what our course of action should -be, in order not to arouse any hopes among the Chinese as to what my -government would do. Instructions had been slow in coming.</p> - -<p>It was my personal opinion that America had a sufficiently vital -interest to insist on being consulted on every phase of these -negotiations. The Chinese had hoped that America might lead Great -Britain and France in a united, friendly, but positive insistence -that the demands be settled only by common consent of all the powers -concerned. But the situation was complex. The state of Europe was -critical. The most I could do, and the least I owed the Chinese, was -to give a sympathetic hearing to whatever they wished to discuss with -me, and to give them my carefully weighed opinion. Our own national -interests were closely involved. It was my positive duty to keep close -watch of what was going on. While not taking the responsibility of -giving advice to the Chinese, I could give them an idea as to how the -tactical situation, as it developed from week to week, impressed me. -Dr. Wellington Koo all through this time acted as liaison officer -between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself, although I also -saw many other members of the Ministry. In discussing the consecutive -phases of the negotiations, as they developed, Doctor Koo and I had -many interesting hours over diplomatic tactics and analysis, in which -I admired his keenness of perception. Some objection was hinted by the -Japanese Legation to Doctor Koo's frequent visits to my office and -house, but his coming and going continued, as was proper.</p> - -<p>Councils were held daily at the President's residence from May 1st on. -Informally, the ministers of the Entente Powers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> advised the Chinese -not to attempt armed resistance to Japan; I believe the Government -never seriously contemplated this, although some military leaders -talked about it. Indeed, violent scenes took place in the Council; -it was urged that submission would mean national disintegration. It -would rob the Government of all authority and public support, while -resistance would rally the nation. The advance of Japan might be -obstructed until the end of the Great War; then European help would -come. They pressed the President with arguments that Japan might, -indeed, occupy larger parts of China; but this would not create rights, -it would expose Japan to universal condemnation. However, in the -existing circumstances of World War, the Government feared that to defy -Japan would mean dismemberment for China.</p> - -<p>Then President Yuan Shih-kai and the Foreign Office made their mistake. -They were panic-stricken at thought of an ultimatum. They were ready to -throw tactical advantage to the winds. Losing sight of the advantage -held by China in opposing the demands of Group V, they offered -concessions on points contained therein, particularly in connection -with the employment of advisers.</p> - -<p>But when the Foreign Office emissary came to the Japanese Legation with -these additional proposals and the Japanese minister saw how far the -Chinese could be driven, he stated calmly that the last instructions -of his government left no alternative; the ultimatum would have to be -presented. This was done on May 7th at three o'clock in the afternoon.</p> - -<p>The Chinese might have foreseen that the demands of Group V would not -be included in the ultimatum. Nevertheless, they were astonished at -their omission, and annoyed at unnecessarily committing themselves -the day before. At first sight, the terms of the ultimatum seemed to -dispose of these ominous demands. In the first sense of their re<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span>lief -from a long strain, the Chinese understood the stipulation of the -ultimatum that "the demands of Group V will be detached from the -present negotiations, and discussed separately in the future," as an -adroit way of abandoning these troublesome questions. They were soon -to learn that their hopes were not in accord with the ideas of the -Japanese.</p> - -<p>Why, when the Chinese were virtually ready to agree to all the demands -actually included in the ultimatum, should the Japanese not have -accepted the concessions, even if they fell slightly short of what -was asked? Thus they would avoid the odium of having threatened a -friendly government with force; a matter which, furthermore, would in -its nature tend to weaken the legal and equitable force of the rights -to be acquired. The Japanese made two fundamental mistakes. The first -was in their disingenuous denials and misrepresentation of the true -character of the demands; the second, in the actual use of an ultimatum -threatening force. That these mistakes were serious is now quite -generally recognized in Japan. Why they were made in the first place is -more difficult to explain.</p> - -<p>Possibly, in the light of subsequent events, when Yuan Shih-kai -realized that he must unavoidably make extensive concessions, he may -have sought a certain <i>quid pro quo</i> in the form of Japanese support -for his personal ambitions. This would accord with the hint dropped by -the Japanese minister at the beginning of the negotiations. If this -explanation be correct, one might possibly understand that Yuan himself -in his inmost thought preferred that he should be forced to accept -these demands through an ultimatum. The possibility of such motives may -have to be considered, yet from my knowledge of the negotiations from -beginning to end, I must consider utterly fanciful the charge made by -Yuan's enemies that it was he who originally conceived the idea of the -twenty-one demands, in order that he might<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> secure Japanese support for -his subsequent policies and ambitions.</p> - -<p>A reason for the harsh measure of the Japanese Government is -admissible. The Japanese may have feared that public opinion throughout -the world, which was disapproving the character and scope of these -negotiations, would encourage the Chinese to hold out in matters of -detail and gradually to raise new difficulties. Moreover, the men who -wielded the power of Japan were believers in military prestige and -may have expected good results from basing their new rights in China -directly on military power.</p> - -<p>The ultimatum gave the Chinese Government a little over forty-eight -hours, that is, until 6 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span> on May 9th, for an answer. On May -8th, the cabinet and Council of State met in a session which lasted -nearly all day, finally deciding that the ultimatum must be accepted in -view of the military threats of Japan.</p> - -<p>In their reply to the ultimatum a serious tactical mistake was made. -I had been informed that it would be accepted in simple and brief -language; that the Chinese Government would say it had made certain -grants to the Japanese, which would be enumerated, making no mention -of Group V. Toward evening of the 9th a member of the Foreign Office -came to me, quite agitated, saying that the Japanese Legation insisted -that the demands of Group V be specifically reserved for future -discussion. "What form," I asked, "has the Chinese answer taken?" -"This," he replied: "'The Chinese Government, etc., hereby accepts, -with the exception of the five articles of Group V, all the articles -of Group I, etc.' But," he added, "when the draft was submitted to the -Japanese Legation, they insisted that after the words 'Group V' there -be added the clause 'which are postponed for later negotiation.'" It -had been thought necessary, my visitor explained, to state in the -reply that something had been refused, in order to save the face<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> of -the Government. But it is perfectly plain that if Group V had not been -mentioned at all, the Japanese would have found it hard to insist upon -its being kept open; for it could not be avowed before other nations as -part of the matter covered by the ultimatum. As it was, the demands in -Group V were given the character of unfinished business, to be taken up -at a future date. Thus portentously, they continued to hang over the -heads of the Chinese.</p> - -<p>Partly in an exchange of notes, partly in a convention, the concessions -exacted through the ultimatum were granted. None of these was ever -ratified by the parliamentary body, as the Constitution requires. -Because of their origin and of this lack of proper ratification, the -Chinese people have looked upon the agreements of 1915 as invalid.</p> - -<p>The State Department had cabled on May 6th counselling patience and -mutual forbearance to both governments. The advice was needed by Japan, -but the instructions came too late; the ultimatum had been presented. I -should have found that its delivery would have seemed like whispering a -gentle admonition through the keyhole after the door had been slammed -to.</p> - -<p>The Department cabled on May 11th an identical note to both -governments, which I delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on -the 13th. It was published in the Peking papers on the 24th, together -with a telegram from Tokyo asserting "on the highest authority" that -the report of the existence of such a note was only another instance of -machinations designed to cause political friction.</p> - -<p>When he received the note Minister Lu said that he had tried throughout -to safeguard the treaty rights of other nations, with which China's -own rights were bound up. To a question from him I replied that -the American Government was not now protesting against any special -proposal, but insisted that the rights referred to in the note be given -complete protection in the definitive provisions of the Treaty.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> The -newly acquired privileges of the Japanese in Manchuria were touched on -in the conversation; I pointed out that any rights of residence granted -to the Japanese, by operation of the most-favoured-nation clause, would -accrue in like terms to all other nations having treaties with China; -they ought to be informed, therefore, of all the terms of the agreement -affecting such rights. On May 15th the Department confirmed this view -by cabled instructions, which I followed with a formal note to the -Minister for Foreign Affairs.</p> - -<p>It appeared that the Chinese Government was comforted by an expression -in which the United States in clear terms reasserted its adhesion to -the fundamental principles of American policy in the Far East.</p> - -<p>So ended the famous negotiations of the Twenty-one Demands. Japan -had gained from the unrepresentative authorities at Peking certain -far-reaching concessions. But in China the people, as an anciently -organized society, are vastly more important than any political -government. The people of China had not consented.</p> - - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> For instance, Putnam Weale wrote: "Though Englishmen -believe that the gallant Japanese are entitled to a recompense just -as much now as they were in 1905 for what they have done, Englishmen -do not and cannot subscribe to the doctrine that Japan is to dominate -China by extorting a whole ring-fence of industrial concessions and -administrative privileges which will ultimately shut out even allies -from obtaining equal opportunities.... In China, though they are -willing to be reduced to second place and even driven out by fair -competition, they will fight in a way your correspondents do not yet -dream of to secure that no diplomacy of the jiujitsu order injures them -or their Chinese friends."</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII</a></p> - -<p class="center">GETTING TOGETHER</p> - - -<p>There arrived in Peking in the fall of 1915 the members of a commission -sent by the Rockefeller Foundation, to formulate definite plans for a -great scientific and educational enterprise in China. They were Dr. -Simon Flexner, of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, of -New York; Dr. George A. Welch, of Johns Hopkins University; and Doctor -Buttrick, the secretary of the Foundation. By early September, 1919, -the cornerstone of the Rockefeller Hospital and Medical School in -Peking had been laid.</p> - -<p>The China Medical Board had acquired the palace of a Manchu prince. -When their plans were first being formulated, the owner had just died, -and this magnificent property could have been bought for $75,000 Mex. -I cabled to New York at the time, advising quick action, but the -organization had not been sufficiently completed to make the purchase. -When, four months later, they were ready to buy, the price had risen -to $250,000. The fact that a rich institution desired to acquire the -property had undoubtedly helped to enhance the price; but real property -was then so rapidly rising in value all over Peking, especially in -central locations, that the price asked, as a matter of fact, was not -excessive, and a similar site could not have been secured for less. -A still further increase of values throughout the central portion of -the city was soon recorded; in fact, in many localities of China land -values have risen after the manner of an American boom town.</p> - -<p>The stately halls of the palace had been dismantled and torn down -because they did not suit the uses of the hospital.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> The materials -recovered, however, were in themselves of great value. The Board had -decided, in consonance with the judgment of the architects, that -the Chinese style of architecture should be used, modified only -sufficiently to answer the modern purpose of the buildings.</p> - -<p>We gathered on a sunny day of early September, when the air of Peking -has the fresh balminess of spring, to dedicate the cornerstone of the -first building to be erected. Admiral Knight, who was visiting us at -the time, accompanied me. Mr. Alston, the British chargé; Dr. Frank -Billings, who had just returned from Russia where he had been chairman -of the American Red Cross; and other representatives of the American -and British community were present, together with many Chinese. Mr. Fan -Yuen-lin, Minister of Education, represented the Chinese Government, -and Bishop Norris, of the Anglican Church, offered prayer. I made a -brief address in which I paid tribute to the achievements of American -and British medical missionaries, and expressed my high idea of the -value and significance, for science and human welfare, of the great -institution here to be established.</p> - -<p>Incidentally, it had seemed to me—and I so expressed to Doctors Welch -and Flexner during their visit—that much of value might be found in -the Chinese <i>materia medica</i>. In my own experience there had been so -many instances where relief had been afforded in apparently hopeless -cases that I thought it worthy of special study. For example, a new -chauffeur whom I had engaged accompanied my old chauffeur in the -machine one day; as he jumped out, his arm was caught between the door -and a telegraph pole and crushed. We immediately had him taken to the -hospital, where the doctors decided that only an immediate operation -afforded any prospect of saving his arm, and that even a successful -operation was doubtful. I was told that evening that his mother had -taken the young man away, notwithstanding the entreaties of our Chinese -legation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> personnel. We gave him up for lost. But within six weeks he -reported for his position, only admitting: "My arm is still a little -weak." A Chinese doctor had cured him with poultices.</p> - -<p>Similar cases often came to my attention. Mr. Chow Tzu-chi had -frequently suffered severely from rheumatism. He had tried every -scientific remedy without avail. One day I was glad to find him chipper -and in fine spirits. He said, "I am cured"; and he told me that a -Chinese doctor had fixed golden needles in different parts of his -body. Within a day his pains had disappeared. The empirical knowledge -accumulated by Chinese doctors through thousands of years may be worth -something.</p> - -<p>In their hours of leisure from the scientific tasks of their mission, -the members of the Rockefeller board saw much of Chinese life on -the lighter as well as its more serious side. One evening we went -together to a Chinese restaurant where we met some native friends and -had an excellent dinner, of the best that Peking cooking affords. The -American guests were delighted with the turmoil in the courts of a -Peking restaurant. We were entertained after dinner by a well-known -prestidigitator. This man often performs in Peking, where he is -known among foreigners by the name of Ega Lang Tang. These words -mean nothing, being only an arbitrary formula which he uses in his -incantations. His tricks, many and astounding, culminate when, after -turning a somersault, he suddenly produces out of nothing a glass bowl -as large as a washtub two feet in diameter filled with water in which -shoals of fish are gaily swimming about.</p> - -<p>In another way American initiative of an educational nature was -welcomed in Peking. Among officials and literary men were many who were -interested in the scientific study of economic and political subjects. -With them and with American and European friends I had often discussed -the desirability of establishing an association devoted to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> such work. -The old literary learning which had up to a very recent time organized -and given cohesion to Chinese intellectual life had largely lost its -power to satisfy men, whereas the scientific learning of the West -had not yet become sufficiently strong to act as the chief bond of -intellectual fellowship.</p> - -<p>As all political and social action, and all systematic effort in -industry and commerce, depend on intellectual forces, it is evident -that disorganization and confusion would soon threaten Chinese life -unless centres were formed in which the old could be brought into -harmonious and organic relationship with the new, so as to focus -intellectual effort. Such centres would wield great influence.</p> - -<p>With the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lu Tsen-tsiang, and a number -of other friends who were equally impressed with the need for such a -centre of thought and discussion, we decided in November, 1917, to take -steps toward forming a Chinese Social and Political Science Association.</p> - -<p>The first meeting was held at the residence of the Minister for Foreign -Affairs on December 5, 1915, when plans were discussed. In an address -which I made on this occasion I expressed my idea of the significance -of the society as follows:</p> - -<p>"The founding of the Society is an indication of the entry of China -into full coöperation in modern scientific work. This initial step -foreshadows a continuous effort through which the experience and -knowledge of China will be made scientifically available to the world -at large. The voice of China will be heard, her experience considered, -and her institutions understood by the world at large; she will be -represented in the scientific councils. At home the work of such an -association, if successful, should result in a clearer conception of -national character and destiny. The knowledge gained by its work would -be of great value<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> in constructive administrative reform. But its -greatest service would lie in the manner in which it would contribute -to a more deep and more definite national self-consciousness...."</p> - -<p>Virtually all the Chinese officials, of modern education, as well as -many teachers and publicists, interested themselves in the new society. -The idea was supported by men of all nations; alongside of Americans -like Doctor Goodnow, Doctors W.W. and W.F. Willoughby, and Dr. Henry -C. Adams, were the British, Dr. George Morrison, Sir Robert Bredon, -Professor Bevan, and Mr. B. Lenox Simpson; the French, M. Mazot and -M. Padoux; the Russians, M. Konovalov and Baron Staël-Holstein; and -the Japanese, Professor Ariga. The society thereafter held regular -meetings, at which valuable addresses and discussions were given; it -published a quarterly review, and it established the first library in -Peking for the use of officials, students, and the public in general.</p> - -<p>Through the assistance of the Prime Minister, Mr. Hsu Hsi-chang, a -portion of the Imperial City was set aside for use by the library—a -centrally situated enclosure, called the Court of the Guardian -Gods. This had been used as a depository for all the paraphernalia -of Imperial ceremonies, such as lanterns, banners, emblems, state -carriages, and catafalques. When I first visited it, large stores of -these objects still remained. They were not of a substantial kind, but -such as are constructed or made over specially for each occasion; and, -while they were quite interesting, they had no intrinsic value. That -the officials and the Imperial Family should combine to set aside so -valuable an area for a modern scientific purpose was an indication that -China is moving.</p> - -<p>Attached to the French Legation was the brilliant sinologist Paul -Pelliot, whose explorations in Turkestan had secured such great -treasures for the French museums and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> Bibliothèque Nationale. -Though he acted officially as military attaché, M. Pelliot really had a -far broader function, being liaison officer between French and Chinese -culture.</p> - -<p>Before the war the Germans had an educational attaché. On account of -the close relationship between Chinese and American education through -the thousands of American returned students, I strongly urged the -appointment of an attaché who could give his attention to educational -affairs. I was so pressed with other business that hundreds of -invitations to address educational bodies throughout China had to go -unaccepted. If there had been an assistant who could have met the -Chinese on these occasions, he could have been exceedingly helpful to -them. But I was told from Washington that there was no provision for an -attaché with such functions.</p> - -<p>The intimate feeling of coöperation between the British and American -communities expressed itself in many meetings, in some of which the -Chinese, too, participated. Thus, on December 8, 1917, there was held a -reception of the English-speaking returned students. The Minister for -Foreign Affairs; a number of his counsellors; the British minister, Sir -John Jordan, and his staff; the American Legation; the missionaries; -all who had received their education in the United States or Great -Britain, were here present. It was a large company that gathered in the -hall of the Y.M.C.A., including a great many Chinese women.</p> - -<p>The hum of the preliminary conversation was suddenly interrupted by -a loud voice issuing from a young man who had hoisted himself on a -chair in the centre of the room. He proceeded to give directions for -the systematic promotion of sociability and conversation. The Chinese -guests were to join hands and form a circle around the room, facing -inward; within that circle the British and American guests were to -join hands, forming a circle facing outward. At the given word the -outer circle was to revolve to the right, the inner<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> circle to the -left. At the word "halt," everyone was to engage his or her vis-à-vis -in conversation. To eliminate every risk of stalemate, the topics for -conversation were given out, one for each stop of the revolving line, -the last being: "My Greatest Secret."</p> - -<p>The young man who proposed this thoroughly American system of breaking -the ice had just come out from Wisconsin, and it was his business to -secure the proper mixing in miscellaneous gatherings. The British -seemed at first somewhat aghast at the prospect of this rotary and -perambulatory conversation; yet they quite readily fell in with the -idea, and when the first word of halt was given, I noticed Sir John -duly making conversation with a simpering little Chinese girl opposite -him.</p> - -<p>A little later, in December, there was formed an Anglo-American -Club, which celebrated its début with a dinner at the Hotel of Four -Nations. This was the beginning of the closest relationship that has -ever existed between the Americans and British in the Far East. In my -brief speech I expressed my genuine feeling of satisfaction that this -coöperation should have come about.</p> - -<p>My relations with educational authorities and activities in Peking were -most pleasant. When Commencement was celebrated at Peking University -I had the distinction of an honorary LL.D. conferred upon me. This -courtesy was performed in a very graceful manner by Doctor Lowry, my -wise and experienced friend, under whose presidency this institution -had been built up from small beginnings. I was so interested in the -promise of this American university in the capital of China that -I consented to act as a member of the Board, and I had interested -myself in its development as far as my official duties would permit. -To my great satisfaction, the university had at this time become -interdenominational, representing four of the Christian mission -societies active in China. A liberal spirit pervaded the university,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> -inspiring its members with a desire to serve China by spreading the -light of learning, without narrow denominational limitations, relying -on Christian spirit and character to exert its influence without undue -insistence on dogma. By a pleasant coincidence, I on that very date -received a cablegram telling me that my alma mater, the University of -Wisconsin, had also given me the honorary LL.D.</p> - -<p>An opportunity for general meetings of Americans and British, -including, also, other residents of Peking, interested in things of the -mind, was afforded by a lecture course arranged by the Peking Language -School. I opened the course with an address on the conservation of -the artistic past of China, which was given at the residence of the -British minister. Sir John Jordan in his introductory remarks said -that the time was at hand when foreigners residing in China would take -a far deeper and more intimate interest in Chinese civilization than -they had done before. I spoke of the danger of losing the expertness -and the creative impulse of Chinese art and of the readiness it had -always shown in the past to develop new forms, methods, and beauties. -Subsequent lectures were given alternately at my residence and at the -theatre of the British Legation, and the entire course emphasized our -common interest in Chinese civilization.</p> - -<p>During the height of the student movement in 1919 the Peking police -closed the offices of the <i>Yi Shih Pao</i> (Social Welfare), a liberal -paper in Peking. The paper had made itself disliked by publishing news -of the Japanese negotiations and criticizing the militarist faction. -A number of Americans had previously interested themselves in the -paper, because of its liberal tendencies and because of its devotion to -social welfare work; they proposed to take it over, but the transfer -had not yet been carried out. The Chinese editor of the paper appealed -to me to assist him in the liberation of an associate who had been -imprisoned. As no legal American interest at the time existed in the -paper, however, it was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> not possible to use my good offices in its -behalf, although I had at all times made the Chinese officials know -that the suppression of free speech in the press was a very undesirable -procedure. The suppression of the <i>Yi Shih Pao</i> was a result of the -desire of the reactionary faction in Peking to choke every expression -favourable to the national movement; they had been encouraged to -imitate the stringent press regulations of Japan.</p> - -<p>Later on the Americans completed their purchase of the <i>Yi Shih Pao</i>. -The question as to how far American protection should be extended over -newspapers printed in Chinese, but owned by Americans, then came up -for decision. As Americans had become interested in the <i>bona fide</i> -enterprise of publishing newspapers in Chinese, it was not apparent -how such protection as is given to others for their legitimate -interests could be refused in this case. I therefore recommended to -the Department of State that no distinction be made against such -enterprises, and several vernacular papers were subsequently registered -in American consulates.</p> - -<p>When I told the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that American -registry had been given the <i>Yi Shih Pao</i>, I informed him of the -character of the American press laws, under which newspapers are in -normal times entirely free from censorship, but are responsible in -law for any misstatements of fact injurious to individuals. Many of -the reactionary officials had persistently opposed the idea of having -American-registered vernacular papers in China. But, manifestly, they -could not make any valid protest against such an arrangement. In fact, -we never had any expression of official displeasure; on the contrary, -nothing could have been more welcome to the people of China and to the -great majority of officials than to know that vernacular papers were to -be published in China by Americans.</p> - -<p>The publication in Peking of news from abroad was much<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> facilitated -by wireless. Early in 1919 I entertained at lunch several American -newspapermen, with whom I had a conference on the press and news -situation in the Far East. They were Mr. Fleisher, of the <i>Japan -Advertiser</i>; Mr. McClatchey, of the <i>Sacramento Bee</i>; Mr. Sharkey, of -the Associated Press; and Mr. Carl Crow, representative of the American -Committee on Public Information. Mr. Walter Rogers, an expert in this -matter, had been in Peking shortly before.</p> - -<p>The great difficulty with which we were confronted in any attempt to -develop the news service between China and the United States was the -expense of telegraphing by cable, which made it impossible to transmit -an adequate news service. We were therefore all agreed that it was -essential to use the wireless and that every effort should be made for -arrangements whereby the wireless system of the American Government -would carry news messages at a reasonable rate.</p> - -<p>The importance of a direct news service was demonstrated during the -war, when under an arrangement by the Committee on Public Information -a budget of news was sent by wireless daily to the Far East. For -the first time in history had there been anything approaching a -fairly complete statement of what was going on in the United States. -The service of news of the Peace Conference was also particularly -appreciated by everybody in China. China had never been so close to -Europe before.</p> - -<p>The only agency supplying news in China is Reuter's. Its news budget -is made up in London. It proceeds to Spain, Morocco, and down the west -coast of Africa to the Cape; thence up the east coast of Egypt, Persia, -India, and Ceylon. At each of the main stations on the way items of -only local interest there are withdrawn. What is left at Ceylon as of -interest to the Far East is sent on to Singapore and Hong-Kong, as well -as by another route to Australia. It is quite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> natural that with such -a source and such a routing, this service should carry next to nothing -about America. I once had it observed for a whole month in June, 1916, -when the only American item carried was that Mr. Bryan had shed tears -at the National Democratic Convention!</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XIV" id="CHAPTER_XIV">CHAPTER XIV</a></p> - -<p class="center">WAR DAYS IN PEKING</p> - - -<p>During my first absence in America Mr. Peck had been appointed consul -at Tsingtau, and Dr. Charles D. Tenney had been sent as his successor. -My predecessor, Mr. W.J. Calhoun, in a letter concerning Doctor -Tenney, bore witness to his unusual acquaintanceship with the Chinese -and knowledge of Chinese affairs. Speaking of Doctor Tenney's joy in -returning to China, Mr. Calhoun remarked: "There is a strange thing -about foreigners who have lived very long in China: they never seem to -be contented anywhere else. They are apparently bitten by some kind -of bug which infuses a virus into their blood, and makes life in that -country the only thing endurable."</p> - -<p>Existence of a state of war deeply affected social life in Peking. -The mutual enemies could, of course, not see each other. Their social -movements, therefore, were considerably restricted. The neutrals, -however, having relations with both sides, were if anything more -busy socially than at other times. Dinners had to be given in sets, -one for the Entente Allies, the other for the Central Powers. The -Austrian minister decided that as his country was at war and his -people were suffering, he would not accept any dinner invitations at -all, except for small parties <i>en famille</i>. The other representatives -of belligerent powers kept up their social life on a reduced scale. -Dancing was gradually restricted, and finally passed out almost -entirely.</p> - -<p>Mr. Rockhill had died at Honolulu in December, 1914. He had been -retained by President Yuan as his personal adviser, and was returning -to China from a brief visit to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> United States. I felt the loss of a -man of such unusual ability and experience, to whom China had been the -most interesting country in the world. In all the difficulties which -followed, his advice would have been of great value to the Chinese -President and Government.</p> - -<p>The report of the Engineers' Commission which investigated the -Hwai River Conservancy project made that enterprise look even more -attractive than I had anticipated. The value of the redeemed land alone -would be more than enough to pay the cost of the improvements. I felt -that the work would give great credit to the American name. Not only -would it assure the livelihood of multitudes through the redemption -of millions of the most fertile acres in China, but it would give -to the Chinese a living example of how, by scientific methods, the -very foundations of their life could be improved. During the winter -of 1914-15 a terrible famine was again devastating that region, -threatening hundreds of thousands of peasants with extinction. Never -had the sum of twenty millions of dollars produced such benefits as -would be assured here. But after urgent appeals to the Department in -Washington, the National Red Cross, and the Rockefeller Foundation, it -was found impossible to secure the necessary capital during the year of -the option. The best I could do was to ask for an extension, which was -granted, although the Chinese themselves were impatient to see the work -begun.</p> - -<p>We received reports during the first winter of the war about the -suffering endured by German and Austrian prisoners in Siberia. They -had been captured during the summer and early autumn, and transported -to Siberia in their summer uniforms. Subjected to the intense cold -of a Siberian winter, they were herded in barracks unprovided with -ordinary necessities; these were sealed to exclude the cold and all -kinds of disease were soon rampant. The Legation at Peking, being -nearest to Siberia, superintended the relief work there of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> -American Red Cross; there was also a German relief organization (called -<i>Hilfsaktion</i>), of which a capable and enterprising woman of Austrian -descent, Madame Von Hanneken, was the moving spirit. The Legation's -work increased; innumerable appeals came to it directly, and in lending -its good offices to the German association care had to be taken that -no use of it be made that could be properly objected to. Madame Von -Hanneken was on friendly terms with the Russian Legation, which gave -her society needed facilities. Its direct representatives were European -neutrals, chiefly Danes and Swedes. The work of the American Red Cross -among the war prisoners in Siberia, as well as the efforts of the -Y.M.C.A. to introduce among them industrial and artistic activities to -alleviate their lot, make a story of unselfish effort.</p> - -<p>I tried to encourage the Chinese to build good roads. The Imperial -roads around Peking were surfaced with huge flagstones which, through -rain and climate, had lost alignment; they tilted and sloped at angles -like the logs of a corduroy road. Vehicles might not pass them, while -the Chinese carts picked their way as best they could over low-lying -dirt tracks by the side of these magnificent causeways. The Chinese -proverbial description of them is: "Ten years of heaven and a thousand -years of hell." The country thoroughfares have worn deep; it is a -Chinese paradox that the rivers usually flow above and the highways lie -below the surface of the land. In the <i>loess</i> regions the roads are -often cut thirty or forty feet deep into the soil.</p> - -<p>I first suggested the building of a road from Tientsin to Peking, but -the railways did not encourage this enterprise, and it was delayed -several years. Mr. E.W. Frazar, an American merchant from Japan who -accompanied me to Tokyo in 1915, had successfully established motor-car -services in Japan. He had come to north China to establish a branch -of his firm there; he was willing to get American capital for road -building and to make a contract therefor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> with the Chinese Government. -This particular contract was not concluded, but an impetus had been -given to the idea among the Chinese, and the building of roads was -gradually taken up, beginning with highways around Peking. The leading -men became interested when they began to realize its effect on real -estate values.</p> - -<p>Governor-General Harrison of the Philippine Islands spent a week in -Peking, sightseeing, making many purchases of antiques and Peking -products. He was much taken with the Chinese rugs and ordered a number -of huge carpets to be made for the Malacañan Palace. We both strongly -felt that something should be done to prevent the total disappearance -of the American flag from the Pacific, and this we knew would occur -if the existing companies carried out their threats of retrenchment -and withdrawal. Had one been able to foresee the enormous demand for -shipping which was soon to arise, he might have outdistanced the -richest of existing millionaires. The Chinese Government did give to -an American a contract to establish a Chino-American steamship line, -with a government guarantee of $3,000,000; unfortunately, it shared -the all-too-common fate of American undertakings in China and was not -carried out.</p> - -<p>The lunar New Year of the Chinese Calendar was changed to the -Republican (Min Kuo) New Year. On January 1st Peking was given a festal -aspect. The Central Park, a part of the old Imperial City, had been -opened to the public, and under innumerable flags crowds streamed along -the pathways, stopping at booths to buy souvenirs and toys, or entering -the always popular eating places where both foreign and Chinese music -is played by bands large and small. On various public places fairs were -held; extensive settlements of booths built of bamboo poles and matting -sprang up overnight. There, curios, pictures, brass utensils, wood -carvings, gold fishes, ming eggs, birdcages, and other objects useful -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> ornamental were on sale. Wandering troops of actors and acrobats -performed in enclosures to which the public was admitted for a small -fee. Before one of these stockades I saw a large sign reading: "Chow -and Chang—champion magicians educated <i>from</i> America." So, even here, -American education was valued. The art collection in the Imperial City -was open at half the usual admission fee; the grounds of the Temple -of Agriculture and of the Temple of Heaven were crowded with holiday -visitors, and at all theatres were special performances. For three or -four days the city wore a holiday aspect.</p> - -<p>But the old New Year was not abandoned. On the days before the lunar -year ended the streets became alive with shoppers preparing for the -grand annual feasting. Quantities of fattened ducks, pigs, chickens, -and fishes, loads of baked things and sweets were transported in -carts, rickshaws, and all sorts of vehicles or by hand, everyone -chattering and smiling in happy anticipation. The Chinese New Year is -the traditional time for settling all outstanding accounts. Slates -are wiped clean, partnerships are wound up, and all balances settled. -When New Year's eve comes, having strained themselves to meet their -obligations, all cast dull care aside. Families and clans gather for a -gargantuan feasting, the abundance and duration of which outdistances -anything seen in the West.</p> - -<p>The official celebration of the Republican New Year at the President's -Palace had to be modified. Because of the war the diplomatic corps -could not be received as a unit. It was therefore arranged that the -President receive the foreign representatives in three groups: the -Allies, the Neutrals, and the Central Powers. High Chinese officials -and picturesque Mongolian dignitaries were received on the first day, -the diplomatic representatives on the second. As the President chatted -informally with each minister, Madam Yuan received in an adjoining -apartment, talking quite naturally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> with the ladies of the party about -such feminine matters as the size of families and the choice of dress -materials.</p> - -<p>A short time ago a young American teacher, Hicks, was murdered and -his two companions seriously wounded while they were ascending the -Yangtse River in a boat. The attack was at the dead of night; the -survivors recalled only flaring torches and swarthy faces, although -they believed that their assailants wore some sort of uniform. The -Chinese Government disavowed responsibility, considering it an ordinary -robbery, and asserting that if the assailants wore uniforms they must -have been insurgents, as no regular troops were near that place. The -crime was revolting, destructive of the sense of security of foreign -travellers, and I insisted absolutely on payment of an indemnity. -Money payment is by no means satisfactory; it does give the injured -parties redress and testifies to the desire of the Central Government -to protect foreigners, but does not bring the consequences of the crime -home to the really guilty parties. I therefore always tried to have the -personal responsibility in such matters followed up and specifically -determined; in this case it was impossible. The Chinese Government -finally agreed to the very handsome indemnity of $25,000 for the death -of young Hicks, the largest pecuniary award for loss of life ever made -in China. It was an ironical circumstance that just after this had been -settled, an American driving his automobile at excessive speed in the -Peking streets struck and killed an old Chinese woman. When I stated to -the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I would ask this man to pay $300 -to the relatives, he replied with a twinkle: "How much was it we paid -you for the last American who was killed?"</p> - -<p>However, he did not really intend to dispute the reasonableness of -even so enormous a difference. Foreigners in China, on account of -their employment as managers or head teachers, necessarily have to be -considered, from a purely pecuniary point of view, to have a value far -above the aver<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span>age. Moreover, should large indemnities be paid for -the death of poor people among the Chinese, they would be constantly -tempted to let themselves be injured or even killed, in order to -provide for their families.</p> - -<p>Among the Chinese who visited me during the first year of the war were -the military and civil governors of Chekiang Province. Contrary to -tradition, both were natives of the province they governed, and good -governors, too. The civil governor, Mr. Chu Ying-kuang, who was under -forty, was a man of great public spirit and wisdom, eager to discuss -constructive ideas and effective methods in government and industry. -Governor Chu wrote me a letter of thanks, which may be considered an -example of Chinese epistolary style. It ran:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>During my short stay in the Capital I hurriedly visited your -Excellency and was so fortunate as to draw upon the stores of -your magnificence and gain the advantage of your instruction. My -appreciation cannot be expressed in words. You also treated me with -extraordinary kindness in preparing for me an elaborate banquet. -Your kindness and courtesy were heaped high and your treasures were -lavishly displayed. My gratitude is graven on my heart and my hope and -prayer is that the splendour of your merit may daily grow brighter and -that your prosperity may mount as high as the clouds.</p> - -<p>I, your younger brother, left Peking on the 29th of last month for the -South, and on February 2nd arrived at Hangchou. The whole journey was -peaceful so that your embroidered thoughts need not be exercised. I -reflect fondly on your refined conversation and cannot forget it for -an instant. I respectfully offer this inch-long casket to express my -sincere gratitude and hope that you will favour it with a glance.</p> - -<p>Respectfully wishing you daily blessings,</p> - -<p> -Your younger brother.<br /> -</p></blockquote> - -<p>The new German minister, Admiral von Hintze, arrived shortly after -the New Year. I saw him frequently after his first visit, as he had -few colleagues with whom, under the conditions of war, he could meet. -In order to avoid capture as an enemy, Admiral von Hintze had come -from the United<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> States incognito, as a supercargo on a Norwegian -vessel. He had been minister in Mexico, and before that the Emperor's -representative at the court of the Czar, and was a man of wide -knowledge of European affairs and of diplomatic intrigue. For a man -of his intelligence, he was inclined to give undue weight to rumours. -Peking was amused shortly after his arrival when he sent orders to the -Germans resident in all parts of the capital to hold themselves ready -to come into the Legation Quarter immediately upon notice being given. -He had read books on the troubles of 1900 and on the assassination of -his predecessor, Baron Kettler; he therefore saw dire menaces where -everything seemed quite normal to older residents. Especially, he -imagined himself surrounded by emissaries and retainers of the enemy. -Several times he would say to me: "My first 'boy' is excellent. He -could not be better. The Japanese pay him well, so he has to do his -best to hold his job."</p> - -<p>Being himself a clever man and familiar with opinion outside of -Germany, Admiral Hintze thoroughly disapproved of the acts of -unnecessary violence by which the Germans had forfeited the good -opinion of the world, especially the sinking of the <i>Lusitania</i> and the -execution of Edith Cavell. "What a mistake," he exclaimed, "for the -sake of one woman! Why not hold her in a prison somewhere in Germany -until the war is over?" The stupidity of such acts deeply offended him. -Had he become Minister for Foreign Affairs at an earlier date, some -bad mistakes might have been avoided. When the first reports of the -resumption of exacerbated submarine warfare were received, he remarked -to me: "Do not believe these reports that Germany will resume unlimited -submarine warfare. I can assure you that they will not be foolish -enough to do such a thing."</p> - -<p>I noticed soon after Admiral Hintze's arrival that his relations with -his Austrian colleague were not the most cordial; these two seemed -to coöperate with difficulty. They were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> men entirely different in -temperament. The German was a man of the world, inspired with the -ideal of German military power and looking on international politics -as a keen and clever intellectual game. Concerning Hindenburg, he said -to me: "There is a man who makes no excuses for his existence." The -Austrian minister was a man of scholarly impulse, with a broad sympathy -for humankind, deploring the shallow game of politics, and hoping for -a more humane and reasonable system of government than that of the -political state.</p> - -<p>Mr. Sun Pao-chi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, resigned on January 28th -to head the Audit Board, and was succeeded by Mr. Lu Tseng-tsiang. -Mr. Lu had enjoyed an extensive experience in Europe. He had acquired -a thorough mastery of French and married a Belgian lady, to whom he -was deeply devoted. Like his predecessor, he abstained from internal -politics. He was called to office when the exceedingly difficult -negotiations with Japan concerning the twenty-one demands were begun, -and it became his duty to carry through a very painful and ungrateful -task. Mr. Lu was interested in general political affairs in their -broader aspects, and gave special attention to international law.</p> - -<p>I was frequently a guest at the house of Mr. Liang Tun-yen, the -Minister of Communications. He was easy-going, prepared to talk -business there rather than at the Ministry, where I would see him -frequently also, about the Hukuang railways. The engineer of the -British section was steadfastly trying to secure standards of British -engineering and manufacture, to which it would be difficult for -American manufacturers to conform. The Legation was beset with protests -concerning orders for materials which Americans did not like, since -they embodied the special practice of one partner to the contract. Thus -matters of a technical nature had to be argued between the Legation and -the Ministry of Communications. Mr. Liang himself was not a railway -expert.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> For example, he once spoke enthusiastically about clearing up -the Grand Canal, exclaiming: "then you could go from Peking to Shanghai -in a houseboat." We often fell back on the more general features -of the political situation in China, concerning which Mr. Liang -displayed a gentle skepticism for all proposed reforms. With respect -to railroad concessions, he was hostile to the idea of percentage -construction contracts, believing it dangerous to measure the returns -of an engineering firm by the sum expended on the works. I argued that -since the professional standing of such a firm was involved it could -not afford to run up the cost of the works merely to increase its own -commission. But I did not overcome his skepticism.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XV" id="CHAPTER_XV">CHAPTER XV</a></p> - -<p class="center">EMPEROR YUAN SHIH-KAI</p> - - -<p>"Yuan Shih-kai is trying to make himself emperor, we hear from Peking," -Mr. E.T. Williams remarked to me at the Department of State when I saw -him there in July, 1915. The report said that an imperialist movement -in behalf of Yuan Shih-kai had been launched in Peking. As there had -been frequent reports during the year of such attempts to set up an -empire, I was not at first inclined to give much credence to the -rumours.</p> - -<p>Upon my return to San Francisco in September, this time to take steamer -for China, I met Dr. Wellington Koo, who had just come on a special -mission. I had been confidentially informed that he would probably be -designated as minister to the United States, to take the place of Mr. -Shah. The Department of State had directed me to delay my departure in -order to confer with Doctor Koo upon recent developments in China. On -the day we spent together we went over all that had happened since my -absence. The reports which had already been received that a movement -had been started to make Yuan Shih-kai emperor I then considered -improbable, in view of all the difficulties which the enterprise must -encounter, both internationally and from the Chinese opposition. Doctor -Koo confirmed this feeling and said that Yuan Shih-kai himself was very -doubtful. He mentioned the Goodnow memorandum, however, as a possible -factor. I was considerably surprised later to discover that the main -object of Doctor Koo's mission was to sound public opinion in America -and Europe concerning the assumption of the imperial dignity by Yuan -Shih-kai, and to prepare the ground for it.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> During my return voyage -to China the matter quickly came to a head, so that when I arrived in -Peking on October 1st I was confronted with an entirely new situation.</p> - -<p>To understand the movement it is necessary to review briefly the -significant facts of Peking politics during the summer of 1915. A -concerted effort had been made to combat the Liang Shih-yi faction. -The opposition centred in the so-called Anhui Party, which was largely -militaristic, but in which civilian leaders like the Premier, Hsu -Shih-chang, the Chief Secretary of the cabinet, Yang Shih-chi, the -Minister of Finance, as well as the Minister of Communications, were -prominent.</p> - -<p>Charges of corruption were lodged against Chang Hu, Vice-Minister -of Finance; Yeh Kung-cho, Vice-Minister of Communications; and the -Director of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Including these, twenty-two -high officials were impeached during July, besides several provincial -governors. The Anhui Party was trying to eliminate radically the -influence of the so-called Communications Party, which had tried to -maintain itself through the vice-ministers and counsellors of several -important ministries, the chiefs of which were Anhui men.</p> - -<p>It appears that several Anhui leaders were involved in a movement to -establish a monarchy, with Yuan Shih-kai as emperor. Care was exercised -in picking the Committee of Ten to make a preliminary draft of the -Permanent Constitution; it was believed by many that influences were -at work for putting into that instrument provisions for reëstablishing -the monarchy. Report had it that on July 7th General Feng Kuo-chang, -military governor at Nanking, had urged that the President assume the -throne, for which he was rebuked by Yuan in severe terms. Dr. Frank -J. Goodnow, the American constitutional adviser, returned to Peking -in mid-July for a short stay; he was asked on behalf of the President -to prepare a memorandum on the comparative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> adaptability of the -republican and monarchical forms of government to Chinese conditions. -Doctor Goodnow complied. As a matter of general theory, he took the -view that the monarchical form might be considered better suited to -the traditions and the actual political development of the Chinese. He -saw special merit in the fact that under the monarchical system, the -succession to power would be regulated so that it could not be made an -ever-recurring object of contention. On the expediency of an actual -return at the time from the republic to the monarchy Doctor Goodnow -expressly refrained from pronouncing a judgment. The memorandum was -prepared simply for the personal information of the President. Advisers -had been so generally treated as academic ornaments that Doctor Goodnow -did not suspect that in this case his memorandum would be made the -starting point and basis of positive action.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Mr. Liang Shih-yi and his group, seeing their power -threatened, decided to do something extreme to recover the lead. They -concluded that the monarchical movement was inevitable; thereupon -they seem to have persuaded Yuan Shih-kai that the movement could be -properly handled and brought to early and successful issue only through -their superior experience and knowledge. It was they who arranged for -the memorandum of Doctor Goodnow. They had remained in the background -until the middle of August, when an open monarchical propaganda began, -based avowedly on the opinions expressed by the American adviser and -thus given a very respectable and impartial appearance.</p> - -<p>They formed the Peace Planning Society (Chou An Hui). Its aim was -to investigate the advantages and disadvantages accruing from the -republican form of government. Doctor Goodnow's views were widely -heralded as categorically giving preference to monarchy for China, -notwithstanding disclaimers which he now issued. The fact that an -American expert should pronounce this judgment was cited as espe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span>cially -strong evidence in favour of the monarchical form, since it came from a -citizen of the foremost republic in the world.</p> - -<p>It became known in early September that the movement was in the hands -of capable organizers. Notwithstanding Yuan Shih-kai's repeated -disclaimers, he failed to take positive action to suppress the -agitation; he was therefore believed to be at least in a receptive -mood. The high officials in Peking with few exceptions had become -favourable to the movement. The Vice-President, General Li Tuan-hung, -was at first opposed, but even he appeared to be reconciled at last, -being not entirely a free agent. The members of the Anhui faction, now -that the lead had been taken out of their hands, were less enthusiastic -for the change. Several political leaders began to withdraw from -affairs. General Tuan Chi-jui, the Minister of War, and Mr. Liang -Chi-chao, the Minister of Education, resigned, undoubtedly because -of their tacit disapproval of the movement, although other reasons -were alleged.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The Premier and Mr. Liang Tung-yen, the Minister -of Communications, though not on principle opposed, considered that -on account of his previous allegiance to the Imperial Family, Yuan -Shih-kai could not with propriety assume the Imperial office. Within -the inner circles of the movement there was no question of the desire -of the President to have it put through. For a time, early in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> -September, he was even thinking of forcing the matter, but began to be -apprehensive regarding the action of certain foreign powers who might -attach difficult conditions to their recognition of the new régime.</p> - -<p>It was suggested that the Legislative Council might simply confer -the title of emperor on the President, and the constitution might -then be amended to make the presidency hereditary. Thus, it was -naïvely believed, legal continuity could be preserved sufficiently -to obviate the necessity of seeking a new recognition. A republic -with a hereditary president seemed to some politicians the key to the -difficulty. This proposal served to direct the minds of those who were -managing the movement to the importance of letting a representative -body participate in it, and of not carrying it through by a <i>coup -d'état</i>.</p> - -<p>On my return to China Mr. Chow Tsu-chi and other leaders waited on me, -saying that present uncertainties involved such drawbacks to peace -and prosperity that from all the provinces the strongest appeals were -coming, to prevail upon Yuan to sanction the movement. Mr. Chow went -so far as to say: "There is such a strong demand for this step that we -shall have great trouble if it is not taken. There will be military -uprisings." When I looked incredulous, Mr. Chow proceeded: "Yes, -indeed, the people can only understand a personal headship, and they -want it, so that the country may be settled." Though I took this all -with a grain of salt, I was surprised at the apparent unanimity with -which the inevitableness of the change seemed to be accepted. When I -asked how the President would reconcile such a step with the oath he -had taken to support a republican government, I was told that this was, -indeed, the great obstacle; that probably it could not be overcome -unless the whole nation insisted and made it a point of duty that Yuan -Shih-kai continue to govern the state under the new form.</p> - -<p>The attempt to reëstablish the monarchy seemed to me a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> step backward. -I had always felt that, whereas the Chinese had no experience with -elective representative institutions, nevertheless they were locally so -largely self-governed that they were fitted by experience and tradition -to evolve some form of provincial and national representation. Yet I -was strongly convinced that it is under any circumstances injudicious -for one nation or the officials of one nation to assume that they can -determine what is the best form of government for another nation. The -fundamental principle of self-government is that every people shall -work out that problem for itself, usually through many troubles and -with many relapses to less perfect methods.</p> - -<p>The Legation had during my absence asked for instructions about a -possible eventual decision to recognize the new form of government. -It had suggested that acceptability to the people, and, consequently, -ability to preserve order, should be among the factors determining our -attitude. This position had been approved by the State Department. -In the many conversations I had with the President and members of -the cabinet, I confined myself to expressing the opinion that the -Government would strengthen itself and gain respect at home and abroad -in such measure as it made real use of representative institutions and -encouraged local self-government.</p> - -<p>The Council of State on 6th October passed a law instituting a -national referendum on the question. Each district was to elect one -representative. The delegates from each province were to meet at the -respective provincial capitals and to ballot upon the question. The -election was fixed for the 5th of November, the date for balloting -on the principal issue on November 15th. Those desiring constructive -and progressive action had allied themselves with the monarchical -movement. They hoped to strengthen constitutional practice and -administrative efficiency after the personal ambitions of Yuan Shih-kai -had been realized. With Yuan in the exalted position of Emperor, Mr. -Chow Tsu-chi explained<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> to me, the government itself would be in -the hands of the prime minister and cabinet; they would carry it on -constitutionally and in harmony with the legislative branch. As Mr. -Chow put it: "We shall make Yuan the Buddha in the temple."</p> - -<p>The original promoters of the movement were not wholly pleased with -the efforts to engraft on it principles of constitutional practice -and popular consent. As certain military leaders might resort to a -<i>coup d'état</i> on October 10th, the anniversary of the outbreak of -the revolution in 1911, the review of troops set for that date was -countermanded.</p> - -<p>Mr. Liang Shih-yi and Mr. Chow Tsu-chi afterward explained to me -their preference for the monarchical form. Mr. Liang said: "Chinese -traditions and customs, official and commercial, emphasize personal -relationships. Abstract forms of thinking, in terms of institutions -and general legal principles, are not understood by our people. Under -an emperor, authority would sit more securely, so that it would be -possible to carry through a fundamental financial reform such as that -of the land tax. The element of personal loyalty and responsibility is -necessary to counteract the growth of corruption among officials. The -Chinese cannot conceive of personal duties toward a pure abstraction."</p> - -<p>With President Yuan Shih-kai I had a long interview on October 4th. -He assumed complete indifference as to the popular vote soon to be -taken. "If the vote is favourable to the existing system," he said, -"matters will simply remain as they are; a vote for the monarchy would, -on the contrary, bring up many questions of organization. I favour a -representative parliament, with full liberty of discussion but with -limited powers over finance." Education and expert guidance in the -work of the Government were other things about which he was planning. -"There is a general lack of useful employment," he added with some -hilarity, "on the part of the numerous advisers who hover around the -departments.