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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c304965 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #55108 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/55108) diff --git a/old/55108-0.txt b/old/55108-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 6ef60f0..0000000 --- a/old/55108-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15450 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Logic of Hegel, by G. W. F. Hegel - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Logic of Hegel - -Author: G. W. F. Hegel - -Contributor: William Wallace - -Translator: William Wallace - -Release Date: July 13, 2017 [EBook #55108] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LOGIC OF HEGEL *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational materials,...) -Images generously made available by the Hathi Trust. - - - - - -THE LOGIC OF HEGEL - -_TRANSLATED FROM_ - -_THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE -PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES_ - -WILLIAM WALLACE, M.A, LL.D. - -FELLOW OF MERTON COLLEGE -AND WHYTE'S PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY -IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD - -SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND AUGMENTED - -OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS - -1892 - - - - -NOTE - - -The present volume contains a translation, which has been revised -throughout and compared with the original, of the Logic as given in the -first part of Hegel's _Encyclopaedia,_ preceded by a bibliographical -account of the three editions and extracts from the prefaces of that -work, and followed by notes and illustrations of a philological rather -than a philosophical character on the text. This introductory chapter -and these notes were not included in the previous edition. - -The volume containing my Prolegomena is under revision and will be -issued shortly. - - W. W. - - - - -CONTENTS - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE ON THE THREE EDITIONS AND THREE PREFACES OF THE -ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES - -_THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC._ - - - CHAPTER I. - INTRODUCTION - - CHAPTER II. - PRELIMINARY NOTION - - CHAPTER III. - FIRST ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY - - CHAPTER IV. - SECOND ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY: - I. _Empiricism_ - II. _The Critical Philosophy_ - - CHAPTER V. - THIRD ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY:-- - _Immediate or Intuitive Knowledge_ - - CHAPTER VI. - LOGIC FURTHER DEFINED AND DIVIDED - - CHAPTER VII. - FIRST SUBDIVISION OF LOGIC:--_The Doctrine of Being_ - - CHAPTER VIII. - SECOND SUBDIVISION OF LOGIC:--_The Doctrine of Essence_ - - CHAPTER IX. - THIRD SUBDIVISION OF LOGIC:--_The Doctrine of the Notion_ - - NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. - - - ON CHAPTER - I - II - III - IV - V - VI - VII - VIII - IX - - - - - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE - - -ON THE THREE EDITIONS AND THREE PREFACES OF THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA - - -THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES IN OUTLINE is the third -in time of the four works which Hegel published. It was preceded by -the _Phenomenology of Spirit,_ in 1807, and the _Science of Logic_ (in -two volumes), in 1812-16, and was followed by the _Outlines of the -Philosophy of Law_ in 1820. The only other works which came directly -from his hand are a few essays, addresses, and reviews. The earliest -of these appeared in the _Critical Journal of Philosophy,_ issued by -his friend Schelling and himself, in 1802--when Hegel was one and -thirty, which, as Bacon thought, 'is a great deal of sand in the -hour-glass'; and the latest were his contributions to the _Jahrbücher -für wissenschaftliche Kritik,_ in the year of his death (1831). - -This _Encyclopaedia_ is the only complete, matured, and authentic -statement of Hegel's philosophical system. But, as the title-page -bears, it is only an outline; and its primary aim is to supply a manual -for the guidance of his students. In its mode of exposition the free -flight of speculation is subordinated to the needs of the professorial -class-room. Pegasus is put in harness. Paragraphs concise in form and -saturated with meaning postulate and presuppose the presiding spirit -of the lecturer to fuse them into continuity and raise them to higher -lucidity. Yet in two directions the works of Hegel furnish a supplement -to the defects of the _Encyclopaedia._ - -One of these aids to comprehension is the _Phenomenology of Spirit,_ -published in his thirty-seventh year. It may be going too far to say -with David Strauss that it is the Alpha and Omega of Hegel, and his -later writings only extracts from it.[1] Yet here the Pegasus of mind -soars free through untrodden fields of air, and tastes the joys of -first love and the pride of fresh discovery in the quest for truth. The -fire of young enthusiasm has not yet been forced to hide itself and -smoulder away in apparent calm. The mood is Olympian--far above the -turmoil and bitterness of lower earth, free from the bursts of temper -which emerge later, when the thinker has to mingle in the fray and -endure the shafts of controversy. But the _Phenomenology,_ if not less -than the _Encyclopaedia_ it contains the diamond purity of Hegelianism, -is a key which needs consummate patience and skill to use with -advantage. If it commands a larger view, it demands a stronger wing of -him who would join its voyage through the atmosphere of thought up to -its purest empyrean. It may be the royal road to the Idea, but only a -kingly soul can retrace its course. - -The other commentary on the _Encyclopaedia_ is supplied partly by -Hegel's other published writings, and partly by the volumes (IX-XV in -the Collected works) in which his editors have given his Lectures on -the Philosophy of History, on Aesthetic, on the Philosophy of Religion, -and on the History of Philosophy. All of these lectures, as well as -the _Philosophy of Law,_ published by himself, deal however only with -the third part of the philosophic system. That system (p. 28) includes -(i) Logic, (ii) Philosophy of Nature, and (iii) Philosophy of Spirit. -It is this third part--or rather it is the last two divisions therein -(embracing the great general interests of humanity, such as law and -morals, religion and art, as well as the development of philosophy -itself) which form the topics of Hegel s most expanded teaching. It -is in this region that he has most appealed to the liberal culture of -the century, and influenced (directly or by reaction) the progress of -that philosophical history and historical philosophy of which our own -generation is reaping the fast-accumulating fruit. If one may foist -such a category into systematic philosophy, we may say that the study -of the 'Objective' and 'Absolute Spirit' is the most _interesting_ part -of Hegel. - -Of the second part of the system there is less to be said. For nearly -half a century the study of nature has passed almost completely out -of the hands of the philosophers into the care of the specialists of -science. There are signs indeed everywhere--and among others Helmholtz -has lately reminded us--that the higher order of scientific students -are ever and anon driven by the very logic of their subject into the -precincts or the borders of philosophy. But the name of a Philosophy -of Nature still recalls a time of hasty enthusiasms and over-grasping -ambition of thought which, in its eagerness to understand the mystery -of the universe jumped to conclusions on insufficient grounds, trusted -to bold but fantastic analogies, and lavished an unwise contempt on the -plodding industry of the mere hodman of facts and experiments. Calmer -retrospection will perhaps modify this verdict, and sift the various -contributions (towards a philosophical unity of the sciences) which -are now indiscriminately damned by the title of _Naturphilosophie._ -For the present purpose it need only be said that, for the second -part of the Hegelian system, we are restricted for explanations -to the notes collected by the editors of Vol. VII. part i. of the -Collected works--notes derived from the annotations which Hegel himself -supplied in the eight or more courses of lectures which he gave on the -Philosophy of Nature between 1804 and 1830. - -Quite other is the case with the Logic--the first division of the -_Encyclopaedia._ There we have the collateral authority of the -'Science of Logic,' the larger Logic which appeared whilst Hegel was -schoolmaster at Nürnberg. The idea of a new Logic formed the natural -sequel to the publication of the _Phenomenology_ in 1807. In that -year Hegel was glad to accept, as a stop-gap and pot-boiler, the post -of editor of the Bamberg Journal. But his interests lay in other -directions, and the circumstances of the time and country helped to -determine their special form. 'In Bavaria,' he says in a letter[2], -'it looks as if organisation were the current business.' A very mania -of reform, says another, prevailed. Hegel's friend and fellow-Swabian, -Niethammer, held an important position in the Bavarian education -office, and wished to employ the philosopher in the work of carrying -out his plans of re-organising the higher education of the Protestant -subjects of the crown. He asked if Hegel would write a logic for school -use, and if he cared to become rector of a grammar school. Hegel, who -was already at work on his larger Logic, was only half-attracted by -the suggestion. 'The traditional Logic,' he replied[3], 'is a subject -on which there are text-books enough, but at the same time it is one -which can by no means remain as it is: it is a thing nobody can make -anything of: 'tis dragged along like an old heirloom, only because -a substitute--of which the want is universally felt--is not yet in -existence. The whole of its rules, still current, might be written -on two pages: every additional detail beyond these two is perfectly -fruitless scholastic subtlety;--or if this logic is to get a thicker -body, its expansion must come from psychological paltrinesses,' Still -less did he like the prospect of instructing in theology, as then -rationalised. 'To write a logic and to be theological instructor is as -bad as to be white-washer and chimney-sweep at once.' 'Shall he, who -for many long years built his eyry on the wild rock beside the eagle -and learned to breathe the free air of the mountains, now learn to feed -on the carcases of dead thoughts or the still-born thoughts of the -moderns, and vegetate in the leaden air of mere babble[4]?' - -At Nürnberg he found the post of rector of the 'gymnasium' by no -means a sinecure. The school had to be made amid much lack of funds -and general bankruptcy of apparatus:--all because of an all-powerful -and unalterable destiny which is called the course of business.' One -of his tasks was 'by graduated exercises to introduce his pupils to -speculative thought,'--and that in the space of four hours weekly[5]. -Of its practicability--and especially with himself as instrument--he -had grave doubts. In theory, he held that an intelligent study of -the ancient classics was the best introduction to philosophy; and -practically he preferred starting his pupils with the principles -of law, morality and religion, and reserving the logic and higher -philosophy for the highest class. Meanwhile he continued to work on -his great Logic, the first volume of which appeared in two parts, 1812, -1813, and the second in 1816. - -This is the work which is the real foundation of the Hegelian -philosophy. Its aim is the systematic reorganisation of the -commonwealth of thought. It gives not a criticism, like Kant; not -a principle, like Fichte; not a bird's eye view of the fields of -nature and history, like Schelling; it attempts the hard work of -re-constructing, step by step, into totality the fragments of the -organism of intelligence. It is scholasticism, if scholasticism means -an absolute and all-embracing system; but it is a protest against -the old school-system and those who tried to rehabilitate it through -their comprehensions of the Kantian theory. Apropos of the logic of -his contemporary Fries (whom he did not love), published in 1811, he -remarks: 'His paragraphs are mindless, quite shallow, bald, trivial; -the explanatory notes are the dirty linen of the professorial chair, -utterly slack and unconnected.'[6] Of himself he thus speaks: 'I am -a schoolmaster who has to teach philosophy,--who, possibly for that -reason, believes that philosophy like geometry is teachable, and -must no less than geometry have a regular structure. But again, a -knowledge of the facts in geometry and philosophy is one thing, and the -mathematical or philosophical talent which procreates and discovers is -another: my province is to discover that scientific form, or to aid -in the formation of it[7].' So he writes to an old college friend; -and in a letter to the rationalist theologian Paulus, in 1814[8], he -professes: 'You know that I have had too much to do not merely with -ancient literature, but even with mathematics, latterly with the higher -analysis, differential calculus, chemistry, to let myself be taken in -by the humbug of Naturphilosophie, philosophising without knowledge of -fact and by mere force of imagination, and treating mere fancies, even -imbecile fancies, as Ideas.' - -In the autumn of 1816 Hegel became professor of philosophy at -Heidelberg. In the following year appeared the first edition of his -_Encyclopaedia_: two others appeared in his lifetime (in 1827 and -1830). The first edition is a thin octavo volume of pp. xvi. 288, -published (like the others) at Heidelberg. The Logic in it occupies -pp. 1-126 (of which 12 pp. are Einleitung and 18 pp. Vorbegriff); the -Philosophy of Nature, pp. 127-204; and the Philosophy of Mind (Spirit), -pp. 205-288. - -In the Preface the book is described (p. iv) as setting forth 'a new -treatment of philosophy on a method which will, as I hope, yet be -recognised as the only genuine method identical with the content.' -Contrasting his own procedure with a mannerism of the day which -used an assumed set of formulas to produce in the facts a show of -symmetry even more arbitrary and mechanical than the arrangements -imposed _ab extra_ in the sciences, he goes on: 'This wilfulness we -saw also take possession of the contents of philosophy and ride out -on an intellectual knight-errantry--for a while imposing on honest -true-hearted workers, though elsewhere it was only counted grotesque, -and grotesque even to the pitch of madness. But oftener and more -properly its teachings--far from seeming imposing or mad--were found -out to be familiar trivialities, and its form seen to be a mere trick -of wit, easily acquired, methodical and premeditated, with its quaint -combinations and strained eccentricities,--the mien of earnestness only -covering self-deception and fraud upon the public. On the other side, -again, we saw shallowness and unintelligence assume the character of -a scepticism wise in its own eyes and of a criticism modest in its -claims for reason, enhancing their vanity and conceit in proportion -as their ideas grew more vacuous. For a space of time these two -intellectual tendencies have befooled German earnestness, have tired -out its profound craving for philosophy, and have been succeeded by -an indifference and even a contempt for philosophic science, till at -length a self-styled modesty has the audacity to let its voice be heard -in controversies touching the deepest philosophical problems, and to -deny philosophy its right to that cognition by reason, the form of -which was what formerly was called _demonstration._' - -'The first of these phenomena may be in part explained as the youthful -exuberance of the new age which has risen in the realm of science no -less than in the world of politics. If this exuberance greeted with -rapture the dawn of the intellectual renascence, and without profounder -labour at once set about enjoying the Idea and revelling for a while in -the hopes and prospects which it offered, one can more readily forgive -its excesses; because it is sound at heart, and the surface vapours -which it had suffused around its solid worth must spontaneously clear -off. But the other spectacle is more repulsive; because it betrays -exhaustion and impotence, and tries to conceal them under a hectoring -conceit which acts the censor over the philosophical intellects of all -the centuries, mistaking them, but most of all mistaking itself. - -'So much the more gratifying is another spectacle yet-to be noted; the -interest in philosophy and the earnest love of higher knowledge which -in the presence of both tendencies has kept itself single-hearted and -without affectation. Occasionally this interest may have taken too -much to the language of intuition and feeling; yet its appearance -proves the existence of that inward and deeper-reaching impulse of -reasonable intelligence which alone gives man his dignity,--proves it -above all, because that standpoint can only be gained as a _result_ -of philosophical consciousness; so that what it seems to disdain is -at least admitted and recognised as a condition. To this interest -in ascertaining the truth I dedicate this attempt to supply an -introduction and a contribution towards its satisfaction.' - -The second edition appeared in 1827. Since the autumn of 1818 Hegel -had been professor at Berlin: and the manuscript was sent thence (from -August 1826 onwards) to Heidelberg, where Daub, his friend--himself -a master in philosophical theology--attended to the revision of the -proofs. 'To the Introduction,' writes Hegel[9], 'I have given perhaps -too great an amplitude: but it, above all, would have cost me time and -trouble to bring within narrower compass. Tied down and distracted -by lectures, and sometimes here in Berlin by other things too, I -have--without a general survey--allowed myself so large a swing that -the work has grown upon me, and there was a danger of its turning into -a book. I have gone through it several times. The treatment of the -attitudes (of thought) which I have distinguished in it was to meet an -interest of the day. The rest I have sought to make more definite, and -so far as may be clearer; but the main fault is not mended--to do which -would require me to limit the detail more, and on the other hand make -the whole more surveyable, so that the contents should better answer -the title of an Encyclopaedia.' Again, in Dec. 1826, he writes[10]: 'In -the Naturphilosophie I have made essential changes, but could not help -here and there going too far into a detail which is hardly in keeping -with the tone of the whole. The second half of the Geistesphilosophie -I shall have to modify entirely.' In May 1827, Hegel offers his -explanation of delay in the preface, which, like the concluding -paragraphs, touches largely on contemporary theology. By August of that -year the book was finished, and Hegel off to Paris for a holiday. - -In the second edition, which substantially fixed the form of the -_Encyclopaedia_, the pages amount to xlii, 534--nearly twice as many -as the first, which, however, as Professor Caird remarks, 'has a -compactness, a brief energy and conclusiveness of expression, which -he never surpassed.' The Logic now occupies pp. 1214, Philosophy of -Nature 215-354, and Philosophy of Spirit from 355-534. The second part -therefore has gained least; and in the third part the chief single -expansions occur towards the close and deal with the relations of -philosophy, art, and religion in the State; viz. § 563 (which in the -third edition is transposed to § 552), and § 573 (where two pages are -enlarged to 18). In the first part, or the Logic, the main increase -and alteration falls within the introductory chapters, where 96 pages -take the place of 30. The Vorbegriff (preliminary notion) of the first -edition had contained the distinction of the three logical 'moments' -(see p. 142), with a few remarks on the methods, first, of metaphysic, -and then (after a brief section on empiricism), of the 'Critical -Philosophy through which philosophy has reached its close.' Instead -of this the second edition deals at length, under this head, with the -three 'attitudes (or positions) of thought to objectivity;' where, -besides a more lengthy criticism of the Critical philosophy, there is a -discussion of the doctrines of Jacobi and other Intuitivists. - -The Preface, like much else in this second edition, is an assertion -of the right and the duty of philosophy to treat independently of -the things of God, and an emphatic declaration that the result of -scientific investigation of the truth is, not the subversion of -the faith, but 'the restoration of that sum of absolute doctrine -which thought at first would have put behind and beneath itself--a -restoration of it however in the most characteristic and the freest -element of the mind.' Any opposition that may be raised against -philosophy on religious grounds proceeds, according to Hegel, from a -religion which has abandoned its true basis and entrenched itself in -formulae and categories that pervert its real nature. 'Yet,' he adds -(p. vii), 'especially where religious subjects are under discussion, -philosophy is expressly set aside, as if in that way all mischief were -banished and security against error and illusion attained;' ... 'as if -philosophy--the mischief thus kept at a distance--were anything but -the investigation of Truth, but with a full sense of the nature and -value of the intellectual links which give unity and form to all fact -whatever.' 'Lessing,' he continues (p. xvi), 'said in his time that -people treat Spinoza like a dead dog[11]. It cannot be said that in -recent times Spinozism and speculative philosophy in general have been -better treated.' - -The time was one of feverish unrest and unwholesome irritability. Ever -since the so-called Carlsbad decrees of 1819 all the agencies of the -higher literature and education had been subjected to an inquisitorial -supervision which everywhere surmised political insubordination and -religious heresy. A petty provincialism pervaded what was then still -the small Residenz-Stadt Berlin; and the King, Frederick William -III, cherished to the full that paternal conception of his position -which has not been unusual in the royal house of Prussia. Champions -of orthodoxy warned him that Hegelianism was unchristian, if not even -anti-christian. Franz von Baader, the Bavarian religious philosopher -(who had spent some months at Berlin during the winter of 1823-4, -studying the religious and philosophical teaching of the universities -in connexion with the revolutionary doctrines which he saw fermenting -throughout Europe), addressed the king in a communication which -described the prevalent Protestant theology as infidel in its very -source, and as tending directly to annihilate the foundations of -the faith. Hegel himself had to remind the censor of heresy that -'all speculative philosophy on religion maybe carried to atheism: -all depends on who carries it; the peculiar piety of our times and -the malevolence of demagogues will not let us want carriers[12].' -His own theology was suspected both by the Rationalists and by the -Evangelicals. He writes to his wife (in 1827) that he had looked at -the university buildings in Louvain and Liège with the feeling that -they might one day afford him a resting-place 'when the parsons in -Berlin make the Kupfergraben completely intolerable for him[13].' 'The -Roman Curia,' he adds, 'would be a more honourable opponent than the -miserable cabals of a miserable boiling of parsons in Berlin.' Hence -the tone in which the preface proceeds (p. xviii). - -'Religion is the kind and mode of consciousness in which the Truth -appeals to all men, to men of every degree of education; but the -scientific ascertainment of the Truth is a special kind of this -consciousness, involving a labour which not all but only a few -undertake. The substance of the two is the same; but as Homer says of -some stars that they have two names, the one in the language of the -gods, the other in the language of ephemeral men--so for that substance -there are two languages,--the one of feeling, of pictorial thought, -and of the limited intellect that makes its home in finite categories -and inadequate abstractions, the other the language of the concrete -notion. If we propose then to talk of and to criticise philosophy from -the religious point of view, there is more requisite than to possess -a familiarity with the language of the ephemeral consciousness. The -foundation of scientific cognition is the substantiality at its core, -the indwelling idea with its stirring intellectual life; just as the -essentials of religion are a heart fully disciplined, a mind awake to -self-collectedness, a wrought and refined substantiality. In modern -times religion has more and more contracted the intelligent expansion -of its contents and withdrawn into the intensiveness of piety, or even -of feeling,--a feeling which betrays its own scantiness and emptiness. -So long however as it still has a creed, a doctrine, a system of dogma, -it has what philosophy can occupy itself with and where it can find for -itself a point of union with religion. This however is not to be taken -in the wrong separatist sense (so dominant in our modern religiosity) -representing the two as mutually exclusive, or as at bottom so capable -of separation that their union is only imposed from without. Rather, -even in what has gone before, it is implied that religion may well -exist without philosophy, but philosophy not without religion--which -it rather includes. True religion--intellectual and spiritual -religion--must have body and substance, for spirit and intellect are -above all consciousness, and consciousness implies an _objective_ body -and substance. - -'The contracted religiosity which narrows itself to a point in the -heart must make that heart's softening and contrition the essential -factor of its new birth; but it must at the same time recollect that it -has to do with the heart of a spirit, that the spirit is the appointed -authority over the heart, and that it can only have such authority so -far as it is itself born again. This new birth of the spirit out of -natural ignorance and natural error takes place through instruction and -through that faith in objective truth and substance which is due to the -witness of the spirit. This new birth of the spirit is besides _ipso -facto_ a new birth of the heart out of that vanity of the one-sided -intellect (on which it sets so much) and its discoveries that finite is -different from infinite, that philosophy must either be polytheism, or, -in acuter minds, pantheism, &c. It is, in short, a new birth out of the -wretched discoveries on the strength of which pious humility holds its -head so high against philosophy and theological science. If religiosity -persists in clinging to its unexpanded and therefore unintelligent -intensity, then it can be sensible only of the contrast which divides -this narrow and narrowing form from the intelligent expansion of -doctrine as such, religious not less than philosophical.' - -After an appreciative quotation from Franz von Baader, and noting his -reference to the theosophy of Böhme, as a work of the past from which -the present generation might learn the speculative interpretation of -Christian doctrines, he reverts to the position that the only mode in -which thought will admit a reconciliation with religious doctrines, is -when these doctrines have learned to 'assume their worthiest phase--the -phase of the notion, of necessity, which binds, and thus also makes -free everything, fact no less than thought.' But it is not from Böhme -or his kindred that we are likely to get the example of a philosophy -equal to the highest theme--to the comprehension of divine things. 'If -old things are to be revived--an old phase, that is; for the burden -of the theme is ever young--the phase of the Idea such as Plato and, -still better, as Aristotle conceived it, is far more deserving of being -recalled,--and for the further reason that the disclosure of it, by -assimilating it into our system of ideas, is, _ipso facto,_ not merely -an interpretation of it, but a progress of the science itself. But -to interpret such forms of the Idea by no means lies so much on the -surface as to get hold of Gnostic and Cabbalistic phantasmagorias; and -to develope Plato and Aristotle is by no means the sinecure that it is -to note or to hint at echoes of the Idea in the medievalists.' - -The third edition of the _Encyclopaedia,_ which appeared in 1830, -consists of pp. lviii, 600--a slight additional increase. The increase -is in the Logic, eight pages; in the Philosophy of Nature, twenty-three -pages; and in the Philosophy of Spirit, thirty-four pages. The concrete -topics, in short, gain most. - -The preface begins by alluding to several criticisms on his -philosophy,--'which for the most part have shown little vocation for -the business'--and to his discussion of them in the _Jahrbücher_ of -1829 (_Vermischte Schriften,_ ii. 149). There is also a paragraph -devoted to the quarrel originated by the attack in Hengstenberg's -Evangelical Journal on the rationalism of certain professors at Halle -(notably Gesenius and Wegscheider),--(an attack based on the evidence -of students' note-books), and by the protest of students and professors -against the insinuations. 'It seemed a little while ago,' says Hegel -(p. xli), 'as if there was an initiation, in a scientific spirit -and on a wider range, of a more serious inquiry, from the region of -theology and even of religiosity, touching God, divine things, and -reason. But the very beginning of the movement checked these hopes; -the issue turned on personalities, and neither the pretensions of the -accusing pietists nor the pretensions of the free reason they accused, -rose to the real subject, still less to a sense that the subject -could only be discussed on philosophic soil. This personal attack, on -the basis of very special externalities of religion, displayed the -monstrous assumption of seeking to decide by arbitrary decree as to -the Christianity of individuals, and to stamp them accordingly with -the seal of temporal and eternal reprobation. Dante, in virtue of the -enthusiasm of divine poesy, has dared to handle the keys of Peter, and -to condemn by name to the perdition of hell many--already deceased -however--of his contemporaries, even Popes and Emperors. A modern -philosophy has been made the subject of the infamous charge that in -it human individuals usurp the rank of God; but such a fictitious -charge--reached by a false logic--pales before the actual assumption -of behaving like judges of the world, prejudging the Christianity of -individuals, and announcing their utter reprobation. The Shibboleth -of this absolute authority is the name of the Lord Christ, and the -assertion that the Lord dwells in the hearts of these judges.' But the -assertion is ill supported by the fruits they exhibit,--the monstrous -insolence with which they reprobate and condemn. - -But the evangelicals are not alone to blame for the bald and -undeveloped nature of their religious life; the same want of free and -living growth in religion characterises their opponents. 'By their -formal, abstract, nerveless reasoning, the rationalists have emptied -religion of all power and substance, no less than the pietists by the -reduction of all faith to the Shibboleth of Lord! Lord! One is no -whit better than the other: and when they meet in conflict there is -no material on which they could come into contact, no common ground, -and no possibility of carrying on an inquiry which would lead to -knowledge and truth. "Liberal" theology on its side has not got beyond -the formalism of appeals to liberty of conscience, liberty of thought, -liberty of teaching, to reason itself and to science. Such liberty no -doubt describes the _infinite right_ of the spirit, and the second -special condition of truth, supplementary to the first, faith. But -the rationalists steer clear of the material point: they do not tell -us the reasonable principles and laws involved in a free and genuine -conscience, nor the import and teaching of free faith and free thought; -they do not get beyond a bare negative formalism and the liberty to -embody their liberty at their fancy and pleasure--whereby in the end -it matters not how it is embodied. There is a further reason for -their failure to reach a solid doctrine. The Christian community must -be, and ought always to be, unified by the tie of a doctrinal idea, -a confession of faith; but the generalities and abstractions of the -stale, not living, waters of rationalism forbid the specificality of -an inherently definite and fully developed body of Christian doctrine. -Their opponents, again, proud of the name Lord! Lord! frankly and -openly disdain carrying out the faith into the fulness of spirit, -reality, and truth.' - -In ordinary moods of mind there is a long way from logic to religion. -But almost every page of what Hegel has called Logic is witness to -the belief in their ultimate identity. It was no new principle of -later years for him. He had written in post-student days to his -friend Schelling: 'Reason and freedom remain our watch-word, and our -point of union the invisible church[14].' His parting token of faith -with another youthful comrade, the poet Hölderlin, had been 'God's -kingdom[15].' - -But after 1827 this religious appropriation of philosophy becomes -more apparent, and in 1829 Hegel seemed deliberately to accept the -position of a Christian philosopher which Göschel had marked out for -him. 'A philosophy without heart and a faith without intellect,' he -remarks[16], 'are abstractions from the true life of knowledge and -faith. The man whom philosophy leaves cold, and the man whom real faith -does not illuminate may be assured that the fault lies in them, not in -knowledge and faith. The former is still an alien to philosophy, the -latter an alien to faith.' - -This is not the place--in a philological chapter--to discuss the issues -involved in the announcement that the truth awaits us ready to hand[17] -'in all genuine consciousness, in all religions and philosophies.' -Yet one remark may be offered against hasty interpretations of a -'speculative' identity. If there is a double edge to the proposition -that the actual is the reasonable, there is no less caution necessary -in approaching and studying from both sides the far-reaching import -of that equation to which Joannes Scotus Erigena gave expression ten -centuries ago: '_Non alia est philosophia, i.e. sapientiae studium, -et alia religio. Quid est aliud de philosophia tractare nisi verae -religionis regulas exponere?_' - - -[1] _Christian Märklin,_ cap. 3. - -[2] Hegel's _Briefe,_ i. 141. - -[3] _Ibid._ i. 172. - -[4] Hegel's _Briefe,_ i. 138. - -[5] _Ibid._ i. 339. - -[6] Hegel's _Briefe,_ i. 328. - -[7] _Ibid._ i. 273. - -[8] _Ibid._ i. 373. - -[9] Hegel's _Briefe,_ ii. 204. - -[10] _Ibid._ ii. 230. - -[11] Jacobi's _Werke,_ iv. A, p. 63. - -[12] Hegel's _Briefe,_ ii. 54. - -[13] _Ibid._ ii. 276. - -[14] Hegel's _Briefe,_ i. 13. - -[15] Hölderlin's _Leben_ (Litzmann), p. 183. - -[16] _Verm. Sehr._ ii. 144. - -[17] Hegel's _Briefe,_ ii. 80. - - * * * * * - -_The following Errata in the Edition of the Logic as given in the -Collected Works (Vol. VI.) are corrected in the translation. The -references in brackets are to the_ German text. - -Page 95, line 1. Und Objektivität has dropped out after der -Subjektivität. [VI. 98, l. 10 from bottom.] - -P. 97, l. 2. The 2nd ed. reads (die Gedanken) nicht in Solchem, instead -of nicht als in Solchem (3rd ed.). [VI. p. 100, l. 3 from bottom.] - -P. 169, l. 13 from bottom. Instead of the reading of the _Werke_ and of -the 3rd ed. read as in ed. II. Also ist dieser Gegenstand nichts. [VI. -p. 178, l. 11.] - -P. 177, l. 3 from bottom. Verstandes; Gegenstandes is a mistake for -Verstandes; Gegensatzes, as in edd. II and III. [VI. p. 188, l. 2.] - -P. 231, l. 19. weiten should be weitern. [VI. p. 251, l. 3 from bottom.] - -P. 316, l. 15. Dinglichkeit is a misprint for Dingheit, as in Hegel's -own editions. [VI. p. 347, l. 1.] - -P. 352, l. 14 from bottom, for seine Realität read seiner Realität. -[VI. p. 385, l. 8.] - - - - -THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC - - -(_THE FIRST PART OF THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES IN -OUTLINE_) - - -BY G. W. F. HEGEL - - - - -THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -INTRODUCTION. - - -1.] PHILOSOPHY misses an advantage enjoyed by the other sciences. It -cannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural -admissions of consciousness, nor can it assume that its method of -cognition, either for starting or for continuing, is one already -accepted. The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the -same as those of religion. In both the object is Truth, in that supreme -sense in which God and God only is the Truth. Both in like manner go on -to treat of the finite worlds of Nature and the human Mind, with their -relation to each other and to their truth in God. Some _acquaintance_ -with its objects, therefore, philosophy may and even must presume, that -and a certain interest in them to boot, were it for no other reason -than this: that in point of time the mind makes general _images_ of -objects, long before it makes _notions_ of them, and that it is only -through these mental images, and by recourse to them, that the thinking -mind rises to know and comprehend _thinkingly._ - -But with the rise of this thinking study of things, it soon becomes -evident that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing -the _necessity_ of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of -its objects, as well as their nature and qualities. Our original -acquaintance with them is thus discovered to be inadequate. We can -assume nothing, and assert nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the -assertions and assumptions of others. And yet we must make a beginning: -and a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption, or -rather is an assumption. It seems as if it were impossible to make a -beginning at all. - -2.] This _thinking study of things_ may serve, in a general way, as -a description of philosophy. But the description is too wide. If it -be correct to say, that thought makes the distinction between man and -the lower animals, then everything human is human, for the sole and -simple reason that it is due to the operation of thought. Philosophy, -on the other hand, is a peculiar mode of thinking--a mode in which -thinking becomes knowledge, and knowledge through notions. However -great therefore may be the identity and essential unity of the two -modes of thought, the philosophic mode gets to be different from the -more general thought which acts in all that is human, in all that gives -humanity its distinctive character. And this difference connects itself -with the fact that the strictly human and thought-induced phenomena of -consciousness do not originally appear in the form of a thought, but as -a feeling, a perception, or mental image--all of which aspects must be -distinguished from the form of thought proper. - -According to an old preconceived idea, which has passed into a trivial -proposition, it is thought which marks the man off from the animals. -Yet trivial as this old belief may seem, it must, strangely enough, -be recalled to mind in presence of certain preconceived ideas of the -present day. These ideas would put feeling and thought so far apart as -to make them opposites, and would represent them as so antagonistic, -that feeling, particularly religious feeling, is supposed to be -contaminated, perverted, and even annihilated by thought. They also -emphatically hold that religion and piety grow out of, and rest upon -something else, and not on thought. But those who make this separation -forget meanwhile that only man has the capacity for religion, and that -animals no more have religion than they have law and morality. - -Those who insist on this separation of religion from thinking usually -have before their minds the sort of thought that may be styled -_after-thought._ They mean 'reflective' thinking, which has to deal -with thoughts as thoughts, and brings them into consciousness. -Slackness to perceive and keep in view this distinction which -philosophy definitely draws in respect of thinking is the source of -the crudest objections and reproaches against philosophy. Man,--and -that just because it is his nature to think,--is the only being that -possesses law, religion, and morality. In these spheres of human life, -therefore, thinking, under the guise of feeling, faith, or generalised -image, has not been inactive: its action and its productions are -there present and therein contained. But it is one thing to have such -feelings and generalised images that have been moulded and permeated by -thought, and another thing to have thoughts about them. The thoughts, -to which after-thought upon those modes of consciousness gives rise, -are what is comprised under reflection, general reasoning, and the -like, as well as under philosophy itself. - -The neglect of this distinction between thought in general and the -reflective thought of philosophy has also led to another and more -frequent misunderstanding. Reflection of this kind has been often -maintained to be the condition, or even the only way, of attaining a -consciousness and certitude of the Eternal and True. The (now somewhat -antiquated) metaphysical proofs of God's existence, for example, have -been treated, as if a knowledge of them and a conviction of their truth -were the only and essential means of producing a belief and conviction -that there is a God. Such a doctrine would find its parallel, if we -said that eating was impossible before we had acquired a knowledge -of the chemical, botanical, and zoological characters of our food; -and that we must delay digestion till we had finished the study of -anatomy and physiology. Were it so, these sciences in their field, -like philosophy in its, would gain greatly in point of utility; in -fact, their utility would rise to the height of absolute and universal -indispensableness. Or rather, instead of being indispensable, they -would not exist at all. - -3.] The _Content,_ of whatever kind it be, with which our consciousness -is taken up, is what constitutes the qualitative character of our -feelings, perceptions, fancies, and ideas; of our aims and duties; -and of our thoughts and notions. From this point of view, feeling, -perception, &c. are the _forms_ assumed by these contents. The contents -remain one and the same, whether they are felt, seen, represented, or -willed, and whether they are merely felt, or felt with an admixture of -thoughts, or merely and simply thought. In any one of these forms, or -in the admixture of several, the contents confront consciousness, or -are its _object._ But when they are thus objects of consciousness, the -modes of the several forms ally themselves with the contents; and each -form of them appears in consequence to give rise to a special object. -Thus what is the same at bottom, may look like a different sort of -fact. - -The several modes of feeling, perception, desire, and will, so far -as we are _aware_ of them, are in general called ideas (mental -representations): and it may be roughly said, that philosophy puts -thoughts, categories, or, in more precise language, adequate _notions,_ -in the place of the generalised images we ordinarily call ideas. Mental -impressions such as these may be regarded as the metaphors of thoughts -and notions. But to have these figurate conceptions does not imply -that we appreciate their intellectual significance, the thoughts and -rational notions to which they correspond. Conversely, it is one thing -to have thoughts and intelligent notions, and another to know what -impressions, perceptions, and feelings correspond to them. - -This difference will to some extent explain what people call the -unintelligibility of philosophy. Their difficulty lies partly in an -incapacity--which in itself is nothing but want of habit--for abstract -thinking; _i.e._ in an inability to get hold of pure thoughts and move -about in them. In our ordinary state of mind, the thoughts are clothed -upon and made one with the sensuous or spiritual material of the hour; -and in reflection, meditation, and general reasoning, we introduce a -blend of thoughts into feelings, percepts, and mental images. (Thus, -in propositions where the subject-matter is due to the senses--_e.g._ -'This leaf is green'--we have such categories introduced, as being and -individuality.) But it is a very different thing to make the thoughts -pure and simple our object. - -But their complaint that philosophy is unintelligible is as much due to -another reason; and that is an impatient wish to have before them as a -mental picture that which is in the mind as a thought or notion. When -people are asked to apprehend some notion, they often complain that -they do not know what they have to think. But the fact is that in a -notion there is nothing further to be thought than the notion itself. -What the phrase reveals, is a hankering after an image with which we -are already familiar. The mind, denied the use of its familiar ideas, -feels the ground where it once stood firm and at home taken away from -beneath it, and, when transported into the region of pure thought, -cannot tell where in the world it is. - -One consequence of this weakness is that authors, preachers, and -orators are found most intelligible, when they speak of things which -their readers or hearers already know by rote,--things which the latter -are conversant with, and which require no explanation. - -4.] The philosopher then has to reckon with popular modes of thought, -and with the objects of religion. In dealing with the ordinary modes -of mind, he will first of all, as we saw, have to prove and almost -to awaken the need for his peculiar method of knowledge. In dealing -with the objects of religion, and with truth as a whole, he will have -to show that philosophy is capable of apprehending them from its own -resources; and should a difference from religious conceptions come to -light, he will have to justify the points in which it diverges. - -5.] To give the reader a preliminary explanation of the distinction -thus made, and to let him see at the same moment that the real import -of our consciousness is retained, and even for the first time put -in its proper light, when translated into the form of thought and -the notion of reason, it may be well to recall another of these old -unreasoned beliefs. And that is the conviction that to get at the truth -of any object or event, even of feelings, perceptions, opinions, and -mental ideas, we must think it over. Now in any case to think things -over is at least to transform feelings, ordinary ideas, &c. into -thoughts. - -Nature has given every one a faculty of thought. But thought is all -that philosophy claims as the form proper to her business: and thus -the inadequate view which ignores the distinction stated in § 3, leads -to a new delusion, the reverse of the complaint previously mentioned -about the unintelligibility of philosophy. In other words, this science -must often submit to the slight of hearing even people who have never -taken any trouble with it talking as if they thoroughly understood all -about it. With no preparation beyond an ordinary education they do -not hesitate, especially under the influence of religious sentiment, -to philosophise and to criticise philosophy. Everybody allows that -to know any other science you must have first studied it, and that -you can only claim to express a judgment upon it in virtue of such -knowledge. Everybody allows that to make a shoe you must have learned -and practised the craft of the shoemaker, though every man has a model -in his own foot, and possesses in his hands the natural endowments for -the operations required. For philosophy alone, it seems to be imagined, -such study, care, and application are not in the least requisite. - -This comfortable view of what is required for a philosopher has -recently received corroboration through the theory of immediate or -intuitive knowledge. - -6.] So much for the form of philosophical knowledge. It is no less -desirable, on the other hand, that philosophy should understand that -its content is no other than _actuality,_ that core of truth which, -originally produced and producing itself within the precincts of the -mental life, has become the _world,_ the inward and outward world, of -consciousness. At first we become aware of these contents in what we -call Experience. But even Experience, as it surveys the wide range -of inward and outward existence, has sense enough to distinguish -the mere appearance, which is transient and meaningless, from what -in itself really deserves the name of actuality. As it is only in -form that philosophy is distinguished from other modes of attaining -an acquaintance with this same sum of being, it must necessarily be -in harmony with actuality and experience. In fact, this harmony may -be viewed as at least an extrinsic means of testing the truth of a -philosophy. Similarly it may be held the highest and final aim of -philosophic science to bring about, through the ascertainment of this -harmony, a reconciliation of the self-conscious reason with the reason -which _is_ in the world,--in other words, with actuality. - -In the preface to my Philosophy of Law, p. xix, are found the -propositions: - - What is reasonable is actual; - and, What is actual is reasonable. - -These simple statements have given rise to expressions of surprise and -hostility, even in quarters where it would be reckoned an insult to -presume absence of philosophy, and still more of religion. Religion -at least need not be brought in evidence; its doctrines of the divine -government of the world affirm these propositions too decidedly. For -their philosophic sense, we must pre-suppose intelligence enough to -know, not only that God is actual, that He is the supreme actuality, -that He alone is truly actual; but also, as regards the logical -bearings of the question, that existence is in part mere appearance, -and only in part actuality. In common life, any freak of fancy, any -error, evil and everything of the nature of evil, as well as every -degenerate and transitory existence whatever, gets in a casual way -the name of actuality. But even our ordinary feelings are enough to -forbid a casual (fortuitous) existence getting the emphatic name of an -actual; for by fortuitous we mean an existence which has no greater -value than that of something possible, which may as well not be as -be. As for the term Actuality, these critics would have done well to -consider the sense in which I employ it. In a detailed Logic I had -treated amongst other things of actuality, and accurately distinguished -it not only from the fortuitous, which, after all, has existence, -but even from the cognate categories of existence and the other -modifications of being. - -The actuality of the rational stands opposed by the popular fancy -that Ideas and ideals are nothing but chimeras, and philosophy a mere -system of such phantasms. It is also opposed by the very different -fancy that Ideas and ideals are something far too excellent to have -actuality, or something too impotent to procure it for themselves. This -divorce between idea and reality is especially dear to the analytic -understanding which looks upon its own abstractions, dreams though they -are, as something true and real, and prides itself on the imperative -'ought,' which it takes especial pleasure in prescribing even on the -field of politics. As if the world had waited on it to learn how it -ought to be, and was not! For, if it were as it ought to be, what would -come of the precocious wisdom of that 'ought'? When understanding -turns this 'ought' against trivial external and transitory objects, -against social regulations or conditions, which very likely possess a -great relative importance for a certain time and special circles, it -may often be right. In such a case the intelligent observer may meet -much that fails to satisfy the general requirements of right; for -who is not acute enough to see a great deal in his own surroundings -which is really far from being as it ought to be? But such acuteness -is mistaken in the conceit that, when it examines these objects and -pronounces what they ought to be, it is dealing with questions of -philosophic science. The object of philosophy is the Idea: and the Idea -is not so impotent as merely to have a right or an obligation to exist -without actually existing. The object of philosophy is an actuality of -which those objects, social regulations and conditions, are only the -superficial outside. - -7.] Thus reflection--thinking things over--in a general way involves -the principle (which also means the beginning) of philosophy. And when -the reflective spirit arose again in its independence in modern times, -after the epoch of the Lutheran Reformation, it did not, as in its -beginnings among the Greeks, stand merely aloof, in a world of its own, -but at once turned its energies also upon the apparently illimitable -material of the phenomenal world. In this way the name philosophy came -to be applied to all those branches of knowledge, which are engaged -in ascertaining the standard and Universal in the ocean of empirical -individualities, as well as in ascertaining the Necessary element, or -Laws, to be found in the apparent disorder of the endless masses of -the fortuitous. It thus appears that modern philosophy derives its -materials from our own personal observations and perceptions of the -external and internal world, from nature as well as from the mind and -heart of man, when both stand in the immediate presence of the observer. - -This principle of Experience carries with it the unspeakably important -condition that, in order to accept and believe any fact, we must be -in contact with it; or, in more exact terms, that we must find the -fact united and combined with the certainty of our own selves. We must -be in touch with our subject-matter, whether it be by means of our -external senses, or, else, by our profounder mind and our intimate -self-consciousness.--This principle is the same as that which has in -the present day been termed faith, immediate knowledge, the revelation -in the outward world, and, above all, in our own heart. - -Those sciences, which thus got the name of philosophy, we call -_empirical_ sciences, for the reason that they take their departure -from experience. Still the essential results which they aim at and -provide, are laws, general propositions, a theory--the thoughts of what -is found existing. On this ground the Newtonian physics was called -Natural Philosophy. Hugo Grotius, again, by putting together and -comparing the behaviour of states towards each other as recorded in -history, succeeded, with the help of the ordinary methods of general -reasoning, in laying down certain general principles, and establishing -a theory which may be termed the Philosophy of International Law. In -England this is still the usual signification of the term philosophy. -Newton continues to be celebrated as the greatest of philosophers: and -the name goes down as far as the price-lists of instrument-makers. -All instruments, such as the thermometer and barometer, which do not -come under the special head of magnetic or electric apparatus, are -styled philosophical instruments[1]. Surely thought, and not a mere -combination of wood, iron, &c. ought to be called the instrument of -philosophy! The recent science of Political Economy in particular, -which in Germany is known as Rational Economy of the State, or -intelligent national economy, has in England especially appropriated -the name of philosophy.[2] - -8.] In its own field this empirical knowledge may at first give -satisfaction; but in two ways it is seen to come short. In the first -place there is another circle of objects which it does not embrace. -These are Freedom, Spirit, and God. They belong to a different -sphere, not because it can be said that they have nothing to do with -experience; for though they are certainly not experiences of the -senses, it is quite an identical proposition to say that whatever is -in consciousness is experienced. The real ground for assigning them to -another field of cognition is that in their scope and _content_ these -objects evidently show themselves as infinite. - -There is an old phrase often wrongly attributed to Aristotle, and -supposed to express the general tenor of his philosophy. '_Nihil -est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu_': there is nothing in -thought which has not been in sense and experience. If speculative -philosophy refused to admit this maxim, it can only have done so from -a misunderstanding. It will, however, on the converse side no less -assert: '_Nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit in intellectu._' And this -may be taken in two senses. In the general sense it means that νοῦς or -spirit (the more profound idea of νοῦς in modern thought) is the cause -of the world. In its special meaning (see § 2) it asserts that the -sentiment of right, morals, and religion is a sentiment (and in that -way an experience) of such scope and such character that it can spring -from and rest upon thought alone. - -9.] But in the second place in point of _form_ the subjective reason -desires a further satisfaction than empirical knowledge gives; and -this form, is, in the widest sense of the term, Necessity (§ 1). The -method of empirical science exhibits two defects. The first is that the -Universal or general principle contained in it, the genus, or kind, &c, -is, on its own account, indeterminate and vague, and therefore not on -its own account connected with the Particulars or the details. Either -is external and accidental to the other; and it is the same with the -particular facts which are brought into union: each is external and -accidental to the others. The second defect is that the beginnings are -in every case data and postulates, neither accounted for nor deduced. -In both these points the form of necessity fails to get its due. Hence -reflection, whenever it sets itself to remedy these defects, becomes -speculative thinking, the thinking proper to philosophy. As a species -of reflection, therefore, which, though it has a certain community -of nature with the reflection already mentioned, is nevertheless -different from it, philosophic thought thus possesses, in addition to -the common forms, some forms of its own, of which the Notion may be -taken as the type. - -The relation of speculative science to the other sciences may be -stated in the following terms. It does not in the least neglect the -empirical facts contained in the several sciences, but recognises and -adopts them: it appreciates and applies towards its own structure the -universal element in these sciences, their laws and classifications: -but besides all this, into the categories of science it introduces, and -gives currency to, other categories. The difference, looked at in this -way, is only a change of categories. Speculative Logic contains all -previous Logic and Metaphysics: it preserves the same forms of thought, -the same laws and objects,--while at the same time remodelling and -expanding them with wider categories. - -From _notion_ in the speculative sense we should distinguish what -is ordinarily called a notion. The phrase, that no notion can ever -comprehend the Infinite, a phrase which has been repeated over and over -again till it has grown axiomatic, is based upon this narrow estimate -of what is meant by notions. - -10.] This thought, which is proposed as the instrument of philosophic -knowledge, itself calls for further explanation. We must understand in -what way it possesses necessity or cogency: and when it claims to be -equal to the task of apprehending the absolute objects (God, Spirit, -Freedom), that claim must be substantiated. Such an explanation, -however, is itself a lesson in philosophy, and properly falls within -the scope of the science itself. A preliminary attempt to make matters -plain would only be unphilosophical, and consist of a tissue of -assumptions, assertions, and inferential pros and cons, _e.g._ of -dogmatism without cogency, as against which there would be an equal -right of counter-dogmatism. - -A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy bids us pause before -proceeding to inquire into God or into the true being of things, and -tells us first of all to examine the faculty of cognition and see -whether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become -acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which -it is to be employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our -trouble will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has -won for it general assent and admiration; the result of which has been -to withdraw cognition from an interest in its objects and absorption in -the study of them, and to direct it back upon itself; and so turn it to -a question of form. Unless we wish to be deceived bywords, it is easy -to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can -try and criticise them in other ways than by setting about the special -work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can -only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called -instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before -we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to -venture into the water until he had learned to swim. - -Reinhold saw the confusion with which this style of commencement is -chargeable, and tried to get out of the difficulty by starting with a -hypothetical and problematical stage of philosophising. In this way he -supposed that it would be possible, nobody can tell how, to get along, -until we found ourselves, further on, arrived at the primary truth -of truths. His method, when closely looked into, will be seen to be -identical with a very common practice. It starts from a substratum -of experiential fact, or from a provisional assumption which has -been brought into a definition; and then proceeds to analyse this -starting-point. We can detect in Reinhold's argument a perception of -the truth, that the usual course which proceeds by assumptions and -anticipations is no better than a hypothetical and problematical mode -of procedure. But his perceiving this does not alter the character of -this method; it only makes clear its imperfections. - -11.] The special conditions which call for the existence of philosophy -maybe thus described. The mind or spirit, when it is sentient or -perceptive, finds its object in something sensuous; when it imagines, -in a picture or image; when it wills, in an aim or end. But in contrast -to, or it may be only in distinction from, these forms of its existence -and of its objects, the mind has also to gratify the cravings of -its highest and most inward life. That innermost self is thought. -Thus the mind renders thought its object. In the best meaning of the -phrase, it comes to itself; for thought is its principle, and its -very unadulterated self. But while thus occupied, thought entangles -itself in contradictions, _e.g._ loses itself in the hard-and-fast -non-identity of its thoughts, and so, instead of reaching itself, -is caught and held in its counterpart. This result, to which honest -but narrow thinking leads the mere understanding, is resisted by the -loftier craving of which we have spoken. That craving expresses the -perseverance of thought, which continues true to itself, even in this -conscious loss of its native rest and independence, 'that it may -overcome' and work out in itself the solution of its own contradictions. - -To see that thought in its very nature is dialectical, and that, as -understanding, it must fall into contradiction,--the negative of -itself, will form one of the main lessons of logic. When thought -grows hopeless of ever achieving, by its own means, the solution of -the contradiction which it has by its own action brought upon itself, -it turns back to those solutions of the question with which the mind -had learned to pacify itself in some of its other modes and forms. -Unfortunately, however, the retreat of thought has led it, as Plato -noticed even in his time, to a very uncalled-for hatred of reason -(misology); and it then takes up against its own endeavours that -hostile attitude of which an example is seen in the doctrine that -'immediate' knowledge, as it is called, is the exclusive form in which -we become cognisant of truth. - -12.] The rise of philosophy is due to these cravings of thought. Its -point of departure is Experience; including under that name both our -immediate consciousness and the inductions from it. Awakened, as it -were, by this stimulus, thought is vitally characterised by raising -itself above the natural state of mind, above the senses and inferences -from the senses into its own unadulterated element, and by assuming, -accordingly, at first a stand-aloof and negative attitude towards -the point from which it started. Through this state of antagonism to -the phenomena of sense its first satisfaction is found in itself, in -the Idea of the universal essence of these phenomena: an Idea (the -Absolute, or God) which may be more or less abstract. Meanwhile, on -the other hand, the sciences, based on experience, exert upon the -mind a stimulus to overcome the form in which their varied contents -are presented, and to elevate these contents to the rank of necessary -truth. For the facts of science have the aspect of a vast conglomerate, -one thing coming side by side with another, as if they were merely -given and presented,--as in short devoid of all essential or necessary -connexion. In consequence of this stimulus thought is dragged out -of its unrealised universality and its fancied or merely possible -satisfaction, and impelled onwards to a development from itself. On -one hand this development only means that thought incorporates the -contents of science, in all their speciality of detail as submitted. On -the other it makes these contents imitate the action of the original -creative thought, and present the aspect of a free evolution determined -by the logic of the fact alone. - -On the relation between 'immediacy' and 'mediation' in consciousness -we shall speak later, expressly and with more detail. Here it may be -sufficient to premise that, though the two 'moments' or factors present -themselves as distinct, still neither of them can be absent, nor can -one exist apart from the other. Thus the knowledge of God, as of every -supersensible reality, is in its true character an exaltation above -sensations or perceptions: it consequently involves a negative attitude -to the initial data of sense, and to that extent implies mediation. -For to mediate is to take something as a beginning and to go onward to -a second thing; so that the existence of this second thing depends on -our having reached it from something else contradistinguished from it. -In spite of this, the knowledge of God is no mere sequel, dependent -on the empirical phase of consciousness: in fact, its independence is -essentially secured through this negation and exaltation.--No doubt, if -we attach an unfair prominence to the fact of mediation, and represent -it as implying a state of conditionedness, it may be said--not that the -remark would mean much--that philosophy is the child of experience, and -owes its rise to _a posteriori_ fact. (As a matter of fact, thinking -is always the negation of what we have immediately before us.) With -as much truth however we may be said to owe eating to the means of -nourishment, so long as we can have no eating without them. If we take -this view, eating is certainly represented as ungrateful: it devours -that to which it owes itself. Thinking, upon this view of its action, -is equally ungrateful. - -But there is also an _a priori_ aspect of thought, where by a -mediation, not made by anything external but by a reflection into self, -we have that immediacy which is universality, the self-complacency -of thought which is so much at home with itself that it feels an -innate indifference to descend to particulars, and in that way to the -development of its own nature. It is thus also with religion, which, -whether it be rude or elaborate, whether it be invested with scientific -precision of detail or confined to the simple faith of the heart, -possesses, throughout, the same intensive nature of contentment and -felicity. But if thought never gets further than the universality of -the Ideas, as was perforce the case in the first philosophies (when -the Eleatics never got beyond Being, or Heraclitus beyond Becoming), -it is justly open to the charge of formalism. Even in a more advanced -phase of philosophy, we may often find a doctrine which has mastered -merely certain abstract propositions or formulae, such as, 'In the -absolute all is one,' 'Subject and object are identical,'--and only -repeating the same thing when it comes to particulars. Bearing in -mind this first period of thought, the period of mere generality, we -may safely say that experience is the real author of _growth_ and -_advance_ in philosophy. For, firstly, the empirical sciences do not -stop short at the mere observation of the individual features of a -phenomenon. By the aid of thought, they are able to meet philosophy -with materials prepared for it, in the shape of general uniformities, -_i.e._ laws, and classifications of the phenomena. When this is done, -the particular facts which they contain are ready to be received into -philosophy. This, secondly, implies a certain compulsion on thought -itself to proceed to these concrete specific truths. The reception into -philosophy of these scientific materials, now that thought has removed -their immediacy and made them cease to be mere data, forms at the same -time a development of thought out of itself. Philosophy, then, owes -its development to the empirical sciences. In return it gives their -contents what is so vital to them, the freedom of thought,--gives them, -in short, an _a priori_ character. These contents are now warranted -necessary, and no longer depend on the evidence of facts merely, that -they were so found and so experienced. The fact as experienced thus -becomes an illustration and a copy of the original and completely -self-supporting activity of thought. - -13.] Stated in exact terms, such is the origin and development of -philosophy. But the History of Philosophy gives us the same process -from an historical and external point of view. The stages in the -evolution of the Idea there seem to follow each other by accident, and -to present merely a number of different and unconnected principles, -which the several systems of philosophy carry out in their own way. -But it is not so. For these thousands of years the same Architect has -directed the work: and that Architect is the one living Mind whose -nature is to think, to bring to self-consciousness what it is, and, -with its being thus set as object before it, to be at the same time -raised above it, and so to reach a higher stage of its own being. -The different systems which the history of philosophy presents are -therefore not irreconcilable with unity. We may either say, that it -is one philosophy at different degrees of maturity: or that the -particular principle, which is the groundwork of each system, is -but a branch of one and the same universe of thought. In philosophy -the latest birth of time is the result of all the systems that have -preceded it, and must include their principles; and so, if, on other -grounds, it deserve the title of philosophy, will be the fullest, most -comprehensive, and most adequate system of all. - -The spectacle of so many and so various systems of philosophy suggests -the necessity of defining more exactly the relation of Universal to -Particular. When the universal is made a mere form and co-ordinated -with the particular, as if it were on the same level, it sinks into a -particular itself. Even common sense in every-day matters is above the -absurdity of setting a universal _beside_ the particulars. Would any -one, who wished for fruit, reject cherries, pears, and grapes, on the -ground that they were cherries, pears, or grapes, and not fruit? But -when philosophy is in question, the excuse of many is that philosophies -are so different, and none of them is _the_ philosophy,--that each is -only _a_ philosophy. Such a plea is assumed to justify any amount of -contempt for philosophy. And yet cherries too are fruit. Often, too, a -system, of which the principle is the universal, is put on a level with -another of which the principle is a particular, and with theories which -deny the existence of philosophy altogether. Such systems are said to -be only different views of philosophy. With equal justice, light and -darkness might be styled different kinds of light. - -14.] The same evolution of thought which is exhibited in the history -of philosophy is presented in the System of Philosophy itself. Here, -instead of surveying the process, as we do in history, from the -outside, we see the movement of thought clearly defined in its native -medium. The thought, which is genuine and self-supporting, must be -intrinsically concrete; it must be an Idea; and when it is viewed in -the whole of its universality, it is the Idea, or the Absolute. The -science of this Idea must form a system. For the truth is concrete; -that is, whilst it gives a bond and principle of unity, it also -possesses an internal source of development. Truth, then, is only -possible as a universe or totality of thought; and the freedom of the -whole, as well as the necessity of the several sub-divisions, which it -implies, are only possible when these are discriminated and defined. - -Unless it is a system, a philosophy is not a scientific production. -Unsystematic philosophising can only be expected to give expression to -personal peculiarities of mind, and has no principle for the regulation -of its contents. Apart from their interdependence and organic union, -the truths of philosophy are valueless, and must then be treated as -baseless hypotheses, or personal convictions. Yet many philosophical -treatises confine themselves to such an exposition of the opinions and -sentiments of the author. - -The term _system_ is often misunderstood. It does not denote a -philosophy, the principle of which is narrow and to be distinguished -from others. On the contrary, a genuine philosophy makes it a principle -to include every particular principle. - -15.] Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle -rounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts, however, the -philosophical Idea is found in a particular specificality or medium. -The single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the -limits imposed by its special medium, and gives rise to a wider circle. -The whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles. The -Idea appears in each single circle, but, at the same time, the whole -Idea is constituted by the system of these peculiar phases, and each is -a necessary member of the organisation. - -16.] In the form of an Encyclopaedia, the science has no room for a -detailed exposition of particulars, and must be limited to setting -forth the commencement of the special sciences and the notions of -cardinal importance in them. - -How much of the particular parts is requisite to constitute a -particular branch of knowledge is so far indeterminate, that the part, -if it is to be something true, must be not an isolated member merely, -but itself an organic whole. The entire field of philosophy therefore -really forms a single science; but it may also be viewed as a total, -composed of several particular sciences. - -The encyclopaedia of philosophy must not be confounded with ordinary -encyclopaedias. An ordinary encyclopaedia does not pretend to be more -than an aggregation of sciences, regulated by no principle, and merely -as experience offers them. Sometimes it even includes what merely bear -the name of sciences, while they are nothing more than a collection of -bits of information. In an aggregate like this, the several branches of -knowledge owe their place in the encyclopaedia to extrinsic reasons, -and their unity is therefore artificial: they are _arranged,_ but we -cannot say they form a _system._ For the same reason, especially as the -materials to be combined also depend upon no one rule or principle, -the arrangement is at best an experiment, and will always exhibit -inequalities. - -An encyclopaedia of philosophy excludes three kinds of partial science. -I. It excludes mere aggregates of bits of information. Philology in -its _prima facie_ aspect belongs to this class. II. It rejects the -quasi-sciences, which are founded on an act of arbitrary will alone, -such as Heraldry. Sciences of this class are positive from beginning to -end. III. In another class of sciences, also styled positive, but which -have a rational basis and a rational beginning, philosophy claims that -constituent as its own. The positive features remain the property of -the sciences themselves. - -The positive element in the last class of sciences is of different -sorts. (I) Their commencement, though rational at bottom, yields to the -influence of fortuitousness, when they have to bring their universal -truth into contact with actual facts and the single phenomena of -experience. In this region of chance and change, the adequate notion -of science must yield its place to reasons or grounds of explanation. -Thus, _e.g._ in the science of jurisprudence, or in the system of -direct and indirect taxation, it is necessary to have certain points -precisely and definitively settled which lie beyond the competence of -the absolute lines laid down by the pure notion. A certain latitude -of settlement accordingly is left: and each point may be determined -in one way on one principle, in another way on another, and admits of -no definitive certainty. Similarly the Idea of Nature, when parcelled -out in detail, is dissipated into contingencies. Natural history, -geography, and medicine stumble upon descriptions of existence, upon -kinds and distinctions, which are not determined by reason, but by -sport and adventitious incidents. Even history comes under the same -category. The Idea is its essence and inner nature; but, as it appears, -everything is under contingency and in the field of voluntary action. -(II) These sciences are positive also in failing to recognise the -finite nature of what they predicate, and to point out how these -categories and their whole sphere pass into a higher. They assume their -statements to possess an authority beyond appeal. Here the fault lies -in the finitude of the form, as in the previous instance it lay in -the matter. (III) In close sequel to this, sciences are positive in -consequence of the inadequate grounds on which their conclusions rest: -based as these are on detached and casual inference, upon feeling, -faith, and authority, and, generally speaking, upon the deliverances -of inward and outward perception. Under this head we must also class -the philosophy which proposes to build upon anthropology,' facts of -consciousness, inward sense, or outward experience. It may happen, -however, that empirical is an epithet applicable only to the form of -scientific exposition; whilst intuitive sagacity has arranged what are -mere phenomena, according to the essential sequence of the notion. In -such a case the contrasts between the varied and numerous phenomena -brought together serve to eliminate the external and accidental -circumstances of their conditions, and the universal thus comes clearly -into view. Guided by such an intuition, experimental physics will -present the rational science of Nature,--as history will present the -science of human affairs and actions--in an external picture, which -mirrors the philosophic notion. - -17.] It may seem as if philosophy, in order to start on its course, -had, like the rest of the sciences, to begin with a subjective -presupposition. The sciences postulate their respective objects, such -as space, number, or whatever it be; and it might be supposed that -philosophy had also to postulate the existence of thought. But the -two cases are not exactly parallel. It is by the free act of thought -that it occupies a point of view, in which it is for its own self, and -thus gives itself an object of its own production. Nor is this all. -The very point of view, which originally is taken on its own evidence -only, must in the course of the science be converted to a result,--the -ultimate result in which philosophy returns into itself and reaches -the point with which it began. In this manner philosophy exhibits the -appearance of a circle which closes with itself, and has no beginning -in the same way as the other sciences have. To speak of a beginning of -philosophy has a meaning only in relation to a person who proposes to -commence the study, and not in relation to the science as science. The -same thing may be thus expressed. The notion of science--the notion -therefore with which we start--which, for the very reason that it is -initial, implies a separation between the thought which is our object, -and the subject philosophising which is, as it were, external to the -former, must be grasped and comprehended by the science itself. This -is in short the one single aim, action, and goal of philosophy--to -arrive at the notion of its notion, and thus secure its return and its -satisfaction. - -18.] As the whole science, and only the whole, can exhibit what the -Idea or system of reason is, it is impossible to give in a preliminary -way a general impression of a philosophy. Nor can a division of -philosophy into its parts be intelligible, except in connexion with the -system. A preliminary division, like the limited conception from which -it comes, can only be an anticipation. Here however it is premised that -the Idea turns out to be the thought which is completely identical -with itself, and not identical simply in the abstract, but also in its -action of setting itself over against itself, so as to gain a being of -its own, and yet of being in full possession of itself while it is in -this other. Thus philosophy is subdivided into three parts: - -I. Logic, the science of the Idea in and for itself. - -II. The Philosophy of Nature: the science of the Idea in its otherness. - -III. The Philosophy of Mind: the science of the Idea come back to -itself out of that otherness. - -As observed in § 15, the differences between the several philosophical -sciences are only aspects or specialisations of the one Idea or system -of reason, which and which alone is alike exhibited in these different -media. In Nature nothing else would have to be discerned, except the -Idea: but the Idea has here divested itself of its proper being. In -Mind, again, the Idea has asserted a being of its own, and is on the -way to become absolute. Every such form in which the Idea is expressed, -is at the same time a passing or fleeting stage: and hence each of -these subdivisions has not only to know its contents as an object which -has being for the time, but also in the same act to expound how these -contents pass into their higher circle. To represent the relation -between them as a division, therefore, leads to misconception; for it -co-ordinates the several parts or sciences one beside another, as if -they had no innate development, but were, like so many species, really -and radically distinct. - - -[1] The journal, too, edited by Thomson is called 'Annals of -Philosophy; or, Magazine of Chemistry, Mineralogy, Mechanics, Natural -History, Agriculture, and Arts.' We can easily guess from the title -what sort of subjects are here to be understood under the term -'philosophy.' Among the advertisements of books just published, I -lately found the following notice in an English newspaper: 'The Art of -Preserving the Hair, on Philosophical Principles, neatly printed in -post 8vo, price seven shillings.' By philosophical principles for the -preservation of the hair are probably meant chemical or physiological -principles. - - -[2] In connexion with the general principles of Political Economy, -the term 'philosophical' is frequently heard from the lips of English -statesmen, even in their public speeches. In the House of Commons, on -the 2nd Feb. 1825, Brougham, speaking oh the address in reply to the -speech from the throne, talked of 'the statesman-like and philosophical -principles of Free-trade,--for philosophical they undoubtedly are--upon -the acceptance of which his majesty this day congratulated the House.' -Nor is this language confined to members of the Opposition. At the -shipowners' yearly dinner in the same month, under the chairmanship -of the Premier Lord Liverpool, supported by Canning the Secretary of -State, and Sir C. Long the Paymaster-General of the Army, Canning -in reply to the toast which had been proposed said: 'A period has -just begun, in which ministers have it in their power to apply to -the administration of this country the sound maxims of a profound -philosophy.' Differences there may be between English and German -philosophy: still, considering that elsewhere the name of philosophy -is used only as a nickname and insult, or as something odious, it is -a matter of rejoicing to see it still honoured in the mouth of the -English Government. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -PRELIMINARY NOTION. - - -19.] LOGIC IS THE SCIENCE OF THE PURE IDEA; pure, that is, because the -Idea is in the abstract medium of Thought. - -This definition, and the others which occur in these introductory -outlines, are derived from a survey of the whole system, to which -accordingly they are subsequent. The same remark applies to all -prefatory notions whatever about philosophy. - -Logic might have been defined as the science of thought, and of its -laws and characteristic forms. But thought, as thought, constitutes -only the general medium, or qualifying circumstance, which renders -the Idea distinctively logical. If we identify the Idea with thought, -thought must not be taken in the sense of a method or form, but in the -sense of the self-developing totality of its laws and peculiar terms. -These laws are the work of thought itself, and not a fact which it -finds and must submit to. - -From different points of view, Logic is either the hardest or the -easiest of the sciences, Logic is hard, because it has to deal not with -perceptions, nor, like geometry, with abstract representations of the -senses, but with pure abstractions; and because it demands a force and -facility of withdrawing into pure thought, of keeping firm hold on it, -and of moving in such an element. Logic is easy, because its facts are -nothing but our own thought and its familiar forms or terms: and these -are the acme of simplicity, the abc of everything else. They are also -what we are best acquainted with: such as, 'Is' and 'Is not': quality -and magnitude: being potential and being actual: one, many, and so on. -But such an acquaintance only adds to the difficulties of the study; -for while, on the one hand, we naturally think it is not worth our -trouble to occupy ourselves any longer with things so familiar, on the -other hand, the problem is to become acquainted with them in a new way, -quite opposite to that in which we know them already. - -The utility of Logic is a matter which concerns its bearings upon the -student, and the training it may give for other purposes. This logical -training consists in the exercise in thinking which the student has -to go through (this science is the thinking of thinking): and in the -fact that he stores his head with thoughts, in their native unalloyed -character. It is true that Logic, being the absolute form of truth, and -another name for the very truth itself, is something more than merely -useful. Yet if what is noblest, most liberal and most independent is -also most useful, Logic has some claim to the latter character. Its -utility must then be estimated at another rate than exercise in thought -for the sake of the exercise. - -(1) The first question is: What is the object of our science? The -simplest and most intelligible answer to this question is that Truth -is the object of Logic. Truth is a noble word, and the thing is nobler -still. So long as man is sound at heart and in spirit, the search for -truth must awake all the enthusiasm of his nature. But immediately -there steps in the objection--Are _we_ able to know truth? There -seems to be a disproportion between finite beings like ourselves and -the truth which is absolute: and doubts suggest themselves whether -there is any bridge between the finite and the infinite. God is -truth: how shall we know Him? Such an undertaking appears to stand in -contradiction with the graces of lowliness and humility.--Others who -ask whether we can know the truth have a different purpose. They want -to justify themselves in living on contented with their petty, finite -aims. And humility of this stamp is a poor thing. - -But the time is past when people asked: How shall I, a poor worm of the -dust, be able to know the truth? And in its stead we find vanity and -conceit: people claim, without any trouble on their part, to breathe -the very atmosphere of truth. The young have been flattered into the -belief that they possess a natural birthright of moral and religious -truth. And in the same strain, those of riper years are declared to -be sunk, petrified, ossified in falsehood. Youth, say these teachers, -sees the bright light of dawn: but the older generation lies in the -slough and mire of the common day. They admit that the special sciences -are something that certainly ought to be cultivated, but merely as -the means to satisfy the needs of outer life. In all this it is not -humility which holds back from the knowledge and study of the truth, -but a conviction that we are already in full possession of it. And no -doubt the young carry with them the hopes of their elder compeers; on -them rests the advance of the world and science. But these hopes are -set upon the young, only on the condition that, instead of remaining as -they are, they undertake the stern labour of mind. - -This modesty in truth-seeking has still another phase: and that is the -genteel indifference to truth, as we see it in Pilate's conversation -with Christ. Pilate asked 'What is truth?' with the air of a man who -had settled accounts with everything long ago, and concluded that -nothing particularly matters:--he meant much the same as Solomon when -he says: 'All is vanity.' When it comes to this, nothing is left but -self-conceit. - -The knowledge of the truth meets an additional obstacle in timidity. -A slothful mind finds it natural to say: 'Don't let it be supposed -that we mean to be in earnest with our philosophy. We shall be glad -_inter alia_ to study Logic: but Logic must be sure to leave us as -we were before.' People have a feeling that, if thinking passes the -ordinary range of our ideas and impressions, it cannot but be on the -evil road. They seem to be trusting themselves to a sea on which they -will be tossed to and fro by the waves of thought, till at length they -again reach the sandbank of this temporal scene, as utterly poor as -when they left it. What coines of such a view, we see in the world. It -is possible within these limits to gain varied information and many -accomplishments, to become a master of official routine, and to be -trained for special purposes. But it is quite another thing to educate -the spirit for the higher life and to devote our energies to its -service. In our own day it may be hoped a longing for something better -has sprung up among the young, so that they will not be contented with -the mere straw of outer knowledge. - -(2) It is universally agreed that thought is the object of Logic. But -of thought our estimate may be very mean, or it may be very high. On -one hand, people say: 'It is _only_ a thought.' In their view thought -is subjective, arbitrary and accidental--distinguished from the thing -itself, from the true and the real. On the other hand, a very high -estimate may be formed of thought; when thought alone is held adequate -to attain the highest of all things, the nature of God, of which the -senses can tell us nothing. God is a spirit, it is said, and must be -worshipped in spirit and in truth. But the merely felt and sensible, -we admit, is not the spiritual; its heart of hearts is in thought; -and only spirit can know spirit. And though it is true that spirit -can demean itself as feeling and sense--as is the case in religion, -the mere feeling, as a mode of consciousness, is one thing, and its -contents another. Feeling, as feeling, is the general form of the -sensuous nature which we have in common with the brutes. This form, -viz. feeling, may possibly seize and appropriate the full organic -truth: but the form has no real congruity with its contents. The form -of feeling is the lowest in which spiritual truth can be expressed. -The world of spiritual existences, God himself, exists in proper -truth, only in thought and as thought. If this be so, there fore, -thought, far from being a mere thought, is the highest and, in strict -accuracy, the sole mode of apprehending the eternal and absolute. - -As of thought, so also of the science of thought, a very high or a -very low opinion may be formed. Any man, it is supposed, can think -without Logic, as he can digest without studying physiology. If he -have studied Logic, he thinks afterwards as he did before, perhaps -more methodically, but with little alteration. If this were all, and -if Logic did no more than make men acquainted with the action of -thought as the faculty of comparison and classification, it would -produce nothing which had not been done quite as well before. And in -point of fact Logic hitherto had no other idea of its duty than this. -Yet to be well-informed about thought, even as a mere activity of the -subject-mind, is honourable and interesting for man. It is in knowing -what he is and what he does, that man is distinguished from the brutes. -But we may take the higher estimate of thought--as what alone can get -really in touch with the supreme and true. In that case, Logic as the -science of thought occupies a high ground. If the science of Logic -then considers thought in its action and its productions (and thought -being no resultless energy produces thoughts and the particular thought -required), the theme of Logic is in general the supersensible world, -and to deal with that theme is to dwell for a while in that world. -Mathematics is concerned with the abstractions of time and space. But -these are still the object of sense, although the sensible is abstract -and idealised. Thought bids adieu even to this last and abstract -sensible: it asserts its own native independence, renounces the field -of the external and internal sense, and puts away the interests and -inclinations of the individual. When Logic takes this ground, it is a -higher science than we are in the habit of supposing. - -(3) The necessity of understanding Logic in a deeper sense than as -the science of the mere form of thought is enforced by the interests -of religion and politics, of law and morality. In earlier days men -meant no harm by thinking: they thought away freely and fearlessly. -They thought about God, about Nature, and the State; and they felt -sure that a knowledge of the truth was obtainable through thought -only, and not through the senses or any random ideas or opinions. -But while they so thought, the principal ordinances of life began -to be seriously affected by their conclusions. Thought deprived -existing institutions of their force. Constitutions fell a victim to -thought: religion was assailed by thought: firm religious beliefs -which had been always looked upon as revelations were undermined, and -in many minds the old faith was upset. The Greek philosophers, for -example, became antagonists of the old religion, and destroyed its -beliefs. Philosophers were accordingly banished or put to death, as -revolutionists who had subverted religion and the state, two things -which were inseparable. Thought, in short, made itself a power in the -real world, and exercised enormous influence. The matter ended by -drawing attention to the influence of thought, and its claims were -submitted to a more rigorous scrutiny, by which the world professed to -find that thought arrogated too much and was unable to perform what -it had undertaken. It had not--people said--learned the real being of -God, of Nature and Mind. It had not learned what the truth was. What -it had done, was to overthrow religion and the state. It became urgent -therefore to justify thought, with reference to the results it had -produced: and it is this examination into the nature of thought and -this justification which in recent times has constituted one of the -main problems of philosophy. - -20.] If we take our _prima facie_ impression of thought, we find on -examination first (a) that, in its usual subjective acceptation, -thought is one out of many activities or faculties of the mind, -co-ordinate with such others as sensation, perception, imagination, -desire, volition, and the like. The product of this activity, the form -or character peculiar to thought, is the UNIVERSAL, or, in general, -the abstract. Thought, regarded as an _activity,_ may be accordingly -described as the _active_ universal, and, since the deed, its product, -is the universal once more, may be called a self-actualising universal. -Thought conceived as a _subject_ (agent) is a thinker, and the subject -existing as a thinker is simply denoted by the term 'I.' - -The propositions giving an account of thought in this and the following -sections are not offered as assertions or opinions of mine on the -matter. But in these preliminary chapters any deduction or proof would -be impossible, and the statements may be taken as matters in evidence. -In other words, every man, when he thinks and considers his thoughts, -will discover by the experience of his consciousness that they possess -the character of universality as well as the other aspects of thought -to be afterwards enumerated. We assume of course that his powers of -attention and abstraction have undergone a previous training, enabling -him to observe correctly the evidence of his consciousness and his -conceptions. - -This introductory exposition has already alluded to the distinction -between Sense, Conception, and Thought. As the distinction is of -capital importance for understanding the nature and kinds of knowledge, -it will help to explain matters if we here call attention to it. For -the explanation of _Sense,_ the readiest method certainly is, to refer -to its external source--the organs of sense. But to name the organ -does not help much to explain what is apprehended by it. The real -distinction between sense and thought lies in this--that the essential -feature of the sensible is individuality, and as the individual (which, -reduced to its simplest terms, is the atom) is also a member of a -group, sensible existence presents a number of mutually exclusive -units,--of units, to speak in more definite and abstract formulae, -which exist side by side with, and after, one another. _Conception_ or -picture-thinking works with materials from the same sensuous source. -But these materials when _conceived_ are expressly characterised as in -me and therefore mine: and secondly, as universal, or simple, because -only referred to self. Nor is sense the only source of materialised -conception. There are conceptions constituted by materials emanating -from self-conscious thought, such as those of law, morality, religion, -and even of thought itself, and it requires some effort to detect -wherein lies the difference between such conceptions and thoughts -having the same import. For it is a thought of which such conception is -the vehicle, and there is no want of the form of universality, without -which no content could be in me, or be a conception at all. Yet here -also the peculiarity of conception is, generally speaking, to be sought -in the individualism or isolation of its contents. True it is that, for -example, law and legal provisions do not exist in a sensible space, -mutually excluding one another. Nor as regards time, though they appear -to some extent in succession, are their contents themselves conceived -as affected by time, or as transient and changeable in it. The fault -in conception lies deeper. These ideas, though implicitly possessing -the organic unity of mind, stand isolated here and there on the broad -ground of conception, with its inward and abstract generality. Thus -cut adrift, each is simple, unrelated: Right, Duty, God. Conception in -these circumstances either rests satisfied with declaring that Right -is Right, God is God: or in a higher grade of culture, it proceeds to -enunciate the attributes; as, for instance, God is the Creator of the -world, omniscient, almighty, &c. In this way several isolated, simple -predicates are strung together: but in spite of the link supplied -by their subject, the predicates never get beyond mere contiguity. -In this point Conception coincides with Understanding: the only -distinction being that the latter introduces relations of universal -and particular, of cause and effect, &c., and in this way supplies a -necessary connexion to the isolated ideas of conception; which last has -left them side by side in its vague mental spaces, connected only by a -bare 'and.' - -The difference between conception and thought is of special importance: -because philosophy may be said to do nothing but transform conceptions -into thoughts,--though it works the further transformation of a mere -thought into a notion. - -Sensible existence has been characterised by the attributes of -individuality and mutual exclusion of the members. It is well to -remember that these very attributes of sense are thoughts and general -terms. It will be shown in the Logic that thought (and the universal) -is not a mere opposite of sense: it lets nothing escape it, but, -outflanking its other, is at once that other and itself. Now language -is the work of thought: and hence all that is expressed in language -must be universal. What I only mean or suppose is mine: it belongs -to me,--this particular individual. But language expresses nothing -but universality; and so I cannot say what I merely _mean._ And the -unutterable,--feeling or sensation,--far from being the highest truth, -is the most unimportant and untrue. If I say 'The individual,' 'This -individual,' 'here,' 'now,' all these are universal terms. Everything -and anything is an individual, a 'this,' and if it be sensible, is -here and now. Similarly when I say, 'I,' I _mean_ my single self to -the exclusion of all others: but what I _say,_ viz. 'I,' is just -every 'I,' which in like manner excludes all others from itself. In -an awkward expression which Kant used, he said that I _accompany_ -all my conceptions,--sensations, too, desires, actions, &c. 'I' is -in essence and act the universal: and such partnership is a form, -though an external form, of universality. All other men have it in -common with me to be 'I': just as it is common to all my sensations -and conceptions to be mine. But 'I,' in the abstract, as such, is the -mere act of self-concentration or self-relation, in which we make -abstraction from all conception and feeling, from every state of mind -and every peculiarity of nature, talent, and experience. To this -extent, 'I' is the existence of a wholly _abstract_ universality, a -principle of abstract freedom. Hence thought, viewed as a subject, is -what is expressed by the word 'I': and since I am at the same time in -all my sensations, conceptions, and states of consciousness, thought -is everywhere present, and is a category that runs through all these -modifications. - -Our first impression when we use the term thought is of a subjective -activity--one amongst many similar faculties, such as memory, -imagination and will. Were thought merely an activity of the -subject-mind and treated under that aspect by logic, logic would -resemble the other sciences in possessing a well-marked object. It -might in that case seem arbitrary to devote a special science to -thought, whilst will, imagination and the rest were denied the same -privilege. The selection of one faculty however might even in this view -be very well grounded on a certain authority acknowledged to belong to -thought, and on its claim to be regarded as the true nature of man, in -which consists his distinction from the brutes. Nor is it unimportant -to study thought even as a subjective energy. A detailed analysis -of its nature would exhibit rules and laws, a knowledge of which is -derived from experience. A treatment of the laws of thought, from this -point of view, used once to form the body of logical science. Of that -science Aristotle was the founder. He succeeded in assigning to thought -what properly belongs to it. Our thought is extremely concrete: but -in its composite contents we must distinguish the part that properly -belongs to thought, or to the abstract mode of its action. A subtle -spiritual bond, consisting in the agency of thought, is what gives -unity to all these contents, and it was this bond, the form as form, -that Aristotle noted and described. Up to the present day, the logic -of Aristotle continues to be the received system. It has indeed been -spun out to greater length, especially by the labours of the medieval -Schoolmen who, without making any material additions, merely refined -in details. The moderns also have left their mark upon this logic, -partly by omitting many points of logical doctrine due to Aristotle and -the Schoolmen, and partly by foisting in a quantity of psychological -matter. The purport of the science is to become acquainted with the -procedure of finite thought: and, if it is adapted to its pre-supposed -object, the science is entitled to be styled correct. The study of this -formal logic undoubtedly has its uses. It sharpens the wits, as the -phrase goes, and teaches us to collect our thoughts and to abstract ---whereas in common consciousness we have to deal with sensuous -conceptions which cross and perplex one another. Abstraction moreover -implies the concentration of the mind on a single point, and thus -induces the habit of attending to our inward selves. An acquaintance -with the forms of finite thought may be made a means of training the -mind for the empirical sciences, since their method is regulated by -these forms: and in this sense logic has been designated Instrumental. -It is true, we may be still more liberal, and say: Logic is to be -studied not for its utility, but for its own sake; the super-excellent -is not to be sought for the sake of mere utility. In one sense this is -quite correct: but it may be replied that the super-excellent is also -the most useful: because it is the all-sustaining principle which, -having a subsistence of its own, may therefore serve as the vehicle of -special ends which it furthers and secures. And thus, special ends, -though they have no right to be set first, are still fostered by the -presence of the highest good. Religion, for instance, has an absolute -value of its own; yet at the same time other ends flourish and succeed -in its train. As Christ says: 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and -all these things shall be added unto you.' Particular ends can be -attained only in the attainment of what absolutely is and exists in its -own right. - -21.] (b) Thought was described as active. We now, in the second place, -consider this action in its bearings upon objects, or as reflection -upon something. In this case the universal or product of its operation -contains the value of the thing--is the essential, inward, and true. - -In § 5 the old belief was quoted that the reality in object, -circumstance, or event, the intrinsic worth or essence, the thing on -which everything depends, is not a self-evident datum of consciousness, -or coincident with the first appearance and impression of the object; -that, on the contrary, Reflection is required in order to discover the -real constitution of the object--and that by such reflection it will be -ascertained. - -To reflect is a lesson which even the child has to learn. One of his -first lessons is to join adjectives with substantives. This obliges -him to attend and distinguish: he has to remember a rule and apply it -to the particular case. This rule is nothing but a universal: and the -child must see that the particular adapts itself to this universal. -In life, again, we have ends to attain. And with regard to these we -ponder which is the best way to secure them. The end here represents -the universal or governing principle: and we have means and instruments -whose action we regulate in conformity to the end. In the same way -reflection is active in questions of conduct. To reflect here means to -recollect the right, the duty,--the universal which serves as a fixed -rule' to guide our behaviour in the given case. Our particular act -must imply and recognise the universal law.--We find the same thing -exhibited in our study of natural phenomena. For instance, we observe -thunder and lightning. The phenomenon is a familiar one, and we often -perceive it. But man is not content with a bare acquaintance, or with -the fact as it appears to the senses; he would like to get behind the -surface, to know what it is, and to comprehend it. This leads him to -reflect: he seeks to find out the cause as something distinct from -the mere phenomenon: he tries to know the inside in its distinction -from the outside. Hence the phenomenon becomes double, it splits into -inside and outside, into force and its manifestation, into cause and -effect. Once more we find the inside or the force identified with the -universal and permanent: not this or that flash of lightning, this -or that plant--but that which continues the same in them all. The -sensible appearance is individual and evanescent: the permanent in -it is discovered by. reflection. Nature shows us a countless number -of individual forms and phenomena. Into this variety we feel a need -of introducing unity: we compare, consequently, and try to find the -universal of each single case. Individuals are born and perish: the -species abides and recurs in them all: and its existence is only -visible to reflection. Under the same head fall such laws as those -regulating the motion of the heavenly bodies. To-day we see the stars -here, and to-morrow there: and our mind finds something incongruous, in -this chaos--something in which it can put no faith, because it believes -in order and in a simple, constant, and universal law. Inspired by this -belief, the mind has directed its reflection towards the phenomena, -and learnt their laws. In other words, it has established the movement -of the heavenly bodies to be in accordance with a universal law from -which every change of position may be known and predicted. The case is -the same with the influences which make themselves felt in the infinite -complexity of human conduct. There, too, man has the belief in the sway -of a general principle.--From all these examples it may be gathered -how reflection is always seeking for something fixed and permanent, -definite in itself and governing the particulars. This universal which -cannot be apprehended by the senses counts as the true and essential. -Thus, duties and rights are all-important in the matter of conduct: and -an action is true when it conforms to those universal formulae. - -In thus characterising the universal, we become aware of its antithesis -to something else. This something else is the merely immediate, -outward and individual, as opposed to the mediate, inward and -universal. The universal does not exist externally to the outward eye -as a universal. The kind as kind cannot be perceived: the laws of the -celestial motions are not written on the sky. The universal is neither -seen nor heard, its existence is only for the mind. Religion leads us -to a universal, which embraces all else within itself, to an Absolute -by which all else is brought into being: and this Absolute is an object -not of the senses but of the mind and of thought. - -22.] (c) By the act of reflection something is _altered_ in the way in -which the fact was originally presented in sensation, perception, or -conception. Thus, as it appears, an alteration of the object must be -interposed before its true nature can be discovered. - -What reflection elicits, is a product of our thought. Solon, for -instance, produced out of his head the laws he gave to the Athenians. -This is half of the truth: but we must not on that account forget -that the universal (in Solon's case, the laws) is the very reverse of -merely subjective, or fail to note that it is the essential, true, -and objective being of things. To discover the truth in things, -mere attention is not enough; we must call in the action of our own -faculties to transform what is immediately before us. Now, at first -sight, this seems an inversion of the natural order, calculated to -thwart the very purpose on which knowledge is bent. But the method is -not so irrational as it seems. It has been the conviction of every age -that the only way of reaching the permanent substratum was to transmute -the given phenomenon by means of reflection. In modern times a doubt -has for the first time been raised on this point in connexion with the -difference alleged to exist between the products of our thought and the -things in their own nature. This real nature of things, it is said, -is very different from what we make out of them. The divorce between -thought and thing is mainly the work of the Critical Philosophy, -and runs counter to the conviction of all previous ages, that their -agreement was a matter of course. The antithesis between them is -the hinge on which modern philosophy turns. Meanwhile the natural -belief of men gives the lie to it. In common life we reflect, without -particularly reminding ourselves that this is the process of arriving -at the truth, and we think without hesitation, and in the firm belief -that thought coincides with thing. And this belief is of the greatest -importance. It marks the diseased state of the age when we see it adopt -the despairing creed that our knowledge is only subjective, and that -beyond this subjective we cannot go. Whereas, rightly understood, truth -is objective, and ought so to regulate the conviction of every one, -that the conviction of the individual is stamped as wrong when it does -not agree with this rule. Modern views, on the contrary, put great -value on the mere fact of conviction, and hold that to be convinced is -good for its own sake, whatever be the burden of our conviction,--there -being no standard by which we can measure its truth. - -We said above that, according to the old belief, it was the -characteristic right of the mind to know the truth. If this be so, it -also implies that everything we know both of outward and inward nature, -in one word, the objective world, is in its own self the same as it is -in thought, and that to think is to bring out the truth of our object, -be it what it may. The business of philosophy is only to bring into -explicit consciousness what the world in all ages has believed about -thought. Philosophy therefore advances nothing new; and our present -discussion has led us to a conclusion which agrees with the natural -belief of mankind. - -23.] (d) The real nature of the object is brought to light in -reflection; but it is no less true that this exertion of thought is -_my_ act. If this be so, the real nature is a _product_ of _my_ mind, -in its character of thinking subject--generated by me in my simple -universality, self-collected and removed from extraneous influences, ---in one word, in my Freedom. - -Think for yourself, is a phrase which people often use as if it had -some special significance. The fact is, no man can think for another, -any more than he can eat or drink for him: and the expression is a -pleonasm. To think is in fact _ipso facto_ to be free, for thought as -the action of the universal is an abstract relating of self to self, -where, being at home with ourselves, and as regards our subjectivity, -utterly blank, our consciousness is, in the matter of its contents, -only in the fact and its characteristics. If this be admitted, and -if we apply the term humility or modesty to an attitude where our -subjectivity is not allowed to interfere by act or quality, it is -easy to appreciate the question touching the humility or modesty and -pride of philosophy. For in point of contents, thought is only true in -proportion as it sinks itself in the facts; and in point of form it -is no private or particular state or act of the subject, but rather -that attitude of consciousness where the abstract self, freed from -all the special limitations to which its ordinary states or qualities -are liable, restricts itself to that universal action in which it is -identical with all individuals. In these circumstances philosophy may -be acquitted of the charge of pride. And when Aristotle summons the -mind to rise to the dignity of that attitude, the dignity he seeks is -won by letting slip all our individual opinions and prejudices, and -submitting to the sway of the fact. - -24.] With these explanations and qualifications, thoughts may be termed -Objective Thoughts,--among which are also to be included the forms -which are more especially discussed in the common logic, where they are -usually treated as forms of conscious thought only. _Logic therefore -coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in -thoughts,_--thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality -of things. - -An exposition of the relation in which such forms as notion, judgment, -and syllogism stand to others, such as causality, is a matter for the -science itself. But this much is evident beforehand. If thought tries -to form a notion of things, this notion (as well as its proximate -phases, the judgment and syllogism) cannot be composed of articles and -relations which are alien and irrelevant to the things. Reflection, it -was said above, conducts to the universal of things: which universal -is itself one of the constituent factors of a notion. To say that -Reason or Understanding is in the world, is equivalent in its import -to the phrase 'Objective Thought.' The latter phrase however has the -inconvenience that thought is usually confined to express what belongs -to the mind or consciousness only, while objective is a term applied, -at least primarily, only to the non-mental. - -(1) To speak of thought or objective thought as the heart [and soul -of the world, may seem to be ascribing consciousness to the things of -nature. We feel a certain repugnance against making thought the inward -function of things, especially as we speak of thought as marking the -divergence of man from nature. It would be necessary, therefore, if -we use the term thought at all, to speak of nature as the system of -unconscious thought, or, to use Schelling's expression, a petrified -intelligence. And in order to prevent misconception, thought-form or -thought-type should be substituted for the ambiguous term thought. - -From what has been said the principles of logic are to be sought -in a system of thought-types or fundamental categories, in which -the opposition between subjective and objective, in its usual -sense, vanishes. The signification thus attached to thought and its -characteristic forms may be illustrated by the ancient saying that -'νοῧς governs the world,' or by our own phrase that 'Reason is in the -world: which means that Reason is the soul of the world it inhabits, -its immanent principle, its most proper and inward nature, its -universal. Another illustration is offered by the circumstance that -in speaking of some definite animal we say it is (an) animal. Now, -the animal, _quâ_ animal, cannot be shown; nothing can be pointed out -excepting some special animal. Animal, _quâ_ animal, does not exist: it -is merely the universal nature of the individual animals, whilst each -existing animal is a more concretely, defined and particularised thing. -But to be an animal,--the law of kind which is the universal in this -case,--is the property of the particular animal, and constitutes its -definite essence. Take away from the dog its animality, and it becomes -impossible to say what it is. All things have a permanent inward -nature, as well as an outward existence. They live and die, arise and -pass away; but their essential and universal part is the kind; and this -means much more than something _common_ to them all. - -If thought is the constitutive substance of external things, it is also -the universal substance of what is spiritual. In all human perception -thought is present; so too thought is the universal in all the acts of -conception and recollection; in short, in every mental activity, in -willing, wishing and the like. All these faculties are only further, -specialisations of thought. When it is presented in this light, thought -has a different part to play from what it has if we speak of a faculty -of thought, one among a crowd of other faculties, such as perception, -conception and will, with which it stands on the same level. When it -is seen, to be the true universal of all that nature and mind contain, -it extends its scope far beyond all these, and becomes the basis of -everything. From this view of thought, in its objective meaning as -[greek: nous], we may next pass to consider the subjective sense of the -term. We say first, Man is a being that thinks; but we also say at the -same time, Man is a being that perceives and wills. Man is a thinker, -and is universal: but he is a thinker only because he feels his own -universality. The animal too is by implication universal, but the -universal is not consciously felt by it to be universal: it feels only -the individual. The animal sees a singular object, for instance, its -food, or a man. For the animal all this never goes beyond an individual -thing. Similarly, sensation has to do with nothing but singulars, such -as _this_ pain or _this_ sweet taste. Nature does not bring its "νοῦς" -into consciousness: it is man who first makes himself double so as -to be a universal for a universal. This first happens when man knows -that he is 'I.' By the term 'I' I mean myself, a single and altogether -determinate person. And yet I really utter nothing peculiar to myself, -for every one else is an 'I' or 'Ego,' and when I call myself 'I,' -though I indubitably mean the single person myself, I express a -thorough universal. 'I,' therefore, is mere being-for-self, in which -everything peculiar or marked is renounced and buried out of sight; -it is as it were the ultimate and unanalysable point of consciousness -We may say 'I' I and thought are the same, or, more definitely, 'I' -is thought as a thinker. What I have in my consciousness, is for me. -'I' is the vacuum or receptacle for anything and everything: for which -everything is and which stores up everything in itself. Every man is a -whole world of conceptions, that lie buried in the night of the 'Ego.' -It follows that the 'Ego' is the universal in which we leave aside all -that is particular, and in which at the same time all the particulars -have a latent existence. In other words, it is not a mere universality -and nothing more, but the universality which includes in it everything. -Commonly we use the word 'I' without attaching much importance to it, -nor is it an object of study except to philosophical analysis. In the -'Ego,' we have thought before us in its utter purity. While the brute -cannot say 'I,' man can, because it is his nature to think. Now in the -'Ego' there are a variety of contents, derived both from within and -from, without, and according to the nature of these contents our state -may be described as perception, or conception, or reminiscence. But -in all of them the 'I' is found: or in them all thought is present. -Man, therefore, is always thinking, even in his perceptions: if he -observes anything, he always observes it as a universal, fixes on a -single point which he places in relief, thus withdrawing his attention -from other points, and takes it as abstract and universal, even if the -universality be only in form. - -In the case of our ordinary conceptions, two things may happen. Either -the contents are moulded by thought, but not the form: or, the form -belongs to thought and not the contents. In using such terms, for -instance, as anger, rose, hope, I am speaking of things which I have -learnt in the way of sensation, but I express these contents in a -universal mode, that is, in the form of thought. I have left out much -that is particular and given the contents in their generality: but -still the contents remain sense-derived. On the other hand, when I -represent God, the content is undeniably a product of pure thought, -but the form still retains the sensuous limitations which it has as -I find it immediately present in myself. In these generalised images -the content is not merely and simply sensible, as it is in a visual -inspection; but either the content is sensuous and the form appertains -to thought, or _vice versâ._ In the first case the material is given to -us, and our thought supplies the form: in the second case the content -which has its source in thought is by means of the form turned into a -something given, which accordingly reaches the mind from without. - -(2) Logic is the study of thought pure and simple, or of the pure -thought-forms. In the ordinary sense of the term, by thought we -generally represent to ourselves something more than simple and -unmixed thought; we mean some thought, the material of which is from -experience. Whereas in logic a thought is understood to include nothing -else but what depends on thinking and what thinking has brought into -existence. It is in these circumstances that thoughts are _pure_ -thoughts. The mind is then in its own home-element and therefore free: -for freedom means that the other thing with which you deal is a second -self--so that you never leave your own ground but give the law to -yourself. In the impulses or appetites the beginning is from something -else, from something which we feel to be external. In this case then -we speak of dependence. For freedom it is necessary that we should -feel no presence of something else which is not ourselves. The natural -man, whose motions follow the rule only of his appetites, is not his -own master. Be he as self-willed as he may, the constituents of his -will and opinion are not his own, and his freedom is merely formal. -But when we _think,_ we renounce our selfish and particular being, -sink ourselves in the thing, allow thought to follow its own course, -and,--if we add anything of our own, we think ill. - -If in pursuance of the foregoing remarks we consider-, Logic to be -the system of the pure types of thought, we find that the other -philosophical sciences, the Philosophy of I Nature and the Philosophy -of Mind, take the place, as it were, of an Applied Logic, and that -Logic is the soul which animates them both. Their problem in that -case is only to recognise the logical forms under the shapes they -assume in Nature and Mind,--shapes which are only a particular mode -of expression for the forms of pure thought. If for instance we take -the syllogism (not as it was understood in the old formal logic, but -at its real value), we shall find it gives expression to the law that -the particular is the middle term which fuses together the extremes of -the universal and the singular. The syllogistic form is a universal -form of all things. Everything that exists is a particular, which -couples together the universal and the singular. But Nature is weak -and fails to exhibit the logical forms in their purity. Such a feeble -exemplification of the syllogism may be seen in the magnet. In the -middle or point of indifference of a magnet, its two poles, however -they may be distinguished, are brought into one. Physics also teaches -us to see the universal or essence in Nature: and the only difference -between it and the Philosophy of Nature is that the latter brings -before our mind the adequate forms of the notion in the physical world. - -It will now be understood that Logic is the all-animating spirit of -all the sciences, and its categories the spiritual hierarchy. They -are the heart and centre of things: and yet at the same time they -are always on our lips, and, apparently at least, perfectly familiar -objects. But things thus familiar are usually the greatest strangers. -Being, for example, is a category of pure thought: but to make 'Is' -an object of investigation never occurs to us. Common fancy puts the -Absolute far away in a world beyond. The Absolute is rather directly -before us, so present that so long as we think, we must, though without -express consciousness of it, always carry it with us and always use it. -Language is the main depository of these types of thought; and one use -of the grammatical instruction which children receive is unconsciously -to turn their attention to distinctions of thought. - -Logic is usually said to be concerned with forms _only_ and to derive -the material for them from elsewhere. But this 'only,' which assumes -that the logical thoughts are nothing in comparison with the rest -of the contents, is not the word to use about forms which are the -absolutely-real ground of everything. Everything else rather is an -'only' compared with these thoughts. To make such abstract forms a -problem pre-supposes in the inquirer a higher level of culture than -ordinary; and to study them in themselves and for their own sake -signifies in addition that these thought-types must be deduced out of -thought itself, and their truth or reality examined by the light of -their own laws. We do not assume them as data from without, and then -define them or exhibit their value and authority by comparing them with -the shape they take in our minds. If we thus acted, we should proceed -from observation and experience, and should, for instance, say we -habitually employ the term 'force' in such a case, and such a meaning. -A definition like that would be called correct, if it agreed with the -conception of its object present in our ordinary state of mind. The -defect of this empirical method is that a notion is not defined as it -is in and for itself, but in terms of something assumed, which is then -used as a criterion and standard of correctness. No such test need be -applied: we have merely to let the thought-forms follow the impulse of -their own organic life. - -To ask if a category is true or not, must sound strange to the ordinary -mind: for a category apparently becomes true only when it is applied -to a given object, and apart from this application it would seem -meaningless to inquire into its truth. But this is the very question on -which everything turns. We must however in the first place understand -clearly what we mean by Truth. In common life truth means the agreement -of an object with our conception of it. We thus pre-suppose an object -to which our conception must conform. In the philosophical sense of the -word, on the other hand, truth may be described, in general abstract -terms, as the agreement of a thought-content with itself. This meaning -is quite different from the one given above. At the same time the -deeper and philosophical meaning of truth can be partially traced even -in the ordinary usage of language. Thus we speak of a true friend; by -which we mean a friend whose manner of conduct accords with the notion -of friendship. In the same way we speak of a true work of Art. Untrue -in this sense means the same as bad, or self-discordant. In this sense -a bad state is an untrue state; and evil and untruth may be said to -consist in the contradiction subsisting between the function or notion -and the existence of the object. Of such a bad object we may form -a correct representation, but the import of such representation is -inherently false. Of these correctnesses; which are at the same time -untruths, we may have many in our heads.--God alone is the thorough -harmony of notion and reality. All finite things involve an untruth: -they have a notion and an existence, but their existence does not meet -the requirements of the notion. For this reason they must perish, and -then the incompatibility between their notion and their existence -becomes manifest. It is in the kind that the individual animal has its -notion: and the kind liberates itself from this individuality by death. - -The study of truth, or, as it is here explained to mean, consistency, -constitutes the proper problem of logic. In our every-day mind we -are never troubled with questions about the truth of the forms of -thought.--We may also express the problem of logic by saying that it -examines the forms of thought touching their capability to hold truth. -And the question comes to this: What are the forms of the infinite, and -what are the forms of the finite? Usually no suspicion attaches to the -finite forms of thought; they are allowed to pass unquestioned. But it -is from conforming to finite categories in thought and action that all -deception originates. - -(3) Truth may be ascertained by several methods, each of which however -is no more than a form. Experience is the first of these methods. But -the method is only a form: it has no intrinsic value of its own. For -in experience everything depends upon the mind we bring to bear upon -actuality. A great mind is great in its experience; and in the motley -play of phenomena at once perceives the point of real significance. The -idea is present, in actual shape, not something, as it were, over the -hill and far away. The genius of a Goethe, for example, looking into -nature or history, has great experiences, catches sight of the living -principle, and gives expression to it. A second method of apprehending -the truth is Reflection, which defines it by intellectual relations of -condition and conditioned. But in these two modes the absolute truth -has not yet found its appropriate form. The most perfect method of -knowledge proceeds in the pure form of thought: and here the attitude -of man is one of entire freedom. - -That the form of thought is the perfect form, and that it presents -the truth as it intrinsically and actually is, is the general dogma -of all philosophy. To give a proof of the dogma there is, in the -first instance, nothing to do but show that these other forms of -knowledge are finite. The grand Scepticism of antiquity accomplished -this task when it exhibited the contradictions contained in every -one of these forms. That Scepticism indeed went further: but when -it ventured to assail the forms of reason, it began by insinuating -under them something finite upon which it might fasten. All the -forms of finite thought will make their appearance in the course of -logical development, the order in which they present themselves being -determined by necessary laws. Here in the introduction they could only -be unscientifically assumed as something given. In the theory of logic -itself these forms will be exhibited, not only on their negative, but -also on their positive side. - -When we compare the different forms of ascertaining truth with one -another, the first of them, immediate knowledge, may perhaps seem the -finest, noblest and most appropriate. It includes everything which -the moralists term innocence as well as religious feeling, simple -trust, love, fidelity, and natural faith. The two other forms, first -reflective, and secondly philosophical cognition, must leave that -unsought natural harmony behind. And so far as they have this in -common, the methods which claim to apprehend the truth by thought -may naturally be regarded as part and parcel of the pride which leads -man to trust to his own powers for a knowledge of the truth. Such a -position involves a thorough-going disruption, and, viewed in that -light, might be regarded as the source of all evil and wickedness--the -original transgression. Apparently therefore they only way of being -reconciled and restored to peace is to surrender all claims to think or -know. - -This lapse from natural unity has not escaped notice, and nations from -the earliest times have asked the meaning of the wonderful division of -the spirit against itself. No such inward disunion is found in nature: -natural things do nothing wicked. - -The Mosaic legend of the Fall of Man has preserved an ancient picture -representing the origin and consequences of this disunion. The -incidents of the legend form the basis of an essential article of the -creed, the doctrine of original sin in man and his consequent need of -succour. It may be well at the commencement of logic to examine the -story which treats of the origin and the bearings of the very knowledge -which logic has to discuss. For, though philosophy must not allow -herself to be overawed by religion, or accept the position of existence -on sufferance, she cannot afford to neglect these popular conceptions. -The tales and allegories of religion, which have enjoyed for thousands -of years the veneration of nations, are not to be set aside as -antiquated even now. - -Upon a closer inspection of the story of the Fall we find, as was -already said, that it exemplifies the universal bearings of knowledge -upon the spiritual life. In its instinctive and natural stage, -spiritual life wears the garb of innocence and confiding simplicity: -but the very essence of spirit implies the absorption of this immediate -condition in something higher. The spiritual is distinguished from the -natural, and more especially from the animal, life, in the circumstance -that it does not continue a mere stream of tendency, but sunders itself -to self-realisation. But this position of severed life has in its turn -to be suppressed, and the spirit has by its own act to win its way -to concord again. The final concord then is spiritual; that is, the -principle of restoration is found in thought, and thought only. The -hand that inflicts the wound is also the hand which heals it. - -We are told in our story that Adam and Eve, the first human beings, -the types of humanity, were placed in a garden, where grew a tree of -life and a tree of the knowledge of good and evil. God, it is said, -had forbidden them to eat of the fruit of this latter tree: of the -tree of life for the present nothing further is said. These words -evidently assume that man is not intended to seek knowledge, and ought -to remain in the state of innocence. Other meditative races, it may -be remarked, have held the same belief that the primitive state of -mankind was one of innocence and harmony. Now all this is to a certain -extent correct. The disunion that appears throughout humanity is not -a condition to rest in. But it is a mistake to regard the natural and -immediate harmony as the right state. The mind is not mere instinct: -on the contrary, it essentially involves the tendency to reasoning -and meditation. Childlike innocence no doubt has in it something -fascinating and attractive: but only because it reminds us of what the -spirit must win for itself. The harmoniousness of childhood is a gift -from the hand of nature: the second harmony must spring from the labour -and culture of the spirit. And so the words of Christ, 'Except ye -_become_ as little children,' &c., are very far from telling us that we -must always remain children. - -Again, we find in the narrative of Moses that the occasion which led -man to leave his natural unity is attributed to solicitation from -without. The serpent was the tempter. But the truth is, that the step -into opposition, the awakening of consciousness, follows from the -very nature of man: and the same history repeats itself in every son -of Adam. The serpent represents likeness to God as consisting in the -knowledge of good and evil: and it is just this knowledge in which man -participates when he breaks with the unity of his instinctive being -and eats of the forbidden fruit. The first reflection of awakened -consciousness in men told them that they were naked. This is a naïve -and profound trait. For the sense of shame bears evidence to the -separation of man from his natural and sensuous life. The beasts never -get so far as this separation, and they feel no shame. And it is in -the human feeling of shame that we are to seek the spiritual and moral -origin of dress, compared with which the merely physical need is a -secondary matter. - -Next comes the Curse, as it is called, which God pronounced upon -man. The prominent point in that curse turns chiefly on the contrast -between man and nature. Man must work in the sweat of his brow: and -woman bring forth in sorrow. As to work, if it is the result of the -disunion, it is also the victory over it. The beasts have nothing more -to do but to pick up the materials required to satisfy their wants: man -on the contrary can only satisfy his wants by himself producing and -transforming the necessary means. Thus even in these outside things man -is dealing with himself. - -The story does not close with the expulsion from Paradise. We are -further told, God said, 'Behold Adam is become as one of us, to -know good and evil.' Knowledge is now spoken of as divine, and not, -as before, as something wrong and forbidden. Such words contain a -confutation of the idle talk that philosophy pertains only to the -finitude of the mind. Philosophy is knowledge, and it is through -knowledge that man first realises his original vocation, to be the -image of God. When the record adds that God drove men out of the Garden -of Eden to prevent their eating of the tree of life, it only means -that on his natural side certainly man is finite and mortal, but in -knowledge infinite. - -We all know the theological dogma that man's nature is evil, tainted -with what is called Original Sin. Now while we accept the dogma, we -must give up the setting of incident which represents original sin as -consequent upon an accidental act of the first man. For the very notion -of spirit is enough to show that man is evil by nature, and it is an -error to imagine that he could ever be otherwise. To such extent as man -is and acts like a creature of nature, his whole behaviour is what it -ought not to be. For the spirit it is a duty to be free, and to realise -itself by its own act. Nature is for man only the starting-point which -he has to transform. The theological doctrine of original sin is a -profound truth; but modern enlightenment prefers to believe that man is -naturally good, and that he acts right so long as he continues true to -nature. - -The hour when man leaves the path of mere natural being marks the -difference between him, a self-conscious agent, and the natural world. -But this schism, though it forms a necessary element in the very notion -of spirit, is not the final goal of man. It is to this state of inward -breach that the whole finite action of thought and will belongs. -In that finite sphere man pursues ends of his own and draws from -himself the material of his conduct. While he pursues these aims to -the uttermost, while his knowledge and his will seek himself, his own -narrow self apart from the universal, he is evil; and his evil is to be -subjective. - -We seem at first to have a double evil here: but both are really the -same. Man in so far as he is spirit is not the creature of nature: and -when he behaves as such, and follows the cravings of appetite, he wills -to be so. The natural wickedness of man is therefore unlike the natural -life of animals. A mere natural life may be more exactly defined by -saying that the natural man as such is an individual: for nature in -every part is in the bonds of individualism. Thus when man wills to be -a creature of nature, he wills in the Same degree to be an individual -simply. Yet against such impulsive and appetitive action, due to -the individualism of nature, there also steps in the law or general -principle. This law may either be an external force, or have the form -of divine authority. So long as he continues in his natural state, man -is in bondage to the law.--It is true that among the instincts and -affections of man, there are social or benevolent inclinations, love, -sympathy, and others, reaching beyond his selfish isolation. But so -long as these tendencies are instinctive, their virtual universality -of scope and purport is vitiated by the subjective form which always -allows free play to self-seeking and random action. - -25.] The term 'Objective Thoughts' indicates the _truth_--the truth -which is to be the absolute _object_ of philosophy, and not merely the -goal at which it aims. But the very expression cannot fail to suggest -an opposition, to characterise and appreciate which is the main motive -of the philosophical attitude of the present time, and which forms the -real problem of the question about truth and our means of ascertaining -it. If the thought-forms are vitiated by a fixed antithesis, _i. -e._ if they are only of a finite character, they are unsuitable for -the self-centred universe of truth, and truth can find no adequate -receptacle in thought. Such thought, which--- can produce only limited -and partial categories and I proceed by their means; is what in the -stricter sense of the word is termed Understanding. The finitude, -further, of these categories lies in two points. Firstly, they are only -subjective, and the antithesis of an objective permanently clings to -them. Secondly, they are always of restricted content, and so persist -in antithesis to one another and still more to the Absolute. In order -more fully to explain the position and import here attributed to logic, -the attitudes in which thought is supposed to stand to objectivity will -next be examined by way of further introduction. - -In my Phenomenology of the Spirit, which on that account was at its -publication described as the first part of the System of Philosophy, -the method adopted was to begin with the first and simplest phase of -mind, immediate consciousness, and to show how that stage gradually -of necessity worked onward to the philosophical point of view, the -necessity of that view being proved by the process. But in these -circumstances it was impossible to restrict the quest to the mere form -of consciousness. For the stage of philosophical knowledge is the -richest in material and organisation, and therefore, as it came before -us in the shape of a result, it pre-supposed the existence of the -concrete formations of consciousness, such as individual and social -morality, art and religion. In the development of consciousness, which -at first sight appears limited to the point of form merely, there is -thus at the same time included the development of the matter or of the -objects discussed in the special branches of philosophy. But the latter -process must, so to speak, go on behind consciousness, since those -facts are the essential nucleus which is raised into consciousness. -The exposition accordingly is rendered more intricate, because so much -that properly belongs to the concrete branches is prematurely dragged -into the introduction. The survey which follows in the present work has -even more the inconvenience of being only historical and inferential in -its method. But it tries especially to show how the questions men have -proposed, outside the school, on the nature of Knowledge, Faith and the -like,--questions which they imagine to have no connexion with abstract -thoughts,--are really reducible to the simple categories, which first -get cleared up in Logic. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -FIRST ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY. - - -28.] The first of these attitudes of thought is seen in the method -which has no doubts and no sense of the contradiction in thought, or of -the hostility of thought against itself. It entertains an unquestioning -belief that reflection is the means of ascertaining the truth, and of -bringing the objects before the mind as they really are. And in this -belief it advances straight upon its objects, takes the materials -furnished by sense and perception, and reproduces them from itself as -facts of thought; and then, believing this result to be the truth, the -method is content. Philosophy in its earliest stages, all the sciences, -and even the daily action and movement of consciousness, live in this -faith. - -27.] This method of thought has never become aware, of the antithesis -of subjective and objective: and to that extent there is nothing to -prevent its statements from possessing a genuinely philosophical and -speculative character, though it is just as possible that they may -never get beyond finite categories, or the stage where the antithesis -is still unresolved. In the present introduction the main question -for us is to observe this attitude of thought in its extreme form; -and we shall accordingly first of all examine its second and inferior -aspect as a philosophic system. One of the clearest instances of it, -and one lying nearest to ourselves, may be found in the Metaphysic of -the Past as it subsisted among us previous to the philosophy of Kant. -It is however only in reference to the history of philosophy that this -Metaphysic can be said to belong to the past: the thing is always and -at all places to be found, as the view which the abstract understanding -takes of the objects of reason. And it is in this point that the real -and immediate good lies of a closer examination of its main scope and -its _modus operandi._ - -28.] This metaphysical system took the laws and forms of thought to be -the fundamental laws and forms of things. It assumed that to think a -thing was the means of finding its very self and nature: and to that -extent it occupied higher ground than the Critical. Philosophy which -succeeded it. But in the first instance (i) _these terms of thought -were cut off from their connexion,_ their solidarity; each was believed -valid by itself and capable of serving as a predicate of the truth. It -was the general assumption of this metaphysic that a knowledge of the -Absolute was gained by assigning predicates to it. It neither inquired -what the terms of the understanding specially meant or what they were -worth, nor did it test the method which characterises the Absolute by -the assignment of predicates. - -As an example of such predicates may be taken; Existence, in the -proposition, 'God has existence:' Finitude or Infinity, as in the -question, 'Is the world-finite or infinite?': Simple and Complex, -in the proposition, 'The soul is simple,'--or again, 'The thing is -a unity, a whole,' &c. Nobody asked whether such predicates had any -intrinsic and independent truth, or if the propositional form could be -a form of truth. - -The Metaphysic of the past assumed, as unsophisticated belief always -does that thought apprehends the very self of things, and that things, -to become what they truly are, require to be thought. For Nature and -the human soul are a very Proteus in their perpetual transformations; -and it soon occurs to the observer that the first crude impression of -things is not their essential being.--This is a point of view the very -reverse of the result arrived at by the Critical Philosophy; a result, -of which it may be said, that it bade man go and feed on mere husks and -chaff. - -We must look more closely into the procedure of that old metaphysic. -In the first place it never went beyond the province of the analytic -understanding. Without preliminary inquiry it adopted the abstract -categories of thought and let them rank as predicates of truth. But in -using the term thought we must not forget the difference between finite -or discursive thinking and the thinking which is infinite and rational. -The categories, as they meet us _prima facie_ and in isolation, are -finite forms. But truth is always infinite, and cannot be expressed -or presented to consciousness in finite terms. The phrase _infinite -thought_ may excite surprise, if we adhere to the modern conception -that thought is always limited. But it is, speaking rightly, the very -essence of thought to be infinite. The nominal explanation of calling -a thing finite is that it has an end, that it exists up to a certain -point only, where it comes into contact with, and is limited by, its -other. The finite therefore subsists in reference to its other, which -is its negation and presents itself as its limit. Now thought is always -in its own sphere; its relations are with itself, and it is its own -object. In having a thought for object, I am at home with myself. -The thinking power, the 'I,' is therefore infinite, because, when it -thinks, it is in relation to an object which is itself. Generally -speaking, an object means a something else, a negative confronting me. -But in the case where thought thinks itself, it has an object which -is at the same time no object: in other words, its objectivity is -suppressed and transformed into an idea. Thought, as thought, therefore -in its unmixed nature involves no limits; it is finite only when it -keeps to limited categories, which it believes to be ultimate. Infinite -or speculative thought, on the contrary, while it no less defines, -does in the very act of limiting and defining make that defect vanish. -And so infinity is not, as most frequently happens, to be conceived as -an abstract away and away for ever and ever, but in the simple manner -previously indicated. - -The thinking of the old metaphysical system was finite. Its whole mode -of action was regulated by categories, the limits of which it believed -to be permanently fixed and not subject to any further negation. Thus, -one of its questions was: Has God existence? The question supposes that -existence is an altogether positive term, a sort of _ne plus ultra._ -We shall see however at a later point that existence is by no means a -merely positive term, but one which is toe low for the Absolute Idea, -and unworthy of God. A second question in these metaphysical systems -was: Is the world finite or infinite? The very terms of the question -assume that the finite is a permanent contradictory to the infinite: -and one can easily see that, when they are so opposed, the infinite, -which of course ought to be the whole, only appears as a single aspect -and suffers restriction from the finite. But a restricted infinity is -itself only a finite. In the same way it was asked whether the soul was -simple or composite. Simpleness was, in other words, taken to be an -ultimate characteristic, giving expression to a whole truth. Far from -being so, simpleness is the expression of a half-truth, as one-sided -and abstract as existence:--a term of thought, which, as we shall -hereafter see, is itself untrue and hence unable to hold truth. If the -soul be viewed as merely and abstractly simple, it is characterised in -an inadequate and finite way. - -It was therefore the main question of the pre-Kantian metaphysic to -discover whether predicates of the kind mentioned were to be ascribed -to its objects. Now these predicates are after all only limited -formulae of the understanding which, instead of expressing the truth, -merely impose a limit. More than this, it should be noted that the -chief feature of the method lay in 'assigning' or 'attributing' -predicates to the object that was to be cognised, for example, to -God. But attribution is no more than an external reflection about the -object: the predicates by which the object is to be determined are -supplied from the resources of picture-thought, and are applied in -a mechanical way. Whereas, if we are to have genuine cognition, the -object must characterise its own self and not derive its predicates -from without. Even supposing we follow the method of predicating, the -mind cannot help feeling that predicates of this sort fail to exhaust -the object. From the same point of view the Orientals are quite correct -in calling God the many-named or the myriad-named One. One after -another of these finite categories leaves the soul unsatisfied, and -the Oriental sage is compelled unceasingly to seek for more and more -of such predicates. In finite things it is no doubt the case that they -have to be characterised through finite predicates: and with these -things the understanding finds proper scope for its special action. -Itself finite, it knows only the nature of the finite. Thus, when -I call some action a theft, I have characterised the action in its -essential facts: and such a knowledge is sufficient for the judge. -Similarly, finite things stand to each other as cause and effect, -force and exercise, and when they are apprehended in these categories, -they are known in their finitude. But the objects of reason cannot be -defined by these finite predicates. To try to do so was the defect of -the old metaphysic. - -29.] Predicates of this kind, taken individually, have but a limited -range of meaning, and no one can fail to perceive how inadequate they -are, and how far they fall below the fulness of detail which our -imaginative thought gives, in the case, for example, of God, Mind, or -Nature. Besides, though the fact of their being all predicates of one -subject supplies them with a certain connexion, their several meanings -keep them apart: and consequently each is brought in as a stranger in -relation to the others. - -The first of these defects the Orientals sought to remedy, when, for -example, they defined God by attributing to Him many names; but still -they felt that the number of names would have had to be infinite. - -30.] (2) In the second place, _the metaphysical systems adopted a -wrong criterion._ Their objects were no doubt totalities which in -their own proper selves belong to reason,--that is, to the organised -and systematically-developed universe, of thought. But these -totalities--God, the Soul, the World,--were taken by the metaphysician -as subjects made and ready, to form the basis for an application of -the categories of the understanding. They were assumed from popular -conception. Accordingly popular conception was the only canon for -settling whether or not the predicates were suitable and sufficient. - -31.] The common conceptions of God, the Soul, the World, may be -supposed to afford thought a firm and fast footing. They do not really -do so. Besides having, a particular and subjective character clinging -to them, and thus leaving room for great variety of interpretation, -they themselves first of all require a firm and fast definition by -thought. This may be seen in any of these propositions where the -predicate, or in philosophy the category, is needed to indicate what -the subject, or the conception we start with, is. - -In such a sentence as 'God is eternal,' we begin with the conception of -God, not knowing as yet what he is: to tell us that, is the business of -the predicate. In the principles of logic, accordingly, where the terms -formulating the subject-matter are those of thought only, it is not -merely superfluous to make these categories predicates to propositions -in which God, or, still vaguer, the Absolute, is the subject, but it -would also have the disadvantage of suggesting another canon than -the nature of thought. Besides, the propositional form (and for -proposition, it would be more correct to substitute judgment) is not -suited to express the concrete--and the true is always concrete--or -the speculative. Every judgment is by its form one-sided and, to that -extent, false. - -This metaphysic was not free or objective thinking. Instead of letting -the object freely and spontaneously expound its own characteristics, -metaphysic pre-supposed it ready-made. If any one wishes to know what -free thought means, he must go to Greek philosophy: for Scholasticism, -like these metaphysical systems, accepted its facts, and accepted them -as a dogma from the authority of the Church. We moderns, too, by our -whole up-bringing, have been initiated into ideas which it is extremely -difficult to overstep, on account of their far-reaching significance. -But the ancient philosophers were in a different position. They were -men who lived wholly in the perceptions of the senses, and who, -after their rejection of mythology and its fancies, pre-supposed -nothing but the heaven above and the earth around. In these material, -non-metaphysical surroundings, thought is free and enjoys its own -privacy,--cleared of everything material, and thoroughly at home. This -feeling that we are all our own is characteristic of free thought--of -that voyage into the open, where nothing is below us or above us, and -we stand in solitude with ourselves alone. - -32.] (3) In the third place, _this system of metaphysic turned into -Dogmatism._ When our thought never ranges beyond narrow and rigid -terms, we are forced to assume that of two opposite assertions, such as -were the above propositions, the one must be true and the other false. - -Dogmatism may be most simply described as the contrary of Scepticism. -The ancient Sceptics gave the name of Dogmatism to every philosophy -whatever holding a system of definite doctrine. In this large sense -Scepticism may apply the name even to philosophy which is properly -Speculative. But in the narrower sense, Dogmatism consists in the -tenacity which draws a hard and fast line between certain terms -and others opposite to them. We may see this clearly in the strict -'Either--or': for instance, The world is either finite or infinite; -but one of these two it must be. The contrary of this rigidity is the -characteristic of all Speculative truth. There no such inadequate -formulae are allowed, nor can they possibly exhaust it. These formulae -Speculative truth holds in union as a totality, whereas, Dogmatism -invests them in their isolation with a title to fixity and truth. - -It often happens in philosophy that the half-truth takes its place -beside the whole truth and assumes on its own account the position -of something permanent. But the fact is that the half-truth, instead -of being a fixed or self-subsistent principle, is a mere element -absolved and included in the whole. The metaphysic of understanding is -dogmatic, because it maintains half-truths in their isolation: whereas -the idealism of speculative philosophy carries out the principle of -totality and shows that it can reach beyond the inadequate formularies -of abstract thought. Thus idealism would say:--The soul is neither -finite only, nor infinite only; it is really the one just as much as -the other, and in that way neither the one nor the other. In other -words; such formularies in their isolation are inadmissible, and only -come into account as formative elements in a larger notion. Such -idealism we see even in the ordinary phases of consciousness. Thus we -say of sensible things, that they are changeable: that is, they _are,_ -but it is equally true that they are _not._ We show more obstinacy -in dealing with the categories of the understanding. These are terms -which we believe to be somewhat firmer--or even absolutely firm and -fast. We look upon them as separated from each other by an infinite -chasm, so that opposite categories can never get at each other. The -battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the -understanding has reduced everything. - -33.] The _first_ part of this metaphysic in its systematic form is -Ontology, or the doctrine of the abstract characteristics of Being. -The multitude of these characteristics, and the limits set to their -applicability, are not founded upon any principle. They have in -consequence to be enumerated as experience and circumstances direct, -and the import ascribed to them is founded only upon common sensualised -conceptions, upon assertions that particular words are used in a -particular sense, and even perhaps upon etymology. If experience -pronounces the list to be complete, and if the usage of language, by -its agreement, shows the analysis to be correct, the metaphysician is -satisfied; and the intrinsic and independent truth and necessity of -such characteristics is never made a matter of investigation at all. - -To ask if being, existence, finitude, simplicity, complexity, &c. are -notions intrinsically and independently true, must surprise those who -believe that a question about truth can only concern propositions (as -to whether a notion is or is not with truth to be attributed, as the -phrase is, to a subject), and that falsehood lies in the contradiction -existing between the subject in our ideas, and the notion to be -predicated of it. Now as the notion is concrete, it and every character -of it in general is essentially a self-contained unity of distinct -characteristics. If truth then were nothing more than the absence -of contradiction, it would be first of all necessary in the case of -every-notion to examine whether it, taken individually, did not contain -this sort of intrinsic contradiction. - -34.] The _second_ branch of the metaphysical system was Rational -Psychology or Pneumatology. It dealt with the metaphysical nature of -the Soul,--that is, of the Mind regarded as a thing. It expected to -find immortality in a sphere dominated by the laws of composition, -time, qualitative change, and quantitative increase or decrease. - -The name 'rational,' given to this species of psychology, served -to contrast it with empirical modes of observing the phenomena of -the soul. Rational psychology viewed the soul in its metaphysical -nature, and through the categories supplied by abstract thought. The -rationalists endeavoured to ascertain the inner nature of the soul as -it is in itself and as it is for thought.--In philosophy at present we -hear little of the soul: the favourite term now is mind (spirit). The -two are distinct, soul being as it were the middle term between body -and spirit, or the bond between the two. The mind, as soul, is immersed -in corporeity, and the soul is the animating principle of the body. - -The pre-Kantian metaphysic, we say, viewed the soul as a thing. 'Thing' -is a very ambiguous word. By a thing, we mean, firstly, an immediate -existence, something we represent in sensuous form: and in this meaning -the term has been applied to the soul. Hence the question regarding the -seat of the soul. Of course, if the soul have a seat, it is in space -and sensuously envisaged. So, too, if the soul be viewed as a thing, -we can ask whether the soul is simple or composite. The question is -important as bearing on the immortality of the soul, which is supposed -to depend on the absence of composition. But the fact is, that in -abstract simplicity we have a category, which as little corresponds to -the nature of the soul, as that of compositeness. - -One word on the relation of rational to empirical psychology. The -former, because it sets itself to apply thought to cognise mind and -even to demonstrate the result of such thinking, is the higher; whereas -empirical psychology starts from perception, and only recounts and -describes what perception supplies. But if we propose to think the -mind, we must not be quite so shy of its special phenomena. Mind is -essentially active in the same sense as the Schoolmen said that God -is 'absolute actuosity.' But if the mind is active it must as it were -utter itself. It is wrong therefore to take the mind for a processless -_ens,_ as did the old metaphysic which divided the processless inward -life of the mind from its outward life. The mind, of all things, must -be looked at in its concrete actuality, in its energy; and in such a -way that its manifestations are seen to be determined by its inward -force. - -35.] The _third_ branch of metaphysics was Cosmology. The topics -it embraced were the world, its contingency, necessity, eternity, -limitation in time and space: the laws (only formal) of its changes: -the freedom of man and the origin of evil. - -To these topics it applied what were believed to be thorough-going -contrasts: such as contingency and necessity; external and internal -necessity; efficient and final cause, or causality in general and -design; essence or substance and phenomenon; form and matter; freedom -and necessity; happiness and pain; good and evil. - -The object of Cosmology comprised not merely Nature, but Mind too, in -its external complication in its phenomenon--in fact, existence in -general, or the sum of finite things. This object however it viewed not -as a concrete whole, but only under certain abstract points of view. -Thus the questions Cosmology attempted to solve were such as these: Is -accident or necessity dominant in the world? Is the world eternal or -created? It was therefore a chief concern of this study to lay down -what were called general Cosmological laws: for instance, that Nature -does not act by fits and starts. And by fits and starts (_saltus_) they -meant a qualitative difference or qualitative alteration showing itself -without any antecedent determining mean: whereas, on the contrary, a -gradual change (of quantity) is obviously not without intermediation. - -In regard to Mind as it makes itself felt in the world, the questions -which Cosmology chiefly discussed turned upon the freedom of man and -the origin of evil. Nobody can deny that these are questions of the -highest importance. But to give them a satisfactory answer, it is above -all things necessary not to claim finality for the abstract formulae -of understanding, or to suppose that each of the two terms in an -antithesis has an independent-subsistence or can be treated in its -isolation as a complete and self-centred truth. This however is the -general position taken by the metaphysicians before Kant, and appears -in their cosmological discussions, which for that reason were incapable -of compassing their purpose, to understand the phenomena of the world. -Observe how they proceed with the distinction between freedom and -necessity, in their application of these categories to Nature and -Mind. Nature they regard as subject in its workings to necessity; -Mind they hold to be free. No doubt there is a real foundation for -this distinction in the very core of the Mind itself: but freedom and -necessity, when thus abstractly opposed, are terms applicable only in -the finite world to which, as such, they belong. A freedom involving no -necessity, and mere necessity without freedom, are abstract and in this -way untrue formulae of [thought. Freedom is no blank indeterminateness: -essentially concrete, and unvaryingly self-determinate, it is so far at -the same time necessary. Necessity, again, in the ordinary acceptation -of the term in popular philosophy, means determination from without -only,--as in finite mechanics, where a body moves only when it is -struck by another body, and moves in the direction communicated to it -by the impact.--This however is a merely external necessity, not the -real inward necessity which is identical with freedom. - -The case is similar with the contrast of Good and Evil,--the favourite -contrast of the introspective modern world. If we regard Evil as -possessing a fixity of its own, apart and distinct from Good, we are -to a certain extent right: there is an opposition between them: nor -do those who maintain the apparent and relative character of the -opposition mean that Evil and Good in the Absolute are one, or, in -accordance with the modern phrase, that a thing first becomes evil -from our way of looking at it. The error arises when we take Evil as a -permanent positive, instead of--what it really is--a negative which, -though it would fain assert itself, has no real persistence, and is, in -fact, only the absolute sham-existence of negativity in itself. - -36.] The _fourth_ branch of metaphysics is Natural or Rational -Theology. The notion of God, or God as a possible being, the proofs of -his existence, and his properties, formed the study of this branch. - -(a) When understanding thus discusses the Deity, its main purpose is -to find what predicates correspond or not to the fact we have in our -imagination as God. And in so doing it assumes the contrast between -positive and negative to be absolute; and hence, in the long run, -nothing is left for the notion as understanding takes it, but the empty -abstraction of indeterminate Being, of mere reality or positivity, the -lifeless product of modern 'Deism.' - -(b) The method of demonstration employed in finite knowledge must -always lead to an inversion of the true order. For it requires the -statement of some objective ground for God's being, which thus acquires -the appearance of being derived from something else. This mode of -proof, guided as it is by the canon of mere analytical identity, -is embarrassed by the difficulty of passing from the finite to the -infinite. Either the finitude of the existing world, which is left as -much a fact as it was before, clings to the notion of Deity, and God -has to be defined as the immediate substance of that world,--which is -Pantheism: or He remains an object set over against the subject, and in -this way, finite,--which is Dualism. - -(c) The attributes of God which ought to be various and precise, had, -properly speaking, sunk and disappeared in the abstract notion of pure -reality, of indeterminate Being. Yet in our material thought, the -finite world continues, meanwhile, to have a real being, with God as a -sort of antithesis: and thus arises the further picture of different -relations of God to the world. These, formulated as properties, must, -on the one hand, as relations to finite circumstances, themselves -possess a finite character (giving us such properties as just, -gracious, mighty, wise, &c.); on the other hand they must be infinite. -Now on this level of thought the only means, and a hazy one, of -reconciling these opposing requirements was quantitative exaltation -of the properties, forcing them into indeterminateness,--into the -_sensus eminentior._ But it was an expedient which really destroyed the -property and left a mere name. - -The object of the old metaphysical theology was to see how far -unassisted reason could go in the knowledge of God. Certainly a -reason-derived knowledge of God is the highest problem of philosophy. -The earliest teachings of religion are figurate conceptions of God. -These conceptions, as the Creed arranges them, are imparted to us in -youth. They are the doctrines of our religion, and in so far as the -individual rests his faith on these doctrines and feels them to be -the truth, he has all he needs as a Christian. Such is faith: and the -science of this faith is Theology. But until Theology is something more -than a bare enumeration and compilation of these doctrines _ab extra,_ -it has no right to the title of science. Even the method so much in -vogue at present--the purely historical mode of treatment--which for -example reports what has been said by this or the other Father of the -Church--does not invest theology with a scientific character. To get -that, we must go on to comprehend the facts by thought,--which is the -business of philosophy. Genuine theology is thus at the same time a -real philosophy of religion, as it was, we may add, in the Middle Ages. - -And now let us examine this rational theology more narrowly. It was -a science which approached God not by reason but by understanding, -and, in its mode of thought, employed the terms without any sense of -their mutual limitations and connexions. The notion of God formed the -subject of discussion; and yet the criterion of our knowledge was -derived from such an extraneous source as the materialised conception -of God. Now thought must be free in its movements. It is no doubt to -be remembered, that the result of independent thought harmonises with -the import of the Christian religion:--for the Christian religion is -a revelation of reason. But such a harmony surpassed the efforts of -rational theology. It proposed to define the figurate conception of God -in terms of thought; but it resulted in a notion of God which was what -we may call the abstract of positivity or reality, to the exclusion -of all negation. God was accordingly defined to be the most real of -all beings. Any one can see however that this most real of beings, in -which negation forms no part, is the very opposite of what it ought -to be and of what understanding supposes it to be. Instead of being -rich and full above all measure, it is so narrowly conceived that it -is, on the contrary, extremely poor and altogether empty. It is with -reason that the heart craves a concrete body of truth; but without -definite feature, that is, without negation, contained in the notion, -there can only be an abstraction. When the notion of God is apprehended -only as that of the abstract or most real being, God is, as it were, -relegated to another world beyond: and to speak of a knowledge of him -would be meaningless. Where there is no definite quality, knowledge is -impossible. Mere light is mere darkness. - -The second problem of rational theology was to prove the existence -of God. Now, in this matter, the main point to be noted is -that demonstration, as the understanding employs it, means the -dependence of one truth on another. In such proofs we have a -pre-supposition--something firm and fast, from which something else -follows; we exhibit the dependence of some truth from an assumed -starting-point. Hence, if this mode of demonstration is applied to the -existence of God, it can only mean that the being of God is to depend -on other terms, which will then constitute the ground of his being. -It is at once evident that this will lead I to some mistake: for God -must be simply and solely the I ground of everything, and in so far -not dependent upon anything else. And a perception of this danger has -in modern times led some to say that God's existence is not capable -of proof, but must be immediately or intuitively apprehended. Reason, -however, and even sound common sense give demonstration a meaning quite -different from that of the understanding. The demonstration of reason -no doubt starts from something which is not God. But, as it advances, -it does not leave the starting-point a mere unexplained fact, which is -what it was. On the contrary it exhibits that point as derivative and -called into being, and then God is seen to be primary, truly immediate -and self-subsisting, with the means of derivation wrapt up and absorbed -in himself. Those who say: 'Consider Nature, and Nature will-lead you -to God; you will find an absolute final cause: 'do not mean that God -is something derivative: they mean that it is we who proceed to God -himself from another; and in this way God, though the consequence, is -also the absolute' ground of the initial step. The relation of the two -things is reversed; and what came as a consequence, being shown to be -an antecedent, the original antecedent is reduced to a consequence. -This is always the way, moreover, whenever reason demonstrates. - -If in the light of the present discussion we cast one glance more on -the metaphysical method as a whole, we find its main characteristic -was to make abstract identity its principle and to try to apprehend -the objects of reason by the abstract and finite categories of the -understanding. But this infinite of the understanding, this pure -essence, is still finite: it has excluded all the variety of particular -things, which thus limit and deny it. Instead of winning a concrete, -this metaphysic stuck fast on an abstract, identity. Its good point was -the perception that thought alone constitutes the essence of all that -is. It derived its materials from earlier philosophers, particularly -the Schoolmen. In speculative philosophy the understanding undoubtedly -forms a stage, but not a stage at which we should keep for ever -standing. Plato is no metaphysician of this imperfect type, still less -Aristotle, although the contrary is generally believed. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -SECOND ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY. - - -I. _Empiricism._ - - -37.] Under these circumstances a double want began to be felt. Partly -it was the need of a concrete subject-matter, as a counterpoise to the -abstract theories of the understanding, which is unable to advance -unaided from its generalities to specialisation and determination. -Partly, too, it was the demand for something fixed and secure, so as -to exclude the possibility of proving anything and everything in the -sphere, and according to the method, of the finite formulae of thought. -Such was the genesis of Empirical philosophy, which abandons the search -for truth in thought itself, and goes to fetch it from Experience, the -outward and the inward present. - -The rise of Empiricism is due to the need thus stated of concrete -contents, and a firm footing--needs which the abstract metaphysic of -the understanding failed to satisfy. Now by concreteness of contents -it is meant that we must know the objects of consciousness as -intrinsically determinate and as the unity of distinct characteristics. -But, as we have already seen, this is by no means the case with the -metaphysic of understanding, if it conform to its principle. With the -mere understanding, thinking is limited to the form of an abstract -universal, and can never advance to the particularisation of this -universal. Thus we find the metaphysicians engaged in an attempt to -elicit by the instrumentality of thought, what was the essence or -fundamental attribute of the Soul The Soul, they said, is simple. -The simplicity thus ascribed to the Soul meant a mere and utter -simplicity, from which difference is excluded: difference, or in other -words composition, being made the fundamental attribute of body, or -of matter in general. Clearly, in simplicity of this narrow type we -have a very shallow category, quite incapable of embracing the wealth -of the soul or of the mind. When it thus appeared that abstract -metaphysical thinking was inadequate, it was felt that resource must be -had to empirical psychology. The same happened in the case of Rational -Physics. The current phrases there were, for instance, that space is -infinite, that Nature makes no leap, &c. Evidently this phraseology was -wholly unsatisfactory in presence of the plenitude and life of nature. - -38.] To some extent this source from which Empiricism draws is common -to it with metaphysic. It is in our materialised conceptions, _i.e._ -in facts which emanate, in the first instance, from experience, -that metaphysic also finds the guarantee for the correctness of its -definitions (including both its initial assumptions and its more -detailed body of doctrine). But, on the other hand, it must be noted -that the single sensation is not the same thing as experience, and -that the Empirical School elevates the facts included under sensation, -feeling, and perception into the form of general ideas, propositions or -laws. This, however, it does with the reservation that these general -principles (such as force), are to have no further import or validity -of their own beyond that taken from the sense-impression, and that -no connexion shall be deemed legitimate except what can be shown to -exist in phenomena. And on the subjective side Empirical cognition has -its stable footing in the fact that in a sensation consciousness is -directly present and certain of itself. - -In Empiricism lies the great principle that whatever is true must -be in the actual world and present to sensation. This principle -contradicts that 'ought to be' on the strength of which 'reflection' -is vain enough to treat the actual present with scorn and to point to -a scene beyond--a scene which is assumed to have place and being only -in the understanding of those who talk of it. No less than Empiricism, -philosophy (§ 7) recognises only what is, and has nothing to do with -what merely ought to be and what is thus confessed not to exist. On the -subjective side, too, it is right to notice the valuable principle of -freedom involved in Empiricism. For the main lesson of Empiricism is -that man must see for himself and feel that he is present in every fact -of knowledge which he has to accept. - -When it is carried out to its legitimate consequences, -Empiricism--being in its facts limited to the finite sphere--denies the -super-sensible in general, or at least any knowledge of it which would -define its nature; it leaves thought no powers except abstraction and -formal universality and identity. But there is a fundamental delusion -in all scientific empiricism. It employs the metaphysical categories of -matter, force, those of one, many, generality, infinity, &c.; following -the clue given by these categories it proceeds to draw conclusions, and -in so doing pre-supposes and applies the syllogistic form. And all the -while it is unaware that it contains metaphysics--in wielding which, it -makes use of those categories and their combinations in a style utterly -thoughtless and uncritical. - - * * * * * - -From Empiricism came the cry: 'Stop roaming in empty abstractions, keep -your eyes open, lay hold on man and nature as they are here before -you, enjoy the present moment.' Nobody can deny that there is a good -deal of truth in these words. The every-day world, what is here and -now, was a good exchange for the futile other-world--for the mirages -and the chimeras of the abstract understanding. And thus was acquired -an infinite principle,--that solid footing so much missed in the old -metaphysic. Finite principles are the most that the understanding -can pick out--and these being essentially unstable and tottering, -the structure they supported must collapse with a crash. Always the -instinct of reason was to find an infinite principle. As yet, the -time had not come for finding it in thought. Hence, this instinct -seized upon the present, the Here, the This,--where doubtless there is -implicit infinite form, but not in the genuine existence of that form. -The external world is the truth, if it could but know it: for the truth -is actual and must exist. The infinite principle, the self-centred -truth, therefore, is in the world for reason to discover: though it -exists in an individual and sensible shape, and not in its truth. - -Besides, this school makes sense-perception the form in which fact -is to be apprehended: and in this consists the defect of Empiricism. -Sense-perception as such is always individual, always transient: not -indeed that the process of knowledge stops short at sensation: on the -contrary, it proceeds to find out the universal and permanent element -in the individual apprehended by sense. This is the process leading -from simple perception to experience. - -In order to form experiences, Empiricism makes especial use of the -form of Analysis. In the impression of sense we have a concrete of -many elements, the several attributes of which we are expected to -peel off one by one, like the coats of an onion. In thus dismembering -the thing, it is understood that we disintegrate and take to pieces -these attributes which have coalesced, and add nothing but our own -act of disintegration. Yet analysis is the process from the immediacy -of sensation to thought: those attributes, which the object analysed -contains in union, acquire the form of universality by being separated. -Empiricism therefore labours under a delusion, if it supposes that, -while analysing the objects, it leaves them as they were: it really -transforms the concrete into an abstract. And as a consequence of this -change the living thing is killed: life can exist only in the concrete -and one. Not that we can do without this division, if it be our -intention to comprehend. Mind itself is an inherent division. The error -lies in forgetting that this is only one-half of the process, and that -the main point is the re-union of what has been parted. And it is where -analysis never gets beyond the stage of partition that the words of the -poet are true: - - _'Encheiresin Naturae_ nennt's die Chemie, - Spottet ihrer Selbst, und weiss nicht, wie: - Hat die Teile in Ihrer Hand - Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.' - -Analysis starts from the concrete; and the possession of this material -gives it a considerable advantage over the abstract thinking of the -old metaphysics. It establishes the differences in things: and this is -very important: but these very differences are nothing after all but -abstract attributes, _e.g._ thoughts. These thoughts, it is assumed, -contain the real essence of the objects; and thus once more we see the -axiom of bygone metaphysics reappear, that the truth of things lies in -thought. - -Let us next compare the empirical theory with that of metaphysics in -the matter of their respective contents. We find the latter, as already -stated, taking for its theme the universal objects of the reason, viz. -God, the Soul, and the World: and these themes, accepted from popular -conception, it was the problem of philosophy to reduce into the form -of thoughts. Another specimen of the same method was the Scholastic -philosophy, the theme pre-supposed by which was formed by the dogmas -of the Christian Church: and it aimed at fixing their meaning and -giving them a systematic arrangement through thought.--The facts on -which Empiricism is based are of entirely different kind. They are -the sensible facts of nature and the facts of the finite mind. In -other words, Empiricism deals with a finite material--and the old -metaphysicians had an infinite,--though, let us add, they made this -infinite content finite by the finite form of the understanding. The -same finitude of form reappears in Empiricism--but here the facts are -finite also. To this exigent, then, both modes of philosophising have -the same method; both proceed from data or assumptions, which they -accept as ultimate. Generally speaking, Empiricism finds the truth in -the outward world; and even if it allow a super-sensible world, it -holds knowledge of that world to be impossible, and would restrict us -to the province of sense-perception. This doctrine when systematically -carried out produces what has been latterly termed Materialism. -Materialism of this stamp looks upon matter, _quâ_ matter, as the -genuine objective world. But with matter we are at once introduced -to an abstraction, which as such cannot be perceived: and it may be -maintained that there is no matter, because, as it exists, it is always -something definite and concrete. Yet the abstraction we term matter is -supposed to lie at the basis of the whole world of sense, and expresses -the sense-world in its simplest terms as out-and-out individualisation, -and hence a congeries of points in mutual exclusion. So long then as -this sensible sphere is and continues to be for Empiricism a mere -datum, we have a doctrine of bondage: for we become free, when we -are confronted by no absolutely alien world, but depend upon a fact -which we ourselves are. Consistently with the empirical point of view, -besides, reason and unreason can only be subjective: in other words, -we must take what is given just as it is, and we have no right to ask -whether and to what extent it is rational in its own nature. - -39.] Touching this principle it has been justly observed that in -what we call Experience, as distinct from mere single perception of -single facts, there are two elements. The one is the matter, infinite -in its multiplicity, and as it stands a mere set of singulars: the -other is the form, the characteristics of universality and necessity. -Mere experience no doubt offers many, perhaps innumerable cases of -similar perceptions: but, after all, no multitude, however great, -can be the same thing as universality. Similarly, mere experience -affords perceptions of changes succeeding each other and of objects in -juxtaposition; but it presents no necessary connexion. If perception, -therefore, is to maintain its claim to be the sole basis of what -men hold for truth, universality and necessity appear something -illegitimate: they become an accident of our minds, a mere custom, the -content of which might be otherwise constituted than it is. - -It is an important corollary of this theory, that on this empirical -mode of treatment legal and ethical principles and laws, as well as the -truths of religion, are exhibited as the work of chance, and stripped -of their objective character and inner truth. - -The scepticism of Hume, to which this conclusion was chiefly due, -should be clearly marked off from Greek scepticism. Hume assumes the -truth of the empirical element, feeling and sensation, and proceeds to -challenge universal principles and laws, because they have no warranty -from sense-perception. So far was ancient scepticism from making -feeling and sensation the canon of truth, that it turned against the -deliverances of sense first of all. (On Modern Scepticism as compared -with Ancient, see Schelling and Hegel's Critical Journal of Philosophy: -1802, vol. I. i.) - - - -II. _The Critical Philosophy._ - - -40.] In common with Empiricism the Critical Philosophy assumes that -experience affords the one sole foundation for cognitions; which -however it does not allow to rank as truths, but only as knowledge of -phenomena. - -The Critical theory starts originally from the distinction of elements -presented in the analysis of experience, viz. the matter of sense, and -its universal relations. Taking into account Hume's criticism on this -distinction as given in the preceding section, viz. that sensation -does not explicitly apprehend more than an individual or more than a -mere event, it insists at the same time on the _fact_ that universality -and necessity are seen to perform a function equally essential in -constituting what is called experience. This element, not being derived -from the empirical facts as such, must belong to the spontaneity of -thought; in other words, it is _a priori._ The Categories or Notions -of the Understanding constitute the _objectivity_ of experiential -cognitions. In every case they involve a connective reference, and -hence through their means are formed synthetic judgments _a priori,_ -that is, primary and underivative connexions of opposites. - -Even Hume's scepticism does not deny that the characteristics of -universality and necessity are found in cognition. And even in Kant -this fact remains a presupposition after all; it may be said, to use -the ordinary phraseology of the sciences, that Kant did no more than -offer another _explanation_ of the fact. - -41.] The Critical Philosophy proceeds to test the value of the -categories employed in metaphysic, as well as in other sciences -and in ordinary conception. This scrutiny however is not directed -to the content of these categories, nor does it inquire into the -exact relation they bear to one another: but simply considers them -as affected by the contrast between subjective and objective. The -contrast, as we are to understand it here, bears upon the distinction -(see preceding §) of the two elements in experience. The name of -objectivity is here given to the element of universality and necessity, -_i.e._ to the categories themselves, or what is called the _a priori_ -constituent. The Critical Philosophy however widened the contrast in -such away, that the subjectivity comes to embrace the _ensemble_ of -experience, including both of the aforesaid elements; and nothing -remains on the other side but the 'thing-in-itself.' - -The special forms of the _a priori_ element, in other words, of -thought, which in spite of its objectivity is looked upon as a purely -subjective act, present themselves as follows in a systematic order -which, it may be remarked, is solely based upon psychological and -historical grounds. - - * * * * * - -(1) A very important step was undoubtedly made, when the terms of the -old metaphysic were subjected to scrutiny. The plain thinker pursued -his unsuspecting way in those categories which had offered themselves -naturally. It never occurred to him to ask to what extent these -categories had a value and authority of their own. If, as has been -said, it is characteristic of free thought to allow no assumptions to -pass unquestioned, the old metaphysicians were not free thinkers. They -accepted their categories as they were, without further trouble, as an -_a priori_ datum, not yet tested by reflection. The Critical philosophy -reversed this. Kant undertook to examine how far the forms of thought -were capable of leading to the knowledge of truth. In particular he -demanded a criticism of the faculty of cognition as preliminary to -its exercise. That is a fair demand, if it mean that even the forms -of thought must be made an object of investigation. Unfortunately -there soon creeps in the misconception of already knowing before _you_ -know,--the error of refusing to enter the water until you have learnt -to swim. True, indeed, the forms of thought should be subjected to a -scrutiny before they are used: yet what is this scrutiny but _ipso -facto_ a cognition? So that what we want is to combine in our process -of inquiry the action of the forms of thought with a criticism of -them. The forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature -and complete development: they are at once the object of research and -the action of that object. Hence they examine themselves: in their own -action they must determine their limits, and point out their defects. -This is that action of thought, which will hereafter be specially -considered under the name of Dialectic, and regarding which we need -only at the outset observe that, instead of being brought to bear upon -the categories from without, it is immanent in their own action. - -We may therefore state the first point in Kant's philosophy as follows: -Thought must itself investigate its own capacity of knowledge. People -in the present day have got over Kant and his philosophy: everybody -wants to get further. But there are two ways of going further--a -back-, ward and a forward. The light of criticism soon shows that many -of our modern essays in philosophy are mere repetitions of the old -metaphysical method, an endless and uncritical thinking in a groove -determined by the natural bent of each man's mind. - -(2) Kant's examination of the categories suffers from the grave defect -of viewing them, not absolutely and for their own sake, but in order to -see whether they are _subjective_ or _objective._ In the language of -common life we mean by objective what exists outside of us and reaches -us from without by means of sensation. What Kant did, was to deny that -the categories, such as cause and effect, were, in this sense of the -word, objective, or given in sensation, and to maintain on the contrary -that they belonged to our own thought itself, to the spontaneity of -thought. To that extent therefore, they were subjective. And yet in -spite of this, Kant gives the name objective to what is thought, to the -universal and necessary, while he describes as subjective whatever is -merely felt. This arrangement apparently reverses the first-mentioned -use of the word, and has caused Kant to be charged with confusing -language. But the charge is unfair if we more narrowly consider the -facts of the case. The vulgar believe that the objects of perception -which confront them, such as an individual animal, or a single star, -are independent and permanent existences, compared with which, thoughts -are unsubstantial and dependent on something else. In fact however -the perceptions of sense are the properly dependent and secondary -feature, while the thoughts are really independent and primary. This -being so, Kant gave the title objective to the intellectual factor, to -the universal and necessary: and he was quite justified in so doing. -Our sensations on the other hand are subjective; for sensations lack -stability in their own nature, and are no less fleeting and evanescent -than thought is permanent and self-subsisting. At the present day, the -special line of distinction established by Kant between the subjective -and objective is adopted by the phraseology of the educated world. Thus -the criticism of a work of art ought, it is said, to be not subjective, -but objective; in other words, instead of springing from the particular -and accidental feeling or temper of the moment, it should keep its eye -on those general points of view which the laws of art establish. In -the same acceptation we can distinguish in any scientific pursuit the -objective and the subjective interest of the investigation. - -But after all, objectivity of thought, in Kant's sense, is again to -a certain extent subjective. Thoughts, according to Kant, although -universal and necessary categories, are _only our_ thoughts--separated -by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our -knowledge. But the true, objectivity of thinking means that the -thoughts, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be the real -essence of the things, and of whatever is an object to us. - -Objective and subjective are convenient expressions in current use, -the employment of which may easily lead to confusion. Up to this -point, the discussion has shown three meanings of objectivity. First, -it means what has external existence, in distinction from which the -subjective is what is only supposed, dreamed, &c. Secondly, it has -the meaning, attached to it by Kant, of the universal and necessary, -as distinguished from the particular, subjective and occasional -element which belongs to our sensations. Thirdly, as has been just -explained, it means the thought-apprehended essence of the existing -thing, in contradistinction from what is merely _our_ thought, and what -consequently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists in -independent essence. - -42.] (a) The Theoretical Faculty.--Cognition _quâ_ cognition. -The specific ground of the categories is declared by the Critical -system to lie in the primary identity of the 'I' in thought,--what -Kant calls the 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness.' -The impressions from feeling and perception are, if we look to -their contents, a multiplicity or miscellany of elements: and the -multiplicity is equally conspicuous in their form. For sense is marked -by a mutual exclusion of members; and that under two aspects, namely -space and time, which, being the forms, that is to say, the universal -type of perception, are themselves _a priori._ This congeries, -afforded by sensation and perception, must however be reduced to an -identity or primary synthesis. To accomplish this the 'I' brings it in -relation to itself and unites it there in _one_ consciousness which -Kant calls 'pure apperception.' The specific modes in which the Ego -refers to itself the multiplicity of sense are the pure concepts of the -understanding, the Categories. - -Kant, it is well known, did not put himself to much trouble in -discovering the categories. 'I,' the unity of self-consciousness, -being quite abstract and completely indeterminate, the question -arises, how are we to get at the specialised forms of the 'I,' the -categories? Fortunately, the common logic offers to our hand an -empirical classification of the kinds of _judgment._ Now, to judge -is the same as to _think_ of a determinate object. Hence the various -modes of judgment, as enumerated to our hand, provide us with the -several categories of thought. To the philosophy of Fichte belongs -the great merit of having called attention to the need of exhibiting -the _necessity_ of these categories and giving a genuine _deduction_ -of them. Fichte ought to have produced at least one effect on the -method of logic. One might have expected that the general laws of -thought, the usual stock-in-trade of logicians, or the classification -of notions, judgments, and syllogisms, would be no longer taken merely -from observation and so only empirically treated, but be deduced from -thought itself. If thought is to be capable of proving anything at all, -if logic must insist upon the necessity of proofs, and if it proposes -to teach the theory of demonstration, its first care should be to give -a reason for its own subject-matter, and to see that it is necessary. - -(i) Kant therefore holds that the categories have their source in the -'Ego,' and that the 'Ego' consequently supplies the characteristics -of universality and necessity. If we observe what we have before us -primarily, we may describe it as a congeries or diversity: and in the -categories we find the simple points or units, to which this congeries -is made to converge. The world of sense is a scene of mutual exclusion: -its being is outside itself. That is the fundamental feature of the -sensible. 'Now' has no meaning except in reference to a before and a -hereafter. Red, in the same way, only subsists by being opposed to -yellow and blue. Now this other thing is outside the sensible; which -latter is, only in so far as it is not the other, and only in so far -as that other is. But thought, or the 'Ego,' occupies a position the -very reverse of the sensible, with its mutual exclusions, and its -being outside itself. The 'I' is the primary identity--at one with -itself and all at home in itself. The word 'I' expresses the mere act -of bringing-to-bear-upon-self: and whatever is placed in this unit or -focus, is affected _by_ it and transformed into it. The 'I' is as it -were the crucible and the fire which consumes the loose plurality of -sense and reduces it to unity. This is the process which Kant calls -pure apperception in distinction from the common apperception, to -which the plurality it receives is a plurality still; whereas pure -apperception is rather an act by which the 'I' makes the materials -'mine.' - -This view has at least the merit of giving a correct expression to the -nature of all consciousness. The tendency of all man's endeavours is to -understand the world, to appropriate and subdue it to himself: and to -this end the positive reality of the world must be as it were crushed -and pounded, in other words, idealised. At the same time we must note -that it is not the mere act of _our_ personal self-consciousness, which -introduces an absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather, this -identity is itself the absolute. The absolute is, as it were, so kind -as to leave individual things to their own enjoyment, and it again -drives them back to the absolute unity. - -(2) Expressions like 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness' have -an ugly look about them, and suggest a monster in the background: -but their meaning is not so abstruse as it looks. Kant's meaning of -transcendental may be gathered by the way he distinguishes it from -transcendent. The _transcendent_ may be said to be what steps out -beyond the categories of the understanding: a sense in which the term -is first employed in mathematics. Thus in geometry you are told to -conceive the circumference of a circle as formed of an infinite number -of infinitely small straight lines. In other words, characteristics -which the understanding holds to be totally different, the straight -line and the curve, are expressly invested with identity. Another -transcendent of the same kind is the self-consciousness which is -identical with itself and infinite in itself, as distinguished from -the ordinary consciousness which derives its form and tone from finite -materials. That unity of self-consciousness, however, Kant called -_transcendental_ only; and he meant thereby that the unity was only in -our minds and did not attach to the objects apart from our knowledge of -them. - -(3) To regard the categories as subjective only, _i.e._ as a part -of ourselves, must seem very odd to the natural mind; and no doubt -there is something queer about it. It is quite true however that the -categories are not contained in the sensation as it is given us. When, -for instance, we look at a piece of sugar, we find it is hard, white, -sweet, &c. All these properties we say are united in one object. Now -it is this unity that is not found in the sensation. The same thing -happens if we conceive two events to stand in the relation of cause -and effect. The senses only inform us of the two several occurrences -which follow each other in time. But that the one is cause, the other -effect,--in other words, the causal nexus between the two,--is not -perceived by sense; it is only evident to thought. Still, though the -categories, such as unity, or cause and effect, are strictly the -property of thought, it by no means follows that they must be ours -merely and not also characteristics of the objects. Kant however -confines them to the subject-mind, and his philosophy may be styled -subjective idealism: for he holds that both the form and the matter of -knowledge are supplied by the Ego--or knowing subject--the form by our -intellectual, the matter by our sentient ego. - -So far as regards the content of this subjective idealism, not a word -need be wasted. It might perhaps at first sight be imagined, that -objects would lose their reality when their unity was transferred to -the subject. But neither we nor the objects would have anything to gain -by the mere fact that they possessed being. The main point is not, -that they are, but what they are, and whether or not their content -is true. It does no good to the things to say merely that they have -being. What has being, will also cease to be when time creeps over it. -It might also be alleged that subjective idealism tended to promote -self-conceit. But surely if a man's world be the sum of his sensible -perceptions, he has no reason to be vain of such a world. Laying aside -therefore as unimportant this distinction between subjective and -objective, we are chiefly interested in knowing what a thing is: _i.e._ -its content, which is no more objective than it is subjective. If mere -existence be enough to make objectivity, even a crime is objective: but -it is an existence which is nullity at the core, as is definitely made -apparent when the day of punishment comes. - -43.] The Categories may be viewed in two aspects. On the one hand it -is by their instrumentality that the mere perception of sense rises to -objectivity and experience. On the other hand these notions are unities -in our consciousness merely: they are consequently conditioned by the -material given to them, and having nothing of their own they can be -applied to use only within the range of experience. But the other -constituent of experience, the impressions of feeling and perception, -is not one whit less subjective than the categories. - -To assert that the categories taken by themselves are empty can -scarcely be right, seeing that they have a content, at all events, in -the special stamp and significance which they possess. Of course the -content of the categories is not perceptible to the senses, nor is it -in time and space: but that is rather a merit than a defect. A glimpse -of this meaning of _content_ may be observed to affect our ordinary -thinking. _A_ book or a speech for example is said to have a great -deal in it, to be full of content, in proportion to the greater number -of thoughts and general results to be found in it: whilst, on the -contrary, we should never say that any book, _e.g._ novel, had much in -it, because it included a great number of single incidents, situations, -and the like. Even the popular voice thus recognises that something -more than the facts of sense is needed to make a work pregnant with -matter. And what is this additional desideratum but thoughts, or in the -first instance the categories? And yet it is not altogether wrong, it -should be added, to call the categories of themselves empty, if it be -meant that they and the logical Idea, of which they are the members, do -not constitute the whole of philosophy, but necessarily lead onwards in -due progress to the real departments of Nature and Mind. Only let the -progress not be misunderstood. The logical Ideal does not thereby come -into possession of a content originally foreign to it: but by its own -native action is specialised and developed to Nature and Mind. - -44.] It follows that the categories are no fit terms to express -the Absolute--the Absolute not being given in perception;--and -Understanding, or knowledge by means of the categories, is consequently -incapable of knowing the Things-in-themselves. - -The Thing-in-itself (and under 'thing' is embraced even Mind and God) -expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness -makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific thoughts -of it. It is easy to see what is left,--utter abstraction, total -emptiness, only described still as an 'other-world'--the negative of -every image, feeling, and definite thought. Nor does it require much -penetration to see that this _caput mortuum_ is still only a product -of thought, such as accrues when thought is carried on to abstraction -unalloyed: that it is the work of the empty 'Ego,' which makes an -object out of this empty self-identity of its own. The _negative_ -characteristic which this abstract identity receives as an _object,_ is -also enumerated among the categories of Kant, and is no less familiar -than the empty identity aforesaid. Hence one can only read with -surprise the perpetual remark that we do not know the Thing-in-itself. -On the contrary there is nothing we can know so easily. - -45.] It is Reason, the faculty of the Unconditioned, which discovers -the conditioned nature of the knowledge comprised in experience. What -is thus called the object of Reason, the Infinite or Unconditioned, -is nothing but self-sameness, or the primary identity of the 'Ego' -in thought (mentioned in § 42). Reason itself is the name given to -the abstract 'Ego' or thought, which makes this pure identity its aim -or object (cf. note to the preceding §). Now this identity, having -no definite attribute at all, can receive no illumination from the -truths of experience, for the reason that these refer always to -definite facts. Such is the sort of Unconditioned that is supposed to -be the absolute truth of Reason,--what is termed the _Idea;_ whilst -the cognitions of experience are reduced to the level of untruth and -declared to be appearances. - -Kant was the first definitely to signalise the distinction between -Reason and Understanding. The object of the former, as he applied the -term, was the infinite and unconditioned, of the latter the finite -and conditioned. Kant did valuable service when he enforced the finite -character of the cognitions of the understanding founded merely upon -experience, and stamped their contents with the name of appearance. -But his mistake was to stop at the purely negative point of view, and -to limit the unconditionality of Reason to an abstract self-sameness -without any shade of distinction. It degrades Reason to a finite and -conditioned thing, to identify it with a mere stepping beyond the -finite and conditioned range of understanding. The real infinite, -far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves -the absorption of the finite into its own fuller nature. In the same -way Kant restored the Idea to its proper dignity: vindicating it for -Reason, as a thing distinct from abstract analytic determinations or -from the merely sensible conceptions which usually appropriate to -themselves the name of ideas. But as respects the Idea also, he never -got beyond its negative aspect, as what ought to be but is not. - -The view that the objects of immediate consciousness, which constitute -the body of experience, are mere appearances (phenomena), was another -important result of the Kantian philosophy. Common Sense, that mixture -of sense and understanding, believes the objects of which it has -knowledge to be severally independent and self-supporting; and when -it becomes evident that they tend towards and limit one another, the -interdependence of one upon another is reckoned something foreign to -them and to their true nature. The very opposite is the truth. The -things immediately known are mere appearances--in other words, the -ground of their being is not in themselves but in something else. -But then comes the important step of defining what this something -else is. According to Kant, the things that we know about are _to us_ -appearances only, and we can never know their essential nature, which -belongs to another world we cannot approach. Plain minds have not -unreasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with its -reduction of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world, -created by ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is -rather as follows. The things of which we have direct consciousness -are mere phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the -true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is to have -their existence founded not in themselves but in the universal divine -Idea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist as Kant's; -but in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical -philosophy should be termed absolute idealism. Absolute idealism, -however, though it is far in advance of vulgar realism, is by no means -merely restricted to philosophy. It lies at the root of all religion; -for religion too believes the actual world we see, the sum total of -existence, to be created and governed by God. - -46.] But it is not enough simply to indicate the existence of the -object of Reason. Curiosity impels us to seek for knowledge of this -identity, this empty thing-in-itself. Now _knowledge_ means such -an acquaintance with the object as apprehends its distinct and -special subject-matter. But such subject-matter involves a complex -inter-connexion in the object itself, and supplies a ground of -connexion with many other objects. In the present case, to express the -nature of the features of the Infinite or Thing-in-itself, Reason would -have nothing except the categories: and in any endeavour so to employ -them Reason becomes over-soaring or 'transcendent.' - -Here begins the second stage of the Criticism of Reason--which, as -an independent piece of work, is more valuable than the first. The -first part, as has been explained above, teaches that the categories -originate in the unity of self-consciousness; that any knowledge which -is gained by their means has nothing objective in it, and that the -very objectivity claimed for them is only subjective. So far as this -goes, the Kantian Criticism presents that 'common' type of idealism -known as Subjective Idealism. It asks no questions about the meaning -or scope of the categories, but simply considers the abstract form of -subjectivity and objectivity, and that even in such a partial way, that -the former aspect, that of subjectivity, is retained as a final and -purely affirmative term of thought. In the second part, however, when -Kant examines the _application,_ as it is called, which Reason makes -of the categories in order to know its objects, the content of the -categories, at least in some points of view, comes in for discussion: -or, at any rate, an opportunity presented itself for a discussion of -the question. It is worth while to see what decision Kant arrives at on -the subject of metaphysic, as this application of the categories to the -unconditioned is called. His method of procedure we shall here briefly -state and criticise. - -47.] (a) The first of the unconditioned entities which Kant examines -is the Soul (see above, § 34). 'In my consciousness,' he says, 'I -always find that I (1) am the determining subject: (2) am singular, or -abstractly simple: (3) am identical, or one and the same, in all the -variety of what I am conscious of: (4) distinguish myself as thinking -from all the things outside me.' - -Now the method of the old metaphysic, as Kant correctly states it, -consisted in substituting for these statements of experience the -corresponding categories or metaphysical terms. Thus arise these four -new propositions: _(a)_ the Soul is a substance: _(b)_ it is a simple -substance: _(c)_ it is numerically identical at the various periods of -existence: _(d)_ it stands in relation to space. - -Kant discusses this translation, and draws attention to the Paralogism -or mistake of confounding one kind of truth with another. He points out -that empirical attributes have here been replaced by categories: and -shows that we are not entitled to argue from the former to the latter, -or to put the latter in place of the former. - -This criticism obviously but repeats the observation of Hume -(§ 39) that the categories as a whole,--ideas of universality -and necessity,--are entirely absent from sensation; and that the -empirical fact both in form and contents differs from its intellectual -formulation. - -If the purely empirical fact were held to constitute the credentials -of the thought, then no doubt it would be indispensable to be able -precisely to identify the 'idea' in the 'impression.' - -And in order to make out, in his criticism of the metaphysical -psychology, that the soul cannot be described as substantial, simple, -self-same, and as maintaining its independence in intercourse with -the material world, Kant argues from the single ground, that the -several attributes of the soul, which consciousness lets us feel in -_experience,_ are not exactly the same attributes as result from the -action of _thought_ thereon. But we have seen above, that according -to Kant all knowledge, even experience, consists in thinking our -impressions--in other words, in transforming into intellectual -categories the attributes primarily belonging to sensation. - -Unquestionably one good result of the Kantian criticism was that -it emancipated mental philosophy from the 'soul-thing,' from the -categories, and, consequently, from questions about the simplicity, -complexity, materiality, &c. of the soul. But even for the common sense -of ordinary men, the true point of view, from which the inadmissibility -of these forms best appears, will be, not that they are thoughts, but -that thoughts of such a stamp neither can nor do contain truth. - -If thought and phenomenon do not perfectly correspond to one another, -we are free at least to choose which of the two shall be held the -defaulter. The Kantian idealism, where it touches on the world of -Reason, throws the blame on the thoughts; saying that the thoughts are -defective, as not being exactly fitted to the sensations and to a mode -of mind wholly restricted within the range of sensation, in which as -such there are no traces of the presence of these thoughts. But as to -the actual content of the thought, no question is raised. - -Paralogisms are a species of unsound syllogism, the especial vice of -which consists in employing one and the same word in the two premisses -with a different meaning. According to Kant the method adopted by the -rational psychology of the old metaphysicians, when they assumed that -the qualities of the phenomenal soul, as given in experience, formed -part of its own real essence, was based upon such a Paralogism. Nor -can it be denied that predicates like simplicity, permanence, &c, are -inapplicable to the soul. But their unfitness is not due to the ground -assigned by Kant, that Reason, by applying them, would exceed its -appointed bounds. The true ground is that this style of abstract terms -is not good enough for the soul, which is very; much more than a mere -simple or unchangeable sort of thing. And thus, for example, while the -soul may be admitted to be simple self-sameness, it is at the same time -active and institutes distinctions in its own nature. But whatever -is merely or abstractly simple is as such also a mere dead thing. By -his polemic against the metaphysic of the past Kant discarded those -predicates from the soul or mind. He did well; but when he came to -state his reasons, his failure is apparent. - -48.] (ß) The second unconditioned object is the World (§ 35). In the -attempt which reason makes to comprehend the unconditioned nature of -the World, it falls into what are called Antinomies. In other words -it maintains two opposite propositions about the same object, and in -such a way that each of them has to be maintained with equal necessity. -From this it follows that the body of cosmical fact, the specific -statements descriptive of which run into contradiction, cannot be a -self-subsistent reality, but only an appearance. The explanation -offered by Kant alleges that the contradiction does not affect the -object in its own proper essence, but attaches only to the Reason which -seeks to comprehend it. - -In this way the suggestion was broached that the contradiction is -occasioned by the subject-matter itself, or by the intrinsic quality -of the categories. And to offer the idea that the contradiction -introduced into the world of Reason by the categories of Understanding -is inevitable and essential, was to make one of the most important -steps in the progress of Modern Philosophy. But the more important the -issue thus raised the more trivial was the solution. Its only motive -was an excess of tenderness for the things of the world. The blemish -of contradiction, it seems, could not be allowed to mar the essence of -the world: but there could be no objection to attach it to the thinking -Reason, to the essence of mind. Probably nobody will feel disposed to -deny that the phenomenal world presents contradictions to the observing -mind; meaning by 'phenomenal' the world as it presents itself to the -senses and understanding, to the subjective mind. But if a comparison -is instituted between the essence of the world and the essence of the -mind, it does seem strange to hear how calmly and confidently the -modest dogma has been advanced by one, and repeated by others, that -thought or Reason, and not the World, is the seat of contradiction. -It is no escape to turn round and explain that Reason falls into -contradiction only by applying the categories. For this application -of the categories is maintained to be necessary, and Reason is not -supposed to be equipped with any other forms but the categories for -the purpose of cognition. But cognition is determining and determinate -thinking: so that, if Reason be mere empty indeterminate thinking, it -thinks nothing. And if in the end Reason be reduced to mere identity -without diversity (see next §), it will in the end also win a happy -release from contradiction at the slight sacrifice of all its facts and -contents. - -It may also be noted that his failure to make a more thorough study -of Antinomy was one of the reasons why Kant enumerated only _four_ -Antinomies. These four attracted his notice, because, as may be seen -in his discussion of the so-called Paralogisms of Reason, he assumed -the list of the categories as a basis of his argument. Employing -what has subsequently become a favourite fashion, he simply put the -object under a rubric otherwise ready to hand, instead of deducing -its characteristics from its notion. Further deficiencies in the -treatment of the Antinomies I have pointed out, as occasion offered, -in my 'Science of Logic' Here it will be sufficient to say that -the Antinomies are not confined to the four special objects taken -from Cosmology: they appear in all objects of every kind, in all -conceptions, notions and Ideas. To be aware of this and to know objects -in this property of theirs, makes a vital part in a philosophical -theory. For the property thus indicated is what we shall afterwards -describe as the Dialectical influence in logic. - - * * * * * - -The principles of the metaphysical philosophy gave rise to the belief -that, when cognition lapsed into contradictions, it was a mere -accidental aberration, due to some subjective mistake in argument -and inference. According to Kant, however, thought has a natural -tendency to issue in contradictions or antinomies, whenever it seeks -to apprehend the infinite. We have in the latter part of the above -paragraph referred to the philosophical importance of the antinomies of -reason, and shown how the recognition of their existence helped largely -to get rid of the rigid dogmatism of the metaphysic of understanding, -and to direct attention to the Dialectical movement of thought. But -here too Kant, as we must add, never got beyond the negative result -that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, and never penetrated to the -discovery of what the antinomies really and positively mean. That true -and positive meaning of the antinomies is this: that every actual -thing involves a coexistence of opposed, elements. Consequently to -know, or, in other words, to comprehend an object is equivalent to -being conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations. -The old. metaphysic, as we have already seen, when it studied the -objects of which it sought a metaphysical knowledge, went to work by -applying categories abstractly and to the exclusion of their opposites. -Kant, on the other hand, tried to prove that the statements, issuing -through this method, could be met by other statements of contrary -import with equal warrant and equal necessity. In the enumeration of -these antinomies he narrowed his ground to the cosmology of the old -metaphysical system, and in his discussion made out four antinomies, a -number which rests upon the list of the categories. The first antinomy -is on the question: Whether we are or are not to think the world -limited in space and time. In the second antinomy we have a discussion -of the dilemma: Matter must be conceived either as endlessly divisible, -or as consisting of atoms. The third antinomy bears upon the antithesis -of freedom and necessity, to such extent as it is embraced in the -question, Whether everything in the world must be supposed subject to -the condition of causality, or if we can also assume free beings, in -other words, absolute initial points of action, in the world. Finally, -the fourth antinomy is the dilemma: Either the world as a whole has a -cause or it is uncaused. - -The method which Kant follows in discussing these antinomies is as -follows. He puts the two propositions implied in the dilemma over -against each other as thesis and antithesis, and seeks to prove both: -that is to say he tries to exhibit them as inevitably issuing from -reflection on the question. He particularly protests against the charge -of being a special pleader and of grounding his reasoning on illusions. -Speaking honestly, however, the arguments which Kant offers for his -thesis and antithesis are mere shams of demonstration. The thing to -be proved is invariably implied in the assumption he starts from, and -the speciousness of his proofs is only due to his prolix and apagogic -mode of procedure. Yet it was, and still is, a great achievement for -the Critical philosophy, when it exhibited these antinomies: for -in this way it gave some expression (at first certainly subjective -and unexplained) to the actual unity of those categories which are -kept persistently separate by the understanding. The first of the -cosmological antinomies, for example, implies a recognition of the -doctrine that space and time present a discrete as well as a continuous -aspect: whereas the old metaphysic, laying exclusive emphasis on the -continuity, had been led to treat the world as unlimited in space -and time. It is quite correct to say that we can go beyond every -_definite_ space and beyond every _definite_ time: but it is no less -correct that space and time are real and actual only when they are -defined or specialised into 'here' and 'now,'--a specialisation which -is involved in the very notion of them. The same observations apply to -the rest of the antinomies. Take, for example, the antinomy of freedom -and necessity. The main gist of itis that freedom and necessity as -understood by abstract thinkers are not independently real, as these -thinkers suppose, but merely ideal factors (moments) of the true -freedom and the true necessity, and that to abstract and isolate either -conception is to make it false. - -49.] (y) The third object of the Reason is God (§36): He also must -be known and defined in terms of thought. But in comparison with -an unalloyed identity, every defining term as such seems to the -understanding to be only a limit and a negation: every reality -accordingly must be taken as limitless, _i.e._ undefined. Accordingly -God, when He is defined to be the sum of all realities, the most real -of beings, turns into a _mere abstract._ And the only term under which -that most real of real, things can be defined is that of Being--itself -the height of abstraction. These are the two elements, abstract -identity, on one hand, which is spoken of in this place as the notion; -and Being on the other,--which Reason seeks to unify. And their union -is the _Ideal_ of Reason. - -50.] To carry out this unification two ways or two forms are -admissible. Either we may begin with Being and proceed to the -_abstraction_ of Thought: or the movement may begin with the -abstraction and end in Being. - -We shall, in the first place, start from Being. But Being, in its -natural aspect, presents itself to view as a Being of infinite variety, -a World in all its plenitude. And this world may be regarded in two -ways: first, as a collection of innumerable unconnected facts; and -second, as a collection of innumerable facts in mutual relation, -giving evidence of design. The first aspect is emphasised in the -Cosmological proof: the latter in the proofs of Natural Theology. -Suppose now that this fulness of being passes under the agency of -thought. Then it is stripped of its isolation and unconnectedness, and -viewed as a universal and absolutely necessary being which determines -itself and acts by general purposes or laws. And this necessary and -self-determined being, different from the being at the commencement, is -God. - -The main force of Kant's criticism on this process attacks it for being -a syllogising, _i.e._ a transition. Perceptions, and that aggregate -of perceptions we call the world, exhibit as they stand no traces of -that universality which they afterwards receive from the purifying act -of thought. The empirical conception of the world therefore gives no -warrant for the idea of universality. And so any attempt on the part -of thought to ascend from the empirical conception of the world to -God is checked by the argument of Hume (as in the paralogisms, § 47), -according to which we have no right to think sensations, that is, to -elicit universality and necessity from them. - -Man is essentially a thinker: and therefore sound Common Sense, as well -as Philosophy, will not yield up their right of rising to God from -and out of the empirical view of the world. The only basis on which -this rise is possible is the thinking study of the world, not the bare -sensuous, animal, attuition of it. Thought and thought alone has eyes -for the essence, substance, universal power, and ultimate design of the -world. And what men call the proofs of God's existence are, rightly -understood, ways of describing and analysing the native course of the -mind, the course of _thought_ thinking the _data_ of the senses. The -rise of thought beyond the world of sense, its passage from the finite -to the infinite, the leap into the super-sensible which it takes when -it snaps asunder the chain of sense, all this transition is thought and -nothing but thought. Say there is no such passage, and you say there is -to be no thinking. And in sooth, animals make no such transition. They -never get further than sensation and the perception of the senses, and -in consequence they have no religion. - -Both on general grounds, and in the particular case, there are two -remarks to be made upon the criticism of this exaltation in thought. -The first remark deals with the question of form. When the exaltation -is exhibited in a syllogistic process, in the shape of what we call -_proofs_ of the being of God, these reasonings cannot but start from -some sort of theory of the world, which makes it an aggregate either -of contingent facts or of final causes and relations involving design. -The merely syllogistic thinker may deem this starting-point a solid -basis and suppose that it remains throughout in the same empirical -light, left at last as it was at the first. In this case, the bearing -of the beginning upon the conclusion to which it leads has a purely -affirmative aspect, as if we were only reasoning from one thing which -_is_ and continues to _be,_ to another thing which in like manner -is. But the great error is to restrict our notions of the nature -of thought to its form in understanding alone. To think think the -phenomenal world rather, means to re-cast its form, and transmute it -into a universal. And thus the action-of-thought, has also, _negative_ -effect upon its basis: and the matter of sensation, when it receives -the stamp of universality, at once loses its first and phenomenal -shape. By the removal and negation of the shell, the kernel within the -sense; v percept is brought to the light (§§ 13 and 23). And it is -because they do not, with sufficient prominence, express the negative -features implied in the exaltation of the mind from the world to God, -that the metaphysical proofs of the being of a God are defective -interpretations and descriptions of the process. If the world is only a -sum of incidents, it follows that it is also deciduous and phenomenal, -in _esse_ and _posse_ null. That upward spring of the mind signifies, -that the being which the world has is only a semblance, no real being, -no absolute truth; it signifies that, beyond and above that appearance, -truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for God. The -process of exaltation might thus appear to be transition and to involve -a means, but it is not a whit less true, that every trace of transition -and means is absorbed; since the world, which might have seemed to be -the means of reaching God, is explained to be a nullity. Unless the -being of the world is nullified, the _point d'appui_ for the exaltation -is lost. In this way the apparent means vanishes, and the process -of derivation is cancelled in the very act by which it proceeds. It -is the affirmative aspect of this relation, as supposed to subsist -between two things, either of which _is_ as much as the other, which -Jacobi mainly has in his eye when he attacks the demonstrations of the -understanding. Justly censuring them for seeking conditions (_i.e._ -the world) for the unconditioned, he remarks that the Infinite or -God must on such a method be presented as dependent and derivative. -But that elevation, as it takes place in the mind, serves to correct -this semblance: in fact, it has no other meaning than to correct that -semblance. Jacobi, however, failed to recognise the genuine nature of -essential thought--by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of -mediating; and consequently, his objection, though it tells against the -merely 'reflective' understanding, is false when applied to thought as -a whole, and in particular to reasonable thought. - -To explain what we mean by the neglect of the negative factor in -thought, we may refer by way of illustration to the charges of -Pantheism and Atheism brought against the doctrines of Spinoza. The -absolute Substance of Spinoza certainly falls short of absolute spirit, -and it is a right and proper requirement that God should be defined -as absolute spirit. But when the definition in Spinoza is said to -identify the world with God, and to confound God with nature and the -finite world, it is implied that the finite world possesses a genuine -actuality and affirmative reality. If this assumption be admitted, of -course a union of God with the world renders God completely finite, -and degrades Him to the bare finite and adventitious congeries of -existence. But there are two objections to be noted. In the first place -Spinoza does not define God as the unity of God with the world, but as -the union of thought with extension, that is, with the material world. -And secondly, even if we accept this awkward popular statement as to -this unity, it would still be true that the system of Spinoza was not -Atheism but Acosmism, defining the world to be an appearance lacking in -true reality. A philosophy, which affirms that God and God-alone is, -should not be stigmatised as atheistic, when even those nations which -worship the ape, the cow, or images of stone and brass, are credited -with some religion. But as things stand the imagination of ordinary men -feels a vehement reluctance to surrender its dearest conviction, that -this aggregate of finitude, which it calls a world, has actual reality; -and to hold that there is no world is a way of thinking they are fain -to believe impossible, or at least much less possible than to entertain -the idea that there is no God. Human nature, not much to its credit, is -more ready to believe that a system denies God, than that it denies the -world. A denial of God seems so much more intelligible than a denial of -the world. - -The second remark bears on the criticism of the material propositions -to which that elevation in thought in the first instance leads. If -these propositions have for their predicate such terms as substance of -the world, its necessary essence, cause which regulates and directs it -according to design, they are certainly inadequate to express what is -or ought to be understood by God. Yet apart from the trick of adopting -a preliminary popular conception of God, and criticising a result by -this assumed standard, it is certain that these characteristics have -great value, and are necessary factors in the idea of God. But if we -wish in this way to bring before thought the genuine idea of God, -and give its true value and expression to the central truth, we must -be careful not to start from a subordinate level of facts. To speak -of the 'merely contingent' things of the world is a very inadequate -description of the premisses. The organic structures, and the evidence -they afford of mutual adaptation, belong to a higher province, the -province of animated nature. But even without taking into consideration -the possible blemish which the study of animated nature and of the -other teleological aspects of existing things may contract from the -pettiness of the final causes, and from puerile instances of them and -their bearings, merely animated nature is, at the best, incapable of -supplying the material for a truthful expression to the idea of God. -God is more than life: He is Spirit. And therefore if the thought of -the Absolute takes a starting-point for its rise, and desires to take -the nearest, the most true and adequate starting-point will be found in -the nature of spirit alone. - -51.] The other way of unification by which to realise the Ideal of -Reason is to set out from the _abstractum_ of Thought and seek to -characterise it: for which purpose Being is the only available term. -This is the method of the Ontological proof. The opposition, here -presented from a merely subjective point of view, lies between Thought -and Being; whereas in the first way of junction, being is common to the -two sides of the antithesis, and the contrast lies only between its -individualisation and universality. Understanding meets this second way -with what is implicitly the same objection, as it made to the first. -It denied that the empirical involves the universal: so it denies that -the universal involves the specialisation, which specialisation in this -instance is being. In other words it says: Being cannot be deduced from -the notion by any analysis. - -The uniformly favourable reception and acceptance which attended -Kant's criticism of the Ontological proof was undoubtedly due to the -illustration which he made use of. To explain the difference between -thought and being, he took the instance of a hundred sovereigns, -which, for anything it matters to the notion, are the same hundred -whether they are real or only possible, though the difference of the -two cases is very perceptible in their effect on a man's purse. Nothing -can be more obvious than that anything we only think or conceive is not -on that account actual: that mental representation, and even notional -comprehension, always falls short of being. Still it may not unfairly -be styled a barbarism in language, when the name of notion is given -to things like a hundred sovereigns. And, putting that mistake aside, -those who perpetually urge against the philosophic Idea the difference -between Being and Thought, might have admitted that philosophers -were not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be any proposition -more trite than this? But after all, it is well to remember, when we -speak of God, that we have an object of another kind than any hundred -sovereigns, and unlike any one particular notion, representation, or -however else it may be styled. It is in fact this and this alone which -marks everything finite:--its being in time and space is discrepant -from its notion. God, on the contrary, expressly has to be what can -only be 'thought as existing'; His notion involves being. It is this -unity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God. - -If this were all, we should have only a formal expression of the divine -nature which would not really go beyond a statement of the nature of -the notion itself. And that the notion, in its most abstract terms, -involves being is plain. For the notion, whatever other determination -it may receive, is at least reference back on itself, which results -by abolishing the intermediation, and thus is immediate. And what is -that reference to self, but being? Certainly it would be strange if the -notion, the very inmost of mind, if even the 'Ego,' or above all, the -concrete totality we call God, were not rich enough to include so poor -a category as being, the very poorest and most abstract of all. For, -if we look at the thought it holds, nothing can be more insignificant -than being. And yet there may be something still more insignificant -than being,--that which at first sight is perhaps supposed to _be,_ an -external and sensible existence, like that of the paper lying before -me. However, in this matter, nobody proposes to speak of the sensible -existence of a limited and perishable thing. Besides, the petty -stricture of the _Kritik_ that 'thought and being are different' can at -most molest the path of the human mind from the thought of God to the -certainty that He _is_: it cannot take it away. It is this process of -transition, depending on the absolute inseparability of the _thought_ -of God from His being, for which its proper authority has been -re-vindicated in the theory of faith or immediate knowledge,--whereof -hereafter. - -52.] In this way thought, at its highest pitch, has to go outside for -any determinateness: and although it is continually termed Reason, is -out-and-out abstract thinking. And the result of all is that Reason -supplies nothing beyond the formal unity required to simplify and -systematise experiences; it is a _canon,_ not an _organon_ of truth, -and can furnish only a _criticism_ of knowledge, not a _doctrine_ of -the infinite. In its final analysis this criticism is summed up in the -assertion that in strictness thought is only the indeterminate unity -and the action of this indeterminate unity. - - Kant undoubtedly held reason to be the faculty of the - unconditioned; but if reason be reduced to abstract identity - only, it by implication renounces its unconditionality and is - in reality no better than empty understanding. For reason is - unconditioned, only in so far as its character and quality are not - due to an extraneous and foreign content, only in so far as it - is self-characterising, and thus, in point of content, is its own - master. Kant, however, expressly explains that the action of reason - consists solely in applying the categories to systematise the - matter given by perception, _e._ to place it in an outside order, - under the guidance of the principle of non-contradiction. - -53.] (b) The Practical Reason is understood by Kant to mean a -_thinking_ Will, _i.e._ a Will that determines itself on universal -principles. Its office is to give objective, imperative laws of -freedom,--laws, that is, which state what ought to happen. The warrant -for thus assuming thought to be an activity which makes itself felt -objectively, that is, to be really a Reason, is the alleged possibility -of proving practical freedom by experience, that is, of showing it in -the phenomenon of self-consciousness. This experience in consciousness -is at once met by all that the Necessitarian produces from contrary -experience, particularly by the sceptical induction (employed amongst -others by Hume) from the endless diversity of what men regard as right -and duty,--_i.e._ from the diversity apparent in those professedly -objective laws of freedom. - -54.] What, then, is to serve as the law which the Practical -Reason embraces and obeys, and as the criterion in its act of -self-determination? There is no rule at hand but the same abstract -identity of understanding as before: There must be no contradiction in -the act of self-determination. Hence the Practical Reason never shakes -off the formalism which is represented as the climax of the Theoretical -Reason. - -But this Practical Reason does not confine the universal principle of -the Good to its own inward regulation: it first becomes _practical,_ -in the true sense of the word, when it insists on the Good being -manifested in the world with an outward objectivity, and requires that -the thought shall be objective throughout, and not merely subjective. -We shall speak of this postulate of the Practical Reason afterwards. - - The free self-determination which Kant denied to the speculative, - he has expressly vindicated for the practical reason. To many minds - this particular aspect of the Kantian philosophy made it welcome; - and that for good reasons. To estimate rightly what we owe to - Kant in the matter, we ought to set before our minds the form of - practical philosophy and in particular of 'moral philosophy,' which - prevailed in his time. It may be generally described as a system - of Eudaemonism, which, when asked what man's chief end ought to - be, replied Happiness. And by happiness Eudaemonism understood the - satisfaction of the private appetites, wishes and wants of the - man: thus raising the contingent and particular into a principle - for the will and its actualisation. To this Eudaemonism, which was - destitute of stability and consistency, and which left the 'door - and gate' wide open for every whim and caprice, Kant opposed the - practical reason, and thus emphasised the need for a principle - of will which should be universal and lay the same obligation - on all. The theoretical reason, as has been made evident in the - preceding paragraphs, is identified by Kant with the negative - faculty of the infinite; and as it has no positive content of its - own, it is restricted to the function of detecting the finitude of - experiential knowledge. To the practical reason, on the contrary, - he has expressly allowed a positive infinity, by ascribing to the - will the power of modifying itself in universal modes, _i.e._ by - thought. Such a power the will undoubtedly has: and it is well - to remember that man is free only in so far as he possesses it - and avails himself of it in his conduct. But a recognition of the - existence of this power is not enough and does not avail to tell - us what are the contents of the will or practical reason. Hence to - say, that a man must make the Good the content of his will, raises - the question, what that content is, and what are the means of - ascertaining what good is. Nor does one get over the difficulty by - the principle that the will must be consistent with itself, or by - the precept to do duty for the sake of duty. - -55.] (c) The Reflective Power of Judgment is invested by Kant -with the function of an Intuitive Understanding. That is to say, -whereas the particulars had hitherto appeared, so far as the universal -or abstract identity was concerned, adventitious and incapable of -being deduced from it, the _Intuitive_ Understanding apprehends the -particulars as moulded and formed by the universal itself. Experience -presents such universalised particulars in the products of Art and of -_organic_ nature. - -The capital feature in Kant's Criticism of the Judgment is, that in -it he gave a representation and a name, if not even an intellectual -expression, to the Idea. Such a representation, as an Intuitive -Understanding, or an inner adaptation, suggests a universal which -is at the same time apprehended as essentially a concrete unity, It -is in these aperçus alone that the Kantian philosophy rises to the -speculative height. Schiller, and others, have found in the idea of -artistic beauty, where thought and sensuous conception have grown -together into one, a way of escape from the abstract and separatist -understanding. Others have found the same relief in the perception -and consciousness of life and of living things, whether that life -be natural or intellectual.