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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c47e7c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #54137 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54137) diff --git a/old/54137-0.txt b/old/54137-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 6af342b..0000000 --- a/old/54137-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14387 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Logic as the Science of the pure Concept, by -Benedetto Croce - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Logic as the Science of the pure Concept - -Author: Benedetto Croce - -Translator: Douglas Ainslie - -Release Date: February 8, 2017 [EBook #54137] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LOGIC *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational materials,...) -Images generously made available by the Internet Archive. - - - - - -LOGIC AS THE SCIENCE OF THE PURE CONCEPT - -TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN OF - -BENEDETTO CROCE - -BY - -DOUGLAS AINSLIE - -B.A. (OXON.), M.R.A.S. - -MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - - -ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON - -1917 - - - - - [Benedetto Croce's Philosophy of the Spirit, in the English translation - by Douglas Ainslie, consists of 4 volumes (which can be read separately): - 1. Aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic. (A first - ed. is available at Project Gutenberg. A second augmented ed. follows.) - 2. Philosophy of the practical: economic and ethic. (In preparation) - 3. Logic as the science of the pure concept. - 4. Theory and history of historiography. (In preparation) - Transcriber's note.] - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE - - -The publication of this third volume of the _Philosophy of the -Spirit_ offers a complete view of the Crocean philosophy to the -English-speaking world. - -I have striven in every way to render the Logic the equal of its -predecessors in accuracy and elegance of translation, and have taken -the opinion of critical friends on many occasions, though more -frequently I have preferred to retain my own. The vocabulary will be -found to resemble those of the _Æsthetic_ and the _Philosophy of the -Practical,_ thereby enabling readers to follow the thought of the -author more easily than if I had made alterations in it. Thus the word -"fancy" will be found here as elsewhere, the equivalent of the Italian -"fantasia" and "imagination" of "immaginazione"; this rendering makes -the meaning far more clear than the use of the words in the opposite -sense that they occasionally bear in English; this is particularly so -in respect of the important distinction of the activities in the early -part of the _Æsthetic._ I have also retained the word "gnoseology" and -its derivatives, as saving the circumlocutions entailed by the use of -any paraphrase, especially when adjectival forms are employed. - -I think that this Logic will come to be recognized as a masterpiece, in -the sense that it supplants and supersedes all Logics that have gone -before, especially those known as formal Logics, of which the average -layman has so profound and justifiable mistrust, for the very good -reason that, as Croce says, they are not Logic at all, but illogic--his -healthy love of life leads him to fight shy of what he feels would -lead to disaster if applied to the problems that he has to face in the -conduct of life. It is shown in the following pages that the prestige -of Aristotle is not wholly to blame for the survival of formal Logic -and for the class of mind that denying thought dwells ever in the _ipse -dixit._ Indeed, one of the chief boons conferred by this book will be -the freeing of the student from that confusion of thought and word that -is the essence of the old formal Logic--of thought that rises upon the -wings of words, like an aviator upon his falcon of wood and metal to -spy out the entrenchments of the enemy. - -One of the most stimulating portions of the book will, I think, be -found in Croce's theory of error and proof of its necessity in the -progress of truth. This may certainly be credited to Croce as a -discovery. That this theory of the uses of error has a great future, -I have no doubt, from its appearance at certain debates on Logic that -have taken place at the Aristotelian Society within the last year or -two, though strangely enough the name of the philosopher to whom it -was due was not mentioned. A like mysterious aposiopesis characterized -Professor J. A. Smith's communication to the same Society as to the -development of the ethical from the economic activity (degrees of the -Spirit) some years after the publication of the _Philosophy of the -Practical._ - -It is my hope that this original work, appearing as it does in the -midst of the great struggle with the Teutonic powers, may serve to -point out to the Anglo-Saxon world where the future of the world's -civilization lies, namely in the ancient line of Latin culture, -which includes in itself the loftiest Hellenic thought. It is sad to -think that the Germans have relapsed to barbarism from the veneer of -cultivation that they once possessed, particularly sad when one comes -upon the German names that must always abound in any treatise on the -development of thought. Their creative moment, however, was very brief, -and the really important names can be numbered on the fingers of one -hand, that of Emmanuel Kant being corrupted from the Scots Cant. Of -recent years the German contribution has been singularly small and -unimportant, such writers as Eucken being mere compilers of the work of -earlier philosophers, and without originality. The foul-souled Teuton -will need a long period of re-education before he can be readmitted -to the comity of nations upon equal terms--his bestiality will ask a -potent purge. - -In conclusion, I can only hope that the fact of this work having been -put into the hands of readers a decade earlier than would in all -probability have been the case, had I not been fortunate enough to -make a certain journey to Naples, will be duly taken advantage of by -students, and that it will serve for many as a solid foundation for -their thought about thought, and so of their thought about the whole of -life and reality in the new world that will succeed the War. - -DOUGLAS AINSLIE. - -THE ATHENAEUM, PALL MALL, - -_March_ 1917. - - - - -ADVERTISEMENT - - -This volume is, and is not, the memoir entitled _Outlines of Logic as -the Science of the Pure Concept,_ which I presented to the Accademia -Pontiana at the sessions of April 10 and May 1, 1904, and April 2, -1905, and which was inserted in volume xxxv. of the _Transactions_ -(printed as an extract from them by Giannini, Naples, 1905, in quarto, -pp. 140). - -I might have republished that memoir, and made in it certain -corrections, great and small, and especially I might have enriched it -with very numerous developments. But partial corrections and copious -additions, while they would have injured the arrangement of the -first work, would not have allowed me to attain to that more secure -and fuller exposition of logical doctrine which, after four years' -study and reflection, it now seems to be in my power to offer. I -have therefore resolved to rewrite the work from the beginning on a -larger scale, with a new arrangement and new diction regarding its -predecessor as a sketch, which in a literary sense stands by itself, -and only making use of a page, or group of pages, here and there, as -suited the natural order of exposition. - -Owing to this connection between the present volume with the -above-mentioned academic memoir, it will be seen in what sense it may -be called, and is called, a "second edition." It is a second edition of -my thought rather than of my book. - -B. C. - -NAPLES, - -_November_ 1908. - - - - -PREFACE TO THIRD ITALIAN EDITION OF THE _LOGIC_ - - -On reprinting the present volume, after an interval of seven years, I -have reread it with attention to its literary form, but have made no -substantial changes or additions to it; because the further development -of that part which deals with the logic of Historiography has been -collected in a special volume, forming as it were an appendix. This is -now the fourth volume of the _Philosophy of the Spirit._ - -It seemed to many, upon the first publication of this volume, that it -chiefly consisted of a very keen attack upon Science. Few, above all, -discovered what it was: _a vindication of the seriousness of logical -thought,_ not only in respect to empiricism and abstract thought, but -also to intuitionist, mystical and pragmatistic doctrines, and to -all the others then very vigorous, which, including justly combated -positivism, distorted every form of logicity. - -Nor, in truth, did its criticism of Science favour what is known as a -philosophy "detesting facts": indeed, the chief preoccupation of that -criticism was meticulous respect of facts, which was neither observed -nor observable in empirical and abstract constructions and in the -analogous mythologies of naturalism. The character of this _Logic_ -might equally be described as affirmation of the concrete universal and -affirmation of the concrete individual, as proof of the Aristotelian -_Scientia est de universalibus_ and proof of Campanula's _Scientia -est de singularibus._ In this manner those empty generalizations and -fictitious riches which are removed from philosophy in the course -of treatment, there appear more than amply, infinitely compensated -for by the restitution to it of its own riches, _of the whole of -history,_ both that known as human and that known as history of nature. -Henceforward it can live there as in its own dominion, or rather its -own body, which is co-extensive with and indivisible from it. The -separation there effected by philosophy from science is not separation -from what is _true knowledge in science,_ that is from the historical -and real elements of science. It is only separation from the schematic -form in which those elements are compressed, mutilated and altered. -Thus it may also be described as a reconnection of it with what of -living, concrete and progressive exists in those sciences. If the -destruction of anything be aimed at in it, that can clearly be nothing -but abstract and anti-historical philosophy. This _Logic_ must thus be -looked upon as a liquidation of philosophy rather than of science, if -abstract science be posited as true philosophy. - -That point is dwelt upon in the polemic against the idea of a general -philosophy which should stand above _particular philosophies,_ or -the methodological problems of historical thought. The distinction -of general philosophy from particular philosophies (which are true -generality in their particularity) seems to me to be the gnoseological -residue of the old dualism and of the old transcendency; a not -innocuous residue, for it always tends to the view that the thoughts -of men upon particular things are of an inferior, common and vulgar -nature, and that the thought of totality or unity is alone superior -and alone completely satisfying. The idea of a general philosophy -prepares in this way consciously or otherwise for the restoration of -Metaphysic, with its pretension of rethinking the already thought -by means of a particular thought of its own. This, when it is not -altogether religious revelation, becomes the caprice of the individual -philosopher. The many examples offered by post-Kantian philosophy -are proof of this. Here Metaphysic raged so furiously and to such -deleterious effect as to involve guiltless philosophy in its guilt. The -latent danger always remains, even if this restoration of Metaphysic -does not take place, for if it never becomes effective because it is -carefully watched and restrained, the other draw-back persists, namely, -that that general philosophy, or super-philosophy or super-intelligence -desired, while it does not succeed in making clear particular problems, -which alone have relation to concrete life, nevertheless in a measure -discredits them, by judging them to be of slight importance and by -surrounding them with a sort of mystical irony. - -To annul the idea of a "general" philosophy is at the same time to -annul the "static" concept of the philosophic system, replacing it with -the dynamic concept of simple historical "systemizations" of groups of -problems, of which particular problems and their solutions are what -remain, not their aggregate and external arrangement. This latter -satisfies the needs of the times and of authors and passes away with -them, or is preserved and admired solely for æsthetic reasons when -it possesses them. But those who retain some superstitious reverence -for "General Philosophy" or "Metaphysic" have still a superstitious -reverence for what are known as static systems. In so doing they behave -in a rational manner, for they cannot altogether free themselves from -the claims of a definitive philosophy which is to solve once and for -all the so-called "enigma of the world" (imaginary because there are -infinite enigmas which appear and are solved in turn, but there is -not the Enigma), and is to provide the "true system" or "basis" of -the true system. Nevertheless I hope that good fortune will attend -the doctrine of the concept here set out, not only because it seems -to me to afford the satisfaction proper to every statement of truth, -namely, to accord with the reality of things, but also (if I may so -express myself) because it carries with it certain immediate and -tangible advantages. Above all, it relieves the student of philosophy -of the terrible responsibility--which I should never wish to assume--of -supplying the Truth, the unique eternal Truth, and of supplying it in -competition with all the greatest philosophers who have appeared in -the course of centuries. Further, it removes from him together both -the hope of the definitive system and the anxious fear of the mortal -doom which will one day strike the very system that he has so lovingly -constructed, as it has struck those of his predecessors. At the same -time it sets him out of reach of the smiling non-philosophers who -foresee with accuracy and are almost able to calculate the date of that -not distant death. Finally, it frees him from the annoyance of the -"school" and of the "scholars"; "school" and "scholars" in the sense of -the old metaphysicians are no longer even conceivable, when the idea -of "systems" having-their "own principles" has been abolished. All -dynamic systems or provisory systemizations of ever new problems have -the same principle, namely, Thought, _perennis philosophia._ There has -not been and never will be anything to add to this. And although the -many propositions and solutions of problems strive among themselves -to attain harmony, yet to each, if it be truly thought, is promised -eternal life, which gives and receives vigour from the life of each of -the others. This is just the opposite of what takes place with static -systems which collapse, one upon the other, only certain portions of -good work surviving them in the shape of happy treatment of special -problems which are to be found mingled with the metaphysic of every -true philosopher. And although there is no longer a field left over to -these scholars who merely faithfully echo the master, like adepts of a -religion, there is yet a wide field always open to the other type of -scholar, men who pay serious attention and assimilate what is of use to -them in the thought of others, but then proceed to state and to solve -new problems of their own. Finally, the life of philosophy as conceived -and portrayed in this _Logic,_ resembles the life of poetry in this: -that it does not become effective save in passing from _different_ to -_different,_ from one original thinker to another, as poetry passes -from poet to poet, and imitators and schools of poetry, although they -certainly belong to the world, yet do not belong to the world of poetry. - -B. C. - -_September_ 1916. - - - - -CONTENTS - -FIRST PART - -THE PURE CONCEPT, THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE _A PRIORI_ LOGICAL -SYNTHESIS - -FIRST SECTION - -THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS - -I - -AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPT - -Thought and sensation--Thought and language--Intuition and -language as presuppositions--Scepsis as to the concept--Its three -forms--Æstheticism--Mysticism--Empiricism--_Redactio ad absurdum_ of -the three forms--Affirmation of the concept. - -II - -THE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS - -Concept and conceptual fictions--The pure concept as ultra- and -omnirepresentative--Conceptual fictions as representative without -universality, or universals void of representations--Criticism of the -doctrine which considers them to be erroneous concepts, or imperfect -concepts preparatory to perfect concepts--Posteriority of fictional -concepts to true and proper concepts--Proper character of conceptual -fictions--The practical end and mnemonic utility--Persistence of -conceptual fictions side by side with concepts--Pure concepts and -pseudoconcepts. - -III - -THE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT - -Expressivity--Universality--Concreteness--The concrete-universal -and the formation of the pseudoconcepts--Empirical and abstract -pseudoconcepts--The other characteristics of the pure concept--The -origin of multiplicity and the unity of the characteristics of the -concept--Objection relating to the unreality of the pure concept and -the impossibility of demonstrating it--Prejudice concerning the nature -of the demonstration--Prejudice relating to the representability of -the concept--Protests of philosophers against this prejudice--Reason of -their perpetual reappearance. - -IV - -DISPUTES CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT - -Disputes of materialistic origin--The concept as value--Realism -and nominalism--Critique of both--True realism--Resolution of -other difficulties as to the genesis of concepts--Disputes arising -from the neglected distinction between empirical and abstract -concepts--Intersection of the various disputes--Other logical -disputes--Representative accompaniment of the concept--Concept -of the thing and concept of the individual--Reasons, laws and -causes--Intellect and Reason--The abstract reason and its practical -nature--The synthesis of theoretical and practical and intellectual -intuition--Uniqueness of thought. - -V - -CRITIQUE OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE CONCEPTS AND - -THEORY OF DISTINCTION AND DEFINITION - -The pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept--Obscurity, -clearness and distinction, not subdivisions of the concept--Inexistence -of subdivisions of the concept as logical form--Distinctions of -the concepts not logical, but real--Multiplicity of the concepts; -and logical difficulty arising therefrom. Necessity of overcoming -it--Impossibility of eliminating it--Unity as distinction--Inadequacy -of the numerical concept of the multiple--Relation of distincts -as ideal history--Distinction between ideal history and real -history--Ideal distinction and abstract distinction--Other usual -distinctions of the concept, and their significance--Identical, -unequal, primitive and derived concepts, etc.--Universal, -particular and singular. Comprehension and extension--Logical -definition--Unity-distinction as a circle--Distinction in the -pseudoconcepts--Subordination and co-ordination of empirical -concepts--Definition in empirical concepts, and forms of the -concept--The series in abstract concepts. - -VI - -OPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES - -Opposite or contradictory concepts--Their diversity from distincts ---Confirmation of this afforded by empirical Logic--Difficulty arising -from the double type of concepts, opposite and distinct--Nature of -opposites; and their identity, when they are distinguished, with -distincts--Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another, -as concept from concept--The dialectic--Opposites are not concepts, -but the unique concept itself--Affirmation and negation--The principle -of identity and contradiction; true meaning, and false interpretation -of it--Another false interpretation: contrast with the principle of -opposition. False application of this principle also--Errors of the -dialectic applied to the relation of distincts--Its reduction to the -absurd--The improper form of logical principles or laws--The principle -of sufficient reason. - - -SECOND SECTION - -INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT - -I - -THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT - -Relation of the logical with the æsthetic form--The concept as -expression--Æsthetic and æsthetic-logical expressions or expressions of -the concept: propositions and judgments--Overcoming of the dualism of -thought and language--The logical judgment as definition--Indistinction -of subject and predicate in the definition--Unity of essence and -existence--Pretended vacuity of the definition--Critique of the -definition as fixed verbal formula. - -II - -THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE SYLLOGISM - -Identity of definition and syllogism--Connection of concepts and -thinking of concepts--Identity of judgment and syllogism--The middle -term and the nature of the concept--Pretended non-definitive logical -judgments--The syllogism as fixed verbal formula--Use and abuse -of it--Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in pure -concepts--Separation of truth and reason of truth in the pseudoconcepts. - -III - -CRITIQUE OF FORMAL LOGIC - -Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic--Its nature--Its partial -justification--Its error--Its traditional constitution--The three -logical forms--Theories of the concept and of the judgment--Theory -of the syllogism--Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal -Logic--Mathematical Logic or Logistic--Its non-mathematical -character--Example of its mode of treatment--Identity of nature of -Logistic and formal Logic--Practical aspect of Logistic. - -IV - -INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION - -Reaction of the concept upon the representation--Logicization of the -representations--The individual judgment; and its difference from -the judgment of definition--Distinction of subject and predicate in -the individual judgment--Reasons for the variety of definitions of -the judgment and of some of its divisions--Individual judgment and -intellectual intuition--Identity of individual judgment with perception -or perceptive judgment, and with commemorative or historical -judgment--Erroneous distinction of individual judgments as of fact -and of value--The individual judgment as ultimate and perfect form of -knowledge--Error of treating it as the first fact of knowledge--Motive -of this error--Individual syllogisms. - -V - -THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE PREDICATE OF EXISTENCE - -The copula: its verbal and logical significance--Questions relating to -propositions without a subject. Verbalism--Confusion between different -forms of judgments in the question of existentiality--Determination -and subdivision of the question concerning the existentiality of -individual judgments--Necessity of the existential character in these -judgments---The absolutely and the relatively inexistent--The character -of existence as predicate--Critique of existentiality as position -and faith--Absurd consequences of those doctrines--The predicate of -existence as not sufficient to constitute a judgment--The predicate of -judgment as the totality of the concept. - -VI - -INDIVIDUAL PSEUDOJUDGMENTS. CLASSIFICATION AND ENUMERATION - -Individual pseudojudgments--Their practical character--Genesis of the -distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value; and -critique of it--Importance of individual pseudojudgments--Empirical -individual and individual abstract judgments--Formative process -of empirical judgments--Their existential basis--Dependence of -empirical judgments upon pure concepts--Empirical judgments as -classification--Classification and understanding--Substitution of -the one for the other, and genesis of perceptive and judicative -illusions--Abstract concepts and individual judgments--Impossibility -of direct application of the first to the second--Intervention of -empirical judgments as intermediate--Reduction of the heterogeneous -to the homogeneous--Empirical abstract judgments and enumeration -(mensuration, etc.)--Enumeration and intelligence--The so-called -conversion of quantity into quality--Mathematical space and time and -their abstractness. - - -THIRD SECTION - -IDENTITY OF THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT THE LOGICAL _A -PRIORI_ SYNTHESIS - -I - -IDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE -INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT - -Result of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and the -individual judgment--Distinction between the two: truth of reason -and truth of fact, necessary and contingent, etc.; formal and -material--Absurdities arising from these distinctions: the individual -judgment as ultra-logical; or, duality of logical forms--Difficulty of -abandoning the distinction--The hypothesis of reciprocal implication, -and so of the identity of the two forms--Objection; the lack of -representative and historical element in the definitive--The historical -element in the definitions taken in their concreteness--The definition -as answer to a question and solution of a problem--Individual and -historical conditionally of every question and problem--Definition -as also historical judgment--Unity of truth of reason and truth of -fact--Considerations in confirmation of this--Critique of the false -distinction between formal and material truths--Platonic men and -Aristotelian men--Theory of application of the concepts, true for -abstract concepts and false for true concepts. - -II - -THE _A PRIORI_ LOGICAL SYNTHESIS - -The identity of the judgment of definition and of the individual -judgment, as synthesis _a priori_--Objections to the synthesis -_a priori,_ deriving from abstractionists and empiricists--False -interpretation of the synthesis _a priori_--Synthesis _a priori in_ -general and logical synthesis _a priori_--Non-logical synthesis _a -priori--_The synthesis _a priori,_ as synthesis, not of opposites, -but of distincts--The category in the judgment. Difference between -category and innate idea--The synthesis _a priori,_ the destruction of -transcendency, and the objectivity of knowing--Power of the synthesis -_a priori_ remained unknown to its discoverer. - -III - -LOGIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES - -The demand for a complete table of the categories--This demand -extraneous to Logic--Logical categories and real categories--Uniqueness -of the logical category: the concept. The other categories, no longer -logical, but real. Systems of categories--The Hegelian system of -the categories, and other posterior systems--The logical order of -the predicates or categories--Illusion as to the logical reality of -this order--The necessity of an order of the predicates not founded -upon Logic in particular, but upon the whole of Philosophy--False -distinction of Philosophy into two spheres--Metaphysic and Philosophy, -rational Philosophy and real Philosophy, etc., derived from the -confusion between Logic and Doctrine of the categories--Philosophy and -pure Logic, etc.; overcoming of the dualism. - - -SECOND PART - -PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND THE NATURAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES - -I - -THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE - -Summary of the results relating to the forms of -knowledge--Non-existence of technical forms, and of composed -forms--Identity of forms of knowledge and of knowing. Objections -to them--Empirical distinctions and their limits--Enumeration and -determination of the forms of knowing reality, corresponding to the -forms of knowledge--Critique of the idea of a special Logic as doctrine -of the forms of knowing the external world and of a special Logic -as doctrine of the methods--Nature of our treatment of the forms of -knowledge. - -II - -PHILOSOPHY - -Philosophy as pure concept; and the various definitions of -philosophy--Those which negate philosophy--Those which define it as -science of supreme principle, of final causes, etc.; contemplation -of death, etc.; as elaboration of the concepts, as criticism, as -science of norms; as doctrine of the categories--Exclusion of material -definitions from philosophy--Idealism of every philosophy--Systematic -character of philosophy--Philosophic significance and literary -significance of the system--Advantages and disadvantages of the -literary form of the system--Genesis of the systematic prejudice, -and rebellion against it--Sacred and philosophic numbers; meaning of -their demand--Impossibility of dividing philosophy into general and -particular--Disadvantages of the conception of a general philosophy, -distinct from particular philosophies. - -III - -HISTORY - -History as individual judgment--The individual element and historical -sources: relics and narrative--The intuitive faculty in historical -research--The intuitive faculty in historical exposition. Resemblance -of history and art. Difference between history and art--The predicate -or logical element in history--Vain attempts to eliminate it--Extension -of historical predicates beyond the limits of mere existence--Asserted -unsurmountable variance in judging and presenting historical facts -and consequent demand for a history without judgment--Restriction of -variance, and exclusion of apparent variances--Overcoming of variances -by means of deep study of the concepts--Subjectivity and objectivity -in history: their meaning--Historical judgments of value, and normal -or neutral values. Critique--Various legitimate meanings of protests -against historical subjectivity--The demand for a theory of historical -factors--Impossibility of dividing history according to its intuitive -and reflective elements--Empiricity of the division of the historical -process into four stages--Divisions founded upon the historical -object--Logical division according to the forms of the spirit--The -empirical division of the representative material--Empirical concepts -in history; and the false theory as to the function they fulfil -there--Hence also the claim to reduce history to a natural science; -and the thesis of the practical character of history--Distinction -between historical facts and non-historical facts; and its empirical -value--The professional prejudice and theory of the practical character -of history. - -IV - -IDENTITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY - -Necessity of the historical element in philosophy--Historical -quality of the culture required of the philosopher--Apparent -objections--Communication of philosophy as changing of -philosophy--Perpetuity of this changing--The overcoming and continuous -progress of philosophy--Meaning of the eternity of philosophy--The -concept of spontaneous, ingenuous, innate philosophy, etc.; and its -meaning--Philosophy as criticism and polemic--Identity of philosophy -and history--Didactic divisions, and other reasons for the apparent -duality--Note. - -V - -THE NATURAL SCIENCES - -The natural sciences as empirical concepts, and their practical -nature--Elimination of an equivocation concerning this practical -character--Impossibility of unifying them in one concept--Impossibility -of introducing into them rigorous divisions--Laws in the natural -sciences, and so-called prevision--Empirical character of -naturalistic laws--The postulate of the uniformity of nature, and its -meaning--Pretended impossibility of exceptions to natural laws--Nature -and its various meanings. Nature as passivity and negativity--Nature -as practical activity--Nature in its gnoseological significance, -as naturalistic or empirical method--The illusions of materialists -and dualists--Nature as empirical distinction of an inferior reality -in respect to a superior reality--The naturalistic method, and the -natural sciences as extending to superior not less than to inferior -reality--Claim for such extension, and effective existence of what is -claimed--Historical foundation of the natural sciences--The question -whether history be foundation or crown of thought--Naturalists -as historical investigators--Prejudices as to non-historicity of -nature--Philosophic foundation of the natural sciences, and effect -of philosophy upon them--Effect of natural sciences upon philosophy, -and errors in conceiving such relation--Reason of these errors. -Naturalistic philosophy--Philosophy as the destroyer of naturalistic -philosophy, but not of the natural sciences. Autonomy of these. - -VI - -MATHEMATICS AND THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCE OF NATURE - -Idea of a mathematical science of nature--Various definitions of -mathematics--Mathematical procedure--Apriority of mathematical -principles--Contradictoriness of the _a priori_ principles. They -are not thinkable, and not intuitive--Identification of mathematics -with abstract pseudoconcepts--The ultimate end of mathematics: to -enumerate, and, therefore, to aid the determination of the single. -Its place--Particular questions concerning mathematics--Rigour of -mathematics and rigour of philosophy--Loves and hates between the -two forms--Impossibility of reducing the empirical sciences to the -mathematical; and the empirical limits of the mathematical science of -nature--Decreasing utility of mathematics in the loftiest spheres of -the real. - -VII - -THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES - -Theory of the forms of knowledge and doctrine of the -categories--Problem of classification of the sciences; its empirical -nature--Falsely philosophic character that it assumes--Coincidence -of that problem with the search for the categories, when understood -with philosophic rigour--Forms of knowledge and literary-didactic -forms--Prejudices derived from the latter--Methodical prologues to -scholastic manuals, their impotence--Capricious multiplication of the -sciences--The sciences and professional prejudices. - - -THIRD PART - -THE FORMS OF ERROR AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH - -I - -ERROR AND ITS NECESSARY FORMS - -Error as negativity; impossibility of a special treatment of -errors--Positive and existing errors--Positive errors as practical -acts--Practical acts and not practical errors--Economically practical -acts, not morally practical acts--Doctrine of error, and doctrine -of necessary forms of error--Logical nature of all theoretical -errors--History of errors and phenomenology of error--Deduction of -the forms of logical errors. Forms deduced from the concept of the -concept, and forms deduced from the other concepts--Errors derived from -errors--Professionally and nationality of errors. - -II - -ÆSTHETICISM, EMPIRICISM AND MATHEMATICISM - -Definition of these forms--Æstheticism--Empiricism--Positivism, the -philosophy founded upon the sciences, inductive metaphysic--Empiricism -and facts--Bankruptcy of Empiricism: dualism, agnosticism, spiritualism -and superstition--Evolutionistic positivism and rationalistic -positivism--Mathematicism--Symbolical mathematics--Mathematics -as a form of demonstration of philosophy--Errors of mathematical -philosophy--Dualism, agnosticism and superstition of mathematicism. - -III - -THE PHILOSOPHISM - -Rupture of the unity of the _a priori_ synthesis--Philosophism, -logicism or panlogicism--Philosophy of history--Contradictions in its -assumptions--Philosophy of history and false analogies--Distinction -between Philosophy of history and books so entitled--Merits of these, -philosophic and historical--Philosophy of nature--Its substantial -identity with Philosophy of history--Contradictions of Philosophy of -nature--Books entitled Philosophy of nature--Contemporary seekings for -a Philosophy of nature and their various meanings. - -IV - -THE MYTHOLOGISM - -Rupture of the unity of the _a priori_ synthesis. The mythologism ---Essence of myth--Problems relating to theory of myth--Myth -and religion--Identity of the two spiritual forms--Religion and -philosophy--Conversion of errors, the one into the other--Conversion of -the mythologism into philosophism (theology) and of the philosophism -into the mythologism (mythology of nature, historical apocalypses, -etc.)--Scepsis. - -DUALISM, SCEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM - -Dualism--Scepsis and scepticism--Mystery--Critique of affirmations -of mystery in philosophy--Agnosticism as a particular form of -scepticism--Mysticism--Errors in other parts of philosophy--Conversion -of these errors into one another and into logical errors. - -VI - -THE ORDER OF ERRORS AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH - -Necessary character of the forms of errors. Their definite number ---Their logical order--Examples of this order in various parts of -philosophy--Erring spirit and spirit of search--Immanence of error -in truth--Erroneous distinction between possession of and search -for truth--Search for truth in the practical sense of preparation -for thought; the series of errors--Transfiguration of error into -tentative or hypothesis in the search so understood--Distinction -between error as error and error as hypothesis--Immanence of the -tentative in error itself as error--Individuals and error--Duplicate -aspect of errors--Ultimate form of error: the methodological error or -hypotheticism. - -VII - -THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ERROR AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY - -Inseparability of phenomenology of error from the philosophical -system--The eternal course and recurrence of errors--Returns to -anterior philosophies; and their meaning--False idea of a history of -philosophy as history of the successive appearance of the categories -and of errors in time--Philosophism case in point of this false -view, as is the formula concerning the identity of philosophy and -history of philosophy--Distinction between this false idea of a -history of philosophy, and the books which take it as their title or -programme--Exact formula: identity of philosophy and history--History -of philosophy and philosophic progress--The truth of all philosophies; -and criticism of eclecticism--Researches for authors and precursors of -truths; reason for the antinomies which they exhibit. - -VIII - -"DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE" - -Logic and defence of Philosophy--Utility of Philosophy and the -Philosophy of the practical--Consolation of philosophy, as joy -of thought and in the true. Impossibility of a pleasure arising -from falsity and illusion--Critique of the concept of a sad truth ---Examples: Philosophical criticism and the concepts of God and -Immortality--Consolatory virtue, pertaining to all spiritual -activities--Sorrow and elevation of sorrow. - - -FOURTH PART - -HISTORICAL RETROSPECT - -I - -HISTORY OF LOGIC AND HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY - -Reality, Thought and Logic--Relation of these three terms--Inexistence -of a general philosophy outside particular philosophic sciences; -and, in consequence, of a general History of philosophy outside the -histories of particular philosophic sciences--Histories of particular -philosophies and literary value of such division--History of Logic in -its particular sense--Works dealing with history of Logic. - -II - -THEORY OF THE CONCEPT - -Question as to the "father of Logic"--Socrates, Plato, Aristotle ---Enquiries as to the nature of the concept in Greece. Question of -transcendency and immanence--Controversies in Plato concerning the -various forms of the concept--Philosophic, empirical and abstract -concepts in Aristotle. Philosophy, physics, mathematics--Universals of -the "always" and those of "for the most part"--Logical controversies -in the Middle Ages--Nominalism and realism--Nominalism, mysticism and -coincidence of opposites--Renaissance and mysticism--Bacon--Ideal of -exact science and Cartesian philosophy--Adversaries of Cartesianism ---Vico--Empiristic logic and its dissolution. Locke, Berkeley and -Hume--Exact science and Kant. Concept of the category--Limits of -science, and Jacobi--Positive elements in Kantian scepticism--The -synthesis _a priori_--Inward contradiction in Kant. Romantic principle -and classic execution--Progress since Kant: Fichte, Schelling, -Hegel--Logic of Hegel. The concrete concept or Idea--Identity of -Hegelian Idea and Kantian synthesis _a priori_--The Idea and the -antinomies. The dialectic--Lacunæ and errors in Hegelian Logic. Their -consequences--Contemporaries of Hegel: Herbart, Schleiermacher and -others--Posterior positivism and psychologicism--Eclectics. Lotze--New -gnoseology of the sciences. Economic theory of scientific concept. -Avenarius, Mach--Rickert--Bergson and the new French philosophy--Le -Roy, and others--Reattachment to romantic ideas, and progress upon -them--Philosophy of pure experience, of intuition, of action, etc.: and -its insufficiency--The theory of values. - -III - -THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT - -Secular neglect of theory relating to history--Ideas upon history -in Græco-Roman world--Theory of history in mediæval and modern -philosophy--Writers on historical art in the sixteenth century--Writers -on method--Theory of history and G. B. Vico--Anti-historicism of -eighteenth century, and Kant--Hidden historical value of synthesis -_a priori_--Theory of history in Hegel--W. von Humboldt--F. -Brentano--Controversies as to the nature of history--Rickert; Xénopol. -History as science of individual--History as art--Other controversies -relating to history. - -IV - -THEORY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND WORD AND FORMALIST LOGIC - -Relation between history of Logic and history of Philosophy of -language--Logical formalism. Indian logic free of it--Aristotelian -Logic and formalism--Later formalism--Rebellions against Aristotelian -Logic--Opposition by humanists and its motives--Opposition of -naturalism--Simplicatory elaboration in eighteenth century. -Kant--Refutation of formal Logic. Hegel; Schleiermacher--Its partial -persistence, owing to insufficient ideas as to language--Formal -Logic in Herbart, in Schopenhauer, in Hamilton--More recent -theories--Mathematical Logic--Inexact idea of language among -mathematicians and intuitionists. - -V - -CONCERNING THIS LOGIC - -Traditional character of this Logic and its connection with Logic of -philosophic concept--Its innovations--I. Exclusion of empirical and -abstract concepts--II. Atheoretic character of second, and autonomy -of empirical and mathematical sciences--III. Concept as unity of -distinctions--IV. Identity of concept with individual judgment and of -philosophy with history--V. Impossibility of defining thought by means -of verbal forms, and refutation of formal Logic--Conclusion. - - - - -FIRST PART - -THE PURE CONCEPT, THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT, AND THE _A PRIORI_ LOGICAL -SYNTHESIS - - - - -FIRST SECTION - - - -THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS - -I - -AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPT - - -[Sidenote: _Thought and sensation._] - -Presupposed in the logical activity, which is the subject of -this treatise, are representations or intuitions. If man had no -representations, he would not think; were he not an imaginative spirit, -he would not be a logical spirit. It is generally admitted that thought -refers back to sensation, as its antecedent; and this doctrine we have -no difficulty in making our own, provided it be given a double meaning. -That is to say, in the first place, sensation must be conceived as -something active and cognitive, or as a cognitive act; and not as -something formless and passive, or active only with the activity of -life, and not with that of contemplation. And, in the second place, -sensation must be taken in its purity, without any logical reflection -and elaboration; as simple sensation, that is to say, and not as -perception, which (as will be seen in the proper place), so far from -being implied, in itself implies logical activity. With this double -explanation, sensation, active, cognitive and unreflective, becomes -synonymous with representation and intuition; and certainly this is -not the place to discuss the use of these synonyms, though there are -excellent reasons of practical convenience pointing to the preference -of the terms which we have adopted. - -At all events, the important thing is to bear clearly in mind, that the -logical activity, or thought, arises upon the many-coloured pageant of -representations, intuitions, or sensations, whichever we may call them; -and by means of these, at every moment the cognitive spirit absorbs -within itself the course of reality, bestowing upon it theoretic form. - -[Sidenote: _Thought and language._] - -Another presupposition is often introduced by logicians: that of -language; since it seems clear that, if man does not speak, he does -not think. This presupposition also we accept, adding to it, however, -a corollary, together with certain elucidations. The elucidations are: -in the first place, that language must be taken in its genuine and -complete reality; that is to say, it must not be arbitrarily restricted -to certain of its manifestations, such as the vocal and articulate; -nor be changed and falsified into a body of abstractions, such as -the classes of Grammar or the words of the Vocabulary, conceived as -these are in the fashion of a machine, which man sets in motion when -he speaks. And, in the second place, by language is to be understood, -not the whole body of discourses, taken all together and in confusion, -into which (as will be seen in its place) logical elements enter; -but only that determinate aspect of these discourses, in virtue of -which they are properly called language. A deep-rooted error, which -springs directly from the failure to make this distinction, is that -of believing language to be constituted of logical elements; adducing -as a proof of this that even in the smallest discourse are to be -found the words _this, that, to be, to do,_ and the like, that is, -logical concepts. But these concepts are by no means really to be -found in every expression; and, even where they are to be found, -the possibility of extracting them is no proof that they exhaust -language. So true is this that those who cherish this conviction are -afterwards obliged to leave over as a residue of their analysis, -elements which they consider to be illogical and which they call -_emphatic, complementary, colorative,_ or _musical_: a residue in which -is concealed true language, which escapes that abstract analysis. -Finally, the corollary is that if the concept of language is thus -rectified, the presupposition made for Logic regarding language is not -a _new_ presupposition, but is identical with that already made, when -representations or intuitions were discussed. In truth, language in the -strict sense, as we understand it, is equivalent to expression; and -expression is identical with representation, since it is inconceivable -that there should be a representation, which should not be expressed -in some way, or an expression which should represent nothing, or be -meaningless. The one would fail to be representation, and the other -would not even be expression; that is to say, both must be and are, one -and the same. - -[Sidenote: _Intuition and language as presuppositions._] - -What is a real presupposition of the logical activity, is, for that -very reason, not a presupposition in Philosophy, which cannot admit -presuppositions and must think and demonstrate all the concepts that -it posits. But it may conveniently be allowed as a presupposition -for that part of Philosophy, which we are now undertaking to treat, -namely Logic; and the existence of the representative or intuitive -form of knowledge be taken for granted. After all, scepticism could -not formulate more than two objections to this position: either the -negation of knowing in general; or the negation of that form of knowing -which we presuppose. Now, the first would be an instance of absolute -scepticism; and we may be allowed to dispense with exhibiting yet again -the old, but ever effective argument against absolute scepticism which -may be found in the mouths of all students at the university, even -of the boys in the higher elementary classes (and this dispensation -may more readily be granted, seeing that we shall unfortunately be -obliged to record many obvious truths of Philosophy in the course of -our exposition). But we do not mean by this declaration that we shall -evade our obligation to show the genesis and the profound reasons for -this same scepticism, when we are led to do so by the order of our -exposition. The second objection implies the negation of the intuitive -activity as original and autonomous, and its resolution into empirical, -hedonistic, intellectualist, or other doctrines. But we have already, -in the preceding volume,[1] directed our efforts towards making the -intuitive activity immune against such doctrines, that is to say, -towards demonstrating the autonomy of fancy and establishing an -Æsthetic. So that, in this way, the presupposition which we now allow -to stand has here its pedagogic justification, since it resolves itself -into a reference to things said elsewhere. - -[Sidenote: _Scepticism as to the concept._] - -Facing, therefore, without more ado, the problem of Logic, the first -obstacle to be removed will not be absolute scepticism nor scepticism -concerning the intuitive form; but a new and more circumscribed -scepticism, which does not question the two first theses, indeed -relies upon them, and negates neither knowledge nor intuition, but -_logical_ knowledge itself. Logical knowledge is something beyond -simple representation. The latter is individuality and multiplicity; -the former the _universality_ of individuality, the _unity_ of -multiplicity; the one is intuition, the other _concept._ To know -logically is to know the universal or concept. The negation of logic is -the affirmation that there is no other knowledge than representative -(or sense knowledge, as it is called), and that universal or conceptual -knowledge does not exist. Beyond simple representation, there is -nothing knowable. - -Were this so, the treatise which we are preparing to develop would -have no subject-matter whatever, and would here cease, since it is -impossible to seek out the nature of what does not exist, that is, of -the concept, or how it operates in relation to the other forms of the -Spirit. But that this is not so, and that the concept really exists -and operates and gives rise to problems, undoubtedly results from the -negation itself, pronounced by that form of scepticism which we will -call _logical,_ and which is, indeed, the only negation conceivable -upon this point. Thus, we can speedily reassure ourselves as to the -fate of our undertaking; or, if it be preferred, we must at once -abandon the hope which we conjured up before ourselves, and resign -ourselves to the labour of constructing a Logic; a labour which logical -scepticism, by restricting us to the sole form of representation, had, -as it seems, the good intention of sparing us. - -[Sidenote: _Its three forms._] - -Logical scepticism, in fact, can assume three forms. It may affirm -simply that representative knowledge is the whole and that unity or -universality, whose existence we have postulated, are words without -meaning. Or it may affirm that the demand for unity is justified, but -that it is satisfied only by the non-cognitive forms of the Spirit. -Or, finally, it may affirm that the demand is certainly satisfied by -these non-cognitive forms, but only in so far as they react upon -the cognitive, that is to say, upon the one admitted form of the -cognitive, namely, the representative. It is clear that there is no -other possibility beyond these three, either that of being satisfied -with representative knowledge; or of being satisfied with something -non-cognitive; or of combining these two forms. In the first case, -we have the theory of _æstheticism_ (which could also be correctly -called sensationalism, if this did not happen to be an inconvenient -term, by reason of the misunderstanding which might easily spring from -it); in the second, the theory of _mysticism;_ in the third, that of -_empiricism_ or _arbitrarism._ - -[Sidenote: _Æstheticism._] - -According to æstheticism, in order to understand the real, it is not -necessary to think by means of concepts, to universalize, to reason, or -to be logical. It suffices to pass from one spectacle to another; and -the sum of these, increased to infinity, is the truth which we seek, -and which we must refrain from transcending, lest we fall into the -void. The _sub specie aeterni_ would be just like that mirror of water -which deceived the avidity of the dog of Phædrus, and made it leave the -real for the illusory food. For the cold and fruitless quest of the -logician there is substituted the rich and moving contemplation of the -artist. Truth lies in works of speech, of colour, of line, and not at -all in the vain babblings of philosophy. Let us sing, let us paint, and -not compel our minds to spasmodic and sterile efforts. - -[Sidenote: _Mysticism._] - -The æstheticist's attitude may be considered as that of the spirit, -which comes out of itself and disperses itself among things, while -keeping itself above and aloof from them, contemplating, but not -immersing itself in them. Mysticism is not satisfied with this, feeling -that no repose is ever accorded to the spirit which abandons itself to -this orgy, this breathless adventure of infinitely various spectacles, -and that the intimate meaning of them all escapes the æstheticist. -It is true that there is no logical knowledge, that the concept is -sterile, but the claim for unity is legitimate, and demands to be, and -is, satisfied. But in what way is it satisfied? Art speaks, and its -speech, however beautiful, does not content us; it paints, and its -colours, however attractive, deceive us. In order to find the inmost -meaning of life, we must seek, not the light, but the shade, not -speech, but silence. In silence, reality raises its head and shows its -countenance; or, better, it shows us nothing, but fills us with itself, -and gives us the sense of its very being. The unity and universality -that we desire are found in action, in the practical form of the -Spirit: in the heart, which palpitates, loves, and wills. Knowledge is -knowledge of the single, it is representation; the eternal is not a -matter of knowledge, but of _intimate and ineffable experience._ - -[Sidenote: _Empiricism._] - -If the sceptics of logico-æsthetic type are chiefly artistic souls, the -logico-mystical sceptics are sentimental and perturbed souls. These, -although they do not usually take an entirely active part in life, yet -do to some extent take part in it, vibrating in sympathetic unison -with it, and, according to circumstances, suffering, sometimes through -taking part, and sometimes through failing so to do. Empiricists -or arbitrarists are to be found, on the other hand, among those -who, engaged in practical affairs, do not indulge in emotions and -sentiments, but aim at producing definite results. Thus, while they are -in complete agreement with the æstheticists and the mystics in denying -all value to logical knowledge as an autonomous form of knowledge, -they are not satisfied, like the former, with spectacles and with -works of art; nor are they caught, like the latter, in the madness and -sorcery of the One and Eternal. The combination which they effect, -of the æstheticist's thesis concerning the value of representation, -with the mystical concerning the value of action, strengthens neither, -but weakens both; and in exchange for the poetry of the first and for -the ecstasy of the second, it offers an eminently prosaic product -countersigned with a most prosaic name, that of _fiction._ There is -something (they say) beyond the mere representation, and this something -is an act of will; which also satisfies the demand for the universal, -not by shutting itself up in itself, but by means of a manipulation -of single representations, so concentrated and simplified as to give -rise to classes or symbols, which are without reality but convenient, -fictitious but useful. Ingenuous philosophers and logicians have -allowed themselves to be deceived by these puppets and have taken them -seriously, as Don Quixote took the Moorish puppets of Master Peter. -Forgetful of the nature and character of the complete operation, -they have proceeded to concentrate and to simplify where there is no -material for such an undertaking, claiming to group afresh, not only -this or that series of representations, but all representations, hoping -thus to obtain the universal concept, that is to say, the concept which -enfolds in its bosom the infinite possibilities of the real. Thus they -have attained the pretended new and autonomous form of knowledge which -goes beyond representations; a refined, but slightly ridiculous process -of thought, like that of a man who would like to make not only knives -of various sizes and shapes, but a knife of knives, beyond all knives -which have a definite shape and are made of iron and steel. - -[Sidenote: _Reduction to the absurd of the three forms._] - -We shall proceed to examine in their places both the errors resulting -from these modes of solving, or of cutting, the problem of knowledge, -and also the partial truths mingled with them which it is necessary to -exhibit in their full efficacy. But, at the point which now occupies -us, _i.e.,_ the affirmation or negation of the conceptual form of -knowledge, let it suffice to observe how all the ranks of those who -deny the concept move to the assault armed with the _concept._ We -need simply observe, not strive to confute, because it is a question -of something which leaps to the eye at once and does not demand many -words; although many would be necessary to illustrate psychologically -the conditions of spirit and of culture, the natural and acquired -tendencies, the habits and the prejudices, which render such marvellous -blindness possible. The æstheticists affirm that truth resides in -æsthetic contemplation and not in the concept. But, pray, is this -affirmation of theirs perchance song, or painting, or music, or -architecture? It certainly concerns intuition, but it is not intuition; -it has art for subject-matter, but it is not art; it does not -communicate a state of the soul, but communicates a thought, that is to -say, an affirmation of universal character; therefore, it is a concept. -And by this concept it is sought to deny the concept. It is as if one -sought to leap over one's own shadow, when the leap itself throws -the shadow, or, by clinging to one's own pigtail, to pull oneself -into safety out of the river. The same may be said of the mystics. -They proclaim the necessity of silence and of seeking the One, the -Universal, the I, concentrating upon themselves and letting themselves -live; during which mystical experience it may, perhaps, befall them (as -in the _Titan_ of J. P. Richter) to rediscover the I, in a somewhat -materialized form, in their own person. Nevertheless in the case of -those who recommend silence, _non silent silentum,_ they do not pass -it by in silence; rather, it has been said, they _proclaim_ it, and go -about explaining and demonstrating how efficacious their prescription -is for satisfying the desire for the universal. Were they silent about -it, we should not be faced with that doctrine, as a precise formula -to combat. The doctrine of silence and of silent action and inner -experience is nothing but an affirmation of absolute character and -universal content, by means of which are refuted, and it is believed -confuted, other affirmations of the same nature. This too, then, -is a concept; as contradictory as you will, and therefore, needing -elaboration, but always conceptual elaboration and not practical; -which last would altogether prevent the adepts in the doctrine from -talking. And who, in our day, talks as much as the mystics? Indeed, -what could they do, in our day, if they did not talk? And is it not -significant that mystics are now found, not in solitudes, but crowded -round little tables in the cafés, where it is customary, not so much to -achieve inner experiences, as, on the contrary, to chatter? Finally, -the theorists of fictions and of toys, in their amiable satire of -logic and of philosophy, forget to explain one small particular, which -is not without importance; that is to say, whether their theory of -the concepts as fiction, is in its turn _fiction._ Because, were it -fiction, it would be useless to discuss it, since by its own admission -it is without truth; and if it were not (as it is not), it would have -a character of true and not fictitious universality; or, it would -be, not at all a simplification and symbol of representations, but -a concept, and would establish the true concept at the very moment -that it unmasks those that are fictitious. Fiction and the theory -of fiction are (and it should appear evident) different things; as -the delinquent and the judge who condemns him are different, or the -madman and the doctor who studies madness. A fiction, which pretends -to be fiction, opens, at the most, an infinite series which it is not -possible to close, unless there eventually intervene an act which is -not fiction, and which explains all the others, as in the unravelling -of a comedy of cross-purposes. And this is the way that the empiricists -or arbitrarists also come to profess the faith that they would deny. -_Salus ex inimicis_ is a great truth for philosophy not less than for -the whole of life; a truth, which on this occasion finds beautiful -continuation in the hostility towards the concept, perhaps never so -fierce as it is to-day, and in the efforts to choke it, never so great -and never so courageously and cleverly employed. But those enemies -find themselves in the unhappy condition of being unable to choke it, -without in the very act suppressing the principle of their own life. - -[Sidenote: _Affirmation of the concept._] - -The concept, then, is not representation, nor is it a mixture and -refinement of representation. It springs from representations, as -something implicit in them that must become explicit; a necessity -whose premisses they provide, but which they are not in a position to -satisfy, not even to affirm. The satisfaction is afforded by the form -of knowledge which is no longer representative but logical, and which -occurs continually and at every instant in the life of the Spirit. - -To deny the existence of this form, or to prove it illusory by -substituting other spiritual formations in its place, is an attempt -which has been and is made, but which has not succeeded and does not -succeed, and which, therefore, may be considered desperate. This series -of manifestations, this aspect of reality, this form of spiritual -activity, which is the Concept, constitutes the object of Logic. - - -[Footnote 1: See the first volume of this _Philosophy as Science of the -Spirit; Æsthetic as Science of Expression._] - - - - -II - - -THE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS - - -[Sidenote: _Concepts and conceptual fictions._] - -By distinguishing the concept from representations, we have recognized -the legitimate sphere of representation, and have assigned to it in the -system of spirit the place of an antecedent and more elementary form -of knowledge. By distinguishing the concept from states of the soul, -from efforts of the will, from action, it is intended also to recognize -the legitimacy of the practical form, although we are not here able -to enlarge upon its relations with the cognitive form.[1] But by -distinguishing the concept from _fictions,_ it would almost seem that -in their case we have not explicitly admitted any legitimate province, -that, indeed, we have implicitly denied it, since we have adopted for -them a designation which in itself sounds almost like a condemnation. -This point must be made clear; because it would be impossible to go -further with the treatment of Logic, if we left doubtful and insecure, -that is, not sufficiently distinguished, one of the terms, from which -the concept must be distinguished. What are conceptual fictions? Are -they false and arbitrary concepts, morally reprehensible? Or are they -spiritual products, which aid and contribute to the life of the spirit? -Are they avoidable evils, or necessary functions? - -[Sidenote: _The pure concept as ultra- and omnirepresentative._] - -A true and proper concept, precisely because it is not representation, -cannot have for content any single representative element, or -have reference to any particular representation, or group of -representations; but on the other hand, precisely because it is -universal in relation to the individuality of the representations, it -must refer at the same time to all and to each. Take as an example any -concept of universal character, be it of _quality,_ of _development,_ -of _beauty,_ or of _final cause._ Can we conceive that a piece of -reality, given us in representation, however ample it may be (let it -even be granted that it embraces ages and ages of history, in all -the complexity of the latter, and millenniums and millenniums of -cosmic life), exhausts in itself quality or development, beauty or -final cause, in such a way that we can affirm an equivalence between -those concepts and that representative content? On the other hand, -if we examine the smallest fragment of representable life, can we -ever conceive that, however small and atomic it be, there is lacking -to it quality and development, beauty and final cause? Certainly, -it may be and has been affirmed, that things are not quality, but -pure quantity; that they do not develop, but remain changeless and -motionless; that the criterion of beauty is the arbitrary extension -which we make to cosmic reality of some of our narrow individual and -historical experiences and sentiments; and that final cause is an -anthropomorphic conception, since not "end" but "cause" is the law -of the real, not teleology but mechanism and determinism. Philosophy -has been and is still engrossed in such disputes; and we do not here -present them as definitely solved, nor do we intend to base ourselves -upon determinate conceptions in the choice of our examples. The point -is, that if the theses which we have just mentioned as opposed to the -first, were true, they would furnish, in every case, true and proper -concepts, superior to every representative determination, and embracing -in themselves all representations, that is to say, every possible -experience; and our conception of the concept would not thereby be -changed, but indeed confirmed. Final cause or mechanism, development -or motionless being, beauty or individual pleasure, would always, in -so far as they are concepts, be posited as ultrarepresentative and -at the same time omnirepresentative. Even if, as often happens, both -the opposed concepts were accepted for the same problem, for example, -final cause and mechanism, or development and unmoved substance, it -is never intended simply to apply either of them to single groups of -representations, but to make them elements and component parts of all -reality. Thus, every reality would be, on one side, end, and on the -other, cause; on one side, motionless, on the other, changeable; man -would have in himself something of the mechanical and something of the -teleological; nature would be matter, but urged forward by a first -cause which was non-material, that is, spiritual and final, or at least -unknown--and so on. When it is demonstrated of a concept that it has -been suggested by contingent facts, by this very fact we eliminate -it from the series of true concepts, and substitute for it another -concept, which is given as truly universal. Or again, we suppress it -without substituting another for it, that is to say, we reduce the -number of true and proper concepts. Such a reduction is a progress -of thought, but it is a progress which can never be extended to the -abolition of all concepts, because one, at least, will always remain -ineliminable; that of thought, which thinks the abolition; and this -concept will be ultra- and omnirepresentative. - -[Sidenote: _Conceptual fictions as representative without -universality,_] - -Fictional concepts or conceptual fictions are something altogether -different. In these, either the content is furnished by a group of -representations, even by a single representation, so that they are -not ultrarepresentative; or there is no representable content, so -that they are not omnirepresentative. Examples of the first type are -afforded by the concepts of _house, cat, rose_; of the second, those -of _triangle,_ or of _free motion._ If we think of the house, we refer -to an artificial structure of stone or masonry or wood, or iron or -straw, where beings, whom we call men, are wont to abide for some -hours, or for entire days and entire years. Now, however great may be -the number of objects denoted by that concept, it is always a finite -number; there was a time when man did not exist, when, therefore, -neither did his house; and there was another time when man existed -without his house, living in caverns and under the open sky. Of course, -undoubtedly, we shall be able to extend the concept of house, so as -to include also the places inhabited by animals; but it will never -be possible to follow with absolute clearness the distinction between -artificial and natural (the act of inhabiting itself makes the place -more or less artificial, by changing, for instance, the temperature); -or between the animals which are inhabitants and the non-animals, -which nevertheless are inhabitants, such as plants, which, as well as -animals, often seek a roof; admitting that certain plants and animals -have other plants and animals as their houses. Hence, in view of the -impossibility of a clear and universal distinctive character, it is -advisable to have recourse at once to enumeration and to give the name -house to certain particular objects, which, however numerous they are, -are also finite in number, and which, with the enumeration complete, or -capable of completion, exclude other objects from themselves. If it is -desired to prevent this exclusion, no other course remains than that of -understanding by _house_ any mode of life between different beings; but -in that case, the conceptual fiction becomes changed into a universal, -lacking particular representations, applicable alike to a house and to -any other manifestation of the real. The same may be said of the cat -and of the rose, since it is evident that cats and roses have appeared -on the earth at a definite time and will disappear at another, and -that while they endure, they can be looked upon as something fixed and -precise, only when we have regard to some particular group of cats and -of roses, indeed to one particular cat or rose at a definite moment of -its existence (a gray cat or a black cat, a cat or a kitten; a white -rose or a red rose, flowering or withered, etc.), elevated into a -symbol and representative of the others. There is not, and there cannot -be, a rigorous characteristic, which should avail to distinguish the -cat from other animals, or the rose from other flowers, or indeed a cat -from other cats and a rose from another rose. These and other fictional -concepts are, therefore, representative, but not ultrarepresentative; -they contain some objects or fragments of reality, they do not contain -it all. - -[Sidenote: _or universals void of representations_] - -The conceptual fictions of the triangle and of free motion have an -analogous but opposite defect. With them, it appears, we emerge from -the difficulties of representations. The triangle and free motion are -not something which begins and ends in time and of which we are not -able to state exactly the character and limits. So long as thought, -that is to say, thinkable reality, exists, the concept of the triangle -and of free motion will have validity. The triangle is formed by the -intersection of three straight lines enclosing a space and forming -three angles, the sum of which, though they 'vary from triangle to -triangle, is equal to that of two right angles. It is impossible to -confuse the triangle with the quadrilateral or the circle. Free motion -is a motion, which we think of as taking place without obstacles of -any sort. It is impossible to confuse it with a motion to which there -is any particular obstacle. So far so good. But if those conceptual -fictions let fall the ballast of representations, they ascend to a zone -without air, where life is impossible; or, to speak without metaphor, -they gain universality by losing reality. There is no geometric -triangle in reality because in reality there are no straight lines, nor -right angles nor sums of right angles, nor sums of angles equal to that -of two right angles. There is no free motion in reality, because every -real motion takes place in definite conditions and therefore among -obstacles. A thought, which has as its object nothing real, is not -thought; and those concepts are not concepts but conceptual fictions. - - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the doctrine which considers them to be -erroneous concepts,_] - -Having made clear, by means of these examples, the character of -concepts and of fictional concepts, we are prepared to solve the -question as to whether the second are legitimate or illegitimate -products, and if they merit the reproach which seems to attach to -their name. And certainly, a view which has had and still has force -does not hesitate to consider those fictions as nothing but _erroneous -concepts,_ and declares a war of extermination against them, in the -name of rigorous thought and of truth. If it follows from what we have -said, that the cat or the house or the rose are not concepts, and -that the geometrical triangle or free motion are not so either, the -conclusion seems inevitable that we must free ourselves from these -errors or misconceptions, and affirm that there is neither the cat -nor the rose nor the house, but a reality all compact (although it is -continuously changing) which develops and is new at every instant; nor -is there either the triangle or free motion, but the eternal forms of -this reality, which cannot be abstracted and fixed by themselves, and -deprived of the conditions which are an integral part of them. But a -single fact suffices to invalidate this conclusion and to confute the -premiss upon which it rests, that conceptual fictions are erroneous -concepts. An error once discovered cannot reappear, at least until the -discovery is forgotten, and there is a falling back into the conditions -of mental obscurity similar to those antecedent to the discovery. -When, for example, the position has been attained that morality is not -a phenomenon of egoism and that it has value in itself, or one has -become certain that Hannibal was ignorant of the disaster that befell -his brother Hasdrubal on the Metaurus, it is impossible to continue -believing that morality is egoism, or that Hannibal has been informed -of the arrival of Hasdrubal and had voluntarily allowed him to be -surprised by the two Consuls. But with conceptual fictions similar to -those in the example the case is otherwise. Even when we are persuaded -that the triangle and free motion correspond to nothing real, and that -the rose, the cat, and the house have nothing precise and universal in -them, we must yet continue to make use of the fictions of triangles, of -free motion; of houses, cats, and roses. We can criticise them, and we -cannot renounce them; therefore, it is not true that they are, at least -altogether and in every sense, errors. - -[Sidenote: _or imperfect concepts preparatory to perfect concepts._] - -This indispensability of conceptual fictions to the life of the spirit, -finds acknowledgment in a more temperate form of the doctrine which -considers them as erroneous concepts; that is, in the thesis that -they are erroneous, but at the same time preparatory to, and almost a -first step towards, the formation of true and proper concepts. The -spirit does not issue all at once from representations and attain to -the universal; it issues from them little by little, and prior to -the rigorous universal, it constructs others less rigorous, which -have the advantage of replacing the infinite representations with -their infinite shades, through which reality presents itself in -æsthetic contemplation. Conceptual fictions, then, would be sketches -of concepts, and therefore, like all sketches, capable of revision -and annulment, but useful. Thus it would be explained how they are -errors, and errors made for a good reason. But this moderate theory -also clashes noisily with the most evident facts. Above all, it is not -true that the spirit issues little by little from the representations, -passing through a series of grades; the procedure of the spirit, in -this regard, is altogether different, and when philosophers have wanted -to find a comparison for it, they have been obliged to come back to -that very 'leap' which they wanted to avoid: "Spirit (said Schelling, -for example,) is an _eternal island,_ which is not to be reached from -matter, without a leap, whatever turns and twists be made." And, for -this very reason, conceptual fictions are not good passages to rigorous -concepts: to think rigorously, we must plunge ourselves again into the -flood of representations and think immediate reality, clearing away the -obstacles that proceed from conceptual fictions. And always for the -same reason, rigorous concepts, when they find themselves confronted -with conceptual fictions as rivals in the same problem, do not claim -their assistance, nor correct, nor refine upon them, in order partially -to preserve them, but combat and destroy them. What the rigorous -concepts are unable to do, is to prevent the others from reappearing; -because the spirit, as has been seen, preserves, without correcting -them, although it has recognized their falsity: it preserves them, that -is to say, not fused and rendered true in the rigorous concepts, but -_outside and after these._ - -[Sidenote: _Posteriority of conceptual fictions to true and proper -concepts._] - -In short, we have to abandon entirely the idea that conceptual fictions -are errors, or sketches and aids, and that they precede rigorous -concepts. Quite the opposite is true: conceptual fictions do not -precede rigorous concepts, but follow them, and presuppose them as -their own foundation. Were this not so, of what could they ever be -fictions? To counterfeit or imitate something implies first knowledge -of the thing which it is desired to counterfeit or to imitate. To -falsify means to have knowledge of the genuine model: false money -implies good money, not vice versa. It is possible to think that man, -from being the ingenuous poet that he first was, raised himself, -immediately, to the thought of the eternal; but it is not possible to -think that he constructed the smallest conceptual fiction, without -having previously imagined and thought. The house, the rose, the cat, -the triangle, free motion presuppose quantity, quality, existence, -and we know not how many other rigorous concepts: they are made with -iron instruments great and small, which logical thought has created, -and which come to be used with such rapidity and naturalness that we -usually end by believing that we have proceeded without them. Whoever -makes conceptual fictions, has already taken his logical bearings in -the world: he knows what he is doing and reasons about it; progress -with his conceptual fictions depending upon progress with his rigorous -concepts, and being continuously remade, according to the new needs and -the new conditions which are formed. Now that the concept of miracle -or witchcraft has been destroyed, the conceptual fictions relating -to the various classes and modes of miraculous facts and acts of -witchcraft are no longer constructed; and since the destruction of -the belief in the direct influence of the stars upon human destinies, -the astrological and mathematical fictions, which arose upon those -conceptual presuppositions, have also disappeared. - -Those who have seen errors or sketches of truth in conceptual -fictions have certainly seen something: because (without incidentally -anticipating at this point the theory of errors, or that of sketches -or aids to the search for truth) it may at once be admitted, that -conceptual fictions also sometimes become both errors and obstacles, -and suggestions and aids to truth. But because a given spiritual -product is adopted for an end different from that which rightly belongs -to it (thereby becoming itself different and giving rise to a new -spiritual product), we must not omit to search for the intrinsic end, -which constitutes the genuine nature of this product. The portrait -of a fair lady, white as milk and red as blood, which the prince of -the story finds beneath a cushion by the help of the fairy, may serve -as an incentive to make him undertake the journey round the world -in search of the woman in flesh and blood, who is like the portrait -and whom he will make his wife; but that portrait, before it is an -instrument in the hands of the fairy, is a picture, that is to say, a -work of art, which has come from the hands, or rather from the fancy, -of the painter; and must be appreciated as such. Thus conceptual -fictions, before they are transmuted into errors or into expedients, -into obstacles or into aids to the search for truth, have, before -them, a truth already constructed, toward the construction of which, -therefore, they cannot serve; whereas that truth has served them, for -they would not otherwise have been able to arise. They are, therefore, -intrinsically neither obstacles nor aids to truth, but something else, -that is, themselves; and what they are in themselves it is still -necessary to determine. - -[Sidenote: _Practical character of conceptual fictions._] - -For this purpose it is needful to direct our attention to the moment of -their formation, which, as has been said, is not at all theoretical, -but practical; and to ask ourselves in what way and with what end -the practical spirit can intervene in representations and concepts -previously produced, manipulate them and make of them conceptual -fictions. The view that the work of the practical spirit can give -rise to new knowledge, not previously attained, must be resolutely -excluded: the practical spirit is such, precisely because it is -non-cognitive; as regards knowledge it is altogether sterile. If, -then, it accomplishes those manipulations, and says to a cat: "You -will represent for me all cats"; or to a rose: "See, I draw you in -my treatise on botany, and you will represent all roses"; and to -the triangle: "It is true I cannot think you, nor represent you; -but I suppose that you are the same as what I draw with rule and -compass, and I make use of you to measure the approximate triangles -of reality";--in so doing, it recognizes that it does not accomplish -any act of _knowledge._ But does it, in that case, accomplish an act -of _anti-knowledge_--that is, does it make these manipulations and -fictions in order to place obstacles in the way of knowledge and to -simulate its products, so that it leads astray the seeker for truth? -If this were so, the "practical spirit" would be synonymous with -the spirit of confusion; and the contriver of conceptual fictions -would deserve the reprobation that attaches to forgers of documents, -sophists, rhetoricians, and charlatans; whereas, on the contrary, -he receives the applause and gratitude of every one. Each one of -us, at every instant, would be guilty of a plot against the truth, -because at every instant each of us forms and employs those fictions; -whereas the moral consciousness, delicate and intolerant though it -be, makes no reproof, but indeed offers encouragement. Therefore, the -act of forming intellectual fictions is an act neither of knowledge -nor of anti-knowledge; it is not logically rational, but neither is -it logically irrational; it is rational, indeed, but _practically_ -rational. - -[Sidenote: _The practical end and mnemonic utility._] - -In this case the practical end in view can be but one. We know in order -to act; and he who acts is interested only in that knowledge, which is -the necessary precedent of his doing. But since our knowledge is all -destined to be recalled as occasion serves for action, or to aid us in -the search for new knowledge (which in this case is a form of acting), -the practical spirit is impelled to provide for the preservation of the -patrimony of acquired knowledge. Without doubt, speaking absolutely, -everything is preserved in reality, and nothing that has once been -done or thought, disappears from the bosom of the cosmos. But the -preservation of which we speak, is properly the making easily available -to memory, knowledge that has once been possessed, and providing for -its ready recall from the bosom of the cosmos or from the apparently -unconscious and forgotten. For this purpose there are constructed -those instruments, which are conceptual fictions, by means of which -armies of representations are evoked with a single word, or by which -a single word approximately indicates what form of operation must be -resorted to, in order that certain representations may be recovered. -The cat of the appropriate conceptual fiction does not enable us to -know any single cat, as a painter or a historian of cats makes us -know it; but by means of it, many images of animals, which would have -remained separate before the memory, or each one dispersed and fused in -the complete picture in which it had been imagined and perceived, are -arranged in a series and recorded as a whole. This matters little or -nothing to one who dreams as a poet or who seeks absolute truth; but it -matters a great deal to one whose house is infested by rats, and who -must employ some one to obtain a cat; and it matters not less to the -seeker for the cat, in that he has to study a new animal, and that he -must proceed in that study with some order, though it be artificial, -and though he reject the artifice in the final synthesis. Again, the -geometrical triangle is of no service either to imagination or to -thought, which are developed without it; but it is indispensable to -any one measuring a field, in the same way as it may possibly be of -service to a painter in his preparatory studies for a picture, or to -a historian, who wishes to know well the configuration of a piece of -ground where a battle was fought. - -[Sidenote: _Persistence of conceptual fictions side by side with -concepts._] - -This is the real reason why, however perfect rigorous concepts become, -conceptual fictions remain ineliminable, and indeed obtain from these -fresh nourishment. They cannot be criticized and resolved by means of -rigorous concepts, because they are of a different order from them: -they cannot act as inferior degrees of the rigorous concept, because -they presuppose it. The reason, which we were pledged to give, is -given; and henceforward there can no longer arise any misunderstanding -as to the relation of the concept to conceptual fictions. It is a -relation not of identity, nor of contrariety, but simply of diversity. - -[Sidenote: _Pure concepts and pseudoconcepts._] - -The terminological question remains, and this, as always, has but -slight importance. "Conceptual fictions" is a manner of speech; and no -one would wish to combat manners of speech. For brevity's sake we shall -call them _pseudoconcepts,_ and for the sake of clearness we shall -call the true and proper concepts _pure concepts._ This term seems to -us more suitable than that of _ideas_ (pure concepts), as opposed to -_logical concepts_ (pseudoconcepts), as they were at one time called -in the schools. It must further be noted, that the pseudoconcepts, -although the word "concept" forms part of their name, are not concepts, -they do not form a species of, nor do they compete with, concepts (save -when forcibly made to do so); and that the pure concepts have not got -the impure concepts at their side, for these are not truly concepts. -Every word offers, in some degree, a hold for misunderstanding, because -it circulates in this base world, which is full of snares; the search -for words which should absolutely prevent misunderstandings is vain, -for it would be necessary first of all to clip the wings of the human -spirit. We may prefer one word to another, according to historical -contingencies; and for our part we prefer the words _pseudoconcept_ -and _pure concept,_ if for no other reason than to remind the makers -of fictional concepts to be modest, and to flash above their heads the -light of the only true form of concept, which is logical nature itself -in its universality and in its severity. How can we fail to think -that the choice has been well made if this title of _pure concept_ -please the few, but terrify the many and irritate the most, more than -the red cloth shaken before the eyes of the bull; and if, like every -efficacious medicine, it provoke a reaction in the organism of the -patient? - - -[Footnote 1: These relations are examined in the _Philosophy of the -Practical,_ first part.] - - - - -III - - -THE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT - - -The characteristics of the pure concept, or simply, concept, may be -gathered from what has previously been said. - -[Sidenote: _Expressivity._] - -The concept has the character of _expressivity;_ that is to say, it is -a cognitive product, and, therefore, expressed or spoken, not a mute -act of the spirit, as is a practical act. If we wish to submit the -effective possession of a concept to a first test, we can employ the -experiment which was advised on a previous occasion:--whoever asserts -that he possesses a concept, should be invited to expound it in words, -and with other means of expression (graphic symbols and the like). If -he refuse to do so, and say that his concept is so profound that words -cannot avail to render it, we can be sure, either that he is under the -illusion of possessing a concept, when he possesses only turbid fancies -and morsels of ideas; or that he has a presentiment of the profound -concept, that it is in process of formation, and will be, but is not -yet, possessed. Each of us knows that when he finds himself in the -meditative depth of the internal battle, of that true _agony_ (because -it is the death of one life and the birth of another), which is the -discovery of a concept, he can certainly talk of the state of his soul, -of his hopes and fears, of the rays that enlighten and of the shadows -that invade him; but he cannot yet communicate his concept, which is -not as yet, because it is not yet expressible. - -[Sidenote: _Universality._] - -If this character of expressivity be common to the concept and to the -representation, its _universality_ is peculiar to the concept; that is -to say, its transcendence in relation to the single representations, so -that no single representation and no number of them can be equivalent -to the concept. There is no middle term between the individual and -the universal: either there is the single or there is the whole, into -which that single enters with all the singles. A concept which has been -proved not universal, is, by that very fact, confuted as a concept. -Our philosophical confutations do not proceed otherwise. Sociology, -for instance, asserts the concept of _Society,_ as a rigorous concept -and principle of science; and the criticism of Sociology proves that -the concept of society is not universal, but individual, and is -related to the groupings of certain beings which representation has -placed before the sociologist, and which he has arbitrarily isolated -from other complexes of beings that representation also placed or -could place before him. The theory of tragedy postulates the concept -of the _tragic,_ and from it deduces certain necessary essentials -of tragedy; and the criticism of literary classes demonstrates that -the tragic is not a concept, but a roughly defined group of artistic -representations, which have certain external likenesses in common; and, -therefore, that it cannot serve as foundation for any theory. On the -other hand, to establish a universality, which at first was wanting, -is the glory of truly scientific thought; hence we give the name of -discoverers to those who bring to light connections of representations -or of representative groups, or of concepts, which had previously been -separate; that is to say, who universalize them. Thus, it was thought -at one time that will and action were distinct concepts; and it was -a step in progress to identify them by the creation of the truly -universal concept of the will, which is also action. Thus, too, it was -held that expression in language was a different thing from expression -in art; and it was an advance to universalize the expression of art by -extending it to language; or that of language by extending it to art. - -[Sidenote: _Concreteness._] - -Not less proper to the concept is the other character of -_concreteness,_ which means that if the concept be universal and -transcendent in relation to the single representation, it is yet -immanent in the single, and therefore in all representations. The -concept is the universal in relation to the representations, and is -not exhausted in any one of them; but since the world of knowledge -is the world of representations, the concept, if it were not in the -representations, would not be anywhere: it would be in _another_ world, -which cannot be thought, and therefore is not. Its transcendence, -therefore, is also immanence; like that truly literary language that -Dante desired, which, in relation to the speech of the different parts -of Italy, _in qualibet redolet civitate nec cubat in ulla._ If it is -proved of a concept that it is inapplicable to reality, and therefore -is not concrete, it is thereby confuted as a true and proper concept. -It is said to be an _abstraction,_ it is not reality; it does not -possess _concreteness._ In this way, for example, has been confuted the -concept of spirit as different from nature (abstract spiritualism); or -of the good, as a model placed above the real world; or of atoms, as -the components of reality; or of the dimensions of space, or of various -quantities of pleasure and pain, and the like. All these are things not -found in any part of the real, since there is neither a reality that is -merely natural and external to spirit, nor an ideal world outside the -real world; nor a space of one or of two dimensions; nor a pleasure or -pain that is homogeneous with another, and therefore greater or less -than another; and for this reason all these things do not result from -concrete thinking and are not concepts. - -[Sidenote: _The concrete universal, and the formation of the -pseudoconcepts._] - -Expressivity, universality, concreteness, are then the three -characteristics of the concept derived from the foregoing discussion. -Expressivity affirms that the concept is a cognitive act, and denies -that it is merely practical, as is maintained in various senses by -mystics, and by arbitrarists or fictionists. Universality affirms that -it is a cognitive act _sui generis,_ the logical act, and denies that -it is an intuition, as is maintained by the æstheticists, or a group -of intuitions, as is asserted in the doctrine of the arbitrarists -or fictionists. Concreteness affirms that the universal logical act -is also a thinking of reality, and denies that it can be universal -and void, universal and inexistent, as is maintained in a special -part of the doctrine of the arbitrarists. But this last point needs -explanation, which leads us to enunciate explicitly an important -division of the pseudoconcepts, which has hitherto been mentioned as -apparently incidental. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical pseudoconcepts and abstract pseudoconcepts._] - -The pseudoconcepts, falsifying the concept, cannot imitate it -scrupulously, because, if they did, they would not be pseudoconcepts, -but concepts; not imitations, but the very reality which they imitate. -An actor who, pretending on the stage to kill his rival in love, -really did so, would no longer be an actor, but a practical man and an -assassin. If, therefore, with regard to the representations, and when -preparing to form pseudoconcepts, we should think representations with -that universality which is also the concreteness proper to the true -concept, and with that transcendence which is also immanence (and is -therefore called _transcendentalism),_ we should form true concepts. -This, indeed, often happens, as we can see in certain treatises which -mean to be empirical and arbitrary, and from which, _currente rota, -non urceus, sed amphora exit._ Their authors, led by a profound and -irrepressible philosophic sense, gradually and almost unconsciously -abandon their initial purpose, and give true and proper concepts in -place of the promised pseudoconcepts: they are philosophers, disguised -as empiricists. In order to create pseudoconcepts, we must therefore -begin by arbitrarily dividing into two the one supreme necessity of -logic, immanent transcendence, or concrete universality, and form -pseudoconcepts, which are _concrete_ without being _universal,_ -or _universal_ without being _concrete._ There is no other way of -falsifying the concept; whoever wishes to falsify it so completely as -to render the imitation unrecognizable, does not falsify, but produces -it; he does not remain outside, but permits himself to be caught in its -coils; he does not invent a practical attitude, but thinks. That one -mode is therefore specified in two particular modes, of which examples -have already been given in our analysis of the pseudoconcepts of the -house, the cat, the rose, which are concrete without being universal; -and of the triangle and of free motion, which are universal without -being concrete. There is nothing left to do, therefore, but to baptize -them; selecting some of the many names that are applied, and often -applied, sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other of the two forms, -or indifferently to both, and giving to each of them a particular name, -which will be constant in this treatise. We shall then call the first, -that is to say, those which are concrete and not universal, _empirical_ -pseudoconcepts; and the second, or those which are universal and not -concrete, _abstract_ pseudoconcepts; or, taking as understood for -brevity's sake, the general denomination (pseudo), _empirical concepts_ -and _abstract concepts._ - -[Sidenote: _The other characteristics of the pure concept._] - -Thus, of the three characteristics of the concept which we have -exhibited, the second and the third constitute, as we can now see, one -only, which is stated in a double form, solely in order to deny and -to combat these two one-sided forms which we have called empirical -and abstract concepts. But, on the other hand, it is easy to see that -the characteristics of the concept are not exhausted in the two that -remain, namely, in expressivity or cognizability, and in transcendence -or concrete universality. Others can reasonably be added, such as -_spirituality, utility, morality,_ but we shall not dwell upon these, -because either they belong to the general assumption of Logic, that -is, to the fundamental concept of Philosophy as the science of spirit, -or they are more conveniently made clear in the other parts of this -Philosophy. The concept has the character of spirituality and not of -mechanism, because reality is spiritual, not mechanical; and for this -reason we have to reject every mechanical or associationist theory -of Logic, just as we have to reject similar doctrines in Æsthetic, -in Economic and in Ethic. A special discussion of these views seems -superfluous, because they are discussed and negated, that is to say, -surpassed, in every line of our treatise. The concept has the character -of utility, because, if the theoretic form of the spirit be distinct -from the practical, it is not less true, by the law of the unity of -the spirit, that to think is also an act of the will, and therefore, -like every act of the will, it is teleological, not antiteleological; -useful, not useless. And, finally, it has the character of morality, -because its utility is not merely individual, but, on the contrary, -is subordinated to and absorbed in the moral activity of the spirit; -so that to think, that is, to seek and find the true, is also to -collaborate in progress, in the elevation of Humanity and Reality, it -is the denial and overcoming of oneself as a single individual, and -the service of God. - -[Sidenote: _The origin of the multiplicity and unity of character of -the concept._] - -Certainly, the form in which the order of our discourse has led us to -establish the characters of the concept--that of enumeration, the one -character being connected with the other by means of an "also"--is, -logically, a very crude form, and must be refined and corrected. Above -all, if we have spoken of _characters_ of the concept, we have done so -in order to adhere to the usual mode of expression. The concept cannot -have characters, in the plural, but _character,_ that one character -which is proper to it. What this is has been seen; the concept is -concrete-universal two words which designate one thing only, and can -also grammatically become one: "transcendental," or whatever other word -be chosen from those already coined, or that may be coined for the -occasion. The other determinations are not _characters_ of the concept, -but affirm its _relations_ with the spiritual activity in general, -of which it is a special form, and with the other special forms of -this activity. In the first relation, the concept is spiritual; in -relation with the æsthetic activity, it is cognitive or expressive, -and enters into the general theoretic-expressive form; in relation -with the practical activity, it is not, as concept, either useful or -moral, but as a concrete act of the spirit it must be called useful -and moral. The exposition of the characters of the concept, correctly -thought, resolves itself into the compendious exposition of the whole -Philosophy of spirit, in which the concept takes its place in its -unique character, that is to say, in itself. - -[Sidenote: _Objections relating to the unreality of the pure concept -and to the impossibility of demonstrating it._] - -This declaration may save us from the accusation of having given an -empirical exposition of the non-empirical _Concept of the concept,_ and -so committing an error for which logicians are justly reproved (for -they have often believed themselves to possess the right of treating -of Logic without logic; perhaps for the same reason that custodians of -sacred places are wont, through over-familiarity, to fail in respect -towards them). But it lays us open to censure very much more severe; -which, if it ultimately prove to be inoffensive, is certainly very -noisy and loquacious. The pretended characters of the concepts (it -is said) are, by your own confession, nothing but its relations with -the other forms of the spirit; and the one character proper to it is -that of universality-concreteness, that is, of being itself, since the -"concrete-universal" is synonymous with the concept, and _vice versa._ -So it turns out that in spite of all your efforts, your concept of the -concept becomes dissipated in a tautology. Give us a demonstration -of what you affirm, or a definition which is not tautologous; then -we shall be able to form some sort of an idea of your pure concept. -Otherwise you may talk about it for ever, but for us it will always be -like "Phœnician Araby" of Metastasian memory: "you say _that it is; -where it is,_ no one knows." - -[Sidenote: _Prejudice relating to the nature of demonstration._] - -Beneath such dissatisfaction and the claim it implies, we find first -of all a prejudice of scholastic origin concerning what is called -_demonstration._ That is to say, it is imagined that demonstration -is like an irresistible contrivance, which grasps the learner by the -neck and drags him willy-nilly, whither he does not and the teacher -does will to go, leaving him open-mouthed before the truth, which -stands external to him, and before which he must, _obtorto collo,_ bow -himself. But such coercive demonstrations do not exist for any form -of knowledge--indeed, for any form of spiritual life--nor is there a -truth outside our spirit. Not that truth presupposes _faith,_ as is -often said, so that rationality is subordinated to some unknown form of -irrationality; but _truth is faith,_ trust in oneself, certainty of -oneself, free development of one's inner powers. The light is in us; -those sequences of sounds, which are the so-called demonstration, serve -only as aids in discarding the veils and directing the gaze; but in -themselves they have no power to open the eyes of those who obstinately -wish to keep them closed. Faced with this sort of reluctance and -rebellion, the pedagogues of the good old days had recourse, as we -know, not to demonstrations, but to the stool of penitence and to the -stick; so fully were they persuaded that the demonstration of truth -requires good dispositions, _i.e._ requires those who are disposed to -fall back upon themselves and to look into themselves. How can the -beauty of the song of Farinata be demonstrated to one who denies it, -and will neither appreciate the soul contained in that sublime poem, -nor accomplish the work necessary to attain to the possibility of such -an appreciation, nor will, on the other hand, humbly confess his own -incapacity and lack of preparation,--how can we forcibly demonstrate -to him that that song is beautiful? The critical wisdom of Francesco -de Sanctis would be disarmed and impotent before such a situation. -How can we demonstrate to one who deliberately refuses to believe -in any authority or document, and breaks the tradition by which -we are bound to the past, that Miltiades conquered at Marathon, or -that Demosthenes strove all his life against the power of Macedonia? -He will capriciously throw doubt on the pages of Herodotus and the -orations of Demosthenes; and no reasoning will be able to repress -that caprice. What more can be said? Even in arithmetic, for which -calculating machines exist, compulsory demonstration is impossible. -In vain you will lift two fingers of the hand, and then the third -and the fourth, in order to demonstrate to one who does not wish for -demonstration that two and two are four; he will reply that he is not -convinced. And indeed he cannot be convinced, if he do not accomplish -that inner spiritual synthesis by which twice two and four reveal -themselves as two names of one and the same thing. Therefore, he -who awaits a compelling demonstration of the existence of the pure -concept, awaits in vain. For our part, we cannot give him anything -but that which we are giving: a discourse, directed towards making -clear the difficulties, and towards demonstrating how, by means of -the pure concept, all problems concerning the life of the spirit are -illuminated, and how, without it, we cannot understand anything. - -[Sidenote: _Prejudice concerning the representability of the concept._] - -But another prejudice, perhaps yet more tenacious than the first, -accompanies this extravagant idea about demonstration. Accustomed as -men are to move among things, to see, to hear, to touch them, while -hardly or only fugitively reflecting upon the spiritual processes which -produce that vision, hearing and touching; when they come to treat of a -philosophic question, and to conceive a concept (and especially when it -is necessary to conceive precisely the concept of the concept), they do -not know how to refrain from demanding just that which they have been -obliged to renounce in their new search, and which they have already -renounced, owing to the very fact of their having entered into it: the -representative element, something that they can see, hear and touch. It -is almost as though a novice, on entering a monastery, and having just -pronounced the solemn vow of chastity, should ask, as his first request -upon taking possession of his cell, for the woman who is to be his -companion in that life. He will be answered that in such a place his -spouse cannot be anything but an ideal spouse, holy Religion or holy -Mother Church. - -[Sidenote: _Protests of the philosophers against this prejudice._] - -All philosophers have been compelled to protest against the request, -which they have had addressed to them, for an impossible external -demonstration and for something representative in a field where -representation has been surpassed. "In our system (said Fichte) we -must _ourselves_ lay the _foundation_ of our own philosophy, and -consequently that system must seem to be without foundation to one -who is incapable of accomplishing that act. But he may be assured -beforehand that he will never find a foundation elsewhere, if he do -not lay such an one for himself, or remain not satisfied with it. -It is fitting that our philosophy should proclaim this in a loud -voice, in order that it may be spared the pretence of demonstrating -to mankind from _without_ what they must create in themselves."[1] -Schelling appropriately compared philosophic obtuseness with æsthetic -obtuseness: "There are two only ways out of common reality. Poetry, -which transports you into an ideal world, and Philosophy, which makes -_the real world disappear altogether from our sight._ One does not see -why the sense for Philosophy should be more generally diffused than -that for Poetry."[2] And Hegel, giving explanations which precisely -meet the present case, says: "What is called the _incomprehensibility_ -of Philosophy, arises, in part, from an incapacity (in itself only -a lack of habit) to think abstractly, that is to say, to hold pure -thoughts firmly before the spirit and to move in them. In our ordinary -consciousness, thoughts are clothed in and united with ordinary -sensible and spiritual matter; and in our rethinking, reflecting and -reasoning we mingle sentiments, intuitions and representations with -thoughts: in every proposition whose content is entirely sensible (for -example: this leaf is green) there are already mingled categories, -such as being and individuality. But it is quite another thing to -take as our object thoughts by themselves, without any admixture. -The other reason for its incomprehensibility is the impatience which -demands to have before it as representation that which in consciousness -appears only as thought and concept. And we hear people say that they -do not know what there is _to think_ in a concept, which is already -apprehended; whereas _in a concept there is nothing to be thought -but the concept itself._ But the meaning of this saying is just that -they want a familiar and ordinary _representation._ It seems to -consciousness as if, with the removal from it of the representation, -the ground had been removed which was its firm and habitual support. -When transported into the pure region of the concepts, it no longer -knows _what world it is in._ For this reason, those writers, preachers -and orators are esteemed marvels of _comprehensibility_ who offer their -readers or hearers things which they already know thoroughly, things -which are familiar to them and which are self-evident."