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> With an administrative reorganization all this will -be changed. These experts will be put to work in helping to develop -administrative activities." And he reverted to his favourite simile of -the infant: "Even if we feel that all their medicine may not be good -for the child, yet we shall let them take it by the hand to help it to -walk."</p> - -<p>It was plain that Yuan Shih-kai, while seeming very detached, was -trying to justify the proposed change on the ground of making the -Government more efficient and giving it also a representative character.</p> - -<p>Doubtless Yuan Shih-kai had thought originally that the Japanese would -not obstruct the movement, though ever since the time of his service -in Korea he had not been favourably regarded by them. His supporters, -indeed, claimed that the assurances first given to Yuan by the -Japanese were strong enough to warrant him in expecting their support -throughout. By the end of October, however, the Japanese Government -came to the conclusion that the project to put Yuan Shih-kai on the -throne should, if possible, be stopped.</p> - -<p>A communication came from Japan to the United States, Great Britain, -France, and Russia, which expressed concern because the monarchical -movement in China was likely to create disturbances and endanger -foreign interests. Japan invited the other powers to join in advising -the Chinese President against continuing this policy. The American -Government declined this invitation, because it did not desire to -interfere in the internal affairs of another country. The other powers, -however, fell in with the Japanese suggestion, and on October 29th the -Japanese Chargé, and the British, French, and Russian ministers, called -at the Foreign Office and individually gave "friendly counsel" to the -effect that it would be desirable to stop the monarchical movement.</p> - -<p>The British minister asked whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs -thought disturbances could surely be prevented; whereat the Chinese -rejoiced, believing it a friendly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> hint that everything would be -well, provided no disturbances should take place. As the machinery -for holding the elections had been set in motion, the Chinese leaders -believed that any action to stop them would bring discredit and loss of -prestige.</p> - -<p>The final voting in the convention of district delegates at Peking, -on December 9th, registered a unanimous desire from the elections of -November 5th to have Yuan Shih-kai assume the imperial dignity. Mr. -Chow Tsu-chi remarked to me: "We tried to get some people to vote in -the negative just for appearance's sake, but they would not do it." -Prince Pu-Lun made the speech nominating Yuan as emperor, which earned -him the resentment of the Manchus. On the basis of these elections, the -acting Parliament passed a resolution bestowing on Yuan Shih-kai the -imperial title, and calling upon him to take up the duties therewith -connected. He twice rejected the proposal, but when it was sent to him -the third time he submitted, having exhausted the traditional forms of -polite refusal.</p> - -<p>When Yuan was actually elected Emperor, the Entente Powers were -puzzled. They announced that they would await developments. The -Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed them that there would -be some delay, as many preparations were still required before the -promulgation of the empire could be made. But it was generally believed -that the movement had reached fruition. The Russian and French -ministers had already expressed themselves privately as favourable -to recognition. The German and Austrian ministers hastened to offer -Yuan their felicitations, which embarrassed the Chinese not a little. -The majority of foreign representatives at Peking were favourable to -recognizing the new order on January 1st, when the promulgation was -to be made. Messages of devotion and sometimes of fulsome praise came -to the Emperor-elect (already called Ta Huang Ti) from foreigners. -Foreign advisers, including<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> the Japanese but not the Americans, set -forth their devotion in glowing phrases. Doctor Ariga, the Japanese -adviser, expressed his feelings in the traditional language of imperial -ceremony. It was even announced that the new emperor had been prayed -for in foreign Christian churches. I could not, however, verify any -such case.</p> - -<p>Suddenly, on Christmas Day, came the report that an opposition movement -had been started in Yunnan Province.</p> - -<p>A young general, Tsai Ao, who had for a time lived in Peking where he -held an administrative post, had left the capital during the summer -and had coöperated with Liang Chi-chao, after the latter resigned -his position as Minister of Education. Liang Chi-chao attacked the -monarchical movement in the press, writing from the foreign concession -at Tientsin. General Tsai Ao returned to his native Yunnan, and from -that mountain fastness launched a military expedition which was opposed -to the Emperor-elect.</p> - -<p>So the dead unanimity was suddenly disrupted. Now voices of opposition -came from all sides. The Chinese are fatalists. The movement to -carry Yuan into imperial power had seemed to them irresistible; many -had therefore suppressed their doubts and fears. But when an open -opposition was started they flocked to the new standard and everywhere -there appeared dissenters.</p> - -<p>A small mutiny took place in Shantung early in December. In the -Japanese papers it was called "premature."</p> - -<p>A night attack was executed near Shanghai on the settlement boundary, -which was participated in by several Japanese. Being easily suppressed, -it was not thought important.</p> - -<p>Yuan Shih-kai had long been in training for the emperorship, he loved -to use the methods of thought and expression of legendary monarchs. -Keeping close to national traditions in the days of his power he always -took care to use words indicative of self-deprecation and consideration -for his sub<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span>ordinates. The members of the cabinet repaired on December -13th to the President's house to offer their congratulations. -Replying, the Emperor-elect said: "I should rather be condoled with -than congratulated; for I am giving up my personal freedom and that -of my descendants for the public service. I would find far greater -satisfaction in leisurely farming and fishing on my Honan estate than -in this constant tussling with problems of state."</p> - -<p>When one of the ministers suggested that there should be a great -celebration of the new departure, Yuan Shih-kai replied: "It would be -better not to think of celebrating and of glory at the present time, -but only of work, and work, and work. My government should be improved -and soundly established. In that case, glory will ultimately come, but -otherwise, if artificially enacted, it is bound to be shortlived."</p> - -<p>These sayings were reported by his faithful ministers as being quite in -keeping with the character of a self-sacrificing, benevolent monarch.</p> - -<p>The empire to be established was to be quite <i>comme il faut</i>; it -was to have a complete ornamentation of newly made nobility. The -Vice-President was to have the title of prince, and there were to be -innumerable marquises, counts, and barons. The military governors -and members of cabinet were to become dukes and marquises, while -the barons would be as many as the sands of the sea. The attitude -of Vice-President Li Yuan-hung was not quite plain. Aside from the -princedom he was also offered the marriage of one of his sons to one -of Yuan's daughters. One of his wives seemed especially fascinated by -these glittering honours; she was said to have virtually prevailed upon -General Li to resign himself to the situation. The President was very -kind to him and had supplied him with a bodyguard which watched his -every movement—for Yuan Shih-kai's information.</p> - -<p>New styles of robes for the Emperor and for his high officials and -attendants were designed under direction of Mr.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> Chu Chi-chien. They -were fashioned after the ceremonial robes of the Japanese Imperial -House. The great coronation halls in the Imperial City were thoroughly -cleansed and repainted. New carpets were ordered; the making of -a nicely upholstered throne was entrusted to Talati's, a general -merchandise house in Peking, which fact greatly amused Countess -Ahlefeldt.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, with foresight and astuteness, General Tsai Ao and Liang -Chi-chao were planning their movement against Yuan. By establishing the -first independent government in the remote province of Yunnan they made -sure that Yuan Shih-kai would be unable to vindicate his authority over -all China at an early time. With Yunnan as starting point, it was hoped -that the provinces of Kweichow, Kuangsi, and Szechuan could be induced -to associate themselves with the anti-monarchist movement. Though -Canton had a large garrison of Yuan's troops, it was hoped that inroads -would be made even there.</p> - - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Mr. Liang Chi-chao wrote a characteristic letter of -resignation to the President: -</p> -<p> -"On a previous occasion, I had the honour to apply to Your Excellency -for leave to resign and in answer to my request, Your Excellency -granted me two months' sick leave. This shows the magnanimity and -kindness of Your Excellency toward me. -</p> -<p> -"The recent state of my health is by no means improved. The 'pulses' -in my body have become swollen and I am often attacked by fits of -dizziness. My appearance looks healthy, but my energy and spirit have -become exhausted. Different medicines have been prescribed by the -doctors, but none has proved effective. My ill-health has been chiefly -caused by my doctors' 'misuse of medicine.' I have lately been often -attacked by fits of cold, which cause me sleepless nights. I am quite -aware of the gravity of my disease and unless I give up all worldly -affairs, I am afraid that my illness will be beyond hope of cure. -</p> -<p> -"In different places in America, the climate is mild and good for -invalids. I have now made up my mind to sail for the new continent to -recuperate my health. There I shall consult the best physicians for the -care of my health. I am longing to spend a vacation in perfect ease -and freedom from worldly cares in order to recuperate my health. I am -sailing immediately. I hereby respectfully bring this to the notice of -Your Excellency." -</p> -<p> -He did not, however, proceed to America.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XVI" id="CHAPTER_XVI">CHAPTER XVI</a></p> - -<p class="center">DOWNFALL AND DEATH OF YUAN SHIH-KAI</p> - - -<p>Everybody thought that the monarchy was to be proclaimed on New Year's -Day, 1916. Disaffection, it was realized, though hitherto confined to -a remote province, might spread; delay was dangerous. Business in the -Yangtse Valley and elsewhere was dull. Merchants blamed the Central -Government, and murmurings were heard. General Feng Kuo-chang, who had -at first encouraged Yuan Shih-kai, now reserved his independence of -action.</p> - -<p>The revolt remained localized in Yunnan throughout January. With -the rise of an opposition, Yuan was now more ready to accentuate -the constitutional character of the new monarchy. His Minister of -Finance, Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, told me that a constitutional convention -would be convoked when the monarchy was proclaimed. This would provide -a representative assembly and a responsible cabinet. Constructive -reforms were to be announced. No further patents of nobility were to be -awarded, the titles already granted would be treated as purely military -honours.</p> - -<p>If Yuan and his advisers had acted boldly at this time in promulgating -the monarchy, recognition by a number of powers would probably -have followed, especially as the continuity of the personnel of -the Government made recognition easier. But hesitation and delay -strengthened the opposition. Yunnanese troops had by the end of January -penetrated into the neighbouring provinces of Szechuan and Kuangsi. To -learn what was going on in these provinces I sent the military attaché, -Major Newell, up the Yangtse River to Szechuan, and the naval attaché, -Lieut.-Commander<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> Hutchins, to Canton. Efforts of the generals loyal to -Yuan to expel the Yunnanese from Szechuan Province were unsuccessful.</p> - -<p>After the peculiarly complex manner of Chinese political relationships, -Yunnan began to exercise an influence in Szechuan Province which was -to last for years. The Yunnanese were protected by natural barriers -of mountains; to make headway against them was difficult, even had -the troops of the President shown greater energy. How hollow was -the unanimity which had been proclaimed in the November elections -now became thoroughly apparent. Encouraged by the open opposition, -ill-will against Yuan Shih-kai began to be shown in other localities, -particularly in Hunan and in the southernmost provinces, Kuangsi and -Kuangtung. Rivalries hitherto held in check by Yuan's strong hand also -came to the fore. In central China the two men holding the greatest -military power, Generals Feng Kuo-chang and Chang Hsun, began to -cherish resentment against the President; for, in exchanging notes upon -meeting, they discovered that Yuan had set each of them to watch the -other.</p> - -<p>Even now the monarchical movement might have gained strength from -the moderates, who feared the Japanese. They did not wish to see the -national unity disrupted. "Get a constitution and a representative -legislature," they advised Yuan Shih-kai; "put in play a constructive -programme of state action; reform the finances and the audit, simplify -the taxes, extend works of public use, build roads, reclaim lands, -develop agriculture and industry, and all might yet be well." Mr. Liang -Shih-yi and Mr. Chow Tsu-chi hoped, once the question of succession was -definitely settled, to "put in commission" the dictatorial power of -Yuan. As Mr. Chow this time put it: "Yuan will have the seat of honour -but others will order the meal."</p> - -<p>Toward the end of January the formal proclamation of the empire was -further postponed. Mr. Chow Tsu-chi was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> to go on a special mission to -Japan, probably to induce the Japanese Government to be more favourable -to the new monarchy, and to bear handsome concessions to the Japanese. -But the Japanese Government declared that for personal reasons the -Emperor of Japan could not receive a Chinese embassy at that time. -Possibly various other concessionaire governments intimated to Japan -that they did not expect her to entertain any special proposals at this -time. Nevertheless, the Japanese must have made strong representations -to cause Yuan Shih-kai, who was a decisive and determined man, to risk -all by hesitating at this critical moment.</p> - -<p>To present some Americans I called on Yuan Shih-kai on February 16th. -Mr. and Mrs. Ulysses S. Grant were visiting Peking, and Yuan was -glad to have me present the son of the famous American President who -had himself visited China and established cordial relations with Li -Hung-chang, Yuan's great master. Significantly the President said to -Mr. Grant: "Your honoured father had great power, but he could safely -resign it to others when the time came. You have great political -experience in the West." It was quite a little party, including -the newly appointed commercial attaché, Mr. Julean H. Arnold; the -commandant of the guard, Colonel Wendell C. Neville; and two young -writers, Miss Emerson and Miss Weil, who have since devoted themselves -to Far Eastern studies and literary work. While the Emperor-elect -betrayed traces of strain and worry, he had his accustomed genial -manners. Apropos of the commercial attaché and the commandant he made -a little pleasantry about commerce and war coming hand in hand. After -a brief interview the visitors were taken by the master of ceremonies -to see the gardens, while I remained with Yuan Shih-kai for a long -conversation. This was interpreted by Doctor Tenney and by Dr. Hawkling -L. Yen, of the Foreign Office; it was understood by us all that the -conversation was personal and unofficial.</p> - -<p>"I have not sought new honours and responsibilities, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> now that a -course of action has been formally decided upon, it is my duty to carry -it out," Yuan said. "The people coöperated in this, I desire that they -shall coöperate at all times."</p> - -<p>I asked how soon he would announce definitely his constitutional -policy. I had some doubt as to how far he intended to apply any, -and his answer was evasive. "It is hard," he replied, "to make a -constitution before the monarchy is actually reëstablished. Then, -too, if the Emperor heads the Government, the powers of departments -under him would need to be more restricted than under a republic." His -advisers, it seemed, were unduly optimistic in expecting Yuan to stand -squarely for constitutional government, with power devolving on the -parliament and the different departments. I reminded him of the British -monarchy in its various historic forms to refute his idea.</p> - -<p>"Well," he responded, "the new constitution must wait for a People's -Convention. This is soon to be called; its action must not be in any -way anticipated."</p> - -<p>He then fell back on his record, stating that he had pressed the Manchu -Government to adopt a constitution. He also referred to the title -chosen for his reign, "Hung Hsien," which means "great constitutional -era."</p> - -<p>A mandate of February 22nd announced the postponement of formal -accession to the throne. Mr. C.C. Wu, who brought me information -concerning certain state plans of Yuan Shih-kai, said that this mandate -would put an end to the innumerable petitions sent to accelerate the -formal coronation. He added that essentially the Government, so far as -domestic matters were concerned, was already a monarchy, that only in -its international aspects had it failed to assume this character.</p> - -<p>Suddenly, on March 18th, the Province of Kuangsi demanded the -cancellation of the monarchy; events were moving more rapidly.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span></p> - -<p>At this juncture I had to decide whether to allow the Lee Higginson -loan to be completed without a caution or warning, or to assume -responsibility of virtually stopping that transaction. As soon as it -became clear that open opposition to Yuan Shih-kai's government was no -longer confined to one province and its immediate sphere of influence, -it seemed no longer proper for any American institution to furnish -money to the Chinese Government. Many appeals had been made by the -Opposition based on the demand that, since the country was divided, no -loans should be made to the Government. In ordinary circumstances the -protests of factions would not have weight, but when several provinces -expressed their disapproval of a basic governmental policy the case was -different. To have to counsel delay in execution of the loan agreement -was intensely disappointing to me, fervently as I had wished the -American financiers to participate in Chinese finance, in order that -credit and resources might be organized and developed for the benefit -of all. Unfortunately, in the lull after the disposal of the twenty-one -demands the Chinese had immediately embarked on this doubtful political -enterprise, consuming precious energies and money. The sums spent on -military expeditions, in favourably attuning doubtful military leaders, -and in the creation of the alleged unanimous consent through a popular -vote, had been thrown away. They merely added to the burdens carried by -the Chinese people.</p> - -<p>With the disaffection of yet more provinces the Government on March -22nd promulgated a decree cancelling the monarchy, and announcing that -Yuan Shih-kai would retain the Presidency of the Republic.</p> - -<p>This sudden and unilateral concession, without a guaranteed <i>quid pro -quo</i> by way of submission to the Central Government by the revolting -forces, came as a surprise. Doubtless the step was taken because -the President feared that the Province of Kuangtung, whose military -governor had urged<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> him to compromise, would join the revolutionaries. -Moreover, the former Secretary of State, Hsu Shih-chang, who had been -in retirement, advised it. The Anhui Party in Peking saw an opportunity -to regain control and oust the Cantonese leaders, in whose hands the -monarchical movement had been since August. The President believed -that the return of such men as Hsu Shih-chang and Tuan Chi-jui would -strengthen him in the eyes of the revolutionists. Hsu Shih-chang -personally had lived up to the canons of Confucian morality in failing -to approve the action of Yuan Shih-kai when he tried to assume the rank -of his former master, the Emperor. This gained him universal respect -in China. But his impelling motive was personal loyalty to the old -Imperial Family rather than attachment to its government.</p> - -<p>Of course, the cancellation of the monarchy failed to satisfy the -revolutionists. They interpreted it as a confession of weakness and -defeat. Nor was it more welcome to the adherents of the President -in the provinces, especially the military, who felt that he was -surrendering without getting anything in return. Thus the President -lost his friends and failed to placate his enemies. Had the southern -leaders been content, the chastened Yuan might have been satisfied to -be formal head of a constitutional government. But they were not. His -authority and prestige had been too gravely compromised; revolutionists -were appearing in various parts of China; Tsingtau was being used as -a base for revolutionary activities in the Province of Shantung with -connivance of the Japanese authorities. The Peking Government was -thrown into confusion. The official world was apprehensive as to what -the President would do, while the foreign community feared military -riots.</p> - -<p>The leaders of the so-called Anhui Party had evidently expected that -it would be easy to proscribe the Cantonese leaders, Liang Shih-yi, -Chow Tsu-chi, lately Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, and Chu -Chi-chien, Minister of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> the Interior, and have them banished or -executed. But contrary to their expectations these men did not at -that critical time take to the woods. To the amusement of everyone, -the leaders of the other party then became frightened and began to -remove their families from Peking and to plan for places of safety -for themselves. With somewhat grim humour, Minister Chu Chi-chien -declared that as conditions in Peking were perfectly normal, and as any -unwarranted show of nervousness by officials would tend unnecessarily -to disturb the populace, officials would no longer be permitted to -remove their families from the city.</p> - -<p>It now became a question whether Yuan Shih-kai could remain even as -President. I had a conversation with Mr. Hioki, the Japanese minister, -who spoke at length about the shortcomings of Yuan, and his tendency to -use all the functions of state, including particularly the financial, -to satisfy his personal ambitions. Mr. Hioki did not believe that Yuan -Shih-kai could possibly restore his authority. The month of April was -a period of great depression in Peking. All constructive work, and -even planning therefor, had been entirely suspended. The new ministry -came in on April 24th, under General Tuan Chi-jui as Minister of War. -This fact indicated shiftings of power, as General Tuan had never -supported the President in his imperialist ambitions. The Cantonese -leaders stepped out of the Government, maintaining their influence -thereafter by the familiar methods of Liang Shih-yi. Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, -who belonged to the Communications Party, but had been specializing -in establishing closer relations with the Japanese, became Minister -of Communications. The President agreed to turn over to the cabinet -full governmental powers, and to make the ministers responsible to the -national parliament, which was to be summoned forthwith. Yuan ceased -his personal control over all important branches of the Administration. -The control of the army was transferred from the President to the -Board of War. He<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> was stripped of all military forces but his Honanese -bodyguard, which numbered about twenty thousand.</p> - -<p>The name of Yuan Shih-kai, however, was retained as a symbol of -authority, for all the military leaders owed him allegiance. Mr. Liang -Shih-yi, as president of the Bank of Communications, still controlled -the finances, and his associate, Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, was placed in charge -of the Bank of China.</p> - -<p>The Government was driven to such extremes by its financial needs that -in May the cabinet declared a moratorium suspending specie payments -on notes of the government banks. The term "moratorium," which had -just then come into prominence in Europe, was greeted by the Chinese -financiers as the password to save them—a respectable name for -what was otherwise not so honourable. Through this step, whatever -confidence still remained in Yuan Shih-kai was dissipated. Because of -the complex nature of Chinese affairs peculiar consequences followed. -Thus, the postal administration offices and those of certain railways -independently announced that they would not accept notes but would -demand payment in silver.</p> - -<p>All reports of local troubles coming from reliable sources in various -parts of China spoke of the participation of Japanese in revolutionary -activities. Specific reports from Shantung indicated that the -revolutionaries there were favoured by the Japanese. At Tsingtau -bandits had come over from Manchuria and were openly drilling early -in May under the noses of the Japanese military. About a thousand -of these rebels left Tsingtau on May 4th over the Shantung railway, -carrying machine guns to the centre of the province, where they took -part in the disturbances. Meanwhile, the same railway, under Japanese -control, had refused to carry Chinese government troops on the ground -that neutrality must be maintained. When questioned about the rebels -transported, the railway officials stated that the rebels must have -been in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> civilian clothes and must have carried their armament as -baggage.</p> - -<p>It is not clear whether the Japanese were systematically working -for the establishment of an independent government in the south, or -whether they were merely covertly encouraging opposition to the Central -Government, to foment division and unrest. But the plans of Japan for -gaining a dominant position in China were certainly favoured by the -final breakdown of the authority of Yuan Shih-kai.</p> - -<p>Japanese correspondents at this time started the report that Chinese -merchants in the Yangtse Valley were so provoked with Americans for -making a loan to the Chinese Government—the Lee Higginson loan—that -they were planning a boycott against American goods. The Japanese -paper, <i>Shun Tim Shih Pao</i>, incidentally drew on its imagination, and -published a yarn to the effect that in addition to the $5,000,000 loan -already agreed to, the American firm had promised to hand over to the -Peking authorities $15,000,000 before the end of July. As a matter -of fact, beyond the original payment of $1,000,000, nothing was ever -paid over. The Chinese did not take up the suggestion of a boycott; -although, had the making of the loan proceeded, such a result might -have followed. In Peking, on the other hand, the Japanese tried to -impress upon Chinese officials that the non-completion of the Lee -Higginson loan offered new proof that Americans could not be relied -upon when it came to a showdown.</p> - -<p>Throughout this difficult period the European Allied Powers felt that -they lacked a free hand, and that any joint action undertaken might -easily assume such form as to create a Japanese hegemony. The Japanese -at all times urged that as they were on the spot it would be only -natural to entrust them with the representation of the interests of the -Allies. Many representative Europeans in China plainly intimated to us -the hope that the American Government<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> might show a strong interest in -Chinese affairs, and might not fail to insist on the maintenance of -existing treaty rights and of Chinese sovereignty.</p> - -<p>I knew from the Chinese who saw him daily that Yuan Shih-kai suffered -under the strain of his troubles and disappointment. As early as March -Mr. Liang Tun-yen besought me to visit the President and give him -encouragement, as worry and despair were breaking him down. Yuan had -lived a sedentary life of intense work and great responsibility. He -had developed Bright's disease, but his strong constitution had fought -it off. Now when great trouble beset him his strength failed. Mr. Chow -Tzu-chi remarked to me: "The President's power of quick decision has -left him; he is helpless in the troublesome alternatives that confront -him. Formerly it was 'yes' or 'no' in an instant, to my proposals. Now -he ruminates, and wavers, and changes a decision many times." Yuan -contemplated resignation, and seemed taken with the idea of visiting -America. I was sounded as to giving him safe conduct and asylum. The -Opposition, it seemed, would make no objection to his leaving the -country. He was confined to his room during the latter half of May, but -continued to give his personal attention to telegrams and important -correspondence. In the first days of June his health seemed to improve. -I went with my family to Peitaiho to instal them in their summer -residence, and to rest for a few days. I had left a special code with -Mr. MacMurray, in which the word <i>Pan</i> stood for Yuan Shih-kai. I was -shocked on the afternoon of June 6th to receive the brief telegram: -"Pan is dead."</p> - -<p>By the night train I returned to the capital. Yuan's sons, the -ex-Premier Hsu Shih-chang, and several officials close to the -President, were with him when he died. During the night he had made -solemn declaration to the ex-Premier that it had not been his wish -to become Emperor; he had been deceived into believing that the step -was demanded by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> public, and was necessary to the country. After -saying this he seemed exhausted, and continued to sink until the end -came. He had weakened himself and further aggravated his illness by -indiscriminately taking medicine prescribed by a foreign physician -together with all sorts of Chinese remedies which his women urged upon -him.</p> - -<p>The ministers of the Allied Powers at once called on General Tuan to -inquire whether the Government was prepared to prevent disorders. Some -time previously the Japanese minister had asked me whether I would -consider it suitable for the diplomatic corps, in the event of danger -of disturbances, to make such an inquiry. I felt it unnecessary and -undesirable, as it might cause apprehension among the public.</p> - -<p>The German and Austrian commandants were included in the conference to -agree on measures of protection—probably the only instance during the -war where the belligerents of both sides met to consider common action. -Subsequently the Belgian minister requested the American Legation to -take over the patrol of the city wall immediately back of the Belgian -Legation, which had thus far had German sentinels. It illustrates the -complexity of all things in China that, as late as 1916, German troops -were concerned in the formal protection of the Belgian Legation.</p> - -<p>Yuan Shih-kai before his death wrote a declaration to the effect -that in the event of his disability the Presidency should devolve on -General Li Yuan-hung. The accession of the Vice-President was announced -immediately. The members of the cabinet, as well as Prince Pu-Lun, as -chairman of the State Council, waited on President Li on the 7th of -June; with a simple ceremonial, including three deferential bows, the -cabinet expressed its allegiance to the new President. He was accepted -peaceably and with unanimity by all the provinces.</p> - -<p>General Tuan Chi-jui and Mr. Liang Shih-yi coöperated in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> arranging -for the transfer of authority to the new President. That this was done -so quietly and in so orderly a fashion caused the foreigners to regard -Chinese republicanism with much higher respect.</p> - -<p>The body of Yuan was not transferred from Peking to his Honan home -until June 28th, when the mausoleum on the ancestral estate was ready. -As part of the Imperial movement, Yuan Shih-kai had previously begun -the construction of this large tomb. The commemorative ceremony took -place on the 26th in Peking. The great hall of the Presidential palace, -where we had often witnessed New Year receptions and other festivities, -was used. There were gathered the foreign representatives with their -staffs and the high officials of the Chinese Republic. It was a strange -mingling of old and new. The President's body lay on a high catafalque, -in the very place where he had so often received us. In front of the -entrance to the inner apartments stood rows of tables bearing the usual -funeral offerings as well as the weapons, clothes, and other objects of -personal use of the departed. Here were gorgeous Mandarin coats of the -old régime, including the famous Yellow Jacket, and generals' uniforms -of the new, and innumerable decorations sent by all the countries -bestowing such honours; also tall riding boots, soft Chinese slippers, -long native pipes and foreign smoking sets, swords, and pistols.</p> - -<p>The service was a litany conducted by Lama priests from temples -in Peking and Mongolia. Some of the priests wore a huge headdress -resembling a dragoon's helmet; others, a large round hat not unlike -that of a cardinal. As they intoned the ritual their deep voices rolled -as if they issued from an underground cavern. The music accompanying -the singing was Chinese, supplied by flutes and stringed instruments; -but at the beginning the President's band had played a Western funeral -march. The second part of the service consisted of the burning of -incense in memory of the departed.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> First, the sons of Yuan, wearing -the white garments of mourners, came forth from an inner apartment and -took their station before the catafalque. They prostrated themselves, -struck their foreheads heavily against the floor, and wailed with loud -voices. Yuan Ko-ting, as chief mourner, offered sacrifice. Meanwhile, -the women of the Presidential household peered through the windows of -the apartments which opened into the central hall.</p> - -<p>When the sons of Yuan had withdrawn, the singing of the priests was -taken up again, now in a different key and accompanied by the tinkling -of many bells clear as silver, but some of them as deep as the sea. -Buddhist prayers were intoned in voices sonorous and deep as the grave. -The new President next offered sacrifice at the bier of his predecessor.</p> - -<p>What contrasts of character and aims, what mingling of old and new -forces, what a rush of incongruous ideas and practices were typified in -this ceremony, with all its accompaniments! And these were embodied, -too, in the personality of the dead leader and in his successor!</p> - -<p>The foreign representatives next paid their respect to the memory of -Yuan. We rose and each in turn deposited before the catafalque a huge -wreath, and returned after making the customary three bows of high -ceremony. Following the diplomats came the Secretary of State and high -Chinese officials, as well as the foreign advisers.</p> - -<p>The procession to the railway station, on June 28th, testified to -the genius of the Chinese for pageantry. They had preserved some of -the colour and brilliance of an Imperial procession, and what was -remarkable, had so arranged the parade that the modern elements—troops -in modern uniform, brass bands, officials in evening dress, and -diplomats in their varied uniforms—myself alone wearing ordinary -civilian dress—did not impart to the pageant a jarring note. In fact, -throughout the ceremony at the palace and the subsequent procession, -there was a gratifying absence of disso<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span>nance, notwithstanding the -multifariousness of the elements included.</p> - -<p>The huge catafalque upon which the body of Yuan lay was borne by a -hundred men by means of a complicated arrangement of poles. It was -covered with crimson silk embroidered in gold; its imperial splendour -accentuated the tragedy of the occasion. Old Chinese funeral customs, -such as the throwing into the air of paper resembling money, were -observed. Heading the procession rode twenty heralds, then followed -in succession three large detachments of infantry, bearing their arms -reversed. Between each two detachments marched a band. After the -infantry came Chinese musicians, playing weirdly plaintive strains -on their flutes. Then came the beautiful and fascinating part of the -cortège—a large squadron of riders in old Chinese costume, carrying -huge banners, long triangular pennants, and fretted streamers of many -colours, which, as they floated gracefully in the air, made a charming -picture. The Chinese have a genius for using banners with dazzling -effect. Then followed lancers escorting an empty state carriage; -Buddhist monks beating drums and cymbals; the President's band; long -lines of bearers with sacrificial vessels preceding the sedan chair -in which was set the soul tablet of Yuan; then still other lines of -men bearing the food offerings, the mementoes of Yuan's personal life, -and the wreaths, all from the funeral ceremony of two days before. -High officials came next, on foot, in military uniform or civilian -full dress, and here indeed the frock coats and top hats did seem -somewhat out of keeping. A throng of white-clad mourners preceded the -catafalque; the sons of Yuan walked under a white canopy. Yuan Ko-ting -in the midst of it all seemed a pathetic figure.</p> - -<p>The vast throngs that lined the route behind lines of troops looked -on in respectful silence. There was no sign of grief, rather mute -indifference. Yuan had not won the heart of the people, who regarded -him as a masterful individual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> dwelling in remote seclusion whose -contact with them came through taxes and executions. I believe a -Chinese crowd is incapable of the enthusiastic hero-worship which great -political leaders in the Occident receive. The people have not yet come -to look upon such men as their leaders. The Peking population, imbued -still with traditions of imperial splendour and the remoteness and -semi-divinity of their rulers, are as yet only onlookers at the pageant -of history.</p> - -<p>The tragedy of the great man who had died as a consequence of his -ambition made this occasion impressive to the foreigners present, -even to the most cynical. It was the last act in one of the most -striking dramas of intrigue, achievement, and defeat. The foreign -representatives left the cortège before it issued from the southernmost -gate of the Imperial City, stopping while the mourners and the -catafalque moved past. A piece of paper money thrown into the air -to pacify the spirits fell on me, and I kept it as a characteristic -memento. I walked back to the Legation Quarter with the Russian -minister, Prince Koudacheff, who, like myself, was deeply impressed; we -agreed that in ceremony and pageantry the Chinese stand supreme.</p> - -<p>Thus, with the fluttering of bright banners and the wailing of the reed -flutes, another crowded chapter in the history of the new China drew to -its close.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XVII" id="CHAPTER_XVII">CHAPTER XVII</a></p> - -<p class="center">REPUBLICANS IN THE SADDLE</p> - - -<p>The passing of Yuan Shih-kai left the ground clear for the nurturing of -a real republic in China. Would those in control be real republicans, -or would they be merely politicians? Politics, with all that this term -implies in modern times, was exotic, its importation into China might -have disastrous results. Concentration on industry, on local government -by the Chinese people, and the building up from these of a sound -and democratic national consciousness were needed. It was upon this -foundation that Li Yuan-hung might have founded his rule.</p> - -<p>His first reception to foreign ministers was given by President Li -Yuan-hung shortly after the funeral of Yuan Shih-kai. Li had removed -from the island in the Imperial City before the death of Yuan; and this -was a step toward freedom, though he had continued to be surrounded -with guards ostensibly for his protection, but really there to watch -him and restrict his movements. His friends were still apprehensive -for his safety, and I was repeatedly approached with inquiries as to -whether in case of need I should receive him at the American Legation, -or possibly, even, send a guard detachment to bring him in. The latter -I could not do; but, while it is not proper to give specific assurances -of protection in advance, I could say that it was customary to grant -asylum to political refugees. I learned that some Americans were ready -to try a rescue of the Vice-President should his situation become -perilous. Upon the death of Yuan Shih-kai, General Li's situation of -uncertainty and danger was ended at least for a while.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span></p> - -<p>He received the diplomats in a private residence, whence he did not -remove to the palace for several months. The ceremony was simple. -The foreign representatives were introduced in three groups: Allies, -Neutrals, and Central Powers. The President received us standing, -attended by his ministers and twelve generals, all in uniform. -General Tuan Chi-jui looked disconsolate, standing with bent head and -with epaulets sloping down on his chest. I do not know whether his -spirit was as sad as his outward demeanour, but he probably saw many -difficulties ahead. The President made a few remarks of a friendly -nature, but throughout he looked far more serious than was his wont; -and his face was not wreathed in smiles.</p> - -<p>On the afternoon of the day of Yuan's funeral I visited the new -President informally; passing through several interior courts where -soldiers were on guard and through a smiling flower garden I came -into the library, simply furnished, where the President was working. -Piles of papers and books on the desk and side tables indicated that -he had been seeking information from many sources. We spent an hour -or so discussing the political situation. He felt relieved at being -no longer guarded and confined; but his newly acquired state had not -changed his simplicity of manner. Quite in his usual optimistic mood, -he said: "I have found a way to secure the coöperation of all factions. -I will declare the Provisional Constitution of 1912 to be in force, and -summon the old parliament; but its membership should be reduced by one -half; it is too unwieldy. It will be summoned for this purpose only and -to finish the Constitution; the reduction will come by amending the -parliamentary election law."</p> - -<p>I asked the President whether he did not consider it impossible thus to -limit the function of the parliament, when once it was summoned. Would -it not, I asked, almost certainly try to assume a controlling power in -the Government,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> and would not this, in the absence of mature leaders, -cause confusion?</p> - -<p>"No," the President insisted; "the parliament will be confined to the -specific function indicated by me."</p> - -<p>As the community of Americans at Shanghai had repeatedly invited -me to come to that city, I carried out a long-delayed intention by -journeying southward to celebrate the Fourth of July there. My chief -engagement—following, among others, an address at the Commencement -exercises at St. John's University, an American University Club lunch, -a reception given in my honour on the Flagship <i>Brooklyn</i>—was an -address before the American Chamber of Commerce at dinner in the Palace -Hotel, on July 1st. I spoke about the requirements of the new period -upon which American commercial interests in the Far East were entering. -In European countries and Japan, I said, the relation between the -Government and the large industries and banking institutions is close. -Together they develop national enterprise abroad. Not so in America. -The Government and the concentrated capital of the United States do -not act as a unit in foreign affairs. We believe that it is better to -leave the initiative to private enterprise, confining the action of the -Government to protecting opportunities for commerce abroad. In their -work of organization, American merchants and representatives have the -function of discovering, testing, and approving commercial policies and -projects which are to be executed with home capital. On their wisdom -and experience in China, New York and Chicago have to rely.</p> - -<p>At the reception given by the Consul-General in Shanghai on the Fourth -of July, I met Mr. Tang Shao-yi, the Kuo Min Tang leader who had -been Premier and Minister of Finance in the first cabinet under the -Republic. I found him unprepared to assume any responsible part in -politics, although the prominence of his opposition to Yuan Shih-kai -might have made him ready to help. As President Li had urged him to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> -come to Peking, Mr. Tang said he would go when parliament had been -reconvoked. But I apprehended and understood from others that he was -loth to go because his enemies in Peking were still too powerful.</p> - -<p>After a brief vacation at the summer residence of my family at -Peitaiho, whither I had proceeded on the U.S. ship <i>Cincinnati</i>, I -returned to Peking on the 27th of July, as much business awaited me -there.</p> - -<p>A change of government took place. The appointment of a new cabinet -was announced on June 30, 1916, with a personnel completely different -from that under Yuan Shih-kai. Mr. Tang did not leave Shanghai. A -provisional cabinet was therefore constituted under General Tuan -Chi-jui, Dr. Chen Chin-tao acting as Minister of Finance and Mr. Hsu -Shih-ying as Minister of Communications. I had long known Doctor -Chen, who had received his education in the United States and had -lived abroad many years as Financial Commissioner of the Chinese -Government. He was one of the few men in Chinese official life familiar -with Western finance and banking—a scholarly man, slow and somewhat -heavy in speech and manner, studious, and desirous of carrying modern -methods of efficiency and careful audit into all branches of the -Administration. Everyone met him with confidence.</p> - -<p>The southern leaders did not come to Peking because they wished -their complete ascendency to be recognized before taking part in the -Government. Their demands that the Constitution of 1912 be revived -and that Parliament be restored had been complied with. They further -insisted on punishment for the leaders of the monarchical movement. -Accordingly, on July 13th a mandate was issued providing for the -arrest and trial of eight public men, including Liang Shih-yi, Chu -Chi-chien, and Chow Tsu-chi. All of these men happened to be beyond -the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government, so the mandate had the -effect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> only of a decree of exile. General Tuan, the Premier, smilingly -remarked in cabinet meeting that if the monarchists were really to be -punished, few men in public life would go free.</p> - -<p>With an entirely new personnel of government, all threads of -negotiations, past and present, had to be taken up anew. I was already -acquainted with the Premier and with Doctor Chen, but the other cabinet -members I had met casually or not at all. With Doctor Chen and his -associate of the Ministry of Finance, Mr. Hsu Un-yuen, who had been -appointed managing director of the Bank of China, and with General Hsu -Shu-cheng, the Premier's chief assistant, I frequently talked over -the financial situation of China. The monarchical movement had been -defeated, the Republic more firmly established; now, they suggested, it -was highly appropriate for America to support China financially. They -requested that the loan contract made by Lee, Higginson & Company be -carried out, and further steps taken for strengthening and organizing -Chinese credit.</p> - -<p>I told the Premier about the railway and canal negotiations. He wished -to encourage American participation in Chinese development, but did not -commit himself on the new American proposals. On the matter of a loan -he reënforced the position taken by the Minister of Finance and General -Hsu. General Tuan had won the confidence of the Chinese people through -his disapproval of Yuan's monarchical ambitions, and now occupied a -strong position. "I do not expect much good," he said, "from the return -of parliament; there will be endless party struggles and interference -with the Administration. But as to this curious modern method of -governing through talk, which fundamentally I see no virtue in, I am -willing to give it a fair trial."</p> - -<p>When I called on the Minister of Communications, I took care that the -conversation should be, not on business, but on literature and the -surroundings of Peking. He liked<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> calligraphy; also, he had written -short literary pieces, one of which was a poetical description of the -Summer Palace. After a pleasant hour with tea the minister escorted me -not only through all the various gates of the inner courts, but to the -very door of my carriage. One of my colleagues on his initial visit -to the minister had a less fortunate experience. The interview, which -concerned a certain action long delayed, was somewhat spirited, for the -diplomat insisted with great emphasis that something be done forthwith. -By contrast the minister made me specially welcome, pleased that I -did not immediately descend upon him with demands. When, thereafter, -matters of business had to be taken up, there was the same cordiality, -even when difficult things were discussed.</p> - -<p>During the first month of its renewed life, beginning the 1st of -August, the parliament did nothing to justify the unfavourable -expectations of its critics. It was not rash or irresponsible, its -members subordinated their private and partisan views to the urgent -needs of national unity and coöperation. The military party pursued -a waiting policy, seeming ready to give parliament a chance to show -what it could do. Meanwhile, the financial situation of the Government -became difficult, as the provinces had not yet been prevailed upon to -give adequate support.</p> - -<p>Among the newly arrived leaders of the democratic party whose abilities -and character I was appraising was Mr. Sun Hung-yi, the Minister of the -Interior. I went to him, passing through narrow and crooked streets to -his house in a remote part of the city. It was surrounded by military -guards, carriages, and automobiles. The courts swarmed with people; -soldiers were lounging about, while countless long-coated individuals -hurried to and fro or sat in conversation in the rooms or on porches. -Mr. Sun, who met me in an interior apartment, was tall, broad faced, -with sparse whiskers and hair standing up rebelliously in wisps. He<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> -wore a long brown coat, bestowing little care on his appearance. -"The parliament," he said, "cannot confine itself to its principal -task, the finishing of the Constitution; it must also control public -administration."</p> - -<p>A contest for power was inevitable, it seemed, between the Premier and -the parliament.</p> - -<p>Mr. Sun was a typical politician. Here he was, his innumerable -retainers about him, all intent on the game, while he was cunningly -deploying his forces for tactical advantage in politics. He betrayed no -ideas of statesmanship, only a desire for party dominance; though later -he did show signs of developing a broader vision.</p> - -<p>I also met Mr. Ku Chung-hsiu, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, -a most complacent and oily person, who would be recognized the world -over as the suave political manipulator.</p> - -<p>Of such calibre, then, were the men who, under President Li Yuan-hung, -were to lay the foundations of the new government.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="PART_III" id="PART_III">PART III</a></p> - -<p class="center">THE WAR AND CHINA</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XVIII" id="CHAPTER_XVIII">CHAPTER XVIII</a></p> - -<p class="center">AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURS IN PEKING</p> - - -<p>As the second year of the Hwai River conservancy option was about to -expire, something positive had to be done in order to make an actual -beginning on this work. Mr. W.F. Carey, whose various enterprises have -already been referred to, had arrived in Peking in December, 1915, with -his family and a large staff. He brought over his whole organization, -for his firm's arrangements with the New York capitalists made him -feel ready, not only to negotiate, but to start work. He had completed -extensive railway construction work in Canada and the United States; -his organization was ready for China. He was a man accustomed to -attacking his work with full force and getting it out of the way. He -knew there was plenty of work to do in China, and he was ready to start -doing it without delay.</p> - -<p>Tested and highly recommended as the conservancy undertaking had been -by the engineering commission under Colonel Sibert, the financiers -associated with the Siems-Carey Company yet hesitated. It was then -suggested that they do part of the work and reserve an option on the -entire enterprise. The negotiations with Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, Minister of -Finance, developed that the only part which might be dissociated from -the whole was the restoration of the Grand Canal. But it would hardly -be profitable to undertake this unless at least the whole portion from -the Yangtse River to Techow were to be made navigable. Enough traffic -might then be counted upon to afford by means of tolls security for -the loan, together with certain tracts of land which would be drained. -A period of four months was given<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> to investigate the feasibility and -cost of this work, while the option on the more extensive enterprise of -the Hwai River conservancy was extended.</p> - -<p>The men representing American firms who came with Mr. Carey created -in Peking the impression of an onslaught of American enterprise. The -International Banking Corporation and the American International -Corporation had sent a new representative. The firm of Anderson, Meyer -& Company, hitherto Danish, had been acquired by American capital, and -a representative had been sent to Peking. Social life in the American -colony was visibly enlivened by this influx. It was amusing to see -how large groups of people from St. Paul, Kansas City, Chicago, and -various Eastern towns, suddenly planted in these entirely foreign -surroundings, could in an incredibly short time make themselves -thoroughly comfortable, and establish intimate relations with their -new neighbours. The various American representatives took large houses -in the city outside of the Legation Quarter, where they entertained a -great deal.</p> - -<p>But by the legal talent mustered for the negotiations the Chinese were -rather taken aback. Not much given to legal refinements, nor to setting -down in the written contract detailed provisions for every imaginable -contingency, the meticulous care of the American legal draughtsmen -impressed the Chinese as savouring of suspicion.</p> - -<p>Their own business arrangements are more simple and general, with -reliance on a mutual sense of equity; moreover, all contracts with -foreigners had hitherto been made in a less technical manner. An -American lawyer would not be satisfied with this. He would think of -the other corporation lawyers at home, sitting in their offices on -the thirty-fifth floor, to whom the ordinary Chinese way of drawing -up contracts would seem criminally lax. To overcome the concealed -resentment of the Chinese took time, together with much talk about -how the common interest would be pro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span>moted by completely defining all -responsibilities assumed. The argument which really impressed them was -that other foreign nations had frequently interpreted simply drawn -contracts entirely to the disadvantage of the Chinese.</p> - -<p>Mr. Carey, also, did not personally believe in much legal refinement, -but bowed to the mature judgment of the profession. He had won his way -from the ranks, and his Irish originality had not been befogged with -theoretical discussion. He immediately felt at home with the frank and -human Chinese, and constantly had many of them at his house, where they -partook of true American hospitality and shared in frolics of dancing -and poker. The Chinese are fond of this American game, in which human -nature plays so large a part; the impassiveness of their countenance -lends itself admirably to the tactics of poker. It was amusing to hear -Liang Shih-yi, who otherwise spoke not a word of English, enunciate -from behind a pile of chips, in staccato tones: "Full house,"—"Two -pair." This eminent financier was a worthy match for any poker expert.</p> - -<p>Mr. Carey brought his unwarped intelligence to bear with great -freshness on Chinese affairs, which he discussed in the language -of an American contractor and business man who reduced everything -to terms of getting something done. To observe how a man of his -training, instincts, and tradition, so utterly different from the -Chinese, remained in constant, intimate intercourse and joyous mutual -understanding with them, made one believe that there must be real bonds -of sympathy between Americans and the Chinese. Mr. Carey abbreviated -many of the Chinese names, thus making them far more pronounceable. Mr. -Chen Pan-ping, the Minister of Agriculture, thus became Ping-pong; the -Secretary of State, Hsu Shih-chang, was Susie.</p> - -<p>When the preliminary contract for the Grand Canal had been signed, Mr. -Carey and all his associates departed for Shantung and Kiangsu under -the guidance of Mr. Pan Fu, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> young capitalist and official from -Shantung Province, who was anxious to have the constructive work begun -early.</p> - -<p>A mistake made by Americans in other parts of the world was not avoided -in China. Several of the new organizations that came in at this time -and during the war made their entry with a considerable blare of -trumpets and pounding of gongs, announcing the millions that were -backing them and describing the manner in which they would rip things -up generally when they got started. As a great part of international -business is diplomacy, such methods of blatant advertisement are not -best calculated to facilitate the early operations of a new enterprise. -They raise expectations of "easy money" in the people dealt with, -and they engender cynicism and rock-ribbed opposition on the part of -competitors. Great enterprises in foreign trade are usually built up -with quieter methods. My observations on this score by no means refer -to all new American enterprise in China, but there was enough of -this sort of brass-band work to give people an idea that it was the -approved method of American entry into foreign markets. The subsequent -flattening out of several of these loudly heralded ventures did not -help matters.</p> - -<p>I had on February 29th a long interview with Dr. Jeme Tien-yow, an -American-educated engineer, who had won repute through the survey -and construction of the Peking-Kalgan Railway, of which he was chief -engineer. He was looked upon as a living example of what the Chinese -could do for themselves in engineering. At this time he was managing -director of the Hukuang railways. I had had extensive correspondence -with him, directly and through the Consul-General at Hankow with -respect to the engineering standards to be applied on his lines, as it -was difficult to find a middle ground between the American and British -manufacturers and those of other nations concerned. Doctor Jeme was -on the whole favourable to America, but clung to European<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> standards, -much to the disadvantage of American equipment. We went over all the -disputed points with regard to solid cast wheels or tread wheels, -shapes of box cars, types of engines, and so on—a curiously technical -conversation for a foreign minister to hold with a railway director as -a matter of official business. Doctor Jeme was slow, undemonstrative, -quite willing to discuss, but not ready to yield any point in which -he thoroughly believed. The argument cleared up some matters and left -others the subject of continued correspondence.</p> - -<p>I was trying to induce the American group to take the lead in -furnishing funds so that the building of the Szechuan line of -the Hukuang railways could be undertaken. I also hoped that, -notwithstanding the war, the British and French groups might continue -to furnish enough funds to complete the line from Hankow to Canton.</p> - -<p>Doubtless the greatest national need of China was the completion of -these trunk lines, both to connect the north and south of the country, -and to open a land route to Szechuan Province, which could then be -reached only by boat on the Yangtse, subject to all contingencies of -an uncertain and dangerous navigation. It should not have required -argument to induce the capitalists to advance money for a short -railway which would open an inland empire of forty millions of people, -especially when they had already bound themselves by contract to -furnish the funds.</p> - -<p>The $30,000,000 originally advanced had been spent, without more than -two hundred miles of actual construction to show for the vast sum. This -was due partly to the need of buying out earlier Chinese companies -at extravagant figures, but also in large part to the cumbersome and -expensive organization of this international enterprise. Only by -actually finishing one of these basically important lines and putting -it in operation could the money already expended be made to count.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span></p> - -<p>At home the group seemed favourable to going ahead to the completion -of the work. Mr. Willard Straight in February went to London to seek -the consent of the British and French partners. But beyond settling -some minor details about alignments no definite result was secured. -Chinese development was blocked disastrously through this failure to -complete the existing contracts. In comparison with the amounts spent -in Europe by America, the cost of entirely carrying out this enormously -important work would have been infinitesimal; a thousandth part of our -war expense would have permanently changed the face of China.