--The work of Art, as well as the living -individual, is, it must be owned, of limited content. But in the -postulated harmony of nature (or necessity) and free purpose,--in the -final purpose of the world conceived as realised, Kant has put before -us the Idea, comprehensive even in its content. Yet what may be called -the laziness of thought, when dealing with this supreme Idea, finds a -too easy mode of evasion in the 'ought to be': instead of the actual -realisation of the ultimate end, it clings hard to the disjunction -of the notion from reality. Yet if thought will not _think_ the ideal -realised, the senses and the intuition can at any rate _see_ it in the -present reality of living organisms and of the beautiful in Art. And -consequently Kant's remarks on these objects were well adapted to lead -the mind on to grasp and think the concrete Idea. - -56.] We are thus led to conceive a different relation between the -universal of understanding and the particular of perception, than that -on which the theory of the Theoretical and Practical Reason is founded. -But while this is so, it is not supplemented by a recognition that the -former is the genuine relation and the very truth. Instead of that, -the unity (of universal with particular) is accepted only as it exists -in finite phenomena, and is adduced only as a fact of experience. -Such experience, at first only personal, may come from two sources. -It may spring from Genius, the faculty which produces 'aesthetic -ideas'; meaning by aesthetic ideas, the picture-thoughts of the free -imagination which subserve an idea and suggest thoughts, although their -content is not expressed in a notional form, and even admits of no -such expression. It may also be due to Taste, the feeling of congruity -between the free play of intuition or imagination and the uniformity of -understanding. - -57.] The principle by which the Reflective faculty of Judgment -regulates and arranges the products of animated nature is described -as the End or final cause,--the notion in action, the universal at -once determining and determinate in itself. At the same time Kant is -careful to discard the conception of external or finite adaptation, in -which the End is only an adventitious form for the means and material -in which it is realised. In the living organism, on the contrary, the -final cause is a moulding principle and an energy immanent in the -matter, and every member is in its turn a means as well as an end. - -58.] Such an Idea evidently radically transforms the relation which the -understanding institutes between means and ends, between subjectivity -and objectivity. And yet in the face of this unification, the End or -design is subsequently explained to be a cause which exists and acts -subjectively, _i.e._ as our idea only: and teleology is accordingly -explained to be only a principle of criticism, purely personal to _our_ -understanding. - -After the Critical philosophy had settled that Reason can know -phenomena only, there would still have been an option for animated -nature between two equally subjective modes of thought. Even according -to Kant's own exposition, there would have been an obligation to admit, -in the case of natural productions, a knowledge not confined to the -categories of quality, cause and effect, composition, constituents, -and so on. The principle of inward adaptation or design, had it been -kept to and carried out in scientific application, would have led to a -different and a higher method of observing nature. - -59.] If we adopt this principle, the Idea, when all limitations were -removed from it, would appear as follows. The universality moulded by -Reason, and described as the absolute and final end or the Good, would -be realised in the world, and realised moreover by means of a third -thing, the power which proposes this End as well as realises it,--that -is, God. Thus in Him, who is the absolute truth, those oppositions of -universal and individual, subjective and objective, are solved and -explained to be neither self-subsistent nor true. - -80.] But Good,--which is thus put forward as the final cause of the -world,--has been already described as only _our_ good, the moral law -of _our_ Practical Reason. This being so, the unity in question -goes no further than make the state of the world and the course of -its events harmonise with our moral standards.[1] Besides, even with -this limitation, the final cause, or Good, is a vague abstraction, -and the same vagueness attaches to what is to be Duty. But, further, -this harmony is met by the revival and re-assertion of the antithesis, -which it by its own principle had nullified. The harmony is then -described as merely subjective, something which merely ought to be, -and which at the same time is not real,--a mere article of faith, -possessing a subjective certainty, but without truth, or that -objectivity which is proper to the Idea. This contradiction may seem -to be disguised by adjourning the realisation of the Idea to a future, -to a _time_ when the Idea will also be. But a sensuous condition like -time is the reverse of a reconciliation of the discrepancy; and an -infinite progression--which is the corresponding image adopted by the -understanding--on the very face of it only repeats and re-enacts the -contradiction. - -A general remark may still be offered on the result to which the -Critical philosophy led as to the nature of knowledge; a result -which has grown one of the current 'idols' or axiomatic beliefs of -the day. In every dualistic system, and especially in that of Kant, -the fundamental defect makes itself visible in the inconsistency of -unifying at one moment, what a moment before had been explained to -be independent and therefore incapable of unification. And then, at -the very moment after unification has been alleged to be the truth, -we suddenly come upon the doctrine that the two elements, which, in -their true status of unification, had been refused all independent -subsistence, are only true and actual in their state of separation. -Philosophising of this kind wants the little penetration needed to -discover, that this shuffling only evidences how unsatisfactory each -one of the two terms is. And it fails simply because it is incapable -of bringing two thoughts together. (And in point of form there are -never more than two.) It argues an utter want of consistency to say, -on the one hand, that the understanding only knows phenomena, and, on -the other, assert the absolute character of this knowledge, by such -statements as 'Cognition can go no further'; 'Here is the _natural_ and -absolute limit of human knowledge.' But 'natural' is the wrong word -here. The things of nature are limited and are natural things only to -such extent as they are not aware of their universal limit, or to such -extent as their mode or quality is a limit from our point of view, -and not from their own. No one knows, or even feels, that anything -is a limit or defect, until he is at the same time above and beyond -it. Living beings, for example, possess the privilege of pain which -is denied to the inanimate: even with living beings, a single mode or -quality passes into the feeling of a negative. For living beings as -such possess within them a universal vitality, which overpasses and -includes the single mode; and thus, as they maintain themselves in -the negative of themselves, they feel the contradiction to _exist_ -within them. But the contradiction is within them, only in so far as -one and the same subject includes both the universality of their sense -of life, and the individual mode which is in negation with it. This -illustration will show how a limit or imperfection in knowledge comes -to be termed a limit or imperfection, only when it is compared with the -actually-present Idea of the universal, of a total and perfect. A very -little consideration might show, that to call a thing finite or limited -proves by implication the very presence of the infinite and unlimited, -and that our knowledge of a limit can only be when the unlimited is _on -this side_ in consciousness. - -The result however of Kant's view of cognition suggests a second -remark. The philosophy of Kant could have no influence on the method of -the sciences. It leaves the categories and method of ordinary knowledge -quite unmolested. Occasionally, it may be, in the first sections of a -scientific work of that period, we find propositions borrowed from the -Kantian philosophy: but the course of the treatise renders it apparent -that these propositions were superfluous decoration, and that the few -first pages might have been omitted without producing the least change -in the empirical contents.[2] - -We may next institute a comparison of Kant with the metaphysics of the -empirical school. Natural plain Empiricism, though it unquestionably -insists most upon sensuous perception, still allows a super-sensible -world or spiritual reality, whatever may be its structure and -constitution, and whether derived from intellect, or from imagination, -&c. So far as form goes, the facts of this super-sensible world rest on -the authority of mind, in the same way as the other facts, embraced -in empirical knowledge, rest on the authority of external perception. -But when Empiricism becomes reflective and logically consistent, it -turns its arms against this dualism in the ultimate and highest species -of fact; it denies the independence of the thinking principle and of -a spiritual world which developes itself in thought. Materialism or -Naturalism, therefore, is the consistent and thorough-going system -of Empiricism. In direct opposition to such an Empiricism, Kant -asserts the principle of thought and freedom, and attaches himself -to the first-mentioned form of empirical doctrine, the general -principles of which he never departed from. There is a dualism in -his philosophy also. On one side stands the world of sensation, and -of the understanding which reflects upon it. This world, it is true, -he alleges to be a world of appearances. But that is only a title -or formal description; for the source, the facts, and the modes of -observation continue quite the same as in Empiricism. On the other side -and independent stands a self-apprehending thought, the principle of -freedom, which Kant has in common with ordinary and bygone metaphysic, -but emptied of all that it held, and without his being able to infuse -into it anything new. For, in the Critical doctrine, thought, or, as it -is there called, Reason, is divested of every specific form, and thus -bereft of all authority. The main effect of the Kantian philosophy has -been to revive the consciousness of Reason, or the absolute inwardness -of thought. Its abstractness indeed prevented that inwardness from -developing into anything, or from originating any special forms, -whether cognitive principles or moral laws; but nevertheless it -absolutely refused to accept or indulge anything possessing the -character of an externality. Henceforth the principle of the -independence of Reason, or of its absolute self-subsistence, is made -a general principle of philosophy, as well as a foregone conclusion of -the time. - -(1) The Critical philosophy has one great negative merit. It has -brought home the conviction that the categories of understanding are -finite in their range, and that any cognitive process confined within -their pale falls short of the truth. But Kant had only a sight of -half the truth. He explained the finite nature of the categories to -mean that they were subjective only, valid only for our thought, from -which the thing-in-itself was divided by an impassable gulf. In fact, -however, it is not because they are subjective, that the categories are -finite: they are finite by their very nature, and it is on their own -selves that it is requisite to exhibit their finitude. Kant however -holds that what we think is false, because it is we who think it. A -further deficiency in the system is that it gives only an historical -description of thought, and a mere enumeration of the factors of -consciousness. The enumeration is in the main correct: but not a word -touches upon the necessity of what is thus empirically colligated. The -observations, made on the various stages of consciousness, culminate -in the summary statement, that the content of all we are acquainted -with is only an appearance. And as it is true at least that all finite -thinking is concerned with appearances, so far the conclusion is -justified. This stage of 'appearance' however--the phenomenal world--is -not the terminus of thought: there is another and a higher region. But -that region was to the Kantian philosophy an inaccessible 'other world.' - -(2) After all it was only formally, that the Kantian system established -the principle that thought is spontaneous and self-determining. Into -details of the manner and the extent of this self-determination of -thought, Kant never went. It was Fichte who first noticed the omission; -and who, after he had called attention to the want of a deduction for -the categories, endeavoured really to supply something of the kind. -With Fichte, the 'Ego' is the starting-point in the philosophical -development: and the outcome of its action is supposed to be visible -in the categories. But in Fichte the 'Ego' is not really presented -as a free, spontaneous energy; it is supposed to receive its first -excitation by a shock or impulse from without. Against this shock -the 'Ego' will, it is assumed, react, and only through this reaction -does it first become conscious of itself. Meanwhile, the nature of -the impulse remains a stranger beyond our pale: and the 'Ego,' with -something else always confronting it, is weighted with a condition. -Fichte, in consequence, never advanced beyond Kant's conclusion, that -the finite only is knowable, while the infinite transcends the range -of thought. What Kant calls the thing-by-itself, Fichte calls the -impulse from without--that abstraction of something else than 'I,' not -otherwise describable or definable than as the negative or non-Ego in -general. The 'I' is thus looked at as standing in essential relation -with the not-I, through which its act of self-determination is first -awakened. And in this manner the 'I' is but the continuous act of -self-liberation from this impulse, never gaining a real freedom, -because with the surcease of the impulse the 'I,' whose being is -its action, would also cease to be. Nor is the content produced by -the action of the 'I' at all different from the ordinary content of -experience, except by the supplementary remark, that this content is -mere appearance. - - - -[1] Even Hermann's 'Handbook of Prosody' begins with paragraphs of -Kantian philosophy. In § 8 it is argued that a law of rhythm must be -(1) objective, (a) formal, and (3) determined _à priori._ With these -requirements and with the principles of Causality and Reciprocity which -follow later, it were well to compare the treatment of the various -measures, upon which those formal principles do not exercise the -slightest influence. - -[2] In Kant's own words (Criticism of the Power of Judgment, p. 427): -'Final Cause is merely a notion of our practical reason. It cannot -be deduced from any data of experience as a theoretical criterion of -nature, nor can it be applied to know nature. No employment of this -notion is possible except solely for the practical reason, by moral -laws. The final purpose of the Creation is that constitution of the -world which harmonises with that to which alone we can give definite -expression on universal principles, viz. the final purpose of our pure -practical reason, and with that in so far as it means to be practical.' - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -THIRD ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY. - - -_Immediate or Intuitive Knowledge._ - - -61.] If we are to believe the Critical philosophy, thought is -subjective, and its ultimate and invincible mode is _abstract -universality_ or formal identity. Thought is thus set in opposition -to Truth, which is no abstraction, but concrete universality. In this -highest mode of thought, which is entitled Reason, the Categories -are left out of account.--The extreme theory on the opposite side -holds thought to be an act of the _particular_ only, and on that -ground declares it incapable of apprehending the Truth. This is the -Intuitional theory. - -62.] According to this theory, thinking, a private and particular -operation, has its whole scope and product in the Categories. But, -these Categories, as arrested by the understanding, are limited -vehicles of thought, forms of the conditioned, of the dependent -and derivative. A thought limited to these modes has no sense of -the Infinite and the True, and cannot bridge over the gulf that -separates it from them. (This stricture refers to the proofs of God's -existence.) These inadequate modes or categories are also spoken of as -_notions_: and to get a notion of an object therefore can only mean, -in this language, to grasp it under the form of being conditioned and -derivative. Consequently, if the object in question be the True, the -Infinite, the Unconditioned, we change it by our notions into a finite -and conditioned; whereby, instead of apprehending the truth by thought, -we have perverted it into untruth. - -Such is the one simple line of argument advanced for the thesis that -the knowledge of God and of truth must be immediate, or intuitive. At -an earlier period all sort of anthropomorphic conceptions, as they -are termed, were banished from God, as being finite and therefore -unworthy of the infinite; and in this way God had been reduced to -a tolerably blank being. But in those days the thought-forms were -in general not supposed to come under the head of anthropomorphism. -Thought was believed rather to strip finitude from the conceptions of -the Absolute,--in agreement with the above-mentioned conviction of all -ages, that reflection is the only road to truth. But now, at length, -even the thought-forms are pronounced anthropomorphic, and thought -itself is described as a mere faculty of finitisation. - -Jacobi has stated this charge most distinctly in the seventh supplement -to his Letters on Spinoza,--borrowing his line of argument from the -works of Spinoza himself, and applying it as a weapon against knowledge -in general. In his attack knowledge is taken to mean knowledge of -the finite only, a process of thought from one condition in a series -to another, each of which is at once conditioning and conditioned. -According to such a view, to explain and to get the notion of -anything, is the same as to show it to be derived from something else. -Whatever such knowledge embraces, consequently, is partial, dependent -and finite, while the infinite or true, _i.e._ God, lies outside -of the mechanical inter-connexion to which knowledge is said to be -confined.--It is important to observe that, while Kant makes the finite -nature of the Categories consist mainly in the formal circumstance -that they are subjective, Jacobi discusses the Categories in their -own proper character, and pronounces them to be in their very import -finite. What Jacobi chiefly had before his eyes, when he thus described -science, was the brilliant successes of the physical or 'exact' -sciences in ascertaining natural forces and laws. It is certainly not -on the finite ground occupied by these sciences that we can expect to -meet the in-dwelling presence of the infinite. Lalande was right when -he said he had swept the whole heaven with his glass, and seen no God. -(See note to § 60.) In the field of physical science, the universal, -which is the final result of analysis, is only the indeterminate -aggregate,--of the external finite,--in one word, Matter: and Jacobi -well perceived that there was no other issue obtainable in the way of a -mere advance from one explanatory clause or law to another. - -63.] All the while the doctrine that truth exists for the mind was so -strongly maintained by Jacobi, that Reason alone is declared to be that -by which man lives. This Reason is the knowledge of God. But, seeing -that derivative knowledge is restricted to the compass of finite facts, -Reason is knowledge underivative, or Faith. - -Knowledge, Faith, Thought, Intuition are the categories that we meet -with on this line of reflection. These terms, as presumably familiar to -every one, are only too frequently subjected to an arbitrary use, under -no better guidance than the conceptions and distinctions of psychology, -without any investigation into their nature and notion, which is the -main question after all. Thus, we often find knowledge contrasted with -faith, and faith at the same time explained to be an underivative -or intuitive knowledge:--so that it must be at least some sort of -knowledge. And, besides, it is unquestionably a fact of experience, -firstly, that what we believe is in our consciousness,---which implies -that we _know about it;_ and secondly, that this belief is a certainty -in our consciousness,--which implies that we _know it._ Again, and -especially, we find thought opposed to immediate knowledge and faith, -and, in particular, to intuition. But if this intuition be qualified -as intellectual, we must really mean intuition which thinks, unless, -in a question about the nature of God, we are willing to interpret -intellect to mean images and representations of imagination. The word -faith or belief, in the dialect of this system, comes to be employed -even with reference to common objects that are present to the senses. -We believe, says Jacobi, that we have a body,--we believe in the -existence of the things of sense. But if we are speaking of faith in -the True and Eternal, and saying that God is given and revealed to us -in immediate knowledge OF intuition, we are concerned not with the -things of sense, but with objects special to our thinking mind, with -truths of inherently universal significance. And when the individual -'I,' or in other words personality, is under discussion--not the 'I' of -experience, or a single private person--above all, when the personality -of God is before us, we are speaking of personality unalloyed,--of a -personality in its own nature universal. Such personality is a thought, -and falls within the province of thought only. More than this. Pure and -simple intuition is completely the same as pure and simple thought. -Intuition and belief, in the first instance, denote the definite -conceptions we attach to these words in our ordinary employment of -them: and to this extent they differ from thought in certain points -which nearly every one can understand. But here they are taken in a -higher sense, and must be interpreted to mean a belief in God, or an -intellectual intuition of God; in short, we must put aside all that -especially distinguishes thought on the one side from belief and -intuition on the other. How belief and intuition, when transferred to -these higher regions, differ from thought, it is impossible for any one -to say. And yet, such are the barren distinctions of words, with which -men fancy that they assert an important truth: even while the formulae -they maintain are identical with those which they impugn. - -The term _Faith_ brings with it the special advantage of suggesting -the faith of the Christian religion; it seems to include Christian -faith, or perhaps even to coincide with it; and thus the Philosophy of -Faith has a thoroughly orthodox and Christian look, on the strength of -which it takes the liberty of uttering its arbitrary dicta with greater -pretension and authority. But we must not let ourselves be deceived by -the semblance surreptitiously secured by a merely verbal similarity. -The two things are radically distinct. Firstly, the Christian faith -comprises in it an authority of the Church: but the faith of Jacobi's -philosophy has no other authority than that of a personal revelation. -And, secondly, the Christian faith is a copious body of objective -truth, a system of knowledge and doctrine: while the scope of the -philosophic faith is so utterly indefinite, that, while it has room for -the faith of the Christian, it equally admits a belief in the divinity -of the Dalai-lama, the ox, or the monkey,--thus, so far as it goes, -narrowing Deity down to its simplest terms, a 'Supreme Being.' Faith -itself, taken in this professedly philosophical sense, is nothing but -the sapless abstract of immediate knowledge,--a purely formal category -applicable to very different facts; and it ought never to be confused -or identified with the spiritual fulness of Christian faith, whether we -look at that faith in the heart of the believer and the in-dwelling of -the Holy Spirit, or in the system of theological doctrine. - -With what is here called faith or immediate knowledge must also be -identified inspiration, the heart's revelations, the truths implanted -in man by nature, and also in particular, healthy reason or Common -Sense, as it is called. All these forms agree in adopting as their -leading principle the immediacy, or self-evident way, in which a fact -or body of truths is presented in consciousness. - -84.] This immediate knowledge consists in knowing that the Infinite, -the Eternal, the God which is in our idea, really _is_: or, it asserts -that in our consciousness there is immediately and inseparably bound up -with this idea the certainty of its actual being. - -To seek to controvert these maxims of immediate knowledge is the last -thing philosophers would think of. They may rather find occasion for -self-gratulation when these ancient doctrines, expressing as they -do the general tenor of philosophic teaching, have, even in this -unphilosophical fashion, become to some extent universal convictions -of the age. The true marvel rather is that any one could suppose that -these principles were opposed to philosophy,--the maxims, viz., that -whatever is held to be true is immanent in the mind, and that there -is truth for the mind (§ 63). From a formal point of view, there is a -peculiar interest in the maxim that the being of God is immediately and -inseparably bound up with the thought of God, that objectivity is bound -up with the subjectivity which the thought originally presents. Not -content with that, the philosophy of immediate knowledge goes so far in -its one-sided view, as to affirm that the attribute of existence, even -in perception, is quite as inseparably connected with the conception -we have of our own bodies and of external things, as it is with the -thought of God. Now it is the endeavour of philosophy to _prove_ such -a unity, to show that it lies in the very nature of thought and -subjectivity, to be inseparable from being and objectivity. In these -circumstances therefore, philosophy, whatever estimate may be formed of -the character of these proofs, must in any case be glad to see it shown -and maintained that its maxims are facts of consciousness, and thus -in harmony with experience. The difference between philosophy and the -asseverations of immediate knowledge rather centres in the exclusive -attitude which immediate knowledge adopts, when it sets itself up -against philosophy. - -And yet it was as a self-evident or immediate truth that the 'Cogito, -ergo sum,' of Descartes, the maxim on which may be said to hinge the -whole interest of Modern Philosophy, was first stated by its author. -The man who calls this a syllogism, must know little more about a -syllogism than that the word 'Ergo' occurs in it. Where shall we look -for the middle term? And a middle term is a much more essential point -of a syllogism than the word 'Ergo.' If we try to justify the name, by -calling the combination of ideas in Descartes an 'immediate' syllogism, -this superfluous variety of syllogism is a mere name for an utterly -unmediated synthesis of distinct terms of thought. That being so, the -synthesis of being with our ideas, as stated in the maxim of immediate -knowledge, has no more and no less claim to the title of syllogism than -the axiom of Descartes has. From Hotho's 'Dissertation on the Cartesian -Philosophy' (published 1826), I borrow the quotation in which Descartes -himself distinctly declares that the maxim 'Cogito, ergo sum,' is no -syllogism. The passages are Respons. ad II Object.: De Methodo IV: -Ep. I. 118. From the first passage I quote the words more immediately -to the point. Descartes says: 'That we are thinking beings is "_prima -quaedam notio quae ex nullo syllogismo concluditur_"' (a certain -primary notion, which is deduced from no syllogism); and goes on: -_'neque cum quis dicit; Ego cogito, ergo sum sive existo, existentiam -ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit.'_ (Nor, when one says, I think, -therefore I am or exist, does he deduce existence from thought by means -of a syllogism.) Descartes knew what it implied in a syllogism, and -so he adds that, in order to make the maxim admit of a deduction by -syllogism, we should have to add the major premiss: _'Illud omne quod -cogitat, est sive existit.'_ (Everything which thinks, is or exists.) -Of course, he remarks, this major premiss itself has to be deduced from -the original statement. - -The language of Descartes on the maxim that the 'I' which _thinks_ must -also at the same time _be,_ his saying that this connexion is given and -implied in the simple perception of consciousness,--that this connexion -is the absolute first, the principle, the most certain and evident of -all things, so that no scepticism can be conceived so monstrous as not -to admit it:--all this language is so vivid and distinct, that the -modern statements of Jacobi and others on this immediate connexion can -only pass for needless repetitions. - -65.] The theory of which we are speaking is not satisfied when it has -shown that mediate knowledge taken separately is an adequate vehicle -of truth. Its distinctive doctrine is that immediate knowledge alone, -to the total exclusion of mediation, can possess a content which is -true. This exclusiveness is enough to show that the theory is a relapse -into the metaphysical understanding, with its pass-words 'Either--or.' -And thus it is really a relapse into the habit of external mediation, -the gist of which consists in clinging to those narrow and one-sided -categories of the finite, which it falsely imagined itself to have left -for ever behind. This point, however, we shall not at present discuss -in detail. An exclusively immediate knowledge is asserted as a fact -only, and in the present Introduction we can only study it from this -external point of view. The real significance of such knowledge will -be explained, when we come to the logical question of the opposition -between mediate and immediate. But it is characteristic of the view -before us to decline to examine the nature of the fact, that is, the -notion of it; for such an examination would itself be a step towards -mediation and even towards knowledge. The genuine discussion on logical -ground, therefore, must be deferred till we come to the proper province -of Logic itself. - -The whole of the second part of Logic, the Doctrine of Essential Being, -is a discussion of the intrinsic and self-affirming unity of immediacy -and mediation. - -66.] Beyond this point then we need not go: immediate knowledge is -to be accepted as a _fact._ Under these circumstances examination is -directed to the field of experience, to a psychological phenomenon. If -that be so, we need only note, as the commonest of experiences, that -truths, which we well know to be results of complicated and highly -mediated trains of thought, present themselves immediately and without -effort to the mind of any man who is familiar with the subject. The -mathematician, like every one who has mastered a particular science, -meets any problem with ready-made solutions which pre-suppose most -complicated analyses: and every educated man has a number of general -views and maxims which he can muster without trouble, but which -can only have sprung from frequent reflection and long experience. -The facility we attain in any sort of knowledge, art, or technical -expertness, consists in having the particular knowledge or kind of -action present to our mind in any case that occurs, even we may say, -immediate in our very limbs, in an out-going activity. In all these -instances, immediacy of knowledge is so far from excluding mediation, -that the two things are linked together,--immediate knowledge being -actually the product and result of mediated knowledge. - -It is no less obvious that immediate _existence_ is bound up with -its mediation. The seed and the parents are immediate and initial -existences in respect of the off-spring which they generate. But the -seed and the parents, though they exist and are therefore immediate, -are yet in their turn generated: and the child, without prejudice to -the mediation of its existence, is immediate, because it _is._ The fact -that I am in Berlin, my immediate presence here, is mediated by my -having made the journey hither. - -67.] One thing may be observed with reference to the immediate -knowledge of God, of legal and ethical principles (including under -the head of immediate knowledge, what is otherwise termed Instinct, -Implanted or Innate Ideas, Common Sense, Natural Reason, or whatever -form, in short, we give to the original spontaneity). It is a matter -of general experience that education or development is required to -bring out into consciousness what is therein contained. It was so even -with the Platonic reminiscence; and the Christian rite of baptism, -although a sacrament, involves the additional obligation of a Christian -up-bringing. In short, religion and morals, however much they may be -faith or immediate knowledge, are still on every side conditioned by -the mediating process which is termed development, education, training. - -The adherents, no less than the assailants, of the doctrine of Innate -Ideas have been guilty throughout of the like exclusiveness and -narrowness as is here noted. They have drawn a hard and fast line -between the essential and immediate union (as it may be described) of -certain universal principles with the soul, and another union which has -to be brought about in an external fashion, and through the channel of -_given_ objects and conceptions, There is one objection, borrowed from -experience, which was raised against the doctrine of Innate ideas. All -men, it was said, must have these ideas; they must have, for example, -the maxim of contradiction, present in the mind,--they must be aware -of it; for this maxim and others like it were included in the class -of Innate ideas. The objection may be set down to misconception; for -the principles in question, though innate, need not on that account -have the form of ideas or conceptions of something we are aware of. -Still, the objection completely meets and overthrows the crude theory -of immediate knowledge, which expressly maintains its formulae in so -far as they are in consciousness.--Another point calls for notice. We -may suppose it admitted by the intuitive school, that the special case -of religious faith involves supplementing by a Christian or religious -education and development. In that case it is acting capriciously when -it seeks to ignore this admission when speaking about faith, or it -betrays a want of reflection not to know, that, if the necessity of -education be once admitted, mediation is pronounced indispensable. - - The reminiscence of ideas spoken of by Plato is equivalent to - saying that ideas implicitly exist in man, instead of being, as - the Sophists assert, a foreign importation into his mind. But to - conceive knowledge as reminiscence does not interfere with, or - set aside as useless, the development of what is implicitly in - man;--which development is another word for mediation. The same - holds good of the innate ideas that we find in Descartes and the - Scotch philosophers. These ideas are only potential in the first - instance, and should be looked at as being a sort of mere capacity - in man. - -88.] In the case of these experiences the appeal turns upon something -that shows itself bound up with immediate consciousness. Even if -this combination be in the first instance taken as an external and -empirical connexion, still, even for empirical observation, the fact -of its being constant shows it to be essential and inseparable. But, -again, if this immediate consciousness, as exhibited in experience, -be taken separately, so far as it is a consciousness of God and -the divine nature, the state of mind which it implies is generally -described as an exaltation above the finite, above the senses, and -above the instinctive desires and affections of the natural heart: -which exaltation passes over into, and terminates in, faith in God and -a divine order. It is apparent, therefore, that, though faith may be an -immediate knowledge and certainty, it equally implies the interposition -of this process as its antecedent and condition. - -It has been already observed, that the so-called proofs of the being -of God, which start from finite being, give an expression to this -exaltation. In that light they are no inventions of an over-subtle -reflection, but the necessary and native channel in which the movement -of mind runs: though it may be that, in their ordinary form, these -proofs have not their correct and adequate expression. - -69.] It is the passage (§ 64) from the subjective Idea to being which -forms the main concern of the doctrine of immediate knowledge. A -primary and self-evident inter-connexion is declared to exist between -our Idea and being. Yet precisely this central point of transition, -utterly irrespective of any connexions which show in experience, -clearly involves a mediation. And the mediation is of no imperfect or -unreal kind, where the mediation takes place with and through something -external, but one comprehending both antecedent and conclusion. - -70.] For, what this theory asserts is that truth lies neither in the -Idea as a merely subjective thought, nor in mere being on its own -account;--that mere being _per se,_ a being that is not of the Idea, -is the sensible finite being of the world. Now all this only affirms, -without demonstration, that the Idea has truth only by means of being, -and being has truth only by means of the Idea. The maxim of immediate -knowledge rejects an indefinite empty immediacy (and such is abstract -being, or pure unity taken by itself), and affirms in its stead the -unity of the Idea with being. And it acts rightly in so doing. But it -is stupid not to see that the unity of distinct terms or modes is not -merely a purely immediate unity, _i.e._ unity empty and indeterminate, -but that--with equal emphasis--the one term is shown to have truth only -as mediated through the other;--or, if the phrase be preferred, that -either term is only mediated with truth through the other. That the -quality of mediation is involved in the very immediacy of intuition -is thus exhibited as a fact, against which understanding, conformably -to the fundamental maxim of immediate knowledge that the evidence of -consciousness is infallible, can have nothing to object. It is only -ordinary abstract understanding which takes the terms of mediation and -immediacy, each by itself absolutely, to represent an inflexible line -of distinction, and thus draws upon its own head the hopeless task of -reconciling them. The difficulty, as we have shown, has no existence in -the fact, and it vanishes in the speculative notion. - -71.] The one-sidedness of the intuitional school has certain -characteristics attending upon it, which we shall proceed to point out -in their main features, now that we have discussed the fundamental -principle. The _first_ of these corollaries is as follows. Since the -criterion of truth is found, not in the nature of the content, but in -the mere fact of consciousness, every alleged truth has no other basis -than subjective certitude and the assertion that we discover a certain -fact in our consciousness. What I discover in my consciousness is thus -exaggerated into a fact of the consciousness of all, and even passed -off for the very nature of consciousness. - -Among the so-called proofs of the existence of God, there used to stand -the _consensus gentium,_ to which appeal is made as early as Cicero. -The _consensus gentium_ is a weighty authority, and the transition is -easy and natural, from the circumstance that a certain fact is found -in the consciousness of every one, to the conclusion that it is a -necessary element in the very nature of consciousness. In this category -of general agreement there was latent the deep-rooted perception, which -does not escape even the least cultivated mind, that the consciousness -of the individual is at the same time particular and accidental. Yet -unless we examine the nature of this consciousness itself, stripping -it of its particular and accidental elements and, by the toilsome -operation of reflection, disclosing the universal in its entirety and -purity, it is only a _unanimous_ agreement upon a given point that can -authorize a decent presumption that that point is part of the very -nature of consciousness. Of course, if thought insists on seeing the -necessity of what is presented as a fact of general occurrence, the -_consensus gentium_ is certainly not sufficient. Yet even granting the -universality of the fact to be a satisfactory proof, it has been found -impossible to establish the belief in God on such an argument, because -experience shows that there are individuals and nations without any -such faith.[1] But there can be nothing shorter and more convenient -than to have the bare assertion to make, that we discover a fact in -our consciousness, and are certain that it is true: and to declare -that this certainty, instead of proceeding from our particular mental -constitution only, belongs to the very nature of the mind. - -72.] A _second_ corollary which results from holding immediacy of -consciousness to be the criterion of truth is that all superstition -or idolatry is allowed to be truth, and that an apology is prepared -for any contents of the will, however wrong and immoral. It is because -he believes in them, and not from the reasoning and syllogism of -what is termed mediate knowledge, that the Hindoo finds God in the -cow, the monkey, the Brahmin, or the Lama. But the natural desires -and affections spontaneously carry and deposit their interests in -consciousness, where also immoral aims make themselves naturally at -home: the good or bad character would thus express the _definite being_ -of the will, which would be known, and that most immediately, in the -interests and aims. - -73.] _Thirdly_ and lastly, the immediate consciousness of God goes no -further than to tell us _that_ He is: to tell us _what_ He is, would be -an act of cognition, involving mediation. So that God as an object of -religion is expressly narrowed down to the indeterminate supersensible, -God in general: and the significance of religion is reduced to a -minimum. - -If it were really needful to win back and secure the bare belief that -there is a God, or even to create it, we might well wonder at the -poverty of the age which can see a gain in the merest pittance of -religious consciousness, and which in its church has sunk so low as to -worship at the altar that stood in Athens long ago, dedicated to the -'Unknown God.' - -74.] We have still briefly to indicate the general nature of the -form of immediacy. For it is the essential one-sidedness of the -category, which makes whatever comes under it one sided and, for -that reason, finite. And, first, it makes the universal no better -than an abstraction external to the particulars, and God a being -without determinate quality. But God can only be called a spirit -when He is known to be at once the beginning and end, as well as -the mean, in the process of mediation. Without this unification of -elements He is neither concrete, nor living, nor a spirit. Thus the -knowledge of God as a spirit necessarily implies mediation. The form -of immediacy, secondly, invests the particular with the character of -independent or self-centred being. But such predicates contradict the -very essence of the particular,--which is to be referred to something -else outside. They thus invest the finite with the character of an -absolute. But, besides, the form of immediacy is altogether abstract: -it has no preference for one set of contents more than another, -but is equally susceptible of all: it may as well sanction what is -idolatrous and immoral as the reverse. Only when we discern that the -content,--the particular, is not self-subsistent, but derivative from -something else, are its finitude and untruth shown in their proper -light. Such discernment, where the content we discern carries with -it the ground of its dependent nature, is a knowledge which involves -mediation. The only content which can be held to be the truth is one -not mediated with something else, not limited by other things: or, -otherwise expressed, it is one mediated by itself, where mediation and -immediate reference-to-self coincide. The understanding that fancies -it has got clear of finite knowledge, the identity of the analytical -metaphysicians and the old 'rationalists,' abruptly takes again as -principle and criterion of truth that immediacy which, as an abstract -reference-to-self, is the same as abstract identity. Abstract thought -(the scientific form used by 'reflective' metaphysic) and abstract -intuition (the form used by immediate knowledge) are one and the same. - - The stereotyped opposition between the form of immediacy and that - of mediation gives to the former a halfness and inadequacy, that - affects every content which is brought under it. Immediacy means, - upon the whole, an abstract reference-to-self, that is, an abstract - identity or abstract universality. Accordingly the essential and - real universal, when taken merely in its immediacy, is a mere - abstract universal; and from this point of view God is conceived - as a being altogether without determinate quality. To call God - spirit is in that case only a phrase: for the consciousness and - self-consciousness, which spirit implies, are impossible without a - distinguishing of it from itself and from something else, _i.e._ - without mediation. - -75.] It was impossible for us to criticise this, the third attitude, -which thought has been made to take towards objective truth, in any -other mode than what is naturally indicated and admitted in the -doctrine itself. The theory asserts that immediate knowledge is a -fact. It has been shown to be untrue in fact to say that there is an -immediate knowledge, a knowledge without mediation either by means of -something else or in itself. It has also been explained to be false -in fact to say that thought advances through finite and conditioned -categories only, which are always mediated by a something else, and to -forget that in the very act of mediation the mediation itself vanishes. -And to show that, in point of fact, there is a knowledge which advances -neither by unmixed immediacy nor by unmixed mediation, we can point to -the example of Logic and the whole of philosophy. - -76.] If we view the maxims of immediate knowledge in connexion with the -uncritical metaphysic of the past from which we started, we shall learn -from the comparison the reactionary nature of the school of Jacobi. His -doctrine is a return to the modern starting-point of this metaphysic -in the Cartesian philosophy. Both Jacobi and Descartes maintain the -following three points: - -(1) The simple inseparability of the thought and being of the -thinker. '_Cogito, ergo sum_' is the same doctrine as that the being, -reality, and existence of the 'Ego' is immediately revealed to me -in consciousness. (Descartes, in fact, is careful to state that by -thought he means consciousness in general. Princip. Phil. I. 9.) This -inseparability is the absolutely first and most certain knowledge, not -mediated or demonstrated. - -(2) The inseparability of existence from the conception of God: the -former is necessarily implied in the latter, or the conception never -can be without the attribute of existence, which is thus necessary and -eternal.[2] - -(3) The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things. -By this nothing more is meant than sense-consciousness. To have such -a thing is the slightest of all cognitions: and the only thing worth -knowing about it is that such immediate knowledge of the being of -things external is error and delusion, that the sensible world as such -is altogether void of truth; that the being of these external things is -accidental and passes away as a show; and that their very nature is to -have only an existence which is separable from their essence and notion. - -77.] There is however a distinction between the two points of view: - -(1) The Cartesian philosophy, from these unproved postulates, which -it assumes to be unprovable, proceeds to wider and wider details of -knowledge, and thus gave rise to the sciences of modern times. The -modern theory (of Jacobi), on the contrary, (§ 62) has come to what is -intrinsically a most important conclusion that cognition, proceeding -as it must by finite mediations, can know only the finite, and never -embody the truth; and would fain have the consciousness of God go no -further than the aforesaid very abstract belief that God _is_.[3] - -(2) The modern doctrine on the one hand makes no change in the -Cartesian method of the usual scientific knowledge, and conducts on -the same plan the experimental and finite sciences that have sprung -from it. But, on the other hand, when it comes to the science which -has infinity for its scope, it throws aside that method, and thus, -as it knows no other, it rejects all methods. It abandons itself to -wild vagaries of imagination and assertion, to a moral priggishness -and sentimental arrogance, or to a reckless dogmatising and lust -of argument, which is loudest against philosophy and philosophic -doctrines. Philosophy of course tolerates no mere assertions or -conceits, and checks the free play of argumentative see-saw. - -78.] We must then reject the opposition between an independent -immediacy in the contents or facts of consciousness and an equally -independent mediation, supposed incompatible with the former. The -incompatibility is a mere assumption, an arbitrary assertion. All other -assumptions and postulates must in like manner be left behind at the -entrance to philosophy, whether they are derived from the intellect or -the imagination. For philosophy is the science, in which every such -proposition must first be scrutinised and its meaning and oppositions -be ascertained. - -Scepticism, made a negative science and systematically applied to all -forms of knowledge, might seem a suitable introduction, as pointing out -the nullity of such assumptions. But a sceptical introduction would -be not only an ungrateful but also a useless course; and that because -Dialectic, as we shall soon make appear, is itself an essential element -of affirmative science. Scepticism, besides, could only get hold of -the finite forms as they were suggested by experience, taking them -as given, instead of deducing them scientifically. To require such -a scepticism accomplished is the same as to insist on science being -preceded by universal doubt, or a total absence of presupposition. -Strictly speaking, in the resolve that _wills pure thought,_ this -requirement is accomplished by freedom which, abstracting from -everything, grasps its pure abstraction, the simplicity of thought. - - - -[1] In order to judge of the greater or less extent lo which Experience -shows cases of Atheism or of the belief in God, it is all-important -to know if the mere general conception of deity suffices, or if a -more definite knowledge of God is required. The Christian world would -certainly refuse the title of God to the idols of the Hindoos and the -Chinese, to the fetiches of the Africans, and even to the gods of -Greece themselves. If so, a believer in these idols would not be a -believer in God. If it were contended, on the other hand, that such -a belief in idols implies some sort of belief in God, as the species -implies the genus, then idolatry would argue not faith in an idol -merely, but faith in God. The Athenians took an opposite view. The -poets and philosophers who explained Zeus to be a cloud, and maintained -that there was only one God, were treated as atheists at Athens. - -The danger in these questions lies in looking at what the mind may make -out of an object, and not what that object actually and explicitly -is. If we fail to note this distinction, the commonest perceptions of -men's senses will be religion: for every such perception, and indeed -every act of mind, implicitly contains the principle which, when it -is purified and developed, rises to religion. But to be capable of -religion is one thing, to have it another. And religion yet implicit is -only a capacity or a possibility. - -Thus in modern times, travellers have found tribes (as Captains Ross -and Parry found the Esquimaux) which, as they tell us, have not even -that small modicum of religion possessed by African sorcerers, the -_goëtes_ of Herodotus. On the other hand, an Englishman, who spent the -first months of the last Jubilee at Rome, says, in his account of the -modern Romans, that the common people are bigots, whilst those who can -read and write are atheists to a man. - -The charge of Atheism is seldom heard in modern times: principally -because the facts and the requirements of religion are reduced to a -minimum. (See § 73.) - - -[2] Descartes, Princip. Phil. I. 15: _Magis hoc (ens summe perfectum -existere) credet, si attendat, nullius alterius rei ideam apud -se inveniri, in qua eodem modo necessariam existentiam contineri -animadveriat;--intelliget illam ideam exhibere veram et immutabilem -naturam, quaeque non potest non existere, cum necessaria existentia in -ea contineatur._ (The reader will be more disposed to _believe_ that -there exists a being supremely perfect, if he notes that in the case -of nothing else is there found in him an idea, in which he notices -necessary existence to be contained in the same way. He will see that -that idea exhibits a true and unchangeable nature,--a nature which -_cannot but exist,_ since necessary existence is _contained in it._) A -remark which immediately follows, and which sounds like mediation or -demonstration, does not really prejudice the original principle. - -In Spinoza we come upon the same statement that the essence or -abstract conception of God implies existence. The first of Spinoza's -definitions, that of the _Causa Sui_ (or Self-Cause), explains it to -be _cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id cujus natura non -potest concipi nisi existens_ (that of which the essence involves -existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as -existing). The inseparability of the notion from being is the main -point and fundamental hypothesis in his system. But what notion is -thus inseparable from being? Not the notion of finite things, for they -are so constituted as to have a contingent and a created existence. -Spinoza's 11th proposition, which follows with a proof that God exists -necessarily, and his 20th, showing that God's existence and his essence -are one and the same, are really superfluous, and the proof is more -in form than in reality. To say, that God is Substance, the only -Substance, and that, as Substance is _Causa Sui,_ God therefore exists -necessarily, is merely stating that God is that of which the notion and -the being are inseparable. - - -[3] Anselm on the contrary says: _Negligentiae mihi videtur, si -post-quam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus, quod credimus, -intelligere._ (Methinks it is _carelessness,_ if, after we have been -confirmed in the faith, we do not _exert ourselves to see the meaning -of what we believe._) [Tractat. Cur Deus Homo?] These words of Anselm, -in connexion with the concrete truths of Christian doctrine, offer a -far harder problem for investigation, than is contemplated by this -modern faith. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -LOGIC FURTHER DEFINED AND DIVIDED. - - -79.] In point of form Logical doctrine has three sides: (α) the -Abstract side, or that of understanding: (_ß_) the Dialectical, or that -of negative reason: (y) the Speculative, or that of positive reason. - -These three sides do not make three _parts_ of logic, but are stages -or 'moments' in every logical entity, that is, of every notion and -truth whatever. They may all be put under the first stage, that of -understanding, and so kept isolated from each other; but this would -give an inadequate conception of them.--The statement of the dividing -lines and the characteristic aspects of logic is at this point no more -than historical and anticipatory. - -80.] (α) Thought, as _Understanding,_ sticks to fixity of characters -and their distinctness from one another: every such limited abstract it -treats as having a subsistence and being of its own. - -In our ordinary usage of the term thought and even notion, we often -have before our eyes nothing more than the operation of Understanding. -And no doubt thought is primarily an exercise of Understanding:--only -it goes further, and the notion is not a function of Understanding -merely. The action of Understanding may be in general described as -investing its subject-matter with the form of universality. But this -universal is an abstract universal: that is to say, its opposition to -the particular is so rigorously maintained, that it is at the same -time also reduced to the character of a particular again. In this -separating and abstracting attitude towards its objects, Understanding -is the reverse of immediate perception and sensation, which, as such, -keep completely to their native sphere of action in the concrete. - -It is by referring to this opposition of Understanding to sensation or -feeling that we must explain the frequent attacks made upon thought -for being hard and narrow, and for leading, if consistently developed, -to ruinous and pernicious results. The answer to these charges, in so -far as they are warranted by their facts, is, that they do not touch -thinking in general, certainly not the thinking of Reason, but only the -exercise of Understanding. It must be added however, that the merit and -rights of the mere Understanding should unhesitatingly be admitted. And -that merit lies in the fact, that apart from Understanding there is no -fixity or accuracy in the region either of theory or of practice. - -Thus, in theory, knowledge begins by apprehending existing objects in -their specific differences. In the study of nature, for example, we -distinguish matters, forces, genera and the like, and stereotype each -in its isolation. Thought is here acting in its analytic capacity, -where its canon is identity, a simple reference of each attribute to -itself. It is under the guidance of the same identity that the process -in knowledge is effected from one scientific truth to another. Thus, -for example, in mathematics magnitude is the feature which, to the -neglect of any other, determines our advance. Hence in geometry we -compare one figure with another, so as to bring out their identity. -Similarly in other fields of knowledge, such as jurisprudence, the -advance is primarily regulated by identity. In it we argue from one -specific law or precedent to another: and what is this but to proceed -on the principle of identity? - -But Understanding is as indispensable in practice as it is in theory. -Character is an essential in conduct, and a man of character is an -understanding man, who in that capacity has definite ends in view and -undeviatingly pursues them. The man who will do something great must -learn, as Goethe says, to limit himself. The man who, on the contrary, -would do everything, really would do nothing, and fails. There is a -host of interesting things in the world: Spanish poetry, chemistry, -politics, and music are all very interesting, and if any one takes -an interest in them we need not find fault. But for a person in a -given situation to accomplish anything, he must stick to one definite -point, and not dissipate his' forces in many directions. In every -calling, too, the great thing is to pursue it with understanding. Thus -the judge must stick to the law, and give his verdict in accordance -with, it, undeterred by one motive or another, allowing no excuses; -and looking neither left nor right. Understanding, too, is always an -element in thorough training. The trained-intellect is not satisfied -with cloudy and indefinite impressions, but grasps the objects in their -fixed character: whereas the uncultivated man wavers unsettled, and it -often costs a deal of trouble to come to an understanding with him on -the matter under discussion, and to bring him to fix his eye on the -definite point in question. - -It has been already explained that the Logical principle in general, -far from being merely a subjective action in our minds, is rather the -very universal, which as such is also objective. This doctrine is -illustrated in the case of understanding, the first form of logical -truths. Understanding in this larger sense corresponds to what we call -the goodness of God, so far as that means that finite things are and -subsist. In nature, for example, we recognise the goodness of God in -the fact that the various classes or species of animals and plants are -provided with whatever they need for their preservation and welfare. -Nor is man excepted, who, both as an individual and as a nation, -possesses partly in the given circumstances of climate, of quality -and products of soil, and partly in his natural parts or talents, all -that is required for his maintenance and development. Under this shape -Understanding is visible in every department of the objective world; -and no object in that world can ever be wholly perfect which does -not give full satisfaction to the canons of understanding. A state, -for example, is imperfect, so long as it has not reached a clear -differentiation of orders and callings, and so long as those functions -of politics and government, which are different in principle, have not -evolved for themselves special organs, in the same way as we see, for -example, the developed animal organism provided with separate organs -for the functions of sensation, motion, digestion, &c. - -The previous course of the discussion may serve to show, that -understanding is indispensable even in those spheres and regions of -action which the popular fancy would deem furthest from it, and that in -proportion as understanding, is absent from them, imperfection is the -result. This particularly holds good of Art, Religion, and Philosophy. -In Art, for example, understanding is visible where the forms of -beauty, which differ in principle, are kept distinct and exhibited in -their purity. The same thing holds good also of single works of art. -It is part of the beauty and perfection of a dramatic poem that the -characters of the several persons should be closely and faithfully -maintained, and that the different aims and interests involved should -be plainly and decidedly exhibited. Or again, take the province of -Religion. The superiority of Greek over Northern mythology (apart from -other differences of subject-matter and conception) mainly consists in -this: that in the former the individual gods are fashioned into forms -of sculpture-like distinctness of outline, while in the latter the -figures fade away vaguely and hazily into one another. Lastly comes -Philosophy. That Philosophy never can get on without the understanding -hardly calls for special remark after what has been said. Its foremost -requirement is that every thought shall be grasped in its full -precision, and nothing allowed to remain vague and indefinite. - -It is usually added that understanding must not go too far. Which is -so far correct, that understanding is not an ultimate, but on the -contrary finite, and so constituted that when carried to extremes it -veers round to its opposite. It is the fashion of youth to dash about -in abstractions: but the man who has learnt to know life steers clear -of the abstract 'either--or,' and keeps to the concrete. - -81.] (ß) In the Dialectical stage these finite characterisations or -formulae supersede themselves, and pass into their opposites. - -(1) But when the Dialectical principle is employed by the understanding -separately and independently,--especially as seen in its application -to philosophical theories, Dialectic becomes Scepticism; in which the -result that ensues from its action is presented as a mere negation. - -(2) It is customary to treat Dialectic as an adventitious art, which -for very wantonness introduces confusion and a mere semblance of -contradiction into definite notions. And in that light, the semblance -is the nonentity, while the true reality is supposed to belong to the -original dicta of understanding. Often, indeed, Dialectic is nothing -more than a subjective see-saw of arguments _pro_ and _con,_ where -the absence of sterling thought is disguised by the subtlety which -gives birth to such arguments. But in its true and proper character. -Dialectic is the very nature and essence of everything predicated by -mere understanding,--the law of things and of the finite as a whole. -Dialectic is different from 'Reflection.' In the first instance, -Reflection is that movement out beyond the isolated predicate of a -thing which gives it some reference, and brings out its relativity, -while still in other respects leaving it its isolated validity. But -by Dialectic is meant the in-dwelling tendency outwards by which the -one-sidedness and limitation of the predicates of understanding is seen -in its true light, and shown to be the negation of them. For anything -to be finite is just to suppress itself and put itself aside. Thus -understood the Dialectical principle constitutes the life and soul of -scientific progress, the dynamic which alone gives immanent connexion -and necessity to the body of science; and, in a word, is seen to -constitute the real and true, as opposed to the external, exaltation -above the finite. - -(1) It is of the highest importance to ascertain and understand rightly -the nature of Dialectic. Wherever there is movement, wherever there is -life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, -there Dialectic is at work. It is also the soul of all knowledge -which is truly scientific. In the popular way of looking at things, -the refusal to be bound by the abstract deliverances of understanding -appears as fairness, which, according to the proverb Live and let -live, demands that each should have its turn; we admit the one, but -we admit the other also. But when we look more closely, we find that -the limitations of the finite do not merely come from without; that -its own nature is the cause of its abrogation, and that by its own -act it passes into its counterpart. We say, for instance, that man is -mortal, and seem to think that the ground of his death is in external -circumstances only; so that if this way of looking were correct, man -would have two special properties, vitality and--also--mortality. But -the true view of the matter is that life, as life, involves the germ -of death, and that the finite, being radically self-contradictory, -involves its own self-suppression. - -Nor, again, is Dialectic to be confounded with mere Sophistry. The -essence of Sophistry lies in giving authority to a partial and abstract -principle, in its isolation, as may suit the interest and particular -situation of the individual at the time. For example, a regard to my -existence, and my having the means of existence, is a vital motive -of conduct, but if I exclusively emphasise this consideration or -motive of my welfare, and draw the conclusion that I may steal or -betray my country, we have a case of Sophistry. Similarly, it is a -vital principle in conduct that I should be subjectively free, that -is to say, that I should have an insight into what I am doing, and -a conviction that it is right. But if my pleading insists on this -principle alone I fall into Sophistry, such as would overthrow all the -principles of morality. From this sort of party-pleading Dialectic is -wholly different; its purpose is to study things in their own being and -movement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of the partial categories -of understanding. - -Dialectic, it may be added, is no novelty in philosophy. Among the -ancients Plato is termed the inventor of Dialectic; and his right to -the name rests on the fact, that the Platonic philosophy first gave -the free scientific, and thus at the same time the objective, form to -Dialectic. Socrates, as we should expect from the general character -of his philosophising, has the dialectical element in a predominantly -subjective shape, that of Irony. He used to turn his Dialectic, -first against ordinary consciousness, and then especially against -the Sophists. In his conversations he used to simulate the wish for -some clearer knowledge about the subject under discussion, and after -putting all sorts of questions with that intent, he drew on those with -whom he conversed to the opposite of what their first impressions -had pronounced correct. If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to -be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist -Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his -more strictly scientific dialogues Plato employs the dialectical method -to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. -Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one, and shows -nevertheless that the many cannot but define itself as the one. In -this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, -more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and -restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen (§ 48), -by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these -Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between -one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every -abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, -naturally veers round into its opposite. - -However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of -Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition if its existence -is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say -that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other -grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that -surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware -that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather -changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that -Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than -what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to -turn suddenly into its opposite. We have before this (§ 80) identified -Understanding with what is implied in the popular idea of the goodness -of God; we may now remark of Dialectic, in the same objective -signification, that its principle answers to the idea of his power. -All things, we say,--that is, the finite world as such,--are doomed; -and in saying so, we have a vision of Dialectic as the universal and -irresistible power before which nothing can stay, however secure and -stable it may deem itself. The category of power does not, it is true, -exhaust the depth of the divine nature or the notion of God; but it -certainly forms a vital element in all religious consciousness. - -Apart from this general objectivity of Dialectic, we find traces of its -presence in each of the particular provinces and phases of the natural -and the spiritual world. Take as an illustration the motion of the -heavenly bodies. At this moment the planet stands in this spot, but -implicitly it is the possibility of being in another spot; and that -possibility of being otherwise the planet brings into existence by -moving. Similarly the 'physical' elements prove to be Dialectical. The -process of meteorological action is the exhibition of their Dialectic. -It is the same dynamic that lies at the root of every other natural -process, and, as it were, forces nature out of itself. To illustrate -the presence of Dialectic in the spiritual world, especially in the -provinces of law and morality, we have only to recollect how general -experience shows us the extreme of one state or action suddenly -shifting into its opposite: a Dialectic which is recognised in many -ways in common proverbs. Thus _summum jus summa injuria:_ which means, -that to drive an abstract right to its extremity is to do a wrong. -In political life, as every one knows, extreme anarchy and extreme -despotism naturally lead to one another. The perception of Dialectic -in the province of individual Ethics is seen in the well-known adages, -Pride comes before a fall: Too much wit outwits itself. Even feeling, -bodily as well as mental, has its Dialectic. Every one knows how -the extremes of pain and pleasure pass into each other: the heart -overflowing with joy seeks relief in tears, and the deepest melancholy -will at times betray its presence by a smile. - -(2) Scepticism should not be looked upon merely as a doctrine of doubt. -It would be more correct to say that the Sceptic has no doubt of his -point, which is the nothingness of all finite existence. He who only -doubts still clings to the hope that his doubt may be resolved, and -that one or other of the definite views, between which he wavers, -will turn out solid and true. Scepticism properly so called is a -very different thing: it is complete hopelessness about all which -understanding counts stable, and the feeling to which it gives birth -is one of unbroken calmness and inward repose. Such at least is the -noble Scepticism of antiquity, especially as exhibited in the writings -of Sextus Empiricus, when in the later times of Rome it had been -systematised as a complement to the dogmatic systems of Stoic and -Epicurean. Of far other stamp, and to be strictly distinguished from -it, is the modern Scepticism already mentioned § (39), which partly -preceded the Critical Philosophy, and partly sprung out of it. That -later Scepticism consisted solely in denying the truth and certitude -of the super-sensible, and in pointing to the facts of sense and of -immediate sensations as what we have to keep to. - -Even to this day Scepticism is often spoken of as the irresistible -enemy of all positive knowledge, and hence of philosophy, in so far -as philosophy is concerned with positive knowledge. But in these -statements there is a misconception. It is only the finite thought -of abstract understanding which has to fear Scepticism, because -unable to withstand it: philosophy includes the sceptical principle -as a subordinate function of its own, in the shape of Dialectic. In -contradistinction to mere Scepticism, however, philosophy does not -remain content with the purely negative result of Dialectic. The -sceptic mistakes the true value of his result, when he supposes it to -be no more than a negation pure and simple. For the negative, which -emerges as the result of dialectic, is, because a result, at the same -time the positive: it contains what it results from, absorbed into -itself, and made part of its own nature. Thus conceived, however, the -dialectical stage has the features characterising the third grade of -logical truth, the speculative form, or form of positive reason. - -82.] (y) The Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, -apprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition,--the -affirmative, which is involved in their disintegration and in their -transition. - -(1) The result of Dialectic is positive, because it has a definite -content, or because its result is not empty and abstract nothing, but -the negation of certain specific propositions which are contained in -the result,--for the very reason that it is a resultant and not an -immediate nothing. (2) It follows from this that the 'reasonable' -result, though it be only a thought and abstract, is still a concrete, -being not a plain formal unity, but a unity of distinct propositions. -Bare abstractions or formal thoughts are therefore no business of -philosophy, which has to deal only with concrete thoughts. (3) The -logic of mere Understanding is involved in Speculative logic, and -can at will be elicited from it, by the simple process of omitting -the dialectical and 'reasonable' element. When that is done, it -becomes what the common logic is, a descriptive collection of sundry -thought-forms and rules which, finite though they are, are taken to be -something infinite. - -If we consider only what it contains, and not how it contains it, -the true reason-world, so far from being the exclusive property of -philosophy, is the right of every human being on whatever grade of -culture or mental growth he may stand; which would justify man's -ancient title of rational being. The general mode by which experience -first makes us aware of the reasonable order of things is by accepted -and unreasoned belief; and the character of the rational, as already -noted (§ 45), is to be unconditioned, and thus to be self-contained, -self-determining. In this sense man above all things becomes aware of -the reasonable order, when he knows of God, and knows Him to be the -completely self-determined. Similarly, the consciousness a citizen has -of his country and its laws is a perception of the reason-world, so -long as he looks up to them as unconditioned and likewise universal -powers, to which he must subject his individual will. And in the same -sense, the knowledge and will of the child is rational, when he knows -his parents' will, and wills it. - -Now, to turn these rational (of course positively-rational) realities -into speculative principles, the only thing needed is that they be -_thought._ The expression 'Speculation' in common life is often used -with a very vague and at the same time secondary sense, as when we -speak of a matrimonial or a commercial speculation. By this we only -mean two things: first, that what is immediately at hand has to be -passed and left behind; and secondly, that the subject-matter of such -speculations, though in the first place only subjective, must not -remain so, but be realised or translated into objectivity. - -What was some time ago remarked respecting the Idea, may be applied -to this common usage of the term 'speculation': and we may add that -people who rank themselves amongst the educated expressly speak of -speculation even as if it were something purely subjective. A certain -theory of some conditions and circumstances of nature or mind may be, -say these people, very fine and correct as a matter of speculation, -but it contradicts experience and nothing of the sort is admissible in -reality. To this the answer is, that the speculative is in its true -signification, neither preliminarily nor even definitively, something -merely subjective: that, on the contrary, it expressly rises above -such oppositions as that between subjective and objective, which the -understanding cannot get over, and absorbing them in itself, evinces -its own concrete and all-embracing nature. A one-sided proposition -therefore can never even give expression to a speculative truth. If -we say, for example, that the absolute is the unity of subjective and -objective, we are undoubtedly in the right, but so far one-sided, as we -enunciate the unity only and lay the accent upon it, forgetting that in -reality the subjective and objective are not merely identical but also -distinct. - -Speculative truth, it may also be noted, means very much the same as -what, in special connexion with religious experience and doctrines, -used to be called Mysticism. The term Mysticism is at present used, -as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible: and -in proportion as their general culture and way of thinking vary, the -epithet is applied by one class to denote the real and the true, by -another to name everything connected with superstition and deception. -On which we first of all remark that there is mystery in the mystical, -only however for the understanding which is ruled by the principle -of abstract identity; whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the -speculative, is the concrete unity of those propositions, which -understanding only accepts in their separation and opposition. And if -those who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content to leave -it in its original utter mystery, their conduct only proves that for -them too, as well as for their antagonists, thinking means abstract -identification, and that in their opinion, therefore, truth can only be -won by renouncing thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading -the reason captive. But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of -understanding is so far from being either ultimate or stable, that it -shows a perpetual tendency to work its own dissolution and swing round -into its opposite. Reasonableness, on the contrary, just, consists in -embracing within itself these opposites as unsubstantial elements. Thus -the reason-world may be equally styled mystical,--not however because -thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies -beyond the compass of understanding. - -83.] Logic is subdivided into three parts:-- - -I. The Doctrine of Being: - -II. The Doctrine of Essence: - -III. The Doctrine of Notion and Idea. - -That is, into the Theory of Thought: - -I. In its immediacy: the notion implicit and in germ. - -II. In its reflection and mediation: the being-for-self and show of the -notion. - -III. In its return into itself, and its developed abiding by itself: -the notion in and for itself. - -The division of Logic now given, as well as the whole of the previous -discussion on the nature of thought, is anticipatory: and the -justification, or proof of it, can only result from the detailed -treatment of thought itself. For in philosophy, to prove means to -show how the subject by and from itself makes itself what it is. The -relation in which these three leading grades of thought, or of the -logical Idea, stand to each other must be conceived as follows. Truth -comes only with the notion: or, more precisely, the notion is the -truth of being and essence, both of which, when separately maintained -in their isolation, cannot but be untrue, the former because it is -exclusively immediate, and the latter because it is exclusively -mediate. Why then, it may be asked, begin with the false and not at -once with the true? To which we answer that truth, to deserve the name, -must authenticate its own truth: which authentication, here within the -sphere of logic, is given, when the notion demonstrates itself to be -what is mediated by and with itself, and thus at the same time to be -truly immediate. This relation between the three stages of the logical -Idea appears in a real and concrete shape thus: God, who is the truth, -is known by us in His truth, that is, as absolute spirit, only in so -far as we at the same time recognise that the world which He created, -nature and the finite spirit, are, in their difference from God, -untrue. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -FIRST SUB-DIVISION OF LOGIC. - - -THE DOCTRINE OF BEING. - - -84.] Being is the notion implicit only: its special forms have the -predicate 'is'; when they are distinguished they are each of them an -'other': and the shape which dialectic takes in them, _i.e._ their -further specialisation, is a passing over into another. This further -determination, or specialisation, is at once a forth-putting and in -that way a disengaging of the notion implicit in being; and at the -same time the withdrawing of being inwards, its sinking deeper into -itself. Thus the explication of the notion in the sphere of being does -two things: it brings out the totality of being, and it abolishes the -immediacy of being, or the form of being as such. - -85.] Being itself and the special sub-categories of it which -follow, as well as those of logic in general, may be looked upon as -definitions of the Absolute, or metaphysical definitions of God: at -least the first and third category in every triad may,--the first, -where the thought-form of the triad is formulated in its simplicity, -and the third, being the return from differentiation to a simple -self-reference. For a metaphysical definition of God is the expression -of His nature in thoughts as such: and logic embraces all thoughts so -long as they continue in the thought-form. The second sub-category in -each triad, where the grade of thought is in its differentiation, -gives, on the other hand, a definition of the finite. The objection to -the form of definition is that it implies a something in the mind's eye -on which these predicates may fasten. Thus even the Absolute (though -it purports to express God in the style and character of thought) in -comparison with its predicate (which really and distinctly expresses -in thought what the subject does not), is as yet only an inchoate -pretended thought--the indeterminate subject of predicates yet to -come. The thought, which is here the matter of sole importance, is -contained only in the predicate: and hence the propositional form, like -the said subject, viz. the Absolute, is a mere superfluity (cf. § 31, -and below, on the Judgment). - -Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic -whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case -with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity, and -measure. Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with -being: so identical, that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses -its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external -to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus _e.g._ a house -remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains -red, whether it be brighter or darker. Measure, the third grade of -being, which is the unity of the first two, is a qualitative quantity. -All things have their measure: _i.e._ the quantitative terms of their -existence, their being so or so great, does not matter within certain -limits; but when these limits are exceeded by an additional more or -less, the things cease to be what they were. From measure follows the -advance to the second sub-division of the idea, Essence. - -The three forms of being here mentioned, just because they are the -first, are also the poorest, _i.e._ the most abstract. Immediate -(sensible) consciousness, in so far as it simultaneously includes -an intellectual element, is especially restricted to the abstract -categories of quality and quantity. The sensuous consciousness is in -ordinary estimation the most concrete and thus also the richest; but -that is only true as regards materials, whereas, in reference to the -thought it contains, it is really the poorest and most abstract. - - -A.--QUALITY. - -(a) Being. - -86.] Pure Being makes the beginning: because it is on one hand pure -thought, and on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate; -and the first beginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further -determined. - -All doubts and admonitions, which might be brought against beginning -the science with abstract empty being, will disappear, if we only -perceive what a beginning naturally implies. It is possible to define -being as 'I = I,' as 'Absolute Indifference' or Identity, and so on. -Where it is felt necessary to begin either with what is absolutely -certain, _i.e._ the certainty of oneself, or with a definition or -intuition of the absolute truth, these and other forms of the kind -may be looked on as if they must be the first. But each of these -forms contains a mediation, and hence cannot be the real first: for -all mediation implies advance made from a first on to a second, and -proceeding from something different. If I = I, or even the intellectual -intuition, are really taken to mean no more than the first, they are in -this mere immediacy identical with being: while conversely, pure being, -if abstract no longer, but including in it mediation, is pure thought -or intuition. - -If we enunciate Being as a predicate of the Absolute, we get the first -definition of the latter. The Absolute is Being. This is (in thought) -the absolutely initial definition, the most abstract and stinted. -It is the definition given by the Eleatics, but at the same time is -also the well-known definition of God as the sum of all realities. It -means, in short, that we are to set aside that limitation which is in -every reality, so that God shall be only the real in all reality, the -superlatively real. Or, if we reject reality, as implying a reflection, -we get a more immediate or unreflected statement of the same thing, -when Jacobi says that the God of Spinoza is the _principium_ of being -in all existence. - -(1) When thinking is to begin, we have nothing but thought in its -merest indeterminateness: for we cannot determine unless there is -both one and another; and in the beginning there is yet no other. The -indeterminate, as we here have it, is the blank we begin with, not a -featurelessness reached by abstraction, not the elimination of all -character, but the original featurelessness which precedes all definite -character and is the very first of all. And this we call Being. It is -not to be felt, or perceived by sense, or pictured in imagination: -it is only and merely thought, and as such it forms the beginning. -Essence also is indeterminate, but in another sense: it has traversed -the process of mediation and contains implicit the determination it has -absorbed. - -(2) In the history of philosophy the different stages of the logical -Idea assume the shape of successive systems, each based on a particular -definition of the Absolute. As the logical Idea is seen to unfold -itself in a process from the abstract to the concrete, so in the -history of philosophy the earliest systems are the most abstract, and -thus at the same time the poorest. The relation too of the earlier -to the later; systems of philosophy is much like the relation of the -corresponding stages of the logical Idea: in other words, the earlier -are preserved in the later; but subordinated and submerged. This is -the true meaning of a much misunderstood phenomenon in the history of -philosophy--the refutation of one system by another, of an earlier by -a later. Most commonly the refutation is taken in a purely negative -sense to mean that the system refuted has ceased to count for anything, -has been set aside and done for. Were it so, the history of philosophy -would be of all studies most saddening, displaying, as it does, -the refutation of every system which time has brought forth. Now, -although it may be admitted that every philosophy has been refuted, -it must be in an equal degree maintained, that no philosophy has been -refuted, nay, or can be refuted. And that in two ways. For first, -every philosophy that deserves the name always embodies the Idea: and -secondly, every system represents one particular factor or particular -stage in the evolution of the Idea. The refutation of a philosophy, -therefore, only means that its barriers are crossed, and its special -principle reduced to a factor in the completer principle that follows. -Thus the history of philosophy, in its true meaning, deals not with a -past, but with an eternal and veritable present: and, in its results, -resembles not a museum of the aberrations of the human intellect, -but a Pantheon of Godlike figures. These figures of Gods are the -various stages of the Idea, as they come forward one after another in -dialectical development. To the historian of philosophy it belongs to -point out more precisely, how far the gradual evolution of his theme -coincides with, or swerves from, the dialectical unfolding of the pure -logical Idea. It is sufficient to mention here, that logic begins -where the proper history of philosophy begins. Philosophy began in the -Eleatic school, especially with Parmenides. Parmenides, who conceives -the absolute as Being, says that 'Being alone is and Nothing is not.' -Such was the true starting-point of philosophy, which is always -knowledge by thought: and here for the first time we find pure thought -seized and made an object to itself. - -Men indeed thought from the beginning: (for thus only were they -distinguished from the animals). But thousands of years had to elapse -before they came to apprehend thought in its purity, and to see in it -the truly objective. The Eleatics are celebrated as daring thinkers. -But this nominal admiration is often accompanied by the remark that -they went too far, when they made Being alone true, and denied the -truth of every other object of consciousness. We must go further than -mere Being, it is true: and yet it is absurd to speak of the other -contents of our consciousness as somewhat as it were outside and beside -Being, or to say that there are other things, as well as Being. The -true state of the case is rather as follows. Being, as Being, is -nothing fixed or ultimate: it yields to dialectic and sinks into its -opposite, which, also taken immediately, is Nothing. After all, the -point is, that Being is the first pure Thought; whatever else you may -begin with (the I = I, the absolute indifference, or God Himself), -you begin with a figure of materialised conception, not a product of -thought; and that, so far as its thought content is concerned, such -beginning is merely Being. - -87.] But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the -absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just -Nothing. - -(1) Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute; the -Absolute is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying -that the thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form -and so without content,--or in saying that God is only the supreme -Being and nothing more; for this is really declaring Him to be the same -negativity as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal -principle, as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same -abstraction. - -(2) If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being -and Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate -the attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into -Nothing. With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of -discovering some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from -Nothing. Thus we find Being identified with what persists amid all -change, with _matter,_ susceptible of innumerable determinations,--or -even, unreflectingly, with a single existence, any chance object of -the senses or of the mind. But every additional and more concrete -characterisation causes Being to lose that integrity and simplicity it -has in the beginning. Only in, and by virtue of, this mere generality -is it Nothing, something inexpressible, whereof the distinction from -Nothing is a mere intention or _meaning._ - -All that is wanted is to realise that these beginnings are nothing but -these empty abstractions, one as empty as the other. The instinct that -induces us to attach a settled import to Being, or to both, is the very -necessity which leads to the onward movement of Being and Nothing, -and gives them a true or concrete significance. This advance is the -logical deduction and the movement of thought exhibited in the sequel. -The reflection which finds a profounder connotation for Being and -Nothing is nothing but logical thought, through which such connotation -is evolved, not, however, in an accidental, but a necessary way. Every -signification, therefore, in which they afterwards appear, is only a -more precise specification and truer definition of the Absolute. And -when that is done, the mere abstract Being and Nothing are replaced -by a concrete in which both these elements form an organic part.--The -supreme form of Nought as a separate principle would be Freedom: but -Freedom is negativity in that stage, when it sinks self-absorbed to -supreme intensity, and is itself an affirmation, and even absolute -affirmation. - -The distinction between Being and Nought is, in the first place, -only implicit, and not yet actually made: they only _ought_ to be -distinguished. A distinction of course implies two things, and that one -of them possesses an attribute which is not found in the other. Being -however is an absolute absence of attributes, and so is Nought. Hence -the distinction between the two is only meant to be; it is a quite -nominal distinction, which is at the same time no distinction. In all -other cases of difference there is some common point which comprehends -both things. Suppose _e.g._ we speak of two different species: the -genus forms a common ground for both. But in the case of mere Being and -Nothing, distinction is without a bottom to stand upon: hence there can -be no distinction, both determinations being the same bottomlessness. -If it be replied that Being and Nothing are both of them thoughts, so -that thought may be reckoned common ground, the objector forgets that -Being is not a particular or definite thought, and hence, being quite -indeterminate, is a thought not to be distinguished from Nothing.--It -is natural too for us to represent Being as absolute riches, and -Nothing as absolute poverty. But if when we view the whole world we -can only say that everything _is,_ and nothing more, we are neglecting -all speciality and, instead of absolute plenitude, we have absolute -emptiness. The same stricture is applicable to those who define God -to be mere Being; a definition not a whit better than that of the -Buddhists, who make God to be Nought, and who from that principle draw -the further conclusion that self-annihilation is the means by which man -becomes God. - -88.] Nothing, if it be thus immediate and equal to itself, is also -conversely the same as Being is. The truth of Being and of Nothing is -accordingly the unity of the two: and this unity is Becoming. - -(1) The proposition that Being and Nothing is the same seems so -paradoxical to the imagination or understanding, that it is perhaps -taken for a joke. And indeed it is one of the hardest things thought -expects itself to do: for Being and Nothing exhibit the fundamental -contrast in all its immediacy,--that is, without the one term being -invested with any attribute which would involve its connexion with -the other. This attribute however, as the above paragraph points out, -is implicit in them--the attribute which is just the same in both. So -far the deduction of their unity is completely analytical: indeed the -whole progress of philosophising in every case, if it be a methodical, -that is to say a necessary, progress, merely renders explicit what -is implicit in a notion.--It is as correct however to say that Being -and Nothing are altogether different, as to assert their unity. The -one is _not_ what the other is. But since the distinction has not at -this point assumed definite shape (Being and Nothing are still the -immediate), it is, in the way that they have it, something unutterable, -which we merely _mean._ - -(2) No great expenditure of wit is needed to make fun of the maxim that -Being and Nothing are the same, or rather to adduce absurdities which, -it is erroneously asserted, are the consequences and illustrations of -that maxim. - -If Being and Nought are identical, say these objectors, it follows that -it makes no difference whether my home, my property, the air I breathe, -this city, the sun, the law, mind, God, are or are not. Now in some of -these cases, the objectors foist in private aims, the utility a thing -has for me, and then ask, whether it be all the same to me if the -thing exist and if it do not. For that matter indeed, the teaching of -philosophy is precisely what frees man from the endless crowd of finite -aims and intentions, by making him so insensible to them, that their -existence or non-existence is to him a matter of indifference. But it -is never to be forgotten that, once mention something substantial, and -you thereby create a connexion with other existences and other purposes -which are _ex hypothesi_ worth having: and on such hypothesis it comes -to depend whether the Being and not-Being of a determinate subject are -the same or not. A substantial distinction is in these cases secretly -substituted for the empty distinction of Being and Nought. In others -of the cases referred to, it is virtually absolute existences and -vital ideas and aims, which are placed under the mere category of -Being or not-Being. But there is more to be said of these concrete -objects, than that they merely are or are not. Barren abstractions, -like Being and Nothing--the initial categories which, for that reason, -are the scantiest anywhere to be found--are utterly inadequate to -the nature of these objects. Substantial truth is something far -above these abstractions and their oppositions.--And always when a -concrete existence is disguised under the name of Being and not-Being, -empty-headedness makes its usual mistake of speaking about, and having -in the mind an image of, something else than what is in question: and -in this place the question is about abstract Being and Nothing. - -(3) It may perhaps be said that nobody can form a notion of the -unity of Being and Nought. As for that, the notion of the unity is -stated in the sections preceding, and that is all: apprehend that, -and you have comprehended this unity. What the objector really means -by comprehension--by a notion--is more than his language properly -implies: he wants a richer and more complex state of mind, a pictorial -conception which will propound the notion as a concrete case and one -more familiar to the ordinary operations of thought. And so long as -incomprehensibility means only the want of habituation for the effort -needed to grasp an abstract thought, free from all sensuous admixture, -and to seize a speculative truth, the reply to the criticism is, that -philosophical knowledge is undoubtedly distinct in kind from the -mode of knowledge best known in common life, as well as from that -which reigns in the other sciences. But if to have no notion merely -means that we cannot represent in imagination the oneness of Being -and Nought, the statement is far from being true; for every one has -countless ways of envisaging this unity. To say that we have no such -conception can only mean, that in none of these images do we recognise -the notion in question, and that we are not aware that they exemplify -it. The readiest example of it is Becoming.; Every one has a mental -idea of Becoming, and will even allow that it is _one_ idea: he will -further allow that, when it is analysed, it involves the attribute -of Being, and also what is the very reverse of Being, viz. Nothing: -and that these two attributes lie undivided in the one idea: so that -Becoming is the unity of Being and Nothing.--Another tolerably plain -example is a Beginning. In its beginning, the thing is not yet, but -it is more than merely nothing, for its Being is already in the -beginning. Beginning is itself a case of Becoming; only the former term -is employed with an eye to the further advance.--If we were to adapt -logic to the more usual method of the sciences, we might start with the -representation of a Beginning as abstractly thought, or with Beginning -as such, and then analyse this representation, and perhaps people -would more readily admit, as a result of this analysis, that Being and -Nothing present themselves as undivided in unity. - -(4) It remains to note that such phrases as 'Being and Nothing are -the same,' or 'The unity of Being and Nothing'--like all other -such unities, that of subject and object, and others--give rise to -reasonable objection. They misrepresent the facts, by giving an -exclusive prominence to the unity, and leaving the difference which -undoubtedly exists in it (because it is Being and Nothing, for example, -the unity of which is declared) without any express mention or notice. -It accordingly seems as if the diversity had been unduly put out of -court and neglected. The fact is, no speculative principle can be -correctly expressed by any such propositional form, for the unity has -to be conceived _in_ the diversity, which is all the while present and -explicit. 'To become' is the true expression for the resultant of 'To -be' and 'Not to be'; it is the unity of the two; but not only is it -the unity, it is also inherent unrest,--the unity, which is no mere -reference-to-self and therefore without movement, but which, through -the diversity of Being and Nothing that is in it, is at war within -itself.--Determinate being, on the other hand, is this unity, or -Becoming in this form of unity: hence all that 'is there and so,' is -one-sided and finite. The opposition between the two factors seems to -have vanished; it is only implied in the unity, it is not explicitly -put in it. - -(5) The maxim of Becoming, that Being is the passage into Nought, -and Nought the passage into Being, is controverted by the maxim of -Pantheism, the doctrine of the eternity of matter, that from nothing -comes nothing, and that something can only come out of something. The -ancients saw plainly that the maxim, 'From nothing comes nothing, -from something something,' really abolishes Becoming: for what it -comes from and what it becomes are one and the same. Thus explained, -the proposition is the maxim of abstract identity as upheld by the -understanding. It cannot but seem strange, therefore, to hear such -maxims as, 'Out of nothing comes nothing: Out of something comes -something,' calmly taught in these days, without the teacher being in -the least aware that they are the basis of Pantheism, and even without -his knowing that the ancients have exhausted all that is to be said -about them. - -Becoming is the first concrete thought, and therefore the first -notion: whereas Being and Nought are empty abstractions. The notion -of Being, therefore, of which we sometimes speak, must mean Becoming; -not the mere point of Being, which is empty Nothing, any more than -Nothing, which is empty Being. In Being then we have Nothing, and in -Nothing Being: but this Being which does not lose itself in Nothing -is Becoming. Nor must we omit the distinction, while we emphasise the -unity of Becoming: without that distinction we should once more return -to abstract Being. Becoming is only the explicit statement of what -Being is in its truth. - -We often hear it maintained that thought is opposed to being. Now in -the face of such a statement, our first question ought to be, what is -meant by being. If we understand being as it is defined by reflection, -all that we can say of it is that it is what is wholly identical and -affirmative. And if we then look at thought, it cannot escape us that -thought also is at least what is absolutely identical with itself. Both -I therefore, being as well as thought, have the same attribute. - -This identity of being and thought is not however to be I taken in -a concrete sense, as if we could say that a stone, so far as it has -being, is the same as a thinking man. A concrete thing is always very -different from the abstract category as such. And in the case of being, -we are speaking of nothing concrete: for being is the utterly abstract. -So far then the question regarding the _being_ of God--a being which is -in itself concrete above all measure--is of slight importance. - -As the first concrete thought-term, Becoming is the first adequate -vehicle of truth. In the history of philosophy, this stage of the -logical Idea finds its analogue in the system of Heraclitus. When -Heraclitus says 'All is flowing' (πάντα ῥεῖ), he enunciates Becoming -as the fundamental feature of all existence, whereas the Eleatics, -as already remarked, saw the only truth in Being, rigid processless -Being. Glancing at the principle of the Eleatics, Heraclitus then goes -on to say: Being no more is than not-Being (οὐδὲν μᾶλλon τὸ όν τοῦ μὴ -ὅντos ἐστί): a statement expressing the negativity of abstract Being, -and its identity with not-Being, as made explicit in Becoming: both -abstractions being alike untenable. This maybe looked at as an instance -of the real refutation of one system by another. To refute a Philosophy -is to exhibit the dialectical movement in its principle, and thus -reduce it to a constituent member of a higher concrete form of the? -Idea. Even Becoming however, taken at its best on its own ground, is an -extremely poor term: it needs to grow in depth and weight of meaning. -Such deepened force we find _e.g._ in Life. Life is a Becoming; but -that is not enough to exhaust the notion of life. A still higher form -is found in Mind. Here too is Becoming, but richer and more intensive -than mere logical Becoming. The elements, whose unity constitutes -mind, are not the bare abstracts of Being and of Nought, but the system -of the logical Idea and of Nature. - -(b) _Being Determinate._ - -89.] In Becoming the Being which is one with Nothing, and the Nothing -which is one with Being, are only vanishing factors; they are and -they are not. Thus by its inherent contradiction Becoming collapses -into the unity in which the two elements are absorbed. This result is -accordingly Being Determinate (Being there and so). - -In this first example we must call to mind, once for all, what was -stated in § 82 and in the note there: the only way to secure any growth -and progress in knowledge is to hold results fast in their truth. There -is absolutely nothing whatever in which we cannot and must not point -to contradictions or opposite attributes; and the abstraction made by -understanding therefore means a forcible insistence on a single aspect, -and a real effort to obscure and remove all consciousness of the other -attribute which is involved. Whenever such contradiction, then, is -discovered in any object or notion, the usual inference is, _Hence_ -this object is _nothing._ Thus Zeno, who first showed the contradiction -native to motion, concluded that there is no motion: and the ancients, -who recognised origin and decease, the two species of Becoming, as -untrue categories, made use of the expression that the One or Absolute -neither arises nor perishes. Such a style of dialectic looks only at -the negative aspect of its result, and fails to notice, what is at the -same time really present, the definite result, in the present case a -pure nothing, but a Nothing which includes Being, and, in like manner, -a Being which includes Nothing. Hence Being Determinate is (1) the -unity of Being and Nothing, in which we get rid of the immediacy in -these determinations, and their contradiction vanishes in their mutual -connexion,--the unity in which they are only constituent elements. And -(2) since the result is the abolition of the contradiction, it comes -in the shape of a simple unity with itself: that is to say, it also -is Being, but Being with negation or determinateness: it is Becoming -expressly put in the form of one of its elements, viz. Being. - -Even our ordinary conception of Becoming implies that somewhat -comes out of it, and that Becoming therefore has a result. But this -conception gives rise to the question, how Becoming does not remain -mere Becoming, but has a result The answer to this question follows -from what Becoming has already shown itself to be. Becoming always -contains Being and Nothing in such a way, that these two are always -changing into each other, and reciprocally cancelling each other. -Thus Becoming stands before us in utter restlessness--unable however -to maintain itself in this abstract restlessness: for since Being and -Nothing vanish in Becoming (and that is the very notion of Becoming), -the latter must vanish also. Becoming is as it were a fire, which -dies out in itself, when it consumes its material. The result of this -process however is not an empty Nothing but Being identical with the -negation,--what we call Being Determinate (being then and there): the -primary import of which evidently is that it _has become._ - -90.] (α) Determinate Being is Being with a character or mode--which -simply _is_; and such un-mediated character is Quality. And as -reflected into itself in this its character or mode, Determinate Being -is a somewhat, an existent.--The categories, which issue by a closer -analysis of Determinate Being, need only be mentioned briefly. - -Quality may be described as the determinate mode immediate and -identical with Being--as distinguished from Quantity (to come -afterwards), which, although a mode of Being, is no longer immediately -identical with Being, but a mode indifferent and external to it. A -Something is what it is in virtue of its quality, and losing its -quality it ceases to be what it is. Quality, moreover, is completely a -category only of the finite, and for that reason too it has its proper -place in Nature, not in the world of Mind. Thus, for example, in Nature -what are styled the elementary bodies, oxygen, nitrogen, &c, should -be regarded as existing qualities. But in the sphere of mind, Quality -appears in a subordinate way only, and not as if its qualitativeness -could exhaust any specific aspect of mind. If, for example, we consider -the subjective mind, which forms the object of psychology, we may -describe what is called (moral and mental) character, as in logical -language identical with Quality. This however does not mean that -character is a mode of being which pervades the soul and is immediately -identical with it, as is the case in the natural world with the -elementary bodies before mentioned. Yet a more distinct manifestation -of Quality as such, in mind even, is found in the case of besotted or -morbid conditions, especially in states of passion and when the passion -rises to derangement. The state of mind of a deranged person, being one -mass of jealousy, fear, &c, may suitably be described as Quality. - -91.] Quality, as determinateness which _is,_ as contrasted with the -Negation which is involved in it but distinguished from it, is -Reality. Negation is no longer an abstract nothing, but, as -a determinate being and somewhat, is only a form on such being--it -is as Otherness. Since this otherness, though a determination of -Quality itself, is in the first instance distinct from it, Quality is -Being-for-another--an expansion of the mere point of Determinate -Being, or of Somewhat. The Being as such of Quality, contrasted with -this reference to somewhat else, is Being-by-self. - -The foundation of all determinateness is negation (as Spinoza says, -_Omnis determinatio est negatio_). The unreflecting observer supposes -that determinate things are merely positive, and pins them down under -the form of being. Mere being however is not the end of the matter:--it -is, as we have already seen, utter emptiness and instability besides. -Still, when abstract being is contused in this way with being modified -and determinate, it implies some perception of the fact that, though -in determinate being there is involved an element of negation, this -element is at first wrapped up, as it were, and only comes to the -front and receives its due in Being-for-self.--If we go on to consider -determinate Being as a determinateness which _is,_ we get in this way -what is called Reality. We speak, for example, of the reality of a -plan or a purpose, meaning thereby that they are no longer inner and -subjective, but have passed into being-there-and-then. In the same -sense the body may be called the reality of the soul, and the law the -reality of freedom, and the world altogether the reality of the divine -idea. The word 'reality' is however used in another acceptation to mean -that something behaves conformably to its essential characteristic or -notion. For example, we use the expression: This is a real occupation: -This is a real man. Here the term does not merely mean outward and -immediate existence: but rather that some existence agrees with its -notion. In which sense, be it added, reality is not distinct from the -ideality which we shall in the first instance become acquainted with in -the shape of Being-for-self. - -92.] (ß) Being, if kept distinct and apart from its determinate -mode, as it is in Being-by-self (Being implicit), would be only the -vacant abstraction of Being. In Being (determinate there and then), -the determinateness is one with Being; yet at the same time, when -explicitly made a negation, it is a Limit, a Barrier. Hence the -otherness is not something indifferent and outside it, but a function -proper to it. Somewhat is by its quality,--firstly finite,--secondly -alterable; so that finitude and variability appertain to its being. - -In Being-there-and-then, the negation is still directly one with the -Being, and this negation is what we call a Limit (Boundary). A thing -is what it is, only in and by reason of its limit. We cannot therefore -regard the limit as only paternal to being which is then and there. It -rather goes through and through the whole of such existence. The view -of limit, as merely an external characteristic of being-there-and-then, -arises from a confusion of quantitative with qualitative limit. Here -we are speaking primarily of the qualitative limit. If, for example, -we observe a piece of ground, three acres large, that circumstance is -its quantitative limit. But, in addition, the ground is, it may be, a -meadow, not a wood or a pond. This is its qualitative limit.--Man, -if he wishes to be actual, must be-there-and-then, and to this end he -must set a limit to himself. People who are too fastidious towards the -finite never reach actuality, but linger lost in abstraction, and their -light dies away. - -If we take a closer look at what a limit implies, we see it involving a -contradiction in itself, and thus evincing its dialectical nature. On -the one side the limit makes the reality of a thing; on the other it -is its negation. But, again, the limit, as the negation of something, -is not an abstract nothing but a nothing which _is,--_what we call an -'other.' Given something, and up starts an other to us: we know that -there is not something only, but an other as well. Nor, again, is the -other of such a nature that we can think something apart from it; a -something is implicitly the other of itself, and the somewhat sees -its limit become objective to it in the other. If we now ask for the -difference between something and another, it turns out that they are -the same: which sameness is expressed in Latin by calling the pair -_aliud--aliud._ The other, as opposed to the something, is itself a -something, and hence we say some other, or something else; and so on -the other hand the first something when opposed to the other, also -defined as something, is itself an other. When we say 'something -else' our first impression is that something taken separately is only -something, and that the quality of being another attaches to it only -from outside considerations. Thus we suppose that the moon, being -something else than the sun, might very well exist without the sun. -But really the moon, as a something, has its other implicit in it: -Plato says: God made the world out of the nature of the 'one' and the -'other' (τοῦ ἑτέρου): having brought these together, he formed from -them a third, which is of the nature of the 'one' and the 'other.' -In these words we have in general terms a statement of the nature -of the finite, which, as something, does not meet the nature of the -other as if it had no affinity to it, but, being implicitly the other -of itself, thus undergoes alteration. Alteration thus exhibits the -inherent contradiction which originally attaches to determinate being, -and which forces it out of its own bounds. To materialised conception -existence stands in the character of something solely positive, and -quietly abiding within its own limits: though we also know, it is -true, that everything finite (such as existence) is subject to change. -Such changeableness in existence is to the superficial eye a mere -possibility, the realisation of which is not a consequence of its own -nature. But the fact is, mutability lies in the notion of existence, -and change is only the manifestation of what it implicitly is. The -living die, simply because as living they bear in themselves the germ -of death. - -93.] Something becomes an other: this other is itself somewhat: -therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on _ad infinitum._ - -94.] This Infinity is the wrong or negative infinity: it is only a -negation of a finite: but the finite rises again the same as ever, and -is never got rid of and absorbed. In other words, this infinite only -expresses the _ought-to-be_ elimination of the finite. The progression -to infinity never gets further than a statement of the contradiction -involved in the finite, viz. that it is somewhat as well as somewhat -else. It sets up with endless iteration the alternation between these -two terms, each of which calls up the other. - -If we let somewhat and another, the elements of determinate Being, -fall asunder, the result is that some becomes other, and this other -is itself a somewhat, which then as such changes likewise, and so -on _ad infinitum._ This result seems to superficial reflection -something very grand, the grandest possible. Besuch a progression to -infinity is not the real infinite. That consists in being at home -with itself in its other, or, if enunciated as a process, in coming -to itself in its other. Much depends on rightly apprehending the -notion of infinity, and not stopping short at the wrong infinity of -endless progression. When time and space, for example, are spoken of -as infinite, it is in the first place the infinite progression on -which our thoughts fasten. We say, Now, This time, and then we keep -continually going forwards and backwards beyond this limit. The case -is the same with space, the infinity of which has formed the theme of -barren declamation to astronomers with a talent for edification. In the -attempt to contemplate such an infinite, our thought, we are commonly -informed, must sink exhausted. It is true indeed that we must abandon -the unending contemplation, not however because the occupation is too -sublime, but because it is too tedious. It is tedious to expatiate in -the contemplation of this infinite progression, because the same thing -is constantly recurring. We lay down a limit: then we pass it: next we -have a limit once more, and so on for ever. All this is but superficial -alternation, which never leaves the region of the finite behind. To -suppose that by stepping out and away into that infinity we release -ourselves from the finite, is in truth but to seek the release which -comes by flight. But the man who flees is not yet free: in fleeing he -is still conditioned by that from which he flees. If it be also said, -that the infinite is unattainable, the statement is true, but only -because to the idea of infinity has been attached the circumstance -of being simply and solely negative. With such empty and other world -stuff philosophy has nothing to do. What philosophy has to do with is -always--something concrete and in the highest sense present. - -No doubt philosophy has also sometimes been set the task of finding -an answer to the question, how the infinite comes to the resolution -of issuing out of itself. This question, founded, as it is, upon the -assumption of a rigid opposition between finite and infinite, may be -answered by saying that the opposition is false, and that in point -of fact the infinite eternally proceeds out of itself, and yet does -not proceed out of itself. If we further say that the infinite is the -not-finite, we have in point of fact virtually expressed the truth: -for as the finite itself is the first negative, the not-finite is the -negative of that negation, the negation which is identical with itself -and thus at the same time a true affirmation. - -The infinity of reflection here discussed is only an _attempt_ to -reach the true Infinity, a wretched neither-one-thing-nor-another. -Generally speaking, it is the point of view which has in recent times -been emphasised in Germany. The finite, this theory tells us, _ought_ -to be absorbed; the infinite _ought_ not to be a negative merely, but -also a positive. That 'ought to be' betrays the incapacity of actually -making good a claim which is at the same time recognised to be right. -This stage was never passed by the systems of Kant and Fichte, so far -as ethics are concerned. The utmost to which this way brings us is only -the postulate of a never-ending approximation to the law of Reason: -which postulate has been made an argument for the immortality of the -soul. - -95.] (γ) What we now in point of fact have before us, is that somewhat -comes to be an other, and that the other generally comes to be an -other. Thus essentially relative to another, somewhat is virtually an -other against it: and since what is passed into is quite the same as -what passes over, since both have one and the same attribute, viz. -to be an other, it follows that something in its passage into other -only joins with itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and -in the other, is the genuine Infinity. Or, under a negative aspect: -what is altered is the other, it becomes the other of the other. Thus -Being, but as negation of the negation, is restored again: it is now -Being-for-self. - -Dualism, in putting an insuperable opposition between finite and -infinite, fails to note the simple circumstance that the infinite is -thereby only one of two, and is reduced to a particular, to which the -finite forms the other particular. Such an infinite, which is only a -particular, is co-terminous with the finite which makes for it a limit -and a barrier: it is not what it ought to be, that is, the infinite, -but is only finite. In such circumstances, where the finite is on this -side, and the infinite on that,--this world as the finite and the other -world as the infinite,--an equal dignity of permanence and independence -is ascribed to finite and to infinite. The being of the finite is made -an absolute being, and by this dualism gets independence and stability. -Touched, so to speak, by the infinite, it would be annihilated. But -it must not be touched by the infinite. There must be an abyss, an -impassable gulf between the two, with the infinite abiding on yonder -side and the finite steadfast on this. Those who attribute to the -finite this inflexible persistence in comparison with the infinite -are not, as they imagine, far above metaphysic: they are still on the -level of the most ordinary metaphysic of understanding. For the same -thing occurs here as in the infinite progression. At one time it is -admitted that the finite has no independent actuality, no absolute -being, no root and development of its own, but is only a transient. -But next moment this is straightway forgotten; the finite, made a mere -counterpart to the infinite, wholly separated from it, and rescued from -annihilation, is conceived to be persistent in its independence. While -thought thus imagines itself elevated to the infinite, it meets with -the opposite fate: it comes to an infinite which is only a finite, and -the finite, which it had left behind, has always to be retained and -made into an absolute. - -After this examination (with which it were well to compare Plato's -Philebus), tending to show the nullity of the distinction made by -understanding between the finite and the infinite, we are liable -to glide into the statement that the infinite and the finite are -therefore one, and that the genuine infinity, the truth, must be -defined and enunciated as the unity of the finite and infinite. Such -a statement would be to some extent correct; but is just as open to -perversion and falsehood as the unity of Being and Nothing already -noticed. Besides it may very fairly be charged with reducing the -infinite to finitude and making a finite infinite. For, so far as -the expression goes, the finite seems left in its place,--it is not -expressly stated to be absorbed. Or, if we reflect that the finite, -when identified with the infinite, certainly cannot remain what it -was out of such unity, and will at least suffer some change in its -characteristics--as an alkali, when combined with an acid, loses some -of its properties, we must see that, the same fate awaits the infinite, -which, as the negative, will on its part likewise have its edge, as -it were, taken off on the other. And this does really happen with the -abstract one-sided infinite of understanding. The genuine infinite -however is not merely in the position of the one-sided acid, and so -does not lose itself. The negation of negation is not a neutralisation: -the infinite is the affirmative, and it is only the finite which is -absorbed. - -In Being-for-self enters the category of Ideality. -Being-there-and-then, as in the first instance apprehended in its being -or affirmation, has reality (§ 91): and thus even finitude in the first -instance is in the category of reality. But the truth of the finite is -rather its ideality. Similarly, the infinite of understanding, which -is co-ordinated with the finite, is itself only one of two finites, -no whole truth, but a non-substantial element. This ideality of the -finite is the chief maxim of philosophy; and for that reason every -genuine philosophy is idealism. But everything depends upon not taking -for the infinite what, in the very terms of its characterisation, is. -at the same time made a particular and finite.--For this reason we -have bestowed a greater amount of attention on this distinction. The -fundamental notion of philosophy, the genuine infinite, depends upon -it. The distinction is cleared up by the simple, and for that reason -seemingly insignificant, but incontrovertible reflections, contained in -the first paragraph of this section. - -(c) _Being-for-self._ - -96.] (α) Being-for self, as reference to itself, is immediacy, and -as reference of the negative to itself, is a self-subsistent, the -One. This unit, being without distinction in itself, thus -excludes the other from itself. - -To be for self--to be one--is completed Quality, and as such, contains -abstract Being and Being modified as non-substantial elements. As -simple Being, the One is simple self-reference; as Being modified it -is determinate: but the determinateness is not in this case a finite -determinateness--a somewhat in distinction from an other--but infinite, -because it contains distinction absorbed and annulled in itself. - -The readiest instance of Being-for-self is found in the 'I.' We know -ourselves as existents, distinguished in the first place from other -existents, and with certain relations thereto. But we also come to -know this expansion of existence (in these relations) reduced, as it -were, to a point in the simple form of being-for-self. When we say 'I,' -we express the reference-to-self which is infinite, and at the same -time negative. Man, it may be said, is distinguished from the animal -world, and in that way from nature altogether, by knowing himself as -'I': which amounts to saying that natural things never attain a free -Being-for-self, but as limited to Being-there-and-then, are always and -only Being for an other.--Again, Being-for-self may be described as -ideality, just as Being-there-and-then was described as reality. It is -said, that besides reality there is _also_ an ideality. Thus the two -categories are made equal and parallel. Properly speaking, ideality is -not somewhat outside of and beside reality: the notion of ideality -just lies in its being the truth of reality. That is to say, when -reality is explicitly put as what it implicitly is, it is at once seen -to be ideality. Hence ideality has not received its proper estimation, -when you allow that reality is not all in all, but that an ideality -must be recognised outside of it. Such an ideality, external to or it -may be even beyond reality, would be no better than an empty name. -Ideality only has a meaning when it is the ideality of something: but -this something is not a mere indefinite this or that, but existence -characterised as reality, which, if retained in isolation, possesses -no truth. The distinction between Nature and Mind is not improperly -conceived, when the former is traced back to reality, and the latter -to ideality as a fundamental category. Nature however is far from -being so fixed and complete, as to subsist even without Mind: in Mind -it first, as it were, attains its goal and its truth. And similarly, -Mind on its part is not merely a world beyond Nature and nothing more: -it is really, and with full proof, seen to be mind, only when it -involves Nature as absorbed in itself.--_Apropos_ of this, we should -note the double meaning of the German word _aufheben_ (to put by, or -set aside). We mean by it (1) to clear away, or annul: thus, we say, a -law or a regulation is set aside: (2) to keep, or preserve: in which -sense we use it when we say: something is well put by. This double -usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative -meaning, is not an accident, and gives no ground for reproaching -language as a cause of confusion. We should rather recognise in it the -speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere 'Either--or' -of understanding. - -97.] (β) The relation of the negative to itself is a negative relation, -and so a distinguishing of the One from itself, the repulsion of -the One; that is, it makes Many Ones. So far as regards the -immediacy of the self-existents, these Many _are:_ and the repulsion of -every One of them becomes to that extent their repulsion against each -other as existing units,--in other words, their reciprocal exclusion. - -Whenever we speak of the One, the Many usually come into our mind at -the same time. Whence, then, we are forced to ask, do the Many come? -This question is unanswerable by the consciousness which pictures the -Many as a primary datum, and-treats the One as only one among the Many. -But the philosophic notion teaches, contrariwise, that the One forms -the pre-supposition of the Many: and in the thought of the One is -implied that it explicitly make itself Many. The self-existing unit is -not, like Being, void of all connective reference: it is a reference, -as well as Being-there-and-then was, not however a reference connecting -somewhat with an other, but, as unity of the some and the other, it is -a connexion with itself, and this connexion be it noted is a negative -connexion. Hereby the One manifests an utter incompatibility with -itself, a self-repulsion: and what it makes itself explicitly be, is -the Many. We may denote this side in the process of Being-for-self -by the figurative term Repulsion. Repulsion is a term originally -employed in the study of matter, to mean that matter, as a Many, in -each of these many Ones, behaves as exclusive to all the others. It -would be wrong however to view the process of repulsion, as if the -One were the repellent and the Many the repelled. The One, as already -remarked, just is self-exclusion and explicit putting itself as the -Many. Each of the Many however is itself a One, and in virtue of its so -behaving, this all-round repulsion is by one stroke converted into its -opposite,--Attraction. - -98.] (γ) But the Many are one the same as another: each is One, or -even one of the Many; they are consequently one and the same. Or when -we study all that Repulsion involves, we see that as a negative -attitude of many Ones to one another, it is just as essentially a -connective reference of them to each other; and as those to which the -One is related in its act of repulsion are ones, it is in them thrown -into relation with itself. The repulsion therefore has an equal right -to be called Attraction; and the exclusive One, or Being-for-self, -suppresses itself. The qualitative character, which in the One or unit -has reached the extreme point of its characterisation, has thus passed -over into determinateness (quality) suppressed, _i.e._ into Being as -Quantity. - -The philosophy of the Atomists is the doctrine in which the Absolute -is formulated as Being-for-self, as One, and many ones. And it is -the repulsion, which shows itself in the notion of the One, which -is assumed as the fundamental force in these atoms. But instead of -attraction, it is Accident, that is, mere unintelligence, which -is expected to bring them together. So long as the One is fixed -as one, it is certainly impossible to regard its congression with -others as anything but external and mechanical. The Void, which is -assumed as the complementary principle to the atoms, is repulsion -and nothing else, presented under the image of the nothing existing -between the atoms.--Modern Atomism--and physics is still in principle -atomistic--has surrendered the atoms so far as to pin its faith -on molecules or particles. In so doing, science has come closer -to sensuous conception, at the cost of losing the precision of -thought.--To put an attractive by the side of a repulsive force, as -the moderns have done, certainly gives completeness to the contrast: -and the discovery of this natural force, as it is called, has been a -source of much pride. But the mutual implication of the two, which -makes what is true and concrete in them, would have to be wrested from -the obscurity and confusion in which they were left even in Kant's -Metaphysical Rudiments of Natural Science.--In modern times the -importance of the atomic theory is even more evident in political than -in physical science. According to it, the will of individuals as such -is the creative principle of the State: the attracting force is the -special wants and inclinations of individuals; and the Universal, or -the State itself, is the external nexus of a compact. - -(1) The Atomic philosophy forms a vital stage in the historical -evolution of the Idea. The principle of that system may be described -as Being-for-self in the shape of the Many. At present, students of -nature who are anxious to avoid metaphysics turn a favourable ear to -Atomism. But it is not possible to escape metaphysics and cease to -trace nature back to terms of thought, by throwing ourselves into the -arms of Atomism. The atom, in fact, is itself a thought; and hence the -theory which holds matter to consist of atoms is a metaphysical theory. -Newton gave physics an express warning to beware of metaphysics, it is -true; but, to his honour be it said, he did not by any means obey his -own warning. The only mere physicists are the animals: they alone do -not think: while man is a thinking being and a born metaphysician. The -real question is not whether we shall apply metaphysics, but whether -our metaphysics are of the right kind: in other words, whether we are -not, instead of the concrete logical Idea, adopting one-sided forms of -thought, rigidly fixed by understanding, and making these the basis of -our theoretical as well as our practical work. It is on this ground -that one objects to the Atomic philosophy. The old Atomists viewed the -world as a many, as their successors often do to this day. On chance -they laid the task of collecting the atoms which float about in the -void. But, after all, the nexus binding the many with one another is -by no means a mere accident: as we have already remarked, the nexus is -founded on their very nature. To Kant we owe the completed theory of -matter as the unity of repulsion and attraction. The theory is correct, -so far as it recognises attraction to be the other of the two elements -involved in the notion of Being-for-self: and to be an element no less -essential than repulsion to constitute matter. Still this dynamical -construction of matter, as it is termed, has the fault of taking for -granted, instead of deducing, attraction and repulsion. Had they been -deduced, we should then have seen the How and the Why of a unity which -is merely asserted. Kant indeed was careful to inculcate that Matter -must not be taken to be in existence _per se,_ and then as it were -incidentally to be provided with the two forces mentioned, but must -be regarded as consisting solely in their unity. German physicists -for some time accepted this pure dynamic. But in spite of this, the -majority of these physicists i n modern times have found it more -convenient to return to the Atomic point of view, and in spite of the -warnings of Kästner, one of their number, have begun to regard Matter -as consisting of infinitesimally small particles, termed 'atoms'--which -atoms have then to be brought into relation with one another by the -play of forces attaching to them,--attractive, repulsive, or whatever -they may be. This too is metaphysics; and metaphysics which, for its -utter unintelligence, there would be sufficient reason to guard against. - -(2) The transition from Quality to Quantity, indicated in the paragraph -before us, is not found in our ordinary way of thinking, which deems -each of these categories to exist independently beside the other. We -are in the habit of saying that things are not merely qualitatively, -but also quantitatively defined; but whence these categories originate, -and how they are related to each other, are questions not further -examined. The fact is, quantity just means quality superseded and -absorbed: and it is by the dialectic of quality here examined that this -supersession is effected. First of all, we had Being: as the truth of -Being, came Becoming: which formed the passage to Being Determinate: -and the truth of that we found to be Alteration. And in its result -Alteration showed itself to be Being-for-self, exempt from implication -of another and from passage into another;--which Being-for-self, -finally, in the two sides of its process, Repulsion and Attraction, -was clearly seen to annul itself, and thereby to annul quality in the -totality of its stages. Still this superseded and absorbed quality is -neither an abstract nothing, nor an equally abstract and featureless -being: it is only being as indifferent to determinateness or character. -This aspect of being is also what appears as quantity in our ordinary -conceptions. We observe things, first of all, with an eye to their -quality--which we take to be the character identical with the being -of the thing. If we proceed to consider their quantity, we get the -conception of an indifferent and external character or mode, of such a -kind that a thing remains what it is, though its quantity is altered, -and the thing becomes greater or less. - -B.--QUANTITY. - -(α) _Pure Quantity._ - -99.] Quantity is pure being, where the mode or character is -no longer taken as one with the being itself, but explicitly put as -superseded or indifferent. - -(i) The expression Magnitude especially marks _determinate_ -Quantity, and is for that reason not a suitable name for Quantity -in general. (2) Mathematics usually define magnitude as what can be -increased or diminished. This definition has the defect of containing -the thing to be defined over again: but it may serve to show that the -category of magnitude is explicitly understood to be changeable and -indifferent, so that, in spite of its being altered by an increased -extension or intension, the thing, a house, for example, does not cease -to be a house, and red to be red. (3) The Absolute is pure Quantity. -This point of view is upon the whole the same as when the Absolute is -defined to be Matter, in which, though form undoubtedly is present, the -form is a characteristic of no importance one way or another. Quantity -too constitutes the main characteristic of the Absolute, when the -Absolute is regarded as absolute indifference, and only admitting of -quantitative distinction.--Otherwise pure space, time, &c. may be taken -as examples of Quantity, if we allow ourselves to regard the real as -whatever fills up space and time, it matters not with what. - -The mathematical definition of magnitude as what may be increased -or diminished, appears at first sight to be more plausible and -perspicuous than the exposition of the notion in the present -section. When closely examined, however, it involves, under cover -of pre-suppositions and images, the same elements as appear in the -notion of quantity reached by the method of logical development. In -other words, when we say that the notion of magnitude lies in the -possibility of being increased or diminished, we state that magnitude -(or more correctly, quantity), as distinguished from quality, is a -characteristic of such kind that the characterised thing is not in the -least affected by any change in it. What then, it may be asked, is -the fault which we have to find with this definition? It is that to -increase and to diminish is the same thing as to characterise magnitude -otherwise. If this aspect then were an adequate account of it, quantity -would be described merely as whatever can be altered. But quality is -no less than quantity open to alteration; and the distinction here -given between quantity and quality is expressed by saying increase -_or_ diminution: the meaning being that, towards whatever side the -determination of magnitude be altered, the thing still remains what it -is. - -One remark more. Throughout philosophy we do not seek merely for -correct, still less for plausible definitions, whose correctness -appeals directly to the popular imagination; we seek approved or -verified definitions, the content of which is not assumed merely as -given, but is seen and known to warrant itself, because warranted -by the free self-evolution of thought. To apply this to the present -case. However correct and self-evident the definition of quantity -usual in Mathematics may be, it will still fail to satisfy the wish to -see how far this particular thought is founded in universal thought, -and in that way necessary. This difficulty, however, is not the only -one. If quantity is not reached through the action of thought, but -taken uncritically from our generalised image of it, we are liable -to exaggerate the range of its validity, or even to raise it to the -height of an absolute category. And that such a danger is real, we see -when the title of exact science is restricted to those sciences the -objects of which can be submitted to mathematical calculation. Here we -have another trace of the bad metaphysics (mentioned in § 98, note) -which replace the concrete idea by partial and inadequate categories of -understanding. Our knowledge would be in a very awkward predicament if -such objects as freedom, law, morality, or even God Himself, because -they cannot be measured and calculated, or expressed in a mathematical -formula, were to be reckoned beyond the reach of exact knowledge, and -we had to put up with a vague generalised image of them, leaving their -details or particulars to the pleasure of each individual, to make -out of them what he will. The pernicious consequences, to which such -a theory gives rise in practice, are at once evident. And this mere -mathematical view, which identifies with the Idea one of its special -stages, viz. quantity, is no other than the principle of Materialism. -Witness the history of the scientific modes of thought, especially in -France since the middle of last century. Matter, in the abstract, is -just what, though of course there is form in it, has that form only as -an indifferent and external attribute. - -The present explanation would be utterly misconceived if it were -supposed to disparage mathematics. By calling the quantitative -characteristic merely external and indifferent, we provide no excuse -for indolence and superficiality, nor do we assert that quantitative -characteristics may be left to mind themselves, or at least require no -very careful handling. Quantity, of course, is a stage of the Idea: and -as such it must have its due, first as a logical category, and then -in the world of objects, natural as well as spiritual. Still even so, -there soon emerges the different importance attaching to the category -of quantity according as its objects belong to the natural or to the -spiritual world. For in Nature, where the form of the Idea is to be -other than, and at the same time outside, itself, greater importance is -for that very reason attached to quantity than in the spiritual world, -the world of free inwardness. No doubt we regard even spiritual facts -under a quantitative point of view; but it is at once apparent that in -speaking of God as a Trinity, the number three has by no means the same -prominence, as when we consider the three dimensions of space or the -three sides of a triangle;--the fundamental feature of which last is -just to be a surface bounded by three lines. Even inside the realm of -Nature we find the same distinction of greater or less importance of -quantitative features. In the inorganic world, Quantity plays, so to -say, a more prominent part than in the organic. Even in organic nature -when we distinguish mechanical functions from what are called chemical, -and in the narrower sense, physical, there is the same difference. -Mechanics is of all branches of science, confessedly, that in which the -aid of mathematics can be least dispensed with,--where indeed we cannot -take one step without them. On that account mechanics is regarded next -to mathematics as the science _par excellence_; which leads us to -repeat the remark about the coincidence of the materialist with the -exclusively mathematical point of view. After all that has been said, -we cannot but hold it, in the interest of exact and thorough knowledge, -one of the most hurtful prejudices, to seek all distinction and -determinateness of objects merely in quantitative considerations. Mind -to be sure is more than Nature and the animal is more than the plant: -but we know very little of these objects and the distinction between -them, if a more and less is enough for us, and if we do not proceed to -comprehend them in their peculiar, that is their qualitative character. - -100.] Quantity, as we saw, has two sources: the exclusive unit, and -the identification or equalisation of these units. When we look -therefore at its immediate relation to self, or at the characteristic -of self-sameness made explicit by attraction, quantity is Continuous -magnitude; but when we look at the other characteristic, the One -implied in it, it is Discrete magnitude. Still continuous quantity has -also a certain discreteness, being but a continuity of the Many: and -discrete quantity is no less continuous, its continuity being the One -or Unit, that is, the self-same point of the many Ones. - -(1) Continuous and Discrete magnitude, therefore, must not be supposed -two species of magnitude, as if the characteristic of the one did not -attach to the other. The only distinction between them is that the -same whole (of quantity) is at one time explicitly put under the one, -at another under the other of its characteristics. (2) The Antinomy of -space, of time, or of matter, which discusses the question of their -being divisible for ever, or of consisting of indivisible units, just -means that we maintain quantity as at one time Discrete, at -another Continuous. If we explicitly invest time, space, or matter with -the attribute of Continuous quantity alone, they are divisible _ad -infinitum._ When, on the contrary, they are invested with the attribute -of Discrete quantity, they are potentially divided already, and consist -of indivisible units. The one view is as inadequate as the other. - -Quantity, as the proximate result of Being-for-self, involves the -two sides in the process of the latter, attraction and repulsion, as -constitutive elements of its own idea. It is consequently Continuous -as well as Discrete. Each of these two elements involves the other -also, and hence there is no such thing as a merely Continuous or a -merely Discrete quantity. We may speak of the two as two particular and -opposite species of magnitude; but that is merely the result of our -abstracting reflection, which in viewing definite magnitudes waives now -the one, now the other, of the elements contained in inseparable unity -in the notion of quantity. Thus, it may be said, the space occupied by -this room is a continuous magnitude, and the hundred men, assembled -in it, form a discrete magnitude. And yet the space is continuous and -discrete at the same time; hence we speak of points of space, or we -divide space, a certain length, into so many feet, inches, &c, which -can be done only on the hypothesis that space is also potentially -discrete. Similarly, on the other hand, the discrete magnitude, made -up of a hundred men, is also continuous: and the circumstance on which -this continuity depends, is the common element, the species man, which -pervades all the individuals and unites them with each other. - -(b) _Quantum (How Much)._ - -101.] Quantity, essentially invested with the exclusionist character -which it involves, is Quantum (or How Much): _i.e._ limited -quantity. - -Quantum is, as it were, the determinate Being of quantity: whereas mere -quantity corresponds to abstract Being, and the Degree, which is next -to be considered, corresponds to Being-for-self. As for the details -of the advance from mere quantity to quantum, it is founded on this: -that whilst in mere quantity the distinction, as a distinction of -continuity and discreteness, is at first only implicit, in a quantum -the distinction is actually made, so that quantity in general now -appears as distinguished or limited. But in this way the quantum breaks -up at the same time into an indefinite multitude of Quanta or definite -magnitudes. Each of these definite magnitudes, as distinguished from -the others, forms a unity, while on the other hand, viewed _per se,_ it -is a many. And, when that is done, the quantum is described as Number. - -102.] In Number the quantum reaches its development and perfect -mode. Like the One, the medium in which it exists, Number involves two -qualitative factors or functions; Annumeration or Sum, which depends on -the factor discreteness, and Unity, which depends on continuity. - -In arithmetic the several kinds of operation are usually presented as -accidental modes of dealing with numbers. If necessity and meaning -is to be found in these operations, it must be by a principle: and -that must come from the characteristic elements in the notion of -number itself. (This principle must here be briefly exhibited.) These -characteristic elements are Annumeration on the one hand, and Unity on -the other, which together constitute number. But Unity, when applied -to empirical numbers, is only the equality of these numbers: hence the -principle of arithmetical operations must be to put numbers in the -ratio of Unity and Sum (or amount), and to elicit the equality of these -two modes. - -The Ones or the numbers themselves are indifferent towards each other, -and hence the unity into which they are translated by the arithmetical -operation takes the aspect of an external colligation. All reckoning is -therefore making up the tale: and the difference between the species of -it lies only in the qualitative constitution of the numbers of which we -make up the tale. The principle for this constitution is given by the -way we fix Unity and Annumeration. - -Numeration comes first: what we may call, making number; a colligation -of as many units as we please. But to get a _species_ of calculation, -it is necessary that what we count up should be numbers already, and no -longer a mere unit. - -First, and as they naturally come to hand, Numbers are quite vaguely -numbers in general, and so, on the whole, unequal. The colligation, or -telling the tale of these, is Addition. - -The second point of view under which we regard numbers is as equal, -so that they make one unity, and of such there is an annumeration or -sum before us. To tell the tale of these is Multiplication. It makes -no matter in the process, how the functions of Sum and Unity are -distributed between the two numbers, or factors of the product; either -may be Sum and either may be Unity. - -The third and final point of view is the equality of Sum (amount) and -Unity. To number together numbers when so characterised is Involution; -and in the first instance raising them to the square power. To -raise the number to ä higher power means in point of form to go on -multiplying a number with itself an indefinite amount of times.--Since -this third type of calculation exhibits the complete equality of the -sole existing distinction in number, viz. the distinction between Sum -or amount and Unity, there can be no more than these three modes of -calculation. Corresponding to the integration we have the dissolution -of numbers according to the same features. Hence besides the three -species mentioned, which may to that extent be called positive, there -are three negative species of arithmetical operation. - -Number, in general, is the quantum in its complete specialisation. -Hence we may employ it not only to determine what we call discrete, but -what are called continuous magnitudes as well. For that reason even -geometry must call in the aid of number, when it is required to specify -definite figurations of space and their ratios. - -(c) _Degree._ - -103.] The limit (in a quantum) is identical with the whole of the -quantum itself. As _in itself_ multiple, the limit is Extensive -magnitude; as in itself _simple_ determinateness (qualitative -simplicity), it is Intensive magnitude or Degree. - -The distinction between Continuous and Discrete magnitude differs -from that between Extensive and Intensive in the circumstance that -the former apply to quantity in general, while the latter apply to -the limit or determinateness of it as such. Intensive and Extensive -magnitude are not, any more than the other, two species, of which the -one involves a character not possessed by the other: what is Extensive -magnitude is just as much Intensive, and _vice versâ._ - -Intensive magnitude or Degree is in its notion distinct from Extensive -magnitude or the Quantum. It is therefore inadmissible to refuse, -as many do, to recognise this distinction, and without scruple to -identify the two forms of magnitude. They are so identified in -physics, when difference of specific gravity is explained by saying, -that a body, with a specific gravity twice that of another, contains -within the same space twice as many material parts (or atoms) as the -other. So with heat and light, if the various degrees of temperature -and brilliancy were to be explained by the greater or less number of -particles (or molecules) of heat and light. No doubt the physicists, -who employ such a mode of explanation, usually excuse themselves, when -they are remonstrated with on its untenableness, by saying that the -expression is without prejudice to the confessedly unknowable essence -of such phenomena, and employed merely for greater convenience. This -greater convenience is meant to point to the easier application of the -calculus: but it is hard to see why Intensive magnitudes, having, as -they do, a definite numerical expression of their own, should not be -as convenient for calculation as Extensive magnitudes. If convenience -be all that is desired, surely it would be more convenient to banish -calculation and thought altogether. A further point against the apology -offered by the physicists is, that, to engage in explanations of this -kind, is to overstep the sphere of perception and experience, and -resort to the realm of metaphysics and of what at other times would be -called idle or even pernicious speculation. It is certainly a fact of -experience that, if one of two purses filled with shillings is twice -as heavy as the other, the reason must be, that the one contains, say -two hundred, and the other only one hundred shillings. These pieces -of money we can see and feel with our senses: atoms, molecules, and -the like, are on the contrary beyond the range of sensuous perception; -and thought alone can decide whether they are admissible, and have -a meaning. But (as already noticed in § 98, note) it is abstract -understanding which stereotypes the factor of multeity (involved in the -notion of Being-for-self) in the shape of atoms, and adopts it as an -ultimate principle. It is the same abstract understanding which, in -the present instance, at equal variance with unprejudiced perception -and with real concrete thought, regards Extensive magnitude as the -sole form of quantity, and, where Intensive magnitudes occur, does not -recognise them in their own character, but makes a violent attempt by a -wholly untenable hypothesis to reduce them to Extensive magnitudes. - -Among the charges made against modern philosophy, one is heard more -than another. Modern philosophy, it is said, reduces everything to -identity. Hence its nickname, the Philosophy of Identity. But the -present discussion may teach that it is philosophy, and philosophy -alone, which insists on distinguishing what is logically as well as -in experience different; while the professed devotees of experience -are the people who erect abstract identity into the chief principle -of knowledge. It is their philosophy which might more appropriately -be termed one of identity. Besides it is quite correct that there are -no merely Extensive and merely Intensive magnitudes, just as little -as there are merely continuous and merely discrete magnitudes. The -two characteristics of quantity are not opposed as independent kinds. -Every Intensive magnitude is also Extensive, and _vice versâ._ Thus a -certain degree of temperature is an Intensive magnitude, which has a -perfectly simple sensation corresponding to it as such. If we look at a -thermometer, we find this degree of temperature has a certain expansion -of the column of mercury corresponding to it; which Extensive magnitude -changes simultaneously with the temperature or Intensive magnitude. The -case is similar in the world of mind: a more intensive character has a -wider range with its effects than a less intensive. - -104.] In Degree the notion of quantum is explicitly put. It is -magnitude as indifferent on its own account and simple: but in such -a way that the character (or modal being) which makes it a quantum -lies quite outside it in other magnitudes. In this contradiction, -where the _independent_ indifferent limit is absolute _externality,_ -the Infinite Quantitative Progression is made explicit--an immediacy -which immediately veers round into its counterpart, into mediation (the -passing beyond and over the quantum just laid down), and _vice versâ._ - -Number is a thought, but thought in its complete self-externalisation. -Because it is a thought, it does not belong to perception: but it is a -thought which is characterised by the externality of perception.--Not -only therefore _may_ the quantum be increased or diminished without -end: the very notion of quantum is thus to push out and out beyond -itself. The infinite quantitative progression is only the meaningless -repetition of one and the same contradiction, which attaches to the -quantum, both generally and, when explicitly invested with its special -character, as degree. Touching the futility of enunciating this -contradiction in the form of infinite progression, Zeno, as quoted by -Aristotle, rightly says, 'It is the same to say a thing once, and to -say it for ever.' - -(1) If we follow the usual definition of the mathematicians, given in -§ 99, and say that magnitude is what can be increased or diminished, -there may be nothing to urge against the correctness of the perception -on which it is founded; but the question remains, how we come to -assume such a capacity of increase or diminution. If we simply appeal -for an answer to experience, we try an unsatisfactory course; because -apart from the fact that we should merely have a material image of -magnitude, and not the thought of it, magnitude would come out as a -bare possibility (of increasing or diminishing) and we should have no -key to the necessity for its exhibiting this behaviour. In the way of -our logical evolution, on the contrary, quantity is obviously a grade -the process of self-determining thought; and it has been shown that it -lies in the very notion of quantity to shoot out beyond itself. In that -way, the increase or diminution (of which we have heard) is not merely -possible, but necessary. - -(2) The quantitative infinite progression is what the reflective -understanding usually relies upon when it is engaged with the -general question of Infinity. The same thing however holds good of -this progression, as was already remarked on the occasion of the -qualitatively, infinite progression. As was then said, it is not the -expression of a true, but of a wrong infinity; it never gets further -than a bare 'ought,' and thus really remains within the limits -of finitude. The quantitative form of this infinite progression, -which Spinoza rightly calls a mere imaginary infinity (_infinitum -imaginationis,_) is an image often employed by poets, such as Haller -and Klopstock, to depict the infinity, not of Nature merely, but even -of God Himself. Thus we find Haller, in a famous description of God's -infinity, saying: - - Ich häufe ungeheure Zahlen, - Gebirge Millionen auf, - Ich sesse Zeit auf Zeit - Und Welt auf Welt zu Hauf, - Und wenn ich von der grausen Höh' - Mit Schwindel wieder nach Dir seh: - Ist alle Macht der Zahl, - Vermehrt zu Tausendmal, - Noch nicht ein Theil von Dir. - -[I heap up monstrous numbers, mountains of millions; I pile time upon -time, and world on the top of world; and when from the awful height I -cast a dizzy look towards Thee, all the power of number, multiplied a -thousand times, is not yet one part of Thee.] - -Here then we meet, in the first place, that continual extrusion of -quantity, and especially of number, beyond itself, which Kant describes -as 'eery.' The only really 'eery' thing about it is the wearisomeness -of ever fixing, and anon unfixing a limit, without advancing a single -step. The same poet however well adds to that description of false -infinity the closing line: - - Ich zieh sie ab, und Du liegst ganz vor mir. - -[These I remove, and Thou liest all before me.] - -Which means, that the true infinite is more than a mere world beyond -the finite, and that we, in order to become conscious of it, must -renounce that _progressus in infinitum._ - -(3) Pythagoras, as is well known, philosophised in numbers, and -conceived number as the fundamental principle of things. To the -ordinary mind this view must at first glance seem an utter paradox, -perhaps a mere craze. What, then, are we to think of it? To answer -this question, we must, in the first place, remember that the problem -of philosophy consists in tracing back things to thoughts, and, of -course, to definite thoughts. Now, number is undoubtedly a thought: it -is the thought nearest the sensible, or, more precisely expressed, it -is the thought of the sensible itself, if we take the sensible to mean -what is many, and in reciprocal exclusion. The attempt to apprehend -the universe as number is therefore the first step to metaphysics. In -the history of philosophy, Pythagoras, as we know, stands between the -Ionian philosophers and the Eleatics. While the former, as Aristotle -says, never get beyond viewing the essence of things as material (ὕλη), -and the latter, especially Parmenides, advanced as far as pure thought, -in the shape of Being, the principle of the Pythagorean philosophy -forms, as it were, the bridge from the sensible to the super-sensible. - -We may gather from this, what is to be said of those who suppose that -Pythagoras undoubtedly went too far, when he conceived the essence -of things as mere number. It is true, they admit, that we can number -things; but, they contend, things are far more than mere numbers. But -in what respect are they more? The ordinary sensuous consciousness, -from its own point of view, would not hesitate to answer the question -by handing us over to sensuous perception, and remarking, that things -are not merely numerable, but also visible, odorous, palpable, &c. In -the phrase of modern times, the fault of Pythagoras would be described -as an excess of idealism. As may be gathered from what has been said -on the historical position of the Pythagorean school, the real state -of the case is quite the reverse. Let it be conceded that things are -more than numbers; but the meaning of that admission must be that the -bare thought of number is still insufficient to enunciate the definite -notion or essence of things. Instead, then, of saying that Pythagoras -went too far with his philosophy of number, it would be nearer the -truth to say that he did not go far enough; and in fact the Eleatics -were the first to take the further step to pure thought. - -Besides, even if there are not things, there are states of things, and -phenomena of nature altogether, the character of which mainly rests on -definite numbers and proportions. This is especially the case with the -difference of tones and their harmonic concord, which, according to a -well-known tradition, first suggested to Pythagoras to conceive the -essence of things as number. Though it is unquestionably important to -science to trace back these phenomena to the definite numbers on which -they are based, it is wholly inadmissible to view the characterisation -by thought as a whole, as merely numerical. We may certainly feel -ourselves prompted to associate the most general characteristics of -thought with the first numbers: saying, 1 is the simple and immediate; -2 is difference and mediation; and 3 the unity of both of these. Such -associations however are purely external: there is nothing in the mere -numbers to make them express these definite thoughts. With every step -in this method, the more arbitrary grows the association of definite -numbers with definite thoughts. Thus, we may view 4 as the unity of -1 and 3, and of the thoughts associated with them, but 4 is just as -much the double of 2; similarly 9 is not merely the square of 3, but -also the sum of 8 and I, of 7 and 2, and so on. To attach, as do some -secret societies of modern times, importance to all sorts of numbers -and figures, is to some extent an innocent amusement, but it is also a -sign of deficiency of intellectual resource. These numbers, it is said, -conceal a profound meaning, and suggest a deal to think about. But the -point in philosophy is, not what you may think, but what you do think: -and the genuine air of thought is to be sought in thought itself, and -not in arbitrarily selected symbols. - -105.] That the Quantum in its independent character is external to -itself, is what constitutes its quality. In that externality it -is itself and referred connectively to itself. There is a union in -it of externality, _i.e._ the quantitative, and of independency -(Being-for-self),--the qualitative. The Quantum when explicitly put -thus in its own self, is the Quantitative Ratio, a mode of being -which, while, in its Exponent, it is an immediate quantum, is also -mediation, viz. the reference of some one quantum to another, forming -the two sides of the ratio. But the two quanta are not reckoned at -their immediate value: their value is only in this relation. - -The quantitative infinite progression appears at first as a continual -extrusion of number beyond itself. On looking closer, it is, however, -apparent that in this progression quantity returns to itself: for -the meaning of this progression, so far as thought goes, is the fact -that number is determined by number. And this gives the quantitative -ratio. Take, for example, the ratio 2:4. Here we have two magnitudes -(not counted in their several immediate values) in which we are only -concerned with their mutual relations. This relation of the two terms -(the exponent of the ratio) is itself a magnitude, distinguished from -the related magnitudes by this, that a change in it is followed by a -change of the ratio, whereas the ratio is unaffected by the change of -both its sides, and remains the same so long as the exponent is not -changed. Consequently, in place of 2:4, we can put 3:6 without changing -the ratio; as the exponent 2 remains the same in both cases. - -106.] The two sides of the ratio are still immediate quanta: and the -qualitative and quantitative characteristics still external to one -another. But in their truth, seeing that the quantitative itself in its -externality is relation to self, or seeing that the independence and -the indifference of the character are combined, it is Measure. - -Thus quantity by means of the dialectical movement so far studied -through its several stages, turns out to be a return to quality. The -first notion of quantity presented to us was that of quality abrogated -and absorbed. That is to say, quantity seemed an external character not -identical with Being, to which it is quite immaterial. This notion, as -we have seen, underlies the mathematical definition of magnitude as -what can be increased or diminished. At first sight this definition -may create the impression that quantity is merely whatever can be -altered:--increase and diminution alike implying determination of -magnitude otherwise--and may tend to confuse it with determinate Being, -the second stage of quality, which in its notion is similarly conceived -as alterable. We can, however, complete the definition by adding, that -in quantity we have an alterable, which in spite of alterations still -remains the same. The notion of quantity, it thus turns out, implies an -inherent contradiction. This, contradiction is what forms the dialectic -of quantity. The result of the dialectic however is not a mere return -to quality, as if that were the true and quantity the false notion, but -an advance to the unity and truth of both, to qualitative quantity, or -Measure. - -It may be well therefore at this point to observe that whenever in -our study of the objective world we are engaged in quantitative -determinations, it is in all cases Measure which we have in view, as -the goal of our operations. This is hinted at even in language, when -the ascertainment of quantitative features and relations is called -measuring. We measure, _e.g._ the length of different chords that have -been put into a state of vibration, with an eye to the qualitative -difference of the tones caused by their vibration, corresponding to -this difference of length. Similarly, in chemistry, we try to ascertain -the quantity of the matters brought into combination, in order to find -out the measures or proportions conditioning such combinations, that -is to say, those quantities which give rise to definite qualities. -In statistics, too, the numbers with which the study is engaged are -important only from the qualitative results conditioned by them. Mere -collection of numerical facts, prosecuted without regard to the ends -here noted, is justly called an exercise of idle curiosity, of neither -theoretical nor practical interest. - -107.] Measure is the qualitative quantum, in the first place as -immediate,--a quantum, to which a determinate being or a quality is -attached. - -Measure, where quality and quantity are in one, is thus the completion -of Being. Being, as we first apprehend it, is something utterly -abstract and characterless: but it is the very essence of Being to -characterise itself, and its complete characterisation is reached -in Measure. Measure, like the other stages of Being, may serve as a -definition of the Absolute: God, it has been said, is the Measure of -all things. It is this idea which forms the ground-note of many of the -ancient Hebrew hymns, in which the glorification of God tends in the -main to show that He has appointed to everything its bound: to the -sea and the solid land, to the rivers and mountains; and also to the -various kinds of plants and animals. To the religious sense of the -Greeks the divinity of measure, especially in respect of social ethics, -was represented by Nemesis. That conception implies a general theory -that all human things, riches, honour, and power, as well as joy and -pain, have their definite measure, the transgression of which brings -ruin and destruction. In the world of objects, too, we have measure. We -see, in the first place, existences in Nature, of which measure forms -the essential structure. This is the case, for example, with the solar -system, which may be described as the realm of free measures. As we -next proceed to the study of inorganic nature, measure retires, as it -were, into the background; at least we often find the quantitative and -qualitative characteristics showing indifference to each other. Thus -the quality of a rock or a river is not tied to a definite magnitude. -But even these objects when closely inspected are found not to be quite -measureless: the water of a river, and the single constituents of a -rock, when chemically analysed, are seen to be qualities conditioned -by quantitative ratios between the matters they contain. In organic -nature, however, measure again rises full into immediate perception. -The various kinds of plants and animals, in the whole as well as in -their parts, have a certain measure: though it is worth noticing that -the more imperfect forms, those which are least removed from inorganic -nature, are partly distinguished from the higher forms by the greater -indefiniteness of their measure. Thus among fossils, we find some -ammonites discernible only by the microscope, and others as large as a -cart-wheel. The same vagueness of measure appears in several plants, -which stand on a low level of organic development,--for instance, ferns. - -108.] In so far as in Measure quality and quantity are only in -_immediate_ unity, to that extent their difference presents itself in -a manner equally immediate. Two cases are then possible. Either the -specific quantum or measure is a bare quantum, and the definite being -(there-and-then) is capable of an increase or a diminution, without -Measure (which to that extent is a Rule) being thereby set completely -aside. Or the alteration of the quantum is also an alteration of the -quality. - -The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, -is at first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other -words, these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an -independent authority. On the one hand, the quantitative features of -existence may be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other -hand, this increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has -its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change. Thus the -temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no consequence -in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase or diminution -of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where -this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water -is converted into steam or ice. A quantitative change takes place, -apparently without any further significance: but there is something -lurking behind, and a seemingly innocent change of quantity acts as a -kind of snare, to catch hold of the quality. The antinomy of Measure -which this implies was exemplified under more than one garb among the -Greeks. It was asked, for example, whether a single grain makes a heap -of wheat, or whether it makes a bald-tail to tear out a single hair -from the horse's tail. At first, no doubt, looking at the nature of -quantity as an indifferent and external character of Being, we are -disposed to answer these questions in the negative. And yet, as we -must admit, this indifferent increase and diminution has its limit: -a point is finally reached, where a single additional grain makes a -heap of wheat; and the bald-tail is produced, if we continue plucking -out single hairs. These examples find a parallel in the story of the -peasant who, as his ass trudged cheerfully along, went on adding ounce -after ounce to its load, till at length it sunk under the unendurable -burden. It would be a mistake to treat these examples as pedantic -futility; they really turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which is -of great importance in practical life, especially in ethics. Thus in -the matter of expenditure, there is a certain latitude within which -a more or less does not matter; but when the Measure, imposed by the -individual circumstances of the special case, is exceeded on the one -side or the other, the qualitative nature of Measure (as in the above -examples of the different temperature of water) makes itself felt, -and a course, which a moment before was held good economy, turns into -avarice or prodigality. The same principle may be applied in politics, -when the constitution of a state has to be looked at as independent of, -no less than as dependent on, the extent of its territory, the number -of its inhabitants, and other quantitative points of the same kind. If -we look _e.g._ at a state with a territory of ten thousand square miles -and a population of four millions, we should, without hesitation, admit -that a few square miles of land or a few thousand inhabitants more or -less could exercise no essential influence on the character of its -constitution. But, on the other hand, we must not forget, that by the -continual increase or diminishing of a state, we finally get to a point -where, apart from all other circumstances, this quantitative alteration -alone necessarily draws with it an alteration in the quality of the -constitution. The constitution of a little Swiss canton does not suit -a great kingdom; and, similarly, the constitution of the Roman republic -was unsuitable when transferred to the small imperial towns of Germany. - -109.] In this second case, when a measure through its quantitative -nature has gone in excess of its qualitative character, we meet, what -is at first an absence of measure, the Measureless. But seeing -that the second quantitative ratio, which in comparison with the first -is measureless, is none the less qualitative, the measureless is also a -measure. These two transitions, from quality to quantum, and from the -latter back again to quality, may be represented under the image of an -infinite progression--as the self-abrogation and restoration of measure -in the measureless. - -Quantity, as we have seen, is not only capable of alteration, _i.e._ -of increase or diminution: it is naturally and necessarily a tendency -to exceed itself. This tendency is maintained even in measure. But if -the quantity present in measure exceeds a certain limit, the quality -corresponding to it is also put in abeyance. This however is not a -negation of quality altogether, but only of this definite quality, the -place of which is at once occupied by another. This process of measure, -which appears alternately as a mere change in quantity, and then as a -sudden revulsion of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the -figure of a nodal (knotted) line. Such lines we find in Nature under -a variety of forms. We have already referred to the qualitatively -different states of aggregation water exhibits under increase or -diminution of temperature. The same phenomenon is presented by the -different degrees in the oxidation of metals. Even the difference of -musical notes may be regarded as an example of what takes place in -the process of measure,--the revulsion from what is at first merely -quantitative into qualitative alteration. - -110.] What really takes place here is that the immediacy, which still -attaches to measure as such, is set aside. In measure, at first, -quality and quantity itself are immediate, and measure is only their -'relative' identity. But measure shows itself absorbed and superseded -in the measureless: yet the measureless, although it be the negation -of measure, is itself a unity of quantity and quality. Thus in the -measureless the measure is still seen to meet only with itself. - -111.] Instead of the more abstract factors, Being and Nothing, some -and other, &c., the Infinite, which is affirmation as a negation -of negation, now finds its factors in quality and quantity. These -(α) have in the first place passed over, quality into quantity, (§ -98), and quantity into quality (§ 105), and thus are both shown up -as negations, (ß) But in their unity, that is, in measure, they are -originally distinct, and the one is only through the instrumentality of -the other. And (γ) after the immediacy of this unity has turned out to -be self-annulling, the unity is explicitly put as what it implicitly -is, simple relation-to-self, which contains in it being and all its -forms absorbed.--Being or immediacy, which by the negation of itself -is a mediation with self and a reference to self,--which consequently -is also a mediation which cancels itself into reference-to-self, or -immediacy,--is Essence. - -The process of measure, instead of being only the wrong infinite of -an endless progression, in the shape of an ever-recurrent recoil -from quality to quantity, and from quantity to quality, is also -the true infinity of coincidence with self in another. In measure, -quality and quantity originally confront each other, like some and -other. But quality is implicitly quantity, and conversely quantity -is implicitly quality. In the process of measure, therefore, these -two pass into each other: each of them becomes what it already was -implicitly: and thus we get Being thrown into abeyance and absorbed, -with its several characteristics negatived. Such Being is Essence. -Measure is implicitly Essence; and its process consists in realising -what it is implicitly.--The ordinary consciousness conceives things -as being, and studies them in quality, quantity, and measure. These -immediate characteristics however soon show themselves to be not fixed -but transient; and Essence is the result of their dialectic. In the -sphere of Essence one category does not pass into another, but refers -to another merely. In Being, the form of reference is purely due to -our reflection on what takes place: but it is the special and proper -characteristic of Essence. In the sphere of Being, when somewhat -becomes another, the somewhat has vanished. Not so in Essence: here -there is no real other, but only diversity, reference of the one -to _its_ other. The transition of Essence is therefore at the same -time no transition: for in the passage of different into different, -the different does not vanish: the different terms remain in their -relation. When we speak of Being and Nought, Being is independent, so -is Nought. The case is otherwise with the Positive and the Negative. -No doubt these possess the characteristic of Being and Nought. But -the positive by itself has no sense; it is wholly in reference to the -negative. And it is the same with the negative. In the sphere of Being -the reference of one term to another is only implicit; in Essence on -the contrary it is explicit And this in general is the distinction -between the forms of Being and Essence: in Being everything is -immediate, in Essence everything is relative. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - -SECOND SUB-DIVISION OF LOGIC. - - -THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE. - - -112.] The terms in Essence are always mere pairs of correlatives, and -not yet absolutely reflected in themselves: hence in essence the actual -unity of the notion is not realised, but only postulated by reflection. -Essence,--which is Being coming into mediation with itself through the -negativity of itself--is self-relatedness, only in so far as it is -relation to an Other,--this Other however coming to view at first not -as something which _is,_ but as postulated and hypothetised.--Being has -not vanished: but, firstly, Essence, as simple self-relation, is Being, -and secondly as regards its one-sided characteristic of immediacy, -Being is deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected -light--Essence accordingly is Being thus reflecting light into itself. - -The Absolute is the Essence. This is the same definition as the -previous one that the Absolute is Being, in so far as Being likewise -is simple self-relation. But it is at the same time higher, because -Essence is Being that has gone into itself: that is to say, the -simple self-relation (in Being) is expressly put as negation of -the negative, as immanent self-mediation.--Unfortunately when the -Absolute is defined to be the Essence, the negativity which this -implies is often taken only to mean the withdrawal of all determinate -predicates. This negative action of withdrawal or abstraction thus -falls outside of the Essence--which is thus left as a mere result apart -from its premisses,--the _caput mortuum_ of abstraction. But as this -negativity, instead of being external to Being, is its own dialectic, -the truth of the latter, viz. Essence, will be Being as retired within -itself,--immanent Being. That reflection, or light thrown into itself, -constitutes the distinction between Essence and immediate Being, and is -the peculiar characteristic of Essence itself. - - * * * * * - -Any mention of Essence implies that we distinguish it from Being: -the latter is immediate, and, compared with the Essence, we look upon -it as mere seeming. But this seeming is not an utter nonentity and -nothing at all, but Being superseded and put by. The point of view -given by the Essence is in general the standpoint of 'Reflection.' -This word 'reflection' is originally applied, when a ray of light in -a straight line impinging upon the surface of a mirror is thrown back -from it. In this phenomenon we have two things,--first an immediate -fact which is, and secondly the deputed, derivated, or transmitted -phase of the same.--Something of this sort takes place when we reflect, -or think upon an object; for here we want to know the object, not in -its immediacy, but as derivative or mediated. The problem or aim of -philosophy is often represented as the ascertainment of the essence of -things: a phrase which only means that things instead of being left -in their immediacy, must be shown to be mediated by, or based upon, -something else. The immediate Being of things is thus conceived under -the image of a rind or curtain behind which the Essence lies hidden. - -Everything, it is said, has an Essence; that is, things really are not -what they immediately show themselves. There is therefore something -more to be done than merely rove from one quality to another, and -merely to advance from qualitative to quantitative, and _vice versâ:_ -there is a permanent in things, and that permanent is in the first -instance their Essence. With respect to other meanings and uses of the -category of Essence, we may note that in the German auxiliary verb -_'sein'_ the past tense is expressed by the term for Essence (_Wesen_): -we designate past being as _gewesen._ This anomaly of language implies -to some extent a correct perception of the relation between Being and -Essence. Essence we may certainly regard as past Being, remembering -however meanwhile that the past is not utterly denied, but only laid -aside and thus at the same time preserved. Thus, to say, Caesar _was_ -in Gaul, only denies the immediacy of the event, but not his sojourn -in Gaul altogether. That sojourn is just what forms the import of -the proposition, in which however it is represented as over and -gone.--'_Wesen_' in ordinary life frequently means only a collection -or aggregate: Zeitungswesen (the Press), Postwesen (the Post-Office), -Steuerwesen (the Revenue). All that these terms mean is that the things -in question are not to be taken single, in their immediacy, but as a -complex, and then, perhaps, in addition, in their various bearings. -This usage of the term is not very different in its implication from -our own. - -People also speak of _finite_ Essences, such as man. But the very term -Essence implies that we have made a step beyond finitude: and the title -as applied to man is so far inexact. It is often added that there is -a supreme Essence (Being): by which is meant God. On this two remarks -may be made. In the first place the phrase 'there is' suggests a -finite only: as when we say, there are so many planets, or, there are -plants of such a constitution and plants of such an other. In these -cases we are speaking of something which has other things beyond and -beside it. But God, the absolutely infinite, is not something outside -and beside whom there are other essences. All else outside f God, if -separated from Him, possesses no essentiality: in its I isolation it -becomes a mere show or seeming, without stay or essence of its own. -But, secondly, it is a poor way of talking to call God the _highest_ -or supreme Essence. The category of quantity which the phrase employs -has its proper place within the compass of the finite. When we call -one mountain the highest on the earth, we have a vision of other -high mountains beside it. So too when we call any one the richest or -most learned in his country. But God, far from being _a_ Being, even -the highest, is _the_ Being. This definition, however, though such -a representation of God is an important and necessary stage in the -growth of the religious consciousness, does not by any means exhaust -the depth of the ordinary Christian idea of God. If we consider God as -the Essence only, and nothing more, we know Him only as the universal -and irresistible Power; in other words, as the Lord. Now the fear of -the Lord is, doubtless, the beginning,--but _only_ the beginning, of -wisdom. To look at God in this light, as the Lord, and the Lord alone, -is especially characteristic of Judaism and also of Mohammedanism. -The defect of these religions lies in their scant recognition of the -finite, which, be it as natural things or as finite phases of mind, -it is characteristic of the heathen and (as they also for that reason -are) polytheistic religions to maintain intact. Another not uncommon -assertion is that God, as the supreme Being, cannot be known. Such is -the view taken by modern 'enlightenment' and abstract understanding, -which is content to say, _Il y a un être suprême_: and there lets -the matter rest. To speak thus, and treat God merely as the supreme -other-world Being, implies that we look upon the world before us in -its immediacy as something permanent and positive, and forget that -true Being is just the superseding of all that is immediate. If God -be the abstract super-sensible Being, outside whom therefore lies all -difference and all specific character, He is only a bare name, a mere -_caput mortuum_ of abstracting understanding. The true knowledge of God -begins when we know that things, as they immediately are, have no truth. - -In reference also to other subjects besides God the category of Essence -is often liable to an abstract use, by which, in the study of anything, -its Essence is held to be something unaffected by, and subsisting in -independence of, its definite phenomenal embodiment. Thus we say, for -example, of people, that the great thing is not what they do or how -they behave, but what they are. This is correct, if it means that a -man's conduct should be looked at, not in its immediacy, but only as -it is explained by his inner self, and as a revelation of that inner -self. Still it should be remembered that the only means by which the -Essence and the inner self can be verified, is their appearance in -outward reality; whereas the appeal which men make to the essential -life, as distinct from the material facts of conduct, is generally -prompted by a desire to assert their own subjectivity and to elude an -absolute and objective judgment. - -113.] Self-relation in Essence is the form of Identity or of -reflection-into-self, which has here taken the place of the immediacy -of Being. They are both the same abstraction,--self-relation. - -The unintelligence of sense, to take everything limited and finite for -Being, passes into the obstinacy of understanding, which views the -finite as self-identical, not inherently self-contradictory. - -114.] This identity, as it has descended from Being, appears in the -first place only charged with the characteristics of Being, and -referred to Being as to something external. This external Being, if -taken in separation from the true Being (of Essence), is called the -Unessential. But that turns out a mistake. Because Essence is -Being-in-self, it is essential only to the extent that it has in itself -its negative, _e._ reference to another, or mediation. Consequently, -it has the unessential as its own proper seeming (reflection) in -itself. But in seeming or mediation there is distinction involved: -and since what is distinguished (as distinguished from the identity -out of which it arises, and in which it is not, or lies as seeming,) -receives itself the form of identity, the semblance is still in the -mode of Being, or of self-related immediacy. The sphere of Essence -thus turns out to be a still imperfect combination of immediacy and -mediation. In it every term is expressly invested with the character -of self-relatedness, while yet at the same time one is forced beyond -it. It has Being,--reflected being, a being in which another shows, -and which shows in another. And so it is also the sphere in which the -contradiction, still implicit in the sphere of Being, is made explicit. - -As the one notion is the common principle underlying all logic, there -appear in the development of Essence the same attributes or terms as -in the development of Being, but in a reflex form. Instead of Being -and Nought we have now the forms of Positive and Negative; the former -at first as Identity corresponding to pure and uncontrasted Being, the -latter developed (showing in itself) as Difference. So also, we have -Becoming represented by the Ground of determinate Being: which itself, -when reflected upon the Ground, is Existence. - -The theory of Essence is the most difficult branch of Logic. It -includes the categories of metaphysic and of the sciences in general. -These are products of reflective understanding, which, while it assumes -the differences to possess a footing of their own, and at the same -time also expressly affirms their relativity, still combines the two -statements, side by side, or one after the other, by an 'Also,' without -bringing these thoughts into one, or unifying them into the notion. - -A.--ESSENCE AS GROUND OF EXISTENCE. - -(a) _The pure principles or categories of Reflection._ - -(α) Identity. - -115.] The Essence lights up _in itself_ or is mere reflection: and -therefore is only self-relation, not as immediate but as reflected. And -that reflex relation is self-Identity. - -This Identity becomes an Identity in form only, or of the -understanding, if it be held hard and fast, quite aloof from -difference. Or, rather, abstraction is the imposition of this Identity -of form, the transformation of something inherently concrete into this -form of elementary simplicity. And this may be done in two ways. Either -we may neglect a part of the multiple features which are found in the -concrete thing (by what is called analysis) and select only one of -them; or, neglecting their variety, we may concentrate the multiple -characters into one. - -If we associate Identity with the Absolute, making the Absolute the -subject of a proposition, we get: The Absolute is what is identical -with itself. However true this proposition may be, it is doubtful -whether it be meant in its truth: and therefore it is at least -imperfect in the expression. For it is left undecided, whether it means -the abstract Identity of understanding,--abstract, that is, because -contrasted with the other characteristics of Essence, or the Identity -which is inherently concrete. In the latter case, as will be seen, -true Identity is first discoverable in the Ground, and, with a higher -truth, in the Notion.--Even the word Absolute is often used to mean no -more than 'abstract.' Absolute space and absolute time, for example, is -another way of saying abstract space and abstract time. - -When the principles of Essence are taken as essential principles of -thought they become predicates of a pre-supposed subject, which, -because they are essential, is 'Everything,' The propositions thus -arising have been stated as universal Laws of Thought. Thus the first -of them, the maxim of Identity, reads: Everything is identical with -itself, A=A: and, negatively, A cannot at the same time be A and not -A.--This maxim, instead of being a true law of thought, is nothing -but the law of abstract understanding. The propositional form itself -contradicts it: for a proposition always promises a distinction -between subject and predicate; while the present one does not fulfil -what its form requires. But the Law is particularly set aside by -the following so-called Laws of Thought, which make laws out of its -opposite.--It is asserted that the maxim of Identity, though it -cannot be proved, regulates the procedure of every consciousness, -and that experience shows it to be accepted as soon as its terms -are apprehended. To this alleged experience of the logic-books may -be opposed the universal experience that no mind thinks or forms -conceptions or speaks, in accordance with this law, and that no -existence of any kind whatever conforms to it. Utterances after the -fashion of this pretended law (A planet is--a planet; Magnetism -is--magnetism; Mind is--mind) are, as they deserve to be, reputed -silly. That is certainly matter of general experience. The logic which -seriously propounds such laws and the scholastic world in which alone -they are valid have long been discredited with practical common sense -as well as with the philosophy of reason. - -* * * * * * - -Identity is, in the first place, the repetition of what we had earlier -as Being, but as _become,_ through supersession of its character of -immediateness. It is therefore Being as Ideality.--It is important -to come to a proper understanding on the true meaning of Identity: -and, for that purpose, we must especially guard against taking it -as abstract Identity, to the exclusion of all Difference. That is -the touchstone for distinguishing all bad philosophy from what alone -deserves the name of philosophy. Identity in its truth, as an Ideality -of what immediately is, is a high category for our religious modes -of mind as well as all other forms of thought and mental activity. -The true knowledge of God, it may be said, begins when we know Him as -identity,--as absolute identity. To know so much is to see that all -the power and glory of the world sinks into nothing in God's presence, -and subsists only as the reflection of His power and His glory. In -the same way, Identity, as self-consciousness, is what distinguishes -man from nature, particularly from the brutes which never reach the -point of comprehending themselves as 'I,' that is, pure self-contained -unity. So again, in connexion with thought, the main thing is not to -confuse the true Identity, which contains Being and its characteristics -ideally transfigured in it, with an abstract Identity, identity of bare -form. All the charges of narrowness, hardness, meaninglessness, which -are so often directed against thought from the quarter of feeling and -immediate perception, rest on the perverse assumption that thought -acts only as a faculty of abstract Identification. The Formal Logic -itself confirms this assumption by laying down the supreme law of -thought (so-called) which has been discussed above. If thinking were no -more than an abstract Identity, we could not but own it to be a most -futile and tedious business. No doubt the notion, and the idea too, are -identical with themselves: but identical only in so far as they at the -same time involve distinction. - -(β) _Difference._ - -116.] Essence is mere Identity and reflection in itself only as it is -self-relating negativity, and in that way self-repulsion. It contains -therefore essentially the characteristic of Difference. - -Other-being is here no longer qualitative, taking the shape of the -character or limit. It is now in Essence, in self-relating essence, and -therefore the negation is at the same time a relation,--is, in short, -Distinction, Relativity, Mediation. - -To ask, 'How Identity comes to Difference,' assumes that Identity as -mere abstract Identity is something of itself, and Difference also -something else equally independent. This supposition renders an answer -to the question impossible. If Identity is viewed as diverse from -Difference, all that we have in this way is but Difference; and hence -we cannot demonstrate the advance to difference, because the person -who asks for the How of the progress thereby implies that for him -the starting-point is non-existent. The question then when put to -the test has obviously no meaning, and its proposer may be met with -the question what he means by Identity; whereupon we should soon see -that he attaches no idea to it at all, and that Identity is for him -an empty name. As we have seen, besides, Identity is undoubtedly a -negative,--not however an abstract empty Nought, but the negation of -Being and its characteristics. Being so, Identity is at the same time -self-relation, and, what is more, negative self-relation; in other -words, it draws a distinction between it and itself. - -117.] Difference is, first of all, (1) immediate difference, _e.g._ -Diversity or Variety. In Diversity the different things are each -individually what they are, and unaffected by the relation in which -they stand to each other. This relation is therefore external to them. -In consequence of the various things being thus indifferent to the -difference between them, it falls outside them into a third thing, the -agent of Comparison. This external difference, as an identity of the -objects related, is Likeness; as a non-identity of them, is Unlikeness. - -The gap which understanding allows to divide these characteristics, is -so great, that although comparison has one and the same substratum for -likeness and unlikeness, which are explained to be different aspects -and points of view in it, still likeness by itself is the first of the -elements alone, viz. identity, and unlikeness by itself is difference. - -Diversity has, like Identity, been transformed into a maxim: -'Everything is various or different': or,'There are no two things -completely like each other.' Here Everything is put under a predicate, -which is the reverse of the identity attributed to it in the first -maxim; and therefore under a law contradicting the first. However there -is an explanation. As the diversity is supposed due only to external -comparison, anything taken _per se_ is expected and understood always -to be identical with itself, so that the second law need not interfere -with the first. But, in that case, variety does not belong to the -something or everything in question: it constitutes no intrinsic -characteristic of the subject: and the second maxim on this showing -does not admit of being stated at all. If, on the other hand, the -something _itself_ is as the maxim says diverse, it must be in virtue -of its own proper character: but in this case the specific difference, -and not variety as such, is what is intended. And this is the meaning -of the maxim of Leibnitz. - -When understanding sets itself to study Identity, it has already passed -beyond it, and is looking at Difference in the shape of bare Variety. -If we follow the so-called law of Identity, and say,--The sea is the -sea, The air is the air, The moon is the moon, these objects pass for -having no bearing on one another. What we have before us therefore is -not Identity, but Difference. We do not stop at this point however, or -regard things merely as different. We compare them one with another, -and thus discover the features of likeness and unlikeness. The work of -the finite sciences lies to a great extent in the application of these -categories, and the phrase 'scientific treatment' generally means no -more than the method which has for its aim comparison of the objects -under examination. This method has undoubtedly led to some important -results;--we may particularly mention the great advance of modern times -in the provinces of comparative anatomy and comparative linguistic. -But it is going too far to suppose that the comparative method can be -employed with equal success in all branches of knowledge. Nor--and this -must be emphasised--can mere comparison ever ultimately satisfy the -requirements of science. Its results are indeed indispensable, but they -are still labours only preliminary to truly intelligent cognition. - -If it be the office of comparison to reduce existing differences to -Identity, the science, which most perfectly fulfils that end, is -mathematics. The reason of that is, that quantitative difference is -only the difference which is quite external. Thus, in geometry, a -triangle and a quadrangle, figures qualitatively different, have this -qualitative difference discounted by abstraction, and are equalised to -one another in magnitude. It follows from what has been formerly said -about the mere Identity of understanding that, as has also been pointed -out (§ 99, note), neither philosophy nor the empirical sciences need -envy this superiority of Mathematics. - -The story is told that, when Leibnitz propounded the maxim of Variety, -the cavaliers and ladies of the court, as they walked round the garden, -made efforts to discover two leaves indistinguishable from each other, -in order to confute the law stated by the philosopher. Their device was -unquestionably a convenient method of dealing with metaphysics,--one -which has not ceased to be fashionable. All the same, as regards the -principle of Leibnitz, difference must be understood to mean not an -external and indifferent diversity merely, but difference essential. -Hence the very nature of things implies that they must be different. - - -118.] Likeness is an Identity only of those things which are not -the same, not identical with each other: and Unlikeness is a -relation of things unlike. The two therefore do not fall on different -aspects or points of view in the thing, without any mutual affinity: -but one throws light into the other. Variety thus comes to be reflexive -difference, or difference (distinction) implicit and essential, -determinate or specific difference. - -* * * * * * - -While things merely various show themselves unaffected by each other, -likeness and unlikeness on the contrary are a pair of characteristics -which are in completely reciprocal relation. The one of them cannot -be thought without the other. This advance from simple variety to -opposition appears in our common acts of thought, when we allow that -comparison has a meaning only upon the hypothesis of an existing -difference, and that on the other hand we can distinguish only on the -hypothesis of existing similarity. - -Hence, if the problem be the discovery of a difference, we attribute -no great cleverness to the man who only distinguishes those objects, -of which the difference is palpable, _e.g._ a pen and a camel: -and similarly, it implies no very advanced faculty of comparison, -when the objects compared, _e.g._ a beech and an oak, a temple and -a church, are near akin. In the case of difference, in short, we -like to sec identity, and in the case of identity we like to see -difference. Within the range of the empirical sciences however, the -one of these two categories is often allowed to put the other out of -sight and mind. Thus the scientific problem at one time is to reduce -existing differences to identity; on another occasion, with equal -one-sidedness, to discover new differences. We see this especially in -physical science. There the problem consists, in the first place, in -the continual search for new 'elements,' new forces, new genera, and -species. Or, in another direction, it seeks to show that all bodies -hitherto believed to be simple are compound: and modern physicists and -chemists smile at the ancients, who were satisfied with four elements, -and these not simple. Secondly, and on the other hand, mere identity -is made the chief question. Thus electricity and chemical affinity -are regarded as the same, and even the organic processes of digestion -and assimilation are looked upon as a mere chemical operation. Modern -philosophy has often been nicknamed the Philosophy of Identity. But, as -was already remarked (§ 103, note), it is precisely philosophy, and in -particular speculative logic, which lays bare the nothingness of the -abstract, undifferentiated identity, known to understanding; though it -also undoubtedly urges its disciples not to rest at mere diversity, but -to ascertain the inner unity of all existence. - -119.] Difference implicit is essential difference, the Positive -and the Negative: and that is this way. The Positive is the -identical self-relation in such a way as not to be the Negative, and -the Negative is the different by itself so as not to be the Positive. -Thus either has an existence of its own in proportion as it is not the -other. The one is made visible in the other, and is only in so far as -that other is. Essential difference is therefore Opposition; according -to which the different is not confronted by _any_ other but by _its_ -other. That is, either of these two (Positive and Negative) is stamped -with a characteristic of its own only in its relation to the other: the -one is only reflected into itself as it is reflected into the other. -And so with the other. Either in this way is the other's _own_ other. - -Difference implicit or essential gives the maxim, Everything is -essentially distinct; or, as it has also been expressed, Of two -opposite predicates the one only can be assigned to anything, and -there is no third possible. This maxim of Contrast or Opposition -most expressly controverts the maxim of Identity: the one says a -thing should be only self-relation, the other says that it must be -an opposite, a relation to its other. The native unintelligence of -abstraction betrays itself by setting in juxtaposition two contrary -maxims, like these, as laws, without even so much as comparing -them.--The Maxim of Excluded Middle is the maxim of the definite -understanding, which would fain avoid contradiction, but in so doing -falls into it. A must be either + A or - A, it says. It virtually -declares in these words a third A which is neither + nor--, and which -at the same time is yet invested with + and - characters. If + W mean -6 miles to the West, and - W mean 6 miles to the East, and if the + -and - cancel each other, the 6 miles of way or space remain what they -were with and without the contrast. Even the mere _plus_ and _minus_ of -number or abstract direction have, if we like, zero, for their third: -but it need not be denied that the empty contrast, which understanding -institutes between _plus_ and _minus,_ is not without its value in such -abstractions as number, direction, &c. - -In the doctrine of contradictory concepts, the one notion is, say, -blue (for in this doctrine even the sensuous generalised image of a -colour is called a notion) and the other not-blue. This other then -would not be an affirmative, say, yellow, but would merely be kept at -the abstract negative.--That the Negative in its own nature is quite as -much Positive (see next §), is implied in saying that what is opposite -to another is _its_ other. The inanity of the opposition between what -are called contradictory notions is fully exhibited in what we may call -the grandiose formula of a general law, that Everything has the one and -not the other of _all_ predicates which are in such opposition. In this -way, mind is either white or not-white, yellow or not-yellow, &c, _ad -infinitum._ - -It was forgotten that Identity and Opposition are themselves opposed, -and the maxim of Opposition was taken even for that of Identity, -in the shape of the principle of Contradiction. A notion, which -possesses neither or both of two mutually contradictory marks, _e.g._ -a quadrangular circle, is held to be logically false. Now though a -multangular circle and a rectilineal arc no less contradict this -maxim, geometers never hesitate to treat the circle as a polygon with -rectilineal sides. But anything like a circle (that is to say its mere -character or nominal definition) is still no notion. In the notion -of a circle, centre and circumference are equally essential: both -marks belong to it: and yet centre and circumference are opposite and -contradictory to each other. - -The conception of Polarity, which is so dominant in physics, contains -by implication the more correct definition of Opposition. But physics -for its theory of the laws of thought adheres to the ordinary logic; it -might therefore well be horrified in case it should ever work out the -conception of Polarity, and get at the thoughts which are implied in it. - -(1) With the positive we return to identity, but in its higher truth -as identical self-relation, and at the same time with the note that it -is not the negative. The negative _per se_ is the same as difference -itself. The identical as such is primarily the yet uncharacterised: -the positive on the other hand is what is self-identical, but with the -mark of antithesis to an other. And the negative is difference as such, -characterised as not identity. This is the difference of difference -within its own self. - -Positive and negative are supposed to express an absolute difference. -The two however are at bottom the same: the name of either might be -transferred to the other. Thus, for example, debts and assets are not -two particular, self-subsisting species of property. What is negative -to the debtor, is positive to the creditor. A way to the east is also -a way to the west. Positive and negative are therefore intrinsically -conditioned by one another, and are only in relation to each other. The -north pole of the magnet cannot be without the south pole, and _vice -versâ._ If we cut a magnet in two, we have not a north pole in one -piece, and a south pole in the other. Similarly, in electricity, the -positive and the negative are not two diverse and independent fluids. -In opposition, the different is not confronted by any other, but by -_its_ other. Usually we regard different things as unaffected by each -other. Thus we say: I am a human being, and around me are air, water, -animals, and all sorts of things. Everything is thus put outside of -every other. But the aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and -to ascertain the necessity of things. By that means the other is seen -to stand over against _its_ other. Thus, for example, inorganic nature -is not to be considered merely something else than organic nature, but -the necessary antithesis of it. Both are in essential relation to one -another; and the one of the two is, only in so far as it excludes the -other from it, and thus relates itself thereto. Nature in like manner -is not without mind, nor mind without nature. An important step has -been taken, when we cease in thinking to use phrases like: Of course -something else is also possible. While we so speak, we are still -tainted with contingency: and all true thinking, we have already said, -is a thinking of necessity. - -In modern physical science the opposition, first observed to exist -in magnetism as polarity, has come to be regarded as a universal law -pervading the whole of nature. This would be a real scientific advance, -if care were at the same time taken not to let mere variety revert -without explanation, as a valid category, side by side with opposition. -Thus at one time the colours are regarded as in polar opposition to one -another, and called complementary colours: at another time they are -looked at in their indifferent and merely quantitative difference of -red, yellow, green, &c. - -(2) Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the -maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is -opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of -mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'Either--or' -as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with -difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then -lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and -what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is -implicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being -consists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not -something that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort -to realise what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving -principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction -is unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that -contradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But -contradiction, when cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for -that is itself only one side of the contrariety. The proximate result -of opposition (when realised as contradiction) is the Ground, which -contains identity as well as difference superseded and deposed to -elements in the completer notion. - -120.] Contrariety then has two forms. The Positive is the aforesaid -various (different) which is understood to be independent, and yet -at the same not to be unaffected by its relation to its other. The -Negative is to be, no less independently, negative self-relating, -self-subsistent, and yet at the same time as Negative must on every -point have this its self-relation, _i.e._ its Positive, only in the -other. Both Positive and Negative are therefore explicit contradiction; -both are potentially the same. Both are so actually also; since either -is the abrogation of the other and of itself. Thus they fall to the -Ground.