[3] - -[Sidenote: _Reason for their perpetual recurrence._] - -Thus have all philosophers protested, and thus will all protest still, -from age to age, because that intolerance, that immobility, that -recalcitrance before the very painful effort of having to abandon -the world of sense (though but for a single instant, and in order -to reconquer and to possess it more completely) will perpetually be -renewed. They are the birth-pangs of the Concept, to escape which no -plans for virginity and no manœuvres to procure abortion are of any -avail. They must be endured, because that law of the Concept ("thou -shalt bring forth in suffering") is also a law of life. - - -[Footnote 1: _System de Sittenlehre_ (in _Sämmtl. Werke_), iv. p. 26.] - -[Footnote 2: _Idealismo transcendentale,_ trad. Losacco, p. 19.] - -[Footnote 3: _Encyclopædia,_ Croce's translation, § 3, Observations.] - - - - -IV - - -DISPUTES AS TO THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT - - -[Sidenote: _Disputes of materialistic origin._] - -Disputes as to the nature of the concept have sometimes had their -origin (notably in the recent period of philosophic barbarism, -which "renews the fear of thought," whence we have with difficulty -emerged) in materialistic, mechanical and naturalistic prejudices. -Therefore, as already mentioned, discussion has arisen as to whether -the concept should be considered logical or psychological, as the -product of synthesis or of association, or of individual or hereditary -association. But these are controversies which, for the reasons we gave -before, we shall not spend time in illustrating. - -[Sidenote: _The concept as value._] - -Nor shall we pay attention to the other controversy, as to whether -concepts are _values or facts,_ whether they operate only as _norms_ or -also as _effective forces_ of the real; because the division between -values and facts, between norms and effective existence (between -_Gelten_ and _Sein,_ as it is expressed in German terminology), is -itself surpassed and unified, implicitly and explicitly, in all our -philosophy. If the concept or thought has value, it can have value -only because it _is;_ if the norm of thought operate as a norm, that -implies that it is thought itself, its own norm, a constitutive element -of reality. There is not to be found in any form of spiritual life any -value which is not also reality--not in art, where there is no other -beauty than art itself; nor in morality, where no other goodness is -known than action itself directed to the universal; nor in the life of -thought. The concept has value, because it is; and is, because it has -value. - -[Sidenote: _Realism and nominalism._] - -But the greater part of these dissensions, which have existed for -centuries and are yet living, rests on the confusion between concepts -and pseudoconcepts, and the consequent pretension to define the concept -by denying one or other of these two forms. This is the origin of -the two opposite schools of _realists_ and _nominalists,_ which are -also called in our times rationalists and empiricists (arbitrarists, -conventionalists, hedonists). The realists maintain that concepts -are real: that they correspond to reality; the nominalists, that -they are simple names to designate representations and groups of -representations, or, as is now said, tickets and labels placed upon -things in order to recognize and find them again. In the former case, -no elaboration of representations higher than the universalizing act -of the concept is possible; in the latter, the only possible operation -is that which has already been described--mutilation, reduction and -fiction, directed to practical ends. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of both._] - -The consequence of these one-sided affirmations has been that the -realists have defined as concepts, and therefore as having a universal -character, all sorts of rough pseudoconcepts; not only the horse, the -artichoke and the mountain, but also, logically, the table, the bed, -the seat, the glass, and so on; and they have exposed themselves from -the earliest beginnings of philosophy to the sarcastic and irresistible -objection that the horse exists, but not horsiness, the table, but not -tabularity. This conceptualization of pseudoconcepts is the error of -which they have really been guilty, not that of conferring empirical -reality on the concepts by placing them as single things alongside -of other things, an extravagance which it is doubtful if any man of -moderate sense has ever seriously committed. The realists who rendered -the concepts real in this sense at the same time rendered them unreal, -that is to say, single and contingent, and in need of being surpassed -by true concepts. The nominalists, on the other hand, considered as -arbitrary and mere names all the presuppositions of their mental -life--being and becoming, quality and final cause, goodness and beauty, -the true and the false, the Spirit and God. Without being aware of it, -they have fallen into inextricable contradictions and into logical -scepticism. - -[Sidenote: _True realism._] - -It is henceforth clear that this secular dispute cannot be decided in -favour of one or other of the contending parties, for both are right in -what they affirm and wrong in what they deny, that is, both are right -and wrong. The two forms of spiritual products, of which each of those -schools in its affirmations emphasizes only one, both actually exist; -the one is not in antithesis to the other, as the rational is to the -irrational. The true doctrine of the concept is realism, which does -not deny nominalism, but puts it in its place, and establishes with it -loyal and unequivocal relations. - -[Sidenote: _Solution of other difficulties concerning the genesis of -concepts._] - -By establishing such relations we emerge from the vicious circle, -which has given such trouble to certain logicians, who have striven -to explain the genesis of the concepts in terms of nominalism, but -were afterwards, when probing their doctrine to the bottom, compelled -to admit the _necessity of the concepts_ as a _foundation_ for the -_genesis of the concepts._ They believed that they had got out of -the difficulty by distinguishing two orders of concepts, primary and -secondary, formative models and formations according to models; and -they thus reproduced, in the semblance of a solution, the problem still -unsolved. In different words, others admitted the same embarrassment. -They attempted to obtain the concepts from _experience,_ but -recognized at the same time that all experience presupposes an _ideal -anticipation._ Or they declared that the concept fixes the _essential_ -characters of things, and, at the same time, that the essential -characters of things are indispensable for fixing the _concept._ Or, -finally, they based the formation of concepts upon _categories,_ which, -enumerated and understood as they understood them, were by no means -categories and functions, but _concepts._ Primary concepts, formative -models, ideal anticipations, essential concepts, concept-categories, -and the like, are nothing but verbal variants of the pure concepts; -the necessary presupposition, as we know, for the impure concepts or -pseudoconcepts. - -[Sidenote: _Disputes arising from neglect of the distinction between -empirical and abstract concepts._] - -Other disputes, far enough apart in significance and nature, concerning -the nature of the concept, acquire a more precise meaning when -referred to our subdivision of pseudoconcepts into _empirical_ or -_representative,_ and _abstract._ Thereby we can understand why it -has been asked if the concepts are _concrete_ or _abstract, general_ -or _universal, contingent_ or _necessary, approximate_ or _rigorous;_ -if they are obtained _a posteriori_ or _a priori,_ by _induction_ or -_deduction,_ by _synthesis_ or _analysis,_ and so on. This series -of disputes likewise cannot be settled, save by admitting that both -contending parties are right and wrong, and demonstrating that -pseudoconcepts (which are alone here in discussion) are constructed -by analysis, and by deduction are _a priori,_ and have the characters -of abstractness, rigorousness, universality and necessity, if it be -a question of _abstract_ pseudoconcepts, that is to say, of empty -fictions, outside experience; while, on the other hand, they are -constructed by synthesis, and by induction are _a posteriori,_ and have -the characters of concreteness, approximation, mere generality and -contingency, if they be empirical or _representative_ pseudoconcepts, -that is to say, groups of representations, which do not go beyond -representation and experience. Indeed, from this last point of view, no -error was made in denying any difference between the (representative) -_concept_ and the _general representation._ It is false that this -latter is the result of psychical mechanism or association, and the -former of psychical purpose, because there is nothing mechanical in -the spirit; and the general representation, if it is a product of the -spirit, is as teleological as the other, indeed is absolutely one with -the other. It obeys, like it, the law of _economy,_ or, as we have -shown, the practical ends of convenience and utility. - -[Sidenote: _Crossing of the various disputes._] - -But these last disputes have crossed with that which we first examined -between realism and nominalism, and have sometimes taken on the same -meaning. This must be kept in mind, to serve as a guide in the dense -forest. Is the concept _a priori_ or _a posteriori,_ universal or -general, necessary or contingent? These questions and others like them -were sometimes understood as equivalent to the question: is it real or -nominal, truth or fiction? - -[Sidenote: _Other logical disputes._] - -Certain problems of Logic, not yet solved in a satisfactory manner, -arise from the failure to make clear the confusion between concepts -and pseudoconcepts, and between empirical and abstract concepts. -Is it or is it not true that every concept must have an individual -representation, taken from its own sphere, as a necessary _support_? -Are concepts of _things_ possible, or is there a special concept -corresponding to every thing? Is a concept of the _individual_ -possible? These three questions may be answered in the affirmative, in -the negative, and in the affirmative-negative, according as they are -referred to the empirical concept, the abstract concept, or the pure -concept. - -[Sidenote: _The representative accompaniment of the concept._] - -For, if we consider the first question, we must resolutely deny that -the abstract concept has any need of a particular representation as its -necessary support. The geometric triangle, as such, is neither white -nor black, nor of any given size; if the representation of a particular -triangle unites itself to it, geometry discards it. But we must just -as resolutely affirm than an empirical or representative concept has -always an image to support it; the concept of a cat needs the image of -a cat, and every book on zoology is accompanied with illustrations. -The image may be varied, but never suppressed; and it may be varied -only within certain limits, because, if these be exceeded, the concept -itself loses its form and is dissipated. Thus, for the concept of the -cat, we could frame a representation of a white or black or red cat, or -a small or big one; but if scarlet colour or the size of an elephant -be attributed to the cat, which serves as symbol of the fiction, the -concept must be changed. That concept has at its command the images -of cats, upon which it has been formed, which, as we know, are always -finite in number. Finally, with reference to the pure concept, it must -be said that every image and no image is in turn a symbol of it; as -every blade of grass (as Vanini said) represents God, and a number of -images, however great it be, does not suffice to represent Him. - -[Sidenote: _The concept of the thing and the concept of the -individual._] - -In like manner, as regards the second question, it must be answered -that the empirical concept is nothing but a concept of things, or a -grouping of a certain number of things beneath one or other of them, -which functions as a type; that the abstract concept is by definition, -the not-thing, incapable of representation; and that the pure concept -is a concept of every thing and of no thing. And as regards the third, -we must answer that the abstract concept is altogether repugnant to -individuality; the pure concept alights upon every individual, only -to leave it again, and in so far as it thinks all individual things, -it renders them all, in a certain way, concepts, and in so far as it -surpasses them, it denies them as such; while the empirical concept -can be the _concept of the individual._ Because if in reality, the -individual be the situation of the universal spirit at a determinate -instant, empirically considered the individual becomes something -isolated, cut off from the rest and shut up in itself, so that it is -possible to attribute to it a certain constancy in relation to the -occurrences of the life it lives; so that that life assumes almost the -position of the individual determinations of a concept. Socrates is the -life of Socrates, inseparable from all the life of the time in which he -developed; but empirically and usefully we can construct the concept of -a Socrates a controversialist, an educator, endowed with imperturbable -calm, of which the Socrates who ate and drank and wore clothes, and -lived during such and such occurrences, is the incarnation. Thus we can -form pseudoconcepts of individuals as well as of things, or, to express -it in terms that are the fashion, we can form _Platonic ideas_ of them. - -[Sidenote: _Reasons, laws, and causes._] - -It is also well to note that to adduce the _reasons,_ the _laws,_ -the _causes_ of things and of reality, is equivalent to establishing -concepts, and since the word "concepts" has been applied in turn to -pure and to empirical and abstract concepts, laws and causes have been -alternately described as truths and as fictions. It belongs to the -discussion of terminology to remark that in general the word "reason" -has been used only for researches into pure and abstract concepts, -"cause" for empirical concepts, and "laws" almost equally for all -three, but perhaps a little more for empirical and abstract than for -pure concepts. But to the confusion of these three forms of spiritual -products is to be attributed the fact that there have been discussions, -as, for instance, whether there be _concepts of laws_ in addition to -concepts of things, the issue of which was at bottom the desire to -ascertain whether there exist abstract and pure concepts, in addition -to empirical concepts. - -[Sidenote: _Intellect and Reason._] - -The profound diversity of the concepts and of the pseudoconcepts -suggested (at the time when it was customary to represent the forms -or grades of the spirit as faculties) the distinction between two -logical faculties, which were called _Intellect_ (or, also, _abstract_ -Intellect), and _Reason._ The first of these formed what we now call -pseudoconcepts; the second, pure concepts. - -[Sidenote: _The abstract intellect and its practical nature._] - -But the proper character of neither of the two faculties was realized -by those who postulated them; they fell into the error, which we have -already had occasion to criticize, of conceiving the Intellect as a -form of knowledge, which either lives in the false, or is limited to -preparing the material for the superior faculty, to which it supplies -a first imperfect sketch of the concept. But the faculty required -for this should be, not of a theoretical nature, but of a practical. -It is a terminological question of slight interest, whether the name -"Intellect" should be retained for the production of pseudoconcepts, -or whether the purely theoretic meaning, which it first had, should be -restored to it, and it should thus be made synonymous with "Reason." -It can only be observed that it will be very difficult to remove -henceforth from "Intellect," from "intellectual formations," and from -"intellectualism," the suspicion and discredit cast upon them by the -great philosophic history of the first half of the nineteenth century; -so much so, that only where a rather popular style is employed, can -Intellect and Reason be used promiscuously. - -With greater truth, Reason was considered as unifying what the -Intellect had divided, and therefore as unifying abstraction and -concreteness, deduction and induction, analysis and synthesis. With -greater truth, although complete exactness would have demanded here, -not so much that to Reason should be given the power of unifying -what has been unduly divided, as that to the Intellect, that is to -say, to the practical faculty, should be given the power of dividing -extrinsically what for Reason is never divided: a power which the -Intellect, as a practical faculty, possesses and exercises, not in a -pathological, but in a physiological way. - -[Sidenote: _The synthesis of theoretic and practical, and the -intellectual intuition._] - -The incomplete survey of the so-called Intellect, the theoretic -character of which was preserved, though in a depreciatory sense, -issued in the result that finally to Reason itself was attributed a -character, no longer theoretic, or rather, _more than theoretic._ -Knowledge, presenting itself in the form of Intellect, seemed -inadequate to truth; to attain to which there intervened Reason, or -speculative procedure, the _synthesis of theory and practice,_ a -knowledge which is action, and an action which is knowledge. Sometimes, -Reason itself, thus transfigured, seemed insufficient, owing to -the presence of ratiocinative processes, which came to it from the -Intellect, and were absorbed by it; and the supreme faculty of truth -was conceived, not as logical reasoning, but as intuition; an intuition -differing from the purely artistic and revealing the genuine truth, -an organ of the absolute, _intellectual Intuition._ It was urged -against intellectual intuition that it created irresponsibility in -the field of truth, and made lawful every individual caprice. But a -similar objection could be brought against Reason, which is superior to -knowledge, and is the synthesis of theory and practice: while, on the -other hand, it cannot be denied, both of intellectual Intuition and of -Reason, that on the whole they affirmed or tended to affirm _the rights -of the pure Concept,_ as opposed to empirical and abstract concepts. - -[Sidenote: _Uniqueness of thought._] - -For our part, we have no need to lower the cognitive activity beneath -the level of truth, by attributing to it an intellectualiste and -arbitrary function; nor, on the other hand (in order to supplement -knowledge and intellect thus pauperized), to exalt Reason above -itself. Thought (call it Intellect, or Reason, or what you will) is -always thought; and it always thinks with pure concepts, never with -pseudoconcepts. And since there is not another thought beneath thought, -so there is not another thought superior to it. The difficulties -which led to these conclusions have been completely explained, when -we have distinguished concepts from pseudoconcepts, and demonstrated -the heterogeneity which exists between these two forms of spiritual -products. - - - - -V - -CRITIQUE OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE CONCEPTS AND THEORY OF DISTINCTION AND -DEFINITION - - -[Sidenote: _The pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept._] - - -Precisely because they are heterogeneous formations, pure concepts and -pseudoconcepts do not constitute divisions of the generic concept of -the concept. To assume that they did, would be a horrible confusion of -terms, not far different (to use Spinoza's example) from that of the -division of the dog into _animal_ dog and _constellation_ dog; though -poets used at one time to talk of the celestial dog also, as "barking -and biting," when the sun implacably burned the fields. - -[Sidenote: _Obscurity, clearness and distinction, not subdivisions of -the concept._] - -And seeing that our point of view is philosophic, we can take no -account of another division of the concept, which had great fame -and authority in the past: that into _obscure, confused, clear_ and -_distinct_ concepts and the like, or of the degrees of _perfection_ to -which the concept attains. Such a division can retain at the most but -an empirical and approximate value, and under this aspect it will be -difficult altogether to renounce it in ordinary discourse; but it has -no logical and philosophic value whatever. The concept is what is truly -concept, the perfect concept, not at all the encumbered or wandering -tendency toward it. Yet that division had great historical importance. -By means of it, indeed, the attempt was made to differentiate the -concept, under the name of _clear_ and _distinct_ thought, from the -intuition, which was _clear_ but _confused_ thought, and both of these -from sensation, impression, or emotion, which was called _obscure._ -This was attempted, but without success; the problem was set but not -solved; for the solution was only attained when it was seen that, -in this case, it was not a question of three degrees of thought, as -absolute logic claimed, but of three forms of the spirit: of thought -or _distinction,_ of intuition _ox clearness_; and of the practical -activity, _obscurity_ or _naturality._ - -[Sidenote: _Non-existence of subdivisions of the concept as a logic at -form._] - -Logically, the concept does not give rise to distinctions, for there -are not several forms of concept, but one only. This is a perfectly -analogous result in Logic to that which we reached in Æsthetic, when -we established the uniqueness of intuition or expression, and the -non-existence of special modes or classes of expressions (except -in the empirical sense, in which we can always establish as many -classes as we wish). In distinguishing the forms of the spirit, the -two principal forms, theoretic and practical, having been divided, -and the theoretic having been subdivided into intuition and concept, -there is no place for a further subdivision of the theoretic forms, -since intuition and concept are each of them indivisible forms. The -reason for this indivisibility cannot be clearly understood, save by -the complete development of the Philosophy of the spirit; and it is -only to be remarked here in passing, that the division of intuition -and concept has as its foundation the distinction between individual -and universal. And since in this distinction there is no _medium quid_ -nor an _ulterius,_ a third or fourth intermediate form, so there is no -subdivision; since we pass from the concept of individuality to single -individuality, which is not a concept, and from the concept of the -concept to the single act of thought, which is no longer the simple -definition of logical thinking, but effective logical thinking itself. - -[Sidenote: _The distinctions of the concept not logical, but real._] - -Since all subdivision of the logical form of the concept has been -excluded, the multiplicity of concepts can be referred only to the -variety of the objects, which are thought in the logical form of the -concept. The concept of _goodness_ is not that of _beauty_; or rather, -both are logically the same thing, since both are logical form; but the -aspect of reality designated by the first is not the same aspect of -reality as is designated by the second. - -[Sidenote: _Multiplicity of the concepts, and the logical difficulty -arising therefrom. Necessity of overcoming it._] - -But here arises the difficulty. How can it be that since in the concept -we deal with reality, in its universal aspect, we yet obtain so many -various forms of reality, that is, so many distinct concepts (for -example, passion, will, morality, imagination, thought, and so on), so -many _universals,_ whereas the concept should give us _the universal._ -If this variety were not overcome or capable of being overcome by the -concept, we should have to conclude that the true universal is not -attainable by thought, and to return to scepticism, or at least to -that peculiar form of logical scepticism which makes the consciousness -of unity an act of the inner life, which cannot be stated in terms of -logic; that is, mysticism. The distinction of the concepts, one from -another, in the absence of unity, is separation and atomism; and it -would certainly not be worth while getting out of the multiplicity of -representations if we were then to fall into that of the concepts. -For this, no less than the other, would issue in a _progressus ad -infinitum,_ for who would ever be able to affirm that the concepts -which were discovered and enumerated were all the concepts? If they be -ten, why should they not be, if better observed, twenty, a hundred, or -fifty thousand? Why, indeed, should they not be just as numerous as -the representations, that is to say, infinite? Spinoza, who counted, -without mediating between them, two attributes of substance, thought -and extension, admitted, with perfect coherence, that two are known to -us, but that the attributes of Substance must in reality be considered -infinite in number. - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of eliminating it._] - -The concept, then, demands that this multiplicity be denied; and we -can affirm that the real is one, because the concept, by means of -which alone we know it, is one; the content is one, because the form -of thought is one. But in accepting this claim, we run into another -difficulty. If we jettison distinction, the unity that we attain is -an empty unity, deprived of organic character, a whole without parts, -a simple _beyond_ the representations, and therefore inexpressible -so that we should return to mysticism by another route. A whole is a -whole, only because and in so far as it has parts, indeed _is_ parts; -an organism is such, because it has and is organs and functions; a -unity is thinkable only in so far as it has distinctions in itself, -and is the unity of the distinctions. Unity without distinction is as -repugnant to thought as distinction without unity. - -[Sidenote: _Unify as distinction._] - -It follows, therefore, that both terms are reciprocally indispensable, -and that the distinctions of the concept are not the negation of the -concept, nor something outside the concept, but the concept itself, -understood in its truth; the _one-distinct;_ one, only because -distinct, and distinct only because one. Unity and distinction are -correlative and therefore inseparable. - -[Sidenote: _Inadequateness of the numerical concept of multiplicity._] - -The distinct concepts, constituting in their distinction unity, cannot, -above all, be infinite in number, for in that case they would be -equivalent to the representations. Not indeed that they are finite in -number, as if they were all alike equally arranged upon one and the -same plane, and capable of being placed in any other sort of order, -without alteration in their being. The _Beautiful,_ the _True,_ the -_Useful,_ the _Good,_ are not the first steps in a numerical series, -nor do they permit themselves to be arranged at pleasure, so that we -may place the beautiful after the true, or the good before the useful, -or the useful before the true, and so on. They have a necessary order, -and mutually imply one another; and from this we learn that they are -not to be described as finite in number, since number is altogether -incapable of expressing such a relation. To count implies having -objects separate from one another before us; and here, on the contrary, -we have terms that are distinct, but inseparable, of which the second -is not only second, but, in a certain sense, also first, and the first -not only first, but, in a certain way, also second. We cannot dispense -with numbers, when treating of these concepts of the spirit, owing to -their convenience for handling the subject; hence we talk, for example, -of the _ten_ categories, or of the _three_ terms of the concept, or of -the _four_ forms of the spirit. But in this case the numbers are mere -_symbols_; and we must beware of understanding the objects which they -enumerate, as though they were ten sheep, three oxen, and four cows. - -[Sidenote: _Relation of the distinct concepts as ideal history._] - -This relation of the distinct concepts in the unity which they -constitute, can be compared to the spectacle of life, in which every -fact is in relation with all other facts, and the fact which comes -after is certainly different from that which precedes, but is also the -same; since the consequent fact contains in itself the preceding, as, -in a certain sense, the preceding virtually contained the consequent, -and was what it was, just because it possessed the power of producing -the consequent. This is called _history_; and therefore (continuing -to develop the comparison) the relation of the concepts, which are -distinct in the unity of the concept, can be called and has been called -_ideal history_; and the logical theory of such ideal history has been -regarded as the theory of the _degrees of the concept,_ just as real -history is conceived as a series of _degrees of civilization._ And -since the theory of the degrees of the concept is the theory of its -distinction, and its distinction is not different from its unity, it -is clear that this theory can be separated from the general doctrine -of the concept with which it is substantially one, only with a view to -greater facility of exposition. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between ideal and real history._] - -Metaphors and comparisons are metaphors and comparisons and (like all -forms of language) their effectiveness for the purposes of dissertation -is accompanied, as we know, by the danger of misunderstanding. In order -to avoid this, without at the same time renouncing the convenience of -such modes of expression, it will be well to insist that the historical -series, where the distinct concepts appear connected, is _ideal,_ and -therefore outside space and time, and eternal; so that it would be -erroneous to conceive that in any smallest fragment of reality, or in -any most fugitive instant of it, one degree is found without the other, -the first without the second, or the first and the second without -the third. Here too, we must allow for the exigencies of exposition, -whereby, sometimes, when we intend to emphasize the distinction, we -are led to speak of the relation of one degree to another, as if they -were distinct existences; as if the practical man really existed side -by side with the theoretic man, or the poet side by side with the -philosopher, or as if the work of Art stood separate from the labour -of reflection, and so on. But if a particular historical fact can in -a certain sense be considered as essentially distinct in time and -space, the grades of the concept are not existentially, temporally, and -spatially distinct. - -[Sidenote: _Ideal and abstract distinction._] - -An opposite, but not less serious error, would be to conceive the -grades of the concept as distinct only _abstractly,_ thus making -abstract concepts of distinct concepts. The abstract distinction -is unreal; and that of the concept is real; and the reality of the -distinction (since here we are dealing with the concept) is precisely -_ideality,_ not _abstraction._ The universal, and therefore also all -the forms of the universal, are found in every minutest fragment of -life, in the so-called physical atom of the physicists, or in the -psychical atom of the psychologists; the concept is therefore all -distinct concepts. But _each one of them is, as it were, distinct -in that union_; and in the same way as man is man, in so far as he -affirms all his activities and his entire humanity, and yet cannot -do this, save by specializing as a scientific man, a politician, a -poet, and so on. In the same way the thinker, when thinking reality, -can think it only in its distinct aspects, and in this way only he -thinks it in its unity. A work of Art and a philosophical work, an -act of thought or of will, cannot be taken up in the hand or pointed -out with the finger; and it can be affirmed only in a practical and -approximate sense that this book is poetry, and that philosophy, -that this movement is a theoretic or practical, a utilitarian or a -moral act. It is well understood that this book is also philosophy; -and that it is also a practical act; just as that useful act is also -moral, and also theoretic; and _vice versa._ But to think a certain -intuitive datum and to recognize it as an affirmation of the whole -spirit, is not possible save by thinking its different aspects -distinctly. This renders possible, for example, a criticism of Art, -conducted exclusively from the point of view of Art; or a philosophical -criticism, from the exclusive point of view of philosophy; or a moral -judgment, which considers exclusively the moral initiative of the -individual, and so on. And therefore, here as in the preceding case, -it is needful to guard against forcing the comparison with history -too far, and conceiving, in history, the possibility of divisions as -rigorous as in the concept. If distinct concepts be not _existences,_ -existences are not _distinct_ concepts; a fact cannot be placed in the -same relation to another fact, as one grade of the concept to another, -precisely because in every fact there are all the determinations of the -concept, and a fact in relation to another fact is not a conceptual -determination. - -Certainly _distinct_ concepts can become _simple abstractions_; but -this only happens when they are taken in an abstract way, and so -separated from one another, co-ordinated and made parallel, by means of -an arbitrary operation, which can be applied even to the pure concepts. -The distinct concepts then become changed into _pseudoconcepts,_ and -the character of abstraction belongs to these last, not to the distinct -concepts as such, which are always at once distinct and united. - -[Sidenote: _Other usual distinctions of the concept, and their meaning, -identicals, disparates, primitives, and derivatives, etc._] - -This is not the place to dwell upon the other forms of concepts met -with in Logic, known as _identical_ concepts, which cannot be anything -but synonyms, or words;--or upon _disparate_ concepts, which are simply -distinct concepts, in so far as they are taken in a relation, which -is not that given in the distinction, and is therefore arbitrary, so -that the concepts, thus presented without the necessary intermediaries, -appear disparate;--or _primitive and derived concepts, or simple and -compound concepts_; a distinction which does not exist for the pure -concepts, since they are always simple and primitive, never compound or -derived. - -[Sidenote: _Universals, particulars, and singulars. Intension and -extension._] - -But the distinction of concepts into _universal, particular,_ and -_singular_ deserves elucidation, for the reason that we are now -giving. Concepts, which are only universal, or only particular, or -only singular, or to which any one of these determinations is wanting, -are not conceivable. Indeed, universality only means that the distinct -concept is also the unique concept, of which it is a distinction and -which is composed of such distinctions; particularity means that the -distinct concept is in a determinate! relation with another distinct -concept; and singularity that in this particularity and in that -universality it is also itself. Thus the distinct concept is always -singular, and therefore universal and particular; and the universal -concept would be abstract were it not also particular and singular. In -every concept there is the whole concept, and all other concepts; but -there is also one determinate concept. For example, beauty is spirit -(universality), theoretic spirit (particularity), and intuitive spirit -(singularity); that is to say, the whole spirit, in so far as it is -intuition. Owing to this distinction into universal, particular, and -singular, it is self-evident that intension and extension are, as the -phrase is, in inverse ratio, since this amounts to repeating that the -universal is universal, the particular particular, and the singular -singular. - -[Sidenote: _Logical definition._] - -The interest of this distinction of universality, particularity, and -singularity lies in this, that upon it is founded the doctrine of -_definition,_ since it is not possible to define, that is, to think -a concept, save by thinking its _singularity_ (peculiarity), nor to -think this, save by determining it as _particularity_ (relation with -the other distinct concepts) and _universality_ (relation with the -whole). Conversely, it is not possible to think universality without -determining its particularity and singularity; otherwise that universal -would be empty. The distinct concepts are defined by means of the one, -and the one by means of the distinct. This doctrine, thus made clear, -is also in harmony with that of the nature of the concepts. - -[Sidenote: _Unity, distinction as circle._] - -But the theory of the distinct concepts and that of their unity still -present something irrational and give rise to a new difficulty. -Because, if it be true that the distinct concepts constitute an ideal -history or series of grades, it is also true that in such a history -and series there is a _first_ and _last,_ the concept _a,_ which opens -the series, and, let us say, the concept _d,_ which concludes it. -Commencement and end thus remain both without motive. But in order -that the concept be unity in distinction and that it may be compared -to an organism, it is necessary that it have no other commencement -save itself, and that none of its single distinct terms be an absolute -commencement. For, in fact, in the organism no member has priority over -the others; but each is reciprocally first and last. Now this means -that the symbol of _linear series_ is inadequate to the concept; and -that its true symbol is the _circle,_ in which _a_ and _d_ function, in -turn, as first and last. And indeed the distinct concepts, as eternal -ideal history, are an eternal going and returning, in which _a, b, c, -d_ arise from _d,_ without possibility of pause or stay, and in which -each one, whether _a_ or _b_ or _c_ or _d,_ being unable to change its -place, is to be designated, in turn, as first or as last. For example, -in the Philosophy of Spirit it can be said with equal truth or error -that the end or final goal of the spirit is to know or to act, art or -philosophy; in truth, neither in particular, but only their totality -is the end; or only the Spirit is the end of the Spirit. Thus is -eliminated the rational difficulty, which might be urged in relation to -this part. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction in the pseudoconcepts._] - -It is still better eliminated, and the whole doctrine of the pure -concepts which we have been expounding is thereby illumined and thrown -into clearer outline when we observe the transformation (which we will -not call either inversion or perversion), to which it is submitted in -the doctrine of the pseudoconcepts. It is therefore expedient to refer -rapidly to this for the sake of contrast and emphasis. - -Above all, certain distinctions, which in the doctrine of the pure -concepts have been seen to be without significance or importance, -find their significance in the doctrine of the pseudoconcepts. We -understand, for instance, how and why _identical_ concepts can be -discussed; since, in the field of caprice, one and the same thing, -or one and the same not-thing, can be defined in different ways -and give rise to two or more concepts which, owing to the identity -of their matter, are thus identical. The concept of a figure having -three angles, or that of a figure having three sides, are identical -concepts, alike applicable to the triangle; the concept of 3 x 4 and -that of 6 x 2 are identical, since both are definitions of the number -12; the concept of a feline domestic animal and that of a domestic -animal that eats mice are identical, both being definitions of the cat. -It is likewise clear how and why _primary_ and _derived, simple_ and -_compound_ concepts are discussed; for our arbitrary choice, by forming -certain concepts and making use of these to form others, comes to posit -the first as simple and primitive in relation to the second, which are, -in their turn, to be considered as compound or secondary. - -[Sidenote: _The subordination and co-ordination of the empirical -concepts._] - -We have already seen that the arbitrary concept differs from the pure -concept in that, of necessity, it produces two forms by the two acts of -empiricism and emptiness and thereby gives rise to two different types -of formations, empirical and abstract concepts. Empirical concepts -have this property, that in them unity is outside distinction and -distinction outside unity. And it is natural: for if it were the case -that these two determinations penetrated one another, the concepts -would be, as we have already noted, not arbitrary, but necessary and -true. If the distinction is placed outside the unity, every division -that is given of it is, like the concepts themselves, arbitrary; -and every enumeration is also arbitrary, because those concepts can -be infinitely multiplied. In exchange for the rationally determined -and completely unified distinctions of the pure concepts, the -pseudoconcepts offer multiple groups, arbitrarily formed, and sometimes -also unified in a single group, which embraces the entire field of the -knowable, but in such a way as not to exclude an infinite number of -other ways of apprehending it. - -In these groups the empirical concepts simulate the arrangement of -the pure concepts, reducing the particular to the universal, that is -to say, a certain number of concepts beneath another concept. But -it is impossible in any way to think these subordinate concepts, as -actualizations of the fundamental concept, which are developed from -one another and return into themselves; hence we are compelled to -leave them external to one another, simply co-ordinated. The scheme -of _subordination_ and _co-ordination,_ and its relative spatial -symbol (the symbol of _classification_), which is a right line, on -the upper side of which falls perpendicularly another right line, -and from whose lower side descend other perpendicular and therefore -parallel right lines, is opposed to the circle and is the most evident -ocular demonstration of the profound diversity of the two procedures. -It will always be impossible to dispose a nexus of pure concepts in -that classificatory scheme without falsifying them; it will always be -impossible to transform empirical concepts into a series of grades -without destroying them. - -[Sidenote: _The definition in the empirical concepts, and the notes of -the concept._] - -In consequence of the scheme of classification, the definition which, -in the case of pure concepts, has the three moments of universality, -particularity, and singularity, in the case of empirical concepts -has only two, which are called _genus_ and _species_; and is applied -according to the rule, by means of the _proximate genus_ and the -_specific difference._ Its object indeed is simply to record, not to -understand and to think, a given empirical formation; and this is fully -attained when its position is determined by means of the indication of -what is above and what is beside it. In order to determine it yet more -accurately, the doctrine of the definition has been gradually enriched -with other _marks_ or _predicables,_ which, in traditional Logic, -are five: _genus, species, differentia, property, accident._ But it -is a question of caprice upon caprice, of which it is not advisable -to take too much account. And as it would be barbaric to apply the -classificatory scheme to the pure concepts, so it would be equally -barbaric to define the pure concepts by means of _marks,_ that is, by -means of characteristics mechanically arranged. - -[Sidenote: _Series in the abstract concepts._] - -Where the thinker forgets the true function of the empirical concepts -and is seized with the desire to develop them rationally, and thus -to overcome the atomism of the scheme of classification and of -extrinsic definition, he is led to refine them into abstract concepts, -in which that scheme and that method of definition are overcome: -the classification becomes a _series_ (numerical series, series of -geometrical forms, etc.), and the definition becomes _genetic._ But -this improvement not only makes the empirical concepts disappear, -and is therefore not improvement but death (like the death which the -empirical concepts find in true knowledge when they return or mount up -again to pure thought); but such improvement substitutes for empiricism -emptiness. Series and genetic definitions answer without doubt to -demands of the practical spirit; but, as we know, they do not yield -truth, not even the truth which lies at the bottom of an empirical -concept or of a falsified and mutilated representation. Hence, here as -elsewhere, empirical concepts and abstract concepts reveal their double -one-sidedness, and exhibit more significantly the value of the unity -which they break up; the distinction, which is not classification, -but circle and unity; the definition, which is not an aggregate of -intuitive data; the series, which is a complete series; the genesis, -which is not abstract but ideal. - - - - -VI - -OPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES - - -[Sidenote: _Opposite or contrary concepts._] - -By what has been said, we have made sufficiently clear the nature of -distinct concepts, that is to say, unity in distinction and distinction -in unity, and we have left no doubt as to the kind of unity which -the concept affirms, that it is not _in spite of_ but _by means of_ -distinction. But another difficulty seems to arise, due to another -order of concepts, which are called _opposites_ or _contraries._ - -[Sidenote: _Their difference from distincts._] - -It is indubitable that opposite concepts neither are nor can be reduced -to distincts; and this becomes evident so soon as instances of both -are recalled to mind. In the system of the spirit, for instance, the -practical activity will be distinct from the theoretic, and within -the practical activity the utilitarian and ethical activities will -be distinct. But the contrary of the practical activity is practical -inactivity, the contrary of utility, harmfulness, the contrary of -morality, immorality. Beauty, truth, utility, moral good are distinct -concepts; but it is easy to see that ugliness, falsehood, uselessness, -evil cannot be added to or inserted among them. Nor is this all: upon -closer inspection we perceive that the second series cannot be added -to or mingled with the first, because each of the contrary terms -is already inherent in its contrary, or accompanies it, as shadow -accompanies light. Beauty is such, because it denies ugliness; good, -because it denies evil, and so on. The opposite is not positive, but -negative, and as such is accompanied by the positive. - -[Sidenote: _Confirmation of this given by the Logic of empiria._] - -This difference of nature between opposite concepts and distinct -concepts is also reflected in empirical Logic, that is, in the theory -of pseudoconcepts; because this Logic, while it reduces the distinct -concepts to _species,_ refuses to treat the opposites in like manner. -Hence one does not say that the genus _dog_ is divided into the species -_live_ dogs and _dead_ dogs; or that the genus _moral man_ is divided -into the species _moral_ and _immoral_ man; and if such has sometimes -been affirmed, an impropriety--even for this kind of Logic--has been -committed, since the _species_ can never be the _negation_ of the -_genus._ So this empirical Logic confirms in its own way that opposite -concepts are different from distinct. - -[Sidenote: _Difficulty arising from the double type of concepts, -opposites, and distincts._] - -It is, however, equally evident that we cannot content ourselves with -enumerating the opposite, side by side with the distinct concepts; -because we should thus be adopting non-philosophical methods in place -of philosophical, and in the philosophical theory of Logic should be -lapsing into illogicality or empiricism. If the unity of the concept -be at the same time its _self-distinction,_ how can that same unity -have another parallel sort of division or self-distinction, which is -_self-opposition!_ If it is inconceivable to resolve the one into -the other, and to make of the opposites distinct concepts, or of the -distincts opposite concepts, then it is not less inconceivable to leave -both distincts and opposites within the unity of the concept unmediated -and unexplained. - -[Sidenote: _Nature of the opposites; and their identity with the -distincts when distinguished from them._] - -It will possibly serve towards a solution of this -difficulty--undoubtedly a very grave one--to go deeply into the -nature of the difference between opposite and distinct concepts. -These latter are distinguishable in unity; reality is their unity and -also their distinction. Man is thought and action; indivisible but -distinguishable forms; so much so that in so far as we think we deny -action, and in so far as we act we deny thought. But the opposites are -not distinguishable in this way: the man who commits an evil action, -_if he really does something,_ does not commit an evil action, but an -action which is useful to him; the man who thinks a false thought, _if -he does something real,_ does not think the false thought, indeed does -not think at all, but, on the contrary, lives and provides for his own -convenience and in general for a good which at that instant he desires. -Hence we see that the opposites, when taken as distinct moments, are no -longer opposites, but distincts; and in that case they retain negative -denominations only metaphorically, whereas, strictly speaking, they -would merit positive. In order, therefore, that the consideration of -opposition be not changed when superficially regarded into that of -distinction, it is desirable not to make of it a distinction in the -bosom of the concept, that is to say, to combat every distinction by -opposition, by declaring it to be _merely abstract._ - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another, -as concept from concept._] - -So true is this, that no sooner are opposite terms taken as distincts -than the one becomes the other, that is to say, both evaporate into -emptiness. The disputes caused by the opposition of _being_ to -_not-being_ and the unity of both in _becoming_ are celebrated in this -connection. And we know that being, thought as pure being, is the same -as not-being or nothing; and nothing, thought as pure nothingness, -is the same as pure being. Thus, the truth is neither the one nor -the other, but is becoming, in which both are, but as opposites, and, -therefore, indistinguishable: becoming is being itself, which has in -it not-being, and so is also not-being. We cannot think the relation -of being to not-being as the relation of one form of the spirit, or -of reality, to another form. In the latter case we have unity in -distinction: in the former, rectified or _restored_ unity, that is to -say, reaffirmed against _emptiness;_ against the empty unity of mere -being, or of mere not-being; or against the mere sum of being and of -not-being. - -[Sidenote: _The dialectic._] - -The two moments should certainly be synthesized, when we attack the -abstract thought, which divides them: taken in themselves, they -are, not two moments united in a third, but one only, the third -(in this case also the number is a symbol), that is to say, the -indistinguishability of the moments. It thus happens (be it said in -passing) that Hegel, to whom we owe the polemic against empty being, -was content for this purpose neither with the words _unity_ and -_identity,_ nor with _synthesis,_ nor with _triad,_ and preferred -to call this indistinguishable opposition in unity the objective -_dialectic_ of the real. But whatever be the words that we chose to -employ, the thing is what has been said. The opposite is not the -distinct of its opposite, but the abstraction of the true reality. - -[Sidenote: _The opposites are not concepts, but the unique concept -itself._] - -If this be the fact, the duality and parallelism of distinct and -opposite concepts no longer exist. The opposites are the concept -itself, and therefore the concepts themselves, each one in itself, -in so far as it is determination of the concept, and in so far as it -is conceived in its true reality. Reality, of which logical thought -elaborates the concept, means, not motionless being or pure being, -but opposition: the forms of reality, which the concept thinks in -order to think reality in its fullness, are opposed in themselves; -otherwise, they would not be forms of reality, or would not be at -all. _Fair is foul and foul is fair_: beauty is such, because it has -within it ugliness, the true is such because it has in it the false, -the good is such because it has within it evil. If the negative term -be removed, as is usually done in abstract thought, the positive also -disappears; but precisely because, with the negative, the positive -itself has been removed. When we talk of negative terms, or of -non-values and so of not-beings as existing, existence really means -that to the _establishment_ of the fact we add the _expression of the -desire_ that another existence should arise upon that existence. "You -are dishonest" means "You are a man that seeks your own pleasure" (a -theoretic judgment); "but you _ought to be_" (no longer a judgment, but -the expression of a desire) "something else, and so serve the universal -ends of Reality." "You have written an ugly verse" will mean, for -example, "You have provided for your own convenience and repose, and -so have accomplished an economic act" (a theoretic judgment); "but you -_ought to_ accomplish an æsthetic act" (no longer judgment, but the -expression of a wish). Examples can be multiplied. But every one has in -him evil, because he has good: Satan is not a creature extraneous to -God, nor the Minister of God, called Satan, but God himself. If God had -not Satan in himself, he would be like food without salt, an abstract -ideal, a simple _ought to be_ which is not, and therefore impotent -and useless. The Italian poet who had sung of Satan, as "rebellion" -and "the avenging force of reason," had a profound meaning when he -concluded by exalting God: as "the most lofty vision to which peoples -attain in the force of their youth," "the Sun of sublime minds and of -ardent hearts." He corrected and integrated the one abstraction with -the other, and thus unconsciously attained to the fullness of truth. - -[Sidenote: _Affirmation and negation._] - -Thought, in so far as it is itself life (that is to say, the life -which is thought, and therefore life of life), and in so far as it is -reality (that is to say, the reality which is thought, and therefore -reality of reality) has in itself opposition; and for this reason it -is also _affirmation and negation_; it does not affirm save by denying, -and does not deny save by affirming. But it does not affirm and deny -save by distinguishing, because thought is distinction, and we cannot -distinguish (truly distinguish _i.e.,_ which is a different thing from -the rough and ready separations made by the pseudoconcepts) save by -unifying. He who meditates upon the connections of affirmation-negation -and unity-distinction has before him the problem of the nature of -thought, and so of the nature of reality; and he ends by seeing that -those two connections are not parallel nor disparate, but are in their -turn unified in unity-distinction understood as effective reality, and -not as simple abstract possibility, or desire, or mere ought to be. - -[Sidenote: _The principle of identity and contradiction; its true -meaning and false interpretation._] - -If we now wish to state the nature of thought as reality in the form of -_law_ (a form which we know to be one with that of the concept, though -the first term be adopted by preference for the pseudoconcepts), we can -only say that the law of thought is the law of unity and distinction, -and therefore that it is expressed in the two formulæ A is A (unity) -and A is not B (distinction), which are precisely what is called -the law or _principle of identity and contradiction._ It is a very -improper, or, rather, a very equivocal formula, chiefly because it -allows it to be supposed that the law or principle is outside or above -thought, like a bridle and guide, whereas it is thought itself; and it -has the further inconvenience of not placing in clear relief the unity -of identity and distinction. But these are not too great evils, because -misunderstandings can be made clear, and because--what we will not tire -of repeating--all, all words indeed, are exposed to misunderstandings. - -[Sidenote: _Another false interpretation; struggle with the principle -of opposition. False application of this principle._] - -We have a much greater evil, when the principle of identity and -contradiction is formulated and understood, not in the sense that A is -not B, but in that of A is A only and not also not A, or its opposite; -because, understood in this way, it leads directly to placing the -negative moment outside the positive, not-being outside or opposite -to being, and so, to the absurd conception of reality as motionless -and empty being. In opposition to this degeneration of the principle -of identity and contradiction, another law or principle has been -conceived and made prominent, whose formula is: "A is also not A," or -"everything is self-contradicting." This is a necessary and provident -reaction against the one-sided way in which the preceding principle was -interpreted. But it too brings in its turn the inconvenience of all -reactions, because it seems to rise up against the first law, like an -irreconcilable rival destined to supplant it. In the first formula we -have a duality of principles, which, as has been said, cannot logically -be maintained; in the second, a degeneration in the opposite sense, the -total loss of the criterion of distinction. To the false application -of the principle of identity and contradiction succeeds _the false -application of the dialectic principle._ - -This false application has also been manifested in a form which could -be called doubly arbitrary; that is to say, when it has attempted to -treat dialectically neither more nor less than empirical and abstract -concepts, whereas in any case it could not be applied to anything -but the pure concepts. The dialectic belongs to opposed categories -(or, rather, it is the thinking of the one category of opposition), -not at all to representative and abstract fictions, which are based -either upon mere representation or upon nothing. As the result of that -arbitrary form, we have seen vegetable opposed to mineral, society -opposed to the family, or even Rome opposed to Greece, and Napoleon -to Rome; or the superficies actually opposed to the line, time to -space, and the number two to the number one. But this error belongs to -another more general error, which we shall deal with in its place, when -discussing philosophism. - -[Sidenote: _Errors of the dialectic applied to the relation of the -distincts._] - -Here it is important to indicate only that false application of the -dialectic which tends to resolve in itself and so to destroy distinct -concepts, by treating them as opposites. The distinct concepts are -distinct and not opposite; and they cannot be opposite, precisely -because they already have opposition in themselves. Fancy has its -opposite in itself, fanciful passivity, or æsthetic ugliness, and -therefore it is not the opposite of thought, which in its turn has -its opposite in itself, logical passivity, antithought, or the false. -Certainly (as has been said), he who does not make the beautiful -(in so far as he does anything, and he cannot but do something) -effectively produces another value, for example the useful, and he -who does not think, if he does anything, produces another value, the -fanciful for instance, and creates a work of art. But in this way we -issue from those determinations considered in themselves, from the -opposition which is in them and _which constitutes them_; and from the -consideration of effectual opposition we pass to the consideration of -distinction. Considered as real, the opposite cannot be anything but -the distinct; but the opposite is precisely the unreal in the real, -and not a form or grade of reality. It will be said that unless one -distinct concept is opposed to another, it is not clear how there can -be a transition from one to the other. But this is a confusion between -concept and fact, between _ideal_ and therefore eternal moments of the -real and their _existential_ manifestations. Existentially, a poet -does not become a philosopher, save when in his spirit there arises -a contradiction to his poetry, that is to say, when he is no longer -satisfied with the individual and with the individual intuition: in -that moment, he does not pass into but is a philosopher, because -to pass, to be effectual, and to become are synonyms. In the same -way, a poet does not pass from one intuition to another, or from one -work of art to another, save through the formation of an internal -contradiction, owing to which his previous work no longer satisfies -him; and he passes into, that is to say he becomes and truly is, -_another_ poet. Transition is the law of the whole of life; and -therefore it is in all the existential and contingent determinations -of each of these forms. We pass from one verse of a poem to another -because the first verse satisfies, and also does not satisfy. The ideal -moments, on the contrary, do not pass into one another, because they -are eternally in each other, distinct, and one with each other. - -[Sidenote: _Its reductio ad absurdum._] - -Moreover, the violent application of the dialectic to the distincts, -and their illegitimate distortion into opposites, due to an elevated -but ill-directed tendency to unity, is punished where it sins; that -is to say, in not attaining to that unity to which it aspired. The -connection of distinct is circular, and therefore true unity; the -application of opposites to the forms of the spirit and of reality -would produce, on the contrary, not the circle, which is true infinity, -but the _progressif ad infinitum,_ which is false or bad infinity. -Indeed, if opposition determine the transition from one ideal grade -to the other, from one form to the other, and is the sole character -and supreme law of the real, by what right can a final form be -established, in which that transition should no longer take place? -By what right, for instance, should the spirit, which moves from the -impression or emotion and passes dialectically to the intuition, and -by a new dialectic transition to logical thought, remain calm and -satisfied there? Why (as is the contention of such philosophies) -should the thought of the Absolute or of the Idea be the end of Life? -In obedience to the law of opposition, it would be necessary that -thought, which denies intuition, should be in its turn denied; and the -denial again denied; and so on, to infinity. This negation to infinity -exists, certainly, and it is life itself, seen in representation; but -precisely for this reason we do not escape from this evil infinite -of representation save through the true infinite, which places the -infinite in every moment, the first in the last and the last in -the first, that is to say, places in every moment unity, which is -distinction. - -We must, however, recognize that the false application of the dialectic -has had, _per accidens,_ the excellent result of demonstrating the -instability of a crowd of ill-distinguished concepts; as we must take -advantage of the devastation and overturning of secular prejudices -which it has brought about. But that erroneous dialectic has also -promoted the habit of lack of precision in the concepts, and sometimes -encouraged the charlatanism of superficial thinkers; though this too, -_per accidens,_ so far as concerns the initial motive of dialectical -polemic is rich with profound truth. - -[Sidenote: _The Improper form of logical principles or laws. The -principle of sufficient reason._] - -The form of _law_ given to the concept of the concept has led to this -confusion; for it is an improper form, all saturated with empirical -usage. Given the law of identity and contradiction, and given side by -side with it that of opposition or dialectic, there inevitably arises a -seeming duality; whereas the two laws are nothing but two inopportune -forms of expressing the unique nature of the concept, or, rather, of -reality itself. The peculiar nature of the concept may rather be said -to be expressed in another law or principle, namely that of _sufficient -reason._ This principle is ordinarily used as referring to the concept -of cause, or to the pseudoconcepts, but (both in its peculiar tendency -and in its historical origin) it truly belonged to the concept of end -or reason. That is to say, it was desired to establish that things -cannot be said to be known, when any sort of cause for them is adduced, -but on the contrary, that cause must be adduced, which is also the end, -and which is, therefore, the _sufficient_ reason. But what else does -seeking the sufficient reason of things mean but thinking them in -their truth, conceiving them in their universality, and stating their -concept? This is logical thought, as distinct from representation or -intuition, which offers things but not reasons, individuality but not -universality. - -It is not worth while talking about the other so-called logical -principles; because, either they have been already implicitly dealt -with, or they are ineptitudes without any sort of interest. - - - - -SECOND SECTION - -THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT - - -I - -THE CONCEPT AND VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT - - -[Sidenote: _Relation of the logical with the Æsthetic form._] - -With the ascent from the intuition-expression to the concept, and with -the concentration upon it of our attention, we have risen from the -purely imaginative to the purely logical form of the spirit. We must -now, so to speak, begin the descent; or rather consider in greater -detail the position that has been reached, in order to understand it in -all its conditions and circumstances. Were we not to do this, we should -have given a concept of the concept, which would err by abstraction. - -[Sidenote: _The concept as expression._] - -The concept, to which we have risen from intuition, does not live in -empty space. It does not exist as a mere concept, or as something -abstract. The air it breathes is the intuition itself, from which it -detaches itself, but in whose ambient it continues. If these images -seem unsuitable, or somewhat drawn from the sphere of representations, -we may choose others, such as that, which we used on another occasion, -of the second grade, which, to be second, must rest upon the first, -and, in a certain sense, be the first. The concept does not exist, and -cannot exist, save in the intuitive and expressive forms, or in what is -called language. To think is also to speak; he who does not express, or -does not know how to express his concept, does not possess it: at the -most, he presumes or hopes to possess it. Not only is there never in -reality an unexpressed representation, a pictorial vision unpainted, -or a song unsung; but there is never even a concept which is simply -thought and not also translated into words. - -We have previously defended this thesis against the objections which -are wont to be made to it.[1] But in order to recapitulate and thus to -avoid the misunderstandings which might arise from the abbreviating -formulæ which we use, it will be well to repeat that the concept is -not expressed only in the so-called vocal or verbal forms; and if we -mention these more than others, it will be by synecdoche, that is to -say, when we refer to them, we desire to take them as representative -of all the others. Undoubtedly, the affirmation that the concept can -also be expressed in non-verbal form may cause surprise. It will be -said that geometry itself, in so far as it describes geometrical -figures, at the same time employs or implies speech; and we shall be -ironically challenged to attempt to set the _Critique of Pure Reason_ -to music or to make a building of Newton's _Natural Philosophy._ But -we must carefully beware of breaking up the unity of the intuitive -spirit, because errors arise and become incorrigible, precisely through -such breaking up. Words, tones, colours, and lines are physical -abstractions, and only by abstraction can they be successfully -separated. In reality, he who looks at a picture with his eyes also -speaks it in words to himself; he who sings an air also has its words -in his spirit; he who builds a palace or a church speaks, sings, and -makes music; he who reads a poem sings, paints, sculptures, constructs. -_The Critique of Pure Reason_ cannot be set to music, because it -already has its music; the _Natural Philosophy_ cannot be built in -stone, because it is already architectonic; in exactly the same way -that the _Transfiguration_ cannot be turned into a symphony in four -movements, or the _Promessi Sposi_ into a series of pictures. Thus the -challenge, if made, would testify to the lack of reflection on the part -of the challengers, for they would confuse physical distinctions with -the real and concrete act of the intuitive spirit. - -[Sidenote: _Æsthetic and Æsthetic-logical expressions or expressions of -the concept; propositions and judgments._] - -Owing to the incarnation of the concept or logic in expression and -language, language is quite full of logical elements; hence people -are often led astray into affirming (we have already made clear the -erroneousness[2] of this) that language is a logical function. Water -might as well be called wine, because wine has been poured into the -water. But language as language or as simple æsthetic fact is one -thing, and language as expression of logical thought is another, for -in this case, certainly, language remains always language and subject -to the law of language, but is also more than language. If the first -be termed simple expression, _logos seimantikos,_ as Aristotle said, -or _judicium æstheticum sive sensitivum,_ according to the school of -Baumgarten, the second must on the contrary be called affirmation, -_logos apophantikos, judicium logicum_ or _æsthetico-logicum._ To -this same issue we can reduce, if we understand it properly, the -distinction between _proposition_ and _judgment,_ for they are only -distinguishable in so far as it is assumed that the second form is -dominated by the concept, whereas the first is given as free of such -domination. - -But we should seek in vain for facts in proof of expressions belonging -to either form, because we cannot furnish them without making the -proviso that we understand them in the meaning of one or other of -the two forms. Taken by themselves, any verbal expressions which we -adduce or can adduce as proofs are indeterminate and therefore of many -meanings. "Love is life" can be the saying of a poet who notes an -impression with which his soul is agitated and marks it with fervour -and solemnity; or it can be, equally, the logical affirmation of -some one philosophizing on the essence of life. "Clear, fresh, and -sweet waters," when uttered by Petrarch, is an æsthetic proposition; -but the same words become a logical judgment when, for example, they -answer the question as to which is the most celebrated love song -of Petrarch, or pseudological when applied by a naturalist to the -substance water. A word no longer has meaning, or--what amounts to the -same thing--has no definite meaning, when it is abstracted from the -circumstances, the implications, the emphasis, and the gesture with -which it has been thought, animated, and pronounced. Nevertheless, -forgetfulness of this elementary hermeneutic canon, by which a word is -a word only on the soil that has produced it and to which it must be -restored, has been in Logic the cause of interminable disputes as to -the logical nature of this or that verbal phrase, separated from the -whole to which it belonged and rendered abstract. It would be much less -equivocal to adduce such poems as _I Sepolcri,_ or the song _A Silvia,_ -as documents of æsthetic propositions, and philosophical treatises -(for examples, the _Metaphysics_ or the _Analytics_) as documents of -æsthetic-logical judgments or propositions. But here, too, we should -need to add: "poetry considered as poetry," and "philosophy considered -as philosophy," since it is clear that a poem is prose in the soul of -him who reflects upon it, and prose is poetry in the soul of a writer -vibrating with enthusiasm and emotion in the act of composition. Facts -do not constitute proofs in philosophy, save when they are interpreted -through the medium of philosophy; and then, too, they become mere -_examples,_ which aid in fixing the attention upon what is being -demonstrated. - -[Sidenote: _Surpassing of the dualism of thought and language._] - -The relation between language and thought, conceived as we have -conceived it, does not admit the criticism that it creates an -insuperable dualism, though that criticism was justly aimed at those -who set the two concepts side by side and parallel with one another. -In that case the sole means that remained of obtaining unity was -to present language as an acoustic fact and declare thought to be -the unique psychic reality, and language the physical side of the -psychophysical nexus. But no one will henceforth wish to repeat the -blasphemy that language (the synonym of fancy and poetry) is nothing -but a physical-acoustic fact and merely adherent to thought. We have in -the two forms, notwithstanding their clear distinction, not parallelism -and dualism, but an organic relation of connection in distinction,--the -first form being implied in the second, the second crystallized into -the first,--precisely in conformity with that rhythmical movement of -the concepts which we have already discussed. And thus, too, when asked -if the _prius_ of Logic be the concept or the judgment, we must reply -that the judgment, understood as an æsthetic proposition, is certainly -a _prius;_ but understood as a logical judgment, it is neither a -_prius_ nor a _posterius_ in relation to the concept, since it is the -concept itself in its effectuality. - -[Sidenote: _The logical judgment as definition._] - -This pure expression of the concept, which is the logical judgment, -constitutes what is called _definitive judgment_ or _definition._ -This, considered on its verbal side, or as the synthesis of thought -and word, does not give rise to any special logical theory in addition -to that which we have already stated, when definition showed itself to -be one with distinction or conceptual thought; nor does it give rise -to any special æsthetic doctrine, since the general doctrine expounded -elsewhere includes this also. The dispute, as to whether the definition -be verbal or real, finds its solution in the relation we have just -established between thought and words; hence definition is verbal -because it is real, and _vice versa._ And as to the other meaning -of the question, whether, that is to say, definition be _nominal_ -or _real,_ conventional or corresponding with the truth, that finds -its solution in the distinction between pseudoconcepts and concepts, -the first of which, it is clear, are _defined_ only in a nominalist -or conventional way, because they _are,_ in fact, nominalist and -conventional. - -[Sidenote: _The indistinguishability of subject and predicate in the -definition. Unity of essence and existence._] - -Greater importance attaches to the other dispute, as to whether the -definitive judgment be analysable into subject, predicate, and copula, -whether, for example, the definition: "the will is the practical -form of the spirit," can be resolved in the terms: "will" (subject), -"practical form of the spirit" (predicate), and "is" (copula). Now, -the difference between subject and predicate is here illusory, since -predicate means the universal which is predicated of an individual, and -here both the so-called subject and the so-called predicate are two -universals, and the second, far from being more ample than the first, -is the first itself. As to the "is," since the two distinct terms which -should be copulated are wanting, it is not a copula; nor has it even -the value of a predicate, as in the case in which it is asserted of an -individual fact that it is, that is to say, that it has really happened -and is _existing._ The "is," in the case of the definition, expresses -nothing except simply the act of thought which thinks; and what is -thought is, in so far as it is thought; if it were not, it would not be -thought; and if it were not thought, it would not be. The concept gives -the essence of things, and in the concept _essence involves existence._ -That this proposition has sometimes been contested is due solely to -the confusion between the essence, which is existence and therefore -concept, and the existence which is not essence and therefore -is representation. It is due therefore to the problem to which -representations gave rise in this respect, and with which we shall -deal further on. Freed from this confusion, the proposition is not -contestable, and is the very basis of all logical thought, of which we -have to examine the conceivability, or essence, that is, its internal -necessity and coherence; and when this has been established, existence -has also been established. If the concept of _virtue_ be conceivable, -virtue is; if the concept of _God_ be conceivable, God is. To the most -perfect concept the perfection of existence cannot be wanting without -being _itself_ non-existent. - -[Sidenote: _Alleged emptiness of the definition._] - -Yet it would seem that though the definition affirms both essence -and existence, and therefore the reality of the concept, it is, -nevertheless, an empty form; for we have recognized that in every -definition subject and predicate are the same, and it is therefore a -tautological judgment. Certainly, the definition is tautological, but -it is a sublime tautology, altogether different from the emptiness -which is usually condemned in that expression. The tautology of the -definition means that the concept is equal only to itself and cannot be -resolved into another or explained by another. In the definition truth -_praesentia patet,_ and if the Goddess does not reveal herself by her -simple presence, it is in vain that the priest will strive to discover -her to the multitude by comparing her with what is inferior to her: -with sensible things, which are particular manifestations of her. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the definition as fixed verbal form._] - -As in relation to the concept the definition is not to be held -distinguishable, so in its expressive or verbal aspect it must not be -understood as a formula separate from the basis of the discourse, as -though it were the official garb of truth, the only worthy setting -for that gem. Such a conception of its nature has caused _pedantry of -definition, hatred_ of and consequent rebellion _against definitions._ -That pedantry, however, like all pedantries, had some good in it; that -is to say, it energetically affirmed the need for exactitude; and too -frequently the rebellion, denying, like all rebellions, not only the -evil but also whatever good there might be in the thing opposed, has, -through its hatred of formulæ, made exactitude of thought a negligible -matter. But definition, taken verbally, is not a formula, a period -or part of a book or discourse; it is the whole book or the whole -discourse, from the first word to the last, including all that in it -may seem accidental or superficial, including even the accent, the -warmth, the emphasis, and the gesture of the living word, the notes, -the parentheses, the full stops, and commas of the writing. Nor can we -indicate a special literary form of definition, such as _the treatise -or system or manual,_ because the definition or concept is given alike -in opuscules and in dialogues, in prose and in verse, in satire and -in lyric, in comedy and in tragedy. To define, from the verbal point -of view, means to express the concept; and all the expressions of the -concept are definitions. This might trouble rhetoricians desirous of -devoting a special chapter to the form of scientific treatment; but it -does not trouble good sense, which quickly recognizes that the thing -is just so, and that an epigram may give that precise and efficacious -definition in which the ample scholastic volume of a professor -sometimes fails, although full of pretence in this respect. - - -[Footnote 1: See _Æsthetic,_ part i. chap. iii.] - -[Footnote 2: See Sect. I. Chap. III.] - - - - -II - - -THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM, THE SYLLOGISM - - -[Sidenote: _Identity of definition and syllogism._] - -The definition not only is not a formula separable or distinguishable -from the thread of the discourse, but it cannot even be separated or -distinguished from the ratiocinative forms or forms of demonstration, -as is implied in the custom of logicians, who make the doctrine of the -definition or of the _systematic_ forms, as they usually call them, -follow that of the forms of demonstration. They ingenuously imagine -that thought, after having had a rough-and-tumble with its adversaries, -and after having proclaimed, shouted, and finally vindicated its own -right, mounts the rostrum and henceforth calm and sure of itself begins -to define. But, in reality, to think is to combat continuously without -any repose; and at every moment of that battle there is always peace -and security; and definition is indistinguishable from demonstration, -because it is found at every instant of the demonstration and -coincides with it. _Definition and Syllogism_ are the same thing. - -[Sidenote: _Connection of concepts and thought of the concept._] - -The syllogism, indeed, is nothing but a connection of concepts; and -although it has been disputed as to whether it must be considered so, -or rather as a connection of logical propositions or judgments, the -dispute is at once solved, so far as we are concerned, by observing -:hat precisely because the syllogism is a connection of concepts, and -concepts only exist in verbal forms, that is to say, in propositions -or judgments, the syllogism is also a connection of judgments. This -serves to reinforce the truth that if the effective presence of the -verbal form must always be recognized in the logical fact, it must, on -the other hand, be forgotten when Logic is being constructed and the -nature of Logic and of the concept is being sought. Now, the connection -of the concepts represents nothing new in relation to the thinking of -the concept. As has already been seen, to think the concept signifies -to think it in its distinctions, to place it in relation with the other -concepts and to unify it with them in the unique concept. A concept -thought outside its relations is indistinct, that is to say, not -thought at all. - -Therefore, the connection of the concepts, or syllogizing, cannot be -conceived as a new and more complex logical act. To syllogize and -to think are synonymous; although, in the ordinary use of language, -the term "to syllogize" throws into special relief the verbal aspect -of thinking, and, more exactly, the _dynamic_ character of verbal -exposition, which is indeed the very character of this exposition, -for it is with difficulty, or only empirically, that it can be -distinguished into static and dynamic, definition and demonstration. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of judgment and of syllogism._] - -But if the syllogism be thus identified with the concept itself, it may -nevertheless seem that it must be distinguished from the judgment of -definition seeing that the syllogism is a form of logical thought, and -consequently of verbal expression, quite distinct from and incapable -of being confounded with any other: a connection of _three_ judgments, -two of which are called _premisses_ and the third _conclusion,_ closely -cemented by the syllogistic force, which is placed in the _middle_ -term. This character of triplicity seems ineradicable and peculiar to -the syllogism in contrast with the judgment. - -Some question, however, must be raised concerning this characteristic -because of another characteristic universally recognized in the -syllogism; namely, that the premisses are conclusions of other -syllogisms, just as the conclusion becomes, in its turn, a premiss. -This being so, it might be said with greater truth that the syllogism -is to syllogize or to think; and since this is infinite, so the -propositions of which it consists are also infinite. On the other hand, -there is no judgment which is not a syllogism, since it is clear that -he who affirms a judgment affirms it by some reasoning or syllogism, -present and active in his spirit, though more or less understood in -the words. And are not other propositions understood in the syllogisms -which are properly so-called, not only in the forms, which are called -abbreviated (immediate inferences, enthymemes, etc.), but also in all -the other forms; since it is admitted that every syllogism, as has -just been observed, presupposes other preceding syllogisms, indeed an -infinity of others? It will be replied that at the end of the chain -there must yet be found the difference between judgment and syllogism, -or two first judgments, which are not produced by syllogism, and form -the columns, upon which the structure of the first conclusion rests. -But such an answer (if it do not imply simply the strange fancy that -thought has a beginning and therefore also an end in time) will mean -that judgment and syllogism are distinct in intrinsic character, which -makes the one the necessary condition of the other. Now, this intrinsic -distinctive character is precisely what cannot be found, because it -does not exist; and if it be not in every link, it is vain to seek it -at the beginning of the chain. - -[Sidenote: _The middle term and the nature of the concept._] - -Certainly, that _venatio medii,_ that _ergo,_ that unification -of triplicity, are things of much importance. But whence comes -their importance if not from being the expression of the synthetic -force of thought, of thought which unifies and distinguishes, and -distinguishes because it unifies and unifies because it distinguishes? -And is triplicity truly triplicity, one, two, three, arithmetically -enumerable? But if this be so, how is it that we never succeed in -counting those three, resolving each one of them into a series of -similar terms, or of other propositions and concepts? Upon attentive -consideration we perceive that here, too, the number three is -symbolical, and that it does no more than designate the distinction, -which unifies or thinks the _singular_ concept in the _universal_ -through the _particular,_ or determines the _universal_ through the -_particular,_ by making it a _singular_ concept, whence it remains -perfectly certain that the relation of these three determinations is -not numerical. Such a logical operation, not being anything special, -but simply logical reasoning itself, is of necessity found also in the -judgment. - -[Sidenote: _Pretended non-definitive logical judgments._] - -A possible objection at this point is that even if the unity of -judgment and syllogism can be held to be demonstrated as regards -definitions and syllogisms which are the basis of definitions, yet -it has not been demonstrated for the other forms of syllogisms and -logical judgments, which are not definitive. But if these judgments -and syllogisms be logical, they cannot fail to be definitive, or to -have for their content affirmations of concepts. "All men are mortal" -is a definition of the concept of man, whose mortality is verbally -emphasized or his immortality denied. It is without doubt an incomplete -definition, because it is torn from the web of thoughts and of speech -of which it formed part; and this web will also always be incomplete -or capable of infinite completion by means of new affirmations and -new negations. But in its incompleteness it is at the same time also -complete, because it affirms a concept of reality, of life and death, -of finite and infinite, of spirituality and of its forms, and so on; -these are all presupposed determinations, and therefore existing and -operating in the concepts of _man_ and _mortality._ "Caius is a man" -(which is the second premiss of the syllogism traditionally adduced as -an example) is certainly not a definition (though it presupposes and -contains many definitions) precisely for the reason that it is not a -pure logical judgment. Hence it happens that the conclusion itself: -"therefore Caius is mortal," is more than a pure logical conclusion, -since it also contains a historical element, the person of Caius. But -we shall speak further on of these individual or historical judgments; -and then we shall also see in what relation they stand to the universal -or pure logical judgments, and if it be truly possible to distinguish -between them, otherwise than for the sake of convenience. The -distinction is in any case convenient and does no harm at this point; -and therefore for didactic reasons we allow it to stand; indeed we make -use of it. - -[Sidenote: _The syllogism as fixed verbal form. Its use and abuse._] - -Just as in the case of definitions, so also in the case of the -syllogism, it is to be noted that the verbal expression does not -consist of an obligatory formula, but assumes the most varied forms, -apparently very remote from syllogizing as commonly understood. The -abuse of the syllogism as a formula continued for centuries, notably -in mediæval Scholasticism, and notwithstanding the rebellion of the -Renaissance, it has persisted among many philosophical schools, -its last conspicuous manifestation being the didactic elaboration -of the Leibnitzian philosophy, or Wolffianism. Certain of Wolff's -demonstrations have remained famous, such as that concerning the -construction of windows, contained in his _Manual of Architecture._ "A -window must be large enough for two persons to lean against it, side by -side," he developed it in this way: "_Demonstration._ It is customary -to lean against a window with another person in order to look out. But -the architect must serve the interests of his employer in everything. -Therefore he must make the window large enough for two persons to be -able to be there side by side.[1] _Q.E.D._" - -No more such syllogistic pedantries have been seen in our times, but -(as has been already remarked in reference to pedantry of definition) -contempt for the formula has too often resulted in contempt even for -the correctness of the reasoning. So that it has sometimes been -necessary to advise a bracing bath of scholasticism, and it has been -observed and lamented of certain new civilizations (for example, of -Russian culture, or of the Japanese people, who are so little addicted -to mathematics), that they have not had a scholastic period, like that -of the West, so general with them is the habit of incorrect, loose, and -passionately impulsive and fantastic reasoning. Certainly the formula, -the exercise of disputation in _forma,_ the _logica scholastica -utens_ has its merits; and we must know how to have recourse to it -when it is advantageous to do so, and to express thought in the brief -and perspicuous formulæ of the syllogism, of the sorites, or of the -dilemma. From this point of view the new methods of mathematical Logic -or Logistic, upon which some are now working, and even the logical -machines which have been constructed, would help; they would help--if -they helped. For the point is just this: when formulæ, methods of -demonstration, machines and the like, are recommended, expedients -and instruments of practical or economic use are thereby proposed; -and these cannot make good their existence otherwise than by getting -themselves accepted for the utility--the saving of time and space, and -so of fatigue, which they effect. Like all technical inventions, those -products must be brought to the market; and the market alone decides -upon their value and assigns to them their price. At the present time, -it seems that logistic methods have no value and price, save for -certain narrow circles of people, who amuse themselves with them in -their own way and so pass the time. - -[Sidenote: _Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in the -pure concepts._] - -Certain erroneous doctrines take their origin from the undue separation -of demonstration and definition, conspicuously that particular error -which places a difference of degree between _truth_ and _reason_ of -truth, and consequently admits that a truth can be known without its -reason being known. But a truth, of which the reason is not known, is -not even truth; or it is truth only in preparation and in hypothesis. -We hear much about the _intuition_ with which men of genius are -equipped, and which enables them to go straight to the truth, even when -they are not capable of demonstrating it. But this intuition, when it -is not that truth in preparation, or that orientation towards a truth -still quite hypothetical, must of necessity be thought and thus also -be demonstration of truth; it must be truth and also reason of truth; -thought and reasoning performed no doubt with lightning rapidity, -which is expressed in brief propositions and needs going over again -and rethinking, in order that it may afford a more ample and, from the -didactic point of view, a more persuasive, exposition; but it is always -thought and reasoning. - -Things are still worse, when not only is a diversity of degree -admitted, but the complete _indifference_ of demonstration to truth is -proclaimed, so that many or infinite possible demonstrations of one -identical truth would be possible. If by this it were meant merely that -one identical truth, or one identical concept, can assume infinite -verbal or expressive forms, and if demonstration were understood as -"exposition" or "expression," there would be nothing to object. But -if by demonstration be meant something truly logical, that which is -properly called by that name in Logic, this thesis leads directly to -the negation of truth, making the demonstration of truth, or truth -itself, an illusion, a sophistical appearance created simply to -persuade. Those acquainted with courts of law know that very often when -a magistrate has made his decision and pronounced sentence he deputes -to a younger colleague the task of "reasoning" it, or of providing an -appearance of reasoning to what is indeed not a logical product, but -simply the _voluntas_ of a certain provision. But though this procedure -be intelligible and useful when it occurs in the field of practice and -of law, it cannot be admitted in the theoretical field, where it would -be the ruin of thought and indirectly of the will itself. - -[Sidenote: _Difference between truth and reason of truth in the -pseudoconcepts._] - -Naturally, all that has been said as to the definition and the -syllogism has reference to the true and proper concept, or the pure -concept. In the case of pseudoconcepts, where practical motives enter, -definition is a simple _command_ (a nominalist definition), and -demonstration has no place, save for those of its elements that are -derived from the pure concept: _given_ the definitions, the reasoning -must logically proceed in a determinate manner. In pseudoconcepts, -then, definitions are separate from demonstrations: the first do not -spring from the second and are not all one with them; the second -presuppose the first and do not produce them. Of these definitions -infinite demonstrations are possible, precisely because in reality -none is possible, for the definitions themselves are infinite; and -when a demonstration is given, this is done only _pro forma_; it is -a deception, to conceal a practical convenience, or rather a logical -reasoning employed to make it clear. It is for this reason also that -the definitions employed in those demonstrations seem to be obtained -by means of an act of _faith_ in the irrational; and here faith -signifies, not the confidence of thought in itself, but the making a -virtue of necessity, accepting as true what is not known as such.--For -the rest, pseudoconcepts and concepts have the same relation with the -verbal form; that is to say, all are expressed in the most various -ways, and there is no obligatory form of language, which can be called -the literary form of logical character. The style of the _Civil Code,_ -which aroused the admiration of Stendhal, is not the eternal style -of laws, for laws were once even put into verse; as in like barbaric -times the sciences used to be put into verse. In the life of the word, -concepts and pseudoconcepts rush forward in such a way that it is vain -to seek there for distinction among them. - - -[Footnote 1: Mentioned in Hegel, _Wiss. d. Logik 2,_ iii. 370 _n._] - - - - -III - - -CRITIQUE OF FORMALIST LOGIC - - -[Sidenote: _Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic._] - -From the fact that in the verbal form all distinctions (pure -concepts, and empirical and abstract concepts, distinct concepts and -opposite concepts) are indistinguishable, and on the other hand all -identities, such as that of concept, definition and demonstration, -appear differentiated or capable of differentiation, we can deduce the -impossibility of constructing logical Science by means of an analysis -of the verbal form. The condemnation of all _formal_ Logic is thus -pronounced. - -[Sidenote: _Its nature._] - -This Logic has been variously called _Aristotelian, peripatetic, -scholastic,_ after its authors and historical representatives; -_syllogistic,_ from the doctrine that forms its principal content; -_formal,_ from its pretensions to philosophic purity; _empirical,_ by -those who tried to drive it back to its place; and although this last -name is correct, it would be better to call it _formal,_ and still -better, _verbal,_ to indicate of what the empiricism to which it is -desired to allude, chiefly consists. Indeed, if empiricism be marked -by its limiting itself to single representations, regrouping them in -types and arranging them in classes, there is no doubt that that method -of treatment is empirical, which takes the logical function, not in -the eternal peculiarity of its character as thought of the universal, -but only in its various particular translations or manifestations, in -which it acquires contingent characteristics. Since these contingent -characteristics come to it, in the first place, from the verbal form, -it can well be called verbalism. Owing to its verbalism, too, it has -happened, that over and above the grammars of individual languages, -there has been conceived as existing a _general, rational_ and -_logical_ Grammar; and this hybrid science, which is no longer grammar -and arose from logical assumptions, has developed in such a way as to -be indistinguishable from empirical or verbal Logic. - -[Sidenote: _Its partial justification._] - -Certainly, as mere empiricism, this so-called Logic could not be -condemned. And Hegel was not wrong in remarking that if people are -interested in establishing that there are sixty species of parrots -and one hundred and thirty-seven of veronica, it is not clear why -it should be of less interest to establish the various forms of the -judgment and of the syllogism. That discipline has its utility as mere -empiricism, and it may be useful to any one to employ in certain cases -the terminology in which an affirmation is characterized as positive -or as merely negative, as particular or as universal, as a judgment -that awaits reasoning and demonstration, as an immediate inference, -enthymeme or sorites, as a conclusive or an inconclusive, or as a -correct or an incorrect syllogism, and so on. It is also comprehensible -how, as mere empiricism, it assumed a _normative_ character, and was -translated into _rules_; rules, which are valid within their own -sphere, neither more nor less than are all empirical rules. - -[Sidenote: _Its error._] - -But it does not limit itself to acting simply as an empirical -description, nor even as a simple technique; it usurps a much more -lofty office. Just as Rhetoric and Grammar, innocent and useful so -long as they limit themselves to the functions of convenient grouping -and convenient terminology, become false and harmful when they assume -the attitude of sciences of absolute values, and must then be resolved -into, and replaced by Æsthetic; so empirical or verbal Logic becomes -transformed into error when it claims to give the laws of thought, or -the thought of thought, which cannot be other than the concept of the -concept. It is not, then, _formal,_ as it boasts itself to be, because -the only logical form is the universal, and this alone is the object of -logical investigation; but it is falsely formal, since it relies upon -contingencies, and must, therefore, be called _formalist._ We reject it -here exclusively in its formalist aspect; that is to say, in so far as -it is a complex of empirical distinctions that wish to pass as rational -and usurp the place of true rationality. - -[Sidenote: _Its traditional constitution._] - -Several of such empirical distinctions, such as the distinction between -thought and principle of thought, truth and reason of truth, judgments -and syllogisms, and such-like, have been recorded and criticized; we -shall proceed to mention others, when suitable opportunities occur. -Here it will be well to refer to the general physiognomy and structure -of that Logic, as it was embodied for centuries in the schools and -still persists in treatises. - -[Sidenote: _The three logical forms._] - -Its point of departure is the external distinction between words and -connections of words, which belongs properly to Grammar. But words -are then treated by it as concepts, and connections of words, as -judgments. Thus it obtains the identification of the concept with the -abstract and mutilated grammatical word and arrives at the monstrous -determination of the concepts as things which are not in themselves -either true or false. Thus, again, by constantly calling upon the -connections of the concepts for succour, it succeeds in distinguishing -the judgment from the mere proposition. A double criterion is -constantly adopted in establishing these and other fundamental forms: -the verbal and the logical; and formalist Logic oscillates equivocally -between the two different determinations; whence the alternating -appearance of truth and of falsehood, with which its distinctions -present themselves. The syllogism, which should be the third -fundamental form, is conceived as the connection of three distinct -judgments; but if it yet retains its importance and preponderance -over two-membered forms or over serial forms of more than three -propositions and judgments, this is really because to the distinction -and enumeration of the three propositions there is added the criterion -of the concept as a nexus, or as a triunity of universal, particular -and singular. - -[Sidenote: _The theories of the concept and of the judgment._] - -The three fundamental forms have been reduced by some logicians to -two, by others; amplified to four or to five, by adding to them -the perceptive form or the definitive and systematic form. These -restrictions and amplifications have always encountered resistance, -because it was justly felt that in this way one form of empiricism was -being mingled with another: the verbal form with empirical distinctions -drawn from other presuppositions. But in determining in particular the -three fundamental forms, formalist Logic has not been able to restrict -itself to the mere distinction of words and propositions, artificially -placed in relation with the pure concept; but has been obliged to draw -from other sources. The concepts are variously classified, sometimes -from the verbal point of view, as _identical, equivalent, equivocal, -anonymous_ and _synonymous_; sometimes from the logical point of view, -as _distinct, disparate, contrary_ or _contradictory_; sometimes -from the psychological point of view, as _incomplete_ and _complete, -obscure_ and _clear,_ the concepts further always being understood -as names, so that, for example, distinct concepts are indifferently -philosophically distinct concepts, and empirically distinct concepts; -and the contraries are both the philosophical contraries and those -empirically so-called. The same has occurred in the classification -of judgments where sometimes the determinations of the concept are -taken as foundation and the judgments distinguished as _universal -particular_ and _individual;_ sometimes the intrinsic dialectic nature -of the concept, and they are distinguished as _affirmative, negative_ -and _indeterminate_ or _infinite_; sometimes the stages passed through -in the search for truth, and they are distinguished into _categorical, -hypothetical_ and _disjunctive,_ or _apodeictic, assertory_ and -_problematic._ And these forms have further always been understood -verbally. "Universality" is the "totality" empirically designated -by the word, and not true universality; and "individuality," on the -contrary, is not only the individuality of the representation, but -also the single particularity of the distinct concept; "affirmative" -is differentiated from "negative" by accidental grammatical form, and -not because that unique act which is thought, at once affirmation and -negation (as the will is both love and hatred) can be truly divided. - -[Sidenote: _The theory of the syllogism._] - -The classification of syllogisms, founded exactly upon the empirical -conception of the judgment as the copulation of a _subject_ and a -_predicate_ affords a suitable parallel to this method of treatment of -the judgment; subject and predicate being understood in an empirical -and grammatical manner, whence they are also discovered in those -verbal affirmations, in which they are not distinct, because they are -identical, as in the case of the judgment of definition. For empirical -Logic, in the judgment: "The will is the practical form of the spirit," -"will" is subject and "practical form" predicate in the same way as in -"Peter is a man," "Peter" is subject, and "man" predicate. From the -distinction between subject and predicate, arise the four _figures_ -of the syllogism; the criterion being the position of the middle term -in the two premisses of the three propositions of which the syllogism -is formed. If the middle term be subject in the first premiss and -predicate in the second, we have the first figure; if it be predicate -in both, the second; if it be subject in both, the third; if it be -predicate in the first and subject in the second, the fourth figure -("_sub-prae,_ turn _prae-prae,_ turn _sub-sub,_ turn _prae-sub")._ -But in order to deduce the moods of each figure recourse is then had -to another criterion, indeed to two other criteria; that is, to the -empirical distinctions of judgments into universal and particular, and -into affirmative and negative, with the four consequent determinations -into universal-affirmative judgments (A), universal-negative (E), -particular-affirmative (I), and particular-negative (O). Thus, in the -first figure, two universal affirmative premisses constitute the first -mood, and the conclusion is universal affirmative _(Barbara)_; two -premisses, both universal, but one affirmative and the other negative, -constitute the second, and the conclusion is universal negative -_(celarent)_; two premisses, one universal affirmative and the other -particular affirmative, constitute the third mood, and the conclusion -is particular affirmative _(darii);_ two premisses, one universal -negative and one particular affirmative, constitute the fourth mood, -and the conclusion is particular negative _(ferio)._ And so on. - -[Sidenote: _Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal Logic._] - -This is not the occasion to go on expounding in its other particulars -this construction, of which we have given an example, for it is -very well known: nor to attach importance to criticizing it, since' -its foundations themselves have already been shown to be false and -its hybrid genesis explained. Verbal Logic, which vaunts itself as -rational, carries its own caricature in itself, namely the creation of -_Sophisms_; because, since it seeks the force of thought in words, it -cannot prevent sophistical ability from making use, in its turn, of -words, in order capriciously to create thoughts and forms of thought. -Thus verbal Logic, in order to combat sophisms, is constrained hastily -and eagerly to abandon simple verbal connections, and to take refuge in -concepts and connections of concepts thought in words; that is to say, -neither more nor less than to negate the formalist point of view. And -with analogous self-irony it renounces that point of view and dissolves -itself, when it tries to refute the fourth figure of the syllogism, or -to reduce the second, third and fourth to the first, as the only real -figure, and then the first to a connection of three concepts; not to -mention the permanent self-irony and patent demonstration of falsity -involved in the logical deduction of the figures of the syllogism which -it makes from a series of moods, recognized as _not conclusive._ - -[Sidenote: _Mathematical Logic or Logistic._] - -Formalist Logic has been the object of many violent attacks from the -Renaissance onwards; but it cannot be said that it has been struck in -its essential part, because up to the present, the principle itself, or -the incoherence from which it springs, has not been attacked. Several -attempts at reform have followed and still follow; they have all of -them the same defect, which is the wish to reform formal Logic without -issuing from its circle, and without refuting its tacit presumption-- -the pretension of obtaining thought in words, concepts in -propositions. The most considerable attempt of the kind that has been -made, which has many zealous followers in our day, is _mathematical -Logic,_ also called _calculatory, algebraical, algorhythmic, symbolic, -a new analytic,_ or a _Logical calculus or Logistic._ - -[Sidenote: _Its non-mathematical character._] - -It is admitted by those who profess it and is for the rest evident -from the definitions of Logistic that have been given, that it has -nothing in common with mathematics, for although the majority of its -cultivators are mathematicians and use is made of the phraseology usual -in Mathematics, and it is directed toward Mathematics, in certain of -its practical intentions, there is nothing intrinsically mathematical -in it. Logistic is a science which deals, not with quantity alone, but -with _quantity and quality together_; it is a science of _things in -general_; it is _universal mathematics,_ containing also, subordinated -to itself, the mathematical sciences properly so-called, but not -coinciding with these. It means to be, not mathematics, but _a general -science of thought._ - -[Sidenote: _Example of its mode of treatment._] - -But the "thought" of Logistic is nothing but the "verbal proposition," -which, in fact, supplies its starting-point. What the proposition is; -whether it be possible truly to distinguish the proposition we call -"verbal" from all the others, poetical, musical, pictorial; whether -the verbal proposition does not bear indistinctly in itself, a series -of very diverse spiritual formations, from poetry to mathematics, from -history and philosophy to the natural sciences; what language is and -what the concept is--these and all other questions concerning the forms -of the spirit and the nature of thought, remain altogether extraneous -to Logistic and do not disturb it in its work. The propositions (the -concept of the proposition remaining an unexplained presupposition) -can be indicated by _p, q,_ etc.; the relation of implication of one -proposition in another can be indicated by the sign _⊃,_ hence an -isolated proposition is "that which implies itself" _(p.⊃.q.)._ By -following a method such as this, many distinctions of the traditional -formalist Logic are eliminated, and in compensation for this, new ones -are added and old and new are dressed in a new phraseology. The logical -_sum a + b_ is the smallest concept, which contains the other two _a_ -and _b_ and is what was previously called the "sphere of the concept"; -the logical _product a x b_ indicates the greater concept contained -in _a_ and in _b,_ and answers to that which was previously called -"comprehension." There are also new or renovated laws, like the law -of _identity,_ by force of which, in Logic (differently from Algebra), -_a + a + a ... = a;_ by which it is desired to signify this profound -truth, that the repetition of one and the same concept as many times as -one wishes, always gives the same concept;--the law of _commutation,_ -by which _ab = ba_;--or that of absorption, by which _a(a + b) = a;_ -or--(the convention being that the negation of a concept is indicated -by placing against it a vertical line) the other beautiful laws and -formulæ: _a + a | = a| (a | )a = a; aa | = o._ This is a charming -amusement for those who have a taste for it. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of nature of Logistic with formalist Logic._] - -Thus it is seen that if the words and the formulæ be somewhat -different, the nature of mathematical Logic in no respect differs from -that of formalist Logic. Where the new Logic contradicts the old, it is -not possible to say which of the two is right; as of two people walking -side by side over insecure ground, it is impossible to say which of -the two walks securely. The very doctrine of the _quantification -of the predicate_ (which has been the leaven of the reform) in no -wise alters the traditional manner of conceiving the judgment, with -the corresponding arbitrary manner of distinguishing subject and -predicate. It simply establishes a convention with the object of being -able to symbolize, with the sign of equality, the subject and the -predicate:--the subject being included in the predicate, is part of it: -"men are mortal" equals: "men are some mortals"; and so, "men" being -indicated with _a_ and "some mortals" with _b,_ the judgment can be -symbolized: _a = b._ For us, it is indifferent whether the modes of -the syllogism be the 64 and the 19 recognized as valid by traditional -Logic, or the 12 affirmative and the 24 negative of Hamilton's Logic, -which distinguishes four classes of affirmative and four of negative -propositions. It is indifferent whether the methods of conversion -be three or two or one. It is indifferent whether logical laws or -principles be enumerated as two, three, five or ten. Since we do not -accept the point of departure, it is impossible for us, far from -admitting the development, even to discuss it; save to demonstrate -that from capricious choice comes capricious choice, as we have made -sufficiently clear in our treatment of formalist Logic. Mathematical -Logic is a new manifestation of this formalist Logic, involving a great -change in traditional formulæ, but none in the intimate substance of -that pretended science of thought. - -[Sidenote: _Practical aspect of Logistic._] - -As the _science of thought,_ Logistic is a laughable thing; worthy, for -that matter, of the brains that conceive and advocate it, which are the -same that are promulgating a new Philosophy of language, indeed a new -Æsthetic, with their insipid theories of the _universal Language._ As a -formula of _practical utility_ it is not incumbent upon us to examine -it here; all the more since we have already had occasion to give our -opinion upon this subject. In the time of Leibnitz, fifty years later -in the last days of Wolffianism; a century ago in Hamilton's time; -forty years ago in the time of Jevons and of others; and finally now, -when Peano, Boole, and Couturat are flourishing, these new arrangements -are offered on the market. But every one has always found them too -costly and complicated, so that they have not hitherto been generally -used. Will they be so in the future? The practical work of persuasion, -proper to the commercial traveller seeking purchasers of a new product, -and the foresight of the merchant or manufacturer as to the fortune -that may await that product, are not pertinent to Philosophy; which, -being disinterested, could here, at the most, reply with words of -benevolent patience: "If they be roses, they will bloom." - - - - -IV - - -THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION - - -[Sidenote: _Reaction of the concept upon the representation._] - -Problems of a widely different nature from these formalist playthings -await exploration in the depths of the Science of Logic. And resuming -what we have called the descent of the universal into the individual, -it is of importance, after having established the relation between -concept and form of expression, to examine in what way the concept -reacts upon the representation, from which it appears to be at a stroke -and altogether separated. - -In more precise terms: Beyond doubt the concept is thought only in -so far as it becomes concrete in an expressive form and itself also -becomes, from this point of view, representative. Thus, a logical -affirmation, or one that presents itself as logical, can be viewed -under a twofold aspect, as logical and as æsthetic. It can be regarded -as well thought-out, and so also very well expressed, perfectly -æsthetic because perfectly logical; or as very well expressed but ill -thought, or not truly thought, and so not logical, and yet sentimental, -passionate and imaginative. But this expression-representation, -in which the concept lives (and which is, for example, the tone, -the accent, the personal form, the style, which I am employing in -this book to expound Logic), is a _new_ representation, conditioned -by the concept. We now ask, not indeed the character of this -representation (which is sufficiently clear), but of what kind are -those representations, about and upon which, the thought of the concept -has been kindled. Do they remain apart, excluded from the light of -the concept, obscure as before, that is, logically obscure? Does the -concept illuminate only itself in a sort of egoistic satisfaction, -without irradiating with its light the representations upon which it -has arisen? - -[Sidenote: _Logicization of the representations._] - -That would be inconceivable and contrary to the unity of the spirit; -and indeed, such separation and indifference do not exist. The -appearance of the concept transfigures the representations upon which -it arises, making them _other_ than they formerly were; from being -indiscriminate it makes them discriminate; from fantastic, logical; -from clear but indistinct (as used to be said), clear and distinct. -I am, for example, in such a condition of soul as prompts me to sing -or to versify, and thus to make myself objective and known to myself; -but I am objective and known only to fancy, so much so, that at the -moment of poetical or musical expression I should not be able to say -what was really happening in me: whether I wake or dream, whether I -see clearly, or catch glimpses, or see wrongly. When from the variety -of the multitude of representations, which have preceded and which -follow it, I pass on to enquire as to the truth of them all (that is -to say, the reality, which does not pass), and rise to the concept, -those representations themselves must be revised in the light of the -concept that has been attained, but no longer with the same eyes as -formerly,--they must not be _looked at,_ but henceforth, _thought._ -My state of soul then becomes determinate; and I shall say, for -example: "What I have experienced (and sung and made poetry of), was -an absurd desire; it was a clash of different tendencies that needed -to be overcome and arranged; it was a remorse, a pious desire," and -so on. Thus by means of the concept is formed a _judgment_ of that -representation. - -[Sidenote: _The individual judgment and its difference from the -definitive judgment._] - -We have already studied the judgment, which is proper to the concept, -and called it definitive judgment or judgment of definition. We have -shown how in it there is no distinction of subject and predicate, -so much so that it may be said, with regard to it, that there is -neither subject nor predicate, but the complete identity of the two: -a predicate or universal, which is subject to itself. However, the -judgment which is now being discussed is not a simple definition and -does not coincide with the first. It certainly has as its base a -concept and therefore a definition; but it contains something more, -a representative or individual element, which is transformed into -logical fact, but does not lose individuality on that account; indeed -it reaffirms its individuality with more precise distinction. This -judgment is connected with the first, but it represents a further stage -of thought. If the first form be a conceptual or _definitive_ judgment, -the second may be called an _individual_ judgment. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction of subject and predicate in the individual -judgment_] - -Owing to this new element, which the individual judgment contains, -and the judgment of definition does not contain, we eventually find -fully justified in the former that distinction between subject and -predicate which verbal Logic in vain claims to discover in all -judgments, including those of universal character (and even in simple -propositions); so that it ends by attributing to that distinction, of -which later we shall perceive the capital philosophical importance, a -purely grammatical or verbal significance. Subject and predicate can -be distinguished only in so far as the one is not and the other is -universal, in so far as the one is not and the other is concept, that -is to say, only in so far as the one is representation and the other -concept. A particular or singular concept (for example, the will) is -always also a universal concept; and therefore not adapted to function -as a subject to which a predicate is applied; because that predicate, -that universal, is already explicitly in the pretended subject itself -which is net thinkable, save by means of that predicate. Only the -_representation_ can be truly _subject;_ and only the _concept_ can -be _predicate._ This takes place plainly in the individual judgment, -where the two elements are connected. "Peter is good," an individual -judgment, implies the subject "Peter" and the predicate "good," the one -not to be confounded with the other; whereas, in the definition "the -will is the practical form of the spirit," "practical form" and "will" -are identical. - -[Sidenote: _Reasons for the variety of definitions of the judgment and -of certain of its divisions._] - -When the attempt was made to define the judgment as differing both -from the concept and from the definition, what was aimed at was -the individual judgment. But, if this be so, then the definitions -which conceive the judgment either as relation of representations -or as relation of concepts (the subsumption of one concept under -another, etc.), must be termed false, since it is henceforth clear -that, as individual judgment, it must be conceived as a _relation -of representation and concept._ On the other hand, some celebrated -divisions of the judgment find their origin in the distinction made -by us (which, we again repeat, is given at this point provisionally -with the intention of seeking the definite formula further on), -between the judgment of the concept and the judgment of the -representation, between definition and individual judgment. In this -way the _analytic_ judgment, defined as that in which the concept of -predicate was obtained from the subject, reveals itself as nothing -but the definition, the identity of subject and predicate; the -_synthetic_ judgment, which adds to the subject something which was -not there previously, is the individual judgment, logical thinking -of the intuition, at first only intuited and not thought. We shall -examine further on the true meaning and the definite formula of this -distinction also. - -[Sidenote: _The individual judgment and intellectual intuition._] - -To ignore the form of the individual judgment, and to recognize only -that of the concept and of the definition, is an impossible position, -though occasionally there appears a tendency in that direction. -We perceive it, for instance, in those who seek for definitions -of everything, and limit themselves to syllogizing, when there is -certainly a case for thinking, but also one for looking, or for -thinking while we look, and for looking while we think. This may be -said truly to represent knowledge, that complete knowledge in which -all anterior forms unite, and which is the result of all of them. To -know is to know reality; and knowledge of reality is translated into -representations, penetrated with thought. That famous _intellectual -intuition,_ which has sometimes been described as the faculty to which -man aspires, but does not possess, and sometimes as a prodigious -faculty, superior to knowledge itself, should be declared, with the -full rigour of letter and concept, to be nothing but the individual -judgment; which is, in truth, intellectual intuition or intuited -intellection. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of the individual judgment with perception or -perceptive judgment._] - -But the individual judgment can take another name, much better known -and more familiar: _perception_; and perception, in its turn, should -be called, synonymously, individual judgment, or at least _perceptive -judgment._ Perception does not consist of opening the eyes, of offering -the ear, and of unlocking any of the other senses, which are wont to be -enumerated, nor, in general, of abandoning oneself to sensation. The -world does not enter our spirit by these wide gates; but has itself -announced, in order to be received with due honours. That good folk -(and among the best of folk are to be counted many philosophers) think -otherwise is in truth to be explained by their wonted neglect or lack -of analysis and reflection. - -And further, perception is not intuition, _i.e.,_ an impression -theoretically fashioned, or that stage or moment of the spirit which -is represented in an eminent degree by the poet, who intuites and does -not know what he intuites, indeed does not know that he does not know -(because the pertinent question has not arisen, and cannot arise, in -him, as poet). To perceive means to apprehend a given fact as having -this or that nature; and so means to think and to judge it. Not even -the lightest impression, the smallest fact, the most insignificant -object, is perceived by us, save in so far as it is thought. - -Hence the supreme importance of the individual judgment, which is that -which embraces all knowledge produced by us at every moment, by means -of which we _possess the world,_ by means of which a _world exists._ - -[Sidenote: _and with the commemorative or historical judgment._] - -In perceptive judgments also, are comprised those judgments which -are called by some _commemorative_ or _historical,_ that is to say, -those by which it is recognized that a given fact has occurred in the -past. This recognition can never be founded upon anything other than -present intuitions, intuitions, that is to say, of our present life, -which contains the past in it, and persuades us of the veracity of a -given piece of evidence, as now apprehended by us. And conversely, all -perceptive judgments are, in some way, commemorative and historical, -because the present, in the very act by which we hold it before our -spirit, becomes a past, that is to say an object of memory and of -history. - -[Sidenote: _Erroneous distinction of individual judgments as of fact -and of value._] - -On the other hand, it would be erroneous to divide individual -judgments, as has often been attempted, into judgments of _fact_ and -judgments of _value,_ claiming that the judgment, "Peter is a man," is -of a different nature from: "Peter is good." Every judgment of fact, in -so far as it attributes a predicate to a subject, gives to it a value, -declaring it to participate in the universal or in a determination of -the universal. And conversely, every judgment of value, in so far as -it attributes a value, cannot attribute other than the universal or -a determination of the universal, since outside the universal there -is no value. Even judgments of negative form, such as: "Peter is -not good," or "is not-good," or: "Peter is bad," are attributes of -universality and of value; because, as we know, theoretically they do -not affirm anything other than that Peter has a spiritual determination -different from goodness (for example, that he is utilitarian, not yet -moral). Certainly, in judgments such as these which we have selected -as examples, there is mingled (this too has been noted; and at this -point it suffices to recall it) the expression of an _ought to be,_ -which, in this case, is revealed in the negative formula adopted; but -the expression of an ought to be or of a desire is not a judgment -either of fact or of value; indeed, it is not a judgment at all; it is -a mere proposition, a logos semanticos, not apophanticos, an optative -or desiderative formula, a _lyricism_ of the spirit directed to the -future.[1] - -[Sidenote: _The individual judgment as ultimate and perfect form of -knowledge._] - -There is no other cognitive fact to know, beyond perception or -individual judgment. In this, the ultimate and the most perfect -of cognitive facts, the circle of knowledge is completed. Obscure -sensibility, having become clear intuition, and then having made itself -thought of the universal, in the individual judgment is logically -thought, and is, henceforward, knowledge of fact or of event, that is, -of effectual reality. The individual judgment, or perception, is fully -adequate to reality. - -[Sidenote: _Error of treating it as the first fact of knowledge._] - -But precisely because perception is the completion of knowledge, it -must be placed not at the beginning, but at the end of cognitive life. -To place it at the beginning, as mere sensibility, and to derive from -it the concepts, either as the effect of psychological mechanism, -or by an arbitrary act of will, is the error of sensationalists and -empiricists. To conceive it as judgment, and nevertheless to place -it at the beginning, and to deduce from it the concepts by further -elaboration, is the error of rationalists and intellectualists. Against -these, it must be firmly maintained that the first moment of knowledge -is _intuitive_ and not perceptive; and that the concepts do _not -originate_ from the intellectual act of perception, but enter the act -itself as _constituents._ To begin with perception, understood as -perceptive judgment, is to begin at the end, that is to say, with the -most highly complex. Perception is thus the sole problem of gnoseology; -but only because it is the whole problem, which contains in itself -all the others. And it also is, if you like, the _first_ form of the -cognitive spirit, but not because it is the most simple, but precisely -because it is the _last_; and the last, being also the whole, can also -in an absolute sense be called first. - -[Sidenote: _Origin of this error._] - -Certainly, the misunderstanding of the sensationalists and the -opposing error of the rationalists contain an element of truth, since -both are really concepts, which are developed from perception and -presuppose it. But, on the other hand, they are not true and proper -concepts, but pseudoconcepts, as we have already defined them, and -these, being developed from perception, give rise, in their turn, -to pseudojudgments. We shall treat of this further on; and thereby -explain the genesis of the misunderstanding, that is to say, the -erroneous theory will be overcome as misunderstanding and determined as -truth. In this difference between individual judgments and individual -pseudojudgments, between perceptions and pseudoperceptions, will -also clearly be found another of the motives (and perhaps the most -profound), which have divided judgments into judgments of fact and -judgments of value. - -[Sidenote: _Individual syllogisms._] - -It is also easy to understand that, as there are individual judgments, -so there are also individual syllogisms; or rather, that since it -is not possible to distinguish between judgments and syllogisms in -philosophical Logic, for they constitute one indivisible whole, so it -is not possible to distinguish individual syllogisms from individual -judgments, or it is only possible to do so verbally. "Caius is dead," -is indeed the conclusion of a syllogism; since it is not possible to -affirm that he is mortal without some reason: for example, because he -is a man, an animal, or a finite being. Thus, the syllogism: "Men are -mortal, Caius is a man; therefore, Caius is mortal," is only verbally -different from "Caius is mortal." We do not say that the difference of -words is nothing; there is always a spiritual difference, even when, -instead of saying, "Caius is mortal," we say, "He, whom I call Caius, -is mortal," or when the same thought is expressed in Latin or German. -But being here occupied with Logic, we declare that there is none, -because, indeed, there is none, _in point of difference of logical -act,_ both forms being the realization of logical reasoning alone. - - -[Footnote 1: See above, Section I. Chap. VI.] - - - - -V - - -THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE PREDICATE OF EXISTENCE - - -[Sidenote: _The copula: its verbal and logical significance._] - -Subject and predicate are indistinguishable in the judgment of -definition, and distinguishable and distinct in the individual -judgment; but the act of distinction (which is also union) between -subject and predicate, representation and concept, is again, in the -individual judgment, the same as the act of distinction and union, by -means of which, in the judgment of definition, the concept is defined. -In both cases thought makes essential what it thinks. In this respect -there is no difference between the two forms of judgment, which we have -analysed and have hitherto kept distinct for reasons of analysis. One -identical act of thought distinguishes both from mere representation, -in which there is wanting the "is" (logical and not verbal)--that "is," -which belongs to the judgment of definition and to the individual -judgment, and which in the second of these more properly assumes the -name of _coptila,_ because it unites two distinct elements, the one -representative, the other logical. Here, too, of course, we must not -allow ourselves to be deceived by verbalism. The essentialization, the -copula, thought, cannot be made to consist of a word, which, abstracted -from the whole, becomes a simple sound, and as sound can assume any -other signification. In mere representation there can also be found the -"is," or what, verbally and grammatically, is called copula, but there -it has no value whatever as act of thought. - - _Nunc est bibendum, nunc pede libero_ - _Pulsanda tellus_ - -is a proposition which possesses the "is," but in this case it has -merely the value of a sign, not of an act of thought, for that phrase -of old Horace is nothing but the expression of a hortatory motion. -The word, too, can be suppressed, but we do not thereby suppress the -act of thought. The exclamation "beautiful!" uttered before a picture -may be an individual judgment, having as subject the representation -of the picture, and as predicate the æsthetic universal, which is -called beautiful, in which the copula (and here, also, the subject) is -verbally understood, but logically existent, and therefore always also -capable of verbal reintegration. On the other hand, this reintegration -cannot be effected when it is a case of a mere representation or an -expression of a state of the soul; because, in that case, there would -be, not a reintegration, but an integration, that is to say, it would -carry out that act of thought, and produce that individual judgment -which was not present before. - -[Sidenote: _Questions concerning propositions without subject. -Verbalism._] - -Thus, in asking a last question concerning the individual judgment, -that is to say, whether it be always _existential,_ we must, as always, -transfer the enquiry from verbal to logical analysis, and not waste -time with speculations as to words or fragments of propositions, -arbitrarily torn from their context, and therefore insignificant and -equivocal. The dispute has been most keen in relation to what are -called propositions without a subject, such as "It rains" and the -like. But, although we do not intend to negate the results, obtained -or obtainable from these disputes, we cannot accept the position which -they imply and which renders it possible to agitate and to discuss the -problem to infinity and therefore makes it insoluble. "It is raining" -said with a smile of satisfaction means: "Thank heaven, it is raining"; -with a feeling of disappointment: "Bother the rain for preventing my -taking a walk"; in reply to some one asking what is the noise audible -on the window-panes: "The audible sound is the sound of rain"; to -contradict some one who says the weather is fine: "You are stating a -falsehood and have not given yourself the trouble of observing; it is -raining"; or it is the correction of an historical error. And so on. -It is therefore waste of breath to dispute as to the logical nature of -that proposition if its precise signification be not determined; and -when it is truly determined (for the propositions we have substituted, -taken abstractly, can also appear to have many senses and give rise -to misunderstandings), we have quite abandoned the materiality of -verbalism and passed to the thinking of spiritual acts, taken in -themselves. - -[Sidenote: _Confusion between different forms of judgments with -relation to existentiality._] - -The question of existentiality in the act of judgment has been -strangely confused, owing both to this verbalism and to the failure -to keep distinct the judgment of definition and the individual -judgment, and even the concept and the pseudoconcept. The question -as to existence has been asked, as if it were the same in the case -of a judgment of definition, like: "The Idea is," and in the case of -an individual judgment like "Peter is." But in the first case, as we -already know, existence coincides with essence, and that judgment -only says that the Idea is thought, and therefore is; whereas the -second not only says that Peter is representable, and therefore is, -but that he exists; Peter might be representable and not exist; the -griffin is representable and does not exist. Pseudoconcepts have -also been incorrectly adduced as examples of judgment of definition -in such statements as: "The triangle is thinkable, but does not -possess existence," or: "The genus mammifer is thinkable, but does -not exist as single animals"; for in this case it should have been -said that "triangle" and "mammifer" are not thought at all, but are -constructed, and therefore have neither essence nor existence. For -us, then, the question of existentiality cannot arise, either for the -pure judgment of definition, which is a concept and has existence as -a concept, that is to say, essence; nor for the definitive judgment -of the pseudoconcepts, which is not even thought; but arises only for -the individual judgment, into which there enters as a constituent -a representative element, that is to say, something individual and -finite. Essence does not coincide with existence in the individual and -finite; indeed its definition is just this: the inadequacy of existence -to essence. Therefore the individual changes at every instant, and -although being at every instant the universal, yet it is adequate to it -only at infinity. - -[Sidenote: _Determination and subdivision of the question of existence -in individual judgments._] - -Having limited the question to the individual judgment, for which alone -it has meaning, we can opportunely divide it into three particular -questions: (i.) Does the individual judgment always imply that the -subject of the judgment is existent? (ii.) What is the character of -existentiality? (iii.) Does this character suffice to construct that -judgment? - -[Sidenote: _Necessity of the existential character in these judgments._] - -Beginning with the first, we believe that without doubt the answer -is affirmative and that adherence should be given to those who have -discovered and persistently defended the necessity of the existential -character, thus contributing in no small degree to the progress of -logical science. Whether what is represented exist or not, is doubtless -indifferent to the intuitive man, to the poet or artist, simply -because he does not leave the circle of representation. But it is not -indifferent to the logical man, since he forms an individual judgment. -He cannot _judge of what does not exist._ - -It has been incorrectly objected that the logical judgment always -remains the same, whether I have a hundred dollars in my pocket or -only in my imagination; that a mountain of gold is a subject of -judgment, although hitherto at least no one has found one in any part -of the earth; that Pamela is a virtuous woman (whatever Barretti may -have written to the contrary), although she has never lived elsewhere -than in the imagination of Richardson and of Goldoni. No predicate -whatsoever can be attributed to a hundred dollars, to a mountain of -gold, and to a Pamela which do not exist; and if it be said that -those hundred dollars are exactly divisible by two or by five; or -that that mountain of gold, imagined as of a certain base and height, -is measurable in terms of cubic metres, and has a value of so many -millions or milliards on the market; or that Pamela is worthy of esteem -and of reward; it must be noted that neither the hundred imagined -dollars, nor the imagined mountain, nor the imagined Pamela are -judged with these judgments, but that the judgments define simply the -arithmetical concepts of number, prime number and divisibility, or the -geometrical concepts of the cube, and the economic concepts of gold -as merchandise, or the moral concepts of virtue, esteem and reward. -No judgment whatever has been given as to those non-existent facts, -because where there is nothing the king (in this case, thought) loses -his rights. - -[Sidenote: _The absolute and the relative non-existent._] - -It will be replied that we talk at every moment about these -non-existent things, and consequently judge them. But here care must -be taken not to confuse absolute with relative non-existence, which -latter is non-existent only in name. The absolutely non-existent is -what is excluded from the judgment, implicitly in the affirmative -formula, explicitly in the negative formula. To him who speaks of the -mountain of gold, of the possession of a hundred dollars, and of Pamela -as existing realities, we reply by denying these existences, that is -to say, by denying them in an absolute manner; and of those negated -existences it is not possible to judge, or even to talk, precisely -because they are altogether negated. Here, in fact, we are speaking of -the individual judgment, which excludes its contradictory from itself, -as, for that matter, is also the case with the judgment of definition. -But in that absolute affirmation and negation there is also made, -explicitly or implicitly, a relative affirmation or negation; as when -we say, in the examples given: "The mountain of gold, the hundred -dollars, Pamela, do not exist," we say at the same time: "There do -exist phantasms, products of the fancy or of the imagination, of a -mountain of gold, of a hundred dollars, and of a virtuous Pamela." Now -the mountain, the dollars, and Pamela are, as such, not the absolutely -non-existent, but certain facts, _subjects_ of judgment, of which the -predicate is expressed by the word "non-existent," which in this case -is equivalent to "existing as phantasms." The absolutely non-existent -is the contradictory, true and proper nothingness; the relatively -non-existent (which is precisely that of the individual judgment) is -an existence, _different_ from that which the same individual judgment -affirms. - -Certainly relative non-existence, and the whole content of the -concept of existence in general, would require more minute analysis; -from which it would perhaps be seen that the so-called non-existent -resolves itself into certain categories of practical facts; and thus -designates sometimes _arbitrary constructions,_ made by combining -images for amusement or with some other intention; sometimes, on the -contrary, the _desires,_ which accompany every volitional act and are -the infinite _possibilities_ of the real. And it would also be seen -that non-existence in the second sense, or the desires, which have been -represented by art, are not in its circle in any way distinguished -from effective volitions and actions; since, in order to distinguish -them, it would be necessary that art should possess a philosophy of -the will, however summary, whereas art is without any philosophy. This -examination would lead us, however, not only outside the problem now -before us, but also outside Logic, to another part of Philosophy,[1] -which, although closely related to Logic (as Logic to it), must be -the object of special treatment if we do not wish to produce mental -confusion by offering everything at once. This was the defect, for -example, of G. B. Vico, who put all books into one book, the whole book -into a chapter, and frequently his whole philosophy and history into a -page or a period. The present writer, though proud to call himself a -Vichian, does not propose to imitate the didactic obtuseness of that -man of genius. - -Suffice it to have made clear, as concerns the problem which now -occupies us, that every individual judgment implies the existence of -what is spoken of, or of the fact given in the representation, even -when this fact consists of an act of imagination, that this act may be -recognized as such and as such existentialized. It assumes a concept of -reality, which divides into effective reality and possible reality, -into existence and non-existence, or mere representability. Some modern -investigators of what is called the _theory of values_ (students who -fluctuate between psychology and philosophy, and between an antiquated -philosophy and one that has the future before it) have maintained that -a judgment of value cannot be pronounced when we are not dealing with -an existing thing. Since for us a judgment of value is equivalent to -any individual judgment, we must accept their thesis; freeing it from -the embarrassment in which it finds itself in regard to _unreal images_ -(which yet give rise, as they themselves confess, to such judgments -of value as the æsthetic) by observing that in that case there is the -_effectuality,_ the _reality,_ or, in short, the _existence_ of images, -which have the _ineffectual_ or _non-existent_ as their content. - -[Sidenote: _The character of existence as predicate._] - -We have in this way opened a path for the solution of the second -question enunciated, which concerns the character to be assigned to -the existentializing act of the judgment. Does this consist of an act -of thought, that is to say, of the application of a predicate to a -subject; or is it an original act of an altogether peculiar nature, -which does not find its parallel in the other acts of thought? In -short, is existence a predicate, or is it not? The answer, already -implicitly contained in the foregoing explanations, affirms that -_existence_ in the individual judgment is a _predicate._ And we say "in -the individual judgment" because in the judgment of definition it is -not predicate, for the reason already expounded, that in that judgment -there is no distinction between subject and predicate, and that in it -existence coincides with essence. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of existentiality as position and faith._] - -The traditional reply is, on the other hand, that existence, in the -judgment of existence, is not a predicate, but a knowledge _sui -generis,_ sometimes called a knowledge of _position,_ sometimes an act -of belief, or _faith;_ two determinations, which are reducible to a -single one. Because, if being is conceived as external to the human -spirit, and knowledge as separable from its object, so much so that the -object could be without being known, it is evident that the existence -of the object becomes a position, or something placed before the -spirit, given to the spirit, extraneous to it, which the spirit would -never appropriate to itself unless it were courageously to swallow the -bitter mouthful with an irrational act of faith. But all the philosophy -which we are now developing demonstrates that there is nothing external -to the spirit, and therefore there are no positions opposed to it. -These very conceptions of something external, mechanical, natural, have -shown themselves to be conceptions, not of external positions, but of -positions of the spirit itself, which creates the so-called external, -because it suits it to do so, as it suits it to annul this creation, -when it is no longer of use. On the other hand, it has never been -possible to discover in the circle of the spirit that mysterious and -unqualifiable faculty called _faith,_ which is said to be an intuition -that intuites the universal, or a thinking of the universal, without -the logical process of thought. All that has been called faith has -revealed itself step by step as an act of knowledge or of will, as a -theoretic or as a practical form of the spirit. - -There is therefore no doubt that existence, if it be something that -is affirmed or denied, cannot be anything but a predicate; it can -only be asked what sort of predicate it is, that is to say, what is -the precise content or concept of existence, and this has already -been indicated or at least sketched in the preceding explications. -Objections have been made to the conceptual and predicative character -of existence, such as that which maintains that if it were a predicate -it would be necessary in the judgment "A is" to be able to think the -two terms--A and existence--separately, whereas in the thought of A, A -is already existentialized. But these objections show themselves to be -sophistical; because outside the judgment A is not thinkable, but only -representable, and therefore without existentiality, which predicate it -only acquires in the act of judgment. - -[Sidenote: _Absurd consequences of those doctrines._] - -For the rest, the difficulties that befall those who conceive -existentiality in the individual judgment as something _sui generis,_ -are illustrated by the theory to which they find themselves led, of a -double kind of judgment, the existential and the categorical, without -their being able to justify this duality. This is at bottom the most -apparent manifestation of their more or less unconscious _metaphysical -dualism,_ which assumes an object external to the spirit, and makes -the spirit apprehend it with an _act of faith_ and afterwards reason -about it with an act of _thought._ Why not always continue with an act -of faith? Or why not also extend the act of thought to the initial -judgment? We have either to continue upon the same path, or to change -it altogether--this is the dilemma which imposes itself here. - -[Sidenote: _The predicate of existence as not sufficing to constitute a -judgment._] - -But in rejecting the double form of the individual judgment, the one -existential, the other categorical, and in resolving both into the -single form, which is the categorical by making existence a predicate -among predicates, we must also explain for what reason (in reply to -the third of the questions into which we have divided the treatment -of existentiality) we now say that the predicate of existence does -not suffice to constitute the judgment. How can it fail to suffice? -If I say that "Peter is," or that "The Ægean is," have I not before -me a perfect judgment? and is it not simply a judgment of existence? -But here, too, we must repeat: _cave_; beware of the deceptions of -verbalism; think of things, not of words. The judgments adduced as an -example are so little judgments of existence that in them we speak of -the "Ægean" and of "Peter," and since we speak of them, it is clear -that we know that the Ægean, for example, is a sea, and what a sea -is, and so on; that Peter is a man, and a man made in this or that -way, an Italian and not a Bushman, thirty years old and not a month, -and so on. The merely representative element cannot be found in the -judgment by fixing it in a word, which, in so far as it forms part of -the judgment, is, like all the rest, penetrated with logical character; -and when we say that "Peter" is the subject and is representation, -and "existing" is the predicate, we speak in a general sort of way and -almost symbolically. If we are looking for the formula of the merely -existential judgment in relation to a representation, that is, of a -judgment which leaves the representation free from all other predicate -save that of existence, such a formula could only be _"Something -is."_ But upon mature consideration this formula would no longer be -an individual judgment, since every logical transfiguration of the -individual and every individual determination of the universal would -not have been excluded: it would correspond neither more nor less than -to a judgment of definition which asserts that "something" (something -in general, indeterminate) "is" or that "reality is." - -[Sidenote: _The predicate of judgment as the totality of the concept._] - -But our theory concerning the indispensability of other predicates in -constituting the judgment is not to be understood as an affirmation -of the necessity that any _other_ predicate of any sort should be -_added_ to the predicate of existence, nor even that _all the others -possible_ should be added to it. In the first case, we shall always -have an unjustifiable duality of predicates: that of existence and -that necessary for essentializing and completing the judgment; in -the second, duality would certainly be avoided, since to constitute -the judgment all the predicates would be necessary, without their -distinction into a double order, and all would be qualitative -predicates; but there would remain the idea of a successive addition -of predicates. Granted this idea, it is impossible ever to understand -what those acts would be, by which the first, or also the second, or -also the third predicate, and so on, should be attributed, without -yet attaining in such attributions the full totality of truth. They -are representations no longer; and not yet judgments: they are then -something insufficient and one-sided, whose existence could not be -admitted save arbitrarily (as in Psychology), and which, therefore, -would be inadmissible in Philosophy. It therefore only remains to -conclude that in the judgment, all possible predicates are _given in -one act_ alone; that is, that the subject is predicated as existence, -and for this very reason determined in a particular way; determined in -a particular way, and for this very reason, as existence. - -In other words, the concept which is predicated in the individual -judgment is not and cannot be a fœtus or a sketch of a concept; but is -the whole concept, in its indivisible unity, as universal, particular -and singular. And if existence seem to be a first predicate, the reason -lies perhaps in this, that the concept of existence as actuality and -action, and in its distinction from mere possibility, is perhaps the -fundamental concept of the real, although on the other hand it is not -truly thinkable save as determined in the particular forms of reality; -hence that first predicate is first only in so far as it contains the -last, that is to say, is neither last nor first, but the whole. To -explain these statements is in any case, as has been said, the task of -the whole of Philosophy, not of Logic alone, which here, as elsewhere, -must rest satisfied with demonstrating the point that most closely -concerns it; that is to say, the impossibility of separating from one -another in the judgment, the predicates necessary for the determination -of the reality of the fact, the absence of any one of which renders the -judgment itself impossible. - - -[Footnote 1: See the _Philosophy of the Practical,_ pt. i. sect. ii. -ch. 6.] - - - - -VI - - -THE INDIVIDUAL PSEUDOCONCEPTS. CLASSIFICATION AND ENUMERATION - - -[Sidenote: _Individual pseudojudgments._] - -As pseudoconcepts imitate pure concepts and the corresponding judgments -of definition, so by means of them are imitated pure individual -judgments, and spiritual formations are obtained, which can be -conveniently called _individual pseudojudgments._ - -[Sidenote: _Their practical character._] - -The character of these pseudojudgments, like that of the -pseudoconcepts, is not cognitive, but practical and more properly -mnemonic. Fixing our attention upon certain examples of such judgments, -if we say of an animal: "It is a squirrel," or "It is a platyrrhine -monkey"; if we say of a house: "This house is thirty metres high -and forty wide"; if of a painting we say: "The _Transfiguration_ is -a sacred picture," or "The _Danaë_ is a mythological picture"; or -if of a literary work we say, "The _Promessi Sposi_ is a historical -romance";--what have we learned as to the true nature of the _Promessi -Sposi,_ of the _Transfiguration,_ of the _Danaë,_ of that house and of -those animals? Upon close consideration, nothing at all. The animals -have been put into one or another compartment or glass case, decorated -with a name which might also be different from what it is, as the -compartment and the glass case might also be different; the house -has been compared in respect of its dimensions to other houses or to -an object arbitrarily assumed as the unit of measurement, which is -the metre, but which might be the foot, the palm, and so on; the two -pictures and the literary work have been looked at from the visual -angle of an arbitrary character, such as the mythological, religious -or historical subject. As to what they truly are, as to how all these -things came to be and to live, and as to their relation with other -things and with the Whole, we have been silent. Their _value,_ as it is -called, remains unknown. - -[Sidenote: _Genesis of the distinction between judgments of fact and -judgments of value; and criticism of them._] - -This lack of all determination as to value, which is characteristic of -individual pseudoconcepts, gives support to the distinction between -judgments of _fact_ (as individual pseudojudgments are sometimes -called) and judgments of _value;_ a distinction which makes evident the -further need of supplying the spirit with what the first judgments -do not give, that is to say, with the meaning or value of things. But -since the individual pseudojudgments are not for us what they boast -themselves to be, judgments of fact, we have no need to complete them -with judgments of value; which would thus be themselves arbitrary (that -is to say, conceived extrinsically to the determination of fact). True -individual judgments are pure, and in them the universal penetrates the -individual and the determination of value coincides with that of fact. -In pseudojudgments there takes place no such penetration, but only the -mechanical _application_ of a predicate to a subject; so much so, that -here is a true occasion for employing words which signify an extrinsic -placing side by side, a reunion, combination or aggregation of subject -with predicate. - -[Sidenote: _Importance of the individual pseudojudgments._] - -Having made this clear, it is superfluous to repeat that we do -not intend to remove, or even to attenuate, the due importance of -individual pseudojudgments, as we did not remove or attenuate that of -pseudoconcepts, when we defined them for what they are. And how can -we deny their importance, if each one of us create and employ them at -every instant, if each one of us strive to keep in order as best he -can the patrimony of his own knowledge? It is easier for a student to -work without notes and memoranda than for any one not to make use of -individual pseudojudgments. If I pass mentally in review the material -that must go to form the history of Italian painting or literature, I -must of necessity arrange it in works of greater or less importance, -in plays and novels, in sacred pictures and landscapes, and so on; -save when I wish to understand those facts historically, and then I -must abandon those divisions. I must abandon them during that act -of comprehension; but I must immediately resume them, if I wish to -give the result of my historical research; and in this exposition it -will be impossible for me to avoid saying that Manzoni, after having -composed _five sacred hymns_ and _two tragedies,_ set to work upon a -historical _romance_; or that _landscape painting_ was developed in the -seventeenth century. These words are necessary instruments for swift -understanding, and only a philosophical pedant could propose to expel -them. In like manner, if I wish to buy a house, I shall visit several -houses and arrange them in memory, according to the situation, their -arrangement, their size and other characteristics, all formulated in -pseudojudgments. I shall have to abandon all of these in the act of -choice, for then the house that I shall choose will possess one only -characteristic: that of being the one that suits my wants, that is -to say, the one _that pleases me._ But I shall again have to employ -those abstract characteristics, in my conversation with the person who -sells it to me and in the contract that I make; there I shall speak, -not only of my will and pleasure, but also of a house thirty metres -high and forty wide, and so on. The same must be said of the squirrels -and platyrrhine monkeys, which I cannot contrive to see in a museum -or zoological garden, unless I describe them in that way; and I shall -continue so to describe them, although those abstract characteristics -have no definite value, either in permitting me to describe those -animals with accuracy, or in making me understand their meaning in the -universe, or in the history of the cosmos. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical individual judgments and abstract individual -judgments._] - -But in proceeding further to determine the differential characteristics -presented by pseudojudgments in contrast with individual judgments, it -is necessary to consider them according to the double form, empirical -and abstract, assumed by pseudoconcepts, thus distinguishing them as -empirical individual judgments and abstract individual judgments. - -[Sidenote: _Process of formation of empirical judgments._] - -In comparing empirical individual judgments with pure individual -judgments--for example, "The _Transfiguration_ is a sacred picture," an -empirical judgment, and "The _Transfiguration_ is an æsthetic work," a -pure judgment--the first thing to note is that the empirical individual -judgment presupposes the pure individual judgment. We already know -that pseudoconcepts, empirical or abstract, presuppose the idea of -the pure concept; but that idea does not suffice for the formation of -determinate empirical concepts, which can be employed as predicates of -empirical judgments. We must not only think effectively these or those -pure concepts, but they must be translated into individual judgments. -Were this not so, where would empirical concepts obtain their material? -Before the judgment: "The _Transfiguration_ is a sacred picture," can -be pronounced, we must first have the empirical concept of "sacred -picture." Now this empirical concept (setting aside the fact that it -presupposes other empirical concepts which we do not here take into -account, because they would complicate the problem without aiding -the solution that we wish to give) presupposes in its turn the pure -concept of "æsthetic work"; and it is only when a certain number, more -or less large, of artistic works have been recognized as such, that -is, when pure individual judgments concerning them have been formed, -that we can abstract the characteristics and pass to the formation -of the pseudoconcepts: sacred, historical, mythological pictures, -landscapes, and so on. Having obtained these, then, and only then when -we stand before an æsthetic work, for example, the _Transfiguration,_ -and formulate again the pure individual judgment which recognizes it -as such ("The _Transfiguration_ is an æsthetic work"), are we enabled -finally to apply the pseudoconcept and to pronounce the empirical -judgment: "The _Transfiguration_ is a sacred picture." - -[Sidenote: _Its foundation in existence._] - -The consequence of the process here recognized as to the manner in -which individual empirical judgments are formed, and in virtue of which -they have pure judgments as their base, is that empirical judgments -also in the last analysis are based upon the concept of existentiality. -Pseudoconcepts of possibility are not formed, because possibilities are -infinite, and it would be vain, or of no mnemonic use, to fix types of -them. When, as sometimes occurs, such types seem to be formed outside -of all existence, their appearance serves, not a mnemonic purpose, -but a purpose of research. This is the case with hypotheses and with -other provisional methods of thought. But the empirical judgment is -related to the individual or existential judgment, and it also employs -pseudoconcepts of existential origin. For this reason, when giving -examples of judgments of existence in the preceding chapter, we availed -ourselves without scruple of empirical judgments also; for these obey -the same law in relation to existentiality. "This animal is a monkey" -implies, not only the existence of the animal taken as subject of the -judgment; but also of that class of animals, of which the character has -been abstracted, and the complex of characteristics which under the -name of a monkey fulfil the function of predicate. An animal that does -not exist and a class of animals that does not exist are not reducible -to subject and predicate, and do not give rise to judgment of any sort. - -[Sidenote: _Dependence of empirical judgments upon pure judgments._] - -Another consequence is that empirical concepts and judgments are -continually originated and modified by pure individual judgments. -The object of empirical concepts and judgments is to maintain the -possession and the easy use of our knowledge; and this with no other -end than that of serving as base for our actions, and thus also as -a means of attaining new knowledge. New knowledge is expressed in -new pure individual judgments, which in their turn supply material -for the elaboration of new empirical concepts and judgments. In this -way empirical concepts and judgments must be and continually are -renewed, by being dipped in the waters of pure individual judgments, -true judgments of reality. From these waters they issue forth with -youth renewed. If they do not do this, the worse for them: they fall -ill, waste away and die. Given a rapid and profound revolution of -thought, or, as it is also called, a transvaluation of all the values -of life and reality, we should also have at once a no less rapid and -profound transformation of all the empirical concepts and judgments -previously possessed and employed. But this is continually occurring -in the life of the spirit, if not in cataclysmic form, then in a more -modest way. For example, who now employs the empirical concept of -phlogiston, or forms judgments based upon it, now that we no longer -admit the existence of that element, which was at one time believed to -be separated from combustible bodies in the act of combustion? Who now -says (save in jest) that such and such a syllogism is in _bramantip_ or -in _fresison,_ or that a certain part of a speech is an _ornatum_ or -a _hypotyposis,_ now that we no longer believe the facts upon which -such concepts of the old Logic and Rhetoric were based? Who still -distinguishes human destinies according to the _conjunctions_ of the -stars that presided at birth, as was done when astrology was believed? - -[Sidenote: _Empirical judgments as classification._] - -The empirical judgment, in so far as it applies a predicate to a -subject supplied by the pure individual judgment, makes that subject -_enter_ that predicate, which is a _type_ or _class_; and therefore it -_classifies_ the subjects of individual judgments. Thus we may also -call empirical judgments, judgments of _classification._ This explains -why the judgment has sometimes been considered to be nothing but a -relation of subordination: for the empirical judgment does indeed -subordinate a representation (which has first been logically determined -by the individual judgment) to an empirical concept; that is, it places -it in a class. - -[Sidenote: _Classification and intelligence._] - -_Classification_ is an essential function, for the reasons already -given, which it would be useless to repeat; but to classify is not -to _realize intellectually,_ to understand, to grasp, to comprehend. -If therefore, in life, we disapprove of those unmethodical people -who detest classification, we do not disapprove any the less of the -perpetual classifiers, who content themselves with arranging things in -classes, when on the contrary the needful thing is to penetrate their -nature and peculiar value. It is a very common error to believe that -something has been thoroughly understood and every problem relating to -it completely solved, when it has simply been put into a drawer, that -is, into a class. Thus in the not distant past, instead of establishing -whether the _Promessi Sposi_ were or were not an æsthetic work, and -what movement of the spirit it represents, it was considered to be the -duty of criticism to enquire whether that book were a romance or a -novel, a historical or didactic romance, a historical representation -of persons or of environment, and so on. The zoologist too, instead of -studying the history and transformations of animals, their life and -habits, limited himself to adding a rare specimen to a variety, or a -variety to a subspecies, or a subspecies to a species, and believed -that by so doing he had completely fulfilled the function of science. - -[Sidenote: _Interchange of the two, and genesis of perceptive and -judicial illusions._] - -The abuse of empirical or classificatory judgments is not less in -relation to perception, which, as we know, is nothing but the series of -individual judgments. It frequently happens that when entering upon -the discussion of real facts, and having in mind groups and series of -pseudoconcepts, we hastily form empirical judgments, which take the -place of pure individual judgments and are taken in exchange for them. -From these exchanges have arisen certain famous controversies about -the truth of perception, such as that indicated by the instance of the -stick immersed in water, which seems to the eye to be broken, whereas -it is whole and straight. The usual answer to such a view is that the -error lies in the judgment, since perception as perception is never -wrong. This answer is not altogether correct, since the perception -is a judgment, and if the judgment is wrong, the perception also is -wrong. On the contrary, the error is not in the judgment, but in the -prejudice that the stick in question is in reality straight, and that -when immersed in water the genuine reality is disturbed by a new -element; as though the stick outside the water possessed greater or -less reality than when immersed in the water. This error arises from -the construction of the empirical concept of "stick," taken as a true -and proper concept, so that when the stick is immersed in water and -seems to be broken it seems not to answer to its true concept. Strictly -speaking, the perception of the stick as broken or otherwise altered -is not less true than that of the straight stick; the absurdity, -occasioned by the empirical concept, arises from seeking the true -perception among various perceptions, in order to make of it the basis -and foundation of the others declared illusory. This error would seem -to be of slight importance, so long at least as it is a matter of a -stick; but it entails most serious consequences, since it is owing to -similar errors that outside the Spirit there has come to be posited -_the Thing in itself._ - -[Sidenote: _Abstract concepts and individual judgments._] - -Passing from the empirical to the abstract concepts, if these latter -presuppose the pure concept, they do not on the other hand presuppose -individual judgments. For example, in order to form the concepts of -numerical series, or of geometrical figures, it is not necessary to -know individual things. Those concepts are abstract, just because they -are without any representative content, and therefore no representative -element is required for their formation. - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of direct application of the first to the -second._] - -But if this be so, it is clear that they cannot alone be translated -into individual pseudojudgments. They will certainly give rise to -judgments of definition (though always arbitrary and abstract), but -not to individual judgments. And in truth numerical and geometrical -series is not applicable to individual facts, as affirmed in -individual judgments. These are at the same time different and yet -inter-connected, in such a way that the one is somehow in the other. -The application of numerical series or geometrical figures implies -that we have before us _homogeneous_ objects (or objects which have -been made homogeneous, which amounts to the same thing). Things -qualitatively different elude such procedure: we cannot add up a cow, -an oak, and a poem. It may be urged that all things have this at least -in common, that they are _things_ and can therefore be enumerated as -such. But things, as such, or things in general are innumerable, being -infinite; which amounts to saying that the series of things in general -is the same as numerical series. Doubtless numerical series can be -constituted; but our enquiry concerns the possibility of making direct -applications of numbers to the individual; that is to say, whether or -not they give rise to _abstract_ individual judgments. We must reply -to this question in the negative. The formula "abstract individual -judgments" is itself a contradiction in terms; for the individual taken -in itself can never be abstract, nor the abstract ever individual, even -through a practical fiction. - -[Sidenote: _Intervention of empirical judgments as intermediaries. -Reduction of the heterogeneous to the homogeneous._] - -The consequence of this demonstration is then that if abstract -concepts can be applied to individual judgments (and they are as -a fact applied), there must be an intermediary which makes the -application possible. The Individual empirical judgments are just such -an intermediary. They reduce the heterogeneous to the homogeneous -and prepare the ground for the application of the abstract concepts -and for the formation of their corresponding pseudojudgments. These -are therefore more correctly termed empirico-abstract judgments -than individual-abstract judgments. Empirical and empirico-abstract -judgments cannot then be presented as two co-ordinate classes of the -individual pseudojudgment. They are two forms, of which the second is -evolved from the first. - -The reduction of the _heterogeneous_ to the _homogeneous_ is effected -by means of the procedure already discussed, by the formation of -classes and classification with them as basis. Individual varieties, -which escape all numerical application, are thus subdued, and we obtain -in exchange things belonging to the same class, as for example oaks, -cows, men, ploughs, plays, pictures, and so on. These things are finite -in number (as we already know from our analysis of the representative -elements contained in a determinate empirical concept) and can -therefore be numbered. Thus we can finally arrive at pronouncing the -empirico-abstract judgments: "These cows number one hundred," "these -oaks are three hundred in number," "there are four hundred houses in -this village," "it contains two thousand inhabitants," "there are two -ploughs in this field," and so on. Or we can say elliptically: "100 -cows," "300 oaks," "400 houses," "2000 inhabitants," "2 ploughs," and -so on, as is done in statistics and inventories. - -[Sidenote: _Empirico-abstract judgments and enumeration (measurement, -etc.)._] - -If the procedure proper to individual judgments has been described -as _classification,_ that of empirico-abstract judgments is rightly -called _enumeration._ Enumeration also makes possible another -procedure, known as _measurement,_ and what has been said by way of -example about abstract concepts of number must be repeated _mutatis -mutandis_ of geometrical figures, which are employed as instruments -of measurement. The procedure of measurement is somewhat more -complicated; enumeration and measurement are related to one another as -are arithmetical and geometrical concepts, but substantially they come -to the same thing. The definition sometimes given of measurement can -be extended to enumeration in general, namely, that it is _qualitative -quantity_ applied to quality, strictly speaking, to quality rendered -homogeneous by the process of classification. The empirico-abstract -judgments are in fact qualitative-quantitative. - -[Sidenote: _Enumeration and intelligence._] - -If classification does not imply understanding things and assigning -to them their value, neither does enumeration imply intelligence -and comprehension, because it consists of a manipulation, which is -altogether extrinsic and indifferent to the quality of the things -enumerated. That given objects are capable of enumeration or measurable -as ioo, or iooo, or 10,000 reveals nothing as to their character. It is -only as the result of gross illusion that value is sometimes believed -to be a function of number, and that value increases or diminishes with -the increase or diminution of number. The common saying that number is -not quality is a good answer to that illusion. - -[Sidenote: _So-called conversion of quantity into quality._] - -A mental fact, afterwards called the transition from _quantity_ to -_quality,_ or the conversion of quantity into quality, has certainly -been known since ancient times. This transition finds a parallel in -those logical diversions, in which, granted the admission, apparently -as legitimate as it is slight, that by the removal of a single hair -from the head of a luxuriantly haired individual, that individual does -not become bald, or that by the removal of a single grain from a heap, -the heap does not disappear, one hair or one grain after another is -removed, and he of the luxuriant locks becomes bald and for the heap -is substituted the bare ground. But the error is in reality contained -entirely in the first admission. A man with a head of hair or a heap -of grain are what they are, so long as nothing in them is changed. The -change of quantity is translated into change of quality, not because -the first concept is constitutive of the second, but, on the contrary, -because the second is constitutive of the first. Quantity has been -obtained, measurement has been effected, by starting from quality, -determined in the pure individual judgment and made homogeneous in the -empirical judgment, which is the basis of the judgment of enumeration -and of measurement. Thus quality constitutes the only real content -of the abstract quantitative concept. By the taking away of the hair -or the grain, _quality_ itself is changed through the _quantitative -formula._ That is to say, quantity does not pass into quality, but one -quality passes into another quality. Quantity, taken by itself, as an -abstract determination, is impotent in presence of the real. - -[Sidenote: _Mathematical space and time and their abstraction._] - -A final observation, suggested by the difference between pure -individual judgments (or judgments of reality and value, if it please -you so to call them), and quantitative or empirico-abstract judgments, -is that the entire conception of things as occupying various portions -of _space_ and following one another in a _discontinuous_ manner, -_separated_ from one another in _time,_ is derived from the last type -of pseudojudgments, namely the quantitative. It is an _alteration_ -effected for practical ends from the ingenuous view offered by pure -perception. To show, as we have shown, the genesis of quantitative -judgments and so of mathematical space and time, amounts to describing -their nature and giving their definition. It amounts to revealing them -as thoughts of _abstractions,_ which are not to be confounded with real -thought, or with genuine thought of reality. The Kantian concept of the -_ideality_ of _time_ and _space_ gives the same result. This doctrine -is among the greatest discoveries of history, and should be accepted -by every philosophy worthy of the name. In accepting it ourselves, we -make but one reservation (justified by the proofs given above), namely, -that the character of mathematical space and time should be called not -ideality (because ideality is true reality), but rather _unreality_ or -_abstract ideality,_ or, as we prefer to call it, _abstractness._ - - - - -THIRD SECTION - - -IDENTITY OF THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT THE LOGICAL _A -PRIORI_ SYNTHESIS - - -I - - - - -IDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE -INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT - - -[Sidenote: _Result of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and -the individual judgment._] - -The descent, as we have called it, from the pure concept to the -intuition, or the examination of the relations which are established -between the concept and the intuitions, when we have attained the -first, and of the ensuing transformations, to which the second are -subject, might at first sight seem complete. The concept, which was -first contemplated in abstraction, has been demonstrated in a more -concrete manner, in so far as it takes the form of language and exists -as the judgment of definition. Further, we have shown how, when thus -concretely possessed, it reacts upon the intuitions from which it was -formed, or how it is applied to them, as it is called, giving rise -to the individual or perceptive judgment. The transition from the -intuitions to the concept, and so to the expression of the concept or -the judgment of definition, and from this to the individual judgment, -has been followed and demonstrated in its logical necessity. Thus the -two distinct forms are also united, the first being the presupposition -and base of the second, so that the connection seems at first sight to -be perfect. The judgment of definition is not an individual judgment; -but the individual judgment implies a previous judgment of definition. -To think the concept of man does not mean that the man Peter exists. -But if we affirm that the man Peter exists, we must first have affirmed -that the concept of man exists, or is thought. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between the two: truth of reason and truth of -fact, necessary and contingent, etc., formal and material._] - -The distinction between the two forms, the judgment of definition and -the individual judgment, is universally recognized. Not only can it be -found, as has already been noted, in at least one of the significations -which have been attached to the two classes of judgments, analytic and -synthetic, but it is even more clearly expressed in the well-known -distinction between _truth of reason_ and _truth of fact,_ between -_necessary truths_ and _contingent_ truths, between truths _a priori_ -and truths _a posteriori,_ between what is _logically_ and what is -_historically_ affirmed. Indeed, it is only on the basis of this -distinction that it seems possible to give any content to the logical -doctrine, which recognizes the possibility of propositions true _in -form_ and false _in fact._ This doctrine, as usually stated, is -altogether untenable. It is impossible, above all, to maintain that -formal truth can be distinguished from effective truth, always assuming -that "form" is understood in its philosophical sense and not in that of -formalist Logic, where it indicates an arbitrarily fixed externality, -which, as such, is neither true nor false. It is therefore impossible -to maintain that one and the same proposition can be true in one -respect and false in another; for a proposition can be judged only -from one point of view, which is that of its unique signification and -value. But it is clear that once we admit the distinction between truth -of reason and truth of fact, affirmations of both kinds might be found -incorporated in the same verbal proposition, one of them false and the -other true. For example, that the saying of Cambronne, "The Guard dies -and never surrenders," is a "sublime saying" is formally (rationally) -true, but it is materially (as fact) false, because Cambronne did not -utter those words. On the other hand, that the _Assedio di Fiorenze_ of -Guerrazzi is "a very beautiful book, because it inflamed many youthful -bosoms with love of country," is materially (as fact) true, but it is -formally (rationally) false, because the fact of its having produced -such an effect is not proof of the beauty of a book, since beauty does -not consist of practical efficacy. - -[Sidenote: _Absurdities arising from these distinctions; the individual -judgment as ultralogical._] - -Yet, notwithstanding the apparently glaring distinction between the -judgment of definition and the individual judgment, between truth -of reason and truth of fact; notwithstanding its secular celebrity -and its confirmation by universal agreement and common usage, this -distinction meets with a very grave difficulty. In order to understand -it, we must, above all, establish clearly what we have just stated -in positing that distinction and in making the individual judgment -or truth of fact _follow_ the judgment of definition or truth of -reason. We have already posited a distinction of this kind between -intuition and concept, and have noted that we have thus distinguished -two fundamental forms of the Spirit: the representative or fantastic -form, and the logical. Now, in positing as distinct the judgment of -definition and the individual judgment, do we mean to do something -analogous? Do we mean to distinguish the logical form (concept or -definition) from another form, no longer logical, although containing -the logical form in itself as overcome and subordinate, in the same way -that the concept contains in itself the intuition? In other words, is -the individual judgment something _ultralogical_? It can certainly be -asserted that it is not mere definition; but can it be asserted that -it is not logical? The words used should not lead to misconception. If -in the individual judgment the subject be a representation, it is also -true that this representation is not found there as it would be found -in æsthetic contemplation, but as subject of a judgment, and therefore -not as a representation pure and simple, but as a representation -thought, or made logical. Hegel has several times remarked that whoever -doubts the unity of individual and universal can never have paid -attention to the judgments which he utters at every instant. In these, -by means of the copula, he resolutely affirms that Peter _is_ a man, -or that the individual (the subject) _is_ the universal (predicate); -not something different, not a piece or fragment, but just that, the -universal. Further, are not truths of fact also truths of reason? Would -it not be irrational to think that a fact was not the fact it had -been? The existence of Cæsar and of Napoleon is not less _rational_ -than that of quality and of becoming. And are not both kinds of facts -equally necessary--those called contingent not less than those called -necessary? We are right to laugh at those who like to think that things -could have happened otherwise than they have happened. Cæsar and -Napoleon are as necessary as quality and becoming. - -[Sidenote: _or duality of logical forms._] - -It follows from these considerations (which could be easily multiplied) -that the individual judgment is not less logical than that of -definition. Truths of fact, contingent and _a posteriori,_ are not -less logical than those of reason, necessary and _a priori._ But if -this be so, the distinction between the two forms would not be a -distinction between forms of the spirit, but a subdistinction within -the logical form of the spirit: a subdistinction of which we have -already denied the possibility. For it is not clear how a logical -thought, or thought of the universal, can be _two_ thinkings, one in -one way, one in another: one universal of the universal, the other -universal of the individual. Either the first is void, or the second is -improper. Intuition and concept are distinguished as individual from -universal; but that universal should be distinguished from universal -by the introduction of individuality as element of differentiation is -inconceivable. - -[Sidenote: _Difficulty of abandoning the distinction._] - -The difficulty becomes greater from the equal inconceivability and -impossibility of abandoning the result reached above, by which the -individual judgment was shown to be possible only by means of a concept -or judgment of definition. Every attempt that may be made to cancel -that presupposition and to reconceive the individual or perceptive -judgment as preceding the concept and being altogether without logical -character, a mere assertion of fact, unenlightened by universality, -must be considered, for the reasons we have given, to be entirely -vain. If we cannot admit a duality of logical forms, still less can we -admit that an alogical character, below the level of logic altogether, -attaches to the individual judgment. - -[Sidenote: _The hypothesis of reciprocal implication and so of the -identity of the two forms._] - -There seems to be but one way out of such a difficulty: namely, -to preserve the result attained, that is to say, the necessity of -the judgment of definition as the presupposition of the individual -judgment, but to affirm at the same time the necessity of the -individual judgment as the presupposition of the judgment of -definition. Admitting this supposition by way of hypothesis, let us -see what it would mean and what effect it would have in the discussion. -Since the one judgment presupposes the other, and this presupposition -is reciprocal, we could no longer talk of distinction between the two, -but of unity pure and simple, of _identity,_ in which distinction -could arise only by abstraction and the arbitrary act of dividing -what cannot exist save as indivisible. But, on the other hand, the -distinction, although abstract, would always retain its value as a -didactic means of making clear the true nature of the logical act. Thus -we should justify our first proceeding to develop the concept and the -judgment of definition and then the individual judgment, and also the -reservation that we have always made as to the provisional nature of -such distinction, and thus also the new question as to the unity of the -act, put and answered in the way proposed. All the difficulties arising -from the appearance of a duality of logical forms would disappear. -Definitions and individual judgments, truth of reason and truth of -fact, necessity and contingency, _a priori_ and _a posteriori,_ would -be revealed as one act and one truth. And we should also be justified -in talking of them as distinct acts, for in expressing that single -truth and single judgment verbally or in literature, we can attach -greater importance now to the definition, and now to the statement of -fact; now to the subject, and now to the predicate. - -[Sidenote: _Objection: the lack of an historical and representative -element in definitions._] - -This path, which would offer such advantages and would constitute a -true way out of the difficulty, seems, however, to be closed to us by -the fact that in definitions there is no trace whatever of individual -judgments which, on this hypothesis, would have to be contained within -and be one with them. If we say "the will is the practical form of the -spirit," or "virtue is the habit of moral actions," where is to be -found in such statements the individual judgment and the representative -element? We find in them without doubt the verbal form, expressive and -representative, which is necessary to the concept for its concrete -existence; but we do not find the statement of fact of which we are -in search. Thus the proposed hypothesis will prove very ingenious and -rich with all the advantages that we have stated; but since it does not -appear to be confirmed by facts, we must, it seems, reject it, even at -the risk of having to think out a better one, or, if we fail in this, -of renouncing as desperate the attempt at a solution. - -[Sidenote: _The historical element in definitions, taken in their -concreteness._] - -We must not, however, be in a hurry, but rather carefully recall the -observation just made incidentally: that the verbal or literary form -can throw into _relief_ a moment of the judgment, while casting a -shadow over the other and causing it to be forgotten, without thereby -ever being able to suppress it. There seemed, we remember, to be no -trace of concepts in perceptive judgments or judgments of fact, and -especially in those forms of them which are called merely existential -and in those called impersonal. Yet there can be no doubt that none -of those judgments is ever possible without the concept as basis. An -analysis which does not allow itself to be arrested by appearances -and examines verbal forms as regards both what they express and what -they leave to be understood (though this too is expressed in its own -way) has discovered it. Similarly a definition does not exist in the -air, as might appear from the examples given in treatises, in which -the _where_ and the _when_ and the _individual_ and the _actual -circumstances_ in which the definition has been given are omitted. In a -definition thus presented, it would certainly be impossible to discover -a representative element and an individual judgment. But the reason for -this is that it has been mutilated and made abstract and indeterminate, -to such an extent that it can be made determinate only by the meaning -which he to whom it is communicated likes to attach to it. If, on the -contrary, we look at the definition in its concrete reality, we shall -_always_ find in it when we examine it with care the _representative -element_ and the _individual judgment._ - -[Sidenote: _The definition as answer to a question and solution of a -problem._] - -For every definition is the answer to a question, the solution of a -problem. Did we not ask questions and set problems, there would be -no occasion for giving any definition. Why should we give them? What -need could there be? The definition is an act of the spirit and every -act of the spirit is conditioned. Without contradiction, there can -be no agreement; without the shock of multiplicity there can be no -unity; without the travail of doubt that calls for peace, there can be -no affirmation of the true. Not only does the answer presuppose the -question; but every answer implies a certain question. The answer must -be in harmony with the question; otherwise, it would not be an answer, -but the avoiding of an answer. In reply to a question of a certain -kind, we should turn our deaf ear, as the saying is, or reply with a -blow. This means that the nature of the question colours the answer -and that a definition taken in its concreteness is determined by the -problem which gives it rise. The definition varies with the problem. - -[Sidenote: _Individual and historical conditionedness of every question -and problem._] - -But the question, the problem, the doubt is always individually -conditioned. The doubt of the child is not that of the adult, the -doubt of the uncultured man is not that of the man of culture, or -the doubt of the novice that of the learned. Further, the doubt of -an Italian is not that of a German, and the doubt of a German of the -year 1800 is not that of a German of the year 1900. Indeed, the doubt -formulated by an individual in a given moment, is not that formulated -by the same individual a moment after. It is sometimes said by way -of simplification, that the same question has been put by very many -men, in various countries and at various times. But in the very act of -saying this, we simplify. In reality, every question differs from every -other question. Every definition, though it may seem to be the same and -bounded with certain definite words, which seem to remain unchanged -and constant, differs in reality from every other, because the words, -even when they seem to be materially the same, are in effect different, -according to the spiritual differences of those who pronounce them. -Each of these is an individual, and on that account each finds himself -in circumstances that are individually determined. "Virtue is the habit -of moral actions," is a formula which can be pronounced a hundred -times. But if it be seriously pronounced as a definition of virtue -each of those hundred times, it answers to a hundred psychological -situations, more or less different, and is in reality not _one,_ but _a -hundred_ definitions. - -It will be replied that the concept remains the same through all these -definitions, like a man who changes his clothes a hundred times. But -(setting aside the fact that even the man who changes his clothes a -hundred times does not remain the same) the truth is that the relation -between concept and definition is not the same as that between a man -and his clothes. No concept exists save in so far as it is thought and -enclosed in words, or in so far as it is defined. If the definitions -vary, the concept itself varies. There are, certainly, variations -of the concept, of that which is, _par excellence,_ self-identical. -These are the life of the concept, not of the representation. But the -concept does not exist outside its life, and every thinking of it is a -phase of this life, never its overcoming, since however far we go, it -is never possible to swim outside water, or however high we climb, to -fly outside air. - -[Sidenote: _The definition as also historical judgment. Unity of truths -of reason and of fact._] - -If we posit individual or historical conditions for every thinking of -the concept, or of every definition (conditions which constitute the -doubt, the problem, the question, to which the definition replies), -we must admit that the definition, which contains the answer and -affirms the concept, at the same time illumines by so doing those -individual and historical conditions, that group of facts, from which -it comes. It illumines, that is to say, qualifies it as what it is, -grasps it as subject by giving it a predicate, and judges it. And -since the fact is always individual, it forms an individual judgment. -This means just that every definition is also an individual judgment. -And this agrees with the hypothesis we framed: it is the assumption -that seemed doubtful and now is proved. Truth of reason and truth of -fact, analytic and synthetic judgments, judgments of definition and -individual judgments, do not exist as distinct from one another: they -are abstractions. The logical act is unique: it is the identity of -definition and of individual judgment, the thinking of the pure concept. - -[Sidenote: _Considerations confirming this._] - -Such a theory as this, although it goes against the ordinary way -of thinking (though this, in its turn, suffers from its own -contradictions), can be made convincing even to ordinary thought, -when it is led to reflect upon what is implicitly understood in any -judgments of definition that are pronounced. For example, definitions -have always in view some particular adversary; they change according to -time and circumstances, and those definitions that we felt constrained -to give, at one stage of our mental development, we abandon at another, -not because we judge them to be erroneous, but because they seem to -us to be inopportune or commonplace. These and other facts, easy to -observe, would not be possible, unless judgment of definite situations -intervened to produce the change. And this judgment, though we may try -to think of it as preceding or as following each one of those acts of -definition, in reality neither precedes nor follows them, but on the -contrary presents itself to the mind as contemporaneous, or rather -coincident and identical with the act of definition. Every one who -attains to a conceptual truth, every one, for instance, who achieves -a definite doctrine of art or of morality, is immediately aware in -himself that henceforth he knows more adequately not only the kingdom -of ideas but also the kingdom of things. He realizes that as soon as -an idea becomes more clear _ipso facto_ it makes clearer the things out -of whose vortex and tumult it comes. The star-gazer who forgets the -earth, will be an astronomer, but certainly not a philosopher. In the -act of thought, in the world of ideas, earth and sky are fused in one. -Whoever looks well at the sky sees in it (miraculously!) the earth. - -For the rest, the identity of definition and individual judgment, which -we have demonstrated by various processes that are usually called -negative, hypothetical, or inductive and based upon observation, is -also confirmed by the process called deductive. For if the thinking -of the concept be a degree superior to pure representation, and if in -the degrees of the spirit the superior contain in itself the inferior, -it is evident that representation as well as conceptual elements must -always be found in the concept. But it is also evident that we can -never find them distinct or distinguishable, but mingled in such a -way that every distinction in them must be introduced solely by a -deliberate act. The logical act is certainly spoken, represented, -individualized. But when it is split up into concept and individual -judgment, one of two things must happen: either we make an empirical -and external distinction, of more or less; or two monstrosities are -asserted: a non-individualized concept, which therefore does not exist, -and a judgment not thought, and therefore non-existent as judgment, and -existing, at the most, as pure intuition. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the false distinction between formal and -material truths._] - -As our distinction between definitions and individual judgments was -provisional, so also we must regard the consequence that we showed -to issue from it--the partial justification of the doctrine of -affirmations formally (logically) true and materially (individually) -false. In reality, an error of fact implies a more or less inaccurate -and erroneous definition, and an error of definition implies an error -of fact. Thus this distinction also retains only an empirical meaning -useful for the rough distinction of certain classes of errors from -certain others. And resuming another previous observation, we must -also say that, strictly speaking, it must be held impossible to err as -to facts through the use of pure concepts, since the penetration of -concepts, however great one may think it, is also always penetration -of facts. This formula, too, cannot have anything but an empirical -meaning, to indicate a certain type of errors of concept and of fact, -which is popularly called the use of concepts and the use of facts, -whereas it is the abuse of both. - -[Sidenote: _Platonic and Aristotelian men._] - - -In ordinary life it is customary to distinguish between those who -cultivate ideas and those who cultivate facts, between _Platonic_ and -_Aristotelian_ men. But if the Platonists seriously cultivate ideas, -they cultivate facts and are also Aristotelians, and the Aristotelians -cultivate ideas and are Platonists. Here, too, the difference is -practical and extrinsic, not substantial; so much so that we are often -astonished both at the singular clear-sightedness and penetration of -the actual situation manifested by cultivators of ideas, and at the -profound philosophy which we discover in the pretended cultivators of -facts. - -[Sidenote: _Theory of the application of the concepts, true for -abstract concepts and false for pure concepts._] - - -Hence the further consequence, that we must avoid the formula which -speaks of the _application_ of concepts, as, for instance, that in -the individual judgment the concept is applied to the intuition. To -say this, is, as a saying, innocuous, since like many others, it is -metaphorical; but the doctrine implied in it, or that may be suggested -by it (and that is indeed rarely separated from it), is altogether -erroneous. The concept is not applied to the intuition, because it -does not exist, even for a moment, outside of the intuition, and the -judgment is a _primitive act_ of the spirit, it is the logical spirit -itself. If that formula has been successful, the reason for its success -must usually be sought in the theory of the pseudoconcepts. Even -these, in relation to the question which engages us now, and in so far -as they are empirical concepts, are indistinguishable from individual -pseudojudgments. To construct an empirical concept is equivalent to -pronouncing that the objects _a, b, c, d,_ etc., belong to a definite -class. The two acts of the construction of the class and of effectual -classification are only to be distinguished in an abstract manner. In -conformity with this, we must now correct the theory that we have given -above. But on the other hand, in so far as they are abstract concepts, -they are void of all representative content, and therefore constituted -outside of every individual judgment. They cannot of themselves give -rise to such judgments. Before they can be united to them, we must -_apply them_ to individual judgments, elaborated into pseudojudgments, -or made homogeneous by the process of classification. And in truth, -'not only the doctrine of application, but also the distinctions -between analytic and synthetic judgments, between definitions and -perceptions, between truths of reason and of fact, between necessity -and contingency, find their confirmation in being referred to abstract -concepts, as distinct from empirical. The same may be also said of -the other doctrine, which distinguishes between affirmations that are -formally true and materially false. Two griffins plus three griffins -make five griffins. This is formally true, since it is true that two -plus three equals five; but it is materially false, because griffins -do not exist. Numbers and their laws would, for example, be truths -of reason, necessary, _a priori,_ in analytical judgments and pure -definitions; truths derived from experience would be truths of fact, -contingent, _a posteriori,_ in synthetic and individual judgments. But -though this conception may have currency in a field where, properly -speaking, there is neither thought nor truth, in the field of truth -and of thought the terms of both series are found in the corresponding -terms of the other. Analysis apart from synthesis is as unthinkable -as synthesis apart from analysis. In the same way we can empirically -distinguish intention and action in the practical spirit. But in -reality pure intention outside effectual action, is not even intention, -because it is nothing. And an action beyond and without intention is -nothing, for practical reality is the identity of intention and action. -Here, too, theoretical spirit and practical spirit correspond at every -point. - - - - -II - -THE LOGICAL, _A PRIORI_ SYNTHESIS - - -[Sidenote: _The identity of the judgment of definition and of the -individual judgment, as synthesis a priori._] - -If analysis apart from synthesis, the _a priori_ apart from the _a -posteriori,_ be inconceivable, and if synthesis apart from analysis, -the _a posteriori_ apart from the _a priori,_ be equally inconceivable, -then the true act of thought will be a synthetic analysis, an analytic -synthesis, an _a posteriori-a priori,_ or, if it be preferred, an _a -priori synthesis._ - -In this manner, the identity that we have established between the -judgment of definition and the individual judgment comes to assume a -name celebrated in the annals of modern philosophy. And by assuming -it at this point, it is also able to affirm, since it has already -demonstrated, the truth of the _a priori_ synthesis, and to determine -its exact content. - -[Sidenote: _Objections raised by abstractionists and empiricists -against the a priori synthesis._] - -This is not the place to enter again into the objections which the -Kantian concept elicited (indeed could not fail to elicit): objections -which in Italy too gave rise to very acute attempts at confutation, -and which ended in the partial absorption of that concept into the -mental organism of its opponents. Suffice it to say that all the -objections to the _a priori_ synthesis, when thoroughly examined, seem -to be derived, as was to be expected, from the upholders of the two -one-sided doctrines which were surpassed by the synthesis. Thus the -dogmatists or abstractionists believed the concept to be thinkable -apart from or above the facts (simple analysis); the empiricists -perceived only the representative element and claimed to obtain the -concept from mere facts (simple synthesis). Both failed to explain -perception, or the individual judgment. The former found it to arise -from the external and almost accidental contact between pure concepts -and given facts; the latter sometimes assumed it without explanation, -sometimes confused it with pure intuition, if not altogether with -sensibility and emotion. It can be said that whoever does not accept -the _a priori_ synthesis is outside the path of modern philosophy, -indeed of all philosophy. Strive to find or to rediscover that path, -unless you wish to incur the punishment of trifling with empiricism, -of lying to yourself with mysticism, or of wandering in the void with -scholasticism. - -[Sidenote: _False interpretation of the a priori synthesis._] - -Instead of noting and of examining all the objections made to the _a -priori_ synthesis (which we have already substantially discussed in -the development of our treatise), it will be of assistance to add some -explanations, which will prevent false interpretations of that concept. -These false interpretations sometimes (as often happens) mingle with -the true even in the philosopher who discovered it, and confer force -and authority upon several of the objections to the very reality of the -_a priori_ synthesis. - -[Sidenote: _A priori synthesis in general and logical a priori -synthesis._] - -In the first place, in accordance with the formula given in Logic we -must not speak of the _a priori_ synthesis in general, but of the -_logical a priori synthesis._ The _a priori_ synthesis belongs to all -the forms of the Spirit; indeed, the Spirit, considered universally, -is nothing but _a priori_ synthesis. The synthesis is operative in the -æsthetic activity, not less than in the logical. For how could a poet -create a pure intuition, if he did not proceed from a given fact, from -some passionate moment of his own, conditioned and constituted in a -particular way? Without something to intuite and to express could there -ever be a poet? And would he be a poet, if he were to repeat that -something mechanically, without transforming it into pure intuition? -In his pure intuition, there is and there is not matter: not as brute -matter, but as formed matter, or form. Thus it is said with reason -that art is pure form, or that matter and form, content and form, in -art are wholly one (_a priori_ æsthetic synthesis). The _a priori_ -synthesis is not less operative in the practical activity than in -the æsthetic and logical (that is, in the theoretic activity). It is -impossible to will without material to will, or to will outside the -given material. The practical man accepts actual conditions, and at the -same time transforms them with his volitional act, creating something -new, in which those conditions are and are not. They are, because -the action achieved is in relation to them; they are not, because -being new, it has transformed them. _A priori_ synthesis, in general, -then, means spiritual activity; not abstract but concrete spiritual -activity, that is to say, the spirit itself, which is _condition_ to -itself and _conditioned_ by itself. Thus the _a priori_ synthesis, -which is constituted by the coincidence or identity of the judgment of -definition with the individual judgment, is not _a priori_ synthesis in -general, but logical _a priori_ synthesis. - -[Sidenote: _Non-logical a priori syntheses._] - -Having clearly established this point we are enabled to eliminate the -confusion caused by the citation of certain spiritual formations, -which do not correspond with that logical act, as examples of _a -priori_ synthetic judgments. Such for instance is the case of the -famous example: "5 + 7 = 12," concerning which it was long disputed -whether it were an _a priori_ synthetic judgment or simply analytical; -the synthetic element being found or not found in it, according to -the point of view. The same thing has occurred in the case of other -examples of a different nature, as in the judgment: "Snow is white." -Here the dispute has been as to whether it be _a priori_ synthetic, -or simply synthetic. The truth is, on the contrary, that in neither -of these two cases is there _logical a priori_ synthesis, because -the judgment "5 + 7= 12" is the expression of abstract or numerical -concepts, and "snow is white" is the expression of empirical or -classificatory concepts. This amounts to saying that both are products, -not of a logical nature, nor of a theoretic nature, but, as we know, -of an arbitrary or practical nature. For this reason, we have denied -the very possibility of simply analytic or simply synthetic judgments -in pure logic. On the other hand, both these kinds of spiritual -formations are _a priori_ syntheses, precisely because, being spiritual -formations (though of a practical nature), they cannot fail to be -produced by a creative (synthetic) act of the spirit. This explains why -they sometimes appear as _a priori_ syntheses, sometimes as something -altogether different from the _a priori_ synthesis. It suffices to -add to the affirmative solution the adjective "practical" and to the -negative the adjective "logical" to obtain agreement and truth. - -[Sidenote: _The a priori synthesis, as synthesis, not of opposites but -of distincts._] - -A question of no less importance is whether the logical _a priori_ -synthesis (we might say, the _a priori_ synthesis in general) is to be -conceived as a synthesis of opposites; if, in other words, intuition -and concept, matter and form, exist in the _a priori_ synthesis in the -same way as Being and not Being exist in true Being, which is Becoming; -or as good and evil, true and false, and so on, exist in the special -forms of the Spirit. The affirmative reply to this question finds, -as is well known, its chief representative in the doctrine of Hegel. -We do not wish to deny the great truth contained in this doctrine, -in so far as by considering the _a priori_ synthesis as a synthesis -of opposites, it insists upon this essential point: that intuition -and concept matter and form, do not exist in the logical act as two -separable elements, merely externally connected. Outside the synthesis -the subject does not exist as subject, and the predicate does not -exist in any way. We must banish altogether the idea of the _a priori_ -synthesis, conceived as the reuniting of two facts existing separately. -But having recognized the true side of the doctrine, we must correct -the inexactness it contains. This arises from the confusion already -criticized, by which the relation of opposition is unduly extended to -distinct concepts, and the unity of effectual distinction is confused -with the dialectic unity, which declares itself synthetic, only in so -far as it makes war against an abstract distinction.[1] The _a priori_ -synthesis is a unity of distinct concepts and not of opposites. That -which is the material of the logical synthesis and which outside it -has no logical character (is not subject), yet in another and inferior -grade of the spirit is form and not matter, and is called intuition. -Hence, there is distinction and unity together; form is not without -matter; but the new matter was already form and, therefore, had its -own matter. The logical _a priori_ synthesis presupposes an æsthetic -_a priori_ synthesis. When considered in the logical sphere, this is -certainly no longer a synthesis, but an indispensable element of the -new synthesis. But outside the logical sphere, it possesses its own -proper and peculiar autonomy. In the logical act intuition is _blind_ -without the concept, as the concept is _void_ without the intuition. -But pure intuition is not blind, because it has its own proper -intuitive light. The concept contains the intuition, but the intuition -transfigured. It is a synthesis, not of itself and its opposite, but -of itself and its distinct concept which is indistinguishable from -itself, save by an act of abstraction. In this way we satisfy the -demand expressed in the formula of the synthesis as unity of opposites, -and at the same time repress its tendency to usurpation. This tendency -leads to the rejection of the concept of æsthetic synthesis, in favour -of the concept of logical synthesis; it means the negation of art by -philosophy, not only in the philosophical field (which would be just), -but in the whole spiritual field. Extending itself from this to other -usurpations and led on by the mirage of an ill-understood unity, it -claims all the other syntheses for logical synthesis, and produces a -great spiritual desert, in which logical thought itself at length dies -of starvation. - -[Sidenote: _The category in the judgment. Difference between category -and innate idea._] - -The logical element, the pure concept or judgment of definition -considered in itself, is given the name of _category_ in the logical -_a priori_ synthesis. This term is nothing but the Greek equivalent -for the word "predicate," which we have hitherto employed. It has been -asked if the category is what used to be called an _inniate idea._ -The answer must be that it is both that and also something profoundly -different. The innate idea was indeed the category, but the category -taken as possessed and thought _prior_ to experience, according to -the view that we have described as abstract or dogmatic. First the -music, then the words; first definitions, then individual judgments or -perceptions. The category, on the contrary, is neither the mother nor -the first-born. It is born at one birth with the individual judgment, -not as its twin, but as that judgment itself. From this aspect the -category or the _a priori_ is not the innate, but the perpetually -new-born. From this we see the vanity of the question, whether the -judgment or the concept be logically _prior,_ not only in the relation, -which we have already examined, of concept with verbal form (judgment -of definition), but also in the relation of concept with individual -judgment. We can say indifferently that to _think_ is to _conceive,_ -or that to _think_ is to _judge,_ because the two formulæ are reduced -to one. Equally vain is the question as to whether the categories -precede the judgment or are obtained from it. They not only do not -precede the judgment, but are not even obtained from it. We never issue -forth from the judgment, as we never issue forth from reality and -history. - -[Sidenote: _The a priori synthesis, the destruction of transcendency, -and the objectivity of knowledge._] - -A final explanation, not less important than those already given, -concerns the _importance_ of the logical _a priori_ synthesis. This too -has been diminished by the very man who discovered and defined that -mental act, and even more by those who have repeated him, without being -capable of reviving again the moment of discovery, and of understanding -the intimate reasons that brought it about. When the concept was placed -outside and prior to the representative element, and thought prior to -and outside the world, so that the former was applied to the latter, -the world was bound to appear to be something inferior to the concept, -a degradation or an impure contact, which thought had to undergo. -When, on the other hand, the representative element was placed outside -and prior to the concept, the latter seemed to be inferior to it, -almost as though it were an expedient for taking hold of the world, -without truly being able to do so, and thus in its turn a degradation -or defilement of it. Hence the sigh that we hear already in antiquity -and more strongly in modern times: oh, if _words_ (that is to say -_concepts,_ because concepts were called words) were not, how directly -should we apprehend things! Oh, if _thought_ were not, how vigorously -should we embrace genuine reality! - -In the first instance, reality is inferior to the concept, in the -second the concept to reality; but in both alike, the two elements -are always thought--as mutually external and truth as undiscoverable. -Thus both these one-sided tendencies end in mystery. According to the -former, the world is created by a God external to it, and will be -disintegrated when it shall seem good to him, while the latter holds -that the truth of things is plunged in impenetrable darkness. But -granted the idea of the _a priori_ synthesis, reality is not inferior -to thought nor thought to reality, nor is the one external to the -other. Representations are docile to thought, and thought conceals -representations even less than the tenuous and scanty veil concealed -the beauty of Alcina. The interpenetration of the two elements is -perfect, and they constitute unity. The false belief in the externality -and heterogeneity of reality and thought can only arise when for the -pure concept and the _a priori_ synthesis there are substitutes, either -abstract concepts with their related analytic judgments, which are -void of all representative content, or empirical concepts with their -related and merely synthetic judgments, which are without logical -form. The value of the _a priori_ synthesis lies in its efficacy in -putting an end to doubts as to the _objectivity_ of thought and the -_cognizability_ of reality, and in making triumphant the power of -thought over the real, which is the power of the real to know itself. - -[Sidenote: _Power of the a priori synthesis never known to its -discoverer._] - -But this efficacy of the _a priori_ synthesis remained obscure to its -discoverer (and most obscure to his orthodox followers). To such an -extent was this the case, that even to Kant the category did not seem -to be immanent in the real and to be the thinking of its reality, -but an extrinsic, though necessary adjunct, an inevitable alteration -introduced into reality to make it thinkable, an anticipatory -renunciation of the knowledge of genuine reality. Reality itself lay -outside every category and judgment, a _thing in itself._ Even in Kant, -the _a priori_ synthesis was confused with simple analysis and with -simple synthesis. These being manipulations of the real, extrinsic and -not intrinsic, practical and not logical, useful, but without truth, so -the _a priori_ synthesis appeared to him to be an expedient to which -man has recourse and cannot but have recourse, but which constitutes, -not his power, but his weakness. Kant, too, dreamed of an ideal of -knowledge, which was not _a priori_ synthesis, but the _intellectual -intuition,_ the perfect adequacy of thought to reality, unattainable -by the human spirit. He did not perceive that the intellectual -intuition, which he longed for as an impossible ideal, was precisely -the continuous operation of the _a priori_ synthesis, nor did he think -that what is necessary and insuperable cannot be defective. He never -knew that the _a priori_ synthesis, which he had discovered, is alone -the true concept and the true judgment, and, therefore, operates in an -altogether different way from simple analysis and simple synthesis, -which are neither concept nor judgment; nor finally that if these -last postulate a _thing in itself,_ the _a priori_ synthesis cannot -postulate it, because it has _it in itself._ - -To understand all the richness of the _a priori_ synthesis is to pay -honour to the genius of Emmanuel Kant; but it is also to recognize -that the systematic construction of Kant showed itself altogether -unequal to the great principle he laid down, but whose value he -insufficiently estimated. - - -[Footnote 1: See above, Sect. I. Chap. VI.] - - - - -III - - -LOGIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES - - -[Sidenote: _The demand for a complete table of the categories._] - -When the definition of the _a priori_ synthesis and of the category has -been attained, it is usual to demand of logical Science (and this will -be demanded also of our exposition) that it should say how many and of -what sort are the categories, how they are connected among themselves, -_i.e._ that it should draw up a _table_ of them. - -[Sidenote: _A request extraneous to Logic. Logical and real -categories._] - -Logic, in our opinion, should reject this demand, the origin of -which lies in the confusion between thought in general and thought -as the science of thought. The categories are certainly affirmed in -the individual judgment, but Logic, as the science of thought, does -not undertake to formulate judgments which will say what are the -predicable terms, the ultimate or pure concepts, the categories, with -which reality is thought. Logic cannot claim to substitute itself for -the other philosophic sciences and itself to solve all the problems -which offer themselves to thought as to the nature of reality. Its -scope is to define categories and to formulate judgments _only on that -aspect of Reality, which is logical thought._ It is, therefore, under -the obligation to face the question as to whether there be logical -categories, supreme concepts or supreme predicables from the point of -view of logic, and if there be, to indicate and to deduce them. It is -not obliged to indicate and to deduce all the supreme predicables and -categories. - -[Sidenote: _The uniqueness of the logical category: the concept._] - -Now we have already treated of the question as to the categories -of Logic and have solved it, partly affirmatively, partly in the -negative. That is to say, we have denied to Logic a multiplicity -of categories, since the three fundamental categories, usually -given as concept, judgment, and syllogism, have been revealed to be -identical. The others, derived from formalist Logic and relating to -classes of concepts, to forms of judgments and to figures of the -syllogism (and even these three preceding, if they are taken as -separable or distinguishable), have been shown to be empirical and -arbitrary. Finally, those that were based upon the gnoseology of the -pseudoconcepts have shown themselves to be extraneous to pure Logic. -On the other hand, we have affirmed the category proper to Logic,--the -unique category to which it gives rise. It has been defined as the -pure concept, at once judgment of definition and individual judgment, -the logical _a priori_ synthesis. Thus the enquiry can be looked upon -as exhaustive as regards this part of the subject. - -[Sidenote: _The other categories. No longer logical, but real. Systems -of categories._] - -A glance at the tables of categories that have appeared in the course -of the history of philosophy, from that of Aristotle, which is the -first, at least among the conspicuous, to that of Stuart Mill, or if -it be preferred, to the Kategorienlehre of E. von Hartmann, which is -the last, or among the last, shows at once that the other categories, -which have been described as logical categories, can be reduced to -verbal variants of this unique one of the pure concept, or belong to -other aspects of the spirit and of reality, as distinct from that of -logical thought. For if in the Aristotelian table the _ousia_ and the -_poion,_ substance and quality, to some extent denote the subject and -the predicate of the judgment, that is to say, the abstract elements -of the _a priori_ synthesis: the _poson,_ on the other hand, appeals -to the processes of enumeration and of measurement, the _pou_ and -the _poté_ to the determination of space and time, the _poiein_ and -the _paschein_ to the principles of practical activity, and so on. -The Kantian table seems to refer, or to mean to refer, to logical -thought; but that does not prevent the appearance in it of traces of -the principles of mathematical, naturalistic, heuristic, and other -processes. Furthermore, in the Kantian philosophy, the whole system -of the categories is to be deduced, not from the transcendental Logic -alone, but also from the transcendental Æsthetic (space and time), and -from the Critique of Practical Reason and Judgment, which all lead to -functions or forms, operating as spiritual syntheses and reappearing -as categories in judgments. Finally, we must not neglect the Kantian -metaphysical categories of Physics. - -[Sidenote: _The Hegelian system of the categories and other later -systems._] - -All this becomes clearer in the doctrine of Hegel, where the categories -are not only those of logical thought or subjective thought, concept, -judgment, syllogism; but also those of quality, quantity and measure, -essence, phenomenon and reality, with their subforms and transitions, -and those of the objective concept, mechanism, chemism, and teleology, -and those of the Idea, life, knowing, and the absolute Idea. The -Hegelian, Kuno Fischer, makes certain declarations in his _Logic_ -to which it is expedient to give heed. Following the example of the -master, he was induced to include knowing and willing among the -categories; "It may at first sight seem strange (he says), that -knowing and willing should appear here as logico-metaphysical concepts, -as categories. Knowledge has need of categories; but is knowledge -itself a category? Willing belongs to Psychology and Morality, not -to Logic and Metaphysic. It seems, then, that the categories lose -themselves now in Physics or Physiology, by means of concepts such -as those of mechanism and organism, now in Psychology and Ethics, -with the concepts of knowing and of willing. Objections of this sort -have often been made. We have shown that the concept must be thought -as object, and that the concept of object demands that of mechanism: -the justification of the thing resides in this proof. Willing and -knowing are indeed categories. If the test, by which we recognize the -categories, consists in that they are valid, not only for certain -objects, but for all, and in that they should express the universal -nature of things, it is not difficult to see in what a profoundly -significant way knowing and willing emerge triumphantly from such a -test. They belong not only to what are called the faculties of the -human spirit, but in truth to the _very conditions of the world._ If -the world must be understood as end it must also be understood as -willing; for the end without the willing is nothing. ... If knowing -and willing were only a small human province of the world, they -would certainly not be categories. Their concept would belong not to -metaphysic, but to the anthropological sciences. Since they are, on the -contrary, both of them cosmic principles, universal concepts, without -which the concept of objects and of the world cannot be thoroughly -thought and known, for that reason they necessarily have the value of -categories. And since, in truth, they compose the concept of the world, -they are the supreme categories."