</p> - -<p>Indeed, completion of such an enterprise would far transcend -mere business. What the Chinese needed was the organization of -their national life. In every particular this depended upon -communications—trunk lines north and south, east and west—which would -have largely overcome obstacles to Chinese progress. The nation's mind, -instead of being focussed on building up, unifying, and organizing the -different parts of the country, remained localized and scattered. A -thousand times the energy needed to achieve this unique work was spent -by us in Europe. That is part of the cost of war.</p> - -<p>Mr. Charles Denby, interested in automobile manufacture, called one -morning and asked that I take a motor ride up the Tartar City Wall—a -thing which had never before been attempted. I yielded to the idea, and -without further inquiry joined him, together with the commandant of -the guard, Colonel W.C. Neville. Leaving the rear gate of the Legation -and approaching the broad ramp leading up to the wall, I was surprised -to see gathered there all the American marines, as well as many other -people, including motion-picture men. I had not counted on this -publicity; it was, however, too late to have any regrets, so we were -whisked up the steep incline and took a ride on the top of the great -wall. This first automobile ascension of the monumental structure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> -excited a good deal of attention. A British paper tried to raise a -laugh by ironically criticizing the British minister for not supporting -British industry by taking air flights, or doing other things which -might serve to attract attention to national products. I did not mind -what was said, as I had enjoyed the excitement of the ride.</p> - -<p>Mr. Carey's party had by this time finished its survey. Laborious -negotiations had gone on for an acceptable contract to improve the -ancient Grand Canal. Mr. Carey also sought a contract for the building -of railways. These matters were entrusted to Mr. Roy S. Anderson, -who carried on the detailed negotiations. I had given Mr. Carey an -introduction to the various officials concerned, and had from time -to time supported his efforts, but did not take part in the details. -The business was carried on with Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, the Minister of -Communications, while the canal matter lay with Mr. Chen Pan-ping, -Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, a younger man, educated in Japan -and a member of the Christian Church. Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, the Minister -of Finance, and Mr. Liang Shih-yi, wielded a directing influence in -the negotiations. I was careful to abstain from anything which could -possibly savour of pressure, or a desire to take advantage of the -difficult financial necessities of the Government. The contracts were -made not on the basis of any temporary or local interest, but to -furnish a foundation for long-continued constructive work.</p> - -<p>The Chinese Government gave to the American concern the right to build -fifteen hundred miles of railway, to be selected from five alignments -mentioned in the contract. Mr. Carey started for America on May 18th, -to secure ratification of the agreements. With him he took the most -favourable concessions which the Chinese Government had ever granted to -foreigners. All the most advantageous provisions of former contracts -had been embodied; the American contractors were to get a commission of -10 per<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> cent. on the cost of construction and equipment, and were to -share, also, in the profits of operation. A broad policy of development -was adopted, embracing the encouragement of industries along the -railways to be built.</p> - -<p>The Chinese Government, accustomed to financial support from nations -which had valuable concessions, hoped that the Americans would now -offer such assistance. The concessions were in no sense made dependent -upon loans, but collateral loan negotiations were proceeding, and Mr. -Carey took with him proposals concerning loans and securities offered. -His associates made every effort to secure a loan to China, but as -they now turned over their holdings to the American International -Corporation, and as the latter was negotiating to take over the -American group agreements with Great Britain, Russia, France, and -Japan, the matter became hopelessly tangled up with international -affairs and no action resulted. The Americans understood that Japan -would coöperate in a joint loan but would oppose any separate action -by the United States. American finance was still too provincial to -act independently in such a matter. Also it would approach each piece -of business as a separate unit, not ready to exert itself in behalf -of a loan in order to create a more favourable situation for other -transactions. European and Japanese combinations in China took a -different view; they were organized to represent a broad national -interest in Chinese business. While the attitude of individual American -corporations corresponded to the individualism of our business, yet the -national commercial interest of America was bound to suffer because -an organization did not exist which was broadly representative, which -would look upon all parts of Chinese commerce and finance in their -interrelation, and gather from every individual exertion favourable -cumulative effects in other fields of enterprise.</p> - -<p>In yet another respect American practice was unsuited to the conditions -of business in China. After negotiating in a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> painstaking manner for -months, the corporation's representatives had finally signed a formal -agreement that was more advantageous than any ever granted before. The -results of this successful negotiation were set before the home office, -which took the position that its hands were still completely free. The -provisions of the contract were minutely reëxamined; on several points -it was concluded that still more favourable arrangements might be made. -The representatives were instructed to reopen the negotiations, making -the consent of the home corporation dependent on the acceptance of -these additional terms.</p> - -<p>Such a method could not be used in China more than once. The -Chinese expect that when an agreement is arrived at with business -representatives in Peking, it will be adhered to, unless very radical -changes of conditions occur. They have been dealing on this basis with -the agents of European corporations, whose experience is considered -by their home offices as entitling them to handle the details of the -negotiations without reporting minutely to home officials far less -informed than they. To disavow the activity of a local representative -in China, except under absolute necessity, is to discredit the whole -negotiation. The representative who should wield great influence is -suddenly reduced to the dimensions of a clerk with whom the Chinese -will not take up anything of importance thereafter.</p> - -<p>That the Americans would not make a loan disappointed the Chinese -officials. They were used to looking for financial support to -powerful groups, who desired or had obtained concessions. When, in -addition, proposals came for many changes in the signed contracts, the -displeasure of the Chinese knew no limits. The storm broke just before -the funeral of Yuan Shih-kai. I was appealed to for aid in predisposing -the Chinese officials to look upon the new proposals with more favour. -The Minister of Communications as well as Mr. Chu Chi-chien, the -Minister of the Interior,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> whom I interviewed, were dejected because -the loan had been so abruptly refused. They had counted on America to -take part in Chinese finance, in order that the Chinese Government -might not be entirely at the mercy of the Five-Power Consortium, or -rather of Japan, which was now the only active member of that group. -I tried to explain the action of the Americans on the basis of sound -business practice. I pointed out that in the United States, capital, -industry, and commerce are not mobilized for foreign enterprise as is -the case with the big foreign banking institutions of Europe. I tried -to encourage them to set American firms to doing constructive work in -China, and assured them that out of such relationships there would -naturally grow a readiness to afford financial support.</p> - -<p>They did not dispute my point, but, in the words of Cleveland, they -felt themselves confronted by a condition, not a theory.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XIX" id="CHAPTER_XIX">CHAPTER XIX</a></p> - -<p class="center">GUARDING THE "OPEN DOOR"</p> - - -<p>Negotiations had been proceeding all through the autumn of 1916, -between the Corporation and the Chinese Government, concerning the -modifications which the former desired to introduce into the Grand -Canal contract signed in May. The negotiations on the part of the -Chinese were in the hands of the Minister of Agriculture, and of Mr. -Pan Fu, a young Shantung capitalist and official of progressive ideas. -As the Minister of Agriculture was not well disposed, it was found -difficult to get him to agree to the additional advantages which the -Corporation desired to secure before finally ratifying the contract. -Shortly before Christmas, however, a basis of agreement had been -reached. Just at this time there came from America the astonishing -news that the American corporation had invited Japanese capitalists to -coöperate in this contract, on condition that such coöperation would be -acceptable to the Chinese Government.</p> - -<p>The representatives of the American corporation in Peking had no -thought nor inkling whatsoever of this change in policy. The step had -been taken without warning and without consulting either the American -Government or the representatives of the company in China. It may be -imagined in what position it left the latter, to whom the Chinese had -entrusted these important rights solely because of the confidence -they had in Americans, both as to their ability to carry through -an enterprise of this kind, and as to their complete freedom from -all political afterthought. Unmindful of the fiduciary relationship -which their repre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span>sentatives had established in China, the American -corporation, without first sounding the Chinese and without giving -any intimation to the American Government—through whose approval and -support they had been able to gain these rights—turned around and made -an agreement to bring the subjects of another nation into the contract. -It is to be doubted if the nationals of any other country would have -acted in this manner.</p> - -<p>If the action had been taken out of deference to rights which the -Japanese might claim in the future as a part of a sphere of influence -to be asserted in Shantung, then indeed it was one of superlative -international courtesy. New York bankers, however, were at this time -still notoriously the most timid beings known to experience, when -it came to matters of foreign investment. To make up for this they -did, when they once got started, throw away American money in amazing -quantities on reckless foreign enterprises in Europe and South America.</p> - -<p>What made this action so inexcusable was not that Japanese coöperation -had been invited or accepted, but that the one enterprise selected for -such coöperation was the one in which America, through the National -Red Cross, had long been interested and which had been committed to -Americans as a special mark of confidence. One might have thought that -goodwill to the Japanese might have been amply demonstrated had our -people declared their complete readiness to coöperate on any one of -the numerous unfinished enterprises which the Japanese controlled in -Manchuria and elsewhere.</p> - -<p>It was no easy task for the representatives of the American corporation -to tell the Chinese what had been done in New York. The proviso that -the arrangement was conditional upon its being acceptable to the -Chinese was of course pathetically ineffectual, because after the -arrangement made in New York the Chinese could certainly not refuse<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> -to accept any outside partners without giving very serious offence -to them. I told the Chinese that we wished them to act with perfect -freedom and consult their own best interests in dealing with the -American corporation. But the Premier met all my explanations with: -"What can we do? The corporation has tied our hands."</p> - -<p>The Chinese had shown special favour and bestowed their contracts -upon the American nation; by their own act Americans had changed this -disposal in such a way as to let in a third party. Personally, I had -not the least objection to the Japanese or any other nation; although -it seemed that in China coöperation with the Chinese would be the -normal method. Yet my experience with the Hukuang railways had made me -very doubtful of the practical advantages of international coöperation -in industry. It is a cumbersome, expensive way of doing business, -full of delay and circumlocution. I felt that the different nations -should mutually facilitate each other's enterprises and coöperate in -constructive planning from which all might derive advantage; but I felt -strongly that individual enterprises should be managed by a particular -group or corporation without complicated international machinery.</p> - -<p>The railway concessions made to the Siems-Carey Company, which were -to be financed by the American International Corporation, were also -making trouble. Protests were made by the Russian Legation with regard -to the alignment from Tatungfu toward Lanchow; these rested upon an old -assurance given by the Chinese to Russia that any line northward or -eastward from Peking and Kalgan should first invite Russian capital. -But the protests had a weak leg to stand on, for the proposed line led -southwestward from Kalgan, away from Russia's dominions. They had the -less force in that the European Powers could not at this time furnish -money for the construction of the much-needed railways which had been -committed to their care; the more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> need, therefore, that America, which -had means, should build other necessary railways to provide China with -inter-provincial transit.</p> - -<p>But that was the method of diplomacy—to hunt about for some ground of -protest to the Chinese Government, in order to obtain from it a few -counterbalancing advantages. The American policy of equal opportunity -had the verbal agreement of the other important powers, but we had -to be vigilant if Americans were to be protected in their right to -do business in various parts of China on the basis of this policy. -Everywhere we met attempts to solidify the inchoate desires and lusts -to secure exclusive rights, until the "spheres of influence" should be -firmly outlined.</p> - -<p>I always took the position with the Russian minister that the American -concession in this case did not conflict with any promise given to -Russia. He spoke to me about the wish of Russia to use Mongolia as a -protective barrier. If Mongolia were to be developed through railways -and colonization, he felt that friction between Russia and China might -come about through this mutual approach of large populations. To keep -so vast a territory barren and unproductive just to serve as frontier -marches seemed to me unjustifiable. But I did not dispute the policy, -rather insisting that a railway that connected one of the eighteen -provinces of China with another could have but remote bearing on the -fears expressed by my Russian colleague. I told him the survey would go -on, but whether the road would be built would depend upon the judgment -of the engineers as to whether it would be commercially profitable. The -conversations were very leisurely. He did not say so, but I could see -that the minister fully expected the Americans to go ahead, while he -would use his protests as a means of getting some "compensation" out of -the Chinese.</p> - -<p>I was therefore not a little surprised when on one of my visits to him -the Russian minister met me with a quizzical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> smile, and handed me a -telegram which he had just received from Washington. The dispatch was -from the Russian ambassador, and read in substance as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>A representative of the American International Corporation has -just called on me. He stated that the corporation regretted beyond -measure that the impression had been given that it might contemplate -undertakings in China which would be unwelcome to the Russian -Government, and to which the latter would object. He stated that it -was far from the intention of the corporation to do anything in China -that would thus be objectionable to the Russian Government.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Never was the ground cut from under any one exerting himself to -safeguard the interests of others as was done in this case. There was -nothing to do but to say: "They are very courteous, and wish to save -your susceptibility. They would probably not ask for any branches in -the direction of Urga, and confine themselves just to building the main -line to Kansu." The Russian minister did not take an undue advantage of -me.</p> - -<p>The next protest came from the French Legation. They had dug up a note -sent them on September 26, 1914, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs -of that time. This note, conveying an entirely unnecessary gift by -that good-natured minister, had been kept secret; it acknowledged the -handsome manner assumed by the French minister during the negotiations -about a small frontier incident. Just to show absence of ill feeling, -the Foreign Minister assured the French minister that in case in future -any mining or railway enterprises were to be undertaken in the Province -of Kwangsi, French capital would be consulted first. It was a grim joke -that an official should thus light-heartedly and without <i>quid pro -quo</i> sign away important rights in contravention to all the announced -policies of his and other governments, including that to which the -grant was made. The French protest related to the southern part of the -line from Chuchow in Honan, to Chinchow, on the coast of Kwangsi.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span></p> - -<p>I took the stand that the note which had turned up was contrary to the -expressed policy of the various governments concerned, and could have -no bearing on the relations of American citizens with China; moreover, -it had been secret, and neither the public nor any other government -knew about it. As the French minister whom the Chinese had asked the -French Government to withdraw because of his domineering attitude was -not at this time complacent in this or any other matter, I suggested -that the Department of State take up this question directly with the -French Minister for Foreign Affairs. I expressed the hope that the -French, our military and diplomatic associates, would wish particularly -to adhere "to the letter and the spirit of the declarations of equal -commercial opportunities."</p> - -<p>The Continental Commercial Bank Loan had been announced in November, -1916. I was happy that this result had been achieved. An advance of -only $5,000,000 was made, but even that small sum was an important -aid to the Chinese Government. The fact that a big Western financial -institution had taken up relations with China was promising. What -foreign banking there was in New York was tangled up with European -interests, followed the lead of London, and had not manifested much -readiness to exert itself for the development of American interests -abroad.</p> - -<p>The French protested this loan because it carried the security of the -tobacco and wine tax which had been assigned to some previous French -loans. I saw Doctor Chen, and Count Martel called on me. I took the -position that as the French loan—which was small in amount and would -require only a very minor portion of the proceeds of the tax—remained -entitled to be the first lien, the French interests were in no way -prejudiced. I imagine, what they really objected to was the eventual -appointment of an American auditor or co-inspector for this revenue. As -this, however, would go to strengthen the security for their loan, I -do not see that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> they had any reason for complaint. The representative -of the French bank which was interested saw me and made a tentative -suggestion that if adviserships were established the French might take -the wine tax, and the Americans the tobacco tax. I felt, however, that -the hands of the Chinese were perfectly free when the loan was made; -there could be no objection, except on the supposition that wherever -the Chinese do business, no matter how small, with respect to any -subject matter, they impliedly give a lien on all future dealings. To -the general suggestion of American-French coöperation in matters for -which both parties could find capital, I was by no means averse.</p> - -<p>In this same month the affairs relating to the Standard Oil Company's -exploration were finally wound up. The geological experts they sent -over had not "struck" oil enough to pay. Drilling expeditions had come -over, which by the spring of 1915 had found traces of oil, and the -Chinese were considering giving them further areas for investigation. -But as they wished to modify their contract relating to production and -refining activities, Mr. E.W. Bemis, vice-president of the company, -came on and negotiated for a whole summer with the officials. He left -without concluding an agreement. Not only had he received the support -of the Legation at Peking and of the American Government, but the -Chinese were anxious to extend the privileges of exploration; his -decision to abandon the negotiations must therefore have been based -on a total change of policy. The company had apparently decided not -to develop production in China, but to continue merely its marketing -business. It was to be expected that competitors would be discouraged -from undertaking similar explorations. Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling, ex-Premier -and chief of the National Oil Administration, called on me at this time -and gave me an account of his final negotiations with the company. He -had offered to establish a joint Chinese and American enterprise if -more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> extensive search should reveal oil deposits of great value.</p> - -<p>The mineral situation in China was being surveyed during this time -by representatives of the New York Orient Mines Company, Mr. John -W. Finch, Dr. F. Bain, and Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, Jr. The attitude -of these men, whose training as observers and clean-cut scientific -methods gave their conclusions a particular cogency and definiteness, -interested me. They had found that the iron deposits of China were not -so extensive as is usually supposed. They believed, also, that the -market for iron products could only gradually be developed with the -growth of the general industry. They had analyzed the organization of -the Hanyehping Iron Works, and learned that its lack of success was due -to faulty planning, which necessitated the bringing of both the coal -and iron ore from a distance to the central point of manufacture. They -believed that for the time there was room for only one first-class iron -and steel enterprise in China. As smaller enterprises would hardly pay, -they favoured a national industrial plant, to be equipped on a scale to -assure every advantage of short transport and economic production. The -Premier gave them permission to investigate China's ore deposits, with -a view to suggesting a basis upon which a national industry could be -founded with temporary American financial assistance.</p> - -<p>The Chinese Government had fully decided to adhere to its policy of -nationalizing the iron deposits, and the decree already issued by Yuan -Shih-kai was to be reënacted by parliament. The Chinese were eager to -establish a national steel industry. It should help supply the national -needs for iron products, with the aid, if necessary, of foreign -capital. They would not take the sole assistance of the Japanese, -because they knew that in that case the Chinese industry would be -confined to the production of pig-iron and would become the slave of -the steel industry of Japan. China would furnish raw materials; Japan, -the finished products.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span></p> - -<p>Another secret agreement, this time with Japan, came to light. A loan -of 3,000,000 yen had been concluded with Japanese banks in the latter -part of 1916, and the secret agreement attached thereto gave Japanese -interests the right to meet the lowest price of any competitor in -bidding on any materials for the Chinese telephone and telegraph -service. Of course, this would have destroyed the equal opportunity -for other nationals in this business. The contract had been signed -by a notoriously corrupt official, who was completely under Japanese -influence and had since fled to escape prosecution for corruption.</p> - -<p>I protested strongly. I told the Minister of Communications that the -provision was monopolistic, therefore in conflict with the treaties. -His answer disavowed the existence of the provision. But I knew it did -exist among the original agreements; nevertheless, the awards actually -made at this time, after my protest, were in accordance with the bids -submitted, and with the recommendations of the experts.</p> - -<p>In a talk I had with the Premier during the spring of 1917 I advised -him to take up quickly the offer of the American International -Corporation to float the first bond issue of $6,000,000 on the -railway to be constructed by the Siems-Carey Company. The Ministry of -Communications was obstructing it, acting under Japanese influences. I -told the Premier that Mr. Carey's authority to conclude the loan might -be revoked at any time, whereupon he promised to instruct the acting -Vice-Minister of Communications to complete the transaction forthwith.</p> - -<p>The Ministry of Communications was then in charge of one Chuan Liang, -who had, in fact, long been considered as representing the Japanese -element. He had married a Japanese woman. Chuan refused obstinately, -first, to take up the negotiations, then, to advance them when they -were begun. The rate of interest and terms of issue offered were fair, -considering existing market values; but the American<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> company agreed to -make a concession and raise the issue price.</p> - -<p>Chuan continued to be stubborn. I spoke to the Premier, General Tuan, -about it; President Li himself gave his support, and the orders to -make the loan were thus reënforced. Still delay. After General Tuan's -retirement, Dr. Wu Ting-fang as acting Premier again issued orders, -which were repeated for the third time by General Chiang when he, in -turn, displaced Doctor Wu. All these high officials concurred. Yet, in -an astounding manner, the acting vice-minister, together with a ring of -petty officials in his ministry and in the cabinet office, blocked the -carrying out of the orders issued by the President, the Premier, and -the whole cabinet.</p> - -<p>But Dr. Wu Ting-fang was anxious to see the contract carried out. He -suggested that I write a note demanding its execution, which I did on -June 6th. Wu intended to have the successive orders published in the -<i>Government Gazette</i>, and, thus published, to be communicated to me -officially by the Foreign Office in response to my note. But the petty -ring delayed the publication. Meanwhile, the answer of the acting -vice-minister was prepared and inserted in the <i>Government Gazette</i> -on the 27th, before the Foreign Office could communicate it to me. It -presented unfairly the proposals of the American company, its language -was almost insulting.</p> - -<p>During all this time the high Chinese officials, who were my friends, -were at a loss to explain to me how this subordinate's defiance of -their orders could be successful. They intimated that the obstruction -must be due to Japanese influence exercised in opposition to American -enterprise in China. We noted that immediately upon publication of -the vice-minister's answer and before we knew about it ourselves, a -secretary of the Japanese Legation quite officiously expressed to one -of the American secretaries his surprise at such a publication.</p> - -<p>But by this act the vice-minister had overstepped the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> mark. The -leaders of the Communications party, who were holding aloof from -politics with General Tuan, strongly condemned Chuan, who had always -been dependent on them. He showed a remarkable change. He even sent -emissaries to me, pleading for forgiveness and stating that he was in -no way animated by hostility to American interests, but had acted on an -honest though mistaken view of the transaction.</p> - -<p>Calling on me on July 2nd, he repeated his apology. On the 30th of June -the Ministry of Communications had formally accepted the offer of funds -by the American company. Thereafter negotiations were again interrupted -by political changes and disturbances.</p> - -<p>This incident will serve to illustrate the complexity of Chinese -affairs, and the condition of disorganization in which the Chinese -Government was at this time.</p> - -<p>The creation of a Chino-American Industrial Bank was the subject of -many discussions I had with Chinese officials and financiers. This -occupied a good deal of my attention during 1918, while Mr. Hsu -Un-yuen, after his retirement from the presidency of the Bank of China, -was devoting his time to working out a plan and securing the support -of prominent Chinese for this undertaking. Mr. Hsu Sing-loh was also -working on it independently; Mr. Hsu was secretary of the Minister -of Finance, educated in England, and exceptionally well informed. In -December of 1918 I accompanied Mr. Hsu to the house of Mr. Yang, a -capitalist interested in the China Merchants Steamship Company, where -we met with the Premier, Mr. Chien Neng-hsun, and Mr. Chou Hsueh-hsi, -who had recently been Minister of Finance. Here we talked over matters -of banking and finance, with Mr. Chou leading the conversation. He was -sure the Government would give a favourable charter that would enlist -the necessary capital. Chinese ideas about an industrial bank were -vague; in some mysterious way it was thought that it could produce -capital for developing industries, or, rather, could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> manifold its -capital for such uses. Three industries were ready—cotton, steel, -and scientific agriculture—for an extensive development. He did not -know how bad it is for a bank to lock up its capital in long-time -commitments. I asked those present as to how ready the Chinese public -would be to absorb the long-term bonds. Mr. Chou thought they would -take them, if strongly backed, at a relatively low interest. All -desired to go ahead. Ultimately the bank was founded, but by another -group.</p> - -<p>Before parting on that day our wealthy host brought forth from the -strong-boxes many great treasures of Chinese art, including paintings -of the Sung and Ming periods. China boasts only one museum. Only -through seeing such private collections can one form an estimate of the -richness and extent of Chinese art treasures. For an hour I looked on -delightedly while one after another of these precious works of Chinese -painting were unrolled before us. Chinese pictures are very modest. -They come out when called, but retire again readily to the quiet -of the storeroom. Also, darkness has not the dulling effect on the -water-colours used by Chinese painters that it exercises upon pictures -done in oils.</p> - -<p>Incidentally, Minister Chow and other prominent officials had been -interested in a savings bank combined with a lottery, which announced -the sale of so-called premium bonds. There were to be quarterly -drawings, at which a certain number of the bonds would receive prizes, -ranging as high as $100,000. Mr. Chow explained to me that it would be -futile for a Chinese savings bank to offer a matter of 5 or 6 per cent. -interest for funds. Nobody would heed it, because of the profitableness -of commercial enterprise. In order to strike public attention and -to cause people to bring their money for deposit, the inducement -of winning a large amount must be provided. The assurance that the -original deposit itself would not be lost, but would ultimately be -repaid, would be the second attraction.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span></p> - -<p>The minister said that it was the plan of the bank to reduce the amount -of prizes and to increase their number so that gradually the payment of -a reasonable interest would be approached, as the people got accustomed -to the idea of placing their funds in such an institution. The fact -that this country, whose people are so frugal and parsimonious and -where there is so much accumulated capital, should hitherto have been -without savings banks appears remarkable to a stranger. But the high -return on commercial loans, and the ever-present gambling instinct of -the Chinese, account to some extent for this absence.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XX" id="CHAPTER_XX">CHAPTER XX</a></p> - -<p class="center">A DIARY OF QUIET DAYS, AUTUMN OF 1916</p> - - -<p><i>September 3</i>: Judge Elbert H. Gary has just been in Peking for ten -days with Mrs. Gary and a small party. I took them to call on President -Li who is now living in a private residence with extensive rockeries -and gardens, in the East City. We threaded our way to a central -pavilion where the President received us. He talked amiably about his -desire to see the great resources of China developed with American -coöperation. In the evening I gave a dinner to Judge Gary and the new -Ministers of Finance and Communications. Charles A. Coolidge, the -Boston architect, was also present. On the following day I arranged for -the American guests to see the Winter Palace; Mr. Coolidge afterward -said to me that the trip through the palace grounds had been the -most interesting experience of his life from the point of view of -architectural beauty. Someone with Judge Gary told me that every lunch, -afternoon reception, and dinner engagement, for the entire stay in -Japan, was already arranged for, together with many engagements for -breakfast; adding: "The Japanese certainly know a great man when they -see him, more than the Chinese." As a matter of fact, the Chinese are -so unartificial that they do not think of organizing their hospitality -to any distinguished guest. What they do is quite spontaneous; they are -truly hospitable, but they do not understand the first elements of the -art of advertising.</p> - -<p><i>September 9</i>: I took a trip to Dajessu with the Austrian minister. -This temple lies about twelve miles beyond the summer palace. We walked -part of the way; a Chinese fell<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> in with us, and, as is customary, -opened conversation. Without seeming unduly inquisitive he elicited -information about the size of our families, our age, income, and the -cost of our clothing, the material of which he greatly admired. When -the Austrian minister told him that he had about four hundred men under -him, our companion looked rather dubious, and finally asked: "Why, -then, if you have so many attendants, are you walking?" The explanation -that we preferred to walk did not seem to remove his doubts. He told us -in turn all the details of his family and business affairs.</p> - -<p>We spent the week-end at the beautiful temple, from which we took -walks to the surrounding mountainside. A deserted temple on a high -hill overlooking the valley is picturesque as any castle on the Rhine. -We ascended to the summer residence of Mr. Hsu Un-yuen, a temple -perched on a precipitous spur of the main mountain range. The temple -had evidently been erected originally for a semi-residential purpose, -though it was in a quite inaccessible place, where neither worshippers -nor vacationists would ordinarily have sought it out. We found Mr. Hsu -and his wife enjoying the magnificent view from a terrace opening out -from the living apartments.</p> - -<p><i>September 13</i>: I gave a dinner to Mr. C.T. Wang, the vice-president -of the senate, and a few representative members of parliament. We -engaged in a general after-dinner discussion of politics. Most of the -men present were Progressives. They argued volubly. The arguments -and illustrations were such as one would hear in a Western country. -I missed, as usual, a thorough discussion of underlying facts, -traditions, and practices of Chinese life, out of which institutions -should develop. I mentioned this; Mr. Wang said that they needed -a guiding principle of organization, which they must get from the -experience of constitutional countries. The question uppermost was -the proposed election of provincial governors by the people of the -respective provinces,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> instead of their appointment by the Central -Government. Most of those present considered this change necessary, -as through union and mutual support the appointive military governors -could exercise great power and defeat the aims of Parliament.</p> - -<p><i>September 14</i>: Failing to get financial assistance from America, -the Chinese have been considering Japanese offers of loans. Dr. -Chen Chin-tao, forced by the situation and the importunities of the -ministers, who need money, has signed a preliminary agreement for a -loan of eighty million yen, on which an advance of five million yen is -to be paid over immediately.</p> - -<p><i>September 18</i>: The House of Representatives to-day in secret session -discussed the Japanese loan. I am informed that it was strongly -attacked on the ground that certain mines in Hunan Province had been -pledged to secure the advance. The Minister of Finance was not present, -the vice-minister appearing to answer questions. The minister was -violently condemned for signing the preliminary agreement without -the consent of parliament. The argument was made that it related to -an advance, but not to the main loan itself. That argument was not -considered valid.</p> - -<p><i>September 19</i>: Negotiations were concluded with the Minister of -Communications for a satisfactory adjustment of the American railway -contract. Most of the proposals made were accepted, so that the -American corporation ought certainly to be thoroughly well satisfied, -considering all the changes and difficulties that have occurred since -the original contract was made. That of the 17th May was allowed -to stand, the changes being introduced by way of annexes. After -the Chinese have thus gone to the limit of making the undertaking -attractive to Americans, it is to be hoped that there will be no -further delay; that, at least, some important constructive work will be -done by Americans.</p> - -<p><i>September 21</i>: We welcomed a little son to-day in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> family. I do -not know that any children were born to any American minister in Peking -before our little daughter Pauline came, in February, 1915. The two -little ones were born into a strange world in which parents may well -fear for the health of their children, because of frequent epidemics. -Still, aside from such visitations, the Peking climate seems to be most -favourable to children; they thrive and grow apace. Claire, the eldest -daughter, aside from a terrible attack of appendicitis in which Dr. -M.A. Stewart, of the Navy, saved her life, has been the very spirit of -health. The faithful Chinese servants surround the children with every -care.</p> - -<p><i>October 3</i>: I gave a men's dinner, attended by the ministers of -Portugal, Russia, and Japan, and by Mr. Obata, the Japanese counsellor; -Count Martel, the French first secretary; Mr. Aglen, Inspector-General -of Customs; Mr. Alston, the British counsellor; Mr. Herrera de Huerta, -formerly Mexican Chargé; Mr. Mitrophanow, of the Russian Legation; -Doctor Willoughby, Doctor McElroy of Princeton, and other guests. It -was really a dinner of welcome to the new Japanese minister, Baron -Hayashi, who has recently arrived to take the place of Mr. Hioki. It -was probably thought better to displace the minister upon whom had -fallen the disagreeable duty of forcing through the Twenty-one Demands -of 1915. Baron Hayashi, who had been ambassador in Italy, brings a long -diplomatic experience and very careful methods. He is very silent, -speaks little except when few or only one other person are present. In -a larger company or at a meeting, he gives the impression of detachment -and deep reflection. In social intercourse he is more retiring than his -predecessor. He impresses me as a thoughtful, fair-minded man.</p> - -<p><i>October 4</i>: I am told that a guest at last night's dinner, a visitor -from a distant country, complained because he had not been ranked with -the ministers. As I had no informa<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span>tion, nor have it now, that he was -entitled to such ranking, I shall not worry. This is the first instance -of any dissatisfaction with the seating. My predecessor related to -me that a secretary of the British Legation once took his sudden -departure before dinner for this reason. I have not always closely -adhered to rank in seating, particularly at dinners where there are -Chinese, in order to avoid a grouping which should make conversation -impossible; but in such cases, of course, I always speak to whichever -guest is slightly prejudiced by the arrangement and explain the reason -to him. I have never noticed the least sign of displeasure. At a very -formal dinner, it is of course always safer to follow rank and let the -conversation take care of itself. Any enjoyment people get out of such -a dinner they set down as pure profit, anyhow.</p> - -<p><i>October 7</i>: Ambassador and Mrs. Guthrie arrived to-day. They will be -our guests for several weeks. Mr. Guthrie has not been very well, so -has come for a rest. We spent the day together, talking over Chinese -and Japanese affairs and relations. We agree on most points.</p> - -<p>In the evening we dined at the officers' mess, after which there was -dancing. Mrs. Ollie James and Mrs. Hall of Washington came with the -Guthries. They were at the dinner, at which great cheer prevailed. -Colonel Neville, the new commandant of the marines, radiates good -fellowship. He is sociable, efficient, and ready to coöperate in all -good causes. His officers and men seem to revere him, and a very fine -spirit reigns in the marine compound.</p> - -<p><i>October 11</i>: I presented Ambassador Guthrie to the President, who -had invited us for luncheon. We were only six at the table. Mr. Quo -Tai-chi, the youthful English-speaking secretary of the President, -interpreted. The President had many questions to ask about Japan. -Then, he spoke quite hopefully about the outlook in China. Financial -difficulties will be overcome through coöperation of parlia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span>ment and -the cabinet, so that the Government may count on popular consent to an -increase in taxes.</p> - -<p>President Li now occupies the palace where Yuan Shih-kai had lived. We -met in a small apartment in the building constructed for the Empress -Dowager, which was tastefully furnished in the best Chinese style.</p> - -<p><i>October 13</i>: The dinner season has fully set in. There are dinners -every night, and will be, throughout the winter. This evening we -entertained for the Guthries, having Prince Koudacheff, Baron Hayashi, -and the wives of the Russian and Danish ministers, who are themselves -absent.</p> - -<p><i>October 23</i>: The Political Science Association met at my house. The -Minister for Foreign Affairs presided. Doctor W.W. Willoughby and -Senator Yen Fu, the noted scholar, read papers. Over a hundred men were -in attendance—the cream of the Western-educated officials, as well as -European and American members.</p> - -<p><i>October 29</i>: The Guthries left yesterday. To-day arrived General and -Mrs. Liggett, who will be our guests for a few days. General Liggett is -tall and impressive-looking. We had a long initial conversation about -the effects of the war in the Far East. The Philippines are beginning -to be prosperous on account of the war demand for their products.</p> - -<p><i>October 31</i>: I presented General Liggett to President Li. In a long -conversation the President was frank in his statement concerning the -international difficulties of China. He expressed himself in strong -terms as desirous of close coöperation with America. I gathered that -he feared that certain foreign influences might stir up trouble -between the parliament and the Government, and otherwise seek to cause -embarrassment.</p> - -<p><i>November 3</i>: I went with a small party to the mountain temple -Djetaissu. Mrs. Chadbourne, the sister of my friend Mr. Charles R. -Crane; Miss Ellen Lamotte the writer; Mr. and Mrs. Burns of Shanghai; -and Mr. Charles Stevenson<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> Smith, of the Associated Press, took this -excursion riding on donkeys, with many spills as the animals slipped on -the rocky road. The temple is near the top, commanding a magnificent -view of the plains and of the higher mountains farther inland. It rises -tier above tier, its platforms shaded by huge trees, with enchanting -vistas of architecture and a broad sweep of view in all directions.</p> - -<p><i>November 9</i>: The Continental Commercial Bank Loan is announced. I am -happy that this result has been achieved. An advance of only $5,000,000 -will be made, but even that small sum will be an important aid to the -Chinese Government. The fact that a big Western financial institution -has taken up relations with China is promising. What foreign banking -there is in New York is tangled up with European interests, follows the -lead of London, and has not manifested much readiness to exert itself -for the development of American interests abroad.</p> - -<p><i>November 10</i>: I attended the balloting for the election of the -Vice-President of the Republic, at a joint session of the two houses -of parliament. While no speeches were made, with the exception of -brief discussion on points of order, yet it was of interest to see -the general aspect of parliament. The procedure, certainly, was -business-like. Balloting was by written and signed vote; after each -ballot, the individual votes are read off from the tribune. I had the -impression that a true election was going on. General Feng Kuo-chang, -the Military Governor of Kiangsu, had the lead from the start, which -was gradually increased by the balloting until finally he got the -necessary majority. I could not stay until the result was announced, -when there was a demonstration to honour the nominee. But I saw before -me a body which had evidently mastered the procedure of parliamentary -action, so that things were done with a smoothness and ease which -implied long experience. Many people witnessed the election, among them -several of my colleagues. I had a brief<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> conversation with Mr. C.T. -Wang, who was hopeful that, now the Vice-Presidential succession was -settled legally and peacefully, the future of the Republic was assured.</p> - -<p>General Feng has occupied a pivotal position at his post at Nanking. He -is shrewd and clever. Like a boy standing over the centre of a seesaw, -he used his weight to balance either side according as the pendulum -movement required. He was at first believed to have given Yuan Shih-kai -encouragement to be emperor, but when asked to express himself, had -allowed the report that he was neutral to gain currency; then, as -the opposition gained strength, he added his weight with gradually -increasing force to its side, although never at any stage coming out -with positive statements. His selection was an attempt to form a -compromise between the militarist and the progressive parties.</p> - -<p><i>November 10</i>: I took a long excursion with Prince Koudacheff. We rode -to the foothills by automobile, then climbed to the top of a lofty -range back of his temple, where one can promenade for six or eight -miles along the crest of the ridge with glorious views of mountain -country on either side.</p> - -<p><i>November 15</i>: I had a long conversation with Baron Hayashi to-day.</p> - -<p><i>November 20</i>: Admiral and Mrs. Winterhalter arrived for a few days' -visit. The Admiral is tall, gray-haired, strong-featured, of energetic -movements. He has always manifested a deep interest in what is going on -in China; we sat down for a long talk immediately after his arrival.</p> - -<p><i>November 22</i>: I presented the Admiral to President Li and we had -a pleasant conversation, although the President was not quite so -expansive and confidential as during my last call. As we made the -rounds of calls on the cabinet ministers, I took the conversation -beyond the ordinary civilities, so as to give the visitor an -opportunity of getting more insight into the affairs now engaging our -attention; also, to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> use this valuable time for an exchange of ideas -with the Chinese leaders.</p> - -<p><i>November 25</i>: The French are protesting against the Continental -Commercial Bank Loan, in so far as the security is concerned. The -security of the tobacco and wine tax had been assigned to some previous -French loans. I saw Doctor Chen, and Count Martel called on me. I -take the position that as the French loan—which is small in amount -and will require only a very minor portion of the proceeds of the -tax—remains entitled to be the first lien, the French interests are in -no way prejudiced. I imagine what they really object to is the eventual -appointment of an American auditor or co-inspector for this revenue. As -this, however, would still strengthen the security for their loan, I -do not see that they have any reason for complaint. The representative -of the French bank which is interested, saw me and made a tentative -suggestion that if advisorships were established, the French might take -the wine tax, and the Americans the tobacco tax. I feel, however, that -the hands of the Chinese were perfectly free when the loan was made; -there can be no objection, except on the supposition that whenever the -Chinese do business, no matter how small, with respect to any subject -matter, they impliedly give a lien on all future dealings.</p> - -<p><i>December 4</i>: I called on Doctor Morrison to take a look at his -library. This unusual collection contains about twenty thousand books -in European languages, dealing with China. The rare editions of early -works are almost completely represented. Doctor Morrison, who lives in -a Chinese-style house, has built a fireproof building for his books. -He has devoted the last fifteen years to getting them together, and -I believe has spent the larger part of his income on them. Recently -he married a lady who had been for a while his secretary. They now -have a little boy. I am told that his marriage and fatherhood have -greatly aug<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span>mented Doctor Morrison's standing and influence among -the Chinese. A bachelor does not fit into their scheme of life. We -repaired to his study, and for a long time were discussing affairs. -We spoke particularly about the railway situation and the fact that -construction on all the lines contracted for has practically been -stopped. This is an enormous disadvantage to the Chinese. They have to -pay heavy interest charges on the initial loans, for which there is as -yet no income-paying property to show, but only surveys and partial -construction. We agreed that the Four-Power bankers, for instance, have -a very weak case if China should decide to cancel their contract for -non-performance, as money to continue the building is not forthcoming. -On the British concession of the Pukow-Singyang Railway, on which -virtually no work has yet been done, the Government nevertheless has to -pay interest on a million dollars of capital that has been advanced.</p> - -<p><i>December 7</i>: I visited Prince Koudacheff, the Russian minister. I -jokingly asked him whether he found that the Chinese thought of the -Russians as half-Asiatic, therefore as brothers. "No," he replied; -"they count us with you and with the other Europeans, as a scourge and -pestilence." In this conversation the Prince uttered a prophecy. "As a -result of this war," he said, "the empire will be abolished in Germany."</p> - -<p>(Neither of us at this time dreamed of the enormous subversions and -convulsions which were soon to take place in Russia.)</p> - -<p><i>December 8</i>: I called on President Li in order to present a personal -letter from President Wilson, in which the latter sends his good -wishes. We discussed the American loan policy. The President, like -other Chinese, finds it difficult to understand why America, with -her great capital strength and industrial development, is so slow in -taking advantage of opportunities for investment and development in -China.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> The President said: "Americans love pioneering. In China there -is pioneering to do, with the added advantage of having a ready labour -supply and local capital, which may be enlisted. Why are they so slow -to come in?" I agree with him that it is difficult to understand.</p> - -<p><i>December 16</i>: Mr. Victor Murdock is in Peking, bringing a breeze -of American good-fellowship, and a vision unobstructed by theories. -He finds China interesting, but, I fear, he will suffer the usual -disability of the passing visitor, that is, he will see the -unfavourable aspects of Chinese life and will not stay long enough to -appreciate the deeper virtues.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>This diary account of some of the happenings during the fall of 1916 -contains nothing of the daily work of conferences, discussions, -interviews, dictations dealing with the innumerable problems that come -up from the consulates, or that arise in the capital directly, or -referring to general policies which are hammered out and formed for -action.</p> - -<p>A great part of the work of a legation is concerned with foreseeing -trouble and trying to avoid it. Such work usually does not appear at -all in the record. In a country where conditions are complicated as -they are in China, where there is such a crisscrossing of influences, -it is easy to make a mistake if constant care be not exercised to keep -informed of every detail and to head off trouble.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXI" id="CHAPTER_XXI">CHAPTER XXI</a></p> - -<p class="center">CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY</p> - - -<p>The time came for the United States to sever relations with the German -Kaiser's government. I had taken advantage of the clear sunshine and -mild air on Sunday, February 4, 1917, to visit Doctor Morrison at his -cottage outside of Peking near the race-course. After lunch a messenger -came from the Legation, bringing word that an important cablegram had -arrived and was being decoded. I returned to town, and at the Legation -Mr. White handed me the decoded message which said that the American -Government had not only broken off diplomatic relations with Germany, -but that it trusted the neutral powers would associate themselves -with the American Government in this action of protest against an -intolerable practice; this would make for the peace of the world. I was -instructed to communicate all this to the Chinese Government.</p> - -<p>After a conference with the first secretary, Mr. MacMurray, and the -Chinese secretary, Doctor Tenney, I made an engagement to see the -President and the Premier on that same evening. I felt justified in -assuming that the invitation to the neutrals to join the United States -was more than a pious wish and that there was some probability that -the European neutrals would support our protest. As to China I had -already informed the Government that we could reasonably expect support -there. I therefore considered it to be the policy of the Government to -assure a common demonstration on the part of all neutral powers, strong -enough to bring Germany to a halt. So far as my action was concerned, -I therefore saw the plain duty to prevail upon China to asso<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span>ciate -herself with the American action as proposed by my government.</p> - -<p>I found President Li Yuan-hung resting after dinner in his palace -and in an amiably expectant mood. With him was Mr. Quo Tai-chi, his -English secretary. He was plainly startled by the prospect of having to -consider so serious a matter, and did not at first say anything, but -sat silently thinking. His doubts and objections were revealed rather -through questions than by direct statements. "What is the present state -of the war, and what the relative strength or degree of exhaustion of -the belligerent parties?" "Could the Allies, even with the assistance -of the United States, win a decisive victory?" Finally, he said: "The -effect of such a far-reaching international act upon the internal -situation in China will have to be carefully considered."</p> - -<p>The President's secretary appeared strongly impressed with the -favourable aspects of our proposal, so that he began to argue a little -with the President. On my part, I pointed out the effects which a -positive act of international assertion in behalf of a just cause and -well-disposed associates would have upon China by taking attention off -her endless factional conflicts. When I touched upon the ethical phases -of the matter, the President fully agreed with me. I had particularly -impressed upon him the need of prompt action in order that counsels -might not be confused by adverse influences from without.</p> - -<p>We next drove to the residence of the Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, -who was then playing an important part in the politics Of China. -I recalled my first interview with him when he had received me in -a dingy room, himself wearing a frowzy long coat and exhibiting a -general air of tedium and lack of energy. There was no suggestion of -the military man about him. The qualities upon which General Tuan's -great influence is founded become apparent only upon a longer and more -intimate acquaintance. Despite his real indolence,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> his wisdom, his -fundamental honesty, and his readiness to shield his subordinates and -to assume responsibility himself have made this quiet and unobtrusive -man the most prominent leader among the Chinese militarists. His -interest centres chiefly in the education of military officers. He is -no politician and is bored by political theory. He is always ready to -turn over the handling of affairs to subordinates, by whom he is often -led into a course which he might not himself have chosen. This, coupled -with extraordinary stubbornness, accounts for his influence often -tending to be disastrous to his country. His personality, however, with -its simplicity and pensiveness, and his real wisdom when he lets his -own nature guide him, make him one of the attractive figures of China.</p> - -<p>Though in himself the principal influence in the Government, Tuan -left all details to his assistants, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin and General Hsu -Shu-cheng. He preferred to play chess. He was, however, always ready -to shoulder responsibility for what his subordinates had done. Often -when he was deep in a game of Chinese chess, his mind focussed on the -complexities of this difficult pastime, General Hsu would approach -him with some proposal. Giving only half an ear to it, the Premier -would respond, "All right" (<i>How how</i>). When, later, the results of -the action thus taken turned out to be bad and the Premier asked for -an explanation, he was reminded that he had himself authorized it. -He would then faintly recollect, and would make a gesture toward his -shoulder, which indicated that—very well—he took the responsibility.</p> - -<p>But on this occasion General Tuan was all attention. He had with -him Mr. C.C. Wu of the Foreign Office, who continued throughout -these negotiations to act as interpreter. The circumstance that the -Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, was ill and had to -be represented by his son, and that in all important interviews both -the Premier and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> young Mr. Wu were present, greatly facilitated the -business and saved time which would have been needed to carry on -parallel conversations in the Foreign Office and with the Premier. -General Tuan was far from accepting the proposal at first sight. "It -would be wise for Germany to modify her submarine policy," he stated, -"because in land warfare she could press her opponents so seriously -that her absolute defeat would be difficult unless the United States -entered the war." He appeared to contemplate the possibility of China -taking so unprecedented a step as the breaking of relations with a -great power with less concern than did the President. We arranged for a -longer discussion on the following day.</p> - -<p>Far into that night I was in conference with the legation staff, and -with certain non-official Americans and Britishers of great influence -among the Chinese. These men looked with enthusiasm upon the idea of -an association with the United States, aligning against Germany the -vast population of China. While the energies and resources of China -were not sufficiently mobilized to be of immediate use in the war, -yet by systematic preparation they might bring an enormous accession -of strength to the Allies if the war should last long. We felt, -also, that through positive alliance with the declared policy of the -United States, China would greatly strengthen herself internally and -externally.</p> - -<p>Dr. John C. Ferguson addressed himself directly to the Premier and -the President; his thorough knowledge of Chinese enabled him to -bring home to them the essential points in favour of prompt action. -Mr. Roy S. Anderson and Mr. W.H. Donald, an Australian acting as -editor of the <i>Far Eastern Review</i>, who were close to the members of -the Communications Party and the Kuo Min Tang, addressed themselves -especially to the leaders in parliament. Dr. G.E. Morrison, the British -adviser of the President of China, had long worked to have China join -in the war: he quietly used all his influence with the President and -high officials,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> in order to make them understand what was at stake. -Other Americans and British newspapermen, like Charles Stevenson Smith -and Sam Blythe, who happened to be in Peking, all tirelessly working in -their own way with men whose confidence they enjoyed, urged the policy -proposed by America. These men made a spontaneous appeal based upon the -fundamental justice of the policy of resisting an intolerable practice, -and on the beneficent effect which a great issue like this would have -in pulling the Chinese nation together and in making it realize its -status as a member of the family of nations. However, what counted most -with the Chinese was the fact that America had acted, and had invited -China to take a similar step.</p> - -<p>At a second long interview with the President, he asked me: "Would not -a positive active foreign policy, particularly if it should lead to -war, strengthen the militarist party?"</p> - -<p>I replied that in my opinion such a contingency would strengthen -decisively the Central Government, enabling it to keep the military in -their proper place as an organ of the state and preventing the further -growth of the pseudo-feudalism inherited from Yuan Shih-kai.</p> - -<p>"But would the American Government assist China in bearing the -responsibilities of such a step?"