--Or as is plain, the essential difference, as a difference, is -only the difference of it from itself, and thus contains the identical: -so that to essential and actual difference there belongs itself as -well as identity. As self-relating difference it is likewise virtually -enunciated as the self-identical. And the opposite is in general that -which includes the one and its other, itself and its opposite. The -immanence of essence thus defined is the Ground. - -(γ) _The Ground._ - -121.] The Ground is the unity of identity and difference, the -truth of what difference and identity have turned out to be,--the -reflection-into-self, which is equally a reflection-into-an-other, and -_vice versâ._ It is essence put explicitly as a totality. - -The maxim of the Ground runs thus: Everything has its Sufficient -Ground: that is, the true essentiality of any thing is not the -predication of it as identical with itself, or as different (various), -or merely positive, or merely negative, but as having its Being in -an other, which, being its self-same, is its essence. And to this -extent the essence is not abstract reflection into self, but into an -other. The Ground is the essence in its own inwardness; the essence is -intrinsically a ground; and it is a ground only when it is a ground of -somewhat, of an other. - -We must be careful, when we say that the ground is the unity of -identity and difference, not to understand by this unity an abstract -identity. Otherwise we only change the name, while we still think the -identity (of understanding) already seen to be false. To avoid this -misconception we may say that the ground, besides being the unity, -is also the difference of identity and difference. In that case in -the ground, which promised at first to supersede contradiction, a new -contradiction seems to arise. It is however a contradiction which, so -far from persisting quietly in itself, is rather the expulsion of it -from itself. The ground is a ground only to the extent that it affords -ground: but the result which thus issued from the ground is only -itself. In this lies its formalism. The ground and what is grounded are -one and the same content: the difference between the two is the mere -difference of form which separates simple self-relation, on the one -hand, from mediation or derivativeness on the other. Inquiry into the -grounds of things goes with the point of view which, as already noted -(note to § 112), is adopted by Reflection. We wish, as it were, to see -the matter double, first in its immediacy, and secondly in its ground, -where it is no longer immediate. This is the plain meaning of the law -of sufficient ground, as it is called; it asserts that things should -essentially be viewed as mediated. The manner in which Formal Logic -establishes this law of thought, sets a bad example to other sciences. -Formal Logic asks these sciences not to accept their subject-matter as -it is immediately given; and yet herself lays down a law of thought -without deducing it,--in other words, without exhibiting its mediation. -With the same justice as the logician maintains our faculty of thought -to be so constituted that we must ask for the ground of everything, -might the physicist, when asked why a man who falls into water is -drowned, reply that man happens to be so organised that he cannot live -under water; or the jurist, when asked why a criminal is punished, -reply that civil society happens to be so constituted that crimes -cannot be left unpunished. - -Yet even if logic be excused the duty of giving a ground for the law -of the sufficient ground, it might at least explain what is to be -understood by a ground. The common explanation, which describes the -ground as what has a consequence, seems at the first glance more lucid -and intelligible than the preceding definition in logical terms. If you -ask however what the consequence is, you are told that it is what has -a ground; and it becomes obvious that the explanation is intelligible -only because it assumes what in our case has been reached as the -termination of an antecedent movement of thought. And this is the -true business of logic: to show that those thoughts, which as usually -employed merely float before consciousness neither understood nor -demonstrated, are really grades in the self-determination of thought. -It is by this means that they are understood and demonstrated. - -In common life, and it is the same in the finite sciences, this -reflective form is often employed as a key to the secret of the real -condition of the objects under investigation. So long as we deal with -what may be termed the household needs of knowledge, nothing can be -urged against this method of study. But it can never afford definitive -satisfaction, either in theory or practice. And the reason why it -fails is that the ground is yet without a definite content of its own; -I so that to regard anything as resting upon a ground merely gives -the formal difference of mediation in place of immediacy. We see an -electrical phenomenon, for example, and we ask for its ground (or -reason): we are told that electricity is the ground of this phenomenon. -What is this but the same content as we had immediately before us, only -translated into the form of inwardness? - -The ground however is not merely simple self-identity, but also -different: hence various grounds may be alleged for the same sum -of fact. This variety of grounds, again, following the logic of -difference, culminates in opposition of grounds _pro_ and _contra._ -In any action, such as a theft, there is a sum of fact in which -several aspects may be distinguished. The theft has violated the -rights of property: it has given the means of satisfying his wants to -the needy thief: possibly too the man, from whom the theft was made, -misused his property. The violation of property is unquestionably -the decisive point of view before which the others must give way: -but the bare law of the ground cannot settle that question. Usually -indeed the law is interpreted to speak of a sufficient ground, not -of any ground whatever: and it might be supposed therefore, in the -action referred to, that, although other points of view besides the -violation of property might be held as grounds, yet they would not be -sufficient grounds. But here comes a dilemma. If we use the phrase -'sufficient ground,' the epithet is either otiose, or of such a kind -as to carry us past the mere category of ground. The predicate is -otiose and tautological, if it only states the capability of giving a -ground or reason: for the ground is a ground, only in so far as it has -this capability. If a soldier runs away from battle to save his life, -his conduct is certainly a violation of duty: but it cannot be held -that the ground which led him so to act was insufficient, otherwise -he would have remained at his post. Besides, there is this also to -be said. On one hand any ground suffices: on the other no ground -suffices as mere ground; because, as already said, it is yet void of -a content objectively and intrinsically determined, and is therefore -not self-acting and productive. A content thus objectively and -intrinsically determined, and hence self-acting, will hereafter come -before us as the notion: and it is the notion which Leibnitz had in his -eye when he spoke of sufficient ground, and urged the study of things -under its point of view. His remarks were originally directed against -that merely mechanical method of conceiving things so much in vogue -even now; a method which he justly pronounces insufficient. We may -see an instance of this mechanical theory of investigation, when the -organic process of the circulation of the blood is traced back merely -to the contraction of the heart; or when certain theories of criminal -law explain the purpose of punishment to lie in deterring people from -crime, in rendering the criminal harmless, or in other extraneous -grounds of the same kind. It is unfair to Leibnitz to suppose that he -was content with anything so poor as this formal law of the ground. The -method of investigation which he inaugurated is the very reverse of a -formalism which acquiesces in mere grounds, where a full and concrete -knowledge is sought. Considerations to this effect led Leibnitz to -contrast _causae efficientes_ and _causae finales,_ and to insist in -the place of final causes as the conception to which the efficient were -to lead up. If we adopt this distinction, light, heat, and moisture -would be the _causae efficientes,_ not the _causa finalis_ of the -growth of plants: the _causa finalis_ is the notion of the plant itself. - -To get no further than mere grounds, especially on questions of law and -morality, is the position and principle of the Sophists. Sophistry, -as we ordinarily conceive it, is a method of investigation which aims -at distorting what is just and true, and exhibiting things in a false -light. Such however is not the proper or primary tendency of Sophistry: -the standpoint of which is no other than that of 'Raisonnement.' The -Sophists came on the scene at a time when the Greeks had begun to grow -dissatisfied with mere authority and tradition and felt the need of -intellectual justification for what they were to accept as obligatory. -That desideratum the Sophists supplied by teaching their countrymen -to seek for the various points of view under which things may be -considered: which points of view are the same as grounds. But the -ground, as we have seen, has no essential and objective principles of -its own, and it is as easy to discover grounds for what is wrong and -immoral as for what is moral and right. Upon the observer therefore it -depends to decide what points are to have most weight. The decision in -such circumstances is prompted by his individual views and sentiments. -Thus the objective foundation of what ought to have been of absolute -and essential obligation, accepted by all, was undermined: and -Sophistry by this destructive action deservedly brought upon itself -the bad name previously mentioned. Socrates, as we all know, met the -Sophists at every point, not by a bare re-assertion of authority and -tradition against their argumentations, but by showing dialectically -how untenable the mere grounds were, and by vindicating the obligation -of justice and goodness,--by reinstating the universal or notion of the -will. In the present day such a method of argumentation is not quite -out of fashion. Nor is that the case only in the discussion of secular -matters. It occurs even in sermons, such as those where every possible -ground of gratitude to God is propounded. To such pleading Socrates -and Plato would not have scrupled to apply the name of Sophistry. -For Sophistry has nothing to do with what is taught:--that may very -possibly be true. Sophistry lies in the formal circumstance of teaching -it by grounds which are as available for attack as for defence. In a -time so rich in reflection and so devoted to _raisonnement_ as our -own, he must be a poor creature who cannot advance a good ground for -everything, even for what is worst and most depraved. Everything in the -world that has become corrupt has had good ground for its corruption. -An appeal to grounds at first makes the hearer think of beating a -retreat: but when experience has taught him the real state of these -matters, he closes his ears against them, and refuses to be imposed -upon any more. - - - -122.] As it first comes, the chief feature of Essence is show in itself -and intermediation in itself. But when it has completed the circle -of intermediation, its unity with itself is explicitly put as the -self-annulling of difference, and therefore of intermediation. Once -more then we come back to immediacy or Being,--but Being in so far as -it is intermediated by annulling the intermediation. And that Being is -Existence. - -The ground is not yet determined by objective principles of its -own, nor is it an end or final cause: hence it is not active, nor -productive. An Existence only _proceeds from_ the ground. The -determinate ground is therefore a formal matter: that is to say, any -point will do, so long as it is expressly put as self-relation, as -affirmation, in correlation with the immediate existence depending on -it. If it be a ground at all, it is a good ground: for the term 'good' -is employed abstractly as equivalent to affirmative; and any point (or -feature) is good which can in any way be enunciated as confessedly -affirmative. So it happens that a ground can be found and adduced for -everything: and a good ground (for example, a good motive for action) -may effect something or may not, it may have a consequence or it may -not. It becomes a motive (strictly so called) and effects something, -_e.g._ through its reception into a will; there and there only it -becomes active and is made a cause. - -(b) _Existence._ - -123.] Existence is the immediate unity of reflection-into-self and -reflection-into-another. It follows from this that existence is the -indefinite multitude of existents as reflected-into-themselves, which -at the same time equally throw light upon one another,--which, in -short, are co-relative, and form a world of reciprocal dependence and -of infinite interconnexion between grounds and consequents. The grounds -are themselves existences: and the existents in like manner are in many -directions grounds as well as consequents. - -The phrase 'Existence' (derived from _existere_) suggests the fact of -having proceeded from something. Existence is Being which has proceeded -from the ground, and been reinstated by annulling its intermediation. -The Essence, as Being set aside and absorbed, originally came -before us as shining or showing in self, and the categories of this -reflection are identity, difference and ground. The last is the unity -of identity and difference; and because it unifies them it has at the -same time to distinguish itself from itself. But that which is in -this way distinguished from the ground is as little mere difference, -as the ground itself is abstract sameness. The ground works its -own suspension: and when suspended, the result of its negation is -existence. Having issued from the ground, existence contains the ground -in it 'the ground does not remain, as it were, behind existence, but by -its very nature supersedes itself and translates itself into existence. -This is exemplified even in our ordinary mode of thinking, when we -look upon the ground of a thing, not as something abstractly inward, -but as itself also an existent. For example, the lightning-flash -which has set a house on fire would be considered the ground of the -conflagration: or the manners of a nation and the condition of its -life would be regarded as the ground of its constitution. Such indeed -is the ordinary aspect in which the existent world originally appears -to reflection,--an indefinite crowd of things existent, which being -simultaneously reflected on themselves and on one another are related -reciprocally as ground and consequence. In this motley play of the -world, if we may so call the sum of existents, there is nowhere a -firm footing to be found: everything bears an aspect of relativity, -conditioned by and conditioning something else. The reflective -understanding makes it its business to elicit and trace these -connexions running out in every direction; but the question touching an -ultimate design is so far left unanswered, and therefore the craving of -the reason after knowledge passes with the further development of the -logical Idea beyond this position of mere relativity. - -124.] The reflection-on-another of the existent is however inseparable -from the reflection-on-self: the ground is their unity, from which -existence has issued. The existent therefore includes relativity, and -has on its own part its multiple interconnexions with other existents: -it is reflected on itself as its ground. The existent is, when so -described, a Thing. - -The 'thing-by-itself' (or thing in the abstract), so famous in the -philosophy of Kant, shows itself here in its genesis. It is seen to be -the abstract reflection-on-self, which is clung to, to the exclusion of -reflection-on-other-things and of all predication of difference. The -thing-by-itself therefore is the empty substratum for these predicates -of relation. - -If to know means to comprehend an object in its concrete character, -then the thing-by-itself, which is nothing but the quite abstract -and indeterminate thing in general, must certainly be as unknowable -as it is alleged to be. With as much reason however as we speak -of the thing-by-itself, we might speak of quality-by-itself or -quantity-by-itself, and of any other category. The expression would -then serve to signify that these categories are taken in their abstract -immediacy, apart from their development and inward character. It is -no better than a whim of the understanding, therefore, if we attach -the qualificatory 'in or by-itself' to the _thing_ only. But this -'in or by-itself' is also applied to the facts of the mental as well -as the natural world: as we speak of electricity or of a plant in -itself, so we speak of man or the state in itself. By this 'in-itself' -in these objects we are meant to understand what they strictly and -properly are. This usage is liable to the same criticism as the -phrase 'thing-in-itself.' For if we stick to the mere 'in-itself' of -an object, we apprehend it not in its truth, but in the inadequate -form of mere abstraction. Thus the man, by or in himself, is the -child. And what the child has to do is to rise out of this abstract -and undeveloped 'in-himself,' and become 'for himself what he is at -first only 'in-himself,' a free and reasonable being. Similarly, the -state-in-itself is the yet immature and patriarchal state, where the -various political functions, latent in the notion of the state, have -not received the full logical constitution which the logic of political -principles demands. In the same sense, the germ may be called the -plant-in-itself. These examples may show the mistake of supposing -that the 'thing-in-itself' or the 'in-itself' of things is something -inaccessible to our cognition. All things are originally in-themselves, -but that is not the end of the matter. As the germ, being the -plant-in-itself, means self-development, so the thing in general passes -beyond its in-itself, (the abstract reflection on self,) to manifest -itself further as a reflection on other things. It is in this sense -that it has properties. - -(c) _The Thing._ - -125.] (α) The Thing is the totality--the development in explicit -unity--of the categories of the ground and of existence. On the side -of one of its factors, viz. reflection-on-other-things, it has in it -the differences, in virtue of which it is a characterised and concrete -thing. These characteristics are different from one another; they have -their reflection-into-self not on their own part, but on the part of -the thing. They are Properties of the thing: and their relation to the -thing is expressed by the word 'have.' - -As a term of relation, 'to have' takes the place of 'to be.' True, -somewhat has qualities on its part too: but this transference of -'Having' into the sphere of Being is inexact, because the character as -quality is directly one with the somewhat, and the somewhat ceases to -be when it loses its quality. But the thing is reflection-into-self: -for it is an identity which is also distinct from the difference, -_i.e._ from its attributes.--In many languages 'have' is employed -to denote past time. And with reason: for the past is absorbed or -suspended being, and the mind is its reflection-into-self; in the mind -only it continues to subsist,--the mind however distinguishing from -itself this being in it which has been absorbed or suspended. - - * * * * * - -In the Thing all the characteristics of reflection recur as existent. -Thus the thing, in its initial aspect, as the thing-by-itself, is the -self-same or identical. But identity, it was proved, is not found -without difference: so the properties, which the thing has, are the -existent difference in the form of diversity. In the case of diversity -or variety each diverse member exhibited an indifference to every -other, and they had no other relation to each other, save what was -given by a comparison external to them. But now in the thing we have a -bond which keeps the various properties in union. Property, besides, -should not be confused with quality. No doubt, we also say, a thing -has qualities. But the phraseology is a misplaced one: 'having' hints -at an independence, foreign to the 'Somewhat,' which is still directly -identical with its quality. Somewhat is what it is only by its -quality: whereas, though the thing indeed exists only as it has its -properties, it is not confined to this or that definite property, and -can therefore lose it, without ceasing to be what it is. - -126.] (ß) Even in the ground, however, the reflection-on-something-else -is directly convertible with reflection-on-self. And hence the -properties are not merely different from each other; they are also -self-identical, independent, and relieved from their attachment to the -thing. Still, as they are the characters of the thing distinguished -from one another (as reflected-into-self), they are not themselves -things, if things be concrete; but only existences reflected -into themselves as abstract characters. They are what are called -Matters. - -Nor is the name 'things' given to Matters, such as magnetic and -electric matters. They are qualities proper, a reflected Being,--one -with their Being,--they are the character that has reached immediacy, -existence: they are 'entities.' - -To elevate the properties, which the Thing has, to the independent -position of matters, or materials of which it consists, is a proceeding -based upon the notion of a Thing: and for that reason is also found -in experience. Thought and experience however alike protest against -concluding from the fact that certain properties of a thing, such -as colour, or smell, may be represented as particular colouring or -odorific matters, that we are then at the end of the inquiry, and -that nothing more is needed to penetrate to the true secret of things -than a disintegration of them into their component materials. This -disintegration into independent matters is properly restricted to -inorganic nature only. The chemist is in the right therefore when, -for example, he analyses common salt or gypsum into its elements, and -finds that the former consists of muriatic acid and soda, the latter of -sulphuric acid and calcium. So too the geologist does well to regard -granite as a compound of quartz, felspar, and mica. These matters, -again, of which the thing consists, are themselves partly things, -which in that way may be once more reduced to more abstract matters. -Sulphuric acid, for example, is a compound of sulphur and oxygen. Such -matters or bodies can as a matter of fact be exhibited as subsisting by -themselves: but frequently we find other properties of things, entirely -wanting this self-subsistence, also regarded as particular matters. -Thus we hear caloric, and electrical or magnetic matters spoken of. -Such matters are at the best figments of understanding. And we see -here the usual procedure of the abstract reflection of understanding. -Capriciously adopting single categories, whose value entirely depends -on their place in the gradual evolution of the logical idea, it employs -them in the pretended interests of explanation, but in the face of -plain, unprejudiced perception and experience, so as to trace back to -them every object investigated. Nor is this all. The theory, which -makes things consist of independent matters, is frequently applied in a -region where it has neither meaning nor force. For within the limits of -nature even, wherever there is organic life, this category is obviously -inadequate. An animal may be said to consist of bones, muscles, nerves, -&c.: but evidently we are here using the term 'consist' in a very -different sense from its use when we spoke of the piece of granite as -consisting of the above-mentioned elements. The elements of granite are -utterly indifferent to their combination: they could subsist as well -without it. The different parts and members of an organic body on the -contrary subsist only in their union: they cease to exist as such, when -they are separated from each other. - -127.] Thus Matter is the mere abstract or indeterminate -reflection-into-something-else, or reflection-into-self at the same -time as determinate; it is consequently Thinghood which then and there -is,--the subsistence of the thing. By this means the thing has on the -part of the matters its reflection-into-self (the reverse of § 125); -it subsists not on its own part, but consists of the matters, and is -only a superficial association between them, an external combination of -them. - -128.] (γ) Matter, being the immediate unity of existence with itself, -is also indifferent towards specific character. Hence the numerous -diverse matters coalesce into the one Matter, or into existence -under the reflective characteristic of identity. In contrast to this -one Matter these distinct properties and their external relation which -they have to one another in the thing, constitute the _Form_,--the -reflective category of difference, but a difference which exists and is -a totality. - -This one featureless Matter is also the same as the Thing-by-itself -was: only the latter is intrinsically quite abstract, while the former -essentially implies relation to something else, and in the first place -to the Form. - - * * * * * - -The various matters of which the thing consists are potentially the -same as one another. Thus we get one Matter in general to which the -difference is expressly attached externally and as a bare form. This -theory which holds things all round to have one and the same matter at -bottom, and merely to differ externally in respect of form, is much in -vogue with the reflective understanding. Matter in that case counts for -naturally indeterminate, but susceptible of any determination; while at -the same time it is perfectly permanent, and continues the same amid -all change and alteration. And in finite things at least this disregard -of matter for any determinate form is certainly exhibited. For example, -it matters not to a block of marble, whether it receive the form of -this or that statue or even the form of a pillar. Be it noted however -that a block of marble can disregard form only relatively, that is, in -reference to the sculptor: it is by no means purely formless. And so -the mineralogist considers the relatively formless marble as a special -formation of rock, differing from other equally special formations, -such as sandstone or porphyry. Therefore we say it is an abstraction -of the understanding which isolates matter into a certain natural -formlessness. For properly speaking the thought of matter includes the -principle of form throughout, and no formless matter therefore appears -anywhere even in experience as existing. Still the conception of -matter as original and pre-existent, and as naturally formless, is a -very ancient one; it meets us even among the Greeks, at first in the -mythical shape of Chaos, which is supposed to represent the unformed -substratum of the existing world. Such a conception must of necessity -tend to make God not the Creator of the world, but a mere world-moulder -or demiurge. A deeper insight into nature reveals God as creating the -world out of nothing. And that teaches two things. On the one hand it -enunciates that matter, as such, has no independent subsistence, and on -the other that the form does not supervene upon matter from without, -but as a totality involves the principle of matter in itself. This free -and infinite form will hereafter come before us as the notion. - -129.] Thus the Thing suffers a disruption into Matter and Form. Each -of these is the totality of thinghood and subsists for itself. But -Matter, which is meant to be the positive and indeterminate existence, -contains, as an existence, reflection-on-another, every whit as -much as it contains self-enclosed being. Accordingly as uniting -these characteristics, it is itself the totality of Form. But Form, -being a complete whole of characteristics, _ipso facto_ involves -reflection-into-self; in other words, as self-relating Form it has the -very function attributed to Matter. Both are at bottom the same. Invest -them with this unity, and you have the relation of Matter and Form, -which are also no less distinct. - -130.] The Thing, being this totality, is a contradiction. On the side -of its negative unity it is Form in which Matter is determined and -deposed to the rank of properties (§ 125). At the same time it consists -of Matters, which in the reflection-of-the-thing-into-itself are as -much independent as they are at the same time negatived. Thus the thing -is the essential existence, in such a way as to be an existence that -suspends or absorbs itself in itself. In other words, the thing is an -Appearance or Phenomenon. - -The negation of the several matters, which is insisted on in the -thing no less than their independent existence, occurs in Physics as -_porosity._ Each of the several matters (colouring matter, odorific -matter, and if we believe some people, even sound-matter,--not -excluding caloric, electric matter, &c:) is also negated: and in this -negation of theirs, or as interpenetrating their pores, we find the -numerous other independent matters, which, being similarly porous, -make room in turn for the existence of the rest. Pores are not -empirical facts; they are figments of the understanding, which uses -them to represent the element of negation in independent matters. -The further working-out of the contradictions is concealed by the -nebulous imbroglio in which all matters are independent and all no less -negated in each other.--If the faculties or activities are similarly -hypostatised in the mind, their living unity similarly turns to the -imbroglio of an action of the one on the others. - -These pores (meaning thereby not the pores in an organic body, such as -the pores of wood or of the skin, but those in the so-called 'matters,' -such as colouring matter, caloric, or metals, crystals, &c.) cannot be -verified by observation. In the same way matter itself,--furthermore -form which is separated from matter,--whether that be the thing as -consisting of matters, or the view that the thing itself subsists and -only has proper ties,--is all a product of the reflective understanding -which, while it observes and professes to record only what it observes, -is rather creating a metaphysic, bristling with contradictions of which -it is unconscious. - - -B.--APPEARANCE. - -131.] The Essence must appear or shine forth. Its shining or reflection -in it is the suspension and translation of it to immediacy, which, -whilst as reflection-on-self it is matter or subsistence, is also form, -reflection-on-something-else, a subsistence which sets itself aside. To -show or shine is the characteristic by which essence is distinguished -from being,--by which it is essence; and it is this show which, when -it is developed, shows itself, and is Appearance. Essence accordingly -is not something beyond or behind appearance, but just because it -is the essence which exists--the existence is Appearance -(Forth-shining). - - * * * * * - -Existence stated explicitly in its contradiction is Appearance. But -appearance (forth-shining) is not to be confused with a mere show -(shining). Show is the proximate truth of Being or immediacy. The -immediate, instead of being, as we suppose, something independent, -resting on its own self, is a mere show, and as such it is packed or -summed up under the simplicity of the immanent essence. The essence -is, in the first place, the sum total of the showing itself, shining -in itself (inwardly); but, far from abiding in this inwardness, it -comes as a ground forward into existence; and this existence being -grounded not in itself, but on something else, is just appearance. -In our imagination we ordinarily combine with the term appearance -or phenomenon the conception of an indefinite congeries of things -existing, the being of which is purely relative, and which consequently -do not rest on a foundation of their own, but are esteemed only as -passing stages. But in this conception it is no less implied that -essence does not linger behind or beyond appearance. Rather it is, we -may say, the Infinite kindness which lets its own show freely issue -into immediacy, and graciously allows it the joy of existence. The -appearance which is thus created does not stand on its own feet, and -has its being not in itself but in something else. God who is the -essence, when He lends existence to the passing stages of His own show -in Himself, may be described as the goodness that creates a world: but -He is also the power above it, and the righteousness, which manifests -the merely phenomenal character of the content of this existing world, -whenever it tries to exist in independence. - -Appearance is in every way a very important grade of the logical idea. -It may be said to be the distinction of philosophy from ordinary -consciousness that it sees the merely phenomenal character of what the -latter supposes to have a self-subsistent being. The significance of -appearance however must be properly grasped, or mistakes will arise. -To say that anything is a _mere_ appearance may be misinterpreted to -mean that, as compared with what is merely phenomenal, there is greater -truth in the immediate, in that which _is._ Now in strict fact, the -case is precisely the reverse. Appearance is higher than mere Being,--a -richer category because it holds in combination the two elements of -reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another: whereas Being (or -immediacy) still mere relationlessness and apparently rests upon itself -alone. Still, to say that anything is _only_ an appearance suggests a -real flaw, which consists in this, that Appearance is still divided -against itself and without intrinsic stability. Beyond and above mere -appearance comes in the first place Actuality, the third grade of -Essence, of which we shall afterwards speak. - -In the history of Modern Philosophy, Kant has the merit of first -rehabilitating this distinction between the common and the philosophic -modes of thought. He stopped half-way however, when he attached to -Appearance a subjective meaning only, and put the abstract essence -immovable outside it as the thing-in-itself beyond the reach of our -cognition. For it is the very nature of the world of immediate objects -to be appearance only. Knowing it to be so, we know at the same time -the essence, which, far from staying behind or beyond the appearance, -rather manifests its own essentiality by deposing the world to a mere -appearance. One can hardly quarrel with the plain man who, in his -desire for totality, cannot acquiesce in the doctrine of subjective -idealism, that we are solely concerned with phenomena. The plain man, -however, in his desire to save the objectivity of knowledge, may very -naturally return to abstract immediacy, and maintain that immediacy -to be true and actual. In a little work published under the title, -_A Report, clear as day, to the larger Public touching the proper -nature of the Latest Philosophy: an Attempt to force the reader to -understand,'_ Fichte examined the opposition between subjective -idealism and immediate consciousness in a popular form, under the shape -of a dialogue between the author and the reader, and tried hard to -prove that the subjective idealist's point of view was right. In this -dialogue the reader complains to the author that he has completely -failed to place himself in the idealist's position, and is inconsolable -at the thought that things around him are no real things but mere -appearances. The affliction of the reader can scarcely be blamed when -he is expected to consider himself hemmed in by an impervious circle -of purely subjective conceptions. Apart from this subjective view of -Appearance, however, we have all reason to rejoice that the things -which environ us are appearances and not steadfast and independent -existences; since in that case we should soon perish of hunger, both -bodily and mental. - -(a) _The World of Appearance._ - -132.] The Apparent or Phenomenal exists in such a way, that its -subsistence is _ipso facto_ thrown into abeyance or suspended and -is only one stage in the form itself. The form embraces in it the -matter or subsistence as one of its characteristics. In this way -the phenomenal has its ground in this (form) as its essence, its -reflection-into-self in contrast with its immediacy, but, in so doing, -has it only in another aspect of the form. This ground of its is no -less phenomenal than itself, and the phenomenon accordingly goes on to -an endless mediation of subsistence by means of form, and thus equally -by non-subsistence. This endless inter-mediation is at the same time -a unity of self-relation; and existence is developed into a totality, -into a world of phenomena,--of reflected finitude. - -(b) _Content and Form._ - -133.] Outside one another as the phenomena in this phenomenal -world are, they form a totality, and are wholly contained in their -self-relatedness. In this way the self-relation of the phenomenon is -completely specified, it has the Form in itself: and because it -is in this identity, has it as essential subsistence. So it comes about -that the form is Content: and in its mature phase is the Law -of the Phenomenon. When the form, on the contrary, is not reflected -into self, it is equivalent to the negative of the phenomenon, to -the non-independent and changeable: and that sort of form is the -indifferent or External Form. - -The essential point to keep in mind about the opposition of Form and -Content is that the content is not formless, but has the form in its -own self, quite as much as the form is external to it. There is thus -a doubling of form. At one time it is reflected into itself; and then -is identical with the content. At another time it is not reflected -into itself, and then is the external existence, which does not at -all affect the content. We are here in presence, implicitly, of the -absolute correlation of content and form: viz. their reciprocal -revulsion, so that content is nothing but the revulsion of form into -content, and form nothing but the revulsion of content into form. This -mutual revulsion is one of the most important laws of thought. But it -is not explicitly brought out before the Relations of Substance and -Causality. - -Form and content are a pair of terms frequently employed by the -reflective understanding, especially with a habit of looking on the -content as the essential and independent, the form on the contrary as -the unessential and dependent. Against this it is to be noted that both -are in fact equally essential; and that, while a formless _content_ can -be as little found as a formless _matter,_ the two (content and matter) -are distinguished by this circumstance, that matter, though implicitly -not without form, still in its existence manifests a disregard of form, -whereas the content, as such, is what it is only because the matured -form is included in it. Still the form comes before us sometimes as -an existence indifferent and external to content, and does so for -the reason that the whole range of Appearance still suffers from -externality. In a book, for instance, it certainly has no bearing upon -the content, whether it be written or printed, bound in paper or in -leather. That however does not in the least imply that apart from such -an indifferent and external form, the content of the book is itself -formless. There are undoubtedly books enough which even in reference -to their content may well be styled formless: but want of form in this -case is the same as bad form, and means the defect of the right form, -not the absence of all form whatever. So far is this right form from -being unaffected by the content that it is rather the content itself. A -work of art that wants the right form is for that very reason no right -or true work of art: and it is a bad way of excusing an artist, to say -that the content of his works is good and even excellent, though they -want the right form. Real works of art are those where content and form -exhibit a thorough identity. The content of the Iliad, it may be said, -is the Trojan war, and especially the wrath of Achilles. In that we -have everything, and yet very little after all; for the Iliad is made -an Iliad by the poetic form, in which that content is moulded. The -content of Romeo and Juliet may similarly be said to be the ruin of two -lovers through the discord between their families: but something more -is needed to make Shakespeare's immortal tragedy. - -In reference to the relation of form and content in the field of -science, we should recollect the difference between philosophy and -the rest of the sciences. The latter are finite, because their mode -of thought, as a merely formal act, derives its content from without. -Their content therefore is not known as moulded from within through -the thoughts which lie at the ground of it, and form and content do -not thoroughly interpenetrate each other. This partition disappears in -philosophy, and thus justifies its title of infinite knowledge. Yet -even philosophic thought is often held to be a merely formal act; and -that logic, which confessedly deals only with thoughts _quâ_ thoughts, -is merely formal, is especially a foregone conclusion. And if content -means no more than what is palpable and obvious to the senses, all -philosophy and logic in particular must be at once acknowledged to -be void of content, that is to say, of content perceptible to the -senses. Even ordinary forms of thought however, and the common usage of -language, do not in the least restrict the appellation of content to -what is perceived by the senses, or to what has a being in place and -time. A book without content is, as every one knows, not a book with -empty leaves, but one of which the content is as good as none. We shall -find as the last result on closer analysis, that by what is called -content an educated mind means nothing but the presence and power of -thought. But this is to admit that thoughts are not empty forms without -affinity to their content, and that in other spheres as well as in art -the truth and the sterling value of the content essentially depend on -the content showing itself identical with the form. - -134.] But immediate existence is a character of the subsistence itself -as well as of the form: it is consequently external to the character of -the content; but in an equal degree this externality, which the content -has through the factor of its subsistence, is essential to it. When -thus explicitly stated, the phenomenon is relativity or correlation: -where one and the same thing, viz. the content or the developed -form, is seen as the externality and antithesis of independent -existences, and as their reduction to a relation of identity, in which -identification alone the two things distinguished are what they are. - -(c) _Relation or Correlation._ - -135.] (α) The immediate relation is that of the Whole and the -Parts. The content is the whole, and consists of the parts (the -form), its counterpart. The parts are diverse one from another. It is -they that possess independent being. But they are parts, only when they -are identified by being related to one another; or, in so far as they -make up the whole, when taken together. But this 'Together' is the -counterpart and negation of the part. - -Essential correlation is the specific and completely universal -phase in which things appear. Everything that exists stands in -correlation, and this correlation is the veritable nature of every -existence. The existent thing in this way has no being of its own, but -only in something else: in this other however it is self-relation; and -correlation is the unity of the self-relation and relation-to-others. - -The relation of the whole and the parts is untrue to this extent, that -the notion and the reality of the relation are not in harmony. The -notion of the whole is to contain parts: but if the whole is taken -and made what its notion implies, _i.e._ if it is divided, it at once -ceases to be a whole. Things there are, no doubt, which correspond -to this relation: but for that very reason they are low and untrue -existences. We must remember however what 'untrue' signifies. When -it occurs in a philosophical discussion, the term 'untrue' does not -signify that the thing to which it is applied is non-existent. A bad -state or a sickly body may exist all the same; but these things are -untrue, because their notion and their reality are out of harmony. - -The relation of whole and parts, being the immediate relation, comes -easy to reflective understanding; and for that reason it often -satisfies when the question really turns on profounder ties. The limbs -and organs, for instance, of an organic body are not merely parts of -it: it is only in their unity that they are what they are, and they -are unquestionably affected by that unity, as they also in turn affect -it. These limbs and organs become mere parts, only when they pass under -the hands of the anatomist, whose occupation, be it remembered, is not -with the living body but with the corpse. Not that such analysis is -illegitimate: we only mean that the external and mechanical relation of -whole and parts is not sufficient for us, if we want to study organic -life in its truth. And if this be so in organic life, it is the case -to a much greater extent when we apply this relation to the mind and -the formations of the spiritual world. Psychologists may not expressly -speak of parts of the soul or mind, but the mode in which this -subject is treated by the analytic understanding is largely founded -on the analogy of this finite relation. At least that is so, when the -different forms of mental activity are enumerated and described merely -in their isolation one after another, as so-called special powers and -faculties. - -136.] (β) The one-and-same of this correlation (the self-relation -found in it) is thus immediately a negative self-relation. The -correlation is in short the mediating process whereby one and the -same is first unaffected towards difference, and secondly is the -negative self-relation, which repels itself as reflection-into-self to -difference, and invests itself (as reflection-into-something-else) with -existence, whilst it conversely leads back this reflection-into-other -to self-relation and indifference. This gives the correlation of -Force and its Expression. - -The relationship of whole and part is the immediate and therefore -unintelligent (mechanical) relation,--a revulsion of self-identity -into mere variety. Thus we pass from the whole to the parts, and from -the parts to the whole: in the one we forget its opposition to the -other, while each on its own account, at one time the whole, at another -the parts, is taken to be an independent existence. In other words, -when the parts are declared to subsist in the whole, and the whole -to consist of the parts, we have either member of the relation at -different times taken to be permanently subsistent, while the other is -non-essential. In its superficial form the mechanical nexus consists in -the parts being independent of each other and of the whole. - -This relation may be adopted for the progression _ad infinitum,_ -in the case of the divisibility of matter: and then it becomes an -unintelligent alternation with the two sides. A thing at one time is -taken as a whole: then we go on to specify the parts: this specifying -is forgotten, and what was a part is regarded as a whole: then the -specifying of the part comes up again, and so on for ever. But if this -infinity be taken as the negative which it is, it is the _negative_ -self-relating element in the correlation,--Force, the self-identical -whole, or immanency; which yet supersedes this immanency and gives -itself expression;--and conversely the expression which vanishes and -returns into Force. - -Force, notwithstanding this infinity, is also finite: for the content, -or the one and the same of the Force and its out-putting, is this -identity at first only for the observer: the two sides of the relation -are not yet, each on its own account, the concrete identity of that -one and same, not yet the totality. For one another they are therefore -different, and the relationship is a finite one. Force consequently -requires solicitation from without: it works blindly: and on account of -this defectiveness of form, the content is also limited and accidental. -It is not yet genuinely identical with the form: not yet is it _as_ a -notion and an end; that is to say, it is not intrinsically and actually -determinate. This difference is most vital, but not easy to apprehend: -it will assume a clearer formulation when we reach Design. If it be -overlooked, it leads to the confusion of conceiving God as Force, a -confusion from which Herder's God especially suffers. - -It is often said that the nature of Force itself is unknown and only -its manifestation apprehended. But, in the first place, it may be -replied, every article in the import of Force is the same as what -is specified in the Exertion: and the explanation of a phenomenon -by a Force is to that extent a mere tautology. What is supposed to -remain unknown, therefore, is really nothing but the empty form of -reflection-into-self, by which alone the Force is distinguished from -the Exertion,--and that form too is something familiar. It is a form -that does not make the slightest addition to the content and to the -law, which have to be discovered from the phenomenon alone. Another -assurance always given is that to speak of forces implies no theory as -to their nature: and that being so, it is impossible to see why the -form of Force has been introduced into the sciences at all. In the -second place the nature of Force is undoubtedly unknown: we are still -without any necessity binding and connecting its content together in -itself, as we are without necessity in the content, in so far as it is -expressly limited and hence has its character by means of another thing -outside it. - -(1) Compared with the immediate relation of whole and parts, the -relation between force and its putting-forth may be considered -infinite. In it that identity of the two sides is realised, which in -the former relation only existed for the observer. The whole, though -we can see that it consists of parts, ceases to be a whole when it -is divided: whereas force is only shown to be force when it exerts -itself, and in its exercise only comes back to itself. The exercise is -only force once more. Yet, on further examination even this relation -will appear finite, and finite in virtue of this mediation: just -as, conversely, the relation of whole and parts is obviously finite -in virtue of its immediacy. The first and simplest evidence for the -finitude of the mediated relation of force and its exercise is, that -each and every force is conditioned and requires something else than -itself for its subsistence. For instance, a special vehicle of magnetic -force, as is well known, is iron, the other properties of which, such -as its colour, specific weight, or relation to acids, are independent -of this connexion with magnetism. The same thing is seen in all other -forces, which from one end to the other are found to be conditioned -and mediated by something else than themselves. Another proof of -the finite nature of force is that it requires solicitation before -it can put itself forth. That through which the force is solicited, -is itself another exertion of force, which cannot put itself forth -without similar solicitation. This brings us either to a repetition of -the infinite progression, or to a reciprocity of soliciting and being -solicited. In either case we have no absolute beginning of motion. -Force is not as yet, like the final cause, inherently self-determining: -the content is given to it as determined, and force, when it exerts -itself, is, according to the phrase, blind in its working. That phrase -implies the distinction between abstract force-manifestation and -teleological action. - -(2) The oft-repeated statement, that the exercise of the force and -not the force itself admits of being known, must be rejected as -groundless. It is the very essence of force to manifest itself, and -thus in the totality of manifestation, conceived as a law, we at the -same time discover the force itself. And yet this assertion that force -in its own self is unknowable betrays a well-grounded presentiment -that this relation is finite. The several manifestations of a force at -first meet us in indefinite multiplicity, and in their isolation seem -accidental: but, reducing this multiplicity to its inner unity, which -we term force, we see that the apparently contingent is necessary, by -recognising the law that rules it. But the different forces themselves -are a multiplicity again, and in their mere juxtaposition seem to be -contingent. Hence in empirical physics, we speak of the forces of -gravity, magnetism, electricity, &c, and in empirical psychology of -the forces of memory, imagination, will, and all the other faculties. -All this multiplicity again excites a craving to know these different -forces as a single whole, nor would this craving be appeased even if -the several forces were traced back to one common primary force. Such -a primary force would be really no more than an empty abstraction, -with as little content as the abstract thing-in-itself. And besides -this, the correlation of force and manifestation is essentially a -mediated correlation (of reciprocal dependence), and it must therefore -contradict the notion of force to view it as primary or resting on -itself. - -Such being the case with the nature of force, though we may consent to -let the world be called a manifestation of divine forces, we should -object to have God Himself viewed as a mere force. For force is after -all a subordinate and finite category. At the so-called renascence of -the sciences, when steps were taken to trace the single phenomena of -nature back to underlying forces, the Church branded the enterprise -as impious. The argument of the Church was as follows. If it be the -forces of gravitation, of vegetation, &c. which occasion the movements -of the heavenly bodies, the growth of plants, &c., there is nothing -left for divine providence, and God sinks to the level of a leisurely -on-looker, surveying this play of forces. The students of nature, it is -true, and Newton more than others, when they employed the reflective -category of force to explain natural phenomena, have expressly pleaded -that the honour of God, as the Creator and Governor of the world, would -not thereby be impaired. Still the logical issue of this explanation -by means of forces is that the inferential understanding proceeds to -fix each of these forces, and to maintain them in their finitude as -ultimate. And contrasted with this deinfinitised world of independent -forces and matters, the only terms in which it is possible still to -describe God will present Him in the abstract infinity of an unknowable -supreme Being in some other world far away. This is precisely the -position of materialism, and of modern 'free-thinking,' whose theology -ignores what God is and restricts itself to the mere fact _that_ He -is. In this dispute therefore the Church and the religious mind have -to a certain extent the right on their side. The finite forms of -understanding certainly fail to fulfil the conditions for a knowledge -either of Nature or of the formations in the world of Mind as they -truly are. Yet on the other side it is impossible to overlook the -formal right which, in the first place, entitles the empirical sciences -to vindicate the right of thought to know the existent world in all -the speciality of its content, and to seek something further than the -bare statement of mere abstract faith that God creates and governs the -world. When our religious consciousness, resting upon the authority of -the Church, teaches us that God created the world by His almighty will, -that He guides the stars in their courses, and vouchsafes to all His -creatures their existence and their well-being, the question Why? is -still left to answer. Now it is the answer to this question which forms -the common task of empirical science and of philosophy. When religion -refuses to recognise this problem, or the right to put it, and appeals -to the unsearchableness of the decrees of God, it is taking up the same -agnostic ground as is taken by the mere Enlightenment of understanding. -Such an appeal is no better than an arbitrary dogmatism, which -contravenes the express command of Christianity, to know God in spirit -and in truth, and is prompted by a humility which is not Christian, but -born of ostentatious bigotry. - -137.] Force is a whole, which is in its own self negative -self-relation; and as such a whole it continually pushes -itself off from itself and puts itself forth. But since this -reflection-into-another (corresponding to the distinction between the -Parts of the Whole) is equally a reflection-into-self, this out-putting -is the way and means by which Force that returns back into itself is -as a Force. The very act of out-putting accordingly sets in abeyance -the diversity of the two sides which is found in this correlation, -and expressly states the identity which virtually constitutes their -content. The truth of Force and utterance therefore is that relation, -in which the two sides are distinguished only as Outward and Inward. - -138.] (γ) The Inward (Interior) is the ground, when it -stands as the mere form of the one side of the Appearance and -the Correlation,--the empty form of reflection-into-self. As a -counterpart to it stands the Outward (Exterior),--Existence, -also as the form of the other side of the correlation, with the -empty characteristic of reflection-into-something-else. But Inward -and Outward are identified: and their identity is identity brought -to fulness in the content, that unity of reflection-into-self and -reflection-into-other which was forced to appear in the movement of -force. Both are the same one totality, and this unity makes them the -content. - -139.] In the first place then, Exterior is the same content as -Interior. What is inwardly is also found outwardly, and _vice versâ._ -The appearance shows nothing that is not in the essence, and in the -essence there is nothing but what is manifested. - -140.] In the second place, Inward and Outward, as formal terms, -are also reciprocally opposed, and that thoroughly. The one is the -abstraction of identity with self; the other, of mere multiplicity -or reality. But as stages of the one form, they are essentially -identical: so that whatever is at first explicitly put only in the one -abstraction, is also as plainly and at one step only in the other. -Therefore what is only internal is also only external: and what is only -external, is so far only at first internal. - -It is the customary mistake of reflection to take the essence to be -merely the interior. If it be so taken, even this way of looking at -it is purely external, and that sort of essence is the empty external -abstraction. - - Ins Innere der Natur - Dringt sein erschaffner Geist, - Zu glücklich wenn er nur - Die äußere Schaale weist.[1] - -It ought rather to have been said that, if the essence of nature is -ever described as the inner part, the person who so describes it -only knows its outer shell. In Being as a whole, or even in mere -sense-perception, the notion is at first only an inward, and for that -very reason is something external to Being, a subjective thinking -and being, devoid of truth.--In Nature as well as in Mind, so long -as the notion, design, or law are at first the inner capacity, mere -possibilities, they are first only an external, inorganic nature, -the knowledge of a third person, alien force, and the like. As a man -is outwardly, that is to say in his actions (not of course in his -merely bodily outwardness), so is he inwardly: and if his virtue, -morality, &c. are only inwardly his,--that is if they exist only in his -intentions and sentiments, and his outward acts are not identical with -them, the one half of him is as hollow and empty as the other. - -The relation of Outward and Inward unites the two relations that -precede, and at the same time sets in abeyance mere relativity and -phenomenality in general. Yet so long as understanding keeps the Inward -and Outward fixed in their separation, they are empty forms, the one -as null as the other. Not only in the study of nature, but also of the -spiritual world, much depends on a just appreciation of the relation -of inward and outward, and especially on avoiding the misconception -that the former only is the essential point on which everything turns, -while the latter is unessential and trivial. We find this mistake made -when, as is often done, the difference between nature and mind is -traced back to the abstract difference between inner and outer. As for -nature, it certainly is in the gross external, not merely to the mind, -but even on its own part. But to call it external 'in the gross' is -not to imply an abstract externality--for there is no such thing. It -means rather that the Idea which forms the common content of nature and -mind, is found in nature as outward only, and for that very reason only -inward. The abstract understanding, with its 'Either--or,' may struggle -against this conception of nature. It is none the less obviously found -in our other modes of consciousness, particularly in religion. It is -the lesson of religion that nature, no less than the spiritual world, -is a revelation of God: but with this distinction, that while nature -never gets so far as to be conscious of its divine essence, that -consciousness is the express problem of the mind, which in the matter -of that problem is as yet finite. Those who look upon the essence of -nature as mere inwardness, and therefore inaccessible to us, take up -the same line as that ancient creed which regarded God as envious and -jealous; a creed which both Plato and Aristotle pronounced against long -ago. All that God is, He imparts and reveals; and He does so, at first, -in and through nature. - -Any object indeed is faulty and imperfect when it is only inward, and -thus at the same time only outward, or, (which is the same thing,) when -it is only an outward and thus only an inward. For instance, a child, -taken in the gross as human being, is no doubt a rational creature; -but the reason of the child as child is at first a mere inward, in the -shape of his natural ability or vocation, &c. This mere inward, at the -same time, has for the child the form of a more outward, in the shape -of the will of his parents, the attainments of his teachers, and the -whole world of reason that environs him. The education and instruction -of a child aim at making him actually and for himself what he is at -first potentially and therefore for others, viz. for his grown-up -friends. The reason, which at first exists in the child only as an -inner possibility, is actualised through education: and conversely, the -child by these means becomes conscious that the goodness, religion, and -science which he had at first looked upon as an outward authority, are -his own and inward nature. As with the child so it is in this matter -with the adult, when, in opposition to his true destiny, his intellect -and will remain in the bondage of the natural man. Thus, the criminal -sees the punishment to which he has to submit as an act of violence -from without: whereas in fact the penalty is only the manifestation of -his own criminal will. - -From what has now been said, we may learn what to think of a man who, -when blamed for his shortcomings, it may be, his discreditable acts, -appeals to the (professedly) excellent intentions and sentiments of -the inner self he distinguishes therefrom. There certainly may be -individual cases, where the malice of outward circumstances frustrates -well-meant designs, and disturbs the execution of the best-laid plans. -But in general even here the essential unity between inward and outward -is maintained. We are thus justified in saying that a man is what he -does; and the lying vanity which consoles itself with the feeling of -inward excellence, may be confronted with the words of the gospel: 'By -their fruits ye shall know them.' That grand saying applies primarily -in a moral and religious aspect, but it also holds good in reference -to performances in art and science. The keen eye of a teacher who -perceives in his pupil decided evidences of talent, may lead him to -state his opinion that a Raphael or a Mozart lies hidden in the boy: -and the result will show how far such an opinion was well-founded. -But if a daub of a painter, or a poetaster, soothe themselves by the -conceit that their head is full of high ideals, their consolation is -a poor one; and if they insist on being judged not by their actual -works but by their projects, we may safely reject their pretensions -as unfounded and unmeaning. The converse case however also occurs. In -passing judgment on men who have accomplished something great and good, -we often make use of the false distinction between inward and outward. -All that they have accomplished, we say, is outward merely; inwardly -they were acting from some very different motive, such as a desire to -gratify their vanity or other unworthy passion. This is the spirit of -envy. Incapable of any great action of its own, envy tries hard to -depreciate greatness and to bring it down to its own level. Let us, -rather, recall the fine expression of Goethe, that there is no remedy -but Love against great superiorities of others. We may seek to rob -men's great actions of their grandeur, by the insinuation of hypocrisy; -but, though it is possible that men in an instance now and then may -dissemble and disguise a good deal, they cannot conceal the whole of -their inner self, which infallibly betrays itself in the _decursus -vitae._ Even here it is true that a man is nothing but the series of -his actions. - -What is called the 'pragmatic' writing of history has in modern times -frequently sinned in its treatment of great historical characters, and -defaced and tarnished the true conception of them by this fallacious -separation of the outward from the inward. Not content with telling -the unvarnished tale of the great acts which have been wrought by -the heroes of the world's history, and with acknowledging that their -inward being corresponds with the import of their acts, the pragmatic -historian fancies himself justified and even obliged to trace the -supposed secret motives that lie behind the open facts of the record. -The historian, in that case, is supposed to write with more depth in -proportion as he succeeds in tearing away the aureole from all that -has been heretofore held grand and glorious, and in depressing it, so -far as its origin and proper significance are concerned, to the level -of vulgar mediocrity. To make these pragmatical researches in history -easier, it is usual to recommend the study of psychology, which is -supposed to make us acquainted with the real motives of human actions. -The psychology in question however is only that petty knowledge of -men, which looks away from the essential and permanent in human -nature to fasten its glance on the casual and private features shown -in isolated instincts and passions. A pragmatical psychology ought -at least to leave the historian, who investigates the motives at the -ground of great actions, a choice between the 'substantial' interests -of patriotism, justice, religious truth and the like, on the one hand, -and the subjective and 'formal' interests of vanity, ambition, avarice -and the like, on the other. The latter however are the motives which -must be viewed by the pragmatist as really efficient, otherwise the -assumption of a contrast between the inward (the disposition of the -agent) and the outward (the import of the action) would fall to the -ground. But inward and outward have in truth the same content; and the -right doctrine is the very reverse of this pedantic judicially. If the -heroes of history had been actuated by subjective and formal interests -alone, they would never have accomplished what they have. And if we -have due regard to the unity between the inner and the outer, we must -own that great men willed what they did, and did what they willed. - -141.] The empty abstractions, by means of which the one identical -content perforce continues in the two correlatives, suspend themselves -in the immediate transition, the one in the other. The content is -itself nothing but their identity (§ 138): and these abstractions are -the seeming of essence, put as seeming. By the manifestation of force -the inward is put into existence: but this putting is the mediation by -empty abstractions. In its own self the intermediating process vanishes -to the immediacy, in which the inward and the outward are absolutely -identical and their difference is distinctly no more than assumed and -imposed. This identity is Actuality. - - -C.--ACTUALITY. - -142.] Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence with -existence, or of inward with outward. The utterance of the actual -is the actual itself: so that in this utterance it remains just as -essential, and only is essential, in so far as it is in immediate -external existence. - -We have ere this met Being and Existence as forms of the immediate. -Being is, in general, unreflected immediacy and transition into -another. Existence is immediate unity of being and reflection; hence -appearance: it comes from the ground, and falls to the ground. In -actuality this unity is explicitly put, and the two sides of the -relation identified. Hence the actual is exempted from transition, and -its externality is its energising. In that energising it is reflected -into itself: its existence is only the manifestation of itself, not of -an other. - -Actuality and thought (or Idea) are often absurdly opposed. How -commonly we hear people saying that, though no objection can be urged -against the truth and correctness of a certain thought, there is -nothing of the kind to be seen in actuality, or it cannot be actually -carried out! People who use such language only prove that they have -not properly apprehended the nature either of thought or of actuality. -Thought in such a case is, on one hand, the synonym for a subjective -conception, plan, intention or the like, just as actuality, on the -other, is made synonymous with external and sensible existence. This -is all very well in common life, where great laxity is allowed in the -categories and the names given to them: and it may of course happen -that _e.g._ the plan, or so-called idea, say of a certain method of -taxation, is good and advisable in the abstract, but that nothing of -the sort is found in so-called actuality, or could possibly be carried -out under the given conditions. But when the abstract understanding -gets hold of these categories and exaggerates the distinction they -imply into a hard and fast line of contrast, when it tells us that in -this actual world we must knock ideas out of our heads, it is necessary -energetically to protest against these doctrines, alike in the name of -science and of sound reason. For on the one hand Ideas are not confined -to our heads merely, nor is the Idea, upon the whole, so feeble as to -leave the question of its actualisation or non-actualisation dependent -in our will. The Idea is rather the absolutely active as well I as -actual. And on the other hand actuality is not so bad and irrational, -as purblind or wrong-headed and muddle-brained would-be reformers -imagine. So far is actuality, as distinguished from mere appearance, -and primarily presenting a unity of inward and outward, from being in -contrariety with reason, that it is rather thoroughly reasonable, and -everything which is not reasonable must on that very ground cease to -be held actual. The same view may be traced in the usages of educated -speech, which declines to give the name of real poet or real statesman -to a poet or a statesman who can do nothing really meritorious or -reasonable. - -In that vulgar conception of actuality which mistakes for it what is -palpable and directly obvious to the senses, we must seek the ground -of a wide-spread prejudice about the relation of the philosophy of -Aristotle to that of Plato. Popular opinion makes the difference to be -as follows. While Plato recognises the idea and only the idea as the -truth, Aristotle, rejecting the idea, keeps to what is actual, and is -on that account to be considered the founder and chief of empiricism. -On this it may be remarked: that although actuality certainly is -the principle of the Aristotelian philosophy, it is not the vulgar -actuality of what is immediately at hand, but the idea as actuality. -Where then lies the controversy of Aristotle against Plato? It lies in -this. Aristotle calls the Platonic idea a mere δίναμις, and establishes -in opposition to Plato that the idea, which both equally recognise to -be the only truth, is essentially to be viewed as an ἐνέργεια, in other -words, as the inward which is quite to the fore, or as the unity of -inner and outer, or as actuality, in the emphatic sense here given to -the word. - -143.] Such a concrete category as Actuality includes the -characteristics aforesaid and their difference, and is therefore also -the development of them, in such a way that, as it has them, they are -at the same time plainly understood to be a show, to be assumed or -imposed (§ 141). - -(α) Viewed as an identity in general, Actuality is first of all -Possibility--the reflection-into-self which, as in contrast with -the concrete unity of the actual, is taken and made an abstract and -unessential essentiality. Possibility is what is essential to reality, -but in such a way that it is at the same time only a possibility. - -It was probably the import of Possibility which induced Kant to regard -it along with necessity and actuality as Modalities, 'since these -categories do not in the least increase the notion as object, but only -express its relation to the faculty of knowledge.' For Possibility is -really the bare abstraction of reflection-into-self,--what was formerly -called the Inward, only that it is now taken to mean the external -inward, lifted out of reality and with the being of a mere supposition, -and is thus, sure enough, supposed only as a bare modality, an -abstraction which comes short, and, in more concrete terms, belongs -only to subjective thought. It is otherwise with Actuality and -Necessity. They are anything but a mere sort and mode for something -else: in fact the very reverse of that. If they are supposed, it is as -the concrete, not merely supposititious, but intrinsically complete. - -As Possibility is, in the first instance, the mere form of -identity-with-self (as compared with the concrete which is actual), -the rule for it merely is that a thing must not be self-contradictory. -Thus everything is possible; for an act of abstraction can give any -content this form of identity. Everything however is as impossible as -it is possible. In every content,--which is and must be concrete,--the -speciality of its nature may be viewed as a specialised contrariety -and in that way as a contradiction. Nothing therefore can be more -meaningless than to speak of such possibility and impossibility. In -philosophy, in particular, there should never be a word said of showing -that 'It is possible,' or 'There is still another possibility,' or, to -adopt another phraseology, 'It is conceivable.' The same consideration -should warn the writer of history against employing a category which -has now been explained to be on its own merits untrue: but the subtlety -of the empty understanding finds its chief pleasure in the fantastic -ingenuity of suggesting possibilities and lots of possibilities. - -Our picture-thought is at first disposed to see in possibility the -richer and more comprehensive, in actuality the poorer and narrower -category. Everything, it is said, is possible, but everything which -is possible is not on that account actual. In real truth, however, if -we deal with them as thoughts, actuality is the more comprehensive, -because it is the concrete thought which includes possibility as an -abstract element. And that superiority is to some extent expressed -in our ordinary mode of thought when we speak of the possible, in -distinction from the actual, as _only_ possible. Possibility is often -said to consist in a thing's being thinkable. 'Think,' however, in this -use of the word, only means to conceive any content under the form of -an abstract identity. Now every content can be brought under this form, -since nothing is required except to separate it from the relations in -which it stands. Hence any content, however absurd and nonsensical, can -be viewed as possible. It is possible that the moon might fall upon -the earth to-night; for the moon is a body separate from the earth, -and may as well fall down upon it as a stone thrown into the air does. -It is possible that the Sultan may become Pope; for, being a man, he -may be converted to the Christian faith, may become a Catholic priest, -and so on. In language like this about possibilities, it is chiefly -the law of the sufficient ground or reason which is manipulated in the -style already explained. Everything, it is said, is possible, for which -you can state some ground. The less education a man has, or, in other -words, the less he knows of the specific connexions of the objects -to which he directs his observations, the greater is his tendency to -launch out into all sorts of empty possibilities. An instance of this -habit in the political sphere is seen in the pot-house politician. -In practical life too it is no uncommon thing to see ill-will and -indolence slink behind the category of possibility, in order to escape -definite obligations. To such conduct the same remarks apply as were -made in connexion with the law of sufficient ground. Reasonable and -practical men refuse to be imposed upon by the possible, for the simple -ground that it is possible only. They stick to the actual (not meaning -by that word merely whatever immediately is now and here). Many of -the proverbs of common life express the same contempt for what is -abstractly possible. 'A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.' - -After all there is as good reason for taking everything to be -impossible, as to be possible: for every content (a content is always -concrete) includes not only diverse but even opposite characteristics. -Nothing is so impossible, for instance, as this, that I am: for 'I' is -at the same time simple self-relation and, as undoubtedly, relation -to something else. The same may be seen in every other fact in the -natural or spiritual world. Matter, it may be said, is impossible: -for it is the unity of attraction and repulsion. The same is true of -life, law, freedom, and above all, of God Himself, as the true, _e.g._ -the triune God,--a notion of God, which the abstract 'Enlightenment' -of Understanding, in conformity with its canons, rejected on the -allegation that it was contradictory in thought. Generally speaking, -it is the empty understanding which haunts these empty forms: and -the business of philosophy in the matter is to show how null and -meaningless they are. Whether a thing is possible or impossible, -depends altogether on the subject-matter: that is, on the sum total of -the elements in actuality, which, as it opens itself out, discloses -itself to be necessity. - -144.] (ß) But the Actual in its distinction from possibility (which -is reflection-into-self) is itself only the outward concrete, the -unessential immediate. In other words, to such extent as the actual -is primarily (§ 142) the simple merely immediate unity of Inward -and Outward, it is obviously made an unessential outward, and thus -at the same time (§ 140) it is merely inward, the abstraction of -reflection-into-self. Hence it is itself characterised as a merely -possible. When thus valued at the rate of a mere possibility, the -actual is a Contingent or Accidental, and, conversely, -possibility is mere Accident itself or Chance. - -146.] Possibility and Contingency are the two factors of -Actuality,--Inward and Outward, put as mere forms which constitute the -externality of the actual. They have their reflection-into-self on the -body of actual fact, or content, with its intrinsic definiteness which -gives the essential ground of their characterisation. The finitude of -the contingent and the possible lies, therefore, as we now see, in the -distinction of the form-determination from the content: and, therefore, -it depends on the content alone whether anything is contingent and -possible. - -As possibility is the mere _inside_ of actuality, it is for that -reason a mere _outside_ actuality, in other words, Contingency. The -contingent, roughly speaking, is what has the ground of its being -not in itself but in somewhat else. Such is the aspect under which -actuality first comes before consciousness, and which is often mistaken -for actuality itself. But the contingent is only one side of the -actual,--the side, namely, of reflection on somewhat else. It is the -actual, in the signification of something merely possible. Accordingly -we consider the contingent to be what may or may not be, what may be -in one way or in another, whose being or not-being, and whose being -on this wise or otherwise, depends not upon itself but on something -else. To overcome this contingency is, roughly speaking, the problem -of science on the one hand; as in the range of practice, on the other, -the end of action is to rise above the contingency of the will, or -above caprice. It has however often happened, most of all in modern -times, that contingency has been unwarrantably elevated, and had a -value attached to it, both in nature and the world of mind, to which -it has no just claim. Frequently Nature--to take it first,--has been -chiefly admired for the richness and variety of its structures. Apart, -however, from what disclosure it contains of the Idea, this richness -gratifies none of the higher interests of reason, and in its vast -variety of structures, organic and inorganic, affords us only the -spectacle of a contingency losing itself in vagueness. At any rate, -the chequered scene presented by the several varieties of animals and -plants, conditioned as it is by outward circumstances,--the complex -changes in the figuration and grouping of clouds, and the like, ought -not to be ranked higher than the equally casual fancies of the mind -which surrenders itself to its own caprices. The wonderment with which -such phenomena are welcomed is a most abstract frame of mind, from -which one should advance to a closer insight into the inner harmony and -uniformity of nature. - -Of contingency in respect of the Will it is especially important to -form a proper estimate. The Freedom of the Will is an expression that -often means mere free-choice, or the will in the form of contingency. -Freedom of choice, or the capacity of determining ourselves towards one -thing or another, is undoubtedly a vital element in the will (which in -its very notion is free); but instead of being freedom itself, it is -only in the first instance a freedom in form. The genuinely free will, -which includes free choice as suspended, is conscious to itself that -its content is intrinsically firm and fast, and knows it at the same -time to be thoroughly its own. A will, on the contrary, which remains -standing on the grade of option, even supposing it does decide in -favour of what is in import right and true, is always haunted by the -conceit that it might, if it had so pleased, have decided in favour of -the reverse course. When more narrowly examined, free choice is seen -to be a contradiction, to this extent that its form and content stand -in antithesis. The matter of choice is given, and known as a content -dependent not on the will itself,'but on outward circumstances. In -reference to such a given content, freedom lies only in the form of -choosing, which, as it is only a freedom in form, may consequently be -regarded as freedom only in supposition. On an ultimate analysis it -will be seen that the same outwardness of circumstances, on which is -founded the content that the will finds to its hand, can alone account -for the will giving its decision for the one and not the other of the -two alternatives. - -Although contingency, as it has thus been shown, is only one aspect in -the whole of actuality, and therefore not to be mistaken for actuality -itself, it has no less than the rest of the forms of the idea its due -office in the world of objects. This is, in the first place, seen in -Nature. On the surface of Nature, so to speak, Chance ranges unchecked, -and that contingency must simply be recognised, without the pretension -sometimes erroneously ascribed to philosophy, of seeking to find in it -a could-only-be-so-and-not-otherwise. Nor is contingency less visible -in the world of Mind. The will, as we have already remarked, includes -contingency under the shape of option or free-choice, but only as a -vanishing and abrogated element. In respect of Mind and its works, -just as in the case of Nature, we must guard against being so far -misled by a well-meant endeavour after rational knowledge, as to try -to exhibit the necessity of phenomena which are marked by a decided -contingency, or, as the phrase is, to construe them _a priori._ Thus -in language (although it be, as it were, the body of thought) Chance -still unquestionably plays a decided part; and the same is true of the -creations of law, of art, &c. The problem of science, and especially of -philosophy, undoubtedly consists in eliciting the necessity concealed -under the semblance of contingency. That however is far from meaning -that the contingent belongs to our subjective conception alone, and -must therefore be simply set aside, if we wish to get at the truth. -All scientific researches which pursue this tendency exclusively, -lay themselves fairly open to the charge of mere jugglery and an -over-strained precisianism. - -146.] When more closely examined, what the aforesaid outward side -of actuality implies is this. Contingency, which is actuality -in its immediacy, is the self-identical, essentially only as a -supposition which is no sooner made than it is revoked and leaves -an existent externality. In this way, the external contingency is -something pre-supposed, the immediate existence of which is at the -same time a possibility, and has the vocation to be suspended, to -be the possibility of something else. Now this possibility is the -Condition. - -The Contingent, as the immediate actuality, is at the same time -the possibility of somewhat else,--no longer however that abstract -possibility which we had at first, but the possibility which _is._ And -a possibility existent is a Condition. By the Condition of a thing -we mean first, an existence, in short an immediate, and secondly -the vocation of this immediate to be suspended and subserve the -actualising of something else.--Immediate actuality is in general -as such never what it ought to be; it is a finite actuality with an -inherent flaw, and its vocation is to be consumed. But the other -aspect of actuality is its essentiality. This is primarily the inside, -which as a mere possibility is no less destined to be suspended. -Possibility thus suspended is the issuing of a new actuality, of which -the first immediate actuality was the pre-supposition. Here we see -the alternation which is involved in the notion of a Condition. The -Conditions of a thing seem at first sight to involve no bias anyway. -Really however an immediate actuality of this kind includes in it -the germ of something else altogether. At first this something else -is only a possibility: but the form of possibility is soon suspended -and translated into actuality. This new actuality thus issuing is the -very inside of the immediate actuality which it uses up. Thus there -comes into being quite an other shape of things, and yet itis not an -other: for the first actuality is only put as what it in essence was. -The conditions which are sacrificed, which fall to the ground and are -spent, only unite with themselves in the other actuality. Such in -general is the nature of the process of actuality. The actual is no -mere case of immediate Being, but, as essential Being, a suspension of -its own immediacy, and thereby mediating itself with itself. - -147.] (γ) When this externality (of actuality) is thus developed into -a circle of the two categories of possibility and immediate actuality, -showing the intermediation of the one by the other, it is what is -called Real Possibility. Being such a circle, further, it -is the totality, and thus the content, the actual fact or affair in -its all-round definiteness. Whilst in like manner, if we look at the -distinction between the two characteristics in this unity, it realises -the concrete totality of the form, the immediate self-translation -of inner into outer, and of outer into inner. This self-movement of -the form is Activity, carrying into effect the fact or affair as a -_real_ ground which is self-suspended to actuality, and carrying into -effect the contingent actuality, the conditions; _i.e._ it is their -reflection-in-self, and their self-suspension to an other actuality, -the actuality of the actual fact. If all the conditions are at hand, -the fact (event) _must_ be actual; and the fact itself is one of the -conditions: for being in the first place only inner, it is at first -itself only pre-supposed. Developed actuality, as the coincident -alternation of inner and outer, the alternation of their opposite -motions combined into a single motion, is Necessity. - -Necessity has been defined, and rightly so, as the union of possibility -and actuality. This mode of expression, however, gives a superficial -and therefore unintelligible description of the very difficult notion -of necessity. It is difficult because it is the notion itself, only -that its stages or factors are still as actualities, which are yet at -the same time to be viewed as forms only, collapsing and transient. In -the two following paragraphs therefore an exposition of the factors -which constitute necessity must be given at greater length. - - * * * * * - -When anything is said to be necessary, the first question we ask is, -Why? Anything necessary accordingly comes before us as something due to -a supposition, the result of certain antecedents. If we go no further -than mere derivation from antecedents however, we have not gained a -complete notion of what necessity means. What is merely derivative, -is what it is, not through itself, but through something else; and in -this way it too is merely contingent. What is necessary, on the other -hand, we would have be what it is through itself; and thus, although -derivative, it must still contain the antecedent whence it is derived -as a vanishing element in itself. Hence we say of what is necessary, -'It is.' We thus hold it to be simple self-relation, in which all -dependence on something else is removed. - -Necessity is often said to be blind. If that means that in the process -of necessity the End or final cause is not explicitly and overtly -present, the statement is correct. The process of necessity begins -with the existence of scattered circumstances which appear to have no -inter-connexion and no concern one with another. These circumstances -are an immediate actuality which collapses, and out of this negation -a new actuality proceeds. Here we have a content which in point of -form is doubled, once as content of the final realised fact, and once -as content of the scattered circumstances which appear as if they -were positive, and make themselves at first felt in that character. -The latter content is in itself nought and is accordingly inverted -into its negative, thus becoming content of the realised fact. The -immediate circumstances fall to the ground as conditions, but are at -the same time retained as content of the ultimate reality. From such -circumstances and conditions there has, as we say, proceeded quite -another thing, and it is for that reason that we call this process of -necessity blind. If on the contrary we consider teleological action, we -have in the end of action a content which is already fore-known. This -activity therefore is not blind but seeing. To say that the world is -ruled by Providence implies that design, as what has been absolutely -pre-determined, is the active principle, so that the issue corresponds -to what has been fore-known and fore-willed. - -The theory however which regards the world as determined through -necessity and the belief in a divine providence are by no means -mutually excluding points of view. The intellectual principle -underlying the idea of divine providence will hereafter be shown to be -the notion. But the notion is the truth of necessity, which it contains -in suspension in itself; just as, conversely, necessity is the notion -implicit. Necessity is blind only so long as it is not understood. -There is nothing therefore more mistaken than the charge of blind -fatalism made against the Philosophy of History, when it takes for its -problem to understand the necessity of every event. The philosophy of -history rightly understood takes the rank of a Théodicée; and those, -who fancy they honour Divine Providence by excluding necessity from -it, are really degrading it by this exclusiveness to a blind and -irrational caprice. In the simple language of the religious mind which -speaks of God's eternal and immutable decrees, there is implied an -express recognition that necessity forms part of the essence of God. In -his difference from God, man, with his own private opinion and will, -follows the call of caprice and arbitrary humour, and thus often finds -his acts turn out something quite different from what he had meant and -willed. But God knows what He wills, is determined in His eternal will -neither by accident from within nor from without, and what He wills He -also accomplishes, irresistibly. - -Necessity gives a point of view which has important bearings upon our -sentiments and behaviour. When we look upon events as necessary, our -situation seems at first sight to lack freedom completely. In the -creed of the ancients, as we know, necessity figured as Destiny. The -modern point of view, on the contrary, is that of Consolation. And -Consolation means that, if we renounce our aims and interests, we do so -only in prospect of receiving compensation. Destiny, on the contrary, -leaves no room for Consolation. But a close examination of the ancient -feeling about destiny, will not by any means reveal a sense of bondage -to its power. Rather the reverse. This will clearly appear, if we -remember, that the sense of bondage springs from inability to surmount -the antithesis, and from looking at what _is,_ and what happens, as -contradictory to what _ought_ to be and happen. In the ancient mind the -feeling was more of the following kind: Because such a thing is, it -is, and as it is, so ought it to be. Here there is no contrast to be -seen, and therefore no sense of bondage, no pain, and no sorrow. True, -indeed, as already remarked, this attitude towards destiny is void of -consolation. But then, on the other hand, it is a frame of mind which -does not need consolation, so long as personal subjectivity has not -acquired its infinite significance. It is this point on which special -stress should be laid in comparing the ancient sentiment with that of -the modern and Christian world. - -By Subjectivity, however, we may understand, in the first place, only -the natural and finite subjectivity, with its contingent and arbitrary -content of private interests and inclinations,--all, in short, that -we call person as distinguished from thing: taking 'thing' in the -emphatic sense of the word (in which we use the (correct) expression -that it is a question of _things_ and not of _persons)._ In this sense -of sub-activity we cannot help admiring the tranquil resignation of -the ancients to destiny, and feeling that it is a much higher and -worthier mood than that of the moderns, who obstinately pursue their -subjective aims, and when they find themselves constrained to resign -the hope of reaching them, console themselves with the prospect of a -reward in some other shape. But the term subjectivity is not to be -confined merely to the bad and finite kind of it which is contrasted -with the thing (fact). In its truth subjectivity is immanent in the -fact, and as a subjectivity thus infinite is the very truth of the -fact. Thus regarded, the doctrine of consolation receives a newer and -a higher significance. It is in this sense that the Christian religion -is to be regarded as the religion of consolation, and even of absolute -consolation. Christianity, we know, teaches that God wishes all men -to be saved. That teaching declares that subjectivity has an infinite -value. And that consoling power of Christianity just lies in the fact -that God Himself is in it known as the absolute subjectivity, so that, -inasmuch as subjectivity involves the element of particularity, _our_ -particular personality too is recognised not merely as something to be -solely and simply nullified, but as at the same time something to be -preserved. The gods of the ancient world were also, it is true, looked -upon as personal; but the personality of a Zeus and an Apollo is not -a real personality: it is only a figure in the mind. In other words, -these gods are mere personifications, which, being such, do not know -themselves, and are only known. An evidence of this defect and this -powerlessness of the old gods is found even in the religious beliefs -of antiquity. In the ancient creeds not only men, but even gods, -were represented as subject to destiny (πεπρωμένον or εἱμαρμένη), a -destiny which we must conceive as necessity not unveiled, and thus as -something wholly impersonal, selfless, and blind. On the other hand, -the Christian God is God not known merely, but also self-knowing; He is -a personality not merely figured in our minds, but rather absolutely -actual. - -We must refer to the Philosophy of Religion for a further discussion of -the points here touched. But we may note in passing how important it -is for any man to meet everything that befalls him with the spirit of -the old proverb which describes each man as the architect of his own -fortune. That means that it is only himself after all of which a man -has the usufruct. The other way would be to lay the blame of whatever -we experience upon other men, upon unfavourable circumstances, and the -like. And this is a fresh example of the language of unfreedom, and at -the same time the spring of discontent. If man saw, on the contrary, -that whatever happens to him is only the outcome of himself, and that -he only bears his own guilt, he would stand free, and in everything -that came upon him would have the consciousness that he suffered no -wrong. A man who lives in dispeace with himself and his lot, commits -much that is perverse and amiss, for no other reason than because of -the false opinion that he is wronged by others. No doubt too there is a -great deal of chance in what befalls us. But the chance has its root in -the 'natural' man. So long however as a man is otherwise conscious that -he is free, his harmony of soul and peace of mind will not be destroyed -by the disagreeables that befall him. It is their view of necessity, -therefore, which is at the root of the content and discontent of men, -and which in that way determines their destiny itself. - -148.] Among the three elements in the process of necessity--the -Condition, the Fact, and the Activity-- - -a. The Condition is (α) what is pre-supposed or ante-stated, _e.g._ -it is not only supposed or stated, and so only a correlative to the -fact, but also prior, and so independent, a contingent and external -circumstance which exists without respect to the fact. While thus -contingent, however, this pre-supposed or ante-stated term, in respect -withal of the fact, which is the totality, is a complete circle of -conditions, (ß) The conditions are passive, are used as materials for -the fact, into the content of which they thus enter. They are likewise -intrinsically conformable to this content, and already contain its -whole characteristic. - -b. The Fact is also (α) something pre-supposed or ante-stated, _i.e._ -it is at first, and as supposed, only inner and possible, and also, -being prior, an independent content by itself, (ß) By using up the -conditions, it receives its external existence, the realisation of -the articles of its content, which reciprocally correspond to the -conditions, so that whilst it presents itself out of these as the fact, -it also proceeds from them. - -c. The Activity similarly has (α) an independent existence of its own -(as a man, a character), and at the same time it is possible only -where the conditions are and the fact, (ß) It is the movement which -translates the conditions into fact, and the latter into the former as -the side of existence, or rather the movement which educes the fact -from the conditions in which it is potentially present, and which gives -existence to the fact by abolishing the existence possessed by the -conditions. - -In so far as these three elements stand to each other in the shape -of independent existences, this process has the aspect of an outward -necessity. Outward necessity has a limited content for its fact. For -the fact is this whole, in phase of singleness. But since in its form -this whole is external to itself, it is self-externalised even in its -own self and in its content, and this externality, attaching to the -fact, is a limit of its content. - -149.] Necessity, then, is potentially the one essence, self-same but -now full of content, in the reflected light of which its distinctions -take the form of independent realities. This self-sameness is at the -same time, as absolute form, the activity which reduces into dependency -and mediates into immediacy.--Whatever is necessary is through an -other, which is broken up into the mediating ground (the Fact and -the Activity) and an immediate actuality or accidental circumstance, -which is at the same time a Condition. The necessary, being through -an other, is not in and for itself: hypothetical, it is a mere result -of assumption. But this intermediation is just as immediately however -the abrogation of itself. The ground and contingent condition is -translated into immediacy, by which that dependency is now lifted up -into actuality, and the fact has closed with itself. In this return -to itself the necessary simply and positively _is,_ as unconditioned -actuality. The necessary is so, mediated through a circle of -circumstances: it is so, because the circumstances are so, and at the -same time it is so, unmediated: it is so, because it is. - -(a) _Relationship of Substantiality._ - -150.] The necessary is in itself an absolute correlation of elements, -_i.e._ the process developed (in the preceding paragraphs), in which -the correlation also suspends itself to absolute identity. - -In its immediate form it is the relationship of Substance and Accident. -The absolute self-identity of this relationship is Substance as such, -which as necessity gives the negative to this form of inwardness, and -thus invests itself with actuality, but which also gives the negative -to this outward thing. In this negativity, the actual, as immediate, -is only an accidental which through this bare possibility passes over -into another actuality. This transition is the identity of substance, -regarded as form-activity (§§ 148, 149). - -151.] Substance is accordingly the totality of the Accidents, -revealing itself in them as their absolute negativity, (that is to -say, as absolute power,) and at the same time as the wealth of all -content. This content however is nothing but that very revelation, -since the character (being reflected in itself to make content) is -only a passing stage of the form which passes away in the power of -substance. Substantiality is the absolute form-activity and the power -of necessity: all content is but a vanishing element which merely -belongs to this process, where there is an absolute revulsion of form -and content into one another. - - * * * * * - -In the history of philosophy we meet with Substance as the principle -of Spinoza's system. On the import and value of that much-praised and -no less decried philosophy there has been great misunderstanding and -a deal of talking since the days of Spinoza. The atheism and, as a -further charge, the pantheism of the system has formed the commonest -ground of accusation. These cries arise because of Spinoza's conception -of God as substance, and substance only. What we are to think of this -charge follows, in the first instance, from the place which substance -takes in the system of the logical idea. Though an essential stage in -the evolution of the idea, substance is not the same with absolute -Idea, but the idea under the still limited form of necessity. It is -true that God is necessity, or, as we may also put it, that He is the -absolute Thing: He is however no less the absolute Person. That He is -the absolute Person however is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza -never reached: and on that side it falls short of the true notion of -God which forms the content of religious consciousness in Christianity. -Spinoza was by descent a Jew; and it is upon the whole the Oriental way -of seeing things, according to which the nature of the finite world -seems frail and transient, that has found its intellectual expression -in his system. This Oriental view of the unity of substance certainly -gives the basis for all real further development. Still it is not the -final idea. It is marked by the absence of the principle of the Western -World, the principle of individuality, which first appeared under a -philosophic shape, contemporaneously with Spinoza, in the Monadology of -Leibnitz. - -From this point we glance back to the alleged atheism of Spinoza. The -charge will be seen to be unfounded if we remember that his system, -instead of denying God, rather recognises that He alone really is. -Nor can it be maintained that the God of Spinoza, although he is -described as alone true, is not the true God, and therefore as good as -no God. If that were a just charge, it would only prove that all other -systems, where speculation has not gone beyond a subordinate stage -of the idea,--that the Jews and Mohammedans who know God only as the -Lord,--and that even the many Christians for whom God is merely the -most high, unknowable, and transcendent being, are as much atheists as -Spinoza. The so-called atheism of Spinoza is merely an exaggeration of -the fact that he defrauds the principle of difference or finitude of -its due. Hence his system, as it holds that there is properly speaking -no world, at any rate that the world has no positive being, should -rather be styled Acosmism, These considerations will also show what is -to be said of the charge of Pantheism. If Pantheism means, as it often -does, the doctrine which takes finite things in their finitude and in -the complex of them to be God, we must acquit the system of Spinoza of -the crime of Pantheism. For in that system, finite things and the world -as a whole are denied all truth. On the other hand, the philosophy -which is Acosmism is for that reason certainly pantheistic. - -The shortcoming thus acknowledged to attach to the content turns out -at the same time to be a shortcoming in respect of form. Spinoza puts -substance at the head of his system, and defines it to be the unity -of thought and extension, without demonstrating how he gets to this -distinction, or how he traces it back to the unity of substance. The -further treatment of the subject proceeds in what is called the -mathematical method. Definitions and axioms are first laid down: after -them comes a series of theorems, which are proved by an analytical -reduction of them to these unproved postulates. Although the system -of Spinoza, and that even by those who altogether reject its contents -and results, is praised for the strict sequence of its method, such -unqualified praise of the form is as little justified as an unqualified -rejection of the content. The defect of the content is that the form -is not known as immanent in it, and therefore only approaches it as an -outer and subjective form. As intuitively accepted by Spinoza without a -previous mediation by dialectic, Substance, as the universal negative -power, is as it were a dark shapeless abyss which engulfs all definite -content as radically null, and produces from itself nothing that has a -positive subsistence of its own. - -152.] At the stage, where substance, as absolute power, is the -self-relating power (itself a merely inner possibility) which thus -determines itself to accidentality,--from which power the externality -it thereby creates is distinguished--necessity is a correlation -strictly so called, just as in the first form of necessity, it is -substance. This is the correlation of Causality. - -(b) _Relationship of Causality._ - -153.] Substance is Cause, in so far as substance reflects into -self as against its passage into accidentality and so stands as the -_primary_ fact, but again no less suspends this reflection-into-self -(its bare possibility), lays itself down as the negative of itself, and -thus produces an Effect, an actuality, which, though so far only -assumed as a sequence, is through the process that effectuates it at -the same time necessary. - -As primary fact, the cause is qualified as having absolute independence -and a subsistence maintained in face of the effect: but in the -necessity, whose identity constitutes that primariness itself, it -is wholly passed into the effect. So far again as we can speak of a -definite content, there is no content in the effect that is not in -the cause. That identity in fact is the absolute content itself: but -it is no less also the form-characteristic. The primariness of the -cause is suspended in the effect in which the cause makes itself a -dependent being. The cause however does not for that reason vanish and -leave the effect to be alone actual. For this dependency is in like -manner directly suspended, and is rather the reflection of the cause -in itself, its primariness: in short, it is in the effect that the -cause first becomes actual and a cause. The cause consequently is in -its full truth _causa sui._--Jacobi, sticking to the partial conception -of mediation (in his Letters on Spinoza, second edit. p. 416), has -treated the _causa sui_ (and the _effectus sui_ is the same), which is -the absolute truth of the cause, as a mere formalism. He has also made -the remark that God ought to be defined not as the ground of things, -but essentially as cause. A more thorough consideration of the nature -of cause would have shown that Jacobi did not by this means gain what -he intended. Even in the finite cause and its conception we can see -this identity between cause and effect in point of content. The rain -(the cause) and the wet (the effect) are the self-same existing water. -In point of form the cause (rain) is dissipated or lost in the effect -(wet): but in that case the result can no longer be described as -effect; for without the cause it is nothing, and we should have only -the unrelated wet left. - -In the common acceptation of the causal relation the cause is finite, -to such extent as its content is so (as is also the case with finite -substance), and so far as cause and effect are conceived as two several -independent existences; which they are, however, only when we leave -the causal relation out of sight. In the finite sphere we never get -over the difference of the form-characteristics in their relation: and -hence we turn the matter round and define the cause also as something -dependent or as an effect. This again has another cause, and thus there -grows up a progress from effects to causes _ad infinitum._ There is a -descending progress too: the effect, looked at in its identity with the -cause, is itself defined as a cause, and at the same time as another -cause, which again has other effects, and so on for ever. - -The way understanding bristles up against the idea of substance is -equalled by its readiness to use the relation of cause and effect. -Whenever it is proposed to view any sum of fact as necessary, it -is especially the relation of causality to which the reflective -understanding makes a point of tracing it back. Now, although this -relation does undoubtedly belong to necessity, it forms only one aspect -in the process of that category. That process equally requires the -suspension of the mediation involved in causality and the exhibition -of it as simple self-relation. If we stick to causality as such, we -have it not in its truth. Such a causality is merely finite, and its -finitude lies in retaining the distinction between cause and effect -unassimilated. But these two terms, if they are distinct, are also -identical. Even in ordinary consciousness that identity may be found. -We say that a cause is a cause, only when it has an effect, and _vice -versâ._ Both cause and effect are thus one and the same content: and -the distinction between them is primarily only that the one lays down, -and the other is laid down. This formal difference however again -suspends itself, because the cause is not only a cause of something -else, but also a cause of itself; while the effect is not only an -effect of something else, but also an effect of itself. The finitude -of things consists accordingly in this. While cause and effect are in -their notion identical, the two forms present themselves severed so -that, though the cause is also an effect, and the effect also a cause, -the cause is not an effect in the same connexion as it is a cause, nor -the effect a cause in the same connexion as it is an effect. This -again gives the infinite progress, in the shape of an endless series -of causes, which shows itself at the same time as an endless series of -effects. - -154.] The effect is different from the cause. The former as such has -a being dependent on the latter. But such a dependence is likewise -reflection-into-self and immediacy: and the action of the cause, as it -constitutes the effect, is at the same time the pre-constitution of -the effect, so long as effect is kept separate from cause. There is -thus already in existence another substance on which the effect takes -place. As immediate, this substance is not a self-related negativity -and _active,_ but _passive._ Yet it is a substance, and it is therefore -active also: it therefore suspends the immediacy it was originally put -forward with, and the effect which was put into it: it reacts, _e.g._ -suspends the activity of the first substance. But this first substance -also in the same way sets aside its own immediacy, or the effect which -is put into it; it thus suspends the activity of the other substance -and reacts. In this manner causality passes into the relation of -Action and Reaction, or Reciprocity. - -In Reciprocity, although causality is not yet invested with its true -characteristic, the rectilinear movement out from causes to effects, -and from effects to causes, is bent round and back into itself, and -thus the progress _ad infinitum_ of causes and effects is, as a -progress, really and truly suspended. This bend, which transforms, the -infinite progression into a self-contained relationship, is here as -always the plain reflection that in the above meaningless repetition -there is only one and the same thing, viz. one cause and another, and -their connexion with one another. Reciprocity--which is the development -of this relation-itself however only distinguishes turn and turn -about (--not causes, but) factors of causation, in each of which--just -because they are inseparable (on the principle of the identity that the -cause is cause in the effect, and _vice versâ_)--the other factor is -also equally supposed. - -(c) _Reciprocity or Action and Reaction._ - -155.] The characteristics which in Reciprocal Action are retained as -distinct are (α) potentially the same. The one side is a cause, is -primary, active, passive, &c, just as the other is. Similarly the -pre-supposition of another side and the action upon it, the immediate -primariness and the dependence produced by the alternation, are one and -the same on both sides. The cause assumed to be first is on account -of its immediacy passive, a dependent being, and an effect. The -distinction of the causes spoken of as two is accordingly void: and -properly speaking there is only one cause, which, while it suspends -itself (as substance) in its effect, also rises in this operation only -to independent existence as a cause. - -156.] But this unity of the double cause is also (β) actual. All this -alternation is properly the cause in act of constituting itself and in -such constitution lies its being. The nullity of the distinctions is -not only potential, or a reflection of ours (§ 155). Reciprocal action -just means that each characteristic we impose is also to be suspended -and inverted into its opposite, and that in this way the essential -nullity of the 'moments' is explicitly stated. An effect is introduced -into the primariness; in other words, the primariness is abolished: the -action of a cause becomes reaction, and so on. - -Reciprocal action realises the causal relation in its complete -development. It is this relation, therefore, in which reflection -usually takes shelter when the conviction grows that things can no -longer be studied satisfactorily from a causal point of view, on -account of the infinite progress already spoken of. Thus in historical -research the question may be raised in a first form, whether the -character and manners of a nation are the cause of its constitution and -its laws, or if they are not rather the effect. Then, as the second -step, the character and manners on one side and the constitution and -laws on the other are conceived on the principle of reciprocity: and -in that case the cause in the same connexion as it is a cause will at -the same time be an effect, and _vice versâ._ The same thing is done -in the study of Nature, and especially of living organisms. There -the several organs and functions are similarly seen to stand to each -other in the relation of reciprocity. Reciprocity is undoubtedly the -proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so -to say, on the threshold of the notion; but on that very ground, -supposing that our aim is a thoroughly comprehensive idea, we should -not rest content with applying this relation. If we get no further than -studying a given content under the point of view of reciprocity, we are -taking up an attitude which leaves matters utterly incomprehensible. -We are left with a mere dry fact; and the call for mediation, which -is the chief motive in applying the relation of causality, is still -unanswered. And it we look more narrowly into the dissatisfaction -felt in applying the relation of reciprocity, we shall see that it -consists in the circumstance, that this relation, instead of being -treated as an equivalent for the notion, ought, first of all, to be -known and understood in its own nature. And to understand the relation -of action and reaction we must not let the two sides rest in their -state of mere given facts, but recognise them, as has been shown in -the two paragraphs preceding, for factors of a third and higher, which -is the notion and nothing else. To make, for example, the manners of -the Spartans the cause of their constitution and their constitution -conversely the cause of their manners, may no doubt be in a way -correct. But, as we have comprehended neither the manners nor the -constitution of the nation, the result of such reflections can never -be final or satisfactory. The satisfactory point will be reached only -when these two, as well as all other, special aspects of Spartan life -and Spartan history are seen to be founded in this notion. - -157.] This pure self-reciprocation is therefore Necessity unveiled -or realised. The link of necessity _quâ_ necessity is identity, as -still inward and concealed, because it is the identity of what are -esteemed actual things, although their very self-subsistence is bound -to be necessity. The circulation of substance through causality -and reciprocity therefore only expressly makes out or states that -self-subsistence is the infinite negative self-relation--a relation -_negative,_ in general, for in it the act of distinguishing and -intermediating becomes a primariness of actual things independent -one against the other,--and _infinite self-relation,_ because their -independence only lies in their identity. - -158.] This truth of necessity, therefore, is _Freedom:_ and the -truth of substance is the Notion,--an independence which, though -self-repulsive into distinct independent elements, yet in that -repulsion is self-identical, and in the movement of reciprocity still -at home and conversant only with itself. - - * * * * * - -Necessity is often called hard, and rightly so, if we keep only to -necessity as such, _i.e._ to its immediate shape. Here we have, -first of all, some state or, generally speaking, fact, possessing an -independent subsistence: and necessity primarily implies that there -falls upon such a fact something else by which it is brought low. -This is what is hard and sad in necessity immediate or abstract. The -identity of the two things, which necessity presents as bound to each -other and thus bereft of their independence, is at first only inward, -and therefore has no existence for those under the yoke of necessity. -Freedom too from this point of view is only abstract, and is preserved -only by renouncing all that we immediately are and have. But, as we -have seen already, the process of necessity is so directed that it -overcomes the rigid externality which it first had and reveals its -inward nature. It then appears that the members, linked to one another, -are not really foreign to each other, but only elements of one whole, -each of them, in its connexion with the other, being, as it were, at -home, and combining with itself. In this way necessity is transfigured -into freedom,--not the freedom that consists in abstract negation, -but freedom concrete and positive. From which we may learn what a -mistake it is to regard freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive. -Necessity indeed _quâ_ necessity is far from being freedom: yet -freedom pre-supposes necessity, and contains it as an unsubstantial -element in itself. A good man is aware that the tenor of his conduct -is essentially obligatory and necessary. But this consciousness is -so far from making any abatement from his freedom, that without it -real and reasonable freedom could not be distinguished from arbitrary -choice,--a freedom which has no reality and is merely potential. A -criminal, when punished, may look upon his punishment as a restriction -of his freedom. Really the punishment is not foreign constraint to -which he is subjected, but the manifestation of his own act: and if he -recognises this, he comports himself as a free man. In short, man is -most independent when he knows himself to be determined by the absolute -idea throughout. It was this phase of mind and conduct which Spinoza -called _Amor intellectualis Dei._ - -159.] Thus the Notion is the truth of Being and Essence, inasmuch as -the shining or show of self-reflection is itself at the same time -independent immediacy, and this being of a different actuality is -immediately only a shining or show on itself. - -The Notion has exhibited itself as the truth of Being and Essence, as -the ground to which the regress of both leads. Conversely it has been -developed out of being as its ground. The former aspect of the advance -may be regarded as a concentration of being into its depth, thereby -disclosing its inner nature: the latter aspect as an issuing of the -more perfect from the less perfect. When such development is viewed on -the latter side only, it does prejudice to the method of philosophy. -The special meaning which these superficial thoughts of more imperfect -and more perfect have in this place is to indicate the distinction of -being, as an immediate unity with itself, from the notion, as free -mediation with itself. Since being has shown that it is an element in -the notion, the latter has thus exhibited itself as the truth of being. -As this its reflection in itself and as an absorption of the mediation, -the notion is the pre-supposition of the immediate--a pre-supposition -which is identical with the return to self; and in this identity lie -freedom and the notion. If the partial element therefore be called the -imperfect, then the notion, or the perfect, is certainly a development -from the imperfect; since its very nature is thus to suspend its -pre-supposition. At the same time it is the notion alone which, in the -act of supposing itself, makes its pre-supposition; as has been made -apparent in causality in general and especially in reciprocal action. - -Thus in reference to Being and Essence the Notion is defined as Essence -reverted to the simple immediacy of Being,--the shining or show of -Essence thereby having actuality, and its actuality being at the same -time a free shining or show in itself. In this manner the notion has -being as its simple self-relation, or as the immediacy of its immanent -unity. Being is so poor a category that it is the least thing which can -be shown to be found in the notion. - -The passage from necessity to freedom, or from actuality into the -notion, is the very hardest, because it proposes that independent -actuality shall be thought as having all its substantiality in the -passing over and identity with the other independent actuality. The -notion, too, is extremely hard, because it is itself just this very -identity. But the actual substance as such, the cause, which in its -exclusiveness resists all invasion, is _ipso facto_ subjected to -necessity or the destiny of passing into dependency: and it is this -subjection rather where the chief hardness lies. To think necessity, on -the contrary, rather tends to melt that hardness. For thinking means -that, in the other, one meets with one's self.--It means a liberation, -which is not the flight of abstraction, but consists in that which is -actual having itself not as something else, but as its own being and -creation, in the other actuality with which it is bound up by the force -of necessity. As existing in an individual form, this liberation is -called I: as developed to its totality, it is free Spirit; as feeling, -it is Love; and as enjoyment, it is Blessedness.--The great vision -of substance in Spinoza is only a potential liberation from finite -exclusiveness and egoism: but the notion itself realises for its own -both the power of necessity and actual freedom. - - * * * * * - -When, as now, the notion is called the truth of Being and Essence, -we must expect to be asked, why we do not begin with the notion? The -answer is that, where knowledge by thought is our aim, we cannot begin -with the truth, because the truth, when it forms the beginning, must -rest on mere assertion. The truth when it is thought must as such -verify itself to thought. If the notion were put at the head of Logic, -and defined, quite correctly in point of content, as the unity of -Being and Essence, the following question would come up: What are we -to think under the terms 'Being' and 'Essence,' and how do they come -to be embraced in the unity of the Notion? But if we answered these -questions, then our beginning with the notion would be merely nominal. -The real start would be made with Being, as we have here done: with -this difference, that the characteristics of Being as well as those -of Essence would have to be accepted uncritically from figurate -conception, whereas we have observed Being and Essence in their own -dialectical development and learnt how they lose themselves in the -unity of the notion. - - -[1] Compare Goethe's indignant outcry--'To Natural Science,' vol. i. -pt. 3: - - Das hör' ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen, - Und fluche drauf, aber verstohlen,-- - Natur hat weder Kern noch Schaale, - Alles ist sie mit einem Male. - - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - - -THIRD SUB-DIVISION OF LOGIC. - - -THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION. - - -160.] The Notion is the principle of freedom, the power of -substance self-realised. It is a systematic whole, in which each of its -constituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put -as indissolubly one with it. Thus in its self-identity it has original -and complete determinateness. - -The position taken up by the notion is that of absolute idealism. -Philosophy is a knowledge through notions because it sees that what -on other grades of consciousness is taken to have Being, and to be -naturally or immediately independent, is but a constituent stage in the -Idea. In the logic of understanding, the notion is generally reckoned -a mere form of thought, and treated as a general conception. It is to -this inferior view of the notion that the assertion refers, so often -urged on behalf of the heart and sentiment, that notions as such are -something dead, empty, and abstract. The case is really quite the -reverse. The notion is, on the contrary, the principle of all life, and -thus possesses at the same time a character of thorough concreteness. -That it is so follows from the whole logical movement up to this point, -and need not be here proved. The contrast between form and content, -which is thus used to criticise the notion when it is alleged to be -merely formal, has, like all the other contrasts upheld by reflection, -been already left behind and overcome dialectically or through itself. -The notion, in short, is what contains all the earlier categories of -thought merged in it. It certainly is a form, but an infinite and -creative form, which includes, but at the same time releases from -itself, the fulness of all content. And so too the notion may, if it -be wished, be styled abstract, if the name concrete is restricted to -the concrete facts of sense or of immediate perception. For the notion -is not palpable to the touch, and when we are engaged with it, hearing -and seeing must quite fail us. And yet, as it was before remarked, the -notion is a true concrete; for the reason that it involves Being and -Essence, and the total wealth of these two spheres with them, merged in -the unity of thought. - -If, as was said at an earlier point, the different stages of the -logical idea are to be treated as a series of definitions of the -Absolute, the definition which now results for us is that the Absolute -is the Notion. That necessitates a higher estimate of the notion, -however, than is found in formal conceptualist Logic, where the notion -is a mere form of our subjective thought, with no original content of -its own. But if Speculative Logic thus attaches a meaning to the term -notion so very different from that usually given, it may be asked why -the same word should be employed in two contrary acceptations, and an -occasion thus given for confusion and misconception. The answer is -that, great as the interval is between the speculative notion and the -notion of Formal Logic, a closer examination shows that the deeper -meaning is not so foreign to the general usages of language as it -seems at first sight. We speak of the deduction of a content from the -notion, _e.g._ of the specific provisions of the law of property from -the notion of property; and so again we speak of tracing back these -material details to the notion. We thus recognise that the notion is no -mere form without a content of its own: for if it were, there would be -in the one case nothing to deduce from such a form, and in the other -case to trace a given body of fact back to the empty form of the notion -would only rob the fact of its specific character, without making it -understood. - -161.] The onward movement of the notion is no longer either -a transition into, or a reflection on something else, but -Development. For in the notion, the elements distinguished are -without more ado at the same time declared to be identical with one -another and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a -free being of the whole notion. - - * * * * * - -Transition into something else is the dialectical process within the -range of Being: reflection (bringing something else into light), in -the range of Essence. The movement of the Notion is _development_: by -which that only is explicit which is already implicitly present. In -the world of nature it is organic life that corresponds to the grade -of the notion. Thus _e.g._ the plant is developed from its germ. The -germ virtually involves the whole plant, but does so only ideally or in -thought: and it would therefore be a mistake to regard the development -of the root, stem, leaves, and other different parts of the plant, as -meaning that they were _realiter_ present, but in a very minute form, -in the germ. That is the so-called 'box-within-box' hypothesis; a -theory which commits the mistake of supposing an actual existence of -what is at first found only as a postulate of the completed thought. -The truth of the hypothesis on the other hand lies in its perceiving -that in the process of development the notion keeps to itself and -only gives rise to alteration of form, without making any addition in -point of content. It is this nature of the notion--this manifestation -of itself in its process as a development of its own self,--which is -chiefly in view with those who speak of innate ideas, or who, like -Plato, describe all learning merely as reminiscence. Of course that -again does not mean that everything which is embodied in a mind, after -that mind has been formed by instruction, had been present in that mind -beforehand, in its definitely expanded shape. - -The movement of the notion is as it were to be looked upon merely as -play: the other which it sets up is in reality not an other. Or, as -it is expressed in the teaching of Christianity: not merely has God -created a world which confronts Him as an other; He has also from all -eternity begotten a Son in whom He, a Spirit, is at home with Himself. - -162.] The doctrine of the notion is divided into three parts. (1) The -first is the doctrine of the Subjective or Formal Notion. -(2) The second is the doctrine of the notion invested with the -character of immediacy, or of Objectivity. (3) The third is the -doctrine of the Idea, the subject-object, the unity of notion -and objectivity, the absolute truth. - -The Common Logic covers only the matters which come before us here -as a portion of the third part of the whole system, together with -the so-called Laws of Thought, which we have already met; and in the -Applied Logic it adds a little about cognition. This is combined with -psychological, metaphysical, and all sorts of empirical materials, -which were introduced because, when all was done, those forms of -thought could not be made to do all that was required of them. But -with these additions the science lost its unity of aim. Then there was -a further circumstance against the Common Logic. Those forms, which -at least do belong to the proper domain of Logic, are supposed to be -categories of conscious thought only, of thought too in the character -of understanding, not of reason. - -The preceding logical categories, those viz. of Being and Essence, are, -it is true, no mere logical modes or entities: they are proved to be -notions in their transition or their dialectical element, and in their -return into themselves and totality. But they are only in a modified -form notions (cp. §§ 84 and 112), notions rudimentary, or, what is -the same thing, notions for us. The antithetical term into which each -category passes, or in which it shines, so producing correlation, is -not characterised as a particular. The third, in which they return -to unity, is not characterised as a subject or an individual: nor is -there any explicit statement that the category: is identical in its -antithesis,--in other words, its freedom is not expressly stated: and -all this because the category is not universality.--What generally -passes current under the name of a notion is a mode of understanding, -or, even, a mere general representation, and therefore, in short, a -finite mode of thought (cp. § 62). - -The Logic of the Notion is usually treated as a science of form only, -and understood to deal with the form of notion, judgment, and syllogism -as form, without in the least touching the question whether anything -is true. The answer to that question is supposed to depend on the -content only. If the logical forms of the notion were really dead and -inert receptacles of conceptions and thoughts, careless of what they -contained, knowledge about them would be an idle curiosity which the -truth might dispense with. On the contrary they really are, as forms -of the notion, the vital spirit of the actual world. That only is -true of the actual which is true in virtue of these forms, through -them and in them. As yet, however, the truth of these forms has never -been considered or examined on their own account any more than their -necessary interconnexion. - - -A.--THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION. - -(a) _The Notion as Notion._ - -163.] The Notion as Notion contains the three following 'moments' or -functional parts. (1) The first is _Universality_--meaning that it -is in free equality with itself in its specific character. (2) The -second is Particularity--that is, the specific character, in -which the universal continues serenely equal to itself. (3) The third -is Individuality--meaning the reflection-into-self of the -specific characters of universality and particularity;--which negative -self-unity has complete and original determinateness, without any loss -to its self-identity or universality. - -Individual and actual are the same thing: only the former has issued -from the notion, and is thus, as a universal, stated expressly as a -negative identity with itself. The actual, because it is at first no -more than a potential or immediate unity of essence and existence, -_may_ possibly have effect: but the individuality of the notion is -the very source of effectiveness, effective moreover no longer as the -cause is, with a show of effecting something else, but effective of -itself.--Individuality, however, is not to be understood to mean the -immediate or natural individual, as when we speak of individual things -or individual men: for that special phase of individuality does not -appear till we come to the judgment. Every function and 'moment' of -the notion is itself the whole notion (§ 160); but the individual or -subject is the notion expressly put as a totality. - -(1) The notion is generally associated in our minds with abstract -generality, and on that account it is often described as a general -conception. We speak, accordingly, of the notions of colour, plant, -animal, &c. They are supposed to be arrived at by neglecting the -particular features which distinguish the different colours, plants, -and animals from each other, and by retaining those common to them all. -This is the aspect of the notion which is familiar to understanding; -and feeling is in the right when it stigmatises such hollow and empty -notions as mere phantoms and shadows. But the universal of the notion -is not a mere sum of features common to several things, confronted -by a particular which enjoys an existence of its own. It is, on the -contrary, self-particularising or self-specifying, and with undimmed -clearness finds itself at home in its antithesis. For the sake both of -cognition and of our practical conduct, it is of the utmost importance -that the real universal should not be confused with what is merely held -in common. All those charges which the devotees of feeling make against -thought, and especially against philosophic thought, and the reiterated -statement that it is dangerous to carry thought to what they call too -great lengths, originate in the confusion of these two things. - -The universal in its true and comprehensive meaning is a thought -which, as we know, cost thousands of years to make it enter into the -consciousness of men. The thought did not gain its full recognition -till the days of Christianity. The Greeks, in other respects so -advanced, knew neither God nor even man in their true universality. -The gods of the Greeks were only particular powers of the mind; and -the universal God, the God of all nations, was to the Athenians still -a God concealed. They believed in the same way that an absolute gulf -separated themselves from the barbarians. Man as man was not then -recognised to be of infinite worth and to have infinite rights. -The question has been asked, why slavery has vanished from modern -Europe. One special circumstance after another has been adduced in -explanation of this phenomenon. But the real ground why there are -no more slaves in Christian Europe is only to be found in the very -principle of Christianity itself, the religion of absolute freedom. -Only in Christendom is man respected as man, in his infinitude and -universality. What the slave is without, is the recognition that he is -a person: and the principle of personality is universality. The master -looks upon his slave not as a person, but as a selfless thing. The -slave is not himself reckoned an 'I';--his 'I' is his master. - -The distinction referred to above between what is merely in common, and -what is truly universal, is strikingly expressed by Rousseau in his -famous 'Contrat Social,' when he says that the laws of a state must -spring from the universal will (_volonté générale,_) but need not on -that account be the will of all (_volonté de tous._) Rousseau would -have made a sounder contribution towards a theory of the state, if he -had always keep this distinction in sight. The general will is the -notion of the will: and the laws are the special clauses of this will -and based upon the notion of it. - -(2) We add a remark upon the account of the origin and formation of -notions which is usually given in the Logic of Understanding. It is -not _we_ who frame the notions. The notion is not something which -is originated at all. No doubt the notion is not mere Being, or the -immediate: it involves mediation, but the mediation lies in itself. In -other words, the notion is what is mediated through itself and with -itself. It is a mistake to imagine that the objects which form the -content of our mental ideas come first and that our subjective agency -then supervenes, and by the aforesaid operation of abstraction, and -by colligating the points possessed in common by the objects, frames -notions of them. Rather the notion is the genuine first; and things -are what they are through the action of the notion, immanent in them, -and revealing itself in them. In religious language we express this -by saying that God created the world out of nothing. In other words, -the world and finite things have issued from the fulness of the divine -thoughts and the divine decrees. Thus religion recognises thought and -(more exactly) the notion to be the infinite form, or the free creative -activity, which can realise itself without the help of a matter that -exists outside it. - -164.] The notion is concrete out and out: because the negative -unity with itself, as characterisation pure and entire, which is -individuality, is just what constitutes its self-relation, its -universality. The functions or 'moments' of the notion are to this -extent indissoluble. The categories of 'reflection' are expected to be -severally apprehended and separately accepted as current, apart from -their opposites. But in the notion, where their identity is expressly -assumed, each of its functions can be immediately apprehended only from -and with the rest. - -Universality, particularity, and individuality are, taken in the -abstract, the same as identity, difference, and ground. But the -universal is the self-identical, with the express qualification, -that it simultaneously contains the particular and the individual. -Again, the particular is the different or the specific character, but -with the qualification that it is in itself universal and is as an -individual. Similarly the individual must be understood to be a subject -or substratum, which involves the genus and species in itself and -possesses a substantial existence. Such is the explicit or realised -inseparability of the functions of the notion in their difference (§ -160)--what may be called the clearness of the notion, in which each -distinction causes no dimness or interruption, but is quite as much -transparent. - -No complaint is oftener made against the notion than that it is -_abstract._ Of course it is abstract, if abstract means that the medium -in which the notion exists is thought in general and not the sensible -thing in its empirical concreteness. It is abstract also, because the -notion falls short of the idea. To this extent the subjective notion -is still formal. This however does not mean that it ought to have -or receive another content than its own. It is itself the absolute -form, and so is all specific character, but as that character is in -its truth. Although it be abstract therefore, it is the concrete, -concrete altogether, the subject as such. The absolutely concrete is -the mind (see end of § 159)--the notion when it _exists_ as notion -distinguishing itself from its objectivity, which notwithstanding the -distinction still continues to be its own. Everything else which is -concrete, however rich it be, is not so intensely identical with itself -and therefore not so concrete on its own part,--least of all what is -commonly supposed to be concrete, but is only a congeries held together -by external influence.--What are called notions, and in fact specific -notions, such as man, house, animal, &c, are simply denotations -and abstract representations. These abstractions retain out of all -the functions of the notion only that of universality; they leave -particularity and individuality out of account and have no development -in these directions. By so doing they just miss the notion. - -165.] It is the element of Individuality which first explicitly -differentiates the elements of the notion. Individuality is the -negative reflection of the notion into itself, and it is in that way at -first the free differentiating of it as the first negation, by which -the specific character of the notion is realised, but under the form -of particularity. That is to say, the different elements are in the -first place only qualified as the several elements of the notion, and, -secondly, their identity is no less explicitly stated, the one being -said to be the other. This realised particularity of the notion is the -Judgment. - -The ordinary classification of notions, as _clear, distinct_ and -_adequate,_ is no part of the notion; it belongs to psychology. -Notions, in fact, are here synonymous with mental representations; -a _clear_ notion is an abstract simple representation: a _distinct_ -notion is one where, in addition to the simplicity, there is one 'mark' -or character emphasised as a sign for subjective cognition. There is -no more striking mark of the formalism and decay of Logic than the -favourite category of the 'mark.' The _adequate_ notion comes nearer -the notion proper, or even the Idea: but after all it expresses only -the formal circumstance that a notion or representation agrees with its -object, that is, with an external thing.--The division into what are -called _subordinate_ and _co-ordinate_ notions implies a mechanical -distinction of universal from particular which allows only a mere -correlation of them in external comparison. Again, an enumeration -of such kinds as _contrary_ and _contradictory, affirmative_ and -_negative_ notions, &c, is only a chance-directed gleaning of logical -forms which properly belong to the sphere of Being or Essence, (where -they have been already examined,) and which have nothing to do with -the specific notional character as such. The true distinctions in the -notion, universal, particular, and individual, may be said also to -constitute species of it, but only when they are kept severed from -each other by external reflection. The immanent differentiating and -specifying of the notion come to sight in the judgment: for to judge is -to specify the notion. - -(b) _The Judgment._ - -166.] The Judgment is the notion in its particularity, as a -connexion which is also a distinguishing of its functions, which are -put as independent and yet as identical with themselves, not with one -another. - -One's first impression about the Judgment is the independence of the -two extremes, the subject and the predicate. The former we take to be -a thing or term _per se,_ and the predicate a general term outside -the said subject and somewhere in our heads. The next point is for us -to bring the latter into combination with the former, and in this way -frame a Judgment. The copula 'is' however enunciates the predicate _of_ -the subject, and so that external subjective subsumption is again put -in abeyance, and the Judgment taken as a determination of the object -itself.--The etymological meaning of the Judgment (_Urtheil_) in -German goes deeper, as it were declaring the unity of the notion to be -primary, and its distinction to be the original partition. And that is -what the Judgment really is. - -In its abstract terms a Judgment is expressible in the proposition: -'The individual is the universal.' These are the terms under which -the subject and the predicate first confront each other, when the -functions of the notion are taken in their immediate character or -first abstraction. [Propositions such as, 'The particular is the -universal,' and 'The individual is the particular,' belong to the -further specialisation of the judgment.] It shows a strange want -of observation in the logic-books, that in none of them is the fact -stated, that in _every_ judgment there is such a statement made, as, -The individual is the universal, or still more definitely, The subject -is the predicate: (_e.g._ God is absolute spirit). No doubt there is -also a distinction between terms like individual and universal, subject -and predicate: but it is none the less the universal fact, that every -judgment states them to be identical. - -The copula 'is' springs from the nature of the notion, to be -self-identical even in parting with its own. The individual and -universal are _its_ constituents, and therefore characters which -cannot be isolated. The earlier categories (of reflection) in their -correlations also refer to one another: but their interconnexion is -only 'having' and not 'being,' _i.e._ it is not the identity which is -realised as identity or universality. In the judgment, therefore, for -the first time there is seen the genuine particularity of the notion: -for it is the speciality or distinguishing of the latter, without -thereby losing universality. - - * * * * * - -Judgments are generally looked upon as combinations of notions, and, -be it added, of heterogeneous notions. This theory of judgment is -correct, so far as it implies that it is the notion which forms the -presupposition of the judgment, and which in the judgment comes up -under the form of difference. But on the other hand, it is false to -speak of notions differing in kind. The notion, although concrete, -is still as a notion essentially one, and the functions which it -contains are not different kinds of it. It is equally false to speak -of a combination of the two sides in the judgment, if we understand -the term 'combination' to imply the independent existence of the -combining members apart from the combination. The same external view -of their nature is more forcibly apparent when judgments are described -as produced by the ascription of a predicate to the subject. Language -like this looks upon the subject as self-subsistent outside, and the -predicate as found somewhere in our head. Such a conception of the -relation between subject and predicate however is at once contradicted -by the copula 'is.' By saying 'This rose is red,' or 'This picture -is beautiful,' we declare, that it is not we who from outside attach -beauty to the picture or redness to the rose, but that these are the -characteristics proper to these objects. An additional fault in the -way in which Formal Logic conceives the judgment is, that it makes -the judgment look as if it were something merely contingent, and -does not offer any proof for the advance from notion on to judgment. -For the notion does not, as understanding supposes, stand still in -its own immobility. It is rather an infinite form, of boundless -activity, as it were the _punctum saliens_ of all vitality, and -thereby self-differentiating. This disruption of the notion into the -difference of its constituent functions',--a disruption imposed by the -native act of the notion, is the judgment. A judgment therefore means -the particularising of the notion. No doubt the notion is implicitly -the particular. But in the notion as notion the particular is not yet -explicit, and still remains in transparent unity with the universal. -Thus, for example, as we remarked before (§ 160, note), the germ of a -plant contains its particular, such as root, branches, leaves, &c.: -but these details are at first present only potentially, and are not -realised till the germ uncloses. This unclosing is, as it were, the -judgment of the plant. The illustration may also serve to show how -neither the notion nor the judgment are merely found in our head, or -merely framed by us. The notion is the very heart of things, and makes -them what they are. To form a notion of an object means therefore to -become aware of its notion: and when we proceed to a criticism or -judgment of the object, we are not performing a subjective act, and -merely ascribing this or that predicate to the object. We are, on the -contrary, observing the object in the specific character imposed by its -notion. - -167.] The Judgment is usually taken in a subjective sense as an -operation and a form, occurring merely in self-conscious thought. This -distinction, however, has no existence on purely logical principles, -by which the judgment is taken in the quite universal signification -that all things are a judgment. That is to say, they are individuals, -which are a universality or inner nature in themselves,--a universal -which is individualised. Their universality and individuality are -distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other. - -The interpretation of the judgment, according to which it is assumed -to be merely subjective, as if _we_ ascribed a predicate to a subject, -is contradicted by the decidedly objective expression of the judgment. -The rose _is_ red; Gold _is_ a metal. It is not by us that something -is first ascribed to them.--A judgment is however distinguished from a -proposition. The latter contains a statement about the subject, which -does not stand to it in any universal relationship, but expresses some -single action, or some state, or the like. Thus, 'Caesar was born at -Rome in such and such a year, waged war in Gaul for ten years, crossed -the Rubicon, &c.,' are propositions, but not judgments. Again it is -absurd to say that such statements as, 'I slept well last night,' or -'Present arms!' may be turned into the form of a judgment. 'A carriage -is passing by'--would be a judgment, and a subjective one at best, only -if it were doubtful, whether the passing object was a carriage, or -whether it and not rather the point of observation was in motion:--in -short, only if it were desired to specify a conception which was still -short of appropriate specification. - -168.] The judgment is an expression of finitude. Things from its point -of view are said to be finite, because they are a judgment, because -their definite being and their universal nature, (their body and their -soul,) though united indeed (otherwise the things would be nothing), -are still elements in the constitution which are already different and -also in any case separable. - -169.] The abstract terms of the judgment, 'The individual is the -universal,' present the subject (as negatively self-relating) as what -is immediately _concrete,_ while the predicate is what is _abstract,_ -indeterminate, in short, the universal. But the two elements are -connected together by an 'is': and thus the predicate (in its -universality) must also contain the speciality of the subject, must, -in short, have particularity: and so is realised the identity between -subject and predicate; which, being thus unaffected by this difference -in form, is the content. - -It is the predicate which first gives the subject, which till then was -on its own account a bare mental representation or an empty name, its -specific character and content. In judgments like 'God is the most -real of all things,' or 'The Absolute is the self-identical,' God and -the Absolute are mere names; what they _are_ we only learn in the -predicate. What the subject may be in other respects, as a concrete -thing, is no concern of _this_ judgment. (Cp. § 31.) - -To define the subject as that of which something is said, and the -predicate as what is said about it, is mere trifling. It gives no -information about the distinction between the two. In point of -thought, the subject is primarily the individual, and the predicate -the universal. As the judgment receives further development, the -subject ceases to be merely the immediate individual, and the predicate -merely the abstract universal: the former acquires the additional -significations of particular and universal,--the latter the additional -significations of particular and individual. Thus while the same names -are given to the two terms of the judgment, their meaning passes -through a series of changes. - -170.] We now go closer into the speciality of subject and predicate. -The subject as negative self-relation (§§ 163, 166) is the stable -substratum in which the predicate has its subsistence and where it -is ideally present. The predicate, as the phrase is, _inheres_ in -the subject. Further, as the subject is in general and immediately -concrete, the specific connotation of the predicate is only one of the -numerous characters of the subject. Thus the subject is ampler and -wider than the predicate. - -Conversely, the predicate as universal is self-subsistent, and -indifferent whether this subject is or not. The predicate outflanks -the subject, subsuming it under itself: and hence on its side is wider -than the subject. The specific content of the predicate (§ 169) alone -constitutes the identity of the two. - -171.] At first, subject, predicate, and the specific content or the -identity are, even in their relation, still put in the judgment -as different and divergent. By implication, however, that is, in -their notion, they are identical. For the subject is a concrete -totality,--which means not any indefinite multiplicity, but -individuality alone, the particular and the universal in an identity: -and the predicate too is the very same unity (§ 170).--The copula -again, even while stating the identity of subject and predicate, -does so at first only by an abstract 'is.' Conformably to such an -identity the subject has to be _put_ also in the characteristic of the -predicate. By this means the latter also receives the characteristic of -the former: so that the copula receives its full complement and full -force. Such is the continuous specification by which the judgment, -through a copula charged with content, comes to be a syllogism. As it -is primarily exhibited in the judgment, this gradual specification -consists in giving to an originally abstract, sensuous universality the -specific character of allness, of species, of genus, and finally of the -developed universality of the notion. - -After we are made aware of this continuous specification of the -judgment, we can see a meaning and an interconnexion in what are -usually stated as the kinds of judgment. Not only does the ordinary -enumeration seem purely casual, but it is also superficial, and even -bewildering in its statement of their distinctions. The distinction -between positive, categorical and assertory judgments, is either a pure -invention of fancy, or is left undetermined. On the right theory, the -different judgments follow necessarily from one another, and present -the continuous specification of the notion; for the judgment itself is -nothing but the notion specified. - -When we look at the two preceding spheres of Being and Essence, we see -that the specified notions as judgments are reproductions of these -spheres, but put in the simplicity of relation peculiar to the notion. - - * * * * * - -The various kinds of judgment are no empirical aggregate. They are -a systematic whole based on a principle; and it was one of Kant's -great merits to have first emphasised the necessity of showing -this. His proposed division, according to the headings in his table -of categories, into judgments of quality, quantity, relation and -modality, can not be called satisfactory, partly from the merely formal -application of this categorical rubric, partly on account of their -content. Still it rests upon a true perception of the fact that the -different species of judgment derive their features from the universal -forms of the logical idea itself. If we follow this clue, it will -supply us with three chief kinds of judgment parallel to the stages -of Being, Essence, and Notion. The second of these kinds, as required -by the character of Essence, which is the stage of differentiation, -must be doubled. We find the inner ground for this systematisation of -judgments in the circumstance that when the Notion, which is the unity -of Being and Essence in a comprehensive thought, unfolds, as it does in -the judgment, it must reproduce these two stages in a transformation -proper to the notion. The notion itself meanwhile is seen to mould and -form the genuine grade of judgment. - -Far from occupying the same level, and being of equal value, the -different species of judgment form a series of steps, the difference -of which rests upon the logical significance of the predicate. That -judgments differ in value is evident even in our ordinary ways of -thinking. We should not hesitate to ascribe a very slight faculty of -judgment to a person who habitually framed only such judgments as, -'This wall is green,' 'This stove is hot.' On the other hand we should -credit with a genuine capacity of judgment the person whose criticisms -dealt with such questions as whether a certain work of art was -beautiful, whether a certain action was good, and so on. In judgments -of the first-mentioned kind the content forms only an abstract quality, -the presence of which can be sufficiently detected by immediate -perception. To pronounce a work of art to be beautiful, or an action to -be good, requires on the contrary a comparison of the objects with what -they ought to be, _i.e._ with their notion. - -(α) Qualitative Judgment. - -172.] The immediate judgment is the judgment of definite Being. The -subject is invested with a universality as its predicate, which is -an immediate, and therefore a sensible quality. It may be (1) a -Positive judgment: The individual is a particular. But the -individual is not a particular: or in more precise language, such -a single quality is not congruous with the concrete nature of the -subject. This is (2) a Negative judgment. - -It is one of the fundamental assumptions of dogmatic Logic that -Qualitative judgments such as, 'The rose is red,' or 'is not red,' can -contain _truth. Correct_ they may be, _i.e._ in the limited circle -of perception, of finite conception and thought: that depends on the -content, which likewise is finite, and, on its own merits, untrue. -Truth, however, as opposed to correctness, depends solely on the form, -viz. on the notion as it is put and the reality corresponding to it. -But truth of that stamp is not found in the Qualitative judgment. - -In common life the terms _truth_ and _correctness_ are often treated -as synonymous: we speak of the truth of a content, when we are only -thinking of its correctness. Correctness, generally speaking, concerns -only the formal coincidence between our conception and its content, -whatever the constitution of this content may be. Truth, on the -contrary, lies in the coincidence of the object with itself, that is, -with its notion. That a person is sick, or that some one has committed -a theft, may certainly be correct. But the content is untrue. A sick -body is not in harmony with the notion of body, and there is a want -of congruity between theft and the notion of human conduct. These -instances may show that an immediate judgment, in which an abstract -quality is predicated of an immediately individual thing, however -correct it may be, cannot contain truth. The subject and predicate of -it do not stand to each other in the relation of reality and notion. - -We may add that the untruth of the immediate judgment lies in the -incongruity between its form and content. To say 'This rose is red,' -involves (in virtue of the copula 'is') the coincidence of subject and -predicate. The rose however is a concrete thing, and so is not red -only: it has also an odour, a specific form, and many other features -not implied in the predicate red. The predicate on its part is an -abstract universal, and does not apply to the rose alone. There are -other flowers and other objects which are red too. The subject and -predicate in the immediate judgment touch, as it were, only in a single -point, but do not cover each other. The case is different with the -notional judgment. In pronouncing an action to be good, we frame a -notional judgment. Here, as we at once perceive, there is a closer and -a more intimate relation than in the immediate judgment. The predicate -in the latter is some abstract quality which may or may not be applied -to the subject. In the judgment of the notion the predicate is, as it -were, the soul of the subject, by which the subject, as the body of -this soul, is characterised through and through. - -173.] This negation of a particular quality, which is the first -negation, still leaves the connexion of the subject with the predicate -subsisting. The predicate is in that manner a sort of relative -universal, of which a special phase only has been negatived. [To say, -that the rose is not red, implies that it is still coloured--in the -first place with another colour; which however would be only one more -positive judgment.] The individual however is not a universal. Hence -(3) the judgment suffers disruption into one of two forms. It is either -(a) the Identical judgment, an empty identical relation stating -that the individual is the individual; or it is (b) what is called the -Infinite judgment, in which we are presented with the total -incompatibility of subject and predicate. - -Examples of the latter are: 'The mind is no elephant:' 'A lion is -no table;' propositions which are correct but absurd, exactly like -the identical propositions: 'A lion is a lion;' 'Mind is mind.' -Propositions like these are undoubtedly the truth of the immediate, or, -as it is called, Qualitative judgment. But they are not judgments at -all, and can only occur in a subjective thought where even an untrue -abstraction may hold its ground.--In their objective aspect, these -latter judgments express the nature of what is, or of sensible things, -which, as they declare, suffer disruption into an empty identity on the -one hand, and on the other a fully-charged relation--only that this -relation is the qualitative antagonism of the things related, their -total incongruity. - - * * * * * - -The negatively-infinite judgment, in which the subject has no relation -whatever to the predicate, gets its place in the Formal Logic solely as -a nonsensical curiosity. But the infinite judgment is not really a mere -casual form adopted by subjective thought. It exhibits the proximate -result of the dialectical process in the immediate judgments preceding -(the positive and simply-negative), and distinctly displays their -finitude and untruth. Crime may be quoted as an objective instance of -the negatively-infinite judgment. The person committing a crime, such -as a theft, does not, as in a suit about civil rights, merely deny -the particular right of another person to some one definite thing. -He denies the right of that person in general, and therefore he is -not merely forced to restore what he has stolen, but is punished in -addition, because he has violated law as law, _i.e._ law in general. -The civil-law suit on the contrary is an instance of the negative -judgment pure and simple where merely the particular law is violated, -whilst law in general is so far acknowledged. Such a dispute is -precisely paralleled by a negative judgment, like, 'This flower is not -red:' by which we merely deny the particular colour of the flower, but -not its colour in general, which may be blue, yellow, or any other. -Similarly death, as a negatively-infinite judgment, is distinguished -from disease as simply-negative. In disease, merely this or that -function of life is checked or negatived: in death, as we ordinarily -say, body and soul part, _i.e._ subject and predicate utterly diverge. - -(ß) _Judgment of Reflection._ - -174.] The individual put as individual (_i.e._ as reflected-into-self) -into the judgment, has a predicate, in comparison with which the -subject, as self-relating, continues to be still _an other_ thing.--In -existence the subject ceases to be immediately qualitative, it is in -correlation, and inter-connexion with an other thing,--with an external -world. In this way the universality of the predicate comes to signify -this relativity--(_e.g._) useful, or dangerous; weight or acidity; or -again, instinct; are examples of such relative predicates. - -The Judgment of Reflection is distinguished from the Qualitative -judgment by the circumstance that its predicate is not an immediate -or abstract quality, but of such a kind as to exhibit the subject -as in relation to something else. When we say, _e.g._ 'This rose is -red.' we regard the subject in its immediate individuality, and -without reference to anything else. If, on the other hand, we frame -the judgment, 'This plant is medicinal,' we regard the subject, plant, -as standing in connexion with something else (the sickness which it -cures), by means of its predicate (its medicinality). The case is the -same with judgments like: This body is elastic: This instrument is -useful: This punishment has a deterrent influence. In every one of -these instances the predicate is some category of reflection. They all -exhibit an advance beyond the immediate individuality of the subject, -but none of them goes so far as to indicate the adequate notion of it. -It is in this mode of judgment that ordinary _raisonnement_ luxuriates. -The greater the concreteness of the object in question, the more points -of view does it offer to reflection; by which however its proper nature -or notion is not exhausted. - -175.] (1) Firstly then the subject, the individual as individual (in -the Singular judgment), is a universal. But (2) secondly, in -this relation it is elevated above its singularity. This enlargement is -external, due to subjective reflection, and at first is an indefinite -number of particulars. (This is seen in the Particular judgment, -which is obviously negative as well as positive: the individual is -divided in itself: partly it is self-related, partly related to -something else.) (3) Thirdly, Some are the universal: particularity is -thus enlarged to universality: or universality is modified through the -individuality of the subject, and appears as allness Community, -the ordinary universality of reflection. - - * * * * * - -The subject, receiving, as in the Singular judgment, a universal -predicate, is carried out beyond its mere individual self. To say, -'This plant is wholesome,' implies not only that this single plant is -wholesome, but that some or several are so. We have thus the particular -judgment (some plants are wholesome, some men are inventive, &c). By -means of particularity the immediate individual comes to lose its -independence, and enters into an inter-connexion with something else. -Man, as _this_ man, is not this single man alone: he stands beside -other men and becomes one in the crowd, just by this means however he -belongs to his universal, and is consequently raised.--The particular -judgment is as much negative as positive. If only some bodies are -elastic, it is evident that the rest are not elastic. - -On this fact again depends the advance to the third form of the -Reflective judgment, viz. the judgment of allness (all men are mortal, -all metals conduct electricity). It is as 'all' that the universal -is in the first instance generally encountered by reflection. The -individuals form for reflection the foundation, and it is only our -subjective action which collects and describes them as 'all.' So far -the universal has the aspect of an external fastening, that holds -together a number of independent individuals, which have not the least -affinity towards it. This semblance of indifference is however unreal: -for the universal is the ground and foundation, the root, and substance -of the individual. If _e.g._ we take Caius, Titus, Sempronius, and -the other inhabitants of a town or country, the fact that all of them -are men is not merely something which they have in common, but their -universal or kind, without which these individuals would not be at all. -The case is very different with that superficial generality falsely -so called, which really means only what attaches, or is common, to -all the individuals. It has been remarked, for example, that men, -in contradistinction from the lower animals, possess in common the -appendage of ear-lobes. It is evident, however, that the absence of -these ear-lobes in one man or another would not affect the rest of -his being, character, or capacities: whereas it would be nonsense -to suppose that Caius, without being a man, would still be brave, -learned, &c. The individual man is what he is in particular, only in so -far as he is before all things a man as man and in general. And that -generality is not something external to, or something in addition to -other abstract qualities, or to mere features discovered by reflection. -It is what permeates and includes in it everything particular. - -176.] The subject being thus likewise characterised as a universal, -there is an express identification of subject and predicate, by which -at the same time the speciality of the judgment form is deprived of -all importance. This unity of the content (the content being the -universality which is identical with the negative reflection-in-self of -the subject) makes the connexion in judgment a necessary one. - -The advance from the reflective judgment of allness to the judgment -of necessity is found in our usual modes of thought, when we say that -whatever appertains to all, appertains to the species, and is therefore -necessary. To say all plants, or all men, is the same thing as to say -_the_ plant, or _the_ man. - -(γ) _Judgment of Necessity._ - -177.] The Judgment of Necessity, _i.e._ of the identity of the content -in its difference (1), contains, in the predicate, partly the substance -or nature of the subject, the concrete universal, the _genus_; partly, -seeing that this universal also contains the specific character as -negative, the predicate represents the exclusive essential character, -the _species._ This is the Categorical judgment. - -(2) Conformably to their substantiality, the two terms receive the -aspect of independent actuality. Their identity is then inward only; -and thus the actuality of the one is at the same time not its own, but -the being of the other. This is the Hypothetical judgment. - -(3) If, in this self-surrender and self-alienation of the notion, -its inner identity is at the same time explicitly put, the universal -is the genus which is self-identical in its mutually-exclusive -individualities. This judgment, which has this universal for both its -terms, the one time as a universal, the other time as the circle of -its self-excluding particularisation in which the 'either--or' as much -as the 'as well as' stands for the genus, is the Disjunctive -judgment. Universality, at first as a genus, and now also as the -circuit of its species, is thus described and expressly put as a -totality. - - * * * * * - -The Categorical judgment (such as 'Gold is a metal,' 'The rose is a -plant') is the un-mediated judgment of necessity, and finds within the -sphere of Essence its parallel in the relation of substance. All things -are a Categorical judgment. In other words, they have their substantial -nature, forming their fixed and unchangeable substratum. It is only -when things are studied from the point of view of their kind, and as -with necessity determined by the kind, that the judgment first begins -to be real. It betrays a defective logical training to place upon the -same level judgments like 'gold is dear,' and judgments like 'gold -is a metal.' That 'gold is dear' is a matter of external connexion -between it and our wants or inclinations, the costs of obtaining it, -and other circumstances. Gold remains the same as it was, though that -external reference is altered or removed. Metalleity, on the contrary, -constitutes the substantial nature of gold, apart from which it, and -all else that is in it, or can be predicated of it, would be unable to -subsist. The same is the case if we say, 'Caius is a man.' We express -by that, that whatever else he may be, has worth and meaning, only when -it corresponds to his substantial nature or manhood. - -But even the Categorical judgment is to a certain extent defective. It -fails to give due place to the function or element of particularity. -Thus 'gold is a metal,' it is true; but so are silver, copper, iron: -and metalleity as such has no leanings to any of its particular -species. In these circumstances we must advance from the Categorical to -the Hypothetical judgment, which may be expressed in the formula: If -_A_ is, _B_ is. The present case exhibits the same advance as formerly -took place from the relation of substance to the relation of cause. In -the Hypothetical judgment the specific character of the content shows -itself mediated and dependent on something else: and this is exactly -the relation of cause and effect. And if we were to give a general -interpretation to the Hypothetical judgment, we should say that it -expressly realises the universal in its particularising. This brings -us to the third form of the Judgment of Necessity, the Disjunctive -judgment. _A_ is either _B_ or _C_ or _D._ A work of poetic art is -either epic or lyric or dramatic. Colour is either yellow or blue or -red. The two terms in the Disjunctive judgment are identical. The genus -is the sum total of the species, and the sum total of the species -is the genus. This unity of the universal and the particular is the -notion: and it is the notion which, as we now see, forms the content of -the judgment. - -(δ) _Judgment of the Notion._ - -178.] The Judgment of the Notion has for its content the notion, the -totality in simple form, the universal with its complete speciality. -The subject is, (1) in the first place, an individual, which has -for its predicate the reflection of the particular existence on its -universal; or the judgment states the agreement or disagreement of -these two aspects. That is, the predicate is such a term as good, true, -correct. This is the Assertory judgment. - -Judgments, such as whether an object, action, &c. is good, bad, true, -beautiful, &c, are those to which even ordinary language first applies -the name of judgment. We should never ascribe judgment to a person who -framed positive or negative judgments like, This rose is red, This -picture is red, green, dusty, &c. - -The Assertory judgment, although rejected by society as out of place -when it claims authority on its own showing, has however been made the -single and all-essential form of doctrine, even in philosophy, through -the influence of the principle of immediate knowledge and faith. In the -so-called philosophic works which maintain this principle, we may read -hundreds and hundreds of assertions about reason, knowledge, thought, -&c. which, now that external authority counts for little, seek to -accredit themselves by an endless restatement of the same thesis. - -179.] On the part of its at first un-mediated subject, the Assertory -judgment does not contain the relation of particular with universal -which is expressed in the predicate. This judgment is consequently -a mere subjective particularity, and is confronted by a contrary -assertion with equal right, or rather want of right. It is therefore -at once turned into (2) a Problematical judgment. But when we -explicitly attach the objective particularity to the subject and make -its speciality the constitutive feature of its existence, the subject -(3) then expresses the connexion of that objective particularity with -its constitution, _i.e._ with its genus; and thus expresses what -forms the content of the predicate (see § 178). [This (_the immediate -individuality_) house (_the genus,_) being so and so constituted -(_particularity,_) is good or bad.] This is the Apodictic -judgment. All things are a genus (_i.e._ have a meaning and purpose) in -an _individual_ actuality of a _particular_ constitution. And they are -finite, because the particular in them may and also may not conform to -the universal. - -180.] In this manner subject and predicate are each the whole judgment. -The immediate constitution of the subject is at first exhibited as -the intermediating ground, where the individuality of the actual -thing meets with its universality, and in this way as the ground of -the judgment. What has been really made explicit is the oneness of -subject and predicate, as the notion itself, filling up the empty 'is' -of the copula. While its constituent elements are at the same time -distinguished as subject and predicate, the notion is put as their -unity, as the connexion which serves to intermediate them: in short, as -the Syllogism. - -(c) _The Syllogism._ - -181.] The Syllogism brings the notion and the judgment into one. -It is notion,--being the simple identity into which the distinctions of -form in the judgment have retired. It is judgment,--because it is at -the same time set in reality, that is, put in the distinction of its -terms. The Syllogism is the reasonable, and everything reasonable. - -Even the ordinary theories represent the Syllogism to be the form of -reasonableness, but only a subjective form; and no inter-connexion -whatever is shown to exist between it and any other reasonable content, -such as a reasonable principle, a reasonable action, idea, &c. The name -of reason is much and often heard, and appealed to: but no one thinks -of explaining its specific character, or saying what it is,--least of -all that it has any connexion with Syllogism. But formal Syllogism -really presents what is reasonable in such a reasonless way that it -has nothing to do with any reasonable matter. But as the matter in -question can only be rational in virtue of the same quality by which -thought is reason, it can be made so by the form only: and that -form is Syllogism. And what is a Syllogism but an explicit putting, -_i.e._ realising of the notion, at first in form only, as stated -above? Accordingly the Syllogism is the essential ground of whatever -is true: and at the present stage the definition of the Absolute is -that it is the Syllogism, or stating the principle in a proposition: -Everything is a Syllogism. Everything is a notion, the existence of -which is the differentiation of its members or functions, so that the -universal nature of the Notion gives itself external reality by means -of particularity, and thereby, and as a negative reflection-into-self, -makes itself an individual. Or, conversely: the actual thing is an -individual, which by means of particularity rises to universality and -makes itself identical with itself.--The actual is one: but it is also -the divergence from each other of the constituent elements of the -notion; and the Syllogism represents the orbit of intermediation of its -elements, by which it realises its unity. - -The Syllogism, like the notion and the judgment, is usually described -as a form merely of our subjective thinking. The Syllogism, it is said, -is the process of proving the judgment. And certainly the judgment does -in every case refer us to the Syllogism. The step from the one to the -other however is not brought about by our subjective action, but by the -judgment itself which puts itself as Syllogism, and in the conclusion -returns to the unity of the notion. The precise point by which we -pass to the Syllogism is found in the Apodictic judgment. In it we -have an individual which by means of its qualities connects itself -with its universal or notion. Here we see the particular becoming the -mediating mean between the individual and the universal. This gives -the fundamental form of the Syllogism, the gradual specification of -which, formally considered, consists in the fact that universal and -individual also occupy this place of mean. This again paves the way for -the passage from subjectivity to objectivity. - -182.] In the 'immediate' Syllogism the several aspects of the notion -confront one another abstractly, and stand in an external relation -only. We have first the two extremes, which are Individuality and -Universality; and then the notion, as the mean for locking the two -together, is in like manner only abstract Particularity. In this way -the extremes are put as independent and without affinity either towards -one another or towards their mean. Such a Syllogism contains reason, -but in utter notionlessness,--the formal Syllogism of Understanding. In -it the subject is coupled with an _other_ character; or the universal -by this mediation subsumes a subject external to it. In the rational -Syllogism, on the contrary, the subject is by means of the mediation -coupled with itself. In this manner it first comes to be a subject: or, -in the subject we have the first germ of the rational Syllogism. - -In the following examination, the Syllogism of Understanding, according -to the interpretation usually put upon it, is expressed in its -subjective shape; the shape which it has when _we_ are said to make -such Syllogisms. And it really is only a subjective syllogising. Such -Syllogism however has also an objective meaning; it expresses only the -finitude of things, but does so in the specific mode which the form -has here reached. In the case of finite things their subjectivity, -being only thinghood, is separable from their properties or their -particularity, but also separable from their universality: not only -when the universality is the bare quality of the thing and its external -inter-connexion with other things, but also when it is its genus and -notion. - - * * * * * - -On the above-mentioned theory of syllogism, as the rational form _par -excellence,_ reason has been defined as the faculty of syllogising, -whilst understanding is defined as the faculty of forming notions. We -might object to the conception on which this depends, and according to -which the mind is merely a sum of forces or faculties existing side -by side. But apart from that objection, we may observe in regard to -the parallelism of understanding with the notion, as well as of reason -with syllogism, that the notion is as little a mere category of the -understanding as the syllogism is without qualification definable -as rational. For, in the first place, what the Formal Logic usually -examines in its theory of syllogism, is really nothing but the mere -syllogism of understanding, which has no claim to the honour of being -made a form of rationality, still less to be held as the embodiment of -all reason. The notion, in the second place, so far from being a form -of understanding, owes its degradation to such a place entirely to -the influence of that abstract mode of thought. And it is not unusual -to draw such a distinction between a notion of understanding and a -notion of reason. The distinction however does not mean that notions -are of two kinds. It means that our own action often stops short at -the mere negative and abstract form of the notion, when we might also -have proceeded to apprehend the notion in its true nature, as at once -positive and concrete. It is _e.g._ the mere understanding, which -thinks liberty to be the abstract contrary of necessity, whereas the -adequate rational notion of liberty requires the element of necessity -to be merged in it. Similarly the definition of God, given by what is -called Deism, is merely the mode in which the understanding thinks God: -whereas Christianity, to which He is known as the Trinity, contains the -rational notion of God. - -(α) _Qualitative Syllogism._ - -183.] The first syllogism is a syllogism of definite being,--a -Qualitative Syllogism, as stated in the last paragraph. Its form (1) is -I--P--U: _i.e._ a subject as Individual is coupled (concluded) with a -Universal character by means of a (Particular) quality. - -Of course the subject (_terminus minor_) has other characteristics -besides individuality, just as the other extreme (the predicate of the -conclusion, or _terminus major_) has other characteristics than mere -universality. But here the interest turns only on the characteristics -through which these terms make a syllogism. - -The syllogism of existence is a syllogism of understanding merely, at -least in so far as it leaves the individual, the particular, and the -universal to confront each other quite abstractly. In this syllogism -the notion is at the very height of self-estrangement. We have in it -an immediately individual thing as subject: next some one particular -aspect or property attaching to this subject is selected, and by means -of this property the individual turns out to be a universal. Thus we -may say, This rose is red: Red is a colour: Therefore, this rose -is a coloured object. It is this aspect of the syllogism which the -common logics mainly treat of. There was a time when the syllogism was -regarded as an absolute rule for all cognition, and when a scientific -statement was not held to be valid until it had been shown to follow -from a process of syllogism. At present, on the contrary, the different -forms of the syllogism are met nowhere save in the manuals of Logic; -and an acquaintance with them is considered a piece of mere pedantry, -of no further use either in practical life or in science. It would -indeed be both useless and pedantic to parade the whole machinery of -the formal syllogism on every occasion. And yet the several forms of -syllogism make themselves constantly felt in our cognition. If any one, -when awaking on a winter morning, hears the creaking of the carriages -on the street, and is thus led to conclude that it has frozen hard in -the night, he has gone through a syllogistic operation:--an operation -which is every day repeated under the greatest variety of conditions. -The interest, therefore, ought at least not to be less in becoming -expressly conscious of this daily action of our thinking selves, than -confessedly belongs to the study of the functions of organic life, such -as the processes of digestion, assimilation, respiration, or even the -processes and structures of the nature around us. We do not, however, -for a moment deny that a study of Logic is no more necessary to teach -us how to draw correct conclusions, than a previous study of anatomy -and physiology is required in order to digest or breathe. - -Aristotle was the first to observe and describe the different forms, -or, as they are called, figures of syllogism, in their subjective -meaning: and he performed his work so exactly and surely, that no -essential addition has ever been required. But while sensible of the -value of what he has thus done, we must not forget that the forms of -the syllogism of understanding, and of finite thought altogether, -are not what Aristotle has made use of in his properly philosophical -investigations. (See § 189.) - -184.] This syllogism is completely contingent (α) in the matter of its -terms. The Middle Term, being an abstract particularity, is nothing -but any quality whatever of the subject: but the subject, being -immediate and thus empirically concrete, has several others, and could -therefore be coupled with exactly as many other universalities as it -possesses single qualities. Similarly a single particularity may have -various characters in itself, so that the same _medius terminus_ would -serve to connect the subject with several different universals. - -It is more a caprice of fashion, than a sense of its incorrectness, -which has led to the disuse of ceremonious syllogising. This and the -following section indicate the uselessness of such syllogising for the -ends of truth. - -The point of view indicated in the paragraph shows how this style of -syllogism can 'demonstrate' (as the phrase goes) the most diverse -conclusions. All that is requisite is to find a _medius terminus_ from -which the transition can be made to the proposition sought. Another -_medius terminus_ would enable us to demonstrate something else, and -even the contrary of the last. And the more concrete an object is, the -more aspects it has, which may become such middle terms. To determine -which of these aspects is more essential than another, again, requires -a further syllogism of this kind, which fixing on the single quality -can with equal ease discover in it some aspect or consideration by -which it can make good its claims to be considered necessary and -important. - -Little as we usually think on the Syllogism of Understanding in the -daily business of life, it never ceases to play its part there. In -a civil suit, for instance, it is the duty of the advocate to give -due force to the legal titles which make in favour of his client. In -logical language, such a legal title is nothing but a middle term. -Diplomatic transactions afford another illustration of the same, when, -for instance, different powers lay claim to one and the same territory. -In such a case the laws of inheritance, the geographical position of -the country, the descent and the language of its inhabitants, or any -other ground, may be emphasised as a _medius terminus._ - -185.] (ß) This syllogism, if it is contingent in point of its terms, -is no less contingent in virtue of the form of relation which is -found in it. In the syllogism, according to its notion, truth lies in -connecting two distinct things by a Middle Term in which they are one. -But connexions of the extremes with the Middle Term (the so-called -_premisses,_ the major and the minor premiss) are in the case of this -syllogism much more decidedly _immediate_ connexions. In other words, -they have not a proper Middle Term. - -This contradiction in the syllogism exhibits a new case of the infinite -progression. Each of the premisses evidently calls for a fresh -syllogism to demonstrate it: and as the new syllogism has two immediate -premisses, like its predecessor, the demand for proof is doubled at -every step, and repeated without end. - -186.] On account of its importance for experience, there has been -here noted a defect in the syllogism, to which in this form absolute -correctness had been ascribed. This defect however must lose itself in -the further specification of the syllogism. For we are now within the -sphere of the notion; and here therefore, as well as in the judgment, -the opposite character is not merely present potentially, but is -explicit. To work out the gradual specification of the syllogism, -therefore, there need only be admitted and accepted what is at each -step realised by the syllogism itself. - -Through the immediate syllogism I--P--U, the Individual is mediated -(through a Particular) with the Universal, and in this conclusion put -as a universal. It follows that the individual subject, becoming itself -a universal, serves to unite the two extremes, and to form their ground -of intermediation. This gives the second figure of the syllogism, (2) -U--I--P. It expresses the truth of the first; it shows in other words -that the intermediation has taken place in the individual, and is thus -something contingent. - -187.] The universal, which in the first conclusion was specified -through individuality, passes over into the second figure and there -now occupies the place that belonged to the immediate subject. In the -second figure it is concluded with the particular. By this conclusion -therefore the universal is explicitly put as particular--and is now -made to mediate between the two extremes, the places of which are -occupied by the two others (the particular and the individual). This is -the third figure of the syllogism: (3) P--U--I. - -What are called the Figures of the syllogism (being three in -number, for the fourth is a superfluous and even absurd addition of -the Moderns to the three known to Aristotle) are in the usual mode of -treatment put side by side, without the slightest thought of showing -their necessity, and still less of pointing out their import and value. -No wonder then that the figures have been in later times treated as an -empty piece of formalism. They have however a very real significance, -derived from the necessity for every function or characteristic -element of the notion to become the whole itself, and to stand as -mediating ground.--But to find out what 'moods' of the propositions -(such as whether they may be universals, or negatives) are needed -to enable us to draw a correct conclusion in the different figures, -is a mechanical inquiry, which its purely mechanical nature and its -intrinsic meaninglessness have very properly consigned to oblivion. -And Aristotle would have been the last person to give any countenance -to those who wish to attach importance to such inquiries or to the -syllogism of understanding in general. It is true that he described -these, as well as numerous other forms of mind and nature, and that -he examined and expounded their specialities. But in his metaphysical -theories, as well as his theories of nature and mind, he was very -far from taking as basis, or criterion, the syllogistic forms of the -'understanding.' Indeed it might be maintained that not one of these -theories would ever have come into existence, or been allowed to exist, -if it had been compelled to submit to the laws of understanding. With -all the descriptiveness and analytic faculty which Aristotle after his -fashion is substantially strong in, his ruling principle is always the -speculative notion; and that syllogistic of 'understanding' to which he -first gave such a definite expression is never allowed to intrude in -the higher domain of philosophy. - - * * * * * - -In their objective sense, the three figures of the syllogism declare -that everything rational is manifested as a triple syllogism; that -is to say, each one of the members takes in turn the place of the -extremes, as well as of the mean which reconciles them. Such, for -example, is the case with the three branches of philosophy; the Logical -Idea, Nature, and Mind. As we first see them, Nature is the middle -term which links the others together. Nature, the totality immediately -before us, unfolds itself into the two extremes of the Logical Idea -and Mind. But Mind is Mind only when it is mediated through nature. -Then, in the second place, Mind, which we know as the principle of -individuality, or as the actualising principle, is the mean; and Nature -and the Logical Idea are the extremes. It is Mind which cognises the -Logical Idea in Nature and which thus raises Nature to its essence. -In the third place again the Logical Idea itself becomes the mean: it -is the absolute substance both of mind and of nature, the universal -and all-pervading principle. These are the members of the Absolute -Syllogism. - -188.] In the round by which each constituent function assumes -successively the place of mean and of the two extremes, their specific -difference from each other has been superseded. In this form, where -there is no distinction between its constituent elements, the syllogism -at first has for its connective link equality, or the external identity -of understanding. This is the Quantitative or Mathematical Syllogism: -if two things are equal to a third, they are equal to one another. - - * * * * * - -Everybody knows that this Quantitative syllogism appears as a -mathematical axiom, which like other axioms is said to be a principle -that does not admit of proof, and which indeed being self-evident does -not require such proof. These mathematical axioms however are really -nothing but logical propositions, which, so far as they enunciate -definite and particular thoughts, are deducible from the universal and -self-characterising thought. To deduce them, is to give their proof. -That is true of the Quantitative syllogism, to which mathematics -gives the rank of an axiom. It is really the proximate result of -the qualitative or immediate syllogism. Finally, the Quantitative -syllogism is the syllogism in utter formlessness. The difference -between the terms which is required by the notion is suspended. -Extraneous circumstances alone can decide what propositions are to be -premisses here: and therefore in applying this syllogism we make a -pre-supposition of what has been elsewhere proved and established. - -189.] Two results follow as to the form. In the first place, each -constituent element has taken the place and performed the function of -the mean and therefore of the whole, thus implicitly losing its partial -and abstract character (§ 182 and § 184); secondly, the mediation has -been completed (§ 185), though the completion too is only implicit, -that is, only as a circle of mediations which in turn pre-suppose each -other. In the first figure I--P--U the two premisses I is P and P is -U are yet without a mediation. The former premiss is mediated in the -third, the latter in the second figure. But each of these two figures, -again, for the mediation of its premisses pre-supposes the two others. - -In consequence of this, the mediating unity of the notion must be put -no longer as an abstract particularity, but as a developed unity of the -individual and universal--and in the first place a reflected unity of -these elements. That is to say, the individuality gets at the same time -the character of universality. A mean of this kind gives the Syllogism -of Reflection. - -(β) _Syllogism of Reflection._ - -190.] If the mean, in the first place, be not only an abstract -particular character of the subject, but at the same time all the -individual concrete subjects which possess that character, but possess -it only along with others, (1) we have the Syllogism of Allness. -The major premiss, however, which has for its subject the particular -character, the _terminus medius,_ as allness, pre-supposes the very -conclusion which ought rather to have pre-supposed it. It rests -therefore (2) on an Induction, in which the mean is given by the -complete list of individuals as such,--a, b, c, d, &c. On account of -the disparity, however, between universality and an immediate and -empirical individuality, the list can never be complete. Induction -therefore rests upon (3) Analogy. The middle term of Analogy -is an individual, which however is understood as equivalent to its -essential universality, its genus, or essential character.--The first -syllogism for its intermediation turns us over to the second, and the -second turns us over to the third. But the third no less demands an -intrinsically determinate Universality, or an individuality as type of -the genus, after the round of the forms of external connexion between -individuality and universality has been run through in the figures of -the Reflective Syllogism. - -By the Syllogism of Allness the defect in the first form of the -Syllogism of Understanding, noted in § 184, is remedied, but only to -give rise to a new defect. This defect is that the major premiss itself -pre-supposes what really ought to be the conclusion, and pre-supposes -it as what is thus an 'immediate' proposition. All men are mortal, -therefore Caius is mortal: All metals conduct electricity, therefore -_e.g._ copper does so. In order to enunciate these major premisses, -which when they say 'all' mean the 'immediate' individuals and are -properly intended to be empirical propositions, it is requisite that -the propositions about the individual man Caius, or the individual -metal copper, should previously have been ascertained to be correct. -Everybody feels not merely the pedantry, but the unmeaning formalism of -such syllogisms as: All men are mortal, Caius is a man, therefore Caius -is mortal. - -The syllogism of Allness hands us over to the syllogism of Induction, -in which the individuals form the coupling mean. 'All metals conduct -electricity,' is an empirical proposition derived from experiments -made with each of the individual metals. We thus get the syllogism of -Induction I in the following shape P--I--U. I . . . - -Gold is a metal: silver is a metal: so is copper, lead, &c. This is -the major premiss. Then comes the minor premiss: All these bodies -conduct electricity; and hence results the conclusion, that all metals -conduct electricity. The point which brings about a combination here -is individuality in the shape of allness. But this syllogism once -more hands us over to another syllogism. Its mean is constituted by -the complete list of the individuals. That pre-supposes that over -a certain region observation and experience are completed. But the -things in question here are individuals; and so again we are landed -in the progression _ad infinitum_ (i, i, i, &c.). In other words, in -no Induction can we ever exhaust the individuals. The 'all metals,' -'all plants,' of our statements, mean only all the metals, all the -plants, which we have hitherto become acquainted with. Every Induction -is consequently imperfect. One and the other observation, many it may -be, have been made: but all the cases, all the individuals, have not -been observed. By this defect of Induction we are led on to Analogy. -In the syllogism of Analogy we conclude from the fact that some things -of a certain kind possess a certain quality, that the same quality is -possessed by other things of the same kind. It would be a syllogism of -Analogy, for example, if we said: In all planets hitherto discovered -this has been found to be the law of motion, consequently a newly -discovered planet will probably move according to the same law. In the -experiential sciences Analogy deservedly occupies a high place, and -has led to results of the highest importance. Analogy is the instinct -of reason, creating an anticipation that this or that characteristic, -which experience has discovered, has its root in the inner nature or -kind of an object, and arguing on the faith of that anticipation. -Analogy it should be added may be superficial or it may be thorough. -It would certainly be a very bad analogy to argue that since the man -Caius is a scholar, and Titus also is a man, Titus will probably be a -scholar too: and it would be bad because a man's learning is not an -unconditional consequence of his manhood. Superficial analogies of -this kind however are very frequently met with. It is often argued, -for example: The earth is a celestial body, so is the moon, and it -is therefore in all probability inhabited as well as the earth. The -analogy is not one whit better than that previously mentioned. That -the earth is inhabited does not depend on its being a celestial body, -but in other conditions, such as the presence of an atmosphere, and of -water in connexion with the atmosphere, &c.: and these are precisely -the conditions which the moon, so far as we know, does not possess. -What has in modern times been called the Philosophy of Nature consists -principally in a frivolous play with empty and external analogies, -which, however, claim to be considered profound results. The natural -consequence has been to discredit the philosophical study of nature. - -(γ) _Syllogism of Necessity._ - -191.] The Syllogism of Necessity, if we look to its purely abstract -characteristics or terms, has for its mean the Universal in the same -way as the Syllogism of Reflection has the Individual, the latter -being in the second, and the former in the third figure (§ 187). -The Universal is expressly put as in its very nature intrinsically -determinate. In the first place (1) the Particular, meaning by the -particular the specific genus or species, is the term for mediating -the extremes--as is done in the Categorical syllogism. (2) The -same office is performed by the Individual, taking the individual as -immediate being, so that it is as much mediating as mediated:--as -happens in the Hypothetical syllogism. (3) We have also the -mediating Universal explicitly put as a totality of its particular -members, and as a single particular, or exclusive individuality:--which -happens in the Disjunctive syllogism. It is one and the same -universal which is in these terms of the Disjunctive syllogism; they -are only different forms for expressing it. - -192.] The syllogism has been taken conformably to the distinctions -which it contains; and the general result of the course of their -evolution has been to show that these differences work out their own -abolition and destroy the notion's outwardness to its own self. And, -as we see, in the first place, (1) each of the dynamic elements has -proved itself the systematic whole of these elements, in short a whole -syllogism,--they are consequently implicitly identical. In the second -place, (2) the negation of their distinctions and of the mediation of -one through another constitutes independency; so that it is one and -the same universal which is in these forms, and which is in this way -also explicitly put as their identity. In this ideality of its dynamic -elements, the syllogistic process may be described as essentially -involving the negation of the characters through which its course runs, -as being a mediative process through the suspension of mediation,--as -coupling the subject not with another, but with a suspended other, in -one word, with itself. - - * * * * * - -In the common logic, the doctrine of syllogism is supposed to conclude -the first part, or what is called the 'elementary' theory. It is -followed by the second part, the doctrine of Method, which proposes -to show how a body of scientific knowledge is created by applying to -existing objects the forms of thought discussed in the elementary part. -Whence these objects originate, and what the thought of objectivity -generally speaking implies, are questions to which the Logic of -Understanding vouchsafes no further answer. It believes thought to -be a mere subjective and formal activity, and the objective fact, -which confronts thought, to have a separate and permanent being. But -this dualism is a half-truth: and there is a want of intelligence in -the procedure which at once accepts, without inquiring into their -origin, the categories of subjectivity and objectivity. Both of them, -subjectivity as well as objectivity, are certainly thoughts--even -specific thoughts: which must show themselves founded on the universal -and self-determining thought. This has here been done--at least for -subjectivity. We have recognised it, or the notion subjective (which -includes the notion proper, the judgment, and the syllogism) as the -dialectical result of the first two main stages of the Logical Idea, -Being and Essence. To say that the notion is subjective and subjective -only, is so far quite correct: for the notion certainly is subjectivity -itself. Not less subjective than the notion are also the judgment and -syllogism: and these forms, together with the so-called Laws of Thought -(the Laws of Identity, Difference, and Sufficient Ground), make up the -contents of what is called the 'Elements' in the common logic. But we -may go a step further. This subjectivity, with its functions of notion, -judgment, and syllogism, is not like a set of empty compartments which -has to get filled from without by separately-existing objects. It would -be truer to say that it is subjectivity itself which, as dialectical, -breaks through its own barriers and opens out into objectivity by means -of the syllogism. - -193.] This 'realisation' of the notion,--a realisation in which the -universal is this one totality withdrawn back into itself (of which -the different members are no less the whole, and) which has given -itself a character of 'immediate' unity by merging the mediation:--this -realisation of the notion is the Object. - -I his transition from the Subject, the notion in general, and -especially the syllogism, to the Object, may, at the first glance, -appear strange, particularly if we look only at the Syllogism -of Understanding, and suppose syllogising to be only an act of -consciousness. But that strangeness imposes on us no obligation to seek -to make the transition plausible to the image-loving conception. The -only question which can be considered is, whether our usual conception -of what is called an 'object' approximately corresponds to the object -as here described. By 'object' is commonly understood not an abstract -being, or an existing thing merely, or any sort of actuality, but -something independent, concrete, and self-complete, this completeness -being the totality of the notion. That the object (_Objekt_) is also -an object to us (_Gegenstand_) and is external to something else, -will be more precisely seen, when it puts itself in contrast with -the subjective. At present, as that into which the notion has passed -from its mediation, it is only immediate object and nothing more, -just as the notion is not describable as subjective, previous to the -subsequent contrast with objectivity. - -Further, the Object in general is the one total, in itself still -unspecified, the Objective World as a whole, God, the Absolute Object. -The object, however, has also difference attaching to it: it falls -into pieces, indefinite in their multiplicity (making an objective -world); and each of these individualised parts is also an object, an -intrinsically concrete, complete, and independent existence. - -Objectivity has been compared with being, existence, and actuality; -and so too the transition to existence and actuality (not to being, -for _it_ is the primary and quite abstract immediate) maybe compared -with the transition to objectivity. The ground from which existence -proceeds, and the reflective correlation which is merged in actuality, -are nothing but the as yet imperfectly realised notion. They are only -abstract aspects of it,--the ground being its merely essence-bred -unity, and the correlation only the connexion of real sides which are -supposed to have only self-reflected being. The notion is the unity of -the two; and the object is not a merely essence-like, but inherently -universal unity, not only containing real distinctions, but containing -them as totalities in itself. - -It is evident that in all these transitions there is a further purpose -than merely to show the indissoluble connexion between the notion or -thought and being. It has been more than once remarked that being is -nothing more than simple self-relation, and this meagre category is -certainly implied in the notion, or even in thought. But the meaning -of these transitions is not to accept characteristics or categories, -as only implied;--a fault which mars even the Ontological argument for -God's existence, when it is stated that being is one among realities. -What such a transition does, is to take the notion, as it ought to be -primarily characterised _per se_ as a notion, with which this remote -abstraction of being, or eve of objectivity, has as yet nothing to do, -and looking at its specific character as a notional character alone, to -see when and whether it passes over into a form which is different from -the character as it belongs to the notion and appears in it. - -If the Object, the product of this transition, be brought into relation -with the notion, which, so far as its special form is concerned, has -vanished in it, we may give a correct expression to the result, by -saying that notion or, if it be preferred, subjectivity and object are -_implicitly_ the same. But it is equally correct to say that they are -different. In short, the two modes of expression are equally correct -and incorrect. The true state of the case can be presented in no -expressions of this kind. The 'implicit' is an abstraction, still more -partial and inadequate than the notion itself, of which the inadequacy -is upon the whole suspended, by suspending itself to the object with -its opposite inadequacy. Hence that implicitness also must, by its -negation, give itself the character of explicitness. As in every case, -speculative identity is not the above-mentioned triviality of an -_implicit_ identity of subject and object. This has been said often -enough. Yet it could not be too often repeated, if the intention were -really to put an end to the stale and purely malicious misconception in -regard to this identity:--of which however there can be no reasonable -expectation. - -Looking at that unity in a quite general way, and raising no objection -to the one-sided form of its implicitness, we find it as the well-known -pre-supposition of the ontological proof for the existence of God. -There, it appears as supreme perfection. Anselm, in whom the notable -suggestion of this proof first occurs, no doubt originally restricted -himself to the question whether a certain content was in our thinking -only. His words are briefly these: '_Certe id quo majus cogitari -nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo -intellectu est, potest cogitari esse_ et in re: _quod majus est. -Si ergo id quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu; id -ipsum quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest. -Sed certe hoc esse non potest._' (Certainly that, than which nothing -greater can be thought, cannot be in the intellect alone. For even -if it is in the intellect alone, it can also be thought to exist in -fact: and that is greater. If then that, than which nothing greater -can be thought, is in the intellect alone; then the very thing, which -is greater than anything which can be thought, can be exceeded in -thought. But certainly this is impossible.) The same unity received -a more objective expression in Descartes, Spinoza and others: while -the theory of immediate certitude or faith presents it, on the -contrary, in somewhat the same subjective aspect as Anselm. These -Intuitionalists hold that _in our consciousness_ the attribute of being -is indissolubly associated with the conception of God. The theory of -faith brings even the conception of external finite things under the -same inseparable nexus between the consciousness and the being of -them, on the ground that _perception_ presents them conjoined with the -attribute of existence: and in so saying, it is no doubt correct. It -would be utterly absurd, however, to suppose that the association in -consciousness between existence and our conception of finite things -is of the same description as the association between existence and -the conception of God. To do so would be to forget that finite things -are changeable and transient, _i.e._ that existence is associated -with them for a season, but that the association is neither eternal -nor inseparable. Speaking in the phraseology of the categories before -us, we may say that, to call a thing finite, means that its objective -existence is not in harmony with the thought of it, with its universal -calling, its kind and its end. Anselm, consequently, neglecting any -such conjunction as occurs in finite things, has with good reason -pronounced that only to be the Perfect which exists not merely in a -subjective, but also in an objective mode. It does no good to put -on airs against the Ontological proof, as it is called, and against -Anselm thus denning the Perfect. The argument is one latent in every -unsophisticated mind, and it recurs in every philosophy, even against -its wish and without its knowledge--as may be seen in the theory of -immediate belief. - -The real fault in the argumentation of Anselm is one which is -chargeable on Descartes and Spinoza, as well as on the theory of -immediate knowledge. It is this. This unity which is enunciated as the -supreme perfection or, it may be, subjectively, as the true knowledge, -is pre-supposed, _i.e._ it is assumed only as potential. This identity, -abstract as it thus appears, between the two categories may be at -once met and opposed by their diversity; and this was the very answer -given to Anselm long ago. In short, the conception and existence of -the finite is set in antagonism to the infinite; for, as previously -remarked, the finite possesses objectivity of such a kind as is at -once incongruous with and different from the end or aim, its essence -and notion. Or, the finite is such a conception and in such a way -subjective, that it does not involve existence. This objection and this -antithesis are got over, only by showing the finite to be untrue and -these categories in their separation to be inadequate and null. Their -identity is thus seen to be one into which they spontaneously pass -over, and in which they are reconciled. - -B.--THE OBJECT. - -194.] The Object is immediate being, because insensible to difference, -which in it has suspended itself. It is, further, a totality in itself, -whilst at the same time (as this identity is only the _implicit_ -identity of its dynamic elements) it is equally indifferent to its -immediate unity. It thus breaks up into distinct parts, each of which -is itself the totality. Hence the object is the absolute contradiction -between a complete independence of the multiplicity, and the equally -complete non-independence of the different pieces. - -The definition, which states that the Absolute is the Object, is most -definitely implied in the Leibnizian Monad. The Monads are each an -object, but an object implicitly 'representative,' indeed the total -representation of the world. In the simple unity of the Monad, all -difference is merely ideal, not independent or real. Nothing from -without comes into the monad: It is the whole notion in itself, only -distinguished by its own greater or less development. None the less, -this simple totality parts into the absolute multeity of differences, -each becoming an independent monad. In the monad of monads, and the -Pre-established Harmony of their inward developments, these substances -are in like manner again reduced to 'ideality' and unsubstantiality. -The philosophy of Leibnitz, therefore, represents contradiction in its -complete development. - - * * * * * - -As Fichte in modern times has especially and with justice insisted, -the theory which regards the Absolute or God as the Object and there -stops, expresses the point of view taken by superstition and slavish -fear. No doubt God is the Object, and, indeed, the Object out and -out, confronted with which our particular or subjective opinions and -desires have no truth and no validity. As absolute object however, God -does not therefore take up the position of a dark and hostile power -over against subjectivity. He rather involves it as a vital element in -Himself. Such also is the meaning of the Christian doctrine, according -to which God has willed that all men should be saved and all attain -blessedness. The salvation and the blessedness of men are attained when -they come to feel themselves at one with God, so that God, on the other -hand, ceases to be for them mere object, and, in that way, an object -of fear and terror, as was especially the case with the religious -consciousness of the Romans. But God in the Christian religion is -also known as Love, because in His Son, who is one with Him, He has -revealed Himself to men as a man amongst men, and thereby redeemed -them. All which is only another way of saying that the antithesis of -subjective and objective is implicitly overcome, and that it is our -affair to participate in this redemption by laying aside our immediate -subjectivity (putting off the old Adam), and learning to know God as -our true and essential self. - -Just as religion and religious worship consist in overcoming the -antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity, so science too and -philosophy have no other task than to overcome this antithesis by the -medium of thought. The aim of knowledge is to divest the objective -world that stands opposed to us of its strangeness, and, as the phrase -is, to find ourselves at home in it: which means no more than to trace -the objective world back to the notion,--to our innermost self. We -may learn from the present discussion the mistake of regarding the -antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity as an abstract and permanent -one. The two are wholly dialectical. The notion is at first only -subjective: but without the assistance of any foreign material or stuff -it proceeds, in obedience to its own action, to objectify itself. So, -too, the object is not rigid and processless. Its process is to show -itself as what is at the same time subjective, and thus form the step -onwards to the idea. Any one who, from want of familiarity with the -categories of subjectivity and objectivity, seeks to retain them in -their abstraction, will find that the isolated categories slip through -his fingers before he is aware, and that he says the exact contrary of -what he wanted to say. - -(2) Objectivity contains the three forms of Mechanism, Chemism, -and Teleology. The object of mechanical type is the immediate and -undifferentiated object. No doubt it contains difference, but the -different pieces stand, as it were, without affinity to each other, -and their connexion is only extraneous. In chemism, on the contrary, -the object exhibits an essential tendency to differentiation, in such -a way that the objects are what they are only by their relation to -each other: this tendency to difference constitutes their quality. -The third type of objectivity, the teleological relation, is the -unity of mechanism and chemism. Design, like the mechanical object, -is a self-contained totality, enriched however by the principle of -differentiation which came to the fore in chemism, and thus referring -itself to the object that stands over against it. Finally, it is the -realisation of design which forms the transition to the Idea. - -(a) _Mechanism._ - -196.] The object (1) in its immediacy is the notion only potentially; -the notion as subjective is primarily outside it; and all its -specific character is imposed from without. As a unity of differents, -therefore, it is a composite, an aggregate; and its capacity of -acting on anything else continues to be an external relation. This is -Formal Mechanism.--Notwithstanding, and in this connexion and -non-independence, the objects remain independent and offer resistance, -external to each other. - -Pressure and impact are examples of mechanical relations. Our knowledge -is said to be mechanical or by rote, when the words have no meaning -for us, but continue external to sense, conception, thought; and -when, being similarly external to each other, they form a meaningless -sequence. Conduct, piety, &c. are in the same way mechanical, when a -man's behaviour is settled for him by ceremonial laws, by a spiritual -adviser, &c.; in short, when his own mind and will are not in his -actions, which in this way are extraneous to himself. - - * * * * * - -Mechanism, the first form of objectivity, is also the category which -primarily offers itself to reflection, as it examines the objective -world. It is also the category beyond which reflection seldom goes. -It is, however, a shallow and superficial mode of observation, one -that cannot carry us through in connexion with Nature and still less -in connexion with the world of Mind. In Nature it is only the veriest -abstract relations of matter in its inert masses which obey the law of -mechanism. On the contrary the phenomena and operations of the province -to which the term 'physical' in its narrower sense is applied, such as -the phenomena of light, heat, magnetism, and electricity, cannot be -explained by any mere mechanical processes, such as pressure, impact, -displacement of parts, and the like. Still less satisfactory is it -to transfer these categories and apply them in the field of organic -nature; at least if it be our aim to understand the specific features -of that field, such as the growth and nourishment of plants, or, it -may be, even animal sensation. It is at any rate a very deep-seated, -and perhaps the main, defect of modern researches into nature, that, -even where other and higher categories than those of mere mechanism -are in operation, they still stick obstinately to the mechanical laws; -although they thus conflict with the testimony of unbiassed perception, -and foreclose the gate to an-adequate knowledge of nature. But even -in considering the formations in the world of Mind, the mechanical -theory has been repeatedly invested with an authority which it has no -right to. Take as an instance the remark that man consists of soul and -body. In this language, the two things stand each self-subsistent, and -associated only from without. Similarly we find the soul regarded as a -mere group of forces and faculties, subsisting independently side by -side. - -Thus decidedly must we reject the mechanical mode of inquiry when it -comes forward and arrogates to itself the place of rational cognition -in general, and seeks to get mechanism accepted as an absolute -category. But we must not on that account forget expressly to vindicate -for mechanism the right and import of a general logical category. It -would be, therefore, a mistake to restrict it to the special physical -department from which it derives its name. There is no harm done, for -example, in directing attention to mechanical actions, such as that -of gravity, the lever, &c, even in departments, notably in physics -and in physiology, beyond the range of mechanics proper. It must -however be remembered, that within these spheres the laws of mechanism -cease to be final or decisive, and sink, as it were, to a subservient -position. To which may be added, that, in Nature, when the higher -or organic functions are in any way checked or disturbed in their -normal efficiency, the otherwise subordinate category of mechanism -is immediately seen to take the upper hand. Thus a sufferer from -indigestion feels pressure on the stomach, after partaking of certain -food in slight quantity; whereas those whose digestive organs are sound -remain free from the sensation, although they have eaten as much. The -same phenomenon occurs in the general feeling of heaviness in the -limbs, experienced in bodily indisposition. Even in the world of Mind, -mechanism has its place; though there, too, it is a subordinate one. We -are right in speaking of mechanical memory, and all sorts of mechanical -operations, such as reading, writing, playing on musical instruments, -&c. In memory, indeed, the mechanical quality of the action is -essential: a circumstance, the neglect of which has not unfrequently -caused great harm in the training of the young, from the misapplied -zeal of modern educationalists for the freedom of intelligence. It -would betray bad psychology, however, to have recourse to mechanism for -an explanation of the nature of memory, and to apply mechanical laws -straight off to the soul. The mechanical feature in memory lies merely -in the fact that certain signs, tones, &c. are apprehended in their -purely external association, and then reproduced in this association, -without attention being expressly directed to their meaning and inward -association. To become acquainted with these conditions of mechanical -memory requires no further study of mechanics, nor would that study -tend at all to advance the special inquiry of psychology. - -196.] The want of stability in itself which allows the object to suffer -violence, is possessed by it (see preceding §) only in so far as it -has a certain stability. Now as the object is implicitly invested -with the character of notion, the one of these characteristics is not -merged into its other; but the object, through the negation of itself -(its lack of independence), closes with itself, and not till it so -closes, is it independent. Thus at the same time in distinction from -the outwardness, and negativing that outwardness in its independence, -does this independence form a negative unity with self,--Centrality -(subjectivity). So conceived, the object itself has direction and -reference towards the external. But this external object is similarly -central in itself, and being so, is no less only referred towards the -other centre; so that it no less has its centrality in the other. This -is (2) Mechanism with Affinity (with bias, or 'difference'), and -may be illustrated by gravitation, appetite, social instinct, &c. - -197.] This relationship, when fully carried out, forms a syllogism. In -that syllogism the immanent negativity, as the central individuality -of an object, (abstract centre,) relates itself to non-independent -objects, as the other extreme, by a mean which unites the centrality -with the non-independence of the objects, (relative centre.) This is -(3) Absolute Mechanism. - -198.] The syllogism thus indicated (I--P--U) is a triad of syllogisms. -The wrong individuality of non-independent objects, in which formal -Mechanism is at home, is, by reason of that non-independence, no -less universality, though it be only external. Hence these objects -also form the mean between the absolute and the relative centre -(the form of syllogism being U--I--P): for it is by this want of -independence that those two are kept asunder and made extremes, as -well as related to one another. Similarly absolute centrality, as the -permanently-underlying universal substance (illustrated by the gravity -which continues identical), which as pure negativity equally includes -individuality in it, is what mediates between the relative centre and -the non-independent objects (the form of syllogism being P--U--I). It -does so no less essentially as a disintegrating force, in its character -of immanent individuality, than in virtue of universality, acting as an -identical bond of union and tranquil self-containedness. - -Like the solar system, so for example in the practical sphere the state -is a system of three syllogisms. (1) The Individual or person, through -his particularity or physical or mental needs (which when carried -out to their full development give _civil_ society), is coupled with -the universal, _i.e._ with society, law, right, government. (2) The -will or action of the individuals is the intermediating force which -procures for these needs satisfaction in society, in law, &c, and -which gives to society, law, &c. their fulfilment and actualisation. -(3) But the universal, that is to say the state, government, and law, -is the permanent underlying mean in which the individuals and their -satisfaction have and receive their fulfilled reality, inter-mediation, -and persistence. Each of the functions of the notion, as it is brought -by intermediation to coalesce with the other extreme, is brought -into union with itself and produces itself: which production is -self-preservation.--It is only by the nature of this triple coupling, -by this triad of syllogisms with the name _termini,_ that a whole is -thoroughly understood in its organisation. - -199.] The immediacy of existence, which the objects have in Absolute -Mechanism, is implicitly negatived by the fact that their independence -is derived from, and due to, their connexions with each other, and -therefore to their own want of stability. Thus the object must be -explicitly stated as in its existence having an Affinity (or a -bias) towards its other,--as not-indifferent. - -(b) _Chemism_. - -200.] The not-indifferent (biassed) object has an immanent mode which -constitutes its nature, and in which it has existence. But as it is -invested with the character of total notion, it is the contradiction -between this totality and the special mode of its existence. -Consequently it is the constant endeavour to cancel this contradiction -and to make its definite being equal to the notion. - - * * * * * - -Chemism is a category of objectivity which, as a rule, is not -particularly emphasised, and is generally put under the head of -mechanism. The common name of mechanical relationship is applied to -both, in contra-distinction to the teleological. There is a reason for -this in the common feature which belongs to mechanism and chemism. In -them the notion exists, but only implicit and latent, and they are thus -both marked off from teleology where the notion has real independent -existence. This is true: and yet chemism and mechanism are very -decidedly distinct. The object, in the form of mechanism, is primarily -only an indifferent reference to self, while the chemical object is -seen to be completely in reference to something else. No doubt even -in mechanism, as it develops itself, there spring up references to -something else: but the nexus of mechanical objects with one another is -at first only an external nexus, so that the objects in connexion with -one another still retain the semblance of independence. In nature, for -example; the several celestial bodies, which form our solar system, -compose a kinetic system, and thereby show that they are related to -one another. Motion, however, as the unity of time and space, is a -connexion which is purely abstract and external. And it seems therefore -as if these celestial bodies, which are thus externally connected with -each other, would continue to be what they are, even apart from this -reciprocal relation. The case is quite different with chemism. Objects -chemically biassed are what they are expressly by that bias alone. -Hence they are the absolute impulse towards integration by and in one -another. - -201.] The product of the chemical process consequently is the Neutral -object, latent in the two extremes, each on the alert. The notion -or concrete universal, by means of the bias of the objects (the -particularity), coalesces with the individuality (in the shape of the -product), and in that only with itself. In this process too the other -syllogisms are equally involved. The place of mean is taken both by -individuality as activity, and by the concrete universal, the essence -of the strained extremes; which essence reaches definite being in the -product. - -202.] Chemism, as it is a reflectional nexus of objectivity, has -pre-supposed, not merely the bias or non-indifferent nature of the -objects, but also their immediate independence. The process of chemism -consists in passing to and fro from one form to another; which forms -continue to be as external as before.--In the neutral product the -specific properties, which the extremes bore towards each other, are -merged. But although the product is conformable to the notion, the -inspiring principle of active differentiation does not exist in it; for -it has sunk back to immediacy. The neutral body is therefore capable -of disintegration. But the discerning principle, which breaks up the -neutral body into biassed and strained extremes, and which gives to -the indifferent object in general its affinity and animation towards -another;--that principle, and the process as a separation with tension, -falls outside of that first process. - - * * * * * - -The chemical process does not rise above a conditioned and finite -process. The notion as notion is only the heart and core of the -process, and does not in this stage come to an existence of its own. -In the neutral product the process is extinct, and the existing cause -falls outside it. - -203.] Each of these two processes, the reduction of the biassed -(not-indifferent) to the neutral, and the differentiation of the -indifferent or neutral, goes its own way without hindrance from the -other. But that want of inner connexion shows that they are finite, -by their passage into products in which they are merged and lost. -Conversely the process exhibits the nonentity of the pre-supposed -immediacy of the not-indifferent objects.--By this negation of -immediacy and of externalism in which the notion as object was sunk, -it is liberated and invested with independent being in face of that -externalism and immediacy. In these circumstances it is the End (Final -Cause). - - * * * * * - -The passage from chemism to the teleological relation is implied in the -mutual cancelling of both of the forms of the chemical process. The -result thus attained is the liberation of the notion, which in chemism -and mechanism was present only in the germ, and not yet evolved. The -notion in the shape of the aim or end thus comes into independent -existence. - -(c) _Teleology._ - -204.] In the End the notion has entered on free existence -and has a being of its own, by means of the negation of immediate -objectivity. It is characterised as subjective, seeing that this -negation is, in the first place, abstract, and hence at first the -relation between it and objectivity still one of contrast. This -character of subjectivity, however, compared with the totality of the -notion, is one-sided, and that, be it added, for the End itself, in -which all specific characters have been put as subordinated and merged. -For it therefore even the object, which it pre-supposes, has only -hypothetical (ideal) reality,--essentially no-reality. The End in short -is a contradiction of its self-identity against the negation stated in -it, _i.e._ its antithesis to objectivity, and being so, contains the -eliminative or destructive activity which negates the antithesis and -renders it identical with itself. This is the realisation of the End: -in which, while it turns itself into the other of its subjectivity and -objectifies itself, thus cancelling the distinction between the two, it -has only closed with itself, and retained itself. - -The notion of Design or End, while on one hand called redundant, is on -another justly described as the rational notion, and contrasted with -the abstract universal of understanding. The latter only _subsumes_ -the particular, and so connects it with itself: but has it not in its -own nature.