[1] This argument amounts to saying, -that whenever a concept is truly universal (not restricted to this -or that class of manifestations of reality and therefore empirical), -whenever a concept is a pure concept, it is always a category. This -thesis is most exact, but it amounts to excluding such a search from -pure Logic, which does not give the concepts or concept of reality, -but only the _concept of the concept._ The attempt of Hegel to embrace -the totality of the categories was not understood and was abandoned -at a later date, and a return was made in some sort to the categories -of the theoretic and practical--theoretic spirit alone--(von Hartmann -gives them in his fundamental tripartition of the categories into -sensibility, reflective thought and speculative thought). But the -tendency to totality reappeared, in an elementary form, in Stuart -Mill, who opposed to the Aristotelian table his own, divided into -the three classes of _sentiments_ (sensations, thoughts, emotions, -volitions), of _substances_ (bodies and spirits), and of _attributes_ -(quality, relation, quantity): a vertiginous regression to an infantile -conception, which yet sought to embrace in its own way the whole of -reality. - -[Sidenote: _The logical order of the predicates or categories._] - -The doctrine of the categories has been introduced and retained in -Logic, not only because of the confusion between the thought of thought -and thought in general, which has just been explained, but also because -of another confusion, which must now be explained, as it has far -deeper roots and far greater importance. It has been and may be argued -in this way. It is true that the categories are nothing but simply -the concepts of reality; but these concepts, acting as predicates, -are presented in logic in a necessary order, which it is the task of -logical Science to deduce. In determining reality by means of thought, -we begin with a first predicate, for instance _being,_ judging that -reality is. This judgment immediately shows itself insufficient, -whence it becomes necessary to determine it with a second predicate -and to judge that reality both is and is not, or is _becoming._ This -predicate of becoming appears in its turn vague and abstract, and it -becomes necessary to determine reality as _quality,_ then as _quantity, -measure, essence, existence, mechanism, teleology, life, reflexion, -will, idea,_ in short with all the predicates that exhaust the concept -of reality. - -[Sidenote: _Illusion as to the logical reality of this order._] - -But we know that this order, this supposed succession, is illusory and -is simply the product of abstract analysis. In the predicate to which -verbal prominence is given, there is concentrated or understood every -predicate, because in every judgment complete reality[2] is predicated -of the subject. Moreover this is shown just by the observation, which -reveals the insufficiency of an isolated and abstract predicate, -and requires for sufficiency nothing less than the totality of the -predicates, the full concept of the Real, of the Spirit or of the Idea. -The concept of Reality, of Spirit or the Idea, can without doubt be -developed, in its unity and in its distinctions; but (let us yet again -repeat) logical Science has for its object, not the effective unity and -distinction of the Real, but the _concept_ of unity and distinction.. - -[Sidenote: _The necessity of the order of the predicates, not founded -in Logic in particular, but in the whole of Philosophy._] - -The ordering of the variety of the predicates, their gradation -according to their greater or less adequacy to reality, arises from -the fact that disputes as to reality show themselves as one-sided -affirmations of this or that predicate or group of predicates, -coupled with the neglect or negation of others, which are not less -indispensable. When, therefore, we attack such one-sidedness and -affirm the complete indivisibility of the predicates, the single -predicates, the objects of the one-sided affirmations, are scrutinized -one after the other, in order to demonstrate their insufficiency, and -for this very reason a certain order is given to them. This order is, -without doubt, necessary, because the possibility of errors, or of -one-sided thoughts, is a consequence of the distinctions, in which -the unity of the Real lives, and which are necessary to it. But for -this very reason the order must be sought, not in logical Science, -but in the total conception of Reality. For instance, in researches -concerning the ethical concept, only he who thinks, not the concept -of the concept (logical science), but the concept of ethical activity -(ethical science), will be able to determine what one-sided concepts -are there possible and what is their order. Only he who thinks a -whole philosophy will be able to determine how many and what and how -connected are the one-sided and erroneous modes of philosophy. This -cannot be found in the concept of the concept; or rather only those -erroneous modes are there found which derive from a one-sided thinking -of the concept of the concept. This we shall see in its place. The -order of the categories in the sense indicated is certainly not -subjective and arbitrary, as a didactic ordering of them would be, a -_πρότερον prὸs ἡμᾶς_; it is a _πρότερον φύσει._ But since this first by -nature is identical with the whole concept of Reality, it is not wholly -contained in the concept of Logic. - -[Sidenote: _False distinction of philosophy into two spheres, -Metaphysic and Philosophy, rational philosophy and real philosophy, -etc., due to the confusion between Logic and doctrine of the -categories._] - -If the confusion between Logic and the Doctrine of the Categories, or -between the thinking of the logical category and the thinking of the -other categories, had produced no other effect than that of introducing -into books of Logic a method of treatment that exceeds their bounds, -the evil would not be great. It would chiefly affect literary harmony -and clarity of didactic exposition. But from that confusion there has -sometimes as _rational Philosophy and real Philosophy,_ sometimes as -_Gnoseology and Anthropology (or Cosmology,)_ sometimes as _Logic and -System of Philosophy,_ and so on. The conception of Reality is thus -twice described: once as part of Logic (the Doctrine of the Categories, -Ontology, etc.); and again as effective or applied Philosophy. -Philosophy is divided into a Prologue to Philosophy and Philosophy, -or into Philosophy and a Conclusion to Philosophy. But Philosophy, -although it is distinguishable into philosophies (for example, -Æsthetic, Logic, Economic and Ethic), _is this distinction itself,_ -or the unity immanent in it. It never gives rise to a duality of -grades. It is never prologue, development and conclusion, being, at its -every point, prologue, development and conclusion. As from empirical -and formalist Logic arose the idea of a Logic which should not be -philosophy, but an organ or instrument or rule or law for the rest of -philosophy; so from the confusion of Logic with the Doctrine of the -Categories has arisen the idea of a Logic, or Metaphysic, or general -Philosophy, or whatever else it may be called, which should be _opposed -to or above_ the rest of philosophy. But the Science of thought, Logic, -is at once thought and effective philosophy; it is thought itself -which in thinking the Real, thinks itself and places itself, as logical -Science, in the place which belongs to it in the system of the Real. - -[Sidenote: _Philosophy and pure logic: overcoming of the duality._] - -It may seem that in this way thought and reality are again divided and -a metaphysical dualism created. But the exact opposite is the truth. -When Philosophy is distinguished into general and particular, into -rational and real, into pure and applied, into Logic-metaphysic and -into Philosophy of nature and of man, an irreparable breach is made, -which can only be concealed or attenuated in a more or less ingenious -manner. But when that doubleness of degree is destroyed (and thought -thinking the real thereby thinks itself), and in the construction of -Philosophy, the Philosophy of philosophy, namely Logic, is constructed, -the dualism is for ever overcome. This thought is the thinking of the -distinctions, which the real presents; but to think distinctions and to -think unity is, as has been already demonstrated, the same thing. - - -[Footnote 1: _Logik,_ pp. 532-3.] - -[Footnote 2: See above Sect. II. Chap. V.] - - - - -SECOND PART - -PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND THE NATURAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES - - - - -I - -THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE - - -[Sidenote: _Summary of results as to the forms of acquaintance._] - - -The result of the preceding enquiries into the constitution of the -cognitive spirit can be resumed, for mnemonic purposes, by saying -that there are _two pure theoretic_ forms, _the intuition_ and -_the concept,_ the second of which is subdivided into _judgment -of definition and individual judgment,_ and that there are two -modes of _practical_ elaboration of knowledge, or of formation of -pseudoconcepts, the _empirical concept and the abstract concept,_ from -which are derived the two subforms of judgment of _classification_ and -of judgment of _enumeration._ If the methods in use in the mediæval -schools or in those of Port-Royal (which were not without their -utility) were still in vogue, we should be able to embody these results -in a few _mnemonic verses,_ which would render the distinctions we have -made easy to impart. - -Easy to impart, but not understood, or worse, ill understood; because, -as we know, both the scheme of classification here adopted and the -arithmetical determination of two or more forms are not truly logical -thoughts adequate to the representation of the process of the real -and of thought. Our grouping constructed to help the memory must -therefore be interpreted with the aid of the developments offered -above, and not only corrected, but altogether resolved in them. In -these developments, the intuition and the concept have appeared as two -forms, not capable of co-ordination, but both distinct and united. The -judgment of definition and the individual judgment have appeared as -logically identical, divisible only from an external or literary point -of view, that is to say, by the greater or less importance attached -either to the predicate or to the subject. Further, the formation of -the pseudoconcepts is outside theory, although founded upon theoretic -elements; it belongs essentially, not to the cognitive spirit, but -to the practical spirit. And if their subdivision into empirical and -abstract concepts is necessary, the necessity is founded upon the fact, -that only in these two modes can the concept be practically developed, -when its synthetic unity is arbitrarily split up into two one-sided -forms. Finally, the two fundamental forms of the spirit themselves, the -theoretic and the practical, are not co-ordinate with one another, nor -capable of arithmetical enumeration. The one is in the other, the one -is correlative to the other, because the one presupposes the other. - - -[Sidenote: _Non-existence of technical forms, and of composite forms._] - -No other cognitive or practical-cognitive forms, or other subforms, -beyond those which we have defined, are conceivable. The _technical -knowledge,_ which is discussed in some treatises on Logic, is nothing -but knowledge itself, which is always and entirely technical, preceding -and conditioning the action and practice of life. The same may be -said of _normative_ knowledge, by which, as with technical, it is -especially meant in ordinary language to designate the whole of the -pseudoconcepts. But this is erroneous, when we consider that such -knowledge constitutes the true immediate precedent condition of action. -The pseudoconcepts must be retranslated into individual judgments, in -order that they may be able to form the basis of action, for which, -as is justly remarked, we require direct and concrete perceptions of -actual situations. Formulæ and abstractions aid perception only in an -indirect and subsidiary manner. - -The so-called combined or _composite_ forms in which two or more -original forms are brought together, must also be rejected, for the -reason already given, that composite concepts do not exist in pure -Logical thought, and consequently cannot exist in the Science of -Logic, which is the science of that thought. The composite form, then, -is an empirical and arbitrary determination, as may be observed, for -instance, in the case in which we speak of an empirico-philosophic -concept, that is, of the union (which is a successive enunciation) of -an empirical concept and a philosophic concept. - - -[Sidenote: _Identity of cognitive forms and forms of knowledge. -Objections to it._] - -The cognitive forms having thus been established, we pass on to -the question, what and how many and of what kind are the _forms of -knowledge._ The reply must be that the forms of knowledge (for example, -History and the natural Sciences) cannot be anything but identical with -the cognitive forms, and of the same kind and same number as they. The -first of these statements finds itself at once at issue with common -thought, in which a profound distinction is drawn between the ordinary -and the scientific man, the profane and the philosopher, the poet and -the non-poet, the ignorant and the learned, layman and clergy; and -again, between conversation and science, effusion of the soul and -art, collection of facts and history, good sense and philosophy. It -is thought that acquaintance belongs to all: every one communicates -his sentiments, narrates his experiences and those of others, reasons, -classifies and calculates. But art, philosophy, history and science are -believed to belong to the few. That alone deserves those solemn names, -which is the result of exceptional moments, when man is more than man, -or at least when he is no longer one of the crowd, but belongs to an -aristocracy. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical distinctions and their limits. _] - -And, certainly, these distinctions are useful, and therefore necessary -in practice. We all feel the need of creating an aristocracy of men and -things; of distinguishing the word that a sergeant whispers in the ear -of a maid-servant from a sonnet or a symphony; the proverbs of Sancho -Panza from a treatise on Ethics; and the report of a police-agent from -the history of Rome or of England. We distinguish the classification -of the glasses and bowls in use at home from that of Mineralogy or -of Zoology; the reckoning of our daily expenses from the calculation -of the astronomer; and, finally, Tom, Dick and Harry from Aeschylus, -Plato, Thucydides, Hippocrates and Euclid. The _odi profanum vulgus_ is -a motto that should be appropriated by whosoever labours to promote -the life of thought and of art, yet not without adding to it Ariosto's -post-script: "Nor do I wish to absolve any from the name of vulgar, -save the prudent." - -But, admitting all this, we must recognize not less energetically -that these distinctions, imposed by the necessities of life, have in -philosophy no value at all, and that their introduction there, if it -has some excuse in professional custom, is nevertheless the way to shut -off from us for ever all understanding both of the forms of knowledge -and of those of acquaintance. Man is complete man at every instant -and in every man; the spirit is always whole in every individuation -of itself. The philosopher in the highest sense (in the philosopher -worthy of the name) could be defined as one who raises doubts, collects -difficulties, and formulates problems, intent upon clearing up doubts, -upon levelling difficulties, and upon solving problems; the artist as -a man who limits himself to looking and to recording the significance -of what he has seen. In this case, the ordinary man would be he who -encounters no theoretic difficulties and is unaware of spectacles -worthy of contemplation. But in reality the ordinary man also sets -himself problems and solves them, contemplates and expresses the -spectacle of the real. The distinction has value, therefore, only in -descriptive Psychology, which passes in review types of reality and -the perfected organs, so to speak, which reality creates for itself in -great philosophers and great poets. But what empiricism always divides, -philosophy must always unite. To be scandalized when some one speaks of -the poetry, philosophy, science, mathematics, which are in every one's -mouth; to mock those who unify and identify; to appeal to good sense -and to threaten the madhouse, are things that reveal much pedantry -but no humanity, or, at most, very little. It is foolish to fear that -such an identification as we propose will lessen the importance of the -forms of knowledge and render trivial divine Poetry, lofty Philosophy, -severe History, serious Science and ingenious Mathematics. As the hero -is not outside humanity, but is he in whom the soul of the people is -concentrated and made powerful, so poetry, philosophy, science and -history, aristocratically circumscribed, are the most conspicuous -manifestations attained by the elementary forms of acquaintance -themselves. Such they could not be, were they not all one with them, -just as the mountains could not be, were it not for the earth upon -which they are raised and of which they are constituted. - -It might be said that the forms of knowledge are rich and complex -manifestations of the human spirit, if this statement did not open -the way to another common prejudice, to the belief that to each of -those forms (for instance, to Art, History and Philosophy) several -spiritual activities contribute. Were this so, we should have before -us a mixture, not a product of an unique and original character, such -as we find, as a matter of fact, in a work of Art, a philosophic -theory, a narrative, and a theorem. By the law of the unity of the -spirit all the forms of the spirit are implicit in one another; and the -results, previously obtained from the various forms, condition each -one of them. But each one of them is, explicitly, itself and not the -others; it absorbs and transforms the results of the others; it does -not leave them within itself as extraneous elements, and it therefore -makes of them its own results. The strength of each one of those -forms of knowledge lies precisely in this _purity,_ which persists -in the greatest complexity. A great poem is as homogeneous as the -shortest lyric or as a verse; a philosophic system as homogeneous as a -definition; the most complicated calculations as the addition of "two -and two make four." - -[Sidenote: _Enumeration and determination of the forms of knowing, -corresponding to the forms of acquaintance._] - -If the forms of acquaintance and the forms of knowledge be identical, -it is proved thereby that the second are as many and of the same -sort as the first; and the existence of combined or composite forms -is also excluded from the forms of knowledge. Thus we are henceforth -freed from the obligation of enquiring into the particular nature of -the various forms of knowledge, a task that we have already fulfilled -when enquiring into the forms of acquaintance. It is sufficient to -name them (in correspondence) with the names already given to the -forms of acquaintance, for thus they will be clearly distinguished and -completely enumerated. The method of denomination itself will not be -new and surprising, because it has been, as it were, anticipated, and -foreseen from the examples of which we have availed ourselves above, -and also from some terminological references. We have now only to make -it manifest, to declare it, so to speak, in clear tones. - -Pure intuition is the theoretic form of Art (or of _Poetry,_ if we wish -to extend to the whole of æsthetic production the name given to a group -of works of art); and art cannot be otherwise defined than as pure -intuition. The thinking of the pure concept, of the concept as itself, -of the universal that is truly universal and not mere generality or -abstraction, is _Philosophy,_ and Philosophy cannot be otherwise -defined than as the thinking, or the conceiving of the pure concept. -And since the pure concept can be expressed either in the form of -definition or in that of individual judgment, there corresponds to this -duplication the distinction of the two forms of knowing, _Philosophy -in the strict sense, and History._ The method of treatment called -_empirical Science or natural Science,_ or most commonly in our time, -_Science,_ is composed of those pseudoconcepts known as representative -or empirical or classificatory. The mathematical Sciences are -composed of abstract, enumerative and mensurative pseudoconcepts, -and the application of the second of these, by means of the first, -to individual judgments, is nothing else than what is called the -_mathematical Science of nature._ - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the idea of a special Logic as doctrine of the -forms of knowledge,_] - -It is usual for the treatment of the forms of knowledge to be presented -in the majority of treatises as a _special_ or _applied Logic_; -following _general_ or _pure Logic,_ which has for its object the -specific forms of acquaintance alone, or as it is significantly -expressed, the _elementary_ forms of acquaintance. But we cannot admit -the existence of such a Logic, for the reasons already given. The -elementary or fundamental forms are the only forms philosophically -conceivable and really existing, and the whole of logical Science is -exhausted in them. There is no duality of grades for logical Science -any more than for Philosophy in general. And as no special Æsthetic -exists independent of general Æsthetic, no special Ethic and Economic -independent of general Economic, so there is not a _general_ Logic -alongside of a _special_ Logic. - -[Sidenote: _and as doctrine of methods._] - -Special Logic is also inadmissible, when it is presented as doctrine -of _methods,_ and especially of demonstrative or intrinsic methods. -The method of a form of knowledge and in general of a form of the -spirit, is not something different or even distinguishable from this -form itself. The method of poetry is poetry, the method of philosophy -is philosophy, the method of mathematics is mathematics, and so on. -Only by means of empirical abstraction is the method separated from the -activity itself; and when this duality has been created, we are led -to add to it a third term, which is called the _object_ of that form. -But since the method is the form itself, so form and method are the -object itself. Certainly, all the forms of the spirit have a common -object, which is Reality; but this is not because reality is separated -from them, but because they are reality: they therefore _have_ not, but -_are_ this object. Thus the forms of knowledge have not a theoretic -object, but create it: they themselves are that object. Philosophy has -the pure concept for method and object; art has intuition; science -the empirical concept, and so on. If we wished to treat of methods in -a special Logic, we could not do otherwise than repeat what we have -already said in respect to the character of each form. - -[Sidenote: _Nature of our treatise in respect to the forms of -knowledge._] - -All this amounts to saying that the things we shall discuss concerning -the various forms of knowledge are not to be understood as a special -Logic, although they are grouped in a second part for literary reasons. -There we shall examine one by one the various forms of knowledge, -in order to confirm their identity with the forms of awareness and -to demonstrate how the characters adopted by them are reducible to -those already explained for the others, and how the difficulties -found in them are overcome by means of the same principles that we -employed to overcome the difficulties presented by the others. In -so doing, we shall also gain the advantage of making more clear the -doctrines already laid down as to the elementary forms, by fixing -our attention upon those manifestations of them which are presented -on a larger scale. To those who forget or deny the existence of the -pure concept or of the abstract concept, it will be of assistance, -in giving the speculative deduction of those forms, to point out the -masterpieces of Art, of Philosophy, or of Mathematics, and to invite an -examination of their structure. It is true that in our day preference -is given to another method, which is not only antiphilosophical but -also antipædagogic. This method consists in altogether neglecting -philosophic demonstration in the attempt to divert the attention from -notable and luminous manifestations of the spirit, in order to devote -it to rude and uncertain manifestations. Inscriptions of savages are -preferred to the art of Michael Angelo, the philosophy that is still -crudely enveloped in religion and custom to that of civilized times, -something whose nature none can tell precisely, owing to lack of -documents and the elements of research, to what is evidently art and -philosophy. Such enquirers adopt precisely an opposite course to that -followed by the sciences of observation, which have made telescopes -and microscopes to enlarge the little and bring the distant near. -They seek for instruments which shall diminish the great and make the -near remote. Theirs is a strange empirical caricature of philosophy, -which substitutes the chronologically remote for the fundamentally -conceptual, and for the logically simple, the materially small, which -is not, on that account, simple and is far less transparent. For our -part (and we say it in passing), we believe that to furnish examples -of where to fix the attention in logical enquiry, the minds of an -Aristotle or of a Kant afford all we require, without there being any -necessity to have recourse to the psychology of sucklings and idiots. -But to study Aristotle and Kant does not suffice for knowledge of the -truth of the concept. We must find in all beings of whatever grade and -importance, the universal Spirit and its eternal forms. - -And since we have studied the first and most ingenuous form of -knowledge, Art, in a special volume, we shall here begin our -examination of the second of its forms, Philosophy; and first of all, -of Philosophy _in the strict sense._ - - - - -II - - -PHILOSOPHY - - -[Sidenote: _Philosophy as pure concept and the various definitions of -philosophy. Those which deny philosophy._] - -All the definitions that have ever been given of philosophy will be -found to contain the thought that philosophy is the pure concept -(or to say the same thing with more words and less precision), that -it has the pure concept as its directive criterion. All, be it well -understood, save those which, in negating the pure concept, negate also -the peculiar nature of philosophy. But such are not, properly speaking, -definitions of philosophy, although even these, by contradicting -themselves, imply and assume the definition of philosophy as an -original form, and so as the pure concept. Such is the case with the -theories already examined, of æstheticism, mysticism, and empiricism -(and also of mathematicism), to which we shall return. For them, -philosophy is art, sentiment, the empirical (or abstract) concept. -But it is an art in some way differentiated from the rest of art, a -sentiment that acquires a peculiar value, an empirical or abstract -concept, which raises itself up and looks over the heads of the others. -Thus it is something peculiar, a mode of reflecting _sui generis,_ -and so precisely the pure concept. Empiricism especially reveals this -intimate contradiction, when it advocates a philosophy consisting of a -systematization or synthesis of the results of the empirical sciences. -That is to say, it advocates something not given by the empirical -sciences, because, were they to give it, they would already be -systematized and synthesized of themselves, and the further elaboration -asked for would be altogether superfluous. - -[Sidenote: _Those that define it as the science of supreme principles, -ultimate causes, etc.; contemplation of death, etc.;_] - -All the other definitions which presuppose the peculiarity of -philosophy are reducible, as is easily seen, to the single character of -the pure concept. Philosophy (they say) is the science of the _supreme -principles of the real,_ the science of _ultimate causes,_ of the -_origin of things,_ and the like. In these propositions, the supreme -principles are evidently not real things, or groups of real things, or -empty formulæ, but the ideal generators of the real. Ultimate causes -are not causes (for the cause is never ultimate, being always the -effect of an antecedent cause), but ideal principles. The origin in -question is not the historical origin of this or that single fact, but -the ideal deduction of the fact from facts or from omnipresent reality. -The same idea is expressed in the imaginative saying that philosophy is -the _contemplation of death._ For what but the individual dies? And is -not the contemplation of the death of the individual also that of the -immortality of the universal? Is it not contemplation of the eternal? -This remark supplies the motive for that other formula which defines -philosophy as "the vision of things _sub specie aeterni._" - -[Sidenote: _as elaboration of the concepts, criticism, science of -norms;_] - -The character of the pure concept is also indicated in the definition -of philosophy as the _elaboration of the concepts,_ which the other -sciences leave imperfect and self-contradictory. Indeed, since no human -activity has the imperfect and contradictory as its aim, if the other -sciences are involved in imperfect and contradictory concepts, this -means that they do not aim at constructing concepts and that philosophy -alone elaborates true and proper concepts. For this reason, philosophy -has sometimes been conceived, not as science, but as criticism, and -criticism means placing oneself above the object criticized, in virtue -of a concept superior to those criticized. For this reason, finally, -philosophy has been conceived as the science of _norms and values_: -norms and values, which, if they are to surpass singular things, cannot -be extraneous to them. Hence it is the same thing to speak of _norms -and values,_ or of universal concepts, surpassing and containing in -themselves each single thing. - -[Sidenote: _as doctrine of the categories._] - -If philosophy is the pure concept, it is also the distinctions of -the pure concept; it is all the pure concepts capable of serving as -predicates to individual judgments and so of acting as categories. Here -there is another definition of philosophy: philosophy is the _doctrine -of the categories._ For this reason we have already refused to assign -to Logic the search for the categories: first because the doctrine of -the categories is the whole of Philosophy, whereas Logic is only one -of its links, and consequently seeks only one of the categories, that -of logicity. It could also be said that Philosophy is the doctrine of -the categories, and that Logic, as a part of Philosophy, is a Category -of categories, or a Philosophy of Philosophy. Hence its singular -position among philosophical sciences, so that it appears at the same -time within and without Philosophy, because it completes by surpassing -and surpasses by completing it. In reality, Logic, like every other -philosophic science, is within and not without Philosophy; like the -glassy water which reflects the landscape and is itself part of the -landscape. - -[Sidenote: _Exclusion of mathematical definitions of philosophy._] - -These definitions which we have selected to record and to interpret -(and others which we leave to the reader to record and to interpret) -are all _formal,_ in the legitimate sense of the word. They define -the eternal nature of philosophy, they do not determine actually any -special solution of other philosophical problems, although naturally -they do potentially determine one solution, in that they can agree -only with one solution. Obedient to this formal character, we have -not taken and shall not take account of definitions that imply the -effective solution of all philosophical problems, or of Philosophy in -its totality. Such is, for instance, the definition that Philosophy is -knowledge of oneself, as was said at the dawn of Hellenic thought; or -that it is the return to the inward man where dwells the truth, as St. -Augustine said; or that it is the science of Spirit, as we say. This -definition offers something more than the simply logical aspect of -Philosophy. Looked at from the purely logical standpoint, Philosophy -will be the science of God or of the Devil, of Spirit or Matter, of -final cause or mechanism, or of anything else that may be suggested -as a hypothesis for enquiry, provided that this, whatever it be, is -thinkable as a _pure concept or Idea._ Whoever should negate this -condition, would not negate this or that philosophy, but as we have -seen, philosophy itself, in favour of art, of action, or of something -else. - -[Sidenote: _Idealism of every philosophy._] - -But if Philosophy is by its logical nature pure concept or idea, every -philosophy, to whatever results it may attain, and whatever may be its -errors, is in its essential character and deepest tendency, _idealism._ -This has been recognized by philosophers of the most different and -antagonistic views (for example, by Hegel and by Herbart). It should -be taught as truth to those who are ignorant of it and those who have -forgotten should be reminded of it. Determinism negates the end and -affirms the cause; but the cause which it posits as its principle, is -not this or that cause, but the _idea_ of cause. Materialism negates -thought and affirms matter; but not this or that matter, which composes -this or that body, but the _idea_ of matter. Naturalism denies spirit -and affirms nature; not this or that manifestation of nature, but -nature as _idea._ Finally, when a single natural fact seems to be -posited as the principle of explanation of reality, this fact is -idealized and stands as the idea of itself, generating itself and -everything else. Thus (it has been repeatedly remarked) the water -of Thales, by the very fact that it is taken as a principle, is no -longer any given empirical water, but metaphysical and ideal water. -In like manner, the _numbers_ of Pythagoras are not those of the -Pythagorean table, but cosmic principles and ideas. Theism does not -believe it possible to obtain the sufficient reason of reality, without -positing a personal God, above and beyond the world. But this God is -always something non-representative, however much he may be involved -in sensible representation, and placed upon Sinai or Olympus. He is -the idea of personal divinity, the idea of Jehovah or of Jove. The -philosophy which is called idealist in the strict sense of the word (it -would be better called activist or finalist or absolute spiritualism), -strives to prove that, for instance, cause, matter, nature, number, -water, Jehovah, Jove and the like, are not thinkable as pure concepts -and as such imply contradictions, and that therefore such philosophies -are insufficient. This means that it holds the _idealism_ of those -philosophies _insufficient,_ that they are not equal to themselves and -are inadequate to the assumption on which they rest; but it does not -imply that this assumption is not idealistic. - -Were it not idealistic, it would not be philosophical, and so it would -not be possible to submit it to criticism from the philosophical point -of view. - -[Sidenote: _Systematic character of philosophy._] - -From the identity of philosophy with the pure concept can be also -deduced its necessarily _systematic_ character. - -To think any pure concept means to think it in its relation of unity -and distinction with all the others. Thus, in reality, what is thought -is never _a_ concept, but _the_ concept, the _system_ of concepts. On -the other hand, to think the concept in general is only possible by -arbitrary abstraction. To think it truly in general, means to think -it also as particular and singular, and so to think the whole system -of distinct concepts. Those who wish to think an isolated concept -philosophically without paying attention to the others, are like -doctors who wish to cure an organ without paying attention to the -organism. Such a mode of treatment may cure the organ, but the organism -dies and with it dies the healed organ a moment after. The true -philosopher, when he makes even the smallest modification in a concept, -has his eye on the whole system, for he knows that this modification, -however small it may seem, modifies to some extent the whole. - -[Sidenote: _Philosophic and literary significance of system._] - -The systematic character of philosophy, understood logically, -belongs to every single philosophical proposition which is always a -philosophical cosmos, as every drop of water is the ocean, indeed, the -whole world, contracted into that drop of water. It is hardly necessary -to distinguish from this the _literary sense_ of system, which is the -name given to certain forms of exposition, which embrace definite -groups of problems, traditionally held to be those in which philosophy -is contained. When some or many of those groups do not receive explicit -literary treatment, it is said that system is wanting. It is true -that there is wanting the fulfilment of a literary task (or what here -amounts to the same thing, of a pedagogic task); but the system is -there, even in the case when a very specialized problem is treated, -provided it be approached with philosophic and so with systematic -energy. That the same thinker, when he passes to another problem, -should give a wrong solution contradictory to that previously given, -does not prove that he had not at first a system, but that he has lost -it when faced with the new difficulty. He was at first a philosopher -and so systematic; afterwards, not philosopher enough, and so not -sufficiently systematic. - -[Sidenote: _Advantages and disadvantages of the literary form of -system._] - -The traditional groupings of problems, and the construction of system -in the literary and pedagogic sense, certainly have their utility -(all that exists has its proper function and value). They preserve -and promote culture already acquired, by obliging it to examine -difficulties, which, were they neglected, might unexpectedly become -a great hindrance and loss. Hence the love for system, or for the -literary form of system, a love which the author of these pages -also nourishes in his soul and of which he has sought to give some -proof, by writing a _system,_ although it is long since systems have -been written, in Italy at least (unless scholastic manuals be thus -called), and it is no slight merit to have braved the ridicule of the -enterprise. But systems have also the disadvantage of sometimes leading -to a tiresome re-exposition of problems that are out of date and -whose solutions have passed into the common patrimony of culture. The -treatment of these problems is better left to be understood, that time -and space may be gained for the treatment of others more urgent. Hence -the rebellion against system, or against the pedantry which can adhere -to that form of exposition. This rebellion is similar at all points -with that against the pedantry of definition, which is a legitimate -rebellion, yet cannot eliminate the logical form of definition. Instead -of systems, we write monographs, essays, and aphorisms, but these, if -philosophic, will always be inwardly systematic. - -[Sidenote: _Genesis of the systematic prejudice and rebellion against -it._] - -But the rebellion against systems has another more serious cause, less -literary and more philosophical. Sometimes the demand for a system -becomes a _systematic prejudice._ This fact merits explanation, because -thus stated it may reasonably appear to be paradoxical. However could -the demand inherent in a function be changed into a prejudice, or into -an obstacle to that function? Stated in these terms, it certainly -seems inconceivable. But it becomes clear and admissible, when we -remember that philosophical enquiry is both induction and deduction, -the thinking of distinction and the thinking of unity in distinction. -Neither of the two processes, which are one single thing, should be -substituted for or dominate the other. If we think the concept of -morality, it should be placed in relation to and deduced from the -other forms of the spirit and thus from unity; but it must also be -thought in itself. The thinking of the peculiar nature of the moral -act cannot remain isolated and atomic, but unity in its turn cannot -give the character of the moral act, unless this act be present to -the spirit and make itself known for what it is. In the process of -research, it is possible to deduce the moral act from the consideration -of the other activities of the spirit, without thinking it in itself. -But here a _heuristic_ process is adopted, a _hypothesis_ is made, -and this hypothesis must afterwards be verified, in order to become -effective thought and concept. Now the systematic prejudice consists -precisely in thinking the unity without thinking the distinctions, in -deduction without induction, in changing the hypothesis into a concept -without having seriously verified it. Hence analogical constructions -(or falsely analogical, and so metaphysical and fantastic), which take -the place of philosophical distinctions, and hence the systematic -prejudice, which is a _false idea of system._ Against this rebellion -is justified. But the mistake is usually made of discarding the true -demand for system through horror of the false, or of denying the -utility of the analogical process, which is blameable in the system, -but useful in enquiry. - -[Sidenote: _Sacred and philosophical numbers; meaning of the demand -which they express._] - -Another aspect of this same rebellion which has become universal -in most recent times, is the distrust of or open hostility towards -the search for _symmetry,_ the arrangement of philosophic concepts -in _dyads, triads, quatriads,_ or in other suchlike numbers, which -precisely express symmetry in the ordering of those concepts. And -such distrust will be judged reasonable by any one who recalls the -excesses caused by this love of symmetry and the puerilities to which -some even of the loftiest philosophers abandoned themselves, owing to -their excessive attachment to certain numbers. The pedantry of the -Kantian quatriads and triads is truly insupportable, nor are Hegel's -triads less artificial. These were very often reduced by his disciples -to conjuring tricks and almost to buffoonery. It was natural that -there should be a reaction towards the search for the asymmetrical and -towards the doctrine that the concepts attained cannot be arranged -in a beautiful order, for they change their order from one sphere to -another, but that nevertheless they and no others are the concepts of -reality--inelegant but honest; asymmetrical but true. The reaction -is comprehensible, the distrust justifiable; but the hostility is -certainly unjustifiable. If distinct concepts constitute a unity, they -must of necessity constitute an order or symmetry, of which certain -numbers, that can be called regular, are the expression or symbol. The -concepts of an empirical science may be thirty-seven, eighty-three, -a hundred and thirteen, or as many as you like according as they -are arranged. But the concepts of philosophy will always be dyads, -triads, quatriads and the like, that is to say, an organic unity of -distinctions and a correspondence of parts. For this reason, the human -race has always had _sacred numbers_ in religion and _philosophic -numbers_ in philosophy. Let him laugh who wills; but we do not say -that he laughs well. The criterion of symmetry must not become a -_prejudice._ It must, however, act as a control upon the enquiry that -has been accomplished, since it greatly aids, as a heuristic process, -the enquiry that is yet to be made. Astronomers are praised, when, -thanks to their calculations, supported by the criterion of proportion -and symmetry, they form a hypothesis that a star, unseen at the time, -but which the telescope eventually discovers, must be at a certain -place in the sky. Why should not a philosopher be equally praised, who -deduces that for reasons of symmetry, there must be in the spirit a -form, as yet unobserved, or that for the same reasons, there should -be eliminated a form which does not seem to be eliminable, but which -spoils the symmetry? Why should the spirit be less rhythmical and less -symmetrical than the starry sky? - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of dividing philosophy into general and -particular._] - -When the systematic character of philosophy is conceived in this -way, it is seen that the system is not something superadded, like a -thread used for binding together the various parts of philosophy and -quite external to the objects that it unites, so that we can consider -separately the objects and the thread, the parts and the system. In -philosophy, none of the parts are without the whole, and the whole does -not exist without the parts. Translated into other terms, this means -chat there are not _particular_ philosophic sciences, just as there -is not a _general_ philosophy. We have made use of this proposition, -in order to confute the usual conception of Logic as a prologue to -philosophy, and to show how this error (which in the case of Logic -is supported by special reasons) is the principal source of other -like errors. Thus Metaphysic or Ontology, or some other science, -which is supposed to give the unity of the real, of which the special -philosophic sciences give only the distinctions, is placed before or -after the special philosophic sciences like a prologue or an epilogue. -The truth is that general philosophy is nothing but the special -philosophic sciences, and _vice versa._ The plural and the singular -cannot be separated in the pure concept, where the plural is plural of -the singular, and the singular is singular of the plural. - -[Sidenote: _Evils of the conception of a general philosophy, separated -from particular philosophies._] - -The destruction of this erroneous idea of a general philosophy has -direct practical, importance. For, once the so-called science has been -constituted, by means of a group of arbitrarily isolated problems, -which really belong to the various sciences called particular, we -are led to believe that true philosophy consists of a medley, in -constant agitation and shock, and that, thanks to this agitation and -these shocks, it becomes ever more worthy of itself, that is, of -being a medley. But the problems of God and of the world, of spirit -and of matter, of thought and of nature, of subject and of object, -of the individual and of the universal, of life and death, torn from -Logic, from Æsthetic, from the Philosophy of the practical, become -insoluble or are solved only in appearance (that is to say, verbally -and imaginatively). Many young men, ignorant of all particular -philosophical knowledge, attack them as if they were the first step -in philosophy, and many old professors find themselves at the end of -their lives in the same state of mental confusion as at the beginning, -indeed with their confusion increased and henceforth inextricable, -owing to the false path that they have followed for so many years. -They have not respected philosophy, in their first relations with it; -they resemble those men who will never really love a woman, because -they failed of respect to women in their youth. On the other hand, -the so-called particular philosophical sciences, deprived of some of -their organs and become blind or deaf or otherwise maimed, fall into -the power of psychologism and empiricism. Hence the empirical and -psychological treatment of Morality, of Æsthetic, and of Logic itself. -In regard to this evil, now more than ever rampant in philosophic -studies, it is necessary to remember, that the history of philosophy -teaches that no philosophic progress has ever been achieved by -so-called general philosophy, but always by discoveries made in one or -other of the so-called special philosophies. The concept of Socrates -and the dialectic of Hegel are discoveries in Logic. Kant's concept -of freedom is a discovery in Ethics. The concept of intuition is a -discovery in Æsthetic. The critique of formalist logic is a discovery -in the Philosophy of language. The old idea of God has been dissolved -by those most modest, yet greatest of men, who contented themselves -with formulating a new proposition on the syllogism or on the will, on -art or history, or with defining the abstract intellect or with fixing -the limits of the fancy. Had we been obliged to await these solutions -from the cultivators of that anæmic general philosophy, the old idea of -God would now be more rife than before. And in truth it is still rife -among those philosophers of whom we have spoken, for it reappears from -the midst of the medley which they stir, either with the name of the -Unknowable, or with the old name that still is reverenced. - - - - -III - - -HISTORY - - -[Sidenote: _History as individual judgment._] - -Since all the characteristics assigned to Philosophy are verbal -variants of its unique character, which is the pure concept, so all -the characteristics of History can be reduced to the definition and -identification of History with the individual judgment. - -History, being the individual judgment, is the synthesis of subject and -predicate, of representation and concept. The intuitive and the logical -elements are both indispensable to it and both are bound together with -an unseverable link. - -[Sidenote: _The individual element and historical sources; relics and -narratives._] - -Owing to the necessity for the subject or intuitive element, history -cannot be constructed by pure reason. The vision of the thing done -is necessary and is the sole _source_ of history. In treatises upon -historical method the sources are usually divided into _remains_ and -_narratives,_ meaning by remains (_Ueberreste_) the things which -remain as traces of an event (for example, a contract, a letter, a -triumphal arch), and by narratives the accounts of the event as they -have been communicated by those who were more or less eye-witnesses, or -by those who have consulted the notes of eye-witnesses. But, in truth, -narratives are valuable just in so far as it is presumed that they -place us in direct contact with the thing that happened and make us -live it again, drawing it forth from the obscure depth of the memories -that the human race bears with it. Had they not this virtue, they would -be altogether useless, as are the narratives to which for one reason -or another credence is refused. A hundred or a thousand narratives -lacking authenticity are not equal to the poorest authentic document. -An authentic narrative is both a document and remains; it is the -reality of the fact as it was _lived_ and as it vibrates in the spirit -of him who took part in it. The search for veracity and the criticism -of the value of sources are reducible in the ultimate analysis, to the -isolation of this genuine resonance of fact, by its liberation from -perturbing elements, such as the illusions, the false judgments, the -preoccupations and passions of the witness. Only in so far as this can -be successfully done, and in the measure in which it is successful, -do we have the first condition of history as act of cognition--that -something can be _intuited_ and thereby transformable into the -_subject_ of the individual judgment, that is to say, into historical -narrative. - -[Sidenote: _The intuitive faculty in historical research._·] - -On this necessity is based the importance which in the examination of -historians is attached to intuition, or touch, or scent, or whatever -else it may be called, that is to say, to the capacity (derived in -part from natural disposition and in part from practical exercise) of -directly intuiting what has occurred, of passing beyond the obstacles -of time and space and the alterations produced by chance or human -passion. An historian without intuitive faculty, or more exactly (since -no one is altogether without it), with but slender intuitive faculty, -is condemned to barrenness, however learned and ingenious he may be in -argument. He finds himself inferior to others, less learned and less -logical than he, inferior even to the uncultured and to the illogical, -when it is a question of feeling what lies beneath words and signs, or -of reproducing in himself what actually happened. For the same reason, -it sometimes happens that an expert in a given trade is astonished to -hear the learned arm-chair historian describe certain orders of facts, -of which he has no experience and of which he talks as a blind man -talks of colours. A sergeant can intuite a march better than a Thiers, -and laugh at the millions of men that Xerxes had led into Greece by -simply enquiring how they were fed. A political schemer understands -a court or ministerial intrigue far better than an honest man like -Muratori. A craftsman can reconstruct the successive brush-strokes and -the traces of change of mind in a picture better than the erudite and -æsthetic historian of art. Historical works perhaps defective or even -failures from other points of view, sometimes fascinate by the proof -they give of freshness of impression: and this quality may serve to -increase our knowledge of facts and to rectify the errors into which -their authors have fallen in other respects. To a historian of the -French Revolution we can pardon even the mistaking of one personage -for another, of a river for a mountain, or the confusion of months and -years, when on the whole he has lived again better than others the soul -of the Jacobins, the spiritual conditions of the mob of Paris, the -attitude of the peasants of Burgundy or of La Vendée. What is called an -historical novel sometimes has in certain respects greater value than -a history, if the novel is inspired by the spirit of the time and the -history contains merely an inventory. - -[Sidenote: _The intuitive faculty in historical exposition. Similarity -of history and art._] - -The intuitive faculty, indispensable in research, is not less -indispensable in historical exposition; since it is necessary to -intuite the actual fact, not in a fugitive and sketchy manner, but so -firmly as to be able to express it and to fix it in words, in such a -way as to transmit its genuine life to others. Hence the specially -artistic character that must be possessed by true historians. Here -they resemble pure artists, painting pictures, as they do, composing -poems and writing tragic dialogues. Certainly, every thought, even that -of the most abstruse philosopher and mathematician, becomes concrete -in artistic form. But the historian (in the somewhat empirical sense -of the word) approximates much more nearly to those who express pure -intuitions, since he gives literary preference to the subject over -the predicate. This has been generally recognized both by historians, -who have freely presented themselves as bards of their race invoking -the Muse who represents History upon Parnassus, while there is there -no representative of Philosophy, Mathematics, or Science; and by -theorists, who have constantly debated the question as to _whether -history is art._ It seems indeed to be art, when the predicate or -logical element is so well concealed that hardly any attention is paid -to it. - -[Sidenote: _Difference between history and art. The predicate or -logical element in history._] - -I say _hardly_; because if no attention whatever be paid to it, if -literary emphasis become logical mutilation, art will remain, but -history will have gone. A book of history will no longer merely -_resemble_ a poem or romance, but will _be_ a poem or a romance. What -is it that, from the point of view of intuition, distinguishes an -imaginative vision and an historical narrative? If we open the _Divine -Comedy_ or the _Rime_ of Petrarch and read: "In the middle pathway -of our life, I found myself in a dark forest ...," or, "I raised my -thought to where she whom I seek was and find not upon earth ..."; and -if we open Livy's _History,_ at the place where he recounts the battle -of Cannae, and read: "_Consules satis exploratis itineribus sequentes -Poenum, ut ventum ad Cannas est, ubi in conspecta Poenum habebant, -bina, castra communiunt,"_ nothing at first seems changed; both are -narratives. Yet everything is changed. If we read Livy as we read -Dante or Petrarch, the battle of Cannae in the same way as the voyage -of Dante to the Inferno, or the passage of the spirit of Petrarch to -the third heaven, Livy is no longer Livy, but a story book. In like -manner, if we read a book of stories, as, for example, the _Kings of -France_ or the _Guerin Meschino,_ in the same way as they are read by -the uneducated man of the people, who seeks history in them, the story -book becomes transformed into a historical book, although of a kind -that must be criticized and refuted when a higher degree of culture has -been attained. This suffices to show the importance of that predicate, -which is sometimes left to be understood in the words, but whose -effective presence transforms the pure intuition into the individual -judgment and makes _history_ of a _poem._ - -[Sidenote: _Vain attempts to eliminate it._] - -The necessity of the logical element has been several times denied, -and it has been affirmed that the historian must let things speak for -themselves and put into them nothing of his own. This fine phrase may -have some reference to a-certain truth, as we shall see. But if it is -understood as the exclusion of the logical element in favour of pure -intuition (and worse still, if it intends to exclude also the category -of intuition, for in that case we have simple _muteness),_ it proclaims -the death of history. Without the logical element it is not possible to -say that even the smallest, the most ordinary fact, belonging to our -individual and everyday life, has _occurred;_ as, for instance, that I -rose this morning at eight o'clock and took luncheon at twelve. For (to -give no other reasons) these historical propositions imply the concept -of existence or actuality and the correlative concept of non-existence -or possibility, since in affirming them I also deny that I only dreamed -of rising at eight or of taking luncheon at twelve. All will agree that -we cannot speak of a historical fact if we do not know that it is a -fact, that is to say, something that has happened; even stories become -the object of history, in so far as their existence as stories is -attributed to them. A story, told without knowing or deciding whether -it be or be not a story, is poetry; perceived and told as a story, it -is mythography, that is to say, history; the author of the _Iliad_ or -the author of the _Niebelungen_ is not Adalbert Kuhn, Jacob Grimm or -Max Müller. - -[Sidenote: _Extension of historical predicates beyond that of mere -existence._] - -But the criterion of existentiality does not itself suffice, as some -believe, for the effectual constitution of historical narrative. For -what sort of narrative should we have, if we merely said that something -had happened, without saying _what_ had happened? That something has -happened and does happen at every instant, is not, as we know, the -content of historical narrative, because it is the affirmation that -being is, or that becoming is. What has been said of the individual -judgment, namely, that it is constituted by all the predicates -together, that is, of the whole concept, and not by the predicate of -existence alone, torn from the others, must also be said of historical -narrative. It is truly complete and therefore realized, when the -intuition, which supplied it with the rough material, is completely -penetrated by the concept, in its universality, particularity and -singularity. That the consuls, after having sufficiently explored -the routes, followed the Carthaginian, entered Cannae, and seeing -themselves face to face with the army of Hannibal, pitched and -fortified their camp (as runs Livy's narrative), implies a crowd of -concepts, equal in number to the historical affirmations collected in -that sentence. No one ignorant as to what is man, war, army, pursuit, -route, camp, fortification, dream, reality, love, hatred, fatherland, -and so on, is capable of _thinking_ such a sentence as this. And the -obscurity of one of those concepts is sufficient to make it impossible -to form the narrative as a whole, just as any one who does not -understand the meaning of the word _castra_ is not in a position to -understand what forms the argument of Livy's narrative. If the sources -are changed, the historical narrative changes; but this latter changes -no less, if our convictions as to the concepts are changed. The same -matter is differently arranged and gives rise to different histories, -if it is narrated by a savage or a cultured European, by an anarchist -or a conservative, by a protestant or a catholic, by the me of this -moment or the same me of ten years hence. Given that all have the same -documents before them, each one reads in them a different happening. - -[Sidenote: _Alleged insuperable variation in judging and presenting -historical facts, and consequent claim for a history without -judgments._] - -But the fact here stated seems to lead straight to despair as to the -fate of history, or at least as to its fate, so long as it is bound -to the logical element, to convictions about the concepts. When it is -observed that the same facts are narrated in the most different way; -that what for some is the work of God is for others the work of the -Devil; that what for some is the manifestation of spiritual forces is -for others the product of material movements of the brain, according -as it is well or ill-nourished; that to some the good of life lies in -every explosion and revolt, while to others it lies only in regular -work under the tutelage of laws rigorously observed and made to be -observed,--we arrive at the conclusion of historical scepticism, -namely, that history as usually narrated is nothing but a story woven -from such a state of degeneration seems to be a return to the pure and -simple reproduction of the document, or at least to the pure intuition, -which introduces no element of _judgment,_ or of what is called -_subjective._ But this salvation is only a figure of speech, for pure -intuition is poetry and not history, and to return to it is equivalent -to abolishing history. This, however, is clearly impossible, for the -human race has always narrated its doings, and none of us can dispense -with establishing at every instant how things have happened, what has -really happened, and in what actual or historical conditions he finds -himself. - -[Sidenote: _Restriction of variations and exclusion of apparent -variations._] - -Historical scepticism is, however, as inexact and one-sided in the -observation of fact as it is puerile in the suggestion of a remedy. -Certainly, there are divergences between the various accounts of -the same fact; but (setting aside _apparent_ divergences, derived -from the different interest taken in a given fact, owing to which -verbal prominence is given to one or to another aspect of it, and -limiting ourselves here to _real_ differences) we must, for the sake -of exactitude, take account of all the no less real agreements, to -be found side by side with these divergences. In virtue of them, for -instance, Protestant and Catholic are unanimous in recognizing that -Luther and Leo X. existed, that the one produced a definite movement -in Germany and that the other had recourse to certain definite -prohibitions; and, finally, both Protestant and Catholic recognize (now -at least) the corruption of the ecclesiastical orders at the beginning -of the sixteenth century, and the mundane and political interests of -the German princes in the wars of religion. In like manner no one, -however revolutionary or conservative he is, will question the bad -condition of French finances at the eve of the Revolution; or that -Louis XVI. convoked the States General; or that he attempted flight -and was stopped at Varennes; or that he was guillotined on the 21st -of January 1793; or that the French Revolution was an event which -profoundly changed the social and moral life of the whole of Europe. -Owing to this substantial agreement between two historians in very many -points, and indeed in the greater part of the narrative, it happens -that we can often read and advise others to read histories that are -tainted with the passions of the partisan, while merely recommending -the reader to make a mental allowance for these passions. In like -manner, we can usefully employ a defective instrument of measurement, -provided we include in the calculation the coefficient of aberration. - -[Sidenote: _The overcoming of variations by means of deepening the -concepts._] - - -As to the remedy, it is clear that if the divergences as to the -concepts arise from ignorance, prejudice, negligence, illegitimate -private or national interests, and from other disturbing passions, -that is to say, from _insufficient conceiving of the concepts,_ or -from inexact thought, the remedy is certainly not to be sought in the -abandonment of concepts and of thought, but in correcting the former -and making perfect the latter. Abandonment would not only be cowardly, -but impossible. Having left the Eden of pure intuition and entered -the field of history, it is not given us to retrace our steps. There -is no returning to blessed and ingenuous ignorance; innocence is lost -for ever, and we must no longer aspire to it, but to virtue, which -is neither innocent nor ingenuous. Why does what seems good to the -Protestant seem bad to the Catholic? Evidently, owing to the different -conception that each forms as to this world and the world above us, -death and life, reason and revelation, criticism and authority, and so -on. It is necessary, then, to open the discussion with the enquiry as -to whether the truth is with the Protestants or with the Catholics, -or whether it be not found rather in a third view, which goes beyond -both. Once a definite result has been obtained, perplexity will be at -an end (at least for him who has attained it), and the narrative can be -constructed with as much security as the available historical sources -permit. The way indicated will seem hard; but it is the only way. -Whoever decides to retain his own opinions, received without criticism, -will perhaps provide for his own convenience, but he will renounce -history and truth. For the rest, we do not here draw up a programme for -the future, but simply establish what history is in its true nature, -and consequently how it is manifested and has _always_ been manifested. -Men in every age have discussed the concepts with which historical -reality has been interpreted and have agreed upon very many points, -as to which there is no longer any discussion. Both Catholics and -Protestants, Revolutionaries and conservatives are, as has been already -remarked, more in agreement than they were formerly; because something -has passed and penetrated from each to each, or rather the _humanity,_ -which is in both, has become elevated. Scepticism accomplishes an easy -task, but uses an illusory argument, in history as in philosophy, -when it catalogues the points of disagreement. These are before the -eyes of all, just because they represent the problems which it is -important to solve. Would it not be worth while to keep in view as of -equal importance the points already solved, and to say, for example, -that historians are henceforth agreed that Anchises did not sleep with -Aphrodite, that the wolf did not suckle Romulus and Remus, and that -William Tell did not establish the liberty of the Swiss Cantons? In -short, it would not be easy to find either those who support or those -who deny Mary's immaculate conception. The Catholic writers who insist -upon such disputes are rare, and those who deny are found only in -little democratic journals of the inferior sort or of degraded taste. - -[Sidenote: _Subjectivity and objectivity in history: their meaning._] - -To drive _subjectivity_ out of history, in order to obtain -_objectivity,_ cannot therefore mean to drive away thought to obtain -intuition, or worse still, to obtain brute matter, which is altogether -inexpressible; but to drive away false thought, or passion that -usurps the place of truth, and to mount to true thought, rigorous -and complete. If we attain to intuition, instead of saving ourselves -from passion we shall burn in its flames. For intuition says nothing -but what we as individuals experience, suffer, and desire. It is -just intuition which, when unduly introduced into history, becomes -subjectivity _sensu deteriori;_ whereas thought is _true subjectivity,_ -that of the universal, which is at the same time _true objectivity._ - -[Sidenote: _Historical judgments of value, and normal or neutral -values. Critique._] - -We have thus also solved the question (so much discussed in our day) -as to the _criterion of value_ in history, and whether judgments of -values, as well as judgments of fact belong to the province of the -historian. It is solved, because true judgments of fact, individual -judgments, are precisely judgments of value, or determinations of the -proper quality, and therefore of the meaning and value of the fact. -We admit no other criterion of value than the concept itself. For -this reason, we must also reject the distinction of the _history_ of -fact and the _criticism_ (or valuation) of it. Every history is also -criticism, and every criticism is also history; to say that a thing is -the fact which we call the _Divine Comedy_ is to say what its value -is, and so to criticize it. To think _normal_ or _neutral_ values, -as to which (according to the most modern historical theories) men -of different points of view should agree, seems at the most a mere -_symbol_ of that agreement which men are constantly seeking and -realizing in the subjectivity objectivity of thought. This will never -be a _fact_ completely agreed upon, because it is a perpetual _fieri._ -It cannot be expected of the future, because it will belong to the -future, as it belongs and has belonged to the present and to the past. - -[Sidenote: _Various legitimate meanings of the protests against -historical subjectivity._] - - -If the protest against the intrusion of subjectivity into history -cannot logically be said to have any legitimate meaning save that of a -polemic against false subjectivity in favour of true subjectivity, it -may also imply, on the literary side, a question of expediency, namely, -that in the historical work of art greater importance should be given -to the representation of facts than to the theoretical discussion of -concepts. A historical should not be transformed into a philosophical -work. But this is a question that must be studied case by case; for -what harm could it do, if a historian, beginning by writing a history, -were to end by writing a philosophic treatise? Certainly, it would not -be a greater evil than if a philosopher, becoming passionate about the -facts he gives as instances, were gradually to abandon his first plan -and produce a history in place of a system. At bottom it would do no -harm, or very little, provided that such philosophy or such historical -representation were good; and this is precisely what must be examined -case by case. A more appropriate meaning of the polemic against the -subjectivity of history is the recommendation that in narrating -history, _emphatic, negative,_ and _desiderative_ forms should -accompany logical judgments which, as such, are judgments of value, -as little as possible. These forms, it is argued, are justifiable in -relation to the present or immediate past, because they indicate the -direction of the future, but in relation to the remote past they are -usually empty and superfluous. Indeed, to rage against Marius or Sulla, -Cæsar or Pompey, Frederick Barbarossa or the burgesses of Lombardy, is -somewhat vain, because those historical personages have, in general, -no near or practical interest. But, on the other hand, it is also true -that these characters always have some near and practical interest, -and in that measure we cannot prevent history, even of the remote -past, being here and there revived with the accents of our present -and of our future. Still more legitimate is the significance of that -polemic when the intention is to blame the habit of those who assume -the functions of praise or blame, in relation not only to men, but to -historical events. They applaud paganism, abuse Christianity, weep -over the fall of the Roman Empire, deplore the formation of Islamism, -regret that Buddhism should not have been disseminated in Europe, -sympathize with the Reformation, or disapprove of Catholicism after -the Council of Trent. To them was addressed the saying that history -is not to be judged but to be narrated. But it would be more accurate -to say that history is not to be judged by the categories by which we -judge the actions of individuals, which are subject to the dialectic -of good and evil, because the action of an individual differs from the -historical event, which transcends individual wills. But the definition -of individuality and of event goes outside the gnoseology of history, -and more properly belongs to the Philosophy of the Practical.[1] - -[Sidenote: _The demand for a theory of historical facts._] - -The conviction that has been gained as to the necessity of the logical -element, of concepts, criteria, or values, for the formation of -narrative, has induced some to demand, not only that the historian -should continually have clearly and firmly in mind the concepts that -he employs and his intention in employing them, but that a _theory -of historical factors_ or, as others call it, a _table of values,_ -should be constructed, which should serve as foundation for historical -narrative in general. The demand is exactly similar to that of the man -who, observing that electricians or metal-founders employ physical -forces, demands the construction of a physical theory to serve as the -basis of industry; as if Physics did not exist and supply the basis -for industry; or as if the sciences changed their nature, according -to the men who employ them. The theory of historical factors, or the -table of values, exists, and is called _Philosophy,_ whose precise -business it is to define _universals,_ which are _factors_ and not -facts, and to give the table of _values,_ which are _categories._ At -the most this demand might be taken to suggest the recommendation of a -popular philosophy, for the use of professional historians; but this -too exists and is natural _good sense. A_ historian who entertains -doubts as to the deliverances of good sense begins to philosophize -(in the restricted and professional sense of the word), and once he -has done this, what is called popular philosophy no longer suffices -him, or serves only to make his mental condition worse, with its -insufficient nourishment. Books on the teaching of history which abound -in our literature of to-day are proof of this. Disquisitions as to -the _predominance_ or the _fundamental_ character of this or that -historical factor belong to this popular and more or less dilettante -literature. In strict philosophy, such problems do not arise, or are -promptly dissolved, because it is known that, since every fact of -reality depends upon another fact, so also every factor, or every -constitutive element of the spirit and of reality, is such only in -union with other factors and elements. None of them predominates, -because measures of greater or less are not used in philosophy, and -none is fundamental, because all are fundamental. - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of dividing history according to its -intuitive and reflective elements._] - - -The representative and conceptual elements in historical judgment -are not separable or even, strictly, distinguishable unless it is -intended to dissolve the historical narrative in order to return to -pure intuition. This too is a corollary of what has been said on the -individual judgment. For this reason, every division of history, based -upon the presence or absence of one or other of these elements, must -be held to be without truth. Of this kind is the once popular division -into _picturesque_ and _reflective_ or _thinking_ history. But this -division designates not two kinds of history, but rather, on the one -hand, the return to indiscriminate intuition, and on the other, true -history, which is intuition thought or reflected. The same false -division is sometimes expressed in the terms _chronicle_ and _history,_ -or _narrative_ and _philosophic_ history. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical nature of the division of the historical process -into four stages._] - -Outside the individual judgment, there is neither subject nor -predicate. Outside the narrative, which synthesizes representation and -concept, and by representing gives existence and judgment, there is no -history. Technical manuals usually divide the process of historical -composition into four stages. The first is _heuristic,_ consisting -of the collection of historical material; the second _criticism_ or -_separation_ of it; the third is _interpretation_ or _comprehension,_ -the fourth _exposition_ or _narrative._ These distinctions portray the -professional historian's method of work. _First,_ he examines archives -and libraries, _then_ he verifies the authenticity of the documents -found, _then_ he seeks to understand them, and _finally_ he puts his -thoughts on paper and pays attention to the beauty of form of the -exposition. These are doubtless useful didactic distinctions. But it -must be observed that so long as we do not have a historical source -before us (the first stage) the very condition of the birth of history -is wanting. Hence the first stage does not belong to historical work, -but to the practical stage of him who goes in search of a material -object. The second stage is already a complete historical work in -itself, since it consists in establishing, whether a given fact, called -sincere evidence, has really taken place. The third coincides logically -with the second, since it is the same thing to ascertain the value of -a piece of evidence and to pronounce on the reality and quality of the -facts to which it witnesses. The fourth coincides with the second and -third, because it is impossible to think a narrative without speaking -it, that is, without giving to it expressive or verbal form. - -[Sidenote: _Divisions founded upon the historical object._] - -If history be not divisible on the basis of the presence or absence -of the reflective or representative element, it may well be divided -by taking as basis, either the concept that determines the particular -historical composition, or the representative material that enters into -it. - -[Sidenote: _Logical division according to the forms of the spirit._] - -The first mode of distinction is rigorous, because founded upon the -character of unity-in-distinction, proper to the pure concept. Thus, -the human mind cannot think history as a whole, save by distinguishing -it at the same time into the history of doing and the history of -knowing, into the history of the practical activity and the history -of æsthetic production, of philosophic thought, and so on. In like -manner, it cannot think any one of these distinctions, save by placing -it in relation with the others, or with the whole, and thinking it -in complete history. Naturally, this intimate, logical unity and -distinction has nothing to do with the _books_ which are called -histories of the practical, philosophic, artistic activities, and the -like. There the correspondence with the division of which we speak is -only approximate, owing to the operation of what we called practical -or economic motives. But every historical proposition, like every -individual judgment, qualifies the real according to one aspect of the -concept, and excludes another, or it qualifies it indeed according to -all its aspects, but distinguishes them, and therefore prevents the -one from intruding upon the other. The literary division of books into -books of practical, philosophic, and artistic history, and so on, gets -its importance from this fundamental distinction, according to which -are also divided the different points of view of historians and the -various interests of their readers. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical division of representative material._] - -The second mode is, of necessity, empirical, and cannot be carried -out without the introduction of empirical concepts. For otherwise it -would not be possible to keep the representations of reality separate, -since they constitute a continuous and compact series. By means of -empirical concepts, history is divided into the history of the State, -of the Church, of society, of the family, of religion (as distinct -from philosophy), or of philosophy (as distinct from religion). Or, -as the history of philosophy, it is divided into the history of -idealism, of materialism, of scepticism; or as the history of art, -into the history of painting, of poetry, of the drama, of fiction. Or -again, as the history of civilization, it is divided into oriental -history--history of Greece, of Rome, of the Middle Ages, of the -Renaissance, of the Reformation, and so on. Even these last mentioned -criteria (Greece, Rome, the Middle Ages, etc.) are empirical concepts -and not representations, because, as we know,[2] the representation -is individual, and when it is made constant and general it is changed -into a concept of the individual, the summary and symbol of several -representations, in fact, the empirical concept. Each one of these -divisions is valid in so far as it is useful; and equally valid, under -a like condition, are all the divisions that have been conceived, and -the infinite number that are conceivable. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical concepts in history and the false theory as to -the function that they have there._] - -But the failure to understand that the true function of the -introduction of empirical concepts is to divide the mass of historical -facts and to regroup them conveniently for mnemonic purposes, has -greatly interfered with the ideas of logicians as to the writing -of history. Just as the individual judgment presupposes neither -the empirical concept, nor the judgment of classification, nor the -abstract concept, nor the judgment of enumeration, whereas all these -forms presuppose just the individual judgment; so history does not -presuppose classifications conducted from the practical point of -view, or enumerations and statistics, whereas on the other hand all -of these do presuppose history, and without it could not appear. We -should not be deceived by finding them fused in historical works (which -continually have recourse to such aids to memory), nor allow ourselves -to forget that their function is _subservient,_ not _constitutive._ -There can be no abstract idea of the Greek, unless we have first known -the individual life of the men called Pericles and Alcibiades. Nor can -there be any enumeration of the Three Hundred of Thermopylæ or of the -Three Hundred of Cremera, except in so far as each was known in his -individual features, and then classified as a citizen of Sparta or a -Roman of the Fabian _gens._ To avail oneself of these simplifications -is not to narrate history, which is already present to the spirit, -but to fix it in the memory and to communicate it to others in an -easier way. Those others, if they have not the capacity to recover -the individual fact beneath those concepts of class and of number, -will understand nothing of history, thus simplified and reduced to a -skeleton for the purposes of communication. - -[Sidenote: _Hence comes also the claim to reduce history to a natural -science;_] - -The positivist fiction that _history can be reduced to a science_ -(natural science is of course meant) arises from the false -interpretation of the subsidiary character of the pseudoconcepts in -history and from making them a constitutive part of it. History, on -this view, would be rendered a perfect example of what it has hitherto -been only in imperfect outline, a classification and statistical table -of reality. The many practical attempts at such a reduction have -damaged contemporary historical writing not a little, by substituting -colourless formulæ and empty abstractions which are applicable to -several epochs at once or to all times, for the narration of individual -reality. The same tendency appears in what is called _sociologism,_ and -in its polemic against what it calls _psychological_ or _individual_ -history, and in favour of _institutional_ or _social_ history. Against -these materialistic reductions of history, the doctrines of _accident_ -or of _little causes_ which upset the effects of _great_ causes, are -efficacious and valuable, for these and suchlike absurdities have the -merit of reducing that false reduction to absurdity. - -[Sidenote: _and the thesis of the practical character of history._] - -By reason of the same erroneous interpretation there has come from -philosophers who are not positivists, the theory that history is -rendered possible only by the intervention of _the practical_ spirit. -On this view, the practical spirit, after establishing practical -values, arranges beneath them the formless material and shapes it into -historical narrative. But the practical spirit is impotent to produce -anything in the field of knowledge; it can act only as the custodian -and administrator of what has already been produced. For this reason, -the theory here referred to, by appealing to the practical spirit, -resolves itself into a complete negation of the value of history as -knowledge. And this negation, though it was certainly not foreseen or -desired by those who maintain the theory, yet is unavoidable. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between historical facts and facts that are not -historical, and its empirical value._] - -In this connection, there has also been maintained the importance of -the distinction between historical events and events not worthy of -history, between historical and non-historical, or between teleological -and ateleological personages. Such a distinction, it has been affirmed, -is afforded by the practical spirit. This is true, but for the reason -already given, it amounts to removing all theoretical importance from -the distinction, by emptying it of all cognitive content. In reality, -for the practical economy of social work, for selecting subjects -for books, or for being easily understood in our own speech, it is -necessary to speak of a definite event or of a definite individual as -a thing and person altogether common and unworthy of history. But it -asks the brain of a pedant to imagine that the individual or the event -has thereby been suppressed, we do not say from the field of reality -(which would be too manifestly absurd), but from that of the _narrative -of reality,_ or from history. What is understood forms part of what -is said; and if we did not always imply a mental reference to the men -we call commonplace, and to insignificant facts, which are more or -less excluded from our words, great men and significant events would -also lose all meaning. Such implications are so little eliminated -or eliminable, that they break out and are even verbally expressed, -according to the various interests that determine books on history at -various times. Thus we have seen domestic and social life, neglected -by the old historians, not only gradually assume importance, but throw -wars and diplomatic negotiations into the shade. We have seen the -so-called masses, neglected in favour of the individual genius, in -their turn conquer, and almost eclipse, the heroes (which does not mean -that these latter will not have their revenge). We have seen names, -once hardly mentioned, become attractive and popular, and others, at -one time celebrated, lose their colour and disappear from view. Even -Italian histories of the most recent events afford instances of such -fluctuations. For instance, in the period of the Risorgimento, the -prevailing interest regarded as supremely important and historical, -the formation of Italian nationality, the constitution of the middle -class and of the commune, and popular rebellions against foreigners -or against tyrants. Now it is the social problem and the socialist -movement that dominate, and preference is given to histories of -economic facts, of class struggles and of movements of the proletariat. - -[Sidenote: _Professional prejudice and the theory of the practical -character of history._] - -Practical preoccupations are so strong with any one engaged in a given -trade, even though it is that of a maker of books of history, as to -suggest almost inevitably the strange doctrine of the _practical_ -character of history, or the non-theoretic character of that form, -which is the crowning result of the theoretic spirit, and which alone -gives full truth--if truth is the Knowledge of Reality, and if Reality -is history. - - -[Footnote 1: See on this point my _Philosophy of the Practical,_ part -i. sect. ii. chaps, v.-vi.] - -[Footnote 2: See above, Part I. Sect. I. Chap. IV.] - - - - -IV - - -IDENTITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY - - -[Sidenote: _Necessity of the historical element in philosophy._] - - -The necessity of philosophy as a condition of history has been made -evident from the preceding considerations. It is now necessary -to affirm with no less clearness the necessity of history for -philosophy. If history is impossible without the logical, that is, -the philosophical, element, philosophy is not possible without the -intuitive, or historical element. - -For a philosophic proposition, or definition, or system (as we have -called it), appears in the soul of a definite individual at a definite -point of time and space and in definite conditions. It is therefore -historically conditioned. Without the historical conditions that -demand it, the system would not be what it is. The Kantian philosophy -was impossible at the time of Pericles, because it presupposes, for -instance, exact natural science, which developed from the Renaissance -onward. And this presupposes geographical discoveries, industry, -capitalist or civil society, and so on. It presupposes the scepticism -of David Hume, which in its turn presupposes the deism of the beginning -of the eighteenth century, which in its turn is connected with the -religious struggles in England and in all Europe in the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries, and so on. On the other hand, if Kant were -to live again in our time, he could not write the _Critique of Pure -Reason_ without modifications so profound as to make of it, not only a -new book, but an altogether new philosophy, though containing within -itself his old philosophy. Stiff with old age, he was even capable -of ignoring the interpretations and developments of Fichte, and of -ignoring Schelling. But to-day he could not ignore either of these, -nor Hegel, nor Herbart, nor Schopenhauer. He could not even ignore -the representatives of the mediæval philosophy, which followed the -classical period of modern philosophy; the authors of positivist myths, -Kantian and Hegelian scholastics, the new combinations of Platonism and -Aristotelianism, that is, of pre-Kantian with post-Kantian philosophy, -the new sophists and sceptics, the new Plotinians and Mystics, nor -the states of soul and the facts, which condition all these things. -For the rest, Kant truly lives again in our days, with a different -name (and what is individuality, countersigned with the name, save a -juxtaposition of syllables?) He is the philosopher of our times, in -whom is continued that philosophic thought, which once took, among -others, the Scoto-German name of Kant. And the philosopher of our day, -whether he will it or no, cannot abandon the historical conditions in -which he lives, or so act as to make that not to have happened which -happened before his time. Those events are in his bones, in his flesh -and blood, and it is impossible to drive them out. He must therefore -take account of them, that is, know them historically. The breadth -of his philosophy will depend upon the breadth of his historical -knowledge. If he did not know them, but merely carried them in him as -facts of life, his condition would not differ from that of any animal -(or of ourselves in so far as we are animals or beings that are, or -rather seem to be, completely immersed in will and practice). For the -animal is precisely conditioned by the whole of nature and the whole of -history, but does not know it. The meaning of the demand must therefore -be understood that a truthful answer may be obtained. _History_ must -be known in order to obtain the truth of _philosophy._ - -[Sidenote: _Historical quality of the culture required in the -philosopher._] - -This demand is usually expressed in the formula that the philosopher -must be cultured, though it is not clear what is the quality of this -culture that is said to be requisite. Some, especially in our own -days, would wish the philosopher to be a physiologist, a physicist, a -mathematician, that is, that his brain should be full of abstractions, -which are certainly not useless (everything is worth knowing, even the -triviality of girls, for even that is a part of life and of reality), -but which are in no direct relation to that form of knowledge which -must be the condition of philosophy. This form of knowledge is, on the -contrary, history; or, as it is said (with an _a potiori_ intention), -the history of philosophy, which of necessity as the history of a -moment of the spirit, includes all history in itself, as we have shown -above, when criticizing the divisions of history. That is to say, it is -necessary to know the meaning of the problems of our own time, and this -implies knowing also those of the past, in order not to take the former -for the latter and so cause inextricable confusion. And to the extent -that they can be of use according to the requirements of the problem, -we must know also the natural, physical, and mathematical sciences. But -we must _not_ know them _as stick_ and develop them as such, but rather -_as historical knowledge_ concerning the state of the natural sciences, -of physics, and of mathematics, in order to understand the problems -that they help to raise for philosophy. - -[Sidenote: _Apparent objections._] - -It is vain to set against this the example of great philosophers -without historical culture, as it is vain in the case of the necessity -of historical knowledge for æsthetic criticism to bring forward -instances of those who, although without any historical knowledge, -have yet given far more true and more profound judgments upon art -than the historically learned. If those judgments are true, then the -critic supposed to be ignorant of history is not ignorant of it. He has -somehow absorbed, scented in the air, divined with rapid perception -those actual facts that were applicable to the given case. And, on the -other hand, the so-called learned man will not be cultured, because his -erudition is not lively and synthetic. The same happens in the case -of those acute philosophers, who are said to be ignorant of the world -and of history and of the thoughts of other philosophers. It cannot -be denied that much or little history may be learned outside the -usual course of teaching by manuals and by orderly mnemonic methods. -But here, too, the exceptional mode of learning confirms the rule and -does not obviate the usefulness for the majority of the customary -modes of learning. On the other hand, if he who is said empirically to -be without historical knowledge, but is not so in a given instance, -should nevertheless prove really ignorant in other instances, where -his unusual way of learning is not open to him, his philosophy also -suffers. For this reason, those philosophers who are ignorant of -history exhibit deficiencies that have often been deplored. They burst -open doors already opened, they do not avail themselves of important -results, they ignore grave difficulties and objections, they fail -to probe certain problems sufficiently deeply, and show themselves -too insecure and too superficial in others, and so on. Thus is the -customary learning of history avenged upon them: and Herbert Spencer, -who would never read Plato or Kant, is rejected, while Schelling and -Hegel are again in the hands of students. - -[Sidenote: _Communication of history as changing of history._] - -Philosophy also changes with the change of history, and since history -changes at every moment, philosophy at every moment is new. This can -be observed even in the fact of the communication of philosophy from -one individual to another by means of speech or writing. Change at once -takes place in that transmission. When we have simply created again in -ourselves the thought of a philosopher, we are in the same condition -as he who has enjoyed a sonnet or a melody, by suiting his spirit to -that of the poet or composer. But this does not suffice in philosophy. -We may attain to ecstasy by the recitation of a poem or the execution -of a piece of music, just as it is, without altering it anywhere. But -it does not seem possible to possess a philosophic proposition, save -when we have _translated_ it, as we say, _into our own language,_ when -in reality, relying upon its results, we formulate new philosophic -propositions and solve new problems that have presented themselves in -our souls. For this reason no book ever completely satisfies us. Every -book quenches one thirst, only to give us a new one. So true is this, -that when we have finished reading or are in course of reading, we -often regret that it is impossible to speak with the author. We are led -to say, like Socrates in the _Phædrus,_[1] that written discourses are -like pictures and do not answer questions, but always repeat what has -already been said. Or we lose patience, like that Paduan professor of the -fifteenth century, who, commenting on the jurist Paolo, and annoyed -at the difficulties, exclaimed at a certain point: _"Iste maledictus -Paulus tam obscure loquitur ut, si haberem eum in manibus, eum per -capillos interrogarem!"_ But if instead of the dumb book, we had -before us a living man, a Paolo obliged to be clear, the process would -still be the same: his speech would be translated into our speech, his -problem would arouse in our spirit our own problem. - -[Sidenote: _The perpetuity of change._] - -The author of a philosophic work is, however, always dissatisfied, for -he feels that his book or treatise hardly suffices for an instant, -but immediately reveals itself as more or less insufficient. For this -reason, to any philosopher, as to any poet, the only works of his -own that bring true satisfaction are those that he has still to do. -Thus every philosopher and every true artist dies unsatisfied, like -Karl Marx, who, when asked in the last year of his life to prepare -a complete edition of his works, replied that he had yet to write -them. He alone is satisfied who at a certain moment ceases to think -and takes to admiring himself, that is to say, the corpse of himself -as a thinker, and is careful, not of art or philosophy, but of his -own person. Yet to no one can even this give the satisfaction he -imagines, for life is no less voracious and insatiable than thought. -In any case, to be satisfied, the author must become philosophically -immobile in a _formula,_ and the reader must content himself with this -formula. Thoughts must become "obtuse and deaf," as Leibnitz called -them, who defined such a spiritual condition as _psittacism._ The -only consolation left to one who does not become immobile is that of -reflecting, like Socrates, that his discourses will not be sterile, but -fruitful. Other discourses will spring from them in his own soul and in -the soul of others, in whom he has sown the _seeds_[2] He will console -himself with the thought that philosophy, like life, is infinite. - -[Sidenote: _Surpassing and continuous progress of philosophy._] - -The infinity of philosophy, its continuous changing, is not a doing -and an undoing, but a continuous _surpassing of itself._ The new -philosophic proposition is made possible only by the old; the old -lives eternally in the new that follows it and in the new that will -follow that again and make old that other which is new. This suffices -to reassure those minds which are easily led astray and inclined to -lament the vanity of things. Where everything is vain, nothing is -vain; fullness consists precisely in that perpetual becoming vain, -which is the perpetual birth of reality, the eternal becoming. Nobody -renounces love because love is transitory, nor abandons thinking -because his thought will give place to other thoughts. Love passes, but -generates other beings, who will love. Thought passes, but generates -other thoughts, which, in their turn, will excite other thoughts. In -the world of thought also, we survive in our own children: in our -children who contradict us, substitute themselves for us and bury us, -not always with due piety. - -[Sidenote: _Meaning of the eternity of philosophy._] - -No other meaning but this is to be found in the vaunted eternity -of philosophy in regard to time and space. The eternity of every -philosophic proposition must be affirmed against those who -materialistically consider all propositions as valueless existences, -and fugitives which leave no trace, as phenomena of brute matter, -which alone persists. Philosophic propositions, though historically -conditioned, are not effects produced and determined by these -conditions, but creations of thought, which is continued in and through -them. When they appear to be produced determinately, they must be -held to be, not philosophy, but false philosophy, vital interests -masquerading as thoughts. That alone can be eternal as philosophy, -which is knowledge and truth. But when eternity is misunderstood as -isolation from those conditions, it must then be denied, and in place -of it the thesis of relativity must be admitted, provided we are -careful that it does not assume the erroneous vesture of historical -materialism and economic determinism. The thesis that the history of -philosophy should be treated _psychologically,_ by the attribution -of ideas to the temporal conditions and the personal experiences of -philosophers, to social history and biography, is reducible (and it -is worth while noticing this) to materialism and determinism in its -least evident form, namely psychologism. Such a thesis is the failure -to recognize spiritual value, or at least (as is the case with some -unconscious æstheticists), the logical value of philosophy, whose -history, when changed into that of the expressions of states of the -soul, comes to coincide altogether with the history of poetry and -literature. - -[Sidenote: _The concept of spontaneous, ingenuous, innate philosophy, -etc., and its meaning._] - -The eternity of philosophy is its truth, and the conception which is -sometimes brought forward of a _spontaneous_ or _ingenuous_ or _innate_ -or _cryptic_ (_abdita_) philosophy, which alone should be permanent -amid the variations of philosophic opinions, or to which the spirit -should return after many wanderings, is nothing but a symbol of this -truth. The Platonic theory of _reminiscence (anamneisis)_ is reducible -to this conception. In this theory true knowledge is explained as the -recollection of an original state; and it is this reminiscence, as the -restitution of the childish soul, that is described by our Leopardi in -the following verses: - -I believe that to know is very often, if we examine it, nothing but to -perceive the folly of beliefs due to habit, and the careful reconquest -of the knowledge of childhood, taken from us by age; for the child -neither knows nor sees more than we, but he does not believe that he -sees and knows. - -But such philosophy and such reminiscence are really found only in -propositions historically conditioned. Ingenuous philosophy and -primitive knowledge are nothing but the concept itself of philosophy, -fully realized in all and none. "Platonic reminiscence (explained -Schelling) is the memory of that state, in which we are all one with -nature." But since we are one with nature in every one of our acts, -each one of them demands a special reminiscence and so a new thought. -In like manner, _the state of nature,_ celebrated in moral and -political doctrines (the doctrines of morality and rights), was a state -of perfection which can never be found anywhere in the world or at any -moment of time, because it expressed the very concept of the good, of -virtue and of justice. Socrates, in another Platonic dialogue, spoke -of those true beliefs (doxai aleiteis) as elusive like the statues of -Daedalus, that disappear from the soul, unless one binds them with -rational arguments, and only when thus bound do they from beliefs -become knowledge.[3] Such is ingenuous philosophy, which in reality -exists only when bound and never when loose and ingenuous, as the name -would suggest; philosophy _abdita_ exists only as philosophy _addita._ -Certainly, to the consciousness of doctrinaires, obscured with too much -labour, we can sometimes oppose ingenuous consciousness, and to the -pedantry of scholastic treatises we can oppose the truth of proverbs, -of good sense, of children, of the people, or of primitive races. But -we must not forget that in all these cases ingenuous is a metaphor -which designates truth in contradistinction to what is not truth. - -[Sidenote: _Philosophy as criticism and polemic._] - -The division of philosophy into ingenuous and learned is due to its -convenience and to its didactic value, and in like manner philosophy -properly so-called, or _system,_ is distinguished from philosophy as -_criticism._ The former is looked upon as the solid and permanent -part, the latter as variable and adaptable to times and places, -having as its object the defence of the eternal truths conquered by -the human spirit, against the wiles and assaults of error. In reality -the distinction is empirical: philosophy and philosophical criticism -are the same thing; every affirmation is a negation, every negation -is an affirmation. The critical or negative side is inseparable from -philosophy, which is always substantially a _polemic,_ as can be seen -from the examination of any philosophic writing. Peace-loving people -are fond of recommending abstention from polemics and the expression of -one's own ideas in a _positive_ manner. But only the artist is capable -of expressing his soul without polemic, since it does not consist of -ideas. Ideas are always armed with helmet and lance, and those who wish -to introduce them among men must let them make war. A philosopher, when -he truly abstains from polemics and expresses himself as though he -were pouring out his own soul, has not even begun to philosophize. Or, -having philosophized upon certain problems, he makes, as Plato does, -the act of renunciation when he is confronted with others, feeling that -he has attained to the extreme limit of his powers, and from philosophy -he passes to poetry and prophecy. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of philosophy and history._] - -Philosophy, then, is neither beyond, nor at the beginning, nor at -the end of history, nor is it achieved in a moment or in any single -moments of history. It is achieved _at every moment_ and is always -completely united to facts and conditioned by historical knowledge. But -this result which we have obtained and which completely coincides with -that of the conditioning of history by philosophy is still somewhat -provisional. Were we to consider it definite, philosophy and history -would appear to be two forms of the spirit, mutually conditioning one -another, or (as has sometimes been trivially remarked) in reciprocal -action. But philosophy and history are not two forms, they are one sole -form: they are not mutually conditioned, but identical. The _a priori_ -synthesis, which is the reality of the individual judgment and of the -definition, is also the reality of philosophy and of history. It is the -formula of thought which by constituting itself qualifies intuition -and constitutes history. History does not precede philosophy, nor -philosophy history: both are born at one birth. If it is desired to -give precedence to philosophy, this can only be done in the sense that -the unique form of philosophy-history must take the name and character, -not of intuition, but of what transforms intuition, that is to say, of -thought and of philosophy. - -[Sidenote: _Didactic divisions and other reasons for the apparent -duality._] - -Philosophy and history are distinguished, as we know, for didactic -purposes, philosophy being that form of exposition in which special -emphasis is accorded to the concept or system, and history as that form -in which the individual judgment or narrative is specially prominent. -But from the very fact that the narrative includes the concept, every -narrative clarifies and solves philosophic problems. On the other -hand, every system of concepts throws light upon the facts which are -before the spirit. The confirmation of the value of a system resides -in the power of interpreting and narrating history, which it displays. -It is history which is the touchstone of philosophy. It is true that -the two may appear to be different, owing to the external differences -of books, in which only one of the two seems to be treated: and it -is also true that the didactic division is based upon a diversity -of aptitudes, which practice contributes to develop. But, provided -always that the meaning both of a philosophic proposition and of a -historical proposition is fathomed to the bottom, their intrinsic -unity is indubitable. The fact that is so often cited of conflicts -between philosophy and history is in reality a conflict between two -philosophies, the one true and the other false, or both partly true and -partly false. Some thinkers, for instance, are idealist in recounting -history and materialist in their philosophic systems. This means -that two philosophies are at strife within them without either being -sufficiently aware of it. And does it not also happen that we find in -a philosophic exposition propositions that contradict one another and -divergent systems capriciously associated in one system? - -From intuition, which is indiscriminate individualization, we rise to -the universal, which is discriminate individualization, from art to -philosophy, which is history. The second stage, precisely because it is -second, is more complex than the first, but this does not imply that -it is, as it were, split into two lesser degrees, philosophy _and_ -history. The concept, with one stroke of the wing, affirms itself and -takes possession of the whole of reality, which is not different from -it, but is itself. - -_Note._--May I be permitted an explanation concerning the history of -my thought (and also of its criticism owing to their unity already -demonstrated)? Sixteen years ago I began my studies in philosophy with -a memoir entitled _History beneath the general concept of Art_ (1893). -There I maintained, not that history is art (as others have summarized -my thought) but (as indeed the title clearly showed) that history -can be placed beneath the _general_ concept of art. I now maintain, -sixteen years after, that, on the contrary, history is philosophy -and that history and philosophy are indeed the same thing. The two -theories are certainly different; but they are far less different -than appears, and the second theory is in any case a development and -perfecting of the first. _Elle a bien changé sur la route,_ without -doubt; but without discontinuity and without gaps. Indeed, the objects -of my memoir were chiefly: (1) to combat the _absorption_ of history, -which the natural sciences were then attempting more than they are -now; (2) the affirmation of the _theoretic_ character of art and of -its _seriousness,_ art being then regarded as a hedonistic fact by the -prevailing positivism; (3) the negation of history as a _third form_ -of the theoretic spirit different from the æsthetic form and from that -of thought. I still maintain these three theses intact and they form -part of my _Æsthetic_ and of my _Logic._ But the proper character of -philosophy, so profoundly different from the empirical and abstract -sciences, was not clear to me at the time, and therefore neither was -the difference between philosophic Logic and Logic of classification. -For this reason I was unable completely to solve the problem that I had -proposed to myself. Owing to this confusion of the true universality -of philosophy and of the false universality of the sciences (which is -either mere generality or abstractness) in a single group, it seemed -to me that the concreteness of history could enter only the group of -art, understood in its greater extension (hence the general concept of -art). In this group, by means of the fallacious method of subordination -and co-ordination, I distinguished history as the _representation of -the real,_ placing it without mediation alongside the representation of -the _possible_ (art in the strict sense of the word). When I understood -the true relation between Philosophy and the sciences (a slow progress, -because to reattain to consciousness of what philosophy truly is has -been slow and difficult for the men of my generation), the nature of -history also became somewhat clearer to me as I gradually freed myself -from the remnants of the intellectualistic and naturalistic method. -In the _Æsthetic_ I looked upon that spiritual product as due to the -intersection of philosophy and of art. In the _Outlines of Logic_ I -made another step in advance, history there appearing to me as the -ultimate result of the theoretic spirit, the sea into which flowed the -river of art, swelled with that of philosophy. The complete identity of -history and of philosophy was, however, always half-hidden from me, -because in me the prejudice still persisted that philosophy might have -a form in a certain way free from the bonds of history, and constitute -in relation to it a prior and independent moment of the spirit. That is -to say, something abstract persisted in my idea of philosophy. But this -prejudice and this abstractness have been vanquished little by little. -And not only have my studies in the Philosophy of the practical greatly -helped me to vanquish them, but also and above all, the studies of my -dearest friend Giovanni Gentile (to whom my mental life owes many other -aids and stimulations), concerning the relation between philosophy -and history of philosophy (cf. now especially _Critica,_ vii. pp. -142-9). In short, I have gradually passed from the accentuation of the -character of concreteness, which history possesses in relation to the -empirical and abstract sciences, to the accentuation of the concrete -character of philosophy. And having completed the elimination of the -double abstractness, the two concretenesses (that which I had first of -all claimed for history, and that which I have afterwards claimed for -philosophy) have finally revealed themselves to me as one. Thus I can -now no longer accept without demur my old theory, which is not the new -one, but is linked to it by such close bonds. - -Such is the road I have travelled, and I wished especially to describe -it, in order to leave no misunderstandings which, through my neglect, -might lead others into error. - - -[Footnote 1: _Phædrus,_ 275.] - -[Footnote 2: _Phædrus,_ 276-7.]µ - -[Footnote 3: _Meno,_ 97-8.] - - - - -V - - -THE NATURAL SCIENCES - - -[Sidenote: _The natural sciences as empirical concepts, and their -practical nature._] - -The natural sciences are nothing but edifices of pseudoconcepts, and -precisely of that sort of pseudoconcept that we have distinguished from -the others as _empirical_ or _representative._ - -This is evident also from the definitions that they assume as _sciences -of phenomena,_ in opposition to philosophy, the science of _noumena_; -and as _sciences of facts,_ again in opposition to philosophy, which -is taken to be the science of _values._ But the pure phenomenon is not -known to science; it is represented by art: and the noumena, in so far -as they are known, are also phenomena, since it would be arbitrary to -break up unity and synthesis. In like manner, true values are facts, -and, on the other hand, facts without the determination of value and of -universality dissolve again into pure phenomena. Hence it is possible -to conclude that those sciences offer neither pure phenomena nor mere -facts, but, on the contrary, develop representative concepts, which -are not intuitions, but spiritual formations of a practical nature. - -[Sidenote: _Elimination of a misunderstanding concerning this practical -character._] - -The word "practical" having been pronounced, it behoves us to eliminate -a misapprehension which leads to the natural sciences (or simply -_sciences,_ as they are also called) being said to be practical, in the -same sense as those whose aim is action. Bacon was a fervent apostle -of the naturalistic movement of modern times and full of this latter -idea or preconception. He proclaimed to satiety that _meta scientiarum -non aha est quam ut dotetur vita humana novis inventis et copiis_; -that they propose to themselves _potentiae et amplitudinis humanae -fines in latim proferre_; and that, by means of them, reality _ad -usus vitae humanae subigitur_[1] But in our day also, many theorists -do not tire of repeating that the sciences are _ordonnées à faction._ -Now, this does not suffice to describe the natural sciences, because -all knowledge is directed to action, art, philosophy, and history -alike, which last, by providing knowledge of the actual situation, is -the true and complete precedent and fact, preparatory to action.[2] -The misapprehension in favour of the natural sciences arises from -the vulgar idea that the only practical things in life are eating, -drinking, clothes, and shelter. It is forgotten that man does not -live by bread alone, and that bread itself is a spiritual food if -it increase the force of spiritual life. But further: the natural -sciences, just because they are composed of empirical concepts (which -are not true knowledge), do not _directly_ subserve action, since -in order to act it is necessary to return from them to the precise -knowledge of the individual actual situation. That is to say, in -ordinary parlance, _abstractions_ must be set aside and it must -be seen _how things_ truly and properly _stand._ The patient, the -individual patient, is treated, not the malady; Socrates or Callias -(as Aristotle said), not man in general: θεραπευτὸν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον: -knowledge of _materia medica_ does not suffice; the _clinical eye_ is -needed. The natural sciences are not directed to action, but _are,_ -themselves, actions: their practical character is not extrinsic, but -_constitutive._ They are actions, and are therefore not directed to -action, but to aid the cognitive spirit. Thus they subserve action -(that is, other actions) only in an indirect way. If an action does not -become knowledge, it cannot give rise: to a new action. - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of unifying them in a concept._] - -The empirical character (and the practical character in the sense -already established) of the natural sciences is commonly admitted in -the case of such of them as consist in classifications of facts: for -example, of zoology, botany, mineralogy, and also of chemistry, in so -far as it enumerates chemical species, and of physics, in so far as -it enumerates classes of phenomena or physical forces. The universals -of all these sciences are quite arbitrary, for it is impossible to -find an exact boundary between the concept of animal (the universal -of zoology) and that of vegetable (the universal of botany). Indeed -it is impossible to find one between the living and the not living, -the organic and the material. Finally, the cellule, which is, for the -present at any rate, the highest concept of the biological sciences, -is differentiated from chemical facts only in an external way. It will -be objected that there is in any case no lack of attempts to determine -strictly the supreme concepts of the sciences, such, for instance, as -those that place the _atom_ at the beginning of all things and attempt -to show each individual fact as nothing but a different aggregate of -atoms. There are also those who mount to the concept of _ether_ or of -_energy_ and declare all individual facts to be nothing but different -forms of energy. Or finally, the vitalists recognize as irreducible -the two concepts of the teleological and the mechanical, of organic -and inorganic, of life and matter. But in all these cases _the natural -sciences are deserted,_ phenomena are abandoned for noumena, and -philosophic explanations are offered. These may or may not have value, -but they are of no use from the point of view of the natural sciences, -or at most ensure to some professor the insipid pleasure of calling an -animal "a complex of atoms," heat "a form of energy," and the cellule -"vital force." - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of introducing into them strict divisions._] - -Since the natural sciences cannot be unified in a concept (hence their -ineradicable _plurality_), and therefore remain unsystematic, a mass of -sciences without close relation among themselves, logical distinctions -are not possible in any science. No one will ever be able to prove that -genera and species must be so many and no more, or describe the truly -original character by which one genus may be distinguished from another -genus and one species from another species. The animal species hitherto -described have been calculated it over four hundred thousand, and those -that may yet be described as fifteen millions. These numbers simply -express the impotence of the empirical sciences to exhaust the infinite -and individual forms of the real and the necessity in which they are -placed of stopping at some sort 1 of number, of some hundreds, of some -thousands, or of some millions. Those species, however few or many they -may be, flow one into the other owing to the undeniable conceivability -of graduated, indeed of continuous intermediate forms, which made -evident the arbitrariness of the clean cut made into fact by separating -the wolf from the dog or the panther from the leopard. - -[Sidenote: _Laws in the natural sciences, and so called prevision._] - -But some doubt is manifested where we pass from classification and -description or from _system_ (as the lack of system of naturalistic -classifications is called, by a curious verbal paradox) to the -consideration of the laws that are posited in those sciences. It is -then perceived that the classification is certainly a simple labour -of preparation, arbitrary, convenient, and nominalistic, but that the -true end of the natural sciences is not the class but the _law._ In the -compass of the law strict accuracy of its truth is indubitable; so much -so that by means of laws it is actually possible to make _previsions_ -as to what will happen. This is indeed a miraculous power, which places -the natural sciences above every form of knowledge, and endows them -with an almost magical force, by means of which man, not contented -with knowing what has happened (which is yet so difficult to know), is -capable of knowing even what has not yet happened, what will happen, -or the future! _Prevision_(there must be a clear understanding of the -concepts) is equivalent to _seeing beforehand or prophesying,_ and the -naturalist is thus neither more nor less than a clairvoyant. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical character of naturalistic laws._] - -The miraculous nature of this boasted power should suffice to make us -doubt whether the law is truly what it is said to be, a strict truth, -quite different from the empirical concept, from the class, and from -the description. In reality, the law is nothing but the empirical -concept itself, the description, class or type, of which we have -just spoken. In philosophy law is a synonym for the pure concept; in -the empirical or natural sciences it is a synonym for the empirical -concept; hence laws are sometimes called _empirical_ laws, or laws of -experience. If they were not empirical, they would not be naturalistic, -but philosophic universals, which, as we have seen, are unfruitful in -the field of the natural sciences. The law of the wolf is the empirical -concept of the wolf: granted that in reality there is found one part -of the representation corresponding to that concept, it is possible to -conclude that the rest is also found. Thus Cuvier (to choose a very -trite example), arranging the types of animals and hence the laws of -the correlations of organs, was able to reconstruct from one surviving -bone the complete fossil animal. In like manner, granted the chemical -concept of water, H2O, and given so much of oxygen and double that -quantity of hydrogen, O and H2, and submitting the two bodies to the -other conditions established by chemistry, it is possible to conclude -that water will be seen to appear. All naturalistic laws are of this -type. Certain naturalists and theorists have reasonably protested -against the division of the natural sciences into descriptive and -explicative, sciences of classification and sciences of laws, and have -maintained that all have one common character, namely, law. But this -is not because the law is superior to the class or to the empirical -concept, but because the two things are identical: the law is the -empirical concept and the empirical concept is the law. - -[Sidenote: _The postulate of the uniformity of nature, and its -meaning._] - -The postulate of the _constancy or uniformity of nature_ is the -base of _empirical laws or concepts._ This, too, is something -mysterious, before which many are ready to bow, seized with reverence -and sacred terror. But that postulate is not even an hypothesis, -somehow conceivable, though not yet explained and demonstrated. -Ordinary thought, like philosophical thought, knows that reality is -neither constant nor uniform, and indeed that it is perpetually being -transformed, evolving and becoming. That constancy and uniformity, -which is postulated and falsely believed to be objective reality, -is the same _practical necessity_ which leads to the neglect of -differences and to the looking upon the different as uniform, the -changeable as constant. The postulate of the uniformity of nature is -the demand for a treatment of reality made uniform for reasons of -convenience. _Natura non facit saltus_ means: _mens non facit saltus in -naturae cogitatione,_ or, better still, _memoriae usus saltus naturae -cohibet._ - -[Sidenote: _Pretended inevitability of natural laws._] - -Another consequence of this is the inversion of the assertion (to be -found everywhere in the rhetoric of the natural sciences) as to the -_inexorability and inevitability_ of the laws of nature. Those laws, -precisely because they are arbitrary constructions of our own and give -the movable as fixed, are not only not inevitable and do sometimes -afford exceptions; but there _is_ absolutely _no real fact,_ which is -not an _exception_ to its naturalistic law. By coupling a wolf and a -she-wolf we obtain a wolf cub, which will in time become a new wolf, -with the appearance, the strength, and the habits of its parents. But -this wolf will not be identical with its parents. Otherwise how could -wolves ever evolve with the evolution of the whole of reality, of which -they are an indivisible part? By chemical analysis of a litre of water -we obtain H2O; but if we again combine H2O, the water that we obtain -is only in a way of speaking the same as before. For that combining -and recombining must have produced some modification (even though not -perceived by us), and in any case changes have occurred in reality -in the subsequent moment, from which the water is not separable, and -therefore in the water itself taken in its concreteness. We could -consequently give the following definition: the _inexorable_ laws of -nature are those that _are violated at every moment,_ while philosophic -laws are by definition those that are _at every moment observed._ -But in what way they are observed cannot be known, save by means of -history, and therefore true knowledge knows nothing of previsions; -it knows only facts that have really happened; of the future there -can be no knowledge. The natural sciences, which do not furnish real -knowledge, have, if possible, even less right (if one may speak thus) -to talk of previsions. - -Yet, it will be objected, it is a fact that we all form previsions, -and that without them we should neither be able to cook an egg nor -to take one step out of doors. That is quite true, but those alleged -previsions are merely the summary of what we know by experience to -have happened, and according to which we resolve upon our action. We -know what has happened. We do not know, nor do we need to know, what -will happen. Were any one truly to wish to know it, he would no longer -be able to move and would be seized with such perplexity before life, -that he would kill himself in desperation or die of fear. The egg, -which usually takes five minutes to cook in the way that suits my -taste, sometimes surprises me by presenting itself to my palate after -those five minutes, either as too much or too little cooked; the step -taken out of doors is sometimes a fall on the threshold. Nevertheless, -the knowledge of this does not prevent me from leaving the house and -cooking the egg, for I must walk and take nourishment. The laws of my -individual being, of my temperament, of my aptitudes, of my forces, -that is, the knowledge of my past, make me resolve to undertake a -journey, as I did twenty years ago, to begin work upon a statue, as I -did ten years ago. Alas! I had not considered that in the meantime my -legs have lost their strength and my arm has begun to tremble. By all -means call the previsions made use of in these cases true or false; -but do not forget that they are nothing but empirical concepts, that -is to say, mnemonic devices, founded upon historical judgments. There -can be no doubt that they are useful; indeed, what we maintain is that -just because they are useful, they are not true. If they possess any -truth, it resides in the establishment of the fact. That is to say, it -does not reside in the prevision and in the law, but in the historical -judgment which forms its basis. - -[Sidenote: _Nature and its various meanings. Nature as passivity and -negativity._] - -Having thus made clear the coincidence of empirical concepts and the -natural sciences, we must determine exactly the meaning of the word -"natural," which is used as qualifying these sciences. It has not -seemed advisable to change it, since its use is so deeply rooted, -although we have, on the other hand, already given its synonym in -qualifying these sciences as "empirical." What is _nature_? The first -meaning of "nature" is the "opposite" of "spirit," and designates -the natural or material moment in relation to the spiritual, the -mechanical in relation to the teleological moment, the negative moment -in relation to the positive. Thus, in the transition from one form of -the spirit to another, the inferior form is like matter, ballast, or -obstacle, and so is the negation of the superior form. Hence reality is -imagined as the strife of two forces, the one spiritual and the other -material or natural. It is superfluous to repeat that the two forces -are not two, but one, and that if the negative moment were not, the -positive moment could not be. The pigeon (says Kant), which rises to -take flight, may believe that had it not to vanquish the resistance of -the air, it would fly still better. But the fact is that without that -resistance, it would fall to earth. In this sense, there is no science -of Nature (of matter, passivity, negation, etc.) distinguishable from -that of Spirit, which is the science of itself and of its opposite, and -the science of itself only in so far as it is also the science of its -opposite. - -[Sidenote: _Nature as practical activity._] - -But in another sense, _nature_ is, not indeed the opposite of spirit, -but something distinct _in_ the spirit, and especially distinct from -the cognitive spirit, as that form of spirituality and activity -which is not cognitive. A non-theoretical activity, a spirituality -which should not be in itself knowledge, cannot be anything but the -_practical_ form of the spirit, the will. _Man makes himself nature_ -at every moment, because at every moment he passes from knowing to -willing and doing and from willing and doing returns to knowing, which -is the basis for new will and action. In this sense, the science of -nature, or the philosophy of nature, could not be anything but the -philosophic science of the will, the Philosophy of the practical. - -[Sidenote: _Nature in the gnoseological sense, as naturalistic or -empirical method._] - -The natural sciences have nothing to do with a philosophic knowledge -of nature as will, with a Philosophy of the practical. They are, as -has already been said, not knowledge of will, but will; not truth, but -utility. In consequence of this, they extend to the whole of reality, -theoretic and practical, to the products of the theoretic spirit, not -less than to those of the practical spirit; and without knowing any -of them, universally or individually, they manipulate and classify -them all in the way we have seen. They have not therefore a _special -object,_ but _a special mode of treatment,_ their object or matter -being the presupposed philosophic-historical knowledge of the real. -They do not treat of the material and mechanical aspect of the real, -nor even of its non-theoretical, practical, volitional aspect (or what -is incorrectly called the irrational aspect of it). They turn the -theoretical into the practical, and by killing its theoretic life, -make it dead, material, and mechanical. Nature, matter, passivity, -motion _ab extra,_ the inert atom and so on, are not reality and -concepts, but natural science itself in action. Mechanism, logically -considered, is neither a fact nor a mode of knowing the fact. It is a -non-fact, a mode of not-knowing: a practical creation, which is real -only in so far as it becomes itself an object of knowledge. This is the -_gnoseological_ or _gnoseopractical_ meaning of the word "nature," a -meaning which must be kept carefully distinct from the two preceding -meanings. When we speak, for instance, of _matter_ or of _nature_ -as not existing, we mean to refer to the puppet of the naturalists, -which the naturalists themselves and the philosophers of naturalism, -forgetting its genesis, take for a real if not a living being. That -matter (said Berkeley) is an abstraction; it is (say we) an empirical -concept, and whoever knows what empirical concepts are will not pretend -that matter or nature exists, simply because it is spoken about. - -[Sidenote: _The illusions of materialists and dualists._] - -We do not claim to have supplied the full solution of the problem -concerning the dualism or materialism of the real with this discussion -on the theme of Logic. This solution cannot (we repeat) be expected, -save from all the philosophic sciences together, that is to say, from -the complete system. But we can already see, from the logical point -of view, that the dualists and materialists cannot avoid the task of -showing that the nature or matter, which they elevate to a principle of -the real or to one of the two principles of the real, is not: firstly, -the mere negation of the spirit, nor secondly, a form of the spirit, -nor thirdly, the abstraction of the natural sciences. They must also -show that it answers to something conceivable and existing, outside -or above the spirit. Logic can pass onward at this point, saying of -materialists and dualists what Dante said of the devils and the damned -struggling in the lake of burning pitch: "And we leave them thus -encompassed." - -[Sidenote: _Nature as empirical distinction of an inferior in relation -to a superior reality._] - -The word "nature" has yet a fourth meaning (but this time altogether -empirical), which is clear in those propositions which distinguish -natural life from social life, natural men _(Naturmenschen)_ or savages -from civilized men, and again natural from human beings, animals -from men, and so on. Nature, in this sense, is distinguished from -civilization or humanity, and thus the sole reality is divided into two -classes of beings: natural beings and human beings (which are sometimes -also called spiritual as compared with the former, which are called -material). The vague and empirical nature of this distinction is at -once perceived from the impossibility that we meet with of assigning -boundaries between civilization and the state of nature, between -humanity and animality. Man can be only empirically distinguished -from the animal, the animal from the vegetable, and vegetables from -inorganic beings, which are organic in their own way. Certainly, -what are called _things_ are not organic, for example a mountain or -a plough-share; but they are not organic, because they are not real, -but aggregates, that is to say, empirical concepts. In the same way, -a forest is not organic, though it is composed of things vegetating, -nor a crowd, though composed of men. When we treat of things in the -above sense, we can say with some mathematicians that _things_ do not -exist, but only their _relations._ Hence if the dualists feel able to -affirm that the two classes of beings, natural and human, are based -upon the existence of two different substances and upon the different -proportions of these in each of the two classes, the task of proving -the thinkability of the two substances and the different proportions of -the compound falls upon them. - -[Sidenote: _The naturalistic method and the natural sciences as -extended to superior not less than to inferior reality._] - -The distinction between nature and spirit being therefore, in this last -sense, altogether empirical, it is clear that the natural sciences -(in the gnoseological or gnoseopractical sense in which we give chem -this name) are not restricted to the development of knowledge relating -to what is called inferior reality, from the animal downwards, leaving -to the sciences of the spirit the knowledge that relates to superior -reality from the animal upwards, that is to say, to man. Sciences -of nature and sciences of the spirit, _orbis naturalis_ and _orbis -intellectuals,_ are also, in this case, partitions and convenient -groupings. All do substantially the same thing, that is to say, they -provide one single homogeneous practical treatment of knowledge. - -[Sidenote: _Demand for such an extension, and effective existence of -what is demanded._] - -On this unity and homogeneity is based the demand so often made -(especially in the second half of the nineteenth century) for the -extension of _the method of the natural sciences_ to the sciences -of the spirit or moral sciences, the _orbis intellectualis,_ for a -naturalistic treatment of the productions of language and of art, or -of political, social, and religious life. Thus were originated or -prophesied a Psychology, an Æsthetic, an Ethic, a Sociology, _methodo -naturali demonstratae._ It was necessary to draw the attention of those -makers of programmes and advisers (apart from the evil philosophic -intentions, positivist or materialistic, which they nourished in their -bosoms) to the superfluity of their demand, and gently to reprove them -with the old phrase: _Quod petis in manu habes._ Since man was man and -constructed pseudoconcepts and empirical sciences, these naturalistic -classifications have never been limited to animals, plants, and -minerals, nor to physical, chemical, and biological phenomena, but -have been extended to all the manifestations of reality. Naturalistic -Logic, Psychology, Linguistic Sociology and Ethics have not awaited the -nineteenth century ere they should open to the sun. And (without going -too far back in time, or leaving Europe) they already bore flower and -fruit in the Sociology (Politics) of Aristotle, in the Grammatics of -the Alexandrians, in the Poetics and Rhetoric of Aristotle himself, or -of Hermagoras, of Cicero, or of Quintilian, and so on. The novelty of -the nineteenth century has principally consisted in giving the names -_social Physics,_ or the _physico-acoustic science of language_ to what -was once more simply, and perhaps in better taste, called otherwise. -But in saying this we do not wish to deny that certain naturalistic -work has been far more copious in the nineteenth century than in -Greece, and that naturalistic methods have not been applied with -singular acumen and exactitude in those fields of study. Linguistic -affords a case in point, with _its phonetic laws,_ by reason of which -it moves so proudly among its companions. - -[Sidenote: _Historical basis of the natural sciences._] - -The natural sciences and the empirical concepts which compose them -appear therefore like a tachygraphic transcription upon living and -mutable reality, capable of complete transcription only in terms of -individual representations. But upon what reality? Upon the reality of -the poet, or upon the clarified and existentialized reality of--the -historian? The constructions of the natural sciences take history -for their presupposition, just as judgments of classification take -individual judgments. Were this not so, their economic function would -have no way of expressing itself, from lack of matter whereon to work. -To employ the easy example already given, it would be of no use to the -zoologist to construct types and classes of animals that were certainly -conceivable, but non-existent. For while those types and classes would -distract the attention from the useful and urgent task of summarizing -reality historically given and known, they would not exhaust the -possibilities, which are infinite And if it appear that imaginary -animals are sometimes classified, as for example griffins centaurs, -Pegasi, and sirens, it is easy to see that this is not done in Zoology, -but in another naturalistic science,--comparative Mythology, in which -not animals but the imaginings of men are really classified. These -too are historical facts, because they are imaginings or fancies -historically given. They are not combinations of images which no people -has ever dreamed of, nor any poet represented, for such, as has already -been said, would be infinite in number and food for mere diversion. - -[Sidenote: _The question as to whether history is the foundation or the -crown of thought._] - -History, which has philosophy for its foundation, becomes in its -turn foundation in the natural sciences. This explains why, with the -controversy as to whether history be a science or an art, there has -always been inextricably connected the other question as to whether -history be the foundation of science or science the foundation of -history. The question finds a solution in the solution of the ambiguity -of the term "science," which is used indifferently, sometimes in the -sense of philosophy, sometimes in that of the natural sciences. If -science is understood as philosophy, history is not its foundation, -indeed philosophy is the foundation of history. Both mingle and are -identified in the sense already explained. If science is understood -as naturalistic science, then history is its necessary foundation or -precedent. Certainly, naturalistic classifications are also reflected -in historical narrative; but, as we have seen, they do not perform a -constitutive function in it; they are of merely subsidiary assistance. - -[Sidenote: _Naturalists and historical research._] - -But since history is the foundation of the natural sciences, and the -special treatment of perceptive material or historical data by these -sciences does not possess theoretic value, but is valuable merely as -a convenient classification, it is clear that the whole content of -truth of the natural sciences (the measure of truth and reality that at -bottom they contribute) is history. Therefore it is not without reason -that the natural sciences or some of them have been called in the -past _natural history._ History is the hot and fluid mass, which the -naturalist cools and solidifies by pouring it into formal classes and -types. Previous to this manipulation, the naturalist must have thought -as a historian. The matter thus cooled and solidified for preservation -and for transport has no theoretic value, save in so far as it can -again be rendered hot and fluid. Similarly, on the other hand, it is -necessary to revise continually the classifications adopted, returning -to the observation of facts, to simple intuitions and perceptions, to -the historical consideration of reality. The _naturalist_ who makes a -discovery, in so far as he is a discoverer of truth, is a _historical_ -discoverer; and revolutions in the natural sciences represent progress -in historical knowledge. Lamarckianism and Darwinism may serve as an -example of this. Naturalists (and we use the word in its ordinary -meaning, applying it to those who explore this "fair family of plants -and animals," and what is called in general the physical world) -feel themselves somewhat humiliated when described as classifiers -careless of truth. But if such classification is exactly what the -natural sciences accomplish from the gnoseological point of view, yet -naturalists as individuals and as corporations of students exercise a -far more substantial and fruitful function. The historical foundation -of the life of the natural sciences is also found in the fact that -a change of historical conditions sometimes renders, if not wholly -useless, at least less useful, certain classifications made with the -object of controlling conditions of life remote from us, or perceptions -concerning life that have now been abandoned. This has occurred -with regard to the classifications of alchemy and of astrology, and -also (passing on to examples from other empirical sciences) to the -descriptive and casuistic portions of feudal law. When the book is no -longer read, the _index_ also falls into disuse. - -[Sidenote: _The prejudice as to the non-historicity of nature._] - -The strangest of statements, that _nature has no history,_ comes from -forgetting the historical foundation of the natural sciences, from -ignorance that it constitutes their sole truth, and from attributing -theoretic importance to classifications which have merely practical -importance. In this case, nature signifies that reality, from man -downwards, which is empirically called inferior reality. But how, if -it is reality, is it without history? How, if it is reality, is it -not becoming? And further, the thesis is confuted by all the most -attentive studies of so-called inferior reality. To limit ourselves -to the animal kingdom, a century before Darwin the acute intellect -of the Abbé Galiani shook itself free of this prejudice as to the -immobility of animals. He remarks in certain places about cats: -"_A-t-on des naturalistes bien exacts qui nous disent que les chats, il -y a trois mille ans, prenaient les souris, préservaient leurs petits, -connaissaient la vertu médicinale de quelques herbes, ou, pour mieux -dire, de l'herbe, comme ils font à présent? ... Mes recherches sur -les mœurs des chattes m'ont donné des soupçons très forts qu'elles -sont perfectibles; mais au bout d'une longue traînée de siècles, -je crois que tous que les cliats savent est l'ouvrage de quarante à -cinquante mille ans. Nous n'avons que quelques siècles d'histoire -naturelle: ainsi le changement qu'ils auront subi dans ce temps, -est imperceptible."_[3] This slight perceptibility of the relative -changes of what is called nature or inferior reality has contributed -to that prejudice (not to mention the confusion between the fixity -that belongs to naturalistic classifications and reality, which is -always in motion). Nature appears to be motionless, just because of -the slight interest that we take in the shadings of its phenomena and -in their continuous variation. But not only is nature not motionless, -but it is not even true that it proceeds (as the poet says) "with -steps so slow that it seems to stand still." The movement of nature or -inferior reality is fast or slow, neither in less nor greater degree -than human reality, according to the various arbitrary constructions of -empirical concepts which are adopted, and according to the variable and -arbitrary standards of measurement which are applied to them. We watch -with vigilant eye every social movement that can cause a variation in -the price of grain or the value of Stock Exchange securities; but we -do not surprise with equally vigilant eye the revolutions that are -prepared in the bosom of the earth or among the green-clad herbs of the -field. - -[Sidenote: _The philosophic foundation of the natural sciences, and the -efficacy of the philosophy that they contain._] - -But if history is the foundation of the natural sciences, it follows -from this that those sciences are always based upon a philosophy. This -is indubitable, for the naturalist, however much he be a naturalist, is -above all things a man, and a man without a philosophy (or what comes -to the same thing, without a religion) has not yet been found. This -does not mean that the natural sciences are philosophy. Their special -task is classification, and here they are just as independent and -autonomous as philosophy is incompetent. But philosophy is competent -in philosophy, and so we see that those naturalists who possess -philosophic culture avoid the prejudices, errors, and absurdities -that spring from bad philosophies, and to which other naturalists are -prone. For instance, if the chemist Professor Ostwald had possessed a -better philosophy, he would not have abandoned his good chemistry for -that doubtful mixture of things--his _Philosophy of Nature._ And had -Ernest Haeckel made an elementary study of philosophy, he would never -have given up his researches upon micro-organisms, in order to solve -the riddles of the universe and to falsify the natural sciences. Let -us limit ourselves to these instances, for our life of to-day supplies -innumerable examples of philosophizing men of science, who are as -pernicious to science as they are to philosophy and to culture. The -antithesis between science and philosophy, of which so many speak, is -a dream. The antithesis is between philosophy and philosophy, between -true philosophy and that which is very imperfect and yet very arrogant, -and manifestly active in the brains of many scientists, though it -has nothing to do with the discoveries made in laboratories and -observatories. - -[Sidenote: _Action of the natural sciences upon philosophy, and errors -in conceiving such relation._] - -The action of philosophy upon the natural sciences is not constitutive -of them, but preparatory. The action of the natural sciences upon -philosophy is not even preparatory, but merely incidental and -subsidiary, having for its end simplicity of exposition and of -memorizing, just as in history. A very common error, derived from a too -hasty analysis of the forms of spiritual life, is that of looking upon -the empirical and natural sciences as a _preparation_ for philosophy. -But in the achievement of the natural sciences, philosophy has been -cold-shouldered, and to recover it we must seek pure intuition, which -is the necessary and only precedent of logical thought. - -Still worse is it, when the natural sciences are considered, not -only as preparation, but just as a first sketch, or a chiselling of -the marble block, from which philosophy will carve the statue. For -this view denies without being aware of it, either the autonomy of -the natural sciences, or that of philosophy, according as either the -philosophic method or the naturalistic method is held to be the method -of truth. - -Indeed, in the first case, if the natural sciences be of a philosophic -nature and represent a first approximation to philosophy, they must -disappear when philosophy is evolved, as the provisional disappears -before the definite, as the proof before the printed book. This would -mean that natural sciences as such do not exist and that what really -exists is philosophy. In the second case, if philosophy have the same -nature as the natural sciences, the further development of the first -sketch will always be the work of the naturalistic method, however -refined and however increased in power we may please to imagine it. -Thus, what would really exist would never be philosophy, but always the -natural sciences. This erroneous conception therefore reduces itself -to a denial, either of the natural sciences or of philosophy; either -of the pseudoconcepts or of the pure concepts; a negation that need -not be confuted, because the whole of our exposition of Logic is its -explicit confutation. - -[Sidenote: _Motive of these errors: naturalistic philosophy._] - -The genesis of such a psychological illusion resides in the fact that -the natural sciences seem to be tormented with the thirst for full and -real truth, and philosophy, on the other hand, to be intent solely -upon correcting the perversions and inexactitudes of the empirical and -natural sciences. But it is a question of likeness or appearance only, -because the thirst for truth belongs not to the natural sciences, but -to philosophy, which lives in all men, and also in the naturalist. -And the philosophic perversions and inexactitudes which have to be -corrected do not form part of the natural sciences (which as such -affirm neither the true nor the false), but to that philosophy which -the naturalist forms and into which he introduces the prejudices -derived from his special business. - -[Sidenote: _Philosophy as destroyer of naturalistic philosophy, but not -of the natural sciences. Autonomy of these._] - -The proof of the theory here maintained is that even when philosophy -engages in strife with naturalistic prejudices, it dissolves those -prejudices, but does not and could not dissolve the sciences which had -suggested them. Indeed, a philosopher becoming again a naturalist, -cultivates those sciences successfully, just as his philosophizing -does not forbid his going into the garden and there scenting and -pruning the plants. The naturalistic sciences of language and of art, -of morality, of rights and of economics (to take instances from the -intellectual world, which seem to have closer contact with philosophy), -are not only what is called the _empirical stage_ of the corresponding -philosophic disciplines, but persist and will persist side by side with -them, because they render services which cannot be replaced. Thus there -is no philosophy of language and of art which can expel from their -proper spheres, even if it does expel them from its own, empirical -Linguistic, Grammar, Phonetics, Morphology, Syntax, and Metric, with -their empirical categories, which are useful to memory. Nor can they -eliminate the classifications of artistic and literary kinds, and -those of the arts according to what are called means of expression, -by means of which it is possible to arrange books on shelves, statues -and pictures in museums, and our knowledge of artistic-literary -history in our memories. Psychology, an empirical and natural science, -certainly does not make us understand the activity of the spirit; -but it permits us to summarize and to remember very many effective -manifestations of the spirit, by classifying as well as may be the -species or classes of facts of representation (sensations, intuitions, -perceptions, imaginings, illusions, concepts, judgments, arguments, -poems, histories, systems, etc.), facts of sentiment, and volitional -facts (pleasure, pain, attraction, repulsion, mixed feelings, desires, -inclinations, nostalgias, will, morality, duties, virtue, family, -judicial, economic, political, religious life, etc.), or by classifying -these same facts according to groups of individuals (the Psychology -of animals, of children, of savages, of criminals, and of man, both -in his normal and abnormal conditions). This wholly extrinsic mode of -consideration, which is now prevalent in Psychology, is the source of -the remark that it has risen (or has sunk?) _to the level_ of a natural -science, and that its method is mechanical, determinist, positive, -antiteleological. Sociology, understood not as a philosophic science -(--there is no such thing--), but as an empirical science, classifies -as well as may be the forms of family and the forms of production, the -forms of religion, of science and of art, political and social forms, -and constructs series of classifications to summarize the principal -forms which human history has assumed in the course of its development. -The philosopher expels these classifications from philosophy, as -extraneous elements causing pathological processes; but that same -philosopher, in so far as he is a complete man, and in so far as -he provides for the economy of his internal life and for more easy -communication with his fellows, must fashion and avail himself of the -empirical. Having ideally destroyed the adjective and the adverb, the -epic and the tragic kinds, the virtues of courage and of prudence, the -monogamous and the polygamous family, the dog and the wolf, he must yet -speak when necessary of adjectives and adverbs, of epics and tragedies, -of courage and of prudence, of families formed in this or that way, of -the species "dog," as though it were clearly distinguished from the -species "wolf." - -Thus is confirmed the autonomy and the peculiar nature of the empirical -or natural sciences, indestructible by philosophy as philosophy is -indestructible by them. - - -[Footnote 1: _Nov. Org._ I. §§ 81, 116; and II. in fine.] - -[Footnote 2: See _The Philosophy of the Practical,_ pt. i. sect. i.] - -[Footnote 3: Letter to d'Epinay, October 12, 1776.] - - - - -VI - - -MATHEMATICS AND THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCE OF NATURE - - -[Sidenote: _The idea of a mathematical science of nature._] - -The conception of a _mathematical science of nature_ is at variance -with the thesis that recognizes the ineliminable historical foundation -of the natural sciences and the consequences which follow from it. It -is claimed that this mathematical science, in expressing the ideal and -end of the natural sciences, would express also their true nature, -which is not empirical but abstract, not synthetic but analytic, not -inductive but deductive. The mathematical conception of the natural -sciences would imply perfect mechanism, the reduction of all phenomena -to quantity without quality, the representation of each phenomenon -by means of a mathematical formula, which should be its adequate -definition. - -[Sidenote: _Various definitions of mathematics._] - -But the nature of mathematics cannot be considered a mystery in our -time. Mathematics (as has lately been said with a subtlety equal to -its truth) is a science "in which it can never be known _what_ we -are talking about, nor whether what we are talking about be _true_" -These affirmations are made one after the other by all mathematicians -who are conscious of their own methods. In what sense can a process -that merits such a description be called a science? A science that -states no sort of truth does not belong to the theoretic spirit, -since it is not even poetry; and a science which is not related to -anything is not even an empirical science, which is always related -to a definite group of representations. For this reason, others -incline to consider mathematics sometimes as _language,_ sometimes as -_logic._ But mathematics is neither language in general nor any special -language; it is not language in the universal sense, co-extensive with -expression and with art; nor is it a historically given language, -which would be a contingent fact; nor a class of languages (phonetic, -pictorial, or musical language, etc.), which would be an approximate -and empirical definition, inapplicable in a function like mathematics, -which expresses its own original nature. It is not logic, because -there is only one logic, and thought thinks always as thought. If it -is maintained, on the other hand, that the human spirit has also a -special logic, which is that of mathematicizing, a return is made to -the problem to be solved, namely, what is mathematicizing? that is to -say, this logic, which is not the logic of thought, because it does not -give truth, and is not the logic of the empirical sciences, because it -does not depend upon representations. - -[Sidenote: _Mathematical process._] - -Any sort of arithmetical operation can serve as an example of -mathematical process. Let us take the multiplication: 4×4 = 16. The -sign = (equals) indicates identity: 4×4 is identical with 16, as it -is identical with an infinite number of such formulæ, since there -can be infinite definitions of every number. What do we learn from -such an equivalence concerning the reality, phenomenal or absolute, -to which the human mind aspires? Nothing at all. But we learn how to -substitute 16 for 8×2, for 9+7, for 21-5, for 32÷2, for 4², for √256, -and so on. One or the other substitution is of service, according to -circumstances. When, for instance, some one promises to pay us 4 lire -daily, and we wish to know the total amount of lire, that is to say, -the object that we shall have at our disposal after four days, we shall -carry out the operation 4×4=16. Again, when we have 32 lire to divide -into equal parts between ourselves and another, we shall have recourse -to the formula: 32÷2 = 16. Mathematics as Mathematics does not know, -but establishes formulæ of equality; it does not subserve knowing, but -counting and calculating what is already known. - -[Sidenote: _Apriority of mathematical principles._] - -For counting and calculating Mathematics requires formulæ, and to -establish these it requires certain fundamental principles. These are -called in turn definitions, axioms, and postulates. Thus arithmetic -requires the number series, which beginning from unity, is obtained by -always adding one unit to the preceding number. Geometry requires the -conception of three dimensional spaces, with the postulates connected -with it. Mechanics requires certain fundamental laws, such as the -law of inertia, by which a body in motion, which is not submitted -to the action of other forces, covers in equal times equal spaces. -There has been much dispute as to whether these principles are _a -priori_ or _a posteriori,_ pure or experimental; but the dispute must -henceforth be considered settled in favour of the former alternative. -Even empiricists distinguish mathematical principles from natural or -empirical principles, as at least (to use their expression) _elementary -experiences,_ as experiences which man completes in his own spirit, -in isolation from external nature. This means, whether they like it -or no, that they too distinguish them profoundly from _a posteriori_ -or experimental knowledge. The _a priori_ character of mathematical -principles is made manifest by every attack upon it. - -[Sidenote: _Contradictory nature of these a priori principles. Their -unthinkability,_] - -But when they are recognized as being not _a posteriori_ and empirical, -but _a priori,_ difficulties are not thereby at an end. The apriority -of those principles possesses other most singular characteristics, -which render them unlike the _a priori_ knowledge of philosophy, -the consciousness of universals and of values, for instance, of -logical or of moral value. For if it is impossible to think that -the concepts of the true and of the good are not true, on the other -hand it is _impossible to think that the principles of mathematics -are trice._ Indeed, when closely considered, they prove to be all of -them altogether false. The number series is obtained by starting from -unity and adding always one unit; but in reality, there is no fact -which can act as the beginning of a series, nor is any fact detachable -from another fact, in such a way as to generate a discrete series. If -mathematics abandons the discrete for the continuous, it comes out of -itself, because it abandons quantity for quality, the irrational, -which is its kingdom, for the rational. If it remains in the discrete, -it posits something unreal and unthinkable. Space is characterized -as constituted of three or more dimensions; but reality gives, not -this space, thus constituted, made up of dimensions, but spatiality, -that is to say, thinkability, intuitibility in general, living and -organic extension, not mechanical and aggregated. Its character is -not to have three dimensions, one, two, three, but to be spatiality, -in which all the other dimensions are in the one, and so there are -not distinguishable and enumerable dimensions. And if the three or -more dimensions as attributes of space prove to be unthinkable, and -also the point without extension, the line without superficies, and -the superficies without solidity--so too in consequence are all the -concepts derived from them, such as those of geometrical figures, none -of which has, or can have, reality. No triangle has, or can have, -the sum of its angles equal to two right angles, because no triangle -has existence. Hence those geometrical concepts are not completely -expressed in any real fact, since they are in none, thereby differing -from the philosophic concepts, which are all in every instant and are -not completely expressed in any instant. Similar results follow in the -case of the principles of Mechanics. No body can be withdrawn from the -action of external forces, because every body is connected with all the -others in the universe; hence the law of inertia is unthinkable. - -[Sidenote: _and not intuitible._] - -As they are unthinkable, so are the principles of mathematics -unimaginable; they have therefore been ill defined as imaginary -entities, for they would in that case lose such _a priori_ validity -as they have. They are _a priori,_ but without the character of -truth--they are organized contradictions. Had mathematics (said -Herbart) to die because of the contradictions of which it is composed, -it would have died long ago.[1] But it does not die of them, because it -does not set itself to think them, as a venomous animal does not die -of its own poison, because it does not inoculate itself. Were it to -pretend to think them and to give them as true, those contradictions -would all become falsities. - -[Sidenote: _Identification of mathematics with abstract -pseudoconcepts._] - -Now, a function which organizes theoretic contradictions without -thinking them, and so without falling into contradictions, is not a -theoretic, but a practical function, and is perfectly well known to -us as that particular productive form of the practical spirit which -creates pseudoconcepts. But since those contradictions are _a priori_ -and not _a posteriori,_ pure and not representative, mathematics cannot -consist of those pseudoconcepts which are representative or empirical -concepts. It remains, therefore, that it consists of the other form of -pseudoconcepts, which are _abstract_ concepts, which we have already -defined as altogether void of truth and also void of representation, -as analytic _a priori_ and not synthetic _a priori._ And we have -demonstrated how, in the falsification or practical reduction of the -pure concept, concreteness without universality, that is to say, mere -generality, belongs to empirical concepts, and universality without -concreteness, that is to say, abstraction, to abstract concepts. - -Such indeed are the fictions of mathematics;--they have universality -without concreteness, and therefore feigned universality. Inversely -to the natural sciences, which give the value of the concept to -representations of the singular, although they succeed in doing so -only by convention, mathematics gives the value of the single to -concepts, also succeeding in this only by convention. Thus it divides -spatiality into dimensions, individuality into numbers, movement into -motion and rest, and so on. It also creates fictitious beings, which -are neither representations nor concepts, but rather concepts treated -as representations. It is a devastation, a mutilation, a scourge, -penetrating into the theoretical world, in which it has no part, being -altogether innocuous, because it affirms nothing of reality and acts -as a simple practical artifice. The general purpose of that artifice -is known; it is to aid memory. And the particular mnemonic purpose of -this is at once evident; it is to aid the recall to memory of series of -representations, previously collected in empirical concepts and thus -rendered homogeneous. That is to say, they serve to supply the abstract -concepts, which make possible the judgment of enumeration; to construct -instruments for counting and calculating and for composing that sort of -false _a priori_ synthesis, which is the enumeration of single objects. - -[Sidenote: _The ultimate end of mathematics: to enumerate and -consequently to aid the determination of the single. Its place._] - -Applying thus to mathematics what has been said of the judgment of -enumeration, it is now clear that it facilitates the manipulation of -knowledge as to individual reality. Calculation indeed presupposes: -(i) perceptions (individual judgments); (2) classifications (judgments -of classification); and only by means of these latter does it attain -to the first. But it must attain to the first, because were there -no single things to recall to the mind, calculation would be vain. -Quantification would be sterile fencing, if it did not eventually -arrive at qualification. - -Mathematics is sometimes conceived as the special instrument of the -natural sciences, _appendix magna_ to the natural sciences, as Bacon -called it; but from what has been said, we must not forget that both -taken together, because co-operating, constitute an _appendix magna_ -or an _index locupletissimus_ to history, which is full knowledge of -the real. It is further altogether erroneous to present mathematics -as a prologue to all knowledge of the real, to philosophy and to the -sciences, for this confuses head with tail, _appendix_ and _index,_ -with text and preface. - -[Sidenote: _Particular questions concerning mathematics._] - -It does not form part of the task that we have undertaken further to -investigate the constitution of mathematics and to determine whether -there be one or several mathematical sciences; if one be fundamental -and the others derived from it; if the Calculus include in itself -Geometry and Mechanics, or if all three can be co-ordinated and unified -in general mathematics; if Geometry and Mechanics be pure mathematics, -or if they do not introduce representative and contingent elements -(as seems to be without doubt the case in mathematical Physics); and -so on. Suffice it that we have established the nature of mathematical -science and furnished the criterion according to which it can be -discerned if a given formation be mathematics or natural science, if -it be pure or applied mathematics (concept or judgment of enumeration, -scheme of calculation, or calculation in the act). And for this reason -we shall not enter into the solution of particular questions, like -those concerning the number of possible fundamental operations of -arithmetic, or concerning the nature of the calculus of infinitesimals, -and whether, in this, there be any place for non-mathematical concepts, -that is, the philosophic, not the quantitative infinite, or, again, -concerning the number of the dimensions of space. As to the use of -mathematics, it concerns the mathematician who knows his business to -see what arbitrary distinctions it suits him to introduce, and what -arbitrary unifications to produce, in order to attain certain ends. -For the philosopher, these unifications and those distinctions, if -transported into philosophy, are all alike false, and all can be -legitimate, if employed in mathematics. If three dimensions of space -are arbitrary but convenient, four, five and _n_ dimensions will be -arbitrary, and the only question that can be discussed will be whether -they are convenient. Of this the philosopher knows nothing, as indeed -he is sure _a priori_ is the case. - -[Sidenote: _Rigour of mathematics and rigour of philosophy. Loves and -hates of the two forms._] - -Practical convenience suggests the postulates to mathematics; but the -purity of the elements that it manipulates gives to them the rigour -of demonstrations, the force of truth. It is a curious force, that -has a weakness for point of support,--the non-truth of the postulate, -and reduces itself to a perpetual tautology, by which it is recorded -that what has been granted has been granted. But the rigour of the -demonstrations and the arbitrariness of the foundations explain how -philosophers have been in turn attracted and repelled by mathematics. -Mathematics operating with pure concepts is a true _simia philosophiae_ -(as it was said of the devil that he was _simia Dei_), and philosophers -have sometimes seen in it the absoluteness of thought and have saluted -it as sister or as the first-born of philosophy. Other philosophers -have recognized the devil in that divine form, and have addressed to it -the far from pleasant words that saints and ascetics used to employ on -similar occasions. Hence mathematics has been accused of not being able -to justify its own principles, notwithstanding its rigorous procedure; -and of constructing empty formulæ and of leaving the mind vacant. It -has been accused of promoting superstition, since the whole of concrete -reality lies outside its conventions, an unattainable mystery; and of -being too difficult for lofty spirits, just because it is too easy.[2] -Gianbattista Vico confessed that having applied himself to the study of -Geometry, he did not go beyond the fifth proposition of Euclid, since -"that study, proper to minute intellects, is not suitable to minds -already made universal by metaphysic."[3] But these accusations are not -accusations, and simply confirm the peculiar nature of those spiritual -formations, eternal as the nature of the spirit is eternal. - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of reducing the empirical sciences to -mathematics, and empirical limits of the mathematical science of -nature._] - -The nature of mathematics being explained, we can now resume the thread -of the narrative, left hanging loose, and discover how inadmissible is -the claim for a mathematical science of nature, which should be the -true end and the inner soul of the empirical and natural sciences. It -is said that this mathematical science presides, as an ideal, over -all the particular natural sciences, but it should be added, as an -unrealized and unrealizable ideal, and therefore rather an illusion -and a mirage than an ideal. It is urged that this ideal has been -partially realized, and that therefore nothing prevents its being -altogether realized. But, indeed, whoever looks closely will see that -it has not been even partially realized, because mathematical formulæ -of natural facts are always affected by the empirical and approximate -character of the naturalistic concepts which they use, and by the -intuitive element upon which these are based. When it is sought to -establish in all its rigour the ideal of the mathematical science of -nature, it becomes necessary to assume as a point of departure elements -that are distinct, but perfectly identical and therefore unthinkable; -quantity without quality, which are nothing but those mathematical -fictions of which we have spoken. The idea of a mathematical science is -thus resolved into the idea simply of mathematics, and the much-vaunted -universality of that science is the universal _applicability_ of -mathematics, wherever there are things and facts to number, to -calculate and to measure. The natural sciences will never lose their -inevitable intuitive and historical foundation, whatever progress may -be made in the calculus and in the application of the calculus. They -will remain, as has been said, _descriptive_ sciences (and this time -it has been well said, as it prevents the failure to recognize the -intuitive elements, of which they are composed). - -[Sidenote: _Decreasing utility of mathematics in the most lofty spheres -of the real._] - -We have already illustrated the slight perceptibility of differences -(or the slight interest that we take in individual differences), -as we gradually descend into what is called nature or inferior -reality. On this is founded the illusion that nature is invariable -and without history. And it also explains why mathematics has seemed -more applicable to the _globus naturalis_ than to the _globus -intellectualis,_ and in the _globus naturalis,_ to mineralogy more -than to zoology, to physics more than to biology. Still, mathematics -is equally applicable to the _globus intellectualis,_ as, for -instance, in Economics and Statistics. And, on the other hand, it -is inapplicable to both spheres, when they are considered in their -effective truth and unity as the _history of nature_ or the _history -of reality,_ in which nothing is repeated and therefore nothing is -equal and identical. Beneath that difference of applicability there -is nothing but a consideration of utility. If the grains of sand on -which we tread can be considered (although they are not) equal to one -another, it happens less frequently that we regard those with whom we -associate and act in the same light. Hence the _decreasing utility_ of -naturalistic constructions (and of mathematical calculation), as we -gradually approach human life and the historical situation in which -we find ourselves. Decreasing but never non-existent, for otherwise, -neither empirical sciences (grammars, books on moral conduct, -psychological types, etc.) nor calculations (statistics, economic -calculations, etc.,) would continue in use. A constructor of machines -needs little intuition, but much physics and mechanics. A leader of -men needs very little mathematics, little empirical science, but much -intuitive and perceptive faculty for the vices and value of the human -individuals with whom he has to do. But both little and much are -empirical determinations; the Spirit, which is the whole spirit in -every particular man and at every particular instant of life, is never -composed of measurable elements. - - -[Footnote 1: _Introduction to Philosophy,_ Italian tr., Vidossich, p. -272.] - -[Footnote 2: There is a curious collection of judgments adverse to -mathematics in Hamilton, _Fragments philosophiques,_ tr. Plisse, Paris, -1840, pp. 283-370.] - -[Footnote 3: Autobiography in _Works,_ Ferrari, 2nd edition, iv. p. -336.] - - - - -VII - - -THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES - - -[Sidenote: _The theory of the forms of knowledge and the doctrine of -the categories._] - -The explanations given as to the various forms of knowledge are -also explanations concerning the categories of the theoretic and -theoretic-practical spirit: the intuition, the concept, historicity, -type, number; and also quality and quantity and qualitative quantity, -space, time, movement, and so on. They form part of that doctrine of -the categories, in which the account of philosophy in the strict sense -is completed. To ask what mathematics or history is, means to search -for the corresponding categories; to ask what is the relation between -history and mathematics, and in general how the various forms of -knowledge are related to one another, means to develop genetically all -these forms, which is precisely what we have attempted. - -[Sidenote: _The problem of the classification of the sciences and its -practical nature._] - -But the difficult enquiry as to the forms of knowledge as categories -has not been much in favour in recent times. Another problem has, on -the other hand, acquired vogue. It has seemed more easy, but that is -not so, because though artfully disguised, it is at bottom identical -with the preceding problem. Instead of putting the question in the -manner indicated above, which implies seeking out the constitution -of the theoretic spirit, a modest request has been made for a -classification of the various forms of knowledge, a _classification of -the sciences._ - -Scant confidence in philosophic thought, and excessive confidence in -naturalistic methods, have so operated that, unable to renounce the -necessity of dominating the chaos of the various competing sciences and -not wishing to have recourse to philosophic systematization, an attempt -has been made to classify the sciences like minerals, vegetables, and -animals. Even now there exist writers occupying professorships who -claim to be specialists in classifying sciences. Volumes on this theme -appear with an unprofitable frequency and abundance. - -[Sidenote: _False philosophic character that it assumes._] - -Certainly, if such writers and professors were to proceed in an -altogether empirical manner, corresponding with their declarations, -nothing could be said against their labours, beyond advising them not -to discuss them philosophically in order that they may not waste time -in misunderstandings, and to recognize their slight utility. But, as -a fact, none of them contains himself within empirical limits, but -each gives some philosophic and rational basis to the classification -which he proposes. Thus there appear bipartitions of the sciences into -_concrete_ and _abstract,_ into _historical_ and _theoromatic_(or -nomotechnical), into sciences of the _successive_ and sciences of the -_coexistent,_ or into _real_ and _formal;_ or _tripartitions,_ into -sciences of _fact,_ of _law_ and of _value_; into _phenomenalist, -genetic_ and _systematic_ sciences; and into similar partitions and -groups, of which some are old acquaintances and correspond to functions -of the spirit that we have already distinguished, while others, on the -contrary, must be held to be false, because they confuse under the -same name functions that are different and divide functions that are -unique. But all of them, true or false, leave the empirical and direct -themselves to the problem of Logic and of theoretic Philosophy. This is -not the place to criticize them, because substantially it has already -been done in the course of the exposition of our theories; and what is -left would reduce itself to a criticism of minute errors, which finds a -more suitable place in reviews dealing with books of the day than in -philosophic treatises. So true is it that those classificatory systems -pass with the day that witnessed their birth. - -[Sidenote: _Coincidence of that problem with the search for the -categories, when understood in a strictly philosophic sense._] - -We are concerned only to demonstrate more clearly that the demand -inherent in such attempts is identical with that which leads to the -establishing of a doctrine of the categories or a philosophic system. -It is indeed possible to discover now and then in the demands for a -classification of the sciences, two demands, the one limited, the other -wider. The first takes the form of a demand for a classification of the -forms of knowledge, as in the Baconian system, and in the others which -repeat the type. Here the sciences are divided according to the three -faculties, memory (natural and civil history), imagination (narrative, -dramatic and parabolical poetry), and reason (theology, philosophy of -nature and philosophy of man). The other tends to a classification -not according to gnoseological forms alone, but according to objects, -according to all the real principles of being, as in the system of -Comte and in those derived from it. Now a classification of the first -kind coincides with researches relating to the forms of the theoretic -spirit, and the problems that it exposes cannot be solved save by -penetrating into the problems of these forms. Otherwise it is not -possible to say if, for example, the Baconian classification be exact -or no, and if not, where it should be corrected. But in passing to -the other form of classification, according to objects or to the real -principles of being, we pass from the sea to the ocean, because that -coincides with the entire philosophic system. The classification of -Comte, for example, is his positivism itself, and it is not possible to -accept or refute or evaluate the one, without accepting or refuting or -submitting to examination the other. There are people who ingenuously -believe that they can understand things by representing them on a -sheet of paper, in the form of a genealogical tree or of a table rich -in graphic signs of inclusion and exclusion. But when we seriously -engage upon the work, we perceive that in order to draw up the tree and -construct the table, it is above all things needful to have understood -them. The pen falls from the hand and the head is obliged to bend -itself in meditation, when it does not prefer to abandon the dangerous -game and amuse itself in other ways. - -[Sidenote: _Forms of knowledge and literary-didactic forms._] - -And this is just the occasion to make clear the distinction that -we have on several occasions employed, between forms of knowledge -and literary or didactic forms of knowledge, between the orders of -knowledge and books. The arrangement of books is not always determined -solely by the demand for the strict treatment of a determinate problem; -very frequently, its motive is supplied by the practical need of having -certain different pieces of knowledge collected together, in order not -to be obliged to go and search for them in several places, that is to -say, in their true places. Thus, side by side with scientific treatises -properly so-called, are to be found scholastic compilations and -manuals. Such are Geographies, Pedagogies, juridical or philological -Encyclopædias, Natural Histories, and so on. Authors, even outside -strictly scholastic limits, used formerly to consider it convenient -sometimes to isolate, sometimes to unite certain orders of knowledge, -and to baptize the mutilation or mixture with a particular name. It is -evident that when dealing with these hybrid compilations and formations -the philosopher and the historian of the sciences, who seek not books, -but ideas, must carry out a series of analyses and syntheses, of -disassociations and associations, without allowing themselves to be -seduced by the authority of the writers or by the solidity of these -mixtures, which have become traditional. - -[Sidenote: _Prejudices arising from these last._] - -But it is not an easy matter. Those mixtures are no longer ingenuous, -nor are the practical motives that have determined them apparent. -Around them has grown up a dense forest of philosophemes, of capricious -distinctions, of false definitions, of imaginary sciences, of -prejudices of every sort. Any one who has succeeded in discerning the -genuine connections and attempts to separate the interlaced boughs, -to isolate the trees and to show the different roots, any one who -sets an axe to those wild tree-trunks, is horrified by cries and -complaints, not less resonant than those that drove Tancred from the -enchanted wood. And there is the traditionalist who admonishes us -severely not to divide _natural_ groupings and not to introduce among -them our own _caprice._ Thus he calls the capricious natural and the -natural capricious. "What?" (has recently written the shocked Professor -Wundt) "for the excellent reason that the search for the individual -is historical search, must Geology be considered history and research -relating to the glacial epoch be abandoned to the amiable interest of -the historian?" And others lament that the ancient _richness_ of the -sciences is destroyed by these simplifications, and call the confusion -richness. - -[Sidenote: _Methodical prologues to Scholastic Manuals and their -powerlessness._] - -It is true that in order to obviate the evil of confusion and the -defective consciousness of the various kinds of research which have -been mingled together, many authors are in the habit of prefixing to -their books theoretic introductions, about the _method,_ as they call -it, of their science. The special logic of the individual disciplines -is to be sought (they say) in the books that treat of these. Manuals -in the German language are especially notable for this arrangement, -preceded, as they are, by the heaviest introductions, which occupy a -great part of the volume or of the volumes of the book. They present a -contrast to French and English books, which usually enter at once _in -medias res._ This arrangement seems preferable: the German type has -against it the sensible observation of Manzoni, that one book at a time -is enough, when it is not more than enough. He who opens a historical -book in order there to learn the particulars of an event, or a book on -economics in order to learn how an economic institution works, should -not be obliged to read the theory of historica events and disquisitions -on the place of Economics in the system of the sciences. _"Il s'agit -d'un chapon et non point d'Aristote,"_ as the judge in the _Plaideurs_ -said to the advocate who went back in his speech to the _Politics_ of -Aristotle. But, besides the literary contamination, there is also here -the other inconvenience, that science and the theory of the sciences -being different operations and demanding different aptitudes and -preparations, the specialist who is competent in the first is usually -not at all competent in the second; though he may be believed to be so, -owing to a confusion of names. Why, indeed, should an expert on banking -and Stock Exchange business be versed in the gnoseology of economic -science? The affirmation of competence in the one on the strength of -competence in the other constitutes a true and proper sophism _a dicto -simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid._ - -[Sidenote: _The capricious multiplication of the sciences._] - -Further, the specialist has his pride, which leads him to exaggerate -what he practises and fail to recognize its true nature and limits. The -multiplication of the _Sciences_ in our days has no other origin than -this; the philosopher contemplates it with astonishment; it is a truly -miraculous multiplication of the seven loaves of bread and five small -fishes. A _new science_ is announced, whenever a crude idea passes -through the brain of a professor. We are made glad with _Sociologies, -social Psychologies, Ethnopsychologies, Anthropogeographies, -Criminologies, comparative Literatures,_ and so on. Some years ago, -an eminent German historian, having observed that some use might be -made of genealogical and heraldic studies, generally abandoned to the -cultivators and purveyors of the mania for birth and titles, instead -of limiting himself to publishing his little collection of minute -observations at once proclaimed Genealogy as a science, _Genealogie -als Wissenschaft,_ and provided the appropriate manual. This begins -by determining the _concept_ of Genealogy, and proceeds to study its -relations with history, with the natural sciences, with zoology, with -physiology, with psychology and psychiatry, and with the knowable -universe. - -[Sidenote: _The sciences and academic prejudices._] - -Finally, the specialist is generally a teacher, and therefore -accustomed to identify eternal ideal science with his real and -contingent chair, and the organism of knowledge with that of the -university faculties. Hence arises a fashion of conceiving the nature -and scope of the sciences that has become habitual in the academic -world. It consists of _personifying_ science, and telling this -imaginary person what he has to do, without regard to whether the -assignment of the task accords or no with the quality of the function. -"Logic will be occupied with this, but yet will not neglect this other -thing; it will benefit by casting a look on this third thing also, -which is extraneous to its task, but not to its interest; nor will -it fail to aid, with due regard, the student of an analogous matter, -by giving to him suggestions, if not even rules." Whoever reads the -scientific books of our times will recognize in this example, not -a caricature, but a plan constantly repeated and applied. It was -said of the poet Aleardo Aleardi that he treated the Muse like his -maid-servant, since he was at every instant addressing himself to her -and asking her something. The professor ends by treating Science like -his steward, or at least his respectable consort, with whom he naively -comes to an agreement regarding the portions that are to form the meals -of the day, and other matters concerning the management of the family. - - - - -THIRD PART - - -THE FORMS OF ERRORS AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH - - - - -I - - -[Sidenote: _Error as negativity, and impossibility of treating -specially of errors._] - -Error has sometimes been called privation or _negativity._ It is -commonly defined as a thinking of the false, as the non-conformity -of thought with its object, and in other similar ways. These are all -reducible to the first, since, for example, thought which is of a -different form from its object is false thought, which does not attain -to its intrinsic end; and false thought is not thought, but privation -of thought, negativity. - -As negativity error gives rise to a negative concept, responding -to the positive concept, which is truth. True and false, truth and -error, are related to one another as opposite concepts. Now we know -from the logical doctrines just stated that opposite concepts, far -from being separable, are not even distinguishable, and when they are -distinguished, they represent nothing but the abstract division of -the pure concept, of the unique concept, which is the synthesis or -dialectic of opposites. And we know from the whole of Philosophy that -Reality, thought in the pure concept and of which the pure concept -is also an integral element, genuine and truly real Reality, is a -perpetual development and progress, which is rendered possible by the -negative term intrinsic to the positive and constituting the mainspring -of its development. - -If then, error is negativity, it is vain to treat it as something -positive. No other positivity or reality belongs to it than just -negativity, which is a moment of the dialectic synthesis and outside -the synthesis is nothing. A treatment of error in this sense already -exists quite complete in the treatment of logical truth; and there is -nothing special to add here to that argument. As a fact, a form of the -spirit distinguishable from the positive and real forms, error does not -exist, and philosophy cannot philosophize upon what is not. - -[Sidenote: _Positive and existing errors._] - -Nevertheless, we all know errors, distinguishable from truth and -existing for themselves. The evolutionist affirms the biological -formation of the _a priori_; the utilitarian resolves duty into -individual interest; the Christian says that God the Father sent -his son Jesus to redeem men from the perdition into which they had -fallen through the sin of Adam; the Buddhist preaches the annulment of -the Will. Are not these true and proper errors? Have they perchance -no existence? Have they not been expressed, repeated, listened to, -believed? Whoever does not admit the validity of the examples adduced -can himself find others; there will certainly be no lack of examples in -such a field. Do we wish to maintain that these errors do not exist, in -homage to the definition of error as negativity and unreality? They may -not exist as truth, but they may perfectly well exist as errors. - -[Sidenote: _Positive errors as practical acts._] - -There is no way of escaping from this antithesis between the -inconceivability of the existence of error and the impossibility of -denying the existence of errors which the mind recognizes and the -fact proves, save by the solution to which we have several times had -occasion to refer. That error, which has existence, is not error and -negativity, but something positive, a product of the spirit. And since -that product of the spirit is without truth, it cannot be the work -of the theoretic spirit. And since beyond the theoretic spirit there -is nothing but the practical spirit, error, which we meet with as -something existing, must of necessity be a product of the practical -spirit. If every way of issue is closed, this one is open; it goes to -the very bottom and leads to the place of rest. - -Indeed, he who produces an error has no power to twist or to -denaturalize or stain the truth, which is his thought itself, the -thought which acts in him and in all men; indeed, no sooner has he -touched thought than he is touched by it: he thinks and does not err. -He possesses only the practical power of passing from thought to -_deed_; and his doing, in fact his thinking, is to open his mouth and -emit sounds to which there corresponds no thought, or, what is the same -thing, no thought which has value, precision, coherence and truth. -It is to smear a canvas to which no intuition corresponds; to rhyme -a sonnet, combining the phrases of others, which simulate the genius -that is absent. Theoretical error, when it is truly so, is inseparable -from the life of thought, which to the extent to which it perpetually -overcomes that negative moment, is always born anew. When it is -possible to separate and consider it in itself, what is before us is -not theoretical error, but practical act. - -[Sidenote: _Practical acts not practical errors._] - -Practical act and not practical error, or Evil; for that practical act -is altogether rational. Let him who doubts this cast a glance at those -who produce errors. He will be at once convinced that they act with -perfect rationality. The dauber produces an object which is asked for -in the market by people who wish to have at home pictures of any sort, -to cover the walls and to attest to their own easy circumstances or -riches, and who are altogether indifferent to the æsthetic significance -of those objects. The rhymer wishes to secure an easy success for -himself among people who look upon a sonnet as a social amusement. The -babbler who emits sounds instead of thoughts, often obtains in virtue -of those sounds applause and honour denied to the serious thinker: _un -sot trouve toujours un plus sot pour l'admirer._ If, by means of those -so-called errors, provision is made for house, firing, food, children's -clothes, or for the satisfaction of self-esteem, ambitions and -caprices, who will say that they are irrational acts? Man does not live -by bread alone, but he does live by bread; and if, by means of those -acts, bread is provided, that is to say, if the wants of each one's -individuality are met, they are well-directed, far-sighted, fruitful, -and therefore most rational. - -[Sidenote: _Economically practical, not morally practical._] - -This does not, on the other hand, mean that they are moral; they are -rational, economically rational but not moral. Morality demands that -man should think the true. Producers of errors evade, or rather, do -not elevate themselves to that duty. Still intent upon the demands -of practical life _qua talis,_ they do not actualize in themselves -the universal life, nor do they create in obedience to this last the -ethical will and the will for truth. Therefore there arises in their -souls, and in the souls of those who see them at work, the desire for -another superior activity, which should supervene upon the preceding -and complete it. They demand, not only to live, but to live well, to -seek not only bread, but that "bread of the angels" with which, as the -divine poet says, we are never sated. The expression of this desire -manifests itself in a cry of discontent, of reprobation, of anguish, -of longing; and therefore, with negative emphasis, it accuses of -irrationality that inferior rationality which has to be surpassed, and -gives the name theoretical error to that which considered in itself -must be called a simple economic act. - -[Sidenote: _Doctrine of error, and doctrine of the necessary forms of -error._] - -The doctrine here expounded is developed from what has been said above, -or from developments given elsewhere in the Philosophy of the Spirit. -We shall not therefore enlarge further upon the immanence of values -in facts, upon evil as the stimulus and concreteness of the good, -on the non-existence of evil in itself, on the practical character -of theoretical error, on moral responsibility for such error, on -the content of desire exhibited by negative statements accompanying -judgments of value, and so on. In an exposition of Logic the genesis of -the theoretical error could be set aside as presupposed, for in this -didactic sphere any one among the common definitions which present -error as a thinking of the false is sufficient. - -A task in closer connection with Logic is that of enquiring as to the -necessary forms of error, the task, that is to say, not of confuting -all errors (which is performed by Philosophy as a whole), but of -establishing in how many ways the products of the various forms -of knowing and of knowledge can be practically combined, and what -therefore are the gnoseological possibilities of error. If error is -nothing but an _improper combination_ of ideas (as Vico said), we -must see the number to which the fundamental forms of these improper -combinations can be reduced. In traditional Logic, the theory of error -appears as the doctrine of _Sophisms_ or of sophistical refutations: -it has the formalist, verbalist, empirical character common to all -that Logic. In our Logic, it must have a philosophic character, that -is to say, it must depend upon the already distinguished forms of the -theoretic spirit, and deduce from them the arbitrary combinations of -the errors which are formally possible. The ideas or concepts of the -theoretic and theoretic-practical spirit are so many and no more, and -so many and no more must be the possible improper combinations of them -and the forms of theoretic error. - -[Sidenote: _Logical nature of all theoretic errors._] - -That theoretical error is always at bottom logical error. This is an -important proposition, which merits explicit statement, because it -is customary to speak of æsthetic, naturalistic, mathematical and -historical errors side by side with those that are properly logical -or philosophical. We too have spoken and will speak thus, when more -subtle distinctions and more precise determinations are not necessary. -But in truth, a fact like _humano capiti cervicem equinam jungere,_ -or _simulare cupressum_ in the sea where the shipwrecked struggles in -the waves, does not constitute in itself that practical act, called -æsthetic error, unless there be added to it the false affirmation that -the object produced is an æsthetic object, that is to say, unless there -be added a logical affirmation, so that the practical act becomes, -by means of it, logical error. Taken in itself, the union of a human -head with a horse's neck, or of a cypress with the sea is a sort of -play of the imagination, such as occurs in fancy, in idleness and in -dream. The extrinsic combination of a fancy and a concept is also -altogether innocent, as in the case of allegory, which, in itself, is -not unsuccessful art, but becomes so only when it is affirmed that -the two heterogeneous elements form only one; or rather, it then -becomes, not unsuccessful art, but bad philosophy. In the same way, a -mathematical error (for example, the formula 4 x 4 = 20) is nothing -but a _flatus vocis,_ such as is made in jest or to loosen the tongue. -Only when we add the logical affirmation that in this _flatus vocis_ an -effectual multiplication has been expressed, do we have a mathematical -error, which is therefore a logical error. It is not possible to -consider and to condemn as a theoretical error a combination which -does not intend to deceive any one as to its proper nature; neither -those to whom it is shown, nor him who has made it. Thus, among -æsthetic, naturalistic, mathematical, historical, logical and practical -productions, combinations without cognitive content are quite possible -and constantly to be found; but they do not become theoretical errors -unless they are crowned with an improper logical affirmation, or rather -with an arbitrary judgment formed upon a logical affirmation. Indeed, -even illogical combinations of philosophic concepts are not, as such, -logical or theoretical errors, since they can be made tentatively, -in order to see whether the two concepts combine or no. To make them -errors, the arbitrariness of a special act of judgment is necessary. -That arbitrariness consists in a lying to others or to ourselves, in -order to satisfy an interest of our merely individual life, and it is -impossible to lie without employing an affirmation, which is always a -logical product. - -[Sidenote: _History of errors and phenomenology of error._] - -In this way the problem of determining the various forms of theoretical -errors, according to the already distinguished forms of knowledge, -becomes transformed and circumscribed in the other problem of -determining the various forms of _logical errors,_ in relation to -the various forms of knowledge, that is to say, of determining the -necessary forms of philosophic errors. Certainly, every individual -errs in his own way, according to the conditions in which he finds -himself; just as every individual according to those conditions -discovers truth in his own way. But Philosophy in the strict sense (in -the form of a philosophical treatise) cannot complete the examination -of all individual errors. This is the task of all philosophies as they -are developed in the ages and of the thought of all thinking beings, -who have been, are, and will be. _Its_ task is to illuminate the -eternal ideal history of errors, which is the eternal ideal history -of truth, in its relations with the eternal forms of the practical -spirit. The Philosophy of the spirit, as a treatise of philosophy, -cannot give the history of errors; but must limit itself to giving -their _phenomenology._ In this sense is to be understood the enquiry -concerning the fundamental forms of philosophical errors. These forms -may be briefly deduced as follows. - -[Sidenote: _Deduction of the forms of logical errors. Forms deduced -from the concept of the concept, and forms deduced from the other -concepts._] - -The pure concept, which is philosophy, can be incorrectly combined and -mistaken either for the form that precedes it, pure representation -(art), or for that which follows it, the empirical and abstract -concept (natural and mathematical sciences); or it can be wrongly -divided in its unity of concept and representation _(a priori_ -synthesis), and wrongly again combined--either the concept may be -taken as representation, or the representation as concept. Hence -arise the fundamental forms of errors which it will be useful to -denominate as _æstheticism, empiricism, mathematicism, philosophism,_ -and _historicism_ (or _mythologism_). On the other hand, the other -distinctions of the concept, or distinct concepts, can be incorrectly -combined among themselves in a series of false combinations, -corresponding to the series of the other particular philosophic -sciences, and hence arise the forms of the other philosophic errors. -But in Logic it is sufficient to show the possibility of these last -forms of errors, and to adduce certain cases as examples, because a -complete determination of them would demand that complete exposition of -the whole philosophic system, which cannot be furnished in a treatise -on Logic. - -[Sidenote: _Errors arising front errors._] - -Finally, since it is impossible that any form whatever of these errors, -whether specifically logical or generically philosophic, should -satisfy the mind, which asks for the true and does not lend itself to -deception or mockery, each one of these forms tends to convert itself -into the other, owing to its arbitrariety and untenability, and all -mutually destroy one another. When the attempt is made to preserve -both the true form and the insufficient form, or all the insufficient -forms, we have gnoseological dualism; but with the decline to complete -destruction, we have the error of _scepticism_ and of _agnosticism._ -Finally, if, having been by these led back to life and being deprived -of every concept that should illuminate it back to life as a mystery, -we affirm that truth lies in that theoretic mystery, in living life -without thought, we have the error of _mysticism._ Dualism, scepticism -(or agnosticism) and mysticism thus extend both to strictly logical -problems (that is to say, to the possibility, in general, of knowing -reality), and to all other philosophic problems. Hence we can speak of -a practical dualism, of an æsthetic or ethical scepticism, and of an -æsthetic or ethical mysticism. - -[Sidenote: _Professionalism and nationality of errors._] - -Such, stated in a summary manner, is the deduction of philosophic -errors, which we shall now proceed to examine in detail. Upon their -forms, which represent so many tendencies of the human spirit, is based -this other fact, which is constantly striking us, and which may be -called the _professionalism_ of errors. Every one is disposed to use -in other fields of activity those instruments that are familiar to him -in the field which he knows best. The poet by vocation and profession -dreams and imagines, even when he should reason; the philosopher -reasons even when he should be poetical; the historian seeks authority, -even when he should seek the necessity of the human mind; the practical -man asks himself of what use a thing is, even when he should ask -himself what a thing is; the naturalist constructs classes, even when -he should break through them, in order to think real things; the -mathematician persists in writing formulae, even when there is nothing -to calculate. If the narrowness of the _Esprits mathématiques_ has been -denounced, it must not be believed that the other professions have -not also got their narrownesses. The philosopher's profession is no -exception to this, for he should surpass all one-sided views, but does -not always succeed. It is one thing to say and another to do, and if -a man forewarned is half saved, he is not therefore altogether saved. -That professionalism of error, which we observe in individuals, is also -to be observed on a large scale among peoples. Thus we speak of peoples -as antiartistic, antiphilosophical, or antimathematical: of speculative -Germany, of intellectualist and abstract France, of empiricist -England, of Italy as artistic in the centre and the north, and as -philosophic in the south. But peoples, like individuals, are changeable -and can be educated: so much so that in our days, the traditional -Anglo-Saxon empiricism begins little by little to lose ground before -the speculative education of the English people, due to classical -German thought; France that was abstractionist becomes intuitionist and -mystic. Germany leaves the vast dominion of the skies assigned to her -by Heine for that of industry and commerce, and philosophizes somewhat -unworthily; Italy, which in greater part was a country of artists, -poets and politicians, is traversed in every direction by religious and -philosophic currents. Were it not for this capacity for education of -individuals and peoples, History would not be a free development, but -determinism and mechanism, and each of us would possess less of that -courage for social activity which each one exhibits with great ardour -according to his own convictions. - - - - -II - - -ÆSTHETICISM, EMPIRICISM AND MATHEMATICISM - - -[Sidenote: _Definition of these forms._] - -Æstheticism is the philosophic error which consists in substituting -the form of intuition for the form of the concept, and of attributing -to the former the office and value of the latter. Empiricism is the -analogous substitution of the empirical concept, by means of which -philosophic function and value is attributed to the empirical and -natural sciences. Finally, mathematicism is the presentation of the -abstract concept as concrete concept and of mathematics as philosophy. - -[Sidenote: _Æstheticism._] - -We have met with æstheticism and with empiricism at the beginning of -our exposition, and again here and there throughout its course; and we -have sufficiently determined the nature of both and demonstrated the -contradictions in which they become involved. In every one of their -movements they presuppose the pure concept and the philosophy of which -they mean to take the place. At the same time, they do not develop the -philosophy which they have presupposed, because they suffocate it in -the vapour of the intuitions and in the chilly waters of naturalistic -concepts. They are not therefore effective thought, but an adulteration -of thought with heterogeneous elements, which by a misuse of words are -said to be furnished with theoretic and logical value. - -Æstheticism has few representatives, because complete abstention -from reflection and reason is too obviously contradictory. Even when -art was considered to be a true _instrument_ of philosophy, in the -Romantic period, this affirmation was put forward in a confused manner, -intuition being finally distinguished from intuition, art from art. -This amounted at bottom to a radical change and an abandonment of -the original thesis. We have seen æstheticism reappear in our times -under the name of _intuitionism,_ or again as _pure experience:_ an -experience which is taken to be not posterior, but anterior to every -intellectual category, and should therefore be called nothing but pure -intuition. - -[Sidenote: _Empiricism_] - -The representatives of empiricism are on the other hand most numerous, -now as in the past; so much so that empiricism sometimes seems to -be the sole adversary of philosophy, and the true origin of all -philosophic errors. This opinion is without doubt inexact, but it finds -support in the fact that philosophy is obliged to defend itself from -the incessant assaults of empiricism, more than from any other enemy. -The confusion between pure and empirical concepts is, indeed, easy, -since both have the form of universality (though the universality of -the second is falsely assumed) and both refer to the concept (though -in the second the concept is something arbitrarily limited). The -empiricist is like the philosopher, in so far as he immerses himself in -facts and constructs concepts. - -[Sidenote: _Positivism, philosophy founded upon the sciences, inductive -metaphysic._] - -The last great historical manifestation of empiricism is that which, -from the system of Auguste Comte, took the name of _positivism_ and -by its very name expressed the intention of basing itself upon facts -(that is, upon facts historically certified), in order to classify -them, thus reducing philosophy to a classification. This, like all -classifications, proceeded from the poorest to the richest, from the -abstract gradually to the less abstract, though never to the concrete. -Positivism did not seem to be aware that the facts from which it -proposed to proceed and which it believed to be the rough material of -experience, were already _philosophic determinations,_ and could only -in this way be admitted as _historically ascertained. Psychologist_ is -also positivism; positivism, that is to say, more properly applied to -the group of the so-called mental and moral sciences. _Neocriticism_ -can be almost altogether identified with positivism, although its -upholders generally possess some knowledge of philosophical history -(which is altogether lacking to the pure positivists), and this -confers a more specious polish on their doctrine. Neocriticism, -indeed, tends to eliminate every speculative element from the Kantian -criticism, and by so doing approaches positivism--so as almost to -become confounded with it. It is no wonder, therefore, that from -the camp of the neocritics should have originated the proclamation -and programme of _a philosophy founded upon the sciences,_ or of -an _inductive metaphysic._ This is simply and solely the reduction -of philosophy to the sciences, because a scientific philosophy, an -inductive metaphysic, is not speculation, but classification, or -as those who advocate it ingenuously declare, a systematization of -the results obtained by the sciences. Here too are kindled the most -comical quarrels between scientists and philosophers. For when it is -only a question of classifying and systematizing those results, the -scientist rightly feels that he can dispense with the labours of the -philosopher, indeed, he feels that he alone, who has obtained the -results, knows what these exactly are and how they should be treated -in order to avoid deformation. And the philosopher, who by making -himself an empiricist, a positivist, a psychologist and a neocritic, -has renounced his autonomy, approaches the scientists and offers with -little dignity services that they refuse. He elaborates scientific -expositions, which they call compilations and mistakes, he proposes -additions or corrections at which they mock as superfluous or foolish. -Nevertheless, the philosopher does not grow weary nor become offended -at these repulses and jests; he returns to the charge and indeed it is -only when someone wishes to redeem him from this voluntary servitude -and abjection that he turns upon him with fury, saying that philosophy -should live on _familiar terms_ with the sciences. As if the relations -that we have faithfully described were relations of reciprocal respect -and harmony! The truth is that the majority of empirical philosophers -are failures in science and unsuccessful in philosophy, who out of -their double incompetence compound a logical theory, thus furnishing -another proof (if further proof were needed) in confirmation of the -practical origin of errors. For our part, we recognise the justice of -the accusation of parasitism, which is brought against a philosophy of -this character, and we will willingly afford our aid to the scientists -in driving out these intruders, who dishonour philosophy in our eyes -not less than in theirs they dishonour the sciences. - -[Sidenote: _Empiricism and facts._] - -Empiricism owes the greater part of its influence upon the minds of -many to its continual appeal to reality and facts. This leads to the -belief that speculative philosophy wishes to neglect reality and facts -and to build, as the saying is, upon clouds. But we have here an -ambiguity and a sophism with which we must not allow ourselves to be -deceived. Not only does speculative philosophy also base itself upon -facts and have the phenomenal world as its point of departure; but -speculative philosophy truly founds itself upon facts and empiricism -does not. The first considers facts in their infinite variety and -in their continuous development; the second, a certain number of -facts, collected at certain epochs and among certain peoples, or -at all epochs and among all peoples empirically known; chat is to -say, it considers a limited number of facts. Speculative philosophy, -presupposing the pure phenomenon, transforms it into (historical) fact -and is a true _philosophy of fact_; empiricism, without being aware of -it, presupposes the facts that it accepts, which are already, though -with little criticism, historically ascertained and interpreted. This -unconsciousness of what it is doing makes its condition worse, so that -it can give nothing but _a philosophy of classifications,_ which are -taken for facts only through habitual lack of reflection. Speculative -philosophy, therefore, can answer the claim and the boast of empiricism -that it is based upon facts, by accepting the claim but denying the -boast, as one to which empiricism has and can have no right, and by -appropriating this achievement to itself. - -[Sidenote: _Bankruptcy of empiricism: dualism, agnosticism, -spiritualism and superstition._] - -But the bankruptcy of empiricism in all its forms and under all its -synonyms is clear in the dualism to which it leads, of appearance and -essence, phenomenon and noumenon. For while it professes that there is -nothing knowable but the phenomenon, it also postulates an essence, a -noumenon, something that is beyond the phenomenon and unknowable. It -is all very well to say that this unknowable is not, for it, a proper -object for science and philosophy, but it is not to be driven from the -field of reality merely by removing it from science and philosophy. -Every empiricism, then, recognises side by side with the rights of -thought, the rights of _feeling,_ and thus the circle of reality comes -to be broken at one or more points. When it is wished to continue -working empirically upon the unknowable residue, we have those various -attempts, which can all of them be summarized beneath the name of -_spiritualism._ Here the hidden truth is sought by means of experiments -of a naturalistic type and spirit is reduced to matter more or less -light and subtle. Empiricism ends in superstition. This has always -happened; in the decadence of ancient civilization, when philosophers -took to converting themselves into thaumaturges; at the eve of the -French Revolution, after a century of empiricism and sensationalism, -when all sorts of fanatics and schemers appeared and were the -favourites of a society of most credulous materialists; in our times, -when they have been favoured by a less credulous public of positivists, -or of ex-positivists. - -[Sidenote: _Evolutionist positivism and rationalist positivism._] - - -Empiricism has certainly sought to cure its own insufficiencies, of -which it was more or less conscious, and _evolutionist positivism_ -must be numbered among these attempts. This form proposed to correct -the anti-historical character of positivism by providing a _history_ -of reality. But this history was always based upon empirical -presuppositions, and was therefore a history of classifications, not -of concrete reality; an extravagant caricature of the philosophy of -becoming, from whose breast comes History rightly and truly so-called. -Another attempt was that of _rationalist positivism,_ which sought to -check the degeneration of positivism toward dualism, sentimentalism -and superstition, by appealing to the absolute rights of reason. -But this reason is nevertheless always empirical reason, limited to -certain series of facts, extrinsic, classificatory, unintelligent. -Absolute authority can well be attributed to it in words, but such an -attribution does not confer the power of exercising it. This kind of -positivism, therefore, meets in our day with favour in freemasonry -(at least of the Franco-Italian sort). This is a sect, which is -annoying, chiefly because, heedless of facts, it preserves and defends -the habit of making use of empty formulas and phrases, and because -when it has insulted some priestly vestment, it believes that it -has successfully destroyed superstition and obscurantism in man, or -when it has declaimed about liberty, it imagines that by this slight -effort, liberty has been won and established. True _reason_ abhors -_rationalism,_ if it be rationalism of that sort. - -[Sidenote: _Mathematicism_] - -_Mathematicism_ is much rarer than empiricism, because the confusion -between thinking and calculating is less easy than that between -thinking and classifying. Owing to its rarity and paradoxical -character, mathematicism has something aristocratic about it, -resembling in this the other extreme error, of æstheticism; whereas -the intermediate error, empiricism, just because of its mediocrity, is -popular and indeed vulgar. - -[Sidenote: _Symbolical mathematics._] - -We cannot properly consider as mathematicism that form of philosophy -which appeared in antiquity as _Pythagoreanism_ and _Neopythagoreanism_ -and has reappeared in our days as a doctrine of the mathematical -relations of the universe and the harmony of the world. In this -conception, numbers are not numbers, but symbols; the numerical -relations are not arithmetical, but æsthetic. The pretended -mathematical philosophers of this type are neither philosophers nor -mathematicians, nor are they arbitrary combiners of these two methods. -They would be better described as poets or semi-poets. - -[Sidenote: _Mathematics as demonstrative form of philosophy._] - -Nor again can we consider to be mathematicism the attempt made by some -philosophers to expound their own ideas by a mathematical, algebraical -or geometrical method. If their ideas were ideas and not numbers, the -method to which they had recourse necessarily remained extrinsic, and -possessed no mathematical character beyond the verbal complacency with -which they adopted certain formulae of definitions, axioms, theorems, -lemmas, corollaries and certain numerical symbols, These formulas and -symbols could always be replaced by others, without any inconvenience -whatever. It is possible to discuss, it has indeed been discussed, -whether such modes of exposition are in good or bad literary taste, -or of greater or less didactic convenience. They can be condemned, -as they have been condemned, and caused to fall into disuse, as they -have fallen; but the quality of the philosophic truth thus expressed, -remains unaltered and is never changed into mathematics. Neither the -system of Spinoza, who employed the geometrical method, nor that of -Leibnitz, who desired the universal calculus, are mathematical systems. -If they were so, modern philosophy would not owe some of its most -important idealist concepts to those two systems. - -[Sidenote: _Errors of mathematicist philosophy._] - -Better examples of mathematicism than the treatises and systems -developed according to its rules are found in the unfulfilled -programmes of such treatises and systems, or in the mathematicist -treatment of certain philosophie problems. Such, for instance, is that -concerning the infinity of the world in space and time, a problem -which, treated mathematistically, becomes insoluble and makes many -people's heads turn. It is impossible to comprehend the world in one's -own mind with the mathematical infinite; and either to give or to -refuse to it a beginning and an end. Hence the exclamations of terror -before that infinite, and the sense of sublimity which seems to arise -in the struggle joined between it, which is indomitable, and the -human mind which wishes to dominate it. It has, however, already been -observed with reason, that such sublimity is not only very near to the -ridiculous, but falls into it with all its weight; and that such terror -could not in truth be anything but terror of the _ennui_ of having -to count and recount in the void and to infinity. The mathematical -infinite is nothing real; its appearance of reality is the shadow -projected by the mathematical power which the human spirit possesses, -of always adding a unit to any number. The true infinite is all before -us, in every real fact, and it is only when the continuous unity of -reality is divided into separate facts, and space and time are rendered -abstract and mathematical, only then, if the complete operation be -forgotten, that the desperate problem arises and the anguish of never -being able to solve it. Another and more actual example of this -mathematicist mode of treatment is that of the dimensions of space. -Here, forgetting that space of three dimensions is nothing real that -can be experienced, but is a mathematical construction, and on the -other hand finding it convenient for mathematical reasons to construct -spaces of less or more than three dimensions, or of _n_ dimensions, -they end by treating these constructions as conceivable realities, and -seriously discuss bi-dimensional beings or four-dimensional worlds. - -[Sidenote: _Dualism, agnosticism and superstition of mathematicism._] - -With affirmations such as those of infinites incomprehensible to -thought, and of real but not experienceable spaces, mathematicism also -creates a dualism of thought and of reality superior to thought, or -(what amounts to the same thing) of thought which meets its equivalent -in experience and thought without a corresponding experience. The -unknowable here too lies in wait and falls upon the imprudent -mathematicist philosopher, who feels himself lost before a second, -third, fourth and infinite worlds, excogitated by himself, superior -or inferior worlds to those of man, underworlds and overworlds and -over-over worlds. He then becomes even spiritualist and asks with -Zollner, why spiritualist facts should not possess reality and be -produced in the fourth dimension of space, shut off from us. The -contradiction of the mathematicist attempt, like that of the æsthetic -and empiricist, is clearly revealed in the dualistic, agnostic and -mystical consequences to which, as we shall see more clearly further -on, all of them necessarily lead. - - - - -III - - -PHILOSOPHISM - - -[Sidenote: _Rupture of the unity of the a priori synthesis._] - -The three modes of error examined exhaust the possible combinations of -the pure concept with the forms of the theoretic or theoretic-practical -spirit, anterior or posterior to it. Other modes of error arise from -the breaking up of the unity of the concept, from the separation of its -constitutive elements. Each one of these elements, abstracted from the -other, and finding that other before it, annuls, instead of recognizing -the other as an organic part of itself; that is to say, substitutes for -it its own abstract existence. - -The concept, as we know, is the logical _a priori_ synthesis, and -so the unity of subject and predicate, unity in distinction and -distinction in unity, affirmation of the concept and judgment of the -fact, at once philosophy and history. In pure and effective thought, -the two elements constitute an indissoluble organism. A fact cannot be -affirmed without thinking; it is impossible to think without affirming -a fact. In logical thought, the representation without the concept is -blind, it is pure representation deprived of logical right, it is not -the subject of a judgment; the concept without representation is void. - -[Sidenote:_Philosophism, logicism or panlogism._] - -This unity can be severed, practically, in the act which is called -error, where propositions expressing the truth are combined, not -according to their theoretical connection, but according to what is -deemed useful by him who makes the combination. It then happens that -in the first place we have an empty concept, which, being without -any internal rule (owing to this very vacuity), fills itself with a -content which does not belong to it--for this it could have only from -contact with the representation--and gives itself a _false_ subject. -The opposite also occurs, that is to say, a false predicate or concept -is posited, a case which will be considered further on. Limiting -ourselves, meanwhile, to the first and observing that it consists in -the abuse of the logical element, we shall be able to call that mode -of error _logicism_ or _panlogism,_ or also _philosophism_ (since -the abuse of the logical element is identical with the abuse of the -philosophic element). - -[Sidenote: _Philosophy of history._] - -Logicism, panlogism or philosophism, is the usurpation that philosophy -in the narrow sense wreaks upon history, by pretending to deduce -history a _priori,_ as the process is called. This usurpation is -logically impossible owing to the identity of philosophy and history -already demonstrated, whence bad history is bad philosophy, and -inversely. It may happen that the same individual who at a given moment -creates excellent philosophy (and excellent history at the same time) -may create bad history (and so bad philosophy) the moment after. But -this amounts to saying that he who at one moment has philosophized -well, may philosophize badly and err the moment after, and not by any -means that the two things are possible in the same act. However, the -usurpation, logically impossible, is practically effected, in which -case, it is not strictly speaking usurpation, although it comes to -be so considered from the logical point of view. On the other hand, -the claim for the _a priori_ in history is perfectly just; for to -affirm a fact means to think it, and it is not possible to think -without transforming the representation by means of the concept, and -so deducing it from the concept. But this deduction is an _a priori_ -synthesis and therefore also induction, whereas the claim to deduce -history _a priori_ would amount to a deduction without induction, -not _History_ (which is, for that very reason, _Philosophy),_ but a -_Philosophy of History._ - - -[Sidenote: _The contradictions in this undertaking._] - -The absurdity of this programme must be clearly set forth, because -those who formulate it are wont to concede equivocally that a -Philosophy of history must be founded upon actual data, and have -induction as its basis. In reality, were those actual data documents -to be interpreted, we should not have the Philosophy of history that -they desire, but simply History. The actual data, the so-called -formless material, in the programme of the Philosophy of history, -are at the most already constructed histories, which do not content -the philosophers of history. They do not content them, not because -they judge them to be false interpretations of the documents (in -which case nothing else would be needed but to correct history with -history, carrying out the work that all historians do); but because -the _very method of history_ does not content them, and they demand -something else. History is despised as mere narration, and considered -not as a form of thought, but as its material, a chaotic mass of -representations. The true form of thought is for them the Philosophy -of history, which appears in history and not in documents. And how -does it appear? If the documents are removed, the _a priori_ synthesis -is no longer possible. It arises, then, by the parthenogenesis of the -abstract concept, which history finds in itself, without the spark -being struck by confrontation with documents. History is deduced -_a priori,_ not in the concrete but in the void. Whatever be the -declarations which philosophers of history add to their programme, its -essence cannot be changed. Were these declarations made seriously and -all their logical consequences accepted, there would be no reason for -maintaining a Philosophy of history beside and beyond history. The -two things would become identical, and the programme itself would be -annulled, both for those who propose it, and for us who judge it to -be contradictory. This is the dilemma, from which there is no escape: -either the Philosophy of history is an interpretation of documents, -and in this case it is synonymous with History and makes no new -claim;--or it does make a new claim and in that case, being no longer -interpretation of documents and intending all the same to think facts, -it thinks them without documents and draws them from the empty concept, -and we have the Philosophy of history, philosophism, panlogism. - -[Sidenote: _Philosophy of history and false analogies._] - -In order to give itself body, the Philosophy of history has recourse to -analogy. This is a legitimate process of thought, which, in its search -for truth, seeks analogies and harmonies. But it is legitimate, as -we know, only on condition that the analogy does not remain a merely -heuristic hypothesis, but is effectively thinkable and thought. Now the -concepts that the Philosophy of history deduces cannot be effectively -thought, because they are void; they are neither pure concepts nor -pure representations, but an arbitrary mixture of the two forms, and -therefore contradiction and vacuity. Thus the analogies of which the -Philosophy of history avails itself, are _false analogies,_ that is -to say, _metaphors_ and _comparisons,_ transformed into analogies and -concepts. It will declare, for instance, that the Middle Ages are the -negation of ancient civilization, and that the modern epoch is the -synthesis of these two opposites. But ancient civilization is nothing -but an unending series of facts, of which each is a synthesis of -opposites, real only in so far as it is a synthesis of opposites. And -between ancient civilization and the Middle Ages, there is absolute -continuity, not less than between the Middle Ages and the modern epoch. -Facts cannot stand to one another as opposite concepts, because they -cannot be opposed to one another as positive and negative. The fact -that is called positive is positive-negative and so, in like manner, -is that which is called negative. It will further declare (always by -way of example) that Greece was thought and Rome action, and the modern -world is the unity of thought and action. But in reality, Greek life -was thought and action, like that of Rome, and like modern life. Every -epoch, every people, every individual, every instant of life is thought -and action, in virtue of the unity of the spirit, whose distinctions -are never broken up into separate existences. The affirmations that -belong to the Philosophy of history are all of this kind, and when they -are not of this kind, it means that they do not belong to the essence -of the Philosophy of history. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between the Philosophy of history, and the -books thus entitled. Philosophical and historical merits of these._] - -The last-mentioned case occurs frequently in books that bear the title -of Philosophy of history. These certainly cannot be considered to have -been refuted when the concept of that science has been refuted. Science -is one thing and the book another. The error of a false attempt at -science is one thing and the value of books, which usually (especially -with great thinkers and writers) have deeper motives and more valuable -parts, is another. Among books upon the philosophy of history are -numbered some masterpieces of human genius,--fountains of truth, at -which many generations have quenched their thirst and to which men -return perpetually. They have often indeed been marvellous books on -history, true history, produced by reaction against superficial, -partisan or trifling histories. They have for the first time revealed -the true character of certain epochs, of certain events, of certain -individuals.[1] The sterile form of duality and opposition between -Philosophy of history and simple History, concealed the fruitful -polemic of a better history against a worse history. Even the formulae, -which were falsely regarded as deductions of concepts (for example, -that the Middle Ages are the negation of antiquity and the Renaissance -the negation of the Middle Ages, or that the Germanic spirit, from the -Reformation to the Romantic movement, is the affirmation of inward -liberty, or that Italy of the fifteenth century represents Art, -France the State, and so on), were at bottom vivacious expressions of -predominant characteristics, by means of which the various epochs and -events were portrayed. These expressions and truths could be accepted -without there being any necessity for presupposing clear and fixed -oppositions and distinctions, or for denying the extra-temporality of -spiritual forms. Besides these historical characteristics, discoveries -more strictly philosophical appeared for the first time in those books; -hence not only do we find in them the first outlines of a Logic of -historical science (a Logic of the individual judgment), but also, -sometimes in imaginative forms, determinations of eternal aspects of -the Spirit, which had previously been unknown or ill-known. Such is -the case with the concept of _progress_ and _providence,_ and of that -other concept concerning the spiritual autonomy of _language_ and of -_art,_ which presented itself for the first time as the discovery of -the historical epoch, in which man, wholly sense and imagination, -without intelligible genera and concepts, is supposed to have spoken -and poetized without reasoning. In an equally imaginary fashion the -constancy of the spirit, which eternally repeats itself, also found -in those philosophies the formula of the perpetual _passing_ away and -returning of the various epochs of civilization. These philosophical -truths, like the historical characteristics, must be purged, the first -from the representations improperly united with them, the second from -the logical character which they wrongly assumed. But they cannot be -discarded, unless we are willing to throw away the gold, through our -unwillingness to have the trouble of separating it from the dross. -And this necessity for purification further confirms the error of the -philosophism, since it is the purification of Philosophy and of History -from the Philosophy of History. - -[Sidenote: _Philosophy of nature._] - -Another manifestation of the philosophism, somewhat different from -the preceding, is the science which assumes the name of _Philosophy_ -of _nature._ Here it is claimed to deduce, not the historical facts -themselves, but the general concepts, which constitute the natural -sciences. The philosophy of nature can be considered as the converse -error to the empiricist error, which claims to induce philosophic -categories _a posteriori,_ whereas this claims to deduce empirical -concepts _a priori._ - -[Sidenote: _Its substantial identity with the Philosophy of history._] - -But the theoretic content of empirical concepts and of the natural -sciences is, as we know, nothing but perception and history. So that, -in the final analysis, the Philosophy of nature can be reduced to the -Philosophy of history (extended to so-called inferior or subhuman -reality), making, like the other, the vain attempt to produce in the -void what thought can produce only in the concrete, that is to say, -by synthesizing. And that it tends to become a Philosophy of history -is also to be seen from its not infrequent hesitances before abstract -concepts, or mathematical science, sometimes declaring that the pure -abstractions of the intellect must remain such and are not otherwise -deducible and capable of being philosophized about. The Philosophy -of nature has usually been extended to the field of the physical and -natural sciences, including also some parts of mechanics. But it has -refused to undertake the deduction of the theorems of geometry and -still more the operations of the Calculus. - -[Sidenote: _The contradictions of the Philosophy of nature._] - -The Philosophy of nature, like the Philosophy of history, has abounded -in declarations of the necessity of the historical and empirical -method. It has recognized that the physical and natural sciences are -its antecedent and presupposition and that it continues and completes -their work. But it is not permitted to complete this work because -this work extends to infinity. And it would not be able to continue -it, save by turning itself into physics and natural sciences, working -as these do in laboratories, observing, classifying, and making laws -(legislating). Now the Philosophy of nature does not wish to adopt such -a procedure, but to introduce a new method into the study of nature. -And since a new method and a new science are the same thing, it does -not wish to be a continuation of physics and of the natural sciences, -but a new science. And since a new science implies a new object, it -wishes to give a new object, which is precisely the _philosophic -idea of nature._ This philosophic idea of nature would therefore be -constructed by a method which would not and could not have anything -in common with that of the empirical sciences. Yet the Philosophy of -nature is not able to dispense with the empirical concepts, which it -strives to deduce _a priori._ And here lies the contradictoriness of -its undertaking. The dilemma which confronted the Philosophy of history -must be repeated in this case also:--either it has to continue the work -of the physical and natural sciences, and in this case there will be -progress in the physical and natural sciences and not in the Philosophy -of nature; or it has to construct the Philosophy of nature (the -physical and natural sciences); and this cannot be done, save by an _a -priori_ deduction of the empirical and thus falling into the error of -panlogism or philosophism. - -[Sidenote: _False analogies in the Philosophy of nature._] - -The Philosophy of nature, like that of history, expresses itself in -false analogies. It will say, for instance, that the poles of the -magnet are the opposed moments of the concept, made extrinsic and -appearing in space; or that light is the ideality of nature; or that -magnetism corresponds to length, electricity to breadth and gravity to -volume; or again (like more ancient philosophers), that water, or fire, -or sulphur, or mercury, is the essence of all natural facts. But these -phenomena which are given as essences, those classes of natural facts -which are given as moments of the concept and of the spirit, are no -longer either scientific phenomena, or the concepts and spiritual forms -of philosophy. The first are intuitions and not categories; the second -categories and not intuitions; and just because they are so clearly -distinguished from one another they mutually mingle in the _a priori_ -synthesis. On the other hand, the concepts of the Philosophy of nature -are categories, which as such present themselves in their emptiness -as intuitions, and intuitions, which in their blindness present -themselves as categories. These thoughts are contradictory. They can -be _spoken,_ or rather _tittered,_ because it is possible to combine -phonetically contradictory propositions, but it is impossible to think -them. Such combinations by their ingenuity often give rise to surprise -or astonishment. But mental satisfaction is never obtained from them -merely because the mind is excited and deluded. On the other hand, the -Philosophy of nature, in this labour of ingenuity, runs against limits, -which even ingenuity cannot overcome. Then are heard affirmations, -which amount to open confessions of the impossibility of the task. Of -this sort is the assertion that nature contains the contingent and the -irrational and therefore is incapable of complete rationalization; -or that nature in its self-externality is impotent to achieve the -concept and the spirit. In like manner. Philosophies of history end by -confessing that there are facts which are told and are not deduced, -because they are small, contingent and fortuitous matter for chronicle. -Thus, after having announced in the programme the rationality of nature -and of history, they recognize in the execution of the programme that -the contrary is true. They simply deny the rationality of the world, -because they cannot bring themselves to deny the rationality of the -pseudo-sciences of philosophism. - -[Sidenote: _Works entitled Philosophy of nature._] - -Finally, the reservations made in the case of works dealing with the -Philosophy of history are to be repeated for those dealing with the -Philosophy of nature. In them, too, there is something more than, and -something different from, the sterile analogical exercises that we have -mentioned. Some of the philosophers of nature, in the pursuit of their -illusions, have made occasional scientific discoveries, in the same way -that the alchemists seeking the philosopher's stone made discoveries -in Chemistry. Those discoveries in physical and natural science cannot -serve to increase the value of the theory of the Philosophy of nature -any more than those made in chemistry increased the value of alchemy. -But they confer value on the books entitled Philosophy of nature, and -do honour to their authors as physicists, not as metaphysicians. From -the philosophical point of view, those works have had the merit of -affirming, though but in imaginative and symbolical ways, the unity -and spirituality of nature, opening the path to its unification with -the history of man. They have the yet greater merit of contributing -effectively in the battle engaged by them against the sciences of -making clear the empirical character of the naturalistic concepts and -the abstract character of the mathematical. Nevertheless, they drew -illegitimate conclusions from such gnoseological truth and carried on -a war of conquest, which must be held to be unjust. In virtue of the -positive elements that they contain, works on the Philosophy of nature -have aided the advance both of the sciences and of philosophy, which in -their properly philosophico-naturalistic parts they have violated and -debased and forced into hybrid unions. - -[Sidenote: _Contemporary demands for a Philosophy of nature and their -various meanings._] - -In our day demands for a Philosophy of history are rare and received -with scant favour; but it seems that those for a Philosophy of nature -are again acquiring vigour. On seeking the inward meaning of this fact, -it is seen that on the one hand many of those who demand a Philosophy -of nature are empiricists, desirous of a natural science elaborated -into a philosophy, and therefore not properly of a Philosophy of -nature, but of a view of the natural sciences that may supplant -philosophy. Other upholders of a Philosophy of nature echo the only -programme of such a philosophy, as it was formulated especially by -Schelling and by Hegel, but declare themselves altogether dissatisfied -with the attempts to carry it out made by Schelling, by Hegel and by -the followers of both. They are dissatisfied, but incapable of setting -their dissatisfaction at rest by a new attempt at carrying out the -programme. They are also without the intellectual courage necessary -to question and to re--examine the solidity of the programme itself, -which is in their judgment plausible and guaranteed by such great -names. For what indeed is more plausible upon first inspection than -the affirmation that the empirical sciences must be elevated to the -rank of philosophy? It seems that too much mental liberty is needed -to understand and to distinguish from the preceding, the somewhat -different proposition that empiricism (empirical philosophy) must -certainly be elevated to the rank of non-empirical philosophy, but that -the _empirical sciences_ must be left in peace to their own methods, -without any attempt to render perfect by means of extrinsic additions -that which has in itself all the perfection of which it is capable. -It seems that more intelligence than is usually met with is necessary -in order to recognize that this last proposition does not establish a -_dualism_ of spirit and nature, of philosophy and the natural sciences, -but for ever destroys every dualism by making of the natural sciences -a merely practical formation of the spirit, which has no voice in -the assembly of the philosophical sciences, as the object which it -has created has no reality. An ultimate tendency can be discerned in -the complex movement of the day toward a Philosophy of nature. This -is the attainment of the consciousness that reality is on this side -of the classifications of the natural sciences, and that the natural -sciences must be retranslated into _history,_ by means of a historical -consideration (concrete and not abstract) of the facts that are called -natural. But this tendency is not something that will attain its end -in a near or in a distant future. It has always shown its value and -shows it also to-day; it can be recommended and promoted, but neither -more nor less than every other legitimate form of spiritual activity -can be recommended and promoted. Classifications are classifications; -and what man really seeks out, what continually enriches the empirical -sciences, is always the history of nature,--the series of facts, which, -as we know, can be distinguished only in an empirical manner from the -history of man, and which along with this constitutes _History_ without -genitive or adjective; history, which cannot even be strictly called -history of the spirit, for the Spirit is, itself, History. - - -[Footnote 1: See my _Essay on Hegel,_ chap. ix. (_What is living, etc., -of Hegel,_ tr. D. Ainslie).] - - - - -IV - - -MYTHOLOGISM - - -[Sidenote: _Rupture of the unity of the synthesis a priori. -Mythologism._] - -When by the severance of subject from predicate, of history from -philosophy, the mutilated subject is given as predicate, mutilated -history as philosophy, and consequently a false predicate is -posited, which predicate is an abstract subject and therefore mere -representation; when this happens, there occurs the opposite error -to that which we have just particularly examined. That was called -philosophism; this might be called historicism; but since this last -term has usually been employed to indicate a form of positivism, it -will be more convenient to call it _mythologism._ - -The process of this error (somewhat abstruse in the way that we have -stated it) becomes clear at once in virtue of the name that has been -assigned to it. Every one has examples of myths present in his memory. -Let us take the myths of Uranus and Gæa, of the seven days of creation, -of the earthly Paradise, and of Prometheus, of Danaë, or of Niobe. -Every one is ready to say of a scientific theory which introduces -causes not demonstrable either in the experience or in thought, that it -is not theory, but mythology, not concept, but myth. - -[Sidenote: _Essence of the myth._] - -What then is it that is called myth? It is certainly not a simple -poetic and artistic fancy. The myth contains an affirmation or logical -judgment, and precisely for this reason may be considered a hybrid -affirmation, half fanciful and erroneous. If it has been confused with -art, it is not so much a false doctrine of the myth that should be -blamed, as a false æsthetic doctrine, which we have already refuted, -and which fails to recognize the original and ingenuous character of -art. On the other hand, the logical affirmation does not stand to the -myth as something extrinsic, as in the case of a fable or image put -forward to express a given concept, where the difference of the two -terms and the arbitrariness of the relation between them declares -itself more or less openly. In this case there is not myth, but -_allegory._ In myth, on the contrary, the concept is not separated -from the representation, indeed it is throughout penetrated by it. -Yet the compenetration is not effected in a logical manner, as in the -singular judgment and in the _a priori_ synthesis. The compenetration -is obtained capriciously, yet it gives itself out as necessary and -logical. For instance, it is desired to explain how sky and earth were -formed, how sea and rivers, plants and animals, men and language arose; -and behold, we are given as explanations, the stories of the marriage -of Uranus and Gæa, and the birth of Chronos and of the other Titans; -or the story of a God Creator, who successively drew all things out of -chaos in seven days, and made man of clay and taught him the names of -things. It is desired to explain the origin of human civilization, and -the tale is told of Prometheus, who steals fire and instructs men in -the arts; or of Adam and Eve, who eat the forbidden fruit, and driven -from the earthly Paradise are forced to till the ground and bathe it -with their sweat. It is desired to explain the astronomical phenomena -of dawn or of winter, and the story is told of Phœbus, who pursues -Daphne, or of the same god who slays one after the other the sons of -Niobe. These naturalistic interpretations may pass as examples, however -contested and antiquated they may be. In place of the concepts which -should illuminate single facts, we are given representations. Hence -are derived what we have called false predicates. Philosophy becomes a -little anecdote, a novelette, a story; history too becomes a story and -ceases to be history, because it lacks the logical element necessary -for its constitution. The true philosophic doctrine in the preceding -cases, for example, will be that of an immanent spirit, of which stars -and sky, earth and sea, plants and animals, constitute the contingent -manifestations; the doctrine which looks upon the consciousness of -good and evil and the necessity for work, not as the result of a theft -made from the gods or of a violation of one of their commands, but -as eternal categories of reality; and which regards language, not as -the teaching of men by a god, but as an essential determination of -humanity, or indeed of spirituality, which is not truly, if it does -not express itself. They will also, if we like, be the philosophic -doctrines of materialism and of evolutionism; but these, in order -to be accepted as philosophic, must prove, like the preceding, that -they do not substitute representations for concepts and are strictly -founded upon thought and employ its method, that is to say, that they -are philosophy and not mythology. For this reason, in philosophical -criticism, adverse philosophies often accuse one another of being -more or less mythological, and we hear of the mythology of _atoms,_ -the mythology of _chance,_ the mythology of _ether,_ of the _two -substances,_ of _monads,_ of the _blind will,_ of the _Unconscious,_ -or, if you like, of the mythology of the _immanent Spirit._ - -[Sidenote: _Problems concerning the theory of myth._] - -The particular treatment of all the problems that concern the myth does -not belong to this place, where it was important solely to determine -the proper nature of that spiritual formation. It is customary, for -instance, to distinguish between _myth_ and _legend,_ attributing -the first name to stories of universal content, and the second to -stories with an individual and historical content. This partition is -analogous to that between philosophy in the strict sense and history, -and as such, though it possesses no little practical importance, it is -without philosophic value, because, as has been remarked, in myth the -universal becomes history and history becomes legend. Nor is it only -legend of the past, but it extends even to the future, and thus appear -_apocalypses,_ the legend of the _Millennium,_ and _eschatology._ -Again, myths are usually distinguished as _physical_ and _ethical,_ -and this division is in turn analogous to that between the philosophy -of the external world and the philosophy of the internal world, the -philosophy of nature and the philosophy of the spirit, and stands or -falls with it. So that by this criticism we can solve the disputes as -to whether physical myths precede ethical or inversely, whether the -origin of myth is or is not anthropomorphic, and the like. - -[Sidenote: _Myth and religion. Identity of the two spiritual -formations._] - -But the myth can assume another name, which makes yet clearer the -knowledge of the logical error of which the analysis has been given: -the name of _religion._ Mythologism is the _religious error._ Against -this thesis various objections have been brought, such as that religion -is not theoretical but practical, and has therefore nothing to do -with myth; or that it is something _sui generis,_ or that it is not -exhausted in the myth, since it consists of the complex of all the -activities of the human spirit. But against these objections it must -above all be maintained that religion is a theoretic fact, since -there is no religion _without affirmation._ The practical activity, -however noble it may be held, is always an operating, a doing, a -producing, and to that extent is mute and alogical. It will be said -that that affirmation is _sui generis_ and goes beyond the limits -of human science. This is most true, if by science we understand -the empirical sciences; but it is not true, if by human science we -understand philosophy, since philosophy also goes beyond or is outside -the limits of the empirical sciences. It will be said that every -religion is founded upon a _revelation,_ whereas philosophy does not -admit of other revelation than that which the spirit makes to itself -as thought. That too is most true; but the revelation of religion, in -so far as it is not that of the spirit as thought, expresses precisely -the logical contradiction of mythologism: the affirmation of the -universal as mere representation, and this asserted as a universal -truth on the strength of a contingent fact, a communication which -ought to be proved and thought, whereas on the contrary it is taken -capriciously, as a principle of proof and as equivalent or superior to -an act of thought. The theory of religion as a mixture hardly merits -refutation, since that complex of the activities of the spirit is a -metaphor of the spirit in its totality; that is to say, it gives not a -theory of religion, but a new name of the spirit itself,--the object of -philosophic speculation. - -[Sidenote: _Religion and philosophy._] - -Since then, religion is identical with myth, and since myth is not -distinguishable from philosophy by any positive character, but only -as false philosophy from true philosophy and as error from the truth -which rectifies and contains it, we must affirm that religion, in -so far as it is truth, is identical with philosophy, or as can also -be said, _that philosophy_ is the _true religion._ All ancient and -modern thought about religions, which have always been dissolved in -philosophies, leads to this result. And since philosophy coincides -with history, and religion and the history of religion are the same, -and myth and religion are strictly speaking indistinguishable, we can -see very well the vanity of the attempt that is being made beneath our -eyes to preserve a religion or mythological truth side by side with a -history of religions, which on the contrary is supposed to be practised -with complete mental freedom and with an entirely critical method. -This, which is one of the tendencies of so-called _modernism,_ is -condemned as contradictory and illogical, by philosophy not less than -by the Catholic Church.[1] The history of religions is an integral part -of the history of philosophy, and as inseparable from it as error from -the history of truth. - -[Sidenote: _Conversion of errors into one another. Conversion of -mythologism into philosophism (theology) and of philosophism into -mythologism (mythology of nature, historical apocalypses, etc.)._] - -When religion does not dissolve into philosophy and wishes to persist -together with it, or to substitute itself for philosophy, it reveals -itself as effective error; that is to say, as an arbitrary attempt -against truth, due to habit, feelings and individual passions. But -the destiny of every form of error is to be unable to persist before -the light of truth. Hence the constant change of tactics and the -passage of every error into the error from which it had at first -wished to disassociate itself, or into which it did not mean to fall. -Thus æstheticism, dislodged from its positions, takes refuge in -those of empiricism; and empiricism either descends again into pure -sensationalism and æstheticism, or becomes volatilized in mysticism. -Thus (to stop at the case we have before us) mythologism, which intends -to be the opposite of philosophism and to work with blind fancy instead -of with empty concepts, is obliged in order to save itself from the -attacks of criticism to have recourse to philosophism; and religion is -then called _theology._ Theology is philosophism, because it works with -concepts which are empty of all historical and empirical content. Myth -becomes _dogma_; the myth of the expulsion from Paradise becomes the -dogma of original sin; the myth of the son of God becomes the dogma of -the incarnation and of the Trinity. Nor must it be thought that for its -part philosophism does not accomplish the opposite transition. Every -philosophy of nature ends by appearing as a _mythology of nature,_ -every philosophy of history as an _apocalypse._ Sometimes even a sort -of revelation occurs in them, and we often find that the unthinkable -connections of concepts constituting those pseudo-philosophies are -obtained and comprehended in virtue of second sight, as the result of a -mental illumination, which is the prerogative of but a few privileged -persons. Finally, philosophism and mythologism embrace one another -and fall embracing into empiricism and into the other forms of error -previously described. - -[Sidenote: _Scepsis._] - -This perpetual transition from one form of error to another gives rise -to a _scepsis,_ which promotes the reciprocal dissolution of errors, -and scorning illusions and confusions, throws their _mental vacuity_ -into clear light. Such a scepsis fulfils an important function. The -lies of æstheticism, mathematicism, philosophism, mythologism, cannot -resist it. Their little wordy strongholds are broken into; the shadows -are dispersed. Especially against mythologism, which in a certain sense -may be called the most complete negation of thought, a scepsis is -helpful; and owing to the resistance offered here more than elsewhere, -by passions and interests, it often takes the form of violent satire. -The last great epoch of this strife is what is called the _Aufklärung,_ -Encyclopedism or Voltaireism, and was directed against Christianity, -especially in its Catholic form. We must make so many reservations in -what follows concerning the enlightened Encyclopedist and Voltairean -attitude, that here we feel obliged to indicate explicitly its serious -and fruitful side. - - - -[Footnote 1: See with reference to this G. Gentile, _Il modernismo e -l'enciclica, Critica,_ vi. pp. 208-229.] - - - - -V - -DUALISM, SCEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM - - -[Sidenote: _Dualism._] - -Total scepticism can be reached only through _dualism,_ which, in -addition to being a particular error in a given philosophic problem, -is a logical error, consisting in the attempt to affirm two methods of -truth at the same time--the philosophic method and the non-philosophic -method, however the second of these be afterwards determined. Such an -error would not be error but supreme truth, if the various methods -were given each its due post (which is what has been attempted in -this Logic); but it becomes error when the various methods are made -philosophical and placed _alongside_ the philosophical. This is the -error of those conciliatory people, who, unwilling to seek out where -reason stands, admit that reason is operative in all of them, and -divide the kingdom of truth amongst all in equal parts. Thus arise -those logical doctrines which demand for the solution of philosophic -problems, the successive or contemporaneous application of the -naturalistic method, of mathematics, of historical research, and so -on. At the least they demand the combination of the naturalistic -method (empiricism) with the speculative and the use of what they call -the double criterion of _teleology_ and _causality,_ or of _double_ -causality. To the question, what is reality, they reply with two -methods and consequently offer two concurrent and parallel realities. -Beneath the appearance of treatment and solution, they abandon the -philosophic problem. Instead of conceiving, they describe, and -description is given as concept, and concept as description: hence the -justifiable intervention of the scepsis. - -[Sidenote: _Scepsis and scepticism._] - -But the scepsis, which clears the ground of all forms of erroneous -logical affirmation, is the negation of error and consequently the -negativity of negativity. The negativity of negativity is affirmation, -and for this reason, the true scepsis, like every true negation, always -contains a positive content in the negative verbal form, which can be -also verbally developed as such. If this positive content, instead of -being developed, is choked in the bud, if instead of negation, which -is also affirmation, a mere negation is given,--an abstract negation, -which destroys without constructing, and if this negation claims to -pass as truth, the final form of error is obtained, which is no longer -called scepsis, but _scepticism._ - -[Sidenote: _Mystery._] - -Scepticism is the proclamation of mystery made in the name of -thought;--a definition the contradictoriness of which leaps to the -eye. It is mortally wounded both by the ancient dilemma against -scepticism and by the _cogito_ of Descartes. Nevertheless, since a -singular tenderness for the idea of mystery seems to have invaded the -contemporary world, it is desirable to leave open no loophole whatever -for misunderstanding. The _mystery_ is _life itself,_ which is an -eternal _problem_ for thought; but this problem would not even be a -problem, if thought did not eternally solve it. For this reason, both -those who consider mystery to be definitely penetrated by thought and -those who consider it impenetrable are equally wrong. The first we -already know: they are the philosophists who reduce reality to pure -terms of abstract thought, by breaking up the _a priori_ synthesis -and by neglecting the historical element, which is ever new and ever -assuming forms not determinable _a priori._ Thus, they claim to shut -up the world for ever in one single act (maybe in some particular -philosophic system). Through their excessive love of the infinite -they make it finite; the sun and the earth and all the stars, the -historical forms of life, and what is called human life, which has -been known for some thousands of years, are transformed by them into -categories of thought, solidified and made eternal. This conception, -which appears (at least as a tendency) in certain parts of the Hegelian -philosophy, is narrow and suffocating. The spirit is superior to all -its manifestations hitherto known, and its power is infinite. It -will never be able to surpass itself, that is to say, its eternal -categories, just as God (according to the best theological doctrines) -could destroy heaven and earth, but not the true and the good, which -are his very essence; yet the spirit is able to surpass, and actually -does surpass, its every contingent incarnation. The world, which is -abstractly assumed to be more or less constant, is all in movement and -becoming. Those who will be raised up to think it will know what worlds -will issue from this world of ours. That we cannot know, for we must -think this world which exists at our moment, and must act on the basis -of it. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the affirmations of mystery in philosophy._] - -But if the philosophers incur the guilt of arrogance, the sceptics, -who affirm a mystery, that is to say, that reality is impenetrable to -thought, fall under the accusation of cowardice. These, when faced with -the problems of the real (soluble, we repeat, by the very fact that -they are problems), avoid the hard work of dominating and penetrating -them, and think it convenient to wrap themselves in abstract negation -and to affirm that _mystery is._ There is mystery, without doubt; and -this means that there is a problem, something that invokes the light of -thought. And it is a beautiful solution which these mysterious ones and -sceptics offer, for it consists in stating the problem and leaving it -untouched. In the same way, when a man asks for help, we might claim to -have given it to him when we had noticed his request. Charity consists -in hastening to render effective aid, not in noting that aid has been -asked for and then turning the back. To think is to break up the -mystery and to solve the problem, not simply to recognize that there is -a problem and a mystery, and to renounce seeking the solution as though -it had already been given and the matter settled by that recognition. - -It seems strange that it should be necessary to explain these -elementary concepts; yet in our time it is necessary, so much have -those concepts been darkened for historical reasons, which it would -take long to expound here, and which can all of them be summarized -as due to a certain moral weakening. And it may be opportune here to -give a warning (since we are dealing with a theme that belongs to -the elementary school of philosophy) that to inculcate the courage -to confront and to solve the problem and to conquer the mystery, is -not to counsel the neglect of difficulties, or superficiality and -arrogance. Mysteries are covered and must continually be covered -by their own shadows; problems torment and must torment, yet it is -only through these shadows and by means of those torments that we -attain to momentary repose in the true; and only thus does repose not -become sloth, but the restoration of our forces to resume the eternal -journey. Superficiality, arrogance, neglect of difficulties, belong -to the sceptics who deafen themselves with words and contrive to live -at their ease in their abstract negation. True thinkers suffer, but -do not flee from pain. "_Et iterum ecce turbatio_ (groans St. Anselm -amid the anxious vicissitudes of his meditations), _ecce iterum obviat -maeror et luctus quaerenti gaudium et laetitiam. Sperabat jam anima -mea satietatem, et ecce iterum obruitur egestate. Conabar assurgere -ad lucem Dei, et recidi in tenebras meas: immo non modo cecidi in -eas, sed sentio me involutum in eis...."_[1] Such words as these are -the pessimistic lyric of the thinker. Sceptics create no such lyric, -because they have cut the desire at the root. They are as a rule -blissfully calm and smiling. - -[Sidenote: _Agnosticism as a particular form of scepticism._] - -There is a form of scepticism which would like to appear critical and -refined and which takes the name of _agnosticism._ It is a scepticism -limited to ultimate things, to profound reality, to the essence of -the world, which amounts to saying that it is limited to the supreme -principles of philosophy. Now, since the principles of philosophy are -all equally supreme, such agnostic scepticism extends its affirmation -of mystery over neither more nor less than the whole of philosophy and -consequently over the whole of human knowledge. Its limits would be -nothing less than the boundaries of knowledge. Indeed, agnosticism is -the spiritual fulfilment sought by all those who negate philosophy, -such as æstheticists, mathematicians, and especially empiricists; and -agnostics and empiricists are ordinarily so closely connected that the -one name is almost synonymous with the other. - -[Sidenote: _Mysticism._] - -The sceptical error, which consists in stating the problem as solution -and mystery as truth, can give way to another mode of error, in which -the very affirmation of scepticism is denied and it is recognized -that thought cannot explicitly state mystery. But this recognition, -which would imply that of the authority of thought, is strangely -combined with the most precise negation of such authority. Thought -being excluded, either affirmatively or negatively, as in the -self-contradiction of scepticism, what remains is life, no longer -a problem, or a solution of a problem, but just life, life lived. -To affirm that truth is life lived, reality directly felt in us as -part of us and we part of it, is the pretension of _mysticism._ -This is the last general form of error that can be thought; and its -self-contradiction is evident from the genetic process which we have -already expounded. Mysticism affirms, when no affirmation is permitted -to it; and it is yet more gravely contradictory than scepticism, which, -though forbidding to itself logical affirmation, does not forbid -itself speech, that is to say, æsthetic expression. To mysticism not -even words can be permissible, because mysticism, being life and not -contemplation, practice and not theory, is by definition _dumbness._ -But we shall say no more of mysticism, having had occasion to refer to -it, as also to æstheticism and empiricism, at the beginning of this -treatise on Logic. - -[Sidenote: _Errors in the other parts of philosophy._] - -When we consider these errors more closely, it is easy to see that -dualism, scepticism, and mysticism manifest themselves not only in the -forms of thought, in philosophy as Logic, but also in all the other -particular philosophic problems, distinct from those that are peculiar -to Logic, and in the errors due to them. The complete enumeration of -these and their concrete determination would (as has already been said) -require the development of the whole philosophic system, and therefore -cannot all be contained in the present treatise. Indeed, they take -their name, not from the forms of the spirit, with which the logical -form is confused, or from the internal mutilation of the logical form, -but from the confusion and mutilation of the remaining spiritual forms. -They are no longer called æstheticism, mathematicism, or philosophism, -but ethical utilitarianism, moral abstractionism, æsthetic logicism, -sensationalism and hedonism, practical intellectualism, metaphysical -dualism or pluralism, optimism and pessimism, and so on. It is not -those who, as in the previous instances, deny philosophy itself, that -fall into such errors, but those who admit it and carry it out more -or less badly in its other parts. Without the admission of the method -of philosophic thought, and without the assertion of a concept, it is -impossible to conceive logical usurpations in the domain of another -concept, which is not less necessary than the first to the fulness and -unity of the real. - -_Ethical utilitarianism,_ for instance, thinks the concept of -utilitarian practical activity; but its fallacy consists in arbitrarily -maintaining that the concept of utility altogether exhausts that of -the practical activity, thus negating the other concept distinct from -it, the practical moral activity. _Moral abstractionism_ commits -the opposite error, affirming the moral activity, but negating the -utilitarian. _Æsthetic logicism_ rightly affirms the reality of the -logical mental form, but is wrong in not recognizing the intuitive -mental form and in considering it to be resolved in the logical -form. Æsthetic _sensationalism,_ directing its attention to crude -and unexpressed sensation, emphasises the necessary precedent of the -æsthetic activity, but then makes of the condition the conditioned, -defining art as sensation. Æsthetic _hedonism, utilitarianism or -practicism,_ is true in so far as it notes the practical and hedonistic -envelope of the æsthetic activity; but it becomes false in so far as -it takes the envelope for the content, and treats art as a mere fact -of pleasure and pain. _Practical intellectualism_ perceives that the -will is not possible without a cognitive basis, but by exaggerating -this, it ends by destroying the originality of the practical spiritual -form, and reduces it to a complex of concepts and reasonings. In like -manner, _metaphysical dualism_ avails itself of the difference between -the concept of reality as spirit and that of reality as nature, the -one arising from logical thought, the other from an empirical and -naturalistic method of treatment, in order to transmute them into -concepts of two distinct forms of reality itself, as spirit and matter, -internal and external world, and so on. _Pluralism_ or monadism, -confounding the individuality of acts with the substantiality which -belongs to the universal subject, makes entities of single acts and -turns them into a multiplicity of simple substances. _Pessimism_ and -_optimism,_ each one availing itself of an abstract element of reality, -which is the unity of opposites, maintain that reality is all evil and -suffering, or all goodness and joy. This process of exemplification -could be carried much further, and would become, as we see, a deduction -of all philosophical concepts and errors. - -[Sidenote: _Conversion of these errors with one another and with -logical errors._] - -Now, each one of those false solutions, obeying the law of errors, -is obliged, in order to maintain itself, to pass into that from -which it was distinguished, and then to pass back again from that -to this. Thus utilitarianism becomes abstract morality and abstract -morality utilitarianism. Hence the work of scepsis and the consequent -appearance of a _particular scepticism of this or that concept._ Ethics -having vainly struggled with the alternate negations, of utility and -of morality, ends in _ethical scepticism;_ Æsthetic torn between -sensationalism and utilitarianism and logicism, and other errors, and -destroying them all with its scepsis, ends in _Æsthetic scepticism_; -Metaphysics, torn between materialism, abstract spiritualism, -dualism, pluralism, pessimism, optimism, and other erroneous views, -ends in _metaphysical scepticism._ And to these errors of particular -scepticism, errors of _particular mysticism_ soon succeed. Thus we hear -it said that there is no concept of the beautiful, as there is of the -true or the good, but that it is only felt and lived; or, again, that -there is no possible definition of what is good, since it concerns a -thing that must be left to sentiment and to life; or, finally, that -thought has value within the limits that abstraction has value, but -that it is impotent before complete reality, because life alone is -capable of comprehending reality, by receiving it into its very bosom. - -On the other hand, it is not possible that any æstheticism, empiricism, -mathematicism, philosophism, mythologism, or logicism whatever, should -remain limited to a determinate philosophic concept without coming -in contact with others, because those forms of error strike at the -logical form of thought itself, and therefore equally at all other -philosophic concepts. The ethical or æsthetic empiricist, for instance, -must logically affirm a general philosophic empiricism if he does not -wish to correct himself by contradicting himself (an hypothesis which -must be neglected and left to be understood in this consideration of -the simple, elementary, fundamental, or _necessary_ forms of error). -He who in a particular philosophic problem has committed a confusion -of concepts, and has thence arrived at a particular scepticism and -mysticism, is led by the systematic and unitary character of philosophy -to widen that mysticism and scepticism from particular to general. From -this general mysticism and scepticism, he is led to return gradually to -mythologism, philosophism, empiricism, and to the other negations of -the logical form of philosophy. Everything is connected in philosophy -and everything is connected in error, which is the negation of -philosophy. - - - -[Footnote 1: _Proslog.,_ c. 18.] - - - - -VI - - -THE ORDER OF ERRORS AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH - - -[Sidenote: _Necessary character of the forms of errors. Their definite -number._] - -Everything is connected in errors; error has its necessary forms. -This implies, in the first place, that the possible forms of errors, -the logical forms of the illogical, are _so many_ and _no more._ -Indeed, the forms of the spirit or concepts of reality, which can -be arbitrarily combined, can be stated as a finite number (where -the process of numbering can be applied to them). Consequently, -the arbitrary combinations or errors which arise from them can -also be similarly numbered. Only the individual forms of error are -infinite, and that for the same reason which we have already given, -as the individual forms of truth are infinite. Problems are always -historically conditioned, and the solutions are conditioned in the same -way; even false solutions, which are determined by feelings, passions, -and interests, also vary according to historical conditions. - -[Sidenote: Their logical order.] - -In the second place, and as corollary to the preceding thesis, the -possible forms of errors present a necessary order; and this, because -the forms of the spirit or the concepts of reality stand in a necessary -order to one another. They cannot be placed after or before one another -nor changed at will. This necessary order is, as we know, a genetic -order of degrees, and consequently the possible forms of errors -constitute a series of degrees. It is commonly said that _error has -its logic,_ and we must say more correctly, that it cannot constitute -itself as error, save by borrowing logical character from truth. - -[Sidenote: _Examples of this order in the various parts of philosophy._] - -This is already clearly seen in the exposition given of the forms of -logical error, and more clearly still when, resuming, we consider -that the spirit, when it rebels against the concept, must by this -very act affirm the term which is distinct from the concept, whether -it be called representation, intuition, or pure sensation. Hence the -necessity of the form of error (in a certain sense the first), which is -_æstheticism,_--the affirmation of truth as pure sensation. Below this -stage, the spirit can descend to annul the problem in _dualism;_ or, -going further and abandoning affirmation, it may fall into scepticism; -or, finally, abandoning even expression, it may fall into _dumbness,_ -or _mysticism,_ which is the lowest degree. Above æstheticism it -can raise itself to try to take refuge in _empiricism,_ in which -is posited a universal, but one that is merely representative and, -therefore, a false universal. It is the second step, nor can any other -be conceived as second:--we must give a false value either to the pure -representation (æstheticism);--or (taking the second step), to the -representation and the concept together, as is the case in the form of -the empirical concept (empiricism). The third step is the desperate -escape from the insufficiency of the empirical concept, by means of the -abstract concept, which guarantees the universality which the other -lacks, but gives an empty universality (mathematicism). Finding no -refuge in this emptiness from the objections of its adversaries, it is -obliged finally to enter philosophy. But the erring spirit continues -its work in philosophy itself and, once it has taken possession, abuses -it. Now it is not possible to abuse philosophy, save by reducing it -either to a concept without intuition, which is nevertheless taken as a -synthesis of concept and intuition (_philosophism_); or to an intuition -without concept, which, in its turn, is taken as the requisite -synthesis _(mythologism)._ The result of all this process is always the -renunciation of the philosophic problem, disguised by the admission of -the double method (dualism), and hence the descent below the logical -form, either with the affirmation which denies itself (scepticism), -or, again, with that which denies even the possibility of expression -(mysticism) and returns to life, which is not a problem at all, being -life lived. - -The same thing occurs with the other errors, when we refer to the other -concepts of the spirit or of reality, although we shall not be able to -give the complete series without summarizing the whole of philosophy, -which is not necessary here, and by its excessive concentration and -extreme brevity would be obscure. Suffice it to say, by way of example, -that the ethical problem, besides being negated by means of erroneous -sensationalist, empiricist, and mycologist solutions, and so on (to -which, in common with all philosophic problems, it is subject), can -be negated by practical intellectualism, which does not recognize a -practical problem side by side with that of the theoretic spirit, -and reduces virtue to knowledge. Hence _ethical intellectualism._ -Since ethical intellectualism cannot resist objections, it is obliged -to introduce at least the slightest practical element that can be -admitted, which is that of individual utility, and resolving morality -into this, it then presents itself as _ethical utilitarianism._ -This in its turn, finding itself in contradiction with the peculiar -character of morality, which goes beyond individual utility, arranges -to recognize and to substitute for the first a super-individual -utility, which is the universal practical value or morality. And thus, -by negating the first on account of the second concept, it presents -itself as _moralism_ or _ethical abstractionism._ The impossibility of -negating both the first and the second, and the necessity of affirming -both, urge the acceptance of the final form of _practical dualism,_ -in which utility and morality appear as co-ordinated or juxtaposed. -Each one of these arbitrary doctrines is critical of the others, -and, by its internal contradictions, of itself. Hence the fall into -scepticism and mysticism. The circle of error can be traversed again, -but it is impossible to alter the place that each of those forms has -in the circle, by placing, for instance, practical dualism before -utilitarianism or intellectualism after moralism. - -[Sidenote: _Spirit of error and spirit of search._] - -There is no gradual issuing from the infernal circle of error, and -salvation from it is not possible, save by entering at one stroke into -the celestial circle of truth, in which alone the mind rests satisfied -as in its kingdom. The spirit that _errs_ or flees from the light must -be converted into the spirit of _search,_ that longs for the light; -pride must yield to humility; narrow love for one's own abstract -individuality become wider and elevate itself to an austere love, to -an unlimited devotion toward that which surpasses the individual, thus -becoming an "heroic fury," the "_amor Dei intellectualis._" - -[Sidenote: _Immanence of error in truth._] - -In this act of love and fervour the spirit becomes pure thought and -attains to the true, is indeed transmuted into the true. But as spirit -of truth it possesses truth and also its contrary transfigured in -that. The possessing of a concept is the possession of it in all its -relations, and so are possessed all the modes in which that concept can -be wrongly altered by error. For instance, the true concept of moral -activity is also the concept of utilitarianism, of abstractionism, -of practical dualism, and so on. The two series of knowledge, that -of the true and that of its contrary, are, in truth, inseparable, -because they really constitute one single series. The concept is -affirmation-negation. - -[Sidenote: _Erroneous distinction between possession of and search for -truth._] - -It will be said that this is perhaps exact in the case of the -_possession_ of truth, but not in that of the _search_ for it, where -the two series may well appear disunited. Truth, to one who searches, -is at the top of the staircase of errors, and as it is possible to -climb a great part of the staircase without reaching what is at the -top of it, so when once the desired place has been reached, it is -possible not to see or not to remember the staircase that is below. But -the possession of truth is never static, as in general no real fact -is static. The possession of and the search for truth are the same. -When it seems that a truth is possessed in a static way and almost -solidified, if we observe closely we shall see that the word expressing -it, the sound of it, has remained, but the spirit has flown away. That -truth was, but is no longer thought, and so is not truth. It will be -truth only when it is thought anew, and thinking and thinking anew are -the same, since each rethinking is a new act of thought. In thinking -the truth is search for truth; it is a most rapid ideal motion which, -starting from the centre, runs through all the possibilities of error, -and only in so far as it runs through and rejects them all does it find -itself at its centre, which is the centre of motion. - -[Sidenote: _The search for truth in the practical sense of preparation -for thought; and the series of errors._] - -In order to separate truth from the search for truth this latter must -be understood, not as the will for thought and so as thought in action, -but as the _will which lays down the conditions for thought,_ the will -which prepares itself for thought, but does not yet think effectually. -This indeed is the usual meaning of the word "search." To search -is to stimulate oneself for thinking, by employing opportune means -for that purpose. And there is no more opportune means than that of -confronting one with another the various forms of the spirit and the -various concepts; because in the course of that confrontation there is -produced the true combination; that is to say, thought, which is truth, -is aroused. To search means therefore to _run through the series of -errors._ - -[Sidenote: _Transfiguration, in the search thus understood, of error -into suggestion or hypothesis._] - -But the seeker sets to work in quite a different spirit from that of -the assertor of errors. The spirit of research is not the rebel erring -spirit, and therefore the path that both follow is only the same in -appearance; the first was the path of errors, but the second can only -be so called by metaphor. Errors are errors when there is the will for -error. Where, on the other hand, there is the will to unify material -and to prepare the conditions of thought, the improper combination -of ideas is not indeed error, but _suggestion_ or _hypothesis._ The -hypothesis is not an act of truth, because either it is not verified -and so reveals itself as without truth, or it is verified and becomes -truth only at the moment in which it is verified. But neither is it -an act of error, because it is affirmed, not as truth, but as simple -means or aid toward the conquest of truth. In the doctrine of search, -the series of errors is all redeemed, baptized, or blessed anew; the -diabolic spirit abandons it precipitately, leaving it void of truth, -but innocent. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between error as error and error as -hypothesis._] - -The distinction between error as _error_ and error as _suggestion,_ -between _error_ and _hypothesis_ or heuristic expedients, is of -capital importance. It is found as basis of some common distinctions, -such as those between _mistake_ and _error,_ between error committed -in _good faith_ and error committed in _bad faith,_ and the like. -These and others like them show themselves to be certainly untenable, -because error as error is always in bad faith, and there is no -difference between error and mistake, save an empirical difference, -or a difference of verbal emphasis, for it can be said according to -empirical accidents that an affirmation is either simply erroneous or -altogether a mistake. But although they cannot be maintained as they -are formulated, they nevertheless suggest the desirability and the -anticipation of this true and profound distinction. - -[Sidenote: _Immanence of the suggestion in error itself as error._] - -On the other hand, error and suggestion, error and heuristic procedure, -since they have in common the practical, extrinsic, and improper -combination of ideas, stand in this relation to one another, that -the suggestion is not error, but _error always contains in itself -willingly or unwillingly a suggestion._ The erring spirit, though -without intending it, prepares the material for the search for truth. -It means to evade that search or to bring it to an arbitrary end; but -in doing so it breaks up the clods of earth, throws them about, ploughs -and fertilizes the field where the truth will sprout. Thus it happens -that many combinations of ideas, proposed and maintained through -caprice and vanity with the lawyer's object of scoring his point, or -of shining and astonishing with paradox, or for pastime and for other -utilitarian reasons, have been adopted by more serious spirits as steps -in the progress of research. The enemies of the truth not only testify -to the truth but come to serve it themselves, through the unforeseen -consequences of their work. A sort of gratitude comes over us at times -and makes us tender toward these adversaries of the truth, because we -feel that from them has come the stimulus to obtain it, as from them -come the strengthening of our hold upon it and the inspiration, the -clear-sightedness, and the warmth of the defence of it that we make -against them. - -[Sidenote: _Individuals and error._] - -But it is not necessary in yielding to the generous feeling for human -fraternity to exaggerate in this last direction. The gratitude that we -feel is not deserved by them; at the most, it is God or the universal -spirit or Providence who deserves it. They did not wish to serve the -truth and did not serve it, save through consequences which are not -their work. One-sided and abstract optimism has intruded here also; -and perceiving in error the element of suggestion, it has altogether -cancelled the category of error in favour of that of suggestion and -has pronounced that man always seeks the true, as he always wills the -good. Certainly; but there is the man who stops at his individual -good, _fruges consumere natus_; and there is the man who progresses -to the universal good. There is the man who combines words to give -himself and others the illusion of knowing what he does not know and -of being able to attend to his own pleasures without further trouble; -and there is the man who combines words with anxious soul and spirit -intent, _venator medii,_ a hunter of the concept. Here, too, the truth -is neither in the optimism nor in the pessimism, but in the doctrine, -which conciliates and surpasses them both. Nor does it matter that -owing to the defect of abstract optimism that very philosopher, who did -more than any other to reveal the hidden richness of the dialectical -principle, was not able to look deeply into the problem of error. - -The conscience of humanity well understood knows how to do justice to -all men, without, on that account, confounding him who seeks with him -who errs, the man of good will with the utilitarian. It does justice -to them, because in every man, indeed at every instant in the life -of every man, it discovers all those various spiritual moments, both -inferior and superior. Error and the search for truth are continually -intertwined. Sometimes a beginning is made with research, and it ends -with an obstinate persistence in the suggestion that has been made, -which is converted into a result and an erroneous affirmation. At -others a beginning is made, with the deliberate intention of escaping -difficulties by means of some sort of a combination of ideas; and that -combination arouses the mind and becomes a suggestion for research, -which is followed until peace is found in the truth. Each one of us is -at every moment in danger of yielding to laziness and to the seduction -of error and has hope of shaking off that laziness and following the -attraction of truth. We fall and rise up again at every instant; we are -weak and strong, cowardly and courageous. When we call another weak and -cowardly, we are condemning ourselves; when we admire another as strong -and courageous, we idolize the strength and courage which is active -within us. When we are in the presence of a complex product, as, for -example, a faith, a doctrine, a book, it would be naïve and fallacious -to look upon it as only error or as only suggestion. For it is both -the one and the other; that is to say, it contains equally the moments -of error properly so-called, and the other moments of suggestion and -search; the voluntary interposition of obstacles to the truth and -the voluntary removal of such obstacles; the disfigured image of the -truth and the outline of the truth. Sometimes we are unable to say of -ourselves whether we are erring or are seeking, whether we believe -that we have found the whole truth or only discovered a ray of it. The -logical criticism which implacably condemns us seems to be unjust, -although we cannot contest its arguments which impose the truth upon -our thought. We feel that that truth was in a way sought, seen for a -moment, and almost possessed in that spiritual state of ours, which has -been summarily and abruptly condemned by others as altogether erroneous. - -[Sidenote: _The double aspect of errors._] - -For this reason even that which has been rejected and blamed as false -from one point of view must be accepted and honoured from another as -an approach to truth. Empiricism is perverse in so far as it is a -construction opposed to the philosophic universal, but it is innocuous -and indeed beneficial in so far as it is an attempt to rise from -pure sensation and representation to the thinking of the universal. -Scepticism as error annuls the theoretic life; but as suggestion it -is necessary to the demonstration of the impossibility of dwelling in -that desert when all false doctrines have been annulled. Mythologism -presents this double aspect in a yet clearer manner; religion is the -negation of thought, but it is also in another aspect a preparation -for thought; the myth is both a travesty and a sketch of the concept; -hence every philosophy feels itself adverse to myth and born from -myth, an _enemy_ and a _daughter_ of religions. In what is empirically -defined as religion or as a body of religious doctrines, for example, -in Christianity, in its myths and in its theology, there is so much of -truth and suggestion of truth that it is possible to affirm (always -from the empirical point of view) the superiority of that religion -over a well-reasoned but poor, a correct but sterile philosophy. -Nevertheless, a period of reverence, of attentive harkening, of -philosophic study and criticism, which is not pure scepticism, -succeeds to a period of encyclopædism, of irreligious scepticism, of -enlightenment, and of Voltaireism. Those who in the nineteenth or in -this twentieth century have repeated the Voltairean scepticism and have -jibed at religion have with good reason been considered superficial of -intellect and soul, vulgar and trivial people. The philosophy of the -eighteenth century has filled and filled well the office of enemy of -religion; that of the nineteenth century has disdained to give blows -to the dead and has adopted towards religion the attitude of a pious -daughter and diligent heir. For our part we are persuaded that the -inheritance of religion has not been well and thoroughly utilized. -This inheritance is at bottom indistinguishable from the philosophic -inheritance, for is there not religion, in, for instance, the Cartesian -idea of God, which unifies the two substances and guarantees with its -truth the certainty of our knowledge? And is it not also philosophy, -that is to say, the concept (in however gross a form), of the immanent -Spirit which is a self-distinguishing unity and certainty of itself? - -[Sidenote: _Last form of the methodological error; Hypothesism._] - -We have now attained to the theory of research, yet we cannot abandon -the survey of the necessary forms of error without mentioning a new -form which arises precisely from the confusion between truth and the -search for the conditions preparatory to truth, between truth and -hypothesis. This error, which converts Heuristic into Logic, may be -called _hypothesism._ It asserts that in regard to truth man can do -nothing more than propose hypotheses, which are said to be more or -less probable, so that his fate is not dissimilar to the punishments -which were assigned to Tantalus, Sisyphus, and the Danaids. But in the -kingdom of the True, differently from that of Erebus: - - The birds do not feed, - The wheels do not turn, - The stone is not rolled up the high mountain, - Nor water drawn with the sieve from the fountain. - -The hypothesis is made, because it serves toward the attainment of the -truth; did it not serve this end it would not be made. The spirit does -not admit waste of time; for it time is always money. Hypothesism is -sometimes restricted to the supreme principles of the real, or to what -is called metaphysics, which would thus be always hypothetical; but for -the reasons given in our discussion of agnosticism, if the principles -of the real were hypothetical, the whole truth would be so, that is to -say, there would not be any truth. For the rest, hypothesism, besides -being internally contradictory, openly reveals that it is so, in -its reference to the greater or lesser _probability_ of hypotheses. -It would be impossible to determine the degree of approximation to -the true without presupposing a criterion of truth, a truth and -consequently the truth. We should hardly have made mention of this -error did it not constitute the fulcrum of some of the most celebrated -and revered philosophies of our times. - - - - -VII - - -THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ERROR AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY - - -[Sidenote: _Inseparability of the phenomenology of error from the -philosophic system. _] - -The phenomenology of error, in its double sense of error and of -suggestion, coincides therefore with the philosophic system. Both -error and suggestion are improper combinations of philosophic ideas or -concepts. To determine these improper combinations is equivalent to -showing the _obverse_ of that of which the philosophic system is the -_face._ But face and obverse are not separable, for they constitute a -single thought (and single reality), which is positivity-negativity, -affirmation-negation. There is, therefore, no phenomenology of error -outside the philosophic system, nor a philosophic system outside -the phenomenology of error; the one is conceived at the moment when -the other is conceived. And since the philosophic system and the -doctrine of the categories are the same, the phenomenology of error is -inseparable and indistinguishable from the doctrine of the categories. - -[Sidenote: _The eternal going and coming of errors._] - -As such the phenomenology of error is an ideal and eternal circle, like -the eternal circle of the truth. Its stages are eternally traversed and -retraversed by the spirit, being the stages of the spirit itself. At -every instant of the life of history and of our individual life there -are represented the stages that have been surpassed and must again be -surpassed: the lower stages return and announce beforehand the higher. - -[Sidenote: _Returns to anterior philosophies, and their meaning._] - -In this lies the origin of a fact which cannot fail to attract -attention in the history of philosophy: the tendency which is found -there, to _return_ to one or other of the philosophies of the past, or, -more correctly, to one or other of the philosophic points of view of -the past. The thirteenth century returned to Aristotle, the Renaissance -to Plato; Bruno revived the philosophy of Cusanus, Gassendi that of -Epicurus; Hegel wished to renew Heraclitus; Herbart, Parmenides; -in recent times a return has been made to Kant, and in times yet -more recent to Hegel. These are spiritual movements, which must be -understood in all their seriousness. This consists wholly in the need -of the philosophic spirit of a certain moment, which, struggling with -an error, discovers the true concept with which it should be corrected, -or at least, the superior and more ample suggestion, to which we -must pass in order to progress. And since that concept or suggestion -had already been represented in an eminent degree in the past by one -particular philosopher, or by one particular school, they speak of the -necessity of again asserting the superiority of that philosopher and -his school against other philosophers and other schools. In reality -neither Aristotle nor Plato returns, nor Cusanus nor Epicurus, nor -Heraclitus nor Parmenides, nor Kant nor Hegel; but only the mental -positions of which these names are, in those cases, the symbols. The -eternal Platonism, Aristotelianism, Heracliteanism, Eleaticism are in -us, as they were formerly in Plato and in Aristotle, in Heraclitus and -in Parmenides. Divested of those historical names, they are called -transcendentalism and immanentism, evolutionism and anti-evolutionism, -and so on. To the philosophers of the past, as men of the past, no -return is made, because _no return is possible._ The past lives in the -present and the pretence of returning to it is equivalent to that of -destroying the present, in which alone it lives. Those who understand -_ideal_ returns in this _empirical_ sense, do not in truth know what -they are saying. - -[Sidenote: _The false idea of a history of philosophy as the history of -the successive appearances in time of the categories and of errors._] - -But just because the phenomenology of error and the system of the -categories are outside time, we must also recognize the fallacy of a -history of philosophy which expounds the development of philosophic -thought as a successive appearance in time of the various philosophic -categories and of the various forms of error. On this view the human -race seems to begin to think truly philosophically at a definite moment -of time and at a definite point of space; for example at a definite -year of the seventh or sixth century before Christ, at a definite -point of Asia Minor, with Thales, who surpassing mere fancy posits as -a philosophic concept the empirical concept of water; or in another -year and place, with Parmenides, who posits the first pure concept, -that of being. And it seems further to progress in philosophic thinking -with other thinkers, each of whom either discovers a concept or offers -a suggestion of one. Thus each takes the other's hand and they form -a chain which is prolonged to one who, more audacious and fortunate -than the others, gives his hand to the first, and unites them all in -a circle. After this, there would remain nothing else to do but to -dance eternally, as the stars dance in the imaginations of the poets, -without any further necessity to devise suggestions and to risk falling -into error. All this is brilliant but arbitrary. The categories are -outside time, because they are all and singly in every instant of -time, and therefore they cannot be divided and impersonated within -empirical and individual limits. It is not true that each philosophic -system has for its beginning a particular category or a particular -suggestion. A philosophic system, in the empirical signification of -the word, is a series of thoughts whose unity is the empirical bond of -the life of a definite individual. It is therefore without beginning, -since it does not constitute a true unity and refers on the one hand -to its predecessors, on the other to those who continue it, and on all -sides to its contemporaries. In the strict sense, in that system, in -so far as it is philosophic, there is always the whole of philosophy; -and therefore, as we have previously seen, all philosophic systems -(including materialism and scepticism) have, whether they admit it -or not, displayed or implied the same principle, which is the pure -concept, and every philosophy is idealism. Nor is it true that there -is progress in the history of philosophy, in the sense of the passage -from one category to another superior category, or from one suggestion -to another superior suggestion. Speaking empirically, we should have in -this case to admit regress also, because it is a fact that a return is -made to inferior categories and suggestions. Philosophically, we can -speak in this case, neither of progress nor of regress, seeing that -those categories and suggestions are eternal and outside time. - -Finally, this conception of philosophic history itself declares its -untenability, since in its last term it is logically obliged to posit a -definitive philosophy (which is that represented by him who constructs -such a history of philosophy), whereas there is nothing definitive -in reality, which is perpetual development. Those very historians of -philosophy themselves, who have desired and in part attempted to give -actuality to that conception, have been perplexed at the assumption of -so great a responsibility as to proclaim a _definitive philosophy,_ -that is to say, to decree the retirement of Thought and so of Reality. - -[Sidenote: _Philosophism both of this false view and of the formula -concerning the identity of philosophy and history of philosophy._] - -The error which appears in this conception of philosophic history, is -the same that we have already studied under the name of philosophism, -and which appears here in one of its special applications. The formula -of the error is the _identity of Philosophy with the History of -philosophy._ The sense in which this is meant is at once shown by the -tendency which exists in this identity of the two terms, to be enlarged -into a third term, that is to say, into the recognition of the identity -of philosophy and of the history of philosophy with the _Philosophy -of history._ And this Philosophy of philosophic history, like every -philosophy of history, converts representations and empirical concepts -into pure concepts assigning to each one the function which properly -belongs to the categories, corrupting philosophy and history and -becoming shipwrecked in a sort of mythologism and propheticism. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between this false idea of a history of -philosophy and the books that are so entitled or profess a like -programme._] - -But, as in the case of the philosophy of history in general, so also in -this application of it to the history of philosophy, it is necessary -to recognize the elements of truth. These lie in the works of genius -in _historical characterization,_ which under this guise have been -achieved by various thinkers and in various epochs of philosophy. -Certainly Plato is not only transcendental, nor is Aristotle only -immanentist; nor Kant only agnostic, nor Hegel only logical, nor -Epicurus only materialist, nor Descartes only dualist; nor is Greek -thought concerned only with objectivity, nor modern thought with -subjectivity alone. But history takes shape as historical narrative, -by noting the prominent traits of the various individuals and of the -various epochs. Without this process it would be impossible to divide, -to summarize, or to record it; without the introduction of empirical -concepts, history could not be fixed in the memory.[1] By means of -those characterizations, it also happens that historical names can be -taken as symbols of truths and errors: all the crudity of dualism is -expressed in Descartes, the paradox of determinism in Spinoza, that of -abstract pluralism in Leibnitz. We owe (as is admitted by all those -competent to judge) the elevation of the history of philosophy from a -chronicle or an erudite collection to history properly so-called, to -historians of philosophy who were tainted with philosophism. And since -Hegel was the first and greatest of those historians, we must impute to -Hegel the arbitrary act that he committed, but also the merit of having -been the first to give a history of philosophy worthy of the name -and accord to him all the more merit, in so far as he almost always -corrected in execution the errors of his original plan.[2] - -[Sidenote: _Exact formula: identity of philosophy and of history._] - -This original plan (and in general the position taken up by the system -of Hegel) may perhaps be considered as a deviation and aberration -from a just impulse, which still awaits its legitimate satisfaction. -This satisfaction we have attempted to give, by going deeply into the -meaning of the Kantian _a priori_ synthesis and by establishing the -identity of philosophy and history. Thus, as regards the question at -issue, the formula that we oppose to Hegel's formula of the identity -of _philosophy and history of philosophy,_ is that of the identity -of _philosophy and history._ This difference may at first sight seem -non-existent or very slight, but yet it is substantial. Philosophy is -indeed identical with history, because by solving historical problems -it affirms itself, and is in this way identical with the history of -philosophy, not because this is separable from other histories, or has -precedence over them, but for precisely the contrary reason, that it -is altogether inseparable from and completely fused in the totality -of history, according to the unity in distinction already explained. -Hence it is seen that philosophy does not originate in time, that -there are not philosophic men and non-philosophic men, that there are -not concepts belonging to one individual which another individual -is without, nor mental efforts which one makes and another does not -make, and that philosophy, or all the categories, operates at every -instant of the spiritual life, and at every instant of the spiritual -life operates upon material altogether new, given to it by history, -which for its part it helps to create. This amounts to saying that -from that concept we obtain the criticism of philosophism and of the -formula expressing the identity of Philosophy, History of Philosophy -and Philosophy of history; and a more exact idea of the history of -philosophy, free from the chains of an arbitrary classification. - -[Sidenote: _The history of philosophy and philosophic progress._] - -It may seem that in this way we destroy all idea of philosophic -progress; and certainly philosophy, taken in itself, that is to say -as an abstract category, does not progress any more than the category -of art or of morality progresses. But philosophy in its concreteness -progresses, like art and the whole of life; it progresses, because -reality is development, and development, including antecedents in -consequences, is progress. Every affirmation of truth is conditioned -by reality and conditions a new reality, which, in turn, is in its -progress, the condition of a new thought and of a new philosophy. In -this respect it is true that a philosophy which comes later in time, -contains the preceding philosophies in itself, and not only when it -is truly a philosophy, adequate to the new times, which comprehend -ancient times in themselves, but even when it is a simple suggestion, -of the kind we have called erroneous and in need of correction. As -erroneous suggestion it will be, ideally, inferior to the truths -already discovered. The scepticism of David Hume, for instance, is -inferior from this point of view, not only to Cartesianism, but even -to Scholasticism, to Platonism and to Socraticism. But historically it -is superior even to the most perfect of those philosophies, because it -is occupied with a problem which they did not propose to themselves -and initiates its solution, by forming a first attempt at solution, -however erroneous. Those perfect philosophies belong to the past, this, -though imperfect, has the future in itself. Thus it is explained how we -sometimes find far more to learn in philosophers who have maintained -errors than from others who have maintained truths; the errors of -the former are gold in the quartz, which when it has been purified -will add weight and value to the mass of gold, which is already in -our possession and has been preserved by the latter. Fanatics content -themselves with truths, however poor they are, and therefore seek those -who repeat them, even though they be poor of spirit. True thinkers seek -for adversaries, bristling with errors and rich with truth; they learn -from them, and while opposing, love and esteem them; indeed, their -opposing them is at the same time an act of esteem and of love. - -[Sidenote: _The truth of all philosophies, and critique of -eclecticism._] - -The philosophy which each one of us professes at a determinate moment, -in so far as it is adequate to the knowledge of facts and in the -proportion in which it is adequate, is the result of all preceding -history, and in it are organically brought together all systems, -all errors and all suggestions. If some error should appear to be -inexplicable, some suggestion without fruit, some concept incapable of -adoption, the new philosophy is to that extent more or less defective. -But the organic reconciliation, which preceding philosophies must find -in those that follow, cannot be the bare bringing them together in -time, and _eclecticism,_ as in those superficial spirits, who associate -fragments of all philosophies without mediation. Eclecticism (from -the historical point of view also, as for instance in the relation -of Victor Cousin to Hegel, whom he admired, imitated and failed to -understand) is the falsification or the caricature of the vastness of -thought, which embraces in itself all thoughts, though apparently the -most diverse and irreconcilable. The peace of the lazy, who do not -collide with one another, because they do not act, must not be made -sublime and confounded with the lofty peace that belongs to those who -have striven and have fraternized after strife, or, indeed, during the -actual combat. - -[Sidenote: _Researches concerning the authors and precursors of truths: -and the reason for the antinomies which they exhibit._] - -A proof of this _constancy_ of philosophy, which is immanent in all -philosophies and in all the thoughts of men, and also of its perpetual -variation and novelty of historical form, is to be found in the -questions that have been and are raised, concerning the _origin_ or -_discovery_ of truth. Hardly has the truth been discovered, when the -critics easily succeed in proving that it was already known, and begin -the search for _precursors._ And there can be no doubt that they are -right and their researches deserve to be followed up. Every assertion -of discovery, in so far as it seems to make a clear cut into the web -of history, has something arbitrary about it. Strictly speaking, -Socrates did not discover the concept, or Vico æsthetic fancy, or Kant -the _a priori_ synthesis, or Hegel the synthesis of opposites; nor -even perhaps, did Pythagoras discover the theorem of the square on the -hypotenuse, or Archimedes the law of the displacement of liquids. If -a discovery is represented as an explosion, this happens for reasons -of practical and mnemonic convenience in narrating and summarising -history; and, for that matter, the explosion, the eruption and the -earthquake are continuous processes. But the rational side of the -search for precursors must not cause the acceptance of the irrational -side, which is the denial of the _originality_ of discoveries, as -though they were to be found point for point in the precursors, or -as though they consisted only in the aggregation of elements which -pre-existed, or in like insignificant changes of form. To attach -oneself to precursors, does not mean to repeat them, but to continue -their work. This continuation is always new, original, and creative -and always gives rise to discoveries, be they small or great. To think -is to discover. The reduction to absurdity of the wrong meaning of -the search for precursors is to be found in the fact that every one -of the most important thoughts can be discovered in a certain sense -in common beliefs, in proverbs, in ways of speech, and among savages -and children. This is so much the case that by this path we can return -to the Utopia of an _ingenuous_ philosophy, outside history; whereas -philosophy is truly ingenuous or genuine only when it _is,_ and it is -not, save in History. - - - -[Footnote 1: See above, Part II. Chap. III.] - -[Footnote 2: See ch. ix. _What is Living and What is Dead of the -Philosophy of Hegel,_ by the Author, English translation by Douglas -Ainslie.] - - - - -VIII - - -"DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE" - - -[Sidenote: _Logic and the defence of philosophy._] - -Attacks upon Philosophy and defences of it have been made as more -or less academic exercises. But the true defence of it can only be -Philosophy itself, and above all, Logic, which, by determining the -concept of Philosophy, recognizes its necessity and function. And since -Logic itself teaches that a concept is not truly known, save in the -system where it is shown in all its relations, the complete defence is -obtained in our opinion only, when this treatise dedicated to _Logic_ -is placed in relation to the preceding, which treats of _Æsthetic,_ and -with that which follows and has for its object the _Philosophy of the -practical._ - -[Sidenote: _The utility of Philosophy and the philosophy of the -practical._] - -To this last must be relegated the complete elucidation of the problem -concerning the utility or non-utility of philosophy. It is a problem -about which We can here raise no fundamental question, if the equation -posited by us be true: philosophy = thought = history = perception -of reality. Thus the doubt concerning the utility of philosophy -would be of equal value with the extravagant doubt as to the utility -of knowledge. The philosophy of the practical also demonstrates -that no action is possible, save when preceded by knowledge, and -that presupposed in action there is always historical or perceptive -knowledge, that is, the knowledge which contains in itself all other -knowledge. And it also demonstrates that reality, being always will -and action, is always thought, and that therefore thought is not an -extrinsic adjunct, but an intrinsic category constitutive of the Real. -Reality is action, because it is thought, and it is thought because it -is action. - -[Sidenote: _Consolation of philosophy, as joy in thought and in the -truth. Impossibility of a pleasure arising from falsity or illusion._] - -If thought is so useful that without it the Real would not be, the -common concept of an unconsolatory philosophy cannot be accepted. -Consolation, pleasure, joy, is activity itself, which rejoices in -itself. So far as is known, no other mode of pleasure, joy and -consolation has yet been discovered. Now, knowledge of the true, -whatever it is, is activity and promotes activity, and therefore brings -with it its own consolation. "The truth, known, though it be sad, _has -its delights." _Not a few would wish to attribute these delights, not -to truth, but to _illusion._ But illusion is either not recognized as -illusion, or it is so recognized. When it is not recognized as such -and yet truly satisfies the mind, it cannot be called illusion, but -truth, which has its own good reasons, since nothing can be held to be -true without good reasons; it is that much of truth which can be noted -in the given circumstances and which from the point of view of a more -complete truth can only arbitrarily be called illusion: the consolation -given by the pretended illusion resides, therefore, in its truth--or -it is recognized as illusion, because the actual circumstances have -changed; and then it is anguish and desire to attain to the truth. If -there is no desire to attain to this truth, and if in order to avoid -it, affirmations are brought forward, which are not adequate to the -new conditions in which we find ourselves, there is error, which, -as such, is always more or less voluntary; and from error, which is -self-critical, arise evil conscience, and remorse, and so again anguish -and desire for the truth, which dissipates illusion and produces -consolation, because ... "the truth though it be sad, yet has its -delights." - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the concept of a sad truth._] - -Yet (it will be said), the true can be _sad;_ true, but sad. This -prejudice also should be eliminated. Truth is reality, and reality is -never either glad or sad, since it comprehends both these categories in -itself, and therefore surpasses them both. To judge reality to be sad, -it would have to be admitted that we possessed besides the idea of it, -the idea of _another_ reality, which should be better than the reality -known to us. But this is contradictory. The second reality would be not -real and therefore not thinkable, and so no idea at all of it could be -formed. And if we did attempt to form an idea of it, thought, entering -into contradiction with itself and striving in a vain effort, would be -seized with terror, and would produce, not that ideal reality, but at -the most an æsthetic expression of terror, like that of a man who looks -upon a bottomless abyss. - -[Sidenote: _Examples: philosophical criticism and the concepts of God -and of Immortality._] - -Once upon a time and even to-day many found and find consolation in -the idea of a personal God, who has created and governs the universe, -and of an immortal life, above this life of ours, which vanishes -at every instant. And this consolation seems to have diminished in -our times, or to many of us, owing to Philosophies. But he who does -not limit himself to the surface and analyses the state of soul of -sincere and noble believers, realizes that the God who comforted -them is the same who comforts us and whom our Philosophies call the -universal Spirit, immanent in all of us--the continuity and rationality -of the universe--just as the Immortality in which they reposed was -the immortality which transcends our individual actions, and in -transcending them, makes them eternal. All that is born is worthy to -perish; but in perishing, it is also preserved as an ideal moment of -what is born from it; and the universe preserves in itself all that -has ever been thought and done, because it is nothing but the organism -of these thoughts and actions. Philosophy has rendered those concepts -of God and of Immortality more exact, and has liberated them from -impurities and errors and thus at the same time from perplexities and -anguish; it has rendered them more, not less, consolatory. On the -other hand, the absurdity which mingled with those concepts, has never -consoled any one who seriously thought them--and serious thinking -of them is an indispensable condition of obtaining consolation from -concepts. If they are not thought, but mechanically repeated, the -consolation is obtained from something else, from distraction and -occupation with life lived, not from the concepts. In the effort -to think a God outside the world, a Despot of the world, we are -seized with a sense of fear for that God, who is a solitary being, -suffering from his omnipotence, which makes activity impossible for -him and dangerous for his creatures, who are his playthings. That God -becomes an object of maledictions. Equally, in seriously thinking our -immortality as empirical individuals, immobilized in our works and in -our affections (which are beautiful only because they are in motion and -fugitive), we are assailed by the terror, not of death, but of this -immortality, which is unthinkable because desolating and desolating -because unthinkable. Ideal immortality has generated the poetic -representations of Paradise, which are representations of infinite -peace; the false concepts of an empirical immortality can generate no -other representation than Swift's profoundly satirical picture of the -_Struldbrugs_ or immortals, plunged in all the miseries of life, unable -to die, and weeping with envy at the sight of a funeral. - -[Sidenote: _Consolatory virtue belonging to all spiritual activities._] - -But we do not wish to close these new considerations upon the old -theme _de consolatione Philosophiae,_ without noting that philosophy -is not the sole or supreme consoler, as the philosophers of antiquity -believed, and some among the moderns, who assumed the same attitude. -It is neither the sole nor the supreme consoler, because thought does -not exist alone, nor does it exist above life: thought is outside and -inside life; and if on one side it surpasses life, on the other it is a -mode of life itself. Philosophy brings consolation in its own kingdom, -putting error to flight and preparing the conditions for practical -life; but man is not thought alone, and if he has joys and sorrows -from thought, other sorrows and joys come to him from the exercise of -life itself. And in this exercise action heals the evils of action and -life brings consolation for life. The error of Stoicism and of similar -doctrines consists in attributing to philosophy a direct action upon -the ills of life and of making it in consequence the whole totality -of the real. But philosophy has no pocket-handkerchiefs to dry all -the tears that man sheds, nor is it able to console unhappy lovers -and unfortunate husbands (as sentimental people pretend): it can only -contribute to their comfort by healing that part of their pain which -is due to theoretic obscurity. Such part is certainly not small: all -our sorrows are irritated and made more pungent by mental darkness -which paralyses or fetters the purification of action. But it is a -part and not the whole. Every form of the activity of the Spirit, art -like philosophy, practical life like theoretic life, is a fount of -consolation and none suffices alone. - -[Sidenote: _Sorrow and the elevation of sorrow._] - -"He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow" is a false saying, -because the increase of knowledge is the overcoming of sorrow. But it -is true, in so far as it means that the increase of knowledge does not -eliminate the sorrows of practical life. It does not eliminate, but -_elevates_ them; and to adopt the fine expression of a contemporary -Italian writer, superiority is "nothing but the right to suffer on -a higher plane." On a higher plane, but neither more nor less than -others, who are at a lower level of knowledge,--to suffer on a higher -plane, in order to act upon a higher plane. - - - - -FOURTH PART - -HISTORICAL RETROSPECT - - - - -I - - -THE HISTORY OF LOGIC AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY - - -[Sidenote: _Reality, Thought and Logic._] - -The three terms, _Reality, Thought_ and _Logic_, and their relations, -could be represented by a system of three circles, the one included in -the other, and by marking at will as the first term that which includes -all, or that which is included in all: R T L or L T R. Limiting -ourselves to the first method, the first circle would be Reality, -which Thought (the second circle) would think, in the same way that -it would in its turn be thought in the third circle, formed by Logic, -the Thought of thought, or the Philosophy of philosophy. This graphic -symbol is probably destined to some fortune; but the reader must not -seek it in our pages, because knowing how much inadequacy, clumsiness -and danger it contains, we share the repugnance, almost instinctively -felt at such materializations, which seem to be and are of slight value. - -[Sidenote: _Relation of these three terms._] - -The vice of that spatial figuration is that it divides into three -circles what is three, but three in one, and should consequently be -expressed as a triple circle which should also be a single circle, in -which all the three coincide; which is geometrically unrepresentable. -The relation of Reality, Thought of Reality and Thought of Thought, -divided into three circles, legitimately gives rise to the question: -Why should there not be a fourth, a fifth, a sixth circle (and so on -to infinity) which should include respectively the third, the fourth, -the fifth (and so on to infinity)? Why should not a Logic of Logic, -or a thought of the thought of thought, and so on, follow the thought -of thought, which is Logic? For us, this question raises no objection -that need bring us to a halt for a single instant, just because we have -never divided the one reality into two or more different realities -(matter and spirit, nature and idea, and so on), nor into a series of -different realities, the one following the other; but we have conceived -it as a system of relations and of correlations, constituting a unity, -indeed the only unity concretely thinkable. There is no progress to -infinity, when the terms are coincident and correlative; hence to -think the thought of thought would not be a new act, but equivalent -to thinking thought. The mental act will be new (and any mental act -is new) for the individual who accomplishes it in conditions that are -always new; but its spiritual form will always be that of Logic, which -thinks thought and contains within itself, on its side, the process -of reality. Further, the indifference exhibited by the symbol of the -triple circle as to the determination of the first as last and the -last as first, confirms for us the non-existence of a first that is -only first and of a last that is only last; confirms, that is to say, -the coincidence of unity in relation that is first and last. Reality -is not only thought by thought, but is also thought; and thought -is not only thought by Logic, but is also Logic. Those who wish to -expound philosophy and history, proceeding from the centre of the logos -or Logic, and those who wish to expound them, proceeding from the -periphery of facts, are both right and wrong, because the centre is -periphery and the periphery centre. - -[Sidenote: _Non-existence of a general philosophy outside the -particular philosophic sciences:_] - -By adopting this view, which affirms the most complete immanence, it -has never happened that in any part of the Real we have discovered a -division between idea and fact, between general and particular, between -primary and secondary reality and the like, but we have found, in every -part, relation and correlation, unity and distinction in unity. There -is no general philosophy opposed to, or consequent on, or alongside -particular philosophies; particular philosophy is general, and the -general is the particular; nor is there a general history, which is -not also particular history, and _vice versa._ History is always the -history of man as artist, thinker, economic producer, and moral agent, -and in distinguishing these various aspects, it gives their unity, -which does not transcend these various aspects, but _is_ these various -aspects themselves. - -[Sidenote: _and consequently of a History of general philosophy outside -the histories of particular philosophic sciences._] - -In like manner, the History of thought, or the History of Philosophy, -which is one of these determinate aspects, is distinguished in the -histories of particular philosophic concepts, as the history of -Æsthetic, of Logic, of Economics and of Ethics; but it is also unified -in them and _consists in nothing but them,_ completely resolving itself -into them. There is no _general History of Philosophy,_ in the sense -of a history of _general Philosophy,_ or of _Metaphysics,_ or whatever -else it may be called, outside particular histories (which are unity in -particularity). - -One of the errors which in our opinion vitiates the writing of the -history of philosophy, appears to be just the prejudice in favour of a -treatment of the general part of this history, in which, for instance, -speculations concerning practice enter only incidentally, a great -part of logical doctrine is excluded as not belonging to it, and the -doctrines of Æsthetic are hardly referred to at all. The prejudice is -derived, in the last analysis, from the old idea of an Ontology or -Metaphysic, as the science of an ideal world, of which nature and man -are the more or less imperfect actualizations; hence the relegation of -a great part of true and proper philosophy to what is called the human -and natural world, and the looking upon this as a special philosophy, -distinguished from general philosophy and consequently lying outside -the true and proper history of philosophy. That prejudice, amounting -almost to a survival, persists even in those who have more or less -surpassed such a conception, and determines the curious configuration -of a general history of philosophy, outside the special histories. -Such a scheme, when closely examined, shows itself to be a complex of -historical elucidations of some problems of Logic, and of some of the -philosophy of the practical (individuality, liberty, the supreme good, -etc.), and of some arising from their relations (knowing and being, -spirit and nature, infinite and finite, etc.). These are all without -doubt arguments of philosophical history; but they must be united with -the others, from which they have been wrenched, and without which they -prove but little intelligible. Philosophy is present in the Poetics -and the Rhetoric of Aristotle as much as in the Metaphysics; not less -in the _Critique of Pure Judgment_ of Kant, than in the _Critique of -Pure Reason._ It is never outside those treatises concerning what are -called the special parts of philosophy. The present-day historians -of philosophy who have overcome so many forms of transcendence -and re-established immanence, must also overcome the residue of -transcendence, which, so to speak, they still retain in their own house. - -[Sidenote: _Histories of particular philosophies and literary value of -such division._] - -Certainly, the reality of the distinctions between the various aspects -of the real and between the various particular philosophies renders -possible literary divisions, through which there are composed special -treatises upon Ethics and so upon the history of Ethic; upon Logic and -so upon the history of Logic; upon Æsthetic and so upon the history -of Æsthetic; but it is not possible by a like method of division to -construct a treatise upon general Philosophy and a corresponding -History of general philosophy. It is not possible, because this -literary division presupposes a distinction of concepts; and a general -philosophy is not conceptually distinguishable. When the attempt to -distinguish it is made, we have, as we saw, a mass of historical -fragments taken from the various philosophic sciences; that is to -say, not the coherent historical treatment of problems relating to a -definite aspect of the real, but a more or less arbitrary aggregate. - -[Sidenote: _History of Logic in a particular sense._] - -With these considerations, we have answered the question concerning the -relation between the History of Logic and the History of Philosophy. -This relation is the same as that between Logic and Philosophy,--terms -which are capable neither of distinction nor of opposition. The history -of Logic is not outside the history of Philosophy, but is an integral -part of this history itself. To make it the object of special treatment -always means to compose a complete history of philosophy, in which, -from the literary point of view, prominence and priority are given -to the problems of Logic, the others being thrown, not outside the -picture, but into the background. The same may be said of the History -of Æsthetic or of Ethic or of any other particular discipline, which is -never held to be distinguishable. - -[Sidenote: _Works relating to the history of Logic._] - -Logic being more or less profoundly renovated (as we have sought -to do in this book), it is natural that the histories of Logic -hitherto available can no longer be completely satisfactory. For they -are written from points of view that have been surpassed, such as -Aristotelian formalism or Hegelian panlogism, and therefore either -do not interpret facts with exactitude, or they give prominence and -exaggerated importance to certain orders of facts, neglecting others -far more worthy of mention and of examination. - -Of the special books bearing the title of the History of Logic, there -is really only one--that of Charles Prantl--which, based upon wide -researches, is truly remarkable for its doctrine and for lucid and -animated exposition. Unfortunately this does not go further than the -fifteenth century and omits the whole movement of modern philosophy.