</p> - -<p>Before replying to this question, I had to cable the Department of -State for instructions as to what assurances I would be authorized to -give to the Chinese Government in the event of their taking the action -suggested by the United States. Unfortunately, as was several times the -case during some critical situation, the cable connection was broken -and I failed to get any reply to assist me during the negotiations.</p> - -<p>With a map the Premier and I, later that afternoon, analyzed the -military situation of the European Powers. From the analogy of the -American Civil War, I expressed to him the belief that Germany could -not resist the enormous pressure from all sides. "What," the Premier -asked, "may be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> expected of America by way of direct military action? -Bear in mind that I wish for nothing more than for a strong America, -able to exercise a guiding influence in the affairs of the world."</p> - -<p>My positive belief that America would, if necessary, follow the -severance of relations with the strongest kind of military action -interested him. America had been represented to the Chinese as a big, -over-rich country which lacked energy for a supreme military effort.</p> - -<p>"What, then, will happen at the conclusion of the war?" he asked.</p> - -<p>The fact that Japan had already made efforts to assure for herself the -right to speak for China was worrying the Chinese. With the Premier, -as with the President, the idea that, through breaking with Germany, -China could assure herself of an independent position at the peace -table, had much weight. Both men also faced the possibility of being -drawn into the war. The Premier appeared to regard this with a certain -degree of positive satisfaction; to the President it seemed a less -agreeable prospect. I made it plain that the American proposal did not -go beyond breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany, and, that -by taking that step, China would effectually rebuke and discourage -the illegal and inhuman acts of Germany on the high seas, keeping her -hands entirely free as to future action. Should further steps be later -needed, the road would be open.</p> - -<p>Intensive discussions were going on all day Monday and deep into the -night among the Chinese officials and the leaders of parliament. I -received calls on Tuesday from many Chinese leaders who wished to talk -over the situation. The progressive, modern-minded, and forward-looking -among the Chinese readily supported the idea that China should range -herself alongside the United States in this action. Admiral Tsai -Ting-kan, who was very close to the President, laboured in company with -Doctor Morrison to bring before Li<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> Yuan-hung all the considerations -favouring positive action. The President, however, still adhered to his -idea that it was safer for China to remain entirely neutral.</p> - -<p>In the cabinet, Dr. Chen Chin-tao, the Minister of Finance, and Mr. -C.C. Wu, representing the Minister for Foreign Affairs, from the -earliest moment associated themselves with those of the opinion -that China must act, and they led the younger officials. In the Kuo -Min Tang, Mr. C.T. Wang, vice-president of the senate; Dr. Wang -Chung-hui, the leading jurist of China; and General Niu Yung-chien, -of revolutionary fame, were the first to become active. The Peking -<i>Gazette</i>, with its brilliant editor, Eugene Chen, came out strongly -in favour of following the United States. A powerful public opinion -was quietly forming among the Chinese. The Young China party was -beginning to see the advantage which lay in having China emerge from -her passivity.</p> - -<p>When I returned from a dinner with the Alstons at the British Legation -on Tuesday night, Mr. C.C. Wu brought me word from the cabinet that -it would be quite impossible to take action unless the American -Government could adequately assure China assistance in bearing the -responsibilities which she might incur, without impairment of her -sovereign rights and the independent control of her national forces.</p> - -<p>The Chinese ministers had in mind two things: In the first place, the -need of financial assistance, in order to make it possible for China -eventually to participate in the war, if that should be desired; and, -second, the prevention of all arrangements whereby Chinese natural -resources, military forces, arsenals, or ships, would be placed -under foreign control incompatible with her undiminished national -independence.</p> - -<p>All through Wednesday I struggled with this difficult problem. I had -to act on my own responsibility, as I could not reach the Department -of State by cable. If all the in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span>fluences unfavourable to the action -proposed were given time to assert themselves, the American proposal -would be obstructed and probably defeated. The Chinese Government -would act only on such assurances as I could feel justified in giving -to them at this time; if I gave them none, no action would be taken. -It seemed almost a matter of course, should China follow the lead of -the American Government, that the latter would not allow China to -suffer through lack of all possible support in aiding China to bear -the responsibilities she assumed, and in preventing action from any -quarter which would impose on China new burdens because of her break -with Germany. Unable to interpret my instructions otherwise than that a -joint protest of the neutrals had actually been planned by the American -Government, and feeling that the effect upon Germany of the American -protest depended on the early concurrence of the important neutral -powers, I considered prompt action essential. I was sure that all sorts -of unfavourable and obstructive influences would presently get to work -in Peking.</p> - -<p>When discussion had reached its limit, on the afternoon of February -7th, I felt it necessary to draw up a note concerning the attitude of -the American Government. The tenor of this note I communicated to the -Premier and the Foreign Office, with the understanding that I should -send the note if favourable action were decided upon by the Chinese -Government.</p> - -<p>I believed that without such assurances the instructions of the -American Government could not be carried out, and that it would act -in all respects in a manner consonant with its position as a powerful -government and as a leader of protest among the neutrals; moreover, -that its relations with those who gave support in a policy of such -fundamental importance would be determined by principles of equity -and justice. I felt that the United States could not be less liberal -toward a country coming to its support than toward those countries<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> -which the American Government was now going to help. It was only these -self-evident conclusions which I cautiously expressed in my note. The -text of this note, in its essential part, had the following form:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p> - -<span class="smcap">Excellency</span>:<br /> -</p> - -<p>In our recent conversation concerning the policy of your Government in -associating itself with the United States in active opposition to the -unrestricted submarine warfare by which Germany is indiscriminately -jeopardizing the lives of neutral citizens, you have with entire -frankness pointed out to me that, whereas the Chinese Government is -in principle disposed to adopt the suggestion of the President of -the United States in that regard, it nevertheless finds itself in a -position in which it would not feel safe in so doing unless assured -that it could obtain from American sources such financial and other -assistance as would enable it to take the measures appropriate to the -situation which would thus be created.</p> - -<p>With like candour I have stated to you that I have recommended to my -Government that in the event of the Chinese Government's associating -itself with the President's suggestion, the Government of the United -States should take measures to put at its disposition the funds -immediately required for the purposes you have indicated, and should -take steps with a view to such a funding of the Boxer Indemnity as -would for the time being make available for the purposes of the -Chinese Government at least the major portion of the current indemnity -instalments; and I have indicated to you my personal conviction that -my Government would be found just and liberal in effecting this or -other such arrangements to enable the Chinese Government to meet -the responsibilities which it might assume upon the suggestion of -the President. I should not be wholly frank with you, however, if I -were to fail to point out that the exact nature of any assistance -to be given or any measure to be taken must be determined through -consultation of various administrative organs, in some cases including -reference to Congress, in order to make effective such arrangements -as might have been agreed to in principle between the executive -authorities of the two countries; and I therefore could not in good -faith make in behalf of my Government any definite commitments upon -your suggestions at the present time.</p> - -<p>I do, however, feel warranted in assuming the responsibility of -assuring you in behalf of my Government that by the methods you have -suggested, or otherwise, adequate means will be devised to enable -China to fulfill the responsibilities consequent upon associating -herself with the action of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> United States Government, without any -impairment of her national independence and of her control of her -military establishment and general administration.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Final presentation of everything that had to be considered in making a -decision was arranged with the Premier for Wednesday evening. I found -General Tuan alone. We spoke awhile about the news of the day, then -I began to go into the main matter. But General Tuan appeared weary -and worried. This may have been the reason for the failure of the -interpreters to make smooth connection: I suggested, as the Premier had -had an excessively long day, that we meet again the following morning. -It was arranged for ten o'clock at the cabinet office, just before the -Thursday morning cabinet conference.</p> - -<p>I had just dined with Mr. C.T. Wang and a number of parliamentary -leaders. They were keen on the policy of following the United States. -They had seen President Li during the day; he was still full of -doubts, but stated that he would leave the decision in the hands of -the cabinet, and would abide by the results. Mr. Wang believed that -the President was gradually coming around to the American point of -view, and that his acceptance of it would be the stronger and heartier -because of the conscientious doubts which he was overcoming.</p> - -<p>The negotiations of these three days had gone on quietly. The men upon -whom rested the responsibility of making the decision were constantly -in conference. Several men of influence worked with officials of the -Government and leaders in parliament. But the outside foreign public -was not fully alive to what was going on, and those who knew and were -interested generally believed that ancient China would not take so -unprecedented a step. The Japanese minister, Baron Hayashi, was absent -from Peking. The German official representatives apparently had no idea -that any radical action could come from the Chinese Government.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span></p> - -<p>I arrived at the cabinet office on Thursday morning, at ten, and was -shown to the room where the Premier was to receive me. As he had told -me that Mr. C.C. Wu would be present to interpret, I had not brought -an interpreter for this informal and intimate interview. The Premier -soon entered unattended and we sat down together, smoking cigarettes, -and observing an enforced silence, as Mr. Wu had not appeared. We -were without an interpreter, but even in such circumstances the -perfection of Chinese manners allows no embarrassment to arise. We had -been sitting in mute thought a little while, when Admiral Chen, the -Minister of the Navy, came in; he spoke English quite well, so that -our conversation could begin; soon we were in the midst of earnest -discussion. Within another ten minutes Dr. Chen Chin-tao, the Minister -of Finance, arrived, and shortly after him came Mr. C.C. Wu. Thus, -quite by chance, I had the opportunity of talking over these momentous -matters jointly with the representatives of the four departments of -government most nearly concerned: Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, and -Navy.</p> - -<p>We could now once more thoroughly go over all doubts and objections, -and look at the proposed policy in all its manifold aspects and -probable results. In this intense and earnest conversation no formal -interpreting was needed. Whoever replied to my remarks would first -repeat in Chinese what I had said for the benefit of the Premier. When -the Premier had spoken, Mr. Wu would interpret his thought for me. All -the others addressed me directly in English. I advanced arguments on -every point, of which the following is a memorandum:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The American Government has taken the present action because the -wilful disregard of neutral rights went to the extent of imperilling -not only neutral property, but the lives of our citizens. In this -matter the interests of China are entirely parallel to those of the -United States; both nations are peaceful and see in the maintenance -of international right and peaceful conditions a vital guarantee of -their national safety. Through association<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> with the United States, -China would enter upon this controversy with a position consonant with -every tradition and interest of her national life, a position which -would have to be respected by friends and foes alike, as dictated by -the highest principles which could guide national action. By taking -this action, China would improve her independent standing among the -nations, she would have to be consulted during the course of the -controversy and at the conclusion of the war; she would, in all this, -be most closely associated with that nation which she has always -looked upon as peculiarly friendly and just to her. In addition to -these arguments, many favourable results were discussed which China -would obtain in international diplomacy.</p> - -<p>Many arguments were advanced by the Chinese officials in doubt of -the policy suggested; it was stated that China had not led up to -a breach with Germany by notes of protest, such as had made the -action of the United States seem natural and unavoidable; Germany -had of late years always been considerate in her treatment of China, -a sudden breach might seem treacherous; it might also be taken by -Japan as so surprising an action as to give a favourable pretext for -pressing the dreaded demands of Group V. It was also apparent that -the representatives of the European Allies were not in a position to -give China, at the present time, any advice favourable to the action -suggested.</p> - -<p>I pointed out in turn that were the action suggested once taken by -China, the representatives of the Allied Powers would have no choice -but to applaud it, which some of them, at least, would do from the -fulness of their hearts. As far as Japan was concerned, the situation -would be such as to indicate that that country, too, would decide -to express approval of the action. Having taken a definite position -on this side of the controversy, without yet entirely associating -herself with the Allies, China would be in a position to command their -goodwill; any interference with China's sovereign rights would be -rendered more difficult because of the situation thus created. It was -almost inconceivable that coercive action should be taken against the -friend who had declared himself. Moreover, the United States having -taken the initiative in inviting China to participate in the protest, -it would be unlikely that any action could be taken over the head of -the United States or without consulting the American Government.</p> - -<p>As to the suddenness of the action suggested, I urged that the -action of the German Government in announcing unrestricted submarine -warfare was itself so astounding in its disregard of neutral rights -that no action taken in reply could be considered too drastic. It -was virtually a threat to kill Chinese citizens navigating certain -portions of the high seas; and injury could be prevented only by -taking a determined and forceful position.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span></p> - -<p>We continued our discussion until nearly twelve o'clock, when I took -my leave, thanking the ministers for their courtesy and goodwill. The -cabinet sat until six in the evening. Shortly after six I received a -telephone call from Mr. C.C. Wu, who said: "I am very happy to tell -you that the cabinet has decided to make a protest to Germany, and -to indicate that diplomatic relations will be broken off unless the -present submarine warfare is abandoned."</p> - -<p>It is interesting to remember, as the publication of the Russian secret -archives has shown, that on this very day the Japanese Minister for -Foreign 'Affairs was urging the Russian ambassador at Tokyo to get from -his government assurances of various benefits (including Shantung) -to come to Japan if she undertook the supposedly difficult task of -inducing China to join the Allies. Japan was thus asking a commission -for persuading the Chinese to join the Allies, although they were -willing to do so freely of their own accord, as their action this day -showed.</p> - -<p>The Chinese had made a great decision. These men had acted -independently upon their judgment of what was just and in the best -interests of their own nation. It was the act of a free government, -without a shadow of attempt at pressure, without a thought of exacting -compensations on their part. When it is considered in comparison with -the manner in which some other governments entered the war, it will -stand as an honour to China for all time. Incidentally, this was -China's first independent participation in world politics. She had -stepped out of her age-long aloofness and taken her place among the -modern nations.</p> - -<p>I now sent the note to the Chinese Government which contained the -simple assurance of fair treatment by the United States. In return I -received this promise:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>In case an act should be performed by the German Government which -should be considered by the American Government as a sufficient cause -for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> a declaration of war, the Chinese Government will at least break -off its diplomatic relations with Germany.</p></blockquote> - -<p>In his formal note to me, dated February 9th, the Minister for Foreign -Affairs declared:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The Chinese Government being in accord with the principles set forth -in Your Excellency's note and firmly associating itself with the -Government of the United States of America, has taken similar action -by protesting energetically to the German Government against the -new measures of blockade. The Chinese Government also proposes to -take such action in the future as will be deemed necessary for the -maintenance of the principles of international law.</p></blockquote> - -<p>On the same day a formal note of protest was dispatched to the German -minister.</p> - -<p>The entire cabinet reported on February 10th to a secret session of -parliament on the diplomatic action it had taken. The report was well -received; only a few questions were asked concerning the procedure -which had been followed. Parliament did not take a vote on this matter, -as it was considered to be an action by the cabinet within the range of -its legal functions.</p> - -<p>A wave of exultation passed over the country. There seemed to be -hope for harmony among factions; the self-respect of the Government -was visibly heightened. That China had without coercion or sordid -inducement taken a definite stand on so momentous a matter inspired the -Chinese with new hope. In coming to the support of international right, -they felt that they were strengthening the forces which make for the -independence of their own country.</p> - -<p>Expressing themselves unofficially the representatives of the Allied -governments during these negotiations cautiously favoured the step -proposed. When the decision had once been taken, the approval of the -Chinese action was unanimous. My Belgian colleague remarked to me: -"The air has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> been cleared, a weight has been lifted off China and the -powers. The stock of America has risen 100 per cent."</p> - -<p>Mr. Sam Blythe gave a dinner on the evening of February 9th, at which -Dr. George Morrison and many other American and British friends were -present. The dinner became a celebration. Greeting me, Doctor Morrison -said: "This is the greatest thing ever accomplished in China. It means -a new era. It will make the Chinese nationally self-conscious; and -that, not for narrow, selfish purposes, but to vindicate human rights."</p> - -<p>But the thing was not yet accomplished. I knew well enough that the -decision of the Central Government would not be immediately accepted -in all parts of China. Opposition might crop out. In certain regions -men of strong German sympathies were in control, or political intrigues -to cause embarrassment and difficulties to the Central Government were -going on. All China must understand and support the decision taken by -the Government.</p> - -<p>Of the leaders in the provinces the Vice-President, General Feng, at -Nanking, was most important; as the blunder had been committed of not -consulting him, he was predisposed against the decision; moreover, -General Feng had several German advisers in whom he placed confidence, -and who had given him a strong notion of German invincibility.</p> - -<p>Fortunately, Mr. Sam Blythe was going to stop at Nanking on his way to -Shanghai, in order as a journalist to interview the Vice-President. -Blythe argued the matter out with him. He found that General Feng -really felt injured. This was smoothed over. With Mr. W.H. Donald as -an able second, Sam Blythe impressed upon the General that China had -merely been asked to break off relations, which did not imply going to -war. After a long and serious conversation, with some side-flashes from -Sam Blythe, the Vice-President declared himself fully satisfied, and he -came out in favour of the Government's policy. (Thus, as has often been -the case,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> an unofficial visit by private individuals accomplished the -good results.)</p> - -<p>In other ways and by other persons, different leaders were visited and -familiarized with the underlying reasons for the act of the Central -Government. These influences interplayed with cumulative effect; no -concerted opposition was formed; by a sort of football "interference" -the policy to condemn German submarine warfare, and, if necessary, to -break relations with Germany, scored its touchdown.</p> - -<p>Intelligent teamwork and American energy were in a fair way to give -China the backing she needed, having first assured her concerted -action with the United States. At a diplomatic dinner which I gave -the Minister for Foreign Affairs in February, the absorbing talk was -about the diplomatic action taken by China. Count Martel and M. Pelliot -of the French Legation, Miles Lampson of the British Legation, Mr. -Konovalov, Russia's financial adviser for China, and other Allied -representatives all came to me during the evening to say how enormously -gratified they were at the initiative of the United States and the -stand taken by China. For once nobody could disapprove of Chinese -action.</p> - -<p>The Japanese also expressed approval, but immediately tried to get -China to take the further step of declaring war, and the French -minister, too, worked actively for this. Japan was eager to recover the -lead. A great campaign of intrigue and counter-intrigue resulted among -the various factions in China which threatened to destroy the unifying -and inspiring effects of China's action. The question of joining the -Allies out and out was thrown into politics. From all this most of the -ministers held aloof. When Liang Chi-chao sounded me on this question, -I told him, while lacking instructions from my government, that I -thought the rupture of diplomatic relations would be enough, if it -should come to that. Within a few days instructions came from the State -Department to the same effect.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span></p> - -<p>During March I repeatedly saw Vice-President Feng and President Li. -Feng, small and slender, intelligent in appearance, bald, with keen but -shifty eyes, was courtesy itself. I was specially delighted with the -refinement and musical quality of his diction. I went over the whole -ground with him, satisfying him, especially, on the question of the -specific American objections to the German U-boats. "I approve heartily -and completely," he finally assured me, "of the proposed break with -Germany."</p> - -<p>I found that General Li was not only in favour of breaking with -Germany, but of an internal break with his own premier, General Tuan. -"I cannot trust him," said Li; "he wishes to eliminate me from real -power." This friction within distressed me not a little, as I had -sincerely hoped that these two men would come to coöperate.</p> - -<p>Then I saw Dr. Wu Ting-fang. Besides being China's foreign minister, -Doctor Wu is a spiritualist. When I entered, he followed his usual -bent, bundled the morning's business details over to the counsellor -in attendance, and devoted himself to philosophizing. Spiritualism, -longevity, and the advantages of a vegetarian diet, were to him topics -for real thought and speculation. In mystic language, he remarked: -"There is an aura gradually spreading from Europe over the entire -surface of the world. It enters the brains of the people and penetrates -them, making them war-mad. We are having the first signs here."</p> - -<p>By March 10th, submarine warfare had not been modified. Parliament then -formally approved the breach of diplomatic relations with Germany.</p> - -<p>I had almost belaboured the department for instructions during the -progress of our work. But it was not until the 13th of March, the very -day the break of diplomatic relations was formally notified, that the -instructions came. These rather implied that the circular inviting -coöperation on the part of the neutral powers had been too<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> strongly -acted upon by me. I could not but be inwardly amused.</p> - -<p>When a government takes a step involving life and death and all the -interests of its own and of general civilization; when, in connection -therewith, it calls upon other powers to associate themselves with -it—it ought to be safe to presume that the government means what -it says. It should see that the action it invokes involves great -sacrifices, and it must not invoke it lightly. A responsible official -would not be justified in interpreting such a note in a platonic sense.</p> - -<p>At once questions of finance arose. Ancient China had taken her -brave step in modern world affairs. She might now have to go to war. -That would take money, and money would be needed to guard such a -contingency—indeed, internally and externally China had need to put -her financial house in order. Yuan Shih-kai's imperialism had left a -burden of debt. The Republic required strengthening by a new system of -national credit and by the building up of its natural resources. Now -the public debt was relatively still small, the rate of taxation upon -the hundreds of millions of citizens low. The situation was basically -sound. The question had been asked since last summer: Would America -supply China with an investment loan of a hundred millions, thus -delivering her of lenders who were seeking to dominate her and to split -her up into "spheres of influence"?</p> - -<p>Minister Wellington Koo, who had journeyed to the United States in -behalf of Yuan Shih-kai's imperial ambitions, now worked for the -Republic there. I suggested at first that the firm of Lee, Higginson -& Company, which still held its option, should complete its loan. -This was not done. Then other capitalists were approached and in -November, 1916, Doctor Koo arranged for a large loan with Mr. John J. -Abbott, president of the Continental and Commercial Savings Bank of -Chicago. Mr. Abbott, wishing to study the Chinese financial situation, -arrived in Peking during April, 1917, bringing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> his lawyer. I got him -acquainted with the Chinese ministers, and took him and Mr. Joy Morton, -also of Chicago, to lunch with President Li and Dr. Chen Chin-tao and -Hsu Un-yuen. The President said: "I will back all financial legislation -which American experts may find necessary for the proper organization -of China's credit."</p> - -<p>Doctor Chen was arrested and put in prison through the plotting of his -enemies, but Hsu Un-yuen remained, with his sound financial training. -Finally Mr. Abbott proposed an ingenious scheme, with the wine and -tobacco taxes as the basis—for every $1,000,000 of annual revenue -there should be a loan of $5,000,000; if the taxes amounted to ten -millions, they would serve as security for a loan of fifty millions. -Mr. Abbott left behind him a plan for reorganizing these taxes, and a -promise to take up at any time the question of loans on this basis, in -addition to five millions lent the preceding November and an option for -twenty-five millions more.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXII" id="CHAPTER_XXII">CHAPTER XXII</a></p> - -<p class="center">CHINA'S BOSSES COME TO PEKING</p> - - -<p>I have noted that Dr. Chen Chin-tao, Chinese Minister of Finance, was -put in prison. Doctor Chen had administered Chinese finances strictly -and well, in a most difficult period. For the military governors or -Tuchuns, who were the real bosses of China's vast population, he was -too honest and too strict. The Tuchuns looked upon the Minister of -Finance as in duty bound to procure funds for them by hook or crook.</p> - -<p>When the government banks were broken and had declared a moratorium, -their large over-issues of notes were worth only one half their face -value. Working with Doctor Chen was Hsu Un-yuen, managing director -of the Bank of China. Mr. Hsu managed judiciously to bring the notes -of his bank virtually to par. The Tuchuns, aided by the pro-Japanese -clique, which formed part of the Premier's entourage, attacked both Hsu -and Doctor Chen. For the latter the cabal laid a trap. It was made to -appear that he gave support to a certain company in return for having -his brother employed. So the cabal, using this pretext to satisfy their -grievances, got him arrested and jailed, thus ending his negotiations -with the Chicago bank of John J. Abbott. President Li was interested -and distressed. When I asked Premier Tuan about Doctor Chen, he -smilingly stated that he should have a chance to clear himself.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the breach between the Premier and the President widened. -To strengthen himself in his policy of favouring a declaration of war, -the Premier called all the Tuchuns to Peking for a conference. Nine -governors-general<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> came, and all the other provinces sent delegates. -General Tuan was successful with them, and by April 28th they had -decided to support his war policy.</p> - -<p>The Tuchun of Shantung was bulky, coarse-looking. I had some idea of -his views on representative government from his inaugural address -to the Shantung Assembly. "Gentlemen," the Tuchun said with genial -frankness, "you resemble birds who are in a large cage together. If -you behave well, and sing songs that are pleasing, we shall feed you; -otherwise, you shall have to go without food."</p> - -<p>Several of the Tuchuns called on me by appointment, and later I gave -them a formal reception, at which I saw all who had come to Peking, -observed their personalities, and tried to fathom the source of their -personal prominence and power. I talked with them individually and in -groups, chiefly about the progress of the war and the relative strength -of the combatants. My guests were full of smiles and good cheer, -particularly did the Tuchun of Fukien radiate joy. In their sociability -they were true Chinese, and here, where they had been received with -the military honours due to their position and in the spirit of -hospitality, they could show themselves in a more amiable light than -when maintaining their power in their provinces. To a brief speech of -welcome which I made when they had all arrived General Hsu Shu-cheng -replied with a most emphatic expression of friendship for America.</p> - -<p>That so many of these governors should have risen from the lowliest -position was indeed strong evidence of the underlying democracy of -Chinese life. But that a mere handful of men should wield such power, -each in his province, did not bespeak strength in representative -government.</p> - -<p>Some of the military commanders were men of education, although most of -them had risen from very modest surroundings: Yen Hsi-shan, of Shansi; -Chu Jui, of Chekiang; Tang Chi-yao, of Yunnan; Chen Kuang-yuan, of -Kiangsi; Ni Tze-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span>chung, of Anhwei; Li Shun, of Nanking, a fisherman's -son; Li Ho-chi of Fukien, Tien Chung-yu of Kalgan, both of middle-class -families—all these were fair scholars. General Wu Pei-fu, who rose -from the post of a private in the Chino-Japanese War, had through great -intelligence and industry acquired a good education, as likewise had -General Feng Yu-hsiang; both of these generals professed the Christian -religion. President Feng Kuo-chang came of a poor family, and as a -young man played a fiddle in a small local theatre.</p> - -<p>Among the other Tuchuns were many to whom the Chinese applied the -proverb: "A good man will never become a soldier." These men, indeed, -deserve credit for having risen from their original state as coolies, -bandits, or horse-thieves, but they often owe their prominence to -qualities which by no means make for the good of the state. Chang -Tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria, commenced his career as a bandit; he -was pardoned by Chao Er-shun, and became a government officer. Chang -Huai-chi was a coolie, and never got much education. Tsao Kun, of -Chihli, was a huckster. Wang Chan-yuan was a hostler. The trio, Chang -Hsun, Lu Yung-ting, and Mu Yung-hsing, headed the so-called Black Flag -Band; at one time the partners put up fifty thousand taels to enable -Chang Hsun to buy himself an office and become respectable. But he -spent it all in high living. With the antecedents of some of these men -one marvels not only at the position they have acquired, but at the -personal polish and air of refinement of many of them.</p> - -<p>All of them dealt with political power as a commodity, secured -through the use of money and soldiers. They were somewhat like the -<i>condottieri</i> of the Italian renaissance, looking ahead only to the -goal of their personal ambition for wealth and power. Even among these -militarists, however, there were those who gave some attention to -matters of public policy, and the idea of national welfare and unity -had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> begun to dawn upon their consciousness. Moreover, in them I felt -a mixture of the old and the new. They had suddenly come into great -power, thought in terms of airplanes and modern armaments, but had as -yet few other modern ideas to inspire their action with anything beyond -personal motives. In their human qualities, however, several of them -excelled; and some, even, showed a real spirit of public service and -ability as administrators.</p> - -<p>The Japanese Government was still trying to get China into the war, -and its minister called on President Li to urge it. I talked on May -9th with the President, who said that he favoured a declaration of war -provided parliament was not overridden in the process. Then I saw the -Premier. "If parliament is obstinate," General Tuan said bluntly, "it -will be dissolved."</p> - -<p>I told him it would make a very bad impression in the United States and -with other Western powers if parliament were ignored in so important -a matter. I knew that parliament did not oppose declaring war, but -desired to control the war policy. "But," the Premier urged, "the -opposition of parliament disregards national interests. It desires -merely to secure partisan advantage." Tuan discussed the attitude of -Japan. "The Japanese have assured me," he declared, "that if I follow a -strong policy I may count on their support. Now circumstances force the -Chinese Government to be friendly to Japan. Of course, I will not give -up any valuable rights to anybody, and I will strengthen China in every -way so that resistance may be offered to any attempted injustice."</p> - -<p>Ironically, he asked whether confidence could be placed in the southern -leaders of the Kuo Min Tang. "I have proof," he continued, "that both -Sun Yat-sen and Tsen Liang-kuang have given written assurances to the -Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai that if either of them becomes -President of China he will conclude a treaty granting to Japan rights -of supervision of military and administrative affairs more extensive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> -than those sought in Group V of the twenty-one demands." So each party -believed the worst of the other.</p> - -<p>Events were tending to a climax. The Government was demoralized. Doctor -Chen was in prison; Mr. Li Ching-hsi, a nephew of Li Hung-chang, -who was to take Chen's place, would not assume office while affairs -remained so unsettled. The Ministry of Communications was in charge of -an underling. The Minister of Education, who also acted as Minister of -the Interior, was seriously ill. The Kuo Min Tang ministers had lost -their influence with their party in parliament because of their failure -effectively to oppose the Tuchuns' policy. It was believed that the -Tuchuns, with the followers of General Tuan, were planning a <i>coup</i> -against Parliament.</p> - -<p>In the midst of this I had a personal chat with Chen Lu, the -Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, at an evening reception at the -British Legation. I told him of my surprise that the Tuchuns, instead -of attending to the urgent business in their provinces, should be -gathered here, interfering with the Central Government. I let it be -distinctly understood that any movement to overthrow parliament in -order to carry out the war policy could not be expected to receive the -sympathy of the United States. The vice-minister was in close touch -with the Tuchuns. I expected that he would repeat my remarks to them. -He did.</p> - -<p>As I was leaving the Chancery a few evenings later Mr. Roy Anderson -appeared with the news that something was happening and drove me over -to the railway station. We went through the Chenmen gate. Along the -main street were many carts rapidly driven, loaded with military stores -and household goods. Automobiles were rushing by them to the station. -On the platform was a turmoil of troops busily transferring the various -military possessions to cars. In a parlour car our friends the Tuchuns -were assembling. I left Mr. Anderson there to observe and to get -information.</p> - -<p>It appeared that the Tuchuns had all of a sudden decided<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> to leave -Peking for their various capitals, taking their bodyguards with them. -Two or three were to remain in Tientsin a little longer to watch -developments. Their precipitous exit seemed to indicate that President -Li had at last got the upper hand.</p> - -<p>As a farewell courtesy to Doctor Willoughby, the American legal -adviser, the President had invited him and me to luncheon on the -following day. President Li was cheerful. The discomfiture of the -Tuchuns filled him with glee. "All danger is passed," he announced; "I -will dismiss General Tuan, appoint a new cabinet, and have parliament -decide the war question without compulsion."</p> - -<p>In order to inform myself as to what was behind the President's -confidence, I asked him what he had to put in the place of his cabinet -and General Tuan, and whether he believed that the Government could be -carried on without the concurrence of that important party.</p> - -<p>"Oh, yes," the President assured me, "it is all arranged."</p> - -<p>Pressing him a little further, and asking upon whom, in particular, he -was relying, to my unspeakable surprise, he said: "General Chang Hsun -will assist me."</p> - -<p>Now General Chang Hsun was an old-time bandit and militarist. His ideas -were devoid of any understanding of representative institutions. It -passed my power of imagination to see how reliance could be placed in -this general for the vindication of parliament. As I looked dubious, -the President repeated: "Yes, you may believe me. I can rely on General -Chang Hsun."</p> - -<p>It was not what Chang Hsun stood for that the President relied on, but -on his enmity to General Tuan. Li Yuan-hung, though quite modern in his -conception of government, in this instance followed a strong Chinese -instinct which aims to prevail by setting off strong individuals -against each other.</p> - -<p>After I had heard that the dismissal of General Tuan had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> been -announced, General Chin Yun-peng called on me. He was agitated and much -worried. "Do you not think that General Tuan should leave Peking?" he -asked. "His enemies will undoubtedly wish to take his life."</p> - -<p>I tried to cheer him up by telling him that in a modern government -such ups and downs must be expected. "Let the other side now develop -their policy, and show what they can do; let General Tuan use this time -for quiet recuperation, after the strain he has been through. Then," -I said, "the time will come again when Tuan will be called back to -power." The eyes of the good general lit up with gratitude. General Ni -Tze-chung, most notorious and active among the military party, declared -on the 26th of May that the dismissal of General Tuan had been illegal. -His province of Anhwei disapproved; it would act independently of the -Central Government.</p> - -<p>This was the crucial point in the development of the situation.</p> - -<p>Expert observers said that had the President immediately dismissed -Ni and ordered his punishment, appointing a junior commander in his -place, the rest of the militarists would have fallen away from Ni, and -the President could have dealt with them individually. Instead, he was -persuaded to send a conciliatory letter to General Ni.</p> - -<p>This, of course, confirmed the leadership of Ni over the military -party; further, it encouraged the majority of the Tuchuns to declare -their independence.</p> - -<p>A so-called provisional government was set up at Tientsin. The older -and wiser heads of the military party, men like General Tuan Chi-jui -and Mr. Hsu Shih-chang, held themselves entirely aloof from this new -organization.</p> - -<p>General Ni Tze-chung was the leading spirit. By dint of force the -so-called government helped itself to the deposits of the Chinese -Government in the Tientsin branch of the Bank of China. The men greatly -in evidence were the members of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> the pro-Japanese clique, Mr. Tsao -Ju-lin and General Hsu Shu-cheng. General Aoki, the Japanese military -adviser to the Government, was also on the ground.</p> - -<p>In Peking a paralysis crept over the Government. The President lost his -advantage as quickly as he had gained it. On the railways all orders -of the Tuchuns for transportation were implicitly obeyed. When at this -time the question of the movement of revolutionary troops and their -stationing at Tientsin and along the railway came up, the Japanese -minister persisted in the position that it would be highly undesirable -to make any objection on the ground of any possible conflict with the -protection of the railway by foreign troops. Two months before, the -Japanese Legation had strongly objected to the stationing of a few -government troops along the same railway.</p> - -<p>The President issued a mandate inviting Chang Hsun to Peking as -arbitrator.</p> - -<p>When I interviewed the President, he looked disconsolate His youthful -English secretary, Mr. Kuo, tried his best to give a more cheerful -and confident note to Li's conversation, but Doctor Tenney, who was -with me, easily compared the President's doleful Chinese with the more -buoyant English translation.</p> - -<p>The plan of the Tuchuns was directed toward isolating and strangling -Peking. They controlled the railways leading there, and were preventing -the shipment of foodstuffs. The ministry that controlled the railways, -it must be remembered, was controlled by Japanese influence. -Constitutional government in China was paralyzed through the lack of -military and financial authority.</p> - -<p>The war issue worried the Chinese. First, they feared that the -militarist party would take advantage of it, through the support of -Japanese influence, to fasten its hold upon China; second, that China -might by the Allies be made a field in which to seek compensations. -But if local political troubles<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> had not entirely upset the situation, -it might have been possible to arrange for a joint declaration of the -powers that would have allayed suspicion and made it feasible for China -to enter the war with a sense of security.</p> - -<p>Dr. Wu Ting-fang, acting on the suggestion of Mr. Lenox Simpson and -liberal-minded Chinese publicists, made a move to have the American -Government do something. He sent advices to Minister Koo in Washington -telling him about General Ni and his leadership of the revolt of the -Tuchuns. The southern provinces were still loyal to the President and -parliament, and the civil and commercial population disapproved of the -rebellion. President Wilson and Secretary Lansing were asked to make -a statement in behalf of representative government in China. This was -followed by a direct appeal to President Wilson.</p> - -<p>But the American Government had already instructed me on the 5th of -June to communicate to the Chinese Government a statement evincing -a sincere desire for internal political harmony. The question of -China's entry into the war, it said, was secondary to continuing the -political unity of China and the laying aside of factional disputes. I -accompanied it orally with a personal statement that the United States -conceived the war to be one for the principles of democracy; that it -would deplore any construction of its invitation which would lend -itself to the idea that it contemplated any coercion or restriction -upon Chinese freedom of action. I made plain that no matter how much -the United States wished the coöperation of China in the war, it did -not desire to bring this about by using the political dissensions or -working with any one faction in disregard of parliament.</p> - -<p>General Tuan Chi-jui at once stated to Doctor Ferguson, who -unofficially informed him of the American note at Tientsin, that he -had totally withdrawn from all politics. The Chinese press gave a very -favourable reception to the note; the Chinese people welcomed America's -advice. General<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> Feng Kuo-chang, later when he had become President, -spoke of the note to me, and remarked on the salutary influence it had -wielded upon public opinion in China.</p> - -<p>While the political dissensions in the Chinese state were too -personal to be overcome by any friendly suggestions from the outside, -nevertheless the American note had set up a standard for all the -Chinese. It had, furthermore, given convincing proof of the fact -that the true interests of China were impartially weighed by the -American Government, and were not entirely subordinated to any war -policy which America might desire to advance. From all parts of China -came expressions of gratitude and satisfaction that the American -Government should have spoken to China so justly and truly. The Chinese -appreciated the spirit of justice of the American Government in not -desiring to have the war issue used for the purposes of enabling any -faction or party to override the free determination of the Chinese -Government and people. As America was itself at war and would therefore -have welcomed coöperation, this just policy particularly impressed the -Chinese.</p> - -<p>The Japanese press both in Japan and China immediately launched forth -into a bitter invective against the American action. The United States -should have consulted Japan. Its action constituted interference in the -domestic affairs of China. "If China listens to advice from America," -a Japanese major-general declared in an excited speech at a dinner in -Peking on the 7th of June, "she will have Japan to deal with."</p> - -<p>The Japanese ambassador at Washington protested informally. Had not -Secretary Bryan, in a note dated the 13th of March, 1915, recognized -the special and close relations, political and economic, between Japan -and China? It was impossible that the American minister at Peking was -taking a part in political affairs in China, but the Japanese public -was sensitive about the note sent by the American<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> Government to China. -Would it not be useful if the American Government would confirm Mr. -Bryan's statement?</p> - -<p>The reply to this communication did not come until the 6th of July. -Mr. Bryan's statement, the reply said, referred only to the special -relations created by territorial contiguity in certain parts of China. -Even with respect to them it in no way admitted that the United States -might not in future be justified in expressing itself relative to -questions that might arise between China and Japan. The United States -could not be indifferent to matters affecting the welfare of the -Chinese people, such as the unrest in China.</p> - -<p>The first detachments of Chang Hsun's troops arrived in Peking on -the 9th of June. Chang Hsun's theory was that it is the business of -a trooper to make himself terrible. These wild horsemen, wearing -loose-fitting black uniforms, with their cues rolled up on the back of -the head, rode about Peking with the air of conquerors. The "Mediator" -was coming with sufficient military force to back his judgment.</p> - -<p>When General Chang himself arrived, the streets from the railway -station to the Mediator's house in the Manchu city were entirely shut -off. Mounted troopers blocked the way as my automobile came along a -side street to cross one of these thoroughfares. They nearly collided -with the front of my machine, drew their guns, and would not budge. To -explain to them my right to pass would have meant sending someone to -the Foreign Office; even then in order to go on I might have to run -over them, for the Foreign Office, undoubtedly, meant nothing at all to -them. I told my companion not to let them know my position. We tried to -pass through on the ground that we had business on the other side, but -they reared their horses up and down, and nearly came into the machine -with us. We were held up until the great man had arrived and had raced -from the station to his residence.</p> - -<p>When I was with Dr. Wu Ting-fang a few days later the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> card of a -secretary of the cabinet was brought in. I knew that he was trying to -induce Doctor Wu to sign a decree dissolving parliament. I had heard in -the morning that President Li had finally caved in; for Chang Hsun's -first prescription for restoring China was to declare that parliament -must be dissolved. The President relied on Chang's assistance. He -could not help himself, he must accept the dictation of the man he had -summoned.</p> - -<p>I rejoined a friend who awaited me outside in the automobile. He had -just overheard the chauffeur of the cabinet secretary and the doorman -of the Foreign Office. The chauffeur had said: "Is your old man going -to sign up? You had better see to it that he does, else something might -happen to him."</p> - -<p>These subordinates were keeping their eyes open.</p> - -<p>The Japanese minister, on whom I called that morning, said to me: -"General Chang's mediation is the last hope of peace. It is desirable -that parliament be gotten rid of, it is obstructive, and makes the -doing of business well-nigh impossible."</p> - -<p>Dr. Wu Ting-fang stood out against countersigning the mandate -that would dissolve the parliament. In matters of spiritualism, -vegetarianism, and longevity, I had perhaps not always been able to -take him quite seriously. But I admired his quiet courage in not -allowing himself to be bowled over, after even President Li had given -in. Before daylight on the 13th of June Doctor Wu was roused from his -bed and now asked to countersign a Presidential mandate designating the -jovial General Chiang Chao-tsung, commander of the Peking gendarmerie, -to act as Premier, and accepting Doctor Wu's resignation. Before -daybreak General Chiang signed the mandate dissolving parliament. The -President consented to its issue, for he had been told it would be -impossible to prevent disturbances in Peking unless this were done.</p> - -<p>So wore on the early summer of 1917. Affairs seemed to have arrived at -a stalemate.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXIII" id="CHAPTER_XXIII">CHAPTER XXIII</a></p> - -<p class="center">AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY</p> - - -<p>My family had gone to Peitaiho for the summer. I was staying at the -residence alone with Mr. F.L. Belin, who had recently come to Peking to -join my staff. I slept rather late on Sunday, July 1st, as the morning -was cool. When Kao, the first boy, came in to take orders he appeared -excited and cried: "Emperor has come back again!"</p> - -<p>I did not immediately grasp the significance of this astonishing -announcement; but he went on volubly telling me that it was true, that -the Emperor had returned, that all the people were hanging out the -yellow dragon flag. I sent out for information and soon learned that -the little emperor, in some mysterious way, had been restored during -the night.</p> - -<p>The monarchical movement came as a complete surprise to everybody, -for it was entirely the personal act of General Chang Hsun. The men -whose names were recited in his proclamations as assisting him had -known nothing about it; it was undreamed of even by those who found -themselves forced to assist, such as the Chief of Staff and the heads -of the gendarmerie and of the police.</p> - -<p>Kang Yu-wei, the "Modern Sage" of China, arrived in Peking on June -29th, and with him the restoration was planned. Kang Yu-wei, who had -been the leader of the first reform movement in 1898, when he made a -stand against absolutism, had always remained a consistent believer in -constitutional monarchy. He encouraged Chang Hsun with philosophical -theory, and wrote all his edicts for him. The two believed that the -Imperial restoration would immediately bring to the active support of -the Government all the military<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> governors, whose true sentiments were -notoriously imperialistic. Their consent was taken for granted, and the -edicts, as drawn up, expressly assumed that it had been given.</p> - -<p>It became known to me that Chang Hsun had also discussed the -possibility of an Imperial restoration with the Japanese minister. The -latter expressed the opinion that the movement should not be undertaken -without first making sure of the assent of the chief military leaders. -Chang Hsun had no doubt of this support; he evidently regarded the -advice of the Japanese minister as encouraging, and believed that his -movement would have diplomatic countenance.</p> - -<p>Chang Hsun had his intimate advisers, particularly Kang Yu-wei, draw -up the requisite Imperial edicts on the 30th of June. In these it was -stated that leading governors, like Feng Kuo-chang, Lu Yung-ting, and -others of equal prominence, had petitioned for the restoration of the -monarchy. Lists of appointments to the highest positions in the Central -Government and the provinces were prepared. The existing military -governors were in most cases reappointed. In the Central Government -the important men designated were Hsu Shih-chang as Guardian of the -Emperor, Liang Tun-yen as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Chu Chi-pao -as Minister of the Interior. Wang Shih-chen was retained as Chief of -the General Staff.</p> - -<p>As an amazing instance of how consent was taken for granted, it was -recited in an Imperial edict that President Li Yuan-hung had himself -petitioned for the reëstablishment of the Empire; this edict appointed -Li a duke of the first class.</p> - -<p>So soon as these edicts were prepared and ready for presentation, a -dinner was arranged for the evening of the same day, to which the heads -of the Peking military and police establishments were invited. They -met at the Kiangsu Guild Hall. After great quantities of wine had been -consumed, Chang Hsun broached his project for the sal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span>vation of China, -stating that all preparations had been made and that military and -diplomatic support was assured. Then, pointing to the Chief of Staff, -he said: "Of course, you are supporting the movement."</p> - -<p>General Wang, completely taken aback, saw no way to refuse—since -he was in the presence of an accomplished fact. In the same way the -consent of General Chiang, head of the gendarmerie, and of General Wu, -head of the police, was obtained.</p> - -<p>Thus the enterprise was launched. Chang Hsun directed General Wang and -four others to proceed immediately to the residence of President Li, -to wake him up, and to obtain his consent to a memorial asking for -reëstablishment of the monarchy. Chang Hsun himself proceeded to the -Imperial City. Not being able to obtain the support of the Imperial -dukes for his movement, he had lavishly bribed the eunuchs in charge of -the palace, who opened the gates for him and his retinue, and took him -to the private residence of the young Emperor. Chang Hsun prostrated -himself, and informed the Emperor that the whole nation demanded his -return to the throne. Thereupon he took the frightened boy to the great -throne room, and, in the presence of his retainers and members of the -Imperial Family, who had been summoned, formally enthroned the Emperor. -Then the edicts which had been prepared were formally sealed.</p> - -<p>As may be imagined, there were some comic incidents. A rather -distinguished man had been summoned by the Premier to discuss with the -President his assumption of one of the cabinet portfolios. A Chinese -friend of mine who had just heard of the restoration saw him at the -hotel about ten o'clock in the morning. On being asked what was his -errand in Peking, the distinguished personage stated confidentially -that he was awaiting a carriage to take him to the President's palace. -"There is no President," he was told. "This is now an Empire; the -Emperor was enthroned at four<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> o'clock this morning." The great man's -astonishment was amusing.</p> - -<p>As the military chiefs were deceived on the preceding night, so Peking -was deceived for one day. As the news spread, the population showed an -almost joyous excitement. Everywhere the yellow dragon flags appeared, -soon the entire city took on a festive appearance. Revived memories -of past splendour seemingly made the population of Peking imperialist -to a man. But the height of this movement was reached as early as the -morning of the 2nd of July.</p> - -<p>I had avoided receiving General Chang Hsun. Mr. Liang Tung-yen came to -assume office as Minister for Foreign Affairs; I also abstained from -seeing him, as well as the rest of General Chang's ministers, asking -Doctor Tenney to talk with those who presented themselves. Mr. Liang -had always been an imperialist, and was in high spirits, believing that -at last China was saved. He had been led to believe that the foreign -diplomats would readily recognize the restoration.</p> - -<p>Strong doubts as to the character of the movement became manifest on -Monday, the 2nd of July. Tuan Chi-jui did not figure in the Imperial -official lists. When asked about this, Chang Hsun declared that General -Tuan was unimportant, having no troops under his command. But Liang -Chi-chao had been playing cards with friends at about 2 <span class="smcap">A.M.</span> -on the fateful night, when the news was telephoned to Tientsin. Liang -immediately went to General Tuan's residence, where the latter was -similarly engaged at cards. General Tuan, who was thoroughly weary of -public affairs, was difficult to rouse; he begged to be spared the -trouble of thinking of what might be occurring in Peking. More details -came in, and it became apparent what a thoroughly one-man affair the -movement was. Then Tuan roused himself.</p> - -<p>Tuan was at that time actually only a private citizen, without -authority or command. But I learned later that Liang Chi-chao had gone -to Japanese friends for funds to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> enlist the military against the -Imperial movement, and he got 1,000,000 yen as a loan to himself and -General Tuan for this purpose. It was to be treated as a government -loan upon restoration of normal conditions.</p> - -<p>The two proceeded on Tuesday to Machang, where the Eighth Division had -been encamped since the attempt to overawe President Li Yuan-hung. -General Tuan, it was stated, felt nervous as to the outcome of his -venture, but he called the commanders, declaring that he had always -been opposed to a restoration of the monarchy, and that it was now -being attempted by a single general. To resist this act he proposed to -take command of the republican troops.</p> - -<p>General Tuan was at once recognized as commander-in-chief. President -Li, on his part, did not yield to the importunities of Chang Hsun. -He gave out an absolute denial of the statement that he favoured the -restoration. After issuing a mandate that turned over the Presidential -powers to the Vice-President and appointed General Tuan Chi-jui Premier -and Commander-in-Chief, he took refuge in the Legation Quarter. I sent -a personal representative to General Tuan at Tientsin, who declared -that he already had complete control of the military situation and -could finish Chang Hsun inside of ten days.</p> - -<p>As hostilities threatened in and around Peking, and as the danger of -looting was always present, I discussed the precautions to be taken -with several of my colleagues, and agreed with the Japanese minister -that we would each bring a company of reinforcements from Tientsin. -Meanwhile, the movements of Tuan's troops began. To hinder their -advance, Chang Hsun's men broke the railway at a point about one third -of the way from Peking to Tientsin.</p> - -<p>Certain members of the diplomatic corps urged that we give notice that -no fighting should take place on or near the railways. As we had made -no objection to the bringing in of Chang Hsun's troops and to their -being stationed in Peking<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> and along the railway, I took the position -that we were not justified in objecting to the troops of the government -to which we were accredited taking necessary action against Chang Hsun. -We might, however, insist upon the right of keeping the railway open. -This met with approval. On the 5th of July a demand was made upon the -belligerent generals that the railway must be kept open, and that at -least one train be allowed to pass in each direction every day.