--The distinction between the End or _final cause,_ and the -mere _efficient cause_ (which is the cause ordinarily so called), is of -supreme importance. Causes, properly so called, belong to the sphere of -necessity, blind, and not yet laid bare. The cause therefore appears -as passing into its correlative, and losing its primordiality there by -sinking into dependency. It is only by implication, or for us, that -the cause is in the effect made for the first time a cause, and that -it there returns into itself. The End, on the other hand, is expressly -stated as containing the specific character in its own self,--the -effect, namely, which in the purely causal relation is never free from -otherness. The End therefore in its efficiency does not pass over, but -retains itself, _i.e._ it carries into effect itself only, and is at -the end what it was in the beginning or primordial state. Until it thus -retains itself, it is not genuinely primordial.--The End then requires -to be speculatively apprehended as the notion, which itself in the -proper unity and ideality of its characteristics contains the judgment -or negation,--the antithesis of subjective and objective,--and which to -an equal extent suspends that antithesis. - -By End however we must not at once, nor must we ever merely, think -of the form which it has in consciousness as a mode of mere mental -representation. By means of the notion of Inner Design Kant has -resuscitated the Idea in general and particularly the idea of life. -Aristotle's definition of life virtually implies inner design, and is -thus far in advance of the notion of design in modern Teleology, which -had in view finite and outward design only. - -Animal wants and appetites are some of the readiest instances of -the End. They are the _felt_ contradiction, which exists _within_ -the living subject, and pass into the activity of negating this -negation which mere subjectivity still is. The satisfaction of the -want or appetite restores the peace between subject and object. The -objective thing which, so long as the contradiction exists, _i.e._ -so long as the want is felt, stands on the other side, loses this -quasi-independence, by its union with the subject. Those who talk of -the permanence and immutability of the finite, as well subjective as -objective, may see the reverse illustrated in the operations of every -appetite. Appetite is, so to speak, the conviction that the subjective -is only a half-truth, no more adequate than the objective. But appetite -in the second place carries out its conviction. It brings about the -supersession of these finites: it cancels the antithesis between the -objective which would be and stay an objective only, and the subjective -which in like manner would be and stay a subjective only. - -As regards the action of the End, attention may be called to the fact, -that in the syllogism, which represents that action, and shows the end -closing with itself by the means of realisation, the radical feature is -the negation of the _termini._ That negation is the one just mentioned -both of the immediate subjectivity appearing in the End as such, and -of the immediate objectivity as seen in the means and the objects -pre-supposed. This is the same negation, as is in operation when the -mind leaves the contingent things of the world as well as its own -subjectivity and rises to God. It is the 'moment' or factor which (as -noticed in the Introduction and § 192) was overlooked and neglected in -the analytic form of syllogisms, under which the so-called proofs of -the Being of a God presented this elevation. - -205.] In its primary and immediate aspect the Teleological relation -is _external_ design, and the notion confronts a pre-supposed object. -The End is consequently finite, and that partly in its content, -partly in the circumstance that it has an external condition in the -object, which has to be found existing, and which is taken as material -for its realisation. Its self-determining is to that extent in form -only. The un-mediatedness of the End has the further result that -its particularity or content--which as form-characteristic is the -subjectivity of the End--is reflected into self, and so different from -the totality of the form, subjectivity in general, the notion. This -variety constitutes the finitude of Design within its own nature. The -content of the End. in this way, is quite as limited, contingent, and -given, as the object is particular and found ready to hand. - - * * * * * - -Generally speaking, the final cause is taken to mean nothing more -than external design. In accordance with this view of it, things are -supposed not to carry their vocation in themselves, but merely to be -means employed and spent in realising a purpose which lies outside -of them. That may be said to be the point of view taken by Utility, -which once played a great part even in the sciences, but of late has -fallen into merited disrepute, now that people have begun to see that -it failed to give a genuine insight into the nature of things. It is -true that finite things as finite ought in justice to be viewed as -non-ultimate, and as pointing beyond themselves. This negativity of -finite things however is their own dialectic, and in order to ascertain -it we must pay attention to their positive content. - -Teleological observations on things often proceed from a well-meant -wish to display the wisdom of God as it is especially revealed in -nature. Now in thus trying to discover final causes for which the -things serve as means, we must remember that we are stopping short -at the finite, and are liable to fall into trifling reflections: as, -for instance, if we not merely studied the vine in respect of its -well-known use for man, but proceeded to consider the cork-tree in -connexion with the corks which are cut from its bark to put into the -wine-bottles. Whole books used to be written in this spirit. It is easy -to see that they promoted the genuine interest neither of religion nor -of science. External design stands immediately in front of the idea: -but what thus stands on the threshold often for that reason is least -adequate. - -206.] The teleological relation is a syllogism in which the subjective -end coalesces with the objectivity external to it, through a middle -term which is the unity of both. This unity is on one hand the -_purposive_ action, on the other the _Means, i.e._ objectivity made -directly subservient to purpose. - - * * * * * - -The development from End to Idea ensues by three stages, first, -Subjective End; second, End in process of accomplishment; and third, -End accomplished. First of all we have the Subjective End; and that, -as the notion in independent being, is itself the totality of the -elementary functions of the notion. The first of these functions -is that of self-identical universality, as it were the neutral -first water, in which everything is involved, but nothing as yet -discriminated. The second of these elements is the particularising -of this universal, by which it acquires a specific content. As this -specific content again is realised by the agency of the universal, the -latter returns by its means back to itself, and coalesces with itself. -Hence too when we set some end before us, we say that we 'conclude' to -do something: a phrase which implies that we were, so to speak, open -and accessible to this or that determination. Similarly we also at a -further step speak of a man 'resolving' to do something, meaning that -the agent steps forward out of his self-regarding inwardness and enters -into dealings with the environing objectivity. This supplies the step -from the merely Subjective End to the purposive action which tends -outwards. - -207.] (1) The first syllogism of the final cause represents the -Subjective End. The universal notion is brought to unite with -individuality by means of particularity, so that the individual -as self-determination acts as judge. That is to say, it not only -particularises or makes into a determinate content the still -indeterminate universal, but also explicitly puts an antithesis of -subjectivity and objectivity, and at the same time is in its own self -a return to itself; for it stamps the subjectivity of the notion, -pre-supposed as against objectivity, with the mark of defect, in -comparison with the complete and rounded totality, and thereby at the -same time turns outwards. - -208.] (2) This action which is directed outwards is the individuality, -which in the Subjective End is identical with the particularity -under which, along with the content, is also comprised the external -objectivity. It throws itself in the first place immediately upon the -object, which it appropriates to itself as a Means. The notion is this -immediate power; for the notion is the self-identical negativity, in -which the being of the object is characterised as wholly and merely -ideal.--The whole Means then is this inward power of the notion, in the -shape of an agency, with which the object as Means is 'immediately' -united and in obedience to which it stands. - -In finite teleology the Means is thus broken up into two elements -external to each other, (a) the action and (b) the object which serves -as Means. The relation of the final cause as power to this object, and -the subjugation of the object to it, is immediate (it forms the first -premiss in the syllogism) to this extent, that in the teleological -notion as the self-existent ideality the object is put as potentially -null. This relation, as represented in the first premiss, itself -becomes the Means, which at the same time involves the syllogism, that -through this relation--in which the action of the End is contained and -dominant--the End is coupled with objectivity. - - * * * * * - -The execution of the End is the mediated mode of realising the End; but -the immediate realisation is not less needful. The End lays hold of the -object immediately, because it is the power over the object, because -in the End particularity, and in particularity objectivity also, is -involved.--A living being has a body; the soul takes possession of it -and without intermediary has objectified itself in it. The human soul -has much to do, before it makes its corporeal nature into a means. Man -must, as it were, take possession of his body, so that it may be the -instrument of his soul. - -209.] (3) Purposive action, with its Means, is still directed outwards, -because the End is also _not_ identical with the object, and must -consequently first be mediated with it. The Means in its capacity of -object stands, in this second premiss, in direct relation to the other -extreme of the syllogism, namely, the material or objectivity which is -pre-supposed. This relation is the sphere of chemism and mechanism, -which have now become the servants of the Final Cause, where lies their -truth and free notion. Thus the Subjective End, which is the power -ruling these processes, in which the objective things wear themselves -out on one another, contrives to keep itself free from them, and to -preserve itself in them. Doing so, it appears as the Cunning of reason. - - * * * * * - -Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be said to lie -in the inter-mediative action which, while it permits the objects to -follow their own bent and act upon one another till they waste away, -and does not itself directly interfere in the process, is nevertheless -only working out its own aims. With this explanation, Divine Providence -may be said to stand to the world and its process in the capacity of -absolute cunning. God lets men do as they please with their particular -passions and interests; but the result is the accomplishment of--not -their plans, but His, and these differ decidedly from the ends -primarily sought by those whom He employs. - -210.] The realised End is thus the overt unity of subjective and -objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this unity, that -the subjective and objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the -point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is subdued and made -conformable to the End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power -above it. The End maintains itself against and in the objective -for it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is also the -concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. This universal, as -simply reflected in itself, is the content which remains unchanged -through all the three _termini_ of the syllogism and their movement. - -211.] In finite design, however, even the executed End has the same -radical rift or flaw as had the Means and the initial End. We have -got therefore only a form extraneously impressed on a pre-existing -material: and this form, by reason of the limited content of the End, -is also a contingent characteristic. The End achieved consequently is -only an object, which again becomes a Means or material for other Ends, -and so on for ever. - -212.] But what virtually happens in the realising of the End is that -the one-sided subjectivity and the show of objective independence -confronting it are both cancelled. In laying hold of the means, the -notion constitutes itself the very implicit essence of the object. In -the mechanical and chemical processes the independence of the object -has been already dissipated implicitly, and in the course of their -movement under the dominion of the End, the show of that independence, -the negative which confronts the notion, is got rid of. But in the fact -that the End achieved is characterised only as a Means and a material, -this object, viz. the teleological, is there and then put as implicitly -null, and only 'ideal.' This being so, the antithesis between form -and content has also vanished. While the End by the removal and -absorption of all form-characteristics coalesces with itself, the form -as self-identical is thereby put as the content, so that the notion, -which is the action of form, has only itself for content. Through this -process, therefore, there is made explicitly manifest what was the -notion of design: viz. the implicit unity of subjective and objective -is now realised. And this is the Idea. - - * * * * * - -This finitude of the End consists in the circumstance, that, in the -process of realising it, the material, which is employed as a means, -is only externally subsumed under it and made conformable to it. But, -as a matter of fact, the object is the notion implicitly: and thus -when the notion, in the shape of End, is realised in the object, we -have but the manifestation of the inner nature of the object itself. -Objectivity is thus, as it were, only a covering under which the notion -lies concealed. Within the range of the finite we can never see or -experience that the End has been really secured. The consummation of -the infinite End, therefore, consists merely in removing the illusion -which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, -is eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that -it needs not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in -full actuality, accomplished. This is the illusion under which we live. -It alone supplies at the same time the actualising force on which the -interest in the world reposes. In the course of its process the Idea -creates that illusion, by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its -action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. -Only out of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the -reconciliation with error and with finitude. Error or other-being, when -superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth -can only be where it makes itself its own result. - - -C.--THE IDEA. - -213.] The Idea is truth in itself and for itself,--the absolute -unity of the notion and objectivity. Its 'ideal' content is nothing -but the notion in its detailed terms: its 'real' content is only the -exhibition which the notion gives itself in the form of external -existence, whilst yet, by enclosing this shape in its ideality, it -keeps it in its power, and so keeps itself in it. - -The definition, which declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself -absolute. All former definitions come back to this. The Idea is -the Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the -notion:--not of course the correspondence of external things with my -conceptions,--for these are only _correct_ conceptions held by _me,_ -the individual person. In the idea we have nothing to do with the -individual, nor with figurate conceptions, nor with external things. -And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the -Idea, and has its truth by and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every -individual being is some one aspect of the Idea: for which, therefore, -yet other actualities are needed, which in their turn appear to have -a self-subsistence of their own. It is only in them altogether and -in their relation that the notion is realised. The individual by -itself does not correspond to its notion. It is this limitation of its -existence which constitutes the finitude and the ruin of the individual. - -The Idea itself is not to be taken as an idea of something or other, -any more than the notion is to be taken as merely a specific notion. -The Absolute is the universal and one idea, which, by an act of -'judgment,' particularises itself to the system of specific ideas; -which after all are constrained by their nature to come back to the one -idea where their truth lies. As issued out of this 'judgment' the Idea -is _in the first place_ only the one universal _substance:_ but its -developed and genuine actuality is to be as a _subject_ and in that way -as mind. - -Because it has no _existence_ for starting-point and _point d'appui,_ -the Idea is frequently treated as a mere logical form. Such a view must -be abandoned to those theories, which ascribe so-called reality and -genuine actuality to the existent thing and all the other categories -which have not yet penetrated as far as the Idea. It is no less false -to imagine the Idea to be mere abstraction. It is abstract certainly, -in so far as everything untrue is consumed in it: but in its own self -it is essentially concrete, because it is the free notion giving -character to itself, and that character, reality. It would be an -abstract form, only if the notion, which is its principle, were taken -as an abstract unity, and not as the negative return of it into self -and as the subjectivity which it really is. - - * * * * * - -Truth is at first taken to mean that I _know_ how something _is._ This -is truth, however, only in reference to consciousness; it is formal -truth, bare correctness. Truth in the deeper sense consists in the -identity between objectivity and the notion. It is in this deeper sense -of truth that we speak of a true state, or of a true work of art. These -objects are true, if they are as they ought to be, _i.e._ if their -reality corresponds to their notion. When thus viewed, to be untrue -means much the same as to be bad. A bad man is an untrue man, a man -who does not behave as his notion or his vocation requires. Nothing -however can subsist, if it be _wholly_ devoid of identity between the -notion and reality. Even bad and untrue things have being, in so far -as their reality still, somehow, conforms to their notion. Whatever -is thoroughly bad or contrary to the notion, is for that very reason -on the way to ruin. It is by the notion alone that the things in the -world have their subsistence; or, as it is expressed in the language of -religious conception, things are what they are, only in virtue of the -divine and thereby creative thought which dwells within them. - -When we hear the Idea spoken of, we need not imagine something far -away beyond this mortal sphere. The idea is rather what is completely -present: and it is found, however confused and degenerated, in -every consciousness. We conceive the world to ourselves as a great -totality which is created by God, and so created that in it God has -manifested Himself to us. We regard the world also as ruled by Divine -Providence: implying that the scattered and divided parts of the world -are continually brought back, and made conformable, to the unity from -which they have issued. The purpose of philosophy has always been the -intellectual ascertainment of the Idea; and everything deserving the -name of philosophy has constantly been based on the consciousness -of an absolute unity where the understanding sees and accepts only -separation.--It is too late now to ask for proof that the Idea is -the truth. The proof of that is contained in the whole deduction and -development of thought up to this point. The idea is the result of -this course of dialectic. Not that it is to be supposed that the idea -is mediate only, _i.e._ mediated through something else than itself. -It is rather its own result, and being so, is no less immediate than -mediate. The stages hitherto considered, viz. those of Being and -Essence, as well as those of Notion and of Objectivity, are not, when -so distinguished, something permanent, resting upon themselves. They -have proved to be dialectical; and their only truth is that they are -dynamic elements of the idea. - -214.] The Idea may be described in many ways. It may be called reason -(and this is the proper philosophical signification of reason); -subject-object; the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and -the infinite, of soul and body; the possibility which has its actuality -in its own self; that of which the nature can be thought only as -existent, &c. All these descriptions apply, because the Idea contains -all the relations of understanding, but contains them in their infinite -self-return and self-identity. - -It is easy work for the understanding to show that everything said -of the Idea is self-contradictory. But that can quite as well be -retaliated, or rather in the Idea the retaliation is actually made. And -this work, which is the work of reason, is certainly not so easy as -that of the understanding. Understanding may demonstrate that the Idea -is self-contradictory: because the subjective is subjective only and is -always confronted by the objective,--because being is different from -notion and therefore cannot be picked out of it,--because the finite -is finite only, the exact antithesis of the infinite, and therefore -not identical with it; and so on with every term of the description. -The reverse of all this however is the doctrine of Logic. Logic shows -that the subjective which is to be subjective only, the finite which -would be finite only, the infinite which would be infinite only, and so -on, have no truth, but contradict themselves, and pass over into their -opposites. Hence this transition, and the unity in which the extremes -are merged and become factors, each with a merely reflected existence, -reveals itself as their truth. - -The understanding, which addresses itself to deal with the Idea, -commits a double misunderstanding. It takes _first_ the extremes of -the Idea (be they expressed as they will, so long as they are in their -unity), not as they are understood when stamped with this concrete -unity, but as if they remained abstractions outside of it. It no less -mistakes the relation between them, ever when it has been expressly -stated. Thus, for example it overlooks even the nature of the copula -in the judgment, which affirms that the individual, or subject, is -after all not individual, but universal. But, in the _second_ place, -the understanding believes _its_ 'reflection,'--that the self-identical -Idea contains its own negative, or contains contradiction,--to be an -external reflection which does not lie within the Idea itself. But the -reflection is really no peculiar cleverness of the understanding. The -Idea itself is the dialectic which for ever divides and distinguishes -the self-identical from the differentiated, the subjective from the -objective, the finite from the infinite, soul from body. Only on -these terms is it an eternal creation, eternal vitality, and eternal -spirit. But while it thus passes or rather translates itself into the -abstract understanding, it for ever remains reason. The Idea is the -dialectic which again makes this mass of understanding and diversity -understand its finite nature and the pseudo-independence in its -productions, and which brings the diversity back to unity. Since this -double movement is not separate or distinct in time, nor indeed in any -other way--otherwise it would be only a repetition of the abstract -understanding--the Idea is the eternal vision of itself in the other, ---notion which in its objectivity _has_ carried out _itself,_--object -which is inward design, essential subjectivity. - -The different modes of apprehending the Idea as unity of ideal and -real, of finite and infinite, of identity and difference, &c. are more -or less formal. They designate some one stage of the _specific_ notion. -Only the notion itself, however, is free and the genuine universal: -in the Idea, therefore, the specific character of the notion is -only the notion itself,--an objectivity, viz. into which it, being -the universal, continues itself, and in which it has only its own -character, the total character. The Idea is the infinite judgment, of -which the terms are severally the independent totality; and in which, -as each grows to the fulness of its own nature, it has thereby at the -same time passed into the other. None of the other specific notions -exhibits this totality complete on both its sides as the notion itself -and objectivity. - -215.] The Idea is essentially a process, because its identity is the -absolute and free identity of the notion, only in so far as it is -absolute negativity and for that reason dialectical. It is the round of -movement, in which the notion, in the capacity of universality which -is individuality, gives itself the character of objectivity and of the -antithesis thereto; and this externality which has the notion for its -substance, finds its way back to subjectivity through its immanent -dialectic. - -As the idea is (a) a process, it follows that such an expression for -the Absolute as _unity_ of thought and being, of finite and infinite, -&c. is false; for unity expresses an abstract and merely quiescent -identity. As the Idea is (b) subjectivity, it follows that the -expression is equally false on another account. That unity of which -it speaks expresses a merely virtual or underlying presence of the -genuine unity. The infinite would thus seem to be merely _neutralised_ -by the finite, the subjective by the objective, thought by being. But -in the negative unity of the Idea, the infinite overlaps and includes -the finite, thought overlaps being, subjectivity overlaps objectivity. -The unity of the Idea is thought, infinity, and subjectivity, and -is in consequence to be essentially distinguished from the Idea as -_substance,_ just as this overlapping subjectivity, thought, or -infinity is to be distinguished from the one-sided subjectivity, -one-sided thought, one-sided infinity to which it descends in judging -and defining. - - * * * * * - -The idea as a process runs through three stages in its development. -The first form of the idea is Life: that is, the idea in the form of -immediacy. The second form is that of mediation or differentiation; -and this is the idea in the form of Knowledge, which appears under -the double aspect of the Theoretical and Practical idea. The process -of knowledge eventuates in the restoration of the unity enriched by -difference. This gives the third form of the idea, the Absolute Idea: -which last stage of the logical idea evinces itself to be at the same -time the true first, and to have a being due to itself alone. - -(a) _Life._ - -216.] The _immediate_ idea is Life. As _soul,_ the notion is -realised in a body of whose externality the soul is the immediate -self-relating universality. But the soul is also its particularisation, -so that the body expresses no other distinctions than follow from the -characterisations of its notion. And finally it is the Individuality -of the body as infinite negativity,--the dialectic of that bodily -objectivity, with its parts lying out of one another, conveying -them away from the semblance of independent subsistence back into -subjectivity, so that all the members are reciprocally momentary -means as well as momentary ends. Thus as life is the initial -particularisation, so it results in the negative self-asserting unity: -in the dialectic of its corporeity it only coalesces with itself. -In this way life is essentially something alive, and in point of -its immediacy this individual living thing. It is characteristic of -finitude in this sphere that, by reason of the immediacy of the idea, -body and soul are separable. This constitutes the mortality of the -living being. It is only, however, when the living being is dead, that -these two sides of the idea are different _ingredients._ - - * * * * * - -The single members of the body are what they are only by and in -relation to their unity. A hand _e.g._ when hewn off from the body is, -as Aristotle has observed, a hand in name only, not in fact. From the -point of view of understanding, life is usually spoken of as a mystery, -and in general as incomprehensible. By giving it such a name, however, -the Understanding only confesses its own finitude and nullity. So far -is life from being incomprehensible, that in it the very notion is -presented to us, or rather the immediate idea existing as a notion. And -having said this, we have indicated the defect of life. Its notion and -reality do not thoroughly correspond to each other. The notion of life -is the soul, and this notion has the body for its reality. The soul is, -as it were, infused into its corporeity; and in that way it is at first -sentient only, and not yet freely self-conscious. The process of life -consists in getting the better of the immediacy with which it is still -beset: and this process, which is itself threefold, results in the idea -under the form of judgment, _i.e._ the idea as Cognition. - -217.] A living being is a syllogism, of which the very elements are in -themselves systems and syllogisms (§§ 198, 201, 207). They are however -active syllogisms or processes; and in the subjective unity of the -vital agent make only one process. Thus the living being is the process -of its coalescence with itself, which runs on through three processes. - -218.] (1) The first is the process of the living being inside itself. -In that process it makes a split on its own self, and reduces its -corporeity to its object or its inorganic nature. This corporeity, as -an aggregate of correlations, enters in its very nature into difference -and opposition of its elements, which mutually become each other's -prey, and assimilate one another, and are retained by producing -themselves. Yet this action of the several members (organs), is only -the living subject's one act to which their productions revert; so that -in these productions nothing is produced except the subject: in other -words, the subject only reproduces itself. - - * * * * * - -The process of the vital subject within its own limits has in Nature -the threefold form of Sensibility, Irritability, and Reproduction. As -Sensibility, the living being is immediately simple self-relation--it -is the soul omnipresent in its body, the outsideness of each member of -which to others has for it no truth. As Irritability, the living being -appears split up in itself; and as Reproduction, it is perpetually -restoring itself from the inner distinction of its members and organs. -A vital agent only exists as this continually self-renewing process -within its own limits. - -219.] (2) But the judgment of the notion proceeds, as free, to -discharge the objective or bodily nature as an independent totality -from itself; and the negative relation of the living thing to itself -makes, as immediate individuality, the pre-supposition of an inorganic -nature confronting it. As this negative of the animate is no less a -function in the notion of the animate itself, it exists consequently -in the latter (which is at the same time a concrete universal) in the -shape of a defect or want. The dialectic by which the object, being -implicitly null, is merged, is the action of the self-assured living -thing, which in this process against an inorganic nature thus retains, -develops, and objectifies itself. - - * * * * * - -The living being stands face to face with an inorganic nature, to which -it comports itself as a master and which it assimilates to itself. -The result of the assimilation is not, as in the chemical process, a -neutral product in which the independence of the two confronting sides -is merged; but the living being shows itself as large enough to embrace -its other which cannot withstand its power. The inorganic nature -which is subdued by the vital agent suffers this fate, because it is -_virtually_ the same as what life is _actually._ Thus in the other the -living being only coalesces with itself. But when the soul has fled -from the body, the elementary powers of objectivity begin their play. -These powers are, as it were, continually on the spring, ready to begin -their process in the organic body; and life is the constant battle -against them. - -220.] (3) The living individual, which in its first process comports -itself as intrinsically subject and notion, through its second -assimilates its external objectivity and thus puts the character of -reality into itself. It is now therefore implicitly a Kind, with -essential universality of nature. The particularising of this Kind is -the relation of the living subject to another subject of its Kind: and -the judgment is the tie of Kind over these individuals thus appointed -for each other. This is the Affinity of the Sexes. - -221.] The process of Kind brings it to a being of its own. Life being -no more than the idea immediate, the product of this process breaks -up into two sides. On the one hand, the living individual, which was -at first pre-supposed as immediate, is now seen to be mediated and -generated. On the other, however, the living individuality, which, on -account of its first immediacy, stands in a negative attitude towards -universality, sinks in the superior power of the latter. - - * * * * * - -The living being dies, because it is a contradiction. Implicitly it is -the universal or Kind, and yet immediately it exists as an individual -only. Death shows the Kind to be the power that rules the immediate -individual. For the animal the process of Kind is the highest point of -its vitality. But the animal never gets so far in its Kind as to have -a being of its own; it succumbs to the power of Kind. In the process -of Kind the immediate living being mediates itself with itself, and -thus rises above its immediacy, only however to sink back into it -again. Life thus runs away, in the first instance, only into the false -infinity of the progress _ad infinitum._ The real result, however, -of the process of life, in the point of its notion, is to merge and -overcome that immediacy with which the idea, in the shape of life, is -still beset. - -222.] In this manner however the idea of life has thrown off not some -one particular and immediate 'This,' but this first immediacy as a -whole. It thus comes to itself, to its truth: it enters upon existence -as a free Kind self-subsistent. The death of merely immediate and -individual vitality is the 'procession' of spirit. - - -(b) _Cognition in general._ - -223.] The idea exists free for itself, in so far as it has universality -for the medium of its existence,--as objectivity itself has -notional being,--as the idea is its own object. Its subjectivity, -thus universalised, is _pure_ self-contained distinguishing of the -idea,--intuition which keeps itself in this identical universality. -But, as _specific_ distinguishing, it is the further judgment of -repelling itself as a totality from itself, and thus, in the first -place, pre-supposing itself as an external universe. There are two -judgments, which though implicitly identical are not yet explicitly put -as identical. - -224.] The relation of these two ideas, which implicitly and as life are -identical, is thus one of correlation: and it is that correlativity -which constitutes the characteristic of finitude in this sphere. It -is the relationship of reflection, seeing that the distinguishing of -the idea in its own self is only the first judgment--presupposing the -other and not yet supposing itself to constitute it. And thus for the -subjective idea the objective is the immediate world found ready to -hand, or the idea as life is in the phenomenon of individual existence. -At the same time, in so far as this judgment is pure distinguishing -within its own limits (§ 223), the idea realises in one both itself and -its other. Consequently it is the certitude of the virtual identity -between itself and the objective world.--Reason comes to the world -with an absolute faith in its ability to make the identity actual, and -to raise its certitude to truth; and with the instinct of realising -explicitly the nullity of that contrast which it sees to be implicitly -null. - -225.] This process is in general terms Cognition. In Cognition -in a single act the contrast is virtually superseded, as regards both -the one-sidedness of subjectivity and the one-sidedness of objectivity. -At first, however, the supersession of the contrast is but implicit. -The process as such is in consequence immediately infected with the -finitude of this sphere, and splits into the twofold movement of the -instinct of reason, presented as two different movements. On the one -hand it supersedes the one-sidedness of the Idea's subjectivity by -receiving the existing world into itself, into subjective conception -and thought; and with this objectivity, which is thus taken to be -real and true, for its content it fills up the abstract certitude of -itself. On the other hand, it supersedes the one-sidedness of the -objective world, which is now, on the contrary, estimated as only a -mere semblance, a collection of contingencies and shapes at bottom -visionary. It modifies and informs that world by the inward nature of -the subjective, which is here taken to be the genuine objective. The -former is the instinct of science after Truth, Cognition properly so -called:--the Theoretical action of the idea. The latter is the instinct -of the Good to fulfil the same--the Practical activity of the idea or -Volition. - -(α) _Cognition proper._ - -226.] The universal finitude of Cognition, which lies in the -one judgment, the pre-supposition of the contrast (§ 224),--a -pre-supposition in contradiction of which its own act lodges protest, -specialises itself more precisely on the face of its own idea. The -result of that specialisation is, that its two elements receive the -aspect of being diverse from each other, and, as they are at least -complete, they take up the relation of 'reflection,' not of 'notion,' -to one another. The assimilation of the matter, therefore, as a datum, -presents itself in the light of a reception of it into categories which -at the same time remain external to it, and which meet each other in -the same style of diversity. Reason is active here, but it is reason in -the shape of understanding. The truth which such Cognition can reach -will therefore be only finite: the infinite truth (of the notion) is -isolated and made transcendent, an inaccessible goal in a world of its -own. Still in its external action cognition stands under the guidance -of the notion, and notional principles form the secret clue to its -movement. - - * * * * * - -The finitude of Cognition lies in the pre-supposition of a world -already in existence, and in the consequent view of the knowing subject -as a _tabula rasa._ The conception is one attributed to Aristotle; -but no man is further than Aristotle from such an outside theory of -Cognition. Such a style of Cognition does not recognise in itself the -activity of the notion--an activity which it is implicitly, but not -consciously. In its own estimation its procedure is passive. Really -that procedure is active. - -227.] Finite Cognition, when it pre-supposes what is distinguished -from it to be something already existing and confronting it,--to be -the various facts of external nature or of consciousness--has, in the -first place, (1) Formal identity or the abstraction of universality for -the form of its action. Its activity therefore consists in analysing -the given concrete object, isolating its differences, and giving them -the form of abstract universality. Or it leaves the concrete thing as -a ground, and by setting aside the unessential-looking particulars, -brings into relief a concrete universal, the Genus, or Force and Law. -This is the Analytical Method. - - * * * * * - -People generally speak of the analytical and synthetical methods, -as if it depended solely on our choice which we pursued. This is -far from the case. It depends on the form of the objects of our -investigation, which of the two methods, that are derivable from the -notion of finite cognition, ought to be applied. In the first place, -cognition is analytical. Analytical cognition deals with an object -which is presented in detachment, and the aim of its action is to -trace back to a universal the individual object before it. Thought -in such circumstances means no more than an act of abstraction or of -formal identity. That is the sense in which thought is understood by -Locke and all empiricists. Cognition, it is often said, can never do -more than separate the given concrete objects into their abstract -elements, and then consider these elements in their isolation. It is, -however, at once apparent that this turns things upside down, and that -cognition, if its purpose be to take things as they are, thereby falls -into contradiction with itself. Thus the chemist _e.g._ places a piece -of flesh in his retort, tortures it in many ways, and then informs us -that it consists of nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen, &c. True: but these -abstract matters have ceased to be flesh. The same defect occurs in -the reasoning of an empirical psychologist when he analyses an action -into the various aspects which it presents, and then sticks to these -aspects in their separation. The object which is subjected to analysis -is treated as a sort of onion from which one coat is peeled off after -another. - -228.] This universality is (2) also a specific universality. In this -case the line of activity follows the three 'moments' of the notion, -which (as it has not its infinity in finite cognition) is the specific -or definite notion of understanding. The reception of the object into -the forms of this notion is the Synthetic Method. - - * * * * * - -The movement of the Synthetic method is the reverse of the Analytical -method. The latter starts from the individual, and proceeds to the -universal; in the former the starting-point is given by the universal -(as a definition), from which we proceed by particularising (in -division) to the individual (the theorem). The Synthetic method thus -presents itself as the development of the 'moments' of the notion on -the object. - -229.] (α) When the object has been in the first instance brought by -cognition into the form of the specific notion in general, so that -in this way its genus and its universal character or speciality are -explicitly stated, we have the Definition. The materials and the -proof of Definition are procured by means of the Analytical method (§ -227). The specific character however is expected to be a 'mark' only: -that is to say it is to be in behoof only of the purely subjective -cognition which is external to the object. - - * * * * * -Definition involves the three organic elements of the -notion: the universal or proximate genus _genus proximum,_ -the particular or specific character of the genus (_qualitas -specified,_) and the individual, or object defined.--The first -question that definition suggests, is where it comes from. -The general answer to this question is to say, that definitions -originate by way of analysis. This will explain how it -happens that people quarrel about the correctness of proposed -definitions; for here everything depends on what -perceptions we started from, and what points of view we -had before our eyes in so doing. The richer the object to -be defined is, that is, the more numerous are the aspects -which it offers to our notice, the more various are the definitions -we may frame of it. Thus there are quite a host of -definitions of life, of the state, &c. Geometry, on the contrary, -dealing with a theme so abstract as space, has an easy -task in giving definitions. Again, in respect of the matter or -contents of the objects defined, there is no constraining -necessity present. We are expected to admit that space -exists, that there are plants, animals, &c, nor is it the business -of geometry, botany, &c. to demonstrate that the objects -in question necessarily are. This very circumstance makes -the synthetical method of cognition as little suitable for -philosophy as the analytical: for philosophy has above all -things to leave no doubt of the necessity of its objects. And -yet several attempts have been made to introduce the synthetical -method into philosophy. Thus Spinoza, in particular, -begins with definitions. He says, for instance, that -substance is the _causa sui._ His definitions are unquestionably -a storehouse of the most speculative truth, but it takes the -shape of dogmatic assertions. The same thing is also true -of Schelling. - -230.] (ß) The statement of the second element of the notion, _i.e._ of -the specific character of the universal as particularising, is given by -Division in accordance with some external consideration. - - * * * * * - -Division we are told ought to be complete. That requires a principle -or ground of division so constituted, that the division based upon it -embraces the whole extent of the region designated by the definition -in general. But, in division, there is the further requirement that -the principle of it must be borrowed from the nature of the object in -question. If this condition be satisfied, the division is natural and -not merely artificial, that is to say, arbitrary. Thus, in zoology, -the ground of division adopted in the classification of the mammalia -is mainly afforded by their teeth and claws. That is so far sensible, -as the mammals themselves distinguish themselves from one another by -these parts of their bodies; back to which therefore the general type -of their various classes is to be traced. In every case the genuine -division must be controlled by the notion. To that extent a division, -in the first instance, has three members: but as particularity -exhibits itself as double, the division may go to the extent even -of four members. In the sphere of mind trichotomy is predominant, a -circumstance which Kant has the credit of bringing into notice. - -231.] (γ) In the concrete individuality, where the mere unanalysed -quality of the definition is regarded as a correlation of elements, -the object is a synthetical nexus of distinct characteristics. It is -a Theorem. Being different, these characteristics possess but -a mediated identity. To supply the materials, which form the middle -terms, is the office of Construction: and the process of mediation -itself, from which cognition derives the necessity of that nexus, is -the Demonstration. - -As the difference between the analytical and synthetical methods is -commonly stated, it seems entirely optional which of the two we employ. -If we assume, to start with, the concrete thing which the synthetic -method presents as a result, we can analyse from it as consequences -the abstract propositions which formed the pre-suppositions and the -material for the proof. Thus, algebraical definitions of curved lines -are theorems in the method of geometry. Similarly even the Pythagorean -theorem, if made the definition of a right-angled triangle, might yield -to analysis those propositions which geometry had already demonstrated -on its behoof. The optionalness of either method is due to both alike -starting from an external pre-supposition. So far as the nature of -the notion is concerned, analysis is prior; since it has to raise the -given material with its empirical concreteness into the form of general -abstractions, which may then be set in the front of the synthetical -method as definitions. - -That these methods, however indispensable and brilliantly successful -in their own province, are unserviceable for philosophical cognition, -is self-evident. They have pre-suppositions; and their style of -cognition is that of understanding, proceeding under the canon of -formal identity. In Spinoza, who was especially addicted to the use of -the geometrical method, we are at once struck by its characteristic -formalism. Yet his ideas were speculative in spirit; whereas the system -of Wolf, who carried the method out to the height of pedantry, was -even in subject-matter a metaphysic of the understanding. The abuses -which these methods with their formalism once led to in philosophy -and science have in modern times been followed by the abuses of what -is called 'Construction.' Kant brought into vogue the phrase that -mathematics 'construes' its notions. All that was meant by the phrase -was that mathematics has not to do with notions, but with abstract -qualities of sense-perceptions. The name 'Construction (_construing_) -of notions' has since been given to a sketch or statement of sensible -attributes which were picked up from perception, quite guiltless -of any influence of the notion, and to the additional formalism of -classifying scientific and philosophical objects in a tabular form -on some pre-supposed rubric, but in other respects at the fancy and -discretion of the observer. In the background of all this, certainly, -there is a dim consciousness of the Idea, of the unity of the notion -and objectivity,--a consciousness, too, that the idea is concrete. But -that play of what is styled 'construing' is far from presenting this -unity adequately--a unity which is none other than the notion properly -so called: and the sensuous concreteness of perception is as little the -concreteness of reason and the idea. - -Another point calls for notice. Geometry works with the sensuous but -abstract perception of space; and in space it experiences no difficulty -in isolating and defining certain simple analytic modes. To geometry -alone therefore belongs in its perfection the synthetical method of -finite cognition. In its course, however (and this is the remarkable -point), it finally stumbles upon what are termed irrational and -incommensurable quantities; and in their case any attempt at further -specification drives it beyond the principle of the understanding. -This is only one of many instances in terminology, where the title -rational is perversely applied to the province of understanding, -while we stigmatise as irrational that which shows a beginning and a -trace of rationality. Other sciences, removed as they are from the -simplicity of space or number, often and necessarily reach a point -where understanding permits no further advance: but they get over the -difficulty without trouble. They make a break in the strict sequence -of their procedure, and assume whatever they require, though it be -the reverse of what preceded, from some external quarter,--opinion, -perception, conception or any other source. Its inobservancy as to -the nature of its methods and their relativity to the subject-matter -prevents this finite cognition from seeing that, when it proceeds by -definitions and divisions, &c., it is really led on by the necessity -of the laws of the notion. For the same reason it cannot see when it -has reached its limit; nor, if it have transgressed that limit, does it -perceive that it is in a sphere where the categories of understanding, -which it still continues rudely to apply, have lost all authority. - -232.] The necessity, which finite cognition produces in the -Demonstration, is, in the first place, an external necessity, intended -for the subjective intelligence alone. But in necessity as such, -cognition itself has left behind its presupposition and starting-point, -which consisted in accepting its content as given or found. -Necessity _quâ_ necessity is implicitly the self-relating notion. The -subjective idea has thus implicitly reached an original and objective -determinateness,--a something not-given, and for that reason immanent -in the subject. It has passed over into the idea of Will. - - * * * * * - -The necessity which cognition reaches by means of the demonstration is -the reverse of what formed its starting-point. In its starting-point -cognition had a given and a contingent content; but now, at the close -of its movement, it knows its content to be necessary. This necessity -is reached by means of subjective agency. Similarly, subjectivity -at starting was quite abstract, a bare _tabula rasa._ It now shows -itself as a modifying and determining principle. In this way we pass -from the idea of cognition to that of will. The passage, as will be -apparent on a closer examination, means that the universal, to be -truly apprehended, must be apprehended as subjectivity, as a notion -self-moving, active, and form-imposing. - - -(ß) _Volition._ - -233.] The subjective idea as original and objective determinateness, -and as a simple uniform content, is the Good. Its impulse -towards self-realisation is in its behaviour the reverse of the idea of -truth, and rather directed towards moulding the world it finds before -it into a shape conformable to its purposed End.--This Volition has, -on the one hand, the certitude of the nothingness of the pre-supposed -object; but, on the other, as finite, it at the same time pre-supposes -the purposed End of the Good to be a mere subjective idea, and the -object to be independent. - -234.] This action of the Will is finite: and its finitude lies in -the contradiction that in the inconsistent terms applied to the -objective world the End of the Good is just as much not executed -as executed,--the end in question put as unessential as much as -essential,--as actual and at the same, time as merely possible. This -contradiction presents itself to imagination as an endless progress in -the actualising of the Good; which is therefore set up and fixed as -a mere 'ought,' or goal of perfection. In point of form however this -contradiction vanishes when the action supersedes the subjectivity of -the purpose, and along with it the objectivity, with the contrast which -makes both finite; abolishing subjectivity as a whole and not merely -the one-sidedness of this form of it. (For another new subjectivity of -the kind, that is, a new generation of the contrast, is not distinct -from that which is supposed to be past and gone.) This return into -itself is at the same time the content's own 'recollection' that it -is the Good and the implicit identity of the two sides,--it is a -'recollection' of the pre-supposition of the theoretical attitude -of mind (§ 224) that the objective world is its own truth and -substantiality. - - * * * * * - -While Intelligence merely proposes to take the world as it is, Will -takes steps to make the world what it ought to be. Will looks upon -the immediate and given present not as solid being, but as mere -semblance without reality. It is here that we meet those contradictions -which are so bewildering from the standpoint of abstract morality. -This position in its 'practical' bearings is the one taken by the -philosophy of Kant, and even by that of Fichte. The Good, say these -writers, has to be realised: we have to work in order to produce it: -and Will is only the Good actualising itself. If the world then were -as it ought to be, the action of Will would be at an end. The Will -itself therefore requires that its End should not be realised. In -these words, a correct expression is given to the _finitude_ of Will. -But finitude was not meant to be the ultimate point: and it is the -process of Will itself which abolishes finitude and the contradiction -it involves. The reconciliation is achieved, when Will in its result -returns to the pre-supposition made by cognition. In other words, it -consists in the unity of the theoretical and practical idea. Will -knows the end to be its own, and Intelligence apprehends the world as -the notion actual. This is the right attitude of rational cognition. -Nullity and transitoriness constitute only the superficial features -and not the real essence of the world. That essence is the notion in -_posse_ and in _esse:_ and thus the world is itself the idea. All -unsatisfied endeavour ceases, when we recognise that the final purpose -of the world is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself. -Generally speaking, this is the man's way of looking; while the young -imagine that the world is utterly sunk in wickedness, and that the -first thing needful is a thorough transformation. The religious mind, -on the contrary, views the world as ruled by Divine Providence, and -therefore correspondent with what it ought to be. But this harmony -between the 'is' and the 'ought to be' is not torpid and rigidly -stationary. Good, the final end of the world, has being, only while it -constantly produces itself. And the world of spirit and the world of -nature continue to have this distinction, that the latter moves only in -a recurring cycle, while the former certainly also makes progress. - -235.] Thus the truth of the Good is laid down as the unity of the -theoretical and practical idea in the doctrine that the Good is -radically and really achieved, that the objective world is in itself -and for itself the Idea, just as it at the same time eternally lays -itself down as End, and by action brings about its actuality. This life -which has returned to itself from the bias and finitude of cognition, -and which by the activity of the notion has become identical with it, -is the Speculative or Absolute Idea. - - -(c) _The Absolute Idea._ - -236.] The Idea, as unity of the Subjective and Objective Idea, is -the notion of the Idea,--a notion whose object (_Gegenstand_) is the -Idea as such, and for which the objective (_Objekt_) is Idea,--an -Object which embraces all characteristics in its unity. This unity -is consequently I the absolute and all truth, the Idea which thinks -itself,--and here at least as a thinking or Logical Idea. - - * * * * * - -The Absolute Idea is, in the first place, the unity of the theoretical -and practical idea, and thus at the same time the unity of the idea -of life with the idea of cognition. In cognition we had the idea in a -biassed, one-sided shape. The process of cognition has issued in the -overthrow of this bias and the restoration of that unity, which as -unity, and in its immediacy, is in the first instance the Idea of Life. -The defect of life lies in its being only the idea implicit or natural: -whereas cognition is in an equally one-sided way the merely conscious -idea, or the idea for itself. The unity and truth of these two is the -Absolute Idea, which is both in itself and for itself. Hitherto _we_ -have had the idea in development through its various grades as _our_ -object, but now the idea comes to be its _own object._ This is the -νόησις νοήσεως which Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of the -idea. - -237.] Seeing that there is in it no transition, or presupposition, -and in general no specific character other than what is fluid and -transparent, the Absolute Idea is for itself the pure form of the -notion, which contemplates its content as its own self. It is its own -content, in so far as it ideally distinguishes itself from itself, -and the one of the two things distinguished is a self-identity in -which however is contained the totality of the form as the system of -terms describing its content. This content is the system of Logic. All -that is at this stage left as form for the idea is the Method of this -content,--the specific consciousness of the value and currency of the -'moments' in its development. - - * * * * * - -To speak of the absolute idea may suggest the conception that we are -at length reaching the right thing and the sum of the whole matter. -It is certainly possible to indulge in a vast amount of senseless -declamation about the idea absolute. But its true content is only the -whole system of which we have been hitherto studying the development. -It may also be said in this strain that the absolute idea is the -universal, but the universal not merely as an abstract form to which -the particular content is a stranger, but as the absolute form, into -which all the categories, the whole fullness of the content it has -given being to, have retired. The absolute idea may in this respect be -compared to the old man who utters the same creed as the child, but -for whom it is pregnant with the significance of a lifetime. Even if -the child understands the truths of religion, he cannot but imagine -them to be something outside of which lies the whole of life and the -whole of the world. The same may be said to be the case with human life -as a whole and the occurrences with which it is fraught. All work is -directed only to the aim or end; and when it is attained, people are -surprised to find nothing else but just the very thing which they had -wished for. The interest lies in the whole movement. When a man traces -up the steps of his life, the end may appear to him very restricted: -but in it the whole _decursus vitae_ is comprehended. So, too, the -content of the absolute idea is the whole breadth of ground which has -passed under our view up to this point. Last of all comes the discovery -that the whole evolution is what constitutes the content and the -interest. It is indeed the prerogative of the philosopher to see that -everything, which, taken apart, is narrow and restricted, receives -its value by its connexion with the whole, and by forming an organic -element of the idea. Thus it is that we have had the content already, -and what we have now is the knowledge that the content is the living -development of the idea. This simple retrospect is contained in the -_form_ of the idea. Each of the stages hitherto reviewed is an image -of the absolute, but at first in a limited mode, and thus it is forced -onwards to the whole, the evolution of which is what we termed Method. - -238.] The several steps or stages of the Speculative Method are, -first of all, (a) the Beginning, which is Being or Immediacy: -self-subsistent, for the simple reason that it is the beginning. But -looked at from the speculative idea, Being is its self-specialising -act, which as the absolute negativity or movement of the notion makes -a judgment and puts itself as its own negative. Being, which to the -beginning as beginning seems mere abstract affirmation, is thus rather -negation, dependency, derivation, and pre-supposition. But it is the -notion, of which Being is the negation: and the notion is completely -self-identical in its otherness, and is the certainty of itself. Being -therefore is the notion implicit, before it has been explicitly put as -a notion. This Being therefore, as the still unspecified notion,--a -notion that is only implicitly or 'immediately' specified--is equally -describable as the Universal. - -When it means immediate being, the beginning is taken from sensation -and perception--the initial stage in the analytical method of finite -cognition. When it means universality, it is the beginning of the -synthetic method. But since the Logical Idea is as much a universal as -it is in being--since it is pre-supposed by the notion as much as it -itself immediately _is,_ its beginning is a synthetical as well as an -analytical beginning. - - * * * * * - -Philosophical method is analytical as well as synthetical, not indeed -in the sense of a bare juxtaposition or mere alternating employment -of these two methods of finite cognition, but rather in such a way -that it holds them merged in itself. In every one of its movements -therefore it displays an attitude at once analytical and synthetical. -Philosophical thought proceeds analytically, in so far as it only -accepts its object, the Idea, and while allowing it its own way, is -only, as it were, an on-looker at its movement and development. To this -extent philosophising is wholly passive. Philosophic thought however is -equally synthetic, and evinces itself to be the action of the notion -itself. To that end, however, there is required an effort to keep back -the incessant impertinence of our own fancies and private opinions. - -239.] (b) The Advance renders explicit the _judgment_ implicit in -the Idea. The immediate universal, as the notion implicit, is the -dialectical force which on its own part deposes its immediacy and -universality to the level of a mere stage or 'moment.' Thus is put -the negative of the beginning, its specific character: it supposes a -correlative, a relation of different terms,--the stage of Reflection. - -Seeing that the immanent dialectic only states explicitly what was -involved in the immediate notion, this advance is Analytical; but -seeing that in this notion this distinction was not yet stated,--it is -equally Synthetical. - - * * * * * - -In the advance of the idea, the beginning exhibits itself as what -it is implicitly. It is seen to be mediated and derivative, and -neither to have proper being nor proper immediacy. It is only for -the consciousness which is itself immediate, that Nature forms the -commencement or immediacy, and that Spirit appears as what is mediated -by Nature. The truth is that Nature is the creation of Spirit, and it -is Spirit itself which gives itself a pre-supposition in Nature. - -240.] The abstract form of the advance is, in Being, an other and -transition into an other; in Essence showing or reflection in the -opposite; in Notion, the distinction of individual from universality, -which continues itself as such into, and is as an identity with, what -is distinguished from it. - -241.] In the second sphere the primarily implicit notion has come as -far as shining, and thus is already the idea in germ. The development -of this sphere becomes a regress into the first, just as the -development of the first is a transition into the second. - -It is only by means of this double movement, that the difference first -gets its due, when each of the two members distinguished, observed -on its own part, completes itself to the totality, and in this way -works out its unity with the other. It is only by both merging their -one-sidedness on their own part, that their unity is kept from becoming -one-sided. - -242.] The second sphere developes the relation of the differents to -what it primarily is,--to the contradiction in its own nature. That -contradiction which is seen in the infinite progress is resolved -(c) into the end or terminus, where the differenced is explicitly -stated as what it is in notion. The end is the negative of the first, -and as the identity with that, is the negativity of itself. It is -consequently the unity in which both of these Firsts, the immediate -and the real First, are made constituent stages in thought, merged, -and at the same time preserved in the unity. The notion, which from -its implicitness thus comes by means of its differentiation and the -merging of that differentiation to close with itself, is the realised -notion,--the notion which contains the relativity or dependence of its -special features in its own independence. It is the idea which, as -absolutely first (in the method), regards this terminus as merely the -disappearance of the show or semblance, which made the beginning appear -immediate, and made itself seem a result. It is the knowledge that the -idea is the one systematic whole. - -243.] It thus appears that the method is not an extraneous form, -but the soul and notion of the content, from which it is only -distinguished, so far as the dynamic elements of the notion even on -their own part come in their own specific character to appear as the -totality of the notion. This specific character, or the content, leads -itself with the form back to the idea; and thus the idea is presented -as a systematic totality which is only one idea, of which the several -elements are each implicitly the idea, whilst they equally by the -dialectic of the notion produce the simple independence of the idea. -The science in this manner concludes by apprehending the notion of -itself, as of the pure idea for which the idea is. - -244.] The Idea which is independent or for itself, when viewed on the -point of this its unity with itself, is Perception or Intuition, and -the percipient Idea is Nature. But as intuition the idea is, through -an external 'reflection,' invested with the one-sided characteristic -of immediacy, or of negation. Enjoying however an absolute liberty, -the Idea does not merely pass over into life, or as finite cognition -allow life to show in it: in its own absolute truth it resolves to let -the 'moment' of its particularity, or of the first characterisation -and other-being, the immediate idea, as its reflected image, go forth -freely as Nature. - - * * * * * - -We have now returned to the notion of the Idea with which we began. -This return to the beginning is also an advance. We began with Being, -abstract Being: where we now are we also have the Idea as Being: but -this Idea which has Being is Nature. - - - - -NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -Page 5, § 2. After-thought = Nachdenken, _e.g._ thought which retraces -and reproduces an original, but submerged, thought (cf. Hegel's -_Werke_, vi. p. xv): to be distinguished from Reflexion (cf. -_Werke_, i. 174). - -P. 7, § 3. On the blending of universal (thought) and individual -(sensation) in what is called perception (Wahrnehmen) see _Encycl._ §§ -420, 421. - -P. 8, § 3. Cf. Fichte, _Werke_, ii. 454: 'Hence for the common sort of -hearers and readers the uncommon intelligibility of certain sermons and -lectures and writings, not one word of which is intelligible to the -man who thinks for himself,--because there is really no intelligence -in them. The old woman who frequents the church--for whom by the way I -cherish all possible respect--finds a sermon very intelligible and very -edifying which contains lots of texts and verses of hymns she knows -by rote and can repeat. In the same way readers, who fancy themselves -far superior to her, find a work very instructive and clear which -tells them what they already know, and proofs very stringent which -demonstrate what they already believe. The pleasure the reader takes in -the writer is a concealed pleasure in himself. What a great man! (he -says to himself); it is as if I heard or read myself. - -P. 10, § 6. Cf. Hegel, _Werke>_ viii. 17: 'In this conviction (that -what is reasonable is actual, and what is actual is reasonable) stands -every plain man, as well as the philosopher; and from it philosophy -starts in the study both of the spiritual and of the natural -universe----The great thing however is, in the show of the temporal -and the transient to recognise the substance which is immanent and the -eternal which is present. For the work of reason (which is synonymous -with the Idea), when in its actuality it simultaneously enters external -existence, emerges with an infinite wealth of forms, phenomena and -phases, and envelopes its kernel with the motley rind with which -consciousness is earliest at home,--a rind which the notion must -penetrate before it can find the inward pulse and feel it still beating -even in the outward phases. But the infinite variety of circumstance -which is formed in this externality by the light of the essence shining -in it,--all this infinite material, with its regulations,--is not -the object of philosophy.... To comprehend _what is,_ is the task of -philosophy: for _what is_ is reason. As regards the individual, each, -whatever happens, is a son of his time. So too philosophy is its -time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as foolish to fancy that a -philosophy can overleap its present world as that an individual can -overleap his time. If his theory really goes beyond actualities, if it -constructs an ideal, a world as it ought to be, then such existence -as it has is only in his intentions--a yielding element in which -anything you please may be fancy-formed.' Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ iv. -390: 'There are very many things, actions, &c. of which we may judge, -after vulgar semblance, that they are unreasonable. All the same we -presuppose and assume that everything which is or which happens is -reasonable, and that reason is, in one word, the prime matter and the -real of all being.' - -P. 11, § 6. Actuality (Wirklichkeit) in _Werke,_ iv. 178 _seqq._ - -P. 12, § 7. Cf. Fichte, _Werke,_ ii. 333: 'Man has nothing at all -but experience; and everything he comes to be comes to only through -experience, through life itself. All his thinking, be it loose or -scientific, common or transcendental, starts from experience and has -experience ultimately in view. Nothing has unconditional value and -significance but life; all other thinking, conception, knowledge has -value only in so far as in some way or other it refers to the fact of -life, starts from it, and has in view a subsequent return to it.' - -P. 13, § 7 (note). Thomas Thomson (1773-1852), Professor of Chemistry -at Glasgow, distinguished in the early history of chemistry and allied -sciences. The _Annals of Philosophy_ appeared from 1813 to 1826.--_The -art of preserving the hair_ was published (anonymous) at London in 1825. - -P. 14, § 7 (note). The speech from the throne was read on Feb. 3rd, -1825. - -The shipowners' dinner was on Feb. 12. The _Times_ of Feb. 14 gives as -Canning's the words 'the just and wise maxims of sound not spurious -philosophy.' - -P. 17, § 10. 'Scholasticus' is the guileless 'freshman,' hero of -certain Facetiae (attributed to the Pythagorean philosopher Hierocles) -which used occasionally to form part of the early Greek reading of -schoolboys. - -K. L. Reinhold (1754-1823) presents in his intellectual history a -picture of the development of ideas in his age. At the beginning -his _Attempt of a new theory of the human representative faculty_ -(1789) is typical of the tendency to give a subjective psychological -interpretation of Kant's theory of knowledge But the period of -Reinhold's teaching here referred to is that of _Contributions to an -easier survey of the condition of philosophy at the beginning of the -nineteenth century_ (Beiträge, 1801): the tendency which Hegel, who -reviewed him in the _Critical Journal of Philosophy_ (_Werke,_ i. 267 -_seqq._), calls 'philosophising before philosophy.'--A similar spirit -is operative in Krug's proposal (in his _Fundamental Philosophy,_ 1803) -to start with what he called 'philosophical problematics.' - -P. 19, § 11. Plato, _Phaedo,_ p. 89, where Socrates protests against -the tendency to confound the defect of a particular piece of reasoning -with the incompetence of human reason altogether. - -P. 22, § 13. The dictum that the historical succession of philosophical -systems is identical with their logical sequence should not be -taken too literally and mechanically. Its essential point is simply -the theorem that history is not a casual series of unconnected -events--the deeds of particular persons, but is an evolution under -laws and uniformities:--it is this theorem applied to philosophies. -But difficulties may easily arise in the application of the general -principle: _e.g._ it will be seen (by comparison of § 86 and § -104) that though Pythagoras precedes Parmenides, and number is a -stepping-stone to pure thought still pure Being comes at an earlier -stage than Quantity. - -P. 23, § 13. There is a silent reference to what Reinhold professed -to make the subject of his teaching at Jena--'philosophy without -surnames' (ohne Beinamen),--_i.e._ not a 'critical' philosophy;--or -to the 'Philosophy which may not bear any man's name of Beck. As Hegel -says, _Werke,_ xvi. 138, 'The solicitude and apprehension against being -one-sided is only too often part of the weakness which is capable only -of many-sided illogical superficiality.' - -P. 27, § 16. By 'anthropology' is meant not the anthropology of modern -writers, who use the name to denote mainly the history of human culture -in its more rudimentary stages, and as exhibited chiefly in material -products, but the study of those aspects of psychology which are most -closely allied with physiological conditions. - -With the power of the intuition of genius to give almost all that -logical synthesis can produce, cf. _Werke,_ I. 331: 'In this way -a grand and pure intuition is able, in the purely architectonic -features of its picture, though the inter-connection of necessity and -the mastery of form does not come forward into visibility, to give -expression to the genuine ethical organism--like a building which -silently exhibits the spirit of its author in the several features of -its mass, without the image of that spirit being set forth anywhere -in one united shape. In such a delineation, made by help of notions, -it is only a want of technical skill which prevents reason from -raising the principle it embraces and pervades into the "ideal" form -and becoming aware of it as the Idea. If the intuition only remains -true to itself and does not let analytic intellect disconcert it, it -will probably--just because it cannot dispense with notions for its -expression--behave awkwardly in dealing with them, assume distorted -shapes in its passage through consciousness, and be (to the speculative -eye) both incoherent and contradictory: but the arrangement of the -parts and of the self-modifying characters betray the inward spirit of -reason, however invisible. And so far as this appearance of that spirit -is regarded as a product and a result, it will as product completely -harmonise with the Idea.' Probably Goethe is before Hegel's mind. - -P. 28, § 17. The triplicity in unity of thought--its forthgoing -'procession,' (cf. p. 362 _seqq._) and its return, which is yet an -abiding in itself (Bei:sich:sein) was first explicitly schematised -by Proclus, the consummator of Neo-Platonism. In his _Institutio -Theologica_ he lays it down that the essential character of all -spiritual reality (aσώματον) is to be πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικόν, _e.g._ -to return upon itself, or to be a unity in and with difference,--to -be an original and spontaneous principle of movement (c. 15): or, as -in C 31: πὰν τὸ πρoῒὸν ἀπό τινος κατ' οὐσίαν ἐπιστρέφεται πρὸς ἐκεῖνο -ἀφ' οὗ πρόεισιν. Its movement, therefore, is circular κυκλικὴν ἔχει -τὴν ἐνέργειαν (c. 33): for everything must at the same time remain -altogether in the cause, and proceed from it, and revert to it (c. 35). -Such an essence is self-subsistent (αὐθυπόςτατον),--is at once agent -(πάραγον) and patient (παραγόμενον). This 'mysticism' (of a trinity -which is also unity of motion which is also rest), with its πρόοδoς, -ἐπιστroφή, and μονή, is taken up, in his own way, by Scotus Erigena -(De Divisione Naturae) as _processio_ (or _divisio_), _reditus,_ -and _adunatio._ From God 'proceed'--by an _eternal_ creation--the -creatures, who however are not outside the divine nature; and to God -all things created _eternally_ return. - - -CHAPTER II. - -P. 31, § 19. Truth:--as early as _Werke,_ i. 82, _i.e._ 1801, Hegel had -come--perhaps influenced by the example of Jacobi--to the conclusion -that 'Truth is a word which, in philosophical discourse, deserves to be -used only of the certainty of the Eternal and non-empirical Actual.' -(And so Spinoza, ii. 310.) - -P. 32. 'The young have been flattered'--_e.g._ by Fichte, _Werke,_ i. -435: 'Hence this science too promises itself few proselytes amongst men -already formed: if it can hope for any at all, it hopes for them rather -from the young world, whose inborn force has not yet been ruined in the -laxity of the age.' - -P. 38, § 20. What Kant actually said (_Kritik der reinen Vernunft: -Elementarlehre,_ § 16), was 'The _I think_ must be able to accompany -all my conceptions' (Vorstellungen). Here, as often elsewhere. Hegel -seems to quote from memory,--with some shortcoming from absolute -accuracy. - -From this point Fichte's idealism takes its spring, _e.g. Werke,_ ii. -505: 'The ground of all certainty,--of all consciousness of fact in -life, and of all demonstrative knowledge in science, is this: _In_ and -_with_ the single thing we affirm (setzen) (and whatever we affirm is -necessarily something single) we also affirm the absolute totality as -such.... Only in so far as we have so affirmed anything, is it certain -for us,--from the single unit we have comprehended under it away to -every single thing in the infinity we shall comprehend under it,--from -the one individual who has comprehended it, to all individuals who -will comprehend it.... Without this absolute "positing" of the absolute -totality in the individual, we cannot (to employ a phrase of Jacobi's) -come to bed and board.' - -'Obviously therefore you enunciate not the judgment of a single -observation, but you embrace and "posit" the sheer infinitude and -totality of all possible observations:--an infinity which is not at -all compounded out of finites, but out of which, conversely, the -finites themselves issue, and of which finite things are the mere -always-uncompleted analysis. This--how shall I call it, procedure, -positing, or whatever you prefer--this "manifestation" of the absolute -totality, I call intellectual vision (Anschauung). I regard it--just -because I cannot in any way get beyond intelligence--as immanent in -intelligence, and name it so far egoity (Ichheit),--not objectivity -and not subjectivity, but the absolute identity of the two:--an -egoity, however, which it was to be hoped would not be taken to mean -individuality. There lies in it, what you' (he is addressing Reinhold, -who here follows Bardili)' call a repetibility _ad infinitum._ For me, -therefore, the essence of the finite is composed of an immediate vision -of the absolutely timeless infinite (with an absolute identity of -subjectivity and objectivity), and of a separation of the two latter, -and an analysis (continued _ad infinitum_) of the infinite. In that -analysis consists the temporal life: and the starting-point of this -temporal life is the separation into subject and object, which through -the intellectual vision (intuition) are still both held together.' - -P. 44, § 22, _the mere fact of conviction._ Cf. _Rechtsphilosophie,_ -§ 140 (_Werke,_ viii. 191): 'Finally the mere conviction which holds -something to be right is given out as what decides the morality of -an action. The good we will to do not yet having any content, the -principle of conviction adds the information that the subsumption of an -action under the category of good is purely a personal matter. If this -be so, the very pretence of an ethical objectivity is utterly lost. A -doctrine like this is closely allied with the self-styled philosophy -which denies that the true is cognoscible: because for the Will, -truth--_i.e._ the rationality of the Will--lies in the moral laws. -Giving out, as such a system does, that the cognition of the true is an -empty vanity, far transcending the range of science (which recognises -only appearance), it must, in the matter of conduct, also find its -principle in the apparent; whereby moral distinctions are reduced to -the peculiar theory of life held by the individual and to his private -conviction. At first no doubt the degradation into which philosophy has -thus sunk seems an affair of supreme indifference, a mere incident in -the futilities of the scholastic world: but the view necessarily makes -itself a home in ethics, which is an essential part of philosophy; and -it is then in the actual world that the world learns the true meaning -of such theories. - -'As the view spreads that subjective conviction, and it alone, decides -the morality of an action, it follows that the charge of hypocrisy, -once so frequent, is now rarely heard. You can only qualify wickedness -as hypocrisy on the assumption that certain actions are inherently -and actually misdeeds, vices, and crimes, and that the defaulter -necessarily is aware of them as such, because he is aware of and -recognises the principles and outward acts of piety and honesty, even -in the pretence to which he misapplies them. In other words, it was -generally assumed as regards immorality that it is a duty to know the -good, and to be aware of its distinction from the bad. In any case it -was an absolute injunction which forbade the commission of vicious and -criminal acts, and which insisted on such actions being imputed to the -agent, so far as he was a man, not a beast. But if the good heart, -the good intention, the subjective conviction, are set forth as the -true sources of moral worth, then there is no longer any hypocrisy, or -immorality at all: for whatever one does, he can always justify it by -the reflection on it of good aims and motives; and by the influence of -that conviction it is good. There is no longer anything _inherently_ -vicious or criminal: instead of the frank and free, hardened and -unperturbed sinner, comes the person whose mind is completely justified -by intention and conviction. My good intention in my act, and my -conviction of its goodness, make it good. We speak of judging and -estimating an _act._ But on this principle it is only the aim and -conviction of the agent--his faith--by which he ought to be judged. -And that not in the sense in which Christ requires faith in objective -truth, so that for one who has a bad faith, _e.g._ a conviction bad -in its content, the judgment to be pronounced must be bad, _e.g._ -conformable to this bad content. But faith here means only fidelity to -conviction. Has the man (we ask) in acting kept true to his conviction? -It is formal subjective conviction on which alone the obligation of -duty is made to depend. - -'A principle like this, where conviction is expressly made something -subjective, cannot but suggest the thought of possible error, with the -further implied presupposition of an absolutely-existing law. But the -law is no agent: it is only the actual human being who acts; and in the -aforesaid principle the only question in estimating human actions is -how far he has received the law into his conviction. If, therefore, it -is not the actions which are to be estimated and generally measured by -that law, it is impossible to see what the law is for, and what end it -can serve. Such a law is degraded to a mere outside letter, in fact an -empty word; which is only made a law, _i.e._ invested with obligatory -force, by my conviction. - -'Such a law may claim its authority from God or the State: it may even -have the authority of tens of centuries during which it served as -the bond that gave men, with all their deed and destiny, subsistence -and coherence. And these are authorities in which are condensed the -convictions of countless individuals. And for me to set against that -the authority of my single conviction--for as my subjective conviction -its sole validity is authority--that self-conceit, monstrous as it at -first seems, is, in virtue of the principle that subjective conviction -is to be the rule, pronounced to be no self-conceit at all. - -'Even if reason and conscience--which shallow science and bad sophistry -can never altogether expel--admit, with a noble illogicality, that -error is possible, still by describing crime and wickedness as -only an error we minimise the fault. For to err is human:--Who has -not been mistaken on one point or another, whether he had fresh or -pickled cabbage for dinner, and about innumerable things more or less -important? But the difference of more or less importance disappears if -everything turns on the subjectivity of conviction and on persistency -in it. But the said noble illogicality which admits error to be -possible, when it comes round to say that a wrong conviction is only an -error, really only falls into a further illogicality--the illogicality -of dishonesty. One time conviction is made the basis of morality and -of man's supreme value, and is thus pronounced the supreme and holy. -Another time all we have to do with is an error: my conviction is -something trivial and casual, strictly speaking something outside, -that may turn out this way or that. And, really, my being convinced -_is_ something supremely trivial? if I cannot _know_ truth, it is -indifferent how I think; and all that is left to my thinking is that -empty good,--a mere abstraction of generalisation. - -'It follows further that, on this principle of justification by -conviction, logic requires me, in dealing with the way others act -against my action, to admit that, so far as they in their belief and -conviction hold my actions to be crimes, they are quite in the right. -On such logic not merely do I gain nothing, I am even deposed from the -post of liberty and honour into a situation of slavery and dishonour. -Justice--which in the abstract is mine as well as theirs--I feel only -as a foreign subjective conviction, and in the execution of justice I -fancy myself to be only treated by an external force.' - -P. 44, § 23. Selbstdenken--to think and not merely to read or listen is -the recurrent cry of Fichte (_e.g. Werke,_ ii. 329). According to the -editors of _Werke,_ xv. 582, the reference here is to Schleiermacher -and to his Monologues. Really it is to the Romantic principle in -general, especially F. Schlegel. - -P. 45, § 23. 'Fichte' _Werke,_ ii, 404: 'Philosophy -(Wissenschaftslehre), besides (for the reason above noted that it has -no auxiliary, no vehicle of the intuition at all, except the intuition -itself), elevates the human mind higher than any geometry can It gives -the mind not only attentiveness, dexterity, stability, but at the same -time absolute independence, forcing it to be alone with itself, and -to live and manage by itself. Compared with it, every other mental -operation is infinitely easy; and to one who has been exercised in -it nothing comes hard. Besides as it prosecutes all objects of human -lore to the centre it accustoms the eye to hit the proper point at -first glance' in everything presented to it, and to prosecute it -undeviatingly For such a practical philosopher therefore there can be -nothing dark, complicated, and confused, if only he is acquainted with -the object of discussion. It comes always easiest to him to construct -everything afresh and _ab initio,_ because he carries within him plans -for every scientific edifice. He finds his way easily, therefore, in -any complicated structure. Add to this the security and confidence of -glance which he has acquired in philosophy--the guide which conducts in -all _raisonnement_ and the imperturbability with which his eye meets -every divergence from the accustomed path and every paradox. It would -be quite different with all human concerns, if men could only resolve -to believe their eyes. At present they inquire at their neighbours and -at antiquity what they really see, and by this distrust in themselves -errors are eternalised. Against this distrust the possessor of -philosophy is for ever protected. In a word, by philosophy the mind -of man comes to itself, and from henceforth rests on itself without -foreign aid, and is completely master of itself, as the dancer of his -feet, or the boxer of his hands.' - -P. 45, § 23. Aristotle, _Metaph._ i. 2, 19 (cf. _Eth._ x. 7). See also -_Werke,_ xiv. 280 _seqq._ - -P. 46, § 24. Schelling's expression, 'petrified intelligence.' The -reference is to some verses of Schelling in _Werke,_ iv. 546 (first -published in _Zeitschrift für speculative Physik,_ 1800). We have no -reason to stand in awe of the world, he says, which is a tame and quiet -beast-- - - Sterft zwar ein Riesengeist darinnen, - Ist aber versteinert mit allen Sinnen; - In todten und lebendigen Dingen - Thut nach Bewustseyn mächtig ringen. - -In human shape he at length awakes from the iron sleep, from the long -dream: but as man he feels himself a stranger and exile; he would -fain return to great Nature; he fears what surrounds him and imagines -spectres, not knowing he might say of Nature to himself-- - - Ich bin der Gott, den sie im Busen hegt, - Der Geist, der sich in allem bewegt: - Vom frühsten Ringen dunkler Kräfte - Bis zum Erguss der ersten Lebenssäfte, - . . . . . . . - herauf zu des Gedankens Jugendkraft - Wodurch Natur verjüngt sich wieder schafft, - Ist eine kraft, ein Wechselspiel und Weben, - Ein Trieb und Drang nach immer höherm Leben. - -Cf. Oken, _Naturphilosophie,_§ 2913: 'A natural body is a thought of -the primal act, turned rigid and crystallised,--a word of God.' - -Phrases of like import are not infrequent in Schelling's works (about -1800-1), _e.g. Werke,_1. Abth. iii. 341: 'The dead and unconscious -products of nature are only unsuccessful attempts to "reflect" itself; -so-called dead nature is in all cases an immature intelligence' -(unreife Intelligenz), or iv. 77, 'Nature itself is an intelligence, -as it were, turned to rigidity (erstarrte) with all its sensations and -perceptions'; and ii. 226 (_Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur,_ -1797), 'Hence nature is only intelligence turned into the rigidity of -being; its qualities are sensations extinguished to being; bodies are -its perceptions, so to speak, killed.' - -A close approach to the phrase quoted is found in the words of another -of the 'Romantic' philosophers: 'Nature is a petrified magic-city' -(versteinerte Zauberstadt). (Novalis, _Schriften,_ ii. 149.) - -P. 48, § 24. Cf. Fichte to Jacobi: (Jacobi's _Briefwechsel,_ ii. 208) -'My absolute Ego is obviously not the individual: that explanation -comes from injured snobs and peevish philosophers, seeking to -impute to me the disgraceful doctrine of practical egoism. But the -_individual must be deduced from the absolute ego._ To that task my -philosophy will proceed in the "Natural Law." A finite being--it may -be deductively shown--can only think itself as a sense-being in a -sphere of sense-beings,--on one part of which (that which has no power -of origination) it has causality, while with the other part (to which -it attributes a subjectivity like its own) it stands in reciprocal -relations. In such circumstances it is called an individual, and the -conditions of individuality are called rights. As surely as it affirms -its individuality, so surely does it affirm such a sphere the two -conceptions indeed are convertible. So long as we look upon ourselves -as individuals--and we always so regard ourselves in life, though not -in philosophy and abstract imagination--we stand on what I call the -"practical" point of view in our reflections (while to the standpoint -of the absolute ego I give the name "speculative"). From the former -point of view there exists for us a world independent of us,--a world -we can only modify; whilst the pure ego (which even on this altitude -does not altogether disappear from us,) is put outside us and called -God. How else could we get the properties we ascribe to God and deny to -ourselves, did we not after all find them within us, and only refuse -them to ourselves in a certain respect, i.e., as individuals? When this -"practical" point of view predominates in our reflections, realism -is supreme: when speculation itself deduces and recognises that -standpoint, there results a complete reconciliation between philosophy -and common sense as premised in my system. - -'For what good, then, is the speculative standpoint and the whole of -philosophy therewith, if it be not for life? Had humanity not tasted -of this forbidden fruit, it might dispense with all philosophy. But in -humanity there is a wish implanted to behold that region lying beyond -the individual; and to behold it not merely in a reflected light but -face to face. The first who raised a question about God's existence -broke through the barriers, he shook humanity in its main foundation -pillars, and threw it out of joint into an intestine strife which is -not yet settled, and which can only be settled by advancing boldly -to that supreme point from which the speculative and the practical -appear to be at one. We began to philosophise from pride of heart, and -thus lost our innocence: we beheld our nakedness, and ever since we -philosophise from the need of our redemption.' - -P. 50. Physics and Philosophy of Nature: cf. _Werke,_ vii. i, p. 18: -'The Philosophy of Nature takes up the material, prepared for it by -physics out of experience, at the point to which physics has brought -it, and again transforms it, without basing it ultimately on the -authority of experience. Physics therefore must work into the hands of -philosophy, so that the latter may translate into a true comprehension -(Begriff) the abstract universal transmitted to it, showing how it -issues from that comprehension as an intrinsically necessary whole. The -philosophic way of putting the facts is no mere whim once in a way, -by way of change, to walk on the head, after walking a long while on -the legs, or once in a way to see our every-day face besmeared with -paint. No; it is because the method of physics does not satisfy the -comprehension, that we have to go on further.' - -P. 51, § 24. The distinction of ordinary and speculative Logic -is partly like that made by Fichte (i. 68) between Logic and -Wissenschaftslehre. 'The former,' says Fichte, 'is conditioned and -determined by the latter.' Logic deals only with form; epistomology -with import as well. - -P. 54, § 24. The Mosaic legend of the Fall; cf. similar interpretations -in Kant: _Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft_, -1ster Stück; and Schelling, _Werke,_ i. (1. Abth.) 34. - - -CHAPTER III. - -P. 61, § 28. Fichte--to emphasise the experiential truth of his -system--says (_Werke,_ ii. 331): 'There was a philosophy which -professed to be able to expand by mere _inference_ the range thus -indicated for philosophy. According to it, thinking was--not, as we -have described it, the analysis of what was given and the recombining -of it in other forms, but at the same time--a production and creation -of something quite new. In this system the philosopher found himself -in the exclusive possession of certain pieces of knowledge which the -vulgar understanding had to do without. In it the philosopher could -reason out for himself a God and an immortality and talk himself into -the conclusion that he was wise and good.' - -Wolfs definition of philosophy is 'the Science of the possible in so -far as it can be'; and the possible = the non-contradictory. - -P. 64, § 29. The oriental sage corresponds (cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ xii. -229) to the writer known as Dionysius the Areopagite (_De Mystica -Theologia,_ and _De Divitus Nominibus._)--The same problem as to the -relation of the Infinite (God) to the Finite (world) is discussed in -Jewish speculation (by Saadia, Mamuni, _&c._) as the question of the -divine names,--a dogma founded on the thirteen names (or attributes) -applied to God in Exodus xxxiv. 6. (Cf. D. Kaufmann, _Geschichte der -Attributenlehre._) The same spirit has led to the list of ninety-nine -'excellent names' of Allah in Islam, a list which tradition derives -from Mohammed. - -P. 65, § 31. Cf. _Werke,_ ii. 47 _seqq.:_ 'The nature of the judgment -or proposition--involving as it does a distinction of subject and -predicate--is destroyed by the "speculative" proposition. This conflict -of the propositional form with the unity of comprehension which -destroys it is like the antagonism in rhythm between metre and accent. -The rhythm results from the floating "mean" and unification of the two. -Hence even in the "philosophical" proposition the identity of subject -and predicate is not meant to annihilate their difference (expressed by -the propositional form): their unity is meant to issue as a _harmony._ -The propositional form lets appear the definite shade or accent -pointing to a distinction in its fulfilment: whereas in the predicate -giving expression to the substance, and the subject itself falling -into the universal, we have the unity in which that accent is heard no -more. Thus in the proposition "God is Being" the predicate is Being; it -represents the substance in which the subject is dissolved away. Being -is here meant not to be predicate but essence: and in that way God -seems to cease to be what he is--by his place in the proposition--viz. -the permanent subject. The mind--far from getting further forward in -the passage from subject to predicate--feels itself rather checked, -through the loss of the subject, and thrown back, from a sense of its -loss, to the thought of the subject. Or,--since the predicate itself -is enunciated as a subject (as Being or as Essence) which exhausts the -nature of the subject, it again comes face to face with the subject -even in the predicate.--Thought thus loses its solid objective ground -which it had on the subject: yet at the same time in the predicate it -is thrown back upon it, and instead of getting to rest in itself it -returns upon the subject of the content.--To this unusual check and -arrest are in the main due the complaints as to the unintelligibility -of philosophical works,--supposing the individual to possess any other -conditions of education needed for understanding them.' - -P. 66, § 32. On the relation of dogmatism and scepticism see the -introduction to Kant's _Criticism of Pure Reason,_ and compare Caird's -_Critical Philosophy of I. Kant,_ vol. i. chap. i. - -P. 67, § 33. The subdivision of 'theoretical' philosophy or metaphysics -into the four branches, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology (rational and -empirical), and Natural Theology, is more or less common to the whole -Wolfian School. Wolf's special addition to the preceding scholastic -systems is found in the conception of a general Cosmology. Metaphysics -precedes physics, and the departments of practical philosophy. In -front of all stands logic or rational philosophy. Empirical psychology -belongs properly to physics, but reasons of practical convenience put -it elsewhere. - -P. 69, § 34. The question of the 'Seat of the Soul' is well known in -the writings of Lotze (_e.g. Metaphysic,_ § 291). - -Absolute actuosity. The _Notio Dei_ according to Thomas Aquinas, as -well as the dogmatics of post-Reformation times, is _actus purus_ -(or _actus purissimus_). For God _nihil potentialitatis habet._ Cf. -_Werke, xii._228: 'Aristotle especially has conceived God under the -abstract category of activity. Pure activity is knowledge (Wissen)--in -the scholastic age, _actus purus_--: but in order to be put as -activity, it must be put in its "moments." For knowledge we require -another thing which is known: and which, when knowledge knows it, is -thereby appropriated. It is implied in this that God--the eternal and -self-subsistent--eternally begets himself as his Son,--distinguishes -himself from himself. But what he thus distinguishes from himself, -has not the shape of an otherness: but what is distinguished is -_ipso facto_ identical with what it is parted from. God is spirit: -no darkness, no colouring or mixture enters this pure light. The -relationship of father and son is taken from organic life and used -metaphorically--the natural relation is only pictorial and hence does -not quite correspond to what is to be expressed. We say, God eternally -begets his Son, God distinguishes himself from himself: and thus we -begin from God, saying he does this, and in the other he creates is -utterly with himself (the form of Love): but we must be well aware -that God is this _whole action itself_ God is the beginning; he does -this: but equally is he only the end, the totality: and as such -totality he is spirit. God as merely the Father is not yet the true -(it is the Jewish religion where he is thus without the Son): He is -rather beginning and end: He is his presupposition, makes himself a -presupposition (this is only another form of distinguishing): He is the -eternal process.' - -Nicolaus Cusanus speaks of God (_De docta Ignorantia,_ ii. I) as -_infinita actualitas quae est actu omnis essendi possibilitas._ The -term 'actuosity' seems doubtful. - -P. 73, § 36. _Sensus eminentior._ Theology distinguishes three modes in -which the human intelligence can attain a knowledge of God. By the _via -causalitatis_ it argues that God is; by the _via negationis,_ what he -is not; by the _via eminentiae,_ it gets a glimpse of the relation in -which he stands to us. It regards God _i.e._ as the cause of the finite -universe; but as God is infinite, all that is predicated of him must be -taken as merely approximative (_sensu eminentiori_) and there is left -a vast remainder which can only be filled up with negations [Durandus -de S. Porciano on the Sentent, i. 3. I]. The _sensus eminentior_ is -the subject of Spinoza's strictures, Ep. 6 (56 in Opp. ii. 202): while -Leibniz adopts it in the preface to _Théodicée,_ 'Les perfections de -Dieu sont celles de nos âmes, mais il les possède sans bornes: il est -un océan, dont nous n'avons reçu que les gouttes; il y a en nous -quelque puissance, quelque connaissance, quelque bonté; mais elles sont -toutes entières en Dieu.' - -The _via causalitatis_ infers _e.g.,_ from the existence of morality -and intelligence here, a Being whose will finds expression therein: the -_via eminentiae_ infers that that will is good, and that intelligence -wise in the highest measure, and the _via negationis_ sets aside in the -conception of God all the limitations and conditions to which human -intelligence and will are subject. - - -CHAPTER IV. - -P. 80, § 38. The verses (forming part of the advice which -Mephistopheles, personating Faust, gives to the recently-arrived -pupil) stand in the original in a different order: beginning "Dann hat -er die Theile in seiner Hand," &c. The meaning of these and the two -preceding lines is somewhat as follows, in versification even laxer -than Goethe's:-- - - If you want to describe life and gather its meaning, - To drive out its spirit most be your beginning, - Then though fast in your hand lie the parts one by one - The spirit that linked them, alas! is gone. - And 'Nature's Laboratory' is only a name - That the chemist bestows on't to hide his own shame. - -One may compare _Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre,_ iii. 3, where it is -remarked, in reference to some anatomical exercises: 'You will learn -ere long that building-up is more instructive than tearing-down, -combining more than separating, animating the dead more than killing -again what was killed already.... Combining means more than separating: -reconstructing more than onlooking.' The first part of _Faust_ appeared -1808: the _Wanderjahre,_ 1828-9. - -P. 82, § 39. The article on the 'Relation of scepticism to philosophy, -an exposition of its various modifications, and comparison of the -latest with the ancient'--in form a review of G. E. Schulze's -_Criticism of Theoretical Philosophy_'--was republished in vol. xvi. of -Hegel's _Werke_ (vol. i. of the _Vermischte Schriften_). - -P. 87, § 42. In an earlier review of Kant's work (_Werke,_ i. 83) on -Glauben und Wissen (an article in Sendling and Hegel's _Journal_) -Hegel attaches more weight to a factor in the critical theory of -knowledge, here neglected. Kant, he says, has--within the limits -allowed by his psychological terms of thought--'put (in an excellent -way) the _à priori_ of sensibility into the original identity and -multiplicity, and that as transcendental imagination in the "higher -power" of an immersion of unity in multiplicity: whilst Understanding -(Verstand) he makes to consist in the elevation to universality of this -_à priori_ synthetic unity of sensibility,--whereby this identity is -invested with a comparative antithesis to the sensibility: and Reason -(Vernunft) is presented as a still higher power over the preceding -comparative antithesis, without however this universality and infinity -being allowed to go beyond the stereotyped formal pure infinity. -This genuinely rational construction by which, though the bad name -"faculties" is left, there is in truth presented a single identity -of them all, is transformed by Jacobi into a series of faculties, -_resting_ one upon another.' - -P. 87, § 42. Fichte: cf. _Werke,_ i. 420: 'I have said before, and -say it here again, that my system is no other than the Kantian. That -means: it contains the same view of facts, but in its method is quite -independent of the Kantian exposition.' 'Kant, up to now, is a closed -book.'--i. 442. There are two ways of critical idealism. 'Either' (as -Fichte) 'it actually deduces from the fundamental laws of intelligence, -that system of necessary modes of action, and with it, at the same -time, the objective conceptions thus arising, and thus lets the whole -compass of our conceptions gradually arise under the eyes of the reader -or hearer; or' (like Kant and his unprogressive disciples) 'it gets -hold of these laws from anywhere and anyhow, as they are immediately -applied to objects, therefore on their lowest grade (--on this grade -they are called _categories),_ and then asseverates that it is by -these that objects are determined and arranged.' And i. 478: 'I know -that the categories which Kant laid down are in no way _proved_ by -him to be conditions of self-consciousness, but only said to be so: -I know that space and time and what in the original consciousness is -inseparable from them and fills them both, are still less deduced as -such conditions, for of them it is not even said expressly--as of the -categories--that they are so, but only inferentially. But I believe -quite as surely that I know that Kant had the thought of such a system: -that everything he actually propounds are fragments and results of this -system; and that his statements have meaning and coherence only on this -presupposition.' Cf. viii. 362. - -P. 89, § 42. Transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Kant's _Kritik -der reinen Vernunft,_ § 16: 'The _I think_ must be able to accompany -all my ideas.... This idea is an act of spontaneity. ... I name it -pure apperception ... or original apperception ... because it is that -self-consciousness which can be accompanied by none further. The unity -of it I also call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in -order to denote the possibility of cognition _à priori_ from it.' - -P. 92, § 44. _Caput mortuum:_ a term of the Alchemists to denote the -non-volatile precipitate left in the retort after the spirit had been -extracted: the fixed or dead remains, 'quando spiritus animam sursum -vexit.' - -P. 92, § 45. Reason and Understanding. In the Wolfian School (_e.g._ -in Baumgarten's _Metaphysik,_ § 468) the term intellect (Verstand) -is used of the general faculty of higher cognition, while _ratio_ -(Vernunft) specially denotes the power of seeing distinctly the -connexions of things. So Wolff (_Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, &c._ § -277) defines Verstand as 'the faculty of distinctly representing the -possible,' and Vernunft (§ 368) as 'the faculty of seeing into the -connexion of truths.' It is on this use of _Reason_ as the faculty of -inference that Kant's use of the term is founded: though it soon widely -departs from its origin. For upon the 'formal' use of reason as the -faculty of syllogising, Kant superinduces a transcendental use as a -'faculty of _principles_,' while the understanding is only 'a faculty -of _rules.'_ 'Reason,' in other words, 'itself begets conceptions,' -and 'maxims, which it borrows neither from the senses nor from the -understanding.' (_Kritik d. r. Vern., Dialektik,_ Einleit. ii. A.) And -the essential aim of Reason is to give unity to the various cognitions -of understanding. While the unity given by understanding is 'unity of -a possible experience,' that sought by reason is the discovery of an -unconditioned which will complete the unity of the former (_Dial._ -Einleit. iv), or of 'the totality of the conditions to a given -conditioned.' (_Dial,_ vii.) - -It is this distinction of the terms which is dominant in Fichte and -Hegel, where Verstand is the more practical intellect which seeks -definite and restricted results and knowledges, while Vernunft is -a deeper and higher power which aims at completeness. In Goethe's -more reflective prose we see illustrations of this usage: _e.g. -Wilh. Meister's Wanderjahre,_ i. it is said to be the object of -the 'reasonable' man 'das entgegengesetzte zu überschauen und in -Uebereinstimmung zu bringen': or Bk. ii. Reasonable men when they have -devised something verständig to get this or that difficulty out of the -way, &c. Goethe, in his _Sprüche in Prosa_ (896), _Werke,_ iii. 281, -says 'Reason has for its province the thing in process (das Werdende), -understanding the thing completed (das Gewordene): the former does not -trouble itself about the purpose, the latter asks not whence. Reason -takes delight in developing; understanding wishes to keep everything as -it is, so as to use it.' (Similarly in Eckermann's Convers. Feb. 13, -1829.) Cf. Oken, Naturphilosophie, § 2914. Verstand ist Microcosmus, -Vernunft Macrocosmus. - -Kant's use of the term Reason, coupled with his special view of -Practical Reason and his use of the term Faith (Glaube), leads on to -the terminology of Jacobi. In earlier writings Jacobi had insisted on -the contrast between the superior authority of feeling and faith (which -are in touch with truth) and the mechanical method of intelligence and -reasoning (Verstand and Vernunft). At a later period however he changed -and fixed the nomenclature of his distinction. What he had first called -Glaube he latterly called Vernunft,--which is in brief a 'sense for -the supersensible'--an intuition giving higher and complete or total -knowledge--an immediate apprehension of the real and the true. As -contrasted with this reasonable faith or feeling, he regards Verstand -as a mere faculty of inference or derivative knowledge, referring one -thing to another by the rule of identity. - -This distinction which is substantially reproduced by Coleridge -(though with certain clauses that show traces of Schellingian -influence) has connexions--like so much else in Jacobi--with the -usage of Schopenhauer, 'Nobody,' says Jacobi, 'has ever spoken of an -animal Vernunft: a mere animal Verstand however we all know and speak -of.' (Jacobi's _Werke,_ iii. 8.) Schopenhauer repeats and enforces -the remark. All animals possess, says Schopenhauer, the power of -apprehending causality, of cognising objects: a power of immediate and -intuitive knowledge of real things: this is Verstand. But Vernunft, -which is peculiar to man, is the cognition of _truth_ (not of reality): -it is an abstract judgment with a sufficient reason (_Welt als W._ i. § -6). - -One is tempted to connect the modern distinction with an older one -which goes back in its origin to Plato and Aristotle, but takes form in -the Neo-Platonist School, and enters the Latin world through Boëthius. -_Consol. Phil._ iv. 6: _Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, -ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus,_ and in v. -4 there is a full distinction of _sensus, imaginatio, ratio_ and -_intelligentia_ in ascending order. _Ratio_ is the discursive knowledge -of the idea (_universali consideratione perpendit): intelligentia_ -apprehends it at once, and as a simple _forma (pura mentis acie -contuetur)_: [cf. Stob. _Ed._ i. 826-832: Porphyr. _Sentent._15]. -Reasoning belongs to the human species, just as intelligence to the -divine alone. Yet it is assumed--in an attempt to explain divine -foreknowledge and defend freedom--that man may in some measure place -himself on the divine standpoint (v. 5). - -This contrast between a higher mental faculty (_mens_) and a lower -(_ratio_) which even Aquinas adopts from the interpretation of -Aristotle (_Summa Theol._ i. 79, 9) is the favourite weapon in the -hands of mysticism. After the example of Dionysius Areop., Nicolaus of -Cusa, Reuchlin, and other thinkers of the Renaissance depreciate mere -discursive thought and logical reasoning. It is the inner _mens_--like -a simple ray of light--penetrating by an immediate and indivisible -act to the divine--which gives us access to the supreme science. This -_simplex intelligentia,--_ superior to imagination or reasoning--as -Gerson says, _Consid. de Th._ 10, is sometimes named _mens,_ sometimes -_Spiritus,_ the light of intelligence, the shadow of the angelical -intellect, the divine light. From Scotus Erigena to Nicolas of Cusa -one tradition is handed down: it is taken up by men like Everard Digby -(in his _Theoria Analytica_) and the group of Cambridge Platonists and -by Spinoza in the seventeenth century, and it reappears, profoundly -modified, in the German idealism between 1790 and 1820. - -P. 99, § 48. 'Science of Logic'; Hegel's large work on the subject, -published between 1812-16. The discussions on the Antinomies belong -chiefly to the first part of it. - -P. 102, § 50. 'Natural Theology,' here to be taken in a narrower sense -than in p. 73, where it is equivalent to Rational Theology in general. -Here it means 'Physico-theology'--the argument from design in nature. - -P. 103, § 50. Spinoza--defining God as 'the union of thought with -extension.' This is not verbally accurate; for according to _Ethica,_ -i. pr. 11, God, or the substance, consists of infinite attributes, -each of which expresses the eternal and infinite essence. But Spinoza -mentions of 'attributes' only two: _Ethica,_ ii. pr. 1. I Thought is -an attribute of God: pr. 2, Extension is an attribute of God. And he -adds, _Ethica,_ i. pr. 10, Schol. 'All the attributes substance has -were always in it together, nor can one be produced by another.' And -in _Ethica,_ ii. 7. Sch. it is said: 'Thinking substance and extended -substance is one and the same substance which is comprehended now under -this, now under that attribute.' - -P. 110, § 54. 'Practical in the true sense of the word.' Cf. Kant, -_Werke,_ Ros. and Sch. i. 581: 'A great misunderstanding, exerting an -injurious influence on scientific methods, prevails with regard to what -should be considered "practical" in such sense as to justify its place -in practical philosophy. Diplomacy and finance, rules of economy no -less than rules of social intercourse, precepts of health and dietetic -of the soul no less than the body, have been classed as practical -philosophy on the mere ground that they all contain a collection of -practical propositions. Hut although such practical propositions -differ in mode of statement from the theoretical propositions which -have for import the possibility of things and the exposition of their -nature, they have the same content. "Practical," properly so called, -are only those propositions which relate to _Liberty_ under laws. All -others whatever are nothing but the theory of what pertains to the -_nature_ of things--only that theory is brought to bear on the way in -which the things may be produced by us in conformity with a principle; -_i.e._ the possibility of the things is presented as the result of -a voluntary action which itself too may be counted among physical -causes.' And Kant, _Werke,_ iv. 10. 'Hence a sum of practical precepts -given by philosophy does not form a special part of it (co-ordinate -with the theoretical) merely because they are practical. Practical -they might be, even though their principle were wholly derived from -the theoretical knowledge of nature,--as _technico-practical_ rules. -They are practical in the true sense, when and because their principle -is not borrowed from the nature-conception (which is always sensuously -conditioned) and rests therefore on the supersensible, which the -conception of liberty alone makes knowable by formal laws. They are -therefore ethico-practical, _i.e._ not merely _precepts and rules_ with -this or that intention, but laws without antecedent reference to ends -and intentions.' - -P. 111, § 54. Eudaemonism. But there is Eudaemonism and Eudaemonism; -as Cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ i. 8. 4 The time had come when the infinite -longing away beyond the body and the world had reconciled itself -with the reality of existence. Yet the reality which the soul was -reconciled to--the objective which the subjectivity recognised--was -actually only empirical existence, common world and actuality.... And -though the reconciliation was in its heart and ground sure and fast, -it still needed an objective form for this ground: the very necessity -of nature made the blind certitude of immersion in the reality of -empirical existence seek to provide itself with a justification and a -good conscience. This reconciliation for consciousness was found in the -Happiness-doctrine: the fixed point it started from being the empirical -subject, and what it was reconciled to, the vulgar actuality, whereon -it might now confide, and to which it might surrender itself without -sin. The profound coarseness and utter vulgarity, which is at the basis -of this happiness-doctrine, has its only elevation in its striving -after justification and a good conscience, which however can get no -further than the objectivity of mere intellectualism. - -'The dogmatism of eudaemonism and of popular philosophy (Aufklärung) -therefore did not consist in the fact that it made happiness and -enjoyment the supreme good. For if Happiness be comprehended as an -_Idea,_ it ceases to be something empirical and casual--as also to be -anything sensuous. In the supreme existence, reasonable act (Thun) and -supreme enjoyment are one. So long as supreme blessedness is supreme -_Idea_ it matters not whether we try to apprehend the supreme existence -on the side of its ideality,--which, as isolated may be first called -reasonable act--or on the side of its reality--which as isolated may -be first called enjoyment and feeling. For reasonable act and supreme -enjoyment, ideality and reality are both alike in it and identical. -Every philosophy has only one problem--to construe supreme blessedness -as supreme Idea. So long as it is by reason that supreme enjoyment is -ascertained, the distinguishability of the two at once disappears: -for this comprehension and the infinity which is dominant in act, and -the reality and finitude which is dominant in enjoyment, are taken up -into one another. The controversy with happiness becomes a meaningless -chatter, when happiness is known as the blessed enjoyment of the -eternal intuition. But what was called eudaemonism meant--it must -be said--an empirical happiness, an enjoyment of sensation, not the -eternal intuition and blessedness.' - -P. 112, § 55. Schiller. _Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des -Menschen_(1795), 18th letter. 'Through beauty the sensuous man is led -to form and to thought; through beauty the intellectual man is led back -to matter and restored to the sense-world. Beauty combines two states -which are opposed to one another.' Letter 25. 'We need not then have -any difficulty about finding a way from sensuous dependence to moral -liberty, after beauty has given a case where liberty can completely -co-exist with dependence, and where man in order to show himself an -intelligence need not make his escape from matter. If--as the fact -of beauty teaches--man is free even in association with the senses, -and if--as the conception necessarily involves--liberty is something -absolute and supersensible, there can no longer be any question how -he comes to elevate himself from limitations to the absolute: for -in beauty this has already come to pass.' Cf. _Ueber Anmuth und -Würde_(1793). 'It is in a beautiful soul, then, that sense and reason, -duty and inclination harmonize; and grace is their expression in the -appearance. Only in the service of a beautiful soul can nature at the -same time possess liberty.' (See Bosanquet's _History of Aesthetic._) - -P. 115, § 60. The quotation in the note comes from § 87 of the _Kritik -der Urtheilskraft_ (_Werke,_ ed. Ros. and Sch. iv. 357). - -P. 120, § 60. Fichte, _Werke,_ i. 279. 'The principle of life and -consciousness, the ground of its possibility, is (as has been shown) -certainly contained in the Ego: yet by this means there arises no -actual life, no empirical life in time--and another life is for us -utterly unthinkable. If such an actual life is to be possible, there -is still needed for that a special impulse (Aufstoss) striking the -Ego from the Non-ego. According to my system, therefore, the ultimate -ground of all actuality for the Ego is an original action and re-action -between the Ego and something outside it, of which all that can be said -is that it must be completely opposed to the Ego. In this reciprocal -action nothing is brought into the Ego, nothing foreign imported; -everything that is developed from it _ad infinitum_ is developed from -it solely according to its own laws. The Ego is merely put in motion by -that opposite, so as to act; and without such a first mover it would -never have acted; and, as its existence consists merely in action, it -would not even have existed. But the source of motion has no further -attributes than to set in motion, to be an opposing force which as such -is only felt. - -'My philosophy therefore is realistic. It shows that the consciousness -of finite natures cannot at all be explained, unless we assume a force -existing independently of them, and completely opposed to them;--on -which as regards their empirical existence they are dependent. But -it asserts nothing further than such an opposed force, which is -merely _felt,_ but not _cognised,_ by finite beings. All possible -specifications of this force or non-ego, which may present themselves -_ad infinitum_ in our consciousness, my system engages to deduce from -the specifying faculty of the Ego.... - -'That the finite mind must necessarily assume outside it something -absolute (a Ding:an:sich), and yet must on the other hand acknowledge -that this something only exists for the mind (is a necessary noümenon): -this is the circle which may be infinitely expanded, but from which the -finite mind can never issue.' Cf. Fichte's _Werke,_ i. 248, ii. 478. - - -CHAPTER V. - -P. 121, § 62. F. H. Jacobi (_Werke,_ v. 82) in his _Woldemar_ (a -romance contained in a series of letters, first published _as a whole_ -in 1781) writes: 'The philosophical understanding (Verstand) is jealous -of everything unique, everything immediately certain which makes itself -true, without proofs, solely by its existence. It persecutes this -faith of reason even into our inmost consciousness, where it tries to -make us distrust the feeling of our identity and personality.' 'What -is absolutely and intrinsically true,' he adds (v. 122), 'is not got -by way of reasoning and comparison: both our immediate consciousness -(Wissen)--I am--and our conscience (Gewissen) are the work of a secret -something in which heart, understanding, and sense combine.' 'Notions -(Begriffe), far from embalming the living, really turn it into a -corpse' (v. 380). - -Cf. Fichte's words (_Werke,_ ii. 255), Aus dem Gewissen allein stammt -die Wahrheit, &c. - -P. 122, § 62. The Letters on the doctrine of Spinoza, published in -1785, were re-issued in 1789 with eight supplements. - -'A science,' says Jacobi in his latest utterance (_Werke,_ iv. pref. -xxx.) 'is only a systematic register of cognitions mutually referring -to one another--the first and last point in the series is wanting.' - -P. 123, § 62. Lalande's dictum is referred to by Fries (_Populäre -Vorlesungen über Sternkunde,_ 1813) quoted by Jacobi in his _Werke,_ -ii. 55. What Lalande has actually written in the preface to his work on -astronomy is that the science as he understands it has no relation to -natural theology--in other words, that he is not writing a Bridgewater -treatise. - -P. 123, § 63. Jacobi, _Werke,_ ii. 222. 'For my part, I regard the -principle of reason as all one with the principle of life.' And ii. -343: 'Evidently reason is the true and proper life of our nature.' -It is in virtue of our inner tendency and instinct towards the -eternal (Richtung und Trieb auf das Ewige),--of our sense for the -supersensible--that we, human beings, really subsist (iv. 6. 152). And -this Organ der Vernehmung des Uebersinnlichen is Reason (iii. 203, &c). - -The language of Jacobi fluctuates, not merely in words, but in the -intensity of his intuitionalism. Thus, _e.g._ iii. 32: 'The reason man -has is no faculty giving the science of the true, but only a presage' -(Ahndung des Wahren). 'The belief in a God,' he says, at one time (iii. -206) 'is as natural to man as his upright position': but that belief -is, he says elsewhere, only 'an inborn devotion (Andacht) before an -unknown God.' Thus, if we have an immediate awareness (Wissen) of -God, this is not knowledge or science (Wissenschaft). Such intuition -of reason is described (ii. 9) as 'the faculty of _presupposing_ the -intrinsically (an sich) true, good, and beautiful, with full confidence -in the objective validity of the presupposition.' But that object we -are let see only in feeling (ii. 61). 'Our philosophy,' he says (iii. -6) 'starts from feeling--of course an objective and pure feeling.' - -P. 124, § 63. Jacobi (_Werke,_ iv. a, p. 211): 'Through faith (Glaube) -we know that we have a body.' Such immediate knowledge of our own -activity--'the feeling of I am, I act' (iii. 411)--the sense of -'absolute self-activity' or freedom (of which the 'possibility cannot -be cognised,' because logically a contradiction) is what Jacobi calls -Anschauung (Intuition). He distinguishes a sensuous, and a rational -intuition (iii. 59). - -P. 125, § 63. Jacobi expressly disclaims identification of his Glaube -with the faith of Christian doctrine (_Werke,_ iv. a, p. 210). In -defence he quotes from Hume, Inquiry V, and from Reid, passages to -illustrate his usage of the term 'belief--by the distinction between -which and faith certain ambiguities are no doubt avoided. - -P. 129, § 66. Kant had said _'Concepts without intuitions are empty'_ -It is an exaggeration of this half-truth (the other half is _Intuitions -without concepts are blind_) that is the basis of these statements of -Jacobi (and of Schopenhauer)--a view of which the following passage -from Schelling (_Werke,_ ii. 125) is representative. 'Concepts -(Begriffe) are only silhouettes of reality. They are projected by -a serviceable faculty, the understanding, which only comes into -action when reality is already on the scene,--which only comprehends, -conceives, retains what it required a creative faculty to produce.... -The mere concept is a word without meaning.... All reality that can -attach to it is lent to it merely by the intuition (Anschauung) which -preceded it. ... Nothing is real for us except what is _immediately -given_ us, without any mediation by concepts, without our feeling at -liberty. But nothing reaches us immediately except through intuition.' -He adds, however, 'Intuition is due to the activity of mind (Sein): -it demands a disengaged sense (freier Sinn) and an intellectual organ -(geistiges Organ).' - -P. 134. Cicero: _De Natura Deorum,_ i. 16; ii. 4, _De quo autem omnium -natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est_; cf. Seneca, Epist. cxvii. -6. The principle is common to Stoics and Epicureans: it is the maxim -of Catholic truth _Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum -est_--equivalent to Aristotle's ὄ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἷναι φάμεν--But as -Aristotle remarks (_An. Post._ i. 31) τὸ καθόλον καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδίνατον -αἰσθάνεσθαι. - -Jacobi: _Werke,_ vi. 145. 'The general opinion about what is true and -good must have an authority equal to reason.' - -P. 136, § 72. Cf. _Encyclop._ § 400: 'That the heart and the feeling -is not the form by which anything is justified as religious, moral, -true, and just, and that an appeal to heart and feeling either means -nothing or means something bad, should hardly need enforcing. Can any -experience be more trite than that hearts and feelings are also bad, -evil, godless, mean, &c.? Ay, that the heart is the source of such -feelings only, is directly said in the words: Out of the heart proceed -evil thoughts, &c. In times when the heart and the sentiment are, by -scientific theology and philosophy, made the criterion of goodness, -religion, and morality, it is necessary to recall these trivial -experiences.' - - -CHAPTER VI. - -P. 145, § 80. Goethe; the reference is to _Werke,_ ii. 268 (Natur und -Kunst): - - Wer Groszes will, muß sich zusammenraffen: - In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister, - Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben. - -Such 'limitation' of aim and work is a frequent lesson in _Wilhelm -Meister's Wanderjahre, e.g._ i. ch. 4. 'Many-sidedness prepares, -properly speaking, only the element in which the one-sided can act.... -The best thing is to restrict oneself to a handi-work.' And i. ch. 12: -'To be acquainted with and to exercise one thing rightly gives higher -training than mere tolerableness (halfness) in a hundred sorts of -things.' And ii. ch. 12: 'Your general training and all establishments -for the purpose are fool's farces.' - -P. 147, § 81. Cf. Fichte, _Werke,_ ii. 37. 'Yet it is not _we_ who -analyse: but knowledge analyses itself, and can do so, because in all -its being it is a _for-self_ (Für:sich),' &c. - -P. 149, § 81. Plato, the inventor of Dialectic. Sometimes on the -authority of Aristotle, as reported by _Diog. Laert._ ix. 25, Zeno of -Elea gets this title; but Hegel refers to such statements as _Diog. -Laer,',_ ii. 34 τρίτον δὲ Πλάτων προσέθηκε τὸν διαλεκτικὸν λόγον, καὶ -ἐτελεσιουργῆσε φιλοσοφίαν. - -Protagoras. But it is rather in the dialogue _Meno,_ pp. 81-97, -that Plato exhibits this view of knowledge. Cf. _Phaedo,_72 E, and -_Phaedrus,_ 245. - -Parmenides; especially see Plat. _Parmen._ pp. 142, 166; cf. Hegel, -_Werke,_ xi v. 204. - -With Aristotle dialectic is set in contrast to apodictic, and treated -as (in the modern sense) a quasi-inductive process (Ar. _Top._ Lib. -viii.): with the Stoics, dialectic is the name of the half-rhetorical -logic which they, rather than Aristotle, handed on to the schoolmen of -the Middle Ages. - -P. 150, § 81. The physical elements are fire, air, earth, and water. -Earthquakes, storms, &c, are examples of the 'meteorological process.' -Cf. _Encyclop._ §§ 281-289. - -P. 152, § 82. Dialectic; cf: _Werke,_ v. 326 seqq. - -P. 154, § 82. Mysticism; cf. Mill's _Logic,_ bk. v, ch. 3, § 4: -'Mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence -to the subjective creations of the mind's own faculties, to mere ideas -of the intellect; and believing that by watching and contemplating -these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in -the world without.' Mill thus takes it as equivalent to an ontological -mythology--probably a rare use of the term. - - -CHAPTER VII. - -P. 156, § 85. The Absolute. The term, in something like its modern -usage, is at least as old as Nicolaus Cusanus. God, according to him, -is the _absoluta omnium quidditas (Apol._406), the _esse absolutum,_ or -_ipsum esse in existentibus_ (_De ludo Globi,_ ii. 161 a), the _unum -absolutum,_ the _vis absoluta,_ or _possibilitas absoluta,_ or _valor -absolutus: absoluta vita, absoluta ratio: absoluta essendi forma._ On -this term and its companion _infinities_ he rings perpetual changes. -But its distinct employment to denote the 'metaphysical God' is much -more modern. In Kant, _e.g._ the 'Unconditioned' (Das Unbedingte) -is the metaphysical, corresponding to the religious, conception of -deity; and the same is the case with Fichte, who however often makes -use of the adjective 'absolute.' It is with Schelling that the term -is naturalised in philosophy: it already appears in his works of 1793 -and 1795: and from him apparently it finds its way into Fichte's -_Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre_ of 1801 (_Werke,_ ii. 13) 'The -absolute is neither knowing nor being; nor is it identity, nor is it -indifference of the two; but it is throughout merely and solely the -absolute.' - -The term comes into English philosophical language through Coleridge -and later borrowers from the German. See Ferrier's _Institutes of -Metaphysic,_ Prop. xx, and Mill's _Examination of Hamilton,_ chap. iv. - -P. 158, § 86. Cf. Schelling, iii. 372: I = I expresses the identity -between the 'I,' in so far as it is the producing, and the 'I' as the -produced; the original synthetical and yet identical proposition: the -_cogito=sum_ of Schelling. - -P. 159. Definition of God as _Ens realissimum, e.g._ Meier's -_Baumgarten's Metaphysic,_ § 605. - -Jacobi, _Werke,_ iv. 6, thus describes Spinoza's God. - -As to the beginning cf. Fichte, _Werke,_ ii. 14 (speaking of 'absolute -knowing'): 'It is not a knowing of something, nor is it a knowing of -nothing (so that it would be a knowing of somewhat, but this somewhat -be nothing): it is not even a knowing of itself, for it is no knowledge -at all _of_;--nor is it _a_ knowing (quantitatively and in relation), -but it is (the) knowing (absolutely qualitatively). It is no act, no -event, or that somewhat is in knowing; but it is just the knowing, in -which alone all acts and all events, which are there set down, can be -set down.' - -History of Philosophy; cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ i. 165. 'If the Absolute, -like its phenomenon Reason, be (as it is) eternally one and the same, -then each reason, which has turned itself upon and cognised itself, -has produced a true philosophy and solved the problem which, like its -solution, is at all times the same. The reason, which cognises itself, -has in philosophy to do only with itself: hence in itself too lies -its whole work and its activity; and as regards the inward essence of -philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors. - -'Just as little, as of constant improvements, can there be talk of -"peculiar views" of philosophy.... The true peculiarity of a philosophy -is the interesting individuality, in which reason has organised itself -a form from the materials of a particular age; in it the particular -speculative reason finds spirit of its spirit, flesh of its flesh; it -beholds itself in it as one and the same, as another living being. -Each philosophy is perfect in itself, and possesses totality, like a -work of genuine art. As little as the works of Apelles and Sophocles, -if Raphael and Shakespeare had known them, could have seemed to them -mere preliminary exercises for themselves--but as cognate spiritual -powers;--so little can reason in its own earlier formations perceive -only useful preparatory exercises.' Cf. Schelling, iv. 401. - -P. 160, § 86. Parmenides (ap. Simplic. _Phys._): of the two ways of -investigation the first is that _it is,_ and that not-to-be is not. - - ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἓστι τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἓστι μὴ εἶναι - -P. 161, § 87. The Buddhists. Cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ xi. 387. Modern -histories of Buddhism insist upon the purely ethico-religious character -of the teaching. Writers like von Hartmann (_Religionsphilosophie,_ p. -320) on the contrary hold that Buddhism carried out the esoteric theory -of Brahmanism to the consequence that the abstract one is nothing. -According to Vassilief, _Le Bouddhisme,_ p. 318 seqq., one of the -Buddhist metaphysical schools, the Madhyamikas, founded by Nâgârdjuna -400 years after Buddha, taught that All is Void.--Such metaphysics were -probably reactions of the underlying Brahmanist idea. - -But generally Buddhism (as was not unnatural 60 years ago) is hardly -taken here in its characteristic historical features. - -P. 167, § 88. Aristotle, _Phys,_ i. 8 (191 a. 26): 'Those philosophers -who first sought the truth and the real substance of things got on a -false track, like inexperienced travellers who fail to discover the -way, and declared that nothing can either come into being or disappear, -because it is necessary that what comes into being should come into -being either from what is or from what is not, and that it is from both -of these impossible: for what is does not become (it already is), and -nothing would become from what is not.' - -(5) is an addition of ed. 3 (1830); cf. _Werke,_ xvii. 181. - -P. 168, § 88. The view of Heraclitus here taken is founded on the -interpretation given by Plato (in the _Theaetetus,_152; _Cratylus,_ -401) and by Aristotle, of a fundamental doctrine of the Ephesian--which -however is expressed in the fragments by the name of the everliving -fire. The other phrase (Ar. _Met._ i. 4) is used by Aristotle to -describe the position, not of Heraclitus, but of Leucippus and -Democritus. Cf. Plutarch, _adv. Colotem,_ 4. 2 Δημόκριτος διορίζεται μὴ -μᾱλλον τὸ δὲν ἥ τὸ μηδν εἶναι; cf. Simplic. in Ar. _Phys._ fol. 7. - -P. 169, § 89. Daseyn: Determinate being. Cf. Schelling, i. 209. -'Being (Seyn) expresses the absolute, Determinate being (Daseyn) a -conditional, 'positing': Actuality, one conditioned in a definite sort -by a definite condition. The single phenomenon in the whole system -of the world has _actuality;_ the world of phenomena in general has -Daseyn; but the absolutely-posited, the Ego, _is. I am_ is all the Ego -can say of itself.' - -P. 171, § 91. Being-by-self: An:sich:seyn. - -Spinoza, _Epist._ 50, _figura non aliud quam determinatio et -determinatio negatio est._ - -P. 172, § 92. Grenze (limit or boundary), and Schranke (barrier or -check) are distinguished in _Werke,_ iii. 128-139 (see Stirling's -_Secret of Hegel,_ i. 377 seqq.). Cf. Kant's remark, _Krit. d. r. -Vernunft,_ p. 795, that Hume only erschränkt our intellect, ohne ihn zu -begrenzen. - -P. 173, § 92. Plato, _Timaeus,_ c. 35 (formation of the world-soul): -'From the individual and ever-identical essence (ὀυσία) and the -divisible which is corporeal, he compounded a third intermediate -species of essence.... And taking these, being three, he compounded -them all into one form (ἰδέα), adjusting perforce the unmixable nature -of the other and the same, and mingling them all with the essence, and -making of three one again, he again distributed this total into as many -portions as were fitting, but each of them mingled out of the same and -the other and the essence.' - -P. 175, § 94. Philosophy. Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ ii. 377. 'A various -experience has taught me that for most men the greatest obstacle to the -understanding and vital apprehension of philosophy is their invincible -opinion that its object is to be sought at an infinite distance. -The consequence is, that while they should fix their eye on what is -present (das Gegenwärtige), every effort of their mind is called out -to get hold of an object which is not in question through the whole -inquiry.' ... 'The aim of the sublimest science can only be to show the -actuality,--in the strictest sense the actuality, the presence, the -vital existence (Daseyn)--of a God in the whole of things and in each -one.... Here we deal no longer with an extra-natural or supernatural -thing, but with the immediately near, the alone-actual to which we -ourselves also belong, and in which we are.' - -P. 177, § 95. Plato's _Philebus,_ ch. xii-xxiii (pp. 23-38): cf. -_Werke,_ xiv. 214 seqq.: 'The absolute is therefore what in one unity -is finite and infinite.' - -P. 178. Idealism of Philosophy: cf. Schelling, ii. 67. 'Every -philosophy therefore is and remains Idealism; and it is only under -itself that it embraces realism and idealism; only that the former -Idealism should not be confused with the latter, which is of a merely -relative kind.' - -Hegel, _Werke,_ iii. 163. 'The proposition that the finite is "ideal" -constitutes Idealism. In nothing else consists the Idealism of -philosophy than in recognising that the finite has no genuine being.... -The contrast of idealistic and realistic philosophy is therefore of -no importance. A philosophy that attributed to finite existences as -such a genuine ultimate absolute being would not deserve the name -philosophy.... By "ideal" is meant existing as a representation in -consciousness: whatever is in a mental concept, idea or imagination is -"ideal": "ideal" is just another word for "in imagination,"--something -not merely distinct from the real, but essentially not real. The mind -indeed is the great idealist: in the sensation, representation, thought -of the mind the fact has not what is called _real_ existence; in the -simplicity of the Ego such external being is only suppressed, existing -_for me,_ and "ideally" in me. This subjective idealism refers only to -the representational form, by which an import is mine.' - -P. 180, § 96. The distinction of nature and mind as real and ideal is -especially Schelling's: See _e.g._ his _Einleitung,_ &c. iii. 272. 'If -it is the problem of Transcendental Philosophy to subordinate the real -to the ideal, it is on the contrary the problem of the philosophy of -nature to explain the ideal from the real.' - -P. 183, § 98. Newton: see _Scholium_ at the end of the _Principia,_ and -cf. _Optics,_ iii. qu. 28. - -Modern Atomism, besides the conception of particles or molecules, has -that of mathematical centres of force. - -Kant, _Werke,_ v. 379 (ed. Rosenk.). 'The general principle of the -_dynamic_ of material nature is that all reality in the objects of the -external senses must be regarded as moving force: whereby accordingly -so-called solid or absolute impenetrability is banished from natural -science as a meaningless concept, and repellent force put in its -stead; whereas true and immediate attraction is defended against all -the subtleties of a self-misconceiving metaphysic and declared to be a -fundamental force necessary for the very possibility of the concept of -matter.' - -P. 184, § 98. Abraham Gottheit Kästner (1719-1800), professor -forty-four years at Göttingen, enjoyed in the latter half of the -eighteenth century a considerable repute, both in literature and in -mathematical science. Some of, his epigrams are still quoted. - -P. 190, § 102. The two 'moments' of number Unity, and Sum (Anzahl), -may be compared with the Greek distinction between one and ἀριθμός -(cf. Arist. _Phys._ iv. 12 ἐλάχίστος ἀριθμός ἡ δυάς). According -to Rosenkranz (_Leben Hegels_) the classification of arithmetical -operations often engaged Hegel's research. Note the relation in Greek -between λογικόν and λογιστικόν. Cf. Kant's view of the 'synthesis' in -arithmetic. - -P. 193, § 103. Intensive magnitude. Cf. Kant, _Kritik der reinen -Vernunft,_ p. 207, on Anticipation of Perception (Wahrnehmung), and p. -414, in application to the question of the soul's persistence. - -P. 195, § 104. Not Aristotle, but rather Simplicius on the _Physics_ -of Aristotle, fol. 306: giving Zeno's argument against the alleged -composition of the line from a series of points. What you can say of -one supposed small real unit, you can say of a smaller, and so on _ad -infinitum._ (Cf. Burnet's _Early Greek Philosophy,_ p. 329.) - -P. 196, § 104. The distinction between imagination and intellect made -by Spinoza in _Ep._ xii. (olim xxix.) in _Opp._ ed. Land vol. ii. 40 -seqq. is analogous to that already noted (p. 402) between _ratio_ and -_intellegentia,_ and is connected, as by Boëthius, with the distinction -which Plato, _Timaeus,_ 37, draws between eternity (αἰών) and time. - -The infinite (_Eth._ i. prop. 8. Schol. I) is the 'absolute affirmation -of a certain nature's existence,' as opposed to finitude which is -really _ex parte negatio._ 'The problem has always been held extremely -difficult, if not inextricable, because people did not distinguish -between what is concluded to be infinite by its own nature and the -force of its definition, and what has no ends, not in virtue of its -essence, but in virtue of its cause. It was difficult also because -they did not distinguish between what is called infinite because it -has no ends, and that whose parts (though we may have a maximum and -minimum of it) we cannot equate or explicate by any number. Lastly -because they lid not distinguish between what we can only understand -(_intelligere,_) but not imagine, and what we can also imagine.' - -To illustrate his meaning, Spinoza calls attention to the distinction -of substance from mode, of eternity from duration. We can 'explicate' -the existence only of modes by duration: that of substance, 'by -eternity, _i.e._ by an infinite fruition of existence or being' (_per -aeternitatem, hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate, -essendi fruitionem._) The attempt therefore to show that extended -_substance_ is composed of parts is an illusion,--which arises because -we look at quantity 'abstractly or superficially, as we have it in -imagination by means of the senses.' So looking at it, as we are liable -to do, a quantity will be found divisible, finite, composed of parts -and manifold. But if we look at it as it really is,--as a Substance ---as it is in the intellect alone--(which is a work of difficulty), it -will be found infinite, indivisible, and unique. 'It is only therefore -when we abstract duration and quantity from substance, that we use -time to determine duration and measure to determine quantity, so as to -be able to imagine them. Eternity and substance, on the other hand, -are no objects of imagination but only of intellect; and to try to -explicate them by such notions as measure, time, and number--which are -only modes of thinking or rather of imagining--is no better than to -fall into imaginative raving.' 'Nor will even the modes of Substance -ever be rightly understood, should they be confounded with this sort -of _entia rationis_' (_i.e. modi cogitandi_ subserving the easier -retention, explication and _imagination_ of things _understood_)' -or aids to imagination. For when we do so, we separate them from -substance, and from the mode in which they flow from eternity, without -which they cannot be properly understood.' (Cf. Hegel's _Werke,_ i. 63.) - -The verses from Albr. von Haller come from his poem on Eternity (1736). -Hegel seems to quote from an edition before 1776, when the fourth line -was added in the stanza as it thus finally stood:-- - - Ich häufe ungeheure Zahlen, - Gebürge Millionen auf, - Ich welze Zeit auf Zeit und Welt auf Welten hin, - Und wenn ich auf der March des endlichen nun bin, - Und von der fürchterlichen Höhe - Mit Schwindeln wieder nach dir sehe, - Ist alle Macht der Zahl, vermehrt mit tausend Malen, - Noch nicht ein Theil von dir. - Ich tilge sie, und du liegst ganz vor mir. - -Kant, _Kritik d. r. Vernunft,_ p. 641. 'Even Eternity, however _eerily_ -sublime may be its description by Haller,' &c. - -P. 197, § 104. Pythagoras in order of time probably comes between -Anaximenes (of Ionia) and Xenophanes (of Elea). But the mathematical -and metaphysical doctrines attributed to the Pythagorean are known -to us only in the form in which they are represented in Plato and -Aristotle, _i.e._ in a later stage of development. The Platonists (cf. -Arist. _Met._ i. 6; xi. 1. 12; xii. 1. 7; cf. Plat. _Rep._ p. 510) -treated mathematical fact as mid-way between 'sensibles' and 'ideas'; -and Aristotle himself places mathematics as a science between physical -and metaphysical (theological) philosophy. - -The tradition (referred to p. 198) about Pythagoras is given by -Iamblichus, _Vita Pyth._ §115 seqq.: it forms part of the later -Neo-Pythagorean legend, which entered literature in the first centuries -of the Christian era. - -P. 201, § 107. Hebrew hymns: _e.g. Psalms_ lxxiv. and civ.; Proverbs -viii. and Job xxxviii. _Vetus verbum est,_ says Leibniz (ed. Erdmann, -p. 162), _Deum omnia pondere, mensura, numero, fecisse._ - -P. 202, § 108. The antinomy of measure. These logical puzzles -are the so-called fallacy of Sorites (a different thing from the -chain-syllogism of the logic-books); cf. Cic. _Acad._ ii. 28, 29; _De -Divin._ ii. 4--and the φαλακρός cf. Horace, _Epist._ ii. 1-45. - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -P. 211, § 113. Self-relation--(sich) auf sich beziehen. - -P. 213, § 115. The 'laws of thought' is the magniloquent title given -in the Formal Logic since Kant's day to the principles or maxims -(_principia_, Grundsätze) which Kant himself described as 'general and -formal criteria of truth.' They include the so-called principle of -contradiction, with its developments, the principle of identity and -excluded middle: to which, with a desire for completeness, eclectic -logicians have added the Leibnizian principle of the reason. Hegel -has probably an eye to Krug and Fries in some of his remarks. The -three laws may be compared and contrasted with the three principles, ---homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms, in Kant's -_Kritik d. r. Vern._ p. 686. - -P. 217, § 117. Leibniz, _Nouveaux Essais,_ Liv. ii. ch. 27, § 3 (ed. -Erdmann, p. 273: cf. fourth Letter to Clarke). _Il n'y a point deux -individus indiscernables. Un gentilhomme d'esprit de mes amis, en -parlant avec moi en présence de Madame l'Electrice dans le jardin de -Herrenhausen, crut qu'il trouverait bien deux feuilles entièrement -semblables. Madame l'Electrice l'en défia, et il courut longtems en -vain pour en chercher._ - -The principle of individuation or indiscernibility is: 'If two -individuals were perfectly alike and equal and, in a word, -indistinguishable by themselves, there would be no principle of -individuation: (Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 277) _Poser deux choses -indiscernables est poser la même chose sous deux noms_ (p. 756). -_Principium individuationis idem est quod absolutae specificationis quâ -res ita sit determinata, ut ab aliis omnibus distingui possit._ - -P. 221, § 119. Polarity. Schelling, ii. 489. 'The law of Polarity is a -universal law of nature'; cf. ii. 459: 'It is a first principle of a -philosophic theory of nature to have a view (in the whole of nature), -on polarity and dualism.' But he adds (476), 'It is time to define -more accurately the concept of polarity.' So Oken, _Naturphilosophie_: -§76: 'A force consisting of two principles is called Polarity.' § 77: -'Polarity is the first force which makes its appearance in the world.' -§ 81: 'The original movement is a result of the original polarity.' - -P. 223, § 119. Cf. Fichte, ii. 53. 'To everything but this the -logically trained thinker can rise. He is on his guard against -contradiction. But, in that case, how about the possibility of the -maxim of his own logic that we can think no contradiction. In some way -he must have got hold of contradiction and thought it, or he could -make no communications about it. Had such people only once regularly -asked themselves how they came to think the _merely_ possible or -contingent (the not-necessary), and how they actually do so! Evidently -they here leap through a not-being, not-thinking, &c, into the utterly -unmediated, self-initiating, free,--into beënt non-being,--in short, -the above contradiction, as it was laid down. With consistent thinkers -the result of this incapacity is nothing but the utter abolition of -freedom,--the most absolute fatalism and Spinozism. - -P. 227, §121. Leibniz (ed. Erdmann, p. 515). 'The principle of _la -raison déterminante_ is that nothing ever occurs without there being a -cause for it, or at least a determinant reason, _i.e._ something which -may serve to render a reason _à priori_ why that is existent rather -than in any other way. This great principle holds good in all events.' -Cf. p. 707. 'The principle of "sufficient reason" is that in virtue -of which we consider that no fact could be found true or consistent, -no enunciation truthful, without there being a sufficient reason why -it is so and not otherwise.... When a truth is necessary, we can find -the reason of it by analysis, resolving it into simpler ideas and -truths, until we come to primitive ideas.... But the sufficient reason -ought also to be found in contingent truths or truths of fact, _i.e._ -in the series of things spread through the universe of creatures, -or the resolution into particular reasons might go into a limitless -detail: ... and as all this detail embraces only other antecedent, or -more detailed contingencies, ... the sufficient or final (_dernière_) -reason must be outside the succession or series of this detail of -contingencies, however infinite it might be. And it is thus that the -final reason of things must be in a "necessary substance," in which the -detail of the changes exists only _eminenter,_ as in the source,--and -it is what we call God.' _(Monadology_ §§ 32-38.) - -Hence the supremacy of final causes. Thus _Opp._ ed. Erdmann, p. 678: -_Ita fit ut efficientes causae pendeant a finalibus, et spiritualia -sint natura priora materialibus._ Accordingly he urges, p. 155, that -final cause has not merely a moral and religious value in ethics and -theology, but is useful even in physics for the detection of deep-laid -truths. Cf. p. 106: _C'est sanctifier la Philosophie que de faire -couler ses ruisseaux de la fontaine des attributs de Dieu. Bien loin -d'exclure les causes finales et la considération d'un être agissant -avec sagesse, c'est de là qu'il faut tout déduire en Physique._ Cf. -also _Principes de la Nature_ (Leibn. ed. Erdm. p. 716): 'It is -surprising that by the sole consideration of efficient causes or -of matter, we could not render a reason for those laws of movement -discovered in our time. _Il y faut recourir aux causes finales_.' - -P. 228, § 121 Socrates. The antitheses between Socrates and the -Sophists belongs in the main to the Platonic dialogues,--not co the -historical Socrates. It is the literary form in which the philosophy of -Plato works out its development through the criticism of contemporary -opinions and doctrines. And even in Plato's writings the antagonism is -very unlike what later interpretations have made out of it. - -P. 231, § 124. Thing by itself (thing in itself) the Ding:an:sich. - -P. 235, § 126. Cf. _Encycl._ § 334 (_Werke,_ viii. 1. p. 411). 'In -empirical chemistry the chief object is the _particularity_ of the -matters and products, which are grouped by superficial abstract -features which make impossible any system in the special detail. In -these lists, metals, oxygen, hydrogen, &c.--metalloids, sulphur, -phosphorus appear side by side as _simple_ chemical bodies on the same -level. The great physical variety of these bodies must of itself create -a prepossession against such coordination; and their chemical origin, -the process from which they issue, is clearly no less various. But -in an equally chaotic way, more abstract and more real processes are -put on the same level. If all this is to get scientific form, every -product ought to be determined according to the grade of the concrete -and completely developed process from which it essentially issues, and -which gives it its peculiar significance; and for that purpose it is -not less essential to distinguish grades in abstractness or reality -of the process. Animal and vegetable substances in any case belong -to a quite other order: so little can their nature be understood from -the chemical process, that they are rather destroyed in it, and only -the way of their death is apprehended. These substances, however, -ought above all to serve to counter-act the metaphysic predominant -in chemistry as in physics,--the ideas or rather wild fancies of the -_unalterability of matters_ under all circumstances, as well as the -categories of the _composition_ and the _consistence_ of bodies from -such matters. We see it generally admitted that chemical matters lose -in combination the _properties_ which they show in separation: and yet -we find the idea prevailing that they are the same things _without_ the -properties as they are _with_ them,--so that as things _with_ these -properties they are not results of the process.'--Cf. _Werke,_ vii. a. -372: 'Air does not consist of oxygen and nitrogen: but these are the -forms under which air is put,' cf. _ib._403. - -P. 241, § 131. Fichte's _Sonnenklarer Bericht_ appeared in 1801. - -P. 247, § 136. Herder's _Gott: Gespräche über Spinoza's System,_ 1787, -2nd ed. 1800. 'God is, in the highest and unique sense of the word, -Force, _i.e._ the primal force of all forces, the soul of all souls' -(p. 63), 'All that we call matter, therefore, is more or less animate: -it is a realm of efficient forces. One force predominates: otherwise -there were no _one,_ no whole' (p. 207). 'The supreme being (Daseyn) -could give its creatures nothing higher than being. (_Theophron._) But, -my friend, being and being, however simple in the concept, are in their -estate very different; and what do you suppose, Philolaus, marks its -grades and differences? (_Phil._) Nothing but forces. In God himself -we found no higher conception; but all his forces were only one. The -supreme force could not be other than supreme goodness and wisdom, -ever-living, ever-active. (_Theoph._) Now you yourself see, Philolaus, -that the supreme, or rather the All (for God is not a supreme unit in -a scale of beings like himself), could not reveal himself otherwise -than in the universe as active. In him nothing could slumber, and what -he expressed was himself. He is before everything, and everything -subsists in him: the whole world an expression, an appearance of his -ever-living, ever-acting forces' (p. 200). - -'It was the mistake of Spinoza,' says Herder, 'to be unduly influenced -by the Cartesian phraseology. Had he chosen the conception of force and -effect, everything would have gone easier, and his system become much -more distinct and coherent. 'Had he developed the conception of power, -and the conception of matter, he must in conformity with his system -necessarily have come to the conception of forces, which work as well -in matter as in organs of thinking: he would in that case have regarded -power and thought as forces, _e.g._ as one.' (Cf. H. Spencer, 'Force, -the Ultimate of Ultimates.' First Princ. p 169) - -According to Rosenkranz (_Leben Hegels,_ p. 223) there exists in -manuscript a criticism by Hegel on the second edition of Herder's -_God._ Herder's Dialogue belongs to the controversy aroused by Jacobi's -letters on Spinoza. - -P. 250, § 136. Newton. Leibniz charges him with the view that God needs -from time to time _remonter sa montre,_ otherwise it would cease going: -that his machine requires to be cleaned (_décrasser_) by extraordinary -aid' (ed. Erdm. p. 746). - -P. 252, § 140. The verses quoted occur in Goethe's _Werke_ ii. 376, -under the heading Allerdings. Originally the first four lines appeared -in Haller's poem _Die menschlichen Tugenden_ thus-- - - Ins Innre der Natur bringt sein erschaffner Geist: - Zu glücklich, wenn sie noch die äußre Schale weist! - - (To nature's heart there penetrates no mere created mind: - Too happy if she but display the outside of her rind.) - -Hegel--reading weizt for weist--takes the second line as - - Too happy, if he can but know the outside of her rind. - -Goethe's attack upon a vulgar misuse of the lines belongs to his -dispute with the scientists. His verses appeared in 1820 as _Heiteres -Reimstück_ at the end of Heft 3 _zur Morphologie,_--of which the -closing section is entitled _Freundlicher Zuruf_ (_Werke_ xxvii. 161), -as follows:-- - - "Ins Innre der Natur," - O du Philister!-- - "Dringt kein erschaffner Geist." - . . . . . . - "Glückselig! wem sie nur - Die äußre Schale weis't." - Das hör' ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen, - Ich fluche drauf, aber verstohlen: - Sage mir taufend tausendmale: - Alles giebt sie reichlich und gern; - Natur hat weder Stern - Noch Schale, - Alles ist sie mit einem Male. - -[The last seven lines may be thus paraphrased in continuation: - - I swear--of course but to myself--as rings within my ears - That same old warning o'er and o'er again for sixty years, - And thus a thousand thousand times I answer in my mind: - --With gladsome and ungrudging hand metes nature from her store: - She keeps not back the core, - Nor separates the rind, - But all in each both rind and core has evermore combined.] - -P. 254, § 140. Plato and Aristotle: cf. Plato, _Phaedrus,_ 247 A -(φθόνoς γὰρ ξω θείον χόρoυ ἴσταται); _Timaeus,_ 29 E; and Aristotle, -_Metaph._ i. 2. 22. - -P. 256, § 140. Goethe: _Sämmtl. Werke,_ iii. 203 (_Maxime und -Reflexionen_). Gegen große Vorzüge eines Andern giebt es kein -Rettungsmittel als die Liebe. Cf. Schiller to Goethe, 2 July, 1796. -'How vividly I have felt on this occasion ... that against surpassing -merit nothing but Love gives liberty' (daß es dem Vortrefflichen -gegenüber seine Freiheit giebt als die Liebe). - -'Pragmatic.' This word, denoting a meddlesome busybody in older English -and sometimes made a vague term of abuse, has been in the present -century used in English as it is here employed in German. - -According to Polybius, ix. I. 2, the πραγματικὸς τρόπος τῆς ἱστορίας -is that which has a directly utilitarian aim. So Kant, _Foundation of -Metaph. of Ethic (Werke,_ viii. 41, note): 'A history is pragmatically -composed when it renders prudent, _i.e._ instructs the world how it may -secure its advantage better or at least as well as the ages preceding.' -Schelling (v. 308) quotes in illustration of pragmatic history-writing -the words of Faust to Wagner (Goethe, xi. 26): - - Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst, - Das ist im Grund der herren eigner Geist,, - In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln. - -Cf. also Hegel, _Werke,_ ix. 8. 'A second kind of reflectional history -is the pragmatic. When we have to do with the past and are engaged -with a distant world, the mind sees rising before it a present, which -it has from its own action as a reward for its trouble. The events are -different; but their central and universal fact, their structural -plan is identical. This abolishes the past and makes the event -present. Pragmatic reflections, however abstract they be, are thus in -reality the present, and vivify the tales of the past with the life of -to-day.--Here too a word should specially be given to the moralising -and the moral instructions to be gained through history,--for which it -was often studied.... Rulers, statesmen, nations, are especially bidden -learn from the experience of history. But what experience and history -teach is that nations and governments never have learned anything from -history, or acted upon teaching which could have been drawn from it.' - -Cf. Froude: _Divorce of Catherine,_ p. 2. 'The student (of history) -looks for an explanation (of political conduct) in elements which he -thinks he understands--in pride, ambition, fear, avarice, jealousy, or -sensuality.' - -P. 257, § 141. Cf. Goethe, xxiii, 298. 'What is the outside of an -organic nature but the ever-varied phenomenon of the inside? This -outside, this surface is so exactly adapted to a varied, complex, -delicate, inward structure that it thus itself becomes an inside: -both aspects, the outside and the inside, standing in most direct -correlation alike in the quietest existence and in the most violent -movement.' - -P. 260, § 143. Kant, _Kritik der reinen Vernunft,_ 2nd ed. p. 266. - -P. 269, § 147. Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ v. 290 (cf. iii. 603). 'There -are three periods of history, that of nature, of destiny, and of -providence. These three ideas express the same identity, but in a -different way. Destiny too is providence, but recognised in the real, -as providence, is also destiny, but beheld (angeschaut) in the ideal.' - -P. 275, § 151. On the relation between Spinoza and Leibniz cf. Hegel, -_Werke,_ iv. 187-193. It would be a mistake, however, to represent -Leibniz as mainly engaged in a work of conscious antagonism to Spinoza. - -P. 277, § 153. Jacobi.--Jacobi (like Schopenhauer) insists specially on -the distinction between grounds (Gründe)--which are formal, logical, -and verbal, and causes (Ursachen)--which carry us into reality and -life and nature. To transform the mere _Because_ into the _cause_ -we must (he says) pass from logic and the analytical understanding -to experience and the inner life. Instead of the timelessness of -simultaneity which characterises the logical relation cf ground and -consequent, the nexus of cause and effect introduces the element -of time,--thereby acquiring reality (Jacobi, _Werke,_ iii. 452). -The conception of Cause--meaningless as a mere category of abstract -thought--gets reality as a factor in experience, ein Erfahrungsbegriff, -and is immediately given to us in the consciousness of our own -causality (Jacobi, _Werke,_ iv. 145-158). Cf. Kant, _Kritik der reinen -Vern._ p. 116. - -P. 283, § 158. The _Amor intellectualis Dei_ (Spinoza, _Eth._ v. 32) -is described as a consequence of the third grade of cognition, viz. -the _scientia intuitiva_ which 'proceeds from an adequate idea of the -formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate cognition -of the essence of things (ii. 40, Schol. 2). From it arises (v. -27), the highest possible _acquiescentia mentis,_ in which the mind -contemplates all things _sub specie aeternitatis_ (v. 29), knows itself -to be in God and sees itself and all things in their divine essence. -But this intellectual love of mind towards God is part of the infinite -love wherewith God loves himself (v. 36) 'From these things we clearly -understand in what our salvation or blessedness or liberty consists: to -wit, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of -God towards men' (Schol. to v. 36). - - -CHAPTER IX. - -Page 289, § 161. Evolution and development in the stricter sense -in which these terms were originally used in the seventeenth and -eighteenth centuries imply a theory of preformation, according -to which the growth of an organic being is simply a process of -enlarging and filling out a miniature organism, actual but invisible, -because too inconspicuous. Such was the doctrine adopted by Leibniz -(_Considérations sur le principe de vie; Système nouveau de la Nature_, -&c). According to it development is no real generation of new parts, -but only an augmentation into bulk and visibility of parts already -outlined. This doctrine of preformation (as opposed to epigenesis) -is carried out by Charles Bonnet, who in his _Considérations sur les -corps organisés_ (1762) propounds the further hypothesis that the -'germs' from which living beings proceed contain, enclosed one within -another, the germs of all creatures yet to be. This is the hypothesis -of '_Emboîtement._' 'The system which regards generations as mere -educts' says Kant (_Kritik der Urteilskraft,_ § 80; _Werke,_ iv. 318) -'is called that of _individual_ preformation or the evolution theory: -the system which regards them as products is called Epigenesis.--which -might also be called the theory of _generic_ preformation, considering -that the productive powers of the générants follow the inherent -tendencies belonging to the family characteristics, and that the -specific form is therefore a 'virtual' preformation, in this way the -opposing theory of individual preformation might be better called -the involution theory, or theory of Einschachtelung (_Emboîtement._) -Cf. Leibniz (_Werke,_ Erdmann, 715). 'As animals generally are not -entirely born at conception or _generation,_ no more do they entirely -perish at what we call _death_; for it is reasonable that what does -not commence naturally, does not finish either in the order of nature. -Thus quitting their mask or their rags, they only return to a subtler -theatre, where however they can be as sensible and well regulated as -in the greater.... Thus not only the souls, but even the animals are -neither generable nor perishable: they are only developed, enveloped, -re-clothed, unclothed,--transformed. The souls never altogether quit -their body, and do not pass from one body into another body which is -entirely new to them. There is therefore no metempsychosis, but there -is metamorphosis. The animals change, take and quit only parts: which -takes place little by little and by small imperceptible parcels, but -continually, in nutrition: and takes place suddenly notably but rarely, -at conception, or at death, which make them gain or lose much all at -once.' - -The theory of _Emboîtement_ or _Envelopment,_ according to Bonnet -(_Considérations,_ &c. ch. I) is that 'the germs of all the organised -bodies of one species were inclosed (_renfermés_) one in another, -and have been developed successively.' So according to Haller -(_Physiology,_ Tome vii. § 2) 'it is evident that in plants the -mother-plant contains the germs of several generations; and there is -therefore no inherent improbability in the view that _tous les enfans, -excepté un, fussent renfermés dans l'ovaire de la première Fille -d'Eve.'_ Cf. Weismann's _Continuity of the Germ-plasma._ Yet Bonnet -(_Contemplation de la Nature,_ part vii. ch. 9, note 2), says, 'The -germs are not enclosed like boxes or cases one in another, but a germ -forms part of another germ, as a grain forms part of the plant in which -it is developed.' - -P. 293, § 163. Rousseau, _Contrat Social,_ liv. ii. ch. 3. - -P. 296, § 165. The 'adequate' idea is a sub-species of the 'distinct.' -When an idea does not merely distinguish a thing from others (when -it is _clear),_ or in addition represent the characteristic marks -belonging to the object so distinguished (when it is _distinct),_ but -also brings out the farther characteristics of these characteristics, -the idea is _adequate._ Thus adequate is a sort of second power of -distinct. (Cf. Baumeister's _Instit. Philos. Ration._ 1765, §§ 64-94.) -Hegel's description rather agrees with the 'complete idea' 'by which -I put before my mind singly marks sufficient to discern the thing -represented from all other things in every case, state, and time' -(Baumeister, _ib._ § 88). But cf. Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 79: _notitia -adaequata._ - -P. 298, § 166. Cf. Baumeister, _Instit. Phil. Rat._ § 185: _Judicium -est idearum conjunctio vel separatio._ - -P. 299, § 166. _Punctum saliens:_ the _punctum sanguineum saliens_ of -Harvey (_de Generat. Animal, exercit._ 17), or first appearance of the -heart: the _στιγμὴ αἱματίνη_ in the egg, of which Aristotle (_Hist. -Anim._ vi. 3) says τoῡτο τὸ σημεῖον πηδᾷ καὶ κινεῖται ὥσπερ ἓμψυχον. - -P. 301, § 169. Cf. Whately, _Logic_ (Bk. ii. ch. I, § 2), 'Of these -terms that which is spoken of is called the _subject;_ that which is -said of it, the _predicate._' - -P. 303, § 171. Kant, _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ (p. 95, 2nd ed.) § 9. - -P. 304, § 172. Cf. Jevons, _Principles of Science,_ ch. 3, 'on limited -identities' and 'negative propositions.' - -P. 309. Ear-lobes. The remark is due to Blumenbach: cf. Hegel's -_Werke,_ v. 285. - -P. 312. Colours, _i.e._ painters' colours; cf. _Werke,_ vii. 1. 314 -(lecture-note). 'Painters are not such fools as to be Newtonians: they -have red, yellow, and blue, and out of these they make their other -colours.' - -P. 315, § 181. For the genetic classification of judgments and -syllogisms and the passage from the former to the latter compare -especially Lotze's _Logic,_ Book i. And for the comprehensive -exhibition of the systematic process of judgment and inference see B. -Bosanquet's _Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge._ The passage from -Hegel's _Werke,_ v. 139, quoted at the head of that work is parallel to -the sentence in p. 318, 'The interest, therefore,' &c. - -P. 320, § 186. The letters I-P-U, of course, stand for Individual, -Particular, and Universal. - -P. 321, § 187. Fourth figure. This so-called Galenian figure was -differentiated from the first figure by the separation of the five -moods, which (after Arist. _An._ pr. i. 7 and ii. I) Theophrastus and -the later pupils, down at least to Boëthius, had subjoined to the four -recognised types of perfect syllogism. But its Galenian origin is more -than doubtful. - -P. 325, § 190. Cf. Mill's _Logic,_ Bk. ii. ch. 3. 'In every syllogism -considered as an argument to prove the conclusion there is a _petitio -principii._' - -Hegel's Induction is that strictly so called or complete induction, the -argument from the sum of actual experiences--that _per enumerationem -simplicem,_ and _διὰ πάντων._ Of course except by accident or by -artificial arrangement such completeness is impossible _in rerum -natura._ - -P. 326, § 190. The 'philosophy of Nature' referred to here is probably -that of Oken and the Schellingians; but later critics (_e.g._ Riehl, -_Philosoph. Criticismus,_ iii. 120) have accused Hegel himself of even -greater enormities in this department. - -P. 328, § 192. _Elementarlehre:_ Theory of the Elements, called by -Hamilton (_Lectures on Logic,_ i. 65) Stoicheiology as opposed to -methodology. Cf. the Port Royal Logic. Kant's _Kritik_ observes the -same division of the subject. - -P. 332, § 193. Anselm, _Proslogium,_ c. 2. In the _Monologium_ Anselm -expounds the usual argument from conditioned to unconditioned (_Est -igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est; per quod -est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, el omnino quidquid aliquid est. -Monol._ c. 3). But in the Proslogium he seeks an argument _quod nullo -ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret--i.e._ from the conception of -(God as) the highest and greatest that can be (_aliquid quo nihil majus -cogitari potest_) he infers its being (_sic ergo vere_ EST _aliquid -quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse._) The -absolute would not be absolute if the idea of it did not _ipso facto_ -imply existence. - -Gaunilo of Marmoutier in the _Liber pro insipiente_ made the objection -that the fact of such argument being needed showed that idea and -reality were _prima facie_ different. And in fact the argument of -Anselm deals with an Absolute which is object rather than subject, -thought rather than thinker; in human consciousness realised, but -not essentially self-affirming--implicit (an:sich) only, as said in -pp. 331, 333. And Anselm admits c. 15 _Domine, non solum es, quo -majus cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam majus quam cogitari potest_ -(transcending our thought). - -P. 333, line 2. This sentence has been transposed in the translation. -In the original it occurs after the quotation from the Latin in p. 332. - -P. 334, § 194. Leibniz: for a brief account of the Monads see Caird's -_Crit. Philosophy of J. Kant,_ i. 86-95. - -A monad is the simple substance or indivisible unity corresponding -to a body. It is as simple what the world is as a multiplicity: it -'represents,' _i.e._ concentrates into unity, the variety of phenomena: -is the expression of the material in the immaterial, of the compound in -the simple, of the extended outward in the inward. Its unity and its -representative capacity go together (cf. Lotze, _Mikrokosmus._) It is -the 'present which is full of the future and laden with the past' (ed. -Erdm. p. 197); the point which is all-embracing, the totality of the -universe. And yet there are monads--in the plural. - -P. 334, § 194. Fichte, _Werke,_ i. 430. 'Every thorough-going dogmatic -philosopher is necessarily a fatalist.' - -P. 338, § 195. Cf. _Encyclop._ § 463. 'This supreme inwardising of -ideation (Vorstellung) is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, -reducing itself to the mere being, the general space of mere names and -meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because -subjectivity, at the same time the power over the different names, the -empty link which fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in fixed -order.' - -Contemporaneously with Hegel, Herbart turned psychology in the line of -a 'statics and dynamics of the mind.' See (besides earlier suggestions) -his _De Attentionis mensura causisque primariis_ (1822) and his -_Ueber die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit, Mathematik auf Psychologie -anzuwenden_ (1822). - -P. 340, § 198. _Civil_ society: distinguished as the social -and economical organisation of the _bourgeoisie,_ with their -particularist-universal aims, from the true universal unity of -_citoyens_ in the state or ethico-political organism. - -P. 345, § 204. Inner design: see Kant's _Kritik der Urtheilskraft,_ § -62. - -Aristotle, _De Anima,_ ii. 4 (415. b. 7) φανερὸν δ' ὠς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ -ψυχὴ ατία: ii. 2 ζωὴν λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὑτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ -φθίσιν. - -P. 347, § 206. Neutral first water, cf. _Encyclop._§ 284, 'without -independent individuality, without rigidity and intrinsic -determination, a thorough-going equilibrium.' Cf. _Werke,_ vii. 6. -168. 'Water is absolute neutrality, not like salt, an individualised -neutrality; and hence it was at an early date called the mother of -everything particular.' 'As the neutral it is the solvent of acids and -alkalis.' Cf. Oken's _Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie,_ §§ 294 and 432. - -P. 348, § 206. Conclude = beschliessen: Resolve = entschliessen. Cf. -Chr. Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften,_ ii. 115, _seqq._ - -P. 359, § 216. Aristotle, _De Anim. Generat._ i. (726. b. 24) ἡ χεὶρ -ἄνεν ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἔστι χεὶρ ἀλλὰ μόνον ὁμώνυμον. - -Arist. _Metaph._ viii. 6 (1045. b. 11) ο δὲ (λέγoυσi) σύνθεσιν ἥ -σύνδεσμον ψυχῆς σώματι τὸ ζῆν. - -P. 360, § 218. Sensibility, &c. This triplicity (as partly -distinguished by Haller after Glisson) of the functions of organic life -is largely worked out in Schelling, ii. 491. - -P. 361, § 219. Cf. Schelling, ii. 540. As walking is a constantly -prevented falling, so life is a constantly prevented extinction of the -vital process. - -P. 367, § 229. Spinoza (_Eth._ i. def. I) defines _causa sui_ as -_id cujus essentia involvit existentiam,_ and (in def. 3) defines -_substantia_ as _id quod in se est et per se concipitur._ - -Schelling: _e.g. Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie_ (1801), -(_Werke,_ iv. 114): 'I call reason the absolute reason, or reason, -in so far as it is thought as total indifference of subjective and -objective.' - -P. 367, § 230. 'Mammals distinguish themselves': unter; unter:scheiden, -instead of scheiden: cf. _Werke,_ ii. 181. 'The distinctive marks of -animals, _e.g._ are taken from the claws and teeth: for in fact it -is not merely cognition which by this means distinguishes one animal -from another: but the animal thereby separates itself off: by these -weapons it keeps itself to itself and separate from the universal.' -Cf. _Werke,_ vii. a. 651 _seqq._ (_Encycl._ § 370) where reference is -made to Cuvier, _Recherches sur les ossements fossiles des quadrupèdes_ -(1812), &c. - -P. 368, § 230. Kant, _Kritik der Urtheilskraft:_ Einleitung, § 9 -(note), (_Werke,_ ed. Ros. iv. 39); see Caird's _Critical Philosophy of -I. Kant,_ Book i. ch. 5; also Hegel's _Werke,_ ii. 3. - -P. 369, § 231. An example of Wolfs pedantry is given in Hegel, _Werke,_ -v. 307, from Wolfs _Rudiments of Architecture,_ Theorem viii. 'A window -must be broad enough for two persons to recline comfortably in it, side -by side. _Proof._ It is customary to recline with another person on the -window to look about. But as the architect ought to satisfy the main -views of the owner (§ I) he must make the window broad enough for two -persons to recline comfortably side by side.' - -'Construction': cf. _Werke,_ ii. 38. 'Instead of its own internal life -and spontaneous movement, such a simple mode (as subject, object, -cause, substance, &c.) has expression given to it by perception (here -= sense-consciousness) on some superficial analogy: and this external -and empty application of the formula is called "Construction." The -procedure shares the qualities of all such formalism. How stupid-headed -must be the man, who could not in a quarter of an hour master the -theory of asthenic, sthenic and indirectly asthenic diseases' (this is -pointed at Schelling's _Werke,_ iii. 236) 'and the three corresponding -curative methods, and who, when, no long time since, such instruction -was sufficient, could not in this short period be transformed from -a mere practitioner into a "scientific" physician? The formalism of -_Naturphilosophie_ may teach _e.g._ that understanding is electricity, -or that the animal is nitrogen, or even that it is _like_ the South or -the North, or that it represents it,--as baldly as is here expressed -or with greater elaboration in terminology. At such teachings the -inexperienced may fall into a rapture of admiration, may reverence the -profound genius it implies,--may take delight in the sprightliness -of language which instead of the abstract _concept_ gives the more -pleasing _perceptual_ image, and may congratulate itself on feeling its -soul akin to such splendid achievement. The trick of such a wisdom is -as soon learnt as it is easy to practice; its repetition, when it grows -familiar, becomes as intolerable as the repetition of juggling once -detected. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is not harder to -manipulate than a painter's palette with two colours on it, say red and -green, the former to dye the surface if a historic piece, the latter if -a landscape is asked for.' - -Kant (_Werke,_ iii. 36) in the 'Prolegomena to every future -Metaphysic,' § 7, says: 'We find, however, it is the peculiarity -of mathematical science that it must first exhibit its concept in -a percept, and do so _à priori_,--hence in a pure percept. This -observation with regard to the nature of mathematics gives a hint as to -the first and supreme condition of its possibility: it must be based -on some pure percept in which it can exhibit all its concepts _in -concreto_ and yet _à priori,_ or, as it is called, _construe_ them.' - -The phrase, and the emphasis on the doctrine, that perception must be -taken as an auxiliary in mathematics,' belong specially to the second -edition of the _Kritik, e.g._ Pref. xii. To learn the properties of -the isosceles triangle the mathematical student must 'produce (by -'construction') what he himself thought into it and exhibited _à -priori_ according to concepts.' - -'Construction, in general,' says Schelling (_Werke,_ v. 252: -cf. iv. 407) 'is the exhibition of the universal and particular -in unity':--'absolute unity of the ideal and the real.' v. 225. -Darstellung in intellektueller Anschauung ist philosophische -Konstruktion. - -P. 372. 'Recollection' = Erinnerung: _e.g._ the return from -differentiation and externality to simplicity and inwardness: -distinguished from Gedächtniss = memory (specially of words). - -P. 373, § 236. Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ iv. 405. 'Every particular -object is in its absoluteness the Idea; and accordingly the Idea is -also the absolute object (Gegenstand) itself,--as the absolutely ideal -also the absolutely real.' - -P. 374, § 236. Aristotle, _Metaphys._ xi. 9 (1074. 6. 34) αὑτὸν ἅρα -νοεῖ (ὁ νοῦς = θεος), εἵπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἐστιν ἡ νόησις -νοήσεως νόησις. Cf. Arist. _Metaph._ xii. 7. - -P. 377, §239. 'Supposes a correlative' = ist für Eines. On Seyn: für -Eines, cf. _Werke,_ iii. 168. Das Ideëlle ist notwendig für:Eines, aber -es ist nicht für ein Anderes: das Eine für welches es ist, ist nur es -selbst.... God is therefore for-self (to himself) in so far as he -himself is that which is for him. - -P. 379, § 244. The percipient idea (anschauende Idee), of course both -object and subject of intuition, is opposed to the Idea (as logical) -in the element of _Thought_: but still _as Idea_ and not--to use -Kant's phrase (_Kritik der r. Vern._ § 26)--as _natura materialiter -spectata._ - - - -THE END. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Logic of Hegel, by G. W. F. 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Hegel and William Wallace. - </title> - <style type="text/css"> - -body { - margin-left: 10%; - margin-right: 10%; -} - - h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { - text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ - clear: both; -} - -p { - margin-top: .51em; - text-align: justify; - margin-bottom: .49em; -} - -.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} -.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} -.p6 {margin-top: 6em;} - -hr { - width: 33%; - margin-top: 2em; - margin-bottom: 2em; - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; - clear: both; -} - -hr.tb {width: 45%;} -hr.chap {width: 65%} -hr.full {width: 95%;} - -hr.r5 {width: 5%; margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em;} -hr.r65 {width: 65%; margin-top: 3em; margin-bottom: 3em;} - -table { - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; -} - - .tdl {text-align: left;} - .tdr {text-align: right;} - .tdc {text-align: center;} - -.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ - /* visibility: hidden; */ - position: absolute; - left: 92%; - font-size: smaller; - text-align: right; - color: #A9A9A9; -} /* page numbers */ - -.linenum { position: absolute; - left: 85%; - font-size: smaller;} /* content number */ - -.blockquot { - margin-left: 5%; - margin-right: 10%; -} - -.block2 { - margin-left: 2%; - margin-right: 2%; -} - -a:link {color: #000099;} - -v:link {color: #000099;} - -.center {text-align: center;} - -.right {text-align: right;} - -.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} - - -.caption {font-weight: bold;} - -/* Images */ -.figcenter { - margin: auto; - text-align: center; -} - -.figleft { - float: left; - clear: left; - margin-left: 0; - margin-bottom: 1em; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-right: 1em; - padding: 0; - text-align: center; -} - -.figright { - float: right; - clear: right; - margin-left: 1em; - margin-bottom: - 1em; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-right: 0; - padding: 0; - text-align: center; -} - -/* Footnotes */ -.footnotes {border: dashed 1px;} - -.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} - -.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} - -.fnanchor { - vertical-align: super; - font-size: .8em; - text-decoration: - none; -} - -/* Transcriber's notes */ -.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size:smaller; - padding:0.5em; - margin-bottom:5em; - font-family:sans-serif, serif; } - </style> - </head> -<body> - - -<pre> - -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Logic of Hegel, by G. W. F. Hegel - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Logic of Hegel - -Author: G. W. F. Hegel - -Contributor: William Wallace - -Translator: William Wallace - -Release Date: July 13, 2017 [EBook #55108] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LOGIC OF HEGEL *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational materials,...) -Images generously made available by the Hathi Trust. - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> -<h1>THE LOGIC OF HEGEL</h1> - -<h3><i>TRANSLATED FROM</i></h3> - -<h3><i>THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE<br /> -PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES</i></h3> - -<h3>By</h3> - -<h3>WILLIAM WALLACE, M.A, LL.D.</h3> - -<h4>FELLOW OF MERTON COLLEGE</h4> -<h6>AND WHYTE'S PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY -IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD</h6> - -<h5>SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND AUGMENTED</h5> - -<h5>OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS</h5> - -<h5>1892</h5> -<hr class="full" /> - - - -<h5><a name="NOTE" id="NOTE">NOTE</a></h5> - - -<p>The present volume contains a translation, which has been revised -throughout and compared with the original, of the Logic as given in the -first part of Hegel's <i>Encyclopaedia,</i> preceded by a bibliographical -account of the three editions and extracts from the prefaces of that -work, and followed by notes and illustrations of a philological rather -than a philosophical character on the text. This introductory chapter -and these notes were not included in the previous edition.</p> - -<p>The volume containing my Prolegomena is under revision and will be -issued shortly.</p> - -<p style="text-align: right; font-size: 0.8em;">W. W.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h4>CONTENTS</h4> - - -<p class="smcap" style="text-align: center;">Bibliographical Notice on the Three Editions <br /> -and Three Prefaces of the -Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences</p> - -<h4><i>THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC.</i></h4> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER I.</p> - -<p class="center" ><span class="smcap">Introduction</span> <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_3">3</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER II.</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Preliminary Notion</span> <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_30">30</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER III.</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">First Attitude of Thought to Objectivity</span> <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_60">60</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER IV.</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Second Attitude of Thought to Objectivity:—</span><br /> - -I. <i>Empiricism</i> <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_76">76</a></span><br /> - -II. <i>The Critical Philosophy</i> <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_82">82</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER V.</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Third Attitude of Thought to Objectivity:</span>—<br /> - -<i>Immediate or Intuitive Knowledge</i> <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_121">121</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER VI.</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Logic Further Defined and Divided</span> <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_143">143</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER VII.</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">First Subdivision of Logic</span>:—<br /><i>The Doctrine of Being</i> <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_156">156</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER VIII.</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Second Subdivision of Logic</span>:—<i><br />The Doctrine of Essence</i> <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_207">207</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER IX.</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Third Subdivision of Logic</span>:—<i><br />The Doctrine of the Notion</i> <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_287">287</a></span></p> - -<hr /> -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;"> -ON CHAPTER</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right"><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">I</span></td><td align="left"><span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_383">383</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right"><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">II</span></td><td align="left"><span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_387">387</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right"><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">III</span></td><td align="left"><span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_395">395</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right"><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">IV</span></td><td align="left"><span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_398">398</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right"><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">V</span></td><td align="left"><span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_406">406</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right"><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VI</span></td><td align="left"><span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_409">409</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right"><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VII</span></td><td align="left"><span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_410">410</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right"><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VIII</span></td><td align="left"><span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_417">417</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right"><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">IX</span></td><td align="left"><span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_424">424</a></span></td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p class="center"><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">INDEX</span><span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_433">433</a></span></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE</h4> - -<h5>ON THE THREE EDITIONS AND THREE PREFACES OF THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA</h5> - - -<p><span class="smcap">The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline</span> is the third -in time of the four works which Hegel published. It was preceded by -the <i>Phenomenology of Spirit,</i> in 1807, and the <i>Science of Logic</i> (in -two volumes), in 1812-16, and was followed by the <i>Outlines of the -Philosophy of Law</i> in 1820. The only other works which came directly -from his hand are a few essays, addresses, and reviews. The earliest -of these appeared in the <i>Critical Journal of Philosophy,</i> issued by -his friend Schelling and himself, in 1802—when Hegel was one and -thirty, which, as Bacon thought, 'is a great deal of sand in the -hour-glass'; and the latest were his contributions to the <i>Jahrbücher -für wissenschaftliche Kritik,</i> in the year of his death (1831).</p> - -<p>This <i>Encyclopaedia</i> is the only complete, matured, and authentic -statement of Hegel's philosophical system. But, as the title-page -bears, it is only an outline; and its primary aim is to supply a manual -for the guidance of his students. In its mode of exposition the free -flight of speculation is subordinated to the needs of the professorial -class-room. Pegasus is put in harness.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span> Paragraphs concise in form and -saturated with meaning postulate and presuppose the presiding spirit -of the lecturer to fuse them into continuity and raise them to higher -lucidity. Yet in two directions the works of Hegel furnish a supplement -to the defects of the <i>Encyclopaedia.</i></p> - -<p>One of these aids to comprehension is the <i>Phenomenology of Spirit,</i> -published in his thirty-seventh year. It may be going too far to say -with David Strauss that it is the Alpha and Omega of Hegel, and his -later writings only extracts from it.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Yet here the Pegasus of mind -soars free through untrodden fields of air, and tastes the joys of -first love and the pride of fresh discovery in the quest for truth. The -fire of young enthusiasm has not yet been forced to hide itself and -smoulder away in apparent calm. The mood is Olympian—far above the -turmoil and bitterness of lower earth, free from the bursts of temper -which emerge later, when the thinker has to mingle in the fray and -endure the shafts of controversy. But the <i>Phenomenology,</i> if not less -than the <i>Encyclopaedia</i> it contains the diamond purity of Hegelianism, -is a key which needs consummate patience and skill to use with -advantage. If it commands a larger view, it demands a stronger wing of -him who would join its voyage through the atmosphere of thought up to -its purest empyrean. It may be the royal road to the Idea, but only a -kingly soul can retrace its course.</p> - -<p>The other commentary on the <i>Encyclopaedia</i> is supplied partly by -Hegel's other published writings, and partly by the volumes (IX-XV in -the Collected works) in which his editors have given his Lectures on -the Philosophy of History, on Aesthetic, on the Philosophy of Religion, -and on the History of Philosophy.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> All of these lectures, as well as -the <i>Philosophy of Law,</i> published by himself, deal however only with -the third part of the philosophic system. That system (p. <a href="#Page_28">28</a>) includes -(i) Logic, (ii) Philosophy of Nature, and (iii) Philosophy of Spirit. -It is this third part—or rather it is the last two divisions therein -(embracing the great general interests of humanity, such as law and -morals, religion and art, as well as the development of philosophy -itself) which form the topics of Hegel's most expanded teaching. It -is in this region that he has most appealed to the liberal culture of -the century, and influenced (directly or by reaction) the progress of -that philosophical history and historical philosophy of which our own -generation is reaping the fast-accumulating fruit. If one may foist -such a category into systematic philosophy, we may say that the study -of the 'Objective' and 'Absolute Spirit' is the most <i>interesting</i> part -of Hegel.</p> - -<p>Of the second part of the system there is less to be said. For nearly -half a century the study of nature has passed almost completely out -of the hands of the philosophers into the care of the specialists of -science. There are signs indeed everywhere—and among others Helmholtz -has lately reminded us—that the higher order of scientific students -are ever and anon driven by the very logic of their subject into the -precincts or the borders of philosophy. But the name of a Philosophy -of Nature still recalls a time of hasty enthusiasms and over-grasping -ambition of thought which, in its eagerness to understand the mystery -of the universe jumped to conclusions on insufficient grounds, trusted -to bold but fantastic analogies, and lavished an unwise contempt on the -plodding industry of the mere hodman of facts and experiments. Calmer -retrospection will perhaps modify this verdict, and sift the various<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span> -contributions (towards a philosophical unity of the sciences) which -are now indiscriminately damned by the title of <i>Naturphilosophie.</i> -For the present purpose it need only be said that, for the second -part of the Hegelian system, we are restricted for explanations -to the notes collected by the editors of Vol. VII. part i. of the -Collected works—notes derived from the annotations which Hegel himself -supplied in the eight or more courses of lectures which he gave on the -Philosophy of Nature between 1804 and 1830.</p> - -<p>Quite other is the case with the Logic—the first division of the -<i>Encyclopaedia.</i> There we have the collateral authority of the -'Science of Logic,' the larger Logic which appeared whilst Hegel was -schoolmaster at Nürnberg. The idea of a new Logic formed the natural -sequel to the publication of the <i>Phenomenology</i> in 1807. In that -year Hegel was glad to accept, as a stop-gap and pot-boiler, the post -of editor of the Bamberg Journal. But his interests lay in other -directions, and the circumstances of the time and country helped to -determine their special form. 'In Bavaria,' he says in a letter<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>, -'it looks as if organisation were the current business.' A very mania -of reform, says another, prevailed. Hegel's friend and fellow-Swabian, -Niethammer, held an important position in the Bavarian education -office, and wished to employ the philosopher in the work of carrying -out his plans of re-organising the higher education of the Protestant -subjects of the crown. He asked if Hegel would write a logic for school -use, and if he cared to become rector of a grammar school. Hegel, who -was already at work on his larger Logic, was only half-attracted by -the suggestion. 'The traditional Logic,' he replied<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>, 'is a subject -on which there are text-books enough, but at the same time it is one -which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span> can by no means remain as it is: it is a thing nobody can make -anything of: 'tis dragged along like an old heirloom, only because -a substitute—of which the want is universally felt—is not yet in -existence. The whole of its rules, still current, might be written -on two pages: every additional detail beyond these two is perfectly -fruitless scholastic subtlety;—or if this logic is to get a thicker -body, its expansion must come from psychological paltrinesses,' Still -less did he like the prospect of instructing in theology, as then -rationalised. 'To write a logic and to be theological instructor is as -bad as to be white-washer and chimney-sweep at once.' 'Shall he, who -for many long years built his eyry on the wild rock beside the eagle -and learned to breathe the free air of the mountains, now learn to feed -on the carcases of dead thoughts or the still-born thoughts of the -moderns, and vegetate in the leaden air of mere babble<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>?'</p> - -<p>At Nürnberg he found the post of rector of the 'gymnasium' by no -means a sinecure. The school had to be made amid much lack of funds -and general bankruptcy of apparatus:—all because of an all-powerful -and unalterable destiny which is called the course of business.' One -of his tasks was 'by graduated exercises to introduce his pupils to -speculative thought,'—and that in the space of four hours weekly<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. -Of its practicability—and especially with himself as instrument—he -had grave doubts. In theory, he held that an intelligent study of -the ancient classics was the best introduction to philosophy; and -practically he preferred starting his pupils with the principles -of law, morality and religion, and reserving the logic and higher -philosophy for the highest class. Meanwhile he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span> continued to work on -his great Logic, the first volume of which appeared in two parts, 1812, -1813, and the second in 1816.</p> - -<p>This is the work which is the real foundation of the Hegelian -philosophy. Its aim is the systematic reorganisation of the -commonwealth of thought. It gives not a criticism, like Kant; not -a principle, like Fichte; not a bird's eye view of the fields of -nature and history, like Schelling; it attempts the hard work of -re-constructing, step by step, into totality the fragments of the -organism of intelligence. It is scholasticism, if scholasticism means -an absolute and all-embracing system; but it is a protest against -the old school-system and those who tried to rehabilitate it through -their comprehensions of the Kantian theory. Apropos of the logic of -his contemporary Fries (whom he did not love), published in 1811, he -remarks: 'His paragraphs are mindless, quite shallow, bald, trivial; -the explanatory notes are the dirty linen of the professorial chair, -utterly slack and unconnected.'<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Of himself he thus speaks: 'I am -a schoolmaster who has to teach philosophy,—who, possibly for that -reason, believes that philosophy like geometry is teachable, and -must no less than geometry have a regular structure. But again, a -knowledge of the facts in geometry and philosophy is one thing, and the -mathematical or philosophical talent which procreates and discovers is -another: my province is to discover that scientific form, or to aid -in the formation of it<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>.' So he writes to an old college friend; -and in a letter to the rationalist theologian Paulus, in 1814<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>, he -professes: 'You know that I have had too much to do not merely with -ancient literature, but even with mathematics, latterly with the higher -analysis, differential<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span> calculus, chemistry, to let myself be taken in -by the humbug of Naturphilosophie, philosophising without knowledge of -fact and by mere force of imagination, and treating mere fancies, even -imbecile fancies, as Ideas.'</p> - -<p>In the autumn of 1816 Hegel became professor of philosophy at -Heidelberg. In the following year appeared the first edition of his -<i>Encyclopaedia</i>: two others appeared in his lifetime (in 1827 and -1830). The first edition is a thin octavo volume of pp. xvi. 288, -published (like the others) at Heidelberg. The Logic in it occupies -pp. 1-126 (of which 12 pp. are Einleitung and 18 pp. Vorbegriff); the -Philosophy of Nature, pp. 127-204; and the Philosophy of Mind (Spirit), -pp. 205-288.</p> - -<p>In the Preface the book is described (p. iv) as setting forth 'a new -treatment of philosophy on a method which will, as I hope, yet be -recognised as the only genuine method identical with the content.' -Contrasting his own procedure with a mannerism of the day which -used an assumed set of formulas to produce in the facts a show of -symmetry even more arbitrary and mechanical than the arrangements -imposed <i>ab extra</i> in the sciences, he goes on: 'This wilfulness we -saw also take possession of the contents of philosophy and ride out -on an intellectual knight-errantry—for a while imposing on honest -true-hearted workers, though elsewhere it was only counted grotesque, -and grotesque even to the pitch of madness. But oftener and more -properly its teachings—far from seeming imposing or mad—were found -out to be familiar trivialities, and its form seen to be a mere trick -of wit, easily acquired, methodical and premeditated, with its quaint -combinations and strained eccentricities,—the mien of earnestness only -covering self-deception and fraud upon the public. On the other side, -again, we saw shallowness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span> and unintelligence assume the character of -a scepticism wise in its own eyes and of a criticism modest in its -claims for reason, enhancing their vanity and conceit in proportion -as their ideas grew more vacuous. For a space of time these two -intellectual tendencies have befooled German earnestness, have tired -out its profound craving for philosophy, and have been succeeded by -an indifference and even a contempt for philosophic science, till at -length a self-styled modesty has the audacity to let its voice be heard -in controversies touching the deepest philosophical problems, and to -deny philosophy its right to that cognition by reason, the form of -which was what formerly was called <i>demonstration.</i>'</p> - -<p>'The first of these phenomena may be in part explained as the youthful -exuberance of the new age which has risen in the realm of science no -less than in the world of politics. If this exuberance greeted with -rapture the dawn of the intellectual renascence, and without profounder -labour at once set about enjoying the Idea and revelling for a while in -the hopes and prospects which it offered, one can more readily forgive -its excesses; because it is sound at heart, and the surface vapours -which it had suffused around its solid worth must spontaneously clear -off. But the other spectacle is more repulsive; because it betrays -exhaustion and impotence, and tries to conceal them under a hectoring -conceit which acts the censor over the philosophical intellects of all -the centuries, mistaking them, but most of all mistaking itself.</p> - -<p>'So much the more gratifying is another spectacle yet-to be noted; the -interest in philosophy and the earnest love of higher knowledge which -in the presence of both tendencies has kept itself single-hearted and -without affectation. Occasionally this interest may have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span> taken too -much to the language of intuition and feeling; yet its appearance -proves the existence of that inward and deeper-reaching impulse of -reasonable intelligence which alone gives man his dignity,—proves it -above all, because that standpoint can only be gained as a <i>result</i> -of philosophical consciousness; so that what it seems to disdain is -at least admitted and recognised as a condition. To this interest -in ascertaining the truth I dedicate this attempt to supply an -introduction and a contribution towards its satisfaction.'</p> - -<p>The second edition appeared in 1827. Since the autumn of 1818 Hegel -had been professor at Berlin: and the manuscript was sent thence (from -August 1826 onwards) to Heidelberg, where Daub, his friend—himself -a master in philosophical theology—attended to the revision of the -proofs. 'To the Introduction,' writes Hegel<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>, 'I have given perhaps -too great an amplitude: but it, above all, would have cost me time and -trouble to bring within narrower compass. Tied down and distracted -by lectures, and sometimes here in Berlin by other things too, I -have—without a general survey—allowed myself so large a swing that -the work has grown upon me, and there was a danger of its turning into -a book. I have gone through it several times. The treatment of the -attitudes (of thought) which I have distinguished in it was to meet an -interest of the day. The rest I have sought to make more definite, and -so far as may be clearer; but the main fault is not mended—to do which -would require me to limit the detail more, and on the other hand make -the whole more surveyable, so that the contents should better answer -the title of an Encyclopaedia.' Again, in Dec. 1826, he writes<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>: 'In -the Naturphilosophie I have made essential changes, but could not help -here and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[Pg xviii]</a></span> there going too far into a detail which is hardly in keeping -with the tone of the whole. The second half of the Geistesphilosophie -I shall have to modify entirely.' In May 1827, Hegel offers his -explanation of delay in the preface, which, like the concluding -paragraphs, touches largely on contemporary theology. By August of that -year the book was finished, and Hegel off to Paris for a holiday.</p> - -<p>In the second edition, which substantially fixed the form of the -<i>Encyclopaedia</i>, the pages amount to xlii, 534—nearly twice as many -as the first, which, however, as Professor Caird remarks, 'has a -compactness, a brief energy and conclusiveness of expression, which -he never surpassed.' The Logic now occupies pp. 1214, Philosophy of -Nature 215-354, and Philosophy of Spirit from 355-534. The second part -therefore has gained least; and in the third part the chief single -expansions occur towards the close and deal with the relations of -philosophy, art, and religion in the State; viz. § 563 (which in the -third edition is transposed to § 552), and § 573 (where two pages are -enlarged to 18). In the first part, or the Logic, the main increase -and alteration falls within the introductory chapters, where 96 pages -take the place of 30. The Vorbegriff (preliminary notion) of the first -edition had contained the distinction of the three logical 'moments' -(see p. 142), with a few remarks on the methods, first, of metaphysic, -and then (after a brief section on empiricism), of the 'Critical -Philosophy through which philosophy has reached its close.' Instead -of this the second edition deals at length, under this head, with the -three 'attitudes (or positions) of thought to objectivity;' where, -besides a more lengthy criticism of the Critical philosophy, there is a -discussion of the doctrines of Jacobi and other Intuitivists.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[Pg xix]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Preface, like much else in this second edition, is an assertion -of the right and the duty of philosophy to treat independently of -the things of God, and an emphatic declaration that the result of -scientific investigation of the truth is, not the subversion of -the faith, but 'the restoration of that sum of absolute doctrine -which thought at first would have put behind and beneath itself—a -restoration of it however in the most characteristic and the freest -element of the mind.' Any opposition that may be raised against -philosophy on religious grounds proceeds, according to Hegel, from a -religion which has abandoned its true basis and entrenched itself in -formulae and categories that pervert its real nature. 'Yet,' he adds -(p. vii), 'especially where religious subjects are under discussion, -philosophy is expressly set aside, as if in that way all mischief were -banished and security against error and illusion attained;' ... 'as if -philosophy—the mischief thus kept at a distance—were anything but -the investigation of Truth, but with a full sense of the nature and -value of the intellectual links which give unity and form to all fact -whatever.' 'Lessing,' he continues (p. xvi), 'said in his time that -people treat Spinoza like a dead dog<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>. It cannot be said that in -recent times Spinozism and speculative philosophy in general have been -better treated.'</p> - -<p>The time was one of feverish unrest and unwholesome irritability. Ever -since the so-called Carlsbad decrees of 1819 all the agencies of the -higher literature and education had been subjected to an inquisitorial -supervision which everywhere surmised political insubordination and -religious heresy. A petty provincialism pervaded what was then still -the small Residenz-Stadt Berlin; and the King, Frederick William -III, cherished<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[Pg xx]</a></span> to the full that paternal conception of his position -which has not been unusual in the royal house of Prussia. Champions -of orthodoxy warned him that Hegelianism was unchristian, if not even -anti-christian. Franz von Baader, the Bavarian religious philosopher -(who had spent some months at Berlin during the winter of 1823-4, -studying the religious and philosophical teaching of the universities -in connexion with the revolutionary doctrines which he saw fermenting -throughout Europe), addressed the king in a communication which -described the prevalent Protestant theology as infidel in its very -source, and as tending directly to annihilate the foundations of -the faith. Hegel himself had to remind the censor of heresy that -'all speculative philosophy on religion maybe carried to atheism: -all depends on who carries it; the peculiar piety of our times and -the malevolence of demagogues will not let us want carriers<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>.' -His own theology was suspected both by the Rationalists and by the -Evangelicals. He writes to his wife (in 1827) that he had looked at -the university buildings in Louvain and Liège with the feeling that -they might one day afford him a resting-place 'when the parsons in -Berlin make the Kupfergraben completely intolerable for him<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>.' 'The -Roman Curia,' he adds, 'would be a more honourable opponent than the -miserable cabals of a miserable boiling of parsons in Berlin.' Hence -the tone in which the preface proceeds (p. xviii).</p> - -<p>'Religion is the kind and mode of consciousness in which the Truth -appeals to all men, to men of every degree of education; but the -scientific ascertainment of the Truth is a special kind of this -consciousness, involving a labour which not all but only a few -undertake. The substance of the two is the same; but as Homer says of -some stars that they have two names,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[Pg xxi]</a></span> the one in the language of the -gods, the other in the language of ephemeral men—so for that substance -there are two languages,—the one of feeling, of pictorial thought, -and of the limited intellect that makes its home in finite categories -and inadequate abstractions, the other the language of the concrete -notion. If we propose then to talk of and to criticise philosophy from -the religious point of view, there is more requisite than to possess -a familiarity with the language of the ephemeral consciousness. The -foundation of scientific cognition is the substantiality at its core, -the indwelling idea with its stirring intellectual life; just as the -essentials of religion are a heart fully disciplined, a mind awake to -self-collectedness, a wrought and refined substantiality. In modern -times religion has more and more contracted the intelligent expansion -of its contents and withdrawn into the intensiveness of piety, or even -of feeling,—a feeling which betrays its own scantiness and emptiness. -So long however as it still has a creed, a doctrine, a system of dogma, -it has what philosophy can occupy itself with and where it can find for -itself a point of union with religion. This however is not to be taken -in the wrong separatist sense (so dominant in our modern religiosity) -representing the two as mutually exclusive, or as at bottom so capable -of separation that their union is only imposed from without. Rather, -even in what has gone before, it is implied that religion may well -exist without philosophy, but philosophy not without religion—which -it rather includes. True religion—intellectual and spiritual -religion—must have body and substance, for spirit and intellect are -above all consciousness, and consciousness implies an <i>objective</i> body -and substance.</p> - -<p>'The contracted religiosity which narrows itself to a point in the -heart must make that heart's softening and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">[Pg xxii]</a></span> contrition the essential -factor of its new birth; but it must at the same time recollect that it -has to do with the heart of a spirit, that the spirit is the appointed -authority over the heart, and that it can only have such authority so -far as it is itself born again. This new birth of the spirit out of -natural ignorance and natural error takes place through instruction and -through that faith in objective truth and substance which is due to the -witness of the spirit. This new birth of the spirit is besides <i>ipso -facto</i> a new birth of the heart out of that vanity of the one-sided -intellect (on which it sets so much) and its discoveries that finite is -different from infinite, that philosophy must either be polytheism, or, -in acuter minds, pantheism, &c. It is, in short, a new birth out of the -wretched discoveries on the strength of which pious humility holds its -head so high against philosophy and theological science. If religiosity -persists in clinging to its unexpanded and therefore unintelligent -intensity, then it can be sensible only of the contrast which divides -this narrow and narrowing form from the intelligent expansion of -doctrine as such, religious not less than philosophical.'</p> - -<p>After an appreciative quotation from Franz von Baader, and noting his -reference to the theosophy of Böhme, as a work of the past from which -the present generation might learn the speculative interpretation of -Christian doctrines, he reverts to the position that the only mode in -which thought will admit a reconciliation with religious doctrines, is -when these doctrines have learned to 'assume their worthiest phase—the -phase of the notion, of necessity, which binds, and thus also makes -free everything, fact no less than thought.' But it is not from Böhme -or his kindred that we are likely to get the example of a philosophy -equal to the highest theme—to the comprehension of divine things. 'If -old things<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii">[Pg xxiii]</a></span> are to be revived—an old phase, that is; for the burden -of the theme is ever young—the phase of the Idea such as Plato and, -still better, as Aristotle conceived it, is far more deserving of being -recalled,—and for the further reason that the disclosure of it, by -assimilating it into our system of ideas, is, <i>ipso facto,</i> not merely -an interpretation of it, but a progress of the science itself. But -to interpret such forms of the Idea by no means lies so much on the -surface as to get hold of Gnostic and Cabbalistic phantasmagorias; and -to develope Plato and Aristotle is by no means the sinecure that it is -to note or to hint at echoes of the Idea in the medievalists.'</p> - -<p>The third edition of the <i>Encyclopaedia,</i> which appeared in 1830, -consists of pp. lviii, 600—a slight additional increase. The increase -is in the Logic, eight pages; in the Philosophy of Nature, twenty-three -pages; and in the Philosophy of Spirit, thirty-four pages. The concrete -topics, in short, gain most.</p> - -<p>The preface begins by alluding to several criticisms on his -philosophy,—'which for the most part have shown little vocation for -the business'—and to his discussion of them in the <i>Jahrbücher</i> of -1829 (<i>Vermischte Schriften,</i> ii. 149). There is also a paragraph -devoted to the quarrel originated by the attack in Hengstenberg's -Evangelical Journal on the rationalism of certain professors at Halle -(notably Gesenius and Wegscheider),—(an attack based on the evidence -of students' note-books), and by the protest of students and professors -against the insinuations. 'It seemed a little while ago,' says Hegel -(p. xli), 'as if there was an initiation, in a scientific spirit -and on a wider range, of a more serious inquiry, from the region of -theology and even of religiosity, touching God, divine things, and -reason. But the very beginning of the movement checked these hopes; -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv">[Pg xxiv]</a></span> issue turned on personalities, and neither the pretensions of the -accusing pietists nor the pretensions of the free reason they accused, -rose to the real subject, still less to a sense that the subject -could only be discussed on philosophic soil. This personal attack, on -the basis of very special externalities of religion, displayed the -monstrous assumption of seeking to decide by arbitrary decree as to -the Christianity of individuals, and to stamp them accordingly with -the seal of temporal and eternal reprobation. Dante, in virtue of the -enthusiasm of divine poesy, has dared to handle the keys of Peter, and -to condemn by name to the perdition of hell many—already deceased -however—of his contemporaries, even Popes and Emperors. A modern -philosophy has been made the subject of the infamous charge that in -it human individuals usurp the rank of God; but such a fictitious -charge—reached by a false logic—pales before the actual assumption -of behaving like judges of the world, prejudging the Christianity of -individuals, and announcing their utter reprobation. The Shibboleth -of this absolute authority is the name of the Lord Christ, and the -assertion that the Lord dwells in the hearts of these judges.' But the -assertion is ill supported by the fruits they exhibit,—the monstrous -insolence with which they reprobate and condemn.</p> - -<p>But the evangelicals are not alone to blame for the bald and -undeveloped nature of their religious life; the same want of free and -living growth in religion characterises their opponents. 'By their -formal, abstract, nerveless reasoning, the rationalists have emptied -religion of all power and substance, no less than the pietists by the -reduction of all faith to the Shibboleth of Lord! Lord! One is no -whit better than the other: and when they meet in conflict there is -no material on which they could come into contact, no common ground,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxv" id="Page_xxv">[Pg xxv]</a></span> -and no possibility of carrying on an inquiry which would lead to -knowledge and truth. "Liberal" theology on its side has not got beyond -the formalism of appeals to liberty of conscience, liberty of thought, -liberty of teaching, to reason itself and to science. Such liberty no -doubt describes the <i>infinite right</i> of the spirit, and the second -special condition of truth, supplementary to the first, faith. But -the rationalists steer clear of the material point: they do not tell -us the reasonable principles and laws involved in a free and genuine -conscience, nor the import and teaching of free faith and free thought; -they do not get beyond a bare negative formalism and the liberty to -embody their liberty at their fancy and pleasure—whereby in the end -it matters not how it is embodied. There is a further reason for -their failure to reach a solid doctrine. The Christian community must -be, and ought always to be, unified by the tie of a doctrinal idea, -a confession of faith; but the generalities and abstractions of the -stale, not living, waters of rationalism forbid the specificality of -an inherently definite and fully developed body of Christian doctrine. -Their opponents, again, proud of the name Lord! Lord! frankly and -openly disdain carrying out the faith into the fulness of spirit, -reality, and truth.'</p> - -<p>In ordinary moods of mind there is a long way from logic to religion. -But almost every page of what Hegel has called Logic is witness to -the belief in their ultimate identity. It was no new principle of -later years for him. He had written in post-student days to his -friend Schelling: 'Reason and freedom remain our watch-word, and our -point of union the invisible church<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a>.' His parting token of faith -with another youthful comrade, the poet Hölderlin, had been 'God's -kingdom<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>.'</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxvi" id="Page_xxvi">[Pg xxvi]</a></span></p> - -<p>But after 1827 this religious appropriation of philosophy becomes -more apparent, and in 1829 Hegel seemed deliberately to accept the -position of a Christian philosopher which Göschel had marked out for -him. 'A philosophy without heart and a faith without intellect,' he -remarks<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a>, 'are abstractions from the true life of knowledge and -faith. The man whom philosophy leaves cold, and the man whom real faith -does not illuminate may be assured that the fault lies in them, not in -knowledge and faith. The former is still an alien to philosophy, the -latter an alien to faith.'</p> - -<p>This is not the place—in a philological chapter—to discuss the issues -involved in the announcement that the truth awaits us ready to hand<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> -'in all genuine consciousness, in all religions and philosophies.' -Yet one remark may be offered against hasty interpretations of a -'speculative' identity. If there is a double edge to the proposition -that the actual is the reasonable, there is no less caution necessary -in approaching and studying from both sides the far-reaching import -of that equation to which Joannes Scotus Erigena gave expression ten -centuries ago: '<i>Non alia est philosophia, i.e. sapientiae studium, -et alia religio. Quid est aliud de philosophia tractare nisi verae -religionis regulas exponere?</i>'</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Christian Märklin,</i> cap. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Briefe,</i> i. 141.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> i. 172.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Briefe,</i> i. 138.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> i. 339.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Briefe,</i> i. 328.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> i. 273.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> i. 373.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Briefe,</i> ii. 204.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> ii. 230.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Jacobi's <i>Werke,</i> iv. A, p. 63.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Briefe,</i> ii. 54.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> ii. 276.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Briefe,</i> i. 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Hölderlin's <i>Leben</i> (Litzmann), p. 183.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Verm. Sehr.</i> ii. 144.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Briefe,</i> ii. 80.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxvii" id="Page_xxvii">[Pg xxvii]</a></span></p></div> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p><i>The following Errata in the Edition of the Logic as given in the -Collected Works (Vol. VI.) are corrected in the translation. The -references in brackets are to the</i> German text.</p> - -<p>Page 95, line 1. Und Objektivität has dropped out after der -Subjektivität. [VI. 98, l. 10 from bottom.]</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, l. 2. The 2nd ed. reads (die Gedanken) nicht in Solchem, instead -of nicht als in Solchem (3rd ed.). [VI. p. 100, l. 3 from bottom.]</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, l. 13 from bottom. Instead of the reading of the <i>Werke</i> and of -the 3rd ed. read as in ed. II. Also ist dieser Gegenstand nichts. [VI. -p. 178, l. 11.]</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, l. 3 from bottom. Verstandes; Gegenstandes is a mistake for -Verstandes; Gegensatzes, as in edd. II and III. [VI. p. 188, l. 2.]</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, l. 19. weiten should be weitern. [VI. p. 251, l. 3 from bottom.]</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, l. 15. Dinglichkeit is a misprint for Dingheit, as in Hegel's -own editions. [VI. p. 347, l. 1.]</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, l. 14 from bottom, for seine Realität read seiner Realität. -[VI. p. 385, l. 8.]</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - - -<h3>THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC</h3> - -<p class="center">(<i>THE FIRST PART OF THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES IN -OUTLINE</i>)</p> - -<h5>BY</h5> - -<h4>G. W. F. HEGEL</h4> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span></p> - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I.</a></h5> - - -<h4>INTRODUCTION.</h4> - - -<p>1.] <span class="smcap">Philosophy</span> misses an advantage enjoyed by the other sciences. It -cannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural -admissions of consciousness, nor can it assume that its method of -cognition, either for starting or for continuing, is one already -accepted. The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the -same as those of religion. In both the object is Truth, in that supreme -sense in which God and God only is the Truth. Both in like manner go on -to treat of the finite worlds of Nature and the human Mind, with their -relation to each other and to their truth in God. Some <i>acquaintance</i> -with its objects, therefore, philosophy may and even must presume, that -and a certain interest in them to boot, were it for no other reason -than this: that in point of time the mind makes general <i>images</i> of -objects, long before it makes <i>notions</i> of them, and that it is only -through these mental images, and by recourse to them, that the thinking -mind rises to know and comprehend <i>thinkingly.</i></p> - -<p>But with the rise of this thinking study of things, it soon becomes -evident that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing -the <i>necessity</i> of its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> facts, of demonstrating the existence of -its objects, as well as their nature and qualities. Our original -acquaintance with them is thus discovered to be inadequate. We can -assume nothing, and assert nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the -assertions and assumptions of others. And yet we must make a beginning: -and a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption, or -rather is an assumption. It seems as if it were impossible to make a -beginning at all.</p> - -<p>2.] This <i>thinking study of things</i> may serve, in a general way, as -a description of philosophy. But the description is too wide. If it -be correct to say, that thought makes the distinction between man and -the lower animals, then everything human is human, for the sole and -simple reason that it is due to the operation of thought. Philosophy, -on the other hand, is a peculiar mode of thinking—a mode in which -thinking becomes knowledge, and knowledge through notions. However -great therefore may be the identity and essential unity of the two -modes of thought, the philosophic mode gets to be different from the -more general thought which acts in all that is human, in all that gives -humanity its distinctive character. And this difference connects itself -with the fact that the strictly human and thought-induced phenomena of -consciousness do not originally appear in the form of a thought, but as -a feeling, a perception, or mental image—all of which aspects must be -distinguished from the form of thought proper.</p> - -<p>According to an old preconceived idea, which has passed into a trivial -proposition, it is thought which marks the man off from the animals. -Yet trivial as this old belief may seem, it must, strangely enough, -be recalled to mind in presence of certain preconceived ideas of the -present day. These ideas would put<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> feeling and thought so far apart as -to make them opposites, and would represent them as so antagonistic, -that feeling, particularly religious feeling, is supposed to be -contaminated, perverted, and even annihilated by thought. They also -emphatically hold that religion and piety grow out of, and rest upon -something else, and not on thought. But those who make this separation -forget meanwhile that only man has the capacity for religion, and that -animals no more have religion than they have law and morality.</p> - -<p>Those who insist on this separation of religion from thinking usually -have before their minds the sort of thought that may be styled -<i>after-thought.