[1] -But even the period exhaustively treated by him (Antiquity and the -Middle Ages) is looked at from the narrow angle of an Aristotelian and -formal temperament. Other works bearing the same title are not worthy -of attention.[2] On the other hand, the better histories of Logic must -not be sought under this title, but especially in the better Histories -of Philosophy, beginning with that of Hegel, which, for the most part, -is precisely a history of Logic. - -In inaugurating a new treatment, governed by the principles which we -have defended, we shall confine ourselves, in the following pages, -to a sketch of the history of some of the principal parts of logical -doctrine, without any claim to even approximate completeness, and with -a view to giving simple illustrations of the things that were said -in the theoretical part. In this theoretical part, in virtue of the -identity of philosophy and history which we have explained, history may -be said to be already contained and projected, even though names and -dates are mostly omitted and left to be understood. - - -[Footnote 1: _Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande,_ Leipzig, 1855-1870, -4 vols. Scattered memoirs of certain writers belonging to later times -are being published by Prantl in academic journals, and it would be -opportune to collect these in a volume.] - -[Footnote 2: A rapid sketch, compiled in part from the work of Prantl, -with a polemical addition directed against the adversaries of the -Hegelian Logic, precedes the _Logic_² of Kuno Fischer. The historical -part of the _System der Logik_ of Ueberweg (fifth edition, 1882, edited -by J. B. Meyer) has an almost exclusively bibliographical character -with excerpts, and that contained in L. Rabus, _Logik ii. System der -Wissenschaften,_ Erlangen-Leipzig, 1895, is yet more arid. The _Gesch. -d. Logik_ of F. Harms (Berlin, 1881) is meagre in facts, verbose and -vague. In recent monographs on special points, one feels the effect -of what is called Logistic or new formalism, which makes the authors -pursue ineptitudes and curiosities of slight value.] - - - - -II - - -THE THEORY OF THE CONCEPT - - -[Sidenote: _Question as to who was the "father of Logic."_] - -Just as whenever in Æsthetic any one sought the "father" of the science -Plato was usually named, so whenever a like enquiry has been proposed -for Logic that honourable title has been almost unanimously bestowed -upon Aristotle. But even if we admit (as we must) in a somewhat -empirical and expedient sense, the propriety of these searches for -"discoverers" and "fathers," Aristotle could not in our eyes occupy -that position. For if Logic is the science of the concept, such a -science was evidently begun before him. Further, Aristotle himself -claimed the distinction only of having reduced and treated the theory -of reasoning[1] and recognized elsewhere that to Socrates belonged the -merit of having directed attention to the examination and definition of -the concept (τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ όρίζεσθαι), that is to -say, to the very principle of logical Science,[2] the rigorous form of -truth. - -[Sidenote: _Socrates, Plato, Aristotle._] - -In this affirmation of the consistency and absoluteness of knowledge -and of truth (sustained in him by a vivid religious and moral -consciousness) lies the significance of Socrates as opposed to the -Sophists; as indeed in the same thing lies the importance of Hellenic -Logic of the truly classical period. This Logic elaborated the idea -of conceptual knowledge, of science or of philosophy, and transmitted -it to the modern world with a terminology, which is in great part -that which we ourselves employ. We too reject in almost the same -words as the Greek philosophers the renascent sophism, the perennial -Protagoreanism, and the sensationalism which denies truth, and (like -the ancient Gorgias), by declaring it incommunicable by the individual, -individualizes and reduces it to practical utility. In Plato, the -affirmation and glorification of conceptual knowledge was accompanied -by contempt for the knowledge of the individual, and in comparison -with the immortal world of ideas, the world of sensations was for him -so dark and obscure as to disappear in his eyes like phantoms before -the sun. But Aristotle, although he held firmly that there is no -science of the accidental and individual, and of sensation, which is -bound to space and time, to the _where_ and the _when,_ and that the -object of science is the universal, the essence, _which is being,_ -was less exclusive than he; and as he saved the world of poetry from -the condemnation of Plato, so, in all his philosophy and in all his -work as physicist, politician and historian, he affirmed the world of -experience and of history.[3] - -[Sidenote: _Enquiries concerning the nature of the concept in Greece. -The question of transcendence and immanence._] - -On the other hand, there was in Socrates only the consciousness of -the universal still indefinite and vague; in Plato there appeared -for the first time the consciousness of the true character of the -universal, and so of its distinction from empirical universals; and -in Aristotle this enquiry gave important results. The problem of the -nature of the concept became, then and afterwards, interwoven with -that other problem of the transcendence or immanence of the concepts; -but since, notwithstanding many points of contact, the two problems -cannot be completely identified, they must not be confounded. Indeed, -the problem of the transcendence or immanence of the universals is -reducible to the more general problem of the relation between values -and facts, the ideal and the real, what ought to be and what is; -whereas the other, concerning the nature of the universals, centres -upon the distinction between universals that are truly logical, and -pseudological universals, and upon the greater or less admissibility -of one or the other or of both, and so upon their mode of relation. -The point of contact between the two problems lies in this, that where -pure and real universals are denied and only arbitrary and nominal -universals allowed to subsist, the question of the immanence or -transcendence of the universals also disappears. And as to the first -problem and the polemic of Aristotle against Plato concerning the -ideas, it has appeared to some critics (to Zeller and others) that -Aristotle misunderstood his master and invented an error that Plato -had never maintained, or attacked merely certain gross expositions of -doctrine which were current in some Platonic school. To others again -(to Lotze, for instance), it has seemed that Aristotle thought this -problem, at bottom, in the same way as Plato, who by placing the ideas -in a hyper-Uranian space, in a super-world or a super-heaven, thus -came to refuse to them that reality which Aristotle himself refused -to them and to consider them as _values,_ not as _beings;_ although -Greek linguistic usage prevented Plato from expressing the difference, -just as it prevented Aristotle from expressing the same thing, when it -led him to describe genera as "second substances" (δεύτεραι οὺσίαι). -However, as regards the first interpretation, it certainly seems to -us that it is impossible to raise doubts about such a document as -the testimony of Aristotle[4] by means of such frequently uncertain -documents as the Platonic dialogues. And as regards the second -interpretation, it seems to us that it does not so much purge Plato -of the vice of transcendence as convict his adversary also of sharing -that vice. On this point the opposition of Aristotle to his predecessor -does not coincide with that of modern nominalism and empiricism to -philosophic idealism, for the former sets in question the truth of the -concept itself. Aristotle denied this truth as little as Plato; indeed -he expressly asserted that his predecessor was right, and approved his -definite accusation of the sophists that they were occupied not with -the universal but with the accidental, that is to say, with not-being. - -[Sidenote: _Controversies as to the various forms of concept in Plato._] - -The beginning of the enquiry as to the nature of universals or of ideas -is to be seen, on the other hand, in Plato's embarrassments before the -questions as to whether there are ideas of everything, of artificial -as well as of natural things, of noble things and vile things alike, -of things only or also of properties and relations; of good things -or also of bad things (καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν)[5] He -does not escape from the embarrassments, save occasionally, by making -strange admissions, by accepting ideas of all the preceding, only -to fall immediately afterwards into contradictions, through which -however we see the outlines of the problems of to-day. Are the ideas -representative concepts (of things) or are they not rather categories -(ideas of relation)? Arc opposites particular kinds of ideas (if there -exist ideas of base and ugly things, as well as of beautiful and good -things)? Is it possible to distinguish, from the point of view of the -Ideas, between the natural world and the human world (between natural -things and artificial)? Plato himself refers to mathematical knowledge -as distinct from philosophic knowledge. - -[Sidenote: _The philosophic concepts and the empirical and abstract -concepts in Aristotle. Philosophy, physics and mathematics._] - -In Aristotle, the determination of the rigorous philosophic concept -and its distinction from empirical and abstract concepts make great -progress, although this does not amount to a solution of those Platonic -embarrassments. Aristotle accurately traces the limits between -Philosophy (and so the philosophic concept) and the physical and -mathematical sciences. Philosophy, the science of God or _theology_ -(as he also calls it), treats of being in its absoluteness, and so -not of particular beings or of the matter that forms part of their -composition. The non-philosophical sciences, on the other hand, always -treat of particular beings (περὶ ὄν τι καὶ γένος τι). They take their -objects from sense or assume them by hypotheses, giving now more, now -less accurate demonstrations of them. All the physical sciences have -need of some definite material (ὕλη) because they are always concerned -with noses, eyes, flesh, bones, animals, plants, roots, bark, in short -with material things, subject to movement. There even arises a physical -science that is concerned with the soul, or rather, with a sort of -soul (περὶ ψυχῆς ἐνίας), in so far as this is not without matter. -Mathematics, like philosophy, studies, not things subject to movement, -but motionless being; but it differs from philosophy in not excluding -the matter in which their objects are as it were incorporated (ὡς ἐν -ὔλῃi): the suppression of matter is obtained in them by aphairesis or -abstraction.[6] - -[Sidenote: _The universals of the "always" and those of the "for the -most part."_] - -This divergence between philosophic and physical or mathematical -procedure is the point upon which empiricism and mathematicism rely; -but these, inferior here to Aristotle, deny the science of absolute -being (περὶ ὅντος άπλῶς) and leave in existence only the second -order of sciences, which deal with the particular and abstract. -There is another important distinction in Aristotle, but to tell -the truth it is impossible to say how far he connected it with the -preceding distinction between philosophy and physics, with which it is -substantially one. Aristotle knew two forms of universal: the universal -of the _always_ (τοῡ ἀεί) and that of the _for the most part_ (τοῡ -ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ).[7] He was well aware of the difference between the -first, which is truly universal, and the second, which is so only in -an approximate and improper manner; and he even asked himself if the -_for the most part_ alone existed and not also the _always_; but his -interest was directed not so much to the comparative differences of -the two series, as to the common character of universality which both -of them asserted as against the individual and accidental. Science (he -said) is occupied, not with the accidental, but with the universal, -whether it be eternal and necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) or only approximately -universal (ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ).[8] Philosophy, physics and mathematics felt at -this period that they had a common enemy in sensationalism and sophism, -and they formed an alliance against this common enemy, rather than as -happened later, dissipate their energies in intestinal welfare. - -[Sidenote: _Controversies concerning Logic in the Middle Ages._] - -Without dwelling upon the later scepticism, mysticism and mythologism, -which represented the dissolution of ancient philosophy and the germ -of a new life (especially in Christian mythologism, which had absorbed -elements of ancient philosophy and was accompanied by a very developed -theology), we must pass on to note the progress which the logical -problem made in the schools of the Middle Ages. To look upon mediæval -philosophy (as many do) as a negligible episode, a mere detritus of -ancient culture quite unconnected with the later spiritual activity, is -now no longer possible. Certainly in the disputes of the nominalists -and realists, the problem of transcendence and of immanence was -neglected. It could not be solved on the presumptions of a philosophy -which had at its side a theology, of which it constituted itself the -handmaiden. The Platonic transcendence was incurable in Christianity, -and those who even to-day seek to purify Christianity from survivals -of Greek thought, do not perceive that, in this purification effected -by their philosophies of action and of immanence, they are destroying -Christianity itself.[9] - -[Sidenote: _Nominalism and realism._] - -But in those disputes, besides the question of the place that belongs -to science in relation to religious faith, or to mundane science in -relation to revealed and divine science, the question of the nature -of the concept was also raised; that is to say, they continued the -Platonic-Aristotelian enquiry into the doctrine of the concept in -the second of the meanings that we have distinguished. But no true -conclusion was reached in this enquiry. The conciliatory formula of -the Arabic interpreters of Aristotle, accepted by Albertus Magnus and -Thomas Aquinas, in which the universals were affirmed as existing -_ante, in_ and _post rem,_ in so far as it is possible to confer -upon it an exact meaning, was understood in a superficial manner, -and therefore it has not unreasonably seemed too easy and too -expeditious.[10] A dispute of this sort cannot be solved by summarizing -discordant opinions, as in the formula we have mentioned, or by fixing -a mean, as in conceptualism. But the realists, bravely maintaining -the truth of the philosophic universal, maintained the rights of -rational thought and of philosophy; and the nominalists, on their part, -asserting in contradiction to the former, the nominalist universal, -prepared the modern theories of natural science. Realism produced -philosophic thought of high importance, as in the so-called ontological -argument of Anselm of Aosta, which (though through the myth of a -personal God) asserts the unity of Essence and Existence, the reality -of what is truly conceivable and conceived. Gaunilo, who confuted and -satirized that concept, by employing the example of a "most perfect -island," thinkable yet non-existent, seems an anticipation of Kant; -at least of the Kant who employed the example of the hundred dollars -to illustrate the same case--if it is not more accurate to say that -Kant was, in that case, a late Gaunilo. Anselm replied (as Hegel did to -Kant) that it was not a question of an island (or of a hundred dollars -of something imaginable that is not at all a concept), but of the being -than which it is impossible to think a greater and a more perfect (the -true and proper concept). On the other hand, the nominalists, who -like Roscellinus maintained that the _universelles substantiae_ were -_nonnisi flatus vocis,_ performed the useful office of preventing the -sciences of experience from being absorbed and lost in philosophy. -In Roger Bacon we see clearly the connection of nominalism with -naturalism. He considered individual facts, so-called external -experience, in its immediacy, as the true and proper object of science. -Concepts were for him a simple expedient, directed towards the mastery -of the immense richness of the individual. "_Intellectus est debilis_ -(he said); _propter eam debilitatem magis conformatur rei debili, quae -est universale, qitam rei quae habet multum de esse, ut singulare._" - -[Sidenote: _Nominalism, mysticism and coincidence of opposites._] - -But the nominalists, _dialecticae haeretici_ (as Anselm called them), -were heretics only in the circle of the dialectic. The truth remained -for them something beyond; the concept, the _secunda intentio,_ was -certainly something arbitrary and _ad placitum instituta_; it was -"_forma artificialis tantum, quae per violentiam habet esse,_" but -beyond it were always faith and revelation. God is the truth, and in -God the ideas are real; hence Roger Bacon gave to inner light (as -the positivists or neocritics of to-day give to feeling) a place -beside sensible experience. Mysticism, being developed from mediæval -philosophy, both from one-sided realism and from one-sided nominalism, -extends its hand at the dawn of the new Era to the philosophy of -Cusanus, to scepticism, to _docta ignorantia._ This was not a mere -negation; so much so that in it (though in a negative form and -mixed with religion) there appears in outline nothing less than the -theory of the _coincidence of opposites,_ that is to say, the cradle -of that modern logical movement, which was destined definitely to -conquer transcendence. The coincidence of opposites is the germ of -the dialectic, which unifies value and fact, ideal and real, what -ought to be and what is. This important thought reappears in German -mysticism; and (significantly for its future destinies) rings out upon -the lips of Martin Luther, who declared that virtue coexists with its -contrary, vice, hope with anxiety, faith with vacillation, indeed with -temptation, gentleness with disdain, chastity with desire, pardon with -sin; as in nature, heat coexists with cold, white with black, riches -with poverty, health with disease; and that _peccatum manet et non -manet, tollitur et non tollitur,_ and that at the moment a man ceases -to make himself better, he ceases to be good.[11] And before it became -dominant in Jacob Böhme it was stripped of its religious form and -eloquently defended in Italy by Giordano Bruno.[12] - - -[Sidenote: _The Renaissance and naturalism. Bacon._] - -This realist, mystical and dialectical current of thought was destined -to yield its best fruits some centuries later. For the time being, in -the seventeenth century, and yet more in the century that followed, -the victory seemed to rest with nominalism, that is to say, with -naturalism. In Italy, Leonardo da Vinci laughed at theological and -speculative disputes and celebrated, not the mind, but the _eye_ of -man, that is, the science of observation. The same tendency appeared -in the anti-Aristotelians and naturalists, who placed the natural -sciences above scholasticism. In England, the other Bacon, however -slight his importance both as philosopher and naturalist, yet has -much importance as the symptom and spokesman of the self-assertion -of naturalism. In the _Novum Organum,_ the universal of the _for the -most part_ claims its rights as against the universal of the necessary -and eternal. He does not wish, however, to do away with the latter, -but rather to complete it; the syllogism is insufficient, induction -also is needed. Philosophy and theology are well where they are, but a -science of physics is also needed; philosophic induction, which goes -at a leap to first causes, must be accompanied by a gradual induction -(the only one that interests the naturalist), which connects particular -facts by means of laws more and more general; final causes must be -banished from the study of nature, and only efficient causes admitted. -_Anticipationes naturae,_ that is to say, the invasions of philosophism -into the natural sciences, are to be prohibited. These utterances are -far more discreet than those that have so often since been heard. - -[Sidenote: _The ideal of exact science and the Cartesian philosophy._] - -By another school of this period, on the other hand, the pure concept -was wrongly identified with the abstract concept. Thus speculative -rationalism took the form of mathematical rationalism and the ideal -of philosophy was confused with the ideal of _exact science._ This -tendency is also to be found in Leonardo, who exalted "reason" -alone, that is calculation, as outside of and sometimes superior to -experience. Galileo expressed similar thoughts later. The Cartesian -philosophy is animated with it, that is to say, the philosophy of -Descartes and of his great followers, especially Spinoza and Leibnitz. -Thus this is especially an intellectualist philosophy, full of empty -excogitations and rigid divisions, developed by a mechanical or by -a teleological method, which always operated by means of mechanism. -It is true that even under these improper forms, philosophic thought -progressed. The consciousness of the inner unity of philosophy -progressed with Descartes, that of the unity of the real by means of -Spinoza's concept of substance, and that of spiritual activity by means -of the dynamism of Leibnitz; but Logic remained as a whole the old -scholastic logic. The purity of the concept was asserted at the expense -of concreteness; thus the concept, in the Logic of those writers, is -always something abstract, although its reality is so far recognized -that it is thought possible to think with it the most real (the God -of Descartes, the substance of Spinoza, the Monad of Leibnitz). The -eighteenth century, mathematical, abstractionist, intellectualist -ratiocinative, anti-historical, illuminist, reformist, and finally -Jacobin, is the legitimate issue of this Cartesian philosophy, which -confuses the Logic of philosophy with the Logic of mathematics. France, -which was the country of its birth and where it became most firmly -rooted and most widely disseminated, owes to it, perhaps even more than -to Scholasticism, the mental imprint which it still bears and which -the strong Germanic influence that has made itself felt there also in -the last century has not sufficed to eradicate. It is only in our day -that the country which is the type of the abstract intellect strives -to become philosophically more concrete. It is now occupied with -æstheticism or intuitionism, and, unless the movement is suffocated or -dissipated, it may effect a true revolution in the traditional French -spirit. - -[Sidenote: _Adversaries of Cartesianism. Vico._] - -The opposition to abstractionism had no representatives in the -seventeenth century and for a great part of the eighteenth, except -among thinkers of but slight systematic powers, with whom it did -not progress beyond the logical form of the presentiment and the -literary form of the aphorism. In France, Blaise Pascal was one of -these, with his anti-Cartesianism, his restriction of the value of -mathematics, and his celebration of the reasons of the heart which -reason does not know. In Germany there was Hamann, who possessed such -a strong sense of tradition, of history, of language, of poetry and -of myth, and finally of the truth contained in the principle of the -_coincidence of opposites_ which he had met with somewhere in Bruno. -The Italian Giambattista Vico was the only great systematic thinker -to express opposition to abstractionism and Cartesianism. Prior to -and more clearly than Hamann, he perceived the unity of philosophy -and history, or as he called it, of _philosophy and philology._ He -conceived thought as an _ideal history_ of reality, immanent in the -real history which occurs in time; he abolished the distinctions of the -concept as separate species and substituted the notion of degrees or -moments, which (as Schelling did after him) he called _ideal epochs_; -he considered the abstractionist and mathematical century which he saw -rising before him, as a period of philosophic decadence, and foretold -the evil effects of Cartesian anti-historicism. (His presage was -fulfilled.) In this way, he sketched a new Logic, very different from -that of Aristotle or of Arnaud which was the most recent, a Logic in -which he attempted to satisfy Plato and Bacon, Tacitus and Grotius, the -idea and the fact. But if the other opponents of abstractionism had -very little effect, because of their immaturity and want of system, -Vico also was ineffectual, because he was born in Italy precisely at -the time when Italy as a productive country was definitely issuing from -the circle of European thought and was beginning passively to accept -the more popular forms of foreign thought. Finally, Naples, the little -country of Vico, was then becoming encyclopædist and sensationalist, -and did not really begin to know until a century later the remedy for -such evils composed in anticipation by Vico. - -[Sidenote: _Empiricist Logic and its dissolution--Locke, Berkeley and -Hume._] - -The surpassing of the Logic of the abstract concept and the achievement -of that of the concrete concept or pure concept or idea, was realized -in other ways, primarily by a sort of reduction to the absurd of -empiricist and mathematical Logic, in the scepticism which was its -result. This reduction to the absurd, this final scepticism, is to -be observed in the movement of English philosophy, beginning with -Locke or even with Hobbes, to Hume. Locke, starting from perception -as his presupposition, derived all ideas from experience, with the -sole instrument of reflection; and rejecting innate ideas and looking -upon others as more or less arbitrary, he preserved some objectivity -to mathematical ideas alone, which relate to what are called primary -qualities. Berkeley denies objectivity even to the primary qualities. -All concepts, naturalist and mathematical alike, are for him abstract -concepts and to that extent without truth. The only truth is the -"idea," which means here nothing but sensation or the representation -of the individual. His Logic is not empiricist, because it is in no -respect Logic. At the most it is an Æsthetic substituted for and -given as Logic. It is true, notwithstanding his complete denial of -universals--of empirical and abstract, no less than of philosophic, -which he never even mentions--that he deludes himself into thinking -that he has overcome scepticism; and it is true also that he laid the -foundations of a spiritualist and voluntarist conception of reality, -which in our opinion should be preserved and adopted by modern thought. -But this proves only that his philosophy does not wholly agree with -his Logic, and not that his Logic is not the complete denial of the -concept and of thought. The logical consequence of Berkeley could not, -then, be anything but the scepticism of David Hume, who shakes the very -foundation upon which the whole of the science of nature rests, namely, -the principle of causality. - -[Sidenote: _Exact science and Kant. The concept of the category._] - -As the effect of this extreme scepticism, the surpassing of empiricist -and abstractionist Logic had to be begun with the restoration of that -Logic itself (because that which does not exist cannot be surpassed), -that is to say, with the demonstration, against Hume, that the exact -science of nature is possible. Such is the principal task of the -_Critique of Pure Reason_, which contains the Logic of the natural -and mathematical sciences, thought no longer by an empiricist, but by -a philosopher who has surpassed empiricism and recognized that the -concepts of experience presuppose the human intellect, which originally -constructed them. Leibnitz had already travelled this road, when in -a polemic against Locke he maintained that reflection to which Locke -appealed, referred back to the innate ideas: for if reflection (he -said) is nothing but "_une attention à ce qui est en nous et les sens -ne nous donnent point ce que nous portons déjà avec nous,_" how can -it ever be denied "_qu'il y est beaucoup d'inné en nous, puisque nous -sommes, pour ainsi dire, innés à nous mêmes? Peut-on nier qu'il y ait -eu nous être, unité, substance, durée, changement, action, perception, -plaisir et mille autres objets de nos idées intellectuelles?_"[13] The -_New Essays,_ in which theses and other similar themes were developed, -remained for a time unedited, but appeared opportunely in 1765 to -fecundate German thought, and acted upon Kant, together with English -empiricism and scepticism, the latter giving the problem and the former -almost an attempt at a solution. But the innate ideas of Leibnitz -are profoundly transformed in the Kantian concept of the _category,_ -which is the formal element and really exists only in the very act -of judgment, which it effects. Mathematics are thus secured in their -possession, no longer by means of the primary qualities of Locke, but -because they arise from the _a priori_ forms of intuition, space and -time. The natural sciences are also secured, because the concepts of -them are constituted by means of the categories of the intellect, -on the data of experience. In other words, mathematical and natural -science have value, in so far as they are a necessary product of the -spirit. - -[Sidenote: _The limits of science and Kantian scepticism._] - -But a limitation of value due also to Kant, accompanies this theoretic -reinforcement of exact science. That science is necessary, because -produced by the categories; but the categories cannot develop their -activity except upon the data of experience; so that exact science is -limited to experience, and whenever it makes the attempt to surpass it, -it becomes involved in antinomies and paralogisms and gesticulates in -the void. Science moves among phenomena and can never penetrate beyond -them and attain to the "Thing in itself." - -[Sidenote: _The limits cf science and Jacobi._] - -It would seem from this that Kant was bound to end in a renovated -nominalism and mysticism, and indeed such is partly the case. -Contemporaneously with him, Jacobi also observed the limit in which -is enclosed the mechanical and determinist science of nature (the -highest philosophic expression of which was then found in the _Ethic_ -of Spinoza), since it works with the principle of causation and is -impotent, unless it wishes to commit suicide, to leave the finite -which it describes in a causal series, and Jacobi concluded in favour -of mysticism and of _feeling,_ the organ of the Knowledge of God. -Kant, like Jacobi, in his turn has recourse to the non-theoretic -form of the spirit, to the practical reason and its postulates, to -provide that certitude of God, of immortality, and of human freedom, -which is not evident to the theoretic reason. But in Kant there are -other positive elements which are not in Jacobi, and these elements, -although not sufficiently elaborated by him and not harmonized with -one another, confer upon his philosophy the value of a new Logic, -more or less sketched. For he recognizes not only a theoretic but -also a practical reason, which cannot be called simply practical, if -it in any way produce (although only under the title of postulates), -knowledge (and knowledge of supreme importance). He recognises also an -æsthetic judgment, which, although developed without concepts, does -not belong to the sphere of practical interests; and a teleological -judgment, which is regulative and not constitutive, but not on this -account arbitrary or without meaning. Finally, the very contradictions, -in which the intellect becomes involved, when it wishes to apply the -categories beyond experience, could not reasonably be considered by -him to be mere errors, because they constitute serious problems, if -the intellect becomes involved in them, not capriciously, but of -_necessity._ All this presages the coming of a new Logic, which shall -set in their places these scattered elements of truth and solve the -contradictions. - -[Sidenote: _The a priori synthesis._] - -But the Kantian philosophy also contains, in addition to these elements -and these stimulations, the concept of the new Logic in the _a priori_ -synthesis. This synthesis is the unity of the necessary and the -contingent, of concept and intuition, of thought and representation, -and consequently is the pure concept, the _concrete_ universal. - -[Sidenote: _The intimate contradiction of Kant. Romantic principle and -classical execution._] - -Kant was not aware of this; and instead of developing with a mind free -from prejudice the thought of his genius, he also allowed himself -to be vanquished by the abstractionism of his time and out of the -logical and philosophical _a priori_ synthesis he made the more or -less arbitrary _a priori_ synthesis of the sciences. In this way, the -apriority of the intuition led him, not to art, but to mathematics -(transcendental Æsthetic)[14] the apriority of the intellect led -him, not to Philosophy, but to Physics (abstract intellect): hence -the impotence which afflicted that synthesis, when confronted with -philosophic problems. When he discovered the _a priori_ synthesis, -Kant had laid his hand upon a profoundly _romantic_ concept; but his -treatment of it became afterwards _classicist_ and _intellectualist._ -The synthesis is the palpitating reality which makes itself and knows -itself in the making: the Kantian philosophy makes it rigid again in -the concepts of the sciences; and it is a philosophy in which the sense -of life, of imagination, of individuality, of history, is almost as -completely absent as in the great systems of the Cartesian period. -Whoever is not aware of this intimate drama and fails to understand -this contradiction; whoever, when confronted with the work of Kant, is -not seized with the need, either of going forward or of going backward, -has not reached the heart of that soul, the centre of that mind. The -old philosophers who condemned Kant as sceptical and as a corrupter of -philosophy, and who confined themselves strictly to Wolfianism and to -scholasticism, and the new who greeted him as a precursor and made of -him a stepping-stone on which to mount higher,--these alone came truly -into contact with Kant's philosophy. For in his case there are but two -alternatives: abhorrence or attraction, loathing or love. In the midst -of a battle one must flee or fight: to sit still and take one's ease is -the attitude of the unconscious and the mad. Certainly it is better to -fight than to flee, but it is better to flee than to sit inactive. He -who flees, saves at least his own skin, or, to abandon metaphor, saves -the old philosophy, which is still something; but the inactive man -loses both life and glory, the old philosophy and the new. - -[Sidenote: _Advance upon Kant: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel._] - -The new philosophy was that of the three great post-Kantians, Fichte, -Schelling and Hegel. With Fichte, all trace of the thing in itself has -disappeared and the dominating concept is that of the Ego, that is, -of the Spirit, which creates the world by means of the transcendental -imagination and recreates it in thought. In Schelling is found the -concept of the Absolute, the unity of subject and object, which has, as -its instrument, intellectual intuition. In Hegel, there is this same -concept, but it has itself as instrument, that is to say, it is truly -logical. All three are Kantians, but all three (and especially the last -two) are not simply Kantian. They employed elements which Kant ignored -or employed timidly, and in particular the mystical tradition and the -new tendencies of æsthetic and historical thought. Thus they pass -beyond the abstractionism and intellectualism of the Kantian period, -and inaugurate the nineteenth century. They are connected ideally with -Vico (Hamann was the little German Vico), and they enrich him with the -thoughts of Kant. - -[Sidenote: _The Logic of Hegel. The concrete concept or Idea._] - -Neglecting the particular differences between these thinkers and the -genetic process by which we pass from one to the other, and taking the -result of that speculative movement in its most mature form, which is -the philosophy of Hegel, we see in it (like a new, securely established -society after the frequent changes of a revolution) the establishment -of the new doctrine of the concept. Kant's unconsciousness of the -consequences of the _a priori_ synthesis had been such that he had -not hesitated to affirm that Logic, since the time of Aristotle, -had possessed so just and secure a form as not to need to take one -single step backward, and to be unable to take one forward.[15] But -Hegel insisted that this was rather a sign that that science demanded -complete re-elaboration, since an application of two thousand years -should have endowed the spirit with a more lofty consciousness of -its own thought and of its own essential nature.[16] What was the -concept for Hegel? It was not that of the empirical sciences, which -consists in a simple general representation and therefore always -in something finite; it is barbaric to give the name concepts to -intellectual formations, like "blue," "house," or "animal." Nor was -it the mathematical concept, which is an arbitrary construction. All -the logical rationality that there is in mathematics is what is called -irrational. These so-called concepts are the products of the abstract -intellect; the true concept is the product of the concrete intellect, -or reason. It has therefore nothing to do with the immediate knowledge -of the sentimentalists and of the mystics, and with the intuition of -the æstheticists; such formulae as these express the necessity for the -concept, but give only a negative determination of it. They assert what -it is not in relation to the empirical sciences and then misstate what -it is in philosophy. For the rest, the shortcomings of the abstract -intellect, generating the pure void or _thing in itself_(which far -from being, as Kant believed, unknowable, is indeed the best known -thing of all, the abstraction from everything and from thought itself) -prepare the environment for the phantasms and caprices of mysticism -and intuitionism. The true concept is the _idea,_ and the idea is the -absolute unity of the concept and of its objectivity. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of the Hegelian Idea with the Kantian a priori -synthesis._] - - -This definition has sometimes seemed whimsical, sometimes most obscure; -yet it presents nothing but the elaboration in a more rigorous form -of the Kantian _a priori_ synthesis, so that these two terms could -without further difficulty be regarded as equivalent; the _a priori_ -logical synthesis is the Idea and the Idea is the _a priori_ logical -synthesis. If Hegel has not been understood, that is due to the fact -that Kant himself has not been understood. Those who assert that they -understand what Kant meant to say, but not what Hegel meant to say, -deceive themselves. For Kant and Hegel say the same thing, though the -latter says it with greater consciousness and clearness, that is to -say, better.[17] - -[Sidenote: _The Idea and the Antinomies. The Dialectic._] - -The idea, the concrete universal, the pure concept, rebels against -the mechanical divisions employed for the empirical concepts. For it -has its own division, its own proper and intimate rhythm, by means -of which it divides and unifies, and unifies itself when dividing -and divides itself when unifying. The concept thinks reality, which -is not immobile but in motion, not abstract being, but becoming; -and therefore in it distinctions are generated one from another and -oppositions reconciled. Hegel not only gives the true meaning of -the Kantian _a priori_ synthesis, recognizing it as the concrete -concept, but replaces the antinomies in its bosom. The contradiction -is not due to the limitation of thought before a non-contradictory -reality, which thought is unable to attain; it is the character of -reality itself, which contradicts itself in itself, and is opposition, -_coincidentia oppositorum,_ the synthesis of opposites, or dialectic. -A new doctrine of opposites and the outlines of a new doctrine of -distinction accompanies the new doctrine of the pure concept. In this -philosophy is truly summarized all the previous history of thought. The -concept of Socrates has acquired the reality of the idea of Plato, the -concreteness of the substance of Aristotle, the unity-in-opposition -of Cusanus and Bruno, the Vichian reconciliation of philosophy and -philology, the unity-in-distinction of the Kantian synthesis and the -æsthetic suppleness of Schelling's intellectual intuition. - -[Sidenote: _The lacunæ and errors of the Hegelian Logic. Their -consequences._] - -Nevertheless, the history of thought does not stop at Hegel. In Hegel -himself are found the points to which later history must attach -itself; the lacunæ which he left and the errors into which he fell. -The fundamental error was the abuse of the dialectic method, which -originated for the philosophic solution of the problem of opposites, -but was extended by Hegel to the distinct concepts, so that he -interpreted even the Kantian synthesis itself as nothing but the unity -of opposites. Hence arises his incapacity to attribute their true -value and function to the alogical forms of the spirit, such as art, -and to the atheoretic, such as the natural sciences and mathematics; -and even to logical thought itself, which, violating the laws of the -synthesis, ended by imposing itself upon history and the natural -sciences, attempting to resolve them into itself by dialectizing them, -as the philosophy of history and the philosophy of nature. To this, -therefore, is due the philosophism or panlogism which is characteristic -of the system. This error was assisted by Hegel's want of clearness as -to the nature of the empirical sciences. For him as for Kant, these -remained _sciences,_ that is to say, knowledge of truth, although -imperfect knowledge of it. They therefore constituted even for him -the material or the first step in philosophy. It is true that he also -had other more acute and profound thoughts upon this subject. Amid a -number of incidental observations, he emphasized the arbitrariness -(_Willkurlichkeit_), with which those forms are affected; and this is -tantamount to declaring their practical and atheoretic character. But -instead of respecting this character, he decided upon surpassing it by -means of a philosophic transformation of those sciences, which was not -so much their death as pretended philosophies (a most true conclusion), -as their elevation to the rank of particular philosophies by means of a -mixture of empirical concepts and pure concepts, of abstract intellect -and of reason. The erroneous tendency found nourishment and took -concrete form in the idea of a Philosophy of nature, which Schelling -had obtained, partly from Kant himself and partly had found in his -own at first latent and then manifest theosophism. In this way, the -system of Hegel became divided into three parts, a Logic-metaphysic, -a Philosophy of nature and a Philosophy of Spirit, whereas it should -on the contrary have unified Logic and the Philosophy of Spirit, and -expelled the Philosophy of nature. By its internal dialectic, panlogism -or philosophism was converted, even in Hegel himself, and still more -among his disciples, into mythologism, and from the system of the Idea -and of absolute immanence, because of the imperfections which they -contained, there reappeared theism and transcendence (the Hegelian -right wing).[18] - -[Sidenote: _Contemporaries of Hegel: Herbart, Schleiermacher, and -others._] - -It would be vain to seek the correction of Hegel among those thinkers -that were his contemporaries, for they were all, though in various -degrees, inferior to him. None of them had attained, through Kant, to -the height attained by Hegel. Dwelling on a lower level, they could -certainly refuse to recognize him and vituperate him, but they could -never collaborate with and beyond him, in the progress of truth. -Herbart held those concepts to which the particular sciences give rise -to be contradictory, but he claimed to surpass the contradiction by -means of an elaboration of the concepts (_Bearbeitung der Begriffe_), -conducted in the very method of the old Logic, that is, of the Logic -of the empirical sciences. Schleiermacher renounced the attempt to -reach the unity of the speculative and the empirical, of Ethic and -Physics, that is, the realization of the pure idea of knowledge; -and he substituted for that ideal, which for him was unattainable, -_criticism,_ a form of worldly wisdom; that is to say, of philosophy -(_Weltweisheit_) which gave access to theology and to religious -feeling.[19] Schopenhauer accepted the distinction between concept -and idea, the first abstract and artificial, the second concrete and -real; but so slight was his understanding of the idea (which he called -the Platonic idea) that he confused it with the concept of natural -species,[20] that is to say, precisely with one of the most artificial -and arbitrary of empirical concepts. Finally, Schelling, who had been -a precursor of Hegel in his youth and had collaborated with him, -not only failed to improve his logic of the intuition in his second -philosophical period, but he abandoned even this embryonic form of the -concrete concept, and gave himself over as a prey to the will and to -irrationality. In his positive philosophy the old adversary of Jacobi -made a bad combination of the alogism of Jacobi with the Hegelian -idea of development and with mythologism, as in metaphysic he had -anticipated the blind will of Schopenhauer.[21] - -[Sidenote: _Later positivism and psychologism._] - -The ensuing period, both in Germany and in the whole of Europe, had -little philosophical interest. It was marked by the reappearance of -a form of naturalism and of Empiricism, in part justified by the -abuse of the dialectic, which had sometimes, in the hands of Hegel's -disciples, seemed altogether mad. But this recrudescence was in every -way very poor in thought and inadequate to previous history. With this -Empiricism is associated the deplorable _Logic_ of John Stuart Mill, -one of those books which do least honour to the human spirit. That -less than mediocre reasoner did not even succeed in producing a Logic -of the natural sciences. He became involved in contradictions and -tautologies, talking, for instance, of experience, which criticises -itself and imposes its own limits upon itself, and of the principle -of causality, as a law which affirms the existence of a law that -there shall be a law. Still less had he any notion of what it is -to philosophize, maintaining that in order to make progress in the -moral and philosophical sciences it is necessary to apply to them -the method of the physical sciences. Nothing is more puerile than -his nominalism, which gives language a logical character, and then -pretends that language must be logically reformed. Logical science was -altogether lost in the evolutionism or physiologism of Spencer, and in -the psychologism which had and still has many followers in Germany, in -France, and in England, not less than in Italy. The state in which the -Logic of philosophy is found in such an environment can be inferred -from the fact that even mathematical Logic fared ill there, since there -have not been wanting those who have dared to conceive a _psychology -of arithmetic._ Finally, as a healthy corrective of psychologism, the -danger of which to the old Logic had already been noted by Kant,[22] -there came the revival of the Aristotelian, and even of the scholastic -Logic, in which there yet lived, though in erroneous forms, the idea of -the universal which had been discovered by the Greek philosophers. - -[Sidenote: _Eclectics. Lotze._] - -Other thinkers have not abandoned all contact with classical German -philosophy; but, in comparison with the thoughts of Kant and of Kant's -great pupils, they seem like children. They try to lift the weapons -of the Titans, and either they do not move them at all or they let -them fall from their hands, wounding themselves with them, but failing -to grip them. The thoughts of Schelling and of Hegel indeed were -discredited, but not touched; and those of Kant were touched, but -ill-treated. In the most esteemed Logics of this description, such -as those of Sigwart and of Wundt, the capital distinction between -pure concepts and representative concepts, between _universalia_ and -_generalia,_ has no prominence at all. Sigwart is obliged to complete -the knowledge obtained from naturalistic and mathematical procedure -by faith and by a gradual elevation to the idea of God. Wundt, who -does not attribute to philosophy a method which is proper to it and -different from that of the other forms of knowledge, conceives the -final result of metaphysical thought as the position of a perpetual -hypothesis. In the Logic of Lotze, who combated Hegelianism and revived -transcendentalism and theism, there is just a luminous streak, a -faint trace, of the idealist philosophy. Lotze understands that it -is impossible to form (empirical) concepts by simply cancelling the -varying parts of representations and preserving the constant parts, and -recognizes that the formation of concepts presupposes the concept: the -universal is made with the universal. He strives to issue from this -circle by positing a _primary_ universal, not formed by the method of -the others, but such that thought finds it in itself. This primary -universal has nothing particular and representative; and only by means -of it is it possible to combine heterogeneous and to differentiate -homogeneous elements, and to form the ideas of size, of more or less, -of one and of many and such like, with which the _second_ universals of -the synthesis are afterwards constructed.[23] - -[Sidenote: _New gnoseology of Science. The Economic theory of the -scientific concept._] - -While students of philosophy, although manifesting some doubt and -dissatisfaction, allowed themselves to be intimidated by naturalism -(dazzled, like the public, with technical applications, or confounded -by the applause of the public), a tendency has become more and more -accentuated during the last decades, which seems to us to offer great -assistance to Logic and philosophy in general, if it is understood -how to adapt it to its true end. It has not had any single centre -of diffusion, but has arisen, almost contemporaneously, in several -places, becoming at once diffused everywhere, like something that has -happened at the right time. Several of its founders and promoters -are mathematicians, physicists, and naturalists. From the very fact -of their having begun to reflect upon their activity, these men -have certainly ceased to be mere specialists, notwithstanding their -protests to the contrary. Yet they obtain considerable strength from -their specialism, finding in it a guide and a curb to prevent their -losing sight in their gnoseological enquiry of the actual procedure of -naturalistic constructions, which are its origin. The formula of this -tendency is the recognition of the _practical or economic_ character of -the mathematical, physical, and natural sciences. - -[Sidenote: _Avenarius, Mach._] - -The empirocriticism of Avenarius considers science to be a simple -description of the forms of experience, and conceptual procedure to -be the instrument that alters pure and primitive experience (pure -intuition or pure perception) for the purpose of simplifying it. Ernest -Mach has developed and popularized these views, for as a student of -mechanics he had reached the same conclusions by his own path and in -his own way. The physical sciences (he says), not less than zoology and -botany, have as their sole foundation the description of natural facts -in which there are never identical cases. Identical cases are created -by means of the schematic imitation that we make of reality; and here -toe lies the origin of the mutual dependence that appears in the -character of facts. To this therefore he restricts the significance of -the principle of causality, for which (in order to avoid fancifulness -and mythologicism) it would be opportune to substitute the concept of -_function._ Bodies or things are abbreviated intellectual _symbols_ of -groups of sensations; symbols, that is to say, which have no existence -outside our intellect. They are cards, like those which dealers attach -to boxes and which have no value except in so far as there are goods of -value inside the box. In this economic schematicism lies the strength, -but also the weakness, of science; for in the presentation of facts -science always sacrifices something of their individuality and real -appearance, and does not seek exactness in another way save when -obliged to do so, by the requirements of a definite moment. Hence the -incongruity between experience and science. Since they are developed -upon parallel lines, they can reduce to some extent the interval that -separates them, but they can never annul it by becoming coincident with -one another.[24] - -_Rickert,_ in his book on the _Limits of the Naturalistic Concepts,_ -maintains similar ideas, though with different cultural assumptions. -The concept, which is the result of the labour of the sciences, is -nothing but a means to a scientific end. The world of bodies and of -souls is infinite in space and time. It is not possible to represent -it in every individual part, by reason of its variety, which is not -only extensive but also intensive: intuition is inexhaustible. The -naturalistic concept is directed to surpassing this infinity of -intuitions. It effects this by determining its own extension and -comprehension, and by formulating its being in a series of judgments. -Thus, in order to conquer intuition altogether, the natural sciences -tend to substitute for concepts of _tilings_ concepts of _relations_ -free from all intuitive elements. But the ultimate concept must always -of necessity be a concept of things (though of things _sui generis,_ -immutable, indivisible, perfectly equal among themselves, expressible -in negative judgments); and besides, they find everywhere insuperable -barriers in the historical or descriptive element, which surrounds them -all and is ineliminable. This naturalistic procedure can be applied -and is indeed applied, not only to the science of bodies, but also to -that of souls, to psychology and sociology; and Rickert opportunely -insists (as did Hegel in his time) upon the possibility of empirical -sciences of what is called the spiritual world; or (as he says) the -word "nature," as used in this connection, means not a reality, but a -particular point of view from which reality is observed, in order to -reach the end of conceptual simplification.[25] - -[Sidenote: _Bergson and the new French philosophy._] - -In France, the same ideas or very similar are represented by a group -of thinkers, who are called variously philosophers of contingency, of -liberty, of intuition, or of action. Bergson, who is the chief of them, -looks upon the concepts of the natural sciences in the same way as -Mach, as _symboles_ and _étiquettes._ Besides the extremely apposite -applications that he has made of this principle to the analysis of -time, of duration, of space, of movement, of liberty, of evolution, he -has also the great merit of having broken his country's traditions of -intellectualism and abstractionism, of giving to France for the first -time that lively consciousness of the intuition, which she has always -lacked, and of shaking her excessive reliance upon clear distinctions, -upon well-turned concepts, upon classes, formulæ, and reasonings that -proceed in a straight line, but run upon the surface of reality.[26] - -[Sidenote: _Le Roy and others._] - -Le Roy, one of the followers of Bergson, has set himself to -demonstrate, with many examples, that scientific laws only become -rigorous when they are changed into conventions and depend upon vicious -circles. The course of events is habitual and regular (if you like -to say so), but it is not at all necessary. The great security of -astronomical previsions is commonly praised; but that security is not -always such in actual fact ("_il y a des comètes qui ne reviennent -pas_"), and in any case it is always approximate. The rigorous -necessity of which the natural sciences boast, is not known, but is -rather postulated, and this postulation has merely the practical object -of dominating single facts and of communicating with our neighbours -("_parler le monde_"). The law of gravity holds, but only when external -forces do not disturb it. In this way it is well understood that it -always holds. The conservation of energy avails only in closed systems; -but closed systems are just those in which energy is conserved. A body -left to itself persists in the state of repose; but this law is nothing -but the definition of a body left to itself, and so on.[27] Poincaré -boldly affirms the conventional character of the mathematical and -physical sciences, as do Milhaud and several others. They have deduced -it as a consequence of the impression aroused by the theories of higher -geometry, which has contributed more or less successfully towards -revealing the practical character of mathematics, which was formerly -held to be the foundation or model of truth and certainty. - -[Sidenote: _Reattachment to romantic ideas and advance made upon them._] - -All those criticisms directed against the sciences do not sound new -to the ears of those Schelling, of Novalis, and of other romantics, -and particularly with Hegel's marvellous criticism of the abstract -(that is, empirical and mathematical) intellect. This runs through -all his books, from the _Phenomenology of the Spirit_ to the _Science -of Logic,_ and is enriched with examples in the observations to the -paragraphs of the _Philosophy of Nature._ But if compared with that of -Hegel, they are at the disadvantage of not being based upon powerful -philosophical thought; they have, on the other hand, this superiority: -that they do not present the characteristics observed in the sciences -as errors which must be corrected, but define them as physiological, -necessary, uncensurable characteristics, derived from the very function -of the sciences, which is not theoretic, but practical and economic. In -this way there is posited one of the premisses that are necessary for -preventing the mixture of the economic method with the method of truth, -of empirical and abstract concepts with pure theoretic forms, and thus -for making impossible that speculative hybridism, which is expressed in -philosophies of history and of nature, and which fashions an abstract -reason to work out a dialectic of the naturalistic concepts, and even -of the representations of history. And with the prevention of this -error there is also prepared a more exact idea of the relation between -pseudoconcepts and concepts and a better constitution of philosophic -Logic. - -[Sidenote: _Philosophy of pure experience, of intuition, of action, -etc.; and its insufficiency._] - -But in order that this result should be obtained, the idea of the -philosophic universal must be reawakened and strengthened, in -conformity with its most perfect elaboration in the history of thought, -at the hands of Hegel. The critics of the sciences are at present -far from this mark. The term that is distinct from the empirical and -abstract concepts, the knowledge of reality which is not falsified by -practical ends and discovered beneath labels and formulae, is supplied, -not by the pure concept, by reality thought in its concreteness, by -philosophy which is history, but by pure sensation or intuition. Both -Avenarius and Mach appeal to pure and primitive experience, that is, -to experience free of thought and anterior to it. Bergson, with an -artistic talent that is wanting to the two Germans, but following -the same path, has proclaimed a new metaphysic, which proceeds in an -opposite sense to that of symbolical knowledge and of generalizing and -abstracting experience. He has defined the metaphysic which he desires, -as a science _qui prétend se passer des symboles,_ and therefore as -"_Science de l'expérience intégrale._" This metaphysic would be the -opposite of the Kantian ideal, of the mathematical universal, of the -Platonism of the concepts, and would be founded upon intuition, the -sole organ of the Absolute: "_est relative la connaissance symbolique -par concepts pré-existants qui va du fixe au mouvant, mais non pas la -connaissance intuitive, qui s'installe dans le mouvement et adopte -la vie même des choses. Cette intuition atteint l'absolu._"[28] The -conclusion is æstheticism, and sometimes something even less than -æstheticism, namely mysticism, or _action_ substituted for the concept. -The criticism of the sciences thereby comes to mean the negation of -knowledge and of truth. Hence the protest of Poincaré[29] against Le -Roy, justified in its motive, but ineffective, because based upon the -presuppositions of mathematics and physics. In others again, it becomes -intermingled with the turbid waters of pragmatism, which is a little of -everything, but, above all, chatter and emptiness. - -[Sidenote: _The theory of values._] - -Finally, another of the thinkers that we have mentioned, Rickert -(following Windelband), wishes to integrate naturalistic and abstract -knowledge with the historical knowledge of individual reality. Being -reasonably diffident as to the possibility of a metaphysic as an -"experimental science" (such as Zeller was among the first to desire), -he moves towards a general theory of values. This indeed is the form -(imperfect because stained with transcendence) by means of which many -in our day are approaching a philosophy as the science of the spirit -(or of immanent value). But in the hands of Windelband and Rickert it -is understood as a primacy of the practical reason, which is taken to -govern the double series of the world of the sciences and the world -of history. This doubtless represents progress, as compared with -empiricism and positivism; but not as compared with the Hegelian Logic -of the pure concept, which included in itself what is and what ought to -be. - -Such, briefly stated, is the present state of logical doctrines -concerning the Concept. - - -[Footnote 1: _De sophist. elench._ ch. 34.] - -[Footnote 2: _Metaphys._ M 4, p. 1078 b 28-30; cf. A 6, p. 987 b 2-3.] - -[Footnote 3: Cf. _Æsthetic,_ part ii. chap. i.] - -[Footnote 4: See in this connection the observations of Lasson, in the -preface to his recent German translation of the _Metaphysic,_ Jena, -Diederichs, 1907.] - -[Footnote 5: Cf. especially the _Parmenides,_ the _Theætetus,_ and -_Book of the Republic._] - -[Footnote 6: _Metaphys._ E I, p. 1025 b, 1026 a.] - -[Footnote 7: _Metaphys._ vi. 1027 a.] - -[Footnote 8: _Anal. post._ i. ch. 30.] - -[Footnote 9: See the writings of Gentile concerning De Wulf and La -Berthonnière in the _Critica,_ iii. pp. 203-21, iv. pp. 431-445.] - -[Footnote 10: Prantl, _Gesch. d. Logik,_ iii. pp. 182-3.] - -[Footnote 11: For these references to writings of Luther, see F. J. -Schmidt, _Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus,_ Leipzig, 1908, pp. 44-6.] - - -[Footnote 12: See my Essay upon Hegel, ch. ii.] - - -[Footnote 13: Preface to _Nouveaux Essais._] - -[Footnote 14: See what is said on this point in my -_Æsthetic,_² Part II. Chap. VIII.] - -[Footnote 15: _Krit. d. rein. Vern._ ed. Kirchmann, pp. 22-3.] - -[Footnote 16: _Wiss. d. Logik,_ i. p. 35; cfr. p. 19.] - -[Footnote 17: Kuno Fischer in his _Logic,_ when expounding the thought -of Hegel, clearly distinguishes the empirical concepts from the pure -concepts, and notes that those which are pure or philosophical, are, -in the spirit, the basis and presupposition of the others. "These -others, the empirical, are formed from single representations or -intuitions, by uniting homogeneous characteristics and separating -them from the heterogeneous; and thus arise general representations, -concepts of classes": empirical, because of their empirical origin, -and representative, because they represent entire classes of single -objects, that is, are generalized representations. But at the base -of each of these are found judgments or syntheses, which contain -non-empirical and non-representable elements, elements which are _a -priori_ and only thinkable. These are the true concepts, the first -thoughts in the ideal order, without which nothing can be thought -(_Logik²,_ i. sect. i. § 3). The difference between these pure concepts -or categories and empirical concepts or categories is not quantitative, -but qualitative: the pure concepts are not the most general, the -broadest classes; they do not represent phenomena, but connections and -relations; they can be compared to the signs (+,-, x, ÷, √, etc.) of -arithmetical operations; they are not obtainable by abstraction, indeed -it is by means of them that all abstractions are affected (_loc. cit._ -§§ 5-6).] - -[Footnote 18: See my essay, _What is Living and what is Dead of the -Philosophy of Hegel,_ for the criticism here briefly summarized.] - -[Footnote 19: _Dialektik,_ ed. Halpern, pp. 203-245.] - -[Footnote 20: _Werke,_ ed. Grisebach, ii. chap. 39.] - -[Footnote 21: The movement of Italian thought in the first decades of -the nineteenth century was rather a progress of national philosophic -culture than a factor in the general history of philosophy. In this -last respect, the rôle of Italy was for the time being ended; though -it did not end in the seventeenth century with Campanella and Galileo -(as foreign historians and the Italians who copy them believe). It -ended magnificently in the first half of the eighteenth century with -Vico, the last representative of the Renaissance and the first of -Romanticism. The influence of German philosophy continued to manifest -itself in Italy in the nineteenth century, at first almost entirely -through French literature, then directly. It can be studied in the -three principal thinkers of the first half of the century, Galuppi, -Rosmini, and Gioberti. The first began from the Scottish school, and -while attacking Kant, he absorbed not a few of his principles. The -second, also in a polemical sense and in a Catholic wrapping, can be -called the Italian Kant. The third, who had always only the slightest -consciousness of history, assumed the same position as Schelling and -Hegel. To have attained (between 1850 and 1860) to such historical -consciousness is the merit of Bertrando Spaventa (see especially his -book, _La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni con la filosofia -europea,_ new edition, by G. Gentile, Bari, Laterza, 1908), who -represented Hegelianism in Italy in a very cautious and critical form. -But there was no true surpassing of Hegelianism either by his disciples -or by his adversaries, and some original thought is to be found only -among non-professional philosophers, particularly in Æsthetic, with -Francesco de Sanctis (cf. _Estetica,_ part ii. chap. 15).] - -[Footnote 22: _Krit. d. rein. Vernunft, loc. cit._] - -[Footnote 23: _Logik,_ p. 42 _sqq._] - -[Footnote 24: See, among other books, _L'Analisi delle sensazioni,_ -Italian translation Turin, Bocca; 1903.] - -[Footnote 25: _Grenzen d. naturwissensch. Begriffsbildung,_ Freiburg i. -B, 1896-1902, chaps. 1-3.] - -[Footnote 26: See above, p. 528.] - -[Footnote 27: See his articles in the _Revue de métaphys. et de -morale,_ vols. vii. viii. xi.] - -[Footnote 28: "Introduction à la Métaphysique," in the _Revue de -métaphys. et de mor._ xi. pp. 1-36.] - -[Footnote 29: _La Valeur de la science,_ Paris, 1904.] - - - - -III - - -THE THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT - - -[Sidenote: _Secular neglect of the theory of history._] - -The theory of the individual judgment and therefore of historical -thought, has been the least elaborated of all logical theories in -the course of philosophic history. It is a very true and profound -remark that the historical sense is a modern thing, and that the -nineteenth century is the first great century of historical thinking. -Of course, since history has always been made and individual judgments -pronounced, theoretic observations upon historical judgments have not -been altogether wanting in the past. The spirit is, as we know, the -whole spirit at every instant, and in this respect nothing is ever -new under the sun, indeed, nothing is new, either before or after the -sun.[1] But history, and in particular, the theory of history, did not -formerly arouse interest nor attract attention, nor was its importance -felt, nor was it the object of anxious and wide investigations to the -degree witnessed in the nineteenth century and in our times, when the -consciousness of immanence triumphs more and more--and immanence means -history. - - -[Sidenote: _Græco-Roman world's ideas of history._] - -Transcendence, then, which has for centuries been more or less -dominant, supplies the reason why the study of the individual and the -theory of history were neglected. In Greek philosophy, individual -judgments were either despised, as in Platonism, or superseded by and -confused with logical judgments of the universal, as in Aristotle. In -the _Poetics_[2] the character of history did not escape him. Differing -from science (which was directed to the universal) and from poetry -(which was directed to the possible), it expresses things that have -happened in their individuality, _ta genomena_ (what Alcibiades did and -experienced). But in the _Organon,_ although he distinguished between -the universal (ta katholou) and the individual (ta kath' ekastou), -between man and Callias,[3] he made no use of the distinction, and -divided judgments into universal, particular and indefinite. The -theory of history was not raised to the rank of philosophic treatment -in antiquity, like the other forms of knowledge, and especially -philosophy, mathematics and poetry. What mark the ancients have -left upon the argument is limited to incidental observations, and -some altogether empirical remarks here and there upon the method of -writing history. They were wont to assign extrinsic ends to it, such -as utility and advice upon the conduct of life. Such utterances of -good common sense as that of Quintilian, to the effect that history -is written _ad narrandum, non ad demonstrandum,_ do not possess great -philosophic weight. Nor had the rules of the rhetoricians philosophic -value, such as that of Dionysus of Halicarnassus, that historical -narrative, without becoming quite poetical, should be somewhat more -elevated in tone than ordinary discourse; or that of Cicero, who -demanded for historical style _verba ferme poëtarum,_ "perhaps" (wrote -Vico, making the rhetorical rule profound) "in order that historians -might be maintained in their most ancient possession, since, as has -been demonstrated in the _Scienza nuova,_ the first historians of -the nations were the first poets."[4] More important, on the other -hand, are the demands (as expressed especially by Polybius) of what -is indispensable to history. Besides the element of fact, there is -needful (Polybius observed) knowledge of the nature of the things -of which the happenings are portrayed, of military art for military -things, of politics for things political. History is written, not -from books, as is the way with compilers and men of letters, but from -original documents, by visiting the places where it has occurred and by -penetrating it with experience and with thought.[5] - -[Sidenote: _The theory of history in mediæval and modern philosophy_] - -The abstractionist and anti-historical character of the Aristotelian -Logic had an injurious effect in the schools, though, on the other -hand, it allied itself well with the persistent transcendentalism. -Certainly, just as in the Middle Ages appeared reflections upon -history, so there could be no avoiding the distinction between what -was known _logice_ and what was known _historice,_ or, as Leibnitz -afterwards formulated the distinction, between _propositions de raison_ -and _propositions de fait._ But these latter were always regarded -with a compassionate eye, as a sort of uncertain and inferior truth. -The ideal of exact science would have been to absorb truths of fact -in truths of reason, and to resolve them all into a philosophy, or -rather into a universal mathematics. Nor did the empiricists succeed -in increasing their credit. These certainly paid particular attention -to facts (hence the polemic of the Anti-Aristotelians and the origin -of the new instrument of observation and induction). But by weakening -the consciousness of the concrete universal they also weakened that -of the concrete individual, and therefore presented the latter in the -mutilated form of species and genera, of types and classes. Bacon, had -he done nothing else, at any rate assigned a place to history in his -classification of knowledge, which was divided, as we know, according -to the three faculties (memory, imagination and reason), into History, -Poetry and Philosophy. He passed in review the two great classes of -history, natural and civil (the first of which was either narrative -or inductive, the second more variously subdivided); thus he even -pointed out the kinds of history that were desirable, but of which no -conspicuous examples were yet extant, such as literary history.[6] -Hobbes, on the other hand, having distinguished the two species of -cognition, one of reason and the other of fact, "altera facti, et est -cognitio propria testium, cujus conscriptio est historia," and having -subdivided this into natural and civil, "_neutra_" (he added, that is -to say neither the natural nor the civil) "_pertinet ad institutum -nostrum_" which was concerned only with the _cognitio consequentiarum,_ -that is to say, science and philosophy.[7] Locke is not less -anti-historical than Descartes and Spinoza, and even Leibnitz, who was -very learned, did not recognize the autonomy of historical work, and -continued to consider it as directed towards utilitarian and moral ends. - -[Sidenote: _Treatises on historical art in the Renaissance._] - -Reflections upon history, suggested rather by the professional needs -of historians than by a need for systematization and a profound -philosophy, continued on their way, almost apart from the philosophy -of the time. From the Renaissance onwards, treatises on historical -art were multiplied at the hands of Robortelli, Atanagi, Riccoboni, -Foglietta, Beni, Mascardi, and of many others, even of non-Italians; -but their discussions usually centred upon elocution, upon the use of -ornament and of digressions, upon arguments worthy of history, and -the like. Among these writers of treatises we must note (here as well -as in the history of Poetics and of Rhetoric) Francesco Patrizio or -Patrizzi (1560), for his ideas, sometimes acute, sometimes incoherent -and extravagant. Overcoming one of the prejudices of empiricism, he -justly wished that the concept of history should not be limited to -military enterprises and political negotiations alone, and that it -should be extended to all the doings of men. With a like superiority -to empirical views, he found historical representation not only in -words, but also in painting and sculpture--(our times, so fruitful -of histories graphically illustrated, should admit that he was to -some extent right), and he did not accept chronological limits. He -also insisted upon the mode of testing historical truth and upon the -degree of credibility of witnesses. But he became extravagant, when he -admitted a history of the future, calling the prophets as witnesses, -and incoherent, when he both denied and affirmed the moral end of -history.[8] - -[Sidenote: _Treatises upon method._] - -Another form of empiricism, certainly more important, the -methodological, which dealt with the canons and criteria to be borne in -mind in making historical researches, accompanied the often rhetorical -empiricism of writers of treatises. The reference to the duties of -the historian in one place in Cicero was repeated and commented upon -by all. But this treatment became gradually more wide, as we see -especially in the work of Vossius, _Ars historica sive de historia -et historiae natura, historiaeque scribendae praeceptis commentatio_ -(1623). The term "Historic" dates from this book and is formed on the -analogy of Logic, Poetic, Rhetoric, etc., and applied to the theory or -Logic of history. Gervinus (1837) and Droysen (1858) tried to bring -this term again into vogue. The methodological treatment of historical -research was more widely developed in the scholastic manuals of Logic -of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as the _Logica seu ars -ratiocinandi_ of Leclerc (1692).[9] With these canons arising in the -field of research and historical criticism, we may opportunely compare -those concerning the mode of valuing and weighing evidence, which were -gradually unified in juridical literature. Methodological treatment -has also progressed in our times, in manuals such as those of Droysen, -of Bernheim, of Langlois-Seignobos; but the general tendency of these -works (as is also evident from their apparatus in heuristic, in -criticism, in comprehension and in exposition) remains and must remain -altogether empirical. - -[Sidenote: _The theory of history and G. B. Vico._] - -The first philosopher who gave to History an importance equal to -Philosophy was Vico, with his already-mentioned union of philosophy -and philology, of _truth_ and _certainty,_ and with the example that -he offered of a philosophic _system,_ which is also a _history_ of the -human race: an "_eternal ideal_ history, upon which the histories of -nations run in _time._" For this reason (not less than from his strong -consciousness of the difference in character between the metaphysical -concept and mathematical abstraction) Vico was an Anti-Cartesian. He -stands between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the opposer -of the past and of the future, or of the nearest past and the nearest -future. Indeed, there is even in Vico a trace of that vice which -arises from a too indiscriminate identification of philosophy and -history, which certainly constitute an identity, but an identity which -is a synthesis and therefore a distinction. Hence, when no account -is taken of this, the substantial truth affirmed loses its balance -in philosophism and mythologism. The real epochs of Vico are too -philosophic and have in them something forced; the ideal epochs are too -historical and have in them something of exuberance and of contingency. -The real epochs are not exempt from philosophistic caprices; the ideal -sometimes become converted into a mythology (though full of profound -meanings). For this reason, it has been possible now to praise, now to -blame him for having invented the _Philosophy of history._ There is -indeed in him, here and there, some hint of a philosophy of history -_sensu deteriori,_ but above all he is the great philosopher and the -great historian. - -[Sidenote: _The anti-historicism of the eighteenth century and Kant._] - -As the eighteenth century did not really know the concept of -philosophy, so was it ignorant of that of history: its anti-historicism -has become proverbial. There appeared at this time some celebrated -theoretic manifestations of historical scepticism, of the negation -of history, which seemed, as before to Sextus Empiricus, a thing -without art and without method (ἅτεχνον ... καὶ ἐκ τἥς ἀμεθόδον ὕλης -τυγχράνουσαν). The book of Melchior Delfico, _Pensieri sull' Istoria -e sull' incertezza ed inutilità della medesima_ (1808), is one of -the last manifestations of this sort. But all the thinkers of that -time were of this opinion; even Kant, in whose wide culture were -certainly two lacunæ--artistic and historical. And if in the course -of elaborating his system he was led by logical necessity to meditate -upon art, or rather upon beauty, he never paid serious attention to the -problem of history. - -[Sidenote: _Concealed historical value of the a priori synthesis._] - -Yet Kant is the true, though unconscious creator of the new Logic -of history. To him belongs the merit, not only of having shown the -importance of the historical judgment, but also of having given the -formula of the identity of philosophy and history in the _a priori_ -synthesis. The logical revolution effected by Kant consists in this: -that he perceives and proclaims that to know is not to think the -concept abstractly, but to think the concept in the intuition, and -that consequently to think is to _judge._ The theory of the judgment -takes the place of that of the concept and is truly the theory of -the concept, in so far as it becomes concrete. What does it matter -that he is not aware of all this and that instead of referring -the logical _a priori_ synthesis to history, he refers it to the -sciences, constituting it an instrument not of history, but of the -sciences; and that instead of exhausting knowledge in the _a priori_ -synthesis, he leaves outside of it true knowledge as an unattainable, -or theoretically unattainable ideal? What does it matter that when -confronted with the problem of the judgment of existence, he solves it -like Gaunilo and withdraws existence from thought, removing from it -the character of predicate and of concept and making of it a position -or an imposition _ab extra?_ What does it matter that his history is -without historical developments and wanting even in knowledge of the -history of philosophy, and that in the parts of the so-called system -that he has developed (for example, in the doctrine of virtue and of -rights) there reigns the most squalid crowd of abstractions and of -anti-historical determinations? What does it matter that we find the -man of the eighteenth century on every page of his book, and that he -was absolutely without sympathy for the tendencies of thought of the -Hamanns and of they Herders? There always remains the fact that the -_a priori_ synthesis carried in itself even that which its discoverer -ignored or denied. - -[Sidenote: _The theory of history in Hegel._] - -It would be preferable to say that all Kant's failures in recognition -and all his lacunæ are certainly of importance, just because they -provided his followers with a new problem, and generated by way of -contrariety the philosophy of Schelling and the historical philosophy -of Hegel. Not even in Hegel is there to be found the elaboration of -the doctrine of the individual judgment, nor is its identity with that -of the concept explicitly recognized. But in Hegel not only do we find -ourselves in the full historical atmosphere (suffice it to recall -his histories of art, of religion, of philosophy and of the general -development of the human race, which are still the most profound and -the most stimulating writings upon history that exist); but these -historical elucidations are all connected with the fundamental thought -of his Logic: the concept is immanent and is divided in itself in the -judgment, of which the general formula is that the individual _is_ the -universal, the subject _is_ the predicate, every judgment is a judgment -of the universal, and the universal is the dialectic of opposites. For -this reason also, we find in the works of Hegel a historical method -far in advance of all his predecessors and also (save in a few points) -of his successors. He maintained, with much vigour, the necessity of -the interpretative and rational element in history; and to those who -demanded that a historian should be disinterested, in the same way as -a magistrate who judges a case, he replied that since the magistrate -has nevertheless his interest, that for the right, so has the historian -also his interest, namely that for truth.[10] - -[Sidenote: _W. von Humboldt._] - -Hegel's defect in relation to history (as was Vico's before him but on -a larger scale) was the philosophist error, which led him to the design -of a philosophy of history, rising above history properly so-called. -The psychological explanations of this strange duplication, together -with its philosophic motives, have already been adduced.[11] Wilhelm -von Humboldt certainly alluded to Hegel and intended to oppose him in -this respect in his discourse concerning the office of the historian -(1820). Here the method of the writer of history was likened to that -of the artist. Fancy is as necessary to the historian as to the poet, -Humboldt said, not in the sense of free fancy, but as the gift of -reconstruction and of association. History, like art, seeks the true -form of events, the pure and concrete form of real facts. But whereas -art hardly touches the fugitive manifestations of the real, in order to -rise above all reality, history attaches itself to those manifestations -and becomes totally immersed in them. The ideas which the historian -elaborates are not introduced by him into history, but discovered in -reality itself, of which they constitute the essence. They are the -outcome of the fulness of events, not of an extrinsic addition, as -in what is called philosophic or theological history (Philosophy of -history). Certainly, universal history is not intelligible without -a world-order (eine Weltregierung). But the historian possesses no -instrument which enables him directly to examine this design, and every -effort in which he attempts to reach it, makes him fall into empty and -arbitrary teleologism. He must, on the contrary, proceed by deducing -it from facts examined in their individuality; for the end of history -can only be the realization of the idea, which humanity must represent -from all sides and in all the different modes in which finite form -can ever be united with the idea. The course of events can only be -interrupted when idea and form are no longer able to interpenetrate -one another.[12] The protest was justified, not indeed against the -fundamental doctrine of Hegel, but rather against one of its particular -aberrations. But the protest was inferior in the determinateness of -its concepts to the philosophy which it opposed. Even in the healthy -tendency of the Hegelian doctrine, ideas should not be introduced but -discovered in history. And if it sometimes seemed that the Philosophy -of history introduced them from without, this happened because in that -case true ideas were not employed and the concreteness of the fact was -not respected. - -[Sidenote: _F. Brentano._] - -The theory of the individual judgment has made no progress in the -Logics of the nineteenth century, save for certain timely explanations -concerning the existential character of the judgment given by Brentano -and his school. Brentano, who is an Anti-Kantian, considers the period -inaugurated by Kant to be that of a new philosophical decadence. Yet -notwithstanding his sympathy for mediæval scholasticism and for modern -psychologism, he has too much philosophic acumen to remain fixed in the -one or to lose himself in the other. Thus the tripartition of the forms -of the spirit, maintained by him,[13] beneath the external appearance -of a renovated Cartesianism, bears traces of the abhorred criticism, -romanticism and idealism. The first form, the pure representation, -answers to the æsthetic moment; the second, the judgment, is the -primitive logical form answering to the Kantian _a priori_ synthesis; -and love and hatred, the third form, which contains will and feeling, -is not without precedent among the Post-Kantians themselves. He -reasonably criticizes the various more or less mechanical theories, -which treat the judgment as a connection of representations or a -subsumption of concepts, and defends the _idiogenetic_ against -allogenetic theories. But when he tries to prove that the judgment -"A is" cannot be resolved into "A" and "is" (that is, into A and -existence), because the concept of existence is found in the judgment -and does not precede it, he goes beyond the mark. For the concept of -existence certainly does not precede, but neither does it _follow_ -the judgment: it is contemporaneous; that is to say, it exists only -in the judgment, like the category in the _a priori_ synthesis. -And he goes beyond the mark again, when he makes existentiality -the character of the judgment, whereas existentiality is only one -of the categories and consequently, if it be indispensable for the -constitution of the judgment, it is not sufficient for any judgment, -since for every judgment there is necessary the inner determination -of the judgment as essence and as existence. For the rest, this is -easily seen in the theories of his school, which end by establishing -a double degree or form of judgment, thus creating a duality that -cannot be maintained.[14] In any case, in the researches of Brentano -and his followers, there is affirmed the need for a complete doctrine -of the judgment and of its relation (which in our opinion is one of -identity) with the doctrine of the concept. The theories of values and -of judgments of values already mentioned, in their investigation of -the universal or valuative element, express the same need from another -point of view; although none of them discovers, by recalling the -Kantian-Hegelian tradition, that values are immanent in single facts, -and that consequently judgments of value, as judgments, are the same as -individual judgments. - -[Sidenote: _Controversies concerning the nature of history._] - -Enquiries concerning the character of history may assist the -constitution of a theory of individual judgments. These enquiries have -never enjoyed so much favour as in the last decade of the nineteenth -century. Naturalism or positivism has provided the incentive to such -enquiries, for it brought into being the problem: "whether history is -or is not a (natural) science," by its attempt to violate and pervert -history by raising it (as they said, and it must have sounded ironical) -to the rank of a science, that is to say, of a naturalistic science. -There were two answers to the problem: (1) that history is a science -_sui generis_ (not natural); (2) that it is, not a science, but an art, -a particular form of art, the representation of the real. - -[Sidenote: _Rickert; Xénopol. History as science of the individual._] - -The first of these answers is to be found in the work of Rickert -(1896-1902), cited above, and in the almost contemporary work -of Xénopol (1899).[15] Rickert's work is that of a professional -philosopher, and a follower of Windelband; the other, of an -intelligent historian, who is somewhat lacking in equipment as a -philosopher. Rickert, after having examined the naturalistic process -and demonstrated how it finds a limit in individuality, next examines -historical process, which takes possession of the field that naturalism -is obliged to relinquish. Xénopol upholds the same distinction, of a -double series of sciences, historical and theoretical, of _phénomènes -successifs_ and of _phénomènes de répétition._ To both these writers -(besides the merit of having revived, in opposition to naturalism, the -consciousness of individuality) belongs that of having understood that -the field of history extends far beyond that ordinarily assigned to it, -and embraces every manifestation of the real. But merely successive -phenomena or phenomena of mere repetition do not exist and are not -conceivable; nor is it true that the sciences dealing with the former -stop at differences of fact and neglect identities. For how could a -history of political facts be written, if no attention were paid to -the constant political nature of those facts? or of poetry, without -paying attention to the constant poetical nature of all its historical -manifestations? or of zoological species, without paying attention -to the constant nature of the organism and of life? The distinction, -therefore, as formulated by Xénopol, is little enough elaborated, not -to say crude. Rickert, for his part, falls into a like error, owing -to his failure to respect that intuitive and individual element, -which he had previously admitted. Hence the serious contradictions, -in which he becomes involved in the second part of his book. After -having defined the concept as peculiar to the naturalistic method, he -eventually claims to find also a species of concept in the procedure -of history, which he had distinguished from and opposed to the former: -a _historical_ concept, which is obtained by cutting out, in the -extensive and intensive infinity of facts, certain groups, which are -placed in relation by means of practical criteria of importance and -of value. It is true (he writes) that the concept has been defined by -us as something of universal content; but now we _wish_ precisely to -surpass this one-sidedness, and therefore in the interest of logic it -is justifiable to give the name concepts also to the thoughts which -express the _historical essence_ of reality.[16] It is worse still -when he attempts to explain the ineradicable intuitive and æsthetic -element of historical narration; for holding art to be without truth -and of use only in producing some sort of artistic (hedonistic?) -effect, he recognizes that element as a means of endowing narration -with liveliness and of exciting the fancy.[17] A consequence of this -lack of understanding of the æsthetic function has been the laborious -and vain attempt which Rickert is obliged to make, to determine to what -personages and facts we are to attribute objective historical value. - -[Sidenote: _History as art._] - -The second answer, that history is an art (that is to say, a special -form of art, which is distinguished from the rest, in that it -represents, not the possible but the real), avoids the above-mentioned -difficulties. It distinguishes clearly between the natural sciences -and history; it explains the ineliminability and the function of -the intuitive element in history, and does not lose itself in the -vain search for the distinctive criterion between historical facts -and non-historical facts, because it declares that all facts are -historical.[18] But it must in any case be corrected and completed with -the conclusion that the representation of the real is no longer simple -representation or simple art, but the interpenetration of thought and -representation, that is to say, philosophy-history.[19] - -[Sidenote: _Other controversies concerning history._] - -All the other controversies recently engaged upon, relate to the -criteria of interpretation, or the system of ideas, which serves as -the basis of any sort of historical narration. Thus there have been -disputes as to the precise meaning and the greater or less importance -in history of climate, of race, of economic factors, of individuality, -of collectivity, of culture, of morality, and of intelligence; and -also as to how teleology, immanence, providence, and so on, are to be -understood in history. In these disputes there recur constantly the -names of Buckle, of Taine, of Spencer, of Ranke, of Marx, of Lamprecht -and of others. It is evident that those controversies concern, not -only the gnoseological nature of historical writing, but the system of -the spirit and of the real, the conception of the world itself. The -materialist and the spiritualist, the theist and the pantheist, will -solve them differently. To write their history here would be to go -beyond the boundaries of Logic and of the particular history of Logic, -that we have set ourselves. - - - -[Footnote 1: See my observations concerning the perpetuity of -historical criticism in _Critica,_ vi. pp. 383-84.] - -[Footnote 2: _Poetics,_ chap. 8.] - -[Footnote 3: _Anal. pr._ i. chap. 27.] - -[Footnote 5: See (in particular for Polybius) E. Pais, _Della -storiografia della filosofia della storia presso i Greci,_ Livorno, -1889.] - -[Footnote 6: _De dign. et augm._ i. ii. chaps. 1-2.] - -[Footnote 7: _De homine,_ chap. 9.] - -[Footnote 8: E. Maffei, _I trattati dell' arte storica del Rinascimento -fino al secolo XVII,_ Napoli, 1897.] - -[Footnote 9: G. Gentile, "Contribution à l'histoire de la méthode -historique," in the _Revue de synthèse historique,_ v. pp. 129-152.] - -[Footnote 10: _Encycl._ § 549; and all the introduction to the _Phil. -d. Gesch._] - -[Footnote 11: See above, Part III. Chap. III.] - -[Footnote 12: "Ueber die Aufgabe des Geschichtsschreibers," in the -_Transactions_ of the Academy of Berlin, 1882, and reprinted in _W. W._] - -[Footnote 13: F. Brentano, _Psychologie,_ Leipzig, 1874.] - -[Footnote 14: F. Hildebrand, _Die neuen Theorien der kategorischer. -Schlussen,_ Vienna, 1891.] - - -[Footnote 15: _Les Principes fondamentaux de l'histoire,_ Paris, 1899; -2nd ed., entitled _La Théorie de l'histoire,_ Paris, 1908.] - -[Footnote 16: _Grenzen d. naturwiss. Begriffsbildung,_ pp. 328-29.] - -[Footnote 17: _Op. cit._ pp. 382-89.] - -[Footnote 18: This is the thesis maintained in 1893 by the author of -this book, cf. also B. Croce, "Les Études relatives à la théorie de -l'histoire en Italie," in the _Revue de synthèse historique,_ v. pp. -257-259.] - -[Footnote 19: See above, Part II. Chap. IV., and the note concerning -it.] - - - - -IV - - -THEORIES OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND WORD AND FORMALIST LOGIC - - -[Sidenote: _Relation between the history of Logic and that of the -Philosophy of language._] - -The history of Logic depends very closely upon the history of the -Philosophy of language, or of Æsthetic, understood as the philosophy -of language and of expression in general. Every discovery concerning -language throws new light upon the function of thought, which, -surpassing language, employs it as an instrument, and therefore unites -itself with language both negatively and positively. It belongs to the -progress of the Philosophy of language, not less than to that of Logic, -to have determined in a more exact manner the relations between thought -and expression, as also to have dissipated or begun the dissipation of -empirical and formalist Logic. This Logic, deluding itself with the -belief that it was analysing thought, presents a series of mutilated -and empty linguistic forms. - -[Sidenote: _Logical formalism. Indian Logic free of it._] - -This error, which appeared very early in our western world, has spread -during the centuries and yet dominates many minds; so true is this that -"Logic" is usually understood to mean just illogic or formalist Logic. -We say our western world, because if Greece created and passed on the -doctrine of logical forms, which was a mixture of thoughts materialized -in words and of words become rigid in thoughts, another Logic is known, -which, as it seems, developed outside the influence of Greek thought, -and remained immune from the formalist error. This is Indian Logic, -which is notably antiverbalist, though very inferior to that of Greece -and of Europe in wealth and depth of concepts, and limited almost -exclusively to the examination of the empirical concept or reasoning, -of naturalistic induction or _expectatio casuum similium._ Indian -Logic studies the naturalistic syllogism in _itself,_ as internal -thought, distinguishing it from the syllogism _for others,_ that is to -say, from the more or less usual, but always extrinsic and accidental -forms of communication and dispute. It has not even a suspicion of the -extravagant idea (which still vitiates our treatises) of a truth which -is merely syllogistic and formalist, and which may be false in fact. It -takes no account of the judgment, or rather it considers what is called -judgment, and what is really the proposition, as a verbal clothing -of knowledge; it does not make the verbal distinctions of subject, -copula and predicate; it does not admit classes of categorical and -hypothetical, of affirmative and of negative judgments. All these are -extraneous to Logic, whose object is the constant: knowledge considered -in itself.[1] - -[Sidenote: _Aristotelian Logic and formalism._] - -It was a subject of enquiry and of disagreement, especially during -the second half of last century, whether formalist Logic, the Logic -of the schools, could legitimately be called _Aristotelian._ Some, -among whom were Trendelenburg and Prantl, absolutely denied this, -and wished to restore the genuine thought of Aristotle, opposing it -to post-Aristotelian and mediæval Logic. But they themselves were -so enmeshed in logical formalism, that they were not capable of -determining its peculiar character. The contrast between those two -Logics, so far as it struck them, concerned secondary points. If -the proper character of formalism consists in the confusion between -thought and word, how are we to deny that Aristotle fell into this -error, or that at any rate he set his foot upon the perilous way? -Certainly he did not proceed to the exaggerations and ineptitudes -of later logicians. He was ingenuous, not pedantic. And his books -(and in particular the _Analytics)_ are rich in acute and original -observations. He was a philosopher, and his successors were very -often manual labourers. But Aristotle (probably influenced by -the mathematical disciplines) conceived the idea of a theory of -_apodeictic,_ which, from simple judgments, through syllogisms and -demonstrations, reached completeness in the definition as its last -term. The concept was the first term, as the loose concept or name, -the last term was the concept defined. He was not ignorant that not -everything can thus be demonstrated, that in the case of the supreme -principles such a demonstration cannot be given, and it is vain to -look for it, and that there is alongside the apodeictic a science of -_anapodeictic._ But that did not induce him to abandon the study of -verbal forms for a close study of the concepts or of the category, -which is the demonstration of itself. In his divisions of judgments -he was very discreet; but yet he distinguished them verbally, as -universal, particular and indefinite, negative and affirmative. In the -syllogism he distinguished only three figures, and affirmed that of -those the first is the truly scientific (ἐπιστημὀνικον), because it -determines _what is,_ whereas the second does not give a categorical -judgment and affirmative knowledge, and the third does not give -universal knowledge; but these restrictions did not suffice to correct -the false step made in positing the idea of _figures_ and _moods_ of -the syllogism. When we examine the various doctrines of Aristotle -and compare them with the forms and developments which they assumed -later, it can be maintained that no logician was less Aristotelian than -Aristotle. But even he was Aristotelian, and the impulse to seek logic -in words had been begun in so masterly a manner that for centuries it -weighed upon the mind like a fate. - -[Sidenote: _Later formalism._] - -Why, then, should we rage, like many modern critics, against the later -manipulations and amplifications to which Aristotelian Logic was -submitted by Peripatetics and Stoics, by commentators and rhetoricians, -by doctors of the Church and masters of the University, by Neolatins -and Byzantines, by Arabs and Germans? We certainly harbour no -tenderness for the _hypothetical_ and _disjunctive_ syllogism, or for -the _fourth figure_ of the syllogism, as elaborated from Theophrastus -to Galen, or for the _five predicables_ of Porphyry, or for subtleties -upon the _conversions_ of judgments, or for the _mnemonic verses_ of -Michael Psellus and of Peter Hispanus, or for the geometric symbols -of the concepts and syllogisms invented by Christian Weiss in the -seventeenth century ("to direct blockheads aright,"[2] as Prantl -permits himself to say), or for the calculations upon the moods of the -syllogism made by John Hispanianus, which he found to be no less than -five hundred and sixty in number, thirty-six of which are conclusive. -We also willingly admit that errors have been made in the traditional -interpretation of certain doctrines of Aristotle (for example, in the -doctrine of the enthymeme).[3] But setting aside these errors, we can -say that for those excogitations and distinctions support was already -found in the Organon of Aristotle, and that they were derived from -principles there laid down. Certainly, with their crude roughness and -their evident absurdity, they shock good sense in a way in which the -distinctions of Aristotle did not, for these were in some sort of -relation with the empirical description of the usual mode of scientific -discussions. But the error nestled in themselves; and it was well that -it should be intensified, so that it might leap to the eyes of all, -just as it is sometimes well that there should be scandals in practical -life. - -[Sidenote: _Rebellions against Aristotelian Logic. The opposition of -the humanists and their motives._] - -The rebellions which the school (in the wide sense of the word, -from the Peripatetic to the modern) continued to arouse in regard -to these doctrines might seem to be of greater interest than this -labour of embroidering and carving. But since there has been a time -during which every protest, and indeed, every insult levelled against -the philosopher of Stagira seemed a sign of original thought, of -spiritual freedom and of secure progress, it is well to repeat that an -indispensable condition for surpassing the Aristotelian Logic was a new -Philosophy of language. Such a condition was altogether wanting in the -past and is partly wanting now. It is therefore not surprising that -when those rebellions are closely examined, we discover in the midst -of secondary and superficial disagreement something quite different -from what was expected; not the radical negation, but the substantial -acceptance, explicit or understood, of the principles of formalist -Logic. - -Such is the case with the rebellions of the humanists, Ciceronians -and rhetoricians, which took place in the fourteenth and fifteenth -centuries, of Lorenzo Valla, of Rudolph Agricola, of Luigi Vives, -of Mario Nizolio, of Peter Ramus. The motive power with all of them -was abhorrence for the heavy scholastic armour. Culture, leaving -the cloisters, spread itself abroad in life; philosophy began to be -written in the common tongue, and for this reason men sought forms of -exposition that were rapid, easy and clear or eloquent and oratorical. -But under these new forms the direction of logical thought remained -unchanged. Ramus, for example, who applied to Aristotle the elegant -terms of _fatuus impostor, chamæleon somnians et stertens,_ and so -forth, ended by claiming that he alone had understood his true thought, -and showed by the reforms of it that he proposed (among which was the -suggestion that the third figure of the syllogism should pass to the -first place) that he, too, was still revolving in the narrow circle of -formalism.