</p> - -<p>The damaged line was reconstructed, and on July 6th, the American -infantry arrived in Peking; on the 7th, the first trains travelled -between Peking and Tientsin—one train actually passing between the -armies during a battle. Fighting went on during these days between the -troops of General Tuan, directly commanded by General Tuan Chi-kwei, -and Chang Hsun's forces; there was much firing but small loss of life, -and the latter's forces were finally driven back toward Peking. The -troops of General Tsao Kun also advanced upon Peking from the west.</p> - -<p>Mr. Grant, of the National Printing Bureau, on Friday rushed into the -legation compound in his automobile, with the report that looting -was going on in the southern part of the city. We ascended the wall. -From the Chenmen Tower we saw excited groups moving up and down the -main streets, but nothing was happening save the bringing in of a few -wounded men. To investigate the cause of the excitement I went with -Mr. Belin in our private rickshaws to the Chinese city, passing to the -end of the broad Chenmen thoroughfare. The street was still crowded, -the people were excited though well behaved; the shops all had their -shutters up. Near the south end of the street some shopkeepers posted -in front of their shops told us that the return of Chang Hsun's troops -from outside the walls had been reported. Looting had been expected but -had not taken place. We proceeded to the Temple of Heaven, where great -crowds were walking about among the tents of the troops.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> On returning, -we entered a shop to look at some antiques, remaining half an hour. -When we came out our rickshaws had disappeared. Doctor Ferguson joined -us as we searched for our men. Suddenly, Belin shouted to a rickshaw -man, who with a dozen others was conveying some of Chang Hsun's petty -officers southward. We insisted that the non-commissioned officer -occupying the rickshaw get out, and he finally complied.</p> - -<p>The rickshaws had been requisitioned by these bandits. Upon our -return to the Legation, my rickshaw-runner had just arrived, excited -to the point of tears. Our two coolies had drawn the men who -originally commandeered them up to the Imperial City; there they were -requisitioned again to convey other men back to the Temple of Heaven. -But my man, when opposite the entrance to Legation Street, had upset -his bandit into the road and made a quick entry into the Legation -Quarter, where the angry and sputtering trooper dared not follow him. -That the rickshaws belonging to foreigners should thus be pressed into -service shows the disregard which these troopers had for everything but -their own desires.</p> - -<p>As we returned to the Legation we noticed a wonderful colour effect. -Coal-black clouds were banked against the western sky, above which were -lighter clouds or angry shreds of flaming colour. Against this the dark -walls and towers of Peking stood out in sharp relief. In the streets -the crowds still surged, in restless expectancy. Suddenly the sunset -light disappeared; the sky became black with clouds; a sharp gust of -wind whirled the dust of the Chinese city northward; then came a flash -of lightning, a clap of thunder, and a heavy downpour, which cooled the -excited heads and drove all to shelter. The late afternoon had been -weird and fantastic, and appeared to presage the happening of still -stranger things.</p> - -<p>I was lunching with a friend at his race-course house on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> Sunday, the -8th of July, when word was brought to me that a certain Colonel Hu, -coming from Chang Hsun, had persuaded the French minister that the city -was in imminent danger of sacking, fighting, and general disturbances. -The only salvation, Colonel Hu had said, lay in asking Hsu Shi-chang to -come from Tientsin to mediate. The French minister thereupon induced -his Entente colleagues to agree to transmit a note to General Tuan -Chi-jui urging him to prevail upon Hsu Chi-Chang to come as mediator. -This seemed to me ill-advised. It meant, at a time when Chang Hsun -was already as good as defeated, that he would be solemnly treated as -entitled to dictate the terms and personnel of mediation by influential -members of the diplomatic corps. I returned to Peking and saw my -colleagues, urging my opinion strongly. The British chargé withdrew his -consent; he had just received a telegram from his consul in Tientsin -reporting that General Tuan was absolutely opposed to mediation. The -action contemplated was not taken, though Chang Hsun persisted in his -attempts to gain recognition from the diplomatic corps. The French -minister, who hated Dr. Wu Ting-fang—this would explain his support -of Chang Hsun—gradually came to see the obverse side of his policy as -certain Germanic affiliations of Chang Hsun became known.</p> - -<p>Kang Yu-wei presented himself at my house on the 8th, seeking refuge, -and I assigned him rooms in one of our compounds. He informed me that -Chang Hsun had had full assurances of support on the part of Hsu -Chi-Chang and other important monarchists. Next day he informed me that -Prince Tsai Tze was anxious to consult me.</p> - -<p>I arranged to have the Prince come to the house assigned to Mr. Kang, -where I had two hours' conversation with the Manchu and the sage. -Kang Yu-wei commenced with a long disquisition on the advantages of a -constitutional monarchy. He wished to explain his action and to prove -to me that he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> was not a reactionary, but was aiming only for progress -under the monarchical form, which he considered most suitable to China.</p> - -<p>All this time the Prince was silent. He seemed greatly depressed, not -inclined to say anything at first. After inquiries about his health, I -asked him what he would like to say to me. With eyes of real sadness -he looked me full in the face, saying: "What shall we do? My house has -been drawn into this affair without our consent. It has been forced on -us. We did not wish to depart from the agreements we had made with the -Republic. But Chang Hsun would not listen to us. He thought he saw the -only way. Now what shall we do?"</p> - -<p>I told him that I appreciated the difficulty in which the Imperial -Family found itself, but that I of course could not know the details -of the situation sufficiently to give any opinion. One thing, however, -seemed to me certain: if the leaders of the republican government knew -the true attitude of the Imperial Family, and if the Emperor would -formally and absolutely dissociate himself from the movement of Chang -Hsun, I believed that they would not make the Imperial Family suffer. -I asked him whether they had considered having the Emperor issue a -decree, absolutely and for all time renouncing all rights to the throne -and declaring his complete fealty to the Republic.</p> - -<p>The Prince regarded me aghast. "Oh, <i>no</i>! No matter how desirable -that might be from many points of view, it is not in the power of the -Emperor to do it. The rights he has inherited are not his. They came -to him in trust from his ancestors. He will have to maintain them, and -hand them on to his descendants. He, and we of his family, shall not -do anything to make these rights prevail against the State, but as the -sons of our ancestors, we cannot repudiate them."</p> - -<p>Never had I been so deeply impressed with the complexity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> of Chinese -affairs as by this answer—an Imperial family maintaining traditions -of empire in the midst of a republic, an emperor continuing to reside -in the Imperial Palace, a neighbour of the republican President in his -residence, and yet no desire to enter again into politics and to grasp -the sovereign power! I could now understand why the Chinese had allowed -the Emperor to remain in the palace; it was the house of his ancestors, -from which he might not be driven. That common reverence was the one -point of understanding between Chinese and Manchus.</p> - -<p>Prince Tsai Tze evidently still hoped that Hsu Shih-Chang, the loyal -friend of the Imperial Family, might be brought to Peking to mediate, -and that he might be prevailed upon to preserve the favourable -treatment hitherto accorded the Imperial Family. I could not give -Prince Tsai Tze any encouragement on this point, on which I had very -definite opinions, but had to content myself with general expressions -of sincere sympathy with the strange fate of this family.</p> - -<p>The question of mediation was again taken up by the diplomatic corps -on the afternoon of this day. Some of the ministers feared that the -city would suffer greatly if things should be allowed to go on. I was -strongly of the opinion that our interference in this matter could -have no good result, but would only further confuse and complicate the -situation. For once, the Chinese must settle it themselves, regardless -of any incidental inconvenience. From what I knew of the strength -of the contending forces and of the whole situation, I had no doubt -whatsoever that if left alone the republican forces would be easily -successful and that there would be no disturbances. I was on principle -against any action which would be in substance intervening in behalf of -a general who had attacked the Republic and whom nothing could now save -from overthrow except such diplomatic action.</p> - -<p>I was approached on the 10th of July by a representative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> of General -Chiang, chief of the gendarmerie. He stated that it was desired to -bring Chang Hsun into the American Legation, for his own safety though -against his will, and that an agreement to this effect had been made -among the different commanders. I stated that in the circumstances it -would be better for the diplomatic corps to discuss what protection -could be extended to Chang Hsun. An informal meeting was held, at which -the British chargé agreed that he would receive Chang Hsun if he were -brought in.</p> - -<p>The legations were notified by General Tuan, late in the afternoon of -July 11th, that during the night the troops would move against Chang -Hsun's forces in the city, and bombardment of the Temple of Heaven and -the quarters near the Imperial City held by Chang Hsun would begin at -dawn on the 12th of July. In conjunction with the commandant of the -legation guard, I sent notice to the American residents in the quarters -particularly affected, directing them to seek safety. Eighteen refugees -came to the Legation, where they were cared for during the day at the -Students' Mess. A company of the Fifteenth Infantry, which had been -brought up from Tientsin, was encamped in the compound in front of my -residence, to which their tents and military equipment imparted an -aspect of great military preparedness.</p> - -<p>I was awakened at daybreak on July 12th by the sound of artillery and -rifle fire. As the fighting commenced people went out of curiosity -upon the city wall. But stray bullets frequently fell on the wall, and -the commandant ordered it cleared. Unfortunately, several of these -onlookers—among them three Americans—were injured. During the battle -I received word from the Imperial tutors that the Dowager Empresses -were preparing to bring the Emperor to my residence. Since the 9th of -July they had wished to remove the Emperor to this legation for safety. -While the Empresses and some of the dukes desired this, the eunuchs -under Chang Hsun's influence opposed the removal. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> Prince Regent, -also influenced by Chang Hsun, took the same view. Thus on various -occasions the eunuchs, whose existence had almost been forgotten, came -out on the stage of action in this curious affair.</p> - -<p>About eleven o'clock, while the firing was at its height and after -several bombs had been dropped from aeroplanes upon the Imperial City, -telephone messages came to the effect that several friends of the -Imperial Family and Doctor Ferguson of the Red Cross were about to -rescue the Emperor from danger and bring him to the Legation. I had the -house prepared. Half an hour later two automobiles with the Red Cross -flag flying entered the legation compound. Mr. Belin ran to the door, -expecting to see the Emperor and Empress emerging from the automobiles, -but he returned with only Mr. Sun Pao-chi, who was shivering with -excitement. I took him to the reception room and comforted him with -tea. He still expected the Emperor to come. The automobiles left again -for the Imperial Palace, but as the aeroplanes had ceased dropping -bombs and the artillery fire was decreasing in violence, the people in -the palace decided against carrying out the flight.</p> - -<p>As I sat in the library all through the forenoon receiving reports and -giving directions, there was a constant hissing of bullets and shells -overhead. No shell dropped in our legation, although two or three fell -in the British. The Chinese artillery fire was remarkably accurate. -Sitting there and listening to the tumult of shouting and firing from -the Chenmen gate and the volleys of guns and artillery exceeding in -volume of sound any Fourth of July I had ever experienced, I felt -thankful to have seen a day when the Chinese would stand up and fight -out a big issue. I soon found that the battle was not commensurate with -its sound.</p> - -<p>Shortly before noon Chang Hsun was brought to the Dutch Legation, -accompanied by a German employé of the Chinese police. Chang Hsun had -been persuaded to come<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> by his generals almost with the use of force. -He was still under the illusion that he could mediate. When the Dutch -minister informed him that this was impossible, he wished to return to -his troops. This, of course, could not be permitted.</p> - -<p>Firing was violent from dawn until nearly noon. The field guns, machine -guns, and rifles filled the air with enormous tumult, but from eleven -o'clock on the firing gradually diminished, and it entirely ceased at -four in the afternoon. Immediately thereafter I proceeded by motor car -to the various centres of fighting. I found that Chang Hsun's house had -been struck by several shells and that the indirect artillery firing -of the government troops had been managed with considerable accuracy. -The human dead had already been removed from the neighbourhood although -numerous carcasses of horses remained. Thence I proceeded to the Temple -of Heaven, where I was astonished to find Chang Hsun's troops encamped -with all their guns and artillery, eating, drinking, and talking in -the best of spirits. They told me that five of their men had been -killed, and that their bodies were still there. The absence of visible -results from the enormous expenditure of ammunition during the day was -astonishing. I found, however, that the method of fighting employed -by the troops was to creep up as closely as possible behind a high -wall, and fire into the air in the general direction where the enemy -might be. Hence, the bystanders were in rather greater danger than the -combatants themselves. In fact, the total number of killed as a result -of the fighting of July 12th was twenty-six; seventy-six were seriously -wounded, and more than half of these were civilians.</p> - -<p>The Chang Hsun contingents in the Temple of Heaven had hoisted the -republican flag at 10 <span class="smcap">A.M.</span> An agreement was reached by which -they were to be paid $60 per man upon the delivery of their arms. -Chang Hsun's troops about the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> Imperial City held out for a larger -payment. To my astonishment, as late as Saturday, the 14th of July, I -saw fully armed soldiers of Chang Hsun on guard at the central police -headquarters. Asking the reason for this—for Chang Hsun's troops were -supposedly routed in pitched battle on the 12th of July—I was told -that the commanders had not yet settled upon the sum these contingents -were to be paid. Eighty dollars per man was finally agreed upon, and by -the 15th of July Chang Hsun's troops, deprived of their arms and their -pigtails, had left Peking with their money, and were on their way to -their rural homes in Shantung.</p> - -<p>The dragon flags disappeared on the 12th of July as suddenly as they -had appeared on the 2nd. The city quickly resumed its ordinary life.</p> - -<p>The swift failure of Chang Hsun's enterprise was due to no inherent -weakness of monarchical sentiment in north China. In fact, monarchist -leanings among the northern military party are quite well known. It -had been assumed that such a movement would be launched, and, if it -had been more prudently planned and prepared, it might easily have -succeeded, at least for a time. Its total failure was due to the fact -that Chang Hsun, counting on monarchist tendencies among the northern -military men, neglected to make those preparatory negotiations which -would have turned the potential support into real strength. While -this is true, there can be no doubt that Chang Hsun's failure gave -an enormous setback to the cause of monarchism in China. After two -failures to reëstablish the empire, ambitious men will think many times -before embarking on such a venture again. Which is to say that the -efforts to restore the Empire actually served to entrench more deeply -the republican form of government.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXIV" id="CHAPTER_XXIV">CHAPTER XXIV</a></p> - -<p class="center">WAR WITH GERMANY: READJUSTMENTS</p> - - -<p>"It has been decided by the Chinese Government to declare war; on this -very day the decision has been formally adopted by the cabinet."</p> - -<p>Thus General Tuan Chi-jui, then Premier, conveyed to me on the 2nd of -August the news of China's further entrance into world politics. I -had known about this from other sources. General Tuan had announced -it as his policy when I visited him on the 14th of July. He had then -stated that Vice-President Feng Kuo-cheng would assume the functions of -President, which President Li would relinquish, and that it would be a -war government.</p> - -<p>The American Government had held to its view that China should not be -pressed to declare war. It believed that the breaking off of diplomatic -relations, for the time being, was sufficient contribution to our -cause in the war. But the Japanese, aided especially by the French, -had strongly urged the Chinese Government to join them. Not until much -later did the Chinese learn of secret treaties made between France, -Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, giving assurance to the Japanese that -no effective resistance would be offered by those powers to anything -which Japan might desire in China at the end of the war.</p> - -<p>In their ignorance of these secret arrangements, the Chinese thought -that association with the war powers would put them on the footing of -an ally. Also, doubtless, the militarist party surrounding Tuan hoped -to increase its power through war activities. For my part, I allowed -the Chinese to feel that the American Government, desiring<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> them to -decide this question according to their own best judgment, hoped that a -way might be found to bring the war situation into harmony with justice -to China.</p> - -<p>When he announced the cabinet's decision, Premier Tuan took up with -me the matter of finance. He evidently expected that the American -Government, or the Consortium, together with independent banks, would -now furnish China the money needed for her war preparations. The powers -were considering what assurances to offer. In previous discussions with -Chinese officials I had repeatedly dwelt on the fact that should China -take this step, she would be entitled to specific and strong assurances -from the powers guaranteeing her political and administrative -integrity, in terms that could not easily be evaded in future. I had -made continued efforts to effect an agreement upon a declaration -favourable to the full maintenance of the sovereign rights of China. My -conversations with the Japanese minister during 1916 and 1917 had this -in view. Now that China was considering entry into the war, I again -suggested the desirability of such a declaration, and hinted to the -Chinese officials that they might be successful upon this occasion in -obtaining a statement which would fortify the sovereign rights of China -and prevent the further growth of special privileges and spheres of -influence.</p> - -<p>My colleagues all appeared to be favourable to the idea. It would -undoubtedly have been possible for the Chinese Government to secure -such a specific and effective declaration. Instead, however, of taking -advantage of the position which their readiness to declare war gave -them, and boldly proposing such a declaration as a necessary condition, -they became tangled up in long discussions. The substance originally -proposed was worn down to a rather empty formula.</p> - -<p>The first proposal was that the governments should declare their -policy to "favour the independent development of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> China, and in no way -to seek in China, either singly or jointly, advantages of the nature -of territorial or preferential rights, whether local or general." -The Chinese had suggested, in addition, a statement that the other -governments would accord to China their full assistance, in order -to "help it obtain the enjoyment of the advantages resulting from -the equality of powers in their international relations." As finally -adopted, the declaration simply gave assurance of friendly support -in "allowing China to benefit in its international relations from -the situation, and from the regard due a great country." Vague and -unmeaning as it was, the latter term was undoubtedly flattering to -Chinese <i>amour propre</i>. These assurances were given to China on August -14th, and the United States participated in them.</p> - -<p>China's internal political situation had not improved greatly as a -result of the overthrow of the monarchical movement. On his return -to Peking as restorer of the republican government, General Tuan had -the chance to rally all elements in Chinese politics to a policy of -constructive action. With whom would he ally himself? As his distrust -of the Kuo Min Tang was great, he constituted his new government -without regard to that party, and sought instead to govern through -a combination of the Chin Pu Tang and the so-called Communications -Party. Of the latter the real leaders, Liang Shih-yi and his immediate -associates, were still living in exile under the mandate issued -by President Li. Mr. Tsao Ju-lin controlled the new wing of the -Communications Party, and he had a disproportionate prominence through -Japanese support. Both he and Liang Chi-chao, the leader of the Chin -Pu Tang, were under the Japanese thumb. This influence could thus -act strongly and extensively on Chinese affairs. It was a Japanese -loan that had facilitated the overthrow of Chang Hsun and made the -leadership of General Tuan possible.</p> - -<p>These two factions, while they supported General Tuan,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> were mutually -antagonistic. Mr. Liang Chi-chao is a literary man and a theorist. -Long befriended by the Japanese, he doubtless believed himself to be -a patriotic Chinese who was ready to use Japanese aid, but would not -surrender any essential national rights. Not being a man of affairs, -he may not always have seen the bearing upon the ultimate independence -of China of the measures which he proposed. Some Chinese as well as -foreigners thought him merely the venal instrument of Japan; others -regarded him as essentially honest, but subject to being misled because -of his theories. As Minister of Finance, his administration tended to -bring about a great increase of Japanese influence in China.</p> - -<p>Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, cynical, practical-minded, and keen, is a different -type of man. He was closely associated with Mr. Lu Tsung-yu, himself -the most pliable instrument of Japanese policy in China. Mr. Tsao -was educated in Japan; one or more of his wives were Japanese, and -in business and pleasure he was constantly in Japanese company. He -was out-spokenly skeptical about his own country and about republican -institutions.</p> - -<p>The Government felt dependent upon assistance from abroad, for it had -financial difficulties due to inherited burdens and present military -expenses. It was made to believe that assistance could come only from -the Japanese. The Americans had left the Consortium four years ago; -they had every opportunity to interest themselves in China, but they -had done nothing substantial beyond the loan of the Chicago bank. In -China, the margin between tolerable existence and financial stress is -so narrow that a few million dollars may wield an enormous influence -for good or bad.</p> - -<p>These needs were accentuated because the southern republicans were -holding aloof. They felt themselves excluded from the Government; they -doubted General<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> Tuan's honesty of purpose, and they planned to remain -independent of the central authorities. From Shanghai Mr. C.T. Wang, -the most prominent of the younger republicans, wrote that Tuan Chi-jui -and his cabinet represented the reactionary element; that they were -strongly backed by undesirable foreign influence, and that the latter -would virtually control the Government. He ascribed to General Tuan -the ambition of paving the way to make himself emperor. The opposition -to Tuan, he said, would continue the fight until the Chinese Republic -was indeed a republic. As to American action in China, he noted that -America plays the game as a gentleman, therefore it is likely to be -outmanœuvred by another country less squeamish about its methods. -Another letter from Mr. C.C. Wu, dated July 19, 1917, I will give -textually, in part:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>... When General Tuan arrived at the head of his troops in Peking, he -had a good opportunity to gain the goodwill and coöperation of the -whole country if he had proclaimed his adherence to the constitution -at present in force, and to reassemble the dissolved parliament -in order that the Permanent Constitution may be completed and the -organization of the future parliament provided for; in other words, -that the basis for a legal and constitutional government may be -found. Unfortunately, other counsels seem to have prevailed. Another -assembly, without any semblance of legality, is to be convened and -the future regulation of the Republic is to be left in its hands. -This will only mean fresh internal dissension and strife. It is to be -admitted that there is much fault to be found with the old parliament, -but as I once told General Tuan, it is the name, the signboard, of -parliament that we must respect.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the papers are full of the inquiry which the Entente Powers -are alleged to have made in regard to the declaration of war against -Germany, and the reply made by the Waichiao Pu that the step will be -taken almost immediately. Now, it is unnecessary to tell you of my -opinion in regard to this question ever since the interview we had on -that fateful Sunday in February, of my firm conviction of the many -advantages, both material and moral, that such a step would confer on -China, nor of the efforts I have exerted in the cause. And my week's -stay in Shanghai has not altered my opinion. At the same time I agree -entirely with the view<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> expressed in the note you recently presented -to the Waichiao Pu on behalf of your government to the effect that -the paramount need of the moment is the consolidation of the country -and the establishment of an effective and responsible government, and -that, compared with this, the demarche against Germany, desirable -though it is, is of secondary importance. Indeed, it is nothing short -of ridiculous to declare war against a foreign power when every man -and every resource has to be kept in hand to meet possible civil -strife and when the authority of the Central Government is effective -in only a doubtful half of the country. It is difficult to see -what benefit the Entente Powers expect to derive by urging such a -government to take such a step, a step which is detrimental to the -best interests of China and contrary to the good advice tendered by -the U.S., with whom Great Britain, at least, associated herself. It -is enough to make one almost suspect that it is for these very two -reasons that the war measure is being urged on the Government.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Quite plainly, the southern leaders believed that the party of General -Tuan was in its war policy animated with the purpose of building up -its power at the expense of the rest of the country—particularly -of subduing the southern republicans. Even less unselfish purposes -were attributed to those who based their policy on foreign financial -support. In a speech in Parliament, Senator Kuang Yen-pao makes the -officials who contract ill-advised public loans say: "We are planning -for the conservation of the property of our sons and grandsons; why -should we have compunctions about driving the whole people to the land -of death? What matters the woe of the whole nation by the side of the -joy and happiness of our own families?" But the southern leaders did -not disavow the act of the Central Government in declaring war. Their -political opposition continued; but they accepted the international -action of Peking as binding on the whole country.</p> - -<p>In such matters China has not the hard-and-fast ideas of sovereign -authority and legality which reign in the West. It was therefore -possible for a local government to be independent in most matters, -and yet to allow itself to be guided<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> by the central authority in -some. A declaration of independence by no means implies that there -are no relationships whatever between the recalcitrant ones and the -central authorities. For this reason, too, the visit of a foreign -representative to any one of the governors who had declared his -independence would not, as in other countries, be regarded as an -affront to the Central Government. Circumstances might occur under -which the Central Government itself might favour such a visit, as -incidentally relieving the strain. I felt quite free to send attachés -of the Legation to the governors of disaffected provinces, and should -quite freely have gone myself.</p> - -<p>In all my interviews with high officials the prime subject was finance. -Not that China, as an associate in the war, was to get such aid—which -was taken as a matter of course—but how it was forthcoming supplied -the only question. Mr. Liang Chi-chao, Minister of Finance, who called -on me on the 4th of August, talked in favour of a big loan by the -Consortium. With this he hoped that the United States would again -associate itself. When he spoke of independent American loans, I called -his attention to the difficulty of concluding them or of calling up -the option under the Chicago loan, unless there were a parliament -whose authority was recognized by the country. Shortly after this I -saw the Acting President, General Feng. "China," he said—undoubtedly -to tell me something pleasant, but also because all Chinese do prefer -association with America—"China has followed the United States in the -policy of declaring war upon Germany. Now will not the United States -independently finance China? Or, if that is out of the question, then, -surely America will join the Consortium since that is the only way the -Chinese Government can be safely and effectively supported."</p> - -<p>"The republican form of government," he vowed, "is now eternally secure -in China." I could not but remember his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> previous monarchist leanings. -The Acting President spoke of General Tuan. "I have a very cordial -understanding with the Premier," he assured me.</p> - -<p>I went to the Premier on the 21st of August. In this discussion the -Chinese iron industry came up. The Premier asked: "Why not go ahead -with the development of mining and iron manufacture? Create a national -Chinese iron industry, and it will form the basis of a general loan -for industrial purposes." He thought, at first, that the Chinese -Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce should summon experts and start -the enterprise. I told him about the enormous technical difficulties -of such a project. Then he seemed to recognize that a contract with an -experienced and powerful organization, which could be held responsible, -would be more effective in establishing a national iron industry for -China. "I am not sure about the ore deposits near Nanking," he added; -"they may not be included in such coöperative enterprises."</p> - -<p>I suspected that he was trying to get financial support from another -source, and was leaving his hands free to make them a grant there. I -put in a <i>caveat</i> against any grant of iron ores to foreign nationals. -Americans had in the past been invariably informed that iron deposits -could not be leased or granted to individuals because they had been -reserved for national uses.</p> - -<p>I visited General Tuan on August 22nd and found him more talkative, -more anxious to discuss the general aspects of policies than ever -before. "We must first of all establish the authority of the Central -Government," he said; "this can be done only through a defeat of the -opposition. My purpose is that military organization in China be made -national and unified, in order that the peace of the country shall not -at all times be upset by local military commanders. The military power -thus unified I intend to take entirely out of politics and confine it -to its specific military purposes.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> At present the military is used in -factional and political disputes. When this is no longer possible, then -we shall leave the public mind in civil life entirely free to settle -all questions of the Constitution and of the public policy."</p> - -<p>I believe the Premier was sincere in these views, and in his efforts -to vindicate the authority of the National Government, but he thought -only in terms of military authority. He did not realize what the -organization of public opinion and of a civilian administration -require. His opponents feared that a consolidated military power would -be used by him, after all, to accomplish the reëstablishment of a -military dictatorship, such as that of Yuan Shih-kai.</p> - -<p>The personal wisdom and integrity of General Tuan commanded respect, -but he was not fortunate in selecting his assistants. Both in Peking -and in the provinces his immediate advisers gave him trouble. When he -appointed General Fu Liang-tso governor of Hunan Province, he expected -the ready settlement of all difficulties there; General Fu would know -how to handle the situation. But the people of Hunan did not welcome -General Fu. Soon his authority and that of the Central Government were -questioned throughout that province. But the Premier never disavowed or -deserted his representatives. He was loyal to them, which accounts for -the strong personal influence which Tuan enjoyed.</p> - -<p>The country could not be unified, of course, until railways were built, -and representatives of the Chinese Government often approached me to -ascertain Whether some action could not be taken in regard to the -Hankow-Canton Railway, long delayed in construction. This trunk line -would have joined the north and south. A trip from Peking to Canton by -existing routes took from ten days to two weeks: by direct railway it -should be possible to make it in two days. Not only the movement of -passengers, but of mail and freight, would stimulate an intercourse -that would be sure to over<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span>come separatist tendencies. But China had -entrusted the building of this railway to foreigners, who had played -with the concession, had lost it, and, after reacquiring part of it, -were now delaying its execution. Europe was preoccupied with the war. -And now that China was herself entering the war, it seemed a prime need -of national preparedness to have this comparatively short remaining -gap in the communications of China filled out. Good friends of America -among the officials—among them Mr. Pan Fu, Mr. T.C. Sun, the managing -director of the Siems-Carey railway offices, and Mr. J.C. Ho—argued -with me, as did their superiors, to have America lead in completing -this essential highway of commerce.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXV" id="CHAPTER_XXV">CHAPTER XXV</a></p> - -<p class="center">THE CHINESE GO A-BORROWING</p> - - -<p>The time was come for China to put money in her purse. She was sure she -could do it, and sure that the United States, her great, rich sponsor -and friend, would help her to the means commensurate with her needs -of development for war. A suggestion to this effect had been made to -the Chinese minister at Washington by the Department of State. It was -undreamt of that no assistance whatever could be given to China.</p> - -<p>During the fall of 1917 all my powers were devoted to securing for our -Far Eastern associate in the war the best form of American assistance. -I wished to avoid, if possible, a loss of the chance for giving Chinese -financial affairs a sound basis. Above all, it was essential to aid -in steering China beyond earshot of the financial sirens that were -luring her upon the Japanese rocks. China invited American leadership, -relied upon it. No other nation in the circumstances could justly take -exception to it. It involved no vast enterprise of immediately raising -a huge army in China, but of preparing the way for such mobilization, -if need should arise. This could be done by facilitating works which -would endure and which would contribute to the welfare of China and -the world, war or no war. It meant building means of communication -and improving the food supply. It meant reconstruction after the war. -It meant an expenditure of money that would be infinitesimal compared -with the sums spent in Europe. America had lent billions to the Entente -Allies; the hundred millions that would have served to make China fit -were a mere trifle. Nor was it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> necessary to insist upon independent -American action in this matter. America's leadership in behalf of the -common interest and in coöperation with her associates could produce -the results desired of putting the situation in the Far East on a -sound basis. I had always desired American independent enterprise -in individual cases, free from all entanglements and semi-political -arrangements with other nations, whose favour, fortunately, we did -not require. But in the great task of the World War joint action with -others was natural, and action in China, given only positive American -leadership, could have produced fine results. The war powers did get -together for some action. They suspended the Boxer indemnity payments -for China, and she got the benefit of the twentieth of <i>ad valorem</i> -duty which the treaties provided; on the basis of reckonings two -decades back, the 5 per cent. had really shrunk to 3. To restore the -rate fixed by the treaties was hardly a beginning of justice.</p> - -<p>Here was China, ready, willing to take her part in the war. What should -she do? In America the slogan: "Food Will Win the War" was in vogue, -and China could furnish food. She could supply coolies, millions if -necessary, as workmen and as soldiers. The war had proved that the -training of men as soldiers could be a matter, not of years, but of -months. Plans were drawn up, at first for hundreds of thousands of -Chinese soldiers, then for half a million.</p> - -<p>I urged my proposals on the State Department. The Canton-Hankow -Railway needed finishing. The Chinese arsenals and shipyards could be -refitted. I asked the consular officers and attachés for a rapid survey -of China's food resources; their returns showed that a large surplus -could be produced, if steps were taken at once to assure a market. -The Chinese have a genius for growing food; among them they have the -world's most skilful gardeners. But they needed added credit if they -were to put in more seed and harvest bigger crops. In these estimates -Professor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> Tuck of Cornell, who was up in Manchuria, and Professor -Bailey, in Nanking, gave their expert aid.</p> - -<p>England and her European allies, it was determined, had "gone broke"; -if there was to be a Consortium of lenders to China, would America -lead the way? Liang Chi-chao, Minister of Finance, proposed it. There -was China's public credit, with such vast human and material resources -as to stagger belief, waiting to be organized. There was the supreme -opportunity to send scattering all of the promoters of the unseemly -scramble to get special advantages through Chinese financial deals. I -spared no pains—for four years, indeed, I had laboured for this very -thing—to impress upon America the new vision of a developed China. Two -things halted action. Outside influences working in America itself were -aimed to stop the free play of financial enterprise in China; next, -there was the provincialism of the New York financiers. They would only -follow where other nations led.</p> - -<p>Then there was the alternative—coöperation between the war powers. By -hoops and barrages of steel we were bound to our brothers of Britain, -France, and Italy; Japan was an allied and associated power; at every -point our gold and war bonds were mingled with theirs. We were powerful -enough to hold our associates to a policy of developing China for the -benefit of all participants; an end might be put there to "special -interests." I suggested a new consortium on this basis.</p> - -<p>I went to the Chinese President. "I know," he declared, "that America -will spare no means whereby China may carry out her purpose to stand by -the side of the Allies on the battlefields of Europe."</p> - -<p>From the President I went to the Premier. By this time he was not so -friendly. Time had elapsed; the glitter of Japanese money had been made -to catch his eye. I inquired concerning the Japanese loan of 20,000,000 -yen, and incidental arrangements connected therewith. "Does not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> China -need to keep a credit balance in a foreign country," he asked; "and -would not the same arrangements be made with the United States if a -loan were made there?" Curiously, he added, "There is no need, yet, -of convoking parliament; no time has been set for it." A militarist -leader, he was being comforted by hopes of Japanese backing. But he was -quite willing to send a big army to Europe.</p> - -<p>The Japanese were alive to this situation. Professor Hori was sent -to lecture on finance before an association which Liang Chi-chao had -helped form. The theme of his opening lecture was the bankruptcy of the -Western powers. China must rely on Japan for money. Following Hori came -a commission of ten officials from Tokyo to study Chinese financial -administration. Then came Doctor Kobayashi to act as Japan's expert -in China. Prominent posts, it was freely said, were to be created for -"currency reform," posts which would be held by Japanese. Later on -Baron Sakatani came, to study Chinese finance.</p> - -<p>From Japan came loans and offers of loans. They lent 10,000,000 yen -through the Yokohama Specie Bank. This was merely an advance on a -future reorganization loan. Then a loan, labelled "Industrial," of -20,000,000 yen, was made through the Bank of Communications. Two -Japanese financial cliques sprang up and flourished. Liang sat at -the receipt of customs at the Ministry of Finance, dealing with the -Yokohama Specie Bank; the other clique, headed by Tsao Ju-lin and Lu -Tsung-yu, played in with the tri-fold group of the Industrial Bank -of Japan, the Bank of Chosen, and the Bank of Taiwan (Formosa). With -the loan dubbed "Industrial"—this to evade the provisions of the -reorganization loan—came Japanese advisorships in the Chinese Bank of -Communications. Not by the remotest chance would the loan be used by -the bank to strengthen its depreciated notes. It went for politics and -the military.</p> - -<p>The Japanese financiers coolly calculated that the British<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> and French -banks would fail to take up their option on the currency reform loan, -which they had held since 1911. That would leave the field clear for -Japan. The French and British legations got busy about this, and so did -we. As a consequence the American Government resumed its interest in -currency reform in China, and the sigh of relief was almost audible. -I called on Minister Liang. Did he not remember the Treaty of 1903 -and America's long-continued interest in Chinese currency betterment? -There was the Jenks-Conant Monetary Commission; there were the long -negotiations conducted by Willard Straight, and the resultant Currency -Loan Agreement of 1911. "I remember all these things," Liang responded; -"America should lead in this matter. Our banknote issues are being -shot to pieces by local issuance of worthless paper. The Tuchuns have -bent the national banks to their purposes. The books of the banks must -be kept and made public. I suggest appointing three principal foreign -experts on a reform of the entire currency. Let them be an American, a -European, and a Japanese."</p> - -<p>The currency loan option was extended until the following April.</p> - -<p>But Japan had other shots in her locker. Suddenly the Japanese press -bristled with news of a projected "arms alliance" with China. It -sounded almost menacing. The Tai Hei Company, originally organized -by the Japanese Government to supply arms to Russia, was going to -furnish China with her armament. General Tuan said that he had long -been urged to buy a "limited amount" of war material from Japan. -The Japanese minister chimed in with the statement that, inasmuch -as the United States refused to sell steel to Japan—under the war -trade restriction—the time was come for Japan to control China's ore -deposits. "Japan is to sell China arms. Why may she not have the raw -materials for them?" he asked.</p> - -<p>The disproportion involved in this demand served to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> amuse the Chinese. -The deposits on which Japan's eyes were fixed amounted to from forty to -fifty million tons of ore—enough to make several guns.</p> - -<p>Along with these negotiations came proposals to establish Japanese -military and arsenal advisorships.</p> - -<p>I asked the Premier about these reports. I told him we could not -object to the purchase of arms by China from any source whatever. -But in negotiations for loans and concessions the United States had -held unswervingly to the principle of the "open door" and no special -privileges. As it sought no control of this kind, it was equally -interested that none should be given to any other power.</p> - -<p>"Have you not," the Premier asked me, "found me always candid and -true?" Most sincerely I assured him I had.</p> - -<p>"Then," he replied, "we have bought of Japan 40,000 rifles, 160 machine -guns, and 80 field guns. There will be no incidental commitments. I can -rely implicitly on my military associates [General Hsu Shu-cheng, the -Vice-Minister of War; Ching Yun-peng, Acting Chief of Staff; and Fu -Liang-tso, Tuchun of Hunan]. They would not sanction such a thing."</p> - -<p>But the next day I got positive evidence that they had. The -negotiations were in full blast for Japanese military advisorships, -control of the Nanking Arsenal, and rights to specific iron deposits. -I saw General Hsu, telling him everything before giving him a chance -to answer. I was not then solely concerned about the encroachment on -Chinese independence. American and European interests had been told: -"Hands off the national iron ore reserve; all remaining iron deposits -are to be held for the nation." Respecting this decision, we had told -our people that concessions for iron ores could not be obtained. We -could not in justice to them now consent to a change of policy, without -protecting our interests. Japan had already one half of China's iron -ore deposits. Was she to get the rest? Also, were Chinese arma<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span>ments -to be standardized without consulting the experts of the Allied -Governments, so that the arms might be used in the present war?</p> - -<p>"We have been hard pressed," General Hsu explained. "The Japanese -wished us to do something for them and we need the arms. They will be -of the larger calibre, such as China's armament now has. The Japanese -did demand the assignment of new ore deposits; they needed security for -the contract. They compromised by reducing the amount of ore we are -to furnish. But we must supply it under a contract of 1916, between -the Japanese and a company formed by Chow Tsu-chi, whereby a million -dollars was paid in advance on iron ores from deposits near Nanking. -This is the best we can do. They demanded at first the grant of new ore -deposits."</p> - -<p>"I should like to visit you more often," General Hsu remarked later; -"but my movements are closely watched." I stated I hoped he entertained -no fear that would keep him from seeing the minister of a friendly -power at any time he wished.</p> - -<p>The real trouble lay in the rivalries between the north and south. -The Premier and General Hsu were willing to barter the nation's -birthright in the form of concessions in order to impose an internal -unity of their own making. For China was torn. The situation in -October, 1917—how different from that of April and May, 1915, when -the twenty-one demands came to their climax! Then the Chinese people -and Government were united as one man. The sentiment of the nation was -now the same; nearly all the members of the Government were unchanged, -yet a small pro-Japanese minority were in the saddle. The men who -had Japanese funds under their control had the advantage over the -mass of officials. They succeeded in muzzling the Chinese press. By -Japanese insistence, aided in this case by the French minister—some -of the Chinese papers had criticized his attitude—<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span>news of diplomatic -negotiations had been absolutely suppressed. Without information, -the public was disturbed and confused. The editor of the Japanese -<i>Kokumin</i>, Mr. Tokutomi, in an interview in Peking, advocated still -more stringent press control. Japan was using the war to displace -the influence of her associates in China and to make her own power -predominant.</p> - -<p>Bad as the situation was it might have been saved by an adequate loan -from America. Liang's first proposal was for a reorganization loan -of $200,000,000, which was vetoed by Europe; this shrivelled to the -mess of pottage of 10,000,000 yen offered by the Yokohama Specie Bank. -General Hsu had unfolded to me in September a comprehensive scheme of -equipping 500,000 soldiers, and providing for the immediate transport -of at least 500,000 to Europe, further detachments were to go as fast -as ships could be had. Later came more specific plans for 1,000,000 -men, out of which the best contingents were to be sent to France. It -was planned ultimately to send the whole million, if needed. Then came -a modified proposal for outfitting 500,000 men and the completion of -the industrial plants needed for war materials and ships. The European -ministers were all anxious to secure China's active participation; the -French Legation, through its military attaché, was coöperating with -special energy in planning for the eventual use of Chinese forces. From -my conversations with the President, the Premier, and his most active -assistant, there was no doubt that the Chinese were in earnest. Now it -was all simmering down to a few millions of Japanese money, supplied -for politics and internal dissension, with Japan seeking special -advantages.</p> - -<p>Work was to be done. The United States could still bring relief and -a strong call for united action into this troubled situation without -giving just cause for complaint or for taking offence. The French were -especially desirous of bringing the Chinese actually into the war. -The Belgians wished<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> the mobilization of Chinese material resources, -particularly foodstuffs. The British were in general accord, though -they doubted whether Chinese troops could be soon transported to the -theatre of war. Dr. George Morrison who had just gone over the whole -situation with the President and cabinet, came to me saying: "The -Chinese will apply to you for advice. You have a freer hand than the -British minister."</p> - -<p>But an event of profound significance was impending, and it interrupted -my efforts along these constructive lines. It was at this time that -the results of Japan's efforts to reach an agreement with the State -Department in Washington became known to China.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="PART_IV" id="PART_IV">PART IV</a></p> - -<p class="center">LAST YEAR OF WAR AND AFTERMATH</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXVI" id="CHAPTER_XXVI">CHAPTER XXVI</a></p> - -<p class="center">THE LANSING-ISHII NOTES</p> - - -<p>It was in rather an indirect way that I learned of the secret -negotiations which had been going on between the head of the State -Department in Washington and the Japanese Government. Since these -negotiations concerned some of the most vital problems in the whole -Chinese situation, it was surprising that everyone had been kept in -ignorance of them. I learned of them, I confess with mingled emotions, -from none other than Baron Hayashi himself. I called on him on the -evening of November 4th; and, after going over the matter of routine -which I had wished to take up with him, I remained chatting pleasantly -with him. In the course of our talk the Baron remarked: "I have just -received some information that is quite important, and I want you to -know about it. Let me get the cablegram."</p> - -<p>He brought a paper and handed it over to me without comment. It -was a cablegram from Tokyo that informed him of the signing of -the Lansing-Ishii notes, and gave a summary of their text. The -first paragraph contained the vital clause: "The Government of the -United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, -particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." This -naturally struck me in the face with stunning force, before I had time -to weigh its meaning in relation to the remainder of the declaration. -I read the dispatch twice and made an effort to impress its salient -points on my memory, and then turned to my Japanese colleague -attempting to retain my composure.</p> - -<p>"Yes," I managed to say, "this is quite interesting. It is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> somewhat in -line with conversations we have had, yet differs in some respects."</p> - -<p>I forced myself to remain a little longer and tried to continue the -matter-of-fact conversation which this astounding piece of news had -interrupted. When I finally took my leave, I was uncertain whether -Baron Hayashi did or did not know that I had been unaware of this -exchange of notes. Hurrying to the Legation, I dispatched a cablegram -to the Department asking that I be informed.</p> - -<p>It had been agreed, so the cable from Tokyo had stated, that an -announcement of the parley should not be given out until November 7th. -But the Japanese minister had already informed the Chinese Foreign -Office on Sunday night; and early on Monday its representative called -to get my version of the matter.</p> - -<p>No word had been sent me. It was inexcusable to fail to give the local -representative the earliest possible information, and I intimated as -much in my cablegram to the Secretary of State. As the Foreign Office -had been fully informed, I could only state to my visitor that I was -not authorized to deliver the text until later, and that I was myself -still considering the full import of the document, which in certain -respects followed lines of policy that had been discussed in the past.</p> - -<p>As I could plainly see, the notes had been paraded in the Chinese -Foreign Office as yielding important concessions from the United -States and as a diplomatic triumph for Japan. I knew nothing of the -motives which had animated the President and Secretary of State when -they agreed to the paper. I could not explain its purposes; but when -my visitor asked: "Does this paper recognize the paramount position of -Japan in China?" I could and did answer with an emphatic "No." Beyond -that I said nothing.</p> - -<p>All that day and the next reports streamed in from many quarters that -the Japanese were "crowing over their vic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span>tory" in their talks with -the Chinese. More Chinese officials and many Americans applied at the -Legation for authentic word. But no help came from the Department of -State. Indeed no word reached me until the morning of the 7th.</p> - -<p>It cannot be said that the American secrecy pledge was not -punctiliously observed—even to the extent of keeping in ignorance -the American minister, who would have to bear the brunt of the -consequences of this diplomatic manœuvre. The Japanese, meanwhile, -had given the note not only to the Chinese Government several days in -advance, but—was it out of abhorrence for secret diplomacy?—even -before the notes had been signed their text was communicated to the -representatives of Great Britain, Russia, France, and Italy. This was -done at Tokyo.</p> - -<p>It is not surprising that this procedure produced upon the Chinese the -impression that the Japanese had got what they wanted. They thought the -declarations made by the United States contained admission of a special -position held by Japan in China, not desired by the latter, but forced -through by the military and political power of Japan.</p> - -<p>The reception given the note by Far Eastern experts and by the public -indicated that it would be interpreted in widely varying fashion. The -first impression only gradually gave way to a calmer judgment when -the specific terms of the notes were carefully read and the ambiguous -character of the instrument was realized. In the first place, the -Japanese Legation, in translating for the benefit of the Chinese -Ministry, had used for "special interest" a Chinese term which implied -the idea of "special position." Doctor Tenney's more direct translation -of the term was without this extra shade. The Department authorized -me to deliver an explanatory note to the effect that the interests -referred to were of an economic, not a political, nature. It referred -to "Japan's commercial and industrial enterprises in China"; these, it -added, "manifestly have, on account of the geogra<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span>phical relation of -the two countries, a certain advantage over similar enterprises on the -part of citizens or subjects of any other country."</p> - -<p>I could not avoid the feeling that the form which the exchange of -notes at Washington had taken was unfortunate. It was indeed desirable -that the friendly attitude of the United States toward all Japan's -economic activities in China should be stated strongly. This had been -the tenor of the conversations between successive Japanese ministers -and myself, which had been communicated to the State Department. It was -necessary, if the Japanese really entertained it, to disabuse them of -the conception that the political influence of the United States was -being used to discourage close business relationships between China and -Japan, and to frown upon Japanese enterprises in China. On the basis -of such an understanding, it was hoped that Japan would join with the -United States in agreeing that special privileges in any part of China, -or any sort of economic advantage, would not be sought by political -means; that the Manchurian régime, to be more specific, would not -extend to other parts of China.</p> - -<p>But the notes definitely stated that Japan would not use her special -interests in a way to "discriminate against the trade of other nations, -or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in -the treaties with other powers." This might give rise to the idea that -"special interests" did not refer merely to specific economic interests -and enterprises. It might include also a certain political influence or -preference.</p> - -<p>The Japanese minister, though disclaiming a reading which would imply -a paramount interest, evidently saw in the notes an endorsement of the -principle of spheres of influence. "The notes speak for themselves," he -said in an interview on the 8th of November; "they simply again place -on record the acknowledged attitude of the United States<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> and Japan -toward China. They are simply a restatement of an old position. Even -the term 'special interests' is doubtless used in the same sense here -as in the past. Several other countries have territory that borders on -China; this fact gives them a special interest in these parts of China -which they touch. In exactly the same way, Japan has special rights in -China."</p> - -<p>The non-official Japanese statements claimed much more than this. They -did "crow over" the Chinese. Was not here a vindication of distinct -priority enjoyed by Japan in China? In Japan the veteran Okuma, who -is never backward in airing his opinions in the press, also seemed to -have a rather broad idea of the notes. "Hitherto," he said, "America's -activities in China were often imprudent and thoughtless. For instance, -Secretary Knox's proposal to neutralize the Manchurian Railway was, -indeed, a reckless move. The United States also relegated Japan to the -background when she sent the note of June 7th to China, advising that -country concerning domestic peace. Thus America disregarded Japan's -special position in China. We may understand that she will not repeat -such follies, in the light of the new convention."</p> - -<p>Of course, there is nothing in the notes to interfere with the -fullest and freest interchange of communications between the American -Government and the Chinese, on any topic whatever.</p> - -<p>In reporting his conversation on the notes with the Japanese Minister -for Foreign Affairs before they were signed, the Russian ambassador -at Tokyo hit it off in this way: "Nevertheless, I gain the impression -from the words of the minister that he is conscious of the possibility -of misunderstandings, also, in the future; but is of the opinion that -in such a case Japan would have at her disposal better means than the -United States for carrying into effect her interpretation."</p> - -<p>To show how different people were affected, I shall cite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> from some -letters. Dr. George Morrison wrote to a friend from southern China: -"Relays of Chinese have thronged to see the American consul, all -sounding one note—that they have been betrayed by America. After all -her valiant protestations, what earthly good did America gain by making -such a concession to Japan, giving recognition to that which every -American and Englishman in China had been endeavouring to prevent? -Carried to its logical conclusion this agreement gives recognition not -only to Japan's 'special interests' in Manchuria, but also to those -in Fukien Province which lies in 'geographical proximity' to Formosa. -Surely the British will now claim recognition of similar rights in -Kwangsi Province. It is all very deplorable."