</i> They mean 'reflective' thinking, which has to deal -with thoughts as thoughts, and brings them into consciousness. -Slackness to perceive and keep in view this distinction which -philosophy definitely draws in respect of thinking is the source of -the crudest objections and reproaches against philosophy. Man,—and -that just because it is his nature to think,—is the only being that -possesses law, religion, and morality. In these spheres of human life, -therefore, thinking, under the guise of feeling, faith, or generalised -image, has not been inactive: its action and its productions are -there present and therein contained. But it is one thing to have such -feelings and generalised images that have been moulded and permeated by -thought, and another thing to have thoughts about them. The thoughts, -to which after-thought upon those modes of consciousness gives rise, -are what is comprised under reflection, general reasoning, and the -like, as well as under philosophy itself.</p> - -<p>The neglect of this distinction between thought in general and the -reflective thought of philosophy has also led to another and more -frequent misunderstanding.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> Reflection of this kind has been often -maintained to be the condition, or even the only way, of attaining a -consciousness and certitude of the Eternal and True. The (now somewhat -antiquated) metaphysical proofs of God's existence, for example, have -been treated, as if a knowledge of them and a conviction of their truth -were the only and essential means of producing a belief and conviction -that there is a God. Such a doctrine would find its parallel, if we -said that eating was impossible before we had acquired a knowledge -of the chemical, botanical, and zoological characters of our food; -and that we must delay digestion till we had finished the study of -anatomy and physiology. Were it so, these sciences in their field, -like philosophy in its, would gain greatly in point of utility; in -fact, their utility would rise to the height of absolute and universal -indispensableness. Or rather, instead of being indispensable, they -would not exist at all.</p> - -<p>3.] The <i>Content,</i> of whatever kind it be, with which our consciousness -is taken up, is what constitutes the qualitative character of our -feelings, perceptions, fancies, and ideas; of our aims and duties; -and of our thoughts and notions. From this point of view, feeling, -perception, &c. are the <i>forms</i> assumed by these contents. The contents -remain one and the same, whether they are felt, seen, represented, or -willed, and whether they are merely felt, or felt with an admixture of -thoughts, or merely and simply thought. In any one of these forms, or -in the admixture of several, the contents confront consciousness, or -are its <i>object.</i> But when they are thus objects of consciousness, the -modes of the several forms ally themselves with the contents; and each -form of them appears in consequence to give rise to a special object. -Thus what is the same at bottom, may look like a different sort of -fact.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></p> - -<p>The several modes of feeling, perception, desire, and will, so far -as we are <i>aware</i> of them, are in general called ideas (mental -representations): and it may be roughly said, that philosophy puts -thoughts, categories, or, in more precise language, adequate <i>notions,</i> -in the place of the generalised images we ordinarily call ideas. Mental -impressions such as these may be regarded as the metaphors of thoughts -and notions. But to have these figurate conceptions does not imply -that we appreciate their intellectual significance, the thoughts and -rational notions to which they correspond. Conversely, it is one thing -to have thoughts and intelligent notions, and another to know what -impressions, perceptions, and feelings correspond to them.</p> - -<p>This difference will to some extent explain what people call the -unintelligibility of philosophy. Their difficulty lies partly in an -incapacity—which in itself is nothing but want of habit—for abstract -thinking; <i>i.e.</i> in an inability to get hold of pure thoughts and move -about in them. In our ordinary state of mind, the thoughts are clothed -upon and made one with the sensuous or spiritual material of the hour; -and in reflection, meditation, and general reasoning, we introduce a -blend of thoughts into feelings, percepts, and mental images. (Thus, -in propositions where the subject-matter is due to the senses—<i>e.g.</i> -'This leaf is green'—we have such categories introduced, as being and -individuality.) But it is a very different thing to make the thoughts -pure and simple our object.</p> - -<p>But their complaint that philosophy is unintelligible is as much due to -another reason; and that is an impatient wish to have before them as a -mental picture that which is in the mind as a thought or notion. When -people are asked to apprehend some notion, they often complain that -they do not know what they have to think.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> But the fact is that in a -notion there is nothing further to be thought than the notion itself. -What the phrase reveals, is a hankering after an image with which we -are already familiar. The mind, denied the use of its familiar ideas, -feels the ground where it once stood firm and at home taken away from -beneath it, and, when transported into the region of pure thought, -cannot tell where in the world it is.</p> - -<p>One consequence of this weakness is that authors, preachers, and -orators are found most intelligible, when they speak of things which -their readers or hearers already know by rote,—things which the latter -are conversant with, and which require no explanation.</p> - -<p>4.] The philosopher then has to reckon with popular modes of thought, -and with the objects of religion. In dealing with the ordinary modes -of mind, he will first of all, as we saw, have to prove and almost -to awaken the need for his peculiar method of knowledge. In dealing -with the objects of religion, and with truth as a whole, he will have -to show that philosophy is capable of apprehending them from its own -resources; and should a difference from religious conceptions come to -light, he will have to justify the points in which it diverges.</p> - -<p>5.] To give the reader a preliminary explanation of the distinction -thus made, and to let him see at the same moment that the real import -of our consciousness is retained, and even for the first time put -in its proper light, when translated into the form of thought and -the notion of reason, it may be well to recall another of these old -unreasoned beliefs. And that is the conviction that to get at the truth -of any object or event, even of feelings, perceptions, opinions, and -mental ideas, we must think it over. Now in any case to think things -over is at least to transform feelings, ordinary ideas, &c. into -thoughts.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span></p> - -<p>Nature has given every one a faculty of thought. But thought is all -that philosophy claims as the form proper to her business: and thus -the inadequate view which ignores the distinction stated in § 3, leads -to a new delusion, the reverse of the complaint previously mentioned -about the unintelligibility of philosophy. In other words, this science -must often submit to the slight of hearing even people who have never -taken any trouble with it talking as if they thoroughly understood all -about it. With no preparation beyond an ordinary education they do -not hesitate, especially under the influence of religious sentiment, -to philosophise and to criticise philosophy. Everybody allows that -to know any other science you must have first studied it, and that -you can only claim to express a judgment upon it in virtue of such -knowledge. Everybody allows that to make a shoe you must have learned -and practised the craft of the shoemaker, though every man has a model -in his own foot, and possesses in his hands the natural endowments for -the operations required. For philosophy alone, it seems to be imagined, -such study, care, and application are not in the least requisite.</p> - -<p>This comfortable view of what is required for a philosopher has -recently received corroboration through the theory of immediate or -intuitive knowledge.</p> - -<p>6.] So much for the form of philosophical knowledge. It is no less -desirable, on the other hand, that philosophy should understand that -its content is no other than <i>actuality,</i> that core of truth which, -originally produced and producing itself within the precincts of the -mental life, has become the <i>world,</i> the inward and outward world, of -consciousness. At first we become aware of these contents in what we -call Experience. But even Experience, as it surveys the wide range -of inward and outward existence, has sense enough to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> distinguish -the mere appearance, which is transient and meaningless, from what -in itself really deserves the name of actuality. As it is only in -form that philosophy is distinguished from other modes of attaining -an acquaintance with this same sum of being, it must necessarily be -in harmony with actuality and experience. In fact, this harmony may -be viewed as at least an extrinsic means of testing the truth of a -philosophy. Similarly it may be held the highest and final aim of -philosophic science to bring about, through the ascertainment of this -harmony, a reconciliation of the self-conscious reason with the reason -which <i>is</i> in the world,—in other words, with actuality.</p> - -<p>In the preface to my Philosophy of Law, p. xix, are found the -propositions:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">What is reasonable is actual;</span><br /> -and, What is actual is reasonable.<br /> -</p> - -<p>These simple statements have given rise to expressions of surprise and -hostility, even in quarters where it would be reckoned an insult to -presume absence of philosophy, and still more of religion. Religion -at least need not be brought in evidence; its doctrines of the divine -government of the world affirm these propositions too decidedly. For -their philosophic sense, we must pre-suppose intelligence enough to -know, not only that God is actual, that He is the supreme actuality, -that He alone is truly actual; but also, as regards the logical -bearings of the question, that existence is in part mere appearance, -and only in part actuality. In common life, any freak of fancy, any -error, evil and everything of the nature of evil, as well as every -degenerate and transitory existence whatever, gets in a casual way -the name of actuality. But even our ordinary feelings are enough to -forbid a casual (fortuitous) existence getting the emphatic name of an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> -actual; for by fortuitous we mean an existence which has no greater -value than that of something possible, which may as well not be as -be. As for the term Actuality, these critics would have done well to -consider the sense in which I employ it. In a detailed Logic I had -treated amongst other things of actuality, and accurately distinguished -it not only from the fortuitous, which, after all, has existence, -but even from the cognate categories of existence and the other -modifications of being.</p> - -<p>The actuality of the rational stands opposed by the popular fancy -that Ideas and ideals are nothing but chimeras, and philosophy a mere -system of such phantasms. It is also opposed by the very different -fancy that Ideas and ideals are something far too excellent to have -actuality, or something too impotent to procure it for themselves. This -divorce between idea and reality is especially dear to the analytic -understanding which looks upon its own abstractions, dreams though they -are, as something true and real, and prides itself on the imperative -'ought,' which it takes especial pleasure in prescribing even on the -field of politics. As if the world had waited on it to learn how it -ought to be, and was not! For, if it were as it ought to be, what would -come of the precocious wisdom of that 'ought'? When understanding -turns this 'ought' against trivial external and transitory objects, -against social regulations or conditions, which very likely possess a -great relative importance for a certain time and special circles, it -may often be right. In such a case the intelligent observer may meet -much that fails to satisfy the general requirements of right; for -who is not acute enough to see a great deal in his own surroundings -which is really far from being as it ought to be? But such acuteness -is mistaken in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> the conceit that, when it examines these objects and -pronounces what they ought to be, it is dealing with questions of -philosophic science. The object of philosophy is the Idea: and the Idea -is not so impotent as merely to have a right or an obligation to exist -without actually existing. The object of philosophy is an actuality of -which those objects, social regulations and conditions, are only the -superficial outside.</p> - -<p>7.] Thus reflection—thinking things over—in a general way involves -the principle (which also means the beginning) of philosophy. And when -the reflective spirit arose again in its independence in modern times, -after the epoch of the Lutheran Reformation, it did not, as in its -beginnings among the Greeks, stand merely aloof, in a world of its own, -but at once turned its energies also upon the apparently illimitable -material of the phenomenal world. In this way the name philosophy came -to be applied to all those branches of knowledge, which are engaged -in ascertaining the standard and Universal in the ocean of empirical -individualities, as well as in ascertaining the Necessary element, or -Laws, to be found in the apparent disorder of the endless masses of -the fortuitous. It thus appears that modern philosophy derives its -materials from our own personal observations and perceptions of the -external and internal world, from nature as well as from the mind and -heart of man, when both stand in the immediate presence of the observer.</p> - -<p>This principle of Experience carries with it the unspeakably important -condition that, in order to accept and believe any fact, we must be -in contact with it; or, in more exact terms, that we must find the -fact united and combined with the certainty of our own selves. We must -be in touch with our subject-matter, whether it be by means of our -external senses, or, else, by our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> profounder mind and our intimate -self-consciousness.—This principle is the same as that which has in -the present day been termed faith, immediate knowledge, the revelation -in the outward world, and, above all, in our own heart.</p> - -<p>Those sciences, which thus got the name of philosophy, we call -<i>empirical</i> sciences, for the reason that they take their departure -from experience. Still the essential results which they aim at and -provide, are laws, general propositions, a theory—the thoughts of what -is found existing. On this ground the Newtonian physics was called -Natural Philosophy. Hugo Grotius, again, by putting together and -comparing the behaviour of states towards each other as recorded in -history, succeeded, with the help of the ordinary methods of general -reasoning, in laying down certain general principles, and establishing -a theory which may be termed the Philosophy of International Law. In -England this is still the usual signification of the term philosophy. -Newton continues to be celebrated as the greatest of philosophers: and -the name goes down as far as the price-lists of instrument-makers. -All instruments, such as the thermometer and barometer, which do not -come under the special head of magnetic or electric apparatus, are -styled philosophical instruments<a name="FNanchor_1_18" id="FNanchor_1_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_18" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>. Surely thought, and not a mere -combination of wood, iron, &c. ought to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> be called the instrument of -philosophy! The recent science of Political Economy in particular, -which in Germany is known as Rational Economy of the State, or -intelligent national economy, has in England especially appropriated -the name of philosophy.<a name="FNanchor_2_19" id="FNanchor_2_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_19" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>8.] In its own field this empirical knowledge may at first give -satisfaction; but in two ways it is seen to come short. In the first -place there is another circle of objects which it does not embrace. -These are Freedom, Spirit, and God. They belong to a different -sphere, not because it can be said that they have nothing to do with -experience; for though they are certainly not experiences of the -senses, it is quite an identical proposition to say that whatever is -in consciousness is experienced. The real ground for assigning them to -another field of cognition is that in their scope and <i>content</i> these -objects evidently show themselves as infinite.</p> - -<p>There is an old phrase often wrongly attributed to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> Aristotle, and -supposed to express the general tenor of his philosophy. '<i>Nihil -est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu</i>': there is nothing in -thought which has not been in sense and experience. If speculative -philosophy refused to admit this maxim, it can only have done so from -a misunderstanding. It will, however, on the converse side no less -assert: '<i>Nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit in intellectu.</i>' And this -may be taken in two senses. In the general sense it means that νοῦς or -spirit (the more profound idea of νοῦς in modern thought) is the cause -of the world. In its special meaning (see § 2) it asserts that the -sentiment of right, morals, and religion is a sentiment (and in that -way an experience) of such scope and such character that it can spring -from and rest upon thought alone.</p> - -<p>9.] But in the second place in point of <i>form</i> the subjective reason -desires a further satisfaction than empirical knowledge gives; and -this form, is, in the widest sense of the term, Necessity (§ 1). The -method of empirical science exhibits two defects. The first is that the -Universal or general principle contained in it, the genus, or kind, &c., -is, on its own account, indeterminate and vague, and therefore not on -its own account connected with the Particulars or the details. Either -is external and accidental to the other; and it is the same with the -particular facts which are brought into union: each is external and -accidental to the others. The second defect is that the beginnings are -in every case data and postulates, neither accounted for nor deduced. -In both these points the form of necessity fails to get its due. Hence -reflection, whenever it sets itself to remedy these defects, becomes -speculative thinking, the thinking proper to philosophy. As a species -of reflection, therefore, which, though it has a certain community -of nature with the reflection already<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> mentioned, is nevertheless -different from it, philosophic thought thus possesses, in addition to -the common forms, some forms of its own, of which the Notion may be -taken as the type.</p> - -<p>The relation of speculative science to the other sciences may be -stated in the following terms. It does not in the least neglect the -empirical facts contained in the several sciences, but recognises and -adopts them: it appreciates and applies towards its own structure the -universal element in these sciences, their laws and classifications: -but besides all this, into the categories of science it introduces, and -gives currency to, other categories. The difference, looked at in this -way, is only a change of categories. Speculative Logic contains all -previous Logic and Metaphysics: it preserves the same forms of thought, -the same laws and objects,—while at the same time remodelling and -expanding them with wider categories.</p> - -<p>From <i>notion</i> in the speculative sense we should distinguish what -is ordinarily called a notion. The phrase, that no notion can ever -comprehend the Infinite, a phrase which has been repeated over and over -again till it has grown axiomatic, is based upon this narrow estimate -of what is meant by notions.</p> - -<p>10.] This thought, which is proposed as the instrument of philosophic -knowledge, itself calls for further explanation. We must understand in -what way it possesses necessity or cogency: and when it claims to be -equal to the task of apprehending the absolute objects (God, Spirit, -Freedom), that claim must be substantiated. Such an explanation, -however, is itself a lesson in philosophy, and properly falls within -the scope of the science itself. A preliminary attempt to make matters -plain would only be unphilosophical, and consist of a tissue of -assumptions, assertions, and inferential<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> pros and cons, <i>i.e.</i> of -dogmatism without cogency, as against which there would be an equal -right of counter-dogmatism.</p> - -<p>A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy bids us pause before -proceeding to inquire into God or into the true being of things, and -tells us first of all to examine the faculty of cognition and see -whether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become -acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which -it is to be employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our -trouble will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has -won for it general assent and admiration; the result of which has been -to withdraw cognition from an interest in its objects and absorption in -the study of them, and to direct it back upon itself; and so turn it to -a question of form. Unless we wish to be deceived bywords, it is easy -to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can -try and criticise them in other ways than by setting about the special -work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can -only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called -instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before -we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to -venture into the water until he had learned to swim.</p> - -<p>Reinhold saw the confusion with which this style of commencement is -chargeable, and tried to get out of the difficulty by starting with a -hypothetical and problematical stage of philosophising. In this way he -supposed that it would be possible, nobody can tell how, to get along, -until we found ourselves, further on, arrived at the primary truth -of truths. His method, when closely looked into, will be seen to be -identical with a very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> common practice. It starts from a substratum -of experiential fact, or from a provisional assumption which has -been brought into a definition; and then proceeds to analyse this -starting-point. We can detect in Reinhold's argument a perception of -the truth, that the usual course which proceeds by assumptions and -anticipations is no better than a hypothetical and problematical mode -of procedure. But his perceiving this does not alter the character of -this method; it only makes clear its imperfections.</p> - -<p>11.] The special conditions which call for the existence of philosophy -maybe thus described. The mind or spirit, when it is sentient or -perceptive, finds its object in something sensuous; when it imagines, -in a picture or image; when it wills, in an aim or end. But in contrast -to, or it may be only in distinction from, these forms of its existence -and of its objects, the mind has also to gratify the cravings of -its highest and most inward life. That innermost self is thought. -Thus the mind renders thought its object. In the best meaning of the -phrase, it comes to itself; for thought is its principle, and its -very unadulterated self. But while thus occupied, thought entangles -itself in contradictions, <i>i.e.</i> loses itself in the hard-and-fast -non-identity of its thoughts, and so, instead of reaching itself, -is caught and held in its counterpart. This result, to which honest -but narrow thinking leads the mere understanding, is resisted by the -loftier craving of which we have spoken. That craving expresses the -perseverance of thought, which continues true to itself, even in this -conscious loss of its native rest and independence, 'that it may -overcome' and work out in itself the solution of its own contradictions.</p> - -<p>To see that thought in its very nature is dialectical, and that, as -understanding, it must fall into contradiction,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span>—the negative of -itself, will form one of the main lessons of logic. When thought -grows hopeless of ever achieving, by its own means, the solution of -the contradiction which it has by its own action brought upon itself, -it turns back to those solutions of the question with which the mind -had learned to pacify itself in some of its other modes and forms. -Unfortunately, however, the retreat of thought has led it, as Plato -noticed even in his time, to a very uncalled-for hatred of reason -(misology); and it then takes up against its own endeavours that -hostile attitude of which an example is seen in the doctrine that -'immediate' knowledge, as it is called, is the exclusive form in which -we become cognisant of truth.</p> - -<p>12.] The rise of philosophy is due to these cravings of thought. Its -point of departure is Experience; including under that name both our -immediate consciousness and the inductions from it. Awakened, as it -were, by this stimulus, thought is vitally characterised by raising -itself above the natural state of mind, above the senses and inferences -from the senses into its own unadulterated element, and by assuming, -accordingly, at first a stand-aloof and negative attitude towards -the point from which it started. Through this state of antagonism to -the phenomena of sense its first satisfaction is found in itself, in -the Idea of the universal essence of these phenomena: an Idea (the -Absolute, or God) which may be more or less abstract. Meanwhile, on -the other hand, the sciences, based on experience, exert upon the -mind a stimulus to overcome the form in which their varied contents -are presented, and to elevate these contents to the rank of necessary -truth. For the facts of science have the aspect of a vast conglomerate, -one thing coming side by side with another, as if they were merely -given and presented,—as in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> short devoid of all essential or necessary -connexion. In consequence of this stimulus thought is dragged out -of its unrealised universality and its fancied or merely possible -satisfaction, and impelled onwards to a development from itself. On -one hand this development only means that thought incorporates the -contents of science, in all their speciality of detail as submitted. On -the other it makes these contents imitate the action of the original -creative thought, and present the aspect of a free evolution determined -by the logic of the fact alone.</p> - -<p>On the relation between 'immediacy' and 'mediation' in consciousness -we shall speak later, expressly and with more detail. Here it may be -sufficient to premise that, though the two 'moments' or factors present -themselves as distinct, still neither of them can be absent, nor can -one exist apart from the other. Thus the knowledge of God, as of every -supersensible reality, is in its true character an exaltation above -sensations or perceptions: it consequently involves a negative attitude -to the initial data of sense, and to that extent implies mediation. -For to mediate is to take something as a beginning and to go onward to -a second thing; so that the existence of this second thing depends on -our having reached it from something else contradistinguished from it. -In spite of this, the knowledge of God is no mere sequel, dependent -on the empirical phase of consciousness: in fact, its independence is -essentially secured through this negation and exaltation.—No doubt, if -we attach an unfair prominence to the fact of mediation, and represent -it as implying a state of conditionedness, it may be said—not that the -remark would mean much—that philosophy is the child of experience, and -owes its rise to <i>a posteriori</i> fact. (As a matter of fact, thinking -is always the negation of what we have immediately before us.) With<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> -as much truth however we may be said to owe eating to the means of -nourishment, so long as we can have no eating without them. If we take -this view, eating is certainly represented as ungrateful: it devours -that to which it owes itself. Thinking, upon this view of its action, -is equally ungrateful.</p> - -<p>But there is also an <i>a priori</i> aspect of thought, where by a -mediation, not made by anything external but by a reflection into self, -we have that immediacy which is universality, the self-complacency -of thought which is so much at home with itself that it feels an -innate indifference to descend to particulars, and in that way to the -development of its own nature. It is thus also with religion, which, -whether it be rude or elaborate, whether it be invested with scientific -precision of detail or confined to the simple faith of the heart, -possesses, throughout, the same intensive nature of contentment and -felicity. But if thought never gets further than the universality of -the Ideas, as was perforce the case in the first philosophies (when -the Eleatics never got beyond Being, or Heraclitus beyond Becoming), -it is justly open to the charge of formalism. Even in a more advanced -phase of philosophy, we may often find a doctrine which has mastered -merely certain abstract propositions or formulae, such as, 'In the -absolute all is one,' 'Subject and object are identical,'—and only -repeating the same thing when it comes to particulars. Bearing in -mind this first period of thought, the period of mere generality, we -may safely say that experience is the real author of <i>growth</i> and -<i>advance</i> in philosophy. For, firstly, the empirical sciences do not -stop short at the mere observation of the individual features of a -phenomenon. By the aid of thought, they are able to meet philosophy -with materials prepared for it, in the shape of general uniformities, -<i>i.e.</i> laws, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> classifications of the phenomena. When this is done, -the particular facts which they contain are ready to be received into -philosophy. This, secondly, implies a certain compulsion on thought -itself to proceed to these concrete specific truths. The reception into -philosophy of these scientific materials, now that thought has removed -their immediacy and made them cease to be mere data, forms at the same -time a development of thought out of itself. Philosophy, then, owes -its development to the empirical sciences. In return it gives their -contents what is so vital to them, the freedom of thought,—gives them, -in short, an <i>a priori</i> character. These contents are now warranted -necessary, and no longer depend on the evidence of facts merely, that -they were so found and so experienced. The fact as experienced thus -becomes an illustration and a copy of the original and completely -self-supporting activity of thought.</p> - -<p>13.] Stated in exact terms, such is the origin and development of -philosophy. But the History of Philosophy gives us the same process -from an historical and external point of view. The stages in the -evolution of the Idea there seem to follow each other by accident, and -to present merely a number of different and unconnected principles, -which the several systems of philosophy carry out in their own way. -But it is not so. For these thousands of years the same Architect has -directed the work: and that Architect is the one living Mind whose -nature is to think, to bring to self-consciousness what it is, and, -with its being thus set as object before it, to be at the same time -raised above it, and so to reach a higher stage of its own being. -The different systems which the history of philosophy presents are -therefore not irreconcilable with unity. We may either say, that it -is one philosophy at different<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> degrees of maturity: or that the -particular principle, which is the groundwork of each system, is -but a branch of one and the same universe of thought. In philosophy -the latest birth of time is the result of all the systems that have -preceded it, and must include their principles; and so, if, on other -grounds, it deserve the title of philosophy, will be the fullest, most -comprehensive, and most adequate system of all.</p> - -<p>The spectacle of so many and so various systems of philosophy suggests -the necessity of defining more exactly the relation of Universal to -Particular. When the universal is made a mere form and co-ordinated -with the particular, as if it were on the same level, it sinks into a -particular itself. Even common sense in every-day matters is above the -absurdity of setting a universal <i>beside</i> the particulars. Would any -one, who wished for fruit, reject cherries, pears, and grapes, on the -ground that they were cherries, pears, or grapes, and not fruit? But -when philosophy is in question, the excuse of many is that philosophies -are so different, and none of them is <i>the</i> philosophy,—that each is -only <i>a</i> philosophy. Such a plea is assumed to justify any amount of -contempt for philosophy. And yet cherries too are fruit. Often, too, a -system, of which the principle is the universal, is put on a level with -another of which the principle is a particular, and with theories which -deny the existence of philosophy altogether. Such systems are said to -be only different views of philosophy. With equal justice, light and -darkness might be styled different kinds of light.</p> - -<p>14.] The same evolution of thought which is exhibited in the history -of philosophy is presented in the System of Philosophy itself. Here, -instead of surveying the process, as we do in history, from the -outside, we see the movement of thought clearly defined in its native<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> -medium. The thought, which is genuine and self-supporting, must be -intrinsically concrete; it must be an Idea; and when it is viewed in -the whole of its universality, it is the Idea, or the Absolute. The -science of this Idea must form a system. For the truth is concrete; -that is, whilst it gives a bond and principle of unity, it also -possesses an internal source of development. Truth, then, is only -possible as a universe or totality of thought; and the freedom of the -whole, as well as the necessity of the several sub-divisions, which it -implies, are only possible when these are discriminated and defined.</p> - -<p>Unless it is a system, a philosophy is not a scientific production. -Unsystematic philosophising can only be expected to give expression to -personal peculiarities of mind, and has no principle for the regulation -of its contents. Apart from their interdependence and organic union, -the truths of philosophy are valueless, and must then be treated as -baseless hypotheses, or personal convictions. Yet many philosophical -treatises confine themselves to such an exposition of the opinions and -sentiments of the author.</p> - -<p>The term <i>system</i> is often misunderstood. It does not denote a -philosophy, the principle of which is narrow and to be distinguished -from others. On the contrary, a genuine philosophy makes it a principle -to include every particular principle.</p> - -<p>15.] Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle -rounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts, however, the -philosophical Idea is found in a particular specificality or medium. -The single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the -limits imposed by its special medium, and gives rise to a wider circle. -The whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles. The -Idea<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> appears in each single circle, but, at the same time, the whole -Idea is constituted by the system of these peculiar phases, and each is -a necessary member of the organisation.</p> - -<p>16.] In the form of an Encyclopaedia, the science has no room for a -detailed exposition of particulars, and must be limited to setting -forth the commencement of the special sciences and the notions of -cardinal importance in them.</p> - -<p>How much of the particular parts is requisite to constitute a -particular branch of knowledge is so far indeterminate, that the part, -if it is to be something true, must be not an isolated member merely, -but itself an organic whole. The entire field of philosophy therefore -really forms a single science; but it may also be viewed as a total, -composed of several particular sciences.</p> - -<p>The encyclopaedia of philosophy must not be confounded with ordinary -encyclopaedias. An ordinary encyclopaedia does not pretend to be more -than an aggregation of sciences, regulated by no principle, and merely -as experience offers them. Sometimes it even includes what merely bear -the name of sciences, while they are nothing more than a collection of -bits of information. In an aggregate like this, the several branches of -knowledge owe their place in the encyclopaedia to extrinsic reasons, -and their unity is therefore artificial: they are <i>arranged,</i> but we -cannot say they form a <i>system.</i> For the same reason, especially as the -materials to be combined also depend upon no one rule or principle, -the arrangement is at best an experiment, and will always exhibit -inequalities.</p> - -<p>An encyclopaedia of philosophy excludes three kinds of partial science. -I. It excludes mere aggregates of bits of information. Philology in -its <i>prima facie</i> aspect belongs to this class. II. It rejects the -quasi-sciences,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> which are founded on an act of arbitrary will alone, -such as Heraldry. Sciences of this class are positive from beginning to -end. III. In another class of sciences, also styled positive, but which -have a rational basis and a rational beginning, philosophy claims that -constituent as its own. The positive features remain the property of -the sciences themselves.</p> - -<p>The positive element in the last class of sciences is of different -sorts. (I) Their commencement, though rational at bottom, yields to the -influence of fortuitousness, when they have to bring their universal -truth into contact with actual facts and the single phenomena of -experience. In this region of chance and change, the adequate notion -of science must yield its place to reasons or grounds of explanation. -Thus, <i>e.g.</i> in the science of jurisprudence, or in the system of -direct and indirect taxation, it is necessary to have certain points -precisely and definitively settled which lie beyond the competence of -the absolute lines laid down by the pure notion. A certain latitude -of settlement accordingly is left: and each point may be determined -in one way on one principle, in another way on another, and admits of -no definitive certainty. Similarly the Idea of Nature, when parcelled -out in detail, is dissipated into contingencies. Natural history, -geography, and medicine stumble upon descriptions of existence, upon -kinds and distinctions, which are not determined by reason, but by -sport and adventitious incidents. Even history comes under the same -category. The Idea is its essence and inner nature; but, as it appears, -everything is under contingency and in the field of voluntary action. -(II) These sciences are positive also in failing to recognise the -finite nature of what they predicate, and to point out how these -categories and their whole sphere pass into a higher. They assume their -statements<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> to possess an authority beyond appeal. Here the fault lies -in the finitude of the form, as in the previous instance it lay in -the matter. (III) In close sequel to this, sciences are positive in -consequence of the inadequate grounds on which their conclusions rest: -based as these are on detached and casual inference, upon feeling, -faith, and authority, and, generally speaking, upon the deliverances -of inward and outward perception. Under this head we must also class -the philosophy which proposes to build upon anthropology,' facts of -consciousness, inward sense, or outward experience. It may happen, -however, that empirical is an epithet applicable only to the form of -scientific exposition; whilst intuitive sagacity has arranged what are -mere phenomena, according to the essential sequence of the notion. In -such a case the contrasts between the varied and numerous phenomena -brought together serve to eliminate the external and accidental -circumstances of their conditions, and the universal thus comes clearly -into view. Guided by such an intuition, experimental physics will -present the rational science of Nature,—as history will present the -science of human affairs and actions—in an external picture, which -mirrors the philosophic notion.</p> - -<p>17.] It may seem as if philosophy, in order to start on its course, -had, like the rest of the sciences, to begin with a subjective -presupposition. The sciences postulate their respective objects, such -as space, number, or whatever it be; and it might be supposed that -philosophy had also to postulate the existence of thought. But the -two cases are not exactly parallel. It is by the free act of thought -that it occupies a point of view, in which it is for its own self, and -thus gives itself an object of its own production. Nor is this all. -The very point of view, which originally is taken on its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> own evidence -only, must in the course of the science be converted to a result,—the -ultimate result in which philosophy returns into itself and reaches -the point with which it began. In this manner philosophy exhibits the -appearance of a circle which closes with itself, and has no beginning -in the same way as the other sciences have. To speak of a beginning of -philosophy has a meaning only in relation to a person who proposes to -commence the study, and not in relation to the science as science. The -same thing may be thus expressed. The notion of science—the notion -therefore with which we start—which, for the very reason that it is -initial, implies a separation between the thought which is our object, -and the subject philosophising which is, as it were, external to the -former, must be grasped and comprehended by the science itself. This -is in short the one single aim, action, and goal of philosophy—to -arrive at the notion of its notion, and thus secure its return and its -satisfaction.</p> - -<p>18.] As the whole science, and only the whole, can exhibit what the -Idea or system of reason is, it is impossible to give in a preliminary -way a general impression of a philosophy. Nor can a division of -philosophy into its parts be intelligible, except in connexion with the -system. A preliminary division, like the limited conception from which -it comes, can only be an anticipation. Here however it is premised that -the Idea turns out to be the thought which is completely identical -with itself, and not identical simply in the abstract, but also in its -action of setting itself over against itself, so as to gain a being of -its own, and yet of being in full possession of itself while it is in -this other. Thus philosophy is subdivided into three parts:</p> - -<p>I. Logic, the science of the Idea in and for itself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span></p> - -<p>II. The Philosophy of Nature: the science of the Idea in its otherness.</p> - -<p>III. The Philosophy of Mind: the science of the Idea come back to -itself out of that otherness.</p> - -<p>As observed in § 15, the differences between the several philosophical -sciences are only aspects or specialisations of the one Idea or system -of reason, which and which alone is alike exhibited in these different -media. In Nature nothing else would have to be discerned, except the -Idea: but the Idea has here divested itself of its proper being. In -Mind, again, the Idea has asserted a being of its own, and is on the -way to become absolute. Every such form in which the Idea is expressed, -is at the same time a passing or fleeting stage: and hence each of -these subdivisions has not only to know its contents as an object which -has being for the time, but also in the same act to expound how these -contents pass into their higher circle. To represent the relation -between them as a division, therefore, leads to misconception; for it -co-ordinates the several parts or sciences one beside another, as if -they had no innate development, but were, like so many species, really -and radically distinct.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_18" id="Footnote_1_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_18"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The journal, too, edited by Thomson is called 'Annals -of Philosophy; or, Magazine of Chemistry, Mineralogy, Mechanics, -Natural History, Agriculture, and Arts.' We can easily guess from the -title what sort of subjects are here to be understood under the term -'philosophy.' Among the advertisements of books just published, I -lately found the following notice in an English newspaper: 'The Art of -Preserving the Hair, on Philosophical Principles, neatly printed in -post 8vo, price seven shillings.' By philosophical principles for the -preservation of the hair are probably meant chemical or physiological -principles.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_19" id="Footnote_2_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_19"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> In connexion with the general principles of Political -Economy, the term 'philosophical' is frequently heard from the lips -of English statesmen, even in their public speeches. In the House of -Commons, on the 2nd Feb. 1825, Brougham, speaking oh the address in -reply to the speech from the throne, talked of 'the statesman-like -and philosophical principles of Free-trade,—for philosophical they -undoubtedly are—upon the acceptance of which his majesty this day -congratulated the House.' Nor is this language confined to members of -the Opposition. At the shipowners' yearly dinner in the same month, -under the chairmanship of the Premier Lord Liverpool, supported by -Canning the Secretary of State, and Sir C. Long the Paymaster-General -of the Army, Canning in reply to the toast which had been proposed -said: 'A period has just begun, in which ministers have it in their -power to apply to the administration of this country the sound maxims -of a profound philosophy.' Differences there may be between English -and German philosophy: still, considering that elsewhere the name of -philosophy is used only as a nickname and insult, or as something -odious, it is a matter of rejoicing to see it still honoured in the -mouth of the English Government.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.</a></h5> - - -<h4>PRELIMINARY NOTION.</h4> - - -<p>19.] <span class="smcap">Logic is the science of the pure Idea</span>; pure, that is, because the -Idea is in the abstract medium of Thought.</p> - -<p>This definition, and the others which occur in these introductory -outlines, are derived from a survey of the whole system, to which -accordingly they are subsequent. The same remark applies to all -prefatory notions whatever about philosophy.</p> - -<p>Logic might have been defined as the science of thought, and of its -laws and characteristic forms. But thought, as thought, constitutes -only the general medium, or qualifying circumstance, which renders -the Idea distinctively logical. If we identify the Idea with thought, -thought must not be taken in the sense of a method or form, but in the -sense of the self-developing totality of its laws and peculiar terms. -These laws are the work of thought itself, and not a fact which it -finds and must submit to.</p> - -<p>From different points of view, Logic is either the hardest or the -easiest of the sciences, Logic is hard, because it has to deal not with -perceptions, nor, like geometry, with abstract representations of the -senses, but with pure abstractions; and because it demands a force and -facility of withdrawing into pure thought, of keeping firm hold on it, -and of moving in such an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> element. Logic is easy, because its facts are -nothing but our own thought and its familiar forms or terms: and these -are the acme of simplicity, the abc of everything else. They are also -what we are best acquainted with: such as, 'Is' and 'Is not': quality -and magnitude: being potential and being actual: one, many, and so on. -But such an acquaintance only adds to the difficulties of the study; -for while, on the one hand, we naturally think it is not worth our -trouble to occupy ourselves any longer with things so familiar, on the -other hand, the problem is to become acquainted with them in a new way, -quite opposite to that in which we know them already.</p> - -<p>The utility of Logic is a matter which concerns its bearings upon the -student, and the training it may give for other purposes. This logical -training consists in the exercise in thinking which the student has -to go through (this science is the thinking of thinking): and in the -fact that he stores his head with thoughts, in their native unalloyed -character. It is true that Logic, being the absolute form of truth, and -another name for the very truth itself, is something more than merely -useful. Yet if what is noblest, most liberal and most independent is -also most useful, Logic has some claim to the latter character. Its -utility must then be estimated at another rate than exercise in thought -for the sake of the exercise.</p> - -<p>(1) The first question is: What is the object of our science? The -simplest and most intelligible answer to this question is that Truth -is the object of Logic. Truth is a noble word, and the thing is nobler -still. So long as man is sound at heart and in spirit, the search for -truth must awake all the enthusiasm of his nature. But immediately -there steps in the objection—Are <i>we</i> able to know truth? There -seems to be a disproportion between finite beings like ourselves and -the truth which is absolute: and doubts<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> suggest themselves whether -there is any bridge between the finite and the infinite. God is -truth: how shall we know Him? Such an undertaking appears to stand in -contradiction with the graces of lowliness and humility.—Others who -ask whether we can know the truth have a different purpose. They want -to justify themselves in living on contented with their petty, finite -aims. And humility of this stamp is a poor thing.</p> - -<p>But the time is past when people asked: How shall I, a poor worm of the -dust, be able to know the truth? And in its stead we find vanity and -conceit: people claim, without any trouble on their part, to breathe -the very atmosphere of truth. The young have been flattered into the -belief that they possess a natural birthright of moral and religious -truth. And in the same strain, those of riper years are declared to -be sunk, petrified, ossified in falsehood. Youth, say these teachers, -sees the bright light of dawn: but the older generation lies in the -slough and mire of the common day. They admit that the special sciences -are something that certainly ought to be cultivated, but merely as -the means to satisfy the needs of outer life. In all this it is not -humility which holds back from the knowledge and study of the truth, -but a conviction that we are already in full possession of it. And no -doubt the young carry with them the hopes of their elder compeers; on -them rests the advance of the world and science. But these hopes are -set upon the young, only on the condition that, instead of remaining as -they are, they undertake the stern labour of mind.</p> - -<p>This modesty in truth-seeking has still another phase: and that is the -genteel indifference to truth, as we see it in Pilate's conversation -with Christ. Pilate asked 'What is truth?' with the air of a man who -had settled accounts with everything long ago, and concluded that -nothing particularly matters:—he meant much the same as Solomon when -he says: 'All is vanity.' When it comes to this, nothing is left but -self-conceit.</p> - -<p>The knowledge of the truth meets an additional obstacle in timidity. -A slothful mind finds it natural to say: 'Don't<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> let it be supposed -that we mean to be in earnest with our philosophy. We shall be glad -<i>inter alia</i> to study Logic: but Logic must be sure to leave us as -we were before.' People have a feeling that, if thinking passes the -ordinary range of our ideas and impressions, it cannot but be on the -evil road. They seem to be trusting themselves to a sea on which they -will be tossed to and fro by the waves of thought, till at length they -again reach the sandbank of this temporal scene, as utterly poor as -when they left it. What coines of such a view, we see in the world. It -is possible within these limits to gain varied information and many -accomplishments, to become a master of official routine, and to be -trained for special purposes. But it is quite another thing to educate -the spirit for the higher life and to devote our energies to its -service. In our own day it may be hoped a longing for something better -has sprung up among the young, so that they will not be contented with -the mere straw of outer knowledge.</p> - -<p>(2) It is universally agreed that thought is the object of Logic. But -of thought our estimate may be very mean, or it may be very high. On -one hand, people say: 'It is <i>only</i> a thought.' In their view thought -is subjective, arbitrary and accidental—distinguished from the thing -itself, from the true and the real. On the other hand, a very high -estimate may be formed of thought; when thought alone is held adequate -to attain the highest of all things, the nature of God, of which the -senses can tell us nothing. God is a spirit, it is said, and must be -worshipped in spirit and in truth. But the merely felt and sensible, -we admit, is not the spiritual; its heart of hearts is in thought; -and only spirit can know spirit. And though it is true that spirit -can demean itself as feeling and sense—as is the case in religion, -the mere feeling, as a mode of consciousness, is one thing, and its -contents another. Feeling, as feeling, is the general form of the -sensuous nature which we have in common with the brutes. This form, -viz. feeling, may possibly seize and appropriate the full organic -truth: but the form has no real congruity with its contents. The form -of feeling is the lowest in which spiritual truth can be expressed. -The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> world of spiritual existences, God himself, exists in proper -truth, only in thought and as thought. If this be so, there fore, -thought, far from being a mere thought, is the highest and, in strict -accuracy, the sole mode of apprehending the eternal and absolute.</p> - -<p>As of thought, so also of the science of thought, a very high or a -very low opinion may be formed. Any man, it is supposed, can think -without Logic, as he can digest without studying physiology. If he -have studied Logic, he thinks afterwards as he did before, perhaps -more methodically, but with little alteration. If this were all, and -if Logic did no more than make men acquainted with the action of -thought as the faculty of comparison and classification, it would -produce nothing which had not been done quite as well before. And in -point of fact Logic hitherto had no other idea of its duty than this. -Yet to be well-informed about thought, even as a mere activity of the -subject-mind, is honourable and interesting for man. It is in knowing -what he is and what he does, that man is distinguished from the brutes. -But we may take the higher estimate of thought—as what alone can get -really in touch with the supreme and true. In that case, Logic as the -science of thought occupies a high ground. If the science of Logic -then considers thought in its action and its productions (and thought -being no resultless energy produces thoughts and the particular thought -required), the theme of Logic is in general the supersensible world, -and to deal with that theme is to dwell for a while in that world. -Mathematics is concerned with the abstractions of time and space. But -these are still the object of sense, although the sensible is abstract -and idealised. Thought bids adieu even to this last and abstract -sensible: it asserts its own native independence, renounces the field -of the external and internal sense, and puts away the interests and -inclinations of the individual. When Logic takes this ground, it is a -higher science than we are in the habit of supposing.</p> - -<p>(3) The necessity of understanding Logic in a deeper sense than as -the science of the mere form of thought is enforced by the interests -of religion and politics, of law and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> morality. In earlier days men -meant no harm by thinking: they thought away freely and fearlessly. -They thought about God, about Nature, and the State; and they felt -sure that a knowledge of the truth was obtainable through thought -only, and not through the senses or any random ideas or opinions. -But while they so thought, the principal ordinances of life began -to be seriously affected by their conclusions. Thought deprived -existing institutions of their force. Constitutions fell a victim to -thought: religion was assailed by thought: firm religious beliefs -which had been always looked upon as revelations were undermined, and -in many minds the old faith was upset. The Greek philosophers, for -example, became antagonists of the old religion, and destroyed its -beliefs. Philosophers were accordingly banished or put to death, as -revolutionists who had subverted religion and the state, two things -which were inseparable. Thought, in short, made itself a power in the -real world, and exercised enormous influence. The matter ended by -drawing attention to the influence of thought, and its claims were -submitted to a more rigorous scrutiny, by which the world professed to -find that thought arrogated too much and was unable to perform what -it had undertaken. It had not—people said—learned the real being of -God, of Nature and Mind. It had not learned what the truth was. What -it had done, was to overthrow religion and the state. It became urgent -therefore to justify thought, with reference to the results it had -produced: and it is this examination into the nature of thought and -this justification which in recent times has constituted one of the -main problems of philosophy.</p> - -<p>20.] If we take our <i>prima facie</i> impression of thought, we find on -examination first (a) that, in its usual subjective acceptation, -thought is one out of many activities or faculties of the mind, -co-ordinate with such others as sensation, perception, imagination, -desire, volition, and the like. The product of this activity, the form -or character peculiar to thought, is the <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">UNIVERSAL</span>, or, in general, -the abstract. Thought, regarded as an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> <i>activity,</i> may be accordingly -described as the <i>active</i> universal, and, since the deed, its product, -is the universal once more, may be called a self-actualising universal. -Thought conceived as a <i>subject</i> (agent) is a thinker, and the subject -existing as a thinker is simply denoted by the term 'I.'</p> - -<p>The propositions giving an account of thought in this and the following -sections are not offered as assertions or opinions of mine on the -matter. But in these preliminary chapters any deduction or proof would -be impossible, and the statements may be taken as matters in evidence. -In other words, every man, when he thinks and considers his thoughts, -will discover by the experience of his consciousness that they possess -the character of universality as well as the other aspects of thought -to be afterwards enumerated. We assume of course that his powers of -attention and abstraction have undergone a previous training, enabling -him to observe correctly the evidence of his consciousness and his -conceptions.</p> - -<p>This introductory exposition has already alluded to the distinction -between Sense, Conception, and Thought. As the distinction is of -capital importance for understanding the nature and kinds of knowledge, -it will help to explain matters if we here call attention to it. For -the explanation of <i>Sense,</i> the readiest method certainly is, to refer -to its external source—the organs of sense. But to name the organ -does not help much to explain what is apprehended by it. The real -distinction between sense and thought lies in this—that the essential -feature of the sensible is individuality, and as the individual (which, -reduced to its simplest terms, is the atom) is also a member of a -group, sensible existence presents a number of mutually exclusive -units,—of units, to speak in more definite and abstract formulae,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> -which exist side by side with, and after, one another. <i>Conception</i> or -picture-thinking works with materials from the same sensuous source. -But these materials when <i>conceived</i> are expressly characterised as in -me and therefore mine: and secondly, as universal, or simple, because -only referred to self. Nor is sense the only source of materialised -conception. There are conceptions constituted by materials emanating -from self-conscious thought, such as those of law, morality, religion, -and even of thought itself, and it requires some effort to detect -wherein lies the difference between such conceptions and thoughts -having the same import. For it is a thought of which such conception is -the vehicle, and there is no want of the form of universality, without -which no content could be in me, or be a conception at all. Yet here -also the peculiarity of conception is, generally speaking, to be sought -in the individualism or isolation of its contents. True it is that, for -example, law and legal provisions do not exist in a sensible space, -mutually excluding one another. Nor as regards time, though they appear -to some extent in succession, are their contents themselves conceived -as affected by time, or as transient and changeable in it. The fault -in conception lies deeper. These ideas, though implicitly possessing -the organic unity of mind, stand isolated here and there on the broad -ground of conception, with its inward and abstract generality. Thus -cut adrift, each is simple, unrelated: Right, Duty, God. Conception in -these circumstances either rests satisfied with declaring that Right -is Right, God is God: or in a higher grade of culture, it proceeds to -enunciate the attributes; as, for instance, God is the Creator of the -world, omniscient, almighty, &c. In this way several isolated, simple -predicates are strung together: but in spite of the link supplied -by their subject, the predicates<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> never get beyond mere contiguity. -In this point Conception coincides with Understanding: the only -distinction being that the latter introduces relations of universal -and particular, of cause and effect, &c., and in this way supplies a -necessary connexion to the isolated ideas of conception; which last has -left them side by side in its vague mental spaces, connected only by a -bare 'and.'</p> - -<p>The difference between conception and thought is of special importance: -because philosophy may be said to do nothing but transform conceptions -into thoughts,—though it works the further transformation of a mere -thought into a notion.</p> - -<p>Sensible existence has been characterised by the attributes of -individuality and mutual exclusion of the members. It is well to -remember that these very attributes of sense are thoughts and general -terms. It will be shown in the Logic that thought (and the universal) -is not a mere opposite of sense: it lets nothing escape it, but, -outflanking its other, is at once that other and itself. Now language -is the work of thought: and hence all that is expressed in language -must be universal. What I only mean or suppose is mine: it belongs -to me,—this particular individual. But language expresses nothing -but universality; and so I cannot say what I merely <i>mean.</i> And the -unutterable,—feeling or sensation,—far from being the highest truth, -is the most unimportant and untrue. If I say 'The individual,' 'This -individual,' 'here,' 'now,' all these are universal terms. Everything -and anything is an individual, a 'this,' and if it be sensible, is -here and now. Similarly when I say, 'I,' I <i>mean</i> my single self to -the exclusion of all others: but what I <i>say,</i> viz. 'I,' is just -every 'I,' which in like manner excludes all others from itself. In -an awkward expression which Kant used, he said that I <i>accompany</i> -all my conceptions,—sensations, too, desires,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> actions, &c. 'I' is -in essence and act the universal: and such partnership is a form, -though an external form, of universality. All other men have it in -common with me to be 'I': just as it is common to all my sensations -and conceptions to be mine. But 'I,' in the abstract, as such, is the -mere act of self-concentration or self-relation, in which we make -abstraction from all conception and feeling, from every state of mind -and every peculiarity of nature, talent, and experience. To this -extent, 'I' is the existence of a wholly <i>abstract</i> universality, a -principle of abstract freedom. Hence thought, viewed as a subject, is -what is expressed by the word 'I': and since I am at the same time in -all my sensations, conceptions, and states of consciousness, thought -is everywhere present, and is a category that runs through all these -modifications.</p> - - -<p class="block2">Our first impression when we use the term thought is of a subjective -activity—one amongst many similar faculties, such as memory, -imagination and will. Were thought merely an activity of the -subject-mind and treated under that aspect by logic, logic would -resemble the other sciences in possessing a well-marked object. It -might in that case seem arbitrary to devote a special science to -thought, whilst will, imagination and the rest were denied the same -privilege. The selection of one faculty however might even in this view -be very well grounded on a certain authority acknowledged to belong to -thought, and on its claim to be regarded as the true nature of man, in -which consists his distinction from the brutes. Nor is it unimportant -to study thought even as a subjective energy. A detailed analysis -of its nature would exhibit rules and laws, a knowledge of which is -derived from experience. A treatment of the laws of thought, from this -point of view, used once to form the body of logical science. Of that -science Aristotle was the founder. He succeeded in assigning to thought -what properly belongs to it. Our thought is extremely concrete: but -in its composite contents we must distinguish the part that properly -belongs<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> to thought, or to the abstract mode of its action. A subtle -spiritual bond, consisting in the agency of thought, is what gives -unity to all these contents, and it was this bond, the form as form, -that Aristotle noted and described. Up to the present day, the logic -of Aristotle continues to be the received system. It has indeed been -spun out to greater length, especially by the labours of the medieval -Schoolmen who, without making any material additions, merely refined -in details. The moderns also have left their mark upon this logic, -partly by omitting many points of logical doctrine due to Aristotle and -the Schoolmen, and partly by foisting in a quantity of psychological -matter. The purport of the science is to become acquainted with the -procedure of finite thought: and, if it is adapted to its pre-supposed -object, the science is entitled to be styled correct. The study of this -formal logic undoubtedly has its uses. It sharpens the wits, as the -phrase goes, and teaches us to collect our thoughts and to abstract -—whereas in common consciousness we have to deal with sensuous -conceptions which cross and perplex one another. Abstraction moreover -implies the concentration of the mind on a single point, and thus -induces the habit of attending to our inward selves. An acquaintance -with the forms of finite thought may be made a means of training the -mind for the empirical sciences, since their method is regulated by -these forms: and in this sense logic has been designated Instrumental. -It is true, we may be still more liberal, and say: Logic is to be -studied not for its utility, but for its own sake; the super-excellent -is not to be sought for the sake of mere utility. In one sense this is -quite correct: but it may be replied that the super-excellent is also -the most useful: because it is the all-sustaining principle which, -having a subsistence of its own, may therefore serve as the vehicle of -special ends which it furthers and secures. And thus, special ends, -though they have no right to be set first, are still fostered by the -presence of the highest good. Religion, for instance, has an absolute -value of its own; yet at the same time other ends flourish and succeed -in its train. As Christ says: 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and -all these things shall be added unto you.' Particular ends can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> be -attained only in the attainment of what absolutely is and exists in its -own right.</p> - -<p>21.] (b) Thought was described as active. We now, in the second place, -consider this action in its bearings upon objects, or as reflection -upon something. In this case the universal or product of its operation -contains the value of the thing—is the essential, inward, and true.</p> - -<p>In § 5 the old belief was quoted that the reality in object, -circumstance, or event, the intrinsic worth or essence, the thing on -which everything depends, is not a self-evident datum of consciousness, -or coincident with the first appearance and impression of the object; -that, on the contrary, Reflection is required in order to discover the -real constitution of the object—and that by such reflection it will be -ascertained.</p> - -<p class="block2">To reflect is a lesson which even the child has to learn. One of his -first lessons is to join adjectives with substantives. This obliges -him to attend and distinguish: he has to remember a rule and apply it -to the particular case. This rule is nothing but a universal: and the -child must see that the particular adapts itself to this universal. -In life, again, we have ends to attain. And with regard to these we -ponder which is the best way to secure them. The end here represents -the universal or governing principle: and we have means and instruments -whose action we regulate in conformity to the end. In the same way -reflection is active in questions of conduct. To reflect here means to -recollect the right, the duty,—the universal which serves as a fixed -rule' to guide our behaviour in the given case. Our particular act -must imply and recognise the universal law.—We find the same thing -exhibited in our study of natural phenomena. For instance, we observe -thunder and lightning. The phenomenon is a familiar one, and we often -perceive it. But man is not content with a bare acquaintance, or with -the fact as it appears to the senses; he would like to get behind the -surface, to know what it is, and to comprehend<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> it. This leads him to -reflect: he seeks to find out the cause as something distinct from -the mere phenomenon: he tries to know the inside in its distinction -from the outside. Hence the phenomenon becomes double, it splits into -inside and outside, into force and its manifestation, into cause and -effect. Once more we find the inside or the force identified with the -universal and permanent: not this or that flash of lightning, this -or that plant—but that which continues the same in them all. The -sensible appearance is individual and evanescent: the permanent in -it is discovered by. reflection. Nature shows us a countless number -of individual forms and phenomena. Into this variety we feel a need -of introducing unity: we compare, consequently, and try to find the -universal of each single case. Individuals are born and perish: the -species abides and recurs in them all: and its existence is only -visible to reflection. Under the same head fall such laws as those -regulating the motion of the heavenly bodies. To-day we see the stars -here, and to-morrow there: and our mind finds something incongruous, in -this chaos—something in which it can put no faith, because it believes -in order and in a simple, constant, and universal law. Inspired by this -belief, the mind has directed its reflection towards the phenomena, -and learnt their laws. In other words, it has established the movement -of the heavenly bodies to be in accordance with a universal law from -which every change of position may be known and predicted. The case is -the same with the influences which make themselves felt in the infinite -complexity of human conduct. There, too, man has the belief in the sway -of a general principle.—From all these examples it may be gathered -how reflection is always seeking for something fixed and permanent, -definite in itself and governing the particulars. This universal which -cannot be apprehended by the senses counts as the true and essential. -Thus, duties and rights are all-important in the matter of conduct: and -an action is true when it conforms to those universal formulae.</p> - -<p class="block2">In thus characterising the universal, we become aware of its antithesis -to something else. This something else is the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> merely immediate, -outward and individual, as opposed to the mediate, inward and -universal. The universal does not exist externally to the outward eye -as a universal. The kind as kind cannot be perceived: the laws of the -celestial motions are not written on the sky. The universal is neither -seen nor heard, its existence is only for the mind. Religion leads us -to a universal, which embraces all else within itself, to an Absolute -by which all else is brought into being: and this Absolute is an object -not of the senses but of the mind and of thought.</p> - -<p>22.] (c) By the act of reflection something is <i>altered</i> in the way in -which the fact was originally presented in sensation, perception, or -conception. Thus, as it appears, an alteration of the object must be -interposed before its true nature can be discovered.</p> - -<p class="block2">What reflection elicits, is a product of our thought. Solon, for -instance, produced out of his head the laws he gave to the Athenians. -This is half of the truth: but we must not on that account forget -that the universal (in Solon's case, the laws) is the very reverse of -merely subjective, or fail to note that it is the essential, true, -and objective being of things. To discover the truth in things, -mere attention is not enough; we must call in the action of our own -faculties to transform what is immediately before us. Now, at first -sight, this seems an inversion of the natural order, calculated to -thwart the very purpose on which knowledge is bent. But the method is -not so irrational as it seems. It has been the conviction of every age -that the only way of reaching the permanent substratum was to transmute -the given phenomenon by means of reflection. In modern times a doubt -has for the first time been raised on this point in connexion with the -difference alleged to exist between the products of our thought and the -things in their own nature. This real nature of things, it is said, -is very different from what we make out of them. The divorce between -thought and thing is mainly the work of the Critical Philosophy, -and runs counter to the conviction of all previous ages, that their -agreement was a matter of course. The antithesis between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> them is -the hinge on which modern philosophy turns. Meanwhile the natural -belief of men gives the lie to it. In common life we reflect, without -particularly reminding ourselves that this is the process of arriving -at the truth, and we think without hesitation, and in the firm belief -that thought coincides with thing. And this belief is of the greatest -importance. It marks the diseased state of the age when we see it adopt -the despairing creed that our knowledge is only subjective, and that -beyond this subjective we cannot go. Whereas, rightly understood, truth -is objective, and ought so to regulate the conviction of every one, -that the conviction of the individual is stamped as wrong when it does -not agree with this rule. Modern views, on the contrary, put great -value on the mere fact of conviction, and hold that to be convinced is -good for its own sake, whatever be the burden of our conviction,—there -being no standard by which we can measure its truth.</p> - -<p class="block2">We said above that, according to the old belief, it was the -characteristic right of the mind to know the truth. If this be so, it -also implies that everything we know both of outward and inward nature, -in one word, the objective world, is in its own self the same as it is -in thought, and that to think is to bring out the truth of our object, -be it what it may. The business of philosophy is only to bring into -explicit consciousness what the world in all ages has believed about -thought. Philosophy therefore advances nothing new; and our present -discussion has led us to a conclusion which agrees with the natural -belief of mankind.</p> - -<p>23.] (d) The real nature of the object is brought to light in -reflection; but it is no less true that this exertion of thought is -<i>my</i> act. If this be so, the real nature is a <i>product</i> of <i>my</i> mind, -in its character of thinking subject—generated by me in my simple -universality, self-collected and removed from extraneous influences, -—in one word, in my Freedom.</p> - -<p>Think for yourself, is a phrase which people often use as if it had -some special significance. The fact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> is, no man can think for another, -any more than he can eat or drink for him: and the expression is a -pleonasm. To think is in fact <i>ipso facto</i> to be free, for thought as -the action of the universal is an abstract relating of self to self, -where, being at home with ourselves, and as regards our subjectivity, -utterly blank, our consciousness is, in the matter of its contents, -only in the fact and its characteristics. If this be admitted, and -if we apply the term humility or modesty to an attitude where our -subjectivity is not allowed to interfere by act or quality, it is -easy to appreciate the question touching the humility or modesty and -pride of philosophy. For in point of contents, thought is only true in -proportion as it sinks itself in the facts; and in point of form it -is no private or particular state or act of the subject, but rather -that attitude of consciousness where the abstract self, freed from -all the special limitations to which its ordinary states or qualities -are liable, restricts itself to that universal action in which it is -identical with all individuals. In these circumstances philosophy may -be acquitted of the charge of pride. And when Aristotle summons the -mind to rise to the dignity of that attitude, the dignity he seeks is -won by letting slip all our individual opinions and prejudices, and -submitting to the sway of the fact.</p> - -<p>24.] With these explanations and qualifications, thoughts may be termed -Objective Thoughts,—among which are also to be included the forms -which are more especially discussed in the common logic, where they are -usually treated as forms of conscious thought only. <i>Logic therefore -coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in -thoughts,</i>—thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality -of things.</p> - -<p>An exposition of the relation in which such forms as notion, judgment, -and syllogism stand to others,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> such as causality, is a matter for the -science itself. But this much is evident beforehand. If thought tries -to form a notion of things, this notion (as well as its proximate -phases, the judgment and syllogism) cannot be composed of articles and -relations which are alien and irrelevant to the things. Reflection, it -was said above, conducts to the universal of things: which universal -is itself one of the constituent factors of a notion. To say that -Reason or Understanding is in the world, is equivalent in its import -to the phrase 'Objective Thought.' The latter phrase however has the -inconvenience that thought is usually confined to express what belongs -to the mind or consciousness only, while objective is a term applied, -at least primarily, only to the non-mental.</p> - -<p class="block2">(1) To speak of thought or objective thought as the heart [and soul -of the world, may seem to be ascribing consciousness to the things of -nature. We feel a certain repugnance against making thought the inward -function of things, especially as we speak of thought as marking the -divergence of man from nature. It would be necessary, therefore, if -we use the term thought at all, to speak of nature as the system of -unconscious thought, or, to use Schelling's expression, a petrified -intelligence. And in order to prevent misconception, thought-form or -thought-type should be substituted for the ambiguous term thought.</p> - -<p class="block2">From what has been said the principles of logic are to be sought -in a system of thought-types or fundamental categories, in which -the opposition between subjective and objective, in its usual -sense, vanishes. The signification thus attached to thought and its -characteristic forms may be illustrated by the ancient saying that -'νοῧς governs the world,' or by our own phrase that 'Reason is in the -world: which means that Reason is the soul of the world it inhabits, -its immanent principle, its most proper and inward nature, its -universal. Another illustration is offered by the circumstance that -in speaking of some definite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> animal we say it is (an) animal. Now, -the animal, <i>quâ</i> animal, cannot be shown; nothing can be pointed out -excepting some special animal. Animal, <i>quâ</i> animal, does not exist: it -is merely the universal nature of the individual animals, whilst each -existing animal is a more concretely, defined and particularised thing. -But to be an animal,—the law of kind which is the universal in this -case,—is the property of the particular animal, and constitutes its -definite essence. Take away from the dog its animality, and it becomes -impossible to say what it is. All things have a permanent inward -nature, as well as an outward existence. They live and die, arise and -pass away; but their essential and universal part is the kind; and this -means much more than something <i>common</i> to them all.</p> - -<p class="block2">If thought is the constitutive substance of external things, it is also -the universal substance of what is spiritual. In all human perception -thought is present; so too thought is the universal in all the acts of -conception and recollection; in short, in every mental activity, in -willing, wishing and the like. All these faculties are only further, -specialisations of thought. When it is presented in this light, thought -has a different part to play from what it has if we speak of a faculty -of thought, one among a crowd of other faculties, such as perception, -conception and will, with which it stands on the same level. When it -is seen, to be the true universal of all that nature and mind contain, -it extends its scope far beyond all these, and becomes the basis of -everything. From this view of thought, in its objective meaning as -[greek: nous], we may next pass to consider the subjective sense of the -term. We say first, Man is a being that thinks; but we also say at the -same time, Man is a being that perceives and wills. Man is a thinker, -and is universal: but he is a thinker only because he feels his own -universality. The animal too is by implication universal, but the -universal is not consciously felt by it to be universal: it feels only -the individual. The animal sees a singular object, for instance, its -food, or a man. For the animal all this never goes beyond an individual -thing. Similarly, sensation has to do with nothing but singulars, such -as <i>this</i> pain or <i>this</i> sweet taste. Nature does not bring<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> its "νοῦς" -into consciousness: it is man who first makes himself double so as -to be a universal for a universal. This first happens when man knows -that he is 'I.' By the term 'I' I mean myself, a single and altogether -determinate person. And yet I really utter nothing peculiar to myself, -for every one else is an 'I' or 'Ego,' and when I call myself 'I,' -though I indubitably mean the single person myself, I express a -thorough universal. 'I,' therefore, is mere being-for-self, in which -everything peculiar or marked is renounced and buried out of sight; -it is as it were the ultimate and unanalysable point of consciousness -We may say 'I' I and thought are the same, or, more definitely, 'I' -is thought as a thinker. What I have in my consciousness, is for me. -'I' is the vacuum or receptacle for anything and everything: for which -everything is and which stores up everything in itself. Every man is a -whole world of conceptions, that lie buried in the night of the 'Ego.' -It follows that the 'Ego' is the universal in which we leave aside all -that is particular, and in which at the same time all the particulars -have a latent existence. In other words, it is not a mere universality -and nothing more, but the universality which includes in it everything. -Commonly we use the word 'I' without attaching much importance to it, -nor is it an object of study except to philosophical analysis. In the -'Ego,' we have thought before us in its utter purity. While the brute -cannot say 'I,' man can, because it is his nature to think. Now in the -'Ego' there are a variety of contents, derived both from within and -from, without, and according to the nature of these contents our state -may be described as perception, or conception, or reminiscence. But -in all of them the 'I' is found: or in them all thought is present. -Man, therefore, is always thinking, even in his perceptions: if he -observes anything, he always observes it as a universal, fixes on a -single point which he places in relief, thus withdrawing his attention -from other points, and takes it as abstract and universal, even if the -universality be only in form.</p> - -<p class="block2">In the case of our ordinary conceptions, two things may happen. Either -the contents are moulded by thought, but not the form: or, the form -belongs to thought and not the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> contents. In using such terms, for -instance, as anger, rose, hope, I am speaking of things which I have -learnt in the way of sensation, but I express these contents in a -universal mode, that is, in the form of thought. I have left out much -that is particular and given the contents in their generality: but -still the contents remain sense-derived. On the other hand, when I -represent God, the content is undeniably a product of pure thought, -but the form still retains the sensuous limitations which it has as -I find it immediately present in myself. In these generalised images -the content is not merely and simply sensible, as it is in a visual -inspection; but either the content is sensuous and the form appertains -to thought, or <i>vice versâ.</i> In the first case the material is given to -us, and our thought supplies the form: in the second case the content -which has its source in thought is by means of the form turned into a -something given, which accordingly reaches the mind from without.</p> - -<p class="block2">(2) Logic is the study of thought pure and simple, or of the pure -thought-forms. In the ordinary sense of the term, by thought we -generally represent to ourselves something more than simple and -unmixed thought; we mean some thought, the material of which is from -experience. Whereas in logic a thought is understood to include nothing -else but what depends on thinking and what thinking has brought into -existence. It is in these circumstances that thoughts are <i>pure</i> -thoughts. The mind is then in its own home-element and therefore free: -for freedom means that the other thing with which you deal is a second -self—so that you never leave your own ground but give the law to -yourself. In the impulses or appetites the beginning is from something -else, from something which we feel to be external. In this case then -we speak of dependence. For freedom it is necessary that we should -feel no presence of something else which is not ourselves. The natural -man, whose motions follow the rule only of his appetites, is not his -own master. Be he as self-willed as he may, the constituents of his -will and opinion are not his own, and his freedom is merely formal. -But when we <i>think,</i> we renounce our selfish and particular being, -sink ourselves in the thing,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> allow thought to follow its own course, -and,—if we add anything of our own, we think ill.</p> - -<p class="block2">If in pursuance of the foregoing remarks we consider-, Logic to be -the system of the pure types of thought, we find that the other -philosophical sciences, the Philosophy of I Nature and the Philosophy -of Mind, take the place, as it were, of an Applied Logic, and that -Logic is the soul which animates them both. Their problem in that -case is only to recognise the logical forms under the shapes they -assume in Nature and Mind,—shapes which are only a particular mode -of expression for the forms of pure thought. If for instance we take -the syllogism (not as it was understood in the old formal logic, but -at its real value), we shall find it gives expression to the law that -the particular is the middle term which fuses together the extremes of -the universal and the singular. The syllogistic form is a universal -form of all things. Everything that exists is a particular, which -couples together the universal and the singular. But Nature is weak -and fails to exhibit the logical forms in their purity. Such a feeble -exemplification of the syllogism may be seen in the magnet. In the -middle or point of indifference of a magnet, its two poles, however -they may be distinguished, are brought into one. Physics also teaches -us to see the universal or essence in Nature: and the only difference -between it and the Philosophy of Nature is that the latter brings -before our mind the adequate forms of the notion in the physical world.</p> - -<p class="block2">It will now be understood that Logic is the all-animating spirit of -all the sciences, and its categories the spiritual hierarchy. They -are the heart and centre of things: and yet at the same time they -are always on our lips, and, apparently at least, perfectly familiar -objects. But things thus familiar are usually the greatest strangers. -Being, for example, is a category of pure thought: but to make 'Is' -an object of investigation never occurs to us. Common fancy puts the -Absolute far away in a world beyond. The Absolute is rather directly -before us, so present that so long as we think, we must, though without -express consciousness of it, always carry it with us and always use it. -Language is the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> main depository of these types of thought; and one use -of the grammatical instruction which children receive is unconsciously -to turn their attention to distinctions of thought.</p> - -<p class="block2">Logic is usually said to be concerned with forms <i>only</i> and to derive -the material for them from elsewhere. But this 'only,' which assumes -that the logical thoughts are nothing in comparison with the rest -of the contents, is not the word to use about forms which are the -absolutely-real ground of everything. Everything else rather is an -'only' compared with these thoughts. To make such abstract forms a -problem pre-supposes in the inquirer a higher level of culture than -ordinary; and to study them in themselves and for their own sake -signifies in addition that these thought-types must be deduced out of -thought itself, and their truth or reality examined by the light of -their own laws. We do not assume them as data from without, and then -define them or exhibit their value and authority by comparing them with -the shape they take in our minds. If we thus acted, we should proceed -from observation and experience, and should, for instance, say we -habitually employ the term 'force' in such a case, and such a meaning. -A definition like that would be called correct, if it agreed with the -conception of its object present in our ordinary state of mind. The -defect of this empirical method is that a notion is not defined as it -is in and for itself, but in terms of something assumed, which is then -used as a criterion and standard of correctness. No such test need be -applied: we have merely to let the thought-forms follow the impulse of -their own organic life.</p> - -<p class="block2">To ask if a category is true or not, must sound strange to the ordinary -mind: for a category apparently becomes true only when it is applied -to a given object, and apart from this application it would seem -meaningless to inquire into its truth. But this is the very question on -which everything turns. We must however in the first place understand -clearly what we mean by Truth. In common life truth means the agreement -of an object with our conception of it. We thus pre-suppose an object -to which our conception must conform. In the philosophical sense of the -word, on the other hand, truth may be described, in general<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> abstract -terms, as the agreement of a thought-content with itself. This meaning -is quite different from the one given above. At the same time the -deeper and philosophical meaning of truth can be partially traced even -in the ordinary usage of language. Thus we speak of a true friend; by -which we mean a friend whose manner of conduct accords with the notion -of friendship. In the same way we speak of a true work of Art. Untrue -in this sense means the same as bad, or self-discordant. In this sense -a bad state is an untrue state; and evil and untruth may be said to -consist in the contradiction subsisting between the function or notion -and the existence of the object. Of such a bad object we may form -a correct representation, but the import of such representation is -inherently false. Of these correctnesses; which are at the same time -untruths, we may have many in our heads.—God alone is the thorough -harmony of notion and reality. All finite things involve an untruth: -they have a notion and an existence, but their existence does not meet -the requirements of the notion. For this reason they must perish, and -then the incompatibility between their notion and their existence -becomes manifest. It is in the kind that the individual animal has its -notion: and the kind liberates itself from this individuality by death.</p> - -<p class="block2">The study of truth, or, as it is here explained to mean, consistency, -constitutes the proper problem of logic. In our every-day mind we -are never troubled with questions about the truth of the forms of -thought.—We may also express the problem of logic by saying that it -examines the forms of thought touching their capability to hold truth. -And the question comes to this: What are the forms of the infinite, and -what are the forms of the finite? Usually no suspicion attaches to the -finite forms of thought; they are allowed to pass unquestioned. But it -is from conforming to finite categories in thought and action that all -deception originates.</p> - -<p class="block2">(3) Truth may be ascertained by several methods, each of which however -is no more than a form. Experience is the first of these methods. But -the method is only a form: it has no intrinsic value of its own. For -in experience everything depends upon the mind we bring to bear upon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> -actuality. A great mind is great in its experience; and in the motley -play of phenomena at once perceives the point of real significance. The -idea is present, in actual shape, not something, as it were, over the -hill and far away. The genius of a Goethe, for example, looking into -nature or history, has great experiences, catches sight of the living -principle, and gives expression to it. A second method of apprehending -the truth is Reflection, which defines it by intellectual relations of -condition and conditioned. But in these two modes the absolute truth -has not yet found its appropriate form. The most perfect method of -knowledge proceeds in the pure form of thought: and here the attitude -of man is one of entire freedom.</p> - -<p class="block2">That the form of thought is the perfect form, and that it presents -the truth as it intrinsically and actually is, is the general dogma -of all philosophy. To give a proof of the dogma there is, in the -first instance, nothing to do but show that these other forms of -knowledge are finite. The grand Scepticism of antiquity accomplished -this task when it exhibited the contradictions contained in every -one of these forms. That Scepticism indeed went further: but when -it ventured to assail the forms of reason, it began by insinuating -under them something finite upon which it might fasten. All the -forms of finite thought will make their appearance in the course of -logical development, the order in which they present themselves being -determined by necessary laws. Here in the introduction they could only -be unscientifically assumed as something given. In the theory of logic -itself these forms will be exhibited, not only on their negative, but -also on their positive side.</p> - -<p class="block2">When we compare the different forms of ascertaining truth with one -another, the first of them, immediate knowledge, may perhaps seem the -finest, noblest and most appropriate. It includes everything which -the moralists term innocence as well as religious feeling, simple -trust, love, fidelity, and natural faith. The two other forms, first -reflective, and secondly philosophical cognition, must leave that -unsought natural harmony behind. And so far as they have this in -common, the methods which claim to apprehend<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> the truth by thought -may naturally be regarded as part and parcel of the pride which leads -man to trust to his own powers for a knowledge of the truth. Such a -position involves a thorough-going disruption, and, viewed in that -light, might be regarded as the source of all evil and wickedness—the -original transgression. Apparently therefore they only way of being -reconciled and restored to peace is to surrender all claims to think or -know.</p> - -<p class="block2">This lapse from natural unity has not escaped notice, and nations from -the earliest times have asked the meaning of the wonderful division of -the spirit against itself. No such inward disunion is found in nature: -natural things do nothing wicked.</p> - -<p class="block2">The Mosaic legend of the Fall of Man has preserved an ancient picture -representing the origin and consequences of this disunion. The -incidents of the legend form the basis of an essential article of the -creed, the doctrine of original sin in man and his consequent need of -succour. It may be well at the commencement of logic to examine the -story which treats of the origin and the bearings of the very knowledge -which logic has to discuss. For, though philosophy must not allow -herself to be overawed by religion, or accept the position of existence -on sufferance, she cannot afford to neglect these popular conceptions. -The tales and allegories of religion, which have enjoyed for thousands -of years the veneration of nations, are not to be set aside as -antiquated even now.</p> - -<p class="block2">Upon a closer inspection of the story of the Fall we find, as was -already said, that it exemplifies the universal bearings of knowledge -upon the spiritual life. In its instinctive and natural stage, -spiritual life wears the garb of innocence and confiding simplicity: -but the very essence of spirit implies the absorption of this immediate -condition in something higher. The spiritual is distinguished from the -natural, and more especially from the animal, life, in the circumstance -that it does not continue a mere stream of tendency, but sunders itself -to self-realisation. But this position of severed life has in its turn -to be suppressed, and the spirit has by its own act to win its way -to concord again. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> final concord then is spiritual; that is, the -principle of restoration is found in thought, and thought only. The -hand that inflicts the wound is also the hand which heals it.</p> - -<p class="block2">We are told in our story that Adam and Eve, the first human beings, -the types of humanity, were placed in a garden, where grew a tree of -life and a tree of the knowledge of good and evil. God, it is said, -had forbidden them to eat of the fruit of this latter tree: of the -tree of life for the present nothing further is said. These words -evidently assume that man is not intended to seek knowledge, and ought -to remain in the state of innocence. Other meditative races, it may -be remarked, have held the same belief that the primitive state of -mankind was one of innocence and harmony. Now all this is to a certain -extent correct. The disunion that appears throughout humanity is not -a condition to rest in. But it is a mistake to regard the natural and -immediate harmony as the right state. The mind is not mere instinct: -on the contrary, it essentially involves the tendency to reasoning -and meditation. Childlike innocence no doubt has in it something -fascinating and attractive: but only because it reminds us of what the -spirit must win for itself. The harmoniousness of childhood is a gift -from the hand of nature: the second harmony must spring from the labour -and culture of the spirit. And so the words of Christ, 'Except ye -<i>become</i> as little children,' &c., are very far from telling us that we -must always remain children.</p> - -<p class="block2">Again, we find in the narrative of Moses that the occasion which led -man to leave his natural unity is attributed to solicitation from -without. The serpent was the tempter. But the truth is, that the step -into opposition, the awakening of consciousness, follows from the -very nature of man: and the same history repeats itself in every son -of Adam. The serpent represents likeness to God as consisting in the -knowledge of good and evil: and it is just this knowledge in which man -participates when he breaks with the unity of his instinctive being -and eats of the forbidden fruit. The first reflection of awakened -consciousness in men told them that they were naked. This is a naïve -and profound trait.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> For the sense of shame bears evidence to the -separation of man from his natural and sensuous life. The beasts never -get so far as this separation, and they feel no shame. And it is in -the human feeling of shame that we are to seek the spiritual and moral -origin of dress, compared with which the merely physical need is a -secondary matter.</p> - -<p class="block2">Next comes the Curse, as it is called, which God pronounced upon -man. The prominent point in that curse turns chiefly on the contrast -between man and nature. Man must work in the sweat of his brow: and -woman bring forth in sorrow. As to work, if it is the result of the -disunion, it is also the victory over it. The beasts have nothing more -to do but to pick up the materials required to satisfy their wants: man -on the contrary can only satisfy his wants by himself producing and -transforming the necessary means. Thus even in these outside things man -is dealing with himself.</p> - -<p class="block2">The story does not close with the expulsion from Paradise. We are -further told, God said, 'Behold Adam is become as one of us, to -know good and evil.' Knowledge is now spoken of as divine, and not, -as before, as something wrong and forbidden. Such words contain a -confutation of the idle talk that philosophy pertains only to the -finitude of the mind. Philosophy is knowledge, and it is through -knowledge that man first realises his original vocation, to be the -image of God. When the record adds that God drove men out of the Garden -of Eden to prevent their eating of the tree of life, it only means -that on his natural side certainly man is finite and mortal, but in -knowledge infinite.</p> - -<p class="block2">We all know the theological dogma that man's nature is evil, tainted -with what is called Original Sin. Now while we accept the dogma, we -must give up the setting of incident which represents original sin as -consequent upon an accidental act of the first man. For the very notion -of spirit is enough to show that man is evil by nature, and it is an -error to imagine that he could ever be otherwise. To such extent as man -is and acts like a creature of nature, his whole behaviour is what it -ought not to be. For the spirit it is a duty to be free, and to realise -itself by its own act. Nature<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> is for man only the starting-point which -he has to transform. The theological doctrine of original sin is a -profound truth; but modern enlightenment prefers to believe that man is -naturally good, and that he acts right so long as he continues true to -nature.</p> - -<p class="block2">The hour when man leaves the path of mere natural being marks the -difference between him, a self-conscious agent, and the natural world. -But this schism, though it forms a necessary element in the very notion -of spirit, is not the final goal of man. It is to this state of inward -breach that the whole finite action of thought and will belongs. -In that finite sphere man pursues ends of his own and draws from -himself the material of his conduct. While he pursues these aims to -the uttermost, while his knowledge and his will seek himself, his own -narrow self apart from the universal, he is evil; and his evil is to be -subjective.</p> - -<p class="block2">We seem at first to have a double evil here: but both are really the -same. Man in so far as he is spirit is not the creature of nature: and -when he behaves as such, and follows the cravings of appetite, he wills -to be so. The natural wickedness of man is therefore unlike the natural -life of animals. A mere natural life may be more exactly defined by -saying that the natural man as such is an individual: for nature in -every part is in the bonds of individualism. Thus when man wills to be -a creature of nature, he wills in the Same degree to be an individual -simply. Yet against such impulsive and appetitive action, due to -the individualism of nature, there also steps in the law or general -principle. This law may either be an external force, or have the form -of divine authority. So long as he continues in his natural state, man -is in bondage to the law.—It is true that among the instincts and -affections of man, there are social or benevolent inclinations, love, -sympathy, and others, reaching beyond his selfish isolation. But so -long as these tendencies are instinctive, their virtual universality -of scope and purport is vitiated by the subjective form which always -allows free play to self-seeking and random action.</p> - -<p>25.] The term 'Objective Thoughts' indicates the <i>truth</i>—the truth -which is to be the absolute <i>object</i> of philosophy,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> and not merely the -goal at which it aims. But the very expression cannot fail to suggest -an opposition, to characterise and appreciate which is the main motive -of the philosophical attitude of the present time, and which forms the -real problem of the question about truth and our means of ascertaining -it. If the thought-forms are vitiated by a fixed antithesis, <i>i. -e.</i> if they are only of a finite character, they are unsuitable for -the self-centred universe of truth, and truth can find no adequate -receptacle in thought. Such thought, which—- can produce only limited -and partial categories and I proceed by their means; is what in the -stricter sense of the word is termed Understanding. The finitude, -further, of these categories lies in two points. Firstly, they are only -subjective, and the antithesis of an objective permanently clings to -them. Secondly, they are always of restricted content, and so persist -in antithesis to one another and still more to the Absolute. In order -more fully to explain the position and import here attributed to logic, -the attitudes in which thought is supposed to stand to objectivity will -next be examined by way of further introduction.</p> - -<p>In my Phenomenology of the Spirit, which on that account was at its -publication described as the first part of the System of Philosophy, -the method adopted was to begin with the first and simplest phase of -mind, immediate consciousness, and to show how that stage gradually -of necessity worked onward to the philosophical point of view, the -necessity of that view being proved by the process. But in these -circumstances it was impossible to restrict the quest to the mere form -of consciousness. For the stage of philosophical knowledge is the -richest in material and organisation, and therefore, as it came before -us in the shape of a result, it pre-supposed the existence of the -concrete formations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> of consciousness, such as individual and social -morality, art and religion. In the development of consciousness, which -at first sight appears limited to the point of form merely, there is -thus at the same time included the development of the matter or of the -objects discussed in the special branches of philosophy. But the latter -process must, so to speak, go on behind consciousness, since those -facts are the essential nucleus which is raised into consciousness. -The exposition accordingly is rendered more intricate, because so much -that properly belongs to the concrete branches is prematurely dragged -into the introduction. The survey which follows in the present work has -even more the inconvenience of being only historical and inferential in -its method. But it tries especially to show how the questions men have -proposed, outside the school, on the nature of Knowledge, Faith and the -like,—questions which they imagine to have no connexion with abstract -thoughts,—are really reducible to the simple categories, which first -get cleared up in Logic.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.</a></h5> - - -<h4>FIRST ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY.</h4> - - -<p>26.] The first of these attitudes of thought is seen in the method -which has no doubts and no sense of the contradiction in thought, or of -the hostility of thought against itself. It entertains an unquestioning -belief that reflection is the means of ascertaining the truth, and of -bringing the objects before the mind as they really are. And in this -belief it advances straight upon its objects, takes the materials -furnished by sense and perception, and reproduces them from itself as -facts of thought; and then, believing this result to be the truth, the -method is content. Philosophy in its earliest stages, all the sciences, -and even the daily action and movement of consciousness, live in this -faith.</p> - -<p>27.] This method of thought has never become aware, of the antithesis -of subjective and objective: and to that extent there is nothing to -prevent its statements from possessing a genuinely philosophical and -speculative character, though it is just as possible that they may -never get beyond finite categories, or the stage where the antithesis -is still unresolved. In the present introduction the main question -for us is to observe this attitude of thought in its extreme form; -and we shall accordingly first of all examine its second and inferior -aspect as a philosophic system. One of the clearest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> instances of it, -and one lying nearest to ourselves, may be found in the Metaphysic of -the Past as it subsisted among us previous to the philosophy of Kant. -It is however only in reference to the history of philosophy that this -Metaphysic can be said to belong to the past: the thing is always and -at all places to be found, as the view which the abstract understanding -takes of the objects of reason. And it is in this point that the real -and immediate good lies of a closer examination of its main scope and -its <i>modus operandi.</i></p> - -<p>28.] This metaphysical system took the laws and forms of thought to be -the fundamental laws and forms of things. It assumed that to think a -thing was the means of finding its very self and nature: and to that -extent it occupied higher ground than the Critical. Philosophy which -succeeded it. But in the first instance (i) <i>these terms of thought -were cut off from their connexion,</i> their solidarity; each was believed -valid by itself and capable of serving as a predicate of the truth. It -was the general assumption of this metaphysic that a knowledge of the -Absolute was gained by assigning predicates to it. It neither inquired -what the terms of the understanding specially meant or what they were -worth, nor did it test the method which characterises the Absolute by -the assignment of predicates.</p> - -<p>As an example of such predicates may be taken; Existence, in the -proposition, 'God has existence:' Finitude or Infinity, as in the -question, 'Is the world-finite or infinite?': Simple and Complex, -in the proposition, 'The soul is simple,'—or again, 'The thing is -a unity, a whole,' &c. Nobody asked whether such predicates had any -intrinsic and independent truth, or if the propositional form could be -a form of truth.</p> - -<p class="block2">The Metaphysic of the past assumed, as unsophisticated belief always -does that thought apprehends the very self of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> things, and that things, -to become what they truly are, require to be thought. For Nature and -the human soul are a very Proteus in their perpetual transformations; -and it soon occurs to the observer that the first crude impression of -things is not their essential being.—This is a point of view the very -reverse of the result arrived at by the Critical Philosophy; a result, -of which it may be said, that it bade man go and feed on mere husks and -chaff.</p> - -<p class="block2">We must look more closely into the procedure of that old metaphysic. -In the first place it never went beyond the province of the analytic -understanding. Without preliminary inquiry it adopted the abstract -categories of thought and let them rank as predicates of truth. But in -using the term thought we must not forget the difference between finite -or discursive thinking and the thinking which is infinite and rational. -The categories, as they meet us <i>prima facie</i> and in isolation, are -finite forms. But truth is always infinite, and cannot be expressed -or presented to consciousness in finite terms. The phrase <i>infinite -thought</i> may excite surprise, if we adhere to the modern conception -that thought is always limited. But it is, speaking rightly, the very -essence of thought to be infinite. The nominal explanation of calling -a thing finite is that it has an end, that it exists up to a certain -point only, where it comes into contact with, and is limited by, its -other. The finite therefore subsists in reference to its other, which -is its negation and presents itself as its limit. Now thought is always -in its own sphere; its relations are with itself, and it is its own -object. In having a thought for object, I am at home with myself. -The thinking power, the 'I,' is therefore infinite, because, when it -thinks, it is in relation to an object which is itself. Generally -speaking, an object means a something else, a negative confronting me. -But in the case where thought thinks itself, it has an object which -is at the same time no object: in other words, its objectivity is -suppressed and transformed into an idea. Thought, as thought, therefore -in its unmixed nature involves no limits; it is finite only when it -keeps to limited categories, which it believes to be ultimate. Infinite -or speculative thought, on the contrary, while it no less<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> defines, -does in the very act of limiting and defining make that defect vanish. -And so infinity is not, as most frequently happens, to be conceived as -an abstract away and away for ever and ever, but in the simple manner -previously indicated.</p> - -<p class="block2">The thinking of the old metaphysical system was finite. Its whole mode -of action was regulated by categories, the limits of which it believed -to be permanently fixed and not subject to any further negation. Thus, -one of its questions was: Has God existence? The question supposes that -existence is an altogether positive term, a sort of <i>ne plus ultra.</i> -We shall see however at a later point that existence is by no means a -merely positive term, but one which is toe low for the Absolute Idea, -and unworthy of God. A second question in these metaphysical systems -was: Is the world finite or infinite? The very terms of the question -assume that the finite is a permanent contradictory to the infinite: -and one can easily see that, when they are so opposed, the infinite, -which of course ought to be the whole, only appears as a single aspect -and suffers restriction from the finite. But a restricted infinity is -itself only a finite. In the same way it was asked whether the soul was -simple or composite. Simpleness was, in other words, taken to be an -ultimate characteristic, giving expression to a whole truth. Far from -being so, simpleness is the expression of a half-truth, as one-sided -and abstract as existence:—a term of thought, which, as we shall -hereafter see, is itself untrue and hence unable to hold truth. If the -soul be viewed as merely and abstractly simple, it is characterised in -an inadequate and finite way.</p> - -<p class="block2">It was therefore the main question of the pre-Kantian metaphysic to -discover whether predicates of the kind mentioned were to be ascribed -to its objects. Now these predicates are after all only limited -formulae of the understanding which, instead of expressing the truth, -merely impose a limit. More than this, it should be noted that the -chief feature of the method lay in 'assigning' or 'attributing' -predicates to the object that was to be cognised, for example, to -God. But attribution is no more than an external reflection about the -object: the predicates by which the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> object is to be determined are -supplied from the resources of picture-thought, and are applied in -a mechanical way. Whereas, if we are to have genuine cognition, the -object must characterise its own self and not derive its predicates -from without. Even supposing we follow the method of predicating, the -mind cannot help feeling that predicates of this sort fail to exhaust -the object. From the same point of view the Orientals are quite correct -in calling God the many-named or the myriad-named One. One after -another of these finite categories leaves the soul unsatisfied, and -the Oriental sage is compelled unceasingly to seek for more and more -of such predicates. In finite things it is no doubt the case that they -have to be characterised through finite predicates: and with these -things the understanding finds proper scope for its special action. -Itself finite, it knows only the nature of the finite. Thus, when -I call some action a theft, I have characterised the action in its -essential facts: and such a knowledge is sufficient for the judge. -Similarly, finite things stand to each other as cause and effect, -force and exercise, and when they are apprehended in these categories, -they are known in their finitude. But the objects of reason cannot be -defined by these finite predicates. To try to do so was the defect of -the old metaphysic.</p> - -<p>29.] Predicates of this kind, taken individually, have but a limited -range of meaning, and no one can fail to perceive how inadequate they -are, and how far they fall below the fulness of detail which our -imaginative thought gives, in the case, for example, of God, Mind, or -Nature. Besides, though the fact of their being all predicates of one -subject supplies them with a certain connexion, their several meanings -keep them apart: and consequently each is brought in as a stranger in -relation to the others.</p> - -<p>The first of these defects the Orientals sought to remedy, when, for -example, they defined God by attributing to Him many names; but still -they felt that the number of names would have had to be infinite.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span></p> - -<p>30.] (2) In the second place, <i>the metaphysical systems adopted a -wrong criterion.</i> Their objects were no doubt totalities which in -their own proper selves belong to reason,—that is, to the organised -and systematically-developed universe, of thought. But these -totalities—God, the Soul, the World,—were taken by the metaphysician -as subjects made and ready, to form the basis for an application of -the categories of the understanding. They were assumed from popular -conception. Accordingly popular conception was the only canon for -settling whether or not the predicates were suitable and sufficient.</p> - -<p>31.] The common conceptions of God, the Soul, the World, may be -supposed to afford thought a firm and fast footing. They do not really -do so. Besides having, a particular and subjective character clinging -to them, and thus leaving room for great variety of interpretation, -they themselves first of all require a firm and fast definition by -thought. This may be seen in any of these propositions where the -predicate, or in philosophy the category, is needed to indicate what -the subject, or the conception we start with, is.</p> - -<p>In such a sentence as 'God is eternal,' we begin with the conception of -God, not knowing as yet what he is: to tell us that, is the business of -the predicate. In the principles of logic, accordingly, where the terms -formulating the subject-matter are those of thought only, it is not -merely superfluous to make these categories predicates to propositions -in which God, or, still vaguer, the Absolute, is the subject, but it -would also have the disadvantage of suggesting another canon than -the nature of thought. Besides, the propositional form (and for -proposition, it would be more correct to substitute judgment) is not -suited to express the concrete—and the true is always concrete—or -the speculative.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> Every judgment is by its form one-sided and, to that -extent, false.</p> - -<p class="block2">This metaphysic was not free or objective thinking. Instead of letting -the object freely and spontaneously expound its own characteristics, -metaphysic pre-supposed it ready-made. If any one wishes to know what -free thought means, he must go to Greek philosophy: for Scholasticism, -like these metaphysical systems, accepted its facts, and accepted them -as a dogma from the authority of the Church. We moderns, too, by our -whole up-bringing, have been initiated into ideas which it is extremely -difficult to overstep, on account of their far-reaching significance. -But the ancient philosophers were in a different position. They were -men who lived wholly in the perceptions of the senses, and who, -after their rejection of mythology and its fancies, pre-supposed -nothing but the heaven above and the earth around. In these material, -non-metaphysical surroundings, thought is free and enjoys its own -privacy,—cleared of everything material, and thoroughly at home. This -feeling that we are all our own is characteristic of free thought—of -that voyage into the open, where nothing is below us or above us, and -we stand in solitude with ourselves alone.</p> - -<p>32.] (3) In the third place, <i>this system of metaphysic turned into -Dogmatism.</i> When our thought never ranges beyond narrow and rigid -terms, we are forced to assume that of two opposite assertions, such as -were the above propositions, the one must be true and the other false.</p> - -<p class="block2">Dogmatism may be most simply described as the contrary of Scepticism. -The ancient Sceptics gave the name of Dogmatism to every philosophy -whatever holding a system of definite doctrine. In this large sense -Scepticism may apply the name even to philosophy which is properly -Speculative. But in the narrower sense, Dogmatism consists in the -tenacity which draws a hard and fast line between certain terms -and others opposite to them. We may see this clearly in the strict -'Either—or': for instance, The world is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> either finite or infinite; -but one of these two it must be. The contrary of this rigidity is the -characteristic of all Speculative truth. There no such inadequate -formulae are allowed, nor can they possibly exhaust it. These formulae -Speculative truth holds in union as a totality, whereas, Dogmatism -invests them in their isolation with a title to fixity and truth.</p> - -<p class="block2">It often happens in philosophy that the half-truth takes its place -beside the whole truth and assumes on its own account the position -of something permanent. But the fact is that the half-truth, instead -of being a fixed or self-subsistent principle, is a mere element -absolved and included in the whole. The metaphysic of understanding is -dogmatic, because it maintains half-truths in their isolation: whereas -the idealism of speculative philosophy carries out the principle of -totality and shows that it can reach beyond the inadequate formularies -of abstract thought. Thus idealism would say:—The soul is neither -finite only, nor infinite only; it is really the one just as much as -the other, and in that way neither the one nor the other. In other -words; such formularies in their isolation are inadmissible, and only -come into account as formative elements in a larger notion. Such -idealism we see even in the ordinary phases of consciousness. Thus we -say of sensible things, that they are changeable: that is, they <i>are,</i> -but it is equally true that they are <i>not.</i> We show more obstinacy -in dealing with the categories of the understanding. These are terms -which we believe to be somewhat firmer—or even absolutely firm and -fast. We look upon them as separated from each other by an infinite -chasm, so that opposite categories can never get at each other. The -battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the -understanding has reduced everything.</p> - -<p>33.] The <i>first</i> part of this metaphysic in its systematic form is -Ontology, or the doctrine of the abstract characteristics of Being. -The multitude of these characteristics, and the limits set to their -applicability, are not founded upon any principle. They have in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> -consequence to be enumerated as experience and circumstances direct, -and the import ascribed to them is founded only upon common sensualised -conceptions, upon assertions that particular words are used in a -particular sense, and even perhaps upon etymology. If experience -pronounces the list to be complete, and if the usage of language, by -its agreement, shows the analysis to be correct, the metaphysician is -satisfied; and the intrinsic and independent truth and necessity of -such characteristics is never made a matter of investigation at all.</p> - -<p>To ask if being, existence, finitude, simplicity, complexity, &c. are -notions intrinsically and independently true, must surprise those who -believe that a question about truth can only concern propositions (as -to whether a notion is or is not with truth to be attributed, as the -phrase is, to a subject), and that falsehood lies in the contradiction -existing between the subject in our ideas, and the notion to be -predicated of it. Now as the notion is concrete, it and every character -of it in general is essentially a self-contained unity of distinct -characteristics. If truth then were nothing more than the absence -of contradiction, it would be first of all necessary in the case of -every-notion to examine whether it, taken individually, did not contain -this sort of intrinsic contradiction.</p> - -<p>34.] The <i>second</i> branch of the metaphysical system was Rational -Psychology or Pneumatology. It dealt with the metaphysical nature of -the Soul,—that is, of the Mind regarded as a thing. It expected to -find immortality in a sphere dominated by the laws of composition, -time, qualitative change, and quantitative increase or decrease.</p> - -<p class="block2">The name 'rational,' given to this species of psychology, served -to contrast it with empirical modes of observing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> the phenomena of -the soul. Rational psychology viewed the soul in its metaphysical -nature, and through the categories supplied by abstract thought. The -rationalists endeavoured to ascertain the inner nature of the soul as -it is in itself and as it is for thought.—In philosophy at present we -hear little of the soul: the favourite term now is mind (spirit). The -two are distinct, soul being as it were the middle term between body -and spirit, or the bond between the two. The mind, as soul, is immersed -in corporeity, and the soul is the animating principle of the body.</p> - -<p class="block2">The pre-Kantian metaphysic, we say, viewed the soul as a thing. 'Thing' -is a very ambiguous word. By a thing, we mean, firstly, an immediate -existence, something we represent in sensuous form: and in this meaning -the term has been applied to the soul. Hence the question regarding the -seat of the soul. Of course, if the soul have a seat, it is in space -and sensuously envisaged. So, too, if the soul be viewed as a thing, -we can ask whether the soul is simple or composite. The question is -important as bearing on the immortality of the soul, which is supposed -to depend on the absence of composition. But the fact is, that in -abstract simplicity we have a category, which as little corresponds to -the nature of the soul, as that of compositeness.</p> - -<p class="block2">One word on the relation of rational to empirical psychology. The -former, because it sets itself to apply thought to cognise mind and -even to demonstrate the result of such thinking, is the higher; whereas -empirical psychology starts from perception, and only recounts and -describes what perception supplies. But if we propose to think the -mind, we must not be quite so shy of its special phenomena. Mind is -essentially active in the same sense as the Schoolmen said that God -is 'absolute actuosity.' But if the mind is active it must as it were -utter itself. It is wrong therefore to take the mind for a processless -<i>ens,</i> as did the old metaphysic which divided the processless inward -life of the mind from its outward life. The mind, of all things, must -be looked at in its concrete actuality, in its energy; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> in such a -way that its manifestations are seen to be determined by its inward -force.</p> - -<p>35.] The <i>third</i> branch of metaphysics was Cosmology. The topics -it embraced were the world, its contingency, necessity, eternity, -limitation in time and space: the laws (only formal) of its changes: -the freedom of man and the origin of evil.</p> - -<p>To these topics it applied what were believed to be thorough-going -contrasts: such as contingency and necessity; external and internal -necessity; efficient and final cause, or causality in general and -design; essence or substance and phenomenon; form and matter; freedom -and necessity; happiness and pain; good and evil.</p> - -<p class="block2">The object of Cosmology comprised not merely Nature, but Mind too, in -its external complication in its phenomenon—in fact, existence in -general, or the sum of finite things. This object however it viewed not -as a concrete whole, but only under certain abstract points of view. -Thus the questions Cosmology attempted to solve were such as these: Is -accident or necessity dominant in the world? Is the world eternal or -created? It was therefore a chief concern of this study to lay down -what were called general Cosmological laws: for instance, that Nature -does not act by fits and starts. And by fits and starts (<i>saltus</i>) they -meant a qualitative difference or qualitative alteration showing itself -without any antecedent determining mean: whereas, on the contrary, a -gradual change (of quantity) is obviously not without intermediation.</p> - -<p class="block2">In regard to Mind as it makes itself felt in the world, the questions -which Cosmology chiefly discussed turned upon the freedom of man and -the origin of evil. Nobody can deny that these are questions of the -highest importance. But to give them a satisfactory answer, it is above -all things necessary not to claim finality for the abstract formulae -of understanding, or to suppose that each of the two terms in an -antithesis has an independent-subsistence or can be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> treated in its -isolation as a complete and self-centred truth. This however is the -general position taken by the metaphysicians before Kant, and appears -in their cosmological discussions, which for that reason were incapable -of compassing their purpose, to understand the phenomena of the world. -Observe how they proceed with the distinction between freedom and -necessity, in their application of these categories to Nature and -Mind. Nature they regard as subject in its workings to necessity; -Mind they hold to be free. No doubt there is a real foundation for -this distinction in the very core of the Mind itself: but freedom and -necessity, when thus abstractly opposed, are terms applicable only in -the finite world to which, as such, they belong. A freedom involving no -necessity, and mere necessity without freedom, are abstract and in this -way untrue formulae of [thought. Freedom is no blank indeterminateness: -essentially concrete, and unvaryingly self-determinate, it is so far at -the same time necessary. Necessity, again, in the ordinary acceptation -of the term in popular philosophy, means determination from without -only,—as in finite mechanics, where a body moves only when it is -struck by another body, and moves in the direction communicated to it -by the impact.—This however is a merely external necessity, not the -real inward necessity which is identical with freedom.</p> - -<p class="block2">The case is similar with the contrast of Good and Evil,—the favourite -contrast of the introspective modern world. If we regard Evil as -possessing a fixity of its own, apart and distinct from Good, we are -to a certain extent right: there is an opposition between them: nor -do those who maintain the apparent and relative character of the -opposition mean that Evil and Good in the Absolute are one, or, in -accordance with the modern phrase, that a thing first becomes evil -from our way of looking at it. The error arises when we take Evil as a -permanent positive, instead of—what it really is—a negative which, -though it would fain assert itself, has no real persistence, and is, in -fact, only the absolute sham-existence of negativity in itself.</p> - -<p>36.] The <i>fourth</i> branch of metaphysics is Natural or Rational -Theology. The notion of God, or God as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> a possible being, the proofs of -his existence, and his properties, formed the study of this branch.</p> - -<p>(a) When understanding thus discusses the Deity, its main purpose is -to find what predicates correspond or not to the fact we have in our -imagination as God. And in so doing it assumes the contrast between -positive and negative to be absolute; and hence, in the long run, -nothing is left for the notion as understanding takes it, but the empty -abstraction of indeterminate Being, of mere reality or positivity, the -lifeless product of modern 'Deism.'</p> - -<p>(b) The method of demonstration employed in finite knowledge must -always lead to an inversion of the true order. For it requires the -statement of some objective ground for God's being, which thus acquires -the appearance of being derived from something else. This mode of -proof, guided as it is by the canon of mere analytical identity, -is embarrassed by the difficulty of passing from the finite to the -infinite. Either the finitude of the existing world, which is left as -much a fact as it was before, clings to the notion of Deity, and God -has to be defined as the immediate substance of that world,—which is -Pantheism: or He remains an object set over against the subject, and in -this way, finite,—which is Dualism.</p> - -<p>(c) The attributes of God which ought to be various and precise, had, -properly speaking, sunk and disappeared in the abstract notion of pure -reality, of indeterminate Being. Yet in our material thought, the -finite world continues, meanwhile, to have a real being, with God as a -sort of antithesis: and thus arises the further picture of different -relations of God to the world. These, formulated as properties, must, -on the one hand, as relations to finite circumstances, themselves -possess a finite character (giving us such properties as just,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> -gracious, mighty, wise, &c.); on the other hand they must be infinite. -Now on this level of thought the only means, and a hazy one, of -reconciling these opposing requirements was quantitative exaltation -of the properties, forcing them into indeterminateness,—into the -<i>sensus eminentior.</i> But it was an expedient which really destroyed the -property and left a mere name.</p> - -<p class="block2">The object of the old metaphysical theology was to see how far -unassisted reason could go in the knowledge of God. Certainly a -reason-derived knowledge of God is the highest problem of philosophy. -The earliest teachings of religion are figurate conceptions of God. -These conceptions, as the Creed arranges them, are imparted to us in -youth. They are the doctrines of our religion, and in so far as the -individual rests his faith on these doctrines and feels them to be -the truth, he has all he needs as a Christian. Such is faith: and the -science of this faith is Theology. But until Theology is something more -than a bare enumeration and compilation of these doctrines <i>ab extra,</i> -it has no right to the title of science. Even the method so much in -vogue at present—the purely historical mode of treatment—which for -example reports what has been said by this or the other Father of the -Church—does not invest theology with a scientific character. To get -that, we must go on to comprehend the facts by thought,—which is the -business of philosophy. Genuine theology is thus at the same time a -real philosophy of religion, as it was, we may add, in the Middle Ages.</p> - -<p class="block2">And now let us examine this rational theology more narrowly. It was -a science which approached God not by reason but by understanding, -and, in its mode of thought, employed the terms without any sense of -their mutual limitations and connexions. The notion of God formed the -subject of discussion; and yet the criterion of our knowledge was -derived from such an extraneous source as the materialised conception -of God. Now thought must be free in its movements. It is no doubt to -be remembered, that the result of independent thought harmonises with -the im<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span>port of the Christian religion:—for the Christian religion is -a revelation of reason. But such a harmony surpassed the efforts of -rational theology. It proposed to define the figurate conception of God -in terms of thought; but it resulted in a notion of God which was what -we may call the abstract of positivity or reality, to the exclusion -of all negation. God was accordingly defined to be the most real of -all beings. Any one can see however that this most real of beings, in -which negation forms no part, is the very opposite of what it ought -to be and of what understanding supposes it to be. Instead of being -rich and full above all measure, it is so narrowly conceived that it -is, on the contrary, extremely poor and altogether empty. It is with -reason that the heart craves a concrete body of truth; but without -definite feature, that is, without negation, contained in the notion, -there can only be an abstraction. When the notion of God is apprehended -only as that of the abstract or most real being, God is, as it were, -relegated to another world beyond: and to speak of a knowledge of him -would be meaningless. Where there is no definite quality, knowledge is -impossible. Mere light is mere darkness.</p> - -<p class="block2">The second problem of rational theology was to prove the existence -of God. Now, in this matter, the main point to be noted is -that demonstration, as the understanding employs it, means the -dependence of one truth on another. In such proofs we have a -pre-supposition—something firm and fast, from which something else -follows; we exhibit the dependence of some truth from an assumed -starting-point. Hence, if this mode of demonstration is applied to the -existence of God, it can only mean that the being of God is to depend -on other terms, which will then constitute the ground of his being. -It is at once evident that this will lead I to some mistake: for God -must be simply and solely the I ground of everything, and in so far -not dependent upon anything else. And a perception of this danger has -in modern times led some to say that God's existence is not capable -of proof, but must be immediately or intuitively apprehended. Reason, -however, and even sound common sense give demonstration a meaning quite -different from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> that of the understanding. The demonstration of reason -no doubt starts from something which is not God. But, as it advances, -it does not leave the starting-point a mere unexplained fact, which is -what it was. On the contrary it exhibits that point as derivative and -called into being, and then God is seen to be primary, truly immediate -and self-subsisting, with the means of derivation wrapt up and absorbed -in himself. Those who say: 'Consider Nature, and Nature will-lead you -to God; you will find an absolute final cause: 'do not mean that God -is something derivative: they mean that it is we who proceed to God -himself from another; and in this way God, though the consequence, is -also the absolute' ground of the initial step. The relation of the two -things is reversed; and what came as a consequence, being shown to be -an antecedent, the original antecedent is reduced to a consequence. -This is always the way, moreover, whenever reason demonstrates.</p> - -<p class="block2">If in the light of the present discussion we cast one glance more on -the metaphysical method as a whole, we find its main characteristic -was to make abstract identity its principle and to try to apprehend -the objects of reason by the abstract and finite categories of the -understanding. But this infinite of the understanding, this pure -essence, is still finite: it has excluded all the variety of particular -things, which thus limit and deny it. Instead of winning a concrete, -this metaphysic stuck fast on an abstract, identity. Its good point was -the perception that thought alone constitutes the essence of all that -is. It derived its materials from earlier philosophers, particularly -the Schoolmen. In speculative philosophy the understanding undoubtedly -forms a stage, but not a stage at which we should keep for ever -standing. Plato is no metaphysician of this imperfect type, still less -Aristotle, although the contrary is generally believed.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV.</a></h5> - - -<h4>SECOND ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY.</h4> - - -<h4>I. <i>Empiricism.</i></h4> - - -<p>37.] Under these circumstances a double want began to be felt. Partly -it was the need of a concrete subject-matter, as a counterpoise to the -abstract theories of the understanding, which is unable to advance -unaided from its generalities to specialisation and determination. -Partly, too, it was the demand for something fixed and secure, so as -to exclude the possibility of proving anything and everything in the -sphere, and according to the method, of the finite formulae of thought. -Such was the genesis of Empirical philosophy, which abandons the search -for truth in thought itself, and goes to fetch it from Experience, the -outward and the inward present.</p> - -<p class="block2">The rise of Empiricism is due to the need thus stated of concrete -contents, and a firm footing—needs which the abstract metaphysic of -the understanding failed to satisfy. Now by concreteness of contents -it is meant that we must know the objects of consciousness as -intrinsically determinate and as the unity of distinct characteristics. -But, as we have already seen, this is by no means the case with the -metaphysic of understanding, if it conform to its principle. With the -mere understanding, thinking is limited to the form of an abstract -universal, and can never advance to the particularisation of this -universal. Thus we find the metaphysicians engaged in an attempt to -elicit by the instrumentality of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> thought, what was the essence or -fundamental attribute of the Soul The Soul, they said, is simple. -The simplicity thus ascribed to the Soul meant a mere and utter -simplicity, from which difference is excluded: difference, or in other -words composition, being made the fundamental attribute of body, or -of matter in general. Clearly, in simplicity of this narrow type we -have a very shallow category, quite incapable of embracing the wealth -of the soul or of the mind. When it thus appeared that abstract -metaphysical thinking was inadequate, it was felt that resource must be -had to empirical psychology. The same happened in the case of Rational -Physics. The current phrases there were, for instance, that space is -infinite, that Nature makes no leap, &c. Evidently this phraseology was -wholly unsatisfactory in presence of the plenitude and life of nature.</p> - -<p>38.] To some extent this source from which Empiricism draws is common -to it with metaphysic. It is in our materialised conceptions, <i>i.e.</i> -in facts which emanate, in the first instance, from experience, -that metaphysic also finds the guarantee for the correctness of its -definitions (including both its initial assumptions and its more -detailed body of doctrine). But, on the other hand, it must be noted -that the single sensation is not the same thing as experience, and -that the Empirical School elevates the facts included under sensation, -feeling, and perception into the form of general ideas, propositions or -laws. This, however, it does with the reservation that these general -principles (such as force), are to have no further import or validity -of their own beyond that taken from the sense-impression, and that -no connexion shall be deemed legitimate except what can be shown to -exist in phenomena. And on the subjective side Empirical cognition has -its stable footing in the fact that in a sensation consciousness is -directly present and certain of itself.</p> - -<p>In Empiricism lies the great principle that whatever<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> is true must -be in the actual world and present to sensation. This principle -contradicts that 'ought to be' on the strength of which 'reflection' -is vain enough to treat the actual present with scorn and to point to -a scene beyond—a scene which is assumed to have place and being only -in the understanding of those who talk of it. No less than Empiricism, -philosophy (§ 7) recognises only what is, and has nothing to do with -what merely ought to be and what is thus confessed not to exist. On the -subjective side, too, it is right to notice the valuable principle of -freedom involved in Empiricism. For the main lesson of Empiricism is -that man must see for himself and feel that he is present in every fact -of knowledge which he has to accept.</p> - -<p>When it is carried out to its legitimate consequences, -Empiricism—being in its facts limited to the finite sphere—denies the -super-sensible in general, or at least any knowledge of it which would -define its nature; it leaves thought no powers except abstraction and -formal universality and identity. But there is a fundamental delusion -in all scientific empiricism. It employs the metaphysical categories of -matter, force, those of one, many, generality, infinity, &c.; following -the clue given by these categories it proceeds to draw conclusions, and -in so doing pre-supposes and applies the syllogistic form. And all the -while it is unaware that it contains metaphysics—in wielding which, it -makes use of those categories and their combinations in a style utterly -thoughtless and uncritical.</p> - -<p class="block2">From Empiricism came the cry: 'Stop roaming in empty abstractions, keep -your eyes open, lay hold on man and nature as they are here before -you, enjoy the present moment.' Nobody can deny that there is a good -deal of truth in these words. The every-day world, what is here and -now, was a good exchange for the futile other-world<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>—for the mirages -and the chimeras of the abstract understanding. And thus was acquired -an infinite principle,—that solid footing so much missed in the old -metaphysic. Finite principles are the most that the understanding -can pick out—and these being essentially unstable and tottering, -the structure they supported must collapse with a crash. Always the -instinct of reason was to find an infinite principle. As yet, the -time had not come for finding it in thought. Hence, this instinct -seized upon the present, the Here, the This,—where doubtless there is -implicit infinite form, but not in the genuine existence of that form. -The external world is the truth, if it could but know it: for the truth -is actual and must exist. The infinite principle, the self-centred -truth, therefore, is in the world for reason to discover: though it -exists in an individual and sensible shape, and not in its truth.</p> - -<p class="block2">Besides, this school makes sense-perception the form in which fact -is to be apprehended: and in this consists the defect of Empiricism. -Sense-perception as such is always individual, always transient: not -indeed that the process of knowledge stops short at sensation: on the -contrary, it proceeds to find out the universal and permanent element -in the individual apprehended by sense. This is the process leading -from simple perception to experience.</p> - -<p class="block2">In order to form experiences, Empiricism makes especial use of the -form of Analysis. In the impression of sense we have a concrete of -many elements, the several attributes of which we are expected to -peel off one by one, like the coats of an onion. In thus dismembering -the thing, it is understood that we disintegrate and take to pieces -these attributes which have coalesced, and add nothing but our own -act of disintegration. Yet analysis is the process from the immediacy -of sensation to thought: those attributes, which the object analysed -contains in union, acquire the form of universality by being separated. -Empiricism therefore labours under a delusion, if it supposes that, -while analysing the objects, it leaves them as they were: it really -transforms the concrete into an abstract. And as a consequence of this -change the living thing is killed: life can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> exist only in the concrete -and one. Not that we can do without this division, if it be our -intention to comprehend. Mind itself is an inherent division. The error -lies in forgetting that this is only one-half of the process, and that -the main point is the re-union of what has been parted. And it is where -analysis never gets beyond the stage of partition that the words of the -poet are true:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -<i>'Encheiresin Naturae</i> nennt's die Chemie,<br /> -Spottet ihrer Selbst, und weiss nicht, wie:<br /> -Hat die Teile in Ihrer Hand<br /> -Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.'<br /> -</p> - -<p class="block2">Analysis starts from the concrete; and the possession of this material -gives it a considerable advantage over the abstract thinking of the -old metaphysics. It establishes the differences in things: and this is -very important: but these very differences are nothing after all but -abstract attributes, <i>i.e.</i> thoughts. These thoughts, it is assumed, -contain the real essence of the objects; and thus once more we see the -axiom of bygone metaphysics reappear, that the truth of things lies in -thought.</p> - -<p class="block2">Let us next compare the empirical theory with that of metaphysics in -the matter of their respective contents. We find the latter, as already -stated, taking for its theme the universal objects of the reason, viz. -God, the Soul, and the World: and these themes, accepted from popular -conception, it was the problem of philosophy to reduce into the form -of thoughts. Another specimen of the same method was the Scholastic -philosophy, the theme pre-supposed by which was formed by the dogmas -of the Christian Church: and it aimed at fixing their meaning and -giving them a systematic arrangement through thought.—The facts on -which Empiricism is based are of entirely different kind. They are -the sensible facts of nature and the facts of the finite mind. In -other words, Empiricism deals with a finite material—and the old -metaphysicians had an infinite,—though, let us add, they made this -infinite content finite by the finite form of the understanding. The -same finitude of form reappears in Empiricism—but here the facts are -finite also. To this exigent, then, both modes of philosophising have -the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> method; both proceed from data or assumptions, which they -accept as ultimate. Generally speaking, Empiricism finds the truth in -the outward world; and even if it allow a super-sensible world, it -holds knowledge of that world to be impossible, and would restrict us -to the province of sense-perception. This doctrine when systematically -carried out produces what has been latterly termed Materialism. -Materialism of this stamp looks upon matter, <i>quâ</i> matter, as the -genuine objective world. But with matter we are at once introduced -to an abstraction, which as such cannot be perceived: and it may be -maintained that there is no matter, because, as it exists, it is always -something definite and concrete. Yet the abstraction we term matter is -supposed to lie at the basis of the whole world of sense, and expresses -the sense-world in its simplest terms as out-and-out individualisation, -and hence a congeries of points in mutual exclusion. So long then as -this sensible sphere is and continues to be for Empiricism a mere -datum, we have a doctrine of bondage: for we become free, when we -are confronted by no absolutely alien world, but depend upon a fact -which we ourselves are. Consistently with the empirical point of view, -besides, reason and unreason can only be subjective: in other words, -we must take what is given just as it is, and we have no right to ask -whether and to what extent it is rational in its own nature.</p> - -<p>39.] Touching this principle it has been justly observed that in -what we call Experience, as distinct from mere single perception of -single facts, there are two elements. The one is the matter, infinite -in its multiplicity, and as it stands a mere set of singulars: the -other is the form, the characteristics of universality and necessity. -Mere experience no doubt offers many, perhaps innumerable cases of -similar perceptions: but, after all, no multitude, however great, -can be the same thing as universality. Similarly, mere experience -affords perceptions of changes succeeding each other and of objects in -juxtaposition; but it presents no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> necessary connexion. If perception, -therefore, is to maintain its claim to be the sole basis of what -men hold for truth, universality and necessity appear something -illegitimate: they become an accident of our minds, a mere custom, the -content of which might be otherwise constituted than it is.</p> - -<p>It is an important corollary of this theory, that on this empirical -mode of treatment legal and ethical principles and laws, as well as the -truths of religion, are exhibited as the work of chance, and stripped -of their objective character and inner truth.</p> - -<p>The scepticism of Hume, to which this conclusion was chiefly due, -should be clearly marked off from Greek scepticism. Hume assumes the -truth of the empirical element, feeling and sensation, and proceeds to -challenge universal principles and laws, because they have no warranty -from sense-perception. So far was ancient scepticism from making -feeling and sensation the canon of truth, that it turned against the -deliverances of sense first of all. (On Modern Scepticism as compared -with Ancient, see Schelling and Hegel's Critical Journal of Philosophy: -1802, vol. I. i.)</p> - - - -<h4>II. <i>The Critical Philosophy.</i></h4> - - -<p>40.] In common with Empiricism the Critical Philosophy assumes that -experience affords the one sole foundation for cognitions; which -however it does not allow to rank as truths, but only as knowledge of -phenomena.</p> - -<p>The Critical theory starts originally from the distinction of elements -presented in the analysis of experience, viz. the matter of sense, and -its universal relations. Taking into account Hume's criticism on this -distinction<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> as given in the preceding section, viz. that sensation -does not explicitly apprehend more than an individual or more than a -mere event, it insists at the same time on the <i>fact</i> that universality -and necessity are seen to perform a function equally essential in -constituting what is called experience. This element, not being derived -from the empirical facts as such, must belong to the spontaneity of -thought; in other words, it is <i>a priori.</i> The Categories or Notions -of the Understanding constitute the <i>objectivity</i> of experiential -cognitions. In every case they involve a connective reference, and -hence through their means are formed synthetic judgments <i>a priori,</i> -that is, primary and underivative connexions of opposites.</p> - -<p>Even Hume's scepticism does not deny that the characteristics of -universality and necessity are found in cognition. And even in Kant -this fact remains a presupposition after all; it may be said, to use -the ordinary phraseology of the sciences, that Kant did no more than -offer another <i>explanation</i> of the fact.</p> - -<p>41.] The Critical Philosophy proceeds to test the value of the -categories employed in metaphysic, as well as in other sciences -and in ordinary conception. This scrutiny however is not directed -to the content of these categories, nor does it inquire into the -exact relation they bear to one another: but simply considers them -as affected by the contrast between subjective and objective. The -contrast, as we are to understand it here, bears upon the distinction -(see preceding §) of the two elements in experience. The name of -objectivity is here given to the element of universality and necessity, -<i>i.e.</i> to the categories themselves, or what is called the <i>a priori</i> -constituent. The Critical Philosophy however widened the contrast in -such away, that the subjectivity comes to embrace the <i>ensemble</i> of -experience, including<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> both of the aforesaid elements; and nothing -remains on the other side but the 'thing-in-itself.'</p> - -<p>The special forms of the <i>a priori</i> element, in other words, of -thought, which in spite of its objectivity is looked upon as a purely -subjective act, present themselves as follows in a systematic order -which, it may be remarked, is solely based upon psychological and -historical grounds.</p> - -<p class="block2">(1) A very important step was undoubtedly made, when the terms of the -old metaphysic were subjected to scrutiny. The plain thinker pursued -his unsuspecting way in those categories which had offered themselves -naturally. It never occurred to him to ask to what extent these -categories had a value and authority of their own. If, as has been -said, it is characteristic of free thought to allow no assumptions to -pass unquestioned, the old metaphysicians were not free thinkers. They -accepted their categories as they were, without further trouble, as an -<i>a priori</i> datum, not yet tested by reflection. The Critical philosophy -reversed this. Kant undertook to examine how far the forms of thought -were capable of leading to the knowledge of truth. In particular he -demanded a criticism of the faculty of cognition as preliminary to -its exercise. That is a fair demand, if it mean that even the forms -of thought must be made an object of investigation. Unfortunately -there soon creeps in the misconception of already knowing before <i>you</i> -know,—the error of refusing to enter the water until you have learnt -to swim. True, indeed, the forms of thought should be subjected to a -scrutiny before they are used: yet what is this scrutiny but <i>ipso -facto</i> a cognition? So that what we want is to combine in our process -of inquiry the action of the forms of thought with a criticism of -them. The forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature -and complete development: they are at once the object of research and -the action of that object. Hence they examine themselves: in their own -action they must determine their limits, and point out their defects. -This is that action of thought, which will hereafter be specially -considered under<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> the name of Dialectic, and regarding which we need -only at the outset observe that, instead of being brought to bear upon -the categories from without, it is immanent in their own action.</p> - -<p class="block2">We may therefore state the first point in Kant's philosophy as follows: -Thought must itself investigate its own capacity of knowledge. People -in the present day have got over Kant and his philosophy: everybody -wants to get further. But there are two ways of going further—a -back-, ward and a forward. The light of criticism soon shows that many -of our modern essays in philosophy are mere repetitions of the old -metaphysical method, an endless and uncritical thinking in a groove -determined by the natural bent of each man's mind.</p> - -<p class="block2">(2) Kant's examination of the categories suffers from the grave defect -of viewing them, not absolutely and for their own sake, but in order to -see whether they are <i>subjective</i> or <i>objective.</i> In the language of -common life we mean by objective what exists outside of us and reaches -us from without by means of sensation. What Kant did, was to deny that -the categories, such as cause and effect, were, in this sense of the -word, objective, or given in sensation, and to maintain on the contrary -that they belonged to our own thought itself, to the spontaneity of -thought. To that extent therefore, they were subjective. And yet in -spite of this, Kant gives the name objective to what is thought, to the -universal and necessary, while he describes as subjective whatever is -merely felt. This arrangement apparently reverses the first-mentioned -use of the word, and has caused Kant to be charged with confusing -language. But the charge is unfair if we more narrowly consider the -facts of the case. The vulgar believe that the objects of perception -which confront them, such as an individual animal, or a single star, -are independent and permanent existences, compared with which, thoughts -are unsubstantial and dependent on something else. In fact however -the perceptions of sense are the properly dependent and secondary -feature, while the thoughts are really independent and primary. This -being so, Kant gave the title<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> objective to the intellectual factor, to -the universal and necessary: and he was quite justified in so doing. -Our sensations on the other hand are subjective; for sensations lack -stability in their own nature, and are no less fleeting and evanescent -than thought is permanent and self-subsisting. At the present day, the -special line of distinction established by Kant between the subjective -and objective is adopted by the phraseology of the educated world. Thus -the criticism of a work of art ought, it is said, to be not subjective, -but objective; in other words, instead of springing from the particular -and accidental feeling or temper of the moment, it should keep its eye -on those general points of view which the laws of art establish. In -the same acceptation we can distinguish in any scientific pursuit the -objective and the subjective interest of the investigation.</p> - -<p class="block2">But after all, objectivity of thought, in Kant's sense, is again to -a certain extent subjective. Thoughts, according to Kant, although -universal and necessary categories, are <i>only our</i> thoughts—separated -by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our -knowledge. But the true, objectivity of thinking means that the -thoughts, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be the real -essence of the things, and of whatever is an object to us.</p> - -<p class="block2">Objective and subjective are convenient expressions in current use, -the employment of which may easily lead to confusion. Up to this -point, the discussion has shown three meanings of objectivity. First, -it means what has external existence, in distinction from which the -subjective is what is only supposed, dreamed, &c. Secondly, it has -the meaning, attached to it by Kant, of the universal and necessary, -as distinguished from the particular, subjective and occasional -element which belongs to our sensations. Thirdly, as has been just -explained, it means the thought-apprehended essence of the existing -thing, in contradistinction from what is merely <i>our</i> thought, and what -consequently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists in -independent essence.</p> - -<p>42.] (a) <b>The Theoretical Faculty</b>.—Cognition <i>quâ</i> cognition. -The specific ground of the categories is declared by the Critical -system to lie in the primary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> identity of the 'I' in thought,—what -Kant calls the 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness.' -The impressions from feeling and perception are, if we look to -their contents, a multiplicity or miscellany of elements: and the -multiplicity is equally conspicuous in their form. For sense is marked -by a mutual exclusion of members; and that under two aspects, namely -space and time, which, being the forms, that is to say, the universal -type of perception, are themselves <i>a priori.</i> This congeries, -afforded by sensation and perception, must however be reduced to an -identity or primary synthesis. To accomplish this the 'I' brings it in -relation to itself and unites it there in <i>one</i> consciousness which -Kant calls 'pure apperception.' The specific modes in which the Ego -refers to itself the multiplicity of sense are the pure concepts of the -understanding, the Categories.</p> - -<p>Kant, it is well known, did not put himself to much trouble in -discovering the categories. 'I,' the unity of self-consciousness, -being quite abstract and completely indeterminate, the question -arises, how are we to get at the specialised forms of the 'I,' the -categories? Fortunately, the common logic offers to our hand an -empirical classification of the kinds of <i>judgment.</i> Now, to judge -is the same as to <i>think</i> of a determinate object. Hence the various -modes of judgment, as enumerated to our hand, provide us with the -several categories of thought. To the philosophy of Fichte belongs -the great merit of having called attention to the need of exhibiting -the <i>necessity</i> of these categories and giving a genuine <i>deduction</i> -of them. Fichte ought to have produced at least one effect on the -method of logic. One might have expected that the general laws of -thought, the usual stock-in-trade of logicians, or the classification -of notions, judgments, and syllogisms, would be no longer taken merely -from observation and so only empirically<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> treated, but be deduced from -thought itself. If thought is to be capable of proving anything at all, -if logic must insist upon the necessity of proofs, and if it proposes -to teach the theory of demonstration, its first care should be to give -a reason for its own subject-matter, and to see that it is necessary.</p> - -<p class="block2">(1) Kant therefore holds that the categories have their source in the -'Ego,' and that the 'Ego' consequently supplies the characteristics -of universality and necessity. If we observe what we have before us -primarily, we may describe it as a congeries or diversity: and in the -categories we find the simple points or units, to which this congeries -is made to converge. The world of sense is a scene of mutual exclusion: -its being is outside itself. That is the fundamental feature of the -sensible. 'Now' has no meaning except in reference to a before and a -hereafter. Red, in the same way, only subsists by being opposed to -yellow and blue. Now this other thing is outside the sensible; which -latter is, only in so far as it is not the other, and only in so far -as that other is. But thought, or the 'Ego,' occupies a position the -very reverse of the sensible, with its mutual exclusions, and its -being outside itself. The 'I' is the primary identity—at one with -itself and all at home in itself. The word 'I' expresses the mere act -of bringing-to-bear-upon-self: and whatever is placed in this unit or -focus, is affected <i>by</i> it and transformed into it. The 'I' is as it -were the crucible and the fire which consumes the loose plurality of -sense and reduces it to unity. This is the process which Kant calls -pure apperception in distinction from the common apperception, to -which the plurality it receives is a plurality still; whereas pure -apperception is rather an act by which the 'I' makes the materials -'mine.'</p> - -<p class="block2">This view has at least the merit of giving a correct expression to the -nature of all consciousness. The tendency of all man's endeavours is to -understand the world, to appropriate and subdue it to himself: and to -this end the positive reality of the world must be as it were crushed -and pounded, in other words, idealised. At the same time we must note<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> -that it is not the mere act of <i>our</i> personal self-consciousness, which -introduces an absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather, this -identity is itself the absolute. The absolute is, as it were, so kind -as to leave individual things to their own enjoyment, and it again -drives them back to the absolute unity.</p> - -<p class="block2">(2) Expressions like 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness' have -an ugly look about them, and suggest a monster in the background: -but their meaning is not so abstruse as it looks. Kant's meaning of -transcendental may be gathered by the way he distinguishes it from -transcendent. The <i>transcendent</i> may be said to be what steps out -beyond the categories of the understanding: a sense in which the term -is first employed in mathematics. Thus in geometry you are told to -conceive the circumference of a circle as formed of an infinite number -of infinitely small straight lines. In other words, characteristics -which the understanding holds to be totally different, the straight -line and the curve, are expressly invested with identity. Another -transcendent of the same kind is the self-consciousness which is -identical with itself and infinite in itself, as distinguished from -the ordinary consciousness which derives its form and tone from finite -materials. That unity of self-consciousness, however, Kant called -<i>transcendental</i> only; and he meant thereby that the unity was only in -our minds and did not attach to the objects apart from our knowledge of -them.</p> - -<p class="block2">(3) To regard the categories as subjective only, <i>i.e.</i> as a part -of ourselves, must seem very odd to the natural mind; and no doubt -there is something queer about it. It is quite true however that the -categories are not contained in the sensation as it is given us. When, -for instance, we look at a piece of sugar, we find it is hard, white, -sweet, &c. All these properties we say are united in one object. Now -it is this unity that is not found in the sensation. The same thing -happens if we conceive two events to stand in the relation of cause -and effect. The senses only inform us of the two several occurrences -which follow each other in time. But that the one is cause, the other -effect,—in other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> words, the causal nexus between the two,—is not -perceived by sense; it is only evident to thought. Still, though the -categories, such as unity, or cause and effect, are strictly the -property of thought, it by no means follows that they must be ours -merely and not also characteristics of the objects. Kant however -confines them to the subject-mind, and his philosophy may be styled -subjective idealism: for he holds that both the form and the matter of -knowledge are supplied by the Ego—or knowing subject—the form by our -intellectual, the matter by our sentient ego.</p> - -<p class="block2">So far as regards the content of this subjective idealism, not a word -need be wasted. It might perhaps at first sight be imagined, that -objects would lose their reality when their unity was transferred to -the subject. But neither we nor the objects would have anything to gain -by the mere fact that they possessed being. The main point is not, -that they are, but what they are, and whether or not their content -is true. It does no good to the things to say merely that they have -being. What has being, will also cease to be when time creeps over it. -It might also be alleged that subjective idealism tended to promote -self-conceit. But surely if a man's world be the sum of his sensible -perceptions, he has no reason to be vain of such a world. Laying aside -therefore as unimportant this distinction between subjective and -objective, we are chiefly interested in knowing what a thing is: <i>i.e.</i> -its content, which is no more objective than it is subjective. If mere -existence be enough to make objectivity, even a crime is objective: but -it is an existence which is nullity at the core, as is definitely made -apparent when the day of punishment comes.</p> - -<p>43.] The Categories may be viewed in two aspects. On the one hand it -is by their instrumentality that the mere perception of sense rises to -objectivity and experience. On the other hand these notions are unities -in our consciousness merely: they are consequently conditioned by the -material given to them, and having nothing of their own they can be -applied to use only within the range of experience. But the other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> -constituent of experience, the impressions of feeling and perception, -is not one whit less subjective than the categories.</p> - -<p class="block2">To assert that the categories taken by themselves are empty can -scarcely be right, seeing that they have a content, at all events, in -the special stamp and significance which they possess. Of course the -content of the categories is not perceptible to the senses, nor is it -in time and space: but that is rather a merit than a defect. A glimpse -of this meaning of <i>content</i> may be observed to affect our ordinary -thinking. <i>A</i> book or a speech for example is said to have a great -deal in it, to be full of content, in proportion to the greater number -of thoughts and general results to be found in it: whilst, on the -contrary, we should never say that any book, <i>e.g.</i> novel, had much in -it, because it included a great number of single incidents, situations, -and the like. Even the popular voice thus recognises that something -more than the facts of sense is needed to make a work pregnant with -matter. And what is this additional desideratum but thoughts, or in the -first instance the categories? And yet it is not altogether wrong, it -should be added, to call the categories of themselves empty, if it be -meant that they and the logical Idea, of which they are the members, do -not constitute the whole of philosophy, but necessarily lead onwards in -due progress to the real departments of Nature and Mind. Only let the -progress not be misunderstood. The logical Ideal does not thereby come -into possession of a content originally foreign to it: but by its own -native action is specialised and developed to Nature and Mind.</p> - -<p>44.] It follows that the categories are no fit terms to express -the Absolute—the Absolute not being given in perception;—and -Understanding, or knowledge by means of the categories, is consequently -incapable of knowing the Things-in-themselves.</p> - -<p>The Thing-in-itself (and under 'thing' is embraced even Mind and God) -expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness -makes of it, all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> its emotional aspects, and all specific thoughts -of it. It is easy to see what is left,—utter abstraction, total -emptiness, only described still as an 'other-world'—the negative of -every image, feeling, and definite thought. Nor does it require much -penetration to see that this <i>caput mortuum</i> is still only a product -of thought, such as accrues when thought is carried on to abstraction -unalloyed: that it is the work of the empty 'Ego,' which makes an -object out of this empty self-identity of its own. The <i>negative</i> -characteristic which this abstract identity receives as an <i>object,</i> is -also enumerated among the categories of Kant, and is no less familiar -than the empty identity aforesaid. Hence one can only read with -surprise the perpetual remark that we do not know the Thing-in-itself. -On the contrary there is nothing we can know so easily.</p> - -<p>45.] It is Reason, the faculty of the Unconditioned, which discovers -the conditioned nature of the knowledge comprised in experience. What -is thus called the object of Reason, the Infinite or Unconditioned, -is nothing but self-sameness, or the primary identity of the 'Ego' -in thought (mentioned in § 42). Reason itself is the name given to -the abstract 'Ego' or thought, which makes this pure identity its aim -or object (cf. note to the preceding §). Now this identity, having -no definite attribute at all, can receive no illumination from the -truths of experience, for the reason that these refer always to -definite facts. Such is the sort of Unconditioned that is supposed to -be the absolute truth of Reason,—what is termed the <i>Idea;</i> whilst -the cognitions of experience are reduced to the level of untruth and -declared to be appearances.</p> - -<p class="block2">Kant was the first definitely to signalise the distinction between -Reason and Understanding. The object of the former, as he applied the -term, was the infinite and unconditioned, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> the latter the finite -and conditioned. Kant did valuable service when he enforced the finite -character of the cognitions of the understanding founded merely upon -experience, and stamped their contents with the name of appearance. -But his mistake was to stop at the purely negative point of view, and -to limit the unconditionality of Reason to an abstract self-sameness -without any shade of distinction. It degrades Reason to a finite and -conditioned thing, to identify it with a mere stepping beyond the -finite and conditioned range of understanding. The real infinite, -far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves -the absorption of the finite into its own fuller nature. In the same -way Kant restored the Idea to its proper dignity: vindicating it for -Reason, as a thing distinct from abstract analytic determinations or -from the merely sensible conceptions which usually appropriate to -themselves the name of ideas. But as respects the Idea also, he never -got beyond its negative aspect, as what ought to be but is not.</p> - -<p class="block2">The view that the objects of immediate consciousness, which constitute -the body of experience, are mere appearances (phenomena), was another -important result of the Kantian philosophy. Common Sense, that mixture -of sense and understanding, believes the objects of which it has -knowledge to be severally independent and self-supporting; and when -it becomes evident that they tend towards and limit one another, the -interdependence of one upon another is reckoned something foreign to -them and to their true nature. The very opposite is the truth. The -things immediately known are mere appearances—in other words, the -ground of their being is not in themselves but in something else. -But then comes the important step of defining what this something -else is. According to Kant, the things that we know about are <i>to us</i> -appearances only, and we can never know their essential nature, which -belongs to another world we cannot approach. Plain minds have not -unreasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with its -reduction of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world, -created by ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is -rather as follows. The things of which we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> have direct consciousness -are mere phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the -true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is to have -their existence founded not in themselves but in the universal divine -Idea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist as Kant's; -but in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical -philosophy should be termed absolute idealism. Absolute idealism, -however, though it is far in advance of vulgar realism, is by no means -merely restricted to philosophy. It lies at the root of all religion; -for religion too believes the actual world we see, the sum total of -existence, to be created and governed by God.</p> - -<p>46.] But it is not enough simply to indicate the existence of the -object of Reason. Curiosity impels us to seek for knowledge of this -identity, this empty thing-in-itself. Now <i>knowledge</i> means such -an acquaintance with the object as apprehends its distinct and -special subject-matter. But such subject-matter involves a complex -inter-connexion in the object itself, and supplies a ground of -connexion with many other objects. In the present case, to express the -nature of the features of the Infinite or Thing-in-itself, Reason would -have nothing except the categories: and in any endeavour so to employ -them Reason becomes over-soaring or 'transcendent.'</p> - -<p>Here begins the second stage of the Criticism of Reason—which, as -an independent piece of work, is more valuable than the first. The -first part, as has been explained above, teaches that the categories -originate in the unity of self-consciousness; that any knowledge which -is gained by their means has nothing objective in it, and that the -very objectivity claimed for them is only subjective. So far as this -goes, the Kantian Criticism presents that 'common' type of idealism -known as Subjective Idealism. It asks no questions about the meaning -or scope of the categories, but simply considers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> the abstract form of -subjectivity and objectivity, and that even in such a partial way, that -the former aspect, that of subjectivity, is retained as a final and -purely affirmative term of thought. In the second part, however, when -Kant examines the <i>application,</i> as it is called, which Reason makes -of the categories in order to know its objects, the content of the -categories, at least in some points of view, comes in for discussion: -or, at any rate, an opportunity presented itself for a discussion of -the question. It is worth while to see what decision Kant arrives at on -the subject of metaphysic, as this application of the categories to the -unconditioned is called. His method of procedure we shall here briefly -state and criticise.</p> - -<p>47.] (α) The first of the unconditioned entities which Kant examines -is the Soul (see above, § 34). 'In my consciousness,' he says, 'I -always find that I (1) am the determining subject: (2) am singular, or -abstractly simple: (3) am identical, or one and the same, in all the -variety of what I am conscious of: (4) distinguish myself as thinking -from all the things outside me.'</p> - -<p>Now the method of the old metaphysic, as Kant correctly states it, -consisted in substituting for these statements of experience the -corresponding categories or metaphysical terms. Thus arise these four -new propositions: <i>(a)</i> the Soul is a substance: <i>(b)</i> it is a simple -substance: <i>(c)</i> it is numerically identical at the various periods of -existence: <i>(d)</i> it stands in relation to space.</p> - -<p>Kant discusses this translation, and draws attention to the Paralogism -or mistake of confounding one kind of truth with another. He points out -that empirical attributes have here been replaced by categories: and -shows that we are not entitled to argue from the former to the latter, -or to put the latter in place of the former.</p> - -<p>This criticism obviously but repeats the observation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> of Hume -(§ 39) that the categories as a whole,—ideas of universality -and necessity,—are entirely absent from sensation; and that the -empirical fact both in form and contents differs from its intellectual -formulation.</p> - -<p>If the purely empirical fact were held to constitute the credentials -of the thought, then no doubt it would be indispensable to be able -precisely to identify the 'idea' in the 'impression.'</p> - -<p>And in order to make out, in his criticism of the metaphysical -psychology, that the soul cannot be described as substantial, simple, -self-same, and as maintaining its independence in intercourse with -the material world, Kant argues from the single ground, that the -several attributes of the soul, which consciousness lets us feel in -<i>experience,</i> are not exactly the same attributes as result from the -action of <i>thought</i> thereon. But we have seen above, that according -to Kant all knowledge, even experience, consists in thinking our -impressions—in other words, in transforming into intellectual -categories the attributes primarily belonging to sensation.</p> - -<p>Unquestionably one good result of the Kantian criticism was that -it emancipated mental philosophy from the 'soul-thing,' from the -categories, and, consequently, from questions about the simplicity, -complexity, materiality, &c. of the soul. But even for the common sense -of ordinary men, the true point of view, from which the inadmissibility -of these forms best appears, will be, not that they are thoughts, but -that thoughts of such a stamp neither can nor do contain truth.</p> - -<p>If thought and phenomenon do not perfectly correspond to one another, -we are free at least to choose which of the two shall be held the -defaulter. The Kantian idealism, where it touches on the world of -Reason, throws the blame on the thoughts; saying that the thoughts are -defective, as not being exactly fitted to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> the sensations and to a mode -of mind wholly restricted within the range of sensation, in which as -such there are no traces of the presence of these thoughts. But as to -the actual content of the thought, no question is raised.</p> - -<p class="block2">Paralogisms are a species of unsound syllogism, the especial vice of -which consists in employing one and the same word in the two premisses -with a different meaning. According to Kant the method adopted by the -rational psychology of the old metaphysicians, when they assumed that -the qualities of the phenomenal soul, as given in experience, formed -part of its own real essence, was based upon such a Paralogism. Nor -can it be denied that predicates like simplicity, permanence, &c., are -inapplicable to the soul. But their unfitness is not due to the ground -assigned by Kant, that Reason, by applying them, would exceed its -appointed bounds. The true ground is that this style of abstract terms -is not good enough for the soul, which is very; much more than a mere -simple or unchangeable sort of thing. And thus, for example, while the -soul may be admitted to be simple self-sameness, it is at the same time -active and institutes distinctions in its own nature. But whatever -is merely or abstractly simple is as such also a mere dead thing. By -his polemic against the metaphysic of the past Kant discarded those -predicates from the soul or mind. He did well; but when he came to -state his reasons, his failure is apparent.</p> - -<p>48.] (ß) The second unconditioned object is the World (§ 35). In the -attempt which reason makes to comprehend the unconditioned nature of -the World, it falls into what are called Antinomies. In other words -it maintains two opposite propositions about the same object, and in -such a way that each of them has to be maintained with equal necessity. -From this it follows that the body of cosmical fact, the specific -statements descriptive of which run into contradiction, cannot be a -self-subsistent reality, but only an appearance. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> explanation -offered by Kant alleges that the contradiction does not affect the -object in its own proper essence, but attaches only to the Reason which -seeks to comprehend it.</p> - -<p>In this way the suggestion was broached that the contradiction is -occasioned by the subject-matter itself, or by the intrinsic quality -of the categories. And to offer the idea that the contradiction -introduced into the world of Reason by the categories of Understanding -is inevitable and essential, was to make one of the most important -steps in the progress of Modern Philosophy. But the more important the -issue thus raised the more trivial was the solution. Its only motive -was an excess of tenderness for the things of the world. The blemish -of contradiction, it seems, could not be allowed to mar the essence of -the world: but there could be no objection to attach it to the thinking -Reason, to the essence of mind. Probably nobody will feel disposed to -deny that the phenomenal world presents contradictions to the observing -mind; meaning by 'phenomenal' the world as it presents itself to the -senses and understanding, to the subjective mind. But if a comparison -is instituted between the essence of the world and the essence of the -mind, it does seem strange to hear how calmly and confidently the -modest dogma has been advanced by one, and repeated by others, that -thought or Reason, and not the World, is the seat of contradiction. -It is no escape to turn round and explain that Reason falls into -contradiction only by applying the categories. For this application -of the categories is maintained to be necessary, and Reason is not -supposed to be equipped with any other forms but the categories for -the purpose of cognition. But cognition is determining and determinate -thinking: so that, if Reason be mere empty indeterminate thinking, it -thinks nothing. And if in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> end Reason be reduced to mere identity -without diversity (see next §), it will in the end also win a happy -release from contradiction at the slight sacrifice of all its facts and -contents.</p> - -<p>It may also be noted that his failure to make a more thorough study -of Antinomy was one of the reasons why Kant enumerated only <i>four</i> -Antinomies. These four attracted his notice, because, as may be seen -in his discussion of the so-called Paralogisms of Reason, he assumed -the list of the categories as a basis of his argument. Employing -what has subsequently become a favourite fashion, he simply put the -object under a rubric otherwise ready to hand, instead of deducing -its characteristics from its notion. Further deficiencies in the -treatment of the Antinomies I have pointed out, as occasion offered, -in my 'Science of Logic' Here it will be sufficient to say that -the Antinomies are not confined to the four special objects taken -from Cosmology: they appear in all objects of every kind, in all -conceptions, notions and Ideas. To be aware of this and to know objects -in this property of theirs, makes a vital part in a philosophical -theory. For the property thus indicated is what we shall afterwards -describe as the Dialectical influence in logic.</p> - -<p class="block2">The principles of the metaphysical philosophy gave rise to the belief -that, when cognition lapsed into contradictions, it was a mere -accidental aberration, due to some subjective mistake in argument -and inference. According to Kant, however, thought has a natural -tendency to issue in contradictions or antinomies, whenever it seeks -to apprehend the infinite. We have in the latter part of the above -paragraph referred to the philosophical importance of the antinomies of -reason, and shown how the recognition of their existence helped largely -to get rid of the rigid dogmatism of the metaphysic of understanding, -and to direct attention to the Dialectical movement of thought. But -here too Kant, as we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> must add, never got beyond the negative result -that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, and never penetrated to the -discovery of what the antinomies really and positively mean. That true -and positive meaning of the antinomies is this: that every actual -thing involves a coexistence of opposed, elements. Consequently to -know, or, in other words, to comprehend an object is equivalent to -being conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations. -The old. metaphysic, as we have already seen, when it studied the -objects of which it sought a metaphysical knowledge, went to work by -applying categories abstractly and to the exclusion of their opposites. -Kant, on the other hand, tried to prove that the statements, issuing -through this method, could be met by other statements of contrary -import with equal warrant and equal necessity. In the enumeration of -these antinomies he narrowed his ground to the cosmology of the old -metaphysical system, and in his discussion made out four antinomies, a -number which rests upon the list of the categories. The first antinomy -is on the question: Whether we are or are not to think the world -limited in space and time. In the second antinomy we have a discussion -of the dilemma: Matter must be conceived either as endlessly divisible, -or as consisting of atoms. The third antinomy bears upon the antithesis -of freedom and necessity, to such extent as it is embraced in the -question, Whether everything in the world must be supposed subject to -the condition of causality, or if we can also assume free beings, in -other words, absolute initial points of action, in the world. Finally, -the fourth antinomy is the dilemma: Either the world as a whole has a -cause or it is uncaused.</p> - -<p>The method which Kant follows in discussing these antinomies is as -follows. He puts the two propositions implied in the dilemma over -against each other as thesis and antithesis, and seeks to prove both: -that is to say he tries to exhibit them as inevitably issuing from -reflection on the question. He particularly protests against the charge -of being a special pleader and of grounding his reasoning on illusions. -Speaking honestly, however, the arguments which Kant offers for his -thesis and antithesis are mere<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> shams of demonstration. The thing to -be proved is invariably implied in the assumption he starts from, and -the speciousness of his proofs is only due to his prolix and apagogic -mode of procedure. Yet it was, and still is, a great achievement for -the Critical philosophy, when it exhibited these antinomies: for -in this way it gave some expression (at first certainly subjective -and unexplained) to the actual unity of those categories which are -kept persistently separate by the understanding. The first of the -cosmological antinomies, for example, implies a recognition of the -doctrine that space and time present a discrete as well as a continuous -aspect: whereas the old metaphysic, laying exclusive emphasis on the -continuity, had been led to treat the world as unlimited in space -and time. It is quite correct to say that we can go beyond every -<i>definite</i> space and beyond every <i>definite</i> time: but it is no less -correct that space and time are real and actual only when they are -defined or specialised into 'here' and 'now,'—a specialisation which -is involved in the very notion of them. The same observations apply to -the rest of the antinomies. Take, for example, the antinomy of freedom -and necessity. The main gist of itis that freedom and necessity as -understood by abstract thinkers are not independently real, as these -thinkers suppose, but merely ideal factors (moments) of the true -freedom and the true necessity, and that to abstract and isolate either -conception is to make it false.</p> - -<p>49.] (γ) The third object of the Reason is God (§36): He also must -be known and defined in terms of thought. But in comparison with -an unalloyed identity, every defining term as such seems to the -understanding to be only a limit and a negation: every reality -accordingly must be taken as limitless, <i>i.e.</i> undefined. Accordingly -God, when He is defined to be the sum of all realities, the most real -of beings, turns into a <i>mere abstract.</i> And the only term under which -that most real of real, things can be defined is that of Being—itself -the height of abstraction. These are the two elements, abstract<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> -identity, on one hand, which is spoken of in this place as the notion; -and Being on the other,—which Reason seeks to unify. And their union -is the <i>Ideal</i> of Reason.</p> - -<p>50.] To carry out this unification two ways or two forms are -admissible. Either we may begin with Being and proceed to the -<i>abstraction</i> of Thought: or the movement may begin with the -abstraction and end in Being.</p> - -<p>We shall, in the first place, start from Being. But Being, in its -natural aspect, presents itself to view as a Being of infinite variety, -a World in all its plenitude. And this world may be regarded in two -ways: first, as a collection of innumerable unconnected facts; and -second, as a collection of innumerable facts in mutual relation, -giving evidence of design. The first aspect is emphasised in the -Cosmological proof: the latter in the proofs of Natural Theology. -Suppose now that this fulness of being passes under the agency of -thought. Then it is stripped of its isolation and unconnectedness, and -viewed as a universal and absolutely necessary being which determines -itself and acts by general purposes or laws. And this necessary and -self-determined being, different from the being at the commencement, is -God.</p> - -<p>The main force of Kant's criticism on this process attacks it for being -a syllogising, <i>i.e.</i> a transition. Perceptions, and that aggregate -of perceptions we call the world, exhibit as they stand no traces of -that universality which they afterwards receive from the purifying act -of thought. The empirical conception of the world therefore gives no -warrant for the idea of universality. And so any attempt on the part -of thought to ascend from the empirical conception of the world to -God is checked by the argument of Hume (as in the paralogisms, § 47), -according to which we have no right to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> think sensations, that is, to -elicit universality and necessity from them.</p> - -<p>Man is essentially a thinker: and therefore sound Common Sense, as well -as Philosophy, will not yield up their right of rising to God from -and out of the empirical view of the world. The only basis on which -this rise is possible is the thinking study of the world, not the bare -sensuous, animal, attuition of it. Thought and thought alone has eyes -for the essence, substance, universal power, and ultimate design of the -world. And what men call the proofs of God's existence are, rightly -understood, ways of describing and analysing the native course of the -mind, the course of <i>thought</i> thinking the <i>data</i> of the senses. The -rise of thought beyond the world of sense, its passage from the finite -to the infinite, the leap into the super-sensible which it takes when -it snaps asunder the chain of sense, all this transition is thought and -nothing but thought. Say there is no such passage, and you say there is -to be no thinking. And in sooth, animals make no such transition. They -never get further than sensation and the perception of the senses, and -in consequence they have no religion.</p> - -<p>Both on general grounds, and in the particular case, there are two -remarks to be made upon the criticism of this exaltation in thought. -The first remark deals with the question of form. When the exaltation -is exhibited in a syllogistic process, in the shape of what we call -<i>proofs</i> of the being of God, these reasonings cannot but start from -some sort of theory of the world, which makes it an aggregate either -of contingent facts or of final causes and relations involving design. -The merely syllogistic thinker may deem this starting-point a solid -basis and suppose that it remains throughout in the same empirical -light, left at last as it was at the first. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> this case, the bearing -of the beginning upon the conclusion to which it leads has a purely -affirmative aspect, as if we were only reasoning from one thing which -<i>is</i> and continues to <i>be,</i> to another thing which in like manner -is. But the great error is to restrict our notions of the nature -of thought to its form in understanding alone. To think think the -phenomenal world rather, means to re-cast its form, and transmute it -into a universal. And thus the action-of-thought, has also, <i>negative</i> -effect upon its basis: and the matter of sensation, when it receives -the stamp of universality, at once loses its first and phenomenal -shape. By the removal and negation of the shell, the kernel within the -sense; v percept is brought to the light (§§ 13 and 23). And it is -because they do not, with sufficient prominence, express the negative -features implied in the exaltation of the mind from the world to God, -that the metaphysical proofs of the being of a God are defective -interpretations and descriptions of the process. If the world is only a -sum of incidents, it follows that it is also deciduous and phenomenal, -in <i>esse</i> and <i>posse</i> null. That upward spring of the mind signifies, -that the being which the world has is only a semblance, no real being, -no absolute truth; it signifies that, beyond and above that appearance, -truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for God. The -process of exaltation might thus appear to be transition and to involve -a means, but it is not a whit less true, that every trace of transition -and means is absorbed; since the world, which might have seemed to be -the means of reaching God, is explained to be a nullity. Unless the -being of the world is nullified, the <i>point d'appui</i> for the exaltation -is lost. In this way the apparent means vanishes, and the process -of derivation is cancelled in the very act by which it proceeds. It -is the affirmative aspect of this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> relation, as supposed to subsist -between two things, either of which <i>is</i> as much as the other, which -Jacobi mainly has in his eye when he attacks the demonstrations of the -understanding. Justly censuring them for seeking conditions (<i>i.e.</i> -the world) for the unconditioned, he remarks that the Infinite or -God must on such a method be presented as dependent and derivative. -But that elevation, as it takes place in the mind, serves to correct -this semblance: in fact, it has no other meaning than to correct that -semblance. Jacobi, however, failed to recognise the genuine nature of -essential thought—by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of -mediating; and consequently, his objection, though it tells against the -merely 'reflective' understanding, is false when applied to thought as -a whole, and in particular to reasonable thought.</p> - -<p>To explain what we mean by the neglect of the negative factor in -thought, we may refer by way of illustration to the charges of -Pantheism and Atheism brought against the doctrines of Spinoza. The -absolute Substance of Spinoza certainly falls short of absolute spirit, -and it is a right and proper requirement that God should be defined -as absolute spirit. But when the definition in Spinoza is said to -identify the world with God, and to confound God with nature and the -finite world, it is implied that the finite world possesses a genuine -actuality and affirmative reality. If this assumption be admitted, of -course a union of God with the world renders God completely finite, -and degrades Him to the bare finite and adventitious congeries of -existence. But there are two objections to be noted. In the first place -Spinoza does not define God as the unity of God with the world, but as -the union of thought with extension, that is, with the material world. -And secondly, even if we accept this awkward popular statement<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> as to -this unity, it would still be true that the system of Spinoza was not -Atheism but Acosmism, defining the world to be an appearance lacking in -true reality. A philosophy, which affirms that God and God-alone is, -should not be stigmatised as atheistic, when even those nations which -worship the ape, the cow, or images of stone and brass, are credited -with some religion. But as things stand the imagination of ordinary men -feels a vehement reluctance to surrender its dearest conviction, that -this aggregate of finitude, which it calls a world, has actual reality; -and to hold that there is no world is a way of thinking they are fain -to believe impossible, or at least much less possible than to entertain -the idea that there is no God. Human nature, not much to its credit, is -more ready to believe that a system denies God, than that it denies the -world. A denial of God seems so much more intelligible than a denial of -the world.</p> - -<p>The second remark bears on the criticism of the material propositions -to which that elevation in thought in the first instance leads. If -these propositions have for their predicate such terms as substance of -the world, its necessary essence, cause which regulates and directs it -according to design, they are certainly inadequate to express what is -or ought to be understood by God. Yet apart from the trick of adopting -a preliminary popular conception of God, and criticising a result by -this assumed standard, it is certain that these characteristics have -great value, and are necessary factors in the idea of God. But if we -wish in this way to bring before thought the genuine idea of God, -and give its true value and expression to the central truth, we must -be careful not to start from a subordinate level of facts. To speak -of the 'merely contingent' things of the world is a very inadequate -description of the premisses. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> organic structures, and the evidence -they afford of mutual adaptation, belong to a higher province, the -province of animated nature. But even without taking into consideration -the possible blemish which the study of animated nature and of the -other teleological aspects of existing things may contract from the -pettiness of the final causes, and from puerile instances of them and -their bearings, merely animated nature is, at the best, incapable of -supplying the material for a truthful expression to the idea of God. -God is more than life: He is Spirit. And therefore if the thought of -the Absolute takes a starting-point for its rise, and desires to take -the nearest, the most true and adequate starting-point will be found in -the nature of spirit alone.</p> - -<p>51.] The other way of unification by which to realise the Ideal of -Reason is to set out from the <i>abstractum</i> of Thought and seek to -characterise it: for which purpose Being is the only available term. -This is the method of the Ontological proof. The opposition, here -presented from a merely subjective point of view, lies between Thought -and Being; whereas in the first way of junction, being is common to the -two sides of the antithesis, and the contrast lies only between its -individualisation and universality. Understanding meets this second way -with what is implicitly the same objection, as it made to the first. -It denied that the empirical involves the universal: so it denies that -the universal involves the specialisation, which specialisation in this -instance is being. In other words it says: Being cannot be deduced from -the notion by any analysis.</p> - -<p>The uniformly favourable reception and acceptance which attended -Kant's criticism of the Ontological proof was undoubtedly due to the -illustration which he made use of. To explain the difference between -thought and being, he took the instance of a hundred<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> sovereigns, -which, for anything it matters to the notion, are the same hundred -whether they are real or only possible, though the difference of the -two cases is very perceptible in their effect on a man's purse. Nothing -can be more obvious than that anything we only think or conceive is not -on that account actual: that mental representation, and even notional -comprehension, always falls short of being. Still it may not unfairly -be styled a barbarism in language, when the name of notion is given -to things like a hundred sovereigns. And, putting that mistake aside, -those who perpetually urge against the philosophic Idea the difference -between Being and Thought, might have admitted that philosophers -were not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be any proposition -more trite than this? But after all, it is well to remember, when we -speak of God, that we have an object of another kind than any hundred -sovereigns, and unlike any one particular notion, representation, or -however else it may be styled. It is in fact this and this alone which -marks everything finite:—its being in time and space is discrepant -from its notion. God, on the contrary, expressly has to be what can -only be 'thought as existing'; His notion involves being. It is this -unity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God.</p> - -<p>If this were all, we should have only a formal expression of the divine -nature which would not really go beyond a statement of the nature of -the notion itself. And that the notion, in its most abstract terms, -involves being is plain. For the notion, whatever other determination -it may receive, is at least reference back on itself, which results -by abolishing the intermediation, and thus is immediate. And what is -that reference to self, but being? Certainly it would be strange if the -notion, the very inmost of mind, if even the 'Ego,' or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> above all, the -concrete totality we call God, were not rich enough to include so poor -a category as being, the very poorest and most abstract of all. For, -if we look at the thought it holds, nothing can be more insignificant -than being. And yet there may be something still more insignificant -than being,—that which at first sight is perhaps supposed to <i>be,</i> an -external and sensible existence, like that of the paper lying before -me. However, in this matter, nobody proposes to speak of the sensible -existence of a limited and perishable thing. Besides, the petty -stricture of the <i>Kritik</i> that 'thought and being are different' can at -most molest the path of the human mind from the thought of God to the -certainty that He <i>is</i>: it cannot take it away. It is this process of -transition, depending on the absolute inseparability of the <i>thought</i> -of God from His being, for which its proper authority has been -re-vindicated in the theory of faith or immediate knowledge,—whereof -hereafter.</p> - -<p>52.] In this way thought, at its highest pitch, has to go outside for -any determinateness: and although it is continually termed Reason, is -out-and-out abstract thinking. And the result of all is that Reason -supplies nothing beyond the formal unity required to simplify and -systematise experiences; it is a <i>canon,</i> not an <i>organon</i> of truth, -and can furnish only a <i>criticism</i> of knowledge, not a <i>doctrine</i> of -the infinite. In its final analysis this criticism is summed up in the -assertion that in strictness thought is only the indeterminate unity -and the action of this indeterminate unity.</p> - -<p class="block2">Kant undoubtedly held reason to be the faculty of the -unconditioned; but if reason be reduced to abstract identity -only, it by implication renounces its unconditionality and is -in reality no better than empty understanding. For reason is -unconditioned, only in so far as its character and quality are not -due to an extraneous and foreign content, only in so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> far as it -is self-characterising, and thus, in point of content, is its own -master. Kant, however, expressly explains that the action of reason -consists solely in applying the categories to systematise the -matter given by perception, <i>e.</i> to place it in an outside order, -under the guidance of the principle of non-contradiction.</p> - -<p>53.] (b) The <b>Practical Reason</b> is understood by Kant to mean a -<i>thinking</i> Will, <i>i.e.</i> a Will that determines itself on universal -principles. Its office is to give objective, imperative laws of -freedom,—laws, that is, which state what ought to happen. The warrant -for thus assuming thought to be an activity which makes itself felt -objectively, that is, to be really a Reason, is the alleged possibility -of proving practical freedom by experience, that is, of showing it in -the phenomenon of self-consciousness. This experience in consciousness -is at once met by all that the Necessitarian produces from contrary -experience, particularly by the sceptical induction (employed amongst -others by Hume) from the endless diversity of what men regard as right -and duty,—<i>i.e.</i> from the diversity apparent in those professedly -objective laws of freedom.</p> - -<p>54.] What, then, is to serve as the law which the Practical -Reason embraces and obeys, and as the criterion in its act of -self-determination? There is no rule at hand but the same abstract -identity of understanding as before: There must be no contradiction in -the act of self-determination. Hence the Practical Reason never shakes -off the formalism which is represented as the climax of the Theoretical -Reason.</p> - -<p>But this Practical Reason does not confine the universal principle of -the Good to its own inward regulation: it first becomes <i>practical,</i> -in the true sense of the word, when it insists on the Good being -manifested in the world with an outward objectivity, and requires that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> -the thought shall be objective throughout, and not merely subjective. -We shall speak of this postulate of the Practical Reason afterwards.</p> - -<p class="block2">The free self-determination which Kant denied to the speculative, -he has expressly vindicated for the practical reason. To many minds -this particular aspect of the Kantian philosophy made it welcome; -and that for good reasons. To estimate rightly what we owe to -Kant in the matter, we ought to set before our minds the form of -practical philosophy and in particular of 'moral philosophy,' which -prevailed in his time. It may be generally described as a system -of Eudaemonism, which, when asked what man's chief end ought to -be, replied Happiness. And by happiness Eudaemonism understood the -satisfaction of the private appetites, wishes and wants of the -man: thus raising the contingent and particular into a principle -for the will and its actualisation. To this Eudaemonism, which was -destitute of stability and consistency, and which left the 'door -and gate' wide open for every whim and caprice, Kant opposed the -practical reason, and thus emphasised the need for a principle -of will which should be universal and lay the same obligation -on all. The theoretical reason, as has been made evident in the -preceding paragraphs, is identified by Kant with the negative -faculty of the infinite; and as it has no positive content of its -own, it is restricted to the function of detecting the finitude of -experiential knowledge. To the practical reason, on the contrary, -he has expressly allowed a positive infinity, by ascribing to the -will the power of modifying itself in universal modes, <i>i.e.</i> by -thought. Such a power the will undoubtedly has: and it is well -to remember that man is free only in so far as he possesses it -and avails himself of it in his conduct. But a recognition of the -existence of this power is not enough and does not avail to tell -us what are the contents of the will or practical reason. Hence to -say, that a man must make the Good the content of his will, raises -the question, what that content is, and what are the means of -ascertaining what good is. Nor does one get over the difficulty by -the principle that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> will must be consistent with itself, or by -the precept to do duty for the sake of duty.</p> - -<p>55.] (c) <b>The Reflective Power of Judgment</b> is invested by Kant -with the function of an Intuitive Understanding. That is to say, -whereas the particulars had hitherto appeared, so far as the universal -or abstract identity was concerned, adventitious and incapable of -being deduced from it, the <i>Intuitive</i> Understanding apprehends the -particulars as moulded and formed by the universal itself. Experience -presents such universalised particulars in the products of Art and of -<i>organic</i> nature.</p> - -<p>The capital feature in Kant's Criticism of the Judgment is, that in -it he gave a representation and a name, if not even an intellectual -expression, to the Idea. Such a representation, as an Intuitive -Understanding, or an inner adaptation, suggests a universal which -is at the same time apprehended as essentially a concrete unity, It -is in these aperçus alone that the Kantian philosophy rises to the -speculative height. Schiller, and others, have found in the idea of -artistic beauty, where thought and sensuous conception have grown -together into one, a way of escape from the abstract and separatist -understanding. Others have found the same relief in the perception -and consciousness of life and of living things, whether that life -be natural or intellectual.—The work of Art, as well as the living -individual, is, it must be owned, of limited content. But in the -postulated harmony of nature (or necessity) and free purpose,—in the -final purpose of the world conceived as realised, Kant has put before -us the Idea, comprehensive even in its content. Yet what may be called -the laziness of thought, when dealing with this supreme Idea, finds a -too easy mode of evasion in the 'ought to be': instead of the actual -realisation of the ultimate end, it clings<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> hard to the disjunction -of the notion from reality. Yet if thought will not <i>think</i> the ideal -realised, the senses and the intuition can at any rate <i>see</i> it in the -present reality of living organisms and of the beautiful in Art. And -consequently Kant's remarks on these objects were well adapted to lead -the mind on to grasp and think the concrete Idea.</p> - -<p>56.] We are thus led to conceive a different relation between the -universal of understanding and the particular of perception, than that -on which the theory of the Theoretical and Practical Reason is founded. -But while this is so, it is not supplemented by a recognition that the -former is the genuine relation and the very truth. Instead of that, -the unity (of universal with particular) is accepted only as it exists -in finite phenomena, and is adduced only as a fact of experience. -Such experience, at first only personal, may come from two sources. -It may spring from Genius, the faculty which produces 'aesthetic -ideas'; meaning by aesthetic ideas, the picture-thoughts of the free -imagination which subserve an idea and suggest thoughts, although their -content is not expressed in a notional form, and even admits of no -such expression. It may also be due to Taste, the feeling of congruity -between the free play of intuition or imagination and the uniformity of -understanding.</p> - -<p>57.] The principle by which the Reflective faculty of Judgment -regulates and arranges the products of animated nature is described -as the End or final cause,—the notion in action, the universal at -once determining and determinate in itself. At the same time Kant is -careful to discard the conception of external or finite adaptation, in -which the End is only an adventitious form for the means and material -in which it is realised. In the living organism, on the contrary, the -final cause is a moulding principle and an energy immanent in the -matter,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> and every member is in its turn a means as well as an end.</p> - -<p>58.] Such an Idea evidently radically transforms the relation which the -understanding institutes between means and ends, between subjectivity -and objectivity. And yet in the face of this unification, the End or -design is subsequently explained to be a cause which exists and acts -subjectively, <i>i.e.</i> as our idea only: and teleology is accordingly -explained to be only a principle of criticism, purely personal to <i>our</i> -understanding.</p> - -<p>After the Critical philosophy had settled that Reason can know -phenomena only, there would still have been an option for animated -nature between two equally subjective modes of thought. Even according -to Kant's own exposition, there would have been an obligation to admit, -in the case of natural productions, a knowledge not confined to the -categories of quality, cause and effect, composition, constituents, -and so on. The principle of inward adaptation or design, had it been -kept to and carried out in scientific application, would have led to a -different and a higher method of observing nature.</p> - -<p>59.] If we adopt this principle, the Idea, when all limitations were -removed from it, would appear as follows. The universality moulded by -Reason, and described as the absolute and final end or the Good, would -be realised in the world, and realised moreover by means of a third -thing, the power which proposes this End as well as realises it,—that -is, God. Thus in Him, who is the absolute truth, those oppositions of -universal and individual, subjective and objective, are solved and -explained to be neither self-subsistent nor true.</p> - -<p>60.] But Good,—which is thus put forward as the final cause of the -world,—has been already described as only <i>our</i> good, the moral law -of <i>our</i> Practical Reason. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> being so, the unity in question -goes no further than make the state of the world and the course of -its events harmonise with our moral standards.<a name="FNanchor_1_20" id="FNanchor_1_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_20" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Besides, even with -this limitation, the final cause, or Good, is a vague abstraction, -and the same vagueness attaches to what is to be Duty. But, further, -this harmony is met by the revival and re-assertion of the antithesis, -which it by its own principle had nullified. The harmony is then -described as merely subjective, something which merely ought to be, -and which at the same time is not real,—a mere article of faith, -possessing a subjective certainty, but without truth, or that -objectivity which is proper to the Idea. This contradiction may seem -to be disguised by adjourning the realisation of the Idea to a future, -to a <i>time</i> when the Idea will also be. But a sensuous condition like -time is the reverse of a reconciliation of the discrepancy; and an -infinite progression—which is the corresponding image adopted by the -understanding—on the very face of it only repeats and re-enacts the -contradiction.</p> - -<p>A general remark may still be offered on the result to which the -Critical philosophy led as to the nature of knowledge; a result -which has grown one of the current 'idols' or axiomatic beliefs of -the day. In every dualistic system, and especially in that of Kant, -the fundamental defect makes itself visible in the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span>inconsistency of -unifying at one moment, what a moment before had been explained to -be independent and therefore incapable of unification. And then, at -the very moment after unification has been alleged to be the truth, -we suddenly come upon the doctrine that the two elements, which, in -their true status of unification, had been refused all independent -subsistence, are only true and actual in their state of separation. -Philosophising of this kind wants the little penetration needed to -discover, that this shuffling only evidences how unsatisfactory each -one of the two terms is. And it fails simply because it is incapable -of bringing two thoughts together. (And in point of form there are -never more than two.) It argues an utter want of consistency to say, -on the one hand, that the understanding only knows phenomena, and, on -the other, assert the absolute character of this knowledge, by such -statements as 'Cognition can go no further'; 'Here is the <i>natural</i> and -absolute limit of human knowledge.' But 'natural' is the wrong word -here. The things of nature are limited and are natural things only to -such extent as they are not aware of their universal limit, or to such -extent as their mode or quality is a limit from our point of view, -and not from their own. No one knows, or even feels, that anything -is a limit or defect, until he is at the same time above and beyond -it. Living beings, for example, possess the privilege of pain which -is denied to the inanimate: even with living beings, a single mode or -quality passes into the feeling of a negative. For living beings as -such possess within them a universal vitality, which overpasses and -includes the single mode; and thus, as they maintain themselves in -the negative of themselves, they feel the contradiction to <i>exist</i> -within them. But the contradiction is within them, only in so far as -one and the same subject includes both the universality of their sense -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> life, and the individual mode which is in negation with it. This -illustration will show how a limit or imperfection in knowledge comes -to be termed a limit or imperfection, only when it is compared with the -actually-present Idea of the universal, of a total and perfect. A very -little consideration might show, that to call a thing finite or limited -proves by implication the very presence of the infinite and unlimited, -and that our knowledge of a limit can only be when the unlimited is <i>on -this side</i> in consciousness.</p> - -<p>The result however of Kant's view of cognition suggests a second -remark. The philosophy of Kant could have no influence on the method of -the sciences. It leaves the categories and method of ordinary knowledge -quite unmolested. Occasionally, it may be, in the first sections of a -scientific work of that period, we find propositions borrowed from the -Kantian philosophy: but the course of the treatise renders it apparent -that these propositions were superfluous decoration, and that the few -first pages might have been omitted without producing the least change -in the empirical contents.<a name="FNanchor_2_21" id="FNanchor_2_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_21" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>We may next institute a comparison of Kant with the metaphysics of the -empirical school. Natural plain Empiricism, though it unquestionably -insists most upon sensuous perception, still allows a super-sensible -world or spiritual reality, whatever may be its structure and -constitution, and whether derived from intellect, or from imagination, -&c. So far as form goes, the facts of this super-sensible world rest on -the authority of mind, in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span>the same way as the other facts, embraced -in empirical knowledge, rest on the authority of external perception. -But when Empiricism becomes reflective and logically consistent, it -turns its arms against this dualism in the ultimate and highest species -of fact; it denies the independence of the thinking principle and of -a spiritual world which developes itself in thought. Materialism or -Naturalism, therefore, is the consistent and thorough-going system -of Empiricism. In direct opposition to such an Empiricism, Kant -asserts the principle of thought and freedom, and attaches himself -to the first-mentioned form of empirical doctrine, the general -principles of which he never departed from. There is a dualism in -his philosophy also. On one side stands the world of sensation, and -of the understanding which reflects upon it. This world, it is true, -he alleges to be a world of appearances. But that is only a title -or formal description; for the source, the facts, and the modes of -observation continue quite the same as in Empiricism. On the other side -and independent stands a self-apprehending thought, the principle of -freedom, which Kant has in common with ordinary and bygone metaphysic, -but emptied of all that it held, and without his being able to infuse -into it anything new. For, in the Critical doctrine, thought, or, as it -is there called, Reason, is divested of every specific form, and thus -bereft of all authority. The main effect of the Kantian philosophy has -been to revive the consciousness of Reason, or the absolute inwardness -of thought. Its abstractness indeed prevented that inwardness from -developing into anything, or from originating any special forms, -whether cognitive principles or moral laws; but nevertheless it -absolutely refused to accept or indulge anything possessing the -character of an externality. Henceforth the principle of the -independence of Reason,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> or of its absolute self-subsistence, is made -a general principle of philosophy, as well as a foregone conclusion of -the time.</p> - -<p class="block2">(1) The Critical philosophy has one great negative merit. It has -brought home the conviction that the categories of understanding are -finite in their range, and that any cognitive process confined within -their pale falls short of the truth. But Kant had only a sight of -half the truth. He explained the finite nature of the categories to -mean that they were subjective only, valid only for our thought, from -which the thing-in-itself was divided by an impassable gulf. In fact, -however, it is not because they are subjective, that the categories are -finite: they are finite by their very nature, and it is on their own -selves that it is requisite to exhibit their finitude. Kant however -holds that what we think is false, because it is we who think it. A -further deficiency in the system is that it gives only an historical -description of thought, and a mere enumeration of the factors of -consciousness. The enumeration is in the main correct: but not a word -touches upon the necessity of what is thus empirically colligated. The -observations, made on the various stages of consciousness, culminate -in the summary statement, that the content of all we are acquainted -with is only an appearance. And as it is true at least that all finite -thinking is concerned with appearances, so far the conclusion is -justified. This stage of 'appearance' however—the phenomenal world—is -not the terminus of thought: there is another and a higher region. But -that region was to the Kantian philosophy an inaccessible 'other world.'</p> - -<p class="block2">(2) After all it was only formally, that the Kantian system established -the principle that thought is spontaneous and self-determining. Into -details of the manner and the extent of this self-determination of -thought, Kant never went. It was Fichte who first noticed the omission; -and who, after he had called attention to the want of a deduction for -the categories, endeavoured really to supply something of the kind. -With Fichte, the 'Ego' is the starting-point in the philosophical -development: and the outcome of its action is supposed to be visible -in the categories. But in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> Fichte the 'Ego' is not really presented -as a free, spontaneous energy; it is supposed to receive its first -excitation by a shock or impulse from without. Against this shock -the 'Ego' will, it is assumed, react, and only through this reaction -does it first become conscious of itself. Meanwhile, the nature of -the impulse remains a stranger beyond our pale: and the 'Ego,' with -something else always confronting it, is weighted with a condition. -Fichte, in consequence, never advanced beyond Kant's conclusion, that -the finite only is knowable, while the infinite transcends the range -of thought. What Kant calls the thing-by-itself, Fichte calls the -impulse from without—that abstraction of something else than 'I,' not -otherwise describable or definable than as the negative or non-Ego in -general. The 'I' is thus looked at as standing in essential relation -with the not-I, through which its act of self-determination is first -awakened. And in this manner the 'I' is but the continuous act of -self-liberation from this impulse, never gaining a real freedom, -because with the surcease of the impulse the 'I,' whose being is -its action, would also cease to be. Nor is the content produced by -the action of the 'I' at all different from the ordinary content of -experience, except by the supplementary remark, that this content is -mere appearance.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_20" id="Footnote_1_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_20"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Even Hermann's 'Handbook of Prosody' begins with -paragraphs of Kantian philosophy. In § 8 it is argued that a law -of rhythm must be (1) objective, (a) formal, and (3) determined <i>à -priori.</i> With these requirements and with the principles of Causality -and Reciprocity which follow later, it were well to compare the -treatment of the various measures, upon which those formal principles -do not exercise the slightest influence.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_21" id="Footnote_2_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_21"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> In Kant's own words (Criticism of the Power of Judgment, -p. 427): 'Final Cause is merely a notion of our practical reason. -It cannot be deduced from any data of experience as a theoretical -criterion of nature, nor can it be applied to know nature. No -employment of this notion is possible except solely for the practical -reason, by moral laws. The final purpose of the Creation is that -constitution of the world which harmonises with that to which alone we -can give definite expression on universal principles, viz. the final -purpose of our pure practical reason, and with that in so far as it -means to be practical.'</p></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span></p> - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.