</p> - -<p>Another Britisher, Mr. W.H. Donald, took a different view. "When I saw -the notes," he wrote, "I was delighted, because I read into them the -fact that America had, to use an Americanism, 'put one over' Japan. -Ishii went to America to get acquiescence in Japan's predominance in -China; to get America to admit Japan's hegemony of the Pacific. He -got neither. Instead, he had to reaffirm adherence to the previous -undertakings—undertakings which were discarded when Japan put in her -twenty-one demands."</p> - -<p>The Chinese papers generally pronounced the notes inconsistent. The -<i>Chung Hua Hsin Pao</i> saw no need for having the "special interests" of -Japan particularly recognized any more than those of other nations, -like Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States, all of -which have territory adjacent to China. The paper thought that the -assurance that Japan seeks no special rights or privileges, should be -taken at its face value when the point of the whole agreement was the -recognition of "special interests" enjoyed by Japan. The tenor of the -note, therefore, appeared to favour "special interests," consequently -the division of China into spheres of influence—contrary to the -traditional policy of the United States.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span></p> - -<p>Personally, from my knowledge of the situation in the Far East, I could -not see any urgent reason for making this declaration. I learned later -that the notes had been drawn up in consultation between the President -and the Secretary of State, without other reference to the Department -of State and without the knowledge of its staff. Also, the Secretary -had acted upon the belief and understanding that the first statement -concerning special interests was simply a self-evident axiom, but that -its restatement would clarify the situation. Certainly, on the other -hand, the positive affirmative pledge against "the acquisition by any -government of any special rights or privileges" was clearer and went -further than any previous declaration.</p> - -<p>To safeguard its rights under any construction that might be given -to the document, the Chinese Government declared that it could not -recognize any agreement relating to China entered into between other -powers.</p> - -<p>I have said that I could not see the need of these notes. Failing to -receive instructions which I sought from the Department of State, -I continued to take the position that the policy of the American -Government remained unchanged with respect to the existence of a -special position or special privileges on the part of any other -power in China. But the immediate effect of the notes on the Chinese -Government was to make its high officials feel that nothing very -positive could be expected from the United States by way of assistance -out of the nation's difficulties.</p> - -<p>The general and continuing effect of the notes was seen in the -behaviour of the Japanese in China. The Japanese papers boldly -declared that Japan would interpret the term "special interests" in -a way to suit herself, and that it implied the supremacy of Japanese -political influence in China. The thrusting forward of this View did -not strengthen the government of General Tuan. Several more provinces -followed those which had declared their independence with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> acts that -made their allegiance at least doubtful. General Tuan's appointee as -military governor of Hunan suffered defeat at the hands of the southern -troops. The governors of the Yangtse Valley, under the leadership of -General Li Shun, addressed to the Government pointed inquiries about -financial dealings with the Japanese and the purchase of arms, which -was reported to involve an arms alliance.</p> - -<p>As the attacks were directed at him personally, General Tuan felt that -he must resign. Notwithstanding an outward show of amity, General Feng -Kuo-chang and the Premier had actually not agreed. The Premier wished -to make war on the south and conquer it. The Acting President, on the -other hand, was in constant correspondence with southern leaders in an -attempt to bring about reconciliation. Tuan sent in his resignation. -The Japanese worked for his retention. The President did ask him to -reconsider, but his resignation finally took effect on the 20th of -November. General Wang Shih-chen, who was close to the President as -chief of staff, became acting premier. But Tsao Ju-lin, who headed the -Japanese clique, was retained.</p> - -<p>Peace and unity did not result. The northern Tuchuns gathered at -Tientsin on December 4th, and decided to push the war against the south -with 200,000 men. This was to be made a pretext for getting more funds.</p> - -<p>I kept in touch with General Tuan, in whose personal character and -honesty of purpose in wishing China to take part in the war I placed -reliance. Also his friend, Mr. Chu Ying-kuang, who had made a fine -record as civilian governor of Chekiang, had kept his eye mainly on -this goal. Through them I kept in touch with all of the Chinese who -fostered such action. If the Chinese of their own initiative should -create services for supplying urgent needs of the Allies, and should -train a model division for use on the battlefields of Europe, I -felt that the United States and her associates would find a way to -transport them to Europe. General Tuan was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> now free of politics. In -the conversations I had with the Premier and his associates, the idea -of a special organization for preparedness was talked over. The upshot -of this was the creation of a War Participation Office, with General -Tuan as its president. The Office was to make constructive plans for -developing resources useful in the war, and for training troops for -Europe.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the Japanese were "cutting loose" in Shantung. Quite openly -they were trying to set up an administration in what they called the -railway zone. The agreements between China and Germany contained no -provision for such a zone. The Germans merely had the railway itself, -and certain specific mining enterprises, together with the port of -Tsingtao. A general priority in the mining districts within a zone -of ten miles along each side of the railway had been abandoned some -time previous to the war. Now the Japanese asserted in this "zone" -general administrative power, including policing, taxation, forestry, -and education. With this encroachment, the Chinese noted evidences of -Japanese toleration of revolutionary and bandit activities wherever -they served the purposes of the invaders.</p> - -<p>People came frequently from Shantung to see me in order to lay before -me their complaints and petitions. They were distressed, but I could -not help them, save where American rights were involved. The Shantung -men reported that the Japanese were making the Lansing-Ishii notes the -basis of their propaganda, stating that Japan's special position had -now been recognized. This penetration into the interior of one of the -provinces of China proper by a foreign political administration was -undoubtedly the most serious attack ever made on Chinese sovereignty.</p> - -<p>A member of the Chinese Foreign Office called on me on the 21st of -December, and spoke earnestly about the Japanese inroads in Shantung. -He said nothing could stop the Japanese. Their minister had stated that -it would be diffi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span>cult to change an ordinance signed by the Premier and -sanctioned by the Emperor.</p> - -<p>Among both Chinese officials and the general public all was -discouragement and depression. The first effect of the Lansing-Ishii -notes, the strong influence exercised by the pro-Japanese clique in the -government because of the financial backing they got, the knowledge -that such backing had to be bought with valuable national concessions, -the increasing disunion between north and south, the general despair -of any constructive and unifying policy being possible, made the -Chinese individually and collectively paralysed with doubt, fear, and a -feeling of impotence. It was plain that Japanese influences, making a -politico-commercial campaign in China, were everywhere actively taking -advantage of this demoralized state of the public mind and intensifying -it through their manipulations.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXVII" id="CHAPTER_XXVII">CHAPTER XXVII</a></p> - -<p class="center">AMIDST TROUBLES PEKING REJOICES</p> - - -<p>The Armistice meant the end of the Great War. Would it also mean the -end of sinister intrigue in China?</p> - -<p>In the joy of the world victory everybody felt so. But when I returned -to Peking early in October, 1918, I found that things had gone from bad -to worse. Money had been squandered on war expeditions which had torn -the country, not united it. The unofficial Japanese financial agent, -Mr. Nishihara, a borer in the rotten trunk of Chinese finance, had -been at work all summer. The fact of his loan negotiations was denied -to the very last by the Japanese Legation. Suddenly, on October 1st, -Japan's Minister of Finance announced that his government had arranged -a number of loans to the Chinese. They involved commitments in the sum -of 320,000,000 yen, ostensibly to build railways and iron works; of -this amount 40,000,000 yen would be immediately advanced.</p> - -<p>The earlier loans had all gone to the inept militarists. The advances -on these so-called industrial loans were in the same way dissipated -in partisanship, division, distraction. The new parliament had been -elected. It was to elect a new president. Money was poured into the -contest between Feng, the Acting President, and Hsu Shih-chang. -General Tuan had his army of small political adherents, who battened -on the funds supplied by the chief manipulators. They formed the Anfu -Club—from <i>An</i>hui, the province of the army clique, and <i>Fu</i>kien, the -province whence the navy drew most of its admirals.</p> - -<p>The inner military ring was operating from the War Par<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span>ticipation -Bureau, which had preëmpted the control of finance, natural resources, -and police. The ministries were powerless. The Government was debauched -with the easy money from Japan. With a sardonic grin, the Japanese -offered to lend China 200,000,000 paper yen, not redeemable, on which -the Chinese Government should base a gold-note issue. On this paper of -the Bank of Korea China should repay Japan, with interest annually.</p> - -<p>Using the militarists, they tried hard to put it through. But the -foreign press, and such Chinese papers as dared, succeeded in laughing -it down. Redeemable in Korean or Japanese banknotes, which the Chinese -never use in daily trade, the proposed government gold notes could -not have been forced into circulation. They would only have worse -confounded the already existing monetary confusion.</p> - -<p>The police terrorized and bullied the papers that opposed Japan's -loan negotiations and printed the facts about them. Nearly a dozen -were suppressed. The Anfu gang had cowed the Government and people in -north China. Without moral and legal authority, it made the Government -impotent in its prime functions, such as levying taxes and protecting -lives.</p> - -<p>The diplomatic corps had to consider whether the customs and salt -revenues should be released to such a government. The best interests -not only of China, but of all the friendly nations, including -Japan herself, were being blighted. The prostitution of the War -Participation Bureau by the gold-lust of the militarists, with Japan -as pander, fostered the brawls of faction and disunion. Public opinion -was throttled and the corrupt elements found no organized popular -opposition.</p> - -<p>Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of Finance, advocated the spurious gold-note -project, which had been dubbed the "gold-brick scheme." Tsao had -represented that the diplomatic corps had approved this scheme. Four -ministers jointly informed the Chinese Government that Mr. Tsao's -methods tended to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> destroy confidence between the Government and the -legations, and one minister said his legation would thenceforward -accept no statement coming from the Minister of Finance until the -Foreign Office had vouched for its truth.</p> - -<p>The Finance Minister unblushingly tried to suspend the renewal of the -currency loan option until the foreign banks should consent to the -gold-note scheme. Here I protested, saying that under the Currency Loan -Agreement the American Government had a right to be consulted before -any such proposals could be considered.</p> - -<p>His Excellency Hsu Shih-chang was elected President—a veteran -statesman of the old régime. In my first interview with him he -complained: "I am trying to deal with the south; but they have nobody -to bind them together and represent them. We are demobilizing most of -our superfluous troops, but I am worried because the Government lacks -financial support."</p> - -<p>I talked with him again often. General Li Shun, of Nanking, had been -asked to mediate. The southern leaders needed to be "grubstaked" to pay -off their troops, then an agreement with them could be reached. The -President's solution smacked of buying them off. But this would not -end the militarist intriguing. President Hsu issued on October 25th a -peace mandate, taking President Wilson's statement about reconstituting -international unity as his point of departure. The President had cabled -this to Hsu when he was inaugurated. The press was reporting that the -British and American ministers were working for internal peace; our -mediation would have been popular. It would have pulled the leaders of -north and south out of their impasse. President Hsu cabled back to Mr. -Wilson: "Though we are separated by a great distance, yet I feel your -influence as if we were face to face."</p> - -<p>President Hsu had gotten a report from Dr. George E. Morrison, who had -returned from investigations in south<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> China. Doctor Morrison made the -point that internal strife must be ended if China was to do anything -in the Great War and to hold up her rights strongly at the Peace -Conference. I will quote this report somewhat at length:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>China under the advice of several of her more powerful ministers looks -to Japan for guidance, Japan having in an incredibly short space -of time, by the energy and patriotism of her united people and the -wisdom of her rulers, raised herself to an important position among -the nations. But Japan is no longer one of the great world powers. -Japan lacks experience of modern war. Her army and navy are much out -of date. Her troops have no experience of the marvellous methods of -modern war. She has no submarine service, she has no air service. -Her government, created after the model of Germany, her kaiserism, -her Prussian militarism, are fast becoming obsolete. Compared with -the great powers of Great Britain, America, France, and Italy, the -strength of Japan is meagre. Japan at the end of the European war is -a third-rate power. Her government is the only military autocracy -existing in the world to-day, and for that reason Japan will occupy a -unique position at any peace conference. Japan is the only one of the -Allied nations who has failed to take any adequate part in the great -world struggle.</p> - -<p>For China, a republic, to seek the guidance of the only existing -autocratic military government in the world to-day has at least the -appearance of inconsistency. Such action is viewed with suspicion by -all those in China who are aspiring to a democratic government—a -government by the people for the people.</p> - -<p>If intervention is to be prevented, there must be early restoration -of democratic government, early reconciliation. As the simplest and -quickest way in which this can be effected, I suggest that your -Excellency invite the President of the United States to act as -mediator, to bring together representatives of the two great parties -of state in China that they may hear and weigh each other's view and -agree to a compromise. There is no loss of face in doing this.</p> - -<p>During my recent visit to the south I gave expression to Chinese views -to all the leading men with whom I had the opportunity of discussing -the question of peace and reconciliation in China. All without -exception expressed their belief and confidence that an invitation to -the President of the United States to act as mediator would be a wise -act and one that promised the easiest solution of the grave conflict -which at present divides into hostile camps this fair land of China.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span></p> - -<p>Japan persisted in her work, the United States remained indifferent.</p> - -<p>The people of China got tired of all this. As a matter of fact, China -was divided only on the surface. Deep down into the life of the people -political controversies had not penetrated. They went on, placid and -industrious, regardless of the bickerings of politicians. Chinese -revolutions and declarations of independence might be bruited to the -world, which might think China had plunged into anarchy. As a people -the Chinese are freer from governmental interference than any nation -living. If the entire Central Government should suddenly disappear from -the face of the earth, it would make little difference in China. Yet -the long continuance of political conflicts lets foreign intrigue into -the national quarrels, and so reacts dangerously.</p> - -<p>The people as a whole wished the nation to be a unit. But the -professional militarists had to be paid off. After the President had -issued his peace mandate, he asked that I see him. "If decisive action -for peace is taken," he asked, "may we depend on the United States -to back us in getting funds to pay off these large bodies of troops? -If not, will she not lead in a reorganization loan joined by several -powers?"</p> - -<p>I asked the American Government for the funds desired. If they came -conditionally upon the reunion of China, the responsible military -governors and civilian leaders north and south would have the means -to be rid of the predatory and parasitic bands. Japan then roused -herself. She approached the governments of the United States, France, -Great Britain, and Italy on October 23rd, asking that they work toward -a peace settlement with the leaders both north and south. The American -Government approved, adding that China needed money, but that no funds -would be afforded her until a reunited government was seated.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the temper of the Chinese people was sounded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> in a -gratifying way. John Mott asked the Y.M.C.A. in China to raise $100,000 -for the War Works Drive. I sat at dinner one evening with Liang Shih-yi -and Chow Tsu-chi, and said: "A drive is going on in the United States -to aid all the war works undertaken for the benefit of the soldiers at -the front. Do you suppose that some of our friends in China would wish -to contribute?" They both replied: "Yes, we are sure they would."</p> - -<p>Two days elapsed. Chow Tsu-chi called, told me they had formed a -National War Works Committee, and that local committees were being -formed in every provincial capital. They raised, not $100,000, but more -than $1,000,000!</p> - -<p>It was the more remarkable because this way of contributing to a public -purpose had never been tried in China. Only the <i>Shun Tien Shih Pao</i> of -Peking, Japanese-controlled, threw cold water on the movement, saying -that to be sending money to Europe while so many provinces in China -themselves needed aid was peculiar.</p> - -<p>The representatives of the Associated Powers met on October 18th. -They felt that participation in the war had not united China; a -clique had perverted it to factional uses. Each representative, it -was agreed, should present instances in which the Central Government -or local officials had obstructed action or been remiss. At the next -meeting, on the 28th, I had prepared a memorandum of instances; this -was made the basis of a statement. A conference was to be held with -the President of China, to be quite friendly, but to make manifest -the grave shortcomings due to political vices. Thus, it was thought, -the responsible and conscientious elements in the Government would -be fortified against the clique that had invaded it. The Foreign -Minister, however, asked that the conference be deferred, in order that -the Government might strive to bring its action more completely into -accord with its real desire. There was no threat in our suggestion. But -publicists often overlooked its true object, and treated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> it as if it -had been a condemnation of China rather than of the controlling clique -in the Government.</p> - -<p>Joy and cheerfulness greeted the news of the Armistice. The American -Legation Band was the first to celebrate, with a detachment of marines -it paraded the legation compounds; only the Japanese Legation sentinel -failed to salute it; he had failed to gather its purport. At Sir John -Jordan's personal invitation I joined the British Legation's impromptu -festivities that night, with some members of my staff. Responding to -Sir John's remarks of welcome, I spoke of the trinity of democratic -peoples, the British, French, and Americans, as destined to lead the -world to a fuller understanding of free institutions and popular rights.</p> - -<p>In the continuous round of festivities and celebrations the foreign -and Chinese communities joined whole-heartedly, with dinners, -receptions, special meetings of societies, and finally a great national -celebration on the 28th of November. We gave a reception on the 20th -to the ministers of the Associated Powers. As each minister arrived, -the national air of his country was played by the Marine Band. When -the Russian minister came in, the band, without special instructions, -played the old Russian Imperial hymn. Prince Koudacheff was moved, for -this anthem was now outlawed in his country; he came to me in tears. -Next day he showed me a song with music which he had suggested for -adoption by the Siberian Government as the Russian national hymn. But -at the solemn service held on the Sunday following, when the national -airs of the different countries were played, when the turn came for the -Russian hymn a pause was noted. Those conducting the service had ruled -out the old Imperial hymn. As there was apparently no music available -as a substitute, poor Russia had to go unsaluted.</p> - -<p>From early in the morning of the national celebration, Chinese troops -marched toward the Imperial City, where they lined the spacious -interior courts. The legation guards<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> followed. Multitudes of Europeans -and Chinese flocked to the palace, where the diplomats were gathered, -all but myself resplendent in gorgeous uniforms. The neutral ministers, -too, were in attendance. The European adviser had found a precedent -among peace celebrations in Europe, such as that after the Danish War -and the Franco-Prussian War, in accordance with which the neutral -ministers might attend, though peace was not fully concluded. Also, -it was argued that the Chinese were celebrating the cessation of -hostilities, and the participation of friendly representatives might be -invited.</p> - -<p>Whispered controversy was heard among the ministers. The representative -of France, seeing senior neutral representatives ahead of him, said -this occasion was different, and demanded that the rank of precedence -be changed. Time was too short for so thorny a problem. We agreed to -say nothing at all, but to walk in a group forming itself spontaneously.</p> - -<p>We gathered in the pavilion of the Ta Ho-men, the gate which leads into -the court immediately before the main Coronation Hall of the Imperial -City. Here, in the very inner sanctuary of the thousand-year-old -imperialism of China, the victory of freedom was celebrated. The square -was massed with troops, Chinese and foreign. On the ascending terraces -stood thousands of guests, the military and officials in uniform; over -the balustrades waved forests of flags of the Associated Nations, as -well as long floating banners with Chinese inscriptions in gold.</p> - -<p>After the President had ascended the steps to the music of bands -of the nations, bowed to all the flags, and made his address, -aeroplanes appeared, dropping innumerable Chinese flags and messages -of felicitation printed in gold on red; then they continued to circle -above the Imperial City. While the military were marching to the gate, -rockets were sent skyward; exploding, they released paper figures of -animals, as well as soldiers and weapons of war, which floated a long<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span> -time in the air. When the President left the Tung Hua Palace, where he -had received thousands of guests, the aeroplanes preceded him on his -ride to his own residence.</p> - -<p>We celebrated Thanksgiving that afternoon in American fashion with -a religious service, the American colony and many British and -other Allied residents attending, as well as the ministers of the -Associated Powers with their staffs. Premier Chien Neng-hsun dined -the diplomatic corps and welcomed President Wilson's proposal for a -league of nations. President Hsu invited us on November 30th, and then -the French minister, who still was troubled with the question of the -non-belligerents, objected to the neutral ministers being there at all. -If they went, he said, he would not go. The British minister and I -devised, as we thought, a way out. Would the neutral ministers view the -Allied ministers as guests of honour on this occasion? The secretary -to the Foreign Minister was chosen to ask them. Unfortunately, the -neutrals took it as a demand rather than an inquiry. Then the fat was -in the fire—the neutral ministers would not attend the dinner. This -was the one discordant note in our celebrations.</p> - -<p>In order to enable the Central Government to get along at all, the -diplomatic corps agreed to the release of surplus salt revenues to the -extent of $5,300,000. President Hsu on the 16th of November ordered -immediate cessation of hostilities in the Chinese interior. The -northern leaders were still war-like, but accepted his decision. The -British, French, American, Japanese, and Italian representatives and -myself met on the 22nd to uphold President Hsu's attitude. We took -up the Japanese proposals, deciding that identical representations -be made at Peking and Canton. My colleagues asked me to draft an -<i>aide mémoire</i> which was to accompany the oral representations. -Japan objected to including in it the American suggestion that no -financial advances would be made now but that a reunited China would -get support from the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> powers. The Japanese banks had bound themselves -to make further payments to China, it was said. The <i>aide mémoire</i> -deplored disunion, disavowed wishing to intervene, and hoped that, -"while refraining from taking any steps which might obstruct peace, -both parties would seek without delay, by frank confidence, the means -of obtaining reconciliation." In the clause about obstructing peace -I had in mind such acts as the election of a northern militarist as -Vice-President. This, though in itself a peaceful act, would have -raised an insurmountable obstacle to peace.</p> - -<p>Five powers were represented in an audience before the President on -December 2nd, the British minister speaking. The northern military -leaders had held a conference at Tientsin. If, as reported, they wished -to demand that Tuan be reinstalled as Premier, and that Tsao Kun, -Military Governor of Chihli, be elected Vice-President, it would have -embittered the south. The public therefore welcomed the representations -of the powers. The American reference to loans was omitted; -nevertheless, the situation produced made it no longer possible for any -one country to lend money to either faction without putting itself in -an equivocal position.</p> - -<p>The Japanese felt moved on the 3rd of December to publish a statement -about Chinese finance. Japan could not discourage financial and -economic enterprises of its nationals in China, the statement read, "so -long as these enterprises are the natural and legitimate outgrowth of -special relations between the two neighbouring and friendly nations. At -the same time they fully realize that under the existing conditions of -domestic strife in China loans are liable to create misunderstandings -and to interfere with peace in China. Accordingly, the Japanese -Government has decided to withhold such financial assistance to China -as is likely in their opinion to add to the complications of her -internal situation."</p> - -<p>This declaration left great latitude in the making of loans, yet -it did, in fact, acknowledge the appropriateness of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> American -position. I asked Baron Hayashi about it. What exceptions would be -made? The Baron was not very definite but said <i>bona fide</i> industrial -loans were meant. "Most decidedly," he added in reply to my continued -questioning, "I favour the strictest scrutiny of each loan, and mutual -information among the governments about such transactions." He gave -me plainly to understand that he did not approve, and had opposed, -certain deals attempted by his countrymen in the semi-official group. -I gathered his thorough disapproval of direct interference by the -military in international affairs; but the military were in power in -Japan, and its diplomats were helpless.</p> - -<p>In accordance with its main suggestion, the American Government -followed with a memorandum about financing China, sent to Great -Britain, France, and Japan. It had already proposed a new consortium, -including virtually all parties interested in each national group. The -Currency Reform Loan should come first, with the shares of the British -and French groups carried by the Americans and Japanese so long as the -former could not furnish funds. Industrial as well as administrative -loans should be included, and thus removed from the sphere of -destructive competition.</p> - -<p>The danger that industrial loans might be converted to political ends -was patent. Yet in my recommendations I felt it difficult to avoid -evils of monopoly, unless independent enterprises involving loans -should be admitted.</p> - -<p>The British and French banking representatives plainly wished to have -America lead in the international financial reorganization of China. -Japan, as its minister often said, desired the United States to reënter -the Consortium—but he meant the old Consortium, in which Japan had -the leadership. Japan did not readily take to the idea of the new -Consortium. It declared that it favoured the proposal "on principle," -but found it necessary to weigh every detail with considerable -minuteness. This caused great delay.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXVIII" id="CHAPTER_XXVIII">CHAPTER XXVIII</a></p> - -<p class="center">A NEW WORLD WAR COMING?</p> - - -<p>The old World War ended with the Armistice. Was a new one looming?</p> - -<p>If one came it would break in China—of that we were convinced. -Unless it settled China's problems the Peace Conference would fall -disastrously short of safeguarding the world against a renewal of -its titanic conflict. In China the powers were rivals, each with its -jealously guarded sphere of influence. In the extravagant language -of fancy, Ku Hung-ming thus pictured to me the situation: "China's -political ship, built in the eclipse and rigged with curses black, has -been boarded by the pirates of the world. In their dark rivalries they -may scuttle it and all sink together, but not until they have first -plundered and burned civilization as we know it."</p> - -<p>Should any action be taken which might be interpreted as a recognition -of a special position for Japan in China, whether in the form of a -so-called Monroe Doctrine or a "regional understanding" or in any other -way, forces would be set in motion that in a generation would be beyond -controlling. In comparison with this tremendous issue, even the complex -re-alignments of Central Europe fell into relative unimportance. The -same fatal result was sure to follow any further accentuation of -spheres of influence.</p> - -<p>We in China realized this, and in deadly earnest we worked out a plan -of joint preventive action by the powers, which would unite them -instead of leaving them in fatal rivalry. The root of all evil is in -the love of money. It was local financing by single exploiting powers -in spheres protected by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> political influence that was the evil. If, -instead, the finance of the world could be made to back a united -China, there would be a great constructive development, from which all -would benefit far in excess of selfish profits garnered in a corner. -We planned a system of joint international finance. That, despite -its drawbacks, would destroy the localization of foreign political -influence. The plan in its relations to the Chinese Government was -worked out with everyone that we could reach competent to give advice. -There were the official and business representatives of Great Britain -and France; the Chinese cabinet ministers and other officials, and all -of the American representatives, including the commercial attachés -Julean Arnold and P.P. Whitham, and the American advisers, Dr. W.W. -Willoughby, Dr. W.C. Dennis, and Mr. J.E. Baker of the Department of -Railways. Day and night the conferences went on informally; by day and -night these matters were threshed out. Japanese experts, too, were -consulted.</p> - -<p>The time seemed propitious. The Armistice brought the hope that the -powers would coöperate. The separatist political aims in China might -be overcome, together with the sinister intrigue for dismembering or -dominating that mighty nation of freemen. Could foreign financial -action and influence in China be gathered up into a unit? Could it be -made to build for the whole of China, not tear it down in its several -parts? At all events, we hammered out a plan to make this possible.</p> - -<p>Foreigners had gone deeply into railway loans, making their chief -investments there. Hence we made the plan of unified financial support -apply, first of all, to the railway service. The operating of the -different Chinese lines according to the respective national loans -was a curse; it was evil politics, and it broke down the railway -service. Foreign experts, acting as servants of the Chinese Government, -might unify the Chinese railroads, though of this Liang<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> Shih-yi, -Chow Tsu-chi, and Yeh Kung-cho—who knew most about Chinese railway -affairs—had their doubts. It would pile up the overhead expenses, they -thought. The railways could be managed thriftily only by the Chinese. -The foreign banking interests, too, might try to be depositories for -the railway funds, as they were already for the customs and salt -revenues. Thus Chinese capital would pay tribute to foreign capital. If -still other revenues were thus absorbed, as might be feared, national -economy would be fettered too much.</p> - -<p>Therefore they proposed a Chinese banking group. It would help in the -financing and could be made the depository of funds.</p> - -<p>These men sympathized, however, with the main purpose of the suggested -arrangement for unification. Foreign expertship on the railways, also, -was highly valued by Chinese railwaymen trained in the West. True, -Mr. Sidney Mayers somewhat frightened them by his proposals. This -British industrial representative of long experience in China proposed -internationalizing each separate line by putting on it an international -group of experts. The Chinese objected; it would mean giving all the -important positions to a large staff of foreign officials. Of this they -had had enough in the Customs.</p> - -<p>It was necessary to dissociate banking from building; such a union -would mean monopoly and fierce attacks upon it by all outside -interests. With the financing separate, the contracting might be left -free to all competitors, bidding low and resting their bids upon their -repute and responsibility.</p> - -<p>So long as it remained possible for different countries to acquire -special privileges in distinct spheres, promises of "integrity and -sovereignty" would be nothing but empty words. No matter how much they -might promise that they would not discriminate against the trade of -other nations, the fact remains that established position in itself -constitutes preference.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span></p> - -<p>The favoured nations might more honestly say: "Give us our special -position and we will give you all the equal opportunity you ask."</p> - -<p>Foreign influence could safely be wielded only as a trusteeship -for China and the world, without any vested political interests or -economic advantages secured through political pressure. But Chinese -administration was lax. I urged the Chinese officials to set their -house in order, to put their public accounting on an efficient plane; -even if necessary to employ foreign experts to do this. They said: -"Yes, if the United States will lead," for a long record of square -dealing had endeared our business men to the Chinese.</p> - -<p>But Americans had been slow in China. Two years had fled, and the -Grand Canal was not yet restored as promised. The half million dollars -advanced had been spent on preliminary surveys. Silver had risen; -American gold bought only one half what it had before. Overhead expense -was high, and for the preliminary work more than the half-million was -needed. The Chinese were disappointed, grief-stricken; they began to be -suspicious.</p> - -<p>The Japanese-controlled papers redoubled their attacks on Americans. -Pretty soon a Japanese journal at Tsinanfu assaulted the name and -character of President Wilson. I had an understanding with my Japanese -colleague that all press misstatement should be corrected. I saw him -about this attack on the head of a friendly nation. He promised to -look into it. After ten days I wrote inquiring again. Under the press -laws of Japan, he responded, a paper could indeed be punished for -libellous attack upon the head of a foreign state, provided that such -head happened to be in Japan at the time. As this paper was notoriously -under the domination of the Japanese authorities, amenable to their -very breath and whisper, I failed to see how the minister should find -it hard to bring it to book. I merely called for a retraction where the -Japanese, if a Chinese-owned paper<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> so scurrilously had attacked the -Japanese Emperor, would have asked for total suppression. The Japanese -minister said he would "further consider the matter" and would see what -he could do. A mild apology and retraction were eventually published.</p> - -<p>The action of the Japanese in China, official and unofficial, during -the war, had aroused the deepest resentment among the Chinese, who -were on the verge of despair. The Chinese people were being whirled -in the vortex of old and new. The old organization was beginning to -crumble; the new had not yet taken shape. It was easy to find spots -of weakness and corruption, aggravation of which would bring about an -actual demoralization of social and political life and the obstruction -of every improvement; bandits could be furnished with arms; weak -persons craving a stimulant could be drugged with morphia; the credit -of native institutions could be ruined; and the most corrupt elements -in the government encouraged. For the original weaknesses and evils the -outside influence was not responsible, but it was culpable for making -them its instruments for the achievement of its aims of political -dominion.</p> - -<p>A vast system whose object was the drugging of China with morphia, -which utilized the petty Japanese hucksters and traders throughout the -country, was exposed in the "opium blacklist" published by the British -papers in China. Specific proof was adduced in each case. Often the -blacklist extended over two pages of a paper. Obviously these Japanese -druggists, photographers, and the whole outfit of small-fry traders -could not traffic in morphia without the connivance of the Japanese -Government and the support of semi-official Japanese interests. The -Japanese post offices were used for its distribution in China. Chinese -police interference with the thousands of Japanese purveyors was ruled -out under the exterritoriality agreements. In Korea, the Japanese opium -grown officially for "medicinal uses" was produced far in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span> excess of -medicinal needs, and through the ports of Dairen and Tsingtao large -quantities of morphia came into China.</p> - -<p>The Japanese-controlled press at first answered the blacklist with -charges of <i>tu quoque</i>; but when they defamed the American missionary -hospitals, alleging that they were centres for distributing narcotic -drugs, nobody among the Chinese paid further attention to them. The -blacklists mapped graphically the thickly sown morphia "joints" -around the police station of the Japanese settlement at Tientsin and -the responsibility was brought home to Japan. An official Japanese -announcement was evoked that no effort would be spared to stop the -"regrettable, secret, illicit traffic."</p> - -<p>In Shantung Japanese civil administration had been set up along the -railway without a scintilla of right. It was later withdrawn for new -concessions and privileges wrung from the Peking Government. The -Japanese were old masters of this trick. Seize something which you -do not really want, and restore it to its owner if he will give you -something you do want. Then what you want you get, but it is not -"stolen," and can be kept with smug immunity. The arrangements in -Shantung were made secretly, riding roughshod over Chinese rights, -and intended to sterilize in advance the enactments of the Peace -Conference. If a foreign power should wish to own the Pennsylvania -Railway system, and should actually come into the United States and -occupy it, the parallel would be exact with what Japan did in Shantung. -After taking the Shantung Railway and holding it, the Japanese stoutly -claimed an "economic right" to it. The whole course of Japan in China -during the Great War alarmed both Chinese and foreigners. I may not -name the responsible and fair-minded writer of a letter from which I -quote:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>It would be in the highest degree unfortunate if the present -fortuitous and temporary possession of the Leased Territory and -Shantung Railway by Japan should be confirmed by the final Treaty of -Peace, for not only would China's sovereignty in Shantung be in danger -of impairment, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> the trading rights of Chinese, Americans, and -Europeans would undoubtedly be prejudiced.</p> - -<p>Another consideration that has the greatest weight with the writer is -that the principles for which the United States entered the European -War and on behalf of which the United States, in common with the -whole world, has paid an unthinkable price in gold and blood, make -unbearable a continuance, not to say accentuation, of the old system -of foreign intrigue in China. It is unbearable that one result of the -victory bought in part with American lives should be the extension -of Japanese power in China, when such extension means the further -strengthening of the domination of a monarchical and imperialistic -foreign nation over China, a result constituting in its own sphere a -complete negation of the objects for which the United States devoted -its entire resources in the war against Germany.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Dr. Sun Yat Sen wrote me at Shanghai on the 19th of November, referring -both to internal and external troubles, and the union of militarists, -foreign and Chinese:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Through you alone will the President and the people of the United -States see the true state of affairs in China. Your responsibility -is indeed great. Whether Democracy or Militarism triumphs in China -largely depends upon Your Excellency's moral support of our helpless -people at this stage.</p></blockquote> - -<p>These words show the Chinese belief in the sheer force of public -opinion, and their wish that the Chinese situation be known and -understood abroad. This achieved, the evils under which China groans -and travails would shrivel.</p> - -<p>We built up our solution of unity for China. In carefully weighed -dispatches I sent it to the American Government, and cabled the -President a statement of China's vital relation to future peace. I was -constrained to condemn Japan's policy, quite deliberately, summing up -the evidence accumulated in the course of five years. I had come to the -Far East admiring the Japanese, friendly to them—my published writings -show this abundantly. I did not lose my earnest goodwill toward the -Japanese people but I could not shut my eyes to Japanese imperialist -politics with its unconscionably ruthless and underhanded actions and -its fundamental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> lack of every idea of fair play. The continuance -of such methods could only bring disaster; their abandonment is a -condition of peace and real welfare. The aims and methods of Japan's -military policy in the Continent of Asia can bring good to no one, -least of all to the Japanese people, notwithstanding any temporary -gains. Such ambitions cannot permanently succeed.</p> - -<p>A cure can come only when such evils are clearly recognized. -Lip-service to political liberalism might mislead the casually -regardful outside world. To those face to face with what Japanese -militarism was doing to continental Asia there was left no doubt of its -sinister quality. Japan herself needs to be delivered from it, for it -has used the Japanese people, their art and their civilization, for its -own evil ends. More than that, it threatens the peace of the world. If -talk of "a better understanding" presupposes the continuance of such -aims and motives as have actuated Japanese political plot during the -past few years, it is futile. What is needed is a change of heart.</p> - -<p>Here is the substance of the memorandum upon which my cablegram to the -President was based:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>In 1915, coercion was applied and China was forced by threats to -solidify and extend the privileged position of Japan in Manchuria -and Mongolia and to agree prospectively to a like régime in Shantung -together with the beginnings of a special position in Fukien Province. -After this there was a change of methods although the policy tended to -the same end—domination over China.</p> - -<p>Instead of coercion, Japan applied secret and corrupt influence -through alliance with purchasable officials kept in office by Japanese -support. The latter insidious policy is more dangerous because it gave -the appearance that rights are duly acquired through grant of the -Chinese Government; no demands or ultimatums are necessary because -corrupt officials strongly supported by Japanese finance, acting -absolutely in secret channels, suppressing all public discussion with -the strong arm of the police, are able to deliver contractual rights -regular in form, though of corrupt secret origin and evil tendency.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span></p> - -<p>Japan has used every possible means to demoralize China by creating -and sustaining trouble; by supporting and financing the most -objectionable elements, particularly a group of corrupt and vicious -military governors akin to bandits in their methods; by employing -instigators of trouble; by protection given to bandits; by the -introduction of morphia and opium; by the corruption of officials -through loans, bribes, and threats; by the wrecking of native banks -and the debauching of local currency; by illegal export of the copper -currency of the people; by local attempts to break down the salt -administration; by persistent efforts to prevent China from going into -the war and then seeing to it that China was never in a position to -render to the common cause such aid as would be in her power and as -she would willingly render if left to herself: finally, by utilizing -the war and the preoccupation of the Allies for enmeshing China in the -terms of a secret military alliance.</p> - -<p>As a result of these methods and manipulations, Japan has gained the -following advantages: a consolidation of her special position in -Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, and the foundation of the same in -Shantung and Fukien; control in the matter of Chinese finance through -the control of the Bank of Communications and the Bureau of Public -Printing and the appointment of a high financial adviser together with -the adoption of the unsound gold-note scheme happily not yet put in -force. She has secured extensive railway concessions in Manchuria, -Shantung, Chihli, and Kiangsu; mining rights in various provinces; -and special monopolistic rights through the Kirin forestry loan, the -telephone loan, and others. Through the secret military convention -Japan attempts not only to control the military policy of China but -incidentally national resources such as iron deposits. All these -arrangements are so secretly made that in most cases not even the -Foreign Office is in possession of the documents relating thereto. -Together with this goes the persistent assertion of special interests -which are interpreted as giving a position of predominance.</p> - -<p>This is a strong indictment and I feel the fullest responsibility in -making these statements. Fundamentally friendly to the Japanese as my -published expressions show, I have been forced through the experience -of five years to the conclusion that the methods applied by the -Japanese military masters can lead only to evil and destruction and -also that they will not be stopped by any consideration of fairness -and justice but only by the definite knowledge that such action will -not be tolerated.</p> - -<p>As a steady stream of information from every American official in -China and from every other source as well as my own experience have -made this conclusion inevitable, I owe the duty to state it to the -American Government in no uncertain terms. Nor is this said in any -spirit of bitterness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> against the Japanese people but from the -conviction that the policy pursued by their military masters can -in the end bring only misery and woe to them and the world. During -all this period it has not been possible for the European powers -or the United States to do anything for China. The United States, -though assisting all other Allies financially, could not contribute -one dollar toward maintaining the financial independence of China -as undivided attention was needed to the requirements of the west -front. The Lansing-Ishii notes, undoubtedly intended to express a -friendly attitude toward any legitimate aspirations of Japan while -safeguarding the rights of China, were perverted by the Japanese into -an acknowledgment of their privileged position in China. Now at last, -when the pressure has been released, America as well as the European -countries must face the issue which has been created, that is, whether -a vast, peaceable, and industrious population whose most articulate -desire is to be allowed to develop their own life in the direction of -free and just government, shall become material to be moulded by the -secret plottings of a foreign military despotism into an instrument of -its power. If it is said that the aims of Japan are now but economic -and in just response to the needs of Japan's expanding population, it -must be remembered that every advantage is gained and maintained by -political and military pressure and that it is exploited by the same -means in a fashion, taking no account of the rights of other foreign -nations or of the Chinese themselves. Divested of their political -character and military aims the economic activities of Japan would -arouse no opposition.</p> - -<p>Only the refusal to accept the results of Japanese secret manipulation -in China during the last four years, particularly, the establishment -of Japanese political influence and a special privilege position in -Shantung can avert the result of either making China a dependence of a -reckless and boundlessly ambitious military caste which would destroy -the peace of the entire world, or bringing on a military struggle -inevitable from the establishment of rival spheres of interest and -local privilege in China.</p> - -<p>Peace is conditioned on the abolition for the present and future -of all localized privileges. China must be freed from all foreign -political influence exercised within her borders, railways controlled -by foreign governments, and preferential arrangements supported by -political power. If this is done, China will readily master her own -trouble, particularly if the military bandits hitherto upheld by Japan -shall no longer have the countenance of any foreign power.</p> - -<p>The advantages enumerated above were gained by Japan when she was -professedly acting as the trustee of the Associated Powers in the -Far East, and they could not have been obtained at all but for the -sacrifices made by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> them in Europe. They are therefore not the -exclusive concern of any one power. With respect to Shantung the -German rights there lapsed, together with all Chino-German treaties, -upon the declaration of war. A succession of treaty rights from -Germany to Japan is therefore not possible, and the recognition of -a special position of Japan in Shantung could only proceed from -a new act to which conceivably some weak Chinese officials might -be induced but which would be contrary to the frequently declared -aims of international policy in China and which would amount to the -definitive establishment of exclusive spheres of influence in China -leading in turn to the more vigorous development of such exclusive -spheres by other nations. The present situation of affairs offers the -last opportunity by common consent to avert threatening disaster by -removing the root of conflict in China.</p> - -<p>Never before has an opportunity for leadership toward the welfare -of humanity presented itself equal to that which invites America in -China at the present time. The Chinese people ask for no better fate -than to be allowed freedom to follow in the footsteps of America; -every device of intrigue and corruption as well as coercion is being -employed to force them in a different direction, including constant -misrepresentation of American policies and aims which, however, has -not as yet prejudiced the Chinese. Nor is it necessary for America to -exercise any political influence. If it were only known that America -in concert with the liberal powers would not tolerate the enslavement -of China either by foreign or native militarists the natural -propensity of the Chinese to follow liberal inclinations would guide -this vast country toward free government and propitious development of -peaceful industrial activities, even through difficulties unavoidable -in the transition of so vast and ancient a society to new methods of -action.</p> - -<p>But if China should be disappointed in her confidence at the present -time the consequences of such disillusionment on her moral and -political development would be disastrous, and we instead of looking -across the Pacific toward a peaceable, industrial nation, sympathetic -with our ideals, would be confronted with a vast materialistic -military organization under ruthless control.</p></blockquote> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXIX" id="CHAPTER_XXIX">CHAPTER XXIX</a></p> - -<p class="center">JAPAN SHOWS HER TEETH</p> - - -<p>Mr. Obata had succeeded Baron Hayashi as Japanese minister in -December. He was a dour, silent man who had been much in China, as -consular officer and in the Legation. He had sat with Mr. Hioki in the -conferences in which the twenty-one demands were pressed on China. -He was known to be a very direct representative, in the diplomatic -service, of the militarist masters of Japan. His appointment was to -the Chinese ominous of a continuance of aggressive tactics. A wail of -indignation went up from the Chinese press, but Mr. Obata remained. In -my personal relations with this secretive man I thought I saw gradually -emerging a broader and more humane outlook.</p> - -<p>The new Japanese minister called on the 2nd of February, 1919, at -the Foreign Office and expressed resentment at the attitude of the -Chinese delegation at Paris. The Chinese representatives had said they -were willing to publish all the secret agreements which the diplomacy -of Nippon had been weaving around China. Japan objected. The sacred -treaties between China and Japan were not to be divulged without the -consent of both parties. If China was so anxious to purge herself of -secret diplomacy, let her publish first the agreement of September -24, 1918, which gave the special privileges of Germany in Shantung to -Japan. The displeasure of the Japanese in Paris was reënforced by Mr. -Obata in Peking by what the Chinese took to be a veiled threat. "Great -Britain," said he, "is preoccupied with internal disorders. She cannot -assist China. But Japan is fully able<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> to assist, as she has a navy of -500,000 tons, and an army of more than a million men ready for action."</p> - -<p>The Shantung agreement had been the consummation of the -Japanese-controlled Minister of Communications. The Chinese Foreign -Office was not consulted when the Chinese minister at Tokyo signed it, -and it had not been ratified by the Chinese Government. The Chinese -people viewed it merely as a draft, and demanded its cancellation with -the return to Japan of the moneys received under it by the politicians.</p> - -<p>Mr. Obata's threat, which the Chinese took to be an attempt to -intimidate the Chinese delegation at Paris, evoked a deluge of -telegraphic messages urging the President and the Government by all -possible means to back their delegates. These expressions came from -men of all parties. Chen Lu, Acting Foreign Minister, tried in vain -to minimize the effect of the interview. Called before the Chamber of -Representatives in secret session, he said that the newspaper reports -had been "somewhat exaggerated," and added: "In this time when the -right and justice of the Allied Powers have definitely destroyed -militarism and despotism, we Chinese, although as yet a weak country, -may consider every menace of foreign aggression as a thing of the past, -and accept it with a smile."</p> - -<p>The Government at first cabled the Paris delegation not to make -the secret treaties public; they were not held to be valid by the -Chinese Government, and publication might lend them force. Later, -the Government cabled, leaving it entirely to the discretion of the -delegates. The diplomatic commission of the Chin Pu Tang recommended -this. Meanwhile, Mr. Liang Chi-chao had gone to France. He meant to go -by way of the United States, where I had prepared for him an itinerary -and letters of introduction. Then his intimate associate, Tang -Hua-lung, was assassinated in Vancouver. Liang, fearful of a similar -fate, went straight to France, evading the Kuo Min Tang sympathizers in -America. Ex-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span>Premier Hsiung Hsi-ling told me that Liang was to inform -the Chinese delegates unofficially about the state of things in China.</p> - -<p>This was so bad that the American recommendation that the powers keep -their money away from either party until China was reunited looked -more and more desirable. An influential and responsible Chinese, who -talked with me about the clique that ran the War Participation Bureau, -made this statement: "The danger to China is in the efforts of Tuan's -militarists. Japan is giving them money to build up an army. With this -they will try to overawe the President and force him to fall in with -their aims. The negotiations for peace with the south will cease; the -war with the south will go on."</p> - -<p>One of the most burning questions both to private individuals and -the press was how to oblige Japan and her officials to cease their -support of the northern militarists by the sending of money and -arms. Certainly a fire was built under them. The Japanese minister -called on me on the 9th of January to say that his government would -now join in a declaration on financial assistance to China. He had -to make reservations about the loan of 20,000,000 yen, pledged in -connection with the secret military agreement, also as to the so-called -"industrial" loans. The secret loan arrangement had been made with -three Japanese banks: the Bank of Chosen, the Industrial Bank of Japan, -and the Bank of Formosa, by the War Participation Bureau. With this, -the minister said, he could not interfere. Also, his government was -in principle favouring a restriction of the sale of arms, as America -recommended; but it would be best for the powers to say nothing -about it, as their joint statement would be taken as an attempt to -restrain Japan, which was the only country able to furnish arms to -China. Besides, the War Participation Bureau had a troublesome private -contract for arms with the Tayeh Company, which the Government felt<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> it -couldn't interfere with. So there you are, as Henry James would put it.</p> - -<p>I told the Japanese minister that we were not proposing any platonic -arrangement as Americans were both able and willing to furnish arms -to the Chinese under legitimate contracts, if the American Government -would permit it. Moreover, as to the transaction of those three -Japanese banks—since the Government of Japan had an interest both in -them and in the munitions company mentioned, their alliance with the -War Participation Bureau would be dissociated with difficulty in the -public mind from the Japanese Government.</p> - -<p>The War Participation Bureau clique was actually getting ready to equip -an army against the south while the North-and-South Peace Conference -was sitting at Shanghai. Tang Shao-yi, chief peace representative of -the south, formally remonstrated to the British minister, as dean of -the diplomatic corps, against such doings of this "Bureau" and its -Japanese support.</p> - -<p>Now, the Bureau had been established as its name implied, to facilitate -participation of China in the Great War. Japan's financial support -of it was ostensibly given also in behalf of the other Allies. If it -were to be prostituted to the fomenting of civil war the others as -well could not escape responsibility. A meeting was held on the 12th -of February by the Allied and Associated ministers. Several strongly -urged that outside money continually given for recruiting of troops was -opposed to the aim of restoring settled conditions in China and to the -policy of the joint declaration of December. The Japanese minister was -silent. He said he must await instructions.</p> - -<p>He informed me on February 21st that Japan had called a halt on the -shipping of ammunition and equipment to the War Participation Bureau, -but the payment of the balance of the loan could not be stopped. Just -then, as it happened,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> an American firm would soon be ready to begin -delivery of a certain amount of equipment in China, contracted for in -good faith during the previous August. America had proposed a joint -declaration against the furnishing of arms, which Japan had blocked. As -the declaration had not been made, I could not then stop the American -delivery though I did so later. But America would still be only too -glad to join in the declaration as proposed.