</a></h5> - - -<h4>THIRD ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY.</h4> - - -<h4><i>Immediate or Intuitive Knowledge.</i></h4> - - -<p>61.] If we are to believe the Critical philosophy, thought is -subjective, and its ultimate and invincible mode is <i>abstract -universality</i> or formal identity. Thought is thus set in opposition -to Truth, which is no abstraction, but concrete universality. In this -highest mode of thought, which is entitled Reason, the Categories -are left out of account.—The extreme theory on the opposite side -holds thought to be an act of the <i>particular</i> only, and on that -ground declares it incapable of apprehending the Truth. This is the -Intuitional theory.</p> - -<p>62.] According to this theory, thinking, a private and particular -operation, has its whole scope and product in the Categories. But, -these Categories, as arrested by the understanding, are limited -vehicles of thought, forms of the conditioned, of the dependent -and derivative. A thought limited to these modes has no sense of -the Infinite and the True, and cannot bridge over the gulf that -separates it from them. (This stricture refers to the proofs of God's -existence.) These inadequate modes or categories are also spoken of as -<i>notions</i>: and to get a notion of an object therefore can only mean, -in this language, to grasp it under the form of being conditioned and -derivative. Consequently, if the object in question be the True, the -Infinite, the Unconditioned, we change<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> it by our notions into a finite -and conditioned; whereby, instead of apprehending the truth by thought, -we have perverted it into untruth.</p> - -<p>Such is the one simple line of argument advanced for the thesis that -the knowledge of God and of truth must be immediate, or intuitive. At -an earlier period all sort of anthropomorphic conceptions, as they -are termed, were banished from God, as being finite and therefore -unworthy of the infinite; and in this way God had been reduced to -a tolerably blank being. But in those days the thought-forms were -in general not supposed to come under the head of anthropomorphism. -Thought was believed rather to strip finitude from the conceptions of -the Absolute,—in agreement with the above-mentioned conviction of all -ages, that reflection is the only road to truth. But now, at length, -even the thought-forms are pronounced anthropomorphic, and thought -itself is described as a mere faculty of finitisation.</p> - -<p>Jacobi has stated this charge most distinctly in the seventh supplement -to his Letters on Spinoza,—borrowing his line of argument from the -works of Spinoza himself, and applying it as a weapon against knowledge -in general. In his attack knowledge is taken to mean knowledge of -the finite only, a process of thought from one condition in a series -to another, each of which is at once conditioning and conditioned. -According to such a view, to explain and to get the notion of -anything, is the same as to show it to be derived from something else. -Whatever such knowledge embraces, consequently, is partial, dependent -and finite, while the infinite or true, <i>i.e.</i> God, lies outside -of the mechanical inter-connexion to which knowledge is said to be -confined.—It is important to observe that, while Kant makes the finite -nature of the Categories consist mainly in the formal circumstance -that they are subjective,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> Jacobi discusses the Categories in their -own proper character, and pronounces them to be in their very import -finite. What Jacobi chiefly had before his eyes, when he thus described -science, was the brilliant successes of the physical or 'exact' -sciences in ascertaining natural forces and laws. It is certainly not -on the finite ground occupied by these sciences that we can expect to -meet the in-dwelling presence of the infinite. Lalande was right when -he said he had swept the whole heaven with his glass, and seen no God. -(See note to § 60.) In the field of physical science, the universal, -which is the final result of analysis, is only the indeterminate -aggregate,—of the external finite,—in one word, Matter: and Jacobi -well perceived that there was no other issue obtainable in the way of a -mere advance from one explanatory clause or law to another.</p> - -<p>63.] All the while the doctrine that truth exists for the mind was so -strongly maintained by Jacobi, that Reason alone is declared to be that -by which man lives. This Reason is the knowledge of God. But, seeing -that derivative knowledge is restricted to the compass of finite facts, -Reason is knowledge underivative, or Faith.</p> - -<p>Knowledge, Faith, Thought, Intuition are the categories that we meet -with on this line of reflection. These terms, as presumably familiar to -every one, are only too frequently subjected to an arbitrary use, under -no better guidance than the conceptions and distinctions of psychology, -without any investigation into their nature and notion, which is the -main question after all. Thus, we often find knowledge contrasted with -faith, and faith at the same time explained to be an underivative -or intuitive knowledge:—so that it must be at least some sort of -knowledge. And, besides, it is unquestionably a fact of experience, -firstly, that what we believe is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> in our consciousness,—-which implies -that we <i>know about it;</i> and secondly, that this belief is a certainty -in our consciousness,—which implies that we <i>know it.</i> Again, and -especially, we find thought opposed to immediate knowledge and faith, -and, in particular, to intuition. But if this intuition be qualified -as intellectual, we must really mean intuition which thinks, unless, -in a question about the nature of God, we are willing to interpret -intellect to mean images and representations of imagination. The word -faith or belief, in the dialect of this system, comes to be employed -even with reference to common objects that are present to the senses. -We believe, says Jacobi, that we have a body,—we believe in the -existence of the things of sense. But if we are speaking of faith in -the True and Eternal, and saying that God is given and revealed to us -in immediate knowledge or intuition, we are concerned not with the -things of sense, but with objects special to our thinking mind, with -truths of inherently universal significance. And when the individual -'I,' or in other words personality, is under discussion—not the 'I' of -experience, or a single private person—above all, when the personality -of God is before us, we are speaking of personality unalloyed,—of a -personality in its own nature universal. Such personality is a thought, -and falls within the province of thought only. More than this. Pure and -simple intuition is completely the same as pure and simple thought. -Intuition and belief, in the first instance, denote the definite -conceptions we attach to these words in our ordinary employment of -them: and to this extent they differ from thought in certain points -which nearly every one can understand. But here they are taken in a -higher sense, and must be interpreted to mean a belief in God, or an -intellectual intuition of God; in short, we must put aside all that -especially distinguishes thought<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> on the one side from belief and -intuition on the other. How belief and intuition, when transferred to -these higher regions, differ from thought, it is impossible for any one -to say. And yet, such are the barren distinctions of words, with which -men fancy that they assert an important truth: even while the formulae -they maintain are identical with those which they impugn.</p> - -<p>The term <i>Faith</i> brings with it the special advantage of suggesting -the faith of the Christian religion; it seems to include Christian -faith, or perhaps even to coincide with it; and thus the Philosophy of -Faith has a thoroughly orthodox and Christian look, on the strength of -which it takes the liberty of uttering its arbitrary dicta with greater -pretension and authority. But we must not let ourselves be deceived by -the semblance surreptitiously secured by a merely verbal similarity. -The two things are radically distinct. Firstly, the Christian faith -comprises in it an authority of the Church: but the faith of Jacobi's -philosophy has no other authority than that of a personal revelation. -And, secondly, the Christian faith is a copious body of objective -truth, a system of knowledge and doctrine: while the scope of the -philosophic faith is so utterly indefinite, that, while it has room for -the faith of the Christian, it equally admits a belief in the divinity -of the Dalai-lama, the ox, or the monkey,—thus, so far as it goes, -narrowing Deity down to its simplest terms, a 'Supreme Being.' Faith -itself, taken in this professedly philosophical sense, is nothing but -the sapless abstract of immediate knowledge,—a purely formal category -applicable to very different facts; and it ought never to be confused -or identified with the spiritual fulness of Christian faith, whether we -look at that faith in the heart of the believer and the in-dwelling of -the Holy Spirit, or in the system of theological doctrine.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span></p> - -<p>With what is here called faith or immediate knowledge must also be -identified inspiration, the heart's revelations, the truths implanted -in man by nature, and also in particular, healthy reason or Common -Sense, as it is called. All these forms agree in adopting as their -leading principle the immediacy, or self-evident way, in which a fact -or body of truths is presented in consciousness.</p> - -<p>84.] This immediate knowledge consists in knowing that the Infinite, -the Eternal, the God which is in our idea, really <i>is</i>: or, it asserts -that in our consciousness there is immediately and inseparably bound up -with this idea the certainty of its actual being.</p> - -<p>To seek to controvert these maxims of immediate knowledge is the last -thing philosophers would think of. They may rather find occasion for -self-gratulation when these ancient doctrines, expressing as they -do the general tenor of philosophic teaching, have, even in this -unphilosophical fashion, become to some extent universal convictions -of the age. The true marvel rather is that any one could suppose that -these principles were opposed to philosophy,—the maxims, viz., that -whatever is held to be true is immanent in the mind, and that there -is truth for the mind (§ 63). From a formal point of view, there is a -peculiar interest in the maxim that the being of God is immediately and -inseparably bound up with the thought of God, that objectivity is bound -up with the subjectivity which the thought originally presents. Not -content with that, the philosophy of immediate knowledge goes so far in -its one-sided view, as to affirm that the attribute of existence, even -in perception, is quite as inseparably connected with the conception -we have of our own bodies and of external things, as it is with the -thought of God. Now it is the endeavour of philosophy to <i>prove</i> such -a unity, to show that it lies in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> the very nature of thought and -subjectivity, to be inseparable from being and objectivity. In these -circumstances therefore, philosophy, whatever estimate may be formed of -the character of these proofs, must in any case be glad to see it shown -and maintained that its maxims are facts of consciousness, and thus -in harmony with experience. The difference between philosophy and the -asseverations of immediate knowledge rather centres in the exclusive -attitude which immediate knowledge adopts, when it sets itself up -against philosophy.</p> - -<p>And yet it was as a self-evident or immediate truth that the 'Cogito, -ergo sum,' of Descartes, the maxim on which may be said to hinge the -whole interest of Modern Philosophy, was first stated by its author. -The man who calls this a syllogism, must know little more about a -syllogism than that the word 'Ergo' occurs in it. Where shall we look -for the middle term? And a middle term is a much more essential point -of a syllogism than the word 'Ergo.' If we try to justify the name, by -calling the combination of ideas in Descartes an 'immediate' syllogism, -this superfluous variety of syllogism is a mere name for an utterly -unmediated synthesis of distinct terms of thought. That being so, the -synthesis of being with our ideas, as stated in the maxim of immediate -knowledge, has no more and no less claim to the title of syllogism than -the axiom of Descartes has. From Hotho's 'Dissertation on the Cartesian -Philosophy' (published 1826), I borrow the quotation in which Descartes -himself distinctly declares that the maxim 'Cogito, ergo sum,' is no -syllogism. The passages are Respons. ad II Object.: De Methodo IV: -Ep. I. 118. From the first passage I quote the words more immediately -to the point. Descartes says: 'That we are thinking beings is "<i>prima -quaedam notio quae ex nullo syllogismo concluditur</i>"' (a certain -primary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> notion, which is deduced from no syllogism); and goes on: -<i>'neque cum quis dicit; Ego cogito, ergo sum sive existo, existentiam -ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit.'</i> (Nor, when one says, I think, -therefore I am or exist, does he deduce existence from thought by means -of a syllogism.) Descartes knew what it implied in a syllogism, and -so he adds that, in order to make the maxim admit of a deduction by -syllogism, we should have to add the major premiss: <i>'Illud omne quod -cogitat, est sive existit.'</i> (Everything which thinks, is or exists.) -Of course, he remarks, this major premiss itself has to be deduced from -the original statement.</p> - -<p>The language of Descartes on the maxim that the 'I' which <i>thinks</i> must -also at the same time <i>be,</i> his saying that this connexion is given and -implied in the simple perception of consciousness,—that this connexion -is the absolute first, the principle, the most certain and evident of -all things, so that no scepticism can be conceived so monstrous as not -to admit it:—all this language is so vivid and distinct, that the -modern statements of Jacobi and others on this immediate connexion can -only pass for needless repetitions.</p> - -<p>65.] The theory of which we are speaking is not satisfied when it has -shown that mediate knowledge taken separately is an adequate vehicle -of truth. Its distinctive doctrine is that immediate knowledge alone, -to the total exclusion of mediation, can possess a content which is -true. This exclusiveness is enough to show that the theory is a relapse -into the metaphysical understanding, with its pass-words 'Either—or.' -And thus it is really a relapse into the habit of external mediation, -the gist of which consists in clinging to those narrow and one-sided -categories of the finite, which it falsely imagined itself to have left -for ever behind. This point, however, we shall not at present discuss -in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> detail. An exclusively immediate knowledge is asserted as a fact -only, and in the present Introduction we can only study it from this -external point of view. The real significance of such knowledge will -be explained, when we come to the logical question of the opposition -between mediate and immediate. But it is characteristic of the view -before us to decline to examine the nature of the fact, that is, the -notion of it; for such an examination would itself be a step towards -mediation and even towards knowledge. The genuine discussion on logical -ground, therefore, must be deferred till we come to the proper province -of Logic itself.</p> - -<p>The whole of the second part of Logic, the Doctrine of Essential Being, -is a discussion of the intrinsic and self-affirming unity of immediacy -and mediation.</p> - -<p>66.] Beyond this point then we need not go: immediate knowledge is -to be accepted as a <i>fact.</i> Under these circumstances examination is -directed to the field of experience, to a psychological phenomenon. If -that be so, we need only note, as the commonest of experiences, that -truths, which we well know to be results of complicated and highly -mediated trains of thought, present themselves immediately and without -effort to the mind of any man who is familiar with the subject. The -mathematician, like every one who has mastered a particular science, -meets any problem with ready-made solutions which pre-suppose most -complicated analyses: and every educated man has a number of general -views and maxims which he can muster without trouble, but which -can only have sprung from frequent reflection and long experience. -The facility we attain in any sort of knowledge, art, or technical -expertness, consists in having the particular knowledge or kind of -action present to our mind in any case that occurs, even we may say, -immediate in our very limbs, in an out-going<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> activity. In all these -instances, immediacy of knowledge is so far from excluding mediation, -that the two things are linked together,—immediate knowledge being -actually the product and result of mediated knowledge.</p> - -<p>It is no less obvious that immediate <i>existence</i> is bound up with -its mediation. The seed and the parents are immediate and initial -existences in respect of the off-spring which they generate. But the -seed and the parents, though they exist and are therefore immediate, -are yet in their turn generated: and the child, without prejudice to -the mediation of its existence, is immediate, because it <i>is.</i> The fact -that I am in Berlin, my immediate presence here, is mediated by my -having made the journey hither.</p> - -<p>67.] One thing may be observed with reference to the immediate -knowledge of God, of legal and ethical principles (including under -the head of immediate knowledge, what is otherwise termed Instinct, -Implanted or Innate Ideas, Common Sense, Natural Reason, or whatever -form, in short, we give to the original spontaneity). It is a matter -of general experience that education or development is required to -bring out into consciousness what is therein contained. It was so even -with the Platonic reminiscence; and the Christian rite of baptism, -although a sacrament, involves the additional obligation of a Christian -up-bringing. In short, religion and morals, however much they may be -faith or immediate knowledge, are still on every side conditioned by -the mediating process which is termed development, education, training.</p> - -<p>The adherents, no less than the assailants, of the doctrine of Innate -Ideas have been guilty throughout of the like exclusiveness and -narrowness as is here noted. They have drawn a hard and fast line -between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> the essential and immediate union (as it may be described) of -certain universal principles with the soul, and another union which has -to be brought about in an external fashion, and through the channel of -<i>given</i> objects and conceptions, There is one objection, borrowed from -experience, which was raised against the doctrine of Innate ideas. All -men, it was said, must have these ideas; they must have, for example, -the maxim of contradiction, present in the mind,—they must be aware -of it; for this maxim and others like it were included in the class -of Innate ideas. The objection may be set down to misconception; for -the principles in question, though innate, need not on that account -have the form of ideas or conceptions of something we are aware of. -Still, the objection completely meets and overthrows the crude theory -of immediate knowledge, which expressly maintains its formulae in so -far as they are in consciousness.—Another point calls for notice. We -may suppose it admitted by the intuitive school, that the special case -of religious faith involves supplementing by a Christian or religious -education and development. In that case it is acting capriciously when -it seeks to ignore this admission when speaking about faith, or it -betrays a want of reflection not to know, that, if the necessity of -education be once admitted, mediation is pronounced indispensable.</p> - -<p class="block2">The reminiscence of ideas spoken of by Plato is equivalent to -saying that ideas implicitly exist in man, instead of being, as -the Sophists assert, a foreign importation into his mind. But to -conceive knowledge as reminiscence does not interfere with, or -set aside as useless, the development of what is implicitly in -man;—which development is another word for mediation. The same -holds good of the innate ideas that we find in Descartes and the -Scotch philosophers. These ideas are only potential in the first -instance, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> should be looked at as being a sort of mere capacity -in man.</p> - -<p>88.] In the case of these experiences the appeal turns upon something -that shows itself bound up with immediate consciousness. Even if -this combination be in the first instance taken as an external and -empirical connexion, still, even for empirical observation, the fact -of its being constant shows it to be essential and inseparable. But, -again, if this immediate consciousness, as exhibited in experience, -be taken separately, so far as it is a consciousness of God and -the divine nature, the state of mind which it implies is generally -described as an exaltation above the finite, above the senses, and -above the instinctive desires and affections of the natural heart: -which exaltation passes over into, and terminates in, faith in God and -a divine order. It is apparent, therefore, that, though faith may be an -immediate knowledge and certainty, it equally implies the interposition -of this process as its antecedent and condition.</p> - -<p>It has been already observed, that the so-called proofs of the being -of God, which start from finite being, give an expression to this -exaltation. In that light they are no inventions of an over-subtle -reflection, but the necessary and native channel in which the movement -of mind runs: though it may be that, in their ordinary form, these -proofs have not their correct and adequate expression.</p> - -<p>69.] It is the passage (§ 64) from the subjective Idea to being which -forms the main concern of the doctrine of immediate knowledge. A -primary and self-evident inter-connexion is declared to exist between -our Idea and being. Yet precisely this central point of transition, -utterly irrespective of any connexions which show in experience, -clearly involves a mediation. And the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> mediation is of no imperfect or -unreal kind, where the mediation takes place with and through something -external, but one comprehending both antecedent and conclusion.</p> - -<p>70.] For, what this theory asserts is that truth lies neither in the -Idea as a merely subjective thought, nor in mere being on its own -account;—that mere being <i>per se,</i> a being that is not of the Idea, -is the sensible finite being of the world. Now all this only affirms, -without demonstration, that the Idea has truth only by means of being, -and being has truth only by means of the Idea. The maxim of immediate -knowledge rejects an indefinite empty immediacy (and such is abstract -being, or pure unity taken by itself), and affirms in its stead the -unity of the Idea with being. And it acts rightly in so doing. But it -is stupid not to see that the unity of distinct terms or modes is not -merely a purely immediate unity, <i>i.e.</i> unity empty and indeterminate, -but that—with equal emphasis—the one term is shown to have truth only -as mediated through the other;—or, if the phrase be preferred, that -either term is only mediated with truth through the other. That the -quality of mediation is involved in the very immediacy of intuition -is thus exhibited as a fact, against which understanding, conformably -to the fundamental maxim of immediate knowledge that the evidence of -consciousness is infallible, can have nothing to object. It is only -ordinary abstract understanding which takes the terms of mediation and -immediacy, each by itself absolutely, to represent an inflexible line -of distinction, and thus draws upon its own head the hopeless task of -reconciling them. The difficulty, as we have shown, has no existence in -the fact, and it vanishes in the speculative notion.</p> - -<p>71.] The one-sidedness of the intuitional school has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> certain -characteristics attending upon it, which we shall proceed to point out -in their main features, now that we have discussed the fundamental -principle. The <i>first</i> of these corollaries is as follows. Since the -criterion of truth is found, not in the nature of the content, but in -the mere fact of consciousness, every alleged truth has no other basis -than subjective certitude and the assertion that we discover a certain -fact in our consciousness. What I discover in my consciousness is thus -exaggerated into a fact of the consciousness of all, and even passed -off for the very nature of consciousness.</p> - -<p>Among the so-called proofs of the existence of God, there used to stand -the <i>consensus gentium,</i> to which appeal is made as early as Cicero. -The <i>consensus gentium</i> is a weighty authority, and the transition is -easy and natural, from the circumstance that a certain fact is found -in the consciousness of every one, to the conclusion that it is a -necessary element in the very nature of consciousness. In this category -of general agreement there was latent the deep-rooted perception, which -does not escape even the least cultivated mind, that the consciousness -of the individual is at the same time particular and accidental. Yet -unless we examine the nature of this consciousness itself, stripping -it of its particular and accidental elements and, by the toilsome -operation of reflection, disclosing the universal in its entirety and -purity, it is only a <i>unanimous</i> agreement upon a given point that can -authorize a decent presumption that that point is part of the very -nature of consciousness. Of course, if thought insists on seeing the -necessity of what is presented as a fact of general occurrence, the -<i>consensus gentium</i> is certainly not sufficient. Yet even granting the -universality of the fact to be a satisfactory proof, it has been found<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> -impossible to establish the belief in God on such an argument, because -experience shows that there are individuals and nations without any -such faith.<a name="FNanchor_1_22" id="FNanchor_1_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_22" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> But there can be nothing shorter and more convenient -than to have the bare assertion to make, that we discover a fact in -our consciousness, and are certain that it is true: and to declare -that this certainty, instead of proceeding from our particular mental -constitution only, belongs to the very nature of the mind.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></p> - -<p>72.] A <i>second</i> corollary which results from holding immediacy of -consciousness to be the criterion of truth is that all superstition -or idolatry is allowed to be truth, and that an apology is prepared -for any contents of the will, however wrong and immoral. It is because -he believes in them, and not from the reasoning and syllogism of -what is termed mediate knowledge, that the Hindoo finds God in the -cow, the monkey, the Brahmin, or the Lama. But the natural desires -and affections spontaneously carry and deposit their interests in -consciousness, where also immoral aims make themselves naturally at -home: the good or bad character would thus express the <i>definite being</i> -of the will, which would be known, and that most immediately, in the -interests and aims.</p> - -<p>73.] <i>Thirdly</i> and lastly, the immediate consciousness of God goes no -further than to tell us <i>that</i> He is: to tell us <i>what</i> He is, would be -an act of cognition, involving mediation. So that God as an object of -religion is expressly narrowed down to the indeterminate supersensible, -God in general: and the significance of religion is reduced to a -minimum.</p> - -<p>If it were really needful to win back and secure the bare belief that -there is a God, or even to create it, we might well wonder at the -poverty of the age which can see a gain in the merest pittance of -religious consciousness, and which in its church has sunk so low as to -worship at the altar that stood in Athens long ago, dedicated to the -'Unknown God.'</p> - -<p>74.] We have still briefly to indicate the general nature of the -form of immediacy. For it is the essential one-sidedness of the -category, which makes whatever comes under it one sided and, for -that reason, finite. And, first, it makes the universal no better -than an abstraction external to the particulars, and God a being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> -without determinate quality. But God can only be called a spirit -when He is known to be at once the beginning and end, as well as -the mean, in the process of mediation. Without this unification of -elements He is neither concrete, nor living, nor a spirit. Thus the -knowledge of God as a spirit necessarily implies mediation. The form -of immediacy, secondly, invests the particular with the character of -independent or self-centred being. But such predicates contradict the -very essence of the particular,—which is to be referred to something -else outside. They thus invest the finite with the character of an -absolute. But, besides, the form of immediacy is altogether abstract: -it has no preference for one set of contents more than another, -but is equally susceptible of all: it may as well sanction what is -idolatrous and immoral as the reverse. Only when we discern that the -content,—the particular, is not self-subsistent, but derivative from -something else, are its finitude and untruth shown in their proper -light. Such discernment, where the content we discern carries with -it the ground of its dependent nature, is a knowledge which involves -mediation. The only content which can be held to be the truth is one -not mediated with something else, not limited by other things: or, -otherwise expressed, it is one mediated by itself, where mediation and -immediate reference-to-self coincide. The understanding that fancies -it has got clear of finite knowledge, the identity of the analytical -metaphysicians and the old 'rationalists,' abruptly takes again as -principle and criterion of truth that immediacy which, as an abstract -reference-to-self, is the same as abstract identity. Abstract thought -(the scientific form used by 'reflective' metaphysic) and abstract -intuition (the form used by immediate knowledge) are one and the same.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span></p> - -<p class="block2">The stereotyped opposition between the form of immediacy and that -of mediation gives to the former a halfness and inadequacy, that -affects every content which is brought under it. Immediacy means, -upon the whole, an abstract reference-to-self, that is, an abstract -identity or abstract universality. Accordingly the essential and -real universal, when taken merely in its immediacy, is a mere -abstract universal; and from this point of view God is conceived -as a being altogether without determinate quality. To call God -spirit is in that case only a phrase: for the consciousness and -self-consciousness, which spirit implies, are impossible without a -distinguishing of it from itself and from something else, <i>i.e.</i> -without mediation.</p> - -<p>75.] It was impossible for us to criticise this, the third attitude, -which thought has been made to take towards objective truth, in any -other mode than what is naturally indicated and admitted in the -doctrine itself. The theory asserts that immediate knowledge is a -fact. It has been shown to be untrue in fact to say that there is an -immediate knowledge, a knowledge without mediation either by means of -something else or in itself. It has also been explained to be false -in fact to say that thought advances through finite and conditioned -categories only, which are always mediated by a something else, and to -forget that in the very act of mediation the mediation itself vanishes. -And to show that, in point of fact, there is a knowledge which advances -neither by unmixed immediacy nor by unmixed mediation, we can point to -the example of Logic and the whole of philosophy.</p> - -<p>76.] If we view the maxims of immediate knowledge in connexion with the -uncritical metaphysic of the past from which we started, we shall learn -from the comparison the reactionary nature of the school of Jacobi. His -doctrine is a return to the modern starting-point of this metaphysic -in the Cartesian philosophy. Both<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> Jacobi and Descartes maintain the -following three points:</p> - -<p>(1) The simple inseparability of the thought and being of the -thinker. '<i>Cogito, ergo sum</i>' is the same doctrine as that the being, -reality, and existence of the 'Ego' is immediately revealed to me -in consciousness. (Descartes, in fact, is careful to state that by -thought he means consciousness in general. Princip. Phil. I. 9.) This -inseparability is the absolutely first and most certain knowledge, not -mediated or demonstrated.</p> - -<p>(2) The inseparability of existence from the conception of God: the -former is necessarily implied in the latter, or the conception never -can be without the attribute of existence, which is thus necessary and -eternal.<a name="FNanchor_2_23" id="FNanchor_2_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_23" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span></p> - -<p>(3) The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things. -By this nothing more is meant than sense-consciousness. To have such -a thing is the slightest of all cognitions: and the only thing worth -knowing about it is that such immediate knowledge of the being of -things external is error and delusion, that the sensible world as such -is altogether void of truth; that the being of these external things is -accidental and passes away as a show; and that their very nature is to -have only an existence which is separable from their essence and notion.</p> - -<p>77.] There is however a distinction between the two points of view:</p> - -<p>(1) The Cartesian philosophy, from these unproved postulates, which -it assumes to be unprovable, proceeds to wider and wider details of -knowledge, and thus gave rise to the sciences of modern times. The -modern theory (of Jacobi), on the contrary, (§ 62) has come to what is -intrinsically a most important conclusion that cognition, proceeding -as it must by finite mediations, can know only the finite, and never -embody the truth; and would fain have the consciousness of God go no -further than the aforesaid very abstract belief that God <i>is</i>.<a name="FNanchor_3_24" id="FNanchor_3_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_24" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span></p> - -<p>(2) The modern doctrine on the one hand makes no change in the -Cartesian method of the usual scientific knowledge, and conducts on -the same plan the experimental and finite sciences that have sprung -from it. But, on the other hand, when it comes to the science which -has infinity for its scope, it throws aside that method, and thus, -as it knows no other, it rejects all methods. It abandons itself to -wild vagaries of imagination and assertion, to a moral priggishness -and sentimental arrogance, or to a reckless dogmatising and lust -of argument, which is loudest against philosophy and philosophic -doctrines. Philosophy of course tolerates no mere assertions or -conceits, and checks the free play of argumentative see-saw.</p> - -<p>78.] We must then reject the opposition between an independent -immediacy in the contents or facts of consciousness and an equally -independent mediation, supposed incompatible with the former. The -incompatibility is a mere assumption, an arbitrary assertion. All other -assumptions and postulates must in like manner be left behind at the -entrance to philosophy, whether they are derived from the intellect or -the imagination. For philosophy is the science, in which every such -proposition must first be scrutinised and its meaning and oppositions -be ascertained.</p> - -<p>Scepticism, made a negative science and systematically applied to all -forms of knowledge, might seem a suitable introduction, as pointing out -the nullity of such assumptions. But a sceptical introduction would -be not only an ungrateful but also a useless course; and that because -Dialectic, as we shall soon make appear, is itself an essential element -of affirmative science. Scepticism, besides, could only get hold of -the finite forms as they were suggested by experience, taking them -as given, instead of deducing them scientifically.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> To require such -a scepticism accomplished is the same as to insist on science being -preceded by universal doubt, or a total absence of presupposition. -Strictly speaking, in the resolve that <i>wills pure thought,</i> this -requirement is accomplished by freedom which, abstracting from -everything, grasps its pure abstraction, the simplicity of thought.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_22" id="Footnote_1_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_22"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> In order to judge of the greater or less extent lo which -Experience shows cases of Atheism or of the belief in God, it is -all-important to know if the mere general conception of deity suffices, -or if a more definite knowledge of God is required. The Christian world -would certainly refuse the title of God to the idols of the Hindoos -and the Chinese, to the fetiches of the Africans, and even to the gods -of Greece themselves. If so, a believer in these idols would not be a -believer in God. If it were contended, on the other hand, that such -a belief in idols implies some sort of belief in God, as the species -implies the genus, then idolatry would argue not faith in an idol -merely, but faith in God. The Athenians took an opposite view. The -poets and philosophers who explained Zeus to be a cloud, and maintained -that there was only one God, were treated as atheists at Athens. -</p> -<p> -The danger in these questions lies in looking at what the mind may make -out of an object, and not what that object actually and explicitly -is. If we fail to note this distinction, the commonest perceptions of -men's senses will be religion: for every such perception, and indeed -every act of mind, implicitly contains the principle which, when it -is purified and developed, rises to religion. But to be capable of -religion is one thing, to have it another. And religion yet implicit is -only a capacity or a possibility. -</p> -<p> -Thus in modern times, travellers have found tribes (as Captains Ross -and Parry found the Esquimaux) which, as they tell us, have not even -that small modicum of religion possessed by African sorcerers, the -<i>goëtes</i> of Herodotus. On the other hand, an Englishman, who spent the -first months of the last Jubilee at Rome, says, in his account of the -modern Romans, that the common people are bigots, whilst those who can -read and write are atheists to a man. -</p> -<p> -The charge of Atheism is seldom heard in modern times: principally -because the facts and the requirements of religion are reduced to a -minimum. (See § 73.)</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_23" id="Footnote_2_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_23"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Descartes, Princip. Phil. I. 15: <i>Magis hoc (ens summe -perfectum existere) credet, si attendat, nullius alterius rei ideam -apud se inveniri, in qua eodem modo necessariam existentiam contineri -animadveriat;—intelliget illam ideam exhibere veram et immutabilem -naturam, quaeque non potest non existere, cum necessaria existentia in -ea contineatur.</i> (The reader will be more disposed to <i>believe</i> that -there exists a being supremely perfect, if he notes that in the case -of nothing else is there found in him an idea, in which he notices -necessary existence to be contained in the same way. He will see that -that idea exhibits a true and unchangeable nature,—a nature which -<i>cannot but exist,</i> since necessary existence is <i>contained in it.</i>) A -remark which immediately follows, and which sounds like mediation or -demonstration, does not really prejudice the original principle. -</p> -<p> -In Spinoza we come upon the same statement that the essence or -abstract conception of God implies existence. The first of Spinoza's -definitions, that of the <i>Causa Sui</i> (or Self-Cause), explains it to -be <i>cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id cujus natura non -potest concipi nisi existens</i> (that of which the essence involves -existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as -existing). The inseparability of the notion from being is the main -point and fundamental hypothesis in his system. But what notion is -thus inseparable from being? Not the notion of finite things, for they -are so constituted as to have a contingent and a created existence. -Spinoza's 11th proposition, which follows with a proof that God exists -necessarily, and his 20th, showing that God's existence and his essence -are one and the same, are really superfluous, and the proof is more -in form than in reality. To say, that God is Substance, the only -Substance, and that, as Substance is <i>Causa Sui,</i> God therefore exists -necessarily, is merely stating that God is that of which the notion and -the being are inseparable.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_24" id="Footnote_3_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_24"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Anselm on the contrary says: <i>Negligentiae mihi videtur, -si post-quam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus, quod credimus, -intelligere.</i> (Methinks it is <i>carelessness,</i> if, after we have been -confirmed in the faith, we do not <i>exert ourselves to see the meaning -of what we believe.</i>) [Tractat. Cur Deus Homo?] These words of Anselm, -in connexion with the concrete truths of Christian doctrine, offer a -far harder problem for investigation, than is contemplated by this -modern faith.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI.</a></h5> - - -<h4>LOGIC FURTHER DEFINED AND DIVIDED.</h4> - - -<p>79.] In point of form Logical doctrine has three sides: (α) the -Abstract side, or that of understanding: (ß) the Dialectical, or that -of negative reason: (y) the Speculative, or that of positive reason.</p> - -<p>These three sides do not make three <i>parts</i> of logic, but are stages -or 'moments' in every logical entity, that is, of every notion and -truth whatever. They may all be put under the first stage, that of -understanding, and so kept isolated from each other; but this would -give an inadequate conception of them.—The statement of the dividing -lines and the characteristic aspects of logic is at this point no more -than historical and anticipatory.</p> - -<p>80.] (α) Thought, as <i>Understanding,</i> sticks to fixity of characters -and their distinctness from one another: every such limited abstract it -treats as having a subsistence and being of its own.</p> - -<p class="block2">In our ordinary usage of the term thought and even notion, we often -have before our eyes nothing more than the operation of Understanding. -And no doubt thought is primarily an exercise of Understanding:—only -it goes further, and the notion is not a function of Understanding -merely. The action of Understanding may be in general described as -investing its subject-matter with the form of universality. But this -universal is an abstract universal: that is to say, its opposition to -the particular is so rigorously<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> maintained, that it is at the same -time also reduced to the character of a particular again. In this -separating and abstracting attitude towards its objects, Understanding -is the reverse of immediate perception and sensation, which, as such, -keep completely to their native sphere of action in the concrete.</p> - -<p class="block2">It is by referring to this opposition of Understanding to sensation or -feeling that we must explain the frequent attacks made upon thought -for being hard and narrow, and for leading, if consistently developed, -to ruinous and pernicious results. The answer to these charges, in so -far as they are warranted by their facts, is, that they do not touch -thinking in general, certainly not the thinking of Reason, but only the -exercise of Understanding. It must be added however, that the merit and -rights of the mere Understanding should unhesitatingly be admitted. And -that merit lies in the fact, that apart from Understanding there is no -fixity or accuracy in the region either of theory or of practice.</p> - -<p class="block2">Thus, in theory, knowledge begins by apprehending existing objects in -their specific differences. In the study of nature, for example, we -distinguish matters, forces, genera and the like, and stereotype each -in its isolation. Thought is here acting in its analytic capacity, -where its canon is identity, a simple reference of each attribute to -itself. It is under the guidance of the same identity that the process -in knowledge is effected from one scientific truth to another. Thus, -for example, in mathematics magnitude is the feature which, to the -neglect of any other, determines our advance. Hence in geometry we -compare one figure with another, so as to bring out their identity. -Similarly in other fields of knowledge, such as jurisprudence, the -advance is primarily regulated by identity. In it we argue from one -specific law or precedent to another: and what is this but to proceed -on the principle of identity?</p> - -<p class="block2">But Understanding is as indispensable in practice as it is in theory. -Character is an essential in conduct, and a man of character is an -understanding man, who in that capacity has definite ends in view and -undeviatingly pursues them.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> The man who will do something great must -learn, as Goethe says, to limit himself. The man who, on the contrary, -would do everything, really would do nothing, and fails. There is a -host of interesting things in the world: Spanish poetry, chemistry, -politics, and music are all very interesting, and if any one takes -an interest in them we need not find fault. But for a person in a -given situation to accomplish anything, he must stick to one definite -point, and not dissipate his' forces in many directions. In every -calling, too, the great thing is to pursue it with understanding. Thus -the judge must stick to the law, and give his verdict in accordance -with, it, undeterred by one motive or another, allowing no excuses; -and looking neither left nor right. Understanding, too, is always an -element in thorough training. The trained-intellect is not satisfied -with cloudy and indefinite impressions, but grasps the objects in their -fixed character: whereas the uncultivated man wavers unsettled, and it -often costs a deal of trouble to come to an understanding with him on -the matter under discussion, and to bring him to fix his eye on the -definite point in question.</p> - -<p class="block2">It has been already explained that the Logical principle in general, -far from being merely a subjective action in our minds, is rather the -very universal, which as such is also objective. This doctrine is -illustrated in the case of understanding, the first form of logical -truths. Understanding in this larger sense corresponds to what we call -the goodness of God, so far as that means that finite things are and -subsist. In nature, for example, we recognise the goodness of God in -the fact that the various classes or species of animals and plants are -provided with whatever they need for their preservation and welfare. -Nor is man excepted, who, both as an individual and as a nation, -possesses partly in the given circumstances of climate, of quality -and products of soil, and partly in his natural parts or talents, all -that is required for his maintenance and development. Under this shape -Understanding is visible in every department of the objective world; -and no object in that world can ever be wholly perfect which does -not give full satisfaction to the canons of understanding. A state, -for example, is imperfect,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> so long as it has not reached a clear -differentiation of orders and callings, and so long as those functions -of politics and government, which are different in principle, have not -evolved for themselves special organs, in the same way as we see, for -example, the developed animal organism provided with separate organs -for the functions of sensation, motion, digestion, &c.</p> - -<p class="block2">The previous course of the discussion may serve to show, that -understanding is indispensable even in those spheres and regions of -action which the popular fancy would deem furthest from it, and that in -proportion as understanding, is absent from them, imperfection is the -result. This particularly holds good of Art, Religion, and Philosophy. -In Art, for example, understanding is visible where the forms of -beauty, which differ in principle, are kept distinct and exhibited in -their purity. The same thing holds good also of single works of art. -It is part of the beauty and perfection of a dramatic poem that the -characters of the several persons should be closely and faithfully -maintained, and that the different aims and interests involved should -be plainly and decidedly exhibited. Or again, take the province of -Religion. The superiority of Greek over Northern mythology (apart from -other differences of subject-matter and conception) mainly consists in -this: that in the former the individual gods are fashioned into forms -of sculpture-like distinctness of outline, while in the latter the -figures fade away vaguely and hazily into one another. Lastly comes -Philosophy. That Philosophy never can get on without the understanding -hardly calls for special remark after what has been said. Its foremost -requirement is that every thought shall be grasped in its full -precision, and nothing allowed to remain vague and indefinite.</p> - -<p class="block2">It is usually added that understanding must not go too far. Which is -so far correct, that understanding is not an ultimate, but on the -contrary finite, and so constituted that when carried to extremes it -veers round to its opposite. It is the fashion of youth to dash about -in abstractions: but the man who has learnt to know life steers clear -of the abstract 'either—or,' and keeps to the concrete.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span></p> - -<p>81.] (ß) In the Dialectical stage these finite characterisations or -formulae supersede themselves, and pass into their opposites.</p> - -<p>(1) But when the Dialectical principle is employed by the understanding -separately and independently,—especially as seen in its application -to philosophical theories, Dialectic becomes Scepticism; in which the -result that ensues from its action is presented as a mere negation.</p> - -<p>(2) It is customary to treat Dialectic as an adventitious art, which -for very wantonness introduces confusion and a mere semblance of -contradiction into definite notions. And in that light, the semblance -is the nonentity, while the true reality is supposed to belong to the -original dicta of understanding. Often, indeed, Dialectic is nothing -more than a subjective see-saw of arguments <i>pro</i> and <i>con,</i> where -the absence of sterling thought is disguised by the subtlety which -gives birth to such arguments. But in its true and proper character. -Dialectic is the very nature and essence of everything predicated by -mere understanding,—the law of things and of the finite as a whole. -Dialectic is different from 'Reflection.' In the first instance, -Reflection is that movement out beyond the isolated predicate of a -thing which gives it some reference, and brings out its relativity, -while still in other respects leaving it its isolated validity. But -by Dialectic is meant the in-dwelling tendency outwards by which the -one-sidedness and limitation of the predicates of understanding is seen -in its true light, and shown to be the negation of them. For anything -to be finite is just to suppress itself and put itself aside. Thus -understood the Dialectical principle constitutes the life and soul of -scientific progress, the dynamic which alone gives immanent connexion -and necessity to the body of science; and, in a word, is seen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> to -constitute the real and true, as opposed to the external, exaltation -above the finite.</p> - -<p class="block2">(1) It is of the highest importance to ascertain and understand rightly -the nature of Dialectic. Wherever there is movement, wherever there is -life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, -there Dialectic is at work. It is also the soul of all knowledge -which is truly scientific. In the popular way of looking at things, -the refusal to be bound by the abstract deliverances of understanding -appears as fairness, which, according to the proverb Live and let -live, demands that each should have its turn; we admit the one, but -we admit the other also. But when we look more closely, we find that -the limitations of the finite do not merely come from without; that -its own nature is the cause of its abrogation, and that by its own -act it passes into its counterpart. We say, for instance, that man is -mortal, and seem to think that the ground of his death is in external -circumstances only; so that if this way of looking were correct, man -would have two special properties, vitality and—also—mortality. But -the true view of the matter is that life, as life, involves the germ -of death, and that the finite, being radically self-contradictory, -involves its own self-suppression.</p> - -<p class="block2">Nor, again, is Dialectic to be confounded with mere Sophistry. The -essence of Sophistry lies in giving authority to a partial and abstract -principle, in its isolation, as may suit the interest and particular -situation of the individual at the time. For example, a regard to my -existence, and my having the means of existence, is a vital motive -of conduct, but if I exclusively emphasise this consideration or -motive of my welfare, and draw the conclusion that I may steal or -betray my country, we have a case of Sophistry. Similarly, it is a -vital principle in conduct that I should be subjectively free, that -is to say, that I should have an insight into what I am doing, and -a conviction that it is right. But if my pleading insists on this -principle alone I fall into Sophistry, such as would overthrow all the -principles of morality. From this sort of party-pleading Dialectic is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> -wholly different; its purpose is to study things in their own being and -movement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of the partial categories -of understanding.</p> - -<p class="block2">Dialectic, it may be added, is no novelty in philosophy. Among the -ancients Plato is termed the inventor of Dialectic; and his right to -the name rests on the fact, that the Platonic philosophy first gave -the free scientific, and thus at the same time the objective, form to -Dialectic. Socrates, as we should expect from the general character -of his philosophising, has the dialectical element in a predominantly -subjective shape, that of Irony. He used to turn his Dialectic, -first against ordinary consciousness, and then especially against -the Sophists. In his conversations he used to simulate the wish for -some clearer knowledge about the subject under discussion, and after -putting all sorts of questions with that intent, he drew on those with -whom he conversed to the opposite of what their first impressions -had pronounced correct. If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to -be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist -Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his -more strictly scientific dialogues Plato employs the dialectical method -to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. -Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one, and shows -nevertheless that the many cannot but define itself as the one. In -this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, -more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and -restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen (§ 48), -by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these -Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between -one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every -abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, -naturally veers round into its opposite.</p> - -<p class="block2">However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of -Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition if its existence -is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say -that Dialectic gives expression to a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> law which is felt in all other -grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that -surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware -that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather -changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that -Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than -what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to -turn suddenly into its opposite. We have before this (§ 80) identified -Understanding with what is implied in the popular idea of the goodness -of God; we may now remark of Dialectic, in the same objective -signification, that its principle answers to the idea of his power. -All things, we say,—that is, the finite world as such,—are doomed; -and in saying so, we have a vision of Dialectic as the universal and -irresistible power before which nothing can stay, however secure and -stable it may deem itself. The category of power does not, it is true, -exhaust the depth of the divine nature or the notion of God; but it -certainly forms a vital element in all religious consciousness.</p> - -<p class="block2">Apart from this general objectivity of Dialectic, we find traces of its -presence in each of the particular provinces and phases of the natural -and the spiritual world. Take as an illustration the motion of the -heavenly bodies. At this moment the planet stands in this spot, but -implicitly it is the possibility of being in another spot; and that -possibility of being otherwise the planet brings into existence by -moving. Similarly the 'physical' elements prove to be Dialectical. The -process of meteorological action is the exhibition of their Dialectic. -It is the same dynamic that lies at the root of every other natural -process, and, as it were, forces nature out of itself. To illustrate -the presence of Dialectic in the spiritual world, especially in the -provinces of law and morality, we have only to recollect how general -experience shows us the extreme of one state or action suddenly -shifting into its opposite: a Dialectic which is recognised in many -ways in common proverbs. Thus <i>summum jus summa injuria:</i> which means, -that to drive an abstract right to its extremity is to do a wrong. -In political life, as every one knows, extreme anarchy and extreme -despotism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> naturally lead to one another. The perception of Dialectic -in the province of individual Ethics is seen in the well-known adages, -Pride comes before a fall: Too much wit outwits itself. Even feeling, -bodily as well as mental, has its Dialectic. Every one knows how -the extremes of pain and pleasure pass into each other: the heart -overflowing with joy seeks relief in tears, and the deepest melancholy -will at times betray its presence by a smile.</p> - -<p>(2) Scepticism should not be looked upon merely as a doctrine of doubt. -It would be more correct to say that the Sceptic has no doubt of his -point, which is the nothingness of all finite existence. He who only -doubts still clings to the hope that his doubt may be resolved, and -that one or other of the definite views, between which he wavers, -will turn out solid and true. Scepticism properly so called is a -very different thing: it is complete hopelessness about all which -understanding counts stable, and the feeling to which it gives birth -is one of unbroken calmness and inward repose. Such at least is the -noble Scepticism of antiquity, especially as exhibited in the writings -of Sextus Empiricus, when in the later times of Rome it had been -systematised as a complement to the dogmatic systems of Stoic and -Epicurean. Of far other stamp, and to be strictly distinguished from -it, is the modern Scepticism already mentioned § (39), which partly -preceded the Critical Philosophy, and partly sprung out of it. That -later Scepticism consisted solely in denying the truth and certitude -of the super-sensible, and in pointing to the facts of sense and of -immediate sensations as what we have to keep to.</p> - -<p class="block2">Even to this day Scepticism is often spoken of as the irresistible -enemy of all positive knowledge, and hence of philosophy, in so far -as philosophy is concerned with positive knowledge. But in these -statements there is a misconception. It is only the finite thought -of abstract understanding which has to fear Scepticism, because -unable to withstand it: philosophy includes the sceptical principle -as a subordinate function of its own, in the shape of Dialectic. In -contradistinction to mere Scepticism, however, philosophy does not -remain content with the purely negative result of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> Dialectic. The -sceptic mistakes the true value of his result, when he supposes it to -be no more than a negation pure and simple. For the negative, which -emerges as the result of dialectic, is, because a result, at the same -time the positive: it contains what it results from, absorbed into -itself, and made part of its own nature. Thus conceived, however, the -dialectical stage has the features characterising the third grade of -logical truth, the speculative form, or form of positive reason.</p> - -<p>82.] (y) The Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, -apprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition,—the -affirmative, which is involved in their disintegration and in their -transition.</p> - -<p>(1) The result of Dialectic is positive, because it has a definite -content, or because its result is not empty and abstract nothing, but -the negation of certain specific propositions which are contained in -the result,—for the very reason that it is a resultant and not an -immediate nothing. (2) It follows from this that the 'reasonable' -result, though it be only a thought and abstract, is still a concrete, -being not a plain formal unity, but a unity of distinct propositions. -Bare abstractions or formal thoughts are therefore no business of -philosophy, which has to deal only with concrete thoughts. (3) The -logic of mere Understanding is involved in Speculative logic, and -can at will be elicited from it, by the simple process of omitting -the dialectical and 'reasonable' element. When that is done, it -becomes what the common logic is, a descriptive collection of sundry -thought-forms and rules which, finite though they are, are taken to be -something infinite.</p> - -<p class="block2">If we consider only what it contains, and not how it contains it, -the true reason-world, so far from being the exclusive property of -philosophy, is the right of every human being on whatever grade of -culture or mental growth he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> may stand; which would justify man's -ancient title of rational being. The general mode by which experience -first makes us aware of the reasonable order of things is by accepted -and unreasoned belief; and the character of the rational, as already -noted (§ 45), is to be unconditioned, and thus to be self-contained, -self-determining. In this sense man above all things becomes aware of -the reasonable order, when he knows of God, and knows Him to be the -completely self-determined. Similarly, the consciousness a citizen has -of his country and its laws is a perception of the reason-world, so -long as he looks up to them as unconditioned and likewise universal -powers, to which he must subject his individual will. And in the same -sense, the knowledge and will of the child is rational, when he knows -his parents' will, and wills it.</p> - -<p class="block2">Now, to turn these rational (of course positively-rational) realities -into speculative principles, the only thing needed is that they be -<i>thought.</i> The expression 'Speculation' in common life is often used -with a very vague and at the same time secondary sense, as when we -speak of a matrimonial or a commercial speculation. By this we only -mean two things: first, that what is immediately at hand has to be -passed and left behind; and secondly, that the subject-matter of such -speculations, though in the first place only subjective, must not -remain so, but be realised or translated into objectivity.</p> - -<p class="block2">What was some time ago remarked respecting the Idea, may be applied -to this common usage of the term 'speculation': and we may add that -people who rank themselves amongst the educated expressly speak of -speculation even as if it were something purely subjective. A certain -theory of some conditions and circumstances of nature or mind may be, -say these people, very fine and correct as a matter of speculation, -but it contradicts experience and nothing of the sort is admissible in -reality. To this the answer is, that the speculative is in its true -signification, neither preliminarily nor even definitively, something -merely subjective: that, on the contrary, it expressly rises above -such oppositions as that between subjective and objective, which the -understanding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> cannot get over, and absorbing them in itself, evinces -its own concrete and all-embracing nature. A one-sided proposition -therefore can never even give expression to a speculative truth. If -we say, for example, that the absolute is the unity of subjective and -objective, we are undoubtedly in the right, but so far one-sided, as we -enunciate the unity only and lay the accent upon it, forgetting that in -reality the subjective and objective are not merely identical but also -distinct.</p> - -<p class="block2">Speculative truth, it may also be noted, means very much the same as -what, in special connexion with religious experience and doctrines, -used to be called Mysticism. The term Mysticism is at present used, -as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible: and -in proportion as their general culture and way of thinking vary, the -epithet is applied by one class to denote the real and the true, by -another to name everything connected with superstition and deception. -On which we first of all remark that there is mystery in the mystical, -only however for the understanding which is ruled by the principle -of abstract identity; whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the -speculative, is the concrete unity of those propositions, which -understanding only accepts in their separation and opposition. And if -those who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content to leave -it in its original utter mystery, their conduct only proves that for -them too, as well as for their antagonists, thinking means abstract -identification, and that in their opinion, therefore, truth can only be -won by renouncing thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading -the reason captive. But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of -understanding is so far from being either ultimate or stable, that it -shows a perpetual tendency to work its own dissolution and swing round -into its opposite. Reasonableness, on the contrary, just, consists in -embracing within itself these opposites as unsubstantial elements. Thus -the reason-world may be equally styled mystical,—not however because -thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies -beyond the compass of understanding.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span></p> - -<p>83.] Logic is subdivided into three parts:—</p> - -<p>I. The Doctrine of Being:</p> - -<p>II. The Doctrine of Essence:</p> - -<p>III. The Doctrine of Notion and Idea.</p> - -<p>That is, into the Theory of Thought:</p> - -<p>I. In its immediacy: the notion implicit and in germ.</p> - -<p>II. In its reflection and mediation: the being-for-self and show of the -notion.</p> - -<p>III. In its return into itself, and its developed abiding by itself: -the notion in and for itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">The division of Logic now given, as well as the whole of the previous -discussion on the nature of thought, is anticipatory: and the -justification, or proof of it, can only result from the detailed -treatment of thought itself. For in philosophy, to prove means to -show how the subject by and from itself makes itself what it is. The -relation in which these three leading grades of thought, or of the -logical Idea, stand to each other must be conceived as follows. Truth -comes only with the notion: or, more precisely, the notion is the -truth of being and essence, both of which, when separately maintained -in their isolation, cannot but be untrue, the former because it is -exclusively immediate, and the latter because it is exclusively -mediate. Why then, it may be asked, begin with the false and not at -once with the true? To which we answer that truth, to deserve the name, -must authenticate its own truth: which authentication, here within the -sphere of logic, is given, when the notion demonstrates itself to be -what is mediated by and with itself, and thus at the same time to be -truly immediate. This relation between the three stages of the logical -Idea appears in a real and concrete shape thus: God, who is the truth, -is known by us in His truth, that is, as absolute spirit, only in so -far as we at the same time recognise that the world which He created, -nature and the finite spirit, are, in their difference from God, -untrue.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII.</a></h5> - - -<h4>FIRST SUB-DIVISION OF LOGIC.</h4> - - -<h5>THE DOCTRINE OF BEING.</h5> - - -<p>84.] Being is the notion implicit only: its special forms have the -predicate 'is'; when they are distinguished they are each of them an -'other': and the shape which dialectic takes in them, <i>i.e.</i> their -further specialisation, is a passing over into another. This further -determination, or specialisation, is at once a forth-putting and in -that way a disengaging of the notion implicit in being; and at the -same time the withdrawing of being inwards, its sinking deeper into -itself. Thus the explication of the notion in the sphere of being does -two things: it brings out the totality of being, and it abolishes the -immediacy of being, or the form of being as such.</p> - -<p>85.] Being itself and the special sub-categories of it which -follow, as well as those of logic in general, may be looked upon as -definitions of the Absolute, or metaphysical definitions of God: at -least the first and third category in every triad may,—the first, -where the thought-form of the triad is formulated in its simplicity, -and the third, being the return from differentiation to a simple -self-reference. For a metaphysical definition of God is the expression -of His nature in thoughts as such: and logic embraces all thoughts so -long as they continue in the thought-form. The second sub-category in -each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> triad, where the grade of thought is in its differentiation, -gives, on the other hand, a definition of the finite. The objection to -the form of definition is that it implies a something in the mind's eye -on which these predicates may fasten. Thus even the Absolute (though -it purports to express God in the style and character of thought) in -comparison with its predicate (which really and distinctly expresses -in thought what the subject does not), is as yet only an inchoate -pretended thought—the indeterminate subject of predicates yet to -come. The thought, which is here the matter of sole importance, is -contained only in the predicate: and hence the propositional form, like -the said subject, viz. the Absolute, is a mere superfluity (cf. § 31, -and below, on the Judgment).</p> - -<p class="block2">Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic -whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case -with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity, and -measure. Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with -being: so identical, that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses -its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external -to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus <i>e.g.</i> a house -remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains -red, whether it be brighter or darker. Measure, the third grade of -being, which is the unity of the first two, is a qualitative quantity. -All things have their measure: <i>i.e.</i> the quantitative terms of their -existence, their being so or so great, does not matter within certain -limits; but when these limits are exceeded by an additional more or -less, the things cease to be what they were. From measure follows the -advance to the second sub-division of the idea, Essence.</p> - -<p class="block2">The three forms of being here mentioned, just because they are the -first, are also the poorest, <i>i.e.</i> the most abstract. Immediate -(sensible) consciousness, in so far as it simultaneously includes -an intellectual element, is especially restricted to the abstract -categories of quality and quantity.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> The sensuous consciousness is in -ordinary estimation the most concrete and thus also the richest; but -that is only true as regards materials, whereas, in reference to the -thought it contains, it is really the poorest and most abstract.</p> - - -<h5>A.—QUALITY.</h5> - -<p class="center">(a) <b>Being</b>.</p> - -<p>86.] Pure <b>Being</b> makes the beginning: because it is on one hand pure -thought, and on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate; -and the first beginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further -determined.</p> - -<p>All doubts and admonitions, which might be brought against beginning -the science with abstract empty being, will disappear, if we only -perceive what a beginning naturally implies. It is possible to define -being as 'I = I,' as 'Absolute Indifference' or Identity, and so on. -Where it is felt necessary to begin either with what is absolutely -certain, <i>i.e.</i> the certainty of oneself, or with a definition or -intuition of the absolute truth, these and other forms of the kind -may be looked on as if they must be the first. But each of these -forms contains a mediation, and hence cannot be the real first: for -all mediation implies advance made from a first on to a second, and -proceeding from something different. If I = I, or even the intellectual -intuition, are really taken to mean no more than the first, they are in -this mere immediacy identical with being: while conversely, pure being, -if abstract no longer, but including in it mediation, is pure thought -or intuition.</p> - -<p>If we enunciate Being as a predicate of the Absolute, we get the first -definition of the latter. The Absolute is Being. This is (in thought) -the absolutely initial definition, the most abstract and stinted. -It is the definition given by the Eleatics, but at the same time is -also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> the well-known definition of God as the sum of all realities. It -means, in short, that we are to set aside that limitation which is in -every reality, so that God shall be only the real in all reality, the -superlatively real. Or, if we reject reality, as implying a reflection, -we get a more immediate or unreflected statement of the same thing, -when Jacobi says that the God of Spinoza is the <i>principium</i> of being -in all existence.</p> - -<p class="block2">(1) When thinking is to begin, we have nothing but thought in its -merest indeterminateness: for we cannot determine unless there is -both one and another; and in the beginning there is yet no other. The -indeterminate, as we here have it, is the blank we begin with, not a -featurelessness reached by abstraction, not the elimination of all -character, but the original featurelessness which precedes all definite -character and is the very first of all. And this we call Being. It is -not to be felt, or perceived by sense, or pictured in imagination: -it is only and merely thought, and as such it forms the beginning. -Essence also is indeterminate, but in another sense: it has traversed -the process of mediation and contains implicit the determination it has -absorbed.</p> - -<p class="block2">(2) In the history of philosophy the different stages of the logical -Idea assume the shape of successive systems, each based on a particular -definition of the Absolute. As the logical Idea is seen to unfold -itself in a process from the abstract to the concrete, so in the -history of philosophy the earliest systems are the most abstract, and -thus at the same time the poorest. The relation too of the earlier -to the later; systems of philosophy is much like the relation of the -corresponding stages of the logical Idea: in other words, the earlier -are preserved in the later; but subordinated and submerged. This is -the true meaning of a much misunderstood phenomenon in the history of -philosophy—the refutation of one system by another, of an earlier by -a later. Most commonly the refutation is taken in a purely negative -sense to mean that the system refuted has ceased to count for anything, -has been set aside and done for. Were it so, the history of philosophy -would be of all studies most saddening,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> displaying, as it does, -the refutation of every system which time has brought forth. Now, -although it may be admitted that every philosophy has been refuted, -it must be in an equal degree maintained, that no philosophy has been -refuted, nay, or can be refuted. And that in two ways. For first, -every philosophy that deserves the name always embodies the Idea: and -secondly, every system represents one particular factor or particular -stage in the evolution of the Idea. The refutation of a philosophy, -therefore, only means that its barriers are crossed, and its special -principle reduced to a factor in the completer principle that follows. -Thus the history of philosophy, in its true meaning, deals not with a -past, but with an eternal and veritable present: and, in its results, -resembles not a museum of the aberrations of the human intellect, -but a Pantheon of Godlike figures. These figures of Gods are the -various stages of the Idea, as they come forward one after another in -dialectical development. To the historian of philosophy it belongs to -point out more precisely, how far the gradual evolution of his theme -coincides with, or swerves from, the dialectical unfolding of the pure -logical Idea. It is sufficient to mention here, that logic begins -where the proper history of philosophy begins. Philosophy began in the -Eleatic school, especially with Parmenides. Parmenides, who conceives -the absolute as Being, says that 'Being alone is and Nothing is not.' -Such was the true starting-point of philosophy, which is always -knowledge by thought: and here for the first time we find pure thought -seized and made an object to itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">Men indeed thought from the beginning: (for thus only were they -distinguished from the animals). But thousands of years had to elapse -before they came to apprehend thought in its purity, and to see in it -the truly objective. The Eleatics are celebrated as daring thinkers. -But this nominal admiration is often accompanied by the remark that -they went too far, when they made Being alone true, and denied the -truth of every other object of consciousness. We must go further than -mere Being, it is true: and yet it is absurd to speak of the other -contents of our consciousness as somewhat as it were outside and beside -Being, or to say that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> there are other things, as well as Being. The -true state of the case is rather as follows. Being, as Being, is -nothing fixed or ultimate: it yields to dialectic and sinks into its -opposite, which, also taken immediately, is Nothing. After all, the -point is, that Being is the first pure Thought; whatever else you may -begin with (the I = I, the absolute indifference, or God Himself), -you begin with a figure of materialised conception, not a product of -thought; and that, so far as its thought content is concerned, such -beginning is merely Being.</p> - -<p>87.] But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the -absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just -<b>Nothing</b>.</p> - -<p>(1) Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute; the -Absolute is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying -that the thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form -and so without content,—or in saying that God is only the supreme -Being and nothing more; for this is really declaring Him to be the same -negativity as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal -principle, as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same -abstraction.</p> - -<p>(2) If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being -and Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate -the attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into -Nothing. With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of -discovering some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from -Nothing. Thus we find Being identified with what persists amid all -change, with <i>matter,</i> susceptible of innumerable determinations,—or -even, unreflectingly, with a single existence, any chance object of -the senses or of the mind. But every additional and more concrete -characterisation causes Being to lose that integrity and simplicity it -has in the beginning. Only in, and by virtue of, this mere generality -is it Nothing, something<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> inexpressible, whereof the distinction from -Nothing is a mere intention or <i>meaning.</i></p> - -<p>All that is wanted is to realise that these beginnings are nothing but -these empty abstractions, one as empty as the other. The instinct that -induces us to attach a settled import to Being, or to both, is the very -necessity which leads to the onward movement of Being and Nothing, -and gives them a true or concrete significance. This advance is the -logical deduction and the movement of thought exhibited in the sequel. -The reflection which finds a profounder connotation for Being and -Nothing is nothing but logical thought, through which such connotation -is evolved, not, however, in an accidental, but a necessary way. Every -signification, therefore, in which they afterwards appear, is only a -more precise specification and truer definition of the Absolute. And -when that is done, the mere abstract Being and Nothing are replaced -by a concrete in which both these elements form an organic part.—The -supreme form of Nought as a separate principle would be Freedom: but -Freedom is negativity in that stage, when it sinks self-absorbed to -supreme intensity, and is itself an affirmation, and even absolute -affirmation.</p> - -<p class="block2">The distinction between Being and Nought is, in the first place, -only implicit, and not yet actually made: they only <i>ought</i> to be -distinguished. A distinction of course implies two things, and that one -of them possesses an attribute which is not found in the other. Being -however is an absolute absence of attributes, and so is Nought. Hence -the distinction between the two is only meant to be; it is a quite -nominal distinction, which is at the same time no distinction. In all -other cases of difference there is some common point which comprehends -both things. Suppose <i>e.g.</i> we speak of two different species: the -genus forms a common ground for both. But in the case of mere Being and -Nothing, distinction is without a bottom to stand upon: hence there can -be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> no distinction, both determinations being the same bottomlessness. -If it be replied that Being and Nothing are both of them thoughts, so -that thought may be reckoned common ground, the objector forgets that -Being is not a particular or definite thought, and hence, being quite -indeterminate, is a thought not to be distinguished from Nothing.—It -is natural too for us to represent Being as absolute riches, and -Nothing as absolute poverty. But if when we view the whole world we -can only say that everything <i>is,</i> and nothing more, we are neglecting -all speciality and, instead of absolute plenitude, we have absolute -emptiness. The same stricture is applicable to those who define God -to be mere Being; a definition not a whit better than that of the -Buddhists, who make God to be Nought, and who from that principle draw -the further conclusion that self-annihilation is the means by which man -becomes God.</p> - -<p>88.] Nothing, if it be thus immediate and equal to itself, is also -conversely the same as Being is. The truth of Being and of Nothing is -accordingly the unity of the two: and this unity is <b>Becoming</b>.</p> - -<p>(1) The proposition that Being and Nothing is the same seems so -paradoxical to the imagination or understanding, that it is perhaps -taken for a joke. And indeed it is one of the hardest things thought -expects itself to do: for Being and Nothing exhibit the fundamental -contrast in all its immediacy,—that is, without the one term being -invested with any attribute which would involve its connexion with -the other. This attribute however, as the above paragraph points out, -is implicit in them—the attribute which is just the same in both. So -far the deduction of their unity is completely analytical: indeed the -whole progress of philosophising in every case, if it be a methodical, -that is to say a necessary, progress, merely renders explicit what -is implicit in a notion.—It is as correct however to say that Being -and Nothing are altogether different, as to assert their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> unity. The -one is <i>not</i> what the other is. But since the distinction has not at -this point assumed definite shape (Being and Nothing are still the -immediate), it is, in the way that they have it, something unutterable, -which we merely <i>mean.</i></p> - -<p>(2) No great expenditure of wit is needed to make fun of the maxim that -Being and Nothing are the same, or rather to adduce absurdities which, -it is erroneously asserted, are the consequences and illustrations of -that maxim.</p> - -<p>If Being and Nought are identical, say these objectors, it follows that -it makes no difference whether my home, my property, the air I breathe, -this city, the sun, the law, mind, God, are or are not. Now in some of -these cases, the objectors foist in private aims, the utility a thing -has for me, and then ask, whether it be all the same to me if the -thing exist and if it do not. For that matter indeed, the teaching of -philosophy is precisely what frees man from the endless crowd of finite -aims and intentions, by making him so insensible to them, that their -existence or non-existence is to him a matter of indifference. But it -is never to be forgotten that, once mention something substantial, and -you thereby create a connexion with other existences and other purposes -which are <i>ex hypothesi</i> worth having: and on such hypothesis it comes -to depend whether the Being and not-Being of a determinate subject are -the same or not. A substantial distinction is in these cases secretly -substituted for the empty distinction of Being and Nought. In others -of the cases referred to, it is virtually absolute existences and -vital ideas and aims, which are placed under the mere category of -Being or not-Being. But there is more to be said of these concrete -objects, than that they merely are or are not. Barren abstractions, -like Being and Nothing—the initial categories which,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> for that reason, -are the scantiest anywhere to be found—are utterly inadequate to -the nature of these objects. Substantial truth is something far -above these abstractions and their oppositions.—And always when a -concrete existence is disguised under the name of Being and not-Being, -empty-headedness makes its usual mistake of speaking about, and having -in the mind an image of, something else than what is in question: and -in this place the question is about abstract Being and Nothing.</p> - -<p>(3) It may perhaps be said that nobody can form a notion of the -unity of Being and Nought. As for that, the notion of the unity is -stated in the sections preceding, and that is all: apprehend that, -and you have comprehended this unity. What the objector really means -by comprehension—by a notion—is more than his language properly -implies: he wants a richer and more complex state of mind, a pictorial -conception which will propound the notion as a concrete case and one -more familiar to the ordinary operations of thought. And so long as -incomprehensibility means only the want of habituation for the effort -needed to grasp an abstract thought, free from all sensuous admixture, -and to seize a speculative truth, the reply to the criticism is, that -philosophical knowledge is undoubtedly distinct in kind from the -mode of knowledge best known in common life, as well as from that -which reigns in the other sciences. But if to have no notion merely -means that we cannot represent in imagination the oneness of Being -and Nought, the statement is far from being true; for every one has -countless ways of envisaging this unity. To say that we have no such -conception can only mean, that in none of these images do we recognise -the notion in question, and that we are not aware that they exemplify -it. The readiest example of it is Becoming.; Every one has a mental -idea of Becoming, and will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> even allow that it is <i>one</i> idea: he will -further allow that, when it is analysed, it involves the attribute -of Being, and also what is the very reverse of Being, viz. Nothing: -and that these two attributes lie undivided in the one idea: so that -Becoming is the unity of Being and Nothing.—Another tolerably plain -example is a Beginning. In its beginning, the thing is not yet, but -it is more than merely nothing, for its Being is already in the -beginning. Beginning is itself a case of Becoming; only the former term -is employed with an eye to the further advance.—If we were to adapt -logic to the more usual method of the sciences, we might start with the -representation of a Beginning as abstractly thought, or with Beginning -as such, and then analyse this representation, and perhaps people -would more readily admit, as a result of this analysis, that Being and -Nothing present themselves as undivided in unity.</p> - -<p>(4) It remains to note that such phrases as 'Being and Nothing are -the same,' or 'The unity of Being and Nothing'—like all other -such unities, that of subject and object, and others—give rise to -reasonable objection. They misrepresent the facts, by giving an -exclusive prominence to the unity, and leaving the difference which -undoubtedly exists in it (because it is Being and Nothing, for example, -the unity of which is declared) without any express mention or notice. -It accordingly seems as if the diversity had been unduly put out of -court and neglected. The fact is, no speculative principle can be -correctly expressed by any such propositional form, for the unity has -to be conceived <i>in</i> the diversity, which is all the while present and -explicit. 'To become' is the true expression for the resultant of 'To -be' and 'Not to be'; it is the unity of the two; but not only is it -the unity, it is also inherent unrest,—the unity, which is no mere -reference-to-self and therefore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> without movement, but which, through -the diversity of Being and Nothing that is in it, is at war within -itself.—Determinate being, on the other hand, is this unity, or -Becoming in this form of unity: hence all that 'is there and so,' is -one-sided and finite. The opposition between the two factors seems to -have vanished; it is only implied in the unity, it is not explicitly -put in it.</p> - -<p>(5) The maxim of Becoming, that Being is the passage into Nought, -and Nought the passage into Being, is controverted by the maxim of -Pantheism, the doctrine of the eternity of matter, that from nothing -comes nothing, and that something can only come out of something. The -ancients saw plainly that the maxim, 'From nothing comes nothing, -from something something,' really abolishes Becoming: for what it -comes from and what it becomes are one and the same. Thus explained, -the proposition is the maxim of abstract identity as upheld by the -understanding. It cannot but seem strange, therefore, to hear such -maxims as, 'Out of nothing comes nothing: Out of something comes -something,' calmly taught in these days, without the teacher being in -the least aware that they are the basis of Pantheism, and even without -his knowing that the ancients have exhausted all that is to be said -about them.</p> - -<p class="block2">Becoming is the first concrete thought, and therefore the first -notion: whereas Being and Nought are empty abstractions. The notion -of Being, therefore, of which we sometimes speak, must mean Becoming; -not the mere point of Being, which is empty Nothing, any more than -Nothing, which is empty Being. In Being then we have Nothing, and in -Nothing Being: but this Being which does not lose itself in Nothing -is Becoming. Nor must we omit the distinction, while we emphasise the -unity of Becoming: without that distinction we should once more return -to abstract Being. Becoming is only the explicit statement of what -Being is in its truth.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span></p> - -<p class="block2">We often hear it maintained that thought is opposed to being. Now in -the face of such a statement, our first question ought to be, what is -meant by being. If we understand being as it is defined by reflection, -all that we can say of it is that it is what is wholly identical and -affirmative. And if we then look at thought, it cannot escape us that -thought also is at least what is absolutely identical with itself. Both -I therefore, being as well as thought, have the same attribute. -This identity of being and thought is not however to be I taken in -a concrete sense, as if we could say that a stone, so far as it has -being, is the same as a thinking man. A concrete thing is always very -different from the abstract category as such. And in the case of being, -we are speaking of nothing concrete: for being is the utterly abstract. -So far then the question regarding the <i>being</i> of God—a being which is -in itself concrete above all measure—is of slight importance.</p> - -<p class="block2">As the first concrete thought-term, Becoming is the first adequate -vehicle of truth. In the history of philosophy, this stage of the -logical Idea finds its analogue in the system of Heraclitus. When -Heraclitus says 'All is flowing' (πάντα ῥεῖ), he enunciates Becoming -as the fundamental feature of all existence, whereas the Eleatics, -as already remarked, saw the only truth in Being, rigid processless -Being. Glancing at the principle of the Eleatics, Heraclitus then goes -on to say: Being no more is than not-Being (οὐδὲν μᾶλλon τὸ όν τοῦ μὴ -ὅντos ἐστί): a statement expressing the negativity of abstract Being, -and its identity with not-Being, as made explicit in Becoming: both -abstractions being alike untenable. This maybe looked at as an instance -of the real refutation of one system by another. To refute a Philosophy -is to exhibit the dialectical movement in its principle, and thus -reduce it to a constituent member of a higher concrete form of the? -Idea. Even Becoming however, taken at its best on its own ground, is an -extremely poor term: it needs to grow in depth and weight of meaning. -Such deepened force we find <i>e.g.</i> in Life. Life is a Becoming; but -that is not enough to exhaust the notion of life. A still higher form -is found in Mind. Here too is Becoming, but richer and more intensive -than mere logical Becoming. The elements, whose<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> unity constitutes -mind, are not the bare abstracts of Being and of Nought, but the system -of the logical Idea and of Nature.</p> - -<p class="center">(b) <b>Being Determinate.</b></p> - -<p>89.] In Becoming the Being which is one with Nothing, and the Nothing -which is one with Being, are only vanishing factors; they are and -they are not. Thus by its inherent contradiction Becoming collapses -into the unity in which the two elements are absorbed. This result is -accordingly <b>Being Determinate</b> (Being there and so).</p> - -<p>In this first example we must call to mind, once for all, what was -stated in § 82 and in the note there: the only way to secure any growth -and progress in knowledge is to hold results fast in their truth. There -is absolutely nothing whatever in which we cannot and must not point -to contradictions or opposite attributes; and the abstraction made by -understanding therefore means a forcible insistence on a single aspect, -and a real effort to obscure and remove all consciousness of the other -attribute which is involved. Whenever such contradiction, then, is -discovered in any object or notion, the usual inference is, <i>Hence</i> -this object is <i>nothing.</i> Thus Zeno, who first showed the contradiction -native to motion, concluded that there is no motion: and the ancients, -who recognised origin and decease, the two species of Becoming, as -untrue categories, made use of the expression that the One or Absolute -neither arises nor perishes. Such a style of dialectic looks only at -the negative aspect of its result, and fails to notice, what is at the -same time really present, the definite result, in the present case a -pure nothing, but a Nothing which includes Being, and, in like manner, -a Being which includes Nothing. Hence Being Determinate is (1) the -unity of Being and Nothing, in which we get rid<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> of the immediacy in -these determinations, and their contradiction vanishes in their mutual -connexion,—the unity in which they are only constituent elements. And -(2) since the result is the abolition of the contradiction, it comes -in the shape of a simple unity with itself: that is to say, it also -is Being, but Being with negation or determinateness: it is Becoming -expressly put in the form of one of its elements, viz. Being.</p> - -<p class="block2">Even our ordinary conception of Becoming implies that somewhat -comes out of it, and that Becoming therefore has a result. But this -conception gives rise to the question, how Becoming does not remain -mere Becoming, but has a result The answer to this question follows -from what Becoming has already shown itself to be. Becoming always -contains Being and Nothing in such a way, that these two are always -changing into each other, and reciprocally cancelling each other. -Thus Becoming stands before us in utter restlessness—unable however -to maintain itself in this abstract restlessness: for since Being and -Nothing vanish in Becoming (and that is the very notion of Becoming), -the latter must vanish also. Becoming is as it were a fire, which -dies out in itself, when it consumes its material. The result of this -process however is not an empty Nothing but Being identical with the -negation,—what we call Being Determinate (being then and there): the -primary import of which evidently is that it <i>has become.</i></p> - -<p>90.] (α) Determinate Being is Being with a character or mode—which -simply <i>is</i>; and such un-mediated character is <b>Quality</b>. And as -reflected into itself in this its character or mode, Determinate Being -is a somewhat, an existent.—The categories, which issue by a closer -analysis of Determinate Being, need only be mentioned briefly.</p> - -<p class="block2">Quality may be described as the determinate mode immediate and -identical with Being—as distinguished from Quantity (to come -afterwards), which, although a mode of Being,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> is no longer immediately -identical with Being, but a mode indifferent and external to it. A -Something is what it is in virtue of its quality, and losing its -quality it ceases to be what it is. Quality, moreover, is completely a -category only of the finite, and for that reason too it has its proper -place in Nature, not in the world of Mind. Thus, for example, in Nature -what are styled the elementary bodies, oxygen, nitrogen, &c., should -be regarded as existing qualities. But in the sphere of mind, Quality -appears in a subordinate way only, and not as if its qualitativeness -could exhaust any specific aspect of mind. If, for example, we consider -the subjective mind, which forms the object of psychology, we may -describe what is called (moral and mental) character, as in logical -language identical with Quality. This however does not mean that -character is a mode of being which pervades the soul and is immediately -identical with it, as is the case in the natural world with the -elementary bodies before mentioned. Yet a more distinct manifestation -of Quality as such, in mind even, is found in the case of besotted or -morbid conditions, especially in states of passion and when the passion -rises to derangement. The state of mind of a deranged person, being one -mass of jealousy, fear, &c., may suitably be described as Quality.</p> - -<p>91.] Quality, as determinateness which <i>is,</i> as contrasted with the -<b>Negation</b> which is involved in it but distinguished from it, is -<b>Reality</b>. Negation is no longer an abstract nothing, but, as -a determinate being and somewhat, is only a form on such being—it -is as Otherness. Since this otherness, though a determination of -Quality itself, is in the first instance distinct from it, Quality is -<b>Being-for-another</b>—an expansion of the mere point of Determinate -Being, or of Somewhat. The Being as such of Quality, contrasted with -this reference to somewhat else, is <b>Being-by-self</b>.</p> - -<p class="block2">The foundation of all determinateness is negation (as Spinoza says, -<i>Omnis determinatio est negatio</i>). The unreflecting observer supposes -that determinate things are merely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> positive, and pins them down under -the form of being. Mere being however is not the end of the matter:—it -is, as we have already seen, utter emptiness and instability besides. -Still, when abstract being is contused in this way with being modified -and determinate, it implies some perception of the fact that, though -in determinate being there is involved an element of negation, this -element is at first wrapped up, as it were, and only comes to the -front and receives its due in Being-for-self.—If we go on to consider -determinate Being as a determinateness which <i>is,</i> we get in this way -what is called Reality. We speak, for example, of the reality of a -plan or a purpose, meaning thereby that they are no longer inner and -subjective, but have passed into being-there-and-then. In the same -sense the body may be called the reality of the soul, and the law the -reality of freedom, and the world altogether the reality of the divine -idea. The word 'reality' is however used in another acceptation to mean -that something behaves conformably to its essential characteristic or -notion. For example, we use the expression: This is a real occupation: -This is a real man. Here the term does not merely mean outward and -immediate existence: but rather that some existence agrees with its -notion. In which sense, be it added, reality is not distinct from the -ideality which we shall in the first instance become acquainted with in -the shape of Being-for-self.</p> - -<p>92.] (ß) Being, if kept distinct and apart from its determinate -mode, as it is in Being-by-self (Being implicit), would be only the -vacant abstraction of Being. In Being (determinate there and then), -the determinateness is one with Being; yet at the same time, when -explicitly made a negation, it is a <b>Limit</b>, a Barrier. Hence the -otherness is not something indifferent and outside it, but a function -proper to it. Somewhat is by its quality,—firstly finite,—secondly -<b>alterable</b>; so that finitude and variability appertain to its being.</p> - -<p class="block2">In Being-there-and-then, the negation is still directly one with the -Being, and this negation is what we call a Limit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> (Boundary). A thing -is what it is, only in and by reason of its limit. We cannot therefore -regard the limit as only paternal to being which is then and there. It -rather goes through and through the whole of such existence. The view -of limit, as merely an external characteristic of being-there-and-then, -arises from a confusion of quantitative with qualitative limit. Here -we are speaking primarily of the qualitative limit. If, for example, -we observe a piece of ground, three acres large, that circumstance is -its quantitative limit. But, in addition, the ground is, it may be, a -meadow, not a wood or a pond. This is its qualitative limit.—Man, -if he wishes to be actual, must be-there-and-then, and to this end he -must set a limit to himself. People who are too fastidious towards the -finite never reach actuality, but linger lost in abstraction, and their -light dies away.</p> - -<p class="block2">If we take a closer look at what a limit implies, we see it involving a -contradiction in itself, and thus evincing its dialectical nature. On -the one side the limit makes the reality of a thing; on the other it -is its negation. But, again, the limit, as the negation of something, -is not an abstract nothing but a nothing which <i>is,—</i>what we call an -'other.' Given something, and up starts an other to us: we know that -there is not something only, but an other as well. Nor, again, is the -other of such a nature that we can think something apart from it; a -something is implicitly the other of itself, and the somewhat sees -its limit become objective to it in the other. If we now ask for the -difference between something and another, it turns out that they are -the same: which sameness is expressed in Latin by calling the pair -<i>aliud—aliud.</i> The other, as opposed to the something, is itself a -something, and hence we say some other, or something else; and so on -the other hand the first something when opposed to the other, also -defined as something, is itself an other. When we say 'something -else' our first impression is that something taken separately is only -something, and that the quality of being another attaches to it only -from outside considerations. Thus we suppose that the moon, being -something else than the sun, might very well exist without the sun. -But really the moon, as a something, has its other implicit in it: -Plato<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> says: God made the world out of the nature of the 'one' and the -'other' (τοῦ ἑτέρου): having brought these together, he formed from -them a third, which is of the nature of the 'one' and the 'other.' -In these words we have in general terms a statement of the nature -of the finite, which, as something, does not meet the nature of the -other as if it had no affinity to it, but, being implicitly the other -of itself, thus undergoes alteration. Alteration thus exhibits the -inherent contradiction which originally attaches to determinate being, -and which forces it out of its own bounds. To materialised conception -existence stands in the character of something solely positive, and -quietly abiding within its own limits: though we also know, it is -true, that everything finite (such as existence) is subject to change. -Such changeableness in existence is to the superficial eye a mere -possibility, the realisation of which is not a consequence of its own -nature. But the fact is, mutability lies in the notion of existence, -and change is only the manifestation of what it implicitly is. The -living die, simply because as living they bear in themselves the germ -of death.</p> - -<p>93.] Something becomes an other: this other is itself somewhat: -therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on <i>ad infinitum.</i></p> - -<p>94.] This Infinity is the wrong or negative infinity: it is only a -negation of a finite: but the finite rises again the same as ever, and -is never got rid of and absorbed. In other words, this infinite only -expresses the <i>ought-to-be</i> elimination of the finite. The progression -to infinity never gets further than a statement of the contradiction -involved in the finite, viz. that it is somewhat as well as somewhat -else. It sets up with endless iteration the alternation between these -two terms, each of which calls up the other.</p> - -<p class="block2">If we let somewhat and another, the elements of determinate Being, -fall asunder, the result is that some becomes other, and this other -is itself a somewhat, which then as such changes likewise, and so -on <i>ad infinitum.</i> This result<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> seems to superficial reflection -something very grand, the grandest possible. Besuch a progression to -infinity is not the real infinite. That consists in being at home -with itself in its other, or, if enunciated as a process, in coming -to itself in its other. Much depends on rightly apprehending the -notion of infinity, and not stopping short at the wrong infinity of -endless progression. When time and space, for example, are spoken of -as infinite, it is in the first place the infinite progression on -which our thoughts fasten. We say, Now, This time, and then we keep -continually going forwards and backwards beyond this limit. The case -is the same with space, the infinity of which has formed the theme of -barren declamation to astronomers with a talent for edification. In the -attempt to contemplate such an infinite, our thought, we are commonly -informed, must sink exhausted. It is true indeed that we must abandon -the unending contemplation, not however because the occupation is too -sublime, but because it is too tedious. It is tedious to expatiate in -the contemplation of this infinite progression, because the same thing -is constantly recurring. We lay down a limit: then we pass it: next we -have a limit once more, and so on for ever. All this is but superficial -alternation, which never leaves the region of the finite behind. To -suppose that by stepping out and away into that infinity we release -ourselves from the finite, is in truth but to seek the release which -comes by flight. But the man who flees is not yet free: in fleeing he -is still conditioned by that from which he flees. If it be also said, -that the infinite is unattainable, the statement is true, but only -because to the idea of infinity has been attached the circumstance -of being simply and solely negative. With such empty and other world -stuff philosophy has nothing to do. What philosophy has to do with is -always—something concrete and in the highest sense present.</p> - -<p class="block2">No doubt philosophy has also sometimes been set the task of finding -an answer to the question, how the infinite comes to the resolution -of issuing out of itself. This question, founded, as it is, upon the -assumption of a rigid opposition between finite and infinite, may be -answered by saying that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> the opposition is false, and that in point -of fact the infinite eternally proceeds out of itself, and yet does -not proceed out of itself. If we further say that the infinite is the -not-finite, we have in point of fact virtually expressed the truth: -for as the finite itself is the first negative, the not-finite is the -negative of that negation, the negation which is identical with itself -and thus at the same time a true affirmation.</p> - -<p class="block2">The infinity of reflection here discussed is only an <i>attempt</i> to -reach the true Infinity, a wretched neither-one-thing-nor-another. -Generally speaking, it is the point of view which has in recent times -been emphasised in Germany. The finite, this theory tells us, <i>ought</i> -to be absorbed; the infinite <i>ought</i> not to be a negative merely, but -also a positive. That 'ought to be' betrays the incapacity of actually -making good a claim which is at the same time recognised to be right. -This stage was never passed by the systems of Kant and Fichte, so far -as ethics are concerned. The utmost to which this way brings us is only -the postulate of a never-ending approximation to the law of Reason: -which postulate has been made an argument for the immortality of the -soul.</p> - -<p>95.] (γ) What we now in point of fact have before us, is that somewhat -comes to be an other, and that the other generally comes to be an -other. Thus essentially relative to another, somewhat is virtually an -other against it: and since what is passed into is quite the same as -what passes over, since both have one and the same attribute, viz. -to be an other, it follows that something in its passage into other -only joins with itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and -in the other, is the genuine Infinity. Or, under a negative aspect: -what is altered is the other, it becomes the other of the other. Thus -Being, but as negation of the negation, is restored again: it is now -Being-for-self.</p> - -<p>Dualism, in putting an insuperable opposition between finite and -infinite, fails to note the simple circumstance that the infinite is -thereby only one of two, and is reduced to a particular, to which the -finite forms the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> other particular. Such an infinite, which is only a -particular, is co-terminous with the finite which makes for it a limit -and a barrier: it is not what it ought to be, that is, the infinite, -but is only finite. In such circumstances, where the finite is on this -side, and the infinite on that,—this world as the finite and the other -world as the infinite,—an equal dignity of permanence and independence -is ascribed to finite and to infinite. The being of the finite is made -an absolute being, and by this dualism gets independence and stability. -Touched, so to speak, by the infinite, it would be annihilated. But -it must not be touched by the infinite. There must be an abyss, an -impassable gulf between the two, with the infinite abiding on yonder -side and the finite steadfast on this. Those who attribute to the -finite this inflexible persistence in comparison with the infinite -are not, as they imagine, far above metaphysic: they are still on the -level of the most ordinary metaphysic of understanding. For the same -thing occurs here as in the infinite progression. At one time it is -admitted that the finite has no independent actuality, no absolute -being, no root and development of its own, but is only a transient. -But next moment this is straightway forgotten; the finite, made a mere -counterpart to the infinite, wholly separated from it, and rescued from -annihilation, is conceived to be persistent in its independence. While -thought thus imagines itself elevated to the infinite, it meets with -the opposite fate: it comes to an infinite which is only a finite, and -the finite, which it had left behind, has always to be retained and -made into an absolute.</p> - -<p>After this examination (with which it were well to compare Plato's -Philebus), tending to show the nullity of the distinction made by -understanding between the finite and the infinite, we are liable -to glide into the statement that the infinite and the finite are -therefore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> one, and that the genuine infinity, the truth, must be -defined and enunciated as the unity of the finite and infinite. Such -a statement would be to some extent correct; but is just as open to -perversion and falsehood as the unity of Being and Nothing already -noticed. Besides it may very fairly be charged with reducing the -infinite to finitude and making a finite infinite. For, so far as -the expression goes, the finite seems left in its place,—it is not -expressly stated to be absorbed. Or, if we reflect that the finite, -when identified with the infinite, certainly cannot remain what it -was out of such unity, and will at least suffer some change in its -characteristics—as an alkali, when combined with an acid, loses some -of its properties, we must see that, the same fate awaits the infinite, -which, as the negative, will on its part likewise have its edge, as -it were, taken off on the other. And this does really happen with the -abstract one-sided infinite of understanding. The genuine infinite -however is not merely in the position of the one-sided acid, and so -does not lose itself. The negation of negation is not a neutralisation: -the infinite is the affirmative, and it is only the finite which is -absorbed.</p> - -<p>In Being-for-self enters the category of Ideality. -Being-there-and-then, as in the first instance apprehended in its being -or affirmation, has reality (§ 91): and thus even finitude in the first -instance is in the category of reality. But the truth of the finite is -rather its ideality. Similarly, the infinite of understanding, which -is co-ordinated with the finite, is itself only one of two finites, -no whole truth, but a non-substantial element. This ideality of the -finite is the chief maxim of philosophy; and for that reason every -genuine philosophy is idealism. But everything depends upon not taking -for the infinite what, in the very terms of its characterisation, is. -at the same time made a particular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> and finite.—For this reason we -have bestowed a greater amount of attention on this distinction. The -fundamental notion of philosophy, the genuine infinite, depends upon -it. The distinction is cleared up by the simple, and for that reason -seemingly insignificant, but incontrovertible reflections, contained in -the first paragraph of this section.</p> - -<p class="center">(c) <b>Being-for-self.</b></p> - -<p>96.] (α) Being-for self, as reference to itself, is immediacy, and -as reference of the negative to itself, is a self-subsistent, the -<b>One</b>. This unit, being without distinction in itself, thus -excludes the other from itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">To be for self—to be one—is completed Quality, and as such, contains -abstract Being and Being modified as non-substantial elements. As -simple Being, the One is simple self-reference; as Being modified it -is determinate: but the determinateness is not in this case a finite -determinateness—a somewhat in distinction from an other—but infinite, -because it contains distinction absorbed and annulled in itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">The readiest instance of Being-for-self is found in the 'I.' We know -ourselves as existents, distinguished in the first place from other -existents, and with certain relations thereto. But we also come to -know this expansion of existence (in these relations) reduced, as it -were, to a point in the simple form of being-for-self. When we say 'I,' -we express the reference-to-self which is infinite, and at the same -time negative. Man, it may be said, is distinguished from the animal -world, and in that way from nature altogether, by knowing himself as -'I': which amounts to saying that natural things never attain a free -Being-for-self, but as limited to Being-there-and-then, are always and -only Being for an other.—Again, Being-for-self may be described as -ideality, just as Being-there-and-then was described as reality. It is -said, that besides reality there is <i>also</i> an ideality. Thus the two -categories are made equal and parallel. Properly speaking, ideality is -not somewhat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> outside of and beside reality: the notion of ideality -just lies in its being the truth of reality. That is to say, when -reality is explicitly put as what it implicitly is, it is at once seen -to be ideality. Hence ideality has not received its proper estimation, -when you allow that reality is not all in all, but that an ideality -must be recognised outside of it. Such an ideality, external to or it -may be even beyond reality, would be no better than an empty name. -Ideality only has a meaning when it is the ideality of something: but -this something is not a mere indefinite this or that, but existence -characterised as reality, which, if retained in isolation, possesses -no truth. The distinction between Nature and Mind is not improperly -conceived, when the former is traced back to reality, and the latter -to ideality as a fundamental category. Nature however is far from -being so fixed and complete, as to subsist even without Mind: in Mind -it first, as it were, attains its goal and its truth. And similarly, -Mind on its part is not merely a world beyond Nature and nothing more: -it is really, and with full proof, seen to be mind, only when it -involves Nature as absorbed in itself.—<i>Apropos</i> of this, we should -note the double meaning of the German word <i>aufheben</i> (to put by, or -set aside). We mean by it (1) to clear away, or annul: thus, we say, a -law or a regulation is set aside: (2) to keep, or preserve: in which -sense we use it when we say: something is well put by. This double -usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative -meaning, is not an accident, and gives no ground for reproaching -language as a cause of confusion. We should rather recognise in it the -speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere 'Either—or' -of understanding.</p> - -<p>97.] (β) The relation of the negative to itself is a negative relation, -and so a distinguishing of the One from itself, the repulsion of -the One; that is, it makes <b>Many</b> Ones. So far as regards the -immediacy of the self-existents, these Many <i>are:</i> and the repulsion of -every One of them becomes to that extent their repulsion against each -other as existing units,—in other words, their reciprocal exclusion.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span></p> - -<p class="block2">Whenever we speak of the One, the Many usually come into our mind at -the same time. Whence, then, we are forced to ask, do the Many come? -This question is unanswerable by the consciousness which pictures the -Many as a primary datum, and-treats the One as only one among the Many. -But the philosophic notion teaches, contrariwise, that the One forms -the pre-supposition of the Many: and in the thought of the One is -implied that it explicitly make itself Many. The self-existing unit is -not, like Being, void of all connective reference: it is a reference, -as well as Being-there-and-then was, not however a reference connecting -somewhat with an other, but, as unity of the some and the other, it is -a connexion with itself, and this connexion be it noted is a negative -connexion. Hereby the One manifests an utter incompatibility with -itself, a self-repulsion: and what it makes itself explicitly be, is -the Many. We may denote this side in the process of Being-for-self -by the figurative term Repulsion. Repulsion is a term originally -employed in the study of matter, to mean that matter, as a Many, in -each of these many Ones, behaves as exclusive to all the others. It -would be wrong however to view the process of repulsion, as if the -One were the repellent and the Many the repelled. The One, as already -remarked, just is self-exclusion and explicit putting itself as the -Many. Each of the Many however is itself a One, and in virtue of its so -behaving, this all-round repulsion is by one stroke converted into its -opposite,—Attraction.</p> - -<p>98.] (γ) But the Many are one the same as another: each is One, or -even one of the Many; they are consequently one and the same. Or when -we study all that <b>Repulsion</b> involves, we see that as a negative -attitude of many Ones to one another, it is just as essentially a -connective reference of them to each other; and as those to which the -One is related in its act of repulsion are ones, it is in them thrown -into relation with itself. The repulsion therefore has an equal right -to be called Attraction; and the exclusive One, or Being-for-self, -suppresses itself. The qualitative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> character, which in the One or unit -has reached the extreme point of its characterisation, has thus passed -over into determinateness (quality) suppressed, <i>i.e.</i> into Being as -Quantity.</p> - -<p>The philosophy of the Atomists is the doctrine in which the Absolute -is formulated as Being-for-self, as One, and many ones. And it is -the repulsion, which shows itself in the notion of the One, which -is assumed as the fundamental force in these atoms. But instead of -attraction, it is Accident, that is, mere unintelligence, which -is expected to bring them together. So long as the One is fixed -as one, it is certainly impossible to regard its congression with -others as anything but external and mechanical. The Void, which is -assumed as the complementary principle to the atoms, is repulsion -and nothing else, presented under the image of the nothing existing -between the atoms.—Modern Atomism—and physics is still in principle -atomistic—has surrendered the atoms so far as to pin its faith -on molecules or particles. In so doing, science has come closer -to sensuous conception, at the cost of losing the precision of -thought.—To put an attractive by the side of a repulsive force, as -the moderns have done, certainly gives completeness to the contrast: -and the discovery of this natural force, as it is called, has been a -source of much pride. But the mutual implication of the two, which -makes what is true and concrete in them, would have to be wrested from -the obscurity and confusion in which they were left even in Kant's -Metaphysical Rudiments of Natural Science.—In modern times the -importance of the atomic theory is even more evident in political than -in physical science. According to it, the will of individuals as such -is the creative principle of the State: the attracting force is the -special wants and inclinations of individuals; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> the Universal, or -the State itself, is the external nexus of a compact.</p> - -<p class="block2">The Atomic philosophy forms a vital stage in the historical -evolution of the Idea. The principle of that system may be described -as Being-for-self in the shape of the Many. At present, students of -nature who are anxious to avoid metaphysics turn a favourable ear to -Atomism. But it is not possible to escape metaphysics and cease to -trace nature back to terms of thought, by throwing ourselves into the -arms of Atomism. The atom, in fact, is itself a thought; and hence the -theory which holds matter to consist of atoms is a metaphysical theory. -Newton gave physics an express warning to beware of metaphysics, it is -true; but, to his honour be it said, he did not by any means obey his -own warning. The only mere physicists are the animals: they alone do -not think: while man is a thinking being and a born metaphysician. The -real question is not whether we shall apply metaphysics, but whether -our metaphysics are of the right kind: in other words, whether we are -not, instead of the concrete logical Idea, adopting one-sided forms of -thought, rigidly fixed by understanding, and making these the basis of -our theoretical as well as our practical work. It is on this ground -that one objects to the Atomic philosophy. The old Atomists viewed the -world as a many, as their successors often do to this day. On chance -they laid the task of collecting the atoms which float about in the -void. But, after all, the nexus binding the many with one another is -by no means a mere accident: as we have already remarked, the nexus is -founded on their very nature. To Kant we owe the completed theory of -matter as the unity of repulsion and attraction. The theory is correct, -so far as it recognises attraction to be the other of the two elements -involved in the notion of Being-for-self: and to be an element no less -essential than repulsion to constitute matter. Still this dynamical -construction of matter, as it is termed, has the fault of taking for -granted, instead of deducing, attraction and repulsion. Had they been -deduced, we should then have seen the How and the Why of a unity which -is merely asserted. Kant indeed was careful to inculcate that Matter<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> -must not be taken to be in existence <i>per se,</i> and then as it were -incidentally to be provided with the two forces mentioned, but must -be regarded as consisting solely in their unity. German physicists -for some time accepted this pure dynamic. But in spite of this, the -majority of these physicists i n modern times have found it more -convenient to return to the Atomic point of view, and in spite of the -warnings of Kästner, one of their number, have begun to regard Matter -as consisting of infinitesimally small particles, termed 'atoms'—which -atoms have then to be brought into relation with one another by the -play of forces attaching to them,—attractive, repulsive, or whatever -they may be. This too is metaphysics; and metaphysics which, for its -utter unintelligence, there would be sufficient reason to guard against.</p> - -<p class="block2">(2) The transition from Quality to Quantity, indicated in the paragraph -before us, is not found in our ordinary way of thinking, which deems -each of these categories to exist independently beside the other. We -are in the habit of saying that things are not merely qualitatively, -but also quantitatively defined; but whence these categories originate, -and how they are related to each other, are questions not further -examined. The fact is, quantity just means quality superseded and -absorbed: and it is by the dialectic of quality here examined that this -supersession is effected. First of all, we had Being: as the truth of -Being, came Becoming: which formed the passage to Being Determinate: -and the truth of that we found to be Alteration. And in its result -Alteration showed itself to be Being-for-self, exempt from implication -of another and from passage into another;—which Being-for-self, -finally, in the two sides of its process, Repulsion and Attraction, -was clearly seen to annul itself, and thereby to annul quality in the -totality of its stages. Still this superseded and absorbed quality is -neither an abstract nothing, nor an equally abstract and featureless -being: it is only being as indifferent to determinateness or character. -This aspect of being is also what appears as quantity in our ordinary -conceptions. We observe things, first of all, with an eye to their -quality—which we take to be the character identical with the being -of the thing. If we proceed to con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span>sider their quantity, we get the -conception of an indifferent and external character or mode, of such a -kind that a thing remains what it is, though its quantity is altered, -and the thing becomes greater or less.</p> - -<h5>B.—QUANTITY.</h5> - -<p class="center">(α) <i>Pure Quantity.</i></p> - -<p>99.] <b>Quantity</b> is pure being, where the mode or character is -no longer taken as one with the being itself, but explicitly put as -superseded or indifferent.</p> - -<p>(1) The expression <b>Magnitude</b> especially marks <i>determinate</i> -Quantity, and is for that reason not a suitable name for Quantity -in general. (2) Mathematics usually define magnitude as what can be -increased or diminished. This definition has the defect of containing -the thing to be defined over again: but it may serve to show that the -category of magnitude is explicitly understood to be changeable and -indifferent, so that, in spite of its being altered by an increased -extension or intension, the thing, a house, for example, does not cease -to be a house, and red to be red. (3) The Absolute is pure Quantity. -This point of view is upon the whole the same as when the Absolute is -defined to be Matter, in which, though form undoubtedly is present, the -form is a characteristic of no importance one way or another. Quantity -too constitutes the main characteristic of the Absolute, when the -Absolute is regarded as absolute indifference, and only admitting of -quantitative distinction.—Otherwise pure space, time, &c. may be taken -as examples of Quantity, if we allow ourselves to regard the real as -whatever fills up space and time, it matters not with what.</p> - -<p class="block2">The mathematical definition of magnitude as what may be increased -or diminished, appears at first sight to be more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> plausible and -perspicuous than the exposition of the notion in the present -section. When closely examined, however, it involves, under cover -of pre-suppositions and images, the same elements as appear in the -notion of quantity reached by the method of logical development. In -other words, when we say that the notion of magnitude lies in the -possibility of being increased or diminished, we state that magnitude -(or more correctly, quantity), as distinguished from quality, is a -characteristic of such kind that the characterised thing is not in the -least affected by any change in it. What then, it may be asked, is -the fault which we have to find with this definition? It is that to -increase and to diminish is the same thing as to characterise magnitude -otherwise. If this aspect then were an adequate account of it, quantity -would be described merely as whatever can be altered. But quality is -no less than quantity open to alteration; and the distinction here -given between quantity and quality is expressed by saying increase -<i>or</i> diminution: the meaning being that, towards whatever side the -determination of magnitude be altered, the thing still remains what it -is.</p> - -<p class="block2">One remark more. Throughout philosophy we do not seek merely for -correct, still less for plausible definitions, whose correctness -appeals directly to the popular imagination; we seek approved or -verified definitions, the content of which is not assumed merely as -given, but is seen and known to warrant itself, because warranted -by the free self-evolution of thought. To apply this to the present -case. However correct and self-evident the definition of quantity -usual in Mathematics may be, it will still fail to satisfy the wish to -see how far this particular thought is founded in universal thought, -and in that way necessary. This difficulty, however, is not the only -one. If quantity is not reached through the action of thought, but -taken uncritically from our generalised image of it, we are liable -to exaggerate the range of its validity, or even to raise it to the -height of an absolute category. And that such a danger is real, we see -when the title of exact science is restricted to those sciences the -objects of which can be submitted to mathematical calculation. Here we -have another trace of the bad metaphysics (mentioned in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> § 98, note) -which replace the concrete idea by partial and inadequate categories of -understanding. Our knowledge would be in a very awkward predicament if -such objects as freedom, law, morality, or even God Himself, because -they cannot be measured and calculated, or expressed in a mathematical -formula, were to be reckoned beyond the reach of exact knowledge, and -we had to put up with a vague generalised image of them, leaving their -details or particulars to the pleasure of each individual, to make -out of them what he will. The pernicious consequences, to which such -a theory gives rise in practice, are at once evident. And this mere -mathematical view, which identifies with the Idea one of its special -stages, viz. quantity, is no other than the principle of Materialism. -Witness the history of the scientific modes of thought, especially in -France since the middle of last century. Matter, in the abstract, is -just what, though of course there is form in it, has that form only as -an indifferent and external attribute.</p> - -<p class="block2">The present explanation would be utterly misconceived if it were -supposed to disparage mathematics. By calling the quantitative -characteristic merely external and indifferent, we provide no excuse -for indolence and superficiality, nor do we assert that quantitative -characteristics may be left to mind themselves, or at least require no -very careful handling. Quantity, of course, is a stage of the Idea: and -as such it must have its due, first as a logical category, and then -in the world of objects, natural as well as spiritual. Still even so, -there soon emerges the different importance attaching to the category -of quantity according as its objects belong to the natural or to the -spiritual world. For in Nature, where the form of the Idea is to be -other than, and at the same time outside, itself, greater importance is -for that very reason attached to quantity than in the spiritual world, -the world of free inwardness. No doubt we regard even spiritual facts -under a quantitative point of view; but it is at once apparent that in -speaking of God as a Trinity, the number three has by no means the same -prominence, as when we consider the three dimensions of space or the -three sides of a triangle;—the fundamental feature of which last is -just to be a surface<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> bounded by three lines. Even inside the realm of -Nature we find the same distinction of greater or less importance of -quantitative features. In the inorganic world, Quantity plays, so to -say, a more prominent part than in the organic. Even in organic nature -when we distinguish mechanical functions from what are called chemical, -and in the narrower sense, physical, there is the same difference. -Mechanics is of all branches of science, confessedly, that in which the -aid of mathematics can be least dispensed with,—where indeed we cannot -take one step without them. On that account mechanics is regarded next -to mathematics as the science <i>par excellence</i>; which leads us to -repeat the remark about the coincidence of the materialist with the -exclusively mathematical point of view. After all that has been said, -we cannot but hold it, in the interest of exact and thorough knowledge, -one of the most hurtful prejudices, to seek all distinction and -determinateness of objects merely in quantitative considerations. Mind -to be sure is more than Nature and the animal is more than the plant: -but we know very little of these objects and the distinction between -them, if a more and less is enough for us, and if we do not proceed to -comprehend them in their peculiar, that is their qualitative character.</p> - -<p>100.] Quantity, as we saw, has two sources: the exclusive unit, and -the identification or equalisation of these units. When we look -therefore at its immediate relation to self, or at the characteristic -of self-sameness made explicit by attraction, quantity is Continuous -magnitude; but when we look at the other characteristic, the One -implied in it, it is Discrete magnitude. Still continuous quantity has -also a certain discreteness, being but a continuity of the Many: and -discrete quantity is no less continuous, its continuity being the One -or Unit, that is, the self-same point of the many Ones.</p> - -<p>(1) Continuous and Discrete magnitude, therefore, must not be supposed -two species of magnitude, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> if the characteristic of the one did not -attach to the other. The only distinction between them is that the -same whole (of quantity) is at one time explicitly put under the one, -at another under the other of its characteristics. (2) The Antinomy of -space, of time, or of matter, which discusses the question of their -being divisible for ever, or of consisting of indivisible units, just -means that we maintain quantity as at one time <b>Discrete</b>, at -another Continuous. If we explicitly invest time, space, or matter with -the attribute of Continuous quantity alone, they are divisible <i>ad -infinitum.</i> When, on the contrary, they are invested with the attribute -of Discrete quantity, they are potentially divided already, and consist -of indivisible units. The one view is as inadequate as the other.</p> - -<p class="block2">Quantity, as the proximate result of Being-for-self, involves the -two sides in the process of the latter, attraction and repulsion, as -constitutive elements of its own idea. It is consequently Continuous -as well as Discrete. Each of these two elements involves the other -also, and hence there is no such thing as a merely Continuous or a -merely Discrete quantity. We may speak of the two as two particular and -opposite species of magnitude; but that is merely the result of our -abstracting reflection, which in viewing definite magnitudes waives now -the one, now the other, of the elements contained in inseparable unity -in the notion of quantity. Thus, it may be said, the space occupied by -this room is a continuous magnitude, and the hundred men, assembled -in it, form a discrete magnitude. And yet the space is continuous and -discrete at the same time; hence we speak of points of space, or we -divide space, a certain length, into so many feet, inches, &c., which -can be done only on the hypothesis that space is also potentially -discrete. Similarly, on the other hand, the discrete magnitude, made -up of a hundred men, is also continuous: and the circumstance on which -this continuity depends, is the common element, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> species man, which -pervades all the individuals and unites them with each other.</p> - -<p class="center">(b) <i>Quantum (How Much).</i></p> - -<p>101.] Quantity, essentially invested with the exclusionist character -which it involves, is <b>Quantum</b> (or How Much): <i>i.e.</i> limited -quantity.</p> - -<p class="block2">Quantum is, as it were, the determinate Being of quantity: whereas mere -quantity corresponds to abstract Being, and the Degree, which is next -to be considered, corresponds to Being-for-self. As for the details -of the advance from mere quantity to quantum, it is founded on this: -that whilst in mere quantity the distinction, as a distinction of -continuity and discreteness, is at first only implicit, in a quantum -the distinction is actually made, so that quantity in general now -appears as distinguished or limited. But in this way the quantum breaks -up at the same time into an indefinite multitude of Quanta or definite -magnitudes. Each of these definite magnitudes, as distinguished from -the others, forms a unity, while on the other hand, viewed <i>per se,</i> it -is a many. And, when that is done, the quantum is described as Number.</p> - -<p>102.] In <b>Number</b> the quantum reaches its development and perfect -mode. Like the One, the medium in which it exists, Number involves two -qualitative factors or functions; Annumeration or Sum, which depends on -the factor discreteness, and Unity, which depends on continuity.</p> - -<p>In arithmetic the several kinds of operation are usually presented as -accidental modes of dealing with numbers. If necessity and meaning -is to be found in these operations, it must be by a principle: and -that must come from the characteristic elements in the notion of -number itself. (This principle must here be briefly exhibited.) These -characteristic elements are Annumeration on the one hand, and Unity on -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> other, which together constitute number. But Unity, when applied -to empirical numbers, is only the equality of these numbers: hence the -principle of arithmetical operations must be to put numbers in the -ratio of Unity and Sum (or amount), and to elicit the equality of these -two modes.</p> - -<p>The Ones or the numbers themselves are indifferent towards each other, -and hence the unity into which they are translated by the arithmetical -operation takes the aspect of an external colligation. All reckoning is -therefore making up the tale: and the difference between the species of -it lies only in the qualitative constitution of the numbers of which we -make up the tale. The principle for this constitution is given by the -way we fix Unity and Annumeration.</p> - -<p>Numeration comes first: what we may call, making number; a colligation -of as many units as we please. But to get a <i>species</i> of calculation, -it is necessary that what we count up should be numbers already, and no -longer a mere unit.</p> - -<p>First, and as they naturally come to hand, Numbers are quite vaguely -numbers in general, and so, on the whole, unequal. The colligation, or -telling the tale of these, is Addition.</p> - -<p>The second point of view under which we regard numbers is as equal, -so that they make one unity, and of such there is an annumeration or -sum before us. To tell the tale of these is Multiplication. It makes -no matter in the process, how the functions of Sum and Unity are -distributed between the two numbers, or factors of the product; either -may be Sum and either may be Unity.</p> - -<p>The third and final point of view is the equality of Sum (amount) and -Unity. To number together numbers when so characterised is Involution; -and in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> first instance raising them to the square power. To -raise the number to ä higher power means in point of form to go on -multiplying a number with itself an indefinite amount of times.—Since -this third type of calculation exhibits the complete equality of the -sole existing distinction in number, viz. the distinction between Sum -or amount and Unity, there can be no more than these three modes of -calculation. Corresponding to the integration we have the dissolution -of numbers according to the same features. Hence besides the three -species mentioned, which may to that extent be called positive, there -are three negative species of arithmetical operation.</p> - -<p>Number, in general, is the quantum in its complete specialisation. -Hence we may employ it not only to determine what we call discrete, but -what are called continuous magnitudes as well. For that reason even -geometry must call in the aid of number, when it is required to specify -definite figurations of space and their ratios.</p> - -<p class="center">(c) <i>Degree.</i></p> - -<p>103.] The limit (in a quantum) is identical with the whole of the -quantum itself. As <i>in itself</i> multiple, the limit is Extensive -magnitude; as in itself <i>simple</i> determinateness (qualitative -simplicity), it is Intensive magnitude or <b>Degree</b>.</p> - -<p>The distinction between Continuous and Discrete magnitude differs -from that between Extensive and Intensive in the circumstance that -the former apply to quantity in general, while the latter apply to -the limit or determinateness of it as such. Intensive and Extensive -magnitude are not, any more than the other, two species, of which the -one involves a character not possessed by the other: what is Extensive -magnitude is just as much Intensive, and <i>vice versâ.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span></p> - -<p class="block2">Intensive magnitude or Degree is in its notion distinct from Extensive -magnitude or the Quantum. It is therefore inadmissible to refuse, -as many do, to recognise this distinction, and without scruple to -identify the two forms of magnitude. They are so identified in -physics, when difference of specific gravity is explained by saying, -that a body, with a specific gravity twice that of another, contains -within the same space twice as many material parts (or atoms) as the -other. So with heat and light, if the various degrees of temperature -and brilliancy were to be explained by the greater or less number of -particles (or molecules) of heat and light. No doubt the physicists, -who employ such a mode of explanation, usually excuse themselves, when -they are remonstrated with on its untenableness, by saying that the -expression is without prejudice to the confessedly unknowable essence -of such phenomena, and employed merely for greater convenience. This -greater convenience is meant to point to the easier application of the -calculus: but it is hard to see why Intensive magnitudes, having, as -they do, a definite numerical expression of their own, should not be -as convenient for calculation as Extensive magnitudes. If convenience -be all that is desired, surely it would be more convenient to banish -calculation and thought altogether. A further point against the apology -offered by the physicists is, that, to engage in explanations of this -kind, is to overstep the sphere of perception and experience, and -resort to the realm of metaphysics and of what at other times would be -called idle or even pernicious speculation. It is certainly a fact of -experience that, if one of two purses filled with shillings is twice -as heavy as the other, the reason must be, that the one contains, say -two hundred, and the other only one hundred shillings. These pieces -of money we can see and feel with our senses: atoms, molecules, and -the like, are on the contrary beyond the range of sensuous perception; -and thought alone can decide whether they are admissible, and have -a meaning. But (as already noticed in § 98, note) it is abstract -understanding which stereotypes the factor of multeity (involved in the -notion of Being-for-self) in the shape of atoms, and adopts it as an -ultimate principle. It is the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> abstract understanding which, in -the present instance, at equal variance with unprejudiced perception -and with real concrete thought, regards Extensive magnitude as the -sole form of quantity, and, where Intensive magnitudes occur, does not -recognise them in their own character, but makes a violent attempt by a -wholly untenable hypothesis to reduce them to Extensive magnitudes.</p> - -<p class="block2">Among the charges made against modern philosophy, one is heard more -than another. Modern philosophy, it is said, reduces everything to -identity. Hence its nickname, the Philosophy of Identity. But the -present discussion may teach that it is philosophy, and philosophy -alone, which insists on distinguishing what is logically as well as -in experience different; while the professed devotees of experience -are the people who erect abstract identity into the chief principle -of knowledge. It is their philosophy which might more appropriately -be termed one of identity. Besides it is quite correct that there are -no merely Extensive and merely Intensive magnitudes, just as little -as there are merely continuous and merely discrete magnitudes. The -two characteristics of quantity are not opposed as independent kinds. -Every Intensive magnitude is also Extensive, and <i>vice versâ.</i> Thus a -certain degree of temperature is an Intensive magnitude, which has a -perfectly simple sensation corresponding to it as such. If we look at a -thermometer, we find this degree of temperature has a certain expansion -of the column of mercury corresponding to it; which Extensive magnitude -changes simultaneously with the temperature or Intensive magnitude. The -case is similar in the world of mind: a more intensive character has a -wider range with its effects than a less intensive.</p> - -<p>104.] In Degree the notion of quantum is explicitly put. It is -magnitude as indifferent on its own account and simple: but in such -a way that the character (or modal being) which makes it a quantum -lies quite outside it in other magnitudes. In this contradiction, -where the <i>independent</i> indifferent limit is absolute <i>externality,</i> -the <b>Infinite Quantitative Progression</b> is made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> explicit—an immediacy -which immediately veers round into its counterpart, into mediation (the -passing beyond and over the quantum just laid down), and <i>vice versâ.</i></p> - -<p>Number is a thought, but thought in its complete self-externalisation. -Because it is a thought, it does not belong to perception: but it is a -thought which is characterised by the externality of perception.—Not -only therefore <i>may</i> the quantum be increased or diminished without -end: the very notion of quantum is thus to push out and out beyond -itself. The infinite quantitative progression is only the meaningless -repetition of one and the same contradiction, which attaches to the -quantum, both generally and, when explicitly invested with its special -character, as degree. Touching the futility of enunciating this -contradiction in the form of infinite progression, Zeno, as quoted by -Aristotle, rightly says, 'It is the same to say a thing once, and to -say it for ever.'</p> - -<p class="block2">(1) If we follow the usual definition of the mathematicians, given in -§ 99, and say that magnitude is what can be increased or diminished, -there may be nothing to urge against the correctness of the perception -on which it is founded; but the question remains, how we come to -assume such a capacity of increase or diminution. If we simply appeal -for an answer to experience, we try an unsatisfactory course; because -apart from the fact that we should merely have a material image of -magnitude, and not the thought of it, magnitude would come out as a -bare possibility (of increasing or diminishing) and we should have no -key to the necessity for its exhibiting this behaviour. In the way of -our logical evolution, on the contrary, quantity is obviously a grade -the process of self-determining thought; and it has been shown that it -lies in the very notion of quantity to shoot out beyond itself. In that -way, the increase or diminution (of which we have heard) is not merely -possible, but necessary.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span></p> - -<p class="block2">(2) The quantitative infinite progression is what the reflective -understanding usually relies upon when it is engaged with the -general question of Infinity. The same thing however holds good of -this progression, as was already remarked on the occasion of the -qualitatively, infinite progression. As was then said, it is not the -expression of a true, but of a wrong infinity; it never gets further -than a bare 'ought,' and thus really remains within the limits -of finitude. The quantitative form of this infinite progression, -which Spinoza rightly calls a mere imaginary infinity (<i>infinitum -imaginationis,</i>) is an image often employed by poets, such as Haller -and Klopstock, to depict the infinity, not of Nature merely, but even -of God Himself. Thus we find Haller, in a famous description of God's -infinity, saying:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -Ich häufe ungeheure Zahlen,<br /> -Gebirge Millionen auf,<br /> -Ich sesse Zeit auf Zeit<br /> -Und Welt auf Welt zu Hauf,<br /> -Und wenn ich von der grausen Höh'<br /> -Mit Schwindel wieder nach Dir seh:<br /> -Ist alle Macht der Zahl,<br /> -Vermehrt zu Tausendmal,<br /> -Noch nicht ein Theil von Dir.<br /> -</p> - -<p class="block2">[I heap up monstrous numbers, mountains of millions; I pile time upon -time, and world on the top of world; and when from the awful height I -cast a dizzy look towards Thee, all the power of number, multiplied a -thousand times, is not yet one part of Thee.]</p> - -<p class="block2">Here then we meet, in the first place, that continual extrusion of -quantity, and especially of number, beyond itself, which Kant describes -as 'eery.' The only really 'eery' thing about it is the wearisomeness -of ever fixing, and anon unfixing a limit, without advancing a single -step. The same poet however well adds to that description of false -infinity the closing line:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -Ich zieh sie ab, und Du liegst ganz vor mir.<br /> -</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 5%;">[These I remove, and Thou liest all before me.]</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span></p> - -<p class="block2">Which means, that the true infinite is more than a mere world beyond -the finite, and that we, in order to become conscious of it, must -renounce that <i>progressus in infinitum.</i></p> - -<p class="block2">(3) Pythagoras, as is well known, philosophised in numbers, and -conceived number as the fundamental principle of things. To the -ordinary mind this view must at first glance seem an utter paradox, -perhaps a mere craze. What, then, are we to think of it? To answer -this question, we must, in the first place, remember that the problem -of philosophy consists in tracing back things to thoughts, and, of -course, to definite thoughts. Now, number is undoubtedly a thought: it -is the thought nearest the sensible, or, more precisely expressed, it -is the thought of the sensible itself, if we take the sensible to mean -what is many, and in reciprocal exclusion. The attempt to apprehend -the universe as number is therefore the first step to metaphysics. In -the history of philosophy, Pythagoras, as we know, stands between the -Ionian philosophers and the Eleatics. While the former, as Aristotle -says, never get beyond viewing the essence of things as material (ὕλη), -and the latter, especially Parmenides, advanced as far as pure thought, -in the shape of Being, the principle of the Pythagorean philosophy -forms, as it were, the bridge from the sensible to the super-sensible.</p> - -<p class="block2">We may gather from this, what is to be said of those who suppose that -Pythagoras undoubtedly went too far, when he conceived the essence -of things as mere number. It is true, they admit, that we can number -things; but, they contend, things are far more than mere numbers. But -in what respect are they more? The ordinary sensuous consciousness, -from its own point of view, would not hesitate to answer the question -by handing us over to sensuous perception, and remarking, that things -are not merely numerable, but also visible, odorous, palpable, &c. In -the phrase of modern times, the fault of Pythagoras would be described -as an excess of idealism. As may be gathered from what has been said -on the historical position of the Pythagorean school, the real state -of the case is quite the reverse. Let it be conceded that things are -more than numbers; but the meaning of that admission must be that the -bare<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> thought of number is still insufficient to enunciate the definite -notion or essence of things. Instead, then, of saying that Pythagoras -went too far with his philosophy of number, it would be nearer the -truth to say that he did not go far enough; and in fact the Eleatics -were the first to take the further step to pure thought.</p> - -<p class="block2">Besides, even if there are not things, there are states of things, and -phenomena of nature altogether, the character of which mainly rests on -definite numbers and proportions. This is especially the case with the -difference of tones and their harmonic concord, which, according to a -well-known tradition, first suggested to Pythagoras to conceive the -essence of things as number. Though it is unquestionably important to -science to trace back these phenomena to the definite numbers on which -they are based, it is wholly inadmissible to view the characterisation -by thought as a whole, as merely numerical. We may certainly feel -ourselves prompted to associate the most general characteristics of -thought with the first numbers: saying, 1 is the simple and immediate; -2 is difference and mediation; and 3 the unity of both of these. Such -associations however are purely external: there is nothing in the mere -numbers to make them express these definite thoughts. With every step -in this method, the more arbitrary grows the association of definite -numbers with definite thoughts. Thus, we may view 4 as the unity of -1 and 3, and of the thoughts associated with them, but 4 is just as -much the double of 2; similarly 9 is not merely the square of 3, but -also the sum of 8 and I, of 7 and 2, and so on. To attach, as do some -secret societies of modern times, importance to all sorts of numbers -and figures, is to some extent an innocent amusement, but it is also a -sign of deficiency of intellectual resource. These numbers, it is said, -conceal a profound meaning, and suggest a deal to think about. But the -point in philosophy is, not what you may think, but what you do think: -and the genuine air of thought is to be sought in thought itself, and -not in arbitrarily selected symbols.</p> - -<p>105.] That the Quantum in its independent character is external to -itself, is what constitutes its quality. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> that externality it -is itself and referred connectively to itself. There is a union in -it of externality, <i>i.e.</i> the quantitative, and of independency -(Being-for-self),—the qualitative. The Quantum when explicitly put -thus in its own self, is the <b>Quantitative Ratio</b>, a mode of being -which, while, in its Exponent, it is an immediate quantum, is also -mediation, viz. the reference of some one quantum to another, forming -the two sides of the ratio. But the two quanta are not reckoned at -their immediate value: their value is only in this relation.</p> - -<p class="block2">The quantitative infinite progression appears at first as a continual -extrusion of number beyond itself. On looking closer, it is, however, -apparent that in this progression quantity returns to itself: for -the meaning of this progression, so far as thought goes, is the fact -that number is determined by number. And this gives the quantitative -ratio. Take, for example, the ratio 2:4. Here we have two magnitudes -(not counted in their several immediate values) in which we are only -concerned with their mutual relations. This relation of the two terms -(the exponent of the ratio) is itself a magnitude, distinguished from -the related magnitudes by this, that a change in it is followed by a -change of the ratio, whereas the ratio is unaffected by the change of -both its sides, and remains the same so long as the exponent is not -changed. Consequently, in place of 2:4, we can put 3:6 without changing -the ratio; as the exponent 2 remains the same in both cases.</p> - -<p>106.] The two sides of the ratio are still immediate quanta: and the -qualitative and quantitative characteristics still external to one -another. But in their truth, seeing that the quantitative itself in its -externality is relation to self, or seeing that the independence and -the indifference of the character are combined, it is <b>Measure</b>.</p> - -<p class="block2">Thus quantity by means of the dialectical movement so far studied -through its several stages, turns out to be a return to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> quality. The -first notion of quantity presented to us was that of quality abrogated -and absorbed. That is to say, quantity seemed an external character not -identical with Being, to which it is quite immaterial. This notion, as -we have seen, underlies the mathematical definition of magnitude as -what can be increased or diminished. At first sight this definition -may create the impression that quantity is merely whatever can be -altered:—increase and diminution alike implying determination of -magnitude otherwise—and may tend to confuse it with determinate Being, -the second stage of quality, which in its notion is similarly conceived -as alterable. We can, however, complete the definition by adding, that -in quantity we have an alterable, which in spite of alterations still -remains the same. The notion of quantity, it thus turns out, implies an -inherent contradiction. This, contradiction is what forms the dialectic -of quantity. The result of the dialectic however is not a mere return -to quality, as if that were the true and quantity the false notion, but -an advance to the unity and truth of both, to qualitative quantity, or -Measure.</p> - -<p class="block2">It may be well therefore at this point to observe that whenever in -our study of the objective world we are engaged in quantitative -determinations, it is in all cases Measure which we have in view, as -the goal of our operations. This is hinted at even in language, when -the ascertainment of quantitative features and relations is called -measuring. We measure, <i>e.g.</i> the length of different chords that have -been put into a state of vibration, with an eye to the qualitative -difference of the tones caused by their vibration, corresponding to -this difference of length. Similarly, in chemistry, we try to ascertain -the quantity of the matters brought into combination, in order to find -out the measures or proportions conditioning such combinations, that -is to say, those quantities which give rise to definite qualities. -In statistics, too, the numbers with which the study is engaged are -important only from the qualitative results conditioned by them. Mere -collection of numerical facts, prosecuted without regard to the ends -here noted, is justly called an exercise of idle curiosity, of neither -theoretical nor practical interest.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span></p> - -<p>107.] <b>Measure</b> is the qualitative quantum, in the first place as -immediate,—a quantum, to which a determinate being or a quality is -attached.</p> - -<p class="block2">Measure, where quality and quantity are in one, is thus the completion -of Being. Being, as we first apprehend it, is something utterly -abstract and characterless: but it is the very essence of Being to -characterise itself, and its complete characterisation is reached -in Measure. Measure, like the other stages of Being, may serve as a -definition of the Absolute: God, it has been said, is the Measure of -all things. It is this idea which forms the ground-note of many of the -ancient Hebrew hymns, in which the glorification of God tends in the -main to show that He has appointed to everything its bound: to the -sea and the solid land, to the rivers and mountains; and also to the -various kinds of plants and animals. To the religious sense of the -Greeks the divinity of measure, especially in respect of social ethics, -was represented by Nemesis. That conception implies a general theory -that all human things, riches, honour, and power, as well as joy and -pain, have their definite measure, the transgression of which brings -ruin and destruction. In the world of objects, too, we have measure. We -see, in the first place, existences in Nature, of which measure forms -the essential structure. This is the case, for example, with the solar -system, which may be described as the realm of free measures. As we -next proceed to the study of inorganic nature, measure retires, as it -were, into the background; at least we often find the quantitative and -qualitative characteristics showing indifference to each other. Thus -the quality of a rock or a river is not tied to a definite magnitude. -But even these objects when closely inspected are found not to be quite -measureless: the water of a river, and the single constituents of a -rock, when chemically analysed, are seen to be qualities conditioned -by quantitative ratios between the matters they contain. In organic -nature, however, measure again rises full into immediate perception.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> -The various kinds of plants and animals, in the whole as well as in -their parts, have a certain measure: though it is worth noticing that -the more imperfect forms, those which are least removed from inorganic -nature, are partly distinguished from the higher forms by the greater -indefiniteness of their measure. Thus among fossils, we find some -ammonites discernible only by the microscope, and others as large as a -cart-wheel. The same vagueness of measure appears in several plants, -which stand on a low level of organic development,—for instance, ferns.</p> - -<p>108.] In so far as in Measure quality and quantity are only in -<i>immediate</i> unity, to that extent their difference presents itself in -a manner equally immediate. Two cases are then possible. Either the -specific quantum or measure is a bare quantum, and the definite being -(there-and-then) is capable of an increase or a diminution, without -Measure (which to that extent is a Rule) being thereby set completely -aside. Or the alteration of the quantum is also an alteration of the -quality.</p> - -<p class="block2">The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, -is at first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other -words, these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an -independent authority. On the one hand, the quantitative features of -existence may be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other -hand, this increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has -its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change. Thus the -temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no consequence -in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase or diminution -of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where -this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water -is converted into steam or ice. A quantitative change takes place, -apparently without any further significance: but there is something -lurking behind, and a seemingly innocent change of quantity acts as a -kind of snare, to catch hold of the quality. The antinomy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> of Measure -which this implies was exemplified under more than one garb among the -Greeks. It was asked, for example, whether a single grain makes a heap -of wheat, or whether it makes a bald-tail to tear out a single hair -from the horse's tail. At first, no doubt, looking at the nature of -quantity as an indifferent and external character of Being, we are -disposed to answer these questions in the negative. And yet, as we -must admit, this indifferent increase and diminution has its limit: -a point is finally reached, where a single additional grain makes a -heap of wheat; and the bald-tail is produced, if we continue plucking -out single hairs. These examples find a parallel in the story of the -peasant who, as his ass trudged cheerfully along, went on adding ounce -after ounce to its load, till at length it sunk under the unendurable -burden. It would be a mistake to treat these examples as pedantic -futility; they really turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which is -of great importance in practical life, especially in ethics. Thus in -the matter of expenditure, there is a certain latitude within which -a more or less does not matter; but when the Measure, imposed by the -individual circumstances of the special case, is exceeded on the one -side or the other, the qualitative nature of Measure (as in the above -examples of the different temperature of water) makes itself felt, -and a course, which a moment before was held good economy, turns into -avarice or prodigality. The same principle may be applied in politics, -when the constitution of a state has to be looked at as independent of, -no less than as dependent on, the extent of its territory, the number -of its inhabitants, and other quantitative points of the same kind. If -we look <i>e.g.</i> at a state with a territory of ten thousand square miles -and a population of four millions, we should, without hesitation, admit -that a few square miles of land or a few thousand inhabitants more or -less could exercise no essential influence on the character of its -constitution. But, on the other hand, we must not forget, that by the -continual increase or diminishing of a state, we finally get to a point -where, apart from all other circumstances, this quantitative alteration -alone necessarily draws with it an alteration in the quality of the -constitution. The constitution of a little Swiss<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> canton does not suit -a great kingdom; and, similarly, the constitution of the Roman republic -was unsuitable when transferred to the small imperial towns of Germany.</p> - -<p>109.] In this second case, when a measure through its quantitative -nature has gone in excess of its qualitative character, we meet, what -is at first an absence of measure, the <b>Measureless</b>. But seeing -that the second quantitative ratio, which in comparison with the first -is measureless, is none the less qualitative, the measureless is also a -measure. These two transitions, from quality to quantum, and from the -latter back again to quality, may be represented under the image of an -infinite progression—as the self-abrogation and restoration of measure -in the measureless.</p> - -<p class="block2">Quantity, as we have seen, is not only capable of alteration, <i>i.e.</i> -of increase or diminution: it is naturally and necessarily a tendency -to exceed itself. This tendency is maintained even in measure. But if -the quantity present in measure exceeds a certain limit, the quality -corresponding to it is also put in abeyance. This however is not a -negation of quality altogether, but only of this definite quality, the -place of which is at once occupied by another. This process of measure, -which appears alternately as a mere change in quantity, and then as a -sudden revulsion of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the -figure of a nodal (knotted) line. Such lines we find in Nature under -a variety of forms. We have already referred to the qualitatively -different states of aggregation water exhibits under increase or -diminution of temperature. The same phenomenon is presented by the -different degrees in the oxidation of metals. Even the difference of -musical notes may be regarded as an example of what takes place in -the process of measure,—the revulsion from what is at first merely -quantitative into qualitative alteration.</p> - -<p>110.] What really takes place here is that the immediacy, which still -attaches to measure as such, is set aside. In measure, at first, -quality and quantity itself<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> are immediate, and measure is only their -'relative' identity. But measure shows itself absorbed and superseded -in the measureless: yet the measureless, although it be the negation -of measure, is itself a unity of quantity and quality. Thus in the -measureless the measure is still seen to meet only with itself.</p> - -<p>111.] Instead of the more abstract factors, Being and Nothing, some -and other, &c., the Infinite, which is affirmation as a negation -of negation, now finds its factors in quality and quantity. These -(α) have in the first place passed over, quality into quantity, (§ -98), and quantity into quality (§ 105), and thus are both shown up -as negations, (ß) But in their unity, that is, in measure, they are -originally distinct, and the one is only through the instrumentality of -the other. And (γ) after the immediacy of this unity has turned out to -be self-annulling, the unity is explicitly put as what it implicitly -is, simple relation-to-self, which contains in it being and all its -forms absorbed.—Being or immediacy, which by the negation of itself -is a mediation with self and a reference to self,—which consequently -is also a mediation which cancels itself into reference-to-self, or -immediacy,—is Essence.</p> - -<p class="block2">The process of measure, instead of being only the wrong infinite of -an endless progression, in the shape of an ever-recurrent recoil -from quality to quantity, and from quantity to quality, is also -the true infinity of coincidence with self in another. In measure, -quality and quantity originally confront each other, like some and -other. But quality is implicitly quantity, and conversely quantity -is implicitly quality. In the process of measure, therefore, these -two pass into each other: each of them becomes what it already was -implicitly: and thus we get Being thrown into abeyance and absorbed, -with its several characteristics negatived. Such Being is Essence. -Measure is implicitly Essence; and its process consists in realising -what it is implicitly.—The ordinary consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> conceives things -as being, and studies them in quality, quantity, and measure. These -immediate characteristics however soon show themselves to be not fixed -but transient; and Essence is the result of their dialectic. In the -sphere of Essence one category does not pass into another, but refers -to another merely. In Being, the form of reference is purely due to -our reflection on what takes place: but it is the special and proper -characteristic of Essence. In the sphere of Being, when somewhat -becomes another, the somewhat has vanished. Not so in Essence: here -there is no real other, but only diversity, reference of the one -to <i>its</i> other. The transition of Essence is therefore at the same -time no transition: for in the passage of different into different, -the different does not vanish: the different terms remain in their -relation. When we speak of Being and Nought, Being is independent, so -is Nought. The case is otherwise with the Positive and the Negative. -No doubt these possess the characteristic of Being and Nought. But -the positive by itself has no sense; it is wholly in reference to the -negative. And it is the same with the negative. In the sphere of Being -the reference of one term to another is only implicit; in Essence on -the contrary it is explicit And this in general is the distinction -between the forms of Being and Essence: in Being everything is -immediate, in Essence everything is relative.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII.</a></h5> - - -<h4>SECOND SUB-DIVISION OF LOGIC.</h4> - - -<h5>THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE.</h5> - - -<p>112.] The terms in <b>Essence</b> are always mere pairs of correlatives, and -not yet absolutely reflected in themselves: hence in essence the actual -unity of the notion is not realised, but only postulated by reflection. -Essence,—which is Being coming into mediation with itself through the -negativity of itself—is self-relatedness, only in so far as it is -relation to an Other,—this Other however coming to view at first not -as something which <i>is,</i> but as postulated and hypothetised.—Being has -not vanished: but, firstly, Essence, as simple self-relation, is Being, -and secondly as regards its one-sided characteristic of immediacy, -Being is deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected -light—Essence accordingly is Being thus reflecting light into itself.</p> - -<p>The Absolute is the Essence. This is the same definition as the -previous one that the Absolute is Being, in so far as Being likewise -is simple self-relation. But it is at the same time higher, because -Essence is Being that has gone into itself: that is to say, the -simple self-relation (in Being) is expressly put as negation of -the negative, as immanent self-mediation.—Unfortunately when the -Absolute is defined to be the Essence, the negativity which this -implies is often taken only to mean the withdrawal of all determinate -predicates. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> negative action of withdrawal or abstraction thus -falls outside of the Essence—which is thus left as a mere result apart -from its premisses,—the <i>caput mortuum</i> of abstraction. But as this -negativity, instead of being external to Being, is its own dialectic, -the truth of the latter, viz. Essence, will be Being as retired within -itself,—immanent Being. That reflection, or light thrown into itself, -constitutes the distinction between Essence and immediate Being, and is -the peculiar characteristic of Essence itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">Any mention of Essence implies that we distinguish it from Being: -the latter is immediate, and, compared with the Essence, we look upon -it as mere seeming. But this seeming is not an utter nonentity and -nothing at all, but Being superseded and put by. The point of view -given by the Essence is in general the standpoint of 'Reflection.' -This word 'reflection' is originally applied, when a ray of light in -a straight line impinging upon the surface of a mirror is thrown back -from it. In this phenomenon we have two things,—first an immediate -fact which is, and secondly the deputed, derivated, or transmitted -phase of the same.—Something of this sort takes place when we reflect, -or think upon an object; for here we want to know the object, not in -its immediacy, but as derivative or mediated. The problem or aim of -philosophy is often represented as the ascertainment of the essence of -things: a phrase which only means that things instead of being left -in their immediacy, must be shown to be mediated by, or based upon, -something else. The immediate Being of things is thus conceived under -the image of a rind or curtain behind which the Essence lies hidden.</p> - -<p class="block2">Everything, it is said, has an Essence; that is, things really are not -what they immediately show themselves. There is therefore something -more to be done than merely rove from one quality to another, and -merely to advance from qualitative to quantitative, and <i>vice versâ:</i> -there is a permanent in things, and that permanent is in the first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> -instance their Essence. With respect to other meanings and uses of the -category of Essence, we may note that in the German auxiliary verb -<i>'sein'</i> the past tense is expressed by the term for Essence (<i>Wesen</i>): -we designate past being as <i>gewesen.</i> This anomaly of language implies -to some extent a correct perception of the relation between Being and -Essence. Essence we may certainly regard as past Being, remembering -however meanwhile that the past is not utterly denied, but only laid -aside and thus at the same time preserved. Thus, to say, Caesar <i>was</i> -in Gaul, only denies the immediacy of the event, but not his sojourn -in Gaul altogether. That sojourn is just what forms the import of -the proposition, in which however it is represented as over and -gone.—'<i>Wesen</i>' in ordinary life frequently means only a collection -or aggregate: Zeitungswesen (the Press), Postwesen (the Post-Office), -Steuerwesen (the Revenue). All that these terms mean is that the things -in question are not to be taken single, in their immediacy, but as a -complex, and then, perhaps, in addition, in their various bearings. -This usage of the term is not very different in its implication from -our own.</p> - -<p class="block2">People also speak of <i>finite</i> Essences, such as man. But the very term -Essence implies that we have made a step beyond finitude: and the title -as applied to man is so far inexact. It is often added that there is -a supreme Essence (Being): by which is meant God. On this two remarks -may be made. In the first place the phrase 'there is' suggests a -finite only: as when we say, there are so many planets, or, there are -plants of such a constitution and plants of such an other. In these -cases we are speaking of something which has other things beyond and -beside it. But God, the absolutely infinite, is not something outside -and beside whom there are other essences. All else outside f God, if -separated from Him, possesses no essentiality: in its I isolation it -becomes a mere show or seeming, without stay or essence of its own. -But, secondly, it is a poor way of talking to call God the <i>highest</i> -or supreme Essence. The category of quantity which the phrase employs -has its proper place within the compass of the finite. When we call -one mountain the highest on the earth, we have a vision of other -high<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> mountains beside it. So too when we call any one the richest or -most learned in his country. But God, far from being <i>a</i> Being, even -the highest, is <i>the</i> Being. This definition, however, though such -a representation of God is an important and necessary stage in the -growth of the religious consciousness, does not by any means exhaust -the depth of the ordinary Christian idea of God. If we consider God as -the Essence only, and nothing more, we know Him only as the universal -and irresistible Power; in other words, as the Lord. Now the fear of -the Lord is, doubtless, the beginning,—but <i>only</i> the beginning, of -wisdom. To look at God in this light, as the Lord, and the Lord alone, -is especially characteristic of Judaism and also of Mohammedanism. -The defect of these religions lies in their scant recognition of the -finite, which, be it as natural things or as finite phases of mind, -it is characteristic of the heathen and (as they also for that reason -are) polytheistic religions to maintain intact. Another not uncommon -assertion is that God, as the supreme Being, cannot be known. Such is -the view taken by modern 'enlightenment' and abstract understanding, -which is content to say, <i>Il y a un être suprême</i>: and there lets -the matter rest. To speak thus, and treat God merely as the supreme -other-world Being, implies that we look upon the world before us in -its immediacy as something permanent and positive, and forget that -true Being is just the superseding of all that is immediate. If God -be the abstract super-sensible Being, outside whom therefore lies all -difference and all specific character, He is only a bare name, a mere -<i>caput mortuum</i> of abstracting understanding. The true knowledge of God -begins when we know that things, as they immediately are, have no truth.</p> - -<p class="block2">In reference also to other subjects besides God the category of Essence -is often liable to an abstract use, by which, in the study of anything, -its Essence is held to be something unaffected by, and subsisting in -independence of, its definite phenomenal embodiment. Thus we say, for -example, of people, that the great thing is not what they do or how -they behave, but what they are. This is correct, if it means that a -man's conduct should be looked at, not in its immediacy, but only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> as -it is explained by his inner self, and as a revelation of that inner -self. Still it should be remembered that the only means by which the -Essence and the inner self can be verified, is their appearance in -outward reality; whereas the appeal which men make to the essential -life, as distinct from the material facts of conduct, is generally -prompted by a desire to assert their own subjectivity and to elude an -absolute and objective judgment.</p> - -<p>113.] Self-relation in Essence is the form of Identity or of -reflection-into-self, which has here taken the place of the immediacy -of Being. They are both the same abstraction,—self-relation.</p> - -<p>The unintelligence of sense, to take everything limited and finite for -Being, passes into the obstinacy of understanding, which views the -finite as self-identical, not inherently self-contradictory.</p> - -<p>114.] This identity, as it has descended from Being, appears in the -first place only charged with the characteristics of Being, and -referred to Being as to something external. This external Being, if -taken in separation from the true Being (of Essence), is called the -<b>Unessential</b>. But that turns out a mistake. Because Essence is -Being-in-self, it is essential only to the extent that it has in itself -its negative, <i>e.</i> reference to another, or mediation. Consequently, -it has the unessential as its own proper seeming (reflection) in -itself. But in seeming or mediation there is distinction involved: -and since what is distinguished (as distinguished from the identity -out of which it arises, and in which it is not, or lies as seeming,) -receives itself the form of identity, the semblance is still in the -mode of Being, or of self-related immediacy. The sphere of Essence -thus turns out to be a still imperfect combination of immediacy and -mediation. In it every term is expressly invested with the character -of self-relatedness, while yet at the same time one is forced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> beyond -it. It has Being,—reflected being, a being in which another shows, -and which shows in another. And so it is also the sphere in which the -contradiction, still implicit in the sphere of Being, is made explicit.</p> - -<p>As the one notion is the common principle underlying all logic, there -appear in the development of Essence the same attributes or terms as -in the development of Being, but in a reflex form. Instead of Being -and Nought we have now the forms of Positive and Negative; the former -at first as Identity corresponding to pure and uncontrasted Being, the -latter developed (showing in itself) as Difference. So also, we have -Becoming represented by the Ground of determinate Being: which itself, -when reflected upon the Ground, is Existence.</p> - -<p>The theory of Essence is the most difficult branch of Logic. It -includes the categories of metaphysic and of the sciences in general. -These are products of reflective understanding, which, while it assumes -the differences to possess a footing of their own, and at the same -time also expressly affirms their relativity, still combines the two -statements, side by side, or one after the other, by an 'Also,' without -bringing these thoughts into one, or unifying them into the notion.</p> - -<h5>A.—ESSENCE AS GROUND OF EXISTENCE.</h5> - -<p class="center">(a) <i>The pure principles or categories of Reflection.</i></p> - -<p class="center">(α) Identity.</p> - -<p>115.] The Essence lights up <i>in itself</i> or is mere reflection: and -therefore is only self-relation, not as immediate but as reflected. And -that reflex relation is <b>self-Identity</b>.</p> - -<p>This Identity becomes an Identity in form only, or of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> the -understanding, if it be held hard and fast, quite aloof from -difference. Or, rather, abstraction is the imposition of this Identity -of form, the transformation of something inherently concrete into this -form of elementary simplicity. And this may be done in two ways. Either -we may neglect a part of the multiple features which are found in the -concrete thing (by what is called analysis) and select only one of -them; or, neglecting their variety, we may concentrate the multiple -characters into one.</p> - -<p>If we associate Identity with the Absolute, making the Absolute the -subject of a proposition, we get: The Absolute is what is identical -with itself. However true this proposition may be, it is doubtful -whether it be meant in its truth: and therefore it is at least -imperfect in the expression. For it is left undecided, whether it means -the abstract Identity of understanding,—abstract, that is, because -contrasted with the other characteristics of Essence, or the Identity -which is inherently concrete. In the latter case, as will be seen, -true Identity is first discoverable in the Ground, and, with a higher -truth, in the Notion.—Even the word Absolute is often used to mean no -more than 'abstract.' Absolute space and absolute time, for example, is -another way of saying abstract space and abstract time.</p> - -<p>When the principles of Essence are taken as essential principles of -thought they become predicates of a pre-supposed subject, which, -because they are essential, is 'Everything,' The propositions thus -arising have been stated as universal Laws of Thought. Thus the first -of them, the maxim of Identity, reads: Everything is identical with -itself, A=A: and, negatively, A cannot at the same time be A and not -A.—This maxim, instead of being a true law of thought, is nothing -but the law of abstract understanding. The propositional form itself -contradicts it: for a proposition always<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> promises a distinction -between subject and predicate; while the present one does not fulfil -what its form requires. But the Law is particularly set aside by -the following so-called Laws of Thought, which make laws out of its -opposite.—It is asserted that the maxim of Identity, though it -cannot be proved, regulates the procedure of every consciousness, -and that experience shows it to be accepted as soon as its terms -are apprehended. To this alleged experience of the logic-books may -be opposed the universal experience that no mind thinks or forms -conceptions or speaks, in accordance with this law, and that no -existence of any kind whatever conforms to it. Utterances after the -fashion of this pretended law (A planet is—a planet; Magnetism -is—magnetism; Mind is—mind) are, as they deserve to be, reputed -silly. That is certainly matter of general experience. The logic which -seriously propounds such laws and the scholastic world in which alone -they are valid have long been discredited with practical common sense -as well as with the philosophy of reason.</p> - -<p class="block2">Identity is, in the first place, the repetition of what we had earlier -as Being, but as <i>become,</i> through supersession of its character of -immediateness. It is therefore Being as Ideality.—It is important -to come to a proper understanding on the true meaning of Identity: -and, for that purpose, we must especially guard against taking it -as abstract Identity, to the exclusion of all Difference. That is -the touchstone for distinguishing all bad philosophy from what alone -deserves the name of philosophy. Identity in its truth, as an Ideality -of what immediately is, is a high category for our religious modes -of mind as well as all other forms of thought and mental activity. -The true knowledge of God, it may be said, begins when we know Him as -identity,—as absolute identity. To know so much is to see that all -the power and glory of the world sinks into nothing in God's presence, -and subsists only as the reflection of His power and His<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> glory. In -the same way, Identity, as self-consciousness, is what distinguishes -man from nature, particularly from the brutes which never reach the -point of comprehending themselves as 'I,' that is, pure self-contained -unity. So again, in connexion with thought, the main thing is not to -confuse the true Identity, which contains Being and its characteristics -ideally transfigured in it, with an abstract Identity, identity of bare -form. All the charges of narrowness, hardness, meaninglessness, which -are so often directed against thought from the quarter of feeling and -immediate perception, rest on the perverse assumption that thought -acts only as a faculty of abstract Identification. The Formal Logic -itself confirms this assumption by laying down the supreme law of -thought (so-called) which has been discussed above. If thinking were no -more than an abstract Identity, we could not but own it to be a most -futile and tedious business. No doubt the notion, and the idea too, are -identical with themselves: but identical only in so far as they at the -same time involve distinction.</p> - -<p class="center">(β) <i>Difference.</i></p> - -<p>116.] Essence is mere Identity and reflection in itself only as it is -self-relating negativity, and in that way self-repulsion. It contains -therefore essentially the characteristic of <b>Difference</b>.</p> - -<p>Other-being is here no longer qualitative, taking the shape of the -character or limit. It is now in Essence, in self-relating essence, and -therefore the negation is at the same time a relation,—is, in short, -Distinction, Relativity, Mediation.</p> - -<p class="block2">To ask, 'How Identity comes to Difference,' assumes that Identity as -mere abstract Identity is something of itself, and Difference also -something else equally independent. This supposition renders an answer -to the question impossible. If Identity is viewed as diverse from -Difference, all that we have in this way is but Difference; and hence -we cannot demonstrate the advance to difference, because the person -who asks for the How of the progress<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> thereby implies that for him -the starting-point is non-existent. The question then when put to -the test has obviously no meaning, and its proposer may be met with -the question what he means by Identity; whereupon we should soon see -that he attaches no idea to it at all, and that Identity is for him -an empty name. As we have seen, besides, Identity is undoubtedly a -negative,—not however an abstract empty Nought, but the negation of -Being and its characteristics. Being so, Identity is at the same time -self-relation, and, what is more, negative self-relation; in other -words, it draws a distinction between it and itself.</p> - -<p>117.] Difference is, first of all, (1) immediate difference, <i>i.e.</i> -<b>Diversity</b> or Variety. In Diversity the different things are each -individually what they are, and unaffected by the relation in which -they stand to each other. This relation is therefore external to them. -In consequence of the various things being thus indifferent to the -difference between them, it falls outside them into a third thing, the -agent of Comparison. This external difference, as an identity of the -objects related, is Likeness; as a non-identity of them, is Unlikeness.</p> - -<p>The gap which understanding allows to divide these characteristics, is -so great, that although comparison has one and the same substratum for -likeness and unlikeness, which are explained to be different aspects -and points of view in it, still likeness by itself is the first of the -elements alone, viz. identity, and unlikeness by itself is difference.</p> - -<p>Diversity has, like Identity, been transformed into a maxim: -'Everything is various or different': or,'There are no two things -completely like each other.' Here Everything is put under a predicate, -which is the reverse of the identity attributed to it in the first -maxim; and therefore under a law contradicting the first. However there -is an explanation. As the diversity is supposed due only to external -comparison, anything taken<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> <i>per se</i> is expected and understood always -to be identical with itself, so that the second law need not interfere -with the first. But, in that case, variety does not belong to the -something or everything in question: it constitutes no intrinsic -characteristic of the subject: and the second maxim on this showing -does not admit of being stated at all. If, on the other hand, the -something <i>itself</i> is as the maxim says diverse, it must be in virtue -of its own proper character: but in this case the specific difference, -and not variety as such, is what is intended. And this is the meaning -of the maxim of Leibnitz.</p> - -<p class="block2">When understanding sets itself to study Identity, it has already passed -beyond it, and is looking at Difference in the shape of bare Variety. -If we follow the so-called law of Identity, and say,—The sea is the -sea, The air is the air, The moon is the moon, these objects pass for -having no bearing on one another. What we have before us therefore is -not Identity, but Difference. We do not stop at this point however, or -regard things merely as different. We compare them one with another, -and thus discover the features of likeness and unlikeness. The work of -the finite sciences lies to a great extent in the application of these -categories, and the phrase 'scientific treatment' generally means no -more than the method which has for its aim comparison of the objects -under examination. This method has undoubtedly led to some important -results;—we may particularly mention the great advance of modern times -in the provinces of comparative anatomy and comparative linguistic. -But it is going too far to suppose that the comparative method can be -employed with equal success in all branches of knowledge. Nor—and this -must be emphasised—can mere comparison ever ultimately satisfy the -requirements of science. Its results are indeed indispensable, but they -are still labours only preliminary to truly intelligent cognition.</p> - -<p class="block2">If it be the office of comparison to reduce existing differences to -Identity, the science, which most perfectly fulfils that end, is -mathematics. The reason of that is, that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> quantitative difference is -only the difference which is quite external. Thus, in geometry, a -triangle and a quadrangle, figures qualitatively different, have this -qualitative difference discounted by abstraction, and are equalised to -one another in magnitude. It follows from what has been formerly said -about the mere Identity of understanding that, as has also been pointed -out (§ 99, note), neither philosophy nor the empirical sciences need -envy this superiority of Mathematics.</p> - -<p class="block2">The story is told that, when Leibnitz propounded the maxim of Variety, -the cavaliers and ladies of the court, as they walked round the garden, -made efforts to discover two leaves indistinguishable from each other, -in order to confute the law stated by the philosopher. Their device was -unquestionably a convenient method of dealing with metaphysics,—one -which has not ceased to be fashionable. All the same, as regards the -principle of Leibnitz, difference must be understood to mean not an -external and indifferent diversity merely, but difference essential. -Hence the very nature of things implies that they must be different.</p> - -<p>118.] <b>Likeness</b> is an Identity only of those things which are not -the same, not identical with each other: and <b>Unlikeness</b> is a -relation of things unlike. The two therefore do not fall on different -aspects or points of view in the thing, without any mutual affinity: -but one throws light into the other. Variety thus comes to be reflexive -difference, or difference (distinction) implicit and essential, -<b>determinate</b> or <b>specific difference</b>.</p> - -<p class="block2">While things merely various show themselves unaffected by each other, -likeness and unlikeness on the contrary are a pair of characteristics -which are in completely reciprocal relation. The one of them cannot -be thought without the other. This advance from simple variety to -opposition appears in our common acts of thought, when we allow that -comparison has a meaning only upon the hypothesis of an existing -difference, and that on the other hand we can distinguish only on the -hypothesis of existing similarity.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> -Hence, if the problem be the discovery of a difference, we attribute -no great cleverness to the man who only distinguishes those objects, -of which the difference is palpable, <i>e.g.</i> a pen and a camel: -and similarly, it implies no very advanced faculty of comparison, -when the objects compared, <i>e.g.</i> a beech and an oak, a temple and -a church, are near akin. In the case of difference, in short, we -like to sec identity, and in the case of identity we like to see -difference. Within the range of the empirical sciences however, the -one of these two categories is often allowed to put the other out of -sight and mind. Thus the scientific problem at one time is to reduce -existing differences to identity; on another occasion, with equal -one-sidedness, to discover new differences. We see this especially in -physical science. There the problem consists, in the first place, in -the continual search for new 'elements,' new forces, new genera, and -species. Or, in another direction, it seeks to show that all bodies -hitherto believed to be simple are compound: and modern physicists and -chemists smile at the ancients, who were satisfied with four elements, -and these not simple. Secondly, and on the other hand, mere identity -is made the chief question. Thus electricity and chemical affinity -are regarded as the same, and even the organic processes of digestion -and assimilation are looked upon as a mere chemical operation. Modern -philosophy has often been nicknamed the Philosophy of Identity. But, as -was already remarked (§ 103, note), it is precisely philosophy, and in -particular speculative logic, which lays bare the nothingness of the -abstract, undifferentiated identity, known to understanding; though it -also undoubtedly urges its disciples not to rest at mere diversity, but -to ascertain the inner unity of all existence.</p> - -<p>119.] Difference implicit is essential difference, the <b>Positive</b> -and the <b>Negative</b>: and that is this way. The Positive is the -identical self-relation in such a way as not to be the Negative, and -the Negative is the different by itself so as not to be the Positive. -Thus either has an existence of its own in proportion as it is not the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> -other. The one is made visible in the other, and is only in so far as -that other is. Essential difference is therefore Opposition; according -to which the different is not confronted by <i>any</i> other but by <i>its</i> -other. That is, either of these two (Positive and Negative) is stamped -with a characteristic of its own only in its relation to the other: the -one is only reflected into itself as it is reflected into the other. -And so with the other. Either in this way is the other's <i>own</i> other.</p> - -<p>Difference implicit or essential gives the maxim, Everything is -essentially distinct; or, as it has also been expressed, Of two -opposite predicates the one only can be assigned to anything, and -there is no third possible. This maxim of Contrast or Opposition -most expressly controverts the maxim of Identity: the one says a -thing should be only self-relation, the other says that it must be -an opposite, a relation to its other. The native unintelligence of -abstraction betrays itself by setting in juxtaposition two contrary -maxims, like these, as laws, without even so much as comparing -them.—The Maxim of Excluded Middle is the maxim of the definite -understanding, which would fain avoid contradiction, but in so doing -falls into it. A must be either + A or - A, it says. It virtually -declares in these words a third A which is neither + nor—, and which -at the same time is yet invested with + and - characters. If + W mean -6 miles to the West, and - W mean 6 miles to the East, and if the + -and - cancel each other, the 6 miles of way or space remain what they -were with and without the contrast. Even the mere <i>plus</i> and <i>minus</i> of -number or abstract direction have, if we like, zero, for their third: -but it need not be denied that the empty contrast, which understanding -institutes between <i>plus</i> and <i>minus,</i> is not without its value in such -abstractions as number, direction, &c.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span></p> - -<p>In the doctrine of contradictory concepts, the one notion is, say, -blue (for in this doctrine even the sensuous generalised image of a -colour is called a notion) and the other not-blue. This other then -would not be an affirmative, say, yellow, but would merely be kept at -the abstract negative.—That the Negative in its own nature is quite as -much Positive (see next §), is implied in saying that what is opposite -to another is <i>its</i> other. The inanity of the opposition between what -are called contradictory notions is fully exhibited in what we may call -the grandiose formula of a general law, that Everything has the one and -not the other of <i>all</i> predicates which are in such opposition. In this -way, mind is either white or not-white, yellow or not-yellow, &c., <i>ad -infinitum.</i></p> - -<p>It was forgotten that Identity and Opposition are themselves opposed, -and the maxim of Opposition was taken even for that of Identity, -in the shape of the principle of Contradiction. A notion, which -possesses neither or both of two mutually contradictory marks, <i>e.g.</i> -a quadrangular circle, is held to be logically false. Now though a -multangular circle and a rectilineal arc no less contradict this -maxim, geometers never hesitate to treat the circle as a polygon with -rectilineal sides. But anything like a circle (that is to say its mere -character or nominal definition) is still no notion. In the notion -of a circle, centre and circumference are equally essential: both -marks belong to it: and yet centre and circumference are opposite and -contradictory to each other.</p> - -<p>The conception of Polarity, which is so dominant in physics, contains -by implication the more correct definition of Opposition. But physics -for its theory of the laws of thought adheres to the ordinary logic; it -might therefore well be horrified in case it should ever work<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> out the -conception of Polarity, and get at the thoughts which are implied in it.</p> - -<p class="block2">(1) With the positive we return to identity, but in its higher truth -as identical self-relation, and at the same time with the note that it -is not the negative. The negative <i>per se</i> is the same as difference -itself. The identical as such is primarily the yet uncharacterised: -the positive on the other hand is what is self-identical, but with the -mark of antithesis to an other. And the negative is difference as such, -characterised as not identity. This is the difference of difference -within its own self.</p> - -<p class="block2">Positive and negative are supposed to express an absolute difference. -The two however are at bottom the same: the name of either might be -transferred to the other. Thus, for example, debts and assets are not -two particular, self-subsisting species of property. What is negative -to the debtor, is positive to the creditor. A way to the east is also -a way to the west. Positive and negative are therefore intrinsically -conditioned by one another, and are only in relation to each other. The -north pole of the magnet cannot be without the south pole, and <i>vice -versâ.</i> If we cut a magnet in two, we have not a north pole in one -piece, and a south pole in the other. Similarly, in electricity, the -positive and the negative are not two diverse and independent fluids. -In opposition, the different is not confronted by any other, but by -<i>its</i> other. Usually we regard different things as unaffected by each -other. Thus we say: I am a human being, and around me are air, water, -animals, and all sorts of things. Everything is thus put outside of -every other. But the aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and -to ascertain the necessity of things. By that means the other is seen -to stand over against <i>its</i> other. Thus, for example, inorganic nature -is not to be considered merely something else than organic nature, but -the necessary antithesis of it. Both are in essential relation to one -another; and the one of the two is, only in so far as it excludes the -other from it, and thus relates itself thereto. Nature in like manner -is not without mind, nor mind without nature. An important step has -been taken, when we cease in thinking to use phrases like:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> Of course -something else is also possible. While we so speak, we are still -tainted with contingency: and all true thinking, we have already said, -is a thinking of necessity.</p> - -<p class="block2">In modern physical science the opposition, first observed to exist -in magnetism as polarity, has come to be regarded as a universal law -pervading the whole of nature. This would be a real scientific advance, -if care were at the same time taken not to let mere variety revert -without explanation, as a valid category, side by side with opposition. -Thus at one time the colours are regarded as in polar opposition to one -another, and called complementary colours: at another time they are -looked at in their indifferent and merely quantitative difference of -red, yellow, green, &c.</p> - -<p class="block2">(2) Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the -maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is -opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of -mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'Either—or' -as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with -difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then -lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and -what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is -implicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being -consists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not -something that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort -to realise what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving -principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction -is unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that -contradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But -contradiction, when cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for -that is itself only one side of the contrariety. The proximate result -of opposition (when realised as contradiction) is the Ground, which -contains identity as well as difference superseded and deposed to -elements in the completer notion.</p> - -<p>120.] Contrariety then has two forms. The Positive is the aforesaid -various (different) which is understood to be independent, and yet -at the same not to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> unaffected by its relation to its other. The -Negative is to be, no less independently, negative self-relating, -self-subsistent, and yet at the same time as Negative must on every -point have this its self-relation, <i>i.e.</i> its Positive, only in the -other. Both Positive and Negative are therefore explicit contradiction; -both are potentially the same. Both are so actually also; since either -is the abrogation of the other and of itself. Thus they fall to the -Ground.—Or as is plain, the essential difference, as a difference, is -only the difference of it from itself, and thus contains the identical: -so that to essential and actual difference there belongs itself as -well as identity. As self-relating difference it is likewise virtually -enunciated as the self-identical. And the opposite is in general that -which includes the one and its other, itself and its opposite. The -immanence of essence thus defined is the Ground.</p> - -<p class="center">(γ) <i>The Ground.</i></p> - -<p>121.] The <b>Ground</b> is the unity of identity and difference, the -truth of what difference and identity have turned out to be,—the -reflection-into-self, which is equally a reflection-into-an-other, and -<i>vice versâ.</i> It is essence put explicitly as a totality.</p> - -<p>The maxim of the Ground runs thus: Everything has its Sufficient -Ground: that is, the true essentiality of any thing is not the -predication of it as identical with itself, or as different (various), -or merely positive, or merely negative, but as having its Being in -an other, which, being its self-same, is its essence. And to this -extent the essence is not abstract reflection into self, but into an -other. The Ground is the essence in its own inwardness; the essence is -intrinsically a ground; and it is a ground only when it is a ground of -somewhat, of an other.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span></p> - -<p class="block2">We must be careful, when we say that the ground is the unity of -identity and difference, not to understand by this unity an abstract -identity. Otherwise we only change the name, while we still think the -identity (of understanding) already seen to be false. To avoid this -misconception we may say that the ground, besides being the unity, -is also the difference of identity and difference. In that case in -the ground, which promised at first to supersede contradiction, a new -contradiction seems to arise. It is however a contradiction which, so -far from persisting quietly in itself, is rather the expulsion of it -from itself. The ground is a ground only to the extent that it affords -ground: but the result which thus issued from the ground is only -itself. In this lies its formalism. The ground and what is grounded are -one and the same content: the difference between the two is the mere -difference of form which separates simple self-relation, on the one -hand, from mediation or derivativeness on the other. Inquiry into the -grounds of things goes with the point of view which, as already noted -(note to § 112), is adopted by Reflection. We wish, as it were, to see -the matter double, first in its immediacy, and secondly in its ground, -where it is no longer immediate. This is the plain meaning of the law -of sufficient ground, as it is called; it asserts that things should -essentially be viewed as mediated. The manner in which Formal Logic -establishes this law of thought, sets a bad example to other sciences. -Formal Logic asks these sciences not to accept their subject-matter as -it is immediately given; and yet herself lays down a law of thought -without deducing it,—in other words, without exhibiting its mediation. -With the same justice as the logician maintains our faculty of thought -to be so constituted that we must ask for the ground of everything, -might the physicist, when asked why a man who falls into water is -drowned, reply that man happens to be so organised that he cannot live -under water; or the jurist, when asked why a criminal is punished, -reply that civil society happens to be so constituted that crimes -cannot be left unpunished.</p> - -<p class="block2">Yet even if logic be excused the duty of giving a ground for the law -of the sufficient ground, it might at least explain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> what is to be -understood by a ground. The common explanation, which describes the -ground as what has a consequence, seems at the first glance more lucid -and intelligible than the preceding definition in logical terms. If you -ask however what the consequence is, you are told that it is what has -a ground; and it becomes obvious that the explanation is intelligible -only because it assumes what in our case has been reached as the -termination of an antecedent movement of thought. And this is the -true business of logic: to show that those thoughts, which as usually -employed merely float before consciousness neither understood nor -demonstrated, are really grades in the self-determination of thought. -It is by this means that they are understood and demonstrated.</p> - -<p class="block2">In common life, and it is the same in the finite sciences, this -reflective form is often employed as a key to the secret of the real -condition of the objects under investigation. So long as we deal with -what may be termed the household needs of knowledge, nothing can be -urged against this method of study. But it can never afford definitive -satisfaction, either in theory or practice. And the reason why it -fails is that the ground is yet without a definite content of its own; -I so that to regard anything as resting upon a ground merely gives -the formal difference of mediation in place of immediacy. We see an -electrical phenomenon, for example, and we ask for its ground (or -reason): we are told that electricity is the ground of this phenomenon. -What is this but the same content as we had immediately before us, only -translated into the form of inwardness?</p> - -<p class="block2">The ground however is not merely simple self-identity, but also -different: hence various grounds may be alleged for the same sum -of fact. This variety of grounds, again, following the logic of -difference, culminates in opposition of grounds <i>pro</i> and <i>contra.</i> -In any action, such as a theft, there is a sum of fact in which -several aspects may be distinguished. The theft has violated the -rights of property: it has given the means of satisfying his wants to -the needy thief: possibly too the man, from whom the theft was made, -misused his property. The violation of property is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> unquestionably -the decisive point of view before which the others must give way: -but the bare law of the ground cannot settle that question. Usually -indeed the law is interpreted to speak of a sufficient ground, not -of any ground whatever: and it might be supposed therefore, in the -action referred to, that, although other points of view besides the -violation of property might be held as grounds, yet they would not be -sufficient grounds. But here comes a dilemma. If we use the phrase -'sufficient ground,' the epithet is either otiose, or of such a kind -as to carry us past the mere category of ground. The predicate is -otiose and tautological, if it only states the capability of giving a -ground or reason: for the ground is a ground, only in so far as it has -this capability. If a soldier runs away from battle to save his life, -his conduct is certainly a violation of duty: but it cannot be held -that the ground which led him so to act was insufficient, otherwise -he would have remained at his post. Besides, there is this also to -be said. On one hand any ground suffices: on the other no ground -suffices as mere ground; because, as already said, it is yet void of -a content objectively and intrinsically determined, and is therefore -not self-acting and productive. A content thus objectively and -intrinsically determined, and hence self-acting, will hereafter come -before us as the notion: and it is the notion which Leibnitz had in his -eye when he spoke of sufficient ground, and urged the study of things -under its point of view. His remarks were originally directed against -that merely mechanical method of conceiving things so much in vogue -even now; a method which he justly pronounces insufficient. We may -see an instance of this mechanical theory of investigation, when the -organic process of the circulation of the blood is traced back merely -to the contraction of the heart; or when certain theories of criminal -law explain the purpose of punishment to lie in deterring people from -crime, in rendering the criminal harmless, or in other extraneous -grounds of the same kind. It is unfair to Leibnitz to suppose that he -was content with anything so poor as this formal law of the ground. The -method of investigation which he inaugurated is the very reverse of a -formalism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> which acquiesces in mere grounds, where a full and concrete -knowledge is sought. Considerations to this effect led Leibnitz to -contrast <i>causae efficientes</i> and <i>causae finales,</i> and to insist in -the place of final causes as the conception to which the efficient were -to lead up. If we adopt this distinction, light, heat, and moisture -would be the <i>causae efficientes,</i> not the <i>causa finalis</i> of the -growth of plants: the <i>causa finalis</i> is the notion of the plant itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">To get no further than mere grounds, especially on questions of law and -morality, is the position and principle of the Sophists. Sophistry, -as we ordinarily conceive it, is a method of investigation which aims -at distorting what is just and true, and exhibiting things in a false -light. Such however is not the proper or primary tendency of Sophistry: -the standpoint of which is no other than that of 'Raisonnement.' The -Sophists came on the scene at a time when the Greeks had begun to grow -dissatisfied with mere authority and tradition and felt the need of -intellectual justification for what they were to accept as obligatory. -That desideratum the Sophists supplied by teaching their countrymen -to seek for the various points of view under which things may be -considered: which points of view are the same as grounds. But the -ground, as we have seen, has no essential and objective principles of -its own, and it is as easy to discover grounds for what is wrong and -immoral as for what is moral and right. Upon the observer therefore it -depends to decide what points are to have most weight. The decision in -such circumstances is prompted by his individual views and sentiments. -Thus the objective foundation of what ought to have been of absolute -and essential obligation, accepted by all, was undermined: and -Sophistry by this destructive action deservedly brought upon itself -the bad name previously mentioned. Socrates, as we all know, met the -Sophists at every point, not by a bare re-assertion of authority and -tradition against their argumentations, but by showing dialectically -how untenable the mere grounds were, and by vindicating the obligation -of justice and goodness,—by reinstating the universal or notion of the -will. In the present day such a method of argumentation is not quite -out of fashion.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> Nor is that the case only in the discussion of secular -matters. It occurs even in sermons, such as those where every possible -ground of gratitude to God is propounded. To such pleading Socrates -and Plato would not have scrupled to apply the name of Sophistry. -For Sophistry has nothing to do with what is taught:—that may very -possibly be true. Sophistry lies in the formal circumstance of teaching -it by grounds which are as available for attack as for defence. In a -time so rich in reflection and so devoted to <i>raisonnement</i> as our -own, he must be a poor creature who cannot advance a good ground for -everything, even for what is worst and most depraved. Everything in the -world that has become corrupt has had good ground for its corruption. -An appeal to grounds at first makes the hearer think of beating a -retreat: but when experience has taught him the real state of these -matters, he closes his ears against them, and refuses to be imposed -upon any more.</p> - -<p>122.] As it first comes, the chief feature of Essence is show in itself -and intermediation in itself. But when it has completed the circle -of intermediation, its unity with itself is explicitly put as the -self-annulling of difference, and therefore of intermediation. Once -more then we come back to immediacy or Being,—but Being in so far as -it is intermediated by annulling the intermediation. And that Being is -<b>Existence</b>.</p> - -<p>The ground is not yet determined by objective principles of its -own, nor is it an end or final cause: hence it is not active, nor -productive. An Existence only <i>proceeds from</i> the ground. The -determinate ground is therefore a formal matter: that is to say, any -point will do, so long as it is expressly put as self-relation, as -affirmation, in correlation with the immediate existence depending on -it. If it be a ground at all, it is a good ground: for the term 'good' -is employed abstractly as equivalent to affirmative; and any point (or -feature) is good which can in any way be enunciated as confessedly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> -affirmative. So it happens that a ground can be found and adduced for -everything: and a good ground (for example, a good motive for action) -may effect something or may not, it may have a consequence or it may -not. It becomes a motive (strictly so called) and effects something, -<i>e.g.</i> through its reception into a will; there and there only it -becomes active and is made a cause.</p> - -<p class="center">(b) <i>Existence.</i></p> - -<p>123.] Existence is the immediate unity of reflection-into-self and -reflection-into-another. It follows from this that existence is the -indefinite multitude of existents as reflected-into-themselves, which -at the same time equally throw light upon one another,—which, in -short, are co-relative, and form a world of reciprocal dependence and -of infinite interconnexion between grounds and consequents. The grounds -are themselves existences: and the existents in like manner are in many -directions grounds as well as consequents.</p> - -<p class="block2">The phrase 'Existence' (derived from <i>existere</i>) suggests the fact of -having proceeded from something. Existence is Being which has proceeded -from the ground, and been reinstated by annulling its intermediation. -The Essence, as Being set aside and absorbed, originally came -before us as shining or showing in self, and the categories of this -reflection are identity, difference and ground. The last is the unity -of identity and difference; and because it unifies them it has at the -same time to distinguish itself from itself. But that which is in -this way distinguished from the ground is as little mere difference, -as the ground itself is abstract sameness. The ground works its -own suspension: and when suspended, the result of its negation is -existence. Having issued from the ground, existence contains the ground -in it 'the ground does not remain, as it were, behind existence, but by -its very nature supersedes itself and translates itself into existence. -This is exemplified even in our ordinary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> mode of thinking, when we -look upon the ground of a thing, not as something abstractly inward, -but as itself also an existent. For example, the lightning-flash -which has set a house on fire would be considered the ground of the -conflagration: or the manners of a nation and the condition of its -life would be regarded as the ground of its constitution. Such indeed -is the ordinary aspect in which the existent world originally appears -to reflection,—an indefinite crowd of things existent, which being -simultaneously reflected on themselves and on one another are related -reciprocally as ground and consequence. In this motley play of the -world, if we may so call the sum of existents, there is nowhere a -firm footing to be found: everything bears an aspect of relativity, -conditioned by and conditioning something else. The reflective -understanding makes it its business to elicit and trace these -connexions running out in every direction; but the question touching an -ultimate design is so far left unanswered, and therefore the craving of -the reason after knowledge passes with the further development of the -logical Idea beyond this position of mere relativity.</p> - -<p>124.] The reflection-on-another of the existent is however inseparable -from the reflection-on-self: the ground is their unity, from which -existence has issued. The existent therefore includes relativity, and -has on its own part its multiple interconnexions with other existents: -it is reflected on itself as its ground. The existent is, when so -described, a <b>Thing</b>.</p> - -<p>The 'thing-by-itself' (or thing in the abstract), so famous in the -philosophy of Kant, shows itself here in its genesis. It is seen to be -the abstract reflection-on-self, which is clung to, to the exclusion of -reflection-on-other-things and of all predication of difference. The -thing-by-itself therefore is the empty substratum for these predicates -of relation.</p> - -<p class="block2">If to know means to comprehend an object in its concrete character, -then the thing-by-itself, which is nothing but the quite abstract -and indeterminate thing in general, must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> certainly be as unknowable -as it is alleged to be. With as much reason however as we speak -of the thing-by-itself, we might speak of quality-by-itself or -quantity-by-itself, and of any other category. The expression would -then serve to signify that these categories are taken in their abstract -immediacy, apart from their development and inward character. It is -no better than a whim of the understanding, therefore, if we attach -the qualificatory 'in or by-itself' to the <i>thing</i> only. But this -'in or by-itself' is also applied to the facts of the mental as well -as the natural world: as we speak of electricity or of a plant in -itself, so we speak of man or the state in itself. By this 'in-itself' -in these objects we are meant to understand what they strictly and -properly are. This usage is liable to the same criticism as the -phrase 'thing-in-itself.' For if we stick to the mere 'in-itself' of -an object, we apprehend it not in its truth, but in the inadequate -form of mere abstraction. Thus the man, by or in himself, is the -child. And what the child has to do is to rise out of this abstract -and undeveloped 'in-himself,' and become 'for himself what he is at -first only 'in-himself,' a free and reasonable being. Similarly, the -state-in-itself is the yet immature and patriarchal state, where the -various political functions, latent in the notion of the state, have -not received the full logical constitution which the logic of political -principles demands. In the same sense, the germ may be called the -plant-in-itself. These examples may show the mistake of supposing -that the 'thing-in-itself' or the 'in-itself' of things is something -inaccessible to our cognition. All things are originally in-themselves, -but that is not the end of the matter. As the germ, being the -plant-in-itself, means self-development, so the thing in general passes -beyond its in-itself, (the abstract reflection on self,) to manifest -itself further as a reflection on other things. It is in this sense -that it has properties.</p> - -<p class="center">(c) <i>The Thing.</i></p> - -<p>125.] (α) The Thing is the totality—the development in explicit -unity—of the categories of the ground and of existence. On the side -of one of its factors, viz.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> reflection-on-other-things, it has in it -the differences, in virtue of which it is a characterised and concrete -thing. These characteristics are different from one another; they have -their reflection-into-self not on their own part, but on the part of -the thing. They are Properties of the thing: and their relation to the -thing is expressed by the word 'have.'</p> - -<p>As a term of relation, 'to have' takes the place of 'to be.' True, -somewhat has qualities on its part too: but this transference of -'Having' into the sphere of Being is inexact, because the character as -quality is directly one with the somewhat, and the somewhat ceases to -be when it loses its quality. But the thing is reflection-into-self: -for it is an identity which is also distinct from the difference, -<i>i.e.</i> from its attributes.—In many languages 'have' is employed -to denote past time. And with reason: for the past is absorbed or -suspended being, and the mind is its reflection-into-self; in the mind -only it continues to subsist,—the mind however distinguishing from -itself this being in it which has been absorbed or suspended.</p> - -<p class="block2">In the Thing all the characteristics of reflection recur as existent. -Thus the thing, in its initial aspect, as the thing-by-itself, is the -self-same or identical. But identity, it was proved, is not found -without difference: so the properties, which the thing has, are the -existent difference in the form of diversity. In the case of diversity -or variety each diverse member exhibited an indifference to every -other, and they had no other relation to each other, save what was -given by a comparison external to them. But now in the thing we have a -bond which keeps the various properties in union. Property, besides, -should not be confused with quality. No doubt, we also say, a thing -has qualities. But the phraseology is a misplaced one: 'having' hints -at an independence, foreign to the 'Somewhat,' which is still directly -identical with its quality. Somewhat is what it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> only by its -quality: whereas, though the thing indeed exists only as it has its -properties, it is not confined to this or that definite property, and -can therefore lose it, without ceasing to be what it is.</p> - -<p>126.] (ß) Even in the ground, however, the reflection-on-something-else -is directly convertible with reflection-on-self. And hence the -properties are not merely different from each other; they are also -self-identical, independent, and relieved from their attachment to the -thing. Still, as they are the characters of the thing distinguished -from one another (as reflected-into-self), they are not themselves -things, if things be concrete; but only existences reflected -into themselves as abstract characters. They are what are called -<b>Matters</b>.</p> - -<p>Nor is the name 'things' given to Matters, such as magnetic and -electric matters. They are qualities proper, a reflected Being,—one -with their Being,—they are the character that has reached immediacy, -existence: they are 'entities.'</p> - -<p class="block2">To elevate the properties, which the Thing has, to the independent -position of matters, or materials of which it consists, is a proceeding -based upon the notion of a Thing: and for that reason is also found -in experience. Thought and experience however alike protest against -concluding from the fact that certain properties of a thing, such -as colour, or smell, may be represented as particular colouring or -odorific matters, that we are then at the end of the inquiry, and -that nothing more is needed to penetrate to the true secret of things -than a disintegration of them into their component materials. This -disintegration into independent matters is properly restricted to -inorganic nature only. The chemist is in the right therefore when, -for example, he analyses common salt or gypsum into its elements, and -finds that the former consists of muriatic acid and soda, the latter of -sulphuric acid and calcium. So too the geologist does well to regard -granite as a compound of quartz, felspar, and mica. These matters, -again, of which the thing consists, are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> themselves partly things, -which in that way may be once more reduced to more abstract matters. -Sulphuric acid, for example, is a compound of sulphur and oxygen. Such -matters or bodies can as a matter of fact be exhibited as subsisting by -themselves: but frequently we find other properties of things, entirely -wanting this self-subsistence, also regarded as particular matters. -Thus we hear caloric, and electrical or magnetic matters spoken of. -Such matters are at the best figments of understanding. And we see -here the usual procedure of the abstract reflection of understanding. -Capriciously adopting single categories, whose value entirely depends -on their place in the gradual evolution of the logical idea, it employs -them in the pretended interests of explanation, but in the face of -plain, unprejudiced perception and experience, so as to trace back to -them every object investigated. Nor is this all. The theory, which -makes things consist of independent matters, is frequently applied in a -region where it has neither meaning nor force. For within the limits of -nature even, wherever there is organic life, this category is obviously -inadequate. An animal may be said to consist of bones, muscles, nerves, -&c.: but evidently we are here using the term 'consist' in a very -different sense from its use when we spoke of the piece of granite as -consisting of the above-mentioned elements. The elements of granite are -utterly indifferent to their combination: they could subsist as well -without it. The different parts and members of an organic body on the -contrary subsist only in their union: they cease to exist as such, when -they are separated from each other.</p> - -<p>127.] Thus Matter is the mere abstract or indeterminate -reflection-into-something-else, or reflection-into-self at the same -time as determinate; it is consequently Thinghood which then and there -is,—the subsistence of the thing. By this means the thing has on the -part of the matters its reflection-into-self (the reverse of § 125); -it subsists not on its own part, but consists of the matters, and is -only a superficial association between them, an external combination of -them.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span></p> - -<p>128.] (γ) Matter, being the immediate unity of existence with itself, -is also indifferent towards specific character. Hence the numerous -diverse matters coalesce into the one <b>Matter</b>, or into existence -under the reflective characteristic of identity. In contrast to this -one Matter these distinct properties and their external relation which -they have to one another in the thing, constitute the <i>Form</i>,—the -reflective category of difference, but a difference which exists and is -a totality.</p> - -<p>This one featureless Matter is also the same as the Thing-by-itself -was: only the latter is intrinsically quite abstract, while the former -essentially implies relation to something else, and in the first place -to the Form.</p> - -<p class="block2">The various matters of which the thing consists are potentially the -same as one another. Thus we get one Matter in general to which the -difference is expressly attached externally and as a bare form. This -theory which holds things all round to have one and the same matter at -bottom, and merely to differ externally in respect of form, is much in -vogue with the reflective understanding. Matter in that case counts for -naturally indeterminate, but susceptible of any determination; while at -the same time it is perfectly permanent, and continues the same amid -all change and alteration. And in finite things at least this disregard -of matter for any determinate form is certainly exhibited. For example, -it matters not to a block of marble, whether it receive the form of -this or that statue or even the form of a pillar. Be it noted however -that a block of marble can disregard form only relatively, that is, in -reference to the sculptor: it is by no means purely formless. And so -the mineralogist considers the relatively formless marble as a special -formation of rock, differing from other equally special formations, -such as sandstone or porphyry. Therefore we say it is an abstraction -of the understanding which isolates matter into a certain natural -formlessness. For properly speaking the thought of matter includes the -principle of form throughout, and no formless matter therefore appears -anywhere<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> even in experience as existing. Still the conception of -matter as original and pre-existent, and as naturally formless, is a -very ancient one; it meets us even among the Greeks, at first in the -mythical shape of Chaos, which is supposed to represent the unformed -substratum of the existing world. Such a conception must of necessity -tend to make God not the Creator of the world, but a mere world-moulder -or demiurge. A deeper insight into nature reveals God as creating the -world out of nothing. And that teaches two things. On the one hand it -enunciates that matter, as such, has no independent subsistence, and on -the other that the form does not supervene upon matter from without, -but as a totality involves the principle of matter in itself. This free -and infinite form will hereafter come before us as the notion.</p> - -<p>129.] Thus the Thing suffers a disruption into Matter and Form. Each -of these is the totality of thinghood and subsists for itself. But -Matter, which is meant to be the positive and indeterminate existence, -contains, as an existence, reflection-on-another, every whit as -much as it contains self-enclosed being. Accordingly as uniting -these characteristics, it is itself the totality of Form. But Form, -being a complete whole of characteristics, <i>ipso facto</i> involves -reflection-into-self; in other words, as self-relating Form it has the -very function attributed to Matter. Both are at bottom the same. Invest -them with this unity, and you have the relation of Matter and Form, -which are also no less distinct.</p> - -<p>130.] The Thing, being this totality, is a contradiction. On the side -of its negative unity it is Form in which Matter is determined and -deposed to the rank of properties (§ 125). At the same time it consists -of Matters, which in the reflection-of-the-thing-into-itself are as -much independent as they are at the same time negatived. Thus the thing -is the essential existence, in such a way<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> as to be an existence that -suspends or absorbs itself in itself. In other words, the thing is an -Appearance or Phenomenon.</p> - -<p>The negation of the several matters, which is insisted on in the -thing no less than their independent existence, occurs in Physics as -<i>porosity.</i> Each of the several matters (colouring matter, odorific -matter, and if we believe some people, even sound-matter,—not -excluding caloric, electric matter, &c.) is also negated: and in this -negation of theirs, or as interpenetrating their pores, we find the -numerous other independent matters, which, being similarly porous, -make room in turn for the existence of the rest. Pores are not -empirical facts; they are figments of the understanding, which uses -them to represent the element of negation in independent matters. -The further working-out of the contradictions is concealed by the -nebulous imbroglio in which all matters are independent and all no less -negated in each other.—If the faculties or activities are similarly -hypostatised in the mind, their living unity similarly turns to the -imbroglio of an action of the one on the others.</p> - -<p>These pores (meaning thereby not the pores in an organic body, such as -the pores of wood or of the skin, but those in the so-called 'matters,' -such as colouring matter, caloric, or metals, crystals, &c.) cannot be -verified by observation. In the same way matter itself,—furthermore -form which is separated from matter,—whether that be the thing as -consisting of matters, or the view that the thing itself subsists and -only has proper ties,—is all a product of the reflective understanding -which, while it observes and professes to record only what it observes, -is rather creating a metaphysic, bristling with contradictions of which -it is unconscious.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span></p> - - -<h5>B.—APPEARANCE.</h5> - -<p>131.] The Essence must appear or shine forth. Its shining or reflection -in it is the suspension and translation of it to immediacy, which, -whilst as reflection-on-self it is matter or subsistence, is also form, -reflection-on-something-else, a subsistence which sets itself aside. To -show or shine is the characteristic by which essence is distinguished -from being,—by which it is essence; and it is this show which, when -it is developed, shows itself, and is Appearance. Essence accordingly -is not something beyond or behind appearance, but just because it -is the essence which exists—the existence is <b>Appearance</b> -(Forth-shining).</p> - -<p class="block2">Existence stated explicitly in its contradiction is Appearance. But -appearance (forth-shining) is not to be confused with a mere show -(shining). Show is the proximate truth of Being or immediacy. The -immediate, instead of being, as we suppose, something independent, -resting on its own self, is a mere show, and as such it is packed or -summed up under the simplicity of the immanent essence. The essence -is, in the first place, the sum total of the showing itself, shining -in itself (inwardly); but, far from abiding in this inwardness, it -comes as a ground forward into existence; and this existence being -grounded not in itself, but on something else, is just appearance. -In our imagination we ordinarily combine with the term appearance -or phenomenon the conception of an indefinite congeries of things -existing, the being of which is purely relative, and which consequently -do not rest on a foundation of their own, but are esteemed only as -passing stages. But in this conception it is no less implied that -essence does not linger behind or beyond appearance. Rather it is, we -may say, the Infinite kindness which lets its own show freely issue -into immediacy, and graciously allows it the joy of existence. The -appearance which is thus created does not stand on its own feet, and -has its being not in itself but in something else. God<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> who is the -essence, when He lends existence to the passing stages of His own show -in Himself, may be described as the goodness that creates a world: but -He is also the power above it, and the righteousness, which manifests -the merely phenomenal character of the content of this existing world, -whenever it tries to exist in independence.</p> - -<p class="block2">Appearance is in every way a very important grade of the logical idea. -It may be said to be the distinction of philosophy from ordinary -consciousness that it sees the merely phenomenal character of what the -latter supposes to have a self-subsistent being. The significance of -appearance however must be properly grasped, or mistakes will arise. -To say that anything is a <i>mere</i> appearance may be misinterpreted to -mean that, as compared with what is merely phenomenal, there is greater -truth in the immediate, in that which <i>is.</i> Now in strict fact, the -case is precisely the reverse. Appearance is higher than mere Being,—a -richer category because it holds in combination the two elements of -reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another: whereas Being (or -immediacy) still mere relationlessness and apparently rests upon itself -alone. Still, to say that anything is <i>only</i> an appearance suggests a -real flaw, which consists in this, that Appearance is still divided -against itself and without intrinsic stability. Beyond and above mere -appearance comes in the first place Actuality, the third grade of -Essence, of which we shall afterwards speak.</p> - -<p class="block2">In the history of Modern Philosophy, Kant has the merit of first -rehabilitating this distinction between the common and the philosophic -modes of thought. He stopped half-way however, when he attached to -Appearance a subjective meaning only, and put the abstract essence -immovable outside it as the thing-in-itself beyond the reach of our -cognition. For it is the very nature of the world of immediate objects -to be appearance only. Knowing it to be so, we know at the same time -the essence, which, far from staying behind or beyond the appearance, -rather manifests its own essentiality by deposing the world to a mere -appearance. One can hardly quarrel with the plain man who, in his -desire for totality, cannot acquiesce in the doctrine of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> subjective -idealism, that we are solely concerned with phenomena. The plain man, -however, in his desire to save the objectivity of knowledge, may very -naturally return to abstract immediacy, and maintain that immediacy -to be true and actual. In a little work published under the title, -<i>A Report, clear as day, to the larger Public touching the proper -nature of the Latest Philosophy: an Attempt to force the reader to -understand,'</i> Fichte examined the opposition between subjective -idealism and immediate consciousness in a popular form, under the shape -of a dialogue between the author and the reader, and tried hard to -prove that the subjective idealist's point of view was right. In this -dialogue the reader complains to the author that he has completely -failed to place himself in the idealist's position, and is inconsolable -at the thought that things around him are no real things but mere -appearances. The affliction of the reader can scarcely be blamed when -he is expected to consider himself hemmed in by an impervious circle -of purely subjective conceptions. Apart from this subjective view of -Appearance, however, we have all reason to rejoice that the things -which environ us are appearances and not steadfast and independent -existences; since in that case we should soon perish of hunger, both -bodily and mental.</p> - -<p class="center">(a) <i>The World of Appearance.</i></p> - -<p>132.] The Apparent or Phenomenal exists in such a way, that its -subsistence is <i>ipso facto</i> thrown into abeyance or suspended and -is only one stage in the form itself. The form embraces in it the -matter or subsistence as one of its characteristics. In this way -the phenomenal has its ground in this (form) as its essence, its -reflection-into-self in contrast with its immediacy, but, in so doing, -has it only in another aspect of the form. This ground of its is no -less phenomenal than itself, and the phenomenon accordingly goes on to -an endless mediation of subsistence by means of form, and thus equally -by non-subsistence. This endless inter-mediation is at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> the same time -a unity of self-relation; and existence is developed into a totality, -into a world of phenomena,—of reflected finitude.</p> - -<p class="center">(b) <i>Content and Form.</i></p> - -<p>133.] Outside one another as the phenomena in this phenomenal -world are, they form a totality, and are wholly contained in their -self-relatedness. In this way the self-relation of the phenomenon is -completely specified, it has the <b>Form</b> in itself: and because it -is in this identity, has it as essential subsistence. So it comes about -that the form is <b>Content</b>: and in its mature phase is the <b>Law -of the Phenomenon</b>. When the form, on the contrary, is not reflected -into self, it is equivalent to the negative of the phenomenon, to -the non-independent and changeable: and that sort of form is the -indifferent or <b>External Form</b>.</p> - -<p>The essential point to keep in mind about the opposition of Form and -Content is that the content is not formless, but has the form in its -own self, quite as much as the form is external to it. There is thus -a doubling of form. At one time it is reflected into itself; and then -is identical with the content. At another time it is not reflected -into itself, and then is the external existence, which does not at -all affect the content. We are here in presence, implicitly, of the -absolute correlation of content and form: viz. their reciprocal -revulsion, so that content is nothing but the revulsion of form into -content, and form nothing but the revulsion of content into form. This -mutual revulsion is one of the most important laws of thought. But it -is not explicitly brought out before the Relations of Substance and -Causality.</p> - -<p class="block2">Form and content are a pair of terms frequently employed by the -reflective understanding, especially with a habit of looking on the -content as the essential and independent, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> form on the contrary as -the unessential and dependent. Against this it is to be noted that both -are in fact equally essential; and that, while a formless <i>content</i> can -be as little found as a formless <i>matter,</i> the two (content and matter) -are distinguished by this circumstance, that matter, though implicitly -not without form, still in its existence manifests a disregard of form, -whereas the content, as such, is what it is only because the matured -form is included in it. Still the form comes before us sometimes as -an existence indifferent and external to content, and does so for -the reason that the whole range of Appearance still suffers from -externality. In a book, for instance, it certainly has no bearing upon -the content, whether it be written or printed, bound in paper or in -leather. That however does not in the least imply that apart from such -an indifferent and external form, the content of the book is itself -formless. There are undoubtedly books enough which even in reference -to their content may well be styled formless: but want of form in this -case is the same as bad form, and means the defect of the right form, -not the absence of all form whatever. So far is this right form from -being unaffected by the content that it is rather the content itself. A -work of art that wants the right form is for that very reason no right -or true work of art: and it is a bad way of excusing an artist, to say -that the content of his works is good and even excellent, though they -want the right form. Real works of art are those where content and form -exhibit a thorough identity. The content of the Iliad, it may be said, -is the Trojan war, and especially the wrath of Achilles. In that we -have everything, and yet very little after all; for the Iliad is made -an Iliad by the poetic form, in which that content is moulded. The -content of Romeo and Juliet may similarly be said to be the ruin of two -lovers through the discord between their families: but something more -is needed to make Shakespeare's immortal tragedy.</p> - -<p class="block2">In reference to the relation of form and content in the field of -science, we should recollect the difference between philosophy and -the rest of the sciences. The latter are finite, because their mode -of thought, as a merely formal act, derives its content from without. -Their content therefore is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> not known as moulded from within through -the thoughts which lie at the ground of it, and form and content do -not thoroughly interpenetrate each other. This partition disappears in -philosophy, and thus justifies its title of infinite knowledge. Yet -even philosophic thought is often held to be a merely formal act; and -that logic, which confessedly deals only with thoughts <i>quâ</i> thoughts, -is merely formal, is especially a foregone conclusion. And if content -means no more than what is palpable and obvious to the senses, all -philosophy and logic in particular must be at once acknowledged to -be void of content, that is to say, of content perceptible to the -senses. Even ordinary forms of thought however, and the common usage of -language, do not in the least restrict the appellation of content to -what is perceived by the senses, or to what has a being in place and -time. A book without content is, as every one knows, not a book with -empty leaves, but one of which the content is as good as none. We shall -find as the last result on closer analysis, that by what is called -content an educated mind means nothing but the presence and power of -thought. But this is to admit that thoughts are not empty forms without -affinity to their content, and that in other spheres as well as in art -the truth and the sterling value of the content essentially depend on -the content showing itself identical with the form.</p> - -<p>134.] But immediate existence is a character of the subsistence itself -as well as of the form: it is consequently external to the character of -the content; but in an equal degree this externality, which the content -has through the factor of its subsistence, is essential to it. When -thus explicitly stated, the phenomenon is relativity or correlation: -where one and the same thing, viz. the content or the developed -form, is seen as the externality and antithesis of independent -existences, and as their reduction to a relation of identity, in which -identification alone the two things distinguished are what they are.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">(c) <i>Relation or Correlation.</i></p> - -<p>135.] (α) The immediate relation is that of the <b>Whole</b> and the -<b>Parts</b>. The content is the whole, and consists of the parts (the -form), its counterpart. The parts are diverse one from another. It is -they that possess independent being. But they are parts, only when they -are identified by being related to one another; or, in so far as they -make up the whole, when taken together. But this 'Together' is the -counterpart and negation of the part.</p> - -<p class="block2"><b>Essential correlation</b> is the specific and completely universal -phase in which things appear. Everything that exists stands in -correlation, and this correlation is the veritable nature of every -existence. The existent thing in this way has no being of its own, but -only in something else: in this other however it is self-relation; and -correlation is the unity of the self-relation and relation-to-others.</p> - -<p class="block2">The relation of the whole and the parts is untrue to this extent, that -the notion and the reality of the relation are not in harmony. The -notion of the whole is to contain parts: but if the whole is taken -and made what its notion implies, <i>i.e.</i> if it is divided, it at once -ceases to be a whole. Things there are, no doubt, which correspond -to this relation: but for that very reason they are low and untrue -existences. We must remember however what 'untrue' signifies. When -it occurs in a philosophical discussion, the term 'untrue' does not -signify that the thing to which it is applied is non-existent. A bad -state or a sickly body may exist all the same; but these things are -untrue, because their notion and their reality are out of harmony.</p> - -<p class="block2">The relation of whole and parts, being the immediate relation, comes -easy to reflective understanding; and for that reason it often -satisfies when the question really turns on profounder ties. The limbs -and organs, for instance, of an organic body are not merely parts of -it: it is only in their unity that they are what they are, and they -are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> unquestionably affected by that unity, as they also in turn affect -it. These limbs and organs become mere parts, only when they pass under -the hands of the anatomist, whose occupation, be it remembered, is not -with the living body but with the corpse. Not that such analysis is -illegitimate: we only mean that the external and mechanical relation of -whole and parts is not sufficient for us, if we want to study organic -life in its truth. And if this be so in organic life, it is the case -to a much greater extent when we apply this relation to the mind and -the formations of the spiritual world. Psychologists may not expressly -speak of parts of the soul or mind, but the mode in which this -subject is treated by the analytic understanding is largely founded -on the analogy of this finite relation. At least that is so, when the -different forms of mental activity are enumerated and described merely -in their isolation one after another, as so-called special powers and -faculties.</p> - -<p>136.] (β) The one-and-same of this correlation (the self-relation -found in it) is thus immediately a negative self-relation. The -correlation is in short the mediating process whereby one and the -same is first unaffected towards difference, and secondly is the -negative self-relation, which repels itself as reflection-into-self to -difference, and invests itself (as reflection-into-something-else) with -existence, whilst it conversely leads back this reflection-into-other -to self-relation and indifference. This gives the correlation of -<b>Force</b> and its <b>Expression</b>.</p> - -<p>The relationship of whole and part is the immediate and therefore -unintelligent (mechanical) relation,—a revulsion of self-identity -into mere variety. Thus we pass from the whole to the parts, and from -the parts to the whole: in the one we forget its opposition to the -other, while each on its own account, at one time the whole, at another -the parts, is taken to be an independent existence. In other words, -when the parts are declared to subsist in the whole, and the whole -to consist of the parts, we have either member of the relation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> at -different times taken to be permanently subsistent, while the other is -non-essential. In its superficial form the mechanical nexus consists in -the parts being independent of each other and of the whole.</p> - -<p>This relation may be adopted for the progression <i>ad infinitum,</i> -in the case of the divisibility of matter: and then it becomes an -unintelligent alternation with the two sides. A thing at one time is -taken as a whole: then we go on to specify the parts: this specifying -is forgotten, and what was a part is regarded as a whole: then the -specifying of the part comes up again, and so on for ever. But if this -infinity be taken as the negative which it is, it is the <i>negative</i> -self-relating element in the correlation,—Force, the self-identical -whole, or immanency; which yet supersedes this immanency and gives -itself expression;—and conversely the expression which vanishes and -returns into Force.</p> - -<p>Force, notwithstanding this infinity, is also finite: for the content, -or the one and the same of the Force and its out-putting, is this -identity at first only for the observer: the two sides of the relation -are not yet, each on its own account, the concrete identity of that -one and same, not yet the totality. For one another they are therefore -different, and the relationship is a finite one. Force consequently -requires solicitation from without: it works blindly: and on account of -this defectiveness of form, the content is also limited and accidental. -It is not yet genuinely identical with the form: not yet is it <i>as</i> a -notion and an end; that is to say, it is not intrinsically and actually -determinate. This difference is most vital, but not easy to apprehend: -it will assume a clearer formulation when we reach Design. If it be -overlooked, it leads to the confusion of conceiving God as Force, a -confusion from which Herder's God especially suffers.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span></p> - -<p>It is often said that the nature of Force itself is unknown and only -its manifestation apprehended. But, in the first place, it may be -replied, every article in the import of Force is the same as what -is specified in the Exertion: and the explanation of a phenomenon -by a Force is to that extent a mere tautology. What is supposed to -remain unknown, therefore, is really nothing but the empty form of -reflection-into-self, by which alone the Force is distinguished from -the Exertion,—and that form too is something familiar. It is a form -that does not make the slightest addition to the content and to the -law, which have to be discovered from the phenomenon alone. Another -assurance always given is that to speak of forces implies no theory as -to their nature: and that being so, it is impossible to see why the -form of Force has been introduced into the sciences at all. In the -second place the nature of Force is undoubtedly unknown: we are still -without any necessity binding and connecting its content together in -itself, as we are without necessity in the content, in so far as it is -expressly limited and hence has its character by means of another thing -outside it.</p> - -<p class="block2">(1) Compared with the immediate relation of whole and parts, the -relation between force and its putting-forth may be considered -infinite. In it that identity of the two sides is realised, which in -the former relation only existed for the observer. The whole, though -we can see that it consists of parts, ceases to be a whole when it -is divided: whereas force is only shown to be force when it exerts -itself, and in its exercise only comes back to itself. The exercise is -only force once more. Yet, on further examination even this relation -will appear finite, and finite in virtue of this mediation: just -as, conversely, the relation of whole and parts is obviously finite -in virtue of its immediacy. The first and simplest evidence for the -finitude of the mediated relation of force and its exercise is, that -each and every force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> is conditioned and requires something else than -itself for its subsistence. For instance, a special vehicle of magnetic -force, as is well known, is iron, the other properties of which, such -as its colour, specific weight, or relation to acids, are independent -of this connexion with magnetism. The same thing is seen in all other -forces, which from one end to the other are found to be conditioned -and mediated by something else than themselves. Another proof of -the finite nature of force is that it requires solicitation before -it can put itself forth. That through which the force is solicited, -is itself another exertion of force, which cannot put itself forth -without similar solicitation. This brings us either to a repetition of -the infinite progression, or to a reciprocity of soliciting and being -solicited. In either case we have no absolute beginning of motion. -Force is not as yet, like the final cause, inherently self-determining: -the content is given to it as determined, and force, when it exerts -itself, is, according to the phrase, blind in its working. That phrase -implies the distinction between abstract force-manifestation and -teleological action.</p> - -<p class="block2">(2) The oft-repeated statement, that the exercise of the force and -not the force itself admits of being known, must be rejected as -groundless. It is the very essence of force to manifest itself, and -thus in the totality of manifestation, conceived as a law, we at the -same time discover the force itself. And yet this assertion that force -in its own self is unknowable betrays a well-grounded presentiment -that this relation is finite. The several manifestations of a force at -first meet us in indefinite multiplicity, and in their isolation seem -accidental: but, reducing this multiplicity to its inner unity, which -we term force, we see that the apparently contingent is necessary, by -recognising the law that rules it. But the different forces themselves -are a multiplicity again, and in their mere juxtaposition seem to be -contingent. Hence in empirical physics, we speak of the forces of -gravity, magnetism, electricity, &c., and in empirical psychology of -the forces of memory, imagination, will, and all the other faculties. -All this multiplicity again excites a craving to know these different -forces as a single whole, nor would this craving be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> appeased even if -the several forces were traced back to one common primary force. Such -a primary force would be really no more than an empty abstraction, -with as little content as the abstract thing-in-itself. And besides -this, the correlation of force and manifestation is essentially a -mediated correlation (of reciprocal dependence), and it must therefore -contradict the notion of force to view it as primary or resting on -itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">Such being the case with the nature of force, though we may consent to -let the world be called a manifestation of divine forces, we should -object to have God Himself viewed as a mere force. For force is after -all a subordinate and finite category. At the so-called renascence of -the sciences, when steps were taken to trace the single phenomena of -nature back to underlying forces, the Church branded the enterprise -as impious. The argument of the Church was as follows. If it be the -forces of gravitation, of vegetation, &c. which occasion the movements -of the heavenly bodies, the growth of plants, &c., there is nothing -left for divine providence, and God sinks to the level of a leisurely -on-looker, surveying this play of forces. The students of nature, it is -true, and Newton more than others, when they employed the reflective -category of force to explain natural phenomena, have expressly pleaded -that the honour of God, as the Creator and Governor of the world, would -not thereby be impaired. Still the logical issue of this explanation -by means of forces is that the inferential understanding proceeds to -fix each of these forces, and to maintain them in their finitude as -ultimate. And contrasted with this deinfinitised world of independent -forces and matters, the only terms in which it is possible still to -describe God will present Him in the abstract infinity of an unknowable -supreme Being in some other world far away. This is precisely the -position of materialism, and of modern 'free-thinking,' whose theology -ignores what God is and restricts itself to the mere fact <i>that</i> He -is. In this dispute therefore the Church and the religious mind have -to a certain extent the right on their side. The finite forms of -understanding certainly fail to fulfil the conditions for a knowledge -either<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> of Nature or of the formations in the world of Mind as they -truly are. Yet on the other side it is impossible to overlook the -formal right which, in the first place, entitles the empirical sciences -to vindicate the right of thought to know the existent world in all -the speciality of its content, and to seek something further than the -bare statement of mere abstract faith that God creates and governs the -world. When our religious consciousness, resting upon the authority of -the Church, teaches us that God created the world by His almighty will, -that He guides the stars in their courses, and vouchsafes to all His -creatures their existence and their well-being, the question Why? is -still left to answer. Now it is the answer to this question which forms -the common task of empirical science and of philosophy. When religion -refuses to recognise this problem, or the right to put it, and appeals -to the unsearchableness of the decrees of God, it is taking up the same -agnostic ground as is taken by the mere Enlightenment of understanding. -Such an appeal is no better than an arbitrary dogmatism, which -contravenes the express command of Christianity, to know God in spirit -and in truth, and is prompted by a humility which is not Christian, but -born of ostentatious bigotry.</p> - -<p>137.] Force is a whole, which is in its own self negative -self-relation; and as such a whole it continually pushes -itself off from itself and puts itself forth. But since this -reflection-into-another (corresponding to the distinction between the -Parts of the Whole) is equally a reflection-into-self, this out-putting -is the way and means by which Force that returns back into itself is -as a Force. The very act of out-putting accordingly sets in abeyance -the diversity of the two sides which is found in this correlation, -and expressly states the identity which virtually constitutes their -content. The truth of Force and utterance therefore is that relation, -in which the two sides are distinguished only as Outward and Inward.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span></p> - -<p>138.] (γ) The <b>Inward</b> (Interior) is the ground, when it -stands as the mere form of the one side of the Appearance and -the Correlation,—the empty form of reflection-into-self. As a -counterpart to it stands the <b>Outward</b> (Exterior),—Existence, -also as the form of the other side of the correlation, with the -empty characteristic of reflection-into-something-else. But Inward -and Outward are identified: and their identity is identity brought -to fulness in the content, that unity of reflection-into-self and -reflection-into-other which was forced to appear in the movement of -force. Both are the same one totality, and this unity makes them the -content.</p> - -<p>139.] In the first place then, Exterior is the same content as -Interior. What is inwardly is also found outwardly, and <i>vice versâ.</i> -The appearance shows nothing that is not in the essence, and in the -essence there is nothing but what is manifested.</p> - -<p>140.] In the second place, Inward and Outward, as formal terms, -are also reciprocally opposed, and that thoroughly. The one is the -abstraction of identity with self; the other, of mere multiplicity -or reality. But as stages of the one form, they are essentially -identical: so that whatever is at first explicitly put only in the one -abstraction, is also as plainly and at one step only in the other. -Therefore what is only internal is also only external: and what is only -external, is so far only at first internal.</p> - -<p>It is the customary mistake of reflection to take the essence to be -merely the interior. If it be so taken, even this way of looking at -it is purely external, and that sort of essence is the empty external -abstraction.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -Ins Innere der Natur<br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span>Dringt sein erschaffner Geist,<br /> -Zu glücklich wenn er nur<br /> -Die äußere Schaale weist.<a name="FNanchor_1_25" id="FNanchor_1_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_25" class="fnanchor">[1]</a><br /> -</p> - -<p>It ought rather to have been said that, if the essence of nature is -ever described as the inner part, the person who so describes it -only knows its outer shell. In Being as a whole, or even in mere -sense-perception, the notion is at first only an inward, and for that -very reason is something external to Being, a subjective thinking -and being, devoid of truth.—In Nature as well as in Mind, so long -as the notion, design, or law are at first the inner capacity, mere -possibilities, they are first only an external, inorganic nature, -the knowledge of a third person, alien force, and the like. As a man -is outwardly, that is to say in his actions (not of course in his -merely bodily outwardness), so is he inwardly: and if his virtue, -morality, &c. are only inwardly his,—that is if they exist only in his -intentions and sentiments, and his outward acts are not identical with -them, the one half of him is as hollow and empty as the other.</p> - -<p class="block2">The relation of Outward and Inward unites the two relations that -precede, and at the same time sets in abeyance mere relativity and -phenomenality in general. Yet so long as understanding keeps the Inward -and Outward fixed in their separation, they are empty forms, the one -as null as the other. Not only in the study of nature, but also of the -spiritual world, much depends on a just appreciation of the relation -of inward and outward, and especially on avoiding the misconception -that the former only is the essential point on which everything turns, -while the latter is unessential and trivial. We find this mistake made -when, as is often done, the difference between nature and mind is -traced back <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span>to the abstract difference between inner and outer. As for -nature, it certainly is in the gross external, not merely to the mind, -but even on its own part. But to call it external 'in the gross' is -not to imply an abstract externality—for there is no such thing. It -means rather that the Idea which forms the common content of nature and -mind, is found in nature as outward only, and for that very reason only -inward. The abstract understanding, with its 'Either—or,' may struggle -against this conception of nature. It is none the less obviously found -in our other modes of consciousness, particularly in religion. It is -the lesson of religion that nature, no less than the spiritual world, -is a revelation of God: but with this distinction, that while nature -never gets so far as to be conscious of its divine essence, that -consciousness is the express problem of the mind, which in the matter -of that problem is as yet finite. Those who look upon the essence of -nature as mere inwardness, and therefore inaccessible to us, take up -the same line as that ancient creed which regarded God as envious and -jealous; a creed which both Plato and Aristotle pronounced against long -ago. All that God is, He imparts and reveals; and He does so, at first, -in and through nature.</p> - -<p class="block2">Any object indeed is faulty and imperfect when it is only inward, and -thus at the same time only outward, or, (which is the same thing,) when -it is only an outward and thus only an inward. For instance, a child, -taken in the gross as human being, is no doubt a rational creature; -but the reason of the child as child is at first a mere inward, in the -shape of his natural ability or vocation, &c. This mere inward, at the -same time, has for the child the form of a more outward, in the shape -of the will of his parents, the attainments of his teachers, and the -whole world of reason that environs him. The education and instruction -of a child aim at making him actually and for himself what he is at -first potentially and therefore for others, viz. for his grown-up -friends. The reason, which at first exists in the child only as an -inner possibility, is actualised through education: and conversely, the -child by these means becomes conscious that the goodness, religion, and -science which he had at first looked upon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> as an outward authority, are -his own and inward nature. As with the child so it is in this matter -with the adult, when, in opposition to his true destiny, his intellect -and will remain in the bondage of the natural man. Thus, the criminal -sees the punishment to which he has to submit as an act of violence -from without: whereas in fact the penalty is only the manifestation of -his own criminal will.</p> - -<p class="block2">From what has now been said, we may learn what to think of a man who, -when blamed for his shortcomings, it may be, his discreditable acts, -appeals to the (professedly) excellent intentions and sentiments of -the inner self he distinguishes therefrom. There certainly may be -individual cases, where the malice of outward circumstances frustrates -well-meant designs, and disturbs the execution of the best-laid plans. -But in general even here the essential unity between inward and outward -is maintained. We are thus justified in saying that a man is what he -does; and the lying vanity which consoles itself with the feeling of -inward excellence, may be confronted with the words of the gospel: 'By -their fruits ye shall know them.' That grand saying applies primarily -in a moral and religious aspect, but it also holds good in reference -to performances in art and science. The keen eye of a teacher who -perceives in his pupil decided evidences of talent, may lead him to -state his opinion that a Raphael or a Mozart lies hidden in the boy: -and the result will show how far such an opinion was well-founded. -But if a daub of a painter, or a poetaster, soothe themselves by the -conceit that their head is full of high ideals, their consolation is -a poor one; and if they insist on being judged not by their actual -works but by their projects, we may safely reject their pretensions -as unfounded and unmeaning. The converse case however also occurs. In -passing judgment on men who have accomplished something great and good, -we often make use of the false distinction between inward and outward. -All that they have accomplished, we say, is outward merely; inwardly -they were acting from some very different motive, such as a desire to -gratify their vanity or other unworthy passion. This is the spirit of -envy. Incapable of any great action of its own, envy tries<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> hard to -depreciate greatness and to bring it down to its own level. Let us, -rather, recall the fine expression of Goethe, that there is no remedy -but Love against great superiorities of others. We may seek to rob -men's great actions of their grandeur, by the insinuation of hypocrisy; -but, though it is possible that men in an instance now and then may -dissemble and disguise a good deal, they cannot conceal the whole of -their inner self, which infallibly betrays itself in the <i>decursus -vitae.</i> Even here it is true that a man is nothing but the series of -his actions.</p> - -<p class="block2">What is called the 'pragmatic' writing of history has in modern times -frequently sinned in its treatment of great historical characters, and -defaced and tarnished the true conception of them by this fallacious -separation of the outward from the inward. Not content with telling -the unvarnished tale of the great acts which have been wrought by -the heroes of the world's history, and with acknowledging that their -inward being corresponds with the import of their acts, the pragmatic -historian fancies himself justified and even obliged to trace the -supposed secret motives that lie behind the open facts of the record. -The historian, in that case, is supposed to write with more depth in -proportion as he succeeds in tearing away the aureole from all that -has been heretofore held grand and glorious, and in depressing it, so -far as its origin and proper significance are concerned, to the level -of vulgar mediocrity. To make these pragmatical researches in history -easier, it is usual to recommend the study of psychology, which is -supposed to make us acquainted with the real motives of human actions. -The psychology in question however is only that petty knowledge of -men, which looks away from the essential and permanent in human -nature to fasten its glance on the casual and private features shown -in isolated instincts and passions. A pragmatical psychology ought -at least to leave the historian, who investigates the motives at the -ground of great actions, a choice between the 'substantial' interests -of patriotism, justice, religious truth and the like, on the one hand, -and the subjective and 'formal' interests of vanity, ambition, avarice -and the like, on the other. The latter<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> however are the motives which -must be viewed by the pragmatist as really efficient, otherwise the -assumption of a contrast between the inward (the disposition of the -agent) and the outward (the import of the action) would fall to the -ground. But inward and outward have in truth the same content; and the -right doctrine is the very reverse of this pedantic judicially. If the -heroes of history had been actuated by subjective and formal interests -alone, they would never have accomplished what they have. And if we -have due regard to the unity between the inner and the outer, we must -own that great men willed what they did, and did what they willed.</p> - -<p>141.] The empty abstractions, by means of which the one identical -content perforce continues in the two correlatives, suspend themselves -in the immediate transition, the one in the other. The content is -itself nothing but their identity (§ 138): and these abstractions are -the seeming of essence, put as seeming. By the manifestation of force -the inward is put into existence: but this putting is the mediation by -empty abstractions. In its own self the intermediating process vanishes -to the immediacy, in which the inward and the outward are absolutely -identical and their difference is distinctly no more than assumed and -imposed. This identity is Actuality.</p> - - -<h5>C.—ACTUALITY.</h5> - -<p>142.] <b>Actuality</b> is the unity, become immediate, of essence with -existence, or of inward with outward. The utterance of the actual -is the actual itself: so that in this utterance it remains just as -essential, and only is essential, in so far as it is in immediate -external existence.</p> - -<p>We have ere this met Being and Existence as forms of the immediate. -Being is, in general, unreflected immediacy and transition into -another. Existence is immediate unity of being and reflection; hence -appearance:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> it comes from the ground, and falls to the ground. In -actuality this unity is explicitly put, and the two sides of the -relation identified. Hence the actual is exempted from transition, and -its externality is its energising. In that energising it is reflected -into itself: its existence is only the manifestation of itself, not of -an other.</p> - -<p class="block2">Actuality and thought (or Idea) are often absurdly opposed. How -commonly we hear people saying that, though no objection can be urged -against the truth and correctness of a certain thought, there is -nothing of the kind to be seen in actuality, or it cannot be actually -carried out! People who use such language only prove that they have -not properly apprehended the nature either of thought or of actuality. -Thought in such a case is, on one hand, the synonym for a subjective -conception, plan, intention or the like, just as actuality, on the -other, is made synonymous with external and sensible existence. This -is all very well in common life, where great laxity is allowed in the -categories and the names given to them: and it may of course happen -that <i>e.g.</i> the plan, or so-called idea, say of a certain method of -taxation, is good and advisable in the abstract, but that nothing of -the sort is found in so-called actuality, or could possibly be carried -out under the given conditions. But when the abstract understanding -gets hold of these categories and exaggerates the distinction they -imply into a hard and fast line of contrast, when it tells us that in -this actual world we must knock ideas out of our heads, it is necessary -energetically to protest against these doctrines, alike in the name of -science and of sound reason. For on the one hand Ideas are not confined -to our heads merely, nor is the Idea, upon the whole, so feeble as to -leave the question of its actualisation or non-actualisation dependent -in our will. The Idea is rather the absolutely active as well I as -actual. And on the other hand actuality is not so bad and irrational, -as purblind or wrong-headed and muddle-brained would-be reformers -imagine. So far is actuality, as distinguished from mere appearance, -and primarily presenting a unity of inward and outward, from being in -contrariety<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> with reason, that it is rather thoroughly reasonable, and -everything which is not reasonable must on that very ground cease to -be held actual. The same view may be traced in the usages of educated -speech, which declines to give the name of real poet or real statesman -to a poet or a statesman who can do nothing really meritorious or -reasonable.</p> - -<p class="block2">In that vulgar conception of actuality which mistakes for it what is -palpable and directly obvious to the senses, we must seek the ground -of a wide-spread prejudice about the relation of the philosophy of -Aristotle to that of Plato. Popular opinion makes the difference to be -as follows. While Plato recognises the idea and only the idea as the -truth, Aristotle, rejecting the idea, keeps to what is actual, and is -on that account to be considered the founder and chief of empiricism. -On this it may be remarked: that although actuality certainly is -the principle of the Aristotelian philosophy, it is not the vulgar -actuality of what is immediately at hand, but the idea as actuality. -Where then lies the controversy of Aristotle against Plato? It lies in -this. Aristotle calls the Platonic idea a mere δίναμις, and establishes -in opposition to Plato that the idea, which both equally recognise to -be the only truth, is essentially to be viewed as an ἐνέργεια, in other -words, as the inward which is quite to the fore, or as the unity of -inner and outer, or as actuality, in the emphatic sense here given to -the word.</p> - -<p>143.] Such a concrete category as Actuality includes the -characteristics aforesaid and their difference, and is therefore also -the development of them, in such a way that, as it has them, they are -at the same time plainly understood to be a show, to be assumed or -imposed (§ 141).</p> - -<p>(α) Viewed as an identity in general, Actuality is first of all -<b>Possibility</b>—the reflection-into-self which, as in contrast with -the concrete unity of the actual, is taken and made an abstract and -unessential essentiality. Possibility is what is essential to reality, -but in such a way that it is at the same time only a possibility.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span></p> - -<p>It was probably the import of Possibility which induced Kant to regard -it along with necessity and actuality as Modalities, 'since these -categories do not in the least increase the notion as object, but only -express its relation to the faculty of knowledge.' For Possibility is -really the bare abstraction of reflection-into-self,—what was formerly -called the Inward, only that it is now taken to mean the external -inward, lifted out of reality and with the being of a mere supposition, -and is thus, sure enough, supposed only as a bare modality, an -abstraction which comes short, and, in more concrete terms, belongs -only to subjective thought. It is otherwise with Actuality and -Necessity. They are anything but a mere sort and mode for something -else: in fact the very reverse of that. If they are supposed, it is as -the concrete, not merely supposititious, but intrinsically complete.</p> - -<p>As Possibility is, in the first instance, the mere form of -identity-with-self (as compared with the concrete which is actual), -the rule for it merely is that a thing must not be self-contradictory. -Thus everything is possible; for an act of abstraction can give any -content this form of identity. Everything however is as impossible as -it is possible. In every content,—which is and must be concrete,—the -speciality of its nature may be viewed as a specialised contrariety -and in that way as a contradiction. Nothing therefore can be more -meaningless than to speak of such possibility and impossibility. In -philosophy, in particular, there should never be a word said of showing -that 'It is possible,' or 'There is still another possibility,' or, to -adopt another phraseology, 'It is conceivable.' The same consideration -should warn the writer of history against employing a category which -has now been explained to be on its own merits untrue: but the subtlety -of the empty<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> understanding finds its chief pleasure in the fantastic -ingenuity of suggesting possibilities and lots of possibilities.</p> - -<p class="block2">Our picture-thought is at first disposed to see in possibility the -richer and more comprehensive, in actuality the poorer and narrower -category. Everything, it is said, is possible, but everything which -is possible is not on that account actual. In real truth, however, if -we deal with them as thoughts, actuality is the more comprehensive, -because it is the concrete thought which includes possibility as an -abstract element. And that superiority is to some extent expressed -in our ordinary mode of thought when we speak of the possible, in -distinction from the actual, as <i>only</i> possible. Possibility is often -said to consist in a thing's being thinkable. 'Think,' however, in this -use of the word, only means to conceive any content under the form of -an abstract identity. Now every content can be brought under this form, -since nothing is required except to separate it from the relations in -which it stands. Hence any content, however absurd and nonsensical, can -be viewed as possible. It is possible that the moon might fall upon -the earth to-night; for the moon is a body separate from the earth, -and may as well fall down upon it as a stone thrown into the air does. -It is possible that the Sultan may become Pope; for, being a man, he -may be converted to the Christian faith, may become a Catholic priest, -and so on. In language like this about possibilities, it is chiefly -the law of the sufficient ground or reason which is manipulated in the -style already explained. Everything, it is said, is possible, for which -you can state some ground. The less education a man has, or, in other -words, the less he knows of the specific connexions of the objects -to which he directs his observations, the greater is his tendency to -launch out into all sorts of empty possibilities. An instance of this -habit in the political sphere is seen in the pot-house politician. -In practical life too it is no uncommon thing to see ill-will and -indolence slink behind the category of possibility, in order to escape -definite obligations. To such conduct the same remarks apply as were -made in connexion with the law<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> of sufficient ground. Reasonable and -practical men refuse to be imposed upon by the possible, for the simple -ground that it is possible only. They stick to the actual (not meaning -by that word merely whatever immediately is now and here). Many of -the proverbs of common life express the same contempt for what is -abstractly possible. 'A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.'</p> - -<p class="block2">After all there is as good reason for taking everything to be -impossible, as to be possible: for every content (a content is always -concrete) includes not only diverse but even opposite characteristics. -Nothing is so impossible, for instance, as this, that I am: for 'I' is -at the same time simple self-relation and, as undoubtedly, relation -to something else. The same may be seen in every other fact in the -natural or spiritual world. Matter, it may be said, is impossible: -for it is the unity of attraction and repulsion. The same is true of -life, law, freedom, and above all, of God Himself, as the true, <i>i.e.</i> -the triune God,—a notion of God, which the abstract 'Enlightenment' -of Understanding, in conformity with its canons, rejected on the -allegation that it was contradictory in thought. Generally speaking, -it is the empty understanding which haunts these empty forms: and -the business of philosophy in the matter is to show how null and -meaningless they are. Whether a thing is possible or impossible, -depends altogether on the subject-matter: that is, on the sum total of -the elements in actuality, which, as it opens itself out, discloses -itself to be necessity.</p> - -<p>144.] (ß) But the Actual in its distinction from possibility (which -is reflection-into-self) is itself only the outward concrete, the -unessential immediate. In other words, to such extent as the actual -is primarily (§ 142) the simple merely immediate unity of Inward -and Outward, it is obviously made an unessential outward, and thus -at the same time (§ 140) it is merely inward, the abstraction of -reflection-into-self. Hence it is itself characterised as a merely -possible. When thus valued at the rate of a mere possibility, the -actual is a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> <b>Contingent</b> or Accidental, and, conversely, -possibility is mere Accident itself or <b>Chance</b>.</p> - -<p>146.] Possibility and Contingency are the two factors of -Actuality,—Inward and Outward, put as mere forms which constitute the -externality of the actual. They have their reflection-into-self on the -body of actual fact, or content, with its intrinsic definiteness which -gives the essential ground of their characterisation. The finitude of -the contingent and the possible lies, therefore, as we now see, in the -distinction of the form-determination from the content: and, therefore, -it depends on the content alone whether anything is contingent and -possible.</p> - -<p class="block2">As possibility is the mere <i>inside</i> of actuality, it is for that -reason a mere <i>outside</i> actuality, in other words, Contingency. The -contingent, roughly speaking, is what has the ground of its being -not in itself but in somewhat else. Such is the aspect under which -actuality first comes before consciousness, and which is often mistaken -for actuality itself. But the contingent is only one side of the -actual,—the side, namely, of reflection on somewhat else. It is the -actual, in the signification of something merely possible. Accordingly -we consider the contingent to be what may or may not be, what may be -in one way or in another, whose being or not-being, and whose being -on this wise or otherwise, depends not upon itself but on something -else. To overcome this contingency is, roughly speaking, the problem -of science on the one hand; as in the range of practice, on the other, -the end of action is to rise above the contingency of the will, or -above caprice. It has however often happened, most of all in modern -times, that contingency has been unwarrantably elevated, and had a -value attached to it, both in nature and the world of mind, to which -it has no just claim. Frequently Nature—to take it first,—has been -chiefly admired for the richness and variety of its structures. Apart, -however, from what disclosure it contains of the Idea, this richness -gratifies none of the higher interests of reason, and in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> its vast -variety of structures, organic and inorganic, affords us only the -spectacle of a contingency losing itself in vagueness. At any rate, -the chequered scene presented by the several varieties of animals and -plants, conditioned as it is by outward circumstances,—the complex -changes in the figuration and grouping of clouds, and the like, ought -not to be ranked higher than the equally casual fancies of the mind -which surrenders itself to its own caprices. The wonderment with which -such phenomena are welcomed is a most abstract frame of mind, from -which one should advance to a closer insight into the inner harmony and -uniformity of nature.</p> - -<p class="block2">Of contingency in respect of the Will it is especially important to -form a proper estimate. The Freedom of the Will is an expression that -often means mere free-choice, or the will in the form of contingency. -Freedom of choice, or the capacity of determining ourselves towards one -thing or another, is undoubtedly a vital element in the will (which in -its very notion is free); but instead of being freedom itself, it is -only in the first instance a freedom in form. The genuinely free will, -which includes free choice as suspended, is conscious to itself that -its content is intrinsically firm and fast, and knows it at the same -time to be thoroughly its own. A will, on the contrary, which remains -standing on the grade of option, even supposing it does decide in -favour of what is in import right and true, is always haunted by the -conceit that it might, if it had so pleased, have decided in favour of -the reverse course. When more narrowly examined, free choice is seen -to be a contradiction, to this extent that its form and content stand -in antithesis. The matter of choice is given, and known as a content -dependent not on the will itself,'but on outward circumstances. In -reference to such a given content, freedom lies only in the form of -choosing, which, as it is only a freedom in form, may consequently be -regarded as freedom only in supposition. On an ultimate analysis it -will be seen that the same outwardness of circumstances, on which is -founded the content that the will finds to its hand, can alone account -for the will giving its decision for the one and not the other of the -two alternatives.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span></p> - -<p class="block2">Although contingency, as it has thus been shown, is only one aspect in -the whole of actuality, and therefore not to be mistaken for actuality -itself, it has no less than the rest of the forms of the idea its due -office in the world of objects. This is, in the first place, seen in -Nature. On the surface of Nature, so to speak, Chance ranges unchecked, -and that contingency must simply be recognised, without the pretension -sometimes erroneously ascribed to philosophy, of seeking to find in it -a could-only-be-so-and-not-otherwise. Nor is contingency less visible -in the world of Mind. The will, as we have already remarked, includes -contingency under the shape of option or free-choice, but only as a -vanishing and abrogated element. In respect of Mind and its works, -just as in the case of Nature, we must guard against being so far -misled by a well-meant endeavour after rational knowledge, as to try -to exhibit the necessity of phenomena which are marked by a decided -contingency, or, as the phrase is, to construe them <i>a priori.</i> Thus -in language (although it be, as it were, the body of thought) Chance -still unquestionably plays a decided part; and the same is true of the -creations of law, of art, &c. The problem of science, and especially of -philosophy, undoubtedly consists in eliciting the necessity concealed -under the semblance of contingency. That however is far from meaning -that the contingent belongs to our subjective conception alone, and -must therefore be simply set aside, if we wish to get at the truth. -All scientific researches which pursue this tendency exclusively, -lay themselves fairly open to the charge of mere jugglery and an -over-strained precisianism.</p> - -<p>146.] When more closely examined, what the aforesaid outward side -of actuality implies is this. Contingency, which is actuality -in its immediacy, is the self-identical, essentially only as a -supposition which is no sooner made than it is revoked and leaves -an existent externality. In this way, the external contingency is -something pre-supposed, the immediate existence of which is at the -same time a possibility, and has the vocation to be suspended, to -be the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span>possibility of something else. Now this possibility is the -<b>Condition</b>.</p> - -<p class="block2">The Contingent, as the immediate actuality, is at the same time -the possibility of somewhat else,—no longer however that abstract -possibility which we had at first, but the possibility which <i>is.</i> And -a possibility existent is a Condition. By the Condition of a thing -we mean first, an existence, in short an immediate, and secondly -the vocation of this immediate to be suspended and subserve the -actualising of something else.—Immediate actuality is in general -as such never what it ought to be; it is a finite actuality with an -inherent flaw, and its vocation is to be consumed. But the other -aspect of actuality is its essentiality. This is primarily the inside, -which as a mere possibility is no less destined to be suspended. -Possibility thus suspended is the issuing of a new actuality, of which -the first immediate actuality was the pre-supposition. Here we see -the alternation which is involved in the notion of a Condition. The -Conditions of a thing seem at first sight to involve no bias anyway. -Really however an immediate actuality of this kind includes in it -the germ of something else altogether. At first this something else -is only a possibility: but the form of possibility is soon suspended -and translated into actuality. This new actuality thus issuing is the -very inside of the immediate actuality which it uses up. Thus there -comes into being quite an other shape of things, and yet itis not an -other: for the first actuality is only put as what it in essence was. -The conditions which are sacrificed, which fall to the ground and are -spent, only unite with themselves in the other actuality. Such in -general is the nature of the process of actuality. The actual is no -mere case of immediate Being, but, as essential Being, a suspension of -its own immediacy, and thereby mediating itself with itself.</p> - -<p>147.] (γ) When this externality (of actuality) is thus developed into -a circle of the two categories of possibility and immediate actuality, -showing the intermediation of the one by the other, it is what is -called <b>Real<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> Possibility</b>. Being such a circle, further, it -is the totality, and thus the content, the actual fact or affair in -its all-round definiteness. Whilst in like manner, if we look at the -distinction between the two characteristics in this unity, it realises -the concrete totality of the form, the immediate self-translation -of inner into outer, and of outer into inner. This self-movement of -the form is Activity, carrying into effect the fact or affair as a -<i>real</i> ground which is self-suspended to actuality, and carrying into -effect the contingent actuality, the conditions; <i>i.e.</i> it is their -reflection-in-self, and their self-suspension to an other actuality, -the actuality of the actual fact. If all the conditions are at hand, -the fact (event) <i>must</i> be actual; and the fact itself is one of the -conditions: for being in the first place only inner, it is at first -itself only pre-supposed. Developed actuality, as the coincident -alternation of inner and outer, the alternation of their opposite -motions combined into a single motion, is <b>Necessity</b>.</p> - -<p>Necessity has been defined, and rightly so, as the union of possibility -and actuality. This mode of expression, however, gives a superficial -and therefore unintelligible description of the very difficult notion -of necessity. It is difficult because it is the notion itself, only -that its stages or factors are still as actualities, which are yet at -the same time to be viewed as forms only, collapsing and transient. In -the two following paragraphs therefore an exposition of the factors -which constitute necessity must be given at greater length.</p> - -<p class="block2">When anything is said to be necessary, the first question we ask is, -Why? Anything necessary accordingly comes before us as something due to -a supposition, the result of certain antecedents. If we go no further -than mere derivation from antecedents however, we have not gained a -complete notion of what necessity means. What is merely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> derivative, -is what it is, not through itself, but through something else; and in -this way it too is merely contingent. What is necessary, on the other -hand, we would have be what it is through itself; and thus, although -derivative, it must still contain the antecedent whence it is derived -as a vanishing element in itself. Hence we say of what is necessary, -'It is.' We thus hold it to be simple self-relation, in which all -dependence on something else is removed.</p> - -<p class="block2">Necessity is often said to be blind. If that means that in the process -of necessity the End or final cause is not explicitly and overtly -present, the statement is correct. The process of necessity begins -with the existence of scattered circumstances which appear to have no -inter-connexion and no concern one with another. These circumstances -are an immediate actuality which collapses, and out of this negation -a new actuality proceeds. Here we have a content which in point of -form is doubled, once as content of the final realised fact, and once -as content of the scattered circumstances which appear as if they -were positive, and make themselves at first felt in that character. -The latter content is in itself nought and is accordingly inverted -into its negative, thus becoming content of the realised fact. The -immediate circumstances fall to the ground as conditions, but are at -the same time retained as content of the ultimate reality. From such -circumstances and conditions there has, as we say, proceeded quite -another thing, and it is for that reason that we call this process of -necessity blind. If on the contrary we consider teleological action, we -have in the end of action a content which is already fore-known. This -activity therefore is not blind but seeing. To say that the world is -ruled by Providence implies that design, as what has been absolutely -pre-determined, is the active principle, so that the issue corresponds -to what has been fore-known and fore-willed.</p> - -<p class="block2">The theory however which regards the world as determined through -necessity and the belief in a divine providence are by no means -mutually excluding points of view. The intellectual principle -underlying the idea of divine providence will hereafter be shown to be -the notion. But the notion is the truth of necessity, which it contains -in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> suspension in itself; just as, conversely, necessity is the notion -implicit. Necessity is blind only so long as it is not understood. -There is nothing therefore more mistaken than the charge of blind -fatalism made against the Philosophy of History, when it takes for its -problem to understand the necessity of every event. The philosophy of -history rightly understood takes the rank of a Théodicée; and those, -who fancy they honour Divine Providence by excluding necessity from -it, are really degrading it by this exclusiveness to a blind and -irrational caprice. In the simple language of the religious mind which -speaks of God's eternal and immutable decrees, there is implied an -express recognition that necessity forms part of the essence of God. In -his difference from God, man, with his own private opinion and will, -follows the call of caprice and arbitrary humour, and thus often finds -his acts turn out something quite different from what he had meant and -willed. But God knows what He wills, is determined in His eternal will -neither by accident from within nor from without, and what He wills He -also accomplishes, irresistibly.</p> - -<p class="block2">Necessity gives a point of view which has important bearings upon our -sentiments and behaviour. When we look upon events as necessary, our -situation seems at first sight to lack freedom completely. In the -creed of the ancients, as we know, necessity figured as Destiny. The -modern point of view, on the contrary, is that of Consolation. And -Consolation means that, if we renounce our aims and interests, we do so -only in prospect of receiving compensation. Destiny, on the contrary, -leaves no room for Consolation. But a close examination of the ancient -feeling about destiny, will not by any means reveal a sense of bondage -to its power. Rather the reverse. This will clearly appear, if we -remember, that the sense of bondage springs from inability to surmount -the antithesis, and from looking at what <i>is,</i> and what happens, as -contradictory to what <i>ought</i> to be and happen. In the ancient mind the -feeling was more of the following kind: Because such a thing is, it -is, and as it is, so ought it to be. Here there is no contrast to be -seen, and therefore no sense of bondage, no pain, and no sorrow. True, -indeed, as already remarked, this attitude towards destiny is void of -consolation. But then, on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> the other hand, it is a frame of mind which -does not need consolation, so long as personal subjectivity has not -acquired its infinite significance. It is this point on which special -stress should be laid in comparing the ancient sentiment with that of -the modern and Christian world.</p> - -<p class="block2">By Subjectivity, however, we may understand, in the first place, only -the natural and finite subjectivity, with its contingent and arbitrary -content of private interests and inclinations,—all, in short, that -we call person as distinguished from thing: taking 'thing' in the -emphatic sense of the word (in which we use the (correct) expression -that it is a question of <i>things</i> and not of <i>persons).</i> In this sense -of sub-activity we cannot help admiring the tranquil resignation of -the ancients to destiny, and feeling that it is a much higher and -worthier mood than that of the moderns, who obstinately pursue their -subjective aims, and when they find themselves constrained to resign -the hope of reaching them, console themselves with the prospect of a -reward in some other shape. But the term subjectivity is not to be -confined merely to the bad and finite kind of it which is contrasted -with the thing (fact). In its truth subjectivity is immanent in the -fact, and as a subjectivity thus infinite is the very truth of the -fact. Thus regarded, the doctrine of consolation receives a newer and -a higher significance. It is in this sense that the Christian religion -is to be regarded as the religion of consolation, and even of absolute -consolation. Christianity, we know, teaches that God wishes all men -to be saved. That teaching declares that subjectivity has an infinite -value. And that consoling power of Christianity just lies in the fact -that God Himself is in it known as the absolute subjectivity, so that, -inasmuch as subjectivity involves the element of particularity, <i>our</i> -particular personality too is recognised not merely as something to be -solely and simply nullified, but as at the same time something to be -preserved. The gods of the ancient world were also, it is true, looked -upon as personal; but the personality of a Zeus and an Apollo is not -a real personality: it is only a figure in the mind. In other words, -these gods are mere personifications, which, being such, do not know -themselves, and are only known.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> An evidence of this defect and this -powerlessness of the old gods is found even in the religious beliefs -of antiquity. In the ancient creeds not only men, but even gods, -were represented as subject to destiny (πεπρωμένον or εἱμαρμένη), a -destiny which we must conceive as necessity not unveiled, and thus as -something wholly impersonal, selfless, and blind. On the other hand, -the Christian God is God not known merely, but also self-knowing; He is -a personality not merely figured in our minds, but rather absolutely -actual.</p> - -<p class="block2">We must refer to the Philosophy of Religion for a further discussion of -the points here touched. But we may note in passing how important it -is for any man to meet everything that befalls him with the spirit of -the old proverb which describes each man as the architect of his own -fortune. That means that it is only himself after all of which a man -has the usufruct. The other way would be to lay the blame of whatever -we experience upon other men, upon unfavourable circumstances, and the -like. And this is a fresh example of the language of unfreedom, and at -the same time the spring of discontent. If man saw, on the contrary, -that whatever happens to him is only the outcome of himself, and that -he only bears his own guilt, he would stand free, and in everything -that came upon him would have the consciousness that he suffered no -wrong. A man who lives in dispeace with himself and his lot, commits -much that is perverse and amiss, for no other reason than because of -the false opinion that he is wronged by others. No doubt too there is a -great deal of chance in what befalls us. But the chance has its root in -the 'natural' man. So long however as a man is otherwise conscious that -he is free, his harmony of soul and peace of mind will not be destroyed -by the disagreeables that befall him. It is their view of necessity, -therefore, which is at the root of the content and discontent of men, -and which in that way determines their destiny itself.</p> - -<p>148.] Among the three elements in the process of necessity—the -Condition, the Fact, and the Activity—</p> - -<p>a. The Condition is (α) what is pre-supposed or ante-stated, <i>i.e.</i> -it is not only supposed or stated, and so only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> a correlative to the -fact, but also prior, and so independent, a contingent and external -circumstance which exists without respect to the fact. While thus -contingent, however, this pre-supposed or ante-stated term, in respect -withal of the fact, which is the totality, is a complete circle of -conditions, (ß) The conditions are passive, are used as materials for -the fact, into the content of which they thus enter. They are likewise -intrinsically conformable to this content, and already contain its -whole characteristic.</p> - -<p>b. The Fact is also (α) something pre-supposed or ante-stated, <i>i.e.</i> -it is at first, and as supposed, only inner and possible, and also, -being prior, an independent content by itself, (ß) By using up the -conditions, it receives its external existence, the realisation of -the articles of its content, which reciprocally correspond to the -conditions, so that whilst it presents itself out of these as the fact, -it also proceeds from them.</p> - -<p>c. The Activity similarly has (α) an independent existence of its own -(as a man, a character), and at the same time it is possible only -where the conditions are and the fact, (ß) It is the movement which -translates the conditions into fact, and the latter into the former as -the side of existence, or rather the movement which educes the fact -from the conditions in which it is potentially present, and which gives -existence to the fact by abolishing the existence possessed by the -conditions.</p> - -<p>In so far as these three elements stand to each other in the shape -of independent existences, this process has the aspect of an outward -necessity. Outward necessity has a limited content for its fact. For -the fact is this whole, in phase of singleness. But since in its form -this whole is external to itself, it is self-externalised even in its -own self and in its content, and this externality, attaching to the -fact, is a limit of its content.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span></p> - -<p>149.] Necessity, then, is potentially the one essence, self-same but -now full of content, in the reflected light of which its distinctions -take the form of independent realities. This self-sameness is at the -same time, as absolute form, the activity which reduces into dependency -and mediates into immediacy.—Whatever is necessary is through an -other, which is broken up into the mediating ground (the Fact and -the Activity) and an immediate actuality or accidental circumstance, -which is at the same time a Condition. The necessary, being through -an other, is not in and for itself: hypothetical, it is a mere result -of assumption. But this intermediation is just as immediately however -the abrogation of itself. The ground and contingent condition is -translated into immediacy, by which that dependency is now lifted up -into actuality, and the fact has closed with itself. In this return -to itself the necessary simply and positively <i>is,</i> as unconditioned -actuality. The necessary is so, mediated through a circle of -circumstances: it is so, because the circumstances are so, and at the -same time it is so, unmediated: it is so, because it is.</p> - -<p class="center">(a) <i>Relationship of Substantiality.</i></p> - -<p>150.] The necessary is in itself an absolute correlation of elements, -<i>i.e.</i> the process developed (in the preceding paragraphs), in which -the correlation also suspends itself to absolute identity.</p> - -<p>In its immediate form it is the relationship of Substance and Accident. -The absolute self-identity of this relationship is Substance as such, -which as necessity gives the negative to this form of inwardness, and -thus invests itself with actuality, but which also gives the negative -to this outward thing. In this negativity, the actual, as immediate, -is only an accidental which through this bare possibility passes over -into another actuality.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> This transition is the identity of substance, -regarded as form-activity (§§ 148, 149).</p> - -<p>151.] <b>Substance</b> is accordingly the totality of the Accidents, -revealing itself in them as their absolute negativity, (that is to -say, as absolute power,) and at the same time as the wealth of all -content. This content however is nothing but that very revelation, -since the character (being reflected in itself to make content) is -only a passing stage of the form which passes away in the power of -substance. Substantiality is the absolute form-activity and the power -of necessity: all content is but a vanishing element which merely -belongs to this process, where there is an absolute revulsion of form -and content into one another.</p> - -<p class="block2">In the history of philosophy we meet with Substance as the principle -of Spinoza's system. On the import and value of that much-praised and -no less decried philosophy there has been great misunderstanding and -a deal of talking since the days of Spinoza. The atheism and, as a -further charge, the pantheism of the system has formed the commonest -ground of accusation. These cries arise because of Spinoza's conception -of God as substance, and substance only. What we are to think of this -charge follows, in the first instance, from the place which substance -takes in the system of the logical idea. Though an essential stage in -the evolution of the idea, substance is not the same with absolute -Idea, but the idea under the still limited form of necessity. It is -true that God is necessity, or, as we may also put it, that He is the -absolute Thing: He is however no less the absolute Person. That He is -the absolute Person however is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza -never reached: and on that side it falls short of the true notion of -God which forms the content of religious consciousness in Christianity. -Spinoza was by descent a Jew; and it is upon the whole the Oriental way -of seeing things, according to which the nature of the finite world -seems frail and transient, that has found its intellectual expression -in his system. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> Oriental view of the unity of substance certainly -gives the basis for all real further development. Still it is not the -final idea. It is marked by the absence of the principle of the Western -World, the principle of individuality, which first appeared under a -philosophic shape, contemporaneously with Spinoza, in the Monadology of -Leibnitz.</p> - -<p class="block2">From this point we glance back to the alleged atheism of Spinoza. The -charge will be seen to be unfounded if we remember that his system, -instead of denying God, rather recognises that He alone really is. -Nor can it be maintained that the God of Spinoza, although he is -described as alone true, is not the true God, and therefore as good as -no God. If that were a just charge, it would only prove that all other -systems, where speculation has not gone beyond a subordinate stage -of the idea,—that the Jews and Mohammedans who know God only as the -Lord,—and that even the many Christians for whom God is merely the -most high, unknowable, and transcendent being, are as much atheists as -Spinoza. The so-called atheism of Spinoza is merely an exaggeration of -the fact that he defrauds the principle of difference or finitude of -its due. Hence his system, as it holds that there is properly speaking -no world, at any rate that the world has no positive being, should -rather be styled Acosmism, These considerations will also show what is -to be said of the charge of Pantheism. If Pantheism means, as it often -does, the doctrine which takes finite things in their finitude and in -the complex of them to be God, we must acquit the system of Spinoza of -the crime of Pantheism. For in that system, finite things and the world -as a whole are denied all truth. On the other hand, the philosophy -which is Acosmism is for that reason certainly pantheistic.</p> - -<p class="block2">The shortcoming thus acknowledged to attach to the content turns out -at the same time to be a shortcoming in respect of form. Spinoza puts -substance at the head of his system, and defines it to be the unity -of thought and extension, without demonstrating how he gets to this -distinction, or how he traces it back to the unity of substance. The -further treatment of the subject proceeds in what is called<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> the -mathematical method. Definitions and axioms are first laid down: after -them comes a series of theorems, which are proved by an analytical -reduction of them to these unproved postulates. Although the system -of Spinoza, and that even by those who altogether reject its contents -and results, is praised for the strict sequence of its method, such -unqualified praise of the form is as little justified as an unqualified -rejection of the content. The defect of the content is that the form -is not known as immanent in it, and therefore only approaches it as an -outer and subjective form. As intuitively accepted by Spinoza without a -previous mediation by dialectic, Substance, as the universal negative -power, is as it were a dark shapeless abyss which engulfs all definite -content as radically null, and produces from itself nothing that has a -positive subsistence of its own.</p> - -<p>152.] At the stage, where substance, as absolute power, is the -self-relating power (itself a merely inner possibility) which thus -determines itself to accidentality,—from which power the externality -it thereby creates is distinguished—necessity is a correlation -strictly so called, just as in the first form of necessity, it is -substance. This is the correlation of Causality.</p> - -<p class="center">(b) <i>Relationship of Causality.</i></p> - -<p>153.] Substance is <b>Cause</b>, in so far as substance reflects into -self as against its passage into accidentality and so stands as the -<i>primary</i> fact, but again no less suspends this reflection-into-self -(its bare possibility), lays itself down as the negative of itself, and -thus produces an <b>Effect</b>, an actuality, which, though so far only -assumed as a sequence, is through the process that effectuates it at -the same time necessary.</p> - -<p>As primary fact, the cause is qualified as having absolute independence -and a subsistence maintained in face of the effect: but in the -necessity, whose identity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> constitutes that primariness itself, it -is wholly passed into the effect. So far again as we can speak of a -definite content, there is no content in the effect that is not in -the cause. That identity in fact is the absolute content itself: but -it is no less also the form-characteristic. The primariness of the -cause is suspended in the effect in which the cause makes itself a -dependent being. The cause however does not for that reason vanish and -leave the effect to be alone actual. For this dependency is in like -manner directly suspended, and is rather the reflection of the cause -in itself, its primariness: in short, it is in the effect that the -cause first becomes actual and a cause. The cause consequently is in -its full truth <i>causa sui.</i>—Jacobi, sticking to the partial conception -of mediation (in his Letters on Spinoza, second edit. p. 416), has -treated the <i>causa sui</i> (and the <i>effectus sui</i> is the same), which is -the absolute truth of the cause, as a mere formalism. He has also made -the remark that God ought to be defined not as the ground of things, -but essentially as cause. A more thorough consideration of the nature -of cause would have shown that Jacobi did not by this means gain what -he intended. Even in the finite cause and its conception we can see -this identity between cause and effect in point of content. The rain -(the cause) and the wet (the effect) are the self-same existing water. -In point of form the cause (rain) is dissipated or lost in the effect -(wet): but in that case the result can no longer be described as -effect; for without the cause it is nothing, and we should have only -the unrelated wet left.</p> - -<p>In the common acceptation of the causal relation the cause is finite, -to such extent as its content is so (as is also the case with finite -substance), and so far as cause and effect are conceived as two several -independent existences; which they are, however, only when we leave -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> causal relation out of sight. In the finite sphere we never get -over the difference of the form-characteristics in their relation: and -hence we turn the matter round and define the cause also as something -dependent or as an effect. This again has another cause, and thus there -grows up a progress from effects to causes <i>ad infinitum.</i> There is a -descending progress too: the effect, looked at in its identity with the -cause, is itself defined as a cause, and at the same time as another -cause, which again has other effects, and so on for ever.</p> - -<p class="block2">The way understanding bristles up against the idea of substance is -equalled by its readiness to use the relation of cause and effect. -Whenever it is proposed to view any sum of fact as necessary, it -is especially the relation of causality to which the reflective -understanding makes a point of tracing it back. Now, although this -relation does undoubtedly belong to necessity, it forms only one aspect -in the process of that category. That process equally requires the -suspension of the mediation involved in causality and the exhibition -of it as simple self-relation. If we stick to causality as such, we -have it not in its truth. Such a causality is merely finite, and its -finitude lies in retaining the distinction between cause and effect -unassimilated. But these two terms, if they are distinct, are also -identical. Even in ordinary consciousness that identity may be found. -We say that a cause is a cause, only when it has an effect, and <i>vice -versâ.</i> Both cause and effect are thus one and the same content: and -the distinction between them is primarily only that the one lays down, -and the other is laid down. This formal difference however again -suspends itself, because the cause is not only a cause of something -else, but also a cause of itself; while the effect is not only an -effect of something else, but also an effect of itself. The finitude -of things consists accordingly in this. While cause and effect are in -their notion identical, the two forms present themselves severed so -that, though the cause is also an effect, and the effect also a cause, -the cause is not an effect in the same connexion as it is a cause, nor -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> effect a cause in the same connexion as it is an effect. This -again gives the infinite progress, in the shape of an endless series -of causes, which shows itself at the same time as an endless series of -effects.</p> - -<p>154.] The effect is different from the cause. The former as such has -a being dependent on the latter. But such a dependence is likewise -reflection-into-self and immediacy: and the action of the cause, as it -constitutes the effect, is at the same time the pre-constitution of -the effect, so long as effect is kept separate from cause. There is -thus already in existence another substance on which the effect takes -place. As immediate, this substance is not a self-related negativity -and <i>active,</i> but <i>passive.</i> Yet it is a substance, and it is therefore -active also: it therefore suspends the immediacy it was originally put -forward with, and the effect which was put into it: it reacts, <i>i.e.</i> -suspends the activity of the first substance. But this first substance -also in the same way sets aside its own immediacy, or the effect which -is put into it; it thus suspends the activity of the other substance -and reacts. In this manner causality passes into the relation of -<b>Action and Reaction</b>, or <b>Reciprocity</b>.</p> - -<p>In Reciprocity, although causality is not yet invested with its true -characteristic, the rectilinear movement out from causes to effects, -and from effects to causes, is bent round and back into itself, and -thus the progress <i>ad infinitum</i> of causes and effects is, as a -progress, really and truly suspended. This bend, which transforms, the -infinite progression into a self-contained relationship, is here as -always the plain reflection that in the above meaningless repetition -there is only one and the same thing, viz. one cause and another, and -their connexion with one another. Reciprocity—which is the development -of this relation-itself however only distinguishes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> turn and turn -about (—not causes, but) factors of causation, in each of which—just -because they are inseparable (on the principle of the identity that the -cause is cause in the effect, and <i>vice versâ</i>)—the other factor is -also equally supposed.</p> - -<p class="center">(c) <i>Reciprocity or Action and Reaction.</i></p> - -<p>155.] The characteristics which in Reciprocal Action are retained as -distinct are (α) potentially the same. The one side is a cause, is -primary, active, passive, &c., just as the other is. Similarly the -pre-supposition of another side and the action upon it, the immediate -primariness and the dependence produced by the alternation, are one and -the same on both sides. The cause assumed to be first is on account -of its immediacy passive, a dependent being, and an effect. The -distinction of the causes spoken of as two is accordingly void: and -properly speaking there is only one cause, which, while it suspends -itself (as substance) in its effect, also rises in this operation only -to independent existence as a cause.</p> - -<p>156.] But this unity of the double cause is also (β) actual. All this -alternation is properly the cause in act of constituting itself and in -such constitution lies its being. The nullity of the distinctions is -not only potential, or a reflection of ours (§ 155). Reciprocal action -just means that each characteristic we impose is also to be suspended -and inverted into its opposite, and that in this way the essential -nullity of the 'moments' is explicitly stated. An effect is introduced -into the primariness; in other words, the primariness is abolished: the -action of a cause becomes reaction, and so on.</p> - -<p class="block2">Reciprocal action realises the causal relation in its complete -development. It is this relation, therefore, in which reflection -usually takes shelter when the conviction grows that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> things can no -longer be studied satisfactorily from a causal point of view, on -account of the infinite progress already spoken of. Thus in historical -research the question may be raised in a first form, whether the -character and manners of a nation are the cause of its constitution and -its laws, or if they are not rather the effect. Then, as the second -step, the character and manners on one side and the constitution and -laws on the other are conceived on the principle of reciprocity: and -in that case the cause in the same connexion as it is a cause will at -the same time be an effect, and <i>vice versâ.</i> The same thing is done -in the study of Nature, and especially of living organisms. There -the several organs and functions are similarly seen to stand to each -other in the relation of reciprocity. Reciprocity is undoubtedly the -proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so -to say, on the threshold of the notion; but on that very ground, -supposing that our aim is a thoroughly comprehensive idea, we should -not rest content with applying this relation. If we get no further than -studying a given content under the point of view of reciprocity, we are -taking up an attitude which leaves matters utterly incomprehensible. -We are left with a mere dry fact; and the call for mediation, which -is the chief motive in applying the relation of causality, is still -unanswered. And it we look more narrowly into the dissatisfaction -felt in applying the relation of reciprocity, we shall see that it -consists in the circumstance, that this relation, instead of being -treated as an equivalent for the notion, ought, first of all, to be -known and understood in its own nature. And to understand the relation -of action and reaction we must not let the two sides rest in their -state of mere given facts, but recognise them, as has been shown in -the two paragraphs preceding, for factors of a third and higher, which -is the notion and nothing else. To make, for example, the manners of -the Spartans the cause of their constitution and their constitution -conversely the cause of their manners, may no doubt be in a way -correct. But, as we have comprehended neither the manners nor the -constitution of the nation, the result of such reflections can never -be final or satisfactory. The satisfactory<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> point will be reached only -when these two, as well as all other, special aspects of Spartan life -and Spartan history are seen to be founded in this notion.</p> - -<p>157.] This pure self-reciprocation is therefore Necessity unveiled -or realised. The link of necessity <i>quâ</i> necessity is identity, as -still inward and concealed, because it is the identity of what are -esteemed actual things, although their very self-subsistence is bound -to be necessity. The circulation of substance through causality -and reciprocity therefore only expressly makes out or states that -self-subsistence is the infinite negative self-relation—a relation -<i>negative,</i> in general, for in it the act of distinguishing and -intermediating becomes a primariness of actual things independent -one against the other,—and <i>infinite self-relation,</i> because their -independence only lies in their identity.</p> - -<p>158.] This truth of necessity, therefore, is <i>Freedom:</i> and the -truth of substance is the Notion,—an independence which, though -self-repulsive into distinct independent elements, yet in that -repulsion is self-identical, and in the movement of reciprocity still -at home and conversant only with itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">Necessity is often called hard, and rightly so, if we keep only to -necessity as such, <i>i.e.</i> to its immediate shape. Here we have, -first of all, some state or, generally speaking, fact, possessing an -independent subsistence: and necessity primarily implies that there -falls upon such a fact something else by which it is brought low. -This is what is hard and sad in necessity immediate or abstract. The -identity of the two things, which necessity presents as bound to each -other and thus bereft of their independence, is at first only inward, -and therefore has no existence for those under the yoke of necessity. -Freedom too from this point of view is only abstract, and is preserved -only by renouncing all that we immediately are and have. But, as we -have seen already,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> the process of necessity is so directed that it -overcomes the rigid externality which it first had and reveals its -inward nature. It then appears that the members, linked to one another, -are not really foreign to each other, but only elements of one whole, -each of them, in its connexion with the other, being, as it were, at -home, and combining with itself. In this way necessity is transfigured -into freedom,—not the freedom that consists in abstract negation, -but freedom concrete and positive. From which we may learn what a -mistake it is to regard freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive. -Necessity indeed <i>quâ</i> necessity is far from being freedom: yet -freedom pre-supposes necessity, and contains it as an unsubstantial -element in itself. A good man is aware that the tenor of his conduct -is essentially obligatory and necessary. But this consciousness is -so far from making any abatement from his freedom, that without it -real and reasonable freedom could not be distinguished from arbitrary -choice,—a freedom which has no reality and is merely potential. A -criminal, when punished, may look upon his punishment as a restriction -of his freedom. Really the punishment is not foreign constraint to -which he is subjected, but the manifestation of his own act: and if he -recognises this, he comports himself as a free man. In short, man is -most independent when he knows himself to be determined by the absolute -idea throughout. It was this phase of mind and conduct which Spinoza -called <i>Amor intellectualis Dei.</i></p> - -<p>159.] Thus the Notion is the truth of Being and Essence, inasmuch as -the shining or show of self-reflection is itself at the same time -independent immediacy, and this being of a different actuality is -immediately only a shining or show on itself.</p> - -<p>The Notion has exhibited itself as the truth of Being and Essence, as -the ground to which the regress of both leads. Conversely it has been -developed out of being as its ground. The former aspect of the advance -may be regarded as a concentration of being into its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> depth, thereby -disclosing its inner nature: the latter aspect as an issuing of the -more perfect from the less perfect. When such development is viewed on -the latter side only, it does prejudice to the method of philosophy. -The special meaning which these superficial thoughts of more imperfect -and more perfect have in this place is to indicate the distinction of -being, as an immediate unity with itself, from the notion, as free -mediation with itself. Since being has shown that it is an element in -the notion, the latter has thus exhibited itself as the truth of being. -As this its reflection in itself and as an absorption of the mediation, -the notion is the pre-supposition of the immediate—a pre-supposition -which is identical with the return to self; and in this identity lie -freedom and the notion. If the partial element therefore be called the -imperfect, then the notion, or the perfect, is certainly a development -from the imperfect; since its very nature is thus to suspend its -pre-supposition. At the same time it is the notion alone which, in the -act of supposing itself, makes its pre-supposition; as has been made -apparent in causality in general and especially in reciprocal action.</p> - -<p>Thus in reference to Being and Essence the Notion is defined as Essence -reverted to the simple immediacy of Being,—the shining or show of -Essence thereby having actuality, and its actuality being at the same -time a free shining or show in itself. In this manner the notion has -being as its simple self-relation, or as the immediacy of its immanent -unity. Being is so poor a category that it is the least thing which can -be shown to be found in the notion.</p> - -<p>The passage from necessity to freedom, or from actuality into the -notion, is the very hardest, because it proposes that independent -actuality shall be thought as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> having all its substantiality in the -passing over and identity with the other independent actuality. The -notion, too, is extremely hard, because it is itself just this very -identity. But the actual substance as such, the cause, which in its -exclusiveness resists all invasion, is <i>ipso facto</i> subjected to -necessity or the destiny of passing into dependency: and it is this -subjection rather where the chief hardness lies. To think necessity, on -the contrary, rather tends to melt that hardness. For thinking means -that, in the other, one meets with one's self.—It means a liberation, -which is not the flight of abstraction, but consists in that which is -actual having itself not as something else, but as its own being and -creation, in the other actuality with which it is bound up by the force -of necessity. As existing in an individual form, this liberation is -called I: as developed to its totality, it is free Spirit; as feeling, -it is Love; and as enjoyment, it is Blessedness.—The great vision -of substance in Spinoza is only a potential liberation from finite -exclusiveness and egoism: but the notion itself realises for its own -both the power of necessity and actual freedom.</p> - -<p class="block2">When, as now, the notion is called the truth of Being and Essence, -we must expect to be asked, why we do not begin with the notion? The -answer is that, where knowledge by thought is our aim, we cannot begin -with the truth, because the truth, when it forms the beginning, must -rest on mere assertion. The truth when it is thought must as such -verify itself to thought. If the notion were put at the head of Logic, -and defined, quite correctly in point of content, as the unity of -Being and Essence, the following question would come up: What are we -to think under the terms 'Being' and 'Essence,' and how do they come -to be embraced in the unity of the Notion? But if we answered these -questions, then our beginning with the notion would be merely nominal. -The real start would be made with Being, as we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> have here done: with -this difference, that the characteristics of Being as well as those -of Essence would have to be accepted uncritically from figurate -conception, whereas we have observed Being and Essence in their own -dialectical development and learnt how they lose themselves in the -unity of the notion.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_25" id="Footnote_1_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_25"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Compare Goethe's indignant outcry—'To Natural Science,' -vol. i. pt. 3: -</p> -<p> -Das hör' ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen,<br /> -Und fluche drauf, aber verstohlen,—<br /> -Natur hat weder Kern noch Schaale,<br /> -Alles ist sie mit einem Male.<br /> -</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX.</a></h5> - - -<h5>THIRD SUB-DIVISION OF LOGIC.</h5> - - -<h4>THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION.</h4> - - -<p>160.] The <b>Notion</b> is the principle of freedom, the power of -substance self-realised. It is a systematic whole, in which each of its -constituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put -as indissolubly one with it. Thus in its self-identity it has original -and complete determinateness.</p> - -<p class="block2">The position taken up by the notion is that of absolute idealism. -Philosophy is a knowledge through notions because it sees that what -on other grades of consciousness is taken to have Being, and to be -naturally or immediately independent, is but a constituent stage in the -Idea. In the logic of understanding, the notion is generally reckoned -a mere form of thought, and treated as a general conception. It is to -this inferior view of the notion that the assertion refers, so often -urged on behalf of the heart and sentiment, that notions as such are -something dead, empty, and abstract. The case is really quite the -reverse. The notion is, on the contrary, the principle of all life, and -thus possesses at the same time a character of thorough concreteness. -That it is so follows from the whole logical movement up to this point, -and need not be here proved. The contrast between form and content, -which is thus used to criticise the notion when it is alleged to be -merely formal, has, like all the other contrasts upheld by reflection, -been already left behind and overcome dialectically or through itself. -The notion, in short, is what contains all the earlier categories of -thought merged in it. It certainly is a form, but an infinite and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> -creative form, which includes, but at the same time releases from -itself, the fulness of all content. And so too the notion may, if it -be wished, be styled abstract, if the name concrete is restricted to -the concrete facts of sense or of immediate perception. For the notion -is not palpable to the touch, and when we are engaged with it, hearing -and seeing must quite fail us. And yet, as it was before remarked, the -notion is a true concrete; for the reason that it involves Being and -Essence, and the total wealth of these two spheres with them, merged in -the unity of thought.</p> - -<p class="block2">If, as was said at an earlier point, the different stages of the -logical idea are to be treated as a series of definitions of the -Absolute, the definition which now results for us is that the Absolute -is the Notion. That necessitates a higher estimate of the notion, -however, than is found in formal conceptualist Logic, where the notion -is a mere form of our subjective thought, with no original content of -its own. But if Speculative Logic thus attaches a meaning to the term -notion so very different from that usually given, it may be asked why -the same word should be employed in two contrary acceptations, and an -occasion thus given for confusion and misconception. The answer is -that, great as the interval is between the speculative notion and the -notion of Formal Logic, a closer examination shows that the deeper -meaning is not so foreign to the general usages of language as it -seems at first sight. We speak of the deduction of a content from the -notion, <i>e.g.</i> of the specific provisions of the law of property from -the notion of property; and so again we speak of tracing back these -material details to the notion. We thus recognise that the notion is no -mere form without a content of its own: for if it were, there would be -in the one case nothing to deduce from such a form, and in the other -case to trace a given body of fact back to the empty form of the notion -would only rob the fact of its specific character, without making it -understood.</p> - -<p>161.] The onward movement of the notion is no longer either -a transition into, or a reflection on something else, but -<b>Development</b>. For in the notion, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> elements distinguished are -without more ado at the same time declared to be identical with one -another and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a -free being of the whole notion.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p class="block2">Transition into something else is the dialectical process within the -range of Being: reflection (bringing something else into light), in -the range of Essence. The movement of the Notion is <i>development</i>: by -which that only is explicit which is already implicitly present. In -the world of nature it is organic life that corresponds to the grade -of the notion. Thus <i>e.g.</i> the plant is developed from its germ. The -germ virtually involves the whole plant, but does so only ideally or in -thought: and it would therefore be a mistake to regard the development -of the root, stem, leaves, and other different parts of the plant, as -meaning that they were <i>realiter</i> present, but in a very minute form, -in the germ. That is the so-called 'box-within-box' hypothesis; a -theory which commits the mistake of supposing an actual existence of -what is at first found only as a postulate of the completed thought. -The truth of the hypothesis on the other hand lies in its perceiving -that in the process of development the notion keeps to itself and -only gives rise to alteration of form, without making any addition in -point of content. It is this nature of the notion—this manifestation -of itself in its process as a development of its own self,—which is -chiefly in view with those who speak of innate ideas, or who, like -Plato, describe all learning merely as reminiscence. Of course that -again does not mean that everything which is embodied in a mind, after -that mind has been formed by instruction, had been present in that mind -beforehand, in its definitely expanded shape.</p> - -<p class="block2">The movement of the notion is as it were to be looked upon merely as -play: the other which it sets up is in reality not an other. Or, as -it is expressed in the teaching of Christianity: not merely has God -created a world which confronts Him as an other; He has also from all -eternity begotten a Son in whom He, a Spirit, is at home with Himself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span></p> - -<p>162.] The doctrine of the notion is divided into three parts. (1) The -first is the doctrine of the <b>Subjective</b> or Formal <b>Notion</b>. -(2) The second is the doctrine of the notion invested with the -character of immediacy, or of <b>Objectivity</b>. (3) The third is the -doctrine of the <b>Idea</b>, the subject-object, the unity of notion -and objectivity, the absolute truth.</p> - -<p>The Common Logic covers only the matters which come before us here -as a portion of the third part of the whole system, together with -the so-called Laws of Thought, which we have already met; and in the -Applied Logic it adds a little about cognition. This is combined with -psychological, metaphysical, and all sorts of empirical materials, -which were introduced because, when all was done, those forms of -thought could not be made to do all that was required of them. But -with these additions the science lost its unity of aim. Then there was -a further circumstance against the Common Logic. Those forms, which -at least do belong to the proper domain of Logic, are supposed to be -categories of conscious thought only, of thought too in the character -of understanding, not of reason.</p> - -<p>The preceding logical categories, those viz. of Being and Essence, are, -it is true, no mere logical modes or entities: they are proved to be -notions in their transition or their dialectical element, and in their -return into themselves and totality. But they are only in a modified -form notions (cp. §§ 84 and 112), notions rudimentary, or, what is -the same thing, notions for us. The antithetical term into which each -category passes, or in which it shines, so producing correlation, is -not characterised as a particular. The third, in which they return -to unity, is not characterised as a subject or an individual: nor is -there any explicit statement that the category: is identical in its -antithesis,—in other words, its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> freedom is not expressly stated: and -all this because the category is not universality.—What generally -passes current under the name of a notion is a mode of understanding, -or, even, a mere general representation, and therefore, in short, a -finite mode of thought (cp. § 62).</p> - -<p>The Logic of the Notion is usually treated as a science of form only, -and understood to deal with the form of notion, judgment, and syllogism -as form, without in the least touching the question whether anything -is true. The answer to that question is supposed to depend on the -content only. If the logical forms of the notion were really dead and -inert receptacles of conceptions and thoughts, careless of what they -contained, knowledge about them would be an idle curiosity which the -truth might dispense with. On the contrary they really are, as forms -of the notion, the vital spirit of the actual world. That only is -true of the actual which is true in virtue of these forms, through -them and in them. As yet, however, the truth of these forms has never -been considered or examined on their own account any more than their -necessary interconnexion.</p> - - -<h5>A.—THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION.</h5> - -<p class="center">(a) <i>The Notion as Notion.</i></p> - -<p>163.] The Notion as Notion contains the three following 'moments' or -functional parts. (1) The first is <i>Universality</i>—meaning that it -is in free equality with itself in its specific character. (2) The -second is <b>Particularity</b>—that is, the specific character, in -which the universal continues serenely equal to itself. (3) The third -is <b>Individuality</b>—meaning the reflection-into-self of the -specific characters of universality and particularity;—which negative -self-unity has complete and original determinateness, without any loss -to its self-identity or universality.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span></p> - -<p>Individual and actual are the same thing: only the former has issued -from the notion, and is thus, as a universal, stated expressly as a -negative identity with itself. The actual, because it is at first no -more than a potential or immediate unity of essence and existence, -<i>may</i> possibly have effect: but the individuality of the notion is -the very source of effectiveness, effective moreover no longer as the -cause is, with a show of effecting something else, but effective of -itself.—Individuality, however, is not to be understood to mean the -immediate or natural individual, as when we speak of individual things -or individual men: for that special phase of individuality does not -appear till we come to the judgment. Every function and 'moment' of -the notion is itself the whole notion (§ 160); but the individual or -subject is the notion expressly put as a totality.</p> - -<p class="block2">(1) The notion is generally associated in our minds with abstract -generality, and on that account it is often described as a general -conception. We speak, accordingly, of the notions of colour, plant, -animal, &c. They are supposed to be arrived at by neglecting the -particular features which distinguish the different colours, plants, -and animals from each other, and by retaining those common to them all. -This is the aspect of the notion which is familiar to understanding; -and feeling is in the right when it stigmatises such hollow and empty -notions as mere phantoms and shadows. But the universal of the notion -is not a mere sum of features common to several things, confronted -by a particular which enjoys an existence of its own. It is, on the -contrary, self-particularising or self-specifying, and with undimmed -clearness finds itself at home in its antithesis. For the sake both of -cognition and of our practical conduct, it is of the utmost importance -that the real universal should not be confused with what is merely held -in common. All those charges which the devotees of feeling make against -thought, and especially against philosophic thought, and the reiterated -statement that it is dangerous to carry thought<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> to what they call too -great lengths, originate in the confusion of these two things.</p> - -<p class="block2">The universal in its true and comprehensive meaning is a thought -which, as we know, cost thousands of years to make it enter into the -consciousness of men. The thought did not gain its full recognition -till the days of Christianity. The Greeks, in other respects so -advanced, knew neither God nor even man in their true universality. -The gods of the Greeks were only particular powers of the mind; and -the universal God, the God of all nations, was to the Athenians still -a God concealed. They believed in the same way that an absolute gulf -separated themselves from the barbarians. Man as man was not then -recognised to be of infinite worth and to have infinite rights. -The question has been asked, why slavery has vanished from modern -Europe. One special circumstance after another has been adduced in -explanation of this phenomenon. But the real ground why there are -no more slaves in Christian Europe is only to be found in the very -principle of Christianity itself, the religion of absolute freedom. -Only in Christendom is man respected as man, in his infinitude and -universality. What the slave is without, is the recognition that he is -a person: and the principle of personality is universality. The master -looks upon his slave not as a person, but as a selfless thing. The -slave is not himself reckoned an 'I';—his 'I' is his master.</p> - -<p class="block2">The distinction referred to above between what is merely in common, and -what is truly universal, is strikingly expressed by Rousseau in his -famous 'Contrat Social,' when he says that the laws of a state must -spring from the universal will (<i>volonté générale,</i>) but need not on -that account be the will of all (<i>volonté de tous.</i>) Rousseau would -have made a sounder contribution towards a theory of the state, if he -had always keep this distinction in sight. The general will is the -notion of the will: and the laws are the special clauses of this will -and based upon the notion of it.</p> - -<p class="block2">(2) We add a remark upon the account of the origin and formation of -notions which is usually given in the Logic of Understanding. It is -not <i>we</i> who frame the notions. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> notion is not something which -is originated at all. No doubt the notion is not mere Being, or the -immediate: it involves mediation, but the mediation lies in itself. In -other words, the notion is what is mediated through itself and with -itself. It is a mistake to imagine that the objects which form the -content of our mental ideas come first and that our subjective agency -then supervenes, and by the aforesaid operation of abstraction, and -by colligating the points possessed in common by the objects, frames -notions of them. Rather the notion is the genuine first; and things -are what they are through the action of the notion, immanent in them, -and revealing itself in them. In religious language we express this -by saying that God created the world out of nothing. In other words, -the world and finite things have issued from the fulness of the divine -thoughts and the divine decrees. Thus religion recognises thought and -(more exactly) the notion to be the infinite form, or the free creative -activity, which can realise itself without the help of a matter that -exists outside it.</p> - -<p>164.] The notion is concrete out and out: because the negative -unity with itself, as characterisation pure and entire, which is -individuality, is just what constitutes its self-relation, its -universality. The functions or 'moments' of the notion are to this -extent indissoluble. The categories of 'reflection' are expected to be -severally apprehended and separately accepted as current, apart from -their opposites. But in the notion, where their identity is expressly -assumed, each of its functions can be immediately apprehended only from -and with the rest.</p> - -<p>Universality, particularity, and individuality are, taken in the -abstract, the same as identity, difference, and ground. But the -universal is the self-identical, with the express qualification, -that it simultaneously contains the particular and the individual. -Again, the particular is the different or the specific character, but -with the qualification that it is in itself universal and is as an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> -individual. Similarly the individual must be understood to be a subject -or substratum, which involves the genus and species in itself and -possesses a substantial existence. Such is the explicit or realised -inseparability of the functions of the notion in their difference (§ -160)—what may be called the clearness of the notion, in which each -distinction causes no dimness or interruption, but is quite as much -transparent.</p> - -<p>No complaint is oftener made against the notion than that it is -<i>abstract.</i> Of course it is abstract, if abstract means that the medium -in which the notion exists is thought in general and not the sensible -thing in its empirical concreteness. It is abstract also, because the -notion falls short of the idea. To this extent the subjective notion -is still formal. This however does not mean that it ought to have -or receive another content than its own. It is itself the absolute -form, and so is all specific character, but as that character is in -its truth. Although it be abstract therefore, it is the concrete, -concrete altogether, the subject as such. The absolutely concrete is -the mind (see end of § 159)—the notion when it <i>exists</i> as notion -distinguishing itself from its objectivity, which notwithstanding the -distinction still continues to be its own. Everything else which is -concrete, however rich it be, is not so intensely identical with itself -and therefore not so concrete on its own part,—least of all what is -commonly supposed to be concrete, but is only a congeries held together -by external influence.—What are called notions, and in fact specific -notions, such as man, house, animal, &c., are simply denotations -and abstract representations. These abstractions retain out of all -the functions of the notion only that of universality; they leave -particularity and individuality out of account and have no development -in these directions. By so doing they just miss the notion.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span></p> - -<p>165.] It is the element of Individuality which first explicitly -differentiates the elements of the notion. Individuality is the -negative reflection of the notion into itself, and it is in that way at -first the free differentiating of it as the first negation, by which -the specific character of the notion is realised, but under the form -of particularity. That is to say, the different elements are in the -first place only qualified as the several elements of the notion, and, -secondly, their identity is no less explicitly stated, the one being -said to be the other. This realised particularity of the notion is the -Judgment.</p> - -<p>The ordinary classification of notions, as <i>clear, distinct</i> and -<i>adequate,</i> is no part of the notion; it belongs to psychology. -Notions, in fact, are here synonymous with mental representations; -a <i>clear</i> notion is an abstract simple representation: a <i>distinct</i> -notion is one where, in addition to the simplicity, there is one 'mark' -or character emphasised as a sign for subjective cognition. There is -no more striking mark of the formalism and decay of Logic than the -favourite category of the 'mark.' The <i>adequate</i> notion comes nearer -the notion proper, or even the Idea: but after all it expresses only -the formal circumstance that a notion or representation agrees with its -object, that is, with an external thing.—The division into what are -called <i>subordinate</i> and <i>co-ordinate</i> notions implies a mechanical -distinction of universal from particular which allows only a mere -correlation of them in external comparison. Again, an enumeration -of such kinds as <i>contrary</i> and <i>contradictory, affirmative</i> and -<i>negative</i> notions, &c., is only a chance-directed gleaning of logical -forms which properly belong to the sphere of Being or Essence, (where -they have been already examined,) and which have nothing to do with -the specific notional character as such. The true distinctions in the -notion, universal, particular, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> individual, may be said also to -constitute species of it, but only when they are kept severed from -each other by external reflection. The immanent differentiating and -specifying of the notion come to sight in the judgment: for to judge is -to specify the notion.</p> - -<p class="center">(b) <i>The Judgment.</i></p> - -<p>166.] The <b>Judgment</b> is the notion in its particularity, as a -connexion which is also a distinguishing of its functions, which are -put as independent and yet as identical with themselves, not with one -another.</p> - -<p>One's first impression about the Judgment is the independence of the -two extremes, the subject and the predicate. The former we take to be -a thing or term <i>per se,</i> and the predicate a general term outside -the said subject and somewhere in our heads. The next point is for us -to bring the latter into combination with the former, and in this way -frame a Judgment. The copula 'is' however enunciates the predicate <i>of</i> -the subject, and so that external subjective subsumption is again put -in abeyance, and the Judgment taken as a determination of the object -itself.—The etymological meaning of the Judgment (<i>Urtheil</i>) in -German goes deeper, as it were declaring the unity of the notion to be -primary, and its distinction to be the original partition. And that is -what the Judgment really is.</p> - -<p>In its abstract terms a Judgment is expressible in the proposition: -'The individual is the universal.' These are the terms under which -the subject and the predicate first confront each other, when the -functions of the notion are taken in their immediate character or -first abstraction. [Propositions such as, 'The particular is the -universal,' and 'The individual is the particular,' belong to the -further specialisation of the judgment.] It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> shows a strange want -of observation in the logic-books, that in none of them is the fact -stated, that in <i>every</i> judgment there is such a statement made, as, -The individual is the universal, or still more definitely, The subject -is the predicate: (<i>e.g.</i> God is absolute spirit). No doubt there is -also a distinction between terms like individual and universal, subject -and predicate: but it is none the less the universal fact, that every -judgment states them to be identical.</p> - -<p>The copula 'is' springs from the nature of the notion, to be -self-identical even in parting with its own. The individual and -universal are <i>its</i> constituents, and therefore characters which -cannot be isolated. The earlier categories (of reflection) in their -correlations also refer to one another: but their interconnexion is -only 'having' and not 'being,' <i>i.e.</i> it is not the identity which is -realised as identity or universality. In the judgment, therefore, for -the first time there is seen the genuine particularity of the notion: -for it is the speciality or distinguishing of the latter, without -thereby losing universality.</p> - -<p class="block2">Judgments are generally looked upon as combinations of notions, and, -be it added, of heterogeneous notions. This theory of judgment is -correct, so far as it implies that it is the notion which forms the -presupposition of the judgment, and which in the judgment comes up -under the form of difference. But on the other hand, it is false to -speak of notions differing in kind. The notion, although concrete, -is still as a notion essentially one, and the functions which it -contains are not different kinds of it. It is equally false to speak -of a combination of the two sides in the judgment, if we understand -the term 'combination' to imply the independent existence of the -combining members apart from the combination. The same external view -of their nature is more forcibly apparent when judgments are described -as produced by the ascription of a predicate to the subject.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> Language -like this looks upon the subject as self-subsistent outside, and the -predicate as found somewhere in our head. Such a conception of the -relation between subject and predicate however is at once contradicted -by the copula 'is.' By saying 'This rose is red,' or 'This picture -is beautiful,' we declare, that it is not we who from outside attach -beauty to the picture or redness to the rose, but that these are the -characteristics proper to these objects. An additional fault in the -way in which Formal Logic conceives the judgment is, that it makes -the judgment look as if it were something merely contingent, and -does not offer any proof for the advance from notion on to judgment. -For the notion does not, as understanding supposes, stand still in -its own immobility. It is rather an infinite form, of boundless -activity, as it were the <i>punctum saliens</i> of all vitality, and -thereby self-differentiating. This disruption of the notion into the -difference of its constituent functions',—a disruption imposed by the -native act of the notion, is the judgment. A judgment therefore means -the particularising of the notion. No doubt the notion is implicitly -the particular. But in the notion as notion the particular is not yet -explicit, and still remains in transparent unity with the universal. -Thus, for example, as we remarked before (§ 160, note), the germ of a -plant contains its particular, such as root, branches, leaves, &c.: -but these details are at first present only potentially, and are not -realised till the germ uncloses. This unclosing is, as it were, the -judgment of the plant. The illustration may also serve to show how -neither the notion nor the judgment are merely found in our head, or -merely framed by us. The notion is the very heart of things, and makes -them what they are. To form a notion of an object means therefore to -become aware of its notion: and when we proceed to a criticism or -judgment of the object, we are not performing a subjective act, and -merely ascribing this or that predicate to the object. We are, on the -contrary, observing the object in the specific character imposed by its -notion.</p> - -<p>167.] The Judgment is usually taken in a subjective sense as an -operation and a form, occurring merely in self-conscious thought. This -distinction, however, has no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> existence on purely logical principles, -by which the judgment is taken in the quite universal signification -that all things are a judgment. That is to say, they are individuals, -which are a universality or inner nature in themselves,—a universal -which is individualised. Their universality and individuality are -distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other.</p> - -<p>The interpretation of the judgment, according to which it is assumed -to be merely subjective, as if <i>we</i> ascribed a predicate to a subject, -is contradicted by the decidedly objective expression of the judgment. -The rose <i>is</i> red; Gold <i>is</i> a metal. It is not by us that something -is first ascribed to them.—A judgment is however distinguished from a -proposition. The latter contains a statement about the subject, which -does not stand to it in any universal relationship, but expresses some -single action, or some state, or the like. Thus, 'Caesar was born at -Rome in such and such a year, waged war in Gaul for ten years, crossed -the Rubicon, &c.,' are propositions, but not judgments. Again it is -absurd to say that such statements as, 'I slept well last night,' or -'Present arms!' may be turned into the form of a judgment. 'A carriage -is passing by'—would be a judgment, and a subjective one at best, only -if it were doubtful, whether the passing object was a carriage, or -whether it and not rather the point of observation was in motion:—in -short, only if it were desired to specify a conception which was still -short of appropriate specification.</p> - -<p>168.] The judgment is an expression of finitude. Things from its point -of view are said to be finite, because they are a judgment, because -their definite being and their universal nature, (their body and their -soul,) though united indeed (otherwise the things would be nothing), -are still elements in the constitution which are already different and -also in any case separable.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span></p> - -<p>169.] The abstract terms of the judgment, 'The individual is the -universal,' present the subject (as negatively self-relating) as what -is immediately <i>concrete,</i> while the predicate is what is <i>abstract,</i> -indeterminate, in short, the universal. But the two elements are -connected together by an 'is': and thus the predicate (in its -universality) must also contain the speciality of the subject, must, -in short, have particularity: and so is realised the identity between -subject and predicate; which, being thus unaffected by this difference -in form, is the content.</p> - -<p>It is the predicate which first gives the subject, which till then was -on its own account a bare mental representation or an empty name, its -specific character and content. In judgments like 'God is the most -real of all things,' or 'The Absolute is the self-identical,' God and -the Absolute are mere names; what they <i>are</i> we only learn in the -predicate. What the subject may be in other respects, as a concrete -thing, is no concern of <i>this</i> judgment. (Cp. § 31.)</p> - -<p class="block2">To define the subject as that of which something is said, and the -predicate as what is said about it, is mere trifling. It gives no -information about the distinction between the two. In point of -thought, the subject is primarily the individual, and the predicate -the universal. As the judgment receives further development, the -subject ceases to be merely the immediate individual, and the predicate -merely the abstract universal: the former acquires the additional -significations of particular and universal,—the latter the additional -significations of particular and individual. Thus while the same names -are given to the two terms of the judgment, their meaning passes -through a series of changes.</p> - -<p>170.] We now go closer into the speciality of subject and predicate. -The subject as negative self-relation (§§ 163, 166) is the stable -substratum in which the predicate has its subsistence and where it -is ideally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> present. The predicate, as the phrase is, <i>inheres</i> in -the subject. Further, as the subject is in general and immediately -concrete, the specific connotation of the predicate is only one of the -numerous characters of the subject. Thus the subject is ampler and -wider than the predicate.</p> - -<p>Conversely, the predicate as universal is self-subsistent, and -indifferent whether this subject is or not. The predicate outflanks -the subject, subsuming it under itself: and hence on its side is wider -than the subject. The specific content of the predicate (§ 169) alone -constitutes the identity of the two.</p> - -<p>171.] At first, subject, predicate, and the specific content or the -identity are, even in their relation, still put in the judgment -as different and divergent. By implication, however, that is, in -their notion, they are identical. For the subject is a concrete -totality,—which means not any indefinite multiplicity, but -individuality alone, the particular and the universal in an identity: -and the predicate too is the very same unity (§ 170).—The copula -again, even while stating the identity of subject and predicate, -does so at first only by an abstract 'is.' Conformably to such an -identity the subject has to be <i>put</i> also in the characteristic of the -predicate. By this means the latter also receives the characteristic of -the former: so that the copula receives its full complement and full -force. Such is the continuous specification by which the judgment, -through a copula charged with content, comes to be a syllogism. As it -is primarily exhibited in the judgment, this gradual specification -consists in giving to an originally abstract, sensuous universality the -specific character of allness, of species, of genus, and finally of the -developed universality of the notion.</p> - -<p> After we are made aware of this continuous specification<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> of the -judgment, we can see a meaning and an interconnexion in what are -usually stated as the kinds of judgment. Not only does the ordinary -enumeration seem purely casual, but it is also superficial, and even -bewildering in its statement of their distinctions. The distinction -between positive, categorical and assertory judgments, is either a pure -invention of fancy, or is left undetermined. On the right theory, the -different judgments follow necessarily from one another, and present -the continuous specification of the notion; for the judgment itself is -nothing but the notion specified.</p> - -<p>When we look at the two preceding spheres of Being and Essence, we see -that the specified notions as judgments are reproductions of these -spheres, but put in the simplicity of relation peculiar to the notion.</p> - -<p class="block2">The various kinds of judgment are no empirical aggregate. They are -a systematic whole based on a principle; and it was one of Kant's -great merits to have first emphasised the necessity of showing -this. His proposed division, according to the headings in his table -of categories, into judgments of quality, quantity, relation and -modality, can not be called satisfactory, partly from the merely formal -application of this categorical rubric, partly on account of their -content. Still it rests upon a true perception of the fact that the -different species of judgment derive their features from the universal -forms of the logical idea itself. If we follow this clue, it will -supply us with three chief kinds of judgment parallel to the stages -of Being, Essence, and Notion. The second of these kinds, as required -by the character of Essence, which is the stage of differentiation, -must be doubled. We find the inner ground for this systematisation of -judgments in the circumstance that when the Notion, which is the unity -of Being and Essence in a comprehensive thought, unfolds, as it does in -the judgment, it must reproduce these two stages in a transformation -proper to the notion. The notion itself meanwhile is seen to mould and -form the genuine grade of judgment.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span></p> - -<p class="block2">Far from occupying the same level, and being of equal value, the -different species of judgment form a series of steps, the difference -of which rests upon the logical significance of the predicate. That -judgments differ in value is evident even in our ordinary ways of -thinking. We should not hesitate to ascribe a very slight faculty of -judgment to a person who habitually framed only such judgments as, -'This wall is green,' 'This stove is hot.' On the other hand we should -credit with a genuine capacity of judgment the person whose criticisms -dealt with such questions as whether a certain work of art was -beautiful, whether a certain action was good, and so on. In judgments -of the first-mentioned kind the content forms only an abstract quality, -the presence of which can be sufficiently detected by immediate -perception. To pronounce a work of art to be beautiful, or an action to -be good, requires on the contrary a comparison of the objects with what -they ought to be, <i>i.e.</i> with their notion.</p> - -<p class="center">(α) Qualitative Judgment.</p> - -<p>172.] The immediate judgment is the judgment of definite Being. The -subject is invested with a universality as its predicate, which is -an immediate, and therefore a sensible quality. It may be (1) a -<b>Positive</b> judgment: The individual is a particular. But the -individual is not a particular: or in more precise language, such -a single quality is not congruous with the concrete nature of the -subject. This is (2) a <b>Negative</b> judgment.</p> - -<p>It is one of the fundamental assumptions of dogmatic Logic that -Qualitative judgments such as, 'The rose is red,' or 'is not red,' can -contain <i>truth. Correct</i> they may be, <i>i.e.</i> in the limited circle -of perception, of finite conception and thought: that depends on the -content, which likewise is finite, and, on its own merits, untrue. -Truth, however, as opposed to correctness, depends solely on the form, -viz. on the notion as it is put and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> the reality corresponding to it. -But truth of that stamp is not found in the Qualitative judgment.</p> - -<p class="block2">In common life the terms <i>truth</i> and <i>correctness</i> are often treated -as synonymous: we speak of the truth of a content, when we are only -thinking of its correctness. Correctness, generally speaking, concerns -only the formal coincidence between our conception and its content, -whatever the constitution of this content may be. Truth, on the -contrary, lies in the coincidence of the object with itself, that is, -with its notion. That a person is sick, or that some one has committed -a theft, may certainly be correct. But the content is untrue. A sick -body is not in harmony with the notion of body, and there is a want -of congruity between theft and the notion of human conduct. These -instances may show that an immediate judgment, in which an abstract -quality is predicated of an immediately individual thing, however -correct it may be, cannot contain truth. The subject and predicate of -it do not stand to each other in the relation of reality and notion.</p> - -<p class="block2">We may add that the untruth of the immediate judgment lies in the -incongruity between its form and content. To say 'This rose is red,' -involves (in virtue of the copula 'is') the coincidence of subject and -predicate. The rose however is a concrete thing, and so is not red -only: it has also an odour, a specific form, and many other features -not implied in the predicate red. The predicate on its part is an -abstract universal, and does not apply to the rose alone. There are -other flowers and other objects which are red too. The subject and -predicate in the immediate judgment touch, as it were, only in a single -point, but do not cover each other. The case is different with the -notional judgment. In pronouncing an action to be good, we frame a -notional judgment. Here, as we at once perceive, there is a closer and -a more intimate relation than in the immediate judgment. The predicate -in the latter is some abstract quality which may or may not be applied -to the subject. In the judgment of the notion the predicate is, as it -were, the soul of the subject, by which the subject, as the body of -this soul, is characterised through and through.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span></p> - -<p>173.] This negation of a particular quality, which is the first -negation, still leaves the connexion of the subject with the predicate -subsisting. The predicate is in that manner a sort of relative -universal, of which a special phase only has been negatived. [To say, -that the rose is not red, implies that it is still coloured—in the -first place with another colour; which however would be only one more -positive judgment.] The individual however is not a universal. Hence -(3) the judgment suffers disruption into one of two forms. It is either -(a) the <b>Identical</b> judgment, an empty identical relation stating -that the individual is the individual; or it is (b) what is called the -<b>Infinite</b> judgment, in which we are presented with the total -incompatibility of subject and predicate.</p> - -<p>Examples of the latter are: 'The mind is no elephant:' 'A lion is -no table;' propositions which are correct but absurd, exactly like -the identical propositions: 'A lion is a lion;' 'Mind is mind.' -Propositions like these are undoubtedly the truth of the immediate, or, -as it is called, Qualitative judgment. But they are not judgments at -all, and can only occur in a subjective thought where even an untrue -abstraction may hold its ground.—In their objective aspect, these -latter judgments express the nature of what is, or of sensible things, -which, as they declare, suffer disruption into an empty identity on the -one hand, and on the other a fully-charged relation—only that this -relation is the qualitative antagonism of the things related, their -total incongruity.</p> - -<p class="block2">The negatively-infinite judgment, in which the subject has no relation -whatever to the predicate, gets its place in the Formal Logic solely as -a nonsensical curiosity. But the infinite judgment is not really a mere -casual form adopted by subjective thought. It exhibits the proximate -result of the dialectical process in the immediate judgments preceding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> -(the positive and simply-negative), and distinctly displays their -finitude and untruth. Crime may be quoted as an objective instance of -the negatively-infinite judgment. The person committing a crime, such -as a theft, does not, as in a suit about civil rights, merely deny -the particular right of another person to some one definite thing. -He denies the right of that person in general, and therefore he is -not merely forced to restore what he has stolen, but is punished in -addition, because he has violated law as law, <i>i.e.</i> law in general. -The civil-law suit on the contrary is an instance of the negative -judgment pure and simple where merely the particular law is violated, -whilst law in general is so far acknowledged. Such a dispute is -precisely paralleled by a negative judgment, like, 'This flower is not -red:' by which we merely deny the particular colour of the flower, but -not its colour in general, which may be blue, yellow, or any other. -Similarly death, as a negatively-infinite judgment, is distinguished -from disease as simply-negative. In disease, merely this or that -function of life is checked or negatived: in death, as we ordinarily -say, body and soul part, <i>i.e.</i> subject and predicate utterly diverge.</p> - -<p class="center">(ß) <i>Judgment of Reflection.</i></p> - -<p>174.] The individual put as individual (<i>i.e.</i> as reflected-into-self) -into the judgment, has a predicate, in comparison with which the -subject, as self-relating, continues to be still <i>an other</i> thing.—In -existence the subject ceases to be immediately qualitative, it is in -correlation, and inter-connexion with an other thing,—with an external -world. In this way the universality of the predicate comes to signify -this relativity—(<i>e.g.</i>) useful, or dangerous; weight or acidity; or -again, instinct; are examples of such relative predicates.</p> - -<p class="block2">The Judgment of Reflection is distinguished from the Qualitative -judgment by the circumstance that its predicate is not an immediate -or abstract quality, but of such a kind as to exhibit the subject -as in relation to something else. When we say, <i>e.g.</i> 'This rose is -red.' we regard the subject in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> immediate individuality, and -without reference to anything else. If, on the other hand, we frame -the judgment, 'This plant is medicinal,' we regard the subject, plant, -as standing in connexion with something else (the sickness which it -cures), by means of its predicate (its medicinality). The case is the -same with judgments like: This body is elastic: This instrument is -useful: This punishment has a deterrent influence. In every one of -these instances the predicate is some category of reflection. They all -exhibit an advance beyond the immediate individuality of the subject, -but none of them goes so far as to indicate the adequate notion of it. -It is in this mode of judgment that ordinary <i>raisonnement</i> luxuriates. -The greater the concreteness of the object in question, the more points -of view does it offer to reflection; by which however its proper nature -or notion is not exhausted.</p> - -<p>175.] (1) Firstly then the subject, the individual as individual (in -the <b>Singular</b> judgment), is a universal. But (2) secondly, in -this relation it is elevated above its singularity. This enlargement is -external, due to subjective reflection, and at first is an indefinite -number of particulars. (This is seen in the <b>Particular</b> judgment, -which is obviously negative as well as positive: the individual is -divided in itself: partly it is self-related, partly related to -something else.) (3) Thirdly, Some are the universal: particularity is -thus enlarged to universality: or universality is modified through the -individuality of the subject, and appears as <b>allness</b> Community, -the ordinary universality of reflection.</p> - -<p class="block2">The subject, receiving, as in the Singular judgment, a universal -predicate, is carried out beyond its mere individual self. To say, -'This plant is wholesome,' implies not only that this single plant is -wholesome, but that some or several are so. We have thus the particular -judgment (some plants are wholesome, some men are inventive, &c.). By -means of particularity the immediate individual comes to lose its -independence, and enters into an inter-connexion with something<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span> else. -Man, as <i>this</i> man, is not this single man alone: he stands beside -other men and becomes one in the crowd, just by this means however he -belongs to his universal, and is consequently raised.—The particular -judgment is as much negative as positive. If only some bodies are -elastic, it is evident that the rest are not elastic.</p> - -<p class="block2">On this fact again depends the advance to the third form of the -Reflective judgment, viz. the judgment of allness (all men are mortal, -all metals conduct electricity). It is as 'all' that the universal -is in the first instance generally encountered by reflection. The -individuals form for reflection the foundation, and it is only our -subjective action which collects and describes them as 'all.' So far -the universal has the aspect of an external fastening, that holds -together a number of independent individuals, which have not the least -affinity towards it. This semblance of indifference is however unreal: -for the universal is the ground and foundation, the root, and substance -of the individual. If <i>e.g.</i> we take Caius, Titus, Sempronius, and -the other inhabitants of a town or country, the fact that all of them -are men is not merely something which they have in common, but their -universal or kind, without which these individuals would not be at all. -The case is very different with that superficial generality falsely -so called, which really means only what attaches, or is common, to -all the individuals. It has been remarked, for example, that men, -in contradistinction from the lower animals, possess in common the -appendage of ear-lobes. It is evident, however, that the absence of -these ear-lobes in one man or another would not affect the rest of -his being, character, or capacities: whereas it would be nonsense -to suppose that Caius, without being a man, would still be brave, -learned, &c. The individual man is what he is in particular, only in so -far as he is before all things a man as man and in general. And that -generality is not something external to, or something in addition to -other abstract qualities, or to mere features discovered by reflection. -It is what permeates and includes in it everything particular.</p> - -<p>176.] The subject being thus likewise characterised<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> as a universal, -there is an express identification of subject and predicate, by which -at the same time the speciality of the judgment form is deprived of -all importance. This unity of the content (the content being the -universality which is identical with the negative reflection-in-self of -the subject) makes the connexion in judgment a necessary one.</p> - -<p class="block2">The advance from the reflective judgment of allness to the judgment -of necessity is found in our usual modes of thought, when we say that -whatever appertains to all, appertains to the species, and is therefore -necessary. To say all plants, or all men, is the same thing as to say -<i>the</i> plant, or <i>the</i> man.</p> - -<p class="center">(γ) <i>Judgment of Necessity.</i></p> - -<p>177.] The Judgment of Necessity, <i>i.e.</i> of the identity of the content -in its difference (1), contains, in the predicate, partly the substance -or nature of the subject, the concrete universal, the <i>genus</i>; partly, -seeing that this universal also contains the specific character as -negative, the predicate represents the exclusive essential character, -the <i>species.</i> This is the <b>Categorical</b> judgment.</p> - -<p>(2) Conformably to their substantiality, the two terms receive the -aspect of independent actuality. Their identity is then inward only; -and thus the actuality of the one is at the same time not its own, but -the being of the other. This is the <b>Hypothetical</b> judgment.</p> - -<p>(3) If, in this self-surrender and self-alienation of the notion, -its inner identity is at the same time explicitly put, the universal -is the genus which is self-identical in its mutually-exclusive -individualities. This judgment, which has this universal for both its -terms, the one time as a universal, the other time as the circle of -its self-excluding particularisation in which the 'either—or' as much -as the 'as well as' stands for the genus, is the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> <b>Disjunctive</b> -judgment. Universality, at first as a genus, and now also as the -circuit of its species, is thus described and expressly put as a -totality.</p> - -<p class="block2">The Categorical judgment (such as 'Gold is a metal,' 'The rose is a -plant') is the un-mediated judgment of necessity, and finds within the -sphere of Essence its parallel in the relation of substance. All things -are a Categorical judgment. In other words, they have their substantial -nature, forming their fixed and unchangeable substratum. It is only -when things are studied from the point of view of their kind, and as -with necessity determined by the kind, that the judgment first begins -to be real. It betrays a defective logical training to place upon the -same level judgments like 'gold is dear,' and judgments like 'gold -is a metal.' That 'gold is dear' is a matter of external connexion -between it and our wants or inclinations, the costs of obtaining it, -and other circumstances. Gold remains the same as it was, though that -external reference is altered or removed. Metalleity, on the contrary, -constitutes the substantial nature of gold, apart from which it, and -all else that is in it, or can be predicated of it, would be unable to -subsist. The same is the case if we say, 'Caius is a man.' We express -by that, that whatever else he may be, has worth and meaning, only when -it corresponds to his substantial nature or manhood.</p> - -<p class="block2">But even the Categorical judgment is to a certain extent defective. It -fails to give due place to the function or element of particularity. -Thus 'gold is a metal,' it is true; but so are silver, copper, iron: -and metalleity as such has no leanings to any of its particular -species. In these circumstances we must advance from the Categorical to -the Hypothetical judgment, which may be expressed in the formula: If -<i>A</i> is, <i>B</i> is. The present case exhibits the same advance as formerly -took place from the relation of substance to the relation of cause. In -the Hypothetical judgment the specific character of the content shows -itself mediated and dependent on something else: and this is exactly -the relation of cause and effect. And if we were to give a general -interpretation to the Hypothetical judgment, we should say that it -expressly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> realises the universal in its particularising. This brings -us to the third form of the Judgment of Necessity, the Disjunctive -judgment. <i>A</i> is either <i>B</i> or <i>C</i> or <i>D.</i> A work of poetic art is -either epic or lyric or dramatic. Colour is either yellow or blue or -red. The two terms in the Disjunctive judgment are identical. The genus -is the sum total of the species, and the sum total of the species -is the genus. This unity of the universal and the particular is the -notion: and it is the notion which, as we now see, forms the content of -the judgment.</p> - -<p class="center">(δ) <i>Judgment of the Notion.</i></p> - -<p>178.] The Judgment of the Notion has for its content the notion, the -totality in simple form, the universal with its complete speciality. -The subject is, (1) in the first place, an individual, which has -for its predicate the reflection of the particular existence on its -universal; or the judgment states the agreement or disagreement of -these two aspects. That is, the predicate is such a term as good, true, -correct. This is the <b>Assertory</b> judgment.</p> - -<p>Judgments, such as whether an object, action, &c. is good, bad, true, -beautiful, &c., are those to which even ordinary language first applies -the name of judgment. We should never ascribe judgment to a person who -framed positive or negative judgments like, This rose is red, This -picture is red, green, dusty, &c.</p> - -<p>The Assertory judgment, although rejected by society as out of place -when it claims authority on its own showing, has however been made the -single and all-essential form of doctrine, even in philosophy, through -the influence of the principle of immediate knowledge and faith. In the -so-called philosophic works which maintain this principle, we may read -hundreds and hundreds of assertions about reason, knowledge, thought, -&c.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> which, now that external authority counts for little, seek to -accredit themselves by an endless restatement of the same thesis.</p> - -<p>179.] On the part of its at first un-mediated subject, the Assertory -judgment does not contain the relation of particular with universal -which is expressed in the predicate. This judgment is consequently -a mere subjective particularity, and is confronted by a contrary -assertion with equal right, or rather want of right. It is therefore -at once turned into (2) a <b>Problematical</b> judgment. But when we -explicitly attach the objective particularity to the subject and make -its speciality the constitutive feature of its existence, the subject -(3) then expresses the connexion of that objective particularity with -its constitution, <i>i.e.</i> with its genus; and thus expresses what -forms the content of the predicate (see § 178). [This (<i>the immediate -individuality</i>) house (<i>the genus,</i>) being so and so constituted -(<i>particularity,</i>) is good or bad.] This is the <b>Apodictic</b> -judgment. All things are a genus (<i>i.e.</i> have a meaning and purpose) in -an <i>individual</i> actuality of a <i>particular</i> constitution. And they are -finite, because the particular in them may and also may not conform to -the universal.</p> - -<p>180.] In this manner subject and predicate are each the whole judgment. -The immediate constitution of the subject is at first exhibited as -the intermediating ground, where the individuality of the actual -thing meets with its universality, and in this way as the ground of -the judgment. What has been really made explicit is the oneness of -subject and predicate, as the notion itself, filling up the empty 'is' -of the copula. While its constituent elements are at the same time -distinguished as subject and predicate, the notion is put as their -unity, as the connexion which serves to intermediate them: in short, as -the Syllogism.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">(c) <i>The Syllogism.</i></p> - -<p>181.] The <b>Syllogism</b> brings the notion and the judgment into one. -It is notion,—being the simple identity into which the distinctions of -form in the judgment have retired. It is judgment,—because it is at -the same time set in reality, that is, put in the distinction of its -terms. The Syllogism is the reasonable, and everything reasonable.</p> - -<p>Even the ordinary theories represent the Syllogism to be the form of -reasonableness, but only a subjective form; and no inter-connexion -whatever is shown to exist between it and any other reasonable content, -such as a reasonable principle, a reasonable action, idea, &c. The name -of reason is much and often heard, and appealed to: but no one thinks -of explaining its specific character, or saying what it is,—least of -all that it has any connexion with Syllogism. But formal Syllogism -really presents what is reasonable in such a reasonless way that it -has nothing to do with any reasonable matter. But as the matter in -question can only be rational in virtue of the same quality by which -thought is reason, it can be made so by the form only: and that -form is Syllogism. And what is a Syllogism but an explicit putting, -<i>i.e.</i> realising of the notion, at first in form only, as stated -above? Accordingly the Syllogism is the essential ground of whatever -is true: and at the present stage the definition of the Absolute is -that it is the Syllogism, or stating the principle in a proposition: -Everything is a Syllogism. Everything is a notion, the existence of -which is the differentiation of its members or functions, so that the -universal nature of the Notion gives itself external reality by means -of particularity, and thereby, and as a negative reflection-into-self, -makes itself an individual. Or, conversely: the actual thing is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> an -individual, which by means of particularity rises to universality and -makes itself identical with itself.—The actual is one: but it is also -the divergence from each other of the constituent elements of the -notion; and the Syllogism represents the orbit of intermediation of its -elements, by which it realises its unity.</p> - -<p class="block2">The Syllogism, like the notion and the judgment, is usually described -as a form merely of our subjective thinking. The Syllogism, it is said, -is the process of proving the judgment. And certainly the judgment does -in every case refer us to the Syllogism. The step from the one to the -other however is not brought about by our subjective action, but by the -judgment itself which puts itself as Syllogism, and in the conclusion -returns to the unity of the notion. The precise point by which we -pass to the Syllogism is found in the Apodictic judgment. In it we -have an individual which by means of its qualities connects itself -with its universal or notion. Here we see the particular becoming the -mediating mean between the individual and the universal. This gives -the fundamental form of the Syllogism, the gradual specification of -which, formally considered, consists in the fact that universal and -individual also occupy this place of mean. This again paves the way for -the passage from subjectivity to objectivity.</p> - -<p>182.] In the 'immediate' Syllogism the several aspects of the notion -confront one another abstractly, and stand in an external relation -only. We have first the two extremes, which are Individuality and -Universality; and then the notion, as the mean for locking the two -together, is in like manner only abstract Particularity. In this way -the extremes are put as independent and without affinity either towards -one another or towards their mean. Such a Syllogism contains reason, -but in utter notionlessness,—the formal Syllogism of Understanding. In -it the subject is coupled with an <i>other</i> character; or the universal -by this mediation subsumes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> a subject external to it. In the rational -Syllogism, on the contrary, the subject is by means of the mediation -coupled with itself. In this manner it first comes to be a subject: or, -in the subject we have the first germ of the rational Syllogism.</p> - -<p>In the following examination, the Syllogism of Understanding, according -to the interpretation usually put upon it, is expressed in its -subjective shape; the shape which it has when <i>we</i> are said to make -such Syllogisms. And it really is only a subjective syllogising. Such -Syllogism however has also an objective meaning; it expresses only the -finitude of things, but does so in the specific mode which the form -has here reached. In the case of finite things their subjectivity, -being only thinghood, is separable from their properties or their -particularity, but also separable from their universality: not only -when the universality is the bare quality of the thing and its external -inter-connexion with other things, but also when it is its genus and -notion.</p> - -<p class="block2">On the above-mentioned theory of syllogism, as the rational form <i>par -excellence,</i> reason has been defined as the faculty of syllogising, -whilst understanding is defined as the faculty of forming notions. We -might object to the conception on which this depends, and according to -which the mind is merely a sum of forces or faculties existing side -by side. But apart from that objection, we may observe in regard to -the parallelism of understanding with the notion, as well as of reason -with syllogism, that the notion is as little a mere category of the -understanding as the syllogism is without qualification definable -as rational. For, in the first place, what the Formal Logic usually -examines in its theory of syllogism, is really nothing but the mere -syllogism of understanding, which has no claim to the honour of being -made a form of rationality, still less to be held as the embodiment of -all reason. The notion, in the second place, so far from being a form -of understanding, owes its degradation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> to such a place entirely to -the influence of that abstract mode of thought. And it is not unusual -to draw such a distinction between a notion of understanding and a -notion of reason. The distinction however does not mean that notions -are of two kinds. It means that our own action often stops short at -the mere negative and abstract form of the notion, when we might also -have proceeded to apprehend the notion in its true nature, as at once -positive and concrete. It is <i>e.g.</i> the mere understanding, which -thinks liberty to be the abstract contrary of necessity, whereas the -adequate rational notion of liberty requires the element of necessity -to be merged in it. Similarly the definition of God, given by what is -called Deism, is merely the mode in which the understanding thinks God: -whereas Christianity, to which He is known as the Trinity, contains the -rational notion of God.</p> - -<p class="center">(α) <i>Qualitative Syllogism.</i></p> - -<p>183.] The first syllogism is a syllogism of definite being,—a -Qualitative Syllogism, as stated in the last paragraph. Its form (1) is -I—P—U: <i>i.e.</i> a subject as Individual is coupled (concluded) with a -Universal character by means of a (Particular) quality.</p> - -<p>Of course the subject (<i>terminus minor</i>) has other characteristics -besides individuality, just as the other extreme (the predicate of the -conclusion, or <i>terminus major</i>) has other characteristics than mere -universality. But here the interest turns only on the characteristics -through which these terms make a syllogism.</p> - -<p class="block2">The syllogism of existence is a syllogism of understanding merely, at -least in so far as it leaves the individual, the particular, and the -universal to confront each other quite abstractly. In this syllogism -the notion is at the very height of self-estrangement. We have in it -an immediately individual thing as subject: next some one particular -aspect or property attaching to this subject is selected, and by means -of this property the individual turns out to be a universal. Thus we -may say, This rose is red: Red is a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> colour: Therefore, this rose -is a coloured object. It is this aspect of the syllogism which the -common logics mainly treat of. There was a time when the syllogism was -regarded as an absolute rule for all cognition, and when a scientific -statement was not held to be valid until it had been shown to follow -from a process of syllogism. At present, on the contrary, the different -forms of the syllogism are met nowhere save in the manuals of Logic; -and an acquaintance with them is considered a piece of mere pedantry, -of no further use either in practical life or in science. It would -indeed be both useless and pedantic to parade the whole machinery of -the formal syllogism on every occasion. And yet the several forms of -syllogism make themselves constantly felt in our cognition. If any one, -when awaking on a winter morning, hears the creaking of the carriages -on the street, and is thus led to conclude that it has frozen hard in -the night, he has gone through a syllogistic operation:—an operation -which is every day repeated under the greatest variety of conditions. -The interest, therefore, ought at least not to be less in becoming -expressly conscious of this daily action of our thinking selves, than -confessedly belongs to the study of the functions of organic life, such -as the processes of digestion, assimilation, respiration, or even the -processes and structures of the nature around us. We do not, however, -for a moment deny that a study of Logic is no more necessary to teach -us how to draw correct conclusions, than a previous study of anatomy -and physiology is required in order to digest or breathe.</p> - -<p class="block2">Aristotle was the first to observe and describe the different forms, -or, as they are called, figures of syllogism, in their subjective -meaning: and he performed his work so exactly and surely, that no -essential addition has ever been required. But while sensible of the -value of what he has thus done, we must not forget that the forms of -the syllogism of understanding, and of finite thought altogether, -are not what Aristotle has made use of in his properly philosophical -investigations. (See § 189.)</p> - -<p>184.] This syllogism is completely contingent (α) in the matter of its -terms. The Middle Term, being an abstract<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> particularity, is nothing -but any quality whatever of the subject: but the subject, being -immediate and thus empirically concrete, has several others, and could -therefore be coupled with exactly as many other universalities as it -possesses single qualities. Similarly a single particularity may have -various characters in itself, so that the same <i>medius terminus</i> would -serve to connect the subject with several different universals.</p> - -<p>It is more a caprice of fashion, than a sense of its incorrectness, -which has led to the disuse of ceremonious syllogising. This and the -following section indicate the uselessness of such syllogising for the -ends of truth.</p> - -<p>The point of view indicated in the paragraph shows how this style of -syllogism can 'demonstrate' (as the phrase goes) the most diverse -conclusions. All that is requisite is to find a <i>medius terminus</i> from -which the transition can be made to the proposition sought. Another -<i>medius terminus</i> would enable us to demonstrate something else, and -even the contrary of the last. And the more concrete an object is, the -more aspects it has, which may become such middle terms. To determine -which of these aspects is more essential than another, again, requires -a further syllogism of this kind, which fixing on the single quality -can with equal ease discover in it some aspect or consideration by -which it can make good its claims to be considered necessary and -important.</p> - -<p class="block2">Little as we usually think on the Syllogism of Understanding in the -daily business of life, it never ceases to play its part there. In -a civil suit, for instance, it is the duty of the advocate to give -due force to the legal titles which make in favour of his client. In -logical language, such a legal title is nothing but a middle term. -Diplomatic transactions afford another illustration of the same, when, -for instance, different powers lay claim to one and the same territory. -In such a case the laws of inheritance, the geographical position of -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> country, the descent and the language of its inhabitants, or any -other ground, may be emphasised as a <i>medius terminus.</i></p> - -<p>185.] (ß) This syllogism, if it is contingent in point of its terms, -is no less contingent in virtue of the form of relation which is -found in it. In the syllogism, according to its notion, truth lies in -connecting two distinct things by a Middle Term in which they are one. -But connexions of the extremes with the Middle Term (the so-called -<i>premisses,</i> the major and the minor premiss) are in the case of this -syllogism much more decidedly <i>immediate</i> connexions. In other words, -they have not a proper Middle Term.</p> - -<p>This contradiction in the syllogism exhibits a new case of the infinite -progression. Each of the premisses evidently calls for a fresh -syllogism to demonstrate it: and as the new syllogism has two immediate -premisses, like its predecessor, the demand for proof is doubled at -every step, and repeated without end.</p> - -<p>186.] On account of its importance for experience, there has been -here noted a defect in the syllogism, to which in this form absolute -correctness had been ascribed. This defect however must lose itself in -the further specification of the syllogism. For we are now within the -sphere of the notion; and here therefore, as well as in the judgment, -the opposite character is not merely present potentially, but is -explicit. To work out the gradual specification of the syllogism, -therefore, there need only be admitted and accepted what is at each -step realised by the syllogism itself.</p> - -<p>Through the immediate syllogism I—P—U, the Individual is mediated -(through a Particular) with the Universal, and in this conclusion put -as a universal. It follows that the individual subject, becoming itself -a universal, serves to unite the two extremes, and to form their ground -of intermediation. This gives the second<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> figure of the syllogism, (2) -U—I—P. It expresses the truth of the first; it shows in other words -that the intermediation has taken place in the individual, and is thus -something contingent.</p> - -<p>187.] The universal, which in the first conclusion was specified -through individuality, passes over into the second figure and there -now occupies the place that belonged to the immediate subject. In the -second figure it is concluded with the particular. By this conclusion -therefore the universal is explicitly put as particular—and is now -made to mediate between the two extremes, the places of which are -occupied by the two others (the particular and the individual). This is -the third figure of the syllogism: (3) P—U—I.</p> - -<p>What are called the <b>Figures</b> of the syllogism (being three in -number, for the fourth is a superfluous and even absurd addition of -the Moderns to the three known to Aristotle) are in the usual mode of -treatment put side by side, without the slightest thought of showing -their necessity, and still less of pointing out their import and value. -No wonder then that the figures have been in later times treated as an -empty piece of formalism. They have however a very real significance, -derived from the necessity for every function or characteristic -element of the notion to become the whole itself, and to stand as -mediating ground.—But to find out what 'moods' of the propositions -(such as whether they may be universals, or negatives) are needed -to enable us to draw a correct conclusion in the different figures, -is a mechanical inquiry, which its purely mechanical nature and its -intrinsic meaninglessness have very properly consigned to oblivion. -And Aristotle would have been the last person to give any countenance -to those who wish to attach importance to such inquiries or to the -syllogism of understanding in general. It is true that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> he described -these, as well as numerous other forms of mind and nature, and that -he examined and expounded their specialities. But in his metaphysical -theories, as well as his theories of nature and mind, he was very -far from taking as basis, or criterion, the syllogistic forms of the -'understanding.' Indeed it might be maintained that not one of these -theories would ever have come into existence, or been allowed to exist, -if it had been compelled to submit to the laws of understanding. With -all the descriptiveness and analytic faculty which Aristotle after his -fashion is substantially strong in, his ruling principle is always the -speculative notion; and that syllogistic of 'understanding' to which he -first gave such a definite expression is never allowed to intrude in -the higher domain of philosophy.</p> - -<p class="block2">In their objective sense, the three figures of the syllogism declare -that everything rational is manifested as a triple syllogism; that -is to say, each one of the members takes in turn the place of the -extremes, as well as of the mean which reconciles them. Such, for -example, is the case with the three branches of philosophy; the Logical -Idea, Nature, and Mind. As we first see them, Nature is the middle -term which links the others together. Nature, the totality immediately -before us, unfolds itself into the two extremes of the Logical Idea -and Mind. But Mind is Mind only when it is mediated through nature. -Then, in the second place, Mind, which we know as the principle of -individuality, or as the actualising principle, is the mean; and Nature -and the Logical Idea are the extremes. It is Mind which cognises the -Logical Idea in Nature and which thus raises Nature to its essence. -In the third place again the Logical Idea itself becomes the mean: it -is the absolute substance both of mind and of nature, the universal -and all-pervading principle. These are the members of the Absolute -Syllogism.</p> - -<p>188.] In the round by which each constituent function assumes -successively the place of mean and of the two<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> extremes, their specific -difference from each other has been superseded. In this form, where -there is no distinction between its constituent elements, the syllogism -at first has for its connective link equality, or the external identity -of understanding. This is the Quantitative or Mathematical Syllogism: -if two things are equal to a third, they are equal to one another.</p> - -<p class="block2">Everybody knows that this Quantitative syllogism appears as a -mathematical axiom, which like other axioms is said to be a principle -that does not admit of proof, and which indeed being self-evident does -not require such proof. These mathematical axioms however are really -nothing but logical propositions, which, so far as they enunciate -definite and particular thoughts, are deducible from the universal and -self-characterising thought. To deduce them, is to give their proof. -That is true of the Quantitative syllogism, to which mathematics -gives the rank of an axiom. It is really the proximate result of -the qualitative or immediate syllogism. Finally, the Quantitative -syllogism is the syllogism in utter formlessness. The difference -between the terms which is required by the notion is suspended. -Extraneous circumstances alone can decide what propositions are to be -premisses here: and therefore in applying this syllogism we make a -pre-supposition of what has been elsewhere proved and established.</p> - -<p>189.] Two results follow as to the form. In the first place, each -constituent element has taken the place and performed the function of -the mean and therefore of the whole, thus implicitly losing its partial -and abstract character (§ 182 and § 184); secondly, the mediation has -been completed (§ 185), though the completion too is only implicit, -that is, only as a circle of mediations which in turn pre-suppose each -other. In the first figure I—P—U the two premisses I is P and P is -U are yet without a mediation. The former premiss is mediated in the -third, the latter in the second figure. But each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> of these two figures, -again, for the mediation of its premisses pre-supposes the two others.</p> - -<p>In consequence of this, the mediating unity of the notion must be put -no longer as an abstract particularity, but as a developed unity of the -individual and universal—and in the first place a reflected unity of -these elements. That is to say, the individuality gets at the same time -the character of universality. A mean of this kind gives the Syllogism -of Reflection.</p> - -<p class="center">(β) <i>Syllogism of Reflection.</i></p> - -<p>190.] If the mean, in the first place, be not only an abstract -particular character of the subject, but at the same time all the -individual concrete subjects which possess that character, but possess -it only along with others, (1) we have the Syllogism of <b>Allness</b>. -The major premiss, however, which has for its subject the particular -character, the <i>terminus medius,</i> as allness, pre-supposes the very -conclusion which ought rather to have pre-supposed it. It rests -therefore (2) on an Induction, in which the mean is given by the -complete list of individuals as such,—a, b, c, d, &c. On account of -the disparity, however, between universality and an immediate and -empirical individuality, the list can never be complete. Induction -therefore rests upon (3) <b>Analogy</b>. The middle term of Analogy -is an individual, which however is understood as equivalent to its -essential universality, its genus, or essential character.—The first -syllogism for its intermediation turns us over to the second, and the -second turns us over to the third. But the third no less demands an -intrinsically determinate Universality, or an individuality as type of -the genus, after the round of the forms of external connexion between -individuality and universality has been run through in the figures of -the Reflective Syllogism.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span></p> - -<p>By the Syllogism of Allness the defect in the first form of the -Syllogism of Understanding, noted in § 184, is remedied, but only to -give rise to a new defect. This defect is that the major premiss itself -pre-supposes what really ought to be the conclusion, and pre-supposes -it as what is thus an 'immediate' proposition. All men are mortal, -therefore Caius is mortal: All metals conduct electricity, therefore -<i>e.g.</i> copper does so. In order to enunciate these major premisses, -which when they say 'all' mean the 'immediate' individuals and are -properly intended to be empirical propositions, it is requisite that -the propositions about the individual man Caius, or the individual -metal copper, should previously have been ascertained to be correct. -Everybody feels not merely the pedantry, but the unmeaning formalism of -such syllogisms as: All men are mortal, Caius is a man, therefore Caius -is mortal.</p> - -<p class="block2">The syllogism of Allness hands us over to the syllogism of Induction, -in which the individuals form the coupling mean. 'All metals conduct -electricity,' is an empirical proposition derived from experiments -made with each of the individual metals. We thus get the syllogism of -Induction in the following shape</p> - -<p class="center"> -I<br /> -P—I—U<br /> -I<br /> -<span style="font-size: 2em;">.</span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 2em;">.</span><br /> -</p> - -<p class="block2">Gold is a metal: silver is a metal: so is copper, lead, &c. This is -the major premiss. Then comes the minor premiss: All these bodies -conduct electricity; and hence results the conclusion, that all metals -conduct electricity. The point which brings about a combination here -is individuality in the shape of allness. But this syllogism once -more hands us over to another syllogism. Its mean is constituted by -the complete list of the individuals. That pre-supposes that over -a certain region observation and experience are completed. But the -things in question here are individuals; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> so again we are landed -in the progression <i>ad infinitum</i> (i, i, i, &c.). In other words, in -no Induction can we ever exhaust the individuals. The 'all metals,' -'all plants,' of our statements, mean only all the metals, all the -plants, which we have hitherto become acquainted with. Every Induction -is consequently imperfect. One and the other observation, many it may -be, have been made: but all the cases, all the individuals, have not -been observed. By this defect of Induction we are led on to Analogy. -In the syllogism of Analogy we conclude from the fact that some things -of a certain kind possess a certain quality, that the same quality is -possessed by other things of the same kind. It would be a syllogism of -Analogy, for example, if we said: In all planets hitherto discovered -this has been found to be the law of motion, consequently a newly -discovered planet will probably move according to the same law. In the -experiential sciences Analogy deservedly occupies a high place, and -has led to results of the highest importance. Analogy is the instinct -of reason, creating an anticipation that this or that characteristic, -which experience has discovered, has its root in the inner nature or -kind of an object, and arguing on the faith of that anticipation. -Analogy it should be added may be superficial or it may be thorough. -It would certainly be a very bad analogy to argue that since the man -Caius is a scholar, and Titus also is a man, Titus will probably be a -scholar too: and it would be bad because a man's learning is not an -unconditional consequence of his manhood. Superficial analogies of -this kind however are very frequently met with. It is often argued, -for example: The earth is a celestial body, so is the moon, and it -is therefore in all probability inhabited as well as the earth. The -analogy is not one whit better than that previously mentioned. That -the earth is inhabited does not depend on its being a celestial body, -but in other conditions, such as the presence of an atmosphere, and of -water in connexion with the atmosphere, &c.: and these are precisely -the conditions which the moon, so far as we know, does not possess. -What has in modern times been called the Philosophy of Nature consists -principally in a frivolous play with empty and external analogies, -which,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> however, claim to be considered profound results. The natural -consequence has been to discredit the philosophical study of nature.</p> - -<p class="center">(γ) <i>Syllogism of Necessity.</i></p> - -<p>191.] The Syllogism of Necessity, if we look to its purely abstract -characteristics or terms, has for its mean the Universal in the same -way as the Syllogism of Reflection has the Individual, the latter -being in the second, and the former in the third figure (§ 187). -The Universal is expressly put as in its very nature intrinsically -determinate. In the first place (1) the Particular, meaning by the -particular the specific genus or species, is the term for mediating -the extremes—as is done in the <b>Categorical</b> syllogism. (2) The -same office is performed by the Individual, taking the individual as -immediate being, so that it is as much mediating as mediated:—as -happens in the <b>Hypothetical</b> syllogism. (3) We have also the -mediating Universal explicitly put as a totality of its particular -members, and as a single particular, or exclusive individuality:—which -happens in the <b>Disjunctive</b> syllogism. It is one and the same -universal which is in these terms of the Disjunctive syllogism; they -are only different forms for expressing it.</p> - -<p>192.] The syllogism has been taken conformably to the distinctions -which it contains; and the general result of the course of their -evolution has been to show that these differences work out their own -abolition and destroy the notion's outwardness to its own self. And, -as we see, in the first place, (1) each of the dynamic elements has -proved itself the systematic whole of these elements, in short a whole -syllogism,—they are consequently implicitly identical. In the second -place, (2) the negation of their distinctions and of the mediation of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> -one through another constitutes independency; so that it is one and -the same universal which is in these forms, and which is in this way -also explicitly put as their identity. In this ideality of its dynamic -elements, the syllogistic process may be described as essentially -involving the negation of the characters through which its course runs, -as being a mediative process through the suspension of mediation,—as -coupling the subject not with another, but with a suspended other, in -one word, with itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">In the common logic, the doctrine of syllogism is supposed to conclude -the first part, or what is called the 'elementary' theory. It is -followed by the second part, the doctrine of Method, which proposes -to show how a body of scientific knowledge is created by applying to -existing objects the forms of thought discussed in the elementary part. -Whence these objects originate, and what the thought of objectivity -generally speaking implies, are questions to which the Logic of -Understanding vouchsafes no further answer. It believes thought to -be a mere subjective and formal activity, and the objective fact, -which confronts thought, to have a separate and permanent being. But -this dualism is a half-truth: and there is a want of intelligence in -the procedure which at once accepts, without inquiring into their -origin, the categories of subjectivity and objectivity. Both of them, -subjectivity as well as objectivity, are certainly thoughts—even -specific thoughts: which must show themselves founded on the universal -and self-determining thought. This has here been done—at least for -subjectivity. We have recognised it, or the notion subjective (which -includes the notion proper, the judgment, and the syllogism) as the -dialectical result of the first two main stages of the Logical Idea, -Being and Essence. To say that the notion is subjective and subjective -only, is so far quite correct: for the notion certainly is subjectivity -itself. Not less subjective than the notion are also the judgment and -syllogism: and these forms, together with the so-called Laws of Thought -(the Laws of Identity, Difference, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> Sufficient Ground), make up the -contents of what is called the 'Elements' in the common logic. But we -may go a step further. This subjectivity, with its functions of notion, -judgment, and syllogism, is not like a set of empty compartments which -has to get filled from without by separately-existing objects. It would -be truer to say that it is subjectivity itself which, as dialectical, -breaks through its own barriers and opens out into objectivity by means -of the syllogism.</p> - -<p>193.] This 'realisation' of the notion,—a realisation in which the -universal is this one totality withdrawn back into itself (of which -the different members are no less the whole, and) which has given -itself a character of 'immediate' unity by merging the mediation:—this -realisation of the notion is the <b>Object</b>.</p> - -<p>I his transition from the Subject, the notion in general, and -especially the syllogism, to the Object, may, at the first glance, -appear strange, particularly if we look only at the Syllogism -of Understanding, and suppose syllogising to be only an act of -consciousness. But that strangeness imposes on us no obligation to seek -to make the transition plausible to the image-loving conception. The -only question which can be considered is, whether our usual conception -of what is called an 'object' approximately corresponds to the object -as here described. By 'object' is commonly understood not an abstract -being, or an existing thing merely, or any sort of actuality, but -something independent, concrete, and self-complete, this completeness -being the totality of the notion. That the object (<i>Objekt</i>) is also -an object to us (<i>Gegenstand</i>) and is external to something else, -will be more precisely seen, when it puts itself in contrast with -the subjective. At present, as that into which the notion has passed -from its mediation, it is only immediate object and nothing more, -just as the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> notion is not describable as subjective, previous to the -subsequent contrast with objectivity.</p> - -<p>Further, the Object in general is the one total, in itself still -unspecified, the Objective World as a whole, God, the Absolute Object. -The object, however, has also difference attaching to it: it falls -into pieces, indefinite in their multiplicity (making an objective -world); and each of these individualised parts is also an object, an -intrinsically concrete, complete, and independent existence.</p> - -<p>Objectivity has been compared with being, existence, and actuality; -and so too the transition to existence and actuality (not to being, -for <i>it</i> is the primary and quite abstract immediate) maybe compared -with the transition to objectivity. The ground from which existence -proceeds, and the reflective correlation which is merged in actuality, -are nothing but the as yet imperfectly realised notion. They are only -abstract aspects of it,—the ground being its merely essence-bred -unity, and the correlation only the connexion of real sides which are -supposed to have only self-reflected being. The notion is the unity of -the two; and the object is not a merely essence-like, but inherently -universal unity, not only containing real distinctions, but containing -them as totalities in itself.</p> - -<p>It is evident that in all these transitions there is a further purpose -than merely to show the indissoluble connexion between the notion or -thought and being. It has been more than once remarked that being is -nothing more than simple self-relation, and this meagre category is -certainly implied in the notion, or even in thought. But the meaning -of these transitions is not to accept characteristics or categories, -as only implied;—a fault which mars even the Ontological argument for -God's existence, when it is stated that being is one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> among realities. -What such a transition does, is to take the notion, as it ought to be -primarily characterised <i>per se</i> as a notion, with which this remote -abstraction of being, or eve of objectivity, has as yet nothing to do, -and looking at its specific character as a notional character alone, to -see when and whether it passes over into a form which is different from -the character as it belongs to the notion and appears in it.</p> - -<p>If the Object, the product of this transition, be brought into relation -with the notion, which, so far as its special form is concerned, has -vanished in it, we may give a correct expression to the result, by -saying that notion or, if it be preferred, subjectivity and object are -<i>implicitly</i> the same. But it is equally correct to say that they are -different. In short, the two modes of expression are equally correct -and incorrect. The true state of the case can be presented in no -expressions of this kind. The 'implicit' is an abstraction, still more -partial and inadequate than the notion itself, of which the inadequacy -is upon the whole suspended, by suspending itself to the object with -its opposite inadequacy. Hence that implicitness also must, by its -negation, give itself the character of explicitness. As in every case, -speculative identity is not the above-mentioned triviality of an -<i>implicit</i> identity of subject and object. This has been said often -enough. Yet it could not be too often repeated, if the intention were -really to put an end to the stale and purely malicious misconception in -regard to this identity:—of which however there can be no reasonable -expectation.</p> - -<p>Looking at that unity in a quite general way, and raising no objection -to the one-sided form of its implicitness, we find it as the well-known -pre-supposition of the ontological proof for the existence of God. -There, it appears as supreme perfection. Anselm, in whom the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> notable -suggestion of this proof first occurs, no doubt originally restricted -himself to the question whether a certain content was in our thinking -only. His words are briefly these: '<i>Certe id quo majus cogitari -nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo -intellectu est, potest cogitari esse</i> <b>et in re</b>: <i>quod majus est. -Si ergo id quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu; id -ipsum quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest. -Sed certe hoc esse non potest.</i>' (Certainly that, than which nothing -greater can be thought, cannot be in the intellect alone. For even -if it is in the intellect alone, it can also be thought to exist in -fact: and that is greater. If then that, than which nothing greater -can be thought, is in the intellect alone; then the very thing, which -is greater than anything which can be thought, can be exceeded in -thought. But certainly this is impossible.) The same unity received -a more objective expression in Descartes, Spinoza and others: while -the theory of immediate certitude or faith presents it, on the -contrary, in somewhat the same subjective aspect as Anselm. These -Intuitionalists hold that <i>in our consciousness</i> the attribute of being -is indissolubly associated with the conception of God. The theory of -faith brings even the conception of external finite things under the -same inseparable nexus between the consciousness and the being of -them, on the ground that <i>perception</i> presents them conjoined with the -attribute of existence: and in so saying, it is no doubt correct. It -would be utterly absurd, however, to suppose that the association in -consciousness between existence and our conception of finite things -is of the same description as the association between existence and -the conception of God. To do so would be to forget that finite things -are changeable and transient, <i>i.e.</i> that existence is associated -with them for a season,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span> but that the association is neither eternal -nor inseparable. Speaking in the phraseology of the categories before -us, we may say that, to call a thing finite, means that its objective -existence is not in harmony with the thought of it, with its universal -calling, its kind and its end. Anselm, consequently, neglecting any -such conjunction as occurs in finite things, has with good reason -pronounced that only to be the Perfect which exists not merely in a -subjective, but also in an objective mode. It does no good to put -on airs against the Ontological proof, as it is called, and against -Anselm thus denning the Perfect. The argument is one latent in every -unsophisticated mind, and it recurs in every philosophy, even against -its wish and without its knowledge—as may be seen in the theory of -immediate belief.</p> - -<p>The real fault in the argumentation of Anselm is one which is -chargeable on Descartes and Spinoza, as well as on the theory of -immediate knowledge. It is this. This unity which is enunciated as the -supreme perfection or, it may be, subjectively, as the true knowledge, -is pre-supposed, <i>i.e.</i> it is assumed only as potential. This identity, -abstract as it thus appears, between the two categories may be at -once met and opposed by their diversity; and this was the very answer -given to Anselm long ago. In short, the conception and existence of -the finite is set in antagonism to the infinite; for, as previously -remarked, the finite possesses objectivity of such a kind as is at -once incongruous with and different from the end or aim, its essence -and notion. Or, the finite is such a conception and in such a way -subjective, that it does not involve existence. This objection and this -antithesis are got over, only by showing the finite to be untrue and -these categories in their separation to be inadequate and null. Their -identity is thus seen to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> be one into which they spontaneously pass -over, and in which they are reconciled.</p> - -<h5>B.—THE OBJECT.</h5> - -<p>194.] The Object is immediate being, because insensible to difference, -which in it has suspended itself. It is, further, a totality in itself, -whilst at the same time (as this identity is only the <i>implicit</i> -identity of its dynamic elements) it is equally indifferent to its -immediate unity. It thus breaks up into distinct parts, each of which -is itself the totality. Hence the object is the absolute contradiction -between a complete independence of the multiplicity, and the equally -complete non-independence of the different pieces.</p> - -<p>The definition, which states that the Absolute is the Object, is most -definitely implied in the Leibnizian Monad. The Monads are each an -object, but an object implicitly 'representative,' indeed the total -representation of the world. In the simple unity of the Monad, all -difference is merely ideal, not independent or real. Nothing from -without comes into the monad: It is the whole notion in itself, only -distinguished by its own greater or less development. None the less, -this simple totality parts into the absolute multeity of differences, -each becoming an independent monad. In the monad of monads, and the -Pre-established Harmony of their inward developments, these substances -are in like manner again reduced to 'ideality' and unsubstantiality. -The philosophy of Leibnitz, therefore, represents contradiction in its -complete development.</p> - -<p class="block2">As Fichte in modern times has especially and with justice insisted, -the theory which regards the Absolute or God as the Object and there -stops, expresses the point of view taken by superstition and slavish -fear. No doubt God is the Object, and, indeed, the Object out and -out, confronted with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> which our particular or subjective opinions and -desires have no truth and no validity. As absolute object however, God -does not therefore take up the position of a dark and hostile power -over against subjectivity. He rather involves it as a vital element in -Himself. Such also is the meaning of the Christian doctrine, according -to which God has willed that all men should be saved and all attain -blessedness. The salvation and the blessedness of men are attained when -they come to feel themselves at one with God, so that God, on the other -hand, ceases to be for them mere object, and, in that way, an object -of fear and terror, as was especially the case with the religious -consciousness of the Romans. But God in the Christian religion is -also known as Love, because in His Son, who is one with Him, He has -revealed Himself to men as a man amongst men, and thereby redeemed -them. All which is only another way of saying that the antithesis of -subjective and objective is implicitly overcome, and that it is our -affair to participate in this redemption by laying aside our immediate -subjectivity (putting off the old Adam), and learning to know God as -our true and essential self.</p> - -<p class="block2">Just as religion and religious worship consist in overcoming the -antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity, so science too and -philosophy have no other task than to overcome this antithesis by the -medium of thought. The aim of knowledge is to divest the objective -world that stands opposed to us of its strangeness, and, as the phrase -is, to find ourselves at home in it: which means no more than to trace -the objective world back to the notion,—to our innermost self. We -may learn from the present discussion the mistake of regarding the -antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity as an abstract and permanent -one. The two are wholly dialectical. The notion is at first only -subjective: but without the assistance of any foreign material or stuff -it proceeds, in obedience to its own action, to objectify itself. So, -too, the object is not rigid and processless. Its process is to show -itself as what is at the same time subjective, and thus form the step -onwards to the idea. Any one who, from want of familiarity with the -categories of subjectivity and objectivity, seeks to retain them in -their abstraction, will find that the isolated categories slip<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> through -his fingers before he is aware, and that he says the exact contrary of -what he wanted to say.</p> - -<p class="block2">(2) Objectivity contains the three forms of Mechanism, Chemism, -and Teleology. The object of mechanical type is the immediate and -undifferentiated object. No doubt it contains difference, but the -different pieces stand, as it were, without affinity to each other, -and their connexion is only extraneous. In chemism, on the contrary, -the object exhibits an essential tendency to differentiation, in such -a way that the objects are what they are only by their relation to -each other: this tendency to difference constitutes their quality. -The third type of objectivity, the teleological relation, is the -unity of mechanism and chemism. Design, like the mechanical object, -is a self-contained totality, enriched however by the principle of -differentiation which came to the fore in chemism, and thus referring -itself to the object that stands over against it. Finally, it is the -realisation of design which forms the transition to the Idea.</p> - -<p class="center">(a) <i>Mechanism.</i></p> - -<p>196.] The object (1) in its immediacy is the notion only potentially; -the notion as subjective is primarily outside it; and all its -specific character is imposed from without. As a unity of differents, -therefore, it is a composite, an aggregate; and its capacity of -acting on anything else continues to be an external relation. This is -<b>Formal Mechanism</b>.—Notwithstanding, and in this connexion and -non-independence, the objects remain independent and offer resistance, -external to each other.</p> - -<p>Pressure and impact are examples of mechanical relations. Our knowledge -is said to be mechanical or by rote, when the words have no meaning -for us, but continue external to sense, conception, thought; and -when, being similarly external to each other, they form a meaningless -sequence. Conduct, piety, &c. are in the same way mechanical, when a -man's behaviour is settled for him by ceremonial laws, by a spiritual -adviser, &c.;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> in short, when his own mind and will are not in his -actions, which in this way are extraneous to himself.</p> - -<p class="block2">Mechanism, the first form of objectivity, is also the category which -primarily offers itself to reflection, as it examines the objective -world. It is also the category beyond which reflection seldom goes. -It is, however, a shallow and superficial mode of observation, one -that cannot carry us through in connexion with Nature and still less -in connexion with the world of Mind. In Nature it is only the veriest -abstract relations of matter in its inert masses which obey the law of -mechanism. On the contrary the phenomena and operations of the province -to which the term 'physical' in its narrower sense is applied, such as -the phenomena of light, heat, magnetism, and electricity, cannot be -explained by any mere mechanical processes, such as pressure, impact, -displacement of parts, and the like. Still less satisfactory is it -to transfer these categories and apply them in the field of organic -nature; at least if it be our aim to understand the specific features -of that field, such as the growth and nourishment of plants, or, it -may be, even animal sensation. It is at any rate a very deep-seated, -and perhaps the main, defect of modern researches into nature, that, -even where other and higher categories than those of mere mechanism -are in operation, they still stick obstinately to the mechanical laws; -although they thus conflict with the testimony of unbiassed perception, -and foreclose the gate to an-adequate knowledge of nature. But even -in considering the formations in the world of Mind, the mechanical -theory has been repeatedly invested with an authority which it has no -right to. Take as an instance the remark that man consists of soul and -body. In this language, the two things stand each self-subsistent, and -associated only from without. Similarly we find the soul regarded as a -mere group of forces and faculties, subsisting independently side by -side.</p> - -<p class="block2">Thus decidedly must we reject the mechanical mode of inquiry when it -comes forward and arrogates to itself the place of rational cognition -in general, and seeks to get mechanism accepted as an absolute -category. But we must not on that account forget expressly to vindicate -for mechanism the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> right and import of a general logical category. It -would be, therefore, a mistake to restrict it to the special physical -department from which it derives its name. There is no harm done, for -example, in directing attention to mechanical actions, such as that -of gravity, the lever, &c., even in departments, notably in physics -and in physiology, beyond the range of mechanics proper. It must -however be remembered, that within these spheres the laws of mechanism -cease to be final or decisive, and sink, as it were, to a subservient -position. To which may be added, that, in Nature, when the higher -or organic functions are in any way checked or disturbed in their -normal efficiency, the otherwise subordinate category of mechanism -is immediately seen to take the upper hand. Thus a sufferer from -indigestion feels pressure on the stomach, after partaking of certain -food in slight quantity; whereas those whose digestive organs are sound -remain free from the sensation, although they have eaten as much. The -same phenomenon occurs in the general feeling of heaviness in the -limbs, experienced in bodily indisposition. Even in the world of Mind, -mechanism has its place; though there, too, it is a subordinate one. We -are right in speaking of mechanical memory, and all sorts of mechanical -operations, such as reading, writing, playing on musical instruments, -&c. In memory, indeed, the mechanical quality of the action is -essential: a circumstance, the neglect of which has not unfrequently -caused great harm in the training of the young, from the misapplied -zeal of modern educationalists for the freedom of intelligence. It -would betray bad psychology, however, to have recourse to mechanism for -an explanation of the nature of memory, and to apply mechanical laws -straight off to the soul. The mechanical feature in memory lies merely -in the fact that certain signs, tones, &c. are apprehended in their -purely external association, and then reproduced in this association, -without attention being expressly directed to their meaning and inward -association. To become acquainted with these conditions of mechanical -memory requires no further study of mechanics, nor would that study -tend at all to advance the special inquiry of psychology.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span></p> - -<p>196.] The want of stability in itself which allows the object to suffer -violence, is possessed by it (see preceding §) only in so far as it -has a certain stability. Now as the object is implicitly invested -with the character of notion, the one of these characteristics is not -merged into its other; but the object, through the negation of itself -(its lack of independence), closes with itself, and not till it so -closes, is it independent. Thus at the same time in distinction from -the outwardness, and negativing that outwardness in its independence, -does this independence form a negative unity with self,—Centrality -(subjectivity). So conceived, the object itself has direction and -reference towards the external. But this external object is similarly -central in itself, and being so, is no less only referred towards the -other centre; so that it no less has its centrality in the other. This -is (2) <b>Mechanism with Affinity</b> (with bias, or 'difference'), and -may be illustrated by gravitation, appetite, social instinct, &c.</p> - -<p>197.] This relationship, when fully carried out, forms a syllogism. In -that syllogism the immanent negativity, as the central individuality -of an object, (abstract centre,) relates itself to non-independent -objects, as the other extreme, by a mean which unites the centrality -with the non-independence of the objects, (relative centre.) This is -(3) <b>Absolute Mechanism</b>.</p> - -<p>198.] The syllogism thus indicated (I—P—U) is a triad of syllogisms. -The wrong individuality of non-independent objects, in which formal -Mechanism is at home, is, by reason of that non-independence, no -less universality, though it be only external. Hence these objects -also form the mean between the absolute and the relative centre -(the form of syllogism being U—I—P): for it is by this want of -independence that those two are kept asunder and made extremes, as -well as related to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> one another. Similarly absolute centrality, as the -permanently-underlying universal substance (illustrated by the gravity -which continues identical), which as pure negativity equally includes -individuality in it, is what mediates between the relative centre and -the non-independent objects (the form of syllogism being P—U—I). It -does so no less essentially as a disintegrating force, in its character -of immanent individuality, than in virtue of universality, acting as an -identical bond of union and tranquil self-containedness.</p> - -<p>Like the solar system, so for example in the practical sphere the state -is a system of three syllogisms. (1) The Individual or person, through -his particularity or physical or mental needs (which when carried -out to their full development give <i>civil</i> society), is coupled with -the universal, <i>i.e.</i> with society, law, right, government. (2) The -will or action of the individuals is the intermediating force which -procures for these needs satisfaction in society, in law, &c., and -which gives to society, law, &c. their fulfilment and actualisation. -(3) But the universal, that is to say the state, government, and law, -is the permanent underlying mean in which the individuals and their -satisfaction have and receive their fulfilled reality, inter-mediation, -and persistence. Each of the functions of the notion, as it is brought -by intermediation to coalesce with the other extreme, is brought -into union with itself and produces itself: which production is -self-preservation.—It is only by the nature of this triple coupling, -by this triad of syllogisms with the name <i>termini,</i> that a whole is -thoroughly understood in its organisation.</p> - -<p>199.] The immediacy of existence, which the objects have in Absolute -Mechanism, is implicitly negatived by the fact that their independence -is derived from, and due to, their connexions with each other, and -therefore to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> their own want of stability. Thus the object must be -explicitly stated as in its existence having an <b>Affinity</b> (or a -bias) towards its other,—as not-indifferent.</p> - -<p class="center">(b) <i>Chemism</i>.</p> - -<p>200.] The not-indifferent (biassed) object has an immanent mode which -constitutes its nature, and in which it has existence. But as it is -invested with the character of total notion, it is the contradiction -between this totality and the special mode of its existence. -Consequently it is the constant endeavour to cancel this contradiction -and to make its definite being equal to the notion.</p> - -<p class="block2">Chemism is a category of objectivity which, as a rule, is not -particularly emphasised, and is generally put under the head of -mechanism. The common name of mechanical relationship is applied to -both, in contra-distinction to the teleological. There is a reason for -this in the common feature which belongs to mechanism and chemism. In -them the notion exists, but only implicit and latent, and they are thus -both marked off from teleology where the notion has real independent -existence. This is true: and yet chemism and mechanism are very -decidedly distinct. The object, in the form of mechanism, is primarily -only an indifferent reference to self, while the chemical object is -seen to be completely in reference to something else. No doubt even -in mechanism, as it develops itself, there spring up references to -something else: but the nexus of mechanical objects with one another is -at first only an external nexus, so that the objects in connexion with -one another still retain the semblance of independence. In nature, for -example; the several celestial bodies, which form our solar system, -compose a kinetic system, and thereby show that they are related to -one another. Motion, however, as the unity of time and space, is a -connexion which is purely abstract and external. And it seems therefore -as if these celestial bodies, which are thus externally connected with -each other, would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> continue to be what they are, even apart from this -reciprocal relation. The case is quite different with chemism. Objects -chemically biassed are what they are expressly by that bias alone. -Hence they are the absolute impulse towards integration by and in one -another.</p> - -<p>201.] The product of the chemical process consequently is the Neutral -object, latent in the two extremes, each on the alert. The notion -or concrete universal, by means of the bias of the objects (the -particularity), coalesces with the individuality (in the shape of the -product), and in that only with itself. In this process too the other -syllogisms are equally involved. The place of mean is taken both by -individuality as activity, and by the concrete universal, the essence -of the strained extremes; which essence reaches definite being in the -product.</p> - -<p>202.] Chemism, as it is a reflectional nexus of objectivity, has -pre-supposed, not merely the bias or non-indifferent nature of the -objects, but also their immediate independence. The process of chemism -consists in passing to and fro from one form to another; which forms -continue to be as external as before.—In the neutral product the -specific properties, which the extremes bore towards each other, are -merged. But although the product is conformable to the notion, the -inspiring principle of active differentiation does not exist in it; for -it has sunk back to immediacy. The neutral body is therefore capable -of disintegration. But the discerning principle, which breaks up the -neutral body into biassed and strained extremes, and which gives to -the indifferent object in general its affinity and animation towards -another;—that principle, and the process as a separation with tension, -falls outside of that first process.</p> - -<p class="block2">The chemical process does not rise above a conditioned<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> and finite -process. The notion as notion is only the heart and core of the -process, and does not in this stage come to an existence of its own. -In the neutral product the process is extinct, and the existing cause -falls outside it.</p> - -<p>203.] Each of these two processes, the reduction of the biassed -(not-indifferent) to the neutral, and the differentiation of the -indifferent or neutral, goes its own way without hindrance from the -other. But that want of inner connexion shows that they are finite, -by their passage into products in which they are merged and lost. -Conversely the process exhibits the nonentity of the pre-supposed -immediacy of the not-indifferent objects.—By this negation of -immediacy and of externalism in which the notion as object was sunk, -it is liberated and invested with independent being in face of that -externalism and immediacy. In these circumstances it is the End (Final -Cause).</p> - -<p class="block2">The passage from chemism to the teleological relation is implied in the -mutual cancelling of both of the forms of the chemical process. The -result thus attained is the liberation of the notion, which in chemism -and mechanism was present only in the germ, and not yet evolved. The -notion in the shape of the aim or end thus comes into independent -existence.</p> - -<p class="center">(c) <i>Teleology.</i></p> - -<p>204.] In the <b>End</b> the notion has entered on free existence -and has a being of its own, by means of the negation of immediate -objectivity. It is characterised as subjective, seeing that this -negation is, in the first place, abstract, and hence at first the -relation between it and objectivity still one of contrast. This -character of subjectivity, however, compared with the totality of the -notion, is one-sided, and that, be it added, for the End itself, in -which all specific characters have been put as subordinated and merged. -For it therefore even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> the object, which it pre-supposes, has only -hypothetical (ideal) reality,—essentially no-reality. The End in short -is a contradiction of its self-identity against the negation stated in -it, <i>i.e.</i> its antithesis to objectivity, and being so, contains the -eliminative or destructive activity which negates the antithesis and -renders it identical with itself. This is the realisation of the End: -in which, while it turns itself into the other of its subjectivity and -objectifies itself, thus cancelling the distinction between the two, it -has only closed with itself, and retained itself.</p> - -<p>The notion of Design or End, while on one hand called redundant, is on -another justly described as the rational notion, and contrasted with -the abstract universal of understanding. The latter only <i>subsumes</i> -the particular, and so connects it with itself: but has it not in its -own nature.—The distinction between the End or <i>final cause,</i> and the -mere <i>efficient cause</i> (which is the cause ordinarily so called), is of -supreme importance. Causes, properly so called, belong to the sphere of -necessity, blind, and not yet laid bare. The cause therefore appears -as passing into its correlative, and losing its primordiality there by -sinking into dependency. It is only by implication, or for us, that -the cause is in the effect made for the first time a cause, and that -it there returns into itself. The End, on the other hand, is expressly -stated as containing the specific character in its own self,—the -effect, namely, which in the purely causal relation is never free from -otherness. The End therefore in its efficiency does not pass over, but -retains itself, <i>i.e.</i> it carries into effect itself only, and is at -the end what it was in the beginning or primordial state. Until it thus -retains itself, it is not genuinely primordial.—The End then requires -to be speculatively apprehended as the notion, which itself in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> -proper unity and ideality of its characteristics contains the judgment -or negation,—the antithesis of subjective and objective,—and which to -an equal extent suspends that antithesis.</p> - -<p>By End however we must not at once, nor must we ever merely, think -of the form which it has in consciousness as a mode of mere mental -representation. By means of the notion of <b>Inner Design</b> Kant has -resuscitated the Idea in general and particularly the idea of life. -Aristotle's definition of life virtually implies inner design, and is -thus far in advance of the notion of design in modern Teleology, which -had in view finite and outward design only.</p> - -<p>Animal wants and appetites are some of the readiest instances of -the End. They are the <i>felt</i> contradiction, which exists <i>within</i> -the living subject, and pass into the activity of negating this -negation which mere subjectivity still is. The satisfaction of the -want or appetite restores the peace between subject and object. The -objective thing which, so long as the contradiction exists, <i>i.e.</i> -so long as the want is felt, stands on the other side, loses this -quasi-independence, by its union with the subject. Those who talk of -the permanence and immutability of the finite, as well subjective as -objective, may see the reverse illustrated in the operations of every -appetite. Appetite is, so to speak, the conviction that the subjective -is only a half-truth, no more adequate than the objective. But appetite -in the second place carries out its conviction. It brings about the -supersession of these finites: it cancels the antithesis between the -objective which would be and stay an objective only, and the subjective -which in like manner would be and stay a subjective only.</p> - -<p>As regards the action of the End, attention may be called to the fact, -that in the syllogism, which represents<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> that action, and shows the end -closing with itself by the means of realisation, the radical feature is -the negation of the <i>termini.</i> That negation is the one just mentioned -both of the immediate subjectivity appearing in the End as such, and -of the immediate objectivity as seen in the means and the objects -pre-supposed. This is the same negation, as is in operation when the -mind leaves the contingent things of the world as well as its own -subjectivity and rises to God. It is the 'moment' or factor which (as -noticed in the Introduction and § 192) was overlooked and neglected in -the analytic form of syllogisms, under which the so-called proofs of -the Being of a God presented this elevation.</p> - -<p>205.] In its primary and immediate aspect the Teleological relation -is <i>external</i> design, and the notion confronts a pre-supposed object. -The End is consequently finite, and that partly in its content, -partly in the circumstance that it has an external condition in the -object, which has to be found existing, and which is taken as material -for its realisation. Its self-determining is to that extent in form -only. The un-mediatedness of the End has the further result that -its particularity or content—which as form-characteristic is the -subjectivity of the End—is reflected into self, and so different from -the totality of the form, subjectivity in general, the notion. This -variety constitutes the finitude of Design within its own nature. The -content of the End. in this way, is quite as limited, contingent, and -given, as the object is particular and found ready to hand.</p> - -<p class="block2">Generally speaking, the final cause is taken to mean nothing more -than external design. In accordance with this view of it, things are -supposed not to carry their vocation in themselves, but merely to be -means employed and spent in realising a purpose which lies outside -of them. That may be said to be the point of view taken by Utility, -which once<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> played a great part even in the sciences, but of late has -fallen into merited disrepute, now that people have begun to see that -it failed to give a genuine insight into the nature of things. It is -true that finite things as finite ought in justice to be viewed as -non-ultimate, and as pointing beyond themselves. This negativity of -finite things however is their own dialectic, and in order to ascertain -it we must pay attention to their positive content.</p> - -<p class="block2">Teleological observations on things often proceed from a well-meant -wish to display the wisdom of God as it is especially revealed in -nature. Now in thus trying to discover final causes for which the -things serve as means, we must remember that we are stopping short -at the finite, and are liable to fall into trifling reflections: as, -for instance, if we not merely studied the vine in respect of its -well-known use for man, but proceeded to consider the cork-tree in -connexion with the corks which are cut from its bark to put into the -wine-bottles. Whole books used to be written in this spirit. It is easy -to see that they promoted the genuine interest neither of religion nor -of science. External design stands immediately in front of the idea: -but what thus stands on the threshold often for that reason is least -adequate.</p> - -<p>206.] The teleological relation is a syllogism in which the subjective -end coalesces with the objectivity external to it, through a middle -term which is the unity of both. This unity is on one hand the -<i>purposive</i> action, on the other the <i>Means, i.e.</i> objectivity made -directly subservient to purpose.</p> - -<p class="block2">The development from End to Idea ensues by three stages, first, -Subjective End; second, End in process of accomplishment; and third, -End accomplished. First of all we have the Subjective End; and that, -as the notion in independent being, is itself the totality of the -elementary functions of the notion. The first of these functions -is that of self-identical universality, as it were the neutral -first water, in which everything is involved, but nothing as yet -discriminated. The second of these elements is the particularising<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> -of this universal, by which it acquires a specific content. As this -specific content again is realised by the agency of the universal, the -latter returns by its means back to itself, and coalesces with itself. -Hence too when we set some end before us, we say that we 'conclude' to -do something: a phrase which implies that we were, so to speak, open -and accessible to this or that determination. Similarly we also at a -further step speak of a man 'resolving' to do something, meaning that -the agent steps forward out of his self-regarding inwardness and enters -into dealings with the environing objectivity. This supplies the step -from the merely Subjective End to the purposive action which tends -outwards.