</p> - -<p>As the Japanese were still paying the loan funds into the War -Participation Bureau, another diplomatic "indignation meeting" was -held about it on March 6th. The Japanese minister said his banks could -not help paying over those funds, but he had suggested to the Chinese -Government that it might be well, in the circumstances, to refrain from -drawing the money; Japan could not object to this. Forthwith one of the -ministers spoke up: "Then let us all make this recommendation which -Japan has made."</p> - -<p>At this the Japanese minister was taken aback, almost shocked. He had -always argued that the War Participation Bureau was a Chinese internal -affair, not one in which the powers that had helped form it should -presume to dip. But the suggestion was quickly adopted. As a result, -the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United -States, all solemnly called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, -expressing their opinion that to draw the war participation funds was -not advisable, as it constituted an obstacle to internal peace.</p> - -<p>But Japan's advice had been merely for the record, not at all to -be acted upon. Soon there came over to Sir John Jordan an informal -memorandum from the Foreign Office, taking the Japanese line of thought -that the War Participation Bureau was China's internal affair. It -might be construed as an intimation that we were meddling. Indeed, two -Chinese of high position told me that the President and the Premier had -held up the memorandum for several days<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> for fear that it might give -offense, until the Minister of War absolutely insisted upon its being -sent.</p> - -<p>Through these two men I sent a quiet intimation to the President that -withdrawal of the memorandum would prevent unpleasant feelings among -men who were sincerely friendly to him and to China. The memorandum was -pulled back without delay; thereupon all the Chinese officials, except -the few directly connected with the War Participation Bureau, rejoiced.</p> - -<p>The five representatives who signed the original declaration of -December met again on the 11th of March, because the French minister -had instructions favouring action upon the Bureau. The Japanese -minister advanced his arguments about its being China's business, -not ours. But the others took the view that as it was an Allied war -institution and Japan had dealt directly with it, it was quasi-external -in character. "Is it not quite clear," protested the Japanese minister, -"that the loan was purely a commercial affair, made by certain banks, -and not controlled by the Japanese Government?" How, then, it was asked -in reply, does it happen that in connection with this loan, officers of -the Japanese army had been assigned to the War Participation Bureau as -advisers and instructors; was it customary to make such extraordinary -arrangements in connection with a purely commercial transaction?</p> - -<p>"I am not sufficiently informed," Mr. Obata responded evasively. "I -shall have to refer to the reports of these transactions."</p> - -<p>The position of Japan in this matter was so patently equivocal that -it was amusing. We decided that we should make it plain that as this -bureau was created to further our common purposes, we could not -acquiesce in any political action or in the use of any money which -would tend to prolong internal strife.</p> - -<p>The Japanese minister on the 1st of March had notified<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> the Chinese -Government that no further deliveries of arms would be made to the War -Participation Bureau pending the termination of the North-and-South -Peace Conference at Shanghai. We proposed to follow this up with joint -action. Certain representatives were uninstructed, though they favoured -frowning on the arms imports. Finally eight powers united "effectively -to restrain their subjects and citizens from importing into China arms -and munitions of war until the establishment of a government whose -authority is recognized throughout the whole country." This included -the delivery of arms under contracts already made but not executed. I -could then warn the American firm not to execute its contract for the -time being, and I did so.</p> - -<p>From time to time, since the early spring of 1918, Baron Sakatani, -Japanese ex-Minister of Finance, had been in Peking. Mr. Liang -Chi-chao, when as Minister of Finance he made his Japanese loans, had -held out the possibility of the appointment of a Japanese financial -advisor. The Baron was an old acquaintance of mine and I held him -in high regard; but, in view of the fact that I could not consider -this time a proper one for settling the matter of the financial -advisorships, I had to distinguish between my personal feelings for him -and the official stand which I might have to take. A Japanese friend -wrote me in connection with Baron Sakatani's visit to China: "A section -of our capitalists have been given every facility to make money and -to lend it to China; with the money squeezed from them, the military -bureaucrats have been corrupting party men and sending them to China -and elsewhere, to exploit the warring nations while they are busy with -the war. The civilian officials and militarists cannot think anything -except in terms of German fear or admiration. If such Japanese are -employed by the Peking government, it will forever alienate Chinese -sympathies from anything we may propose."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span></p> - -<p>Baron Sakatani from the first had nursed the ambition of being made -currency adviser to the Chinese Government; by January, 1919, it -appeared that his wish was to be fulfilled. The Japanese minister -announced that the other nations had agreed to the Baron's appointment. -I had not agreed to it. I had heard nothing whatever about it and had -consistently and energetically opposed any action of this sort. I -considered that it would permanently determine the course to be taken -with regard to currency loans, and would preclude the possibility of -any consultation with the United States. I requested the Minister of -Finance to defer the appointment until I could consult my government. -The next development came on the 20th when the Japanese minister -handed me a memorandum which referred to the personal goodwill I had -expressed to Baron Hayashi and which went on to state that the proposed -appointment of Baron Sakatani had been sanctioned by Mr. Lansing in -Washington.</p> - -<p>I cabled to Washington, receiving therefrom on the 30th instructions -saying that the appointment of a currency adviser should be settled -only after full consultation by all concerned, and that Mr. Lansing had -not committed himself to any other understanding. I sent a note to the -Minister of Finance, stating that as one of the parties to the Currency -Loan Agreement, the United States wished that action be postponed -until further consideration could be given. I was immediately assured -that the position taken would be considered as final. As a personal -friend I regretted that Baron Sakatani could not be retained, but in -so important a matter it was impossible to stand aside while action -was rushed through which would be prejudicial to the long-established -interests of the powers who were, at the time, preoccupied with -after-war problems.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXX" id="CHAPTER_XXX">CHAPTER XXX</a></p> - -<p class="center">BANDITS, INTRIGUERS, AND A HOUSE DIVIDED</p> - - -<p>There is a phase of Chinese life which I should touch upon if the -picture I am trying to give of the China I knew is to be complete.</p> - -<p>Brigandage is an established institution in China, where it has -operated so long that people have become accustomed to it and take -it for granted as a natural visitation. At this time there was a -vicious circle around which brigands and troops and rich citizens and -villagers were travelling, one in pursuit of the other. The brigands -were recruited from disbanded soldiers—men who had lost connection -with their family and clan. Often their families had been wiped out -by famine, flood, or disease, or had been killed in the revolution. -At other times the individual may have lost touch through a fault -of his own causing him to be cast out. It is very difficult for an -isolated person, without family and clan connections, to reëstablish -himself. The easiest way is to enlist in the army. If that cannot be -done, he becomes a brigand. Brigands foregather in provinces where the -administration is lax or in remote regions difficult to reach. They lie -in ambush and seize wealthy persons, who are carried off to the hills -and released only when ransom is paid. In this way, a considerable -tax is levied on accumulated wealth. This money the brigands spend -among the villagers where they happen to be. Meanwhile, the Provincial -Governor bethinks himself that a certain brigade or division has -not been paid for a long time and therefore might cause trouble, -so he announces what is called a "country cleansing campaign." The -situation is so intolerable that the general<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> sees himself forced to -go to extremes, and to send his troops with orders to exterminate the -brigands. They proceed to the infested regions; the brigands, having -meanwhile got wind of these movements, depart for healthier climes, -leaving the troops to quarter themselves on the villagers, who are by -them relieved of the money which they have made out of the brigands. -Some brigands may be unfortunate enough to be caught; some will be shot -as an example, and others will be allowed to enlist. When the soldiers -have dwelt for a while among the villagers, they report that the -bands have now been fully suppressed and that the country is cleaned. -They are then recalled to headquarters; their general reports to the -governor, and is appropriately rewarded. Meanwhile, the brigands return -from their safer haunts and begin again to catch wealthy people, whom -they relieve of their surplus liquidable property. And so the circle -revolves interminably.</p> - -<p>A little more efficiency in China would deliver it of much of its -intriguing and all of its banditry. Returning to Peking from a trip -to the Philippines I found that Mr. Kyle, an American engineer on the -Siems-Carey railway survey, and Mr. Purcell, another employé, had been -seized by bandits in a remote part of Honan. The bandits took a large -sum of silver these men were carrying to pay off the surveying parties -farther up toward Szechuan, then they decided to hold Kyle and Purcell -for ransom.</p> - -<p>Doctor Tenney, the Chinese secretary, was in Kaifengfu, stirring up -the provincial governor to hurry the release of the men. The company -was quite ready to pay the ransom, and I could easily have induced -the Chinese Government to pay it. I was advised that this would be -the only certain way of rescuing the men, but I felt it would be -a dangerous precedent; as the bandits would then go on taking and -holding foreigners for ransom. Mr. Kyle was neither young nor robust. -I feared for the strenuous life and the worry he was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> undergoing, but -waited two weeks for the Central and the Provincial Government, which -I made responsible, to get them back. One night, Mr. Purcell escaped. -I then through Doctor Tenney notified the Governor-General that he -must surround the entire region where the bandits were, telling them -emphatically that if anything happened to Mr. Kyle the band would be -hunted down and exterminated.</p> - -<p>The threat was "got across" to the bandits, and with it a promise that -those instrumental in restoring the captive would escape punishment -and in some way be rewarded. After a week's further suspense Mr. -Kyle was delivered to the pursuing troops and forthwith returned to -Peking. The chief of the band was rewarded with a commission in the -army; his henchmen were enlisted as soldiers. But those who had no -part in the delivery were one by one caught and executed. So, in the -end, a salutary example was set to keep bandits from interfering with -foreigners.</p> - -<p>Mr. Kyle moved with the band every night in their mountainous and -inaccessible region. Over divides they went from valley to valley. Mr. -Kyle kept his normal health, but complained that they had not let him -sleep. He snored so loudly, the bandits told him, that they feared he -would attract the notice of the troops; so, during the final ten days, -he had not had a solid hour of sleep. But he made up his mind that he -would keep his mental equipoise and his physical fitness in order to -live through the experience.</p> - -<p>Two woman missionaries had been taken at about the same time by bandits -in Shantung Province. But they were released after a few days. The -missionaries of the society they belonged to circulated a pamphlet -somewhat later, pointing out the superior efficacy of prayer over -diplomatic intervention. In response to prayer these two teachers had -been freed within a week; whereas all our diplomatic efforts had not -yet secured the release of the American engineer.</p> - -<p>Fear of foreign displeasure lost the Chinese the chance to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> get the -services of a great engineer. Before going to the Philippines I had -been visited by Mr. Ostrougoff, Minister of Railways in Kerensky's -time, who had inaugurated the Russian agreement under which Mr. John -F. Stevens was given the task of helping to reorganize the Russian -railways. The work had been prevented by disturbed conditions. Admiral -Kolchak, together with Alexis Staal, had also called on me, with -others who had faith in the beginnings of a representative political -organization in Siberia. I recall Kolchak's fine, serious face, and his -manner which was that of a man under the strain imposed by duties that -transcend any mere personal interest. On my return, John F. Stevens -came to Peking for a month. He was discouraged by the Russian and -Siberian situation. The general breakdown, the social revolution, and -the establishment of soviets had demolished the chances for carrying -out his railway plans in Russia. No organized authority had backed -him. In Peking he studied the Chinese railway situation. In his quiet, -thorough-going way, he looked into the whole question for China; it was -not long before he had great confidence in its possibilities. I felt -it would be a godsend if a man of his genius for original planning and -constructive work, proved in the great Panama Canal project; a man, -moreover, who had intimate experience of American railway operation, -could work out with the Chinese a systematic plan for developing their -railway service. The Chinese would have eagerly welcomed this chance, -but they were not free. The engagement of one foreigner would have -brought demands to employ many more.</p> - -<p>This was in the spring of 1918. I called on Mr. Liang Shih-yi to greet -him on his return from exile. "The urgent thing," he said, "is to -put a stop to military interference with the civil government. The -question of a parliament is not quite so important, but, as it has been -put to the fore, it must be solved first. My solution is to elect a -new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> parliament under the old law. Then reduce the army and separate -military from civilian affairs."</p> - -<p>Liang described to me the characteristics of the nine chief southern -leaders. They were rivals, they had their hostilities; no three leaders -would agree. Two would come to an understanding, and the rest would -turn and rend them. Finally, he predicted that Hsu Shih-chang would be -the most likely candidate for President, Tuan having declined.</p> - -<p>In Hunan the northern and southern troops were still fighting and -inflicting suffering on the people there; General Chang Chin-yao, -in particular, an opium-smoking gambler and corrupter, the military -governor of Hunan; his troops destroyed certain property belonging to -missionaries. American and British residents of Changsha, the capital, -petitioned the British and American ministers for protection to foreign -life and property. I had learned that the governor put no bridle on -his troops. With my British and Japanese colleagues I insisted that -commanding officers be held personally and individually responsible -for injuries to foreigners. We pointed out that Chang, especially, -was under observation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs delivered -a warning, and Admiral Knight, whom I had fully advised, ordered a -gunboat to Changsha.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the War Participation Bureau, created to aid the Associated -Powers in the Great War, was watched by Japan. Because of it they made -their special military convention of which General Tuan had spoken -to me, using the revolution in Russia and the rise of Bolshevism as -their pretext. The Japanese militarist element in the Government was -active and urgent, and General Aoki at Peking and General Tanaka at -Tokyo were leaving no stone unturned to aid them. They sought at first -a general military alliance. The Chinese would not consider anything -so sweeping. Then the unrest in Siberia was made the basis of more -limited coöperation. In March a preliminary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> entente was formed; China -and Japan would consider in common the measures to be taken to cope -with the Russian situation and to take part in the present war, and the -means and conditions of coöperation would be arranged by the military -and naval authorities of both countries.</p> - -<p>War participation in general was thus put into the purview of mutual -agreement between Japan and China. While no general military alliance -was concluded, nevertheless the Japanese could now control what was to -be done by China in the war. It meant that China would do nothing.</p> - -<p>The terms of the military and naval conventions on methods of -coöperating, concluded the 16th of May, flexibly permitted Japan in -certain circumstances to control Chinese railways and resources. The -whole thing was managed secretly. The public became suspicious of the -results, since the chief arrangements were made not by the cabinet or -the Foreign Office, but by the military and naval representatives. -Would China longer freely coöperate with the other Allies? Would she -not be under Japan's strict leadership? Was not this the entering wedge -for a complete control of Chinese military affairs by Japan? Would not -Chinese militarism be strengthened and made obedient to Japanese policy?</p> - -<p>Japan's acts in Shantung gave these questions pertinence. There she was -expropriating by eminent domain; in Tsingtau the Japanese authorities -thus acquired about twelve square miles of land, including the shore -of Kiaochow Bay for several miles, which gave control of every land -approach and every possible steamship and railway terminal in this -port. Plainly, Japan was carrying out a policy of permanent occupation.</p> - -<p>While the Chino-Japanese entente was being negotiated, -Japanese-controlled papers in China were preaching enmity to the white -race. In May a Japanese parliamentary party visited China, making -speeches calculated to stir racial feeling. The burden of the appeals -was that, after the war,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span> European nations would try to fasten their -control more firmly on China, hence the yellow race should now unite in -timely opposition.</p> - -<p>Mr. Nishihara, close associate of the Japanese Premier, General -Terauchi, was unofficially doing the financial business of Japan in -China. The Japanese Legation could deny that negotiations were going -on, while Japanese interests were actively influencing the financial -measures of the Peking Government. A large loan was proposed, to be -secured on the tobacco and wine revenues. They were the security for -the existing American loan, with option for further advances. I asked -Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of Finance, about this and his answer was: "The -United States is not giving to China the assistance she gives to her -other associates in the war. The American bankers have not completed -their contract. It is necessary for China to look elsewhere."</p> - -<p>Mr. Tsao said he would at any time consider American proposals and give -them as favourable treatment as to any other nation. I asked assurances -that before anything further was done on the basis of the tobacco and -wine revenues, the American bank have a chance to consider a proposal -from the Chinese Government under its option. The minister had denied -that the revenues were now in any way involved; but at this request he -sidestepped. I made the most of his denial, placing it on record in a -note to the Foreign Office. The French minister took action similar -to mine. Tsao was not only Minister of Finance; he was concurrently -Minister of Communications. Both departments, therefore, were under the -thumb of Japan.</p> - -<p>I have rather rapidly sketched the state of affairs within China up -to July of 1918. I wished a personal discussion of the situation -with the officials at Washington—my first since America's entrance -into the war. I left Peking for the United States after another long -interview with General<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> Tuan, who had become Premier. On June 27th the -Premier stated to me his policy and motives with frankness. "If we stop -military action," he said, "that would be interpreted as weakness. The -south would only make more extravagant demands, and further encroach on -northern territory. Force that is adequate—that answers the question. -For this we need money. If home revenues are not enough, then we must -have foreign loans. That will restore national unity, which, in turn, -will make repayment easy. The army will be reformed. The people will -get protection, and the country will prosper."</p> - -<p>This policy was wise, inevitable, he thought. But it suited a class of -inept generals who systematically made war at home, with only moderate -risk of actual fighting. Their methods involved money more than -bayonets.</p> - -<p>"When you return from America," Tuan said at parting, "everything will -be settled, and the south will recognize our authority."</p> - -<p>A sea-borne war expedition, sent to conquer the south, was in his mind. -I could not but express my conviction of the impossibility of such an -achievement but he was obstinate.</p> - -<p>I divided my time in America between Washington and New York, save for -a visit to my mother. In four weeks I saw representatives of most of -the great interests, public and private, involved in China. I by no -means stopped with the State Department. I saw the Secretary of War -and the Adjutant General, on questions dealing with the recruiting -of troops to be stationed in China; the Intelligence Division of the -War Department and of the Navy, as well as the Committee on Public -Information; the Secretary of Commerce, and officials of the War -Trade Board and War Industries Board, about restrictions on commerce -and American commercial developments in China, together with the men -of the Shipping Board about trans-Pacific lines. Among great private -organizations I conferred with members of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> the National City Bank; J.P. -Morgan & Company; the Guaranty Trust Company of New York; Kuhn, Loeb & -Company; the General Electric and American Locomotive companies; the -Standard Oil Company of New York; the International Banking Corporation -and American International Corporation; the Chase National Bank; -the Siems-Carey Company; Pacific Development Corporation, and the -Continental & Commercial Bank of Chicago.</p> - -<p>The American policy with respect to Russia and Siberia had not been -determined, and in interviews with President Wilson the Siberian -problem, to which I had been very close, as well as Chinese finance, -were subjects of particular attention. I showed to the President how -the Chinese got loans for alleged industrial purposes; then, with the -connivance of the lenders, instead of building railways and telephone -systems, they diverted them to political or partisan ends. Thus Chinese -credit and the authority of the Government were progressively weakened. -Then foreigners would encroach, and in some fields American opportunity -was in danger of being restricted or lost entirely. I wished to see -the United States backing financially a sound programme of Chinese -reorganization. That would accord with our traditions. But jealousies -and friction were to be eliminated, hence I favoured the forming of an -International Public Loan Consortium.</p> - -<p>This would support the credit of the Chinese Government and put Chinese -finance on a sound basis. Such a consortium would claim priority in -making all administrative or political loans; but monopoly should -be avoided by leaving contracts for building and supplies open to -competition, and by letting outside financiers make industrial loans. -Of course, the Consortium as the chief backer of China should have full -information about industrial loans, and each government should engage -to scrutinize all loans made by its nationals for industries. All this, -at his request, went to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> President in a memorandum submitted on the -14th of August.</p> - -<p>With respect to Siberia and Russia, my information led me to believe -that the Russian people might still be influenced to remain friendly -to the Allies, so as to prevent the growth of German control. I had in -mind, not intervention, but economic assistance. I urged a commission -that would aid the Russian people to import the commodities they -needed most. The Russian Coöperative societies were anxious for just -such assistance; thus, their leaders believed, further unfavourable -developments could be prevented. I knew the Russians to be universally -friendly; any movement initiated by America would be received with -extreme goodwill.</p> - -<p>President Wilson seemed to wish something like this to be carried -out. He even discussed with me what men were most likely to succeed -in organizing so huge an enterprise. But he feared to place a -representative of "big business" in such a position; men would suspect -selfish national motives. I felt that he wished America to lead in -giving the Russian people such aid in reorganizing their economic life -as would permanently benefit them and preserve them for our common -cause.</p> - -<p>After many, many departments and boards were consulted, I found they -were not thinking of China. Their chief problem was to train the -American army and transport it to the western front. They did not care -to get Chinese contingents there. This was the critical moment of -the war. By comparison other interests shrivelled. As for financial -advances to China, the Government found that China entered the war -after the law authorizing advances was passed. A new law would be -needed. To propose it would bring up the whole question of war policy. -The temper of the day was to concentrate every effort on the greatest -immediate show of strength on the west front. I appreciated all this, -but I deeply regretted that a tiny rivulet out of the vast streams of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span> -financial strength directed to Europe could not pass to China. Even -one thousandth part of the funds given to Europe, invested in building -up China, would have prevented many disheartening and disastrous -developments. For every dollar tenfold in value would have been gained -in fortifying Chinese ability to help in the war and in the post-bellum -recovery.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXXI" id="CHAPTER_XXXI">CHAPTER XXXI</a></p> - -<p class="center">YOUNG MEN IN PEKING, OLD MEN IN PARIS</p> - - -<p>A crowd of students appeared before the legation gate on the 5th of May -clamouring to see me. I was absent, that day, on a trip to the temple -above Men Tou-kou and so missed seeing them. Their demonstration, as -it turned out afterward, was the first step in the widespread student -movement which was to make history. Their patriotic fervour had, on -that morning, been brought to the boiling point by the first inkling of -the Paris decision on Shantung.</p> - -<p>The first reaction of the Chinese people as a whole to this news was -one of dumb dismay. It was a stunning, paralyzing blow. It seemed -that all the brazen intrigue through which Japan had been seeking to -strengthen her hold on Shantung, all the cunning by which she had -prepared the basis of her claim to permanent possession of the German -rights, had been endorsed by the Versailles Conference.</p> - -<p>The Chinese people, discouraged in Peking, had centred their hopes on -Paris. When hints of a possible acceptance of Japan's demands were -received in Peking, the first impulse of the students was to see the -American minister, to ask him whether this news was true, and to see -what he had to say. I escaped a severe ordeal.</p> - -<p>When they were told that I was absent there was at first a hum of -voices, then came the cry: "To the house of the traitor!" They meant -the house of Tsao Ju-lin, where the schemers had assembled to make the -contracts which China hated. Tsao Ju-lin, the smooth little plotter -whom most people regarded as the guiding spirit of the humiliating -business, was the most despised; but they associated with him<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> Chang -Ching-hsiang, who had been Chinese minister at Tokyo when the secret -treaties were drawn up. The students rushed over to the house and -broke down the door and trooped inside. They found both men there. No -time was lost, either on the part of the students or their prey. The -students breaking up chairs and tables and using pieces of them for -weapons went after the two diplomats. Tsao, still smooth and slippery, -managed to escape through a window and into a narrow alley where he -eluded his pursuers. Chang, however, was beaten into insensibility. -Lu Tsung-yu, the other plotter whom the students would have "treated -rough", was not to be found.</p> - -<p>For four days we were without foreign news. The first brief telegraphic -intimation of the Paris decision was followed by the cutting of the -wires; Japanese agents, the people surmised, did this to prevent the -universal Chinese protest from influencing the decision or causing its -review.</p> - -<p>Primarily the cause of the student violence lay in the proximity of the -fourth anniversary of the Japanese ultimatum of 1915; but they were -also anxious and stirred because of the reported action of the old men -at Paris.</p> - -<p>While other telegraphic communication was cut off I got information of -what was actually done by wireless. I found it hard to believe that -President Wilson would be compliant to the Japanese demands, in View -of the complete and insistent information the American Government had -had from me and all other American officials in China as to what would -result from such action. The Shantung decision constituted a wrong -of far-reaching effect; no general benefits bestowed by a league of -nations could outweigh it. Indeed, as I stated to the Government, it -destroyed all confidence in a league of nations which had such an ugly -fact as its cornerstone.</p> - -<p>To any one who had watched, day by day, month by month, the -unconscionable plotting for these claims, the decision was a lamentable -denial of every principle put for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span>ward during the war. President Wilson -brushed aside the unanimous opinion of the American experts, it would -seem, for two reasons: first, he believed that if only the League were -established, all difficulties of detail could easily be resolved; and, -second, he had not given enough attention to the Shantung question to -realize that this was not a matter of detail, but a fundamental issue.</p> - -<p>President Wilson tried to make himself and others believe that with the -acceptance of the Treaty and Covenant, the Shantung question would be -solved through fulfilment by Japan of its promise "to restore Shantung -Peninsula to China with full sovereignty," reserving only economic -rights. This was his primary misconception. The ownership by a foreign -government of a trunk railway reaching from a first-class port to -the heart of China could not be correctly termed an economic right. -Political control of such "economic rights" was exactly what American -policy had tried to prevent for decades. The President submitted, also, -in the apparent fear that Japanese delegates might follow the lead of -the Italians and leave the Conference. Colonel House, it appears, was -frightened into this belief and communicated it to President Wilson; -the two believed the League was endangered, and that every sacrifice -must be made to save it.</p> - -<p>The fear was quite unfounded. I had seen indications enough, of which -I had told the Government, that the Japanese set enormous store upon -their membership in the Conference and their position in Paris. As a -military, naval, and financial power, Japan could certainly not be put -in the first class, notwithstanding the tactical advantages which the -war had brought her. She would never forego the first-class status -bestowed by the arrangements of the Peace Conference. The Japanese had -not the remotest idea of throwing these advantages to the wind. The -impression they produced on Colonel House simply proved their capacity -for bluffing. Had President Wilson taken the trouble to understand -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> situation, he could without difficulty, by the use of friendly -firmness, have secured a very different solution. As a matter of fact, -it is now well known that the Japanese were ready to agree to an -arrangement whereby the German rights in China should accrue to the -Allied and Associated Powers jointly with an early reversion to China.</p> - -<p>Probably nowhere else in the world had expectations of America's -leadership at Paris been raised so high as in China. The Chinese -trusted America, they trusted the frequent declarations of principle -uttered by President Wilson, whose words had reached China in its -remotest parts. The more intense was their disappointment and -disillusionment due to the decisions of the old men that controlled -the Peace Conference. It sickened and disheartened me to think how the -Chinese people would receive this blow which meant the blasting of -their hopes and the destruction of their confidence in the equity of -nations.</p> - -<p>In the universal despair I feared a revulsion of feeling against -America; not because we were more to blame than others for the unjust -decision, but because the Chinese had entertained a deeper belief in -our power, influence, and loyalty to principle. They would hardly -understand so abject and complete a surrender. Foreign papers, also, -placed the chief responsibility on the United States. The British in -China felt that their government had been forced into the unfortunate -secret agreements with Japan when it could not help itself, because of -the German danger and the difficulties Japan might raise by going over -to the other side. The United States, whose hands were free, could have -saved us all, they said, by insisting on the right solution. They had -really hoped for this; their saying so now in their editorials and in -private conversation was in no spirit of petty hostility, but they had -to give vent to their feelings. I feared the Chinese might feel that -they had been betrayed in the house of their friends, but they met the -blow with sturdy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> spirit. They never wounded my feelings by anything -approaching an upbraiding of the United States for the part that -President Wilson played at Paris. They expressed to me their terrible -dejection, but said merely that President Wilson must have encountered -very great difficulties which they could know nothing about.</p> - -<p>They all knew, of course, that the case of China had been weakened -by the treaties made through the connivance of Tsao Ju-lin and his -associates in the fall of 1918. Their resentment was turned toward -Japan, which had thus taken advantage of the war and the weakness of -China, and against the Chinese politicians who had become Japan's tools.</p> - -<p>The Americans in China, as well as the British and the Chinese, were -deeply dejected during these difficult weeks. From the moment America -entered the war there had been a triumphant confidence that all this -sacrifice and suffering would establish just principles of world -action, under which mankind could live more happily and in greater -security. That hope was now all but crushed.</p> - -<p>In commemoration of the soldier dead, the American community gathered -on May 30th, Decoration Day. It fell to me to make the address, in -which I spoke of those recently stationed in Peking who had died during -the war. Especially, I spoke of the fruitful career of Major Willard -Straight. It was remarkable how many officers of the Marine Guard -recently in Peking had gone through the brunt of the war and had been -distinguished in their service. I spoke of General Neville, General -Bowley, Commander Hutchins, Colonel Newell, and Colonel Holcombe, all -of whom had been in the thick of it, and rejoiced in their record and -the fact that though they passed through the valley of death they had -been spared. My eyes often rested on the sad face of Mrs. Deering, -transfigured with the mother's pride in that heroic son whose war -letters, published by her, are one of the intimately human memorials of -the great struggle.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span></p> - -<p>I was impressed with how inadequately this wonderful country of -China and the promise of its people were understood in America. I -knew the difficulties and dangers to be overcome there, and I felt -that Americans well-disposed toward China would take a hand in its -development. But the "folks back home," especially the interests that -controlled the economic life of America, remained blind and deaf, -lavishing their money in Europe.</p> - -<p>I had spent my energies freely, withholding assistance from none who -deserved it, although I could easily have limited my official action -within narrower and more convenient bounds. In developments that would -mean a slow lift of this fine old civilization to a modern plane real -American interests had come in. Foundations had been laid in the -Canal Contract, the China Medical Board, the railway concessions, the -creation of a Chino-American bank, and many other enterprises. America -stood no longer with empty hands; she could not be confronted with the -gibe so often used before: "It is easy for you to suggest generous -action, for you have nothing to contribute."</p> - -<p>With these as beginnings, I arrived at the conclusion that more, -possibly, could be done by way of arousing American interests in Far -Eastern affairs by going to the United States than by staying in China. -I feared, also, that if I remained away from America too long, it would -be difficult readily to get in touch again with affairs there.</p> - -<p>For such reasons, I came to the decision that I should send my -resignation to the President. I did not wish to run away from a -difficult and disagreeable situation. Indeed, until the first effects -of the Paris decision had been overcome, I would not leave. Beyond that -time, I had no desire to remain. Like the Chinese, I at that time still -believed that President Wilson had probably met tremendous difficulties -of which I had no knowledge. At any rate, it was far from my purpose to -embarrass him or the Government through<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span> my action. Therefore, the only -motive I gave for my resignation was my desire to return to the United -States. However, in my letter to the President I tried to express in -moderate but serious terms my view of the situation and of the action -which had been taken at Paris. This letter follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p> - -June 7, 1919.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Dear Mr. President</span>:<br /> -</p> - -<p>I have the honour to place in your hands my resignation as minister to -China and to request that I may be relieved of the duties of this post -as soon as convenient to yourself and to the Secretary of State. My -reason for this action is that I am wearied after nearly six years of -continuous strain, that I feel that the interests of my family demand -my return to the United States, and that I should like to reënter -affairs at home without making my absence so long as to break off all -of the most important relationships.</p> - -<p>I desire to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me, -and it shall be my greatest desire to continue in the future to -coöperate in helping to realize those great purposes of national and -international policy which you have so clearly and strongly put before -the American nation and the world.</p> - -<p>In making this communication to you I cannot but refer to recent -developments with respect China. The general outlook is indeed most -discouraging, and it seems impossible to accomplish anything here -at present or until the home governments are willing to face the -situation and to act. It is not difficulties that deter me, and I -should stay at my post if it were necessary and if I did not think -that I could be of more use in the United States than in China at the -present time. But in fact, the situation requires that the American -people should be made to realize what is at stake here for us in -order that they may give the necessary backing to the Government for -support in any action which the developments here may Inquire. Unless -the American people realize this and the Government feels strong -enough to take adequate action, the fruits of one hundred and forty -years of American work in China will inevitably be lost. Our people -will be permitted to exist here only on the sufferance of others, and -the great opportunity which has been held out to us by the Chinese -people to assist in the development of education and free institutions -will be gone beyond recall. In its stead there will come a sinister -situation dominated by the unscrupulous methods of the reactionary -military régime centred in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> Tokyo, absolutist in tendency, cynical of -the principles of free government and human progress. If this force, -with all the methods it is accustomed to apply, remains unopposed -there will be created in the Far East the greatest engine of military -oppression and dominance that the world has yet seen. Nor can we -avoid the conclusion that the brunt of evil results will fall on the -United States, as is already foreshadowed by the bitter hostility and -abnormal vituperativeness of the Japanese press with regard to America.</p> - -<p>The United States and Great Britain will have to stand together in -this matter; I do not think this is realized as fully by Britishers -at home as by those out here. If Russia can become an independent -representative government its interests would parallel ours. The -forces of public opinion and strength which can thus be mobilized are -entirely sufficient to control the situation here and to keep it from -assuming the menacing character which is threatened at present; but -this can only be done if the situation is clearly seen and if it is -realized that the military party of Japan will continue its present -methods and purposes which have proved so successful until it becomes -a dead wall of firm, quiet opposition. There will be a great deal of -talk of friendship for China, of restoration of Shantung, of loyalty -to the League of Nations, but it will be dangerous to accept this and -to stop questioning what are the methods actually applied; as long as -they exist the menace is growing all the time. We cannot rest secure -on treaties nor even on the League of Nations without this checking -up of the facts. Otherwise these instruments would only make the game -a little more complicated but not change its essential character. -The menace can be avoided only if it is made plain to Japan that her -purposes are unmistakable and that the methods utilized to effect -them will by no means be tolerated. Such purposes are the stirring -up of trouble and revolution, encouragement of bandits and pirates, -morphia, financial corruption, misleading of the press, refusal of -just satisfaction when Americans are injured in order to gain prestige -for absolute power, and chief of all official duplicity, such as -the disavowal of knowledge when loans are being made to the Chinese -Government by leading Japanese banks and the subsequent statement by -the Japanese minister that these loans were private arrangements by -"merchants."</p> - -<p>If continuous support could be given not only to the activities of -American merchants but to the constructive forces in Chinese national -life itself these purposes and methods would not have the chance to -flourish and succeed which they now enjoy.</p> - -<p>During the war our action in the support of constructive forces -in China necessarily could not be effective, as our energies were -required elsewhere.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span> Yet I believe that a great opportunity was missed -when China had broken of relations with Germany. The very least -recognition of her sentiments, support and efforts, on our part, would -have changed the entire situation. But while millions upon millions -were paid to the least important of the countries of Europe not a cent -was forthcoming for China. This lack of support drove Tuan and his -followers into the arms of the pro-Japanese agents. Instead of support -we gave China the Lansing-Ishii Note.</p> - -<p>Throughout this period the Japanese game has still been in the stage -of bluff; while Germany seemed at her strongest in the war, indeed the -Japanese were perhaps making their veiled threats with a feeling that -if they should ally themselves with a strong Germany the two would -be invincible; but even at that time a portion of the American navy -detached could have checkmated Japan. Since the complete breakdown of -Germany the case of Japan has been carried through solely on bluff -though perhaps it may be that the Japanese militarists have succeeded -in convincing themselves that their establishment is formidable. But -it is plain that they would be absolutely powerless in the face of a -stoppage of commerce and a navy demonstration on the part of any one -of the great powers. No one desires to think of this contingency, but -it is plain that after the breakdown of Germany it was not feasible -for Japan to use force nor could she have suffered a greater damage -than to exclude herself from the Peace Conference where she had -everything to gain and nothing to lose. In ten years there may be a -very different situation. Then also our people, having grown wise, -will be sure to shout: "Why was not this stopped while there was yet -time?" It seems to me necessary that someone in the Government ought -to give attention primarily to China and the Far Eastern situation. -It is very difficult to get any attention for China. I mean any -continuous attention that results in getting something actually -done. Everything else seems to come first because Europe seems so -much nearer; and yet the destinies of Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, and -Greece are infinitesimal in their importance to the future of America -compared With those of China.</p> - -<p>During my service here I have constantly suffered from this lack of -continuous attention at home to the Far Eastern situation. It has -reacted on the consular service; the interpreter service which is -absolutely necessary to make our consular corps in China effective -has been starved, as no new appointments have been made. In my own -case promises of assistance which had been given repeatedly went -unfulfilled. In this matter I have not the least personal feeling. -I know the result is not due to the personal neglect or ill-will of -any man or group of men, only it seems to me to indicate a general -sentiment of the unimportance of Far Eastern affairs, which ought to -be remedied. I repeat that these statements are not made in a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> spirit -of complaint; all individual members of the Department of State have -shown nothing but consideration and readiness to assist, but there -has been lacking a concentrated interest in China, which ought to be -represented in some one of the high officials, designated to follow -up Far Eastern affairs and accorded influence commensurate with -responsibilities in this matter.</p></blockquote> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXXII" id="CHAPTER_XXXII">CHAPTER XXXII</a></p> - -<p class="center">A NATION STRIKES AND UNITES</p> - - -<p>The students of Peking "started something." For the first time in -thousands of years public opinion was aroused and organized in China. -Through the action of the students, with whom the merchants made common -cause, before and after the Shantung decision, China found herself.</p> - -<p>The Japanese papers insisted steadfastly that these student -disturbances had been brought on at the "instigation of certain -countries." But instigation was not needed. If foreigners had wished -to make trouble in this way, they would have been kept extremely -busy trying to keep pace with the Chinese themselves. You do not -have to instigate a man to resist a pillager who is trying to break -into his house. Those who started this tremendous movement toward -nationalism—for that is what it grew into—were students in the -government schools and in the private schools of Peking and Tientsin. -In the beginning the students were alone in the agitation, but not for -long. Throughout the agitators were referred to as "students," but this -term came to be used in a broad sense; it came to mean Young China, -including all of the youth of the land who had been educated in modern -schools.</p> - -<p>China is the home of the strike and the boycott; but never before -had these weapons been employed on such a scale. The merchants and -students of north China met during the second half of May, declared a -general boycott of Japanese goods, and demanded the dismissal of the -three men called traitors, the notorious agents in the Chino-Japanese -negotiations. The boycott spread rapidly, a spontane<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span>ous expression of -deep resentment. But the movement strove also to control and purify -the action of the Chinese Government. The instrument for this was the -strike—passive resistance—the stopping of the wheels of commerce and -industry till the will of the people was listened to.</p> - -<p>The popular sense of equity, which in China asserts itself naturally -in strikes, responded everywhere. Unless the Government dismissed the -three offenders, merchants would close their shops. Teachers, students, -shopkeepers, chauffeurs, dockhands, all classes of workmen would -strike. All China, indeed, would go on strike.</p> - -<p>The movement gained momentum like an avalanche thundering down a -mountain. Its fury was first of all concentrated on the attempt to -force the dismissal of the three officials who were, in the popular -mind, guilty of trading away the national birthright. The organization -of the uprising seemed to be almost spontaneous. Active little groups, -similar to the Committees of Correspondence in the time of Adams and -Franklin, sprang up in all parts of China. The masses of the people -were marshalled for action. From the ten thousand students who had -originally struck in Shanghai the movement expanded swiftly until it -included merchants and chambers of commerce and dozens of other bodies -in every walk of life. Associations of servants were formed under the -title of The Industrial National Salvation Society. Even Japanese -bankers were put under the ban by the Chinese financiers; finally the -boycott went so far that it blacklisted the foreign goods which were -brought to Chinese ports by Japanese steamers.</p> - -<p>In Peking, fifty groups of student speakers were sent out to appeal -to the public. General Tuan Chi-jui, who, among others, was held -responsible by the students for the nation's troubles, stoutly stood by -his subordinates. The militarists in general, feeling that the student -movement was not favourable to them, prevailed on the Government to try -to suppress<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> it. Martial law was proclaimed, and students trying to -speak were arrested. The students were undaunted and working en masse. -The Government soon saw that it could imprison them, but that it was -powerless to stem the tide of feeling they were creating. Thundering -from all parts of the country, it was recognized that the students -could, if they chose, turn the entire people against the Government. -By June 4th, nearly a thousand students were under forcible detention -in Peking; those recently arrested had wisely provided themselves with -knapsacks stocked with food before taking their lecture trips.</p> - -<p>Then the girl students came forth. They fully shared the patriotic -feelings of their brothers. Seven hundred girls from the Peking schools -assembled and marched to the President's palace to request the release -of the young men under arrest.</p> - -<p>The Government made a technical mistake. When the student feeling -seemed to be a little on the ebb, the Government took occasion to issue -a decree trying to white-wash Tsao Ju-lin and his confederates. That -fanned the flame which ultimately swept all over China.</p> - -<p>Weakening, the Government offered the students release if they would -return to work and make no further trouble. The students saw their -advantage, and stated that they had no wish to leave their prisons, if -it meant promising to abstain from expressing their opinion in future; -moreover, they would not leave until the Government had apologized for -their unjust arrest.</p> - -<p>The jailing of this large number of the youth of China finally -brought such ill-concealed opposition that the Government complied -with the students' ultimatum. An apology was offered them, whereupon -the students returned to their colleges and their work. But they -continued their street lectures, calling upon the people to join in a -powerful expression of national opinion through which their country's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span> -institutions and policies might be put on a sounder basis, and Japanese -aggression powerfully resisted.</p> - -<p>In Shanghai the boycott and the strike of the shopkeepers were in full -force. Their shops were closed, they threatened to pay no taxes unless -the "traitors" were ousted. American officials at Shanghai sent me -alarming reports. The British there, particularly those of the official -class, were inclined to repress the movement.</p> - -<p>The Japanese, who were feeling the full force of the popular thrust, -tried to brand it anti-foreign and to reawaken memories of the Boxer -period. Some of the influential British in Shanghai, frightened by the -successful efforts of the merchants and students among the industrial -workers, began to call them anti-foreign, too. I was told that the -municipal council in Shanghai might take very stringent action against -the boycott and strike. The British minister had gone to the seashore, -and I sent him word that the situation was serious.</p> - -<p>It would have been the height of folly had either we or the British -let ourselves be dragged into the disturbance, which was directed -solely against the Japanese, and was fortunately not our concern, -and in no sense anti-foreign. I sent specific instructions to the -consulate-general at Shanghai advising the American community neither -to encourage nor oppose this movement, which was the affair of the -Chinese. The Americans saw the point clearly, and realized how -undesirable it would be to entangle the municipal council in the -business. I told the Consul-General that, illegal and overt acts -excepted, the foreign authorities in China had nothing to do with the -strike; being happily free of Chinese ill-will, we wished to remain -free. In order to avoid all danger of more general trouble, Americans -exerted considerable influence with the Chinese leaders to cause them -to abstain from action that would tend to involve foreigners generally. -They responded willingly.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span></p> - -<p>By this time even the mafoos (horse boys) at the Shanghai Race Club -were on strike. A run on the Bank of Communications was started because -Tsao Ju-lin was associated with it. More and more serious grew the -situation, but the demand on the Government remained unchanged: "When -the three traitors are dismissed, the strike will be called off; -otherwise, still more people will strike."</p> - -<p>The Government finally yielded on the 11th of June. The insistent -demand had come from all parts of China that the three unpopular -officials go in disgrace. The Peking Government complied. But the great -public in Shanghai was not content until the British minister and I -gave confirmation of the report that the mandate of dismissal had been -issued. Then the strike was off.</p> - -<p>However, the boycott against Japanese goods continued unabated. Yet -it must not be supposed that the movement, which at the beginning was -distinctly turned against Japan, was either essentially anti-Japanese -or purely oppositional and negative. Quite early, its true, positive, -national Chinese character stood revealed. The Japanese had stung the -Chinese national pride to the quick. It turned against them, not in a -spirit of blind hostility, but only in so far as the Japanese stood in -the way of the national Chinese regeneration.</p> - -<p>Out of this unprecedented popular uprising several momentous facts -emerged. First, public opinion must be so awakened that it would be -a continuing force, so organized that it would at all times have the -means of expressing its will, so that it would be able to compel the -Government to resist further encroachments on China's rights. That -would take time; but it could be done, the strike and boycott proved -that. For the first time in her history China had roused herself and -wrung from her government a specific surrender. That lesson sank deep. -The leaders realized that this single act was merely a very small -beginning.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> But the important thing was that it did constitute a -beginning.</p> - -<p>The second important result was the sudden focussing of attention on -the means by which native Chinese industry might be built up. The -boycott of Japanese goods had had a positive as well as a negative -side. Indeed it had been stated positively all along. The people were -not told to refrain from buying Japanese goods; they were advised to -avoid buying goods of an inferior quality—which would be interpreted -to mean Japanese products, of course—and they were pointedly urged to -patronize home industries. The people responded with a will. They did -buy the wares produced by their own factories. It gave great impetus to -the development of Chinese industry, and gave both the manufacturers -and the Government a clue as to what a definite campaign for the -stimulation of the home industries might accomplish.</p> - -<p>While we were talking together informally at a meeting of the -diplomatic corps, the French minister, M. Boppe, remarked: "We are in -the presence of the most astounding and important thing that has ever -happened—the organization of a national public opinion in China for -positive action."</p> - -<p>Thus out of the evil of the Paris decision came an inspiring national -awakening of the Chinese people, a welding together for joint thought -and joint action. All ranks of the population were affected. When -to avoid foreign complications student delegates went among the -workers of a factory in Shanghai to persuade them not to strike, the -workers asked: "Do you think we have no feeling for our country, nor -indignation against the traitors?"</p> - -<p>About the evil of the Shantung decision the foreign communities were -unanimous, nor did they feel that they ought to be silent. They were on -the ground; they knew the inevitable consequences that would follow the -rigid application of the decision. They spoke out. Sir Edward Walker, -chairman of the Commercial Bank of Canada, gave an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> address on June 6th -before the Anglo-American Association of Peking, dealing particularly -with the needs of transportation. What the completion of two or three -trunk lines would mean to China he fully realized. After his address -the British minister and I, who were honorary members, took our leave, -as it had been intimated that the Association would discuss the -Shantung matter. The meeting then adopted a resolution which expressed -the conviction of Americans and British in China in this wise:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>We express our solemn conviction that this decision will create -conditions that must inevitably bring about extreme discord between -the Chinese people and Japan, and raise a most serious hindrance -to the development of the economic interests of China and other -countries. A settlement which perpetuates the conditions created by -Germany's aggression in Shantung in 1898, conditions that led to -similar action on the part of other states, that were contributing -causes to the disorders in North China in 1900, and that made -inevitable the Russo-Japanese war, cannot make for peace in the Far -East, for political stability in China itself, or for development of -trade and commerce equally open to all.</p> - -<p>Further, the evil consequences of conditions which are not only -subversive of the principle of national self-determination, but also -a denial of the policy of the open door and of the principle of -equality of opportunity, will be greatly accentuated if Japan, a near -neighbour, be now substituted for Germany, whose centre of political -and economic activities was on the other side of the globe.</p> - -<p>Therefore we, the members of the Peking Anglo-American Association, -resolve that representations be made to the British and American -Governments urging that the states taking part in the Peace Conference -devise and carry through a just settlement which will not endanger the -safety of China and the peace of the world.</p></blockquote> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="ph2"><a name="CHAPTER_XXXIII" id="CHAPTER_XXXIII">CHAPTER XXXIII</a></p> - -<p class="center">TAKING LEAVE OF PEKING</p> - - -<p>The Government was now confronted with the question of whether its -delegates at Paris should or should not sign the Treaty and Covenant. -The Chinese people were opposed to signing, for with China's signature -would go specific recognition of the transfer of German rights to -Japan. They had learned one great lesson: that to make concessions to -foreign powers never got them out of trouble, but only aggravated it. -If the Peking officials in 1898 had turned a deaf ear to the German -demands, despite threats of naval demonstrations, the Germans could -never have secured the things which the Chinese actually gave them. The -Chinese people now said: "Never again!"</p> - -<p>I was informed on the 28th of May that nearly all the officials in -Peking were agreed that the Treaty should be signed. Knowledge of -their readiness to capitulate brought the national movement of the -Chinese people to its height almost immediately, in opposition to the -reactionary militarist control. By the 1st of July, a gentleman from -the immediate entourage of the President, who often came to see me on -the latter's behalf, told me that the President had instructed the -delegates at Paris not to sign the Treaty. They did not sign it then, -and steadfastly resisted all efforts to make them sign it later.