</p> - -<p>207.] (1) The first syllogism of the final cause represents the -Subjective End. The universal notion is brought to unite with -individuality by means of particularity, so that the individual -as self-determination acts as judge. That is to say, it not only -particularises or makes into a determinate content the still -indeterminate universal, but also explicitly puts an antithesis of -subjectivity and objectivity, and at the same time is in its own self -a return to itself; for it stamps the subjectivity of the notion, -pre-supposed as against objectivity, with the mark of defect, in -comparison with the complete and rounded totality, and thereby at the -same time turns outwards.</p> - -<p>208.] (2) This action which is directed outwards is the individuality, -which in the Subjective End is identical with the particularity -under which, along with the content, is also comprised the external -objectivity. It throws itself in the first place immediately upon the -object, which it appropriates to itself as a Means. The notion is this -immediate power; for the notion is the self-identical negativity, in -which the being of the object is characterised as wholly and merely -ideal.—The whole Means then is this inward power of the notion, in the -shape of an agency, with which the object as Means is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> 'immediately' -united and in obedience to which it stands.</p> - -<p>In finite teleology the Means is thus broken up into two elements -external to each other, (a) the action and (b) the object which serves -as Means. The relation of the final cause as power to this object, and -the subjugation of the object to it, is immediate (it forms the first -premiss in the syllogism) to this extent, that in the teleological -notion as the self-existent ideality the object is put as potentially -null. This relation, as represented in the first premiss, itself -becomes the Means, which at the same time involves the syllogism, that -through this relation—in which the action of the End is contained and -dominant—the End is coupled with objectivity.</p> - -<p class="block2">The execution of the End is the mediated mode of realising the End; but -the immediate realisation is not less needful. The End lays hold of the -object immediately, because it is the power over the object, because -in the End particularity, and in particularity objectivity also, is -involved.—A living being has a body; the soul takes possession of it -and without intermediary has objectified itself in it. The human soul -has much to do, before it makes its corporeal nature into a means. Man -must, as it were, take possession of his body, so that it may be the -instrument of his soul.</p> - -<p>209.] (3) Purposive action, with its Means, is still directed outwards, -because the End is also <i>not</i> identical with the object, and must -consequently first be mediated with it. The Means in its capacity of -object stands, in this second premiss, in direct relation to the other -extreme of the syllogism, namely, the material or objectivity which is -pre-supposed. This relation is the sphere of chemism and mechanism, -which have now become the servants of the Final Cause, where lies their -truth and free notion. Thus the Subjective End, which is the power -ruling these processes, in which the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> objective things wear themselves -out on one another, contrives to keep itself free from them, and to -preserve itself in them. Doing so, it appears as the Cunning of reason.</p> - -<p class="block2">Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be said to lie -in the inter-mediative action which, while it permits the objects to -follow their own bent and act upon one another till they waste away, -and does not itself directly interfere in the process, is nevertheless -only working out its own aims. With this explanation, Divine Providence -may be said to stand to the world and its process in the capacity of -absolute cunning. God lets men do as they please with their particular -passions and interests; but the result is the accomplishment of—not -their plans, but His, and these differ decidedly from the ends -primarily sought by those whom He employs.</p> - -<p>210.] The realised End is thus the overt unity of subjective and -objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this unity, that -the subjective and objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the -point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is subdued and made -conformable to the End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power -above it. The End maintains itself against and in the objective -for it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is also the -concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. This universal, as -simply reflected in itself, is the content which remains unchanged -through all the three <i>termini</i> of the syllogism and their movement.</p> - -<p>211.] In finite design, however, even the executed End has the same -radical rift or flaw as had the Means and the initial End. We have -got therefore only a form extraneously impressed on a pre-existing -material: and this form, by reason of the limited content of the End, -is also a contingent characteristic. The End achieved<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> consequently is -only an object, which again becomes a Means or material for other Ends, -and so on for ever.</p> - -<p>212.] But what virtually happens in the realising of the End is that -the one-sided subjectivity and the show of objective independence -confronting it are both cancelled. In laying hold of the means, the -notion constitutes itself the very implicit essence of the object. In -the mechanical and chemical processes the independence of the object -has been already dissipated implicitly, and in the course of their -movement under the dominion of the End, the show of that independence, -the negative which confronts the notion, is got rid of. But in the fact -that the End achieved is characterised only as a Means and a material, -this object, viz. the teleological, is there and then put as implicitly -null, and only 'ideal.' This being so, the antithesis between form -and content has also vanished. While the End by the removal and -absorption of all form-characteristics coalesces with itself, the form -as self-identical is thereby put as the content, so that the notion, -which is the action of form, has only itself for content. Through this -process, therefore, there is made explicitly manifest what was the -notion of design: viz. the implicit unity of subjective and objective -is now realised. And this is the Idea.</p> - -<p class="block2">This finitude of the End consists in the circumstance, that, in the -process of realising it, the material, which is employed as a means, -is only externally subsumed under it and made conformable to it. But, -as a matter of fact, the object is the notion implicitly: and thus -when the notion, in the shape of End, is realised in the object, we -have but the manifestation of the inner nature of the object itself. -Objectivity is thus, as it were, only a covering under which the notion -lies concealed. Within the range of the finite we can never see or -experience that the End has been really secured. The consummation of -the infinite End, therefore, consists merely in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> removing the illusion -which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, -is eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that -it needs not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in -full actuality, accomplished. This is the illusion under which we live. -It alone supplies at the same time the actualising force on which the -interest in the world reposes. In the course of its process the Idea -creates that illusion, by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its -action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. -Only out of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the -reconciliation with error and with finitude. Error or other-being, when -superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth -can only be where it makes itself its own result.</p> - - -<h5>C.—THE IDEA.</h5> - -<p>213.] The <b>Idea</b> is truth in itself and for itself,—the absolute -unity of the notion and objectivity. Its 'ideal' content is nothing -but the notion in its detailed terms: its 'real' content is only the -exhibition which the notion gives itself in the form of external -existence, whilst yet, by enclosing this shape in its ideality, it -keeps it in its power, and so keeps itself in it.</p> - -<p>The definition, which declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself -absolute. All former definitions come back to this. The Idea is -the Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the -notion:—not of course the correspondence of external things with my -conceptions,—for these are only <i>correct</i> conceptions held by <i>me,</i> -the individual person. In the idea we have nothing to do with the -individual, nor with figurate conceptions, nor with external things. -And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the -Idea, and has its truth by and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every -individual being is some one aspect of the Idea: for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span> which, therefore, -yet other actualities are needed, which in their turn appear to have -a self-subsistence of their own. It is only in them altogether and -in their relation that the notion is realised. The individual by -itself does not correspond to its notion. It is this limitation of its -existence which constitutes the finitude and the ruin of the individual.</p> - -<p>The Idea itself is not to be taken as an idea of something or other, -any more than the notion is to be taken as merely a specific notion. -The Absolute is the universal and one idea, which, by an act of -'judgment,' particularises itself to the system of specific ideas; -which after all are constrained by their nature to come back to the one -idea where their truth lies. As issued out of this 'judgment' the Idea -is <i>in the first place</i> only the one universal <i>substance:</i> but its -developed and genuine actuality is to be as a <i>subject</i> and in that way -as mind.</p> - -<p>Because it has no <i>existence</i> for starting-point and <i>point d'appui,</i> -the Idea is frequently treated as a mere logical form. Such a view must -be abandoned to those theories, which ascribe so-called reality and -genuine actuality to the existent thing and all the other categories -which have not yet penetrated as far as the Idea. It is no less false -to imagine the Idea to be mere abstraction. It is abstract certainly, -in so far as everything untrue is consumed in it: but in its own self -it is essentially concrete, because it is the free notion giving -character to itself, and that character, reality. It would be an -abstract form, only if the notion, which is its principle, were taken -as an abstract unity, and not as the negative return of it into self -and as the subjectivity which it really is.</p> - -<p class="block2">Truth is at first taken to mean that I <i>know</i> how something <i>is.</i> This -is truth, however, only in reference to consciousness;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> it is formal -truth, bare correctness. Truth in the deeper sense consists in the -identity between objectivity and the notion. It is in this deeper sense -of truth that we speak of a true state, or of a true work of art. These -objects are true, if they are as they ought to be, <i>i.e.</i> if their -reality corresponds to their notion. When thus viewed, to be untrue -means much the same as to be bad. A bad man is an untrue man, a man -who does not behave as his notion or his vocation requires. Nothing -however can subsist, if it be <i>wholly</i> devoid of identity between the -notion and reality. Even bad and untrue things have being, in so far -as their reality still, somehow, conforms to their notion. Whatever -is thoroughly bad or contrary to the notion, is for that very reason -on the way to ruin. It is by the notion alone that the things in the -world have their subsistence; or, as it is expressed in the language of -religious conception, things are what they are, only in virtue of the -divine and thereby creative thought which dwells within them.</p> - -<p class="block2">When we hear the Idea spoken of, we need not imagine something far -away beyond this mortal sphere. The idea is rather what is completely -present: and it is found, however confused and degenerated, in -every consciousness. We conceive the world to ourselves as a great -totality which is created by God, and so created that in it God has -manifested Himself to us. We regard the world also as ruled by Divine -Providence: implying that the scattered and divided parts of the world -are continually brought back, and made conformable, to the unity from -which they have issued. The purpose of philosophy has always been the -intellectual ascertainment of the Idea; and everything deserving the -name of philosophy has constantly been based on the consciousness -of an absolute unity where the understanding sees and accepts only -separation.—It is too late now to ask for proof that the Idea is -the truth. The proof of that is contained in the whole deduction and -development of thought up to this point. The idea is the result of -this course of dialectic. Not that it is to be supposed that the idea -is mediate only, <i>i.e.</i> mediated through something else than itself. -It is rather its own result, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> being so, is no less immediate than -mediate. The stages hitherto considered, viz. those of Being and -Essence, as well as those of Notion and of Objectivity, are not, when -so distinguished, something permanent, resting upon themselves. They -have proved to be dialectical; and their only truth is that they are -dynamic elements of the idea.</p> - -<p>214.] The Idea may be described in many ways. It may be called reason -(and this is the proper philosophical signification of reason); -subject-object; the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and -the infinite, of soul and body; the possibility which has its actuality -in its own self; that of which the nature can be thought only as -existent, &c. All these descriptions apply, because the Idea contains -all the relations of understanding, but contains them in their infinite -self-return and self-identity.</p> - -<p>It is easy work for the understanding to show that everything said -of the Idea is self-contradictory. But that can quite as well be -retaliated, or rather in the Idea the retaliation is actually made. And -this work, which is the work of reason, is certainly not so easy as -that of the understanding. Understanding may demonstrate that the Idea -is self-contradictory: because the subjective is subjective only and is -always confronted by the objective,—because being is different from -notion and therefore cannot be picked out of it,—because the finite -is finite only, the exact antithesis of the infinite, and therefore -not identical with it; and so on with every term of the description. -The reverse of all this however is the doctrine of Logic. Logic shows -that the subjective which is to be subjective only, the finite which -would be finite only, the infinite which would be infinite only, and so -on, have no truth, but contradict themselves, and pass over into their -opposites. Hence this transition, and the unity in which the extremes -are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> merged and become factors, each with a merely reflected existence, -reveals itself as their truth.</p> - -<p>The understanding, which addresses itself to deal with the Idea, -commits a double misunderstanding. It takes <i>first</i> the extremes of -the Idea (be they expressed as they will, so long as they are in their -unity), not as they are understood when stamped with this concrete -unity, but as if they remained abstractions outside of it. It no less -mistakes the relation between them, ever when it has been expressly -stated. Thus, for example it overlooks even the nature of the copula -in the judgment, which affirms that the individual, or subject, is -after all not individual, but universal. But, in the <i>second</i> place, -the understanding believes <i>its</i> 'reflection,'—that the self-identical -Idea contains its own negative, or contains contradiction,—to be an -external reflection which does not lie within the Idea itself. But the -reflection is really no peculiar cleverness of the understanding. The -Idea itself is the dialectic which for ever divides and distinguishes -the self-identical from the differentiated, the subjective from the -objective, the finite from the infinite, soul from body. Only on -these terms is it an eternal creation, eternal vitality, and eternal -spirit. But while it thus passes or rather translates itself into the -abstract understanding, it for ever remains reason. The Idea is the -dialectic which again makes this mass of understanding and diversity -understand its finite nature and the pseudo-independence in its -productions, and which brings the diversity back to unity. Since this -double movement is not separate or distinct in time, nor indeed in any -other way—otherwise it would be only a repetition of the abstract -understanding—the Idea is the eternal vision of itself in the other, -—notion which in its objectivity <i>has</i> carried out <i>itself,</i>—object -which is inward design, essential subjectivity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span></p> - -<p>The different modes of apprehending the Idea as unity of ideal and -real, of finite and infinite, of identity and difference, &c. are more -or less formal. They designate some one stage of the <i>specific</i> notion. -Only the notion itself, however, is free and the genuine universal: -in the Idea, therefore, the specific character of the notion is -only the notion itself,—an objectivity, viz. into which it, being -the universal, continues itself, and in which it has only its own -character, the total character. The Idea is the infinite judgment, of -which the terms are severally the independent totality; and in which, -as each grows to the fulness of its own nature, it has thereby at the -same time passed into the other. None of the other specific notions -exhibits this totality complete on both its sides as the notion itself -and objectivity.</p> - -<p>215.] The Idea is essentially a process, because its identity is the -absolute and free identity of the notion, only in so far as it is -absolute negativity and for that reason dialectical. It is the round of -movement, in which the notion, in the capacity of universality which -is individuality, gives itself the character of objectivity and of the -antithesis thereto; and this externality which has the notion for its -substance, finds its way back to subjectivity through its immanent -dialectic.</p> - -<p>As the idea is (a) a process, it follows that such an expression for -the Absolute as <i>unity</i> of thought and being, of finite and infinite, -&c. is false; for unity expresses an abstract and merely quiescent -identity. As the Idea is (b) subjectivity, it follows that the -expression is equally false on another account. That unity of which -it speaks expresses a merely virtual or underlying presence of the -genuine unity. The infinite would thus seem to be merely <i>neutralised</i> -by the finite, the subjective by the objective, thought by being. But -in the negative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> unity of the Idea, the infinite overlaps and includes -the finite, thought overlaps being, subjectivity overlaps objectivity. -The unity of the Idea is thought, infinity, and subjectivity, and -is in consequence to be essentially distinguished from the Idea as -<i>substance,</i> just as this overlapping subjectivity, thought, or -infinity is to be distinguished from the one-sided subjectivity, -one-sided thought, one-sided infinity to which it descends in judging -and defining.</p> - -<p class="block2">The idea as a process runs through three stages in its development. -The first form of the idea is Life: that is, the idea in the form of -immediacy. The second form is that of mediation or differentiation; -and this is the idea in the form of Knowledge, which appears under -the double aspect of the Theoretical and Practical idea. The process -of knowledge eventuates in the restoration of the unity enriched by -difference. This gives the third form of the idea, the Absolute Idea: -which last stage of the logical idea evinces itself to be at the same -time the true first, and to have a being due to itself alone.</p> - -<p class="center">(a) <i>Life.</i></p> - -<p>216.] The <i>immediate</i> idea is <b>Life</b>. As <i>soul,</i> the notion is -realised in a body of whose externality the soul is the immediate -self-relating universality. But the soul is also its particularisation, -so that the body expresses no other distinctions than follow from the -characterisations of its notion. And finally it is the Individuality -of the body as infinite negativity,—the dialectic of that bodily -objectivity, with its parts lying out of one another, conveying -them away from the semblance of independent subsistence back into -subjectivity, so that all the members are reciprocally momentary -means as well as momentary ends. Thus as life is the initial -particularisation, so it results in the negative self-asserting unity: -in the dialectic of its corporeity it only coalesces with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> itself. -In this way life is essentially something alive, and in point of -its immediacy this individual living thing. It is characteristic of -finitude in this sphere that, by reason of the immediacy of the idea, -body and soul are separable. This constitutes the mortality of the -living being. It is only, however, when the living being is dead, that -these two sides of the idea are different <i>ingredients.</i></p> - -<p class="block2">The single members of the body are what they are only by and in -relation to their unity. A hand <i>e.g.</i> when hewn off from the body is, -as Aristotle has observed, a hand in name only, not in fact. From the -point of view of understanding, life is usually spoken of as a mystery, -and in general as incomprehensible. By giving it such a name, however, -the Understanding only confesses its own finitude and nullity. So far -is life from being incomprehensible, that in it the very notion is -presented to us, or rather the immediate idea existing as a notion. And -having said this, we have indicated the defect of life. Its notion and -reality do not thoroughly correspond to each other. The notion of life -is the soul, and this notion has the body for its reality. The soul is, -as it were, infused into its corporeity; and in that way it is at first -sentient only, and not yet freely self-conscious. The process of life -consists in getting the better of the immediacy with which it is still -beset: and this process, which is itself threefold, results in the idea -under the form of judgment, <i>i.e.</i> the idea as Cognition.</p> - -<p>217.] A living being is a syllogism, of which the very elements are in -themselves systems and syllogisms (§§ 198, 201, 207). They are however -active syllogisms or processes; and in the subjective unity of the -vital agent make only one process. Thus the living being is the process -of its coalescence with itself, which runs on through three processes.</p> - -<p>218.] (1) The first is the process of the living being inside itself. -In that process it makes a split on its own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span> self, and reduces its -corporeity to its object or its inorganic nature. This corporeity, as -an aggregate of correlations, enters in its very nature into difference -and opposition of its elements, which mutually become each other's -prey, and assimilate one another, and are retained by producing -themselves. Yet this action of the several members (organs), is only -the living subject's one act to which their productions revert; so that -in these productions nothing is produced except the subject: in other -words, the subject only reproduces itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">The process of the vital subject within its own limits has in Nature -the threefold form of Sensibility, Irritability, and Reproduction. As -Sensibility, the living being is immediately simple self-relation—it -is the soul omnipresent in its body, the outsideness of each member of -which to others has for it no truth. As Irritability, the living being -appears split up in itself; and as Reproduction, it is perpetually -restoring itself from the inner distinction of its members and organs. -A vital agent only exists as this continually self-renewing process -within its own limits.</p> - -<p>219.] (2) But the judgment of the notion proceeds, as free, to -discharge the objective or bodily nature as an independent totality -from itself; and the negative relation of the living thing to itself -makes, as immediate individuality, the pre-supposition of an inorganic -nature confronting it. As this negative of the animate is no less a -function in the notion of the animate itself, it exists consequently -in the latter (which is at the same time a concrete universal) in the -shape of a defect or want. The dialectic by which the object, being -implicitly null, is merged, is the action of the self-assured living -thing, which in this process against an inorganic nature thus retains, -develops, and objectifies itself.</p> - -<p class="block2">The living being stands face to face with an inorganic nature, to which -it comports itself as a master and which it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> assimilates to itself. -The result of the assimilation is not, as in the chemical process, a -neutral product in which the independence of the two confronting sides -is merged; but the living being shows itself as large enough to embrace -its other which cannot withstand its power. The inorganic nature -which is subdued by the vital agent suffers this fate, because it is -<i>virtually</i> the same as what life is <i>actually.</i> Thus in the other the -living being only coalesces with itself. But when the soul has fled -from the body, the elementary powers of objectivity begin their play. -These powers are, as it were, continually on the spring, ready to begin -their process in the organic body; and life is the constant battle -against them.</p> - -<p>220.] (3) The living individual, which in its first process comports -itself as intrinsically subject and notion, through its second -assimilates its external objectivity and thus puts the character of -reality into itself. It is now therefore implicitly a <b>Kind</b>, with -essential universality of nature. The particularising of this Kind is -the relation of the living subject to another subject of its Kind: and -the judgment is the tie of Kind over these individuals thus appointed -for each other. This is the Affinity of the Sexes.</p> - -<p>221.] The process of Kind brings it to a being of its own. Life being -no more than the idea immediate, the product of this process breaks -up into two sides. On the one hand, the living individual, which was -at first pre-supposed as immediate, is now seen to be mediated and -generated. On the other, however, the living individuality, which, on -account of its first immediacy, stands in a negative attitude towards -universality, sinks in the superior power of the latter.</p> - -<p class="block2">The living being dies, because it is a contradiction. Implicitly it is -the universal or Kind, and yet immediately it exists as an individual -only. Death shows the Kind to be the power that rules the immediate -individual. For the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> animal the process of Kind is the highest point of -its vitality. But the animal never gets so far in its Kind as to have -a being of its own; it succumbs to the power of Kind. In the process -of Kind the immediate living being mediates itself with itself, and -thus rises above its immediacy, only however to sink back into it -again. Life thus runs away, in the first instance, only into the false -infinity of the progress <i>ad infinitum.</i> The real result, however, -of the process of life, in the point of its notion, is to merge and -overcome that immediacy with which the idea, in the shape of life, is -still beset.</p> - -<p>222.] In this manner however the idea of life has thrown off not some -one particular and immediate 'This,' but this first immediacy as a -whole. It thus comes to itself, to its truth: it enters upon existence -as a free Kind self-subsistent. The death of merely immediate and -individual vitality is the 'procession' of spirit.</p> - - -<p class="center">(b) <i>Cognition in general.</i></p> - -<p>223.] The idea exists free for itself, in so far as it has universality -for the medium of its existence,—as objectivity itself has -notional being,—as the idea is its own object. Its subjectivity, -thus universalised, is <i>pure</i> self-contained distinguishing of the -idea,—intuition which keeps itself in this identical universality. -But, as <i>specific</i> distinguishing, it is the further judgment of -repelling itself as a totality from itself, and thus, in the first -place, pre-supposing itself as an external universe. There are two -judgments, which though implicitly identical are not yet explicitly put -as identical.</p> - -<p>224.] The relation of these two ideas, which implicitly and as life are -identical, is thus one of correlation: and it is that correlativity -which constitutes the characteristic of finitude in this sphere. It -is the relationship of reflection, seeing that the distinguishing of -the idea in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span> own self is only the first judgment—presupposing the -other and not yet supposing itself to constitute it. And thus for the -subjective idea the objective is the immediate world found ready to -hand, or the idea as life is in the phenomenon of individual existence. -At the same time, in so far as this judgment is pure distinguishing -within its own limits (§ 223), the idea realises in one both itself and -its other. Consequently it is the certitude of the virtual identity -between itself and the objective world.—Reason comes to the world -with an absolute faith in its ability to make the identity actual, and -to raise its certitude to truth; and with the instinct of realising -explicitly the nullity of that contrast which it sees to be implicitly -null.</p> - -<p>225.] This process is in general terms <b>Cognition</b>. In Cognition -in a single act the contrast is virtually superseded, as regards both -the one-sidedness of subjectivity and the one-sidedness of objectivity. -At first, however, the supersession of the contrast is but implicit. -The process as such is in consequence immediately infected with the -finitude of this sphere, and splits into the twofold movement of the -instinct of reason, presented as two different movements. On the one -hand it supersedes the one-sidedness of the Idea's subjectivity by -receiving the existing world into itself, into subjective conception -and thought; and with this objectivity, which is thus taken to be -real and true, for its content it fills up the abstract certitude of -itself. On the other hand, it supersedes the one-sidedness of the -objective world, which is now, on the contrary, estimated as only a -mere semblance, a collection of contingencies and shapes at bottom -visionary. It modifies and informs that world by the inward nature of -the subjective, which is here taken to be the genuine objective. The -former is the instinct of science after Truth, Cognition properly so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span> -called:—the Theoretical action of the idea. The latter is the instinct -of the Good to fulfil the same—the Practical activity of the idea or -Volition.</p> - -<p class="center">(α) <i>Cognition proper.</i></p> - -<p>226.] The universal finitude of Cognition, which lies in the -one judgment, the pre-supposition of the contrast (§ 224),—a -pre-supposition in contradiction of which its own act lodges protest, -specialises itself more precisely on the face of its own idea. The -result of that specialisation is, that its two elements receive the -aspect of being diverse from each other, and, as they are at least -complete, they take up the relation of 'reflection,' not of 'notion,' -to one another. The assimilation of the matter, therefore, as a datum, -presents itself in the light of a reception of it into categories which -at the same time remain external to it, and which meet each other in -the same style of diversity. Reason is active here, but it is reason in -the shape of understanding. The truth which such Cognition can reach -will therefore be only finite: the infinite truth (of the notion) is -isolated and made transcendent, an inaccessible goal in a world of its -own. Still in its external action cognition stands under the guidance -of the notion, and notional principles form the secret clue to its -movement.</p> - -<p class="block2">The finitude of Cognition lies in the pre-supposition of a world -already in existence, and in the consequent view of the knowing subject -as a <i>tabula rasa.</i> The conception is one attributed to Aristotle; -but no man is further than Aristotle from such an outside theory of -Cognition. Such a style of Cognition does not recognise in itself the -activity of the notion—an activity which it is implicitly, but not -consciously. In its own estimation its procedure is passive. Really -that procedure is active.</p> - -<p>227.] Finite Cognition, when it pre-supposes what is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> distinguished -from it to be something already existing and confronting it,—to be -the various facts of external nature or of consciousness—has, in the -first place, (1) Formal identity or the abstraction of universality for -the form of its action. Its activity therefore consists in analysing -the given concrete object, isolating its differences, and giving them -the form of abstract universality. Or it leaves the concrete thing as -a ground, and by setting aside the unessential-looking particulars, -brings into relief a concrete universal, the Genus, or Force and Law. -This is the <b>Analytical Method</b>.</p> - -<p class="block2">People generally speak of the analytical and synthetical methods, -as if it depended solely on our choice which we pursued. This is -far from the case. It depends on the form of the objects of our -investigation, which of the two methods, that are derivable from the -notion of finite cognition, ought to be applied. In the first place, -cognition is analytical. Analytical cognition deals with an object -which is presented in detachment, and the aim of its action is to -trace back to a universal the individual object before it. Thought -in such circumstances means no more than an act of abstraction or of -formal identity. That is the sense in which thought is understood by -Locke and all empiricists. Cognition, it is often said, can never do -more than separate the given concrete objects into their abstract -elements, and then consider these elements in their isolation. It is, -however, at once apparent that this turns things upside down, and that -cognition, if its purpose be to take things as they are, thereby falls -into contradiction with itself. Thus the chemist <i>e.g.</i> places a piece -of flesh in his retort, tortures it in many ways, and then informs us -that it consists of nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen, &c. True: but these -abstract matters have ceased to be flesh. The same defect occurs in -the reasoning of an empirical psychologist when he analyses an action -into the various aspects which it presents, and then sticks to these -aspects in their separation. The object which is subjected to analysis -is treated as a sort of onion from which one coat is peeled off after -another.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span></p> - -<p>228.] This universality is (2) also a specific universality. In this -case the line of activity follows the three 'moments' of the notion, -which (as it has not its infinity in finite cognition) is the specific -or definite notion of understanding. The reception of the object into -the forms of this notion is the <b>Synthetic Method</b>.</p> - -<p class="block2">The movement of the Synthetic method is the reverse of the Analytical -method. The latter starts from the individual, and proceeds to the -universal; in the former the starting-point is given by the universal -(as a definition), from which we proceed by particularising (in -division) to the individual (the theorem). The Synthetic method thus -presents itself as the development of the 'moments' of the notion on -the object.</p> - -<p>229.] (α) When the object has been in the first instance brought by -cognition into the form of the specific notion in general, so that -in this way its genus and its universal character or speciality are -explicitly stated, we have the <b>Definition</b>. The materials and the -proof of Definition are procured by means of the Analytical method (§ -227). The specific character however is expected to be a 'mark' only: -that is to say it is to be in behoof only of the purely subjective -cognition which is external to the object.</p> - -<p>Definition involves the three organic elements of the notion: the -universal or proximate genus <i>genus proximum,</i> the particular or -specific character of the genus (<i>qualitas specified,</i>) and the -individual, or object defined.—The first question that definition -suggests, is where it comes from. The general answer to this question -is to say, that definitions originate by way of analysis. This will -explain how it happens that people quarrel about the correctness of -proposed definitions; for here everything depends on what perceptions -we started from, and what points of view we had before our eyes -in so doing. The richer the object to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> be defined is, -that is, the more numerous are the aspects which it offers to our -notice, the more various are the definitions we may frame of it. Thus -there are quite a host of definitions of life, of the state, &c. -Geometry, on the contrary, dealing with a theme so abstract as space, -has an easy task in giving definitions. Again, in respect of the matter -or contents of the objects defined, there is no constraining necessity -present. We are expected to admit that space exists, that there are -plants, animals, &c., nor is it the business of geometry, botany, -&c. to demonstrate that the objects in question necessarily are. -This very circumstance makes the synthetical method of cognition as -little suitable for philosophy as the analytical: for philosophy has -above all things to leave no doubt of the necessity of its objects. -And yet several attempts have been made to introduce the synthetical -method into philosophy. Thus Spinoza, in particular, begins with -definitions. He says, for instance, that substance is the <i>causa sui.</i> -His definitions are unquestionably a storehouse of the most speculative -truth, but it takes the shape of dogmatic assertions. The same thing is -also true of Schelling.</p> - -<p>230.] (ß) The statement of the second element of the notion, <i>i.e.</i> of -the specific character of the universal as particularising, is given by -<b>Division</b> in accordance with some external consideration.</p> - -<p class="block2">Division we are told ought to be complete. That requires a principle -or ground of division so constituted, that the division based upon it -embraces the whole extent of the region designated by the definition -in general. But, in division, there is the further requirement that -the principle of it must be borrowed from the nature of the object in -question. If this condition be satisfied, the division is natural and -not merely artificial, that is to say, arbitrary. Thus, in zoology, -the ground of division adopted in the classification of the mammalia -is mainly afforded by their teeth and claws. That is so far sensible, -as the mammals themselves distinguish themselves from one another by -these parts of their bodies; back to which therefore the general<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> type -of their various classes is to be traced. In every case the genuine -division must be controlled by the notion. To that extent a division, -in the first instance, has three members: but as particularity -exhibits itself as double, the division may go to the extent even -of four members. In the sphere of mind trichotomy is predominant, a -circumstance which Kant has the credit of bringing into notice.</p> - -<p>231.] (γ) In the concrete individuality, where the mere unanalysed -quality of the definition is regarded as a correlation of elements, -the object is a synthetical nexus of distinct characteristics. It is -a <b>Theorem</b>. Being different, these characteristics possess but -a mediated identity. To supply the materials, which form the middle -terms, is the office of Construction: and the process of mediation -itself, from which cognition derives the necessity of that nexus, is -the <b>Demonstration</b>.</p> - -<p>As the difference between the analytical and synthetical methods is -commonly stated, it seems entirely optional which of the two we employ. -If we assume, to start with, the concrete thing which the synthetic -method presents as a result, we can analyse from it as consequences -the abstract propositions which formed the pre-suppositions and the -material for the proof. Thus, algebraical definitions of curved lines -are theorems in the method of geometry. Similarly even the Pythagorean -theorem, if made the definition of a right-angled triangle, might yield -to analysis those propositions which geometry had already demonstrated -on its behoof. The optionalness of either method is due to both alike -starting from an external pre-supposition. So far as the nature of -the notion is concerned, analysis is prior; since it has to raise the -given material with its empirical concreteness into the form of general -abstractions, which may then be set in the front of the synthetical -method as definitions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span></p> - -<p>That these methods, however indispensable and brilliantly successful -in their own province, are unserviceable for philosophical cognition, -is self-evident. They have pre-suppositions; and their style of -cognition is that of understanding, proceeding under the canon of -formal identity. In Spinoza, who was especially addicted to the use of -the geometrical method, we are at once struck by its characteristic -formalism. Yet his ideas were speculative in spirit; whereas the system -of Wolf, who carried the method out to the height of pedantry, was -even in subject-matter a metaphysic of the understanding. The abuses -which these methods with their formalism once led to in philosophy -and science have in modern times been followed by the abuses of what -is called 'Construction.' Kant brought into vogue the phrase that -mathematics 'construes' its notions. All that was meant by the phrase -was that mathematics has not to do with notions, but with abstract -qualities of sense-perceptions. The name 'Construction (<i>construing</i>) -of notions' has since been given to a sketch or statement of sensible -attributes which were picked up from perception, quite guiltless -of any influence of the notion, and to the additional formalism of -classifying scientific and philosophical objects in a tabular form -on some pre-supposed rubric, but in other respects at the fancy and -discretion of the observer. In the background of all this, certainly, -there is a dim consciousness of the Idea, of the unity of the notion -and objectivity,—a consciousness, too, that the idea is concrete. But -that play of what is styled 'construing' is far from presenting this -unity adequately—a unity which is none other than the notion properly -so called: and the sensuous concreteness of perception is as little the -concreteness of reason and the idea.</p> - -<p>Another point calls for notice. Geometry works with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> the sensuous but -abstract perception of space; and in space it experiences no difficulty -in isolating and defining certain simple analytic modes. To geometry -alone therefore belongs in its perfection the synthetical method of -finite cognition. In its course, however (and this is the remarkable -point), it finally stumbles upon what are termed irrational and -incommensurable quantities; and in their case any attempt at further -specification drives it beyond the principle of the understanding. -This is only one of many instances in terminology, where the title -rational is perversely applied to the province of understanding, -while we stigmatise as irrational that which shows a beginning and a -trace of rationality. Other sciences, removed as they are from the -simplicity of space or number, often and necessarily reach a point -where understanding permits no further advance: but they get over the -difficulty without trouble. They make a break in the strict sequence -of their procedure, and assume whatever they require, though it be -the reverse of what preceded, from some external quarter,—opinion, -perception, conception or any other source. Its inobservancy as to -the nature of its methods and their relativity to the subject-matter -prevents this finite cognition from seeing that, when it proceeds by -definitions and divisions, &c., it is really led on by the necessity -of the laws of the notion. For the same reason it cannot see when it -has reached its limit; nor, if it have transgressed that limit, does it -perceive that it is in a sphere where the categories of understanding, -which it still continues rudely to apply, have lost all authority.</p> - -<p>232.] The necessity, which finite cognition produces in the -Demonstration, is, in the first place, an external necessity, intended -for the subjective intelligence alone. But in necessity as such, -cognition itself has left behind its presupposition and starting-point, -which consisted in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span> accepting its content as given or found. -Necessity <i>quâ</i> necessity is implicitly the self-relating notion. The -subjective idea has thus implicitly reached an original and objective -determinateness,—a something not-given, and for that reason immanent -in the subject. It has passed over into the idea of Will.</p> - -<p class="block2">The necessity which cognition reaches by means of the demonstration is -the reverse of what formed its starting-point. In its starting-point -cognition had a given and a contingent content; but now, at the close -of its movement, it knows its content to be necessary. This necessity -is reached by means of subjective agency. Similarly, subjectivity -at starting was quite abstract, a bare <i>tabula rasa.</i> It now shows -itself as a modifying and determining principle. In this way we pass -from the idea of cognition to that of will. The passage, as will be -apparent on a closer examination, means that the universal, to be -truly apprehended, must be apprehended as subjectivity, as a notion -self-moving, active, and form-imposing.</p> - - -<p class="center">(ß) <i>Volition.</i></p> - -<p>233.] The subjective idea as original and objective determinateness, -and as a simple uniform content, is the <b>Good</b>. Its impulse -towards self-realisation is in its behaviour the reverse of the idea of -truth, and rather directed towards moulding the world it finds before -it into a shape conformable to its purposed End.—This Volition has, -on the one hand, the certitude of the nothingness of the pre-supposed -object; but, on the other, as finite, it at the same time pre-supposes -the purposed End of the Good to be a mere subjective idea, and the -object to be independent.</p> - -<p>234.] This action of the Will is finite: and its finitude lies in -the contradiction that in the inconsistent terms applied to the -objective world the End of the Good is just as much not executed -as executed,—the end<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span> in question put as unessential as much as -essential,—as actual and at the same, time as merely possible. This -contradiction presents itself to imagination as an endless progress in -the actualising of the Good; which is therefore set up and fixed as -a mere 'ought,' or goal of perfection. In point of form however this -contradiction vanishes when the action supersedes the subjectivity of -the purpose, and along with it the objectivity, with the contrast which -makes both finite; abolishing subjectivity as a whole and not merely -the one-sidedness of this form of it. (For another new subjectivity of -the kind, that is, a new generation of the contrast, is not distinct -from that which is supposed to be past and gone.) This return into -itself is at the same time the content's own 'recollection' that it -is the Good and the implicit identity of the two sides,—it is a -'recollection' of the pre-supposition of the theoretical attitude -of mind (§ 224) that the objective world is its own truth and -substantiality.</p> - -<p class="block2">While Intelligence merely proposes to take the world as it is, Will -takes steps to make the world what it ought to be. Will looks upon -the immediate and given present not as solid being, but as mere -semblance without reality. It is here that we meet those contradictions -which are so bewildering from the standpoint of abstract morality. -This position in its 'practical' bearings is the one taken by the -philosophy of Kant, and even by that of Fichte. The Good, say these -writers, has to be realised: we have to work in order to produce it: -and Will is only the Good actualising itself. If the world then were -as it ought to be, the action of Will would be at an end. The Will -itself therefore requires that its End should not be realised. In -these words, a correct expression is given to the <i>finitude</i> of Will. -But finitude was not meant to be the ultimate point: and it is the -process of Will itself which abolishes finitude and the contradiction -it involves. The reconciliation is achieved,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> when Will in its result -returns to the pre-supposition made by cognition. In other words, it -consists in the unity of the theoretical and practical idea. Will -knows the end to be its own, and Intelligence apprehends the world as -the notion actual. This is the right attitude of rational cognition. -Nullity and transitoriness constitute only the superficial features -and not the real essence of the world. That essence is the notion in -<i>posse</i> and in <i>esse:</i> and thus the world is itself the idea. All -unsatisfied endeavour ceases, when we recognise that the final purpose -of the world is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself. -Generally speaking, this is the man's way of looking; while the young -imagine that the world is utterly sunk in wickedness, and that the -first thing needful is a thorough transformation. The religious mind, -on the contrary, views the world as ruled by Divine Providence, and -therefore correspondent with what it ought to be. But this harmony -between the 'is' and the 'ought to be' is not torpid and rigidly -stationary. Good, the final end of the world, has being, only while it -constantly produces itself. And the world of spirit and the world of -nature continue to have this distinction, that the latter moves only in -a recurring cycle, while the former certainly also makes progress.</p> - -<p>235.] Thus the truth of the Good is laid down as the unity of the -theoretical and practical idea in the doctrine that the Good is -radically and really achieved, that the objective world is in itself -and for itself the Idea, just as it at the same time eternally lays -itself down as End, and by action brings about its actuality. This life -which has returned to itself from the bias and finitude of cognition, -and which by the activity of the notion has become identical with it, -is the <b>Speculative</b> or Absolute Idea.</p> - - -<p class="center">(c) <i>The Absolute Idea.</i></p> - -<p>236.] The Idea, as unity of the Subjective and Objective Idea, is -the notion of the Idea,—a notion whose object (<i>Gegenstand</i>) is the -Idea as such, and for which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> the objective (<i>Objekt</i>) is Idea,—an -Object which embraces all characteristics in its unity. This unity -is consequently I the absolute and all truth, the Idea which thinks -itself,—and here at least as a thinking or Logical Idea.</p> - -<p class="block2">The Absolute Idea is, in the first place, the unity of the theoretical -and practical idea, and thus at the same time the unity of the idea -of life with the idea of cognition. In cognition we had the idea in a -biassed, one-sided shape. The process of cognition has issued in the -overthrow of this bias and the restoration of that unity, which as -unity, and in its immediacy, is in the first instance the Idea of Life. -The defect of life lies in its being only the idea implicit or natural: -whereas cognition is in an equally one-sided way the merely conscious -idea, or the idea for itself. The unity and truth of these two is the -Absolute Idea, which is both in itself and for itself. Hitherto <i>we</i> -have had the idea in development through its various grades as <i>our</i> -object, but now the idea comes to be its <i>own object.</i> This is the -νόησις νοήσεως which Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of the -idea.</p> - -<p>237.] Seeing that there is in it no transition, or presupposition, -and in general no specific character other than what is fluid and -transparent, the Absolute Idea is for itself the pure form of the -notion, which contemplates its content as its own self. It is its own -content, in so far as it ideally distinguishes itself from itself, -and the one of the two things distinguished is a self-identity in -which however is contained the totality of the form as the system of -terms describing its content. This content is the system of Logic. All -that is at this stage left as form for the idea is the Method of this -content,—the specific consciousness of the value and currency of the -'moments' in its development.</p> - -<p class="block2">To speak of the absolute idea may suggest the conception that we are -at length reaching the right thing and the sum of the whole matter. -It is certainly possible to indulge in a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span> vast amount of senseless -declamation about the idea absolute. But its true content is only the -whole system of which we have been hitherto studying the development. -It may also be said in this strain that the absolute idea is the -universal, but the universal not merely as an abstract form to which -the particular content is a stranger, but as the absolute form, into -which all the categories, the whole fullness of the content it has -given being to, have retired. The absolute idea may in this respect be -compared to the old man who utters the same creed as the child, but -for whom it is pregnant with the significance of a lifetime. Even if -the child understands the truths of religion, he cannot but imagine -them to be something outside of which lies the whole of life and the -whole of the world. The same may be said to be the case with human life -as a whole and the occurrences with which it is fraught. All work is -directed only to the aim or end; and when it is attained, people are -surprised to find nothing else but just the very thing which they had -wished for. The interest lies in the whole movement. When a man traces -up the steps of his life, the end may appear to him very restricted: -but in it the whole <i>decursus vitae</i> is comprehended. So, too, the -content of the absolute idea is the whole breadth of ground which has -passed under our view up to this point. Last of all comes the discovery -that the whole evolution is what constitutes the content and the -interest. It is indeed the prerogative of the philosopher to see that -everything, which, taken apart, is narrow and restricted, receives -its value by its connexion with the whole, and by forming an organic -element of the idea. Thus it is that we have had the content already, -and what we have now is the knowledge that the content is the living -development of the idea. This simple retrospect is contained in the -<i>form</i> of the idea. Each of the stages hitherto reviewed is an image -of the absolute, but at first in a limited mode, and thus it is forced -onwards to the whole, the evolution of which is what we termed Method.</p> - -<p>238.] The several steps or stages of the Speculative Method are, -first of all, (a) the Beginning, which is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> Being or Immediacy: -self-subsistent, for the simple reason that it is the beginning. But -looked at from the speculative idea, Being is its self-specialising -act, which as the absolute negativity or movement of the notion makes -a judgment and puts itself as its own negative. Being, which to the -beginning as beginning seems mere abstract affirmation, is thus rather -negation, dependency, derivation, and pre-supposition. But it is the -notion, of which Being is the negation: and the notion is completely -self-identical in its otherness, and is the certainty of itself. Being -therefore is the notion implicit, before it has been explicitly put as -a notion. This Being therefore, as the still unspecified notion,—a -notion that is only implicitly or 'immediately' specified—is equally -describable as the Universal.</p> - -<p>When it means immediate being, the beginning is taken from sensation -and perception—the initial stage in the analytical method of finite -cognition. When it means universality, it is the beginning of the -synthetic method. But since the Logical Idea is as much a universal as -it is in being—since it is pre-supposed by the notion as much as it -itself immediately <i>is,</i> its beginning is a synthetical as well as an -analytical beginning.</p> - -<p class="block2">Philosophical method is analytical as well as synthetical, not indeed -in the sense of a bare juxtaposition or mere alternating employment -of these two methods of finite cognition, but rather in such a way -that it holds them merged in itself. In every one of its movements -therefore it displays an attitude at once analytical and synthetical. -Philosophical thought proceeds analytically, in so far as it only -accepts its object, the Idea, and while allowing it its own way, is -only, as it were, an on-looker at its movement and development. To this -extent philosophising is wholly passive. Philosophic thought however is -equally synthetic, and evinces itself to be the action of the notion -itself. To that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span> end, however, there is required an effort to keep back -the incessant impertinence of our own fancies and private opinions.</p> - -<p>239.] (b) The Advance renders explicit the <i>judgment</i> implicit in -the Idea. The immediate universal, as the notion implicit, is the -dialectical force which on its own part deposes its immediacy and -universality to the level of a mere stage or 'moment.' Thus is put -the negative of the beginning, its specific character: it supposes a -correlative, a relation of different terms,—the stage of Reflection.</p> - -<p>Seeing that the immanent dialectic only states explicitly what was -involved in the immediate notion, this advance is Analytical; but -seeing that in this notion this distinction was not yet stated,—it is -equally Synthetical.</p> - -<p class="block2">In the advance of the idea, the beginning exhibits itself as what -it is implicitly. It is seen to be mediated and derivative, and -neither to have proper being nor proper immediacy. It is only for -the consciousness which is itself immediate, that Nature forms the -commencement or immediacy, and that Spirit appears as what is mediated -by Nature. The truth is that Nature is the creation of Spirit, and it -is Spirit itself which gives itself a pre-supposition in Nature.</p> - -<p>240.] The abstract form of the advance is, in Being, an other and -transition into an other; in Essence showing or reflection in the -opposite; in Notion, the distinction of individual from universality, -which continues itself as such into, and is as an identity with, what -is distinguished from it.</p> - -<p>241.] In the second sphere the primarily implicit notion has come as -far as shining, and thus is already the idea in germ. The development -of this sphere becomes a regress into the first, just as the -development of the first is a transition into the second.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span></p> - -<p>It is only by means of this double movement, that the difference first -gets its due, when each of the two members distinguished, observed -on its own part, completes itself to the totality, and in this way -works out its unity with the other. It is only by both merging their -one-sidedness on their own part, that their unity is kept from becoming -one-sided.</p> - -<p>242.] The second sphere developes the relation of the differents to -what it primarily is,—to the contradiction in its own nature. That -contradiction which is seen in the infinite progress is resolved -(c) into the end or terminus, where the differenced is explicitly -stated as what it is in notion. The end is the negative of the first, -and as the identity with that, is the negativity of itself. It is -consequently the unity in which both of these Firsts, the immediate -and the real First, are made constituent stages in thought, merged, -and at the same time preserved in the unity. The notion, which from -its implicitness thus comes by means of its differentiation and the -merging of that differentiation to close with itself, is the realised -notion,—the notion which contains the relativity or dependence of its -special features in its own independence. It is the idea which, as -absolutely first (in the method), regards this terminus as merely the -disappearance of the show or semblance, which made the beginning appear -immediate, and made itself seem a result. It is the knowledge that the -idea is the one systematic whole.</p> - -<p>243.] It thus appears that the method is not an extraneous form, -but the soul and notion of the content, from which it is only -distinguished, so far as the dynamic elements of the notion even on -their own part come in their own specific character to appear as the -totality of the notion. This specific character, or the content, leads -itself with the form back to the idea;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> and thus the idea is presented -as a systematic totality which is only one idea, of which the several -elements are each implicitly the idea, whilst they equally by the -dialectic of the notion produce the simple independence of the idea. -The science in this manner concludes by apprehending the notion of -itself, as of the pure idea for which the idea is.</p> - -<p>244.] The Idea which is independent or for itself, when viewed on the -point of this its unity with itself, is Perception or Intuition, and -the percipient Idea is Nature. But as intuition the idea is, through -an external 'reflection,' invested with the one-sided characteristic -of immediacy, or of negation. Enjoying however an absolute liberty, -the Idea does not merely pass over into life, or as finite cognition -allow life to show in it: in its own absolute truth it resolves to let -the 'moment' of its particularity, or of the first characterisation -and other-being, the immediate idea, as its reflected image, go forth -freely as Nature.</p> - -<p class="block2">We have now returned to the notion of the Idea with which we began. -This return to the beginning is also an advance. We began with Being, -abstract Being: where we now are we also have the Idea as Being: but -this Idea which has Being is Nature.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="NOTES_AND_ILLUSTRATIONS" id="NOTES_AND_ILLUSTRATIONS">NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS</a></h4> - - -<h6>CHAPTER I.</h6> - - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, § 2. After-thought = Nachdenken, <i>i.e.</i> thought which retraces -and reproduces an original, but submerged, thought (cf. Hegel's -<i>Werke</i>, vi. p. xv): to be distinguished from <b>Reflexion</b> (cf. -<i>Werke</i>, i. 174).</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, § 3. On the blending of universal (thought) and individual -(sensation) in what is called perception (Wahrnehmen) see <i>Encycl.</i> §§ -420, 421.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, § 3. Cf. Fichte, <i>Werke</i>, ii. 454: 'Hence for the common sort of -hearers and readers the uncommon intelligibility of certain sermons and -lectures and writings, not one word of which is intelligible to the -man who thinks for himself,—because there is really no intelligence -in them. The old woman who frequents the church—for whom by the way I -cherish all possible respect—finds a sermon very intelligible and very -edifying which contains lots of texts and verses of hymns she knows -by rote and can repeat. In the same way readers, who fancy themselves -far superior to her, find a work very instructive and clear which -tells them what they already know, and proofs very stringent which -demonstrate what they already believe. The pleasure the reader takes in -the writer is a concealed pleasure in himself. What a great man! (he -says to himself); it is as if I heard or read myself.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, § 6. Cf. Hegel, <i>Werke></i> viii. 17: 'In this conviction (that -what is reasonable is actual, and what is actual is reasonable) stands -every plain man, as well as the philosopher; and from it philosophy -starts in the study both of the spiritual and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> of the natural -universe——The great thing however is, in the show of the temporal -and the transient to recognise the substance which is immanent and the -eternal which is present. For the work of reason (which is synonymous -with the Idea), when in its actuality it simultaneously enters external -existence, emerges with an infinite wealth of forms, phenomena and -phases, and envelopes its kernel with the motley rind with which -consciousness is earliest at home,—a rind which the notion must -penetrate before it can find the inward pulse and feel it still beating -even in the outward phases. But the infinite variety of circumstance -which is formed in this externality by the light of the essence shining -in it,—all this infinite material, with its regulations,—is not -the object of philosophy.... To comprehend <i>what is,</i> is the task of -philosophy: for <i>what is</i> is reason. As regards the individual, each, -whatever happens, is a son of his time. So too philosophy is its -time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as foolish to fancy that a -philosophy can overleap its present world as that an individual can -overleap his time. If his theory really goes beyond actualities, if it -constructs an ideal, a world as it ought to be, then such existence -as it has is only in his intentions—a yielding element in which -anything you please may be fancy-formed.' Cf. Schelling, <i>Werke,</i> iv. -390: 'There are very many things, actions, &c. of which we may judge, -after vulgar semblance, that they are unreasonable. All the same we -presuppose and assume that everything which is or which happens is -reasonable, and that reason is, in one word, the prime matter and the -real of all being.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, § 6. Actuality (Wirklichkeit) in <i>Werke,</i> iv. 178 <i>seqq.</i></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, § 7. Cf. Fichte, <i>Werke,</i> ii. 333: 'Man has nothing at all -but experience; and everything he comes to be comes to only through -experience, through life itself. All his thinking, be it loose or -scientific, common or transcendental, starts from experience and has -experience ultimately in view. Nothing has unconditional value and -significance but life; all other thinking, conception, knowledge has -value only in so far as in some way or other it refers to the fact of -life, starts from it, and has in view a subsequent return to it.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, § 7 (note). Thomas Thomson (1773-1852), Professor of Chemistry -at Glasgow, distinguished in the early history of chemistry and allied -sciences. The <i>Annals of Philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span></i> appeared from 1813 to 1826.—<i>The -art of preserving the hair</i> was published (anonymous) at London in 1825.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, § 7 (note). The speech from the throne was read on Feb. 3rd, -1825.</p> - -<p>The shipowners' dinner was on Feb. 12. The <i>Times</i> of Feb. 14 gives as -Canning's the words 'the just and wise maxims of sound not spurious -philosophy.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, § 10. 'Scholasticus' is the guileless 'freshman,' hero of -certain Facetiae (attributed to the Pythagorean philosopher Hierocles) -which used occasionally to form part of the early Greek reading of -schoolboys.</p> - -<p>K. L. Reinhold (1754-1823) presents in his intellectual history a -picture of the development of ideas in his age. At the beginning -his <i>Attempt of a new theory of the human representative faculty</i> -(1789) is typical of the tendency to give a subjective psychological -interpretation of Kant's theory of knowledge But the period of -Reinhold's teaching here referred to is that of <i>Contributions to an -easier survey of the condition of philosophy at the beginning of the -nineteenth century</i> (Beiträge, 1801): the tendency which Hegel, who -reviewed him in the <i>Critical Journal of Philosophy</i> (<i>Werke,</i> i. 267 -<i>seqq.</i>), calls 'philosophising before philosophy.'—A similar spirit -is operative in Krug's proposal (in his <i>Fundamental Philosophy,</i> 1803) -to start with what he called 'philosophical problematics.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, § 11. Plato, <i>Phaedo,</i> p. 89, where Socrates protests against -the tendency to confound the defect of a particular piece of reasoning -with the incompetence of human reason altogether.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, § 13. The dictum that the historical succession of philosophical -systems is identical with their logical sequence should not be -taken too literally and mechanically. Its essential point is simply -the theorem that history is not a casual series of unconnected -events—the deeds of particular persons, but is an evolution under -laws and uniformities:—it is this theorem applied to philosophies. -But difficulties may easily arise in the application of the general -principle: <i>e.g.</i> it will be seen (by comparison of § 86 and § -104) that though Pythagoras precedes Parmenides, and number is a -stepping-stone to pure thought still pure Being comes at an earlier -stage than Quantity.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, § 13. There is a silent reference to what Reinhold professed -to make the subject of his teaching at Jena—'philosophy without -surnames' (ohne Beinamen),—<i>i.e.</i> not a 'critical'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> philosophy;—or -to the 'Philosophy which may not bear any man's name of Beck. As Hegel -says, <i>Werke,</i> xvi. 138, 'The solicitude and apprehension against being -one-sided is only too often part of the weakness which is capable only -of many-sided illogical superficiality.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, § 16. By 'anthropology' is meant not the anthropology of modern -writers, who use the name to denote mainly the history of human culture -in its more rudimentary stages, and as exhibited chiefly in material -products, but the study of those aspects of psychology which are most -closely allied with physiological conditions.</p> - -<p>With the power of the intuition of genius to give almost all that -logical synthesis can produce, cf. <i>Werke,</i> I. 331: 'In this way -a grand and pure intuition is able, in the purely architectonic -features of its picture, though the inter-connection of necessity and -the mastery of form does not come forward into visibility, to give -expression to the genuine ethical organism—like a building which -silently exhibits the spirit of its author in the several features of -its mass, without the image of that spirit being set forth anywhere -in one united shape. In such a delineation, made by help of notions, -it is only a want of technical skill which prevents reason from -raising the principle it embraces and pervades into the "ideal" form -and becoming aware of it as the Idea. If the intuition only remains -true to itself and does not let analytic intellect disconcert it, it -will probably—just because it cannot dispense with notions for its -expression—behave awkwardly in dealing with them, assume distorted -shapes in its passage through consciousness, and be (to the speculative -eye) both incoherent and contradictory: but the arrangement of the -parts and of the self-modifying characters betray the inward spirit of -reason, however invisible. And so far as this appearance of that spirit -is regarded as a product and a result, it will as product completely -harmonise with the Idea.' Probably Goethe is before Hegel's mind.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, § 17. The triplicity in unity of thought—its forthgoing -'procession,' (cf. p. 362 <i>seqq.</i>) and its return, which is yet an -abiding in itself (Bei:sich:sein) was first explicitly schematised -by Proclus, the consummator of Neo-Platonism. In his <i>Institutio -Theologica</i> he lays it down that the essential character of all -spiritual reality (aσώματον) is to be πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικόν, <i>i.e.</i> -to return upon itself, or to be a unity in and with difference,—<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span>to -be an original and spontaneous principle of movement (c. 15): or, as -in C 31: πὰν τὸ πρoῒὸν ἀπό τινος κατ' οὐσίαν ἐπιστρέφεται πρὸς ἐκεῖνο -ἀφ' οὗ πρόεισιν. Its movement, therefore, is circular κυκλικὴν ἔχει -τὴν ἐνέργειαν (c. 33): for everything must at the same time remain -altogether in the cause, and proceed from it, and revert to it (c. 35). -Such an essence is self-subsistent (αὐθυπόςτατον),—is at once agent -(πάραγον) and patient (παραγόμενον). This 'mysticism' (of a trinity -which is also unity of motion which is also rest), with its πρόοδoς, -ἐπιστroφή, and μονή, is taken up, in his own way, by Scotus Erigena -(De Divisione Naturae) as <i>processio</i> (or <i>divisio</i>), <i>reditus,</i> -and <i>adunatio.</i> From God 'proceed'—by an <i>eternal</i> creation—the -creatures, who however are not outside the divine nature; and to God -all things created <i>eternally</i> return.</p> - - -<h6>CHAPTER II.</h6> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, § 19. Truth:—as early as <i>Werke,</i> i. 82, <i>i.e.</i> 1801, Hegel had -come—perhaps influenced by the example of Jacobi—to the conclusion -that 'Truth is a word which, in philosophical discourse, deserves to be -used only of the certainty of the Eternal and non-empirical Actual.' -(And so Spinoza, ii. 310.)</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_32">32</a>. 'The young have been flattered'—<i>e.g.</i> by Fichte, <i>Werke,</i> i. -435: 'Hence this science too promises itself few proselytes amongst men -already formed: if it can hope for any at all, it hopes for them rather -from the young world, whose inborn force has not yet been ruined in the -laxity of the age.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, § 20. What Kant actually said (<i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft: -Elementarlehre,</i> § 16), was 'The <i>I think</i> must be able to accompany -all my conceptions' (Vorstellungen). Here, as often elsewhere. Hegel -seems to quote from memory,—with some shortcoming from absolute -accuracy.</p> - -<p>From this point Fichte's idealism takes its spring, <i>e.g. Werke,</i> ii. -505: 'The ground of all certainty,—of all consciousness of fact in -life, and of all demonstrative knowledge in science, is this: <i>In</i> and -<i>with</i> the single thing we affirm (setzen) (and whatever we affirm is -necessarily something single) we also affirm the absolute totality as -such.... Only in so far as we have so affirmed anything, is it certain -for us,—from the single unit we have comprehended under it away to -every single thing in the infinity we shall comprehend under it,—from -the one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> individual who has comprehended it, to all individuals who -will comprehend it.... Without this absolute "positing" of the absolute -totality in the individual, we cannot (to employ a phrase of Jacobi's) -come to bed and board.'</p> - -<p>'Obviously therefore you enunciate not the judgment of a single -observation, but you embrace and "posit" the sheer infinitude and -totality of all possible observations:—an infinity which is not at -all compounded out of finites, but out of which, conversely, the -finites themselves issue, and of which finite things are the mere -always-uncompleted analysis. This—how shall I call it, procedure, -positing, or whatever you prefer—this "manifestation" of the absolute -totality, I call intellectual vision (Anschauung). I regard it—just -because I cannot in any way get beyond intelligence—as immanent in -intelligence, and name it so far egoity (Ichheit),—not objectivity -and not subjectivity, but the absolute identity of the two:—an -egoity, however, which it was to be hoped would not be taken to mean -individuality. There lies in it, what you' (he is addressing Reinhold, -who here follows Bardili)' call a repetibility <i>ad infinitum.</i> For me, -therefore, the essence of the finite is composed of an immediate vision -of the absolutely timeless infinite (with an absolute identity of -subjectivity and objectivity), and of a separation of the two latter, -and an analysis (continued <i>ad infinitum</i>) of the infinite. In that -analysis consists the temporal life: and the starting-point of this -temporal life is the separation into subject and object, which through -the intellectual vision (intuition) are still both held together.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, § 22, <i>the mere fact of conviction.</i> Cf. <i>Rechtsphilosophie,</i> -§ 140 (<i>Werke,</i> viii. 191): 'Finally the mere conviction which holds -something to be right is given out as what decides the morality of -an action. The good we will to do not yet having any content, the -principle of conviction adds the information that the subsumption of an -action under the category of good is purely a personal matter. If this -be so, the very pretence of an ethical objectivity is utterly lost. A -doctrine like this is closely allied with the self-styled philosophy -which denies that the true is cognoscible: because for the Will, -truth—<i>i.e.</i> the rationality of the Will—lies in the moral laws. -Giving out, as such a system does, that the cognition of the true is an -empty vanity, far transcending the range of science (which recognises -only appearance), it must, in the matter of conduct, also find its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> -principle in the apparent; whereby moral distinctions are reduced to -the peculiar theory of life held by the individual and to his private -conviction. At first no doubt the degradation into which philosophy has -thus sunk seems an affair of supreme indifference, a mere incident in -the futilities of the scholastic world: but the view necessarily makes -itself a home in ethics, which is an essential part of philosophy; and -it is then in the actual world that the world learns the true meaning -of such theories.</p> - -<p>'As the view spreads that subjective conviction, and it alone, decides -the morality of an action, it follows that the charge of hypocrisy, -once so frequent, is now rarely heard. You can only qualify wickedness -as hypocrisy on the assumption that certain actions are inherently -and actually misdeeds, vices, and crimes, and that the defaulter -necessarily is aware of them as such, because he is aware of and -recognises the principles and outward acts of piety and honesty, even -in the pretence to which he misapplies them. In other words, it was -generally assumed as regards immorality that it is a duty to know the -good, and to be aware of its distinction from the bad. In any case it -was an absolute injunction which forbade the commission of vicious and -criminal acts, and which insisted on such actions being imputed to the -agent, so far as he was a man, not a beast. But if the good heart, -the good intention, the subjective conviction, are set forth as the -true sources of moral worth, then there is no longer any hypocrisy, or -immorality at all: for whatever one does, he can always justify it by -the reflection on it of good aims and motives; and by the influence of -that conviction it is good. There is no longer anything <i>inherently</i> -vicious or criminal: instead of the frank and free, hardened and -unperturbed sinner, comes the person whose mind is completely justified -by intention and conviction. My good intention in my act, and my -conviction of its goodness, make it good. We speak of judging and -estimating an <i>act.</i> But on this principle it is only the aim and -conviction of the agent—his faith—by which he ought to be judged. -And that not in the sense in which Christ requires faith in objective -truth, so that for one who has a bad faith, <i>i.e.</i> a conviction bad -in its content, the judgment to be pronounced must be bad, <i>i.e.</i> -conformable to this bad content. But faith here means only fidelity to -conviction. Has the man (we ask) in acting kept true to his conviction? -It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span> is formal subjective conviction on which alone the obligation of -duty is made to depend.</p> - -<p>'A principle like this, where conviction is expressly made something -subjective, cannot but suggest the thought of possible error, with the -further implied presupposition of an absolutely-existing law. But the -law is no agent: it is only the actual human being who acts; and in the -aforesaid principle the only question in estimating human actions is -how far he has received the law into his conviction. If, therefore, it -is not the actions which are to be estimated and generally measured by -that law, it is impossible to see what the law is for, and what end it -can serve. Such a law is degraded to a mere outside letter, in fact an -empty word; which is only made a law, <i>i.e.</i> invested with obligatory -force, by my conviction.</p> - -<p>'Such a law may claim its authority from God or the State: it may even -have the authority of tens of centuries during which it served as -the bond that gave men, with all their deed and destiny, subsistence -and coherence. And these are authorities in which are condensed the -convictions of countless individuals. And for me to set against that -the authority of my single conviction—for as my subjective conviction -its sole validity is authority—that self-conceit, monstrous as it at -first seems, is, in virtue of the principle that subjective conviction -is to be the rule, pronounced to be no self-conceit at all.</p> - -<p>'Even if reason and conscience—which shallow science and bad sophistry -can never altogether expel—admit, with a noble illogicality, that -error is possible, still by describing crime and wickedness as -only an error we minimise the fault. For to err is human:—Who has -not been mistaken on one point or another, whether he had fresh or -pickled cabbage for dinner, and about innumerable things more or less -important? But the difference of more or less importance disappears if -everything turns on the subjectivity of conviction and on persistency -in it. But the said noble illogicality which admits error to be -possible, when it comes round to say that a wrong conviction is only an -error, really only falls into a further illogicality—the illogicality -of dishonesty. One time conviction is made the basis of morality and -of man's supreme value, and is thus pronounced the supreme and holy. -Another time all we have to do with is an error: my conviction is -something trivial and casual, strictly speaking something outside, -that may turn out this way or that. And,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span> really, my being convinced -<i>is</i> something supremely trivial? if I cannot <i>know</i> truth, it is -indifferent how I think; and all that is left to my thinking is that -empty good,—a mere abstraction of generalisation.</p> - -<p>'It follows further that, on this principle of justification by -conviction, logic requires me, in dealing with the way others act -against my action, to admit that, so far as they in their belief and -conviction hold my actions to be crimes, they are quite in the right. -On such logic not merely do I gain nothing, I am even deposed from the -post of liberty and honour into a situation of slavery and dishonour. -Justice—which in the abstract is mine as well as theirs—I feel only -as a foreign subjective conviction, and in the execution of justice I -fancy myself to be only treated by an external force.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, § 23. Selbstdenken—to think and not merely to read or listen is -the recurrent cry of Fichte (<i>e.g. Werke,</i> ii. 329). According to the -editors of <i>Werke,</i> xv. 582, the reference here is to Schleiermacher -and to his Monologues. Really it is to the Romantic principle in -general, especially F. Schlegel.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, § 23. 'Fichte' <i>Werke,</i> ii, 404: 'Philosophy -(Wissenschaftslehre), besides (for the reason above noted that it has -no auxiliary, no vehicle of the intuition at all, except the intuition -itself), elevates the human mind higher than any geometry can It gives -the mind not only attentiveness, dexterity, stability, but at the same -time absolute independence, forcing it to be alone with itself, and -to live and manage by itself. Compared with it, every other mental -operation is infinitely easy; and to one who has been exercised in -it nothing comes hard. Besides as it prosecutes all objects of human -lore to the centre it accustoms the eye to hit the proper point at -first glance' in everything presented to it, and to prosecute it -undeviatingly For such a practical philosopher therefore there can be -nothing dark, complicated, and confused, if only he is acquainted with -the object of discussion. It comes always easiest to him to construct -everything afresh and <i>ab initio,</i> because he carries within him plans -for every scientific edifice. He finds his way easily, therefore, in -any complicated structure. Add to this the security and confidence of -glance which he has acquired in philosophy—the guide which conducts in -all <i>raisonnement</i> and the imperturbability with which his eye meets -every divergence from the accustomed path and every paradox. It would -be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> quite different with all human concerns, if men could only resolve -to believe their eyes. At present they inquire at their neighbours and -at antiquity what they really see, and by this distrust in themselves -errors are eternalised. Against this distrust the possessor of -philosophy is for ever protected. In a word, by philosophy the mind -of man comes to itself, and from henceforth rests on itself without -foreign aid, and is completely master of itself, as the dancer of his -feet, or the boxer of his hands.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, § 23. Aristotle, <i>Metaph.</i> i. 2, 19 (cf. <i>Eth.</i> x. 7). See also -<i>Werke,</i> xiv. 280 <i>seqq.</i></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, § 24. Schelling's expression, 'petrified intelligence.' The -reference is to some verses of Schelling in <i>Werke,</i> iv. 546 (first -published in <i>Zeitschrift für speculative Physik,</i> 1800). We have no -reason to stand in awe of the world, he says, which is a tame and quiet -beast—</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -Sterft zwar ein Riesengeist darinnen,<br /> -Ist aber versteinert mit allen Sinnen;<br /> -In todten und lebendigen Dingen<br /> -Thut nach Bewustseyn mächtig ringen.<br /> -</p> - -<p>In human shape he at length awakes from the iron sleep, from the long -dream: but as man he feels himself a stranger and exile; he would -fain return to great Nature; he fears what surrounds him and imagines -spectres, not knowing he might say of Nature to himself—</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -Ich bin der Gott, den sie im Busen hegt,<br /> -Der Geist, der sich in allem bewegt:<br /> -Vom frühsten Ringen dunkler Kräfte<br /> -Bis zum Erguss der ersten Lebenssäfte,<br /> -. . . . . . .<br /> -herauf zu des Gedankens Jugendkraft<br /> -Wodurch Natur verjüngt sich wieder schafft,<br /> -Ist eine kraft, ein Wechselspiel und Weben,<br /> -Ein Trieb und Drang nach immer höherm Leben.<br /> -</p> - -<p>Cf. Oken, <i>Naturphilosophie,</i>§ 2913: 'A natural body is a thought of -the primal act, turned rigid and crystallised,—a word of God.'</p> - -<p>Phrases of like import are not infrequent in Schelling's works (about -1800-1), <i>e.g. Werke,</i>1. Abth. iii. 341: 'The dead and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> unconscious -products of nature are only unsuccessful attempts to "reflect" itself; -so-called dead nature is in all cases an immature intelligence' -(unreife Intelligenz), or iv. 77, 'Nature itself is an intelligence, -as it were, turned to rigidity (erstarrte) with all its sensations and -perceptions'; and ii. 226 (<i>Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur,</i> -1797), 'Hence nature is only intelligence turned into the rigidity of -being; its qualities are sensations extinguished to being; bodies are -its perceptions, so to speak, killed.'</p> - -<p>A close approach to the phrase quoted is found in the words of another -of the 'Romantic' philosophers: 'Nature is a petrified magic-city' -(versteinerte Zauberstadt). (Novalis, <i>Schriften,</i> ii. 149.)</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, § 24. Cf. Fichte to Jacobi: (Jacobi's <i>Briefwechsel,</i> ii. 208) -'My absolute Ego is obviously not the individual: that explanation -comes from injured snobs and peevish philosophers, seeking to -impute to me the disgraceful doctrine of practical egoism. But the -<i>individual must be deduced from the absolute ego.</i> To that task my -philosophy will proceed in the "Natural Law." A finite being—it may -be deductively shown—can only think itself as a sense-being in a -sphere of sense-beings,—on one part of which (that which has no power -of origination) it has causality, while with the other part (to which -it attributes a subjectivity like its own) it stands in reciprocal -relations. In such circumstances it is called an individual, and the -conditions of individuality are called rights. As surely as it affirms -its individuality, so surely does it affirm such a sphere the two -conceptions indeed are convertible. So long as we look upon ourselves -as individuals—and we always so regard ourselves in life, though not -in philosophy and abstract imagination—we stand on what I call the -"practical" point of view in our reflections (while to the standpoint -of the absolute ego I give the name "speculative"). From the former -point of view there exists for us a world independent of us,—a world -we can only modify; whilst the pure ego (which even on this altitude -does not altogether disappear from us,) is put outside us and called -God. How else could we get the properties we ascribe to God and deny to -ourselves, did we not after all find them within us, and only refuse -them to ourselves in a certain respect, i.e., as individuals? When this -"practical" point of view predominates in our reflections, realism -is supreme: when speculation itself deduces and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span> recognises that -standpoint, there results a complete reconciliation between philosophy -and common sense as premised in my system.</p> - -<p>'For what good, then, is the speculative standpoint and the whole of -philosophy therewith, if it be not for life? Had humanity not tasted -of this forbidden fruit, it might dispense with all philosophy. But in -humanity there is a wish implanted to behold that region lying beyond -the individual; and to behold it not merely in a reflected light but -face to face. The first who raised a question about God's existence -broke through the barriers, he shook humanity in its main foundation -pillars, and threw it out of joint into an intestine strife which is -not yet settled, and which can only be settled by advancing boldly -to that supreme point from which the speculative and the practical -appear to be at one. We began to philosophise from pride of heart, and -thus lost our innocence: we beheld our nakedness, and ever since we -philosophise from the need of our redemption.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_50">50</a>. Physics and Philosophy of Nature: cf. <i>Werke,</i> vii. i, p. 18: -'The Philosophy of Nature takes up the material, prepared for it by -physics out of experience, at the point to which physics has brought -it, and again transforms it, without basing it ultimately on the -authority of experience. Physics therefore must work into the hands of -philosophy, so that the latter may translate into a true comprehension -(Begriff) the abstract universal transmitted to it, showing how it -issues from that comprehension as an intrinsically necessary whole. The -philosophic way of putting the facts is no mere whim once in a way, -by way of change, to walk on the head, after walking a long while on -the legs, or once in a way to see our every-day face besmeared with -paint. No; it is because the method of physics does not satisfy the -comprehension, that we have to go on further.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, § 24. The distinction of ordinary and speculative Logic -is partly like that made by Fichte (i. 68) between Logic and -Wissenschaftslehre. 'The former,' says Fichte, 'is conditioned and -determined by the latter.' Logic deals only with form; epistomology -with import as well.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, § 24. The Mosaic legend of the Fall; cf. similar interpretations -in Kant: <i>Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft</i>, -1<sup>ster</sup> Stück; and Schelling, <i>Werke,</i> i. (1. Abth.) 34.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span></p> - - -<h6>CHAPTER III.</h6> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, § 28. Fichte—to emphasise the experiential truth of his -system—says (<i>Werke,</i> ii. 331): 'There was a philosophy which -professed to be able to expand by mere <i>inference</i> the range thus -indicated for philosophy. According to it, thinking was—not, as we -have described it, the analysis of what was given and the recombining -of it in other forms, but at the same time—a production and creation -of something quite new. In this system the philosopher found himself -in the exclusive possession of certain pieces of knowledge which the -vulgar understanding had to do without. In it the philosopher could -reason out for himself a God and an immortality and talk himself into -the conclusion that he was wise and good.'</p> - -<p>Wolfs definition of philosophy is 'the Science of the possible in so -far as it can be'; and the possible = the non-contradictory.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, § 29. The oriental sage corresponds (cf. Hegel, <i>Werke,</i> xii. -229) to the writer known as Dionysius the Areopagite (<i>De Mystica -Theologia,</i> and <i>De Divitus Nominibus.</i>)—The same problem as to the -relation of the Infinite (God) to the Finite (world) is discussed in -Jewish speculation (by Saadia, Mamuni, <i>&c.</i>) as the question of the -divine names,—a dogma founded on the thirteen names (or attributes) -applied to God in Exodus xxxiv. 6. (Cf. D. Kaufmann, <i>Geschichte der -Attributenlehre.</i>) The same spirit has led to the list of ninety-nine -'excellent names' of Allah in Islam, a list which tradition derives -from Mohammed.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, § 31. Cf. <i>Werke,</i> ii. 47 <i>seqq.:</i> 'The nature of the judgment -or proposition—involving as it does a distinction of subject and -predicate—is destroyed by the "speculative" proposition. This conflict -of the propositional form with the unity of comprehension which -destroys it is like the antagonism in rhythm between metre and accent. -The rhythm results from the floating "mean" and unification of the two. -Hence even in the "philosophical" proposition the identity of subject -and predicate is not meant to annihilate their difference (expressed by -the propositional form): their unity is meant to issue as a <i>harmony.</i> -The propositional form lets appear the definite shade or accent -pointing to a distinction in its fulfilment: whereas in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> the predicate -giving expression to the substance, and the subject itself falling -into the universal, we have the unity in which that accent is heard no -more. Thus in the proposition "God is Being" the predicate is Being; it -represents the substance in which the subject is dissolved away. Being -is here meant not to be predicate but essence: and in that way God -seems to cease to be what he is—by his place in the proposition—viz. -the permanent subject. The mind—far from getting further forward in -the passage from subject to predicate—feels itself rather checked, -through the loss of the subject, and thrown back, from a sense of its -loss, to the thought of the subject. Or,—since the predicate itself -is enunciated as a subject (as Being or as Essence) which exhausts the -nature of the subject, it again comes face to face with the subject -even in the predicate.—Thought thus loses its solid objective ground -which it had on the subject: yet at the same time in the predicate it -is thrown back upon it, and instead of getting to rest in itself it -returns upon the subject of the content.—To this unusual check and -arrest are in the main due the complaints as to the unintelligibility -of philosophical works,—supposing the individual to possess any other -conditions of education needed for understanding them.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, § 32. On the relation of dogmatism and scepticism see the -introduction to Kant's <i>Criticism of Pure Reason,</i> and compare Caird's -<i>Critical Philosophy of I. Kant,</i> vol. i. chap. i.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, § 33. The subdivision of 'theoretical' philosophy or metaphysics -into the four branches, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology (rational and -empirical), and Natural Theology, is more or less common to the whole -Wolfian School. Wolf's special addition to the preceding scholastic -systems is found in the conception of a general Cosmology. Metaphysics -precedes physics, and the departments of practical philosophy. In -front of all stands logic or rational philosophy. Empirical psychology -belongs properly to physics, but reasons of practical convenience put -it elsewhere.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, § 34. The question of the 'Seat of the Soul' is well known in -the writings of Lotze (<i>e.g. Metaphysic,</i> § 291).</p> - -<p>Absolute actuosity. The <i>Notio Dei</i> according to Thomas Aquinas, as -well as the dogmatics of post-Reformation times, is <i>actus purus</i> -(or <i>actus purissimus</i>). For God <i>nihil potentialitatis habet.</i> Cf. -<i>Werke, xii.</i>228: 'Aristotle especially has conceived God under the -abstract category of activity. Pure activity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span> is knowledge (Wissen)—in -the scholastic age, <i>actus purus</i>—: but in order to be put as -activity, it must be put in its "moments." For knowledge we require -another thing which is known: and which, when knowledge knows it, is -thereby appropriated. It is implied in this that God—the eternal and -self-subsistent—eternally begets himself as his Son,—distinguishes -himself from himself. But what he thus distinguishes from himself, -has not the shape of an otherness: but what is distinguished is -<i>ipso facto</i> identical with what it is parted from. God is spirit: -no darkness, no colouring or mixture enters this pure light. The -relationship of father and son is taken from organic life and used -metaphorically—the natural relation is only pictorial and hence does -not quite correspond to what is to be expressed. We say, God eternally -begets his Son, God distinguishes himself from himself: and thus we -begin from God, saying he does this, and in the other he creates is -utterly with himself (the form of Love): but we must be well aware -that God is this <i>whole action itself</i> God is the beginning; he does -this: but equally is he only the end, the totality: and as such -totality he is spirit. God as merely the Father is not yet the true -(it is the Jewish religion where he is thus without the Son): He is -rather beginning and end: He is his presupposition, makes himself a -presupposition (this is only another form of distinguishing): He is the -eternal process.'</p> - -<p>Nicolaus Cusanus speaks of God (<i>De docta Ignorantia,</i> ii. I) as -<i>infinita actualitas quae est actu omnis essendi possibilitas.</i> The -term 'actuosity' seems doubtful.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, § 36. <i>Sensus eminentior.</i> Theology distinguishes three modes in -which the human intelligence can attain a knowledge of God. By the <i>via -causalitatis</i> it argues that God is; by the <i>via negationis,</i> what he -is not; by the <i>via eminentiae,</i> it gets a glimpse of the relation in -which he stands to us. It regards God <i>i.e.</i> as the cause of the finite -universe; but as God is infinite, all that is predicated of him must be -taken as merely approximative (<i>sensu eminentiori</i>) and there is left -a vast remainder which can only be filled up with negations [Durandus -de S. Porciano on the Sentent, i. 3. I]. The <i>sensus eminentior</i> is -the subject of Spinoza's strictures, Ep. 6 (56 in Opp. ii. 202): while -Leibniz adopts it in the preface to <i>Théodicée,</i> 'Les perfections de -Dieu sont celles de nos âmes, mais il les possède sans bornes: il est -un océan, dont nous n'avons reçu<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span> que les gouttes; il y a en nous -quelque puissance, quelque connaissance, quelque bonté; mais elles sont -toutes entières en Dieu.'</p> - -<p>The <i>via causalitatis</i> infers <i>e.g.,</i> from the existence of morality -and intelligence here, a Being whose will finds expression therein: the -<i>via eminentiae</i> infers that that will is good, and that intelligence -wise in the highest measure, and the <i>via negationis</i> sets aside in the -conception of God all the limitations and conditions to which human -intelligence and will are subject.</p> - - -<h6>CHAPTER IV.</h6> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, § 38. The verses (forming part of the advice which -Mephistopheles, personating Faust, gives to the recently-arrived -pupil) stand in the original in a different order: beginning "Dann hat -er die Theile in seiner Hand," &c. The meaning of these and the two -preceding lines is somewhat as follows, in versification even laxer -than Goethe's:—</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -If you want to describe life and gather its meaning,<br /> -To drive out its spirit most be your beginning,<br /> -Then though fast in your hand lie the parts one by one<br /> -The spirit that linked them, alas! is gone.<br /> -And 'Nature's Laboratory' is only a name<br /> -That the chemist bestows on't to hide his own shame.<br /> -</p> - -<p>One may compare <i>Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre,</i> iii. 3, where it is -remarked, in reference to some anatomical exercises: 'You will learn -ere long that building-up is more instructive than tearing-down, -combining more than separating, animating the dead more than killing -again what was killed already.... Combining means more than separating: -reconstructing more than onlooking.' The first part of <i>Faust</i> appeared -1808: the <i>Wanderjahre,</i> 1828-9.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, § 39. The article on the 'Relation of scepticism to philosophy, -an exposition of its various modifications, and comparison of the -latest with the ancient'—in form a review of G. E. Schulze's -<i>Criticism of Theoretical Philosophy</i>'—was republished in vol. xvi. of -Hegel's <i>Werke</i> (vol. i. of the <i>Vermischte Schriften</i>).</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, § 42. In an earlier review of Kant's work (<i>Werke,</i> i. 83) on -Glauben und Wissen (an article in Sendling and Hegel's <i>Journal</i>) -Hegel attaches more weight to a factor in the critical theory of -knowledge, here neglected. Kant, he says, has—<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span>within the limits -allowed by his psychological terms of thought—'put (in an excellent -way) the <i>à priori</i> of sensibility into the original identity and -multiplicity, and that as transcendental imagination in the "higher -power" of an immersion of unity in multiplicity: whilst Understanding -(Verstand) he makes to consist in the elevation to universality of this -<i>à priori</i> synthetic unity of sensibility,—whereby this identity is -invested with a comparative antithesis to the sensibility: and Reason -(Vernunft) is presented as a still higher power over the preceding -comparative antithesis, without however this universality and infinity -being allowed to go beyond the stereotyped formal pure infinity. -This genuinely rational construction by which, though the bad name -"faculties" is left, there is in truth presented a single identity -of them all, is transformed by Jacobi into a series of faculties, -<i>resting</i> one upon another.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, § 42. Fichte: cf. <i>Werke,</i> i. 420: 'I have said before, and -say it here again, that my system is no other than the Kantian. That -means: it contains the same view of facts, but in its method is quite -independent of the Kantian exposition.' 'Kant, up to now, is a closed -book.'—i. 442. There are two ways of critical idealism. 'Either' (as -Fichte) 'it actually deduces from the fundamental laws of intelligence, -that system of necessary modes of action, and with it, at the same -time, the objective conceptions thus arising, and thus lets the whole -compass of our conceptions gradually arise under the eyes of the reader -or hearer; or' (like Kant and his unprogressive disciples) 'it gets -hold of these laws from anywhere and anyhow, as they are immediately -applied to objects, therefore on their lowest grade (—on this grade -they are called <i>categories),</i> and then asseverates that it is by -these that objects are determined and arranged.' And i. 478: 'I know -that the categories which Kant laid down are in no way <i>proved</i> by -him to be conditions of self-consciousness, but only said to be so: -I know that space and time and what in the original consciousness is -inseparable from them and fills them both, are still less deduced as -such conditions, for of them it is not even said expressly—as of the -categories—that they are so, but only inferentially. But I believe -quite as surely that I know that Kant had the thought of such a system: -that everything he actually propounds are fragments and results of this -system; and that his statements have meaning and coherence only on this -presupposition.' Cf. viii. 362.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, § 42. Transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Kant's <i>Kritik -der reinen Vernunft,</i> § 16: 'The <i>I think</i> must be able to accompany -all my ideas.... This idea is an act of spontaneity. ... I name it -pure apperception ... or original apperception ... because it is that -self-consciousness which can be accompanied by none further. The unity -of it I also call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in -order to denote the possibility of cognition <i>à priori</i> from it.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, § 44. <i>Caput mortuum:</i> a term of the Alchemists to denote the -non-volatile precipitate left in the retort after the spirit had been -extracted: the fixed or dead remains, 'quando spiritus animam sursum -vexit.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, § 45. Reason and Understanding. In the Wolfian School (<i>e.g.</i> -in Baumgarten's <i>Metaphysik,</i> § 468) the term intellect (Verstand) -is used of the general faculty of higher cognition, while <i>ratio</i> -(Vernunft) specially denotes the power of seeing distinctly the -connexions of things. So Wolff (<i>Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, &c.</i> § -277) defines Verstand as 'the faculty of distinctly representing the -possible,' and Vernunft (§ 368) as 'the faculty of seeing into the -connexion of truths.' It is on this use of <i>Reason</i> as the faculty of -inference that Kant's use of the term is founded: though it soon widely -departs from its origin. For upon the 'formal' use of reason as the -faculty of syllogising, Kant superinduces a transcendental use as a -'faculty of <i>principles</i>,' while the understanding is only 'a faculty -of <i>rules.'</i> 'Reason,' in other words, 'itself begets conceptions,' -and 'maxims, which it borrows neither from the senses nor from the -understanding.' (<i>Kritik d. r. Vern., Dialektik,</i> Einleit. ii. A.) And -the essential aim of Reason is to give unity to the various cognitions -of understanding. While the unity given by understanding is 'unity of -a possible experience,' that sought by reason is the discovery of an -unconditioned which will complete the unity of the former (<i>Dial.</i> -Einleit. iv), or of 'the totality of the conditions to a given -conditioned.' (<i>Dial,</i> vii.)</p> - -<p>It is this distinction of the terms which is dominant in Fichte and -Hegel, where Verstand is the more practical intellect which seeks -definite and restricted results and knowledges, while Vernunft is -a deeper and higher power which aims at completeness. In Goethe's -more reflective prose we see illustrations of this usage: <i>e.g. -Wilh. Meister's Wanderjahre,</i> i. it is said to be the object of -the 'reasonable' man 'das entgegengesetzte zu überschauen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> und in -Uebereinstimmung zu bringen': or Bk. ii. Reasonable men when they have -devised something verständig to get this or that difficulty out of the -way, &c. Goethe, in his <i>Sprüche in Prosa</i> (896), <i>Werke,</i> iii. 281, -says 'Reason has for its province the thing in process (das Werdende), -understanding the thing completed (das Gewordene): the former does not -trouble itself about the purpose, the latter asks not whence. Reason -takes delight in developing; understanding wishes to keep everything as -it is, so as to use it.' (Similarly in Eckermann's Convers. Feb. 13, -1829.) Cf. Oken, Naturphilosophie, § 2914. Verstand ist Microcosmus, -Vernunft Macrocosmus.</p> - -<p>Kant's use of the term Reason, coupled with his special view of -Practical Reason and his use of the term Faith (Glaube), leads on to -the terminology of Jacobi. In earlier writings Jacobi had insisted on -the contrast between the superior authority of feeling and faith (which -are in touch with truth) and the mechanical method of intelligence and -reasoning (Verstand and Vernunft). At a later period however he changed -and fixed the nomenclature of his distinction. What he had first called -Glaube he latterly called Vernunft,—which is in brief a 'sense for -the supersensible'—an intuition giving higher and complete or total -knowledge—an immediate apprehension of the real and the true. As -contrasted with this reasonable faith or feeling, he regards Verstand -as a mere faculty of inference or derivative knowledge, referring one -thing to another by the rule of identity.</p> - -<p>This distinction which is substantially reproduced by Coleridge -(though with certain clauses that show traces of Schellingian -influence) has connexions—like so much else in Jacobi—with the -usage of Schopenhauer, 'Nobody,' says Jacobi, 'has ever spoken of an -animal Vernunft: a mere animal Verstand however we all know and speak -of.' (Jacobi's <i>Werke,</i> iii. 8.) Schopenhauer repeats and enforces -the remark. All animals possess, says Schopenhauer, the power of -apprehending causality, of cognising objects: a power of immediate and -intuitive knowledge of real things: this is Verstand. But Vernunft, -which is peculiar to man, is the cognition of <i>truth</i> (not of reality): -it is an abstract judgment with a sufficient reason (<i>Welt als W.</i> i. § -6).</p> - -<p>One is tempted to connect the modern distinction with an older one -which goes back in its origin to Plato and Aristotle, but takes form in -the Neo-Platonist School, and enters the Latin world through Boëthius. -<i>Consol. Phil.</i> iv. 6: <i>Igitur uti est ad<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span> intellectum ratiocinatio, -ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus,</i> and in v. -4 there is a full distinction of <i>sensus, imaginatio, ratio</i> and -<i>intelligentia</i> in ascending order. <i>Ratio</i> is the discursive knowledge -of the idea (<i>universali consideratione perpendit): intelligentia</i> -apprehends it at once, and as a simple <i>forma (pura mentis acie -contuetur)</i>: [cf. Stob. <i>Ed.</i> i. 826-832: Porphyr. <i>Sentent.</i>15]. -Reasoning belongs to the human species, just as intelligence to the -divine alone. Yet it is assumed—in an attempt to explain divine -foreknowledge and defend freedom—that man may in some measure place -himself on the divine standpoint (v. 5).</p> - -<p>This contrast between a higher mental faculty (<i>mens</i>) and a lower -(<i>ratio</i>) which even Aquinas adopts from the interpretation of -Aristotle (<i>Summa Theol.</i> i. 79, 9) is the favourite weapon in the -hands of mysticism. After the example of Dionysius Areop., Nicolaus of -Cusa, Reuchlin, and other thinkers of the Renaissance depreciate mere -discursive thought and logical reasoning. It is the inner <i>mens</i>—like -a simple ray of light—penetrating by an immediate and indivisible -act to the divine—which gives us access to the supreme science. This -<i>simplex intelligentia,—</i> superior to imagination or reasoning—as -Gerson says, <i>Consid. de Th.</i> 10, is sometimes named <i>mens,</i> sometimes -<i>Spiritus,</i> the light of intelligence, the shadow of the angelical -intellect, the divine light. From Scotus Erigena to Nicolas of Cusa -one tradition is handed down: it is taken up by men like Everard Digby -(in his <i>Theoria Analytica</i>) and the group of Cambridge Platonists and -by Spinoza in the seventeenth century, and it reappears, profoundly -modified, in the German idealism between 1790 and 1820.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, § 48. 'Science of Logic'; Hegel's large work on the subject, -published between 1812-16. The discussions on the Antinomies belong -chiefly to the first part of it.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, § 50. 'Natural Theology,' here to be taken in a narrower sense -than in p. 73, where it is equivalent to Rational Theology in general. -Here it means 'Physico-theology'—the argument from design in nature.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, § 50. Spinoza—defining God as 'the union of thought with -extension.' This is not verbally accurate; for according to <i>Ethica,</i> -i. pr. 11, God, or the substance, consists of infinite attributes, -each of which expresses the eternal and infinite essence. But Spinoza -mentions of 'attributes' only two: <i>Ethica,</i> ii. pr. 1. I Thought is -an attribute of God: pr. 2, Extension is an attribute<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span> of God. And he -adds, <i>Ethica,</i> i. pr. 10, Schol. 'All the attributes substance has -were always in it together, nor can one be produced by another.' And -in <i>Ethica,</i> ii. 7. Sch. it is said: 'Thinking substance and extended -substance is one and the same substance which is comprehended now under -this, now under that attribute.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, § 54. 'Practical in the true sense of the word.' Cf. Kant, -<i>Werke,</i> Ros. and Sch. i. 581: 'A great misunderstanding, exerting an -injurious influence on scientific methods, prevails with regard to what -should be considered "practical" in such sense as to justify its place -in practical philosophy. Diplomacy and finance, rules of economy no -less than rules of social intercourse, precepts of health and dietetic -of the soul no less than the body, have been classed as practical -philosophy on the mere ground that they all contain a collection of -practical propositions. Hut although such practical propositions -differ in mode of statement from the theoretical propositions which -have for import the possibility of things and the exposition of their -nature, they have the same content. "Practical," properly so called, -are only those propositions which relate to <i>Liberty</i> under laws. All -others whatever are nothing but the theory of what pertains to the -<i>nature</i> of things—only that theory is brought to bear on the way in -which the things may be produced by us in conformity with a principle; -<i>i.e.</i> the possibility of the things is presented as the result of -a voluntary action which itself too may be counted among physical -causes.' And Kant, <i>Werke,</i> iv. 10. 'Hence a sum of practical precepts -given by philosophy does not form a special part of it (co-ordinate -with the theoretical) merely because they are practical. Practical -they might be, even though their principle were wholly derived from -the theoretical knowledge of nature,—as <i>technico-practical</i> rules. -They are practical in the true sense, when and because their principle -is not borrowed from the nature-conception (which is always sensuously -conditioned) and rests therefore on the supersensible, which the -conception of liberty alone makes knowable by formal laws. They are -therefore ethico-practical, <i>i.e.</i> not merely <i>precepts and rules</i> with -this or that intention, but laws without antecedent reference to ends -and intentions.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, § 54. Eudaemonism. But there is Eudaemonism and Eudaemonism; -as Cf. Hegel, <i>Werke,</i> i. 8. 4 The time had come when the infinite -longing away beyond the body and the world<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span> had reconciled itself -with the reality of existence. Yet the reality which the soul was -reconciled to—the objective which the subjectivity recognised—was -actually only empirical existence, common world and actuality.... And -though the reconciliation was in its heart and ground sure and fast, -it still needed an objective form for this ground: the very necessity -of nature made the blind certitude of immersion in the reality of -empirical existence seek to provide itself with a justification and a -good conscience. This reconciliation for consciousness was found in the -Happiness-doctrine: the fixed point it started from being the empirical -subject, and what it was reconciled to, the vulgar actuality, whereon -it might now confide, and to which it might surrender itself without -sin. The profound coarseness and utter vulgarity, which is at the basis -of this happiness-doctrine, has its only elevation in its striving -after justification and a good conscience, which however can get no -further than the objectivity of mere intellectualism.</p> - -<p>'The dogmatism of eudaemonism and of popular philosophy (Aufklärung) -therefore did not consist in the fact that it made happiness and -enjoyment the supreme good. For if Happiness be comprehended as an -<i>Idea,</i> it ceases to be something empirical and casual—as also to be -anything sensuous. In the supreme existence, reasonable act (Thun) and -supreme enjoyment are one. So long as supreme blessedness is supreme -<i>Idea</i> it matters not whether we try to apprehend the supreme existence -on the side of its ideality,—which, as isolated may be first called -reasonable act—or on the side of its reality—which as isolated may -be first called enjoyment and feeling. For reasonable act and supreme -enjoyment, ideality and reality are both alike in it and identical. -Every philosophy has only one problem—to construe supreme blessedness -as supreme Idea. So long as it is by reason that supreme enjoyment is -ascertained, the distinguishability of the two at once disappears: -for this comprehension and the infinity which is dominant in act, and -the reality and finitude which is dominant in enjoyment, are taken up -into one another. The controversy with happiness becomes a meaningless -chatter, when happiness is known as the blessed enjoyment of the -eternal intuition. But what was called eudaemonism meant—it must -be said—an empirical happiness, an enjoyment of sensation, not the -eternal intuition and blessedness.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, § 55. Schiller. <i>Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> -Menschen</i>(1795), 18th letter. 'Through beauty the sensuous man is led -to form and to thought; through beauty the intellectual man is led back -to matter and restored to the sense-world. Beauty combines two states -which are opposed to one another.' Letter 25. 'We need not then have -any difficulty about finding a way from sensuous dependence to moral -liberty, after beauty has given a case where liberty can completely -co-exist with dependence, and where man in order to show himself an -intelligence need not make his escape from matter. If—as the fact -of beauty teaches—man is free even in association with the senses, -and if—as the conception necessarily involves—liberty is something -absolute and supersensible, there can no longer be any question how -he comes to elevate himself from limitations to the absolute: for -in beauty this has already come to pass.' Cf. <i>Ueber Anmuth und -Würde</i>(1793). 'It is in a beautiful soul, then, that sense and reason, -duty and inclination harmonize; and grace is their expression in the -appearance. Only in the service of a beautiful soul can nature at the -same time possess liberty.' (See Bosanquet's <i>History of Aesthetic.</i>)</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, § 60. The quotation in the note comes from § 87 of the <i>Kritik -der Urtheilskraft</i> (<i>Werke,</i> ed. Ros. and Sch. iv. 357).</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, § 60. Fichte, <i>Werke,</i> i. 279. 'The principle of life and -consciousness, the ground of its possibility, is (as has been shown) -certainly contained in the Ego: yet by this means there arises no -actual life, no empirical life in time—and another life is for us -utterly unthinkable. If such an actual life is to be possible, there -is still needed for that a special impulse (Aufstoss) striking the -Ego from the Non-ego. According to my system, therefore, the ultimate -ground of all actuality for the Ego is an original action and re-action -between the Ego and something outside it, of which all that can be said -is that it must be completely opposed to the Ego. In this reciprocal -action nothing is brought into the Ego, nothing foreign imported; -everything that is developed from it <i>ad infinitum</i> is developed from -it solely according to its own laws. The Ego is merely put in motion by -that opposite, so as to act; and without such a first mover it would -never have acted; and, as its existence consists merely in action, it -would not even have existed. But the source of motion has no further -attributes than to set in motion, to be an opposing force which as such -is only felt.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span></p> - -<p>'My philosophy therefore is realistic. It shows that the consciousness -of finite natures cannot at all be explained, unless we assume a force -existing independently of them, and completely opposed to them;—on -which as regards their empirical existence they are dependent. But -it asserts nothing further than such an opposed force, which is -merely <i>felt,</i> but not <i>cognised,</i> by finite beings. All possible -specifications of this force or non-ego, which may present themselves -<i>ad infinitum</i> in our consciousness, my system engages to deduce from -the specifying faculty of the Ego....</p> - -<p>'That the finite mind must necessarily assume outside it something -absolute (a Ding:an:sich), and yet must on the other hand acknowledge -that this something only exists for the mind (is a necessary noümenon): -this is the circle which may be infinitely expanded, but from which the -finite mind can never issue.' Cf. Fichte's <i>Werke,</i> i. 248, ii. 478.</p> - - -<h6>CHAPTER V.</h6> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, § 62. F. H. Jacobi (<i>Werke,</i> v. 82) in his <i>Woldemar</i> (a -romance contained in a series of letters, first published <i>as a whole</i> -in 1781) writes: 'The philosophical understanding (Verstand) is jealous -of everything unique, everything immediately certain which makes itself -true, without proofs, solely by its existence. It persecutes this -faith of reason even into our inmost consciousness, where it tries to -make us distrust the feeling of our identity and personality.' 'What -is absolutely and intrinsically true,' he adds (v. 122), 'is not got -by way of reasoning and comparison: both our immediate consciousness -(Wissen)—I am—and our conscience (Gewissen) are the work of a secret -something in which heart, understanding, and sense combine.' 'Notions -(Begriffe), far from embalming the living, really turn it into a -corpse' (v. 380).</p> - -<p>Cf. Fichte's words (<i>Werke,</i> ii. 255), Aus dem Gewissen allein stammt -die Wahrheit, &c.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, § 62. The Letters on the doctrine of Spinoza, published in -1785, were re-issued in 1789 with eight supplements.</p> - -<p>'A science,' says Jacobi in his latest utterance (<i>Werke,</i> iv. pref. -xxx.) 'is only a systematic register of cognitions mutually referring -to one another—the first and last point in the series is wanting.'</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, § 62. Lalande's dictum is referred to by Fries (<i>Populäre -Vorlesungen über Sternkunde,</i> 1813) quoted by Jacobi in his <i>Werke,</i> -ii. 55. What Lalande has actually written in the preface to his work on -astronomy is that the science as he understands it has no relation to -natural theology—in other words, that he is not writing a Bridgewater -treatise.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, § 63. Jacobi, <i>Werke,</i> ii. 222. 'For my part, I regard the -principle of reason as all one with the principle of life.' And ii. -343: 'Evidently reason is the true and proper life of our nature.' -It is in virtue of our inner tendency and instinct towards the -eternal (Richtung und Trieb auf das Ewige),—of our sense for the -supersensible—that we, human beings, really subsist (iv. 6. 152). And -this Organ der Vernehmung des Uebersinnlichen is Reason (iii. 203, &c.).</p> - -<p>The language of Jacobi fluctuates, not merely in words, but in the -intensity of his intuitionalism. Thus, <i>e.g.</i> iii. 32: 'The reason man -has is no faculty giving the science of the true, but only a presage' -(Ahndung des Wahren). 'The belief in a God,' he says, at one time (iii. -206) 'is as natural to man as his upright position': but that belief -is, he says elsewhere, only 'an inborn devotion (Andacht) before an -unknown God.' Thus, if we have an immediate awareness (Wissen) of -God, this is not knowledge or science (Wissenschaft). Such intuition -of reason is described (ii. 9) as 'the faculty of <i>presupposing</i> the -intrinsically (an sich) true, good, and beautiful, with full confidence -in the objective validity of the presupposition.' But that object we -are let see only in feeling (ii. 61). 'Our philosophy,' he says (iii. -6) 'starts from feeling—of course an objective and pure feeling.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, § 63. Jacobi (<i>Werke,</i> iv. a, p. 211): 'Through faith (Glaube) -we know that we have a body.' Such immediate knowledge of our own -activity—'the feeling of I am, I act' (iii. 411)—the sense of -'absolute self-activity' or freedom (of which the 'possibility cannot -be cognised,' because logically a contradiction) is what Jacobi calls -Anschauung (Intuition). He distinguishes a sensuous, and a rational -intuition (iii. 59).</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, § 63. Jacobi expressly disclaims identification of his Glaube -with the faith of Christian doctrine (<i>Werke,</i> iv. a, p. 210). In -defence he quotes from Hume, Inquiry V, and from Reid, passages to -illustrate his usage of the term 'belief—by the distinction between -which and faith certain ambiguities are no doubt avoided.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, § 66. Kant had said <i>'Concepts without intuitions are empty'</i> -It is an exaggeration of this half-truth (the other half is <i>Intuitions -without concepts are blind</i>) that is the basis of these statements of -Jacobi (and of Schopenhauer)—a view of which the following passage -from Schelling (<i>Werke,</i> ii. 125) is representative. 'Concepts -(Begriffe) are only silhouettes of reality. They are projected by -a serviceable faculty, the understanding, which only comes into -action when reality is already on the scene,—which only comprehends, -conceives, retains what it required a creative faculty to produce.... -The mere concept is a word without meaning.... All reality that can -attach to it is lent to it merely by the intuition (Anschauung) which -preceded it. ... Nothing is real for us except what is <i>immediately -given</i> us, without any mediation by concepts, without our feeling at -liberty. But nothing reaches us immediately except through intuition.' -He adds, however, 'Intuition is due to the activity of mind (Sein): -it demands a disengaged sense (freier Sinn) and an intellectual organ -(geistiges Organ).'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_134">134</a>. Cicero: <i>De Natura Deorum,</i> i. 16; ii. 4, <i>De quo autem omnium -natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est</i>; cf. Seneca, Epist. cxvii. -6. The principle is common to Stoics and Epicureans: it is the maxim -of Catholic truth <i>Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum -est</i>—equivalent to Aristotle's ὄ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἷναι φάμεν—But as -Aristotle remarks (<i>An. Post.</i> i. 31) τὸ καθόλον καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδίνατον -αἰσθάνεσθαι.</p> - -<p>Jacobi: <i>Werke,</i> vi. 145. 'The general opinion about what is true and -good must have an authority equal to reason.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, § 72. Cf. <i>Encyclop.</i> § 400: 'That the heart and the feeling -is not the form by which anything is justified as religious, moral, -true, and just, and that an appeal to heart and feeling either means -nothing or means something bad, should hardly need enforcing. Can any -experience be more trite than that hearts and feelings are also bad, -evil, godless, mean, &c.? Ay, that the heart is the source of such -feelings only, is directly said in the words: Out of the heart proceed -evil thoughts, &c. In times when the heart and the sentiment are, by -scientific theology and philosophy, made the criterion of goodness, -religion, and morality, it is necessary to recall these trivial -experiences.'</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span></p> - - -<h6>CHAPTER VI.</h6> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, § 80. Goethe; the reference is to <i>Werke,</i> ii. 268 (Natur und -Kunst):</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -Wer Groszes will, muß sich zusammenraffen:<br /> -In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister,<br /> -Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben.<br /> -</p> - -<p>Such 'limitation' of aim and work is a frequent lesson in <i>Wilhelm -Meister's Wanderjahre, e.g.</i> i. ch. 4. 'Many-sidedness prepares, -properly speaking, only the element in which the one-sided can act.... -The best thing is to restrict oneself to a handi-work.' And i. ch. 12: -'To be acquainted with and to exercise one thing rightly gives higher -training than mere tolerableness (halfness) in a hundred sorts of -things.' And ii. ch. 12: 'Your general training and all establishments -for the purpose are fool's farces.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, § 81. Cf. Fichte, <i>Werke,</i> ii. 37. 'Yet it is not <i>we</i> who -analyse: but knowledge analyses itself, and can do so, because in all -its being it is a <i>for-self</i> (Für:sich),' &c.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, § 81. Plato, the inventor of Dialectic. Sometimes on the -authority of Aristotle, as reported by <i>Diog. Laert.</i> ix. 25, Zeno of -Elea gets this title; but Hegel refers to such statements as <i>Diog. -Laer,',</i> ii. 34 τρίτον δὲ Πλάτων προσέθηκε τὸν διαλεκτικὸν λόγον, καὶ -ἐτελεσιουργῆσε φιλοσοφίαν.</p> - -<p>Protagoras. But it is rather in the dialogue <i>Meno,</i> pp. 81-97, -that Plato exhibits this view of knowledge. Cf. <i>Phaedo,</i>72 E, and -<i>Phaedrus,</i> 245.</p> - -<p>Parmenides; especially see Plat. <i>Parmen.</i> pp. 142, 166; cf. Hegel, -<i>Werke,</i> xi v. 204.</p> - -<p>With Aristotle dialectic is set in contrast to apodictic, and treated -as (in the modern sense) a quasi-inductive process (Ar. <i>Top.</i> Lib. -viii.): with the Stoics, dialectic is the name of the half-rhetorical -logic which they, rather than Aristotle, handed on to the schoolmen of -the Middle Ages.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, § 81. The physical elements are fire, air, earth, and water. -Earthquakes, storms, &c., are examples of the 'meteorological process.' -Cf. <i>Encyclop.</i> §§ 281-289.</p> - -<p>P. 152, § 82. Dialectic; cf: <i>Werke,</i> v. 326 seqq.</p> - -<p>P. 154, § 82. Mysticism; cf. Mill's <i>Logic,</i> bk. v, ch. 3, § 4: -'Mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span> existence -to the subjective creations of the mind's own faculties, to mere ideas -of the intellect; and believing that by watching and contemplating -these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in -the world without.' Mill thus takes it as equivalent to an ontological -mythology—probably a rare use of the term.</p> - - -<h6>CHAPTER VII.</h6> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, § 85. The Absolute. The term, in something like its modern -usage, is at least as old as Nicolaus Cusanus. God, according to him, -is the <i>absoluta omnium quidditas (Apol.</i>406), the <i>esse absolutum,</i> or -<i>ipsum esse in existentibus</i> (<i>De ludo Globi,</i> ii. 161 a), the <i>unum -absolutum,</i> the <i>vis absoluta,</i> or <i>possibilitas absoluta,</i> or <i>valor -absolutus: absoluta vita, absoluta ratio: absoluta essendi forma.</i> On -this term and its companion <i>infinities</i> he rings perpetual changes. -But its distinct employment to denote the 'metaphysical God' is much -more modern. In Kant, <i>e.g.</i> the 'Unconditioned' (Das Unbedingte) -is the metaphysical, corresponding to the religious, conception of -deity; and the same is the case with Fichte, who however often makes -use of the adjective 'absolute.' It is with Schelling that the term -is naturalised in philosophy: it already appears in his works of 1793 -and 1795: and from him apparently it finds its way into Fichte's -<i>Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre</i> of 1801 (<i>Werke,</i> ii. 13) 'The -absolute is neither knowing nor being; nor is it identity, nor is it -indifference of the two; but it is throughout merely and solely the -absolute.'</p> - -<p>The term comes into English philosophical language through Coleridge -and later borrowers from the German. See Ferrier's <i>Institutes of -Metaphysic,</i> Prop. xx, and Mill's <i>Examination of Hamilton,</i> chap. iv.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, § 86. Cf. Schelling, iii. 372: I = I expresses the identity -between the 'I,' in so far as it is the producing, and the 'I' as the -produced; the original synthetical and yet identical proposition: the -<i>cogito=sum</i> of Schelling.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_159">159</a>. Definition of God as <i>Ens realissimum, e.g.</i> Meier's -<i>Baumgarten's Metaphysic,</i> § 605.</p> - -<p>Jacobi, <i>Werke,</i> iv. 6, thus describes Spinoza's God.</p> - -<p>As to the beginning cf. Fichte, <i>Werke,</i> ii. 14 (speaking of 'absolute -knowing'): 'It is not a knowing of something, nor is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> it a knowing of -nothing (so that it would be a knowing of somewhat, but this somewhat -be nothing): it is not even a knowing of itself, for it is no knowledge -at all <i>of</i>;—nor is it <i>a</i> knowing (quantitatively and in relation), -but it is (the) knowing (absolutely qualitatively). It is no act, no -event, or that somewhat is in knowing; but it is just the knowing, in -which alone all acts and all events, which are there set down, can be -set down.'</p> - -<p>History of Philosophy; cf. Hegel, <i>Werke,</i> i. 165. 'If the Absolute, -like its phenomenon Reason, be (as it is) eternally one and the same, -then each reason, which has turned itself upon and cognised itself, -has produced a true philosophy and solved the problem which, like its -solution, is at all times the same. The reason, which cognises itself, -has in philosophy to do only with itself: hence in itself too lies -its whole work and its activity; and as regards the inward essence of -philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors.</p> - -<p>'Just as little, as of constant improvements, can there be talk of -"peculiar views" of philosophy.... The true peculiarity of a philosophy -is the interesting individuality, in which reason has organised itself -a form from the materials of a particular age; in it the particular -speculative reason finds spirit of its spirit, flesh of its flesh; it -beholds itself in it as one and the same, as another living being. -Each philosophy is perfect in itself, and possesses totality, like a -work of genuine art. As little as the works of Apelles and Sophocles, -if Raphael and Shakespeare had known them, could have seemed to them -mere preliminary exercises for themselves—but as cognate spiritual -powers;—so little can reason in its own earlier formations perceive -only useful preparatory exercises.' Cf. Schelling, iv. 401.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, § 86. Parmenides (ap. Simplic. <i>Phys.</i>): of the two ways of -investigation the first is that <i>it is,</i> and that not-to-be is not.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἓστι τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἓστι μὴ εἶναι<br /> -</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, § 87. The Buddhists. Cf. Hegel, <i>Werke,</i> xi. 387. Modern -histories of Buddhism insist upon the purely ethico-religious character -of the teaching. Writers like von Hartmann (<i>Religionsphilosophie,</i> p. -320) on the contrary hold that Buddhism carried out the esoteric theory -of Brahmanism to the consequence that the abstract one is nothing. -According to Vassilief, <i>Le Bouddhisme,</i> p. 318 seqq., one of the -Buddhist metaphysical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> schools, the Madhyamikas, founded by Nâgârdjuna -400 years after Buddha, taught that All is Void.—Such metaphysics were -probably reactions of the underlying Brahmanist idea.</p> - -<p>But generally Buddhism (as was not unnatural 60 years ago) is hardly -taken here in its characteristic historical features.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, § 88. Aristotle, <i>Phys,</i> i. 8 (191 a. 26): 'Those philosophers -who first sought the truth and the real substance of things got on a -false track, like inexperienced travellers who fail to discover the -way, and declared that nothing can either come into being or disappear, -because it is necessary that what comes into being should come into -being either from what is or from what is not, and that it is from both -of these impossible: for what is does not become (it already is), and -nothing would become from what is not.'</p> - -<p>(5) is an addition of ed. 3 (1830); cf. <i>Werke,</i> xvii. 181.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, § 88. The view of Heraclitus here taken is founded on the -interpretation given by Plato (in the <i>Theaetetus,</i>152; <i>Cratylus,</i> -401) and by Aristotle, of a fundamental doctrine of the Ephesian—which -however is expressed in the fragments by the name of the everliving -fire. The other phrase (Ar. <i>Met.</i> i. 4) is used by Aristotle to -describe the position, not of Heraclitus, but of Leucippus and -Democritus. Cf. Plutarch, <i>adv. Colotem,</i> 4. 2 Δημόκριτος διορίζεται μὴ -μᾱλλον τὸ δὲν ἥ τὸ μηδν εἶναι; cf. Simplic. in Ar. <i>Phys.</i> fol. 7.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, § 89. Daseyn: Determinate being. Cf. Schelling, i. 209. -'Being (Seyn) expresses the absolute, Determinate being (Daseyn) a -conditional, 'positing': Actuality, one conditioned in a definite sort -by a definite condition. The single phenomenon in the whole system -of the world has <i>actuality;</i> the world of phenomena in general has -Daseyn; but the absolutely-posited, the Ego, <i>is. I am</i> is all the Ego -can say of itself.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, § 91. Being-by-self: An:sich:seyn.</p> - -<p>Spinoza, <i>Epist.</i> 50, <i>figura non aliud quam determinatio et -determinatio negatio est.</i></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, § 92. Grenze (limit or boundary), and Schranke (barrier or -check) are distinguished in <i>Werke,</i> iii. 128-139 (see Stirling's -<i>Secret of Hegel,</i> i. 377 seqq.). Cf. Kant's remark, <i>Krit. d. r. -Vernunft,</i> p. 795, that Hume only erschränkt our intellect, ohne ihn zu -begrenzen.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, § 92. Plato, <i>Timaeus,</i> c. 35 (formation of the world-soul): -'From the individual and ever-identical essence (ὀυσία)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span> and the -divisible which is corporeal, he compounded a third intermediate -species of essence.... And taking these, being three, he compounded -them all into one form (ἰδέα), adjusting perforce the unmixable nature -of the other and the same, and mingling them all with the essence, and -making of three one again, he again distributed this total into as many -portions as were fitting, but each of them mingled out of the same and -the other and the essence.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, § 94. Philosophy. Cf. Schelling, <i>Werke,</i> ii. 377. 'A various -experience has taught me that for most men the greatest obstacle to the -understanding and vital apprehension of philosophy is their invincible -opinion that its object is to be sought at an infinite distance. -The consequence is, that while they should fix their eye on what is -present (das Gegenwärtige), every effort of their mind is called out -to get hold of an object which is not in question through the whole -inquiry.' ... 'The aim of the sublimest science can only be to show the -actuality,—in the strictest sense the actuality, the presence, the -vital existence (Daseyn)—of a God in the whole of things and in each -one.... Here we deal no longer with an extra-natural or supernatural -thing, but with the immediately near, the alone-actual to which we -ourselves also belong, and in which we are.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, § 95. Plato's <i>Philebus,</i> ch. xii-xxiii (pp. 23-38): cf. -<i>Werke,</i> xiv. 214 seqq.: 'The absolute is therefore what in one unity -is finite and infinite.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_178">178</a>. Idealism of Philosophy: cf. Schelling, ii. 67. 'Every -philosophy therefore is and remains Idealism; and it is only under -itself that it embraces realism and idealism; only that the former -Idealism should not be confused with the latter, which is of a merely -relative kind.'</p> - -<p>Hegel, <i>Werke,</i> iii. 163. 'The proposition that the finite is "ideal" -constitutes Idealism. In nothing else consists the Idealism of -philosophy than in recognising that the finite has no genuine being.... -The contrast of idealistic and realistic philosophy is therefore of -no importance. A philosophy that attributed to finite existences as -such a genuine ultimate absolute being would not deserve the name -philosophy.... By "ideal" is meant existing as a representation in -consciousness: whatever is in a mental concept, idea or imagination is -"ideal": "ideal" is just another word for "in imagination,"—something -not merely distinct from the real, but essentially not real. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span> mind -indeed is the great idealist: in the sensation, representation, thought -of the mind the fact has not what is called <i>real</i> existence; in the -simplicity of the Ego such external being is only suppressed, existing -<i>for me,</i> and "ideally" in me. This subjective idealism refers only to -the representational form, by which an import is mine.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, § 96. The distinction of nature and mind as real and ideal is -especially Schelling's: See <i>e.g.</i> his <i>Einleitung,</i> &c. iii. 272. 'If -it is the problem of Transcendental Philosophy to subordinate the real -to the ideal, it is on the contrary the problem of the philosophy of -nature to explain the ideal from the real.'</p> - -<p>P. 183, § 98. Newton: see <i>Scholium</i> at the end of the <i>Principia,</i> and -cf. <i>Optics,</i> iii. qu. 28.</p> - -<p>Modern Atomism, besides the conception of particles or molecules, has -that of mathematical centres of force.</p> - -<p>Kant, <i>Werke,</i> v. 379 (ed. Rosenk.). 'The general principle of the -<i>dynamic</i> of material nature is that all reality in the objects of the -external senses must be regarded as moving force: whereby accordingly -so-called solid or absolute impenetrability is banished from natural -science as a meaningless concept, and repellent force put in its -stead; whereas true and immediate attraction is defended against all -the subtleties of a self-misconceiving metaphysic and declared to be a -fundamental force necessary for the very possibility of the concept of -matter.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, § 98. Abraham Gottheit Kästner (1719-1800), professor -forty-four years at Göttingen, enjoyed in the latter half of the -eighteenth century a considerable repute, both in literature and in -mathematical science. Some of, his epigrams are still quoted.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, § 102. The two 'moments' of number Unity, and Sum (Anzahl), -may be compared with the Greek distinction between one and ἀριθμός -(cf. Arist. <i>Phys.</i> iv. 12 ἐλάχίστος ἀριθμός ἡ δυάς). According -to Rosenkranz (<i>Leben Hegels</i>) the classification of arithmetical -operations often engaged Hegel's research. Note the relation in Greek -between λογικόν and λογιστικόν. Cf. Kant's view of the 'synthesis' in -arithmetic.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, § 103. Intensive magnitude. Cf. Kant, <i>Kritik der reinen -Vernunft,</i> p. 207, on Anticipation of Perception (Wahrnehmung), and p. -414, in application to the question of the soul's persistence.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, § 104. Not Aristotle, but rather Simplicius on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span> <i>Physics</i> -of Aristotle, fol. 306: giving Zeno's argument against the alleged -composition of the line from a series of points. What you can say of -one supposed small real unit, you can say of a smaller, and so on <i>ad -infinitum.</i> (Cf. Burnet's <i>Early Greek Philosophy,</i> p. 329.)</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, § 104. The distinction between imagination and intellect made -by Spinoza in <i>Ep.</i> xii. (olim xxix.) in <i>Opp.</i> ed. Land vol. ii. 40 -seqq. is analogous to that already noted (p. 402) between <i>ratio</i> and -<i>intellegentia,</i> and is connected, as by Boëthius, with the distinction -which Plato, <i>Timaeus,</i> 37, draws between eternity (αἰών) and time.</p> - -<p>The infinite (<i>Eth.</i> i. prop. 8. Schol. I) is the 'absolute affirmation -of a certain nature's existence,' as opposed to finitude which is -really <i>ex parte negatio.</i> 'The problem has always been held extremely -difficult, if not inextricable, because people did not distinguish -between what is concluded to be infinite by its own nature and the -force of its definition, and what has no ends, not in virtue of its -essence, but in virtue of its cause. It was difficult also because -they did not distinguish between what is called infinite because it -has no ends, and that whose parts (though we may have a maximum and -minimum of it) we cannot equate or explicate by any number. Lastly -because they lid not distinguish between what we can only understand -(<i>intelligere,</i>) but not imagine, and what we can also imagine.'</p> - -<p>To illustrate his meaning, Spinoza calls attention to the distinction -of substance from mode, of eternity from duration. We can 'explicate' -the existence only of modes by duration: that of substance, 'by -eternity, <i>i.e.</i> by an infinite fruition of existence or being' (<i>per -aeternitatem, hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate, -essendi fruitionem.</i>) The attempt therefore to show that extended -<i>substance</i> is composed of parts is an illusion,—which arises because -we look at quantity 'abstractly or superficially, as we have it in -imagination by means of the senses.' So looking at it, as we are liable -to do, a quantity will be found divisible, finite, composed of parts -and manifold. But if we look at it as it really is,—as a Substance -—as it is in the intellect alone—(which is a work of difficulty), it -will be found infinite, indivisible, and unique. 'It is only therefore -when we abstract duration and quantity from substance, that we use -time to determine duration and measure to determine quantity, so as to -be able to imagine them.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span> Eternity and substance, on the other hand, -are no objects of imagination but only of intellect; and to try to -explicate them by such notions as measure, time, and number—which are -only modes of thinking or rather of imagining—is no better than to -fall into imaginative raving.' 'Nor will even the modes of Substance -ever be rightly understood, should they be confounded with this sort -of <i>entia rationis</i>' (<i>i.e. modi cogitandi</i> subserving the easier -retention, explication and <i>imagination</i> of things <i>understood</i>)' -or aids to imagination. For when we do so, we separate them from -substance, and from the mode in which they flow from eternity, without -which they cannot be properly understood.' (Cf. Hegel's <i>Werke,</i> i. 63.)</p> - -<p>The verses from Albr. von Haller come from his poem on Eternity (1736). -Hegel seems to quote from an edition before 1776, when the fourth line -was added in the stanza as it thus finally stood:—</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -Ich häufe ungeheure Zahlen,<br /> -Gebürge Millionen auf,<br /> -Ich welze Zeit auf Zeit und Welt auf Welten hin,<br /> -Und wenn ich auf der March des endlichen nun bin,<br /> -Und von der fürchterlichen Höhe<br /> -Mit Schwindeln wieder nach dir sehe,<br /> -Ist alle Macht der Zahl, vermehrt mit tausend Malen,<br /> -Noch nicht ein Theil von dir.<br /> -Ich tilge sie, und du liegst ganz vor mir.<br /> -</p> - -<p>Kant, <i>Kritik d. r. Vernunft,</i> p. 641. 'Even Eternity, however <i>eerily</i> -sublime may be its description by Haller,' &c.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, § 104. Pythagoras in order of time probably comes between -Anaximenes (of Ionia) and Xenophanes (of Elea). But the mathematical -and metaphysical doctrines attributed to the Pythagorean are known -to us only in the form in which they are represented in Plato and -Aristotle, <i>i.e.</i> in a later stage of development. The Platonists (cf. -Arist. <i>Met.</i> i. 6; xi. 1. 12; xii. 1. 7; cf. Plat. <i>Rep.</i> p. 510) -treated mathematical fact as mid-way between 'sensibles' and 'ideas'; -and Aristotle himself places mathematics as a science between physical -and metaphysical (theological) philosophy.</p> - -<p>The tradition (referred to p. 198) about Pythagoras is given by -Iamblichus, <i>Vita Pyth.</i> §115 seqq.: it forms part of the later -Neo-Pythagorean legend, which entered literature in the first centuries -of the Christian era.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, § 107. Hebrew hymns: <i>e.g. Psalms</i> lxxiv. and civ.; Proverbs -viii. and Job xxxviii. <i>Vetus verbum est,</i> says Leibniz (ed. Erdmann, -p. 162), <i>Deum omnia pondere, mensura, numero, fecisse.</i></p> - -<p>P. 202, § 108. The antinomy of measure. These logical puzzles -are the so-called fallacy of Sorites (a different thing from the -chain-syllogism of the logic-books); cf. Cic. <i>Acad.</i> ii. 28, 29; <i>De -Divin.</i> ii. 4—and the φαλακρός cf. Horace, <i>Epist.</i> ii. 1-45.</p> - - -<h6>CHAPTER VIII.</h6> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, § 113. Self-relation—(sich) auf sich beziehen.</p> - -<p>P. 213, § 115. The 'laws of thought' is the magniloquent title given -in the Formal Logic since Kant's day to the principles or maxims -(<i>principia</i>, Grundsätze) which Kant himself described as 'general and -formal criteria of truth.' They include the so-called principle of -contradiction, with its developments, the principle of identity and -excluded middle: to which, with a desire for completeness, eclectic -logicians have added the Leibnizian principle of the reason. Hegel -has probably an eye to Krug and Fries in some of his remarks. The -three laws may be compared and contrasted with the three principles, -—homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms, in Kant's -<i>Kritik d. r. Vern.</i> p. 686.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, § 117. Leibniz, <i>Nouveaux Essais,</i> Liv. ii. ch. 27, § 3 (ed. -Erdmann, p. 273: cf. fourth Letter to Clarke). <i>Il n'y a point deux -individus indiscernables. Un gentilhomme d'esprit de mes amis, en -parlant avec moi en présence de Madame l'Electrice dans le jardin de -Herrenhausen, crut qu'il trouverait bien deux feuilles entièrement -semblables. Madame l'Electrice l'en défia, et il courut longtems en -vain pour en chercher.</i></p> - -<p>The principle of individuation or indiscernibility is: 'If two -individuals were perfectly alike and equal and, in a word, -indistinguishable by themselves, there would be no principle of -individuation: (Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 277) <i>Poser deux choses -indiscernables est poser la même chose sous deux noms</i> (p. 756). -<i>Principium individuationis idem est quod absolutae specificationis quâ -res ita sit determinata, ut ab aliis omnibus distingui possit.</i></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, § 119. Polarity. Schelling, ii. 489. 'The law of Polarity is a -universal law of nature'; cf. ii. 459: 'It is a first principle of a -philosophic theory of nature to have a view (in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span> the whole of nature), -on polarity and dualism.' But he adds (476), 'It is time to define -more accurately the concept of polarity.' So Oken, <i>Naturphilosophie</i>: -§76: 'A force consisting of two principles is called Polarity.' § 77: -'Polarity is the first force which makes its appearance in the world.' -§ 81: 'The original movement is a result of the original polarity.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, § 119. Cf. Fichte, ii. 53. 'To everything but this the -logically trained thinker can rise. He is on his guard against -contradiction. But, in that case, how about the possibility of the -maxim of his own logic that we can think no contradiction. In some way -he must have got hold of contradiction and thought it, or he could -make no communications about it. Had such people only once regularly -asked themselves how they came to think the <i>merely</i> possible or -contingent (the not-necessary), and how they actually do so! Evidently -they here leap through a not-being, not-thinking, &c., into the utterly -unmediated, self-initiating, free,—into beënt non-being,—in short, -the above contradiction, as it was laid down. With consistent thinkers -the result of this incapacity is nothing but the utter abolition of -freedom,—the most absolute fatalism and Spinozism.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, §121. Leibniz (ed. Erdmann, p. 515). 'The principle of <i>la -raison déterminante</i> is that nothing ever occurs without there being a -cause for it, or at least a determinant reason, <i>i.e.</i> something which -may serve to render a reason <i>à priori</i> why that is existent rather -than in any other way. This great principle holds good in all events.' -Cf. p. 707. 'The principle of "sufficient reason" is that in virtue -of which we consider that no fact could be found true or consistent, -no enunciation truthful, without there being a sufficient reason why -it is so and not otherwise.... When a truth is necessary, we can find -the reason of it by analysis, resolving it into simpler ideas and -truths, until we come to primitive ideas.... But the sufficient reason -ought also to be found in contingent truths or truths of fact, <i>i.e.</i> -in the series of things spread through the universe of creatures, -or the resolution into particular reasons might go into a limitless -detail: ... and as all this detail embraces only other antecedent, or -more detailed contingencies, ... the sufficient or final (<i>dernière</i>) -reason must be outside the succession or series of this detail of -contingencies, however infinite it might be. And it is thus that the -final reason of things must be in a "necessary substance," in which the -detail of the changes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> exists only <i>eminenter,</i> as in the source,—and -it is what we call God.' <i>(Monadology</i> §§ 32-38.)</p> - -<p>Hence the supremacy of final causes. Thus <i>Opp.</i> ed. Erdmann, p. 678: -<i>Ita fit ut efficientes causae pendeant a finalibus, et spiritualia -sint natura priora materialibus.</i> Accordingly he urges, p. 155, that -final cause has not merely a moral and religious value in ethics and -theology, but is useful even in physics for the detection of deep-laid -truths. Cf. p. 106: <i>C'est sanctifier la Philosophie que de faire -couler ses ruisseaux de la fontaine des attributs de Dieu. Bien loin -d'exclure les causes finales et la considération d'un être agissant -avec sagesse, c'est de là qu'il faut tout déduire en Physique.</i> Cf. -also <i>Principes de la Nature</i> (Leibn. ed. Erdm. p. 716): 'It is -surprising that by the sole consideration of efficient causes or -of matter, we could not render a reason for those laws of movement -discovered in our time. <i>Il y faut recourir aux causes finales</i>.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, § 121 Socrates. The antitheses between Socrates and the -Sophists belongs in the main to the Platonic dialogues,—not co the -historical Socrates. It is the literary form in which the philosophy of -Plato works out its development through the criticism of contemporary -opinions and doctrines. And even in Plato's writings the antagonism is -very unlike what later interpretations have made out of it.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, § 124. Thing by itself (thing in itself) the Ding:an:sich.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, § 126. Cf. <i>Encycl.</i> § 334 (<i>Werke,</i> viii. 1. p. 411). 'In -empirical chemistry the chief object is the <i>particularity</i> of the -matters and products, which are grouped by superficial abstract -features which make impossible any system in the special detail. In -these lists, metals, oxygen, hydrogen, &c.—metalloids, sulphur, -phosphorus appear side by side as <i>simple</i> chemical bodies on the same -level. The great physical variety of these bodies must of itself create -a prepossession against such coordination; and their chemical origin, -the process from which they issue, is clearly no less various. But -in an equally chaotic way, more abstract and more real processes are -put on the same level. If all this is to get scientific form, every -product ought to be determined according to the grade of the concrete -and completely developed process from which it essentially issues, and -which gives it its peculiar significance; and for that purpose it is -not less essential to distinguish grades in abstractness or reality -of the process. Animal and vegetable substances in any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span> case belong -to a quite other order: so little can their nature be understood from -the chemical process, that they are rather destroyed in it, and only -the way of their death is apprehended. These substances, however, -ought above all to serve to counter-act the metaphysic predominant -in chemistry as in physics,—the ideas or rather wild fancies of the -<i>unalterability of matters</i> under all circumstances, as well as the -categories of the <i>composition</i> and the <i>consistence</i> of bodies from -such matters. We see it generally admitted that chemical matters lose -in combination the <i>properties</i> which they show in separation: and yet -we find the idea prevailing that they are the same things <i>without</i> the -properties as they are <i>with</i> them,—so that as things <i>with</i> these -properties they are not results of the process.'—Cf. <i>Werke,</i> vii. a. -372: 'Air does not consist of oxygen and nitrogen: but these are the -forms under which air is put,' cf. <i>ib.</i>403.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, § 131. Fichte's <i>Sonnenklarer Bericht</i> appeared in 1801.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, § 136. Herder's <i>Gott: Gespräche über Spinoza's System,</i> 1787, -2nd ed. 1800. 'God is, in the highest and unique sense of the word, -Force, <i>i.e.</i> the primal force of all forces, the soul of all souls' -(p. 63), 'All that we call matter, therefore, is more or less animate: -it is a realm of efficient forces. One force predominates: otherwise -there were no <i>one,</i> no whole' (p. 207). 'The supreme being (Daseyn) -could give its creatures nothing higher than being. (<i>Theophron.</i>) But, -my friend, being and being, however simple in the concept, are in their -estate very different; and what do you suppose, Philolaus, marks its -grades and differences? (<i>Phil.</i>) Nothing but forces. In God himself -we found no higher conception; but all his forces were only one. The -supreme force could not be other than supreme goodness and wisdom, -ever-living, ever-active. (<i>Theoph.</i>) Now you yourself see, Philolaus, -that the supreme, or rather the All (for God is not a supreme unit in -a scale of beings like himself), could not reveal himself otherwise -than in the universe as active. In him nothing could slumber, and what -he expressed was himself. He is before everything, and everything -subsists in him: the whole world an expression, an appearance of his -ever-living, ever-acting forces' (p. 200).</p> - -<p>'It was the mistake of Spinoza,' says Herder, 'to be unduly influenced -by the Cartesian phraseology. Had he chosen the conception of force and -effect, everything would have gone easier, and his system become much -more distinct and coherent.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span> 'Had he developed the conception of power, -and the conception of matter, he must in conformity with his system -necessarily have come to the conception of forces, which work as well -in matter as in organs of thinking: he would in that case have regarded -power and thought as forces, <i>i.e.</i> as one.' (Cf. H. Spencer, 'Force, -the Ultimate of Ultimates.' First Princ. p 169)</p> - -<p>According to Rosenkranz (<i>Leben Hegels,</i> p. 223) there exists in -manuscript a criticism by Hegel on the second edition of Herder's -<i>God.</i> Herder's Dialogue belongs to the controversy aroused by Jacobi's -letters on Spinoza.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, § 136. Newton. Leibniz charges him with the view that God needs -from time to time <i>remonter sa montre,</i> otherwise it would cease going: -that his machine requires to be cleaned (<i>décrasser</i>) by extraordinary -aid' (ed. Erdm. p. 746).</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, § 140. The verses quoted occur in Goethe's <i>Werke</i> ii. 376, -under the heading Allerdings. Originally the first four lines appeared -in Haller's poem <i>Die menschlichen Tugenden</i> thus—</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -Ins Innre der Natur bringt sein erschaffner Geist:<br /> -Zu glücklich, wenn sie noch die äußre Schale weist!<br /> -<br /> -(To nature's heart there penetrates no mere created mind:<br /> -Too happy if she but display the outside of her rind.)<br /> -</p> - -<p>Hegel—reading weizt for weist—takes the second line as</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -Too happy, if he can but know the outside of her rind.<br /> -</p> - -<p>Goethe's attack upon a vulgar misuse of the lines belongs to his -dispute with the scientists. His verses appeared in 1820 as <i>Heiteres -Reimstück</i> at the end of Heft 3 <i>zur Morphologie,</i>—of which the -closing section is entitled <i>Freundlicher Zuruf</i> (<i>Werke</i> xxvii. 161), -as follows:—</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -"Ins Innre der Natur,"<br /> -O du Philister!—<br /> -"Dringt kein erschaffner Geist."<br /> -. . . . . . .<br /> -"Glückselig! wem sie nur<br /> -Die äußre Schale weis't."<br /> -Das hör' ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen,<br /> -Ich fluche drauf, aber verstohlen:<br /> -Sage mir taufend tausendmale:<br /> -Alles giebt sie reichlich und gern;<br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span>Natur hat weder Stern<br /> -Noch Schale,<br /> -Alles ist sie mit einem Male.<br /> -</p> - -<p>[The last seven lines may be thus paraphrased in continuation:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -I swear—of course but to myself—as rings within my ears<br /> -That same old warning o'er and o'er again for sixty years,<br /> -And thus a thousand thousand times I answer in my mind:<br /> -—With gladsome and ungrudging hand metes nature from her store:<br /> -She keeps not back the core,<br /> -Nor separates the rind,<br /> -But all in each both rind and core has evermore combined.]<br /> -</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, § 140. Plato and Aristotle: cf. Plato, <i>Phaedrus,</i> 247 A -(φθόνoς γὰρ ξω θείον χόρoυ ἴσταται); <i>Timaeus,</i> 29 E; and Aristotle, -<i>Metaph.</i> i. 2. 22.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, § 140. Goethe: <i>Sämmtl. Werke,</i> iii. 203 (<i>Maxime und -Reflexionen</i>). Gegen große Vorzüge eines Andern giebt es kein -Rettungsmittel als die Liebe. Cf. Schiller to Goethe, 2 July, 1796. -'How vividly I have felt on this occasion ... that against surpassing -merit nothing but Love gives liberty' (daß es dem Vortrefflichen -gegenüber seine Freiheit giebt als die Liebe).</p> - -<p>'Pragmatic.' This word, denoting a meddlesome busybody in older English -and sometimes made a vague term of abuse, has been in the present -century used in English as it is here employed in German.</p> - -<p>According to Polybius, ix. I. 2, the πραγματικὸς τρόπος τῆς ἱστορίας -is that which has a directly utilitarian aim. So Kant, <i>Foundation of -Metaph. of Ethic (Werke,</i> viii. 41, note): 'A history is pragmatically -composed when it renders prudent, <i>i.e.</i> instructs the world how it may -secure its advantage better or at least as well as the ages preceding.' -Schelling (v. 308) quotes in illustration of pragmatic history-writing -the words of Faust to Wagner (Goethe, xi. 26):</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst,<br /> -Das ist im Grund der herren eigner Geist,,<br /> -In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.<br /> -</p> - -<p>Cf. also Hegel, <i>Werke,</i> ix. 8. 'A second kind of reflectional history -is the pragmatic. When we have to do with the past and are engaged -with a distant world, the mind sees rising before it a present, which -it has from its own action as a reward for its trouble. The events are -different; but their central and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span> universal fact, their structural -plan is identical. This abolishes the past and makes the event -present. Pragmatic reflections, however abstract they be, are thus in -reality the present, and vivify the tales of the past with the life of -to-day.—Here too a word should specially be given to the moralising -and the moral instructions to be gained through history,—for which it -was often studied.... Rulers, statesmen, nations, are especially bidden -learn from the experience of history. But what experience and history -teach is that nations and governments never have learned anything from -history, or acted upon teaching which could have been drawn from it.'</p> - -<p>Cf. Froude: <i>Divorce of Catherine,</i> p. 2. 'The student (of history) -looks for an explanation (of political conduct) in elements which he -thinks he understands—in pride, ambition, fear, avarice, jealousy, or -sensuality.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, § 141. Cf. Goethe, xxiii, 298. 'What is the outside of an -organic nature but the ever-varied phenomenon of the inside? This -outside, this surface is so exactly adapted to a varied, complex, -delicate, inward structure that it thus itself becomes an inside: -both aspects, the outside and the inside, standing in most direct -correlation alike in the quietest existence and in the most violent -movement.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, § 143. Kant, <i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft,</i> 2nd ed. p. 266.</p> - -<p>P. 269, § 147. Cf. Schelling, <i>Werke,</i> v. 290 (cf. iii. 603). 'There -are three periods of history, that of nature, of destiny, and of -providence. These three ideas express the same identity, but in a -different way. Destiny too is providence, but recognised in the real, -as providence, is also destiny, but beheld (angeschaut) in the ideal.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, § 151. On the relation between Spinoza and Leibniz cf. Hegel, -<i>Werke,</i> iv. 187-193. It would be a mistake, however, to represent -Leibniz as mainly engaged in a work of conscious antagonism to Spinoza.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, § 153. Jacobi.—Jacobi (like Schopenhauer) insists specially on -the distinction between grounds (Gründe)—which are formal, logical, -and verbal, and causes (Ursachen)—which carry us into reality and -life and nature. To transform the mere <i>Because</i> into the <i>cause</i> -we must (he says) pass from logic and the analytical understanding -to experience and the inner life. Instead of the timelessness of -simultaneity which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span> characterises the logical relation cf ground and -consequent, the nexus of cause and effect introduces the element -of time,—thereby acquiring reality (Jacobi, <i>Werke,</i> iii. 452). -The conception of Cause—meaningless as a mere category of abstract -thought—gets reality as a factor in experience, ein Erfahrungsbegriff, -and is immediately given to us in the consciousness of our own -causality (Jacobi, <i>Werke,</i> iv. 145-158). Cf. Kant, <i>Kritik der reinen -Vern.</i> p. 116.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, § 158. The <i>Amor intellectualis Dei</i> (Spinoza, <i>Eth.</i> v. 32) -is described as a consequence of the third grade of cognition, viz. -the <i>scientia intuitiva</i> which 'proceeds from an adequate idea of the -formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate cognition -of the essence of things (ii. 40, Schol. 2). From it arises (v. -27), the highest possible <i>acquiescentia mentis,</i> in which the mind -contemplates all things <i>sub specie aeternitatis</i> (v. 29), knows itself -to be in God and sees itself and all things in their divine essence. -But this intellectual love of mind towards God is part of the infinite -love wherewith God loves himself (v. 36) 'From these things we clearly -understand in what our salvation or blessedness or liberty consists: to -wit, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of -God towards men' (Schol. to v. 36).</p> - - -<h6>CHAPTER IX.</h6> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, § 161. Evolution and development in the stricter sense -in which these terms were originally used in the seventeenth and -eighteenth centuries imply a theory of preformation, according -to which the growth of an organic being is simply a process of -enlarging and filling out a miniature organism, actual but invisible, -because too inconspicuous. Such was the doctrine adopted by Leibniz -(<i>Considérations sur le principe de vie; Système nouveau de la Nature</i>, -&c.). According to it development is no real generation of new parts, -but only an augmentation into bulk and visibility of parts already -outlined. This doctrine of preformation (as opposed to epigenesis) -is carried out by Charles Bonnet, who in his <i>Considérations sur les -corps organisés</i> (1762) propounds the further hypothesis that the -'germs' from which living beings proceed contain, enclosed one within -another, the germs of all creatures yet to be. This is the hypothesis -of '<i>Emboîtement.</i>' 'The system<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span> which regards generations as mere -educts' says Kant (<i>Kritik der Urteilskraft,</i> § 80; <i>Werke,</i> iv. 318) -'is called that of <i>individual</i> preformation or the evolution theory: -the system which regards them as products is called Epigenesis.—which -might also be called the theory of <i>generic</i> preformation, considering -that the productive powers of the générants follow the inherent -tendencies belonging to the family characteristics, and that the -specific form is therefore a 'virtual' preformation, in this way the -opposing theory of individual preformation might be better called -the involution theory, or theory of Einschachtelung (<i>Emboîtement.</i>) -Cf. Leibniz (<i>Werke,</i> Erdmann, 715). 'As animals generally are not -entirely born at conception or <i>generation,</i> no more do they entirely -perish at what we call <i>death</i>; for it is reasonable that what does -not commence naturally, does not finish either in the order of nature. -Thus quitting their mask or their rags, they only return to a subtler -theatre, where however they can be as sensible and well regulated as -in the greater.... Thus not only the souls, but even the animals are -neither generable nor perishable: they are only developed, enveloped, -re-clothed, unclothed,—transformed. The souls never altogether quit -their body, and do not pass from one body into another body which is -entirely new to them. There is therefore no metempsychosis, but there -is metamorphosis. The animals change, take and quit only parts: which -takes place little by little and by small imperceptible parcels, but -continually, in nutrition: and takes place suddenly notably but rarely, -at conception, or at death, which make them gain or lose much all at -once.'</p> - -<p>The theory of <i>Emboîtement</i> or <i>Envelopment,</i> according to Bonnet -(<i>Considérations,</i> &c. ch. I) is that 'the germs of all the organised -bodies of one species were inclosed (<i>renfermés</i>) one in another, -and have been developed successively.' So according to Haller -(<i>Physiology,</i> Tome vii. § 2) 'it is evident that in plants the -mother-plant contains the germs of several generations; and there is -therefore no inherent improbability in the view that <i>tous les enfans, -excepté un, fussent renfermés dans l'ovaire de la première Fille -d'Eve.'</i> Cf. Weismann's <i>Continuity of the Germ-plasma.</i> Yet Bonnet -(<i>Contemplation de la Nature,</i> part vii. ch. 9, note 2), says, 'The -germs are not enclosed like boxes or cases one in another, but a germ -forms part of another germ, as a grain forms part of the plant in which -it is developed.'</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, § 163. Rousseau, <i>Contrat Social,</i> liv. ii. ch. 3.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, § 165. The 'adequate' idea is a sub-species of the 'distinct.' -When an idea does not merely distinguish a thing from others (when -it is <i>clear),</i> or in addition represent the characteristic marks -belonging to the object so distinguished (when it is <i>distinct),</i> but -also brings out the farther characteristics of these characteristics, -the idea is <i>adequate.</i> Thus adequate is a sort of second power of -distinct. (Cf. Baumeister's <i>Instit. Philos. Ration.</i> 1765, §§ 64-94.) -Hegel's description rather agrees with the 'complete idea' 'by which -I put before my mind singly marks sufficient to discern the thing -represented from all other things in every case, state, and time' -(Baumeister, <i>ib.</i> § 88). But cf. Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 79: <i>notitia -adaequata.</i></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, § 166. Cf. Baumeister, <i>Instit. Phil. Rat.</i> § 185: <i>Judicium -est idearum conjunctio vel separatio.</i></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, § 166. <i>Punctum saliens:</i> the <i>punctum sanguineum saliens</i> of -Harvey (<i>de Generat. Animal, exercit.</i> 17), or first appearance of the -heart: the <i>στιγμὴ αἱματίνη</i> in the egg, of which Aristotle (<i>Hist. -Anim.</i> vi. 3) says τoῡτο τὸ σημεῖον πηδᾷ καὶ κινεῖται ὥσπερ ἓμψυχον.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, § 169. Cf. Whately, <i>Logic</i> (Bk. ii. ch. I, § 2), 'Of these -terms that which is spoken of is called the <i>subject;</i> that which is -said of it, the <i>predicate.</i>'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, § 171. Kant, <i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft</i> (p. 95, 2nd ed.) § 9.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, § 172. Cf. Jevons, <i>Principles of Science,</i> ch. 3, 'on limited -identities' and 'negative propositions.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_309">309</a>. Ear-lobes. The remark is due to Blumenbach: cf. Hegel's -<i>Werke,</i> v. 285.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_312">312</a>. Colours, <i>i.e.</i> painters' colours; cf. <i>Werke,</i> vii. 1. 314 -(lecture-note). 'Painters are not such fools as to be Newtonians: they -have red, yellow, and blue, and out of these they make their other -colours.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, § 181. For the genetic classification of judgments and -syllogisms and the passage from the former to the latter compare -especially Lotze's <i>Logic,</i> Book i. And for the comprehensive -exhibition of the systematic process of judgment and inference see B. -Bosanquet's <i>Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge.</i> The passage from -Hegel's <i>Werke,</i> v. 139, quoted at the head of that work is parallel to -the sentence in p. 318, 'The interest, therefore,' &c.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, § 186. The letters I-P-U, of course, stand for Individual, -Particular, and Universal.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, § 187. Fourth figure. This so-called Galenian figure was -differentiated from the first figure by the separation of the five -moods, which (after Arist. <i>An.</i> pr. i. 7 and ii. I) Theophrastus and -the later pupils, down at least to Boëthius, had subjoined to the four -recognised types of perfect syllogism. But its Galenian origin is more -than doubtful.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, § 190. Cf. Mill's <i>Logic,</i> Bk. ii. ch. 3. 'In every syllogism -considered as an argument to prove the conclusion there is a <i>petitio -principii.</i>'</p> - -<p>Hegel's Induction is that strictly so called or complete induction, the -argument from the sum of actual experiences—that <i>per enumerationem -simplicem,</i> and <i>διὰ πάντων.</i> Of course except by accident or by -artificial arrangement such completeness is impossible <i>in rerum -natura.</i></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, § 190. The 'philosophy of Nature' referred to here is probably -that of Oken and the Schellingians; but later critics (<i>e.g.</i> Riehl, -<i>Philosoph. Criticismus,</i> iii. 120) have accused Hegel himself of even -greater enormities in this department.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, § 192. <i>Elementarlehre:</i> Theory of the Elements, called by -Hamilton (<i>Lectures on Logic,</i> i. 65) Stoicheiology as opposed to -methodology. Cf. the Port Royal Logic. Kant's <i>Kritik</i> observes the -same division of the subject.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, § 193. Anselm, <i>Proslogium,</i> c. 2. In the <i>Monologium</i> Anselm -expounds the usual argument from conditioned to unconditioned (<i>Est -igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est; per quod -est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, el omnino quidquid aliquid est. -Monol.</i> c. 3). But in the Proslogium he seeks an argument <i>quod nullo -ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret—i.e.</i> from the conception of -(God as) the highest and greatest that can be (<i>aliquid quo nihil majus -cogitari potest</i>) he infers its being (<i>sic ergo vere</i> EST <i>aliquid -quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse.</i>) The -absolute would not be absolute if the idea of it did not <i>ipso facto</i> -imply existence.</p> - -<p>Gaunilo of Marmoutier in the <i>Liber pro insipiente</i> made the objection -that the fact of such argument being needed showed that idea and -reality were <i>prima facie</i> different. And in fact the argument of -Anselm deals with an Absolute which is object rather than subject, -thought rather than thinker; in human<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span> consciousness realised, but -not essentially self-affirming—implicit (an:sich) only, as said in -pp. 331, 333. And Anselm admits c. 15 <i>Domine, non solum es, quo -majus cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam majus quam cogitari potest</i> -(transcending our thought).</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, line 2. This sentence has been transposed in the translation. -In the original it occurs after the quotation from the Latin in p. 332.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, § 194. Leibniz: for a brief account of the Monads see Caird's -<i>Crit. Philosophy of J. Kant,</i> i. 86-95.</p> - -<p>A monad is the simple substance or indivisible unity corresponding -to a body. It is as simple what the world is as a multiplicity: it -'represents,' <i>i.e.</i> concentrates into unity, the variety of phenomena: -is the expression of the material in the immaterial, of the compound in -the simple, of the extended outward in the inward. Its unity and its -representative capacity go together (cf. Lotze, <i>Mikrokosmus.</i>) It is -the 'present which is full of the future and laden with the past' (ed. -Erdm. p. 197); the point which is all-embracing, the totality of the -universe. And yet there are monads—in the plural.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, § 194. Fichte, <i>Werke,</i> i. 430. 'Every thorough-going dogmatic -philosopher is necessarily a fatalist.'</p> - -<p>P. 338, § 195. Cf. <i>Encyclop.</i> § 463. 'This supreme inwardising of -ideation (Vorstellung) is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, -reducing itself to the mere being, the general space of mere names and -meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because -subjectivity, at the same time the power over the different names, the -empty link which fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in fixed -order.'</p> - -<p>Contemporaneously with Hegel, Herbart turned psychology in the line of -a 'statics and dynamics of the mind.' See (besides earlier suggestions) -his <i>De Attentionis mensura causisque primariis</i> (1822) and his -<i>Ueber die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit, Mathematik auf Psychologie -anzuwenden</i> (1822).</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, § 198. <i>Civil</i> society: distinguished as the social -and economical organisation of the <i>bourgeoisie,</i> with their -particularist-universal aims, from the true universal unity of -<i>citoyens</i> in the state or ethico-political organism.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, § 204. Inner design: see Kant's <i>Kritik der Urtheilskraft,</i> § -62.</p> - -<p>Aristotle, <i>De Anima,</i> ii. 4 (415. b. 7) φανερὸν δ' ὠς καὶ οὗ<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span> ἕνεκα ἡ -ψυχὴ ατία: ii. 2 ζωὴν λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὑτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ -φθίσιν.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, § 206. Neutral first water, cf. <i>Encyclop.</i>§ 284, 'without -independent individuality, without rigidity and intrinsic -determination, a thorough-going equilibrium.' Cf. <i>Werke,</i> vii. 6. -168. 'Water is absolute neutrality, not like salt, an individualised -neutrality; and hence it was at an early date called the mother of -everything particular.' 'As the neutral it is the solvent of acids and -alkalis.' Cf. Oken's <i>Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie,</i> §§ 294 and 432.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, § 206. Conclude = beschliessen: Resolve = entschliessen. Cf. -Chr. Sigwart, <i>Kleine Schriften,</i> ii. 115, <i>seqq.</i></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, § 216. Aristotle, <i>De Anim. Generat.</i> i. (726. b. 24) ἡ χεὶρ -ἄνεν ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἔστι χεὶρ ἀλλὰ μόνον ὁμώνυμον.</p> - -<p>Arist. <i>Metaph.</i> viii. 6 (1045. b. 11) ο δὲ (λέγoυσi) σύνθεσιν ἥ -σύνδεσμον ψυχῆς σώματι τὸ ζῆν.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, § 218. Sensibility, &c. This triplicity (as partly -distinguished by Haller after Glisson) of the functions of organic life -is largely worked out in Schelling, ii. 491.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, § 219. Cf. Schelling, ii. 540. As walking is a constantly -prevented falling, so life is a constantly prevented extinction of the -vital process.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, § 229. Spinoza (<i>Eth.</i> i. def. I) defines <i>causa sui</i> as -<i>id cujus essentia involvit existentiam,</i> and (in def. 3) defines -<i>substantia</i> as <i>id quod in se est et per se concipitur.</i></p> - -<p>Schelling: <i>e.g. Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie</i> (1801), -(<i>Werke,</i> iv. 114): 'I call reason the absolute reason, or reason, -in so far as it is thought as total indifference of subjective and -objective.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, § 230. 'Mammals distinguish themselves': unter; unter:scheiden, -instead of scheiden: cf. <i>Werke,</i> ii. 181. 'The distinctive marks of -animals, <i>e.g.</i> are taken from the claws and teeth: for in fact it -is not merely cognition which by this means distinguishes one animal -from another: but the animal thereby separates itself off: by these -weapons it keeps itself to itself and separate from the universal.' -Cf. <i>Werke,</i> vii. a. 651 <i>seqq.</i> (<i>Encycl.</i> § 370) where reference is -made to Cuvier, <i>Recherches sur les ossements fossiles des quadrupèdes</i> -(1812), &c.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, § 230. Kant, <i>Kritik der Urtheilskraft:</i> Einleitung, § 9 -(note), (<i>Werke,</i> ed. Ros. iv. 39); see Caird's <i>Critical Philosophy of -I. Kant,</i> Book i. ch. 5; also Hegel's <i>Werke,</i> ii. 3.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span></p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, § 231. An example of Wolfs pedantry is given in Hegel, <i>Werke,</i> -v. 307, from Wolfs <i>Rudiments of Architecture,</i> Theorem viii. 'A window -must be broad enough for two persons to recline comfortably in it, side -by side. <i>Proof.</i> It is customary to recline with another person on the -window to look about. But as the architect ought to satisfy the main -views of the owner (§ I) he must make the window broad enough for two -persons to recline comfortably side by side.'</p> - -<p>'Construction': cf. <i>Werke,</i> ii. 38. 'Instead of its own internal life -and spontaneous movement, such a simple mode (as subject, object, -cause, substance, &c.) has expression given to it by perception (here -= sense-consciousness) on some superficial analogy: and this external -and empty application of the formula is called "Construction." The -procedure shares the qualities of all such formalism. How stupid-headed -must be the man, who could not in a quarter of an hour master the -theory of asthenic, sthenic and indirectly asthenic diseases' (this is -pointed at Schelling's <i>Werke,</i> iii. 236) 'and the three corresponding -curative methods, and who, when, no long time since, such instruction -was sufficient, could not in this short period be transformed from -a mere practitioner into a "scientific" physician? The formalism of -<i>Naturphilosophie</i> may teach <i>e.g.</i> that understanding is electricity, -or that the animal is nitrogen, or even that it is <i>like</i> the South or -the North, or that it represents it,—as baldly as is here expressed -or with greater elaboration in terminology. At such teachings the -inexperienced may fall into a rapture of admiration, may reverence the -profound genius it implies,—may take delight in the sprightliness -of language which instead of the abstract <i>concept</i> gives the more -pleasing <i>perceptual</i> image, and may congratulate itself on feeling its -soul akin to such splendid achievement. The trick of such a wisdom is -as soon learnt as it is easy to practice; its repetition, when it grows -familiar, becomes as intolerable as the repetition of juggling once -detected. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is not harder to -manipulate than a painter's palette with two colours on it, say red and -green, the former to dye the surface if a historic piece, the latter if -a landscape is asked for.'</p> - -<p>Kant (<i>Werke,</i> iii. 36) in the 'Prolegomena to every future -Metaphysic,' § 7, says: 'We find, however, it is the peculiarity -of mathematical science that it must first exhibit its concept in -a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span> percept, and do so <i>à priori</i>,—hence in a pure percept. This -observation with regard to the nature of mathematics gives a hint as to -the first and supreme condition of its possibility: it must be based -on some pure percept in which it can exhibit all its concepts <i>in -concreto</i> and yet <i>à priori,</i> or, as it is called, <i>construe</i> them.'</p> - -<p>The phrase, and the emphasis on the doctrine, that perception must be -taken as an auxiliary in mathematics,' belong specially to the second -edition of the <i>Kritik, e.g.</i> Pref. xii. To learn the properties of -the isosceles triangle the mathematical student must 'produce (by -'construction') what he himself thought into it and exhibited <i>à -priori</i> according to concepts.'</p> - -<p>'Construction, in general,' says Schelling (<i>Werke,</i> v. 252: -cf. iv. 407) 'is the exhibition of the universal and particular -in unity':—'absolute unity of the ideal and the real.' v. 225. -Darstellung in intellektueller Anschauung ist philosophische -Konstruktion.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_372">372</a>. 'Recollection' = Erinnerung: <i>i.e.</i> the return from -differentiation and externality to simplicity and inwardness: -distinguished from Gedächtniss = memory (specially of words).</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, § 236. Cf. Schelling, <i>Werke,</i> iv. 405. 'Every particular -object is in its absoluteness the Idea; and accordingly the Idea is -also the absolute object (Gegenstand) itself,—as the absolutely ideal -also the absolutely real.'</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, § 236. Aristotle, <i>Metaphys.</i> xi. 9 (1074. 6. 34) αὑτὸν ἅρα -νοεῖ (ὁ νοῦς = θεος), εἵπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἐστιν ἡ νόησις -νοήσεως νόησις. Cf. Arist. <i>Metaph.</i> xii. 7.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, §239. 'Supposes a correlative' = ist für Eines. On Seyn: für -Eines, cf. <i>Werke,</i> iii. 168. Das Ideëlle ist notwendig für:Eines, aber -es ist nicht für ein Anderes: das Eine für welches es ist, ist nur es -selbst. ... God is therefore for-self (to himself) in so far as he -himself is that which is for him.</p> - -<p>P. <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, § 244. The percipient idea (anschauende Idee), of course both -object and subject of intuition, is opposed to the Idea (as logical) -in the element of <i>Thought</i>: but still <i>as Idea</i> and not—to use -Kant's phrase (<i>Kritik der r. Vern.</i> § 26)—as <i>natura materialiter -spectata.</i></p> - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a><br /><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span></p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -<span class="caption">INDEX</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -A.<br /> -<br /> -Absolute (the), <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>; relation<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to God, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>; absolute idea, <a href="#Page_374">374</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_431">431</a>);</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">definitions of, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">288, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>.</span><br /> -Abstract (and concrete), <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>.<br /> -Abstraction, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>.<br /> -Accidents (of substance), <a href="#Page_273">273</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Activity (bringing condition to fact), <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br /> -Actuality, <a href="#Page_257">257</a> <i>seqq.</i>; its relations<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to reason, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>.</span><br /> -Affinity (in chemism), <a href="#Page_341">341</a>.<br /> -Agnosticism, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.<br /> -All (quasi-universal), <a href="#Page_308">308</a>.<br /> -Alteration, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.<br /> -Analogy, 324 <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Analysis, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>; its dangers, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">analytical method, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>.</span><br /> -Animals and men, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>.<br /> -Anselm, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a> <i>seqq.</i>(cf. <a href="#Page_427">427</a>).<br /> -Anthropomorphism, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>.<br /> -Antinomies (of reason), <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>.<br /> -Apodictic judgment, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>.<br /> -Appearance, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Apperception (pure), <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>.<br /> -Appetite, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>.<br /> -<i>A priori</i> (the), <a href="#Page_83">83</a>.<br /> -Aristotle, his idealism, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_364">364</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as a logician, <a href="#Page_39">39</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the dignity of philosophy, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with Plato, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the Idea, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>; on life, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>.</span><br /> -Arithmetic (logic of), <a href="#Page_163">163</a>.<br /> -Art, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>.<br /> -Assertory judgments, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>.<br /> -Atheism, what it implies, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">charged against Spinoza, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>.</span><br /> -Atomic philosophy, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.<br /> -Atoms, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>.<br /> -Attraction (as constructive principle), <a href="#Page_181">181</a>.<br /> -Attribution (of predicates), <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.<br /> -<i>Auflieben,</i> explained, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>.<br /> -Axioms (mathematical), <a href="#Page_323">323</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -B.<br /> -<br /> -Becoming, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>.<br /> -Beginning, what it implies, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>.<br /> -Being (doctrine of), <a href="#Page_156">156</a> <i>seqq.;</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">being and nothing, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">contrasted with thought, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a> <i>seqq.;</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">determinate being, <a href="#Page_167">167</a> <i>seqq.;</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">being in or by self, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">being-for-self, <a href="#Page_176">176</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -Body (and soul), <a href="#Page_360">360</a>.<br /> -Boëthius, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>.<br /> -Buddhist metaphysics, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -C.<br /> -<br /> -<i>Caput Mortuum,</i> <a href="#Page_400">400</a>.<br /> -Cartesianism, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>.<br /> -Categorical judgment, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>; syllogism, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>.<br /> -Categories (the), <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">their finitude, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>; criticism of, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>.</span><br /> -Cause and effect, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>; efficient and final, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>.<br /> -Chance, <a href="#Page_263">263</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Chaos, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>.<br /> -Chemism, <a href="#Page_341">341</a> <i>seqq.;</i> chemical principles, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>.<br /> -Christianity, a religion of reason, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its faith, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>; religion of consolation, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of personality, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>; its philosophical precept, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>.</span><br /> -Cognition, as analysed by Kant, <a href="#Page_86">86</a> <i>seqq.;</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its nature and methods, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>.</span><br /> -Coleridge, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>.<br /> -Common sense, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>.<br /> -Comparison, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>.<br /> -Conceivable (the), <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.<br /> -Concept: <i>see</i> Notion.<br /> -Conception (= Representation), <a href="#Page_37">37</a>; preliminary to thought, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>.<br /> -Condition, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>.<br /> -Conditioned (the), <a href="#Page_121">121</a>.<br /> -Conscience (rights of), <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>.<br /> -Consciousness (appeal to), <a href="#Page_134">134</a>.<br /> -<i>Consensus gentium</i>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>.<br /> -Consolation (Christian), <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.<br /> -Construction (method of), <a href="#Page_368">368</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_430">430</a>).<br /> -Content (and form), <a href="#Page_242">242</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Contingency, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>.<br /> -Continuous quantity, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>.<br /> -Contradiction (principle of), <a href="#Page_221">221</a> <i>seqq;</i> <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>.<br /> -Contrariety, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.<br /> -Conviction (right of): <i>see</i> Conscience.<br /> -Copula (of a judgment), <a href="#Page_298">298</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Correctness (and truth), <a href="#Page_304">304</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_352">352</a>.<br /> -Correlation, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.<br /> -Cosmology, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>; cosmological proof, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.<br /> -Critical philosophy, its thesis, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">examined at length, <a href="#Page_82">82</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -D.<br /> -<br /> -Deduction of categories, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Definiteness, its value, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.<br /> -Definition, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>; criterion of, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>.<br /> -Degree, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>.<br /> -Deism, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>.<br /> -Demonstration, <a href="#Page_368">368</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Descartes, <a href="#Page_127">127</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_333">333</a>; compared with Jacobi, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.<br /> -Design (argument from), <a href="#Page_347">347</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_424">424</a>).<br /> -Destiny, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.<br /> -Determinate being, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.<br /> -Development, <a href="#Page_288">288</a> <i>seqq.;</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in relation to innate ideas, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.</span><br /> -Dialectic, innate in thought, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its operation explained, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>seqq.;</i> in Plato and Kant, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">(cf. <a href="#Page_409">409</a>); in Aristotle, <a href="#Page_409">409</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distinguished from Scepticism, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and from Reflection, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>.</span><br /> -Difference, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>.<br /> -Discrete quantity, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>.<br /> -Disjunctive judgment, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>; syllogism, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>.<br /> -Diversity, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>.<br /> -Division (logical), <a href="#Page_367">367</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_429">429</a>).<br /> -Dogmatic philosophy, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>.<br /> -Dualism in theology, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>; in philosophy, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -E.<br /> -<br /> -Eden (Garden of), <a href="#Page_54">54</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Education, its office, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>; mistake in, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>.<br /> -Effect (and Cause), <a href="#Page_276">276</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Ego (the absolute), <a href="#Page_393">393</a>.<br /> -Eleatic philosophy, <a href="#Page_159">159</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -'Elements' of logic, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>.<br /> -<i>Emboîtement,</i>289, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>.<br /> -Empiricism, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a> <i>seqq.;</i> its relative value, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>.<br /> -Encyclopaedia of science, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>; of philosophy, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>.<br /> -End (= final cause), <a href="#Page_113">113</a>,343 <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Essence (opposed to Being), <a href="#Page_202">202</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Eudaemonism (before Kant), <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>.<br /> -Evil (Good and), <a href="#Page_71">71</a>; origin of, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>.<br /> -Evolution, old technical sense, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>.<br /> -Existence, <a href="#Page_229">229</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Experience, principle of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>; elements in, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>.<br /> -Explanation (limits of), <a href="#Page_255">255</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -F.<br /> -<br /> -Faculties (in psychology), <a href="#Page_238">238</a>.<br /> -Faith, as philosophic principle, <a href="#Page_124">124</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Fall of man, interpreted, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>.<br /> -Fate, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>.<br /> -Feeling, as cognitive form, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>.<br /> -Fichte, deduction of categories, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the <i>Anstoss,</i> <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Sonnenklarer Bericht,</i> <a href="#Page_241">241</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">characteristics of, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the Object, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>; the Ego, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>.</span><br /> -Figures of syllogism, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>.<br /> -Final cause, <a href="#Page_343">343</a> <i>seqq.</i>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>.<br /> -Finite (and infinite), <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>.<br /> -Force, <a href="#Page_246">246</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Form (and content), <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a> <i>seqq.;</i><br /> -form of thought, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>; form and matter, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>.<br /> -Fortuitous (the), <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.<br /> -Freedom, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as character of all thought, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as Nihilism, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>; of will, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -G.<br /> -<br /> -Generality, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.<br /> -Genius (defined by Kant), <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.<br /> -Geometrical method, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>.<br /> -<i>Glaube,</i> <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>.<br /> -God, logical definition of, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">how knowable, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proofs of his being examined, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">74, <a href="#Page_103">103</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as activity, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_396">396</a>; as spirit, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as creator, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>; as force, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as trinity, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as absolute cunning, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">not jealous, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>; his goodness, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his power, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>; his names, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a>.</span><br /> -Goethe, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_398">398</a>), <a href="#Page_145">145</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_409">409</a>),<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">253 (cf. <a href="#Page_421">421</a>), <a href="#Page_256">256</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_422">422</a>), <a href="#Page_400">400</a>, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>.</span><br /> -Good (the), <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>.<br /> -Greek philosophers, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>; gods, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>.<br /> -<i>Grenze</i> and <i>Schranke,</i>412.<br /> -Ground (and consequent), <a href="#Page_224">224</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -H.<br /> -<br /> -Haller (A. v.), quoted, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>.<br /> -Have (and be), <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.<br /> -Heraclitus (and the Eleatics), <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>.<br /> -Herder, <a href="#Page_247">247</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_420">420</a>).<br /> -History, pragmatic, <a href="#Page_256">256</a> (cf.422);<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">psychological, <i>ib.</i>; history of</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">philosophy, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>.</span><br /> -Hume (on ideas of necessity), <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.<br /> -Hypothetical judgment, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>; syllogism, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -I.<br /> -<br /> -I (Ego), its universality, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">source of the categories, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as self-reference, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>; I = I, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>.</span><br /> -Idea (the), <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a> <i>seqq.;</i> aesthetic<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ideas, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>; innate ideas, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">clear and distinct, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>.</span><br /> -Ideal, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>; of reason, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.<br /> -Idealism, subjective, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>; absolute, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>.<br /> -Ideality (of the finite), <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>.<br /> -Identity, philosophy of, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its meaning, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>; law of, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>.</span><br /> -Imagination (in Spinoza), <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Kant, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>.</span><br /> -Immediacy (and mediation), <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">immediate knowledge, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -Indifference (absolute), <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.<br /> -Individuality, <a href="#Page_291">291</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Induction, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a>.<br /> -Infinite (and finite), <a href="#Page_62">62</a>; wrong infinite, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;<br /> -infinite progress, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>.<br /> -Innate ideas, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.<br /> -Intuition (and thought), <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>.<br /> -Inward (and outward), <a href="#Page_252">252</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -J.<br /> -<br /> -Jacobi (F. H.), <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a> <i>seqq.;</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">against demonstration, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">agnostic, <a href="#Page_121">121</a> <i>seqq.;</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on cause, <a href="#Page_277">277</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_423">423</a>).</span><br /> -Judaism, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>.<br /> -Judgment, defined, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">classification of, <a href="#Page_303">303</a> <i>seqq.</i> (cf. <a href="#Page_420">420</a>);</span><br /> -Kant's criticism of the faculty, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -K.<br /> -<br /> -Kant: his standpoint, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his doctrine of categories, <a href="#Page_83">83</a> <i>seqq.;</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">examination of his system, <a href="#Page_81">81</a> <i>seqq.</i>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of matter, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on 'construction' in mathematics, <a href="#Page_369">369</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_430">430</a>);</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on teleology, <a href="#Page_343">343</a> on modality, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his ethics, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">defects of his system, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>. <a href="#Page_372">372</a>-387, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>.</span><br /> -Kästner (A. G.), <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>.<br /> -Kind (genus), <a href="#Page_361">361</a>.<br /> -Knowledge, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>; immediate, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -L.<br /> -<br /> -Lalande, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>.<br /> -Law (of thought), <a href="#Page_213">213</a> <i>seqq.</i> (cf.417), <a href="#Page_290">290</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of a phenomenon, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>.</span><br /> -Leibniz: maxim of indiscernibles, <a href="#Page_217">217</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_417">417</a>);<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of sufficient reason, <a href="#Page_227">227</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_418">418</a>);</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on final cause, <a href="#Page_228">228</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_419">419</a>);</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his monadology, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_428">428</a>).</span><br /> -Life (as a logical category), <a href="#Page_358">358</a> <i>seqq.;</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">example of becoming, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>.</span><br /> -Like (and unlike), <a href="#Page_218">218</a>.<br /> -Limit (barrier), <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.<br /> -Locke (as empiricist), <a href="#Page_365">365</a>.<br /> -Logic, defined, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>; its utility, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Aristotle, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>; applied, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>; subdivided, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">formal, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -M.<br /> -<br /> -Magnitude, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>; intensive, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>.<br /> -Man (as an universal), <a href="#Page_293">293</a>.<br /> -Many (and one), <a href="#Page_181">181</a>.<br /> -Marks (in concept), <a href="#Page_296">296</a>.<br /> -Materialism (as logical result of empiricism), <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of a mathematical system, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>.</span><br /> -Mathematics: place in science, <a href="#Page_187">187</a> <i>seqq.</i>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mathematical syllogism, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>.</span><br /> -Matter (and form), <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>.<br /> -Mean (= middle term), <a href="#Page_318">318</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Means (and end) <a href="#Page_347">347</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Measure (logical category), <a href="#Page_199">199</a> <i>seqq.</i>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its antinomy, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>.</span><br /> -Mechanism, <a href="#Page_336">336</a> <i>seqq.;</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in ethics and politics, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</span><br /> -Mediation (and immediacy), <a href="#Page_133">133</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Memory (mechanical), <a href="#Page_338">338</a>.<br /> -Metaphysics, as logic, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">pre-Kantian, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">pseudo-metaphysics in science, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">categories, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>.</span><br /> -Methods: different, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">metaphysical, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">analytic, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">synthetic, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">speculative, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>;</span><br /> -methodology, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>.<br /> -Middle (law of excluded), <a href="#Page_220">220</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">middle term, <a href="#Page_318">318</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -Mind (and nature), <a href="#Page_70">70</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>.<br /> -Modality, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.<br /> -Mohammedanism, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>.<br /> -Monads, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>.<br /> -Moods (of syllogism), <a href="#Page_334">334</a>.<br /> -Mysticism, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>,410; mystic numbers, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -N.<br /> -<br /> -Nature (philosophy of), <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and spirit, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">nature and the logical idea, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>.</span><br /> -Natural (or physico-) theology, <a href="#Page_162">162</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_402">402</a>.<br /> -Naturalism, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>.<br /> -Necessity (and freedom), <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and universality, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its nature analysed, <a href="#Page_267">267</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -Necessitarian, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.<br /> -Negation, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.<br /> -Nemesis (measure as), <a href="#Page_201">201</a>.<br /> -Neutralisation, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>.<br /> -Newton, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>.<br /> -Nicolaus Cusanus, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>.<br /> -Nodal lines, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.<br /> -Nothing (and being), <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.<br /> -Notion: contrasted with being, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">theory of, <a href="#Page_286">286</a> <i>seqq.;</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">classifications of, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">opposed to representative concept, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>.</span><br /> -Novalis, quoted, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>.<br /> -Number, <a href="#Page_190">190</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -O.<br /> -<br /> -Object (and subject), <a href="#Page_329">329</a> <i>seqq.</i>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">objective (and subjective), <a href="#Page_83">83</a> <i>seqq.;</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">objective thought, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.</span><br /> -Oken, quoted, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>.<br /> -One (and many), <a href="#Page_179">179</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Ontology, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>; ontological proof<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in theology, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>.</span><br /> -Opposition (logical), <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br /> -Organism, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Oriental theosophy, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.<br /> -Ought (the), <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>.<br /> -Outward (and inward), <a href="#Page_253">253</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -P.<br /> -<br /> -Pantheism, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>; in Spinoza, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its principle, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</span><br /> -Paralogism (in rational psychology), <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>.<br /> -Parmenides, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>.<br /> -Particular, <a href="#Page_291">291</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Parts (and whole), <a href="#Page_245">245</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distinct from organs, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</span><br /> -Personality, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>.<br /> -Phenomenalism (Kant's), <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>.<br /> -Phenomenology of Spirit: place in Hegel's system, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>.<br /> -Philosophy: general definition, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its scope and aim, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">127, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">history of, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in England, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rise of, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its branches, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">method of, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">philosophy and life, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>.</span><br /> -Physicists, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>.<br /> -Plato: reminiscence of ideas, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his dialectic, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on the Other, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Philebus, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with Aristotle, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</span><br /> -Pneumatology, <a href="#Page_68">68</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Polarity, <a href="#Page_221">221</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_418">418</a>).<br /> -Porosity, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>.<br /> -Positive (and negative), <a href="#Page_219">219</a> <i>seqq.;</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">positive element in Science, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>.</span><br /> -Possibility, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br /> -Practical Reason, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>.<br /> -Predication, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Preformation, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>.<br /> -Problematical judgment, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>.<br /> -Proclus, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>.<br /> -Progress: its meaning, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.<br /> -Properties (of a thing), <a href="#Page_233">233</a>.<br /> -Proposition, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a>.<br /> -Protagoras, <a href="#Page_149">149</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_409">409</a>).<br /> -Proverbs quoted, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br /> -Providence, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>.<br /> -Psychology, <a href="#Page_68">68</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_95">95</a> <i>seqq.</i>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, (cf. <a href="#Page_428">428</a>).<br /> -<i>Punctum Sailens,</i>426.<br /> -Pure thought, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>.<br /> -Pythagoras, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Q.<br /> -<br /> -Qualitative judgment, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>; syllogism, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>.<br /> -Quality, <a href="#Page_158">158</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.<br /> -Quantity, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>.<br /> -Quantum, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -R.<br /> -<br /> -<i>Raisonnement,</i>229.<br /> -Ratio (quantitative), <a href="#Page_199">199</a>.<br /> -Reality: opposed to negation, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to ideality, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>.</span><br /> -Reason: faculty of the unconditioned, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a> <i>seqq.;</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as merely critical, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">practical, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">negative, <a href="#Page_152">152</a> <i>seqq.;</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as syllogism, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>.</span><br /> -Reciprocity, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br /> -Reflection, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distinct from dialectic, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">judgments of, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>.</span><br /> -Reinhold: his method, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>.<br /> -Religion (and philosophy), <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its nature, <a href="#Page_132">132</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -Reminiscence (Platonic), <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>.<br /> -Repulsion, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>.<br /> -Roman religion, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>.<br /> -Rousseau, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>.<br /> -Rule, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -S.<br /> -<br /> -Scepticism: ancient, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">opposed to dogmatism, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">modern, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its function in philosophy, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.</span><br /> -Schelling, <a href="#Page_46">46</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>), <a href="#Page_367">367</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">(cf. <a href="#Page_429">429</a>).</span><br /> -Schiller, <a href="#Page_112">112</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_405">405</a>).<br /> -Scholasticism, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">definition of God, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>.</span><br /> -Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>.<br /> -Sciences and philosophy, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">science and religion, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>.</span><br /> -Scotch philosophers, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>.<br /> -Scotus Erigena, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>.<br /> -Self-determination, in.<br /> -Self-identity, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>.<br /> -Sensation, <a href="#Page_36">36</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<i>Sensas eminentior,</i> <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a>.<br /> -Sex, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>.<br /> -Sin (original), <a href="#Page_55">55</a>.<br /> -Slavery (abolition of), <a href="#Page_293">293</a>.<br /> -Socrates, his dialectic, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>.<br /> -Solon, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>.<br /> -Somewhat, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.<br /> -Sophists: theory of education, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">essence of sophistry, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">opposed to Socrates, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>.</span><br /> -<i>Sorites,</i>203, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>.<br /> -Soul: as object of psychology, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">(rationalist theory of,) criticised by Kant, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">soul and Spirit, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>.</span><br /> -Speculation, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as opposed to dogmatism, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">speculative reason, <a href="#Page_152">152</a> <i>seqq.</i></span><br /> -Spinoza, his alleged atheism and pantheism, <a href="#Page_105">105</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_275">275</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>causa sui,</i> <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his God, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on determination, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>amor intellectualis,</i> <a href="#Page_283">283</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_424">424</a>);</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on imagination, <a href="#Page_196">196</a> (cf. <a href="#Page_415">415</a>);</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">his method, <a href="#Page_367">367</a> <i>seqq.</i>(cf. <a href="#Page_429">429</a>).</span><br /> -Spirit, see <i>Mind.</i><br /> -State (mechanical theories of the), <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.<br /> -Subject (and predicate), <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>.<br /> -Subjective (and objective), <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.<br /> -Substance, <a href="#Page_273">273</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Sufficient Reason (principle of), <a href="#Page_224">224</a> <i>seqq.</i> (cf. <a href="#Page_418">418</a>).<br /> -Syllogism, <a href="#Page_314">314</a> <i>seqq.;</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as a universal form of things, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in mechanism, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>; in teleology, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>.</span><br /> -Synthetic method, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>.<br /> -System (in philosophy), <a href="#Page_23">23</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_159">159</a>.<br /> -<br /> -T<br /> -<br /> -Taste, defined by Kant, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.<br /> -Teleology, <a href="#Page_343">343</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Terms (of syllogism), <a href="#Page_317">317</a>.<br /> -Theology (natural), <a href="#Page_71">71</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_101">101</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_397">397</a>.<br /> -Theorem, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>.<br /> -Theoretical Reason (Kant on), <a href="#Page_86">86</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Thing, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>; thing in or by itself, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>.<br /> -Thought, its meaning and activity, <a href="#Page_35">35</a> <i>seqq.</i>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">subjective, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">objective, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distinguished from pictorial representation, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.</span><br /> -Transcendent, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>; transcendental, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>.<br /> -Truth, object of philosophy, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and of logic, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its meaning, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distinguished from correctness, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -U.<br /> -<br /> -Unconditioned (the), <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>.<br /> -Understanding, as faculty of the conditioned, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as a principle of limitation, <a href="#Page_143">143</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_400">400</a>.</span><br /> -Unessential, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>.<br /> -Universal (the), <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">moment of the notion, <a href="#Page_291">291</a> <i>seqq.;</i></span><br /> -universality and necessity, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>.<br /> -Untrue, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.<br /> -<i>Urtheil,</i> <a href="#Page_297">297</a>.<br /> -Utilitarianism in Science, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -V.<br /> -<br /> -Variety, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<i>Verstand</i> and <i>Vernunft,</i> <a href="#Page_400">400</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Volition, <a href="#Page_364">364</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<br /> -W.<br /> -<br /> -<i>Wesen,</i> <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.<br /> -Whole (and parts), <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.<br /> -Will <a href="#Page_371">371</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">as practical reason, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">its freedom, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.</span><br /> -Wolff (Christian), his philosophy, <a href="#Page_60">60</a> <i>seqq.,</i> <a href="#Page_395">395</a>, <a href="#Page_396">396</a>;<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">method, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>.</span><br /> -World (the), as object of Cosmology, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Z.<br /> -<br /> -Zeno (of Elea), <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>.<br /> -</p> - -<h4>THE END.</h4> - - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Logic of Hegel, by G. 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