</p> - -<p>When the student troubles were at their height, on the 2nd of June -I was at the Legation late one evening to answer some cablegrams. I -was interrupted by an American woman teacher who with five Chinese -schoolgirls came to my office in a state of great excitement. The girls -had stood<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> with a crowd for forty-eight hours asking admission to the -President's palace to present their grievance. They had endured these -hardships as bravely as any of the young men, but they were now alarmed -because two of the student leaders had been seized and taken inside the -palace. The girls feared their execution, and begged me to intercede. -As I could not quiet their apprehensions, I finally said I would direct -that an inquiry be made at the palace. By telephone I learned that the -students were being detained because they had been too forward in their -demonstrations, but that nothing untoward would happen to them. The -girls, happy and thankful at this reassurance, went home.</p> - -<p>No one could fail to sympathize with the aims and ideals of the -students, who were striving for national freedom and regeneration. I, -too, felt a strong sympathy, though I, of course, abstained from all -direct contact with the movement, as it was a purely Chinese matter. -Nevertheless, the Japanese papers reported quite in detail how I -had organized the student movement, and how I had spent $2,000,000 -in getting it under way. As everybody knew how spontaneous and -irrepressible the movement of the students was, these items excited -only amusement.</p> - -<p>Pessimism reigned among liberal-minded people in early June. They -feared that followers of General Tuan would insist upon putting him -back into the Premiership, in which case there would be no escape from -another revolution to oppose him, with the general demoralization -and waste of national resources which would attend it. The second -<i>aide mémoire</i> of the associated representatives was presented to the -President by Sir John Jordan on the 5th of June; it conveyed the hope -that China's internal difficulties might now come to an end, that -the peace conference at Shanghai might be resumed and successfully -concluded without delay,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span> and it stated that meanwhile military -measures should not be resumed. The friendly advice encouraged the -liberal elements, particularly the express desire that there should -be no further fighting. It was felt that the President's hands were -strengthened for peace.</p> - -<p>Dr. Chiang Monlin, Acting Chancellor of Peking University in the -absence of Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei, went to Shanghai because the militarist -faction wished to hold him responsible for the acts of the students. -He was, indeed, one of their chief counsellors, but he counselled -wisdom and moderation. He told me that the leaders were conscious of -much progress in organizing public opinion, but that at least ten -years of further work and experience would be necessary before there -could be any approach to a public opinion consciously and unceasingly -active in support, or in proper restraint, of the Government. "All we -ask," Doctor Chiang said, "is ten years' time—freedom from outside -interference—then the New China will be organized."</p> - -<p>I visited General Tuan, finding him calm but stubborn as usual. I -asked him whether, if the students should call on him, he would go out -to speak to them. "I would certainly do that," he replied; "I am in -sympathy with them, but I feel that they are often misled by people -whose motives are not disinterested." I told him that I believed the -students would gladly follow him and make him their leader if they -could be assured that he would not be controlled by counsellors who had -not the true welfare of China at heart.</p> - -<p>This movement of the Chinese people impressed me the more vividly in -the light of a letter from R.F. Johnston on July 3rd which led me to -hark back to the days of the old Empire. Mr. Johnston was a tutor of -the young Emperor, and he inclosed a translation of a Chinese poem -which the Emperor had written out for me. It bore the Imperial seals,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span> -and was dated: "Eleventh year of Hsuan Tung, sixth month, fifth day." -Here is the first verse:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The red bows unbent,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Were received and deposited.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">I have here an admirable guest,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And with all my heart I bestow one on him.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The bells and drums have been arranged in order,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">And all the morning will I feast him.</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>Shortly after, in a talk I had with Mr. Johnston, he told me that the -little Emperor had himself conceived the idea of writing something for -me. Johnston had suggested a certain poem but it did not satisfy his -pupil, who finally made his own selection. He said to his tutor: "I -want to imagine that the American minister is coming to the palace as -my guest."</p> - -<p>The young Emperor, Mr. Johnston said, was interested in everything -that went on in the political and social life of the capital, and read -the papers every day. I attributed his interest in my doings to the -fact that the Emperor shared the love for America that is general in -China; but, also, I think the repeated likelihood of being taken to -the American Legation for refuge and shelter had impressed itself very -strongly on his youthful mind, so that it seemed to him a haven of -escape from all terror and danger.</p> - -<p>Reports came at the end of July that President Wilson was defending -the Shantung settlement, by stating that it conferred on Japan no -political rights but only economic privileges. Had Mr. Wilson given -attention to the details of the question, as reported over and over -again in telegrams and dispatches from the Legation and consulates in -China, he could not have harboured such a misunderstanding. In this -instance the President based his action rather on vague assurances -given by Japan, the actual bearing of which he did not know. The term -"economic privileges" can hardly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> apply to such matters as control -of the port of Tsingtao and the Shantung Railway, and to a general -commercial preference in Shantung Province; yet these were plainly what -Japan wished to retain. Her pledge "to return Shantung Peninsula with -full sovereignty" sounded satisfactory, but it was never defined to -cover more than the 150 square miles of agricultural and mountain land -which the Germans had held as a leasehold, exclusive of Tsingtao port. -That important harbour the Japanese intended to retain, as well as the -terminals, railway, and mines.</p> - -<p>The refusal of the Chinese to sign the Paris Treaty afforded an -opportunity for saving Shantung to China. But if the German rights -were to be confirmed to Japan under the term of "economic privileges," -we should soon find that these economic privileges meant an end of -independent American enterprise in Shantung Province. Japan had used -such "economic privileges" in Manchuria. We were amply warned what to -expect from an extension of that policy to other parts of China.</p> - -<p>President Wilson stated later that the League would prevent Japan from -assuming full sovereignty over Shantung. Here he again misunderstood. -Japan had no idea of asking for sovereignty over Shantung; she had -absolutely no right to it, and did not need it for carrying out her -plans, so long as she could retain the politico-economic rights awarded -at Paris.</p> - -<p>I reiterated these statements in my telegrams to Washington. I -explained again that ownership by a foreign government of port -facilities and of a railway leading into the interior of China, -together with exclusive commercial preferences, are economic rights -so fortified politically that they constitute political control—as -Manchuria shows—without the name. In fact, they could be safely -accompanied with most profuse protestations to respect Chinese -sovereignty.</p> - -<p>The question of political sovereignty was beside the mark.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> It had -been broached, as I have pointed out, to make the world believe that -something was being returned. "Returning Shantung Peninsula with full -sovereignty" was a big phrase and it had an imposing sound. But the -sovereignty of Shantung was not involved, it had never been either -German or Japanese: it had always been Chinese. The 150 square miles of -unimportant land outside the port of Tsingtao might be "returned with -full sovereignty," but nobody cared for that. To talk of sovereignty -merely obscured the issue.</p> - -<p>Dr. Sun Yat-sen was just then busying himself with the task of -drawing up projects for the further economic development of China -with international participation, and I corresponded with him. In -one of my letters I considered how rapid and sweeping the industrial -transformation of China should be. I wrote:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>I believe that we should at all times keep in mind the fact that we -are not dealing with a new country, but with one in which social -arrangements are exceedingly intricate and in which a long-tested -system of agricultural and industrial organization exists. It is to -my mind most important that the transition to new methods of industry -and labour should not be sudden but that the old values should be -gradually transmuted. It is highly important that artistic ability, -such as exists, for instance, in silk and porcelain manufacture, -should be maintained and protected, and not superseded by cheaper -processes. The one factor in modern organization which the Chinese -must learn to understand better is the corporation, and the fiduciary -relationship which the officers of the corporation ought to occupy -with respect to the stockholders. If the Chinese cannot learn to use -the corporation properly, the organization of the national credit -cannot be effected. Here, too, it is necessary that the principle of -personal honesty which was fostered under the old system should not -be lost, but transferred to the new methods of doing business. So, -at every point where we are planning for a better and more efficient -organization, it seems necessary to hold on to the values created in -the past, and not to disturb the balance of Chinese society by too -sudden changes.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Among his suggestions for constructive works, Dr. Sun Yat-sen had -spoken of a northern port, somewhere on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span> coast of Chihli Province, -which should have water deep enough to admit large ocean-going -ships. The port of Tientsin is not adequate: it is far up river, -and lacks satisfactory anchorage where the river empties into the -sea. Chinwangtao is a far better port, but so exposed that enormous -expenditure would be needed to improve it; and its capacity, even then, -would be too small. I asked Mr. Paul P. Whitham, special commissioner -of the Department of Commerce, to go to the Chihli coast to see -whether about half way between Tientsin and Chinwangtao a satisfactory -port site might be found. He succeeded in finding a site where, with -comparatively moderate expense, a deep-sea port could be built. It -was easy to see the transformation in north China commerce that this -would bring about. Here would be an outlet for a rich and extensive -hinterland, including the Province of Chihli and all the region to the -north and northwest of it, particularly inner Mongolia and western -Manchuria. I talked the matter over with the civil governor and other -provincial leaders of Chihli Province, also with the representatives -of Governor Li Hsun of Nanking, besides certain members of the Central -Government. They greatly favoured the project, and before many weeks -preliminary surveys were made. It was to be known as the Great Northern -Port.</p> - -<p>I visited Sir John Jordan on August 14th telling him of my resignation, -at which he expressed regret; but he admitted that he could understand -why I wished to return to the United States. He, too, wished to be -relieved of his duties as soon as possible. I had on that day a very -full talk about Shantung with Mr. Yoshizawa, Japanese Chargé, in which -we considered ways which might render the Shantung arrangement more -satisfactory, especially if Tsingtao should be made into a genuine -international settlement. But I emphasized the importance of the return -of the railway.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span></p> - -<p>The negotiations for the new Consortium had been going on for some -time. The Japanese proposed that the Consortium should not apply to -Manchuria and eastern Mongolia. The Japanese-controlled press had -attacked the first proposal of this Consortium, as Japan purposed -during the war to achieve complete leadership of foreign finance in -China. If the United States would join the <i>old</i> Consortium, Japan -would have been pleased, for there she led. But ordinarily the -financial power of Japan is of distinctly secondary importance, and the -abnormal conditions of the war could not last. Now Japan approved of -the new Consortium in principle, but continued to procrastinate when a -decision on details was required.</p> - -<p>My resignation was accepted in a cablegram received on the 18th of -August, the President expressing formally his regret that I should find -it necessary to insist upon relinquishing my post. Even now, when I -knew how decidedly the President had misjudged the Chinese situation, -notwithstanding my insistent and detailed warnings, I had no desire -to advertise differences in policy. The Japanese press, I knew, would -consider my resignation due to the defeat of my "policy" to have -America maintain her honourable and trusted position in China. I did -not wish to favour this sort of interpretation by a controversy with -the administration.</p> - -<p>The Chinese understood the situation quite completely. When I told -the President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Premier, and -non-official Chinese friends, they seemed discouraged at the prospect -of my leaving China at this juncture. I had the good fortune to make -many friendships in China with men whose loyalty and truthfulness could -be relied upon. Though seemingly distressed at the idea of my going, -they knew I only hoped it might enable the work of developing close -relations between the two countries to continue more effectively. I -wished to bring about positive practical action. The spirit of the -American policies and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> declarations was admirable, but not enough -individual and specific American activity in China accompanied them.</p> - -<p>Mr. Fu, Acting Minister of Education, and a number of his associates -visited me on the 25th of August, to consider arrangements for exchange -professorships in American and Chinese universities. I had always -favoured bringing young Chinese scholars into lectureships in American -universities, to make accessible to the American public the treasures -of Chinese literature, philosophy, and art. President Yuan Shih-kai had -supported this idea, and, but for the unfortunate monarchical movement, -would have done much to promote intellectual contact between the United -States and China. His successors shared his sentiments, and only the -turmoil in Peking's political life prevented their working out plans in -detail.</p> - -<p>General Hsu Shu-cheng called on me from time to time and told me about -his Mongolian venture. When the War Participation Bureau became plainly -obsolete its name was changed to "Northwest Frontier Defence Bureau." -Everybody knew against whom this Bureau was to "defend" China, though -there was talk about Bolshevik activity in Mongolia, also of the -designs of General Semenoff to create a Pan-Mongolian state. General -Hsu unfolded in his talks with me very large schemes for developing -Mongolia, including a colonial bank, the building of highways for -motor transport, the digging of artesian wells, and the establishment -of model farms. He would, he said, also promote the completion of -the railway from Kalgan to Urga, and would even extend it to Chinese -Turkestan. Report had it that the Japanese had promised General Hsu -an advance of $50,000,000 for his enterprises. But he told me that he -would carry them out with capital entirely subscribed in China. The -President and other Peking leaders, it was said, apprehensive of the -direction the overflowing energies of General Hsu<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> might take next, -bethought themselves of the undeveloped reaches of Mongolia. There -would be the field ample enough for his ebullient nature. All this -time the Japanese were carefully watching any factor that might become -active in Mongolia, including General Semenoff, General Chang Tso-lin, -the Viceroy of Manchuria, and General Hsu Shu-cheng. Whatever might -happen there, they undoubtedly intended that it should fit in with -their policy of imposing their influence upon that dependency.</p> - -<p>Mrs. Reinsch and my family had sailed from Chinwangtao on the 12th -of June for Honolulu, where they were to spend the summer. As my -resignation had already gone forward, it was a farewell to Peking for -Mrs. Reinsch, who was reluctant to leave the city which she had enjoyed -so much. A series of farewell luncheons, dinners, and receptions began -for me in August which, with the heavy work of winding up the business -of my office, filled the remaining weeks with activity every day from -sunrise until after midnight. When President Hsu Shih-chang entertained -me for the last time, he said: "The Chinese look to you to be a friend -and guide to them, and we hope your action and influence may continue -for many decades." On the next day he invited me, through Mr. Chow -Tsu-chi, to act as counsellor to the Chinese Government, with residence -in America.</p> - -<p>I left Peking on the evening of September 13th. All my colleagues with -members of their staffs, the high Chinese officials, and a throng of -other people, had gathered at the station to say "good-bye." Drawn up -on the platform were companies of the American marines, the Indian -troops of the British Legation Guard, and Chinese troops. With the -Acting Premier, Mr. Kung Shin-Chan, I inspected them, accepted their -salute, and made a few farewell remarks to the faithful marines. As -the American band played "Auld Lang Syne," the train moved out of the -station, and the thousands of faces of those who had come to see me -off<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> became blurred in the distance, leaving impressed on my mind a -composite face, friendly, eager, urging to endeavour.</p> - -<p>My friend, Chow Tsu-chi, accompanied me as far as Tientsin where -I parted with him. It had, all in all, been a truly heart-warming -leave-taking. I felt that the spontaneous expressions of deep -confidence both on the part of my countrymen and of the Chinese would -remain with me as the best reward for any exertions and efforts I had -made.</p> - -<p>Dr. Charles D. Tenney, American Chargé d'Affaires after my departure, -wrote the following report to the Secretary of State concerning the -farewell hospitalities:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>I have the honour to state that the departure from Peking of the -Honourable Paul S. Reinsch, American Minister to China, whose -resignation has been accepted by the President, was made the occasion -of gratifying manifestations of cordiality toward the United States -and of the highest popular and official esteem for the retiring -Minister.</p> - -<p>Mr. Reinsch was naturally the guest of honour at numerous dinners -and receptions in the period just preceding his departure, at which -the Chinese present expressed the deepest appreciation of his -diversified activities during the six years of his tenure of office. -Published references to Mr. Reinsch's career as American Minister, -also, refer to his many-sided interest in and efforts to promote the -joint commercial, industrial, and educational interests of China -and the United States, in addition to the usual duty of fostering -international unity between the two nations. It was made strikingly -evident that the Government and people of this Republic have come -earnestly to desire and expect a policy of vigorous advancement of -these interests by the United States in China. The feeling of all was -epitomized by President Hsu Shih-chang, who, at Mr. Reinsch's farewell -interview, asserted his profound belief that the latter's activities -as Minister had advanced and strengthened in a very real way all -those economic and social relations that to-day bind the governments -and peoples of China and the United States in close friendship, at -the same time expressing his hope that on his return to the United -States Mr. Reinsch would abate none of his efforts toward these ends, -but that in his altered capacity he would continue to work in the -interests of China.</p> - -<p>Mr. Reinsch left Peking on the evening of the thirteenth instant and -the scene at the railway station was of an unusual and gratifying -description. Although it is not customary for guards of honour to -be tendered by other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> legations on the departure of ministers, -on this occasion there was present a detachment from the British -Legation Guard, and there were also present detachments from the -American Legation Guard, the Peking police force and the Peking -gendarmerie, with military music. The Acting Premier came in person -to the station to bid farewell to Mr. Reinsch and there were present -a thousand persons, including Chinese officials, foreign diplomats, -representatives of all varieties of institutions and societies, and -personal friends of all nationalities.</p></blockquote> - -<p>I had turned over arrangements for my trip through Japan to Mr. Willing -Spencer, the First Secretary, who had consulted with Mr. Tokugawa, -of the Japanese Legation. Their main difficulty had been the fact -that Korea was under quarantine because of the cholera. An amusing -experience ensued. In order to avoid any risk of delay I agreed to be -inoculated; this was done deferentially by a little physician who came -from the Japanese Legation. At Shimonoseki our steamer arrived in the -early morning, and was held in quarantine. The inspecting officers who -boarded said I should be permitted to land almost immediately. However, -they left and said a launch would be sent for me before noon. As the -evening train would be the last that could make my connection with the -steamer at Yokohama, I waited somewhat nervously for the launch. It -was three o'clock before the officers returned, saying that my baggage -could now be taken ashore; soon they disappeared with the baggage, but -left me still on the boat. I wired the embassy at Tokyo, telling them -of my predicament. The train was to leave at half-past seven, and no -launch had appeared at six.</p> - -<p>Suddenly out of the evening mist covering the bay a little launch -emerged, and an official I had not seen before boarded and asked me -to accompany him. Descending to the launch with my two servants, I -was surprised to notice that it did not head toward Shimonoseki, but -took the opposite direction. I remonstrated, but the officer, smiling -reassuringly, said: "It will be all right." Then the two inspecting -officers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> appeared from below; smiling and bowing they told me we were -going to the Isolation Hospital!</p> - -<p>And to the Isolation Hospital we went. There in the central reception -room I was introduced to the chief, who, after a brief exchange of -civilities, announced, "Now, everything is all right."</p> - -<p>We took the launch, and arrived at Shimonoseki with still a quarter -of an hour to spare before the train departed, whereon a special -compartment had been reserved for me. Everything was now clear. The -Japanese passengers on the steamer were as little pleased at being -detained there as I was. Had a foreigner, even a foreign minister, been -taken off the ship to Shimonoseki, a small riot might be looked for. -So the word was passed around that I was being taken to the Isolation -Hospital, where nobody had any particular wish to go. I could not but -admire the resourcefulness of these little officials, and to feel -thankful to them for all the trouble they took to solve this knotty -problem without doing violence to any of their quarantine regulations.</p> - -<p>I had only one day in Tokyo. A luncheon had been arranged for me -at the house of Baron Okura, where I went with Ambassador Morris -and met several Japanese gentlemen, among them Mr. Hanihara, just -made Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Baron Shidehara, the new -Ambassador to the United States. We took lunch on an open veranda, -overlooking delightful gardens, and after an animated conversation -I took my leave and hurried to Yokohama, with the same agreeable -impression of Japanese hospitality that I had received six years -before, on my first arrival in the Far East.</p> - - -<p class="center">THE END</p> - - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span></p> -<p class="ph2"><a name="INDEX" id="INDEX">INDEX</a></p> - - -<p> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Abbott, John J., <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Adams, Dr. Henry C., <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Administrative Conference, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Advice from America, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Advisers, Foreign, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Aglen, Sir Francis, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Aide mémoire of December 2, 1918, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Alston, Mr., <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American activity, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American aims in China, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American Chamber of Commerce, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American coöperation, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American enterprise in China, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, -<a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American International Corporation, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American Legation, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American Marines, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American minister, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American Red Cross, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American University Club, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">American-French coöperation, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ancestor worship, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Anderson, Meyer & Co., <a href="#Page_208">208</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Anderson, Roy S., <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Anfu Club, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Anglo-American Association, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Anglo-American friendship, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Anglo-Japanese Alliance, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Anhui Party, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Anti-foreign propaganda, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Aoki, General, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ariga, Professor, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Armistice, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Arms, Importation of, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Army, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Arnold, Julean, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Arsenals, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Associated Press, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Authority, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Automobiles, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Backhouse, Edward, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bain, Dr. F., <a href="#Page_224">224</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Baker, J.E., <a href="#Page_329">329</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bandits, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bank of China, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bank of Communications, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Banking, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bashford, Bishop, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Battle of Peking, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Beelaerts, van Blokland, M., <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Belin, F.L., <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bemis, E.W., <a href="#Page_223">223</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bethlehem Steel Corporation, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bevan, Professor, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Billings, Dr. Frank, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Bite to death," <a href="#Page_110">110</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Blood of enemies, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Blythe, Sam L., <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Boardman, Miss, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bolshevism, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Botanical Gardens, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bowley, Major, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Boxer indemnity payments, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bredon, Sir Robert, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Brigands, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">British Legation, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">British minister, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">British-American Tobacco Company, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bryan, Secretary, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Business representatives, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Buttrick, Dr., <a href="#Page_150">150</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Calhoun, W.J., <a href="#Page_161">161</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Carey, W.F., <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Government, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chadbourne, Mrs., <a href="#Page_235">235</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chang Chien, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chang Chin-yao, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chang Chung-hsiang, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chang Hsun, General, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chang Hu, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chang Tso-lin, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chen Chin-tao, Dr., <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chen, Eugene, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chen Huan-chang, Dr., <a href="#Page_23">23</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chen Lu, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chen Pan-ping, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chiang, Dr. Monlin, <a href="#Page_377">377</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chien Neng-hsun, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chienmen, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chin Pu Tang, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chin Yun-peng, General, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">China Medical Board, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">China Press, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinchow-Aigun Railway, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinda, Ambassador, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese art, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese dinners, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese ethics, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese life, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese handwriting, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese industry, <a href="#Page_373">373</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese iron industry, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese language, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese manners, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese <i>materia medica</i>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese musicians, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese navy, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese politics, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese Social and Political Science Association, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese traditions, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese women, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chino-American Bank, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chino-American steamship line, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chino-Japanese entente, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinwangtao, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chou Hsueh-hsi, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chow Tsu-chi, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, -<a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chu Chi-chien, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chu Jui, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chu Ying-kuang, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chuan Liang, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chuchow Chinchow Railway, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chüfu, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chung Hua Hsin Pao, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Claims, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Coal Hill, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Communications, Ministry of, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Confucian family, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Confucian Society, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Confucianism, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Consortium, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Constitution, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Continental & Commercial Bank loan, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Coolidge, Charles A., <a href="#Page_320">320</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Corruption, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Crane, Charles R., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Currency loan, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Currency loan agreement, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Currency reform loan, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Customs, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Dane, Sir Richard, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Davis, Arthur P., <a href="#Page_82">82</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Decoration Day, <a href="#Page_362">362</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Deering, Mrs., <a href="#Page_362">362</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Democratic party, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Denby, Charles, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Denials, diplomatic, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Dennis, Dr. W.C., <a href="#Page_329">329</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Department of State, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Diplomacy and commerce, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Diplomatic corps in Peking, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Diplomatic tactics, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Disorganization, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Donald, W.H., <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Dragon flags, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Economic development, <a href="#Page_380">380</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Eliot, President, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Emerson, Miss, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Emperor, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Empress Dowager, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Equal opportunity, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Extra-territoriality, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Famine, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Fan Yuen-lin, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Farewell, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Feng Kuo-chang, General, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, -<a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Feng Yu-hsiang, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ferguson, Dr. John C., <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Festivities, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Fifteenth United States Infantry, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Finance, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Finch, John W., <a href="#Page_224">224</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Fleisher, B.W., <a href="#Page_159">159</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Flexner, Dr. Simon, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Forbidden City, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Foreign Office ball, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Frazar, E.W., <a href="#Page_163">163</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Frazar & Company, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">French interests, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">French minister, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Fu Liang-tso, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Fukien, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Gailey, Robert, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Gary, Judge Elbert H., <a href="#Page_230">230</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Gattrell, Dr., <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Gest, G.M., <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Gilbert, Mrs., <a href="#Page_12">12</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Gold-note scheme, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Goodnow, Dr. F.J., <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Grand Canal, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Grant, Ulysses S., Jr., <a href="#Page_185">185</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Great northern port, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Group V demands, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Guthrie, Ambassador, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Han Yeh Ping Co., <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hanihara, Mr., <a href="#Page_387">387</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hankow-Canton line, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Harrison, Governor-General, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hayashi, Baron, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Haxthausen, Von, Baron, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Herrera de Huerta, M., <a href="#Page_233">233</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hicks claim, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hilfsaktion, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hintze, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hioki, Mr. Eki, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ho, J.C., <a href="#Page_295">295</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Holcombe, Lieut.-Colonel, <a href="#Page_362">362</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Holy Duke, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Honorary LL.D., <a href="#Page_157">157</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hornbeck, Dr. Stanley K., <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">House, Colonel, <a href="#Page_360">360</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hsiung Hsi-ling, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hsu Shih-chang, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, -<a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hsu Shih-ying, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hsu Shu-cheng, General, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hsu Sing-loh, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hsu Un-yuen, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hukuang Railways, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hunan, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hutchins, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hwai River conservancy, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Immortality, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Imperial City, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Imperial Family, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Imperial movement of Yuan Shih-kai, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>-179</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Imperial Palace, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Imperial restoration, 1917, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Industrial Bank, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Industrial Bank of Japan, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Industrial loans, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">International Banking Corporation, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">International railway syndicate, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Iron deposits, <a href="#Page_224">224</a> -</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Japan Mail</i>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese activity, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese coöperation, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese diplomats, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese hegemony, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese in Manchuria, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese in Shantung, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese loan, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese methods, <a href="#Page_335">335</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese minister, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese morphia, <a href="#Page_332">332</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese opposition to Yuan, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese papers, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Japanese post offices, <a href="#Page_332">332</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Jeme Tien-yew, Dr., <a href="#Page_210">210</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Jenks-Conant Monetary Commission, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Jernigan, T.R., <a href="#Page_89">89</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Johnston, Archibald, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Johnston, R.F., <a href="#Page_377">377</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Jordan, Sir John, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Journal de Pekin</i>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Judson, President, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kalgan-Urga route, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kang Yu-wei, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kiang, General, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">King Ya-mei, Dr., <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Knight, Admiral, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Knox, Secretary, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kobayashi, Dr., <a href="#Page_299">299</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kolchak, Admiral, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Konovalov, M., <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Koo, Dr. Wellington, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Korea, <a href="#Page_332">332</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Koudacheff, Prince, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Krupenski, M., <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ku Chung-hsiu, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kuangsi, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kuangtung, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kung Shin-chan, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kuo Min Tang, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kyle, Mr., <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lama priests, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lansing, Secretary, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lansing Ishii Notes, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_366">366</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lee Higginson loan, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Legal talent, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Legation guards, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Legation Quarter, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Li Ching-hsi, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Li Ho-chi, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Li Shun, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Li Yuan-hung, General, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, -<a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Liang Chi-chao, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Liang Chi-chao, resignation of, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Liang Shih-yi, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, -<a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Liang Tun-yen, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Library, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Liggett, General, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Living Buddha, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Liu, Civil Governor, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Loans, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Localized privileges, <a href="#Page_337">337</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">London <i>Times</i>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lowry, Dr., <a href="#Page_156">156</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lu Tsung-hsiang, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lu Tsung-yu, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Lusitania</i>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ma Liang, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">MacMurray, J.V.A., <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mailed fist, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Manchuria, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Martel, Count, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Martin, Dr. W.A.P., <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mayers, Sidney, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mazot, M., <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">McClatchey, C.K., <a href="#Page_159">159</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mead, Professor D.W., <a href="#Page_82">82</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Medical missions, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Midzuno, Mr., <a href="#Page_82">82</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Militarists, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Missionaries, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mongolia, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Moratorium, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Morris, Ambassador, <a href="#Page_387">387</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Morrison, Dr. George E., <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, -<a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Morton, Joy, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Murdock, Mr. Victor, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Music, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nan Tung-chow, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nanking, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nanking Road, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Naval base, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Neville, Colonel Wendell C., <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">New China, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">New Year, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Newell, Major, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">News from abroad, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">News service, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Newspapers, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ni Tze-chung, General, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nishihara, Mr., <a href="#Page_353">353</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Nobility, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Norris, Bishop, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">North China <i>Daily News</i>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Note of May 13, 1915, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Obata Mr., <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Oil Development Bureau, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Okuma, Count, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Open Door policy, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Orphans strike, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Ostasiatische Lloyd</i>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ostrougoff, Mr., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Padoux, M., <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Pan Fu, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Paris, Chinese delegation at, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Parliament, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Pastor, Don Luis, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Paulding & Company, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peace Planning Society, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peace Conference, <a href="#Page_360">360</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peace Conference at Shanghai, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peck, Willys R., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peitaiho, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peking, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peking, city walls of, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peking <i>Gazette</i>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peking Language School, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peking tramways, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peking University, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Peking-Kalgan Railway, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Pelliot, Paul, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">People's Convention, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Pettus, W.B., <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Political discussions, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Pott, Dr. Hawks, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Prisoners in Siberia, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Progressive party, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Provisional Constitution of 1912, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Pu Lun, Prince, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Putnam Weale, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Quo Tai-chi, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Railway contract, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Railway guards, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Railway unification, <a href="#Page_329">329</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Randolph, W., <a href="#Page_98">98</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Rank in seating, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Rank of precedence, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Real property value, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Recognition, question of, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Regional understanding," <a href="#Page_328">328</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Reinsch, Mrs., <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Reorganization Loan, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Republicanism, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Resignation, A Chinese, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Resignation, letter of, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Resources, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Revolutionists, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Roads, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Rockhill, W.W., <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Rogers, Walter, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Rosthorn, von, M., <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Russia and Siberia, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Russian ambassador at Tokyo, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Russo-Asiatic Bank, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Russo-Japanese entente, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Salt Revenue, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sakatani, Baron, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sarajevo, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Saturday Lunch Club, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Savings banks, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Secret agreements, <a href="#Page_361">361</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sforza, Count, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Shanghai, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Shansi Bankers' Guild, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Shantung, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, -<a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Shantung railway, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sheng Hsuan-huai, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Shidehara, Baron, <a href="#Page_387">387</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Shimonoseki, <a href="#Page_386">386</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Shun Tien Shih Pao, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sibert, Colonel, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Siems-Carey Company, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Simpson, B. Lenox, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sinologists, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Smith, Dr. Arthur H., <a href="#Page_50">50</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Smith, Charles Stevenson, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Social life, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Southern party, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Special interests, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Spencer, Willing, <a href="#Page_386">386</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Spheres of interest, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Spiritualism, Dr. Wu, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">St. John's University, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Staël-Holstein, Baron, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Standard Oil Company, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Statement of 5th of June, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Stevens, John F., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Stewart, Dr. M.A., <a href="#Page_233">233</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Stone, Dr. Mary, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Straight, Williard, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Strike and boycott, <a href="#Page_372">372</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Strikes, <a href="#Page_369">369</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Student movement, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sun Hung-yi, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sun Pao-chi, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sun, T.C., <a href="#Page_295">295</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sun Yat-sen, Dr., <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Surplus salt revenue, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sze, Alfred, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Szechuan, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Taft, President, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Taishan, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tanaka, General, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tang Shao-yi, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tartar City Wall, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Taxation, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Telephone and telegraph agreement, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Temple of Confucius, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Temple of Heaven, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tenney, Dr. Charles D., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Terauchi, General, <a href="#Page_353">353</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Thanksgiving, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tien Chung-yu, Tuchun, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tientsin, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tobacco and wine revenue, <a href="#Page_353">353</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tobacco and wine tax, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tokugawa, Mr., <a href="#Page_386">386</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tokutomi, Mr., <a href="#Page_303">303</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Troops, foreign, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tsai, Duke, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tsai Ao, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tsai Chu-tung, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tsai Ting-kan, Admiral, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tsai, Dr. Yuan-pei, <a href="#Page_377">377</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tsao Ju-lin, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, -<a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tsao Kun, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tsing Hua College, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tsur, Dr. T.T., <a href="#Page_112">112</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tuchuns, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tuan Chi-Jui, General, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, -<a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, -<a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Twenty-one demands, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ultimatum, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Versailles Conference, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Walker, Sir Edward, <a href="#Page_373">373</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wang, Dr. C.C., <a href="#Page_112">112</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wang Chung-hui, Dr., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wang, C.T., <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wang Shih-chen, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">War Participation Office, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">War Works Drive, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Weil, Miss, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Welch, Dr. George A., <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Western Hills, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">White, Corporation, J.G., <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">White Wolf, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Whitham, W.P., <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Williams, E.T., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Willoughby, Dr. W.F., <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Willoughby, Dr. W.W., <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wilson, President, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, -<a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Winterhalter, Admiral, <a href="#Page_237">237</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wireless telegraph, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wu Fu Ssu, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Women's Medical College, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Worship of heaven, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wu Pei-fu, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wu, C.C., <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wu Ting-fang, Dr., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Y.M.C.A., <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yamaza, Mr., <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yang Shih-chi, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yangtse, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yangtse Valley, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yeh Kung-cho, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yen Fu, Dr., <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yen, Mr. Hawkling L., <a href="#Page_185">185</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yen Hsi-shan, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yen, Dr. W.W., <a href="#Page_10">10</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yi Shih Pao, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ying Chang, General, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yin Chang-heng, General, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yokohama Specie Bank, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yoshizawa, Mr., <a href="#Page_381">381</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Young China, <a href="#Page_368">368</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yuan, Madame, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yuan Ko-ting, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yuan Shih-kai, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, -<a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, -<a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Yunnan, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></span><br /> -</p> - - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's An American Diplomat in China, by Paul S. 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