[4] - -[Sidenote: _The opposition of naturalism._] - -Even the opposition of naturalism to the Aristotelian Logic did -not strike it to the heart, but wished to replace and more often -to accompany one form of empiricism with another: the rules of the -syllogism with the precepts of induction, the sophistical refutations -with the determination of the four idols that preoccupy men's minds. -Bacon never dreamed of denying to syllogistic the value of true -doctrine. He believed, however, that it had already been sufficiently -studied and developed, that it lacked nothing, and even possessed -something superfluous, whereas there was still wanting a criterion of -invention and of induction, which was of fundamental importance for -syllogistic itself. In making the inventory of knowledge (he writes) it -is to be observed that we find ourselves almost in the conditions of a -man who inherits an estate, in the inventory of which there is noted: -"ready money, none" ("numeratae pecuniae, nihil").[5] Hence he raised -his voice against the abuse of disputations and of reasoning as to -matters of fact; the subtlety of the syllogism is always conquered by -that of nature.[6] The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions -of words, and words are the counters of concepts; but if the concepts -are confused or wrongly abstracted, the syllogistic consequences -deduced from them are without any sort of security. Hence the necessity -of beginning with induction: "_spes est una in inciuctione vera._"[7] -Bacon's position (which was therefore not anti-formalist, but only -an addition or complement to formalism) has been renewed, word for -word, in all inductive Logics, up to that of the English school of the -nineteenth century, and to ours of to-day. Stuart Mill's book expresses -the combination of the two empiricisms, syllogistic and inductive, in -its very title: "A system of Logic, _ratiocinative_ and _inductive,_ -being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of -Scientific _investigation._" - -[Sidenote: _Labour of simplification in the eighteenth century. Kant._] - -In the eighteenth century, while Leibnitz sought an amplification -and perfecting of syllogistic in the logical calculus, and some -followed him who did not, however, attain to true effectiveness in the -history of culture,[8] formalist Logic fell always more and more into -discredit, not only as Logica _utens,_ but also as _docens,_ that is to -say, as theory. - -Hence the moderate tendency, to which Kant adhered, which consists of -preserving that Logic, while seeking to correct, and, in particular, -to simplify it. For example, Kant undertook to demonstrate the "false -subtlety of the four figures of the syllogism," and at the same time -rendered traditional Logic yet more formalist by withdrawing from it -all examination of the synthesis and the categories, which he referred -to his new transcendental Logic. Traditional Logic, which he respected -and held to be substantially perfect, constituted (he said) a canon -of the intellect and of reason, but only in the _formal_ aspect of -their employment, whatever be the content to which it is applied. Its -only criterion is the agreement or non-agreement of any knowledge -with the general and formal laws of the intellect and of reason; a -_conditio sine qua non_ of every truth, but a _conditio_ which is only -negative.[9] - -[Sidenote: _Refutation of formalist Logic. Hegel; Schleiermacher._] - -Hegel, on the contrary, opposed tradition. He understood the -character of formalist Logic marvellously well: this "_empirical_ -Logic, a bizarre science, which is an _irrational_ knowledge of -the _rational,_ and sets the bad example of not following its own -doctrines. Indeed it assumes the licence of doing the opposite of -what its rules prescribe, when it neglects to deduce the concepts and -to demonstrate its affirmations."[10] In so far as it was empirical -it was intellectualist, and presented the determinations of reason -in an abstract and atomic manner in combining them mechanically. The -new concept of the concept, originated by Hegel, creates from itself -its own theories and allows the old formalist theories to disappear -as dead and dry remains. The forms of thought are henceforth the very -forms of the real; the Idea is the unity of concept and representation, -because it is the universal itself, big with the individual. Things -are realized judgments, and the syllogism is the Idea which identifies -itself with its own reality. This at bottom amounts to saying that -thought fully dominates reality, because it is not an extrinsic -addition or an interposed means, but Reality itself, which makes itself -thought, because it is thought. Other philosophers, too, contemporaries -and adversaries of Hegel, rejected formalist Logic, and among these -was Schleiermacher.[11] He made the logical forms of the _concept_ and -of the _judgment_ correspond to the two forms of reality, _being_ and -_doing,_ finding corresponding analogies in _space,_ a dividing of -being, and in _time,_ a dividing of doing. The concept and the judgment -mutually presuppose one another, and give rise to a circle, which is so -only when considered temporally; since at the point of indifference, of -fusion, of indistinction the two make one.[12] Schleiermacher differed -from Hegel (who attains in thought the unity of the real) in being -obliged to withdraw the syllogism from the number of the essential -forms of thought, because (he says), "if the syllogism were a true -form, a being of its own should correspond to it, and this is not found -to be the case."[13] - -[Sidenote: _Its partial persistence owing to insufficient ideas as to -language._] - -But if with the Hegelian criticism formalist Logic was surpassed by a -truly philosophical Logic, and thereupon lost all its importance, it -cannot be said that it was definitely dissolved. In Hegel himself there -remain traces of it in certain divisions of the forms of judgment and -of syllogism, which he either accepts and corrects or creates anew. -Definitive criticism demanded that in any case the error peculiar to -this empiricism should be recognized. This error consists in confusing -language and thought, taking thought as language, and therefore also -language as thought. Hegel could not effect this criticism, for he -was logistic as regards the theory of language, conceiving it to be a -complex of logical and universal elements.[14] Hence the coincidence -between the forms of language and those of thought did not seem to him -irrational, provided that both were taken in their true connection. The -revival of the Philosophy of language, begun by Vico and carried on -by Hamann and by Herder, and then again by Humboldt, remained unknown -to him or had no influence upon him. Nor, to tell the truth, has it -influenced even later Logic, for had it acquired this knowledge, it -would have been freed for ever from formalism or verbalism and have -possessed a method and a power of application to the nature of the -problems that belong to it. Just a trace of serious discussion (but -made rather in the interest of the Philosophy of language than in -that of Logic) appears in the polemic between Steinthal and Becker -concerning the relations between Logic and Grammar.[15] - -[Sidenote: _Formalist Logic in Herbart, in Schopenhauer, in Hamilton._] - -For this reason, formalist Logic has continued to exist (with -difficulty if you will, but yet to exist) in the nineteenth century. -From Kant it had received with the name _formal_ a new baptism and -a new legitimization. Among post-Kantians Herbart clung closely -to it, though he somewhat simplified it, and hostile as he was to -all transcendental Logic, he continued to conceive it as the sole -instrument of thought. Schopenhauer held logical forms to be a good -parallel to rhetorical forms, and limited himself to proposing some -slight remodelling of the former: for example, to consider judgments -as always universal (both those called by that name and particular -and singular judgments as well), and to explain hypothetical and -disjunctive judgments as pronounced upon the comparison of two or -more categorical judgments. From the syllogism, which he defined as -"a judgment drawn from two other judgments, without the intervention -of new conditions," he dropped the fourth figure, but he proclaimed -the first three to be "ectypes" of three real and essentially -different operations of thought.[16] Kant's teaching was followed in -England by Hamilton. Hamilton insisted upon the purely hypothetical -character of logical reasonings; he excluded from Logic discussions -of possibility and impossibility and of the modalities, and declared -that the intrusion into that science of the concepts of perfect or -imperfect induction, which refer to material differences and are -therefore extralogical,[17] was a fundamental error. In this way he -reacted against inductive Logic, which, in his country especially, had -prevailed against formalist Logic or had strangely accompanied it. He -persuaded himself that he could perfect the latter, by simplifying -the doctrine of the judgment, by means of what is called the -_quantification of the predicate._[18] - -[Sidenote: _More recent theories._] - -Later logicians continued to employ these partial and superficial -modifications. Trendelenburg, as has been mentioned, believed that -he could make progress by referring the thing to its beginning, -that is, by turning from Aristotelianism to Aristotle, and owing to -the curious influence of a thought of Hegel, he assigned to logic -and reality a common foundation which, for him, was not the Idea, -but Movement. Lotze reduced the forms of judgments to three only, -according to the variations of the copula: categorical, hypothetical -and disjunctive judgments; and he made impersonal judgments precede -categorical. By this last class he vainly sought to satisfy the -desire for a theoretic form which is presupposed in properly -logical thought, and it is yet to seek. Lotze always had at bottom -an intellectualistic concept of language: poetry and art seemed to -him to be directed, not to contemplation and expression, but to -emotion and to feelings of pleasure and pain. He could not therefore -recognize the primitive theoretic form in art, in intuition, in pure -expressiveness. Drobisch, the Herbartian, revealed formalism in all -its crudity, beginning with the affirmation that "there are certainly -necessary judgments and syllogisms, but no necessary concepts." -Sigwart reformed the classification of judgments (of denomination, of -property and activity, impersonal, of relation, abstract, narrative and -explicative), and retouched that of syllogisms. Wundt, accepting the -old tripartition of logical forms, also attempts new sub-divisions, -distinguishing judgments for example, according to their subject, into -indeterminate, singular and plural; according to their predicate, -into narrative, descriptive and explicative; according to their -relation, into judgments of identity, superordination, subordination, -co-ordination and dependence; and into negative predications and -negative oppositions. Brentano's reform does not in general abandon the -formalist circle; hence, having assigned the quantity of judgments to -their matter, he limits himself to dividing them into affirmative and -negative; among immediate inferences he accepts only the inference _ad -contradictoriam_; among the laws of the syllogism he denies the law -_ex mere negativis,_ maintaining indeed that _ex mere affirmativis nil -sequitur;_ he defends, as the law of all syllogisms, that of _quaternio -terminorum,_ which used to pass for the sign of the sophism; and he -further abolishes the vain distinctions of figures and moods. - -[Sidenote: _Mathematical Logic._] - -Opposed as radical innovators to these logicians, who work more or less -with traditional formulas, are the mathematical logicians, who follow, -not philosophy, but certain fictions of the Leibnitzian philosophy. -George Bentham, De Morgan, Boole, Jevons, Grassman and now several in -England, in France, in Germany and in Italy (Peano), have been and are -representative of this tendency. They are innovators only in a manner -of speaking, for they are ultra-reactionaries, far more formalist than -the formalist Aristotle. They are dissatisfied with the divisions made -by him, not because they are toe numerous and arbitrary, but because -they are toe few and still bear some traces of rationality They strive -to the uttermost to provide a theory of thought, from which all thought -is absent This kind of Logic has been well defined by Windelband as -"Logic of the green cloth."[19] - -[Sidenote: _Inexact idea of language among mathematical logicians and -intuitionists._] - -These logicians have naturally inherited the other fiction of -Leibnitz, namely that of the possibility of a constant and universal -language,[20] thus revealing another reason for their aberration, -and the usual support of the whole formalist error--ignorance of the -alogical nature of language. The nature of language remains obscure -from another point of view, even to the modern intuitionists (Bergson). -They continue to regard as language, not language in its simplicity, -but the intellectualist procedure (classificatory and abstractive) -which falsifies the continuous in the discontinuous, breaks up -duration, and builds a fictitious world upon the real world. They are -therefore ultimately led to attribute the value of a pure expression -of reality to music, as though music were not language, and true -language (not the intellectualist discourse which they accept in place -of it) were not essentially music, that is to say, poetry. For the -intellectualists also, a Logic (were they to resolve upon constructing -one) would be nothing but formalist. - - -[Footnote 1: See the recent exposition of the secular Indian Logic, in -its most complete form, as found in a treatise of the twelfth century, -in II. Jacobi, "Die indische Logik," in the _Nachrichten v. d. Königl. -Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaft zu Göttingen,_ Philol.-hist. Klasse, 1901, -fasc. iv. pp. 460-484.] - - -[Footnote 2: _Gesch. d. Logik,_ i. p. 362.] - -[Footnote 3: Hamilton, _Fragments philosophiques,_ French tr. pp. -238-242.] - -[Footnote 4: Frantl, "Über Petrus Ramus," in the _Sitzungsberichte d. -k. bayer. Akad. d. Wissensch.,_ Philol.-hist. Klasse, 1878, ii. pp. -157-169.] - -[Footnote 5: _De dign. et augm._ iv. ch. 2-5.] - -[Footnote 6: _Ib._ ch. 2.] - -[Footnote 7: _Nov. Org._ i., aphorism 14.] - -[Footnote 8: It is pertinent to translate here a passage of Hegel, in -relation to this Leibnitzian tendency, which is now again becoming -fashionable. "The extreme form of this (syllogistic) disconceptualized -manner of dealing with the conceptual determinations of the syllogism, -is found in Leibnitz, who (_Opp._ t. ii. p. i) places the syllogism -under the calculus of combination. By this means he has calculated -how many positions of the syllogism are possible, and thus, by taking -count of the differences of positive and negative judgments, then of -universal, particular, indeterminate and singular judgments, he has -arrived at the result that the possible combinations are 2048, of -which, after excluding the invalid, there remain 24 valid. Leibnitz -boasts much of the utility possessed by the analysis of combination in -finding, not only the forms of the syllogism, but also the connections -of other concepts. This operation is the same as that of calculating -the number of possible combinations of letters that can be made from -an alphabet, or of moves in a game of draughts, or of different hands -in a game of _hombre,_ and so on. From which it is clear that the -determinations of a syllogism are placed on a level with moves in -draughts, or hands in _hombre._ The rational is taken as something -dead, altogether deprived of the concept, and the peculiar character -of the concept and its determinations is left out; that is to say, -the character that in so far as they are spiritual facts, they are -_relation,_ and that, in virtue of this relation, they suppress their -_immediate_ determination. This Leibnitzian application of the calculus -of combination to the syllogism and to the connection of other concepts -is not to be distinguished in any way from the discredited _art of -Lully,_ save for the greater methodicalness in calculation of which -it gives proof; it resembles that absurdity in every other respect. -Another thought, dear to Leibnitz, was included in the calculus -of combination. He had nourished this thought in his youth, and -notwithstanding its immaturity and superficiality, he never afterwards -abandoned it. This was the thought of a _universal characteristic_ of -concepts, of a writing, in which every concept should be represented as -proceeding from others or as referring to another; almost as though, in -a rational connection, which is essentially dialectic, a content should -preserve the same determinations that it has when standing alone. - -"The calculus of Ploucquet is doubtless supported by the most cogent -mode of submitting the relation of the syllogism to calculation. He -abstracts in the judgment from the difference of relation; that is to -say, from its singularity, particularity and universality, and fixes -the _abstract identity_ of subject and predicate, placing them in a -_mathematical relation._ This relation reduces reason to an empty, -tautological formation of propositions. In the proposition, 'the rose -is red,' the predicate must signify, not red in general, but only the -determinate 'red of the rose.' In the proposition, 'all Christians are -men,' the predicate must signify only 'those men who are Christians.' -From this and from the other proposition, 'Hebrews are not Christians,' -follows the conclusion (which did not constitute a good recommendation -for this calculus with Mendelssohn): 'hence, Hebrews are not men' (that -is to say, they are not those men, who are Christians). - -"Ploucquet gives as a consequence of his invention _posse etiant rudes -mechanice tot am logicam doceri, uti pueri arithmeticam docentur. ita -quidem, ut nulla formidine in ratiociniis suis errandi lorqueri, vel -fallaciis circumveniri possint, si in calculo non errant._ This eulogy -of the calculus, to the effect that by its means it is possible to -supply uneducated people with the whole of Logic, is certainly the -worst that can be said of an invention which concerns logical Science'" -(_Wiss. d. Logik,_ iii. pp. 142-43).] - -[Footnote 9: _Kr. d. rein. Vern.,_ ed. quoted, pp. 101-2.] - -[Footnote 10: _Wiss. d. Logik,_ iii. p. 51.] - -[Footnote 11: _Dialektik,_ ed. quoted, pp. 74-5.] - -[Footnote 12: Work cited, pp. 145, 147-9.] - -[Footnote 13: Work cited, pp. 146, 291-2.] - -[Footnote 14: _Wiss. d. Logik,_ i. pp. 10-11 and _passim; Encykl._ § -205 and elsewhere.] - -[Footnote 15: _Estetica_², p. II, ch. xii.] - -[Footnote 16: _Werke,_ ed. cited, ii. pp. 120-135.] - -[Footnote 17: Work cited, pp. 159, 165.] - -[Footnote 18: See above, pp. 297, dealing with Ploucquet.] - -[Footnote 19: In his remarks upon the present state of Logic, contained -in his work _Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts_ -(Heidelberg 1904), i. pp. 163-186.] - -[Footnote 20: See my remarks in the _Critica,_ iii. pp. 428-433 -(concerning the work of Messrs. Couturat and Léau); and cf. same, iv. -pp. 379-381.] - - - - -V - - -CONCERNING THIS LOGIC - - -[Sidenote: _Traditional character of this Logic and its connection with -the Logic of the philosophic concept._] - -The Logic which we have expounded in this treatise is also in a certain -sense traditional Logic. But it should be connected, not with the -tradition of formalism, but rather with that of the Hegelian Logic, -of Kantian transcendental Logic, and so of the loftiest Hellenic -speculative thought. In other words, its affinity should be sought in -the logical sections of the _Critique of Pure Reason_ of Kant, or in -the _Metaphysic_ of Aristotle, and not in the _Lessons in Logic_ or in -the _Analytics_ of the same authors. This traditional character endows -it with confidence, because man has always thought the true, and it -is to be doubted if he who fails to discover the truth in the past, -possesses the truth of the present and of the future, of which in his -proud isolation he thinks himself secure. - -[Sidenote: _Its innovations._] - -But to be truly attached to tradition means to carry it on and to -collaborate with it. Contact with thought is always dynamic and -propulsive and urges us to go forward, since it is impossible to stop -or to turn back. For this reason, this Logic presents some novelties, -of which the fundamental and principal can be thus enumerated: - -[Sidenote: _I. Exclusion of empirical and abstract concepts._] - -I. Accepting the doctrine, which culminates in the last great modern -philosophy of the _pure Concept,_ as the only doctrine of logical -truth, this Logic excludes empirical and abstract concepts, declaring -them to be irreducible to the pure concept. - -[Sidenote: _II. Non-theoretic character of the second and autonomy of -the empirical and mathematical sciences._] - -II. Accepting for these last the _economic theory_ of the empirical and -abstract sciences and considering them as having a practical character -and therefore as non-concepts (pseudoconcepts), this Logic denies that -they exhaust logical thought, indeed it altogether denies that they -belong to it and demonstrates that their very existence presupposes -the reality of the pure concept. Hence, it connects the two doctrines -with one another and asserts the _autonomy_ of philosophy, at the same -time respecting the relative autonomy of the empirical and mathematical -sciences thus rendered atheoretical. - -[Sidenote: _III. The concept as unity of distinctions._] - -III. In the doctrine concerning the organism of the pure concept, it -accepts the _dialectic_ view or the unity of opposites, but denies -its immediate validity for the distinctions of the concept; the unity -of which is organized as a unity of distinctions in the theory of -_degrees_ of reality. In this way, the autonomy of the forms of reality -or of the spirit is also respected and the _practical_ nature of error -established. - -[Sidenote: _IV. Identity of the concept with the individual judgment -and of philosophy with history._] - -IV. The richness of reality, of facts, of experience, which seemed -to be withdrawn from the pure concept and so from philosophy by the -separation of it from the empirical sciences, is on the contrary -restored to and recognized in philosophy, not in the diminished and -improper form which is that of empirical science, but in a total and -integral manner. This is effected by means of the connection, which -is a _unity,_ between _Philosophy_ and _History_--a unity obtained by -making clear and profoundly studying the nature of the concept and the -logical _a priori_ synthesis. - -[Sidenote: _V. Impossibility of defining thought by means of verbal -forms, and refutation of formalists Logic._] - -V. Finally, the doctrines and the presuppositions of formalist Logic -are refuted in a precise manner. The autonomy of the _logical form_ is -asserted and consequently the effort to contain its determinations in -words or expressive forms is declared to be vain. These are certainly -necessary, but obey, not the law of logic, but that of the æsthetic -spirit. - -[Sidenote: _Conclusion._] - -Such, summarily indicated, is the progress upon previous thought, which -this Logic would wish to represent. To gain this end, it has availed -itself, not only of the help afforded by ancient and modern Logic, -concentrated in the Hegelian Logic, but also of those others that have -come into being since Hegel, and especially of æsthetic, of the theory -of historical writing and of the gnoseology of the sciences. It has -striven to avail itself of all scattered truths, but of none in an -eclectic manner, that is to say, by making arbitrary collections or -merely aggregations, for it has been conscious that scattered truths -become truly truths when they are no longer scattered but fused, not -many, but one. - -THE END - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Logic as the Science of the pure -Concept, by Benedetto Croce - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LOGIC *** - -***** This file should be named 54137-0.txt or 54137-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/1/3/54137/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... 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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Logic as the Science of the pure Concept - -Author: Benedetto Croce - -Translator: Douglas Ainslie - -Release Date: February 8, 2017 [EBook #54137] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LOGIC *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational materials,...) -Images generously made available by the Internet Archive. - - - - - - -</pre> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> -<h1>LOGIC AS THE SCIENCE OF THE PURE CONCEPT</h1> - -<h4>TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN OF</h4> - -<h2>BENEDETTO CROCE</h2> - -<h4>BY</h4> - -<h4>DOUGLAS AINSLIE</h4> - -<h4>B.A. (OXON.), M.R.A.S.</h4> - -<h5>MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED</h5> - - -<h5>ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON</h5> - -<h5>1917</h5> -<hr class="full" /> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> - - - -<p class="transnote"> Benedetto Croce's Philosophy of the Spirit, in the English translation -by Douglas Ainslie, consists of 4 volumes (which can be read separately):<br /> -1. Aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic. (A first -ed. is available at Project Gutenberg. A second augmented ed. follows.)<br /> -2. Philosophy of the practical: economic and ethic. (In preparation)<br /> -3. Logic as the science of the pure concept.<br /> -4. Theory and history of historiography. (In preparation)<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 60%;">Transcriber's note.</span></p> - - - -<h4><a name="TRANSLATORS_PREFACE" id="TRANSLATORS_PREFACE">TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE</a></h4> - - -<p>The publication of this third volume of the <i>Philosophy of the -Spirit</i> offers a complete view of the Crocean philosophy to the -English-speaking world.</p> - -<p>I have striven in every way to render the Logic the equal of its -predecessors in accuracy and elegance of translation, and have taken -the opinion of critical friends on many occasions, though more -frequently I have preferred to retain my own. The vocabulary will be -found to resemble those of the <i>Æsthetic</i> and the <i>Philosophy of the -Practical,</i> thereby enabling readers to follow the thought of the -author more easily than if I had made alterations in it. Thus the word -"fancy" will be found here as elsewhere, the equivalent of the Italian -"fantasia" and "imagination" of "immaginazione"; this rendering makes -the meaning far more clear than the use of the words in the opposite -sense that they occasionally bear in English; this is particularly so -in respect of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span> important distinction of the activities in the early -part of the <i>Æsthetic.</i> I have also retained the word "gnoseology" and -its derivatives, as saving the circumlocutions entailed by the use of -any paraphrase, especially when adjectival forms are employed.</p> - -<p>I think that this Logic will come to be recognized as a masterpiece, in -the sense that it supplants and supersedes all Logics that have gone -before, especially those known as formal Logics, of which the average -layman has so profound and justifiable mistrust, for the very good -reason that, as Croce says, they are not Logic at all, but illogic—his -healthy love of life leads him to fight shy of what he feels would -lead to disaster if applied to the problems that he has to face in the -conduct of life. It is shown in the following pages that the prestige -of Aristotle is not wholly to blame for the survival of formal Logic -and for the class of mind that denying thought dwells ever in the <i>ipse -dixit.</i> Indeed, one of the chief boons conferred by this book will be -the freeing of the student from that confusion of thought and word that -is the essence of the old formal Logic—of thought that rises upon the -wings of words, like an aviator upon his falcon of wood and metal to -spy out the entrenchments of the enemy.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> - -<p>One of the most stimulating portions of the book will, I think, be -found in Croce's theory of error and proof of its necessity in the -progress of truth. This may certainly be credited to Croce as a -discovery. That this theory of the uses of error has a great future, -I have no doubt, from its appearance at certain debates on Logic that -have taken place at the Aristotelian Society within the last year or -two, though strangely enough the name of the philosopher to whom it -was due was not mentioned. A like mysterious aposiopesis characterized -Professor J. A. Smith's communication to the same Society as to the -development of the ethical from the economic activity (degrees of the -Spirit) some years after the publication of the <i>Philosophy of the -Practical.</i></p> - -<p>It is my hope that this original work, appearing as it does in the -midst of the great struggle with the Teutonic powers, may serve to -point out to the Anglo-Saxon world where the future of the world's -civilization lies, namely in the ancient line of Latin culture, -which includes in itself the loftiest Hellenic thought. It is sad to -think that the Germans have relapsed to barbarism from the veneer of -cultivation that they once possessed, particularly sad when one comes -upon the German names that must always abound in any treatise<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span> on the -development of thought. Their creative moment, however, was very brief, -and the really important names can be numbered on the fingers of one -hand, that of Emmanuel Kant being corrupted from the Scots Cant. Of -recent years the German contribution has been singularly small and -unimportant, such writers as Eucken being mere compilers of the work of -earlier philosophers, and without originality. The foul-souled Teuton -will need a long period of re-education before he can be readmitted -to the comity of nations upon equal terms—his bestiality will ask a -potent purge.</p> - -<p>In conclusion, I can only hope that the fact of this work having been -put into the hands of readers a decade earlier than would in all -probability have been the case, had I not been fortunate enough to -make a certain journey to Naples, will be duly taken advantage of by -students, and that it will serve for many as a solid foundation for -their thought about thought, and so of their thought about the whole of -life and reality in the new world that will succeed the War.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 70%; font-size: 0.8em;">DOUGLAS AINSLIE.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 5%; font-size: 0.8em;">THE ATHENAEUM, PALL MALL,</p> -<p style="margin-left: 10%; font-size: 0.8em;"><i>March</i> 1917.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="ADVERTISEMENT" id="ADVERTISEMENT">ADVERTISEMENT</a></h4> - - -<p>This volume is, and is not, the memoir entitled <i>Outlines of Logic as -the Science of the Pure Concept,</i> which I presented to the Accademia -Pontiana at the sessions of April 10 and May 1, 1904, and April 2, -1905, and which was inserted in volume xxxv. of the <i>Transactions</i> -(printed as an extract from them by Giannini, Naples, 1905, in quarto, -pp. 140).</p> - -<p>I might have republished that memoir, and made in it certain -corrections, great and small, and especially I might have enriched it -with very numerous developments. But partial corrections and copious -additions, while they would have injured the arrangement of the -first work, would not have allowed me to attain to that more secure -and fuller exposition of logical doctrine which, after four years' -study and reflection, it now seems to be in my power to offer. I -have therefore resolved to rewrite the work from the beginning on a -larger scale, with a new arrangement and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span> new diction regarding its -predecessor as a sketch, which in a literary sense stands by itself, -and only making use of a page, or group of pages, here and there, as -suited the natural order of exposition.</p> - -<p>Owing to this connection between the present volume with the -above-mentioned academic memoir, it will be seen in what sense it may -be called, and is called, a "second edition." It is a second edition of -my thought rather than of my book.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 80%; font-size: 0.8em;">B. C.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%; font-size: 0.8em;">NAPLES,</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 5%; font-size: 0.8em;"><i>November</i> 1908.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="PREFACE_TO_THIRD_ITALIAN_EDITION_OF_THE_LOGIC" id="PREFACE_TO_THIRD_ITALIAN_EDITION_OF_THE_LOGIC">PREFACE TO THIRD ITALIAN EDITION OF THE <i>LOGIC</i></a></h4> - - -<p>On reprinting the present volume, after an interval of seven years, I -have reread it with attention to its literary form, but have made no -substantial changes or additions to it; because the further development -of that part which deals with the logic of Historiography has been -collected in a special volume, forming as it were an appendix. This is -now the fourth volume of the <i>Philosophy of the Spirit.</i></p> - -<p>It seemed to many, upon the first publication of this volume, that it -chiefly consisted of a very keen attack upon Science. Few, above all, -discovered what it was: <i>a vindication of the seriousness of logical -thought,</i> not only in respect to empiricism and abstract thought, but -also to intuitionist, mystical and pragmatistic doctrines, and to -all the others then very vigorous, which, including justly combated -positivism, distorted every form of logicity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span></p> - -<p>Nor, in truth, did its criticism of Science favour what is known as a -philosophy "detesting facts": indeed, the chief preoccupation of that -criticism was meticulous respect of facts, which was neither observed -nor observable in empirical and abstract constructions and in the -analogous mythologies of naturalism. The character of this <i>Logic</i> -might equally be described as affirmation of the concrete universal and -affirmation of the concrete individual, as proof of the Aristotelian -<i>Scientia est de universalibus</i> and proof of Campanula's <i>Scientia -est de singularibus.</i> In this manner those empty generalizations and -fictitious riches which are removed from philosophy in the course -of treatment, there appear more than amply, infinitely compensated -for by the restitution to it of its own riches, <i>of the whole of -history,</i> both that known as human and that known as history of nature. -Henceforward it can live there as in its own dominion, or rather its -own body, which is co-extensive with and indivisible from it. The -separation there effected by philosophy from science is not separation -from what is <i>true knowledge in science,</i> that is from the historical -and real elements of science. It is only separation from the schematic -form in which those elements are compressed, mutilated and altered. -Thus it may also be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span> described as a reconnection of it with what of -living, concrete and progressive exists in those sciences. If the -destruction of anything be aimed at in it, that can clearly be nothing -but abstract and anti-historical philosophy. This <i>Logic</i> must thus be -looked upon as a liquidation of philosophy rather than of science, if -abstract science be posited as true philosophy.</p> - -<p>That point is dwelt upon in the polemic against the idea of a general -philosophy which should stand above <i>particular philosophies,</i> or -the methodological problems of historical thought. The distinction -of general philosophy from particular philosophies (which are true -generality in their particularity) seems to me to be the gnoseological -residue of the old dualism and of the old transcendency; a not -innocuous residue, for it always tends to the view that the thoughts -of men upon particular things are of an inferior, common and vulgar -nature, and that the thought of totality or unity is alone superior -and alone completely satisfying. The idea of a general philosophy -prepares in this way consciously or otherwise for the restoration of -Metaphysic, with its pretension of rethinking the already thought -by means of a particular thought of its own. This, when it is not -altogether religious revelation,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span> becomes the caprice of the individual -philosopher. The many examples offered by post-Kantian philosophy -are proof of this. Here Metaphysic raged so furiously and to such -deleterious effect as to involve guiltless philosophy in its guilt. The -latent danger always remains, even if this restoration of Metaphysic -does not take place, for if it never becomes effective because it is -carefully watched and restrained, the other draw-back persists, namely, -that that general philosophy, or super-philosophy or super-intelligence -desired, while it does not succeed in making clear particular problems, -which alone have relation to concrete life, nevertheless in a measure -discredits them, by judging them to be of slight importance and by -surrounding them with a sort of mystical irony.</p> - -<p>To annul the idea of a "general" philosophy is at the same time to -annul the "static" concept of the philosophic system, replacing it with -the dynamic concept of simple historical "systemizations" of groups of -problems, of which particular problems and their solutions are what -remain, not their aggregate and external arrangement. This latter -satisfies the needs of the times and of authors and passes away with -them, or is preserved and admired solely for æsthetic reasons<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span> when -it possesses them. But those who retain some superstitious reverence -for "General Philosophy" or "Metaphysic" have still a superstitious -reverence for what are known as static systems. In so doing they behave -in a rational manner, for they cannot altogether free themselves from -the claims of a definitive philosophy which is to solve once and for -all the so-called "enigma of the world" (imaginary because there are -infinite enigmas which appear and are solved in turn, but there is -not the Enigma), and is to provide the "true system" or "basis" of -the true system. Nevertheless I hope that good fortune will attend -the doctrine of the concept here set out, not only because it seems -to me to afford the satisfaction proper to every statement of truth, -namely, to accord with the reality of things, but also (if I may so -express myself) because it carries with it certain immediate and -tangible advantages. Above all, it relieves the student of philosophy -of the terrible responsibility—which I should never wish to assume—of -supplying the Truth, the unique eternal Truth, and of supplying it in -competition with all the greatest philosophers who have appeared in -the course of centuries. Further, it removes from him together both -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span> hope of the definitive system and the anxious fear of the mortal -doom which will one day strike the very system that he has so lovingly -constructed, as it has struck those of his predecessors. At the same -time it sets him out of reach of the smiling non-philosophers who -foresee with accuracy and are almost able to calculate the date of that -not distant death. Finally, it frees him from the annoyance of the -"school" and of the "scholars"; "school" and "scholars" in the sense of -the old metaphysicians are no longer even conceivable, when the idea -of "systems" having-their "own principles" has been abolished. All -dynamic systems or provisory systemizations of ever new problems have -the same principle, namely, Thought, <i>perennis philosophia. </i> There has -not been and never will be anything to add to this. And although the -many propositions and solutions of problems strive among themselves -to attain harmony, yet to each, if it be truly thought, is promised -eternal life, which gives and receives vigour from the life of each of -the others. This is just the opposite of what takes place with static -systems which collapse, one upon the other, only certain portions of -good work surviving them in the shape of happy treatment of special -problems which are to be found mingled with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span> the metaphysic of every -true philosopher. And although there is no longer a field left over to -these scholars who merely faithfully echo the master, like adepts of a -religion, there is yet a wide field always open to the other type of -scholar, men who pay serious attention and assimilate what is of use to -them in the thought of others, but then proceed to state and to solve -new problems of their own. Finally, the life of philosophy as conceived -and portrayed in this <i>Logic,</i> resembles the life of poetry in this: -that it does not become effective save in passing from <i>different</i> to -<i>different,</i> from one original thinker to another, as poetry passes -from poet to poet, and imitators and schools of poetry, although they -certainly belong to the world, yet do not belong to the world of poetry.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 80%; font-size: 0.8em;">B. C.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 5%; font-size: 0.8em;"><i>September</i> 1916.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[Pg xviii]</a><br /><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[Pg xix]</a></span></p> - - -<blockquote> - -<h5>CONTENTS</h5> - -<p class="center">FIRST PART</p> - -<p class="center">THE PURE CONCEPT, THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE <i>A PRIORI</i> LOGICAL -SYNTHESIS</p> -<hr class="r5" /> -<p class="center">FIRST SECTION</p> - -<p class="center">THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS</p> - -<p class="center">I</p> - - -<p class="center">AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPT <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_3">3</a></span></p> - -<p>Thought and sensation—Thought and language—Intuition and -language as presuppositions—Scepsis as to the concept—Its three -forms—Æstheticism—Mysticism—Empiricism—<i>Redactio ad absurdum</i> of -the three forms—Affirmation of the concept.</p> - -<p class="center">II</p> - -<p class="center">THE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_19">19</a></span></p> - -<p>Concept and conceptual fictions—The pure concept as ultra- and -omnirepresentative—Conceptual fictions as representative without -universality, or universals void of representations—Criticism of the -doctrine which considers them to be erroneous concepts, or imperfect -concepts preparatory to perfect concepts—Posteriority of fictional -concepts to true and proper conceptsmdash;Proper character of conceptual -fictions—The practical end and mnemonic utility—Persistence of -conceptual fictions side by side with concepts—Pure concepts and -pseudoconcepts.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[Pg xx]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">III</p> - -<p class="center">THE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_40">40</a></span></p> - -<p>Expressivity—Universality—Concreteness—The concrete-universal -and the formation of the pseudoconcepts—Empirical and abstract -pseudoconcepts—The other characteristics of the pure concept—The -origin of multiplicity and the unity of the characteristics of the -concept—Objection relating to the unreality of the pure concept and -the impossibility of demonstrating it—Prejudice concerning the nature -of the demonstration—Prejudice relating to the representability of -the concept—Protests of philosophers against this prejudice—Reason of -their perpetual reappearance.</p> - -<p class="center">IV</p> - -<p class="center">DISPUTES CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_58">58</a></span></p> - -<p>Disputes of materialistic origin—The concept as value—Realism -and nominalism—Critique of both—True realism—Resolution of -other difficulties as to the genesis of concepts—Disputes arising -from the neglected distinction between empirical and abstract -concepts—Intersection of the various disputes—Other logical -disputes—Representative accompaniment of the concept—Concept -of the thing and concept of the individual—Reasons, laws and -causes—Intellect and Reason—The abstract reason and its practical -nature—The synthesis of theoretical and practical and intellectual -intuition—Uniqueness of thought.</p> - -<p class="center">V</p> - -<p class="center">CRITIQUE OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE CONCEPTS AND</p> - -<p class="center">THEORY OF DISTINCTION AND DEFINITION <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_72">72</a></span></p> - -<p>The pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept—Obscurity, -clearness and distinction, not subdivisions of the concept—Inexistence -of subdivisions of the concept as logical form—Distinctions of -the concepts not logical, but real—Multiplicity of the concepts; -and logical difficulty arising therefrom.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[Pg xxi]</a></span> Necessity of overcoming -it—Impossibility of eliminating it—Unity as distinction—Inadequacy -of the numerical concept of the multiple—Relation of distincts -as ideal history—Distinction between ideal history and real -history—Ideal distinction and abstract distinction—Other usual -distinctions of the concept, and their significance—Identical, -unequal, primitive and derived concepts, etc.—Universal, -particular and singular. Comprehension and extension—Logical -definition—Unity-distinction as a circle—Distinction in the -pseudoconcepts—Subordination and co-ordination of empirical -concepts—Definition in empirical concepts, and forms of the -concept—The series in abstract concepts.</p> - -<p class="center">VI</p> - -<p class="center">OPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_92">92</a></span></p> - -<p>Opposite or contradictory concepts—Their diversity from -distincts—Confirmation of this afforded by empirical Logic—Difficulty arising -from the double type of concepts, opposite and distinct—Nature of -opposites; and their identity, when they are distinguished, with -distincts—Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another, -as concept from concept—The dialectic—Opposites are not concepts, -but the unique concept itself—Affirmation and negation—The principle -of identity and contradiction; true meaning, and false interpretation -of it—Another false interpretation: contrast with the principle of -opposition. False application of this principle also—Errors of the -dialectic applied to the relation of distincts—Its reduction to the -absurd—The improper form of logical principles or laws—The principle -of sufficient reason.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<p class="center">SECOND SECTION</p> - -<p class="center">INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT</p> - -<p class="center">I</p> - -<p class="center">THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_108">108</a></span></p> - -<p>Relation of the logical with the æsthetic form—The concept as -expression—Æsthetic and æsthetic-logical expressions or expressions of -the concept: propositions and judgments—Overcoming of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">[Pg xxii]</a></span> the dualism of -thought and language—The logical judgment as definition—Indistinction -of subject and predicate in the definition—Unity of essence and -existence—Pretended vacuity of the definition—Critique of the -definition as fixed verbal formula.</p> - -<p class="center">II</p> - -<p class="center">THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE SYLLOGISM <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_120">120</a></span></p> - -<p>Identity of definition and syllogism—Connection of concepts and -thinking of concepts—Identity of judgment and syllogism—The middle -term and the nature of the concept—Pretended non-definitive logical -judgments—The syllogism as fixed verbal formula—Use and abuse -of it—Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in pure -concepts—Separation of truth and reason of truth in the pseudoconcepts.</p> - -<p class="center">III</p> - -<p class="center">CRITIQUE OF FORMAL LOGIC <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_133">133</a></span></p> - -<p>Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic—Its nature—Its partial -justification—Its error—Its traditional constitution—The three -logical forms—Theories of the concept and of the judgment—Theory -of the syllogism—Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal -Logic—Mathematical Logic or Logistic—Its non-mathematical -character—Example of its mode of treatment—Identity of nature of -Logistic and formal Logic—Practical aspect of Logistic.</p> - -<p class="center">IV</p> - -<p class="center">INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_148">148</a></span></p> - -<p>Reaction of the concept upon the representation—Logicization of the -representations—The individual judgment; and its difference from -the judgment of definition—Distinction of subject and predicate in -the individual judgment—Reasons for the variety of definitions of -the judgment and of some of its divisions—Individual judgment and -intellectual intuition—Identity of individual judgment with perception -or perceptive judgment, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii">[Pg xxiii]</a></span> with commemorative or historical -judgment—Erroneous distinction of individual judgments as of fact -and of value—The individual judgment as ultimate and perfect form of -knowledge—Error of treating it as the first fact of knowledge—Motive -of this error—Individual syllogisms.</p> - -<p class="center">V</p> - -<p class="center">THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE PREDICATE OF EXISTENCE <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_161">161</a></span></p> - -<p>The copula: its verbal and logical significance—Questions relating to -propositions without a subject. Verbalism—Confusion between different -forms of judgments in the question of existentiality—Determination -and subdivision of the question concerning the existentiality of -individual judgments—Necessity of the existential character in these -judgments—The absolutely and the relatively inexistent—The character -of existence as predicate—Critique of existentiality as position -and faith—Absurd consequences of those doctrines—The predicate of -existence as not sufficient to constitute a judgment—The predicate of -judgment as the totality of the concept.</p> - -<p class="center">VI</p> - -<p class="center">INDIVIDUAL PSEUDOJUDGMENTS. CLASSIFICATION AND ENUMERATION <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_179">179</a></span></p> - -<p>Individual pseudojudgments—Their practical character—Genesis of the -distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value; and -critique of it—Importance of individual pseudojudgments—Empirical -individual and individual abstract judgments—Formative process -of empirical judgments—Their existential basis—Dependence of -empirical judgments upon pure concepts—Empirical judgments as -classification—Classification and understanding—Substitution of -the one for the other, and genesis of perceptive and judicative -illusions—Abstract concepts and individual judgments—Impossibility -of direct application of the first to the second—Intervention of -empirical judgments as intermediate—Reduction of the heterogeneous -to the homogeneous—Empirical abstract judgments and enumeration -(mensuration, etc.)—Enumeration and intelligence—The so-called -conversion of quantity into quality—Mathematical space and time and -their abstractness.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv">[Pg xxiv]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">THIRD SECTION</p> - -<p class="center">IDENTITY OF THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT THE LOGICAL <i>A -PRIORI</i> SYNTHESIS</p> - -<p class="center">I</p> - -<p class="center">IDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE -INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_198">198</a></span></p> - -<p>Result of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and the -individual judgment—Distinction between the two: truth of reason -and truth of fact, necessary and contingent, etc.; formal and -material—Absurdities arising from these distinctions: the individual -judgment as ultra-logical; or, duality of logical forms—Difficulty of -abandoning the distinction—The hypothesis of reciprocal implication, -and so of the identity of the two forms—Objection; the lack of -representative and historical element in the definitive—The historical -element in the definitions taken in their concreteness—The definition -as answer to a question and solution of a problem—Individual and -historical conditionally of every question and problem—Definition -as also historical judgment—Unity of truth of reason and truth of -fact—Considerations in confirmation of this—Critique of the false -distinction between formal and material truths—Platonic men and -Aristotelian men—Theory of application of the concepts, true for -abstract concepts and false for true concepts.</p> - -<p class="center">II</p> - -<p class="center">THE <i>A PRIORI</i> LOGICAL SYNTHESIS <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_218">218</a></span></p> - -<p>The identity of the judgment of definition and of the individual -judgment, as synthesis <i>a priori</i>—Objections to the synthesis -<i>a priori,</i> deriving from abstractionists and empiricists—False -interpretation of the synthesis <i>a priori</i>—Synthesis <i>a priori in</i> -general and logical synthesis <i>a priori</i>—Non-logical synthesis <i>a -priori—</i> The synthesis <i>a priori,</i> as synthesis, not of opposites, -but of distincts—The category in the judgment. Difference between -category and innate idea—The synthesis <i>a priori,</i> the destruction of -transcendency, and the objectivity of knowing—Power of the synthesis -<i>a priori</i> remained unknown to its discoverer.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxv" id="Page_xxv">[Pg xxv]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">III</p> - -<p class="center">LOGIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_232">232</a></span></p> - -<p>The demand for a complete table of the categories—This demand -extraneous to Logic—Logical categories and real categories—Uniqueness -of the logical category: the concept. The other categories, no longer -logical, but real. Systems of categories—The Hegelian system of -the categories, and other posterior systems—The logical order of -the predicates or categories—Illusion as to the logical reality of -this order—The necessity of an order of the predicates not founded -upon Logic in particular, but upon the whole of Philosophy—False -distinction of Philosophy into two spheres—Metaphysic and Philosophy, -rational Philosophy and real Philosophy, etc., derived from the -confusion between Logic and Doctrine of the categories—Philosophy and -pure Logic, etc.; overcoming of the dualism.</p> - -<hr /> -<p class="center">SECOND PART</p> - -<p class="center">PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND THE NATURAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES</p> - -<p class="center">I</p> - -<p class="center">THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_247">247</a></span></p> - -<p>Summary of the results relating to the forms of -knowledge—Non-existence of technical forms, and of composed -forms—Identity of forms of knowledge and of knowing. Objections -to them—Empirical distinctions and their limits—Enumeration and -determination of the forms of knowing reality, corresponding to the -forms of knowledge—Critique of the idea of a special Logic as doctrine -of the forms of knowing the external world and of a special Logic -as doctrine of the methods—Nature of our treatment of the forms of -knowledge.</p> - -<p class="center">II</p> - -<p class="center">PHILOSOPHY <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_261">261</a></span></p> - -<p>Philosophy as pure concept; and the various definitions of -philosophy—Those which negate philosophy—Those which define<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxvi" id="Page_xxvi">[Pg xxvi]</a></span> it as -science of supreme principle, of final causes, etc.; contemplation -of death, etc.; as elaboration of the concepts, as criticism, as -science of norms; as doctrine of the categories—Exclusion of material -definitions from philosophy—Idealism of every philosophy—Systematic -character of philosophy—Philosophic significance and literary -significance of the system—Advantages and disadvantages of the -literary form of the system—Genesis of the systematic prejudice, -and rebellion against it—Sacred and philosophic numbers; meaning of -their demand—Impossibility of dividing philosophy into general and -particular—Disadvantages of the conception of a general philosophy, -distinct from particular philosophies.</p> - -<p class="center">III</p> - -<p class="center">HISTORY <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_279">279</a></span></p> - -<p>History as individual judgment—The individual element and historical -sources: relics and narrative—The intuitive faculty in historical -research—The intuitive faculty in historical exposition. Resemblance -of history and art. Difference between history and art—The predicate -or logical element in history—Vain attempts to eliminate it—Extension -of historical predicates beyond the limits of mere existence—Asserted -unsurmountable variance in judging and presenting historical facts -and consequent demand for a history without judgment—Restriction of -variance, and exclusion of apparent variances—Overcoming of variances -by means of deep study of the concepts—Subjectivity and objectivity -in history: their meaning—Historical judgments of value, and normal -or neutral values. Critique—Various legitimate meanings of protests -against historical subjectivity—The demand for a theory of historical -factors—Impossibility of dividing history according to its intuitive -and reflective elements—Empiricity of the division of the historical -process into four stages—Divisions founded upon the historical -object—Logical division according to the forms of the spirit—The -empirical division of the representative material—Empirical concepts -in history; and the false theory as to the function they fulfil -there—Hence also the claim to reduce history to a natural science; -and the thesis of the practical character of history—Distinction -between historical facts and non-historical facts; and its empirical -value—The professional prejudice and theory of the practical character -of history.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxvii" id="Page_xxvii">[Pg xxvii]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">IV</p> - -<p class="center">IDENTITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_310">310</a></span></p> - -<p>Necessity of the historical element in philosophy—Historical -quality of the culture required of the philosopher—Apparent -objections—Communication of philosophy as changing of -philosophy—Perpetuity of this changing—The overcoming and continuous -progress of philosophy—Meaning of the eternity of philosophy—The -concept of spontaneous, ingenuous, innate philosophy, etc.; and its -meaning—Philosophy as criticism and polemic—Identity of philosophy -and history—Didactic divisions, and other reasons for the apparent -duality—Note.</p> - -<p class="center">V</p> - -<p class="center">THE NATURAL SCIENCES <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_330">330</a></span></p> - -<p>The natural sciences as empirical concepts, and their practical -nature—Elimination of an equivocation concerning this practical -character—Impossibility of unifying them in one concept—Impossibility -of introducing into them rigorous divisions—Laws in the natural -sciences, and so-called prevision—Empirical character of -naturalistic laws—The postulate of the uniformity of nature, and its -meaning—Pretended impossibility of exceptions to natural laws—Nature -and its various meanings. Nature as passivity and negativity—Nature -as practical activity —Nature in its gnoseological significance, -as naturalistic or empirical method—The illusions of materialists -and dualists—Nature as empirical distinction of an inferior reality -in respect to a superior reality—The naturalistic method, and the -natural sciences as extending to superior not less than to inferior -reality -Claim for such extension, and effective existence of what is -claimed—Historical foundation of the natural sciences—The question -whether history be foundation or crown of thought—Naturalists -as historical investigators—Prejudices as to non-historicity of -nature—Philosophic foundation of the natural sciences, and effect -of philosophy upon them—Effect of natural sciences upon philosophy, -and errors in conceiving such relation—Reason of these errors. -Naturalistic philosophy—Philosophy as the destroyer of naturalistic -philosophy, but not of the natural sciences. Autonomy of these.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxviii" id="Page_xxviii">[Pg xxviii]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">VI</p> - - -<p class="center">MATHEMATICS AND THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCE OF NATURE <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_362">362</a></span></p> - -<p>Idea of a mathematical science of nature—Various definitions of -mathematics—Mathematical procedure—Apriority of mathematical -principles—Contradictoriness of the <i>a priori</i> principles. They -are not thinkable, and not intuitive—Identification of mathematics -with abstract pseudoconcepts—The ultimate end of mathematics: to -enumerate, and, therefore, to aid the determination of the single. -Its place—Particular questions concerning mathematics—Rigour of -mathematics and rigour of philosophy—Loves and hates between the -two forms—Impossibility of reducing the empirical sciences to the -mathematical; and the empirical limits of the mathematical science of -nature—Decreasing utility of mathematics in the loftiest spheres of -the real.</p> - -<p class="center">VII</p> - -<p class="center">THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_378">378</a></span></p> - -<p>Theory of the forms of knowledge and doctrine of the -categories—Problem of classification of the sciences; its empirical -nature—Falsely philosophic character that it assumes—Coincidence -of that problem with the search for the categories, when understood -with philosophic rigour—Forms of knowledge and literary-didactic -forms—Prejudices derived from the latter—Methodical prologues to -scholastic manuals, their impotence—Capricious multiplication of the -sciences—The sciences and professional prejudices.</p> - -<hr /> -<p class="center">THIRD PART</p> - -<p class="center">THE FORMS OF ERROR AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH</p> - -<p class="center">I</p> - -<p class="center">ERROR AND ITS NECESSARY FORMS <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_391">391</a></span></p> - -<p>Error as negativity; impossibility of a special treatment of -errors—Positive and existing errors—Positive errors as practical -acts—<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxix" id="Page_xxix">[Pg xxix]</a></span> Practical acts and not practical errors—Economically practical -acts, not morally practical acts—Doctrine of error, and doctrine -of necessary forms of error—Logical nature of all theoretical -errors—History of errors and phenomenology of error—Deduction of -the forms of logical errors. Forms deduced from the concept of the -concept, and forms deduced from the other concepts—Errors derived from -errors—Professionally and nationality of errors.</p> - -<p class="center">II</p> - -<p class="center">ÆSTHETICISM, EMPIRICISM AND MATHEMATICISM <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_406">406</a></span></p> - -<p>Definition of these forms—Æstheticism—Empiricism—Positivism, the -philosophy founded upon the sciences, inductive metaphysic—Empiricism -and facts—Bankruptcy of Empiricism: dualism, agnosticism, spiritualism -and superstition—Evolutionistic positivism and rationalistic -positivism—Mathematicism—Symbolical mathematics—Mathematics -as a form of demonstration of philosophy—Errors of mathematical -philosophy—Dualism, agnosticism and superstition of mathematicism.</p> - -<p class="center">III</p> - -<p class="center">THE PHILOSOPHISM <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_420">420</a></span></p> - -<p>Rupture of the unity of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis—Philosophism, -logicism or panlogicism—Philosophy of history—Contradictions in its -assumptions—Philosophy of history and false analogies—Distinction -between Philosophy of history and books so entitled—Merits of these, -philosophic and historical—Philosophy of nature—Its substantial -identity with Philosophy of history—Contradictions of Philosophy of -nature—Books entitled Philosophy of nature—Contemporary seekings for -a Philosophy of nature and their various meanings.</p> - -<p class="center">IV</p> - -<p class="center">THE MYTHOLOGISM <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_438">438</a></span></p> - -<p>Rupture of the unity of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis. The mythologism—Essence -of myth—Problems relating to theory of myth—Myth -and religion—Identity of the two spiritual forms—Religion and -philosophy—Conversion of errors, the one into the other—Conversion of -the mythologism into philosophism (theology) and of the philosophism -into the mythologism (mythology of nature, historical apocalypses, -etc.)—Scepsis.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxx" id="Page_xxx">[Pg xxx]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">V</p> - -<p class="center">DUALISM, SCEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_449">449</a></span></p> - -<p>Dualism—Scepsis and scepticism—Mystery—Critique of affirmations -of mystery in philosophy—Agnosticism as a particular form of -scepticism—Mysticism—Errors in other parts of philosophy—Conversion -of these errors into one another and into logical errors.</p> - -<p class="center">VI</p> - -<p class="center">THE ORDER OF ERRORS AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_462">462</a></span></p> - -<p>Necessary character of the forms of errors. Their definite number—Their -logical order—Examples of this order in various parts of -philosophy—Erring spirit and spirit of search—Immanence of error -in truth—Erroneous distinction between possession of and search -for truth—Search for truth in the practical sense of preparation -for thought; the series of errors—Transfiguration of error into -tentative or hypothesis in the search so understood—Distinction -between error as error and error as hypothesis—Immanence of the -tentative in error itself as error—Individuals and error—Duplicate -aspect of errors—Ultimate form of error: the methodological error or -hypotheticism.</p> - -<p class="center">VII</p> - -<p class="center">THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ERROR AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_479">479</a></span></p> - -<p>Inseparability of phenomenology of error from the philosophical -system—The eternal course and recurrence of errors—Returns to -anterior philosophies; and their meaning—False idea of a history of -philosophy as history of the successive appearance of the categories -and of errors in time—Philosophism case in point of this false -view, as is the formula concerning the identity of philosophy and -history of philosophy—Distinction between this false idea of a -history of philosophy, and the books which take it as their title or -programme—Exact formula: identity of philosophy and history—History -of philosophy and philosophic progress—The truth of all philosophies; -and criticism of eclecticism—Researches for authors and precursors of -truths; reason for the antinomies which they exhibit.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxi" id="Page_xxxi">[Pg xxxi]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">VIII</p> - -<p class="center">"DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE" <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_493">493</a></span></p> - -<p>Logic and defence of Philosophy—Utility of Philosophy and the -Philosophy of the practical—Consolation of philosophy, as joy -of thought and in the true. Impossibility of a pleasure arising -from falsity and illusion—Critique of the concept of a sad -truth—Examples: Philosophical criticism and the concepts of God and -Immortality—Consolatory virtue, pertaining to all spiritual -activities—Sorrow and elevation of sorrow.</p> - -<hr /> -<p class="center">FOURTH PART</p> - -<p class="center">HISTORICAL RETROSPECT</p> - -<p class="center">I</p> - -<p class="center">HISTORY OF LOGIC AND HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_503">503</a></span></p> - -<p>Reality, Thought and Logic—Relation of these three terms—Inexistence -of a general philosophy outside particular philosophic sciences; -and, in consequence, of a general History of philosophy outside the -histories of particular philosophic sciences—Histories of particular -philosophies and literary value of such division—History of Logic in -its particular sense—Works dealing with history of Logic.</p> - -<p class="center">II</p> - -<p class="center">THEORY OF THE CONCEPT <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_512">512</a></span></p> - -<p>Question as to the "father of Logic"—Socrates, Plato, Aristotle -—Enquiries as to the nature of the concept in Greece. Question of -transcendency and immanence—Controversies in Plato concerning the -various forms of the concept—Philosophic, empirical and abstract -concepts in Aristotle. Philosophy, physics, mathematics—Universals of -the "always" and those of "for the most part"—Logical controversies -in the Middle Ages—Nominalism and realism—Nominalism, mysticism and -coincidence of opposites—Renaissance and mysticism—Bacon—Ideal of -exact science and Cartesian philosophy—Adversaries of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxii" id="Page_xxxii">[Pg xxxii]</a></span> -Cartesianism—Vico—Empiristic logic and its dissolution. Locke, Berkeley and -Hume—Exact science and Kant. Concept of the category—Limits of -science, and Jacobi—Positive elements in Kantian scepticism—The -synthesis <i>a priori</i>—Inward contradiction in Kant. Romantic principle -and classic execution—Progress since Kant: Fichte, Schelling, -Hegel—Logic of Hegel. The concrete concept or Idea—Identity of -Hegelian Idea and Kantian synthesis <i>a priori</i>—The Idea and the -antinomies. The dialectic—Lacunæ and errors in Hegelian Logic. Their -consequences—Contemporaries of Hegel: Herbart, Schleiermacher and -others—Posterior positivism and psychologicism—Eclectics. Lotze—New -gnoseology of the sciences. Economic theory of scientific concept. -Avenarius, Mach—Rickert—Bergson and the new French philosophy—Le -Roy, and others—Reattachment to romantic ideas, and progress upon -them—Philosophy of pure experience, of intuition, of action, etc.: and -its insufficiency—The theory of values.</p> - -<p class="center">III</p> - -<p class="center">THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_561">561</a></span></p> - -<p>Secular neglect of theory relating to history—Ideas upon history -in Græco-Roman world—Theory of history in mediæval and modern -philosophy—Writers on historical art in the sixteenth century—Writers -on method—Theory of history and G. B. Vico—Anti-historicism of -eighteenth century, and Kant—Hidden historical value of synthesis -<i>a priori</i>—Theory of history in Hegel—W. von Humboldt—F. -Brentano—Controversies as to the nature of history—Rickert; Xénopol. -History as science of individual—History as art—Other controversies -relating to history.</p> - -<p class="center">IV</p> - -<p class="center">THEORY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND WORD AND FORMALIST LOGIC <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_583">583</a></span></p> - -<p>Relation between history of Logic and history of Philosophy of -language—Logical formalism. Indian logic free of it—Aristotelian -Logic and formalism—Later formalism—Rebellions against Aristotelian -Logic—Opposition by humanists and its motives—Opposition of -naturalism—Simplicatory elaboration in eighteenth century. -Kant—Refutation of formal Logic. Hegel; Schleiermacher—Its partial -persistence, owing to insufficient ideas as to language—Formal -Logic in Herbart, in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxiii" id="Page_xxxiii">[Pg xxxiii]</a></span> Schopenhauer, in Hamilton—More recent -theories—Mathematical Logic—Inexact idea of language among -mathematicians and intuitionists.</p> - -<p class="center">V</p> - -<p class="center">CONCERNING THIS LOGIC <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_603">603</a></span></p> - -<p>Traditional character of this Logic and its connection with Logic of -philosophic concept—Its innovations—I. Exclusion of empirical and -abstract concepts—II. Atheoretic character of second, and autonomy -of empirical and mathematical sciences—III. Concept as unity of -distinctions—IV. Identity of concept with individual judgment and of -philosophy with history—V. Impossibility of defining thought by means -of verbal forms, and refutation of formal Logic—Conclusion.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxiv" id="Page_xxxiv">[Pg xxxiv]</a><br /><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - -</blockquote> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h4><a name="FIRST_PART" id="FIRST_PART">FIRST PART</a></h4> - -<h3>THE PURE CONCEPT, THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT, AND THE <i>A PRIORI</i> LOGICAL -SYNTHESIS</h3> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a><br /><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="FIRST_SECTION" id="FIRST_SECTION">FIRST SECTION</a></h5> - - -<h4>THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS</h4> - - - -<hr /> -<h4><a name="I" id="I">I</a></h4> - -<h5>AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPT</h5> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Thought and sensation.</i></div> - -<p>Presupposed in the logical activity, which is the subject of -this treatise, are representations or intuitions. If man had no -representations, he would not think; were he not an imaginative spirit, -he would not be a logical spirit. It is generally admitted that thought -refers back to sensation, as its antecedent; and this doctrine we have -no difficulty in making our own, provided it be given a double meaning. -That is to say, in the first place, sensation must be conceived as -something active and cognitive, or as a cognitive act; and not as -something formless and passive, or active only with the activity of -life, and not with that of contemplation. And, in the second place, -sensation must be taken in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> purity, without any logical reflection -and elaboration; as simple sensation, that is to say, and not as -perception, which (as will be seen in the proper place), so far from -being implied, in itself implies logical activity. With this double -explanation, sensation, active, cognitive and unreflective, becomes -synonymous with representation and intuition; and certainly this is -not the place to discuss the use of these synonyms, though there are -excellent reasons of practical convenience pointing to the preference -of the terms which we have adopted.</p> - -<p>At all events, the important thing is to bear clearly in mind, that the -logical activity, or thought, arises upon the many-coloured pageant of -representations, intuitions, or sensations, whichever we may call them; -and by means of these, at every moment the cognitive spirit absorbs -within itself the course of reality, bestowing upon it theoretic form.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Thought and language.</i></div> - -<p>Another presupposition is often introduced by logicians: that of -language; since it seems clear that, if man does not speak, he does -not think. This presupposition also we accept, adding to it, however, -a corollary, together with certain elucidations. The elucidations are: -in the first place, that language must be taken in its genuine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> and -complete reality; that is to say, it must not be arbitrarily restricted -to certain of its manifestations, such as the vocal and articulate; -nor be changed and falsified into a body of abstractions, such as -the classes of Grammar or the words of the Vocabulary, conceived as -these are in the fashion of a machine, which man sets in motion when -he speaks. And, in the second place, by language is to be understood, -not the whole body of discourses, taken all together and in confusion, -into which (as will be seen in its place) logical elements enter; -but only that determinate aspect of these discourses, in virtue of -which they are properly called language. A deep-rooted error, which -springs directly from the failure to make this distinction, is that -of believing language to be constituted of logical elements; adducing -as a proof of this that even in the smallest discourse are to be -found the words <i>this, that, to be, to do,</i> and the like, that is, -logical concepts. But these concepts are by no means really to be -found in every expression; and, even where they are to be found, -the possibility of extracting them is no proof that they exhaust -language. So true is this that those who cherish this conviction are -afterwards obliged to leave over as a residue of their analysis, -elements which they consider to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> be illogical and which they call -<i>emphatic, complementary, colorative,</i> or <i>musical</i>: a residue in which -is concealed true language, which escapes that abstract analysis. -Finally, the corollary is that if the concept of language is thus -rectified, the presupposition made for Logic regarding language is not -a <i>new</i> presupposition, but is identical with that already made, when -representations or intuitions were discussed. In truth, language in the -strict sense, as we understand it, is equivalent to expression; and -expression is identical with representation, since it is inconceivable -that there should be a representation, which should not be expressed -in some way, or an expression which should represent nothing, or be -meaningless. The one would fail to be representation, and the other -would not even be expression; that is to say, both must be and are, one -and the same.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intuition and language as presuppositions.</i></div> - -<p>What is a real presupposition of the logical activity, is, for that -very reason, not a presupposition in Philosophy, which cannot admit -presuppositions and must think and demonstrate all the concepts that -it posits. But it may conveniently be allowed as a presupposition -for that part of Philosophy, which we are now undertaking to treat, -namely Logic; and the existence of the representative or intuitive -form of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> knowledge be taken for granted. After all, scepticism could -not formulate more than two objections to this position: either the -negation of knowing in general; or the negation of that form of knowing -which we presuppose. Now, the first would be an instance of absolute -scepticism; and we may be allowed to dispense with exhibiting yet again -the old, but ever effective argument against absolute scepticism which -may be found in the mouths of all students at the university, even -of the boys in the higher elementary classes (and this dispensation -may more readily be granted, seeing that we shall unfortunately be -obliged to record many obvious truths of Philosophy in the course of -our exposition). But we do not mean by this declaration that we shall -evade our obligation to show the genesis and the profound reasons for -this same scepticism, when we are led to do so by the order of our -exposition. The second objection implies the negation of the intuitive -activity as original and autonomous, and its resolution into empirical, -hedonistic, intellectualist, or other doctrines. But we have already, -in the preceding volume,<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> directed our efforts towards making the -intuitive activity immune against such doctrines,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> that is to say, -towards demonstrating the autonomy of fancy and establishing an -Æsthetic. So that, in this way, the presupposition which we now allow -to stand has here its pedagogic justification, since it resolves itself -into a reference to things said elsewhere.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Scepticism as to the concept.</i></div> - -<p>Facing, therefore, without more ado, the problem of Logic, the first -obstacle to be removed will not be absolute scepticism nor scepticism -concerning the intuitive form; but a new and more circumscribed -scepticism, which does not question the two first theses, indeed -relies upon them, and negates neither knowledge nor intuition, but -<i>logical</i> knowledge itself. Logical knowledge is something beyond -simple representation. The latter is individuality and multiplicity; -the former the <i>universality</i> of individuality, the <i>unity</i> of -multiplicity; the one is intuition, the other <i>concept.</i> To know -logically is to know the universal or concept. The negation of logic is -the affirmation that there is no other knowledge than representative -(or sense knowledge, as it is called), and that universal or conceptual -knowledge does not exist. Beyond simple representation, there is -nothing knowable.</p> - -<p>Were this so, the treatise which we are preparing to develop would -have no subject-matter<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> whatever, and would here cease, since it is -impossible to seek out the nature of what does not exist, that is, of -the concept, or how it operates in relation to the other forms of the -Spirit. But that this is not so, and that the concept really exists -and operates and gives rise to problems, undoubtedly results from the -negation itself, pronounced by that form of scepticism which we will -call <i>logical,</i> and which is, indeed, the only negation conceivable -upon this point. Thus, we can speedily reassure ourselves as to the -fate of our undertaking; or, if it be preferred, we must at once -abandon the hope which we conjured up before ourselves, and resign -ourselves to the labour of constructing a Logic; a labour which logical -scepticism, by restricting us to the sole form of representation, had, -as it seems, the good intention of sparing us.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its three forms.</i></div> - -<p>Logical scepticism, in fact, can assume three forms. It may affirm -simply that representative knowledge is the whole and that unity or -universality, whose existence we have postulated, are words without -meaning. Or it may affirm that the demand for unity is justified, but -that it is satisfied only by the non-cognitive forms of the Spirit. -Or, finally, it may affirm that the demand is certainly satisfied by -these non-cognitive forms,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> but only in so far as they react upon -the cognitive, that is to say, upon the one admitted form of the -cognitive, namely, the representative. It is clear that there is no -other possibility beyond these three, either that of being satisfied -with representative knowledge; or of being satisfied with something -non-cognitive; or of combining these two forms. In the first case, -we have the theory of <i>æstheticism</i> (which could also be correctly -called sensationalism, if this did not happen to be an inconvenient -term, by reason of the misunderstanding which might easily spring from -it); in the second, the theory of <i>mysticism;</i> in the third, that of -<i>empiricism</i> or <i>arbitrarism.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æstheticism.</i></div> - -<p>According to æstheticism, in order to understand the real, it is not -necessary to think by means of concepts, to universalize, to reason, or -to be logical. It suffices to pass from one spectacle to another; and -the sum of these, increased to infinity, is the truth which we seek, -and which we must refrain from transcending, lest we fall into the -void. The <i>sub specie aeterni</i> would be just like that mirror of water -which deceived the avidity of the dog of Phædrus, and made it leave the -real for the illusory food. For the cold and fruitless quest of the -logician there is substituted the rich and moving contemplation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> of the -artist. Truth lies in works of speech, of colour, of line, and not at -all in the vain babblings of philosophy. Let us sing, let us paint, and -not compel our minds to spasmodic and sterile efforts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mysticism.</i></div> - -<p>The æstheticist's attitude may be considered as that of the spirit, -which comes out of itself and disperses itself among things, while -keeping itself above and aloof from them, contemplating, but not -immersing itself in them. Mysticism is not satisfied with this, feeling -that no repose is ever accorded to the spirit which abandons itself to -this orgy, this breathless adventure of infinitely various spectacles, -and that the intimate meaning of them all escapes the æstheticist. -It is true that there is no logical knowledge, that the concept is -sterile, but the claim for unity is legitimate, and demands to be, and -is, satisfied. But in what way is it satisfied? Art speaks, and its -speech, however beautiful, does not content us; it paints, and its -colours, however attractive, deceive us. In order to find the inmost -meaning of life, we must seek, not the light, but the shade, not -speech, but silence. In silence, reality raises its head and shows its -countenance; or, better, it shows us nothing, but fills us with itself, -and gives us the sense of its very being. The unity and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> universality -that we desire are found in action, in the practical form of the -Spirit: in the heart, which palpitates, loves, and wills. Knowledge is -knowledge of the single, it is representation; the eternal is not a -matter of knowledge, but of <i>intimate and ineffable experience.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empiricism.</i></div> - -<p>If the sceptics of logico-æsthetic type are chiefly artistic souls, the -logico-mystical sceptics are sentimental and perturbed souls. These, -although they do not usually take an entirely active part in life, yet -do to some extent take part in it, vibrating in sympathetic unison -with it, and, according to circumstances, suffering, sometimes through -taking part, and sometimes through failing so to do. Empiricists -or arbitrarists are to be found, on the other hand, among those -who, engaged in practical affairs, do not indulge in emotions and -sentiments, but aim at producing definite results. Thus, while they are -in complete agreement with the æstheticists and the mystics in denying -all value to logical knowledge as an autonomous form of knowledge, -they are not satisfied, like the former, with spectacles and with -works of art; nor are they caught, like the latter, in the madness and -sorcery of the One and Eternal. The combination which they effect, -of the æstheticist's thesis concerning<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> the value of representation, -with the mystical concerning the value of action, strengthens neither, -but weakens both; and in exchange for the poetry of the first and for -the ecstasy of the second, it offers an eminently prosaic product -countersigned with a most prosaic name, that of <i>fiction.</i> There is -something (they say) beyond the mere representation, and this something -is an act of will; which also satisfies the demand for the universal, -not by shutting itself up in itself, but by means of a manipulation -of single representations, so concentrated and simplified as to give -rise to classes or symbols, which are without reality but convenient, -fictitious but useful. Ingenuous philosophers and logicians have -allowed themselves to be deceived by these puppets and have taken them -seriously, as Don Quixote took the Moorish puppets of Master Peter. -Forgetful of the nature and character of the complete operation, -they have proceeded to concentrate and to simplify where there is no -material for such an undertaking, claiming to group afresh, not only -this or that series of representations, but all representations, hoping -thus to obtain the universal concept, that is to say, the concept which -enfolds in its bosom the infinite possibilities of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> real. Thus they -have attained the pretended new and autonomous form of knowledge which -goes beyond representations; a refined, but slightly ridiculous process -of thought, like that of a man who would like to make not only knives -of various sizes and shapes, but a knife of knives, beyond all knives -which have a definite shape and are made of iron and steel.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Reduction to the absurd of the three forms.</i></div> - -<p>We shall proceed to examine in their places both the errors resulting -from these modes of solving, or of cutting, the problem of knowledge, -and also the partial truths mingled with them which it is necessary to -exhibit in their full efficacy. But, at the point which now occupies -us, <i>i.e.,</i> the affirmation or negation of the conceptual form of -knowledge, let it suffice to observe how all the ranks of those who -deny the concept move to the assault armed with the <i>concept.</i> We -need simply observe, not strive to confute, because it is a question -of something which leaps to the eye at once and does not demand many -words; although many would be necessary to illustrate psychologically -the conditions of spirit and of culture, the natural and acquired -tendencies, the habits and the prejudices, which render such marvellous -blindness possible. The æstheticists affirm that truth resides in -æsthetic contemplation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> and not in the concept. But, pray, is this -affirmation of theirs perchance song, or painting, or music, or -architecture? It certainly concerns intuition, but it is not intuition; -it has art for subject-matter, but it is not art; it does not -communicate a state of the soul, but communicates a thought, that is to -say, an affirmation of universal character; therefore, it is a concept. -And by this concept it is sought to deny the concept. It is as if one -sought to leap over one's own shadow, when the leap itself throws -the shadow, or, by clinging to one's own pigtail, to pull oneself -into safety out of the river. The same may be said of the mystics. -They proclaim the necessity of silence and of seeking the One, the -Universal, the I, concentrating upon themselves and letting themselves -live; during which mystical experience it may, perhaps, befall them (as -in the <i>Titan</i> of J. P. Richter) to rediscover the I, in a somewhat -materialized form, in their own person. Nevertheless in the case of -those who recommend silence, <i>non silent silentum,</i> they do not pass -it by in silence; rather, it has been said, they <i>proclaim</i> it, and go -about explaining and demonstrating how efficacious their prescription -is for satisfying the desire for the universal. Were they silent about -it, we should not be faced with that doctrine, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> a precise formula -to combat. The doctrine of silence and of silent action and inner -experience is nothing but an affirmation of absolute character and -universal content, by means of which are refuted, and it is believed -confuted, other affirmations of the same nature. This too, then, -is a concept; as contradictory as you will, and therefore, needing -elaboration, but always conceptual elaboration and not practical; -which last would altogether prevent the adepts in the doctrine from -talking. And who, in our day, talks as much as the mystics? Indeed, -what could they do, in our day, if they did not talk? And is it not -significant that mystics are now found, not in solitudes, but crowded -round little tables in the cafés, where it is customary, not so much to -achieve inner experiences, as, on the contrary, to chatter? Finally, -the theorists of fictions and of toys, in their amiable satire of -logic and of philosophy, forget to explain one small particular, which -is not without importance; that is to say, whether their theory of -the concepts as fiction, is in its turn <i>fiction.</i> Because, were it -fiction, it would be useless to discuss it, since by its own admission -it is without truth; and if it were not (as it is not), it would have -a character of true and not fictitious universality; or, it would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> -be, not at all a simplification and symbol of representations, but -a concept, and would establish the true concept at the very moment -that it unmasks those that are fictitious. Fiction and the theory -of fiction are (and it should appear evident) different things; as -the delinquent and the judge who condemns him are different, or the -madman and the doctor who studies madness. A fiction, which pretends -to be fiction, opens, at the most, an infinite series which it is not -possible to close, unless there eventually intervene an act which is -not fiction, and which explains all the others, as in the unravelling -of a comedy of cross-purposes. And this is the way that the empiricists -or arbitrarists also come to profess the faith that they would deny. -<i>Salus ex inimicis</i> is a great truth for philosophy not less than for -the whole of life; a truth, which on this occasion finds beautiful -continuation in the hostility towards the concept, perhaps never so -fierce as it is to-day, and in the efforts to choke it, never so great -and never so courageously and cleverly employed. But those enemies -find themselves in the unhappy condition of being unable to choke it, -without in the very act suppressing the principle of their own life.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Affirmation of the concept.</i></div> - -<p>The concept, then, is not representation, nor is it a mixture and -refinement of representation.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> It springs from representations, as -something implicit in them that must become explicit; a necessity -whose premisses they provide, but which they are not in a position to -satisfy, not even to affirm. The satisfaction is afforded by the form -of knowledge which is no longer representative but logical, and which -occurs continually and at every instant in the life of the Spirit.</p> - -<p>To deny the existence of this form, or to prove it illusory by -substituting other spiritual formations in its place, is an attempt -which has been and is made, but which has not succeeded and does not -succeed, and which, therefore, may be considered desperate. This series -of manifestations, this aspect of reality, this form of spiritual -activity, which is the Concept, constitutes the object of Logic.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See the first volume of this <i>Philosophy as Science of the -Spirit; Æsthetic as Science of Expression.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="II" id="II">II</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Concepts and conceptual fictions.</i></div> - -<p>By distinguishing the concept from representations, we have recognized -the legitimate sphere of representation, and have assigned to it in the -system of spirit the place of an antecedent and more elementary form -of knowledge. By distinguishing the concept from states of the soul, -from efforts of the will, from action, it is intended also to recognize -the legitimacy of the practical form, although we are not here able -to enlarge upon its relations with the cognitive form.<a name="FNanchor_1_2" id="FNanchor_1_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_2" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> But by -distinguishing the concept from <i>fictions,</i> it would almost seem that -in their case we have not explicitly admitted any legitimate province, -that, indeed, we have implicitly denied it, since we have adopted for -them a designation which in itself sounds almost like a condemnation. -This point must be made clear; because it would be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> impossible to go -further with the treatment of Logic, if we left doubtful and insecure, -that is, not sufficiently distinguished, one of the terms, from which -the concept must be distinguished. What are conceptual fictions? Are -they false and arbitrary concepts, morally reprehensible? Or are they -spiritual products, which aid and contribute to the life of the spirit? -Are they avoidable evils, or necessary functions?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The pure concept as ultra- and omnirepresentative.</i></div> - -<p>A true and proper concept, precisely because it is not representation, -cannot have for content any single representative element, or -have reference to any particular representation, or group of -representations; but on the other hand, precisely because it is -universal in relation to the individuality of the representations, it -must refer at the same time to all and to each. Take as an example any -concept of universal character, be it of <i>quality,</i> of <i>development,</i> -of <i>beauty,</i> or of <i>final cause.</i> Can we conceive that a piece of -reality, given us in representation, however ample it may be (let it -even be granted that it embraces ages and ages of history, in all -the complexity of the latter, and millenniums and millenniums of -cosmic life), exhausts in itself quality or development, beauty or -final cause, in such a way that we can affirm an equivalence between -those concepts and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> that representative content? On the other hand, -if we examine the smallest fragment of representable life, can we -ever conceive that, however small and atomic it be, there is lacking -to it quality and development, beauty and final cause? Certainly, -it may be and has been affirmed, that things are not quality, but -pure quantity; that they do not develop, but remain changeless and -motionless; that the criterion of beauty is the arbitrary extension -which we make to cosmic reality of some of our narrow individual and -historical experiences and sentiments; and that final cause is an -anthropomorphic conception, since not "end" but "cause" is the law -of the real, not teleology but mechanism and determinism. Philosophy -has been and is still engrossed in such disputes; and we do not here -present them as definitely solved, nor do we intend to base ourselves -upon determinate conceptions in the choice of our examples. The point -is, that if the theses which we have just mentioned as opposed to the -first, were true, they would furnish, in every case, true and proper -concepts, superior to every representative determination, and embracing -in themselves all representations, that is to say, every possible -experience; and our conception of the concept would not thereby be -changed, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> indeed confirmed. Final cause or mechanism, development -or motionless being, beauty or individual pleasure, would always, in -so far as they are concepts, be posited as ultrarepresentative and -at the same time omnirepresentative. Even if, as often happens, both -the opposed concepts were accepted for the same problem, for example, -final cause and mechanism, or development and unmoved substance, it -is never intended simply to apply either of them to single groups of -representations, but to make them elements and component parts of all -reality. Thus, every reality would be, on one side, end, and on the -other, cause; on one side, motionless, on the other, changeable; man -would have in himself something of the mechanical and something of the -teleological; nature would be matter, but urged forward by a first -cause which was non-material, that is, spiritual and final, or at least -unknown—and so on. When it is demonstrated of a concept that it has -been suggested by contingent facts, by this very fact we eliminate -it from the series of true concepts, and substitute for it another -concept, which is given as truly universal. Or again, we suppress it -without substituting another for it, that is to say, we reduce the -number of true and proper concepts. Such a reduction is a progress<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> -of thought, but it is a progress which can never be extended to the -abolition of all concepts, because one, at least, will always remain -ineliminable; that of thought, which thinks the abolition; and this -concept will be ultra- and omnirepresentative.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Conceptual fictions as representative without -universality,</i></div> - -<p>Fictional concepts or conceptual fictions are something altogether -different. In these, either the content is furnished by a group of -representations, even by a single representation, so that they are -not ultrarepresentative; or there is no representable content, so -that they are not omnirepresentative. Examples of the first type are -afforded by the concepts of <i>house, cat, rose</i>; of the second, those -of <i>triangle,</i> or of <i>free motion.</i> If we think of the house, we refer -to an artificial structure of stone or masonry or wood, or iron or -straw, where beings, whom we call men, are wont to abide for some -hours, or for entire days and entire years. Now, however great may be -the number of objects denoted by that concept, it is always a finite -number; there was a time when man did not exist, when, therefore, -neither did his house; and there was another time when man existed -without his house, living in caverns and under the open sky. Of course, -undoubtedly, we shall be able to extend the concept of house, so as -to include also the places inhabited by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> animals; but it will never -be possible to follow with absolute clearness the distinction between -artificial and natural (the act of inhabiting itself makes the place -more or less artificial, by changing, for instance, the temperature); -or between the animals which are inhabitants and the non-animals, -which nevertheless are inhabitants, such as plants, which, as well as -animals, often seek a roof; admitting that certain plants and animals -have other plants and animals as their houses. Hence, in view of the -impossibility of a clear and universal distinctive character, it is -advisable to have recourse at once to enumeration and to give the name -house to certain particular objects, which, however numerous they are, -are also finite in number, and which, with the enumeration complete, or -capable of completion, exclude other objects from themselves. If it is -desired to prevent this exclusion, no other course remains than that of -understanding by <i>house</i> any mode of life between different beings; but -in that case, the conceptual fiction becomes changed into a universal, -lacking particular representations, applicable alike to a house and to -any other manifestation of the real. The same may be said of the cat -and of the rose, since it is evident that cats and roses have appeared -on the earth at a definite time and will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> disappear at another, and -that while they endure, they can be looked upon as something fixed and -precise, only when we have regard to some particular group of cats and -of roses, indeed to one particular cat or rose at a definite moment of -its existence (a gray cat or a black cat, a cat or a kitten; a white -rose or a red rose, flowering or withered, etc.), elevated into a -symbol and representative of the others. There is not, and there cannot -be, a rigorous characteristic, which should avail to distinguish the -cat from other animals, or the rose from other flowers, or indeed a cat -from other cats and a rose from another rose. These and other fictional -concepts are, therefore, representative, but not ultrarepresentative; -they contain some objects or fragments of reality, they do not contain -it all.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>or universals void of representations</i></div> - -<p>The conceptual fictions of the triangle and of free motion have an -analogous but opposite defect. With them, it appears, we emerge from -the difficulties of representations. The triangle and free motion are -not something which begins and ends in time and of which we are not -able to state exactly the character and limits. So long as thought, -that is to say, thinkable reality, exists, the concept of the triangle -and of free motion will have validity. The triangle is formed by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> the -intersection of three straight lines enclosing a space and forming -three angles, the sum of which, though they 'vary from triangle to -triangle, is equal to that of two right angles. It is impossible to -confuse the triangle with the quadrilateral or the circle. Free motion -is a motion, which we think of as taking place without obstacles of -any sort. It is impossible to confuse it with a motion to which there -is any particular obstacle. So far so good. But if those conceptual -fictions let fall the ballast of representations, they ascend to a zone -without air, where life is impossible; or, to speak without metaphor, -they gain universality by losing reality. There is no geometric -triangle in reality because in reality there are no straight lines, nor -right angles nor sums of right angles, nor sums of angles equal to that -of two right angles. There is no free motion in reality, because every -real motion takes place in definite conditions and therefore among -obstacles. A thought, which has as its object nothing real, is not -thought; and those concepts are not concepts but conceptual fictions.</p> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Critique of the doctrine which considers them to be -erroneous concepts,</i></div> - -<p>Having made clear, by means of these examples, the character of -concepts and of fictional concepts, we are prepared to solve the -question as to whether the second are legitimate or illegitimate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> -products, and if they merit the reproach which seems to attach to -their name. And certainly, a view which has had and still has force -does not hesitate to consider those fictions as nothing but <i>erroneous -concepts,</i> and declares a war of extermination against them, in the -name of rigorous thought and of truth. If it follows from what we have -said, that the cat or the house or the rose are not concepts, and -that the geometrical triangle or free motion are not so either, the -conclusion seems inevitable that we must free ourselves from these -errors or misconceptions, and affirm that there is neither the cat -nor the rose nor the house, but a reality all compact (although it is -continuously changing) which develops and is new at every instant; nor -is there either the triangle or free motion, but the eternal forms of -this reality, which cannot be abstracted and fixed by themselves, and -deprived of the conditions which are an integral part of them. But a -single fact suffices to invalidate this conclusion and to confute the -premiss upon which it rests, that conceptual fictions are erroneous -concepts. An error once discovered cannot reappear, at least until the -discovery is forgotten, and there is a falling back into the conditions -of mental obscurity similar to those antecedent to the discovery.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> -When, for example, the position has been attained that morality is not -a phenomenon of egoism and that it has value in itself, or one has -become certain that Hannibal was ignorant of the disaster that befell -his brother Hasdrubal on the Metaurus, it is impossible to continue -believing that morality is egoism, or that Hannibal has been informed -of the arrival of Hasdrubal and had voluntarily allowed him to be -surprised by the two Consuls. But with conceptual fictions similar to -those in the example the case is otherwise. Even when we are persuaded -that the triangle and free motion correspond to nothing real, and that -the rose, the cat, and the house have nothing precise and universal in -them, we must yet continue to make use of the fictions of triangles, of -free motion; of houses, cats, and roses. We can criticise them, and we -cannot renounce them; therefore, it is not true that they are, at least -altogether and in every sense, errors.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>or imperfect concepts preparatory to perfect concepts.</i></div> - -<p>This indispensability of conceptual fictions to the life of the spirit, -finds acknowledgment in a more temperate form of the doctrine which -considers them as erroneous concepts; that is, in the thesis that -they are erroneous, but at the same time preparatory to, and almost a -first step towards, the formation of true and proper concepts.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> The -spirit does not issue all at once from representations and attain to -the universal; it issues from them little by little, and prior to -the rigorous universal, it constructs others less rigorous, which -have the advantage of replacing the infinite representations with -their infinite shades, through which reality presents itself in -æsthetic contemplation. Conceptual fictions, then, would be sketches -of concepts, and therefore, like all sketches, capable of revision -and annulment, but useful. Thus it would be explained how they are -errors, and errors made for a good reason. But this moderate theory -also clashes noisily with the most evident facts. Above all, it is not -true that the spirit issues little by little from the representations, -passing through a series of grades; the procedure of the spirit, in -this regard, is altogether different, and when philosophers have wanted -to find a comparison for it, they have been obliged to come back to -that very 'leap' which they wanted to avoid: "Spirit (said Schelling, -for example,) is an <i>eternal island,</i> which is not to be reached from -matter, without a leap, whatever turns and twists be made." And, for -this very reason, conceptual fictions are not good passages to rigorous -concepts: to think rigorously, we must plunge ourselves again<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> into the -flood of representations and think immediate reality, clearing away the -obstacles that proceed from conceptual fictions. And always for the -same reason, rigorous concepts, when they find themselves confronted -with conceptual fictions as rivals in the same problem, do not claim -their assistance, nor correct, nor refine upon them, in order partially -to preserve them, but combat and destroy them. What the rigorous -concepts are unable to do, is to prevent the others from reappearing; -because the spirit, as has been seen, preserves, without correcting -them, although it has recognized their falsity: it preserves them, that -is to say, not fused and rendered true in the rigorous concepts, but -<i>outside and after these.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Posteriority of conceptual fictions to true and proper -concepts.</i></div> - -<p>In short, we have to abandon entirely the idea that conceptual fictions -are errors, or sketches and aids, and that they precede rigorous -concepts. Quite the opposite is true: conceptual fictions do not -precede rigorous concepts, but follow them, and presuppose them as -their own foundation. Were this not so, of what could they ever be -fictions? To counterfeit or imitate something implies first knowledge -of the thing which it is desired to counterfeit or to imitate. To -falsify means to have knowledge of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> the genuine model: false money -implies good money, not vice versa. It is possible to think that man, -from being the ingenuous poet that he first was, raised himself, -immediately, to the thought of the eternal; but it is not possible to -think that he constructed the smallest conceptual fiction, without -having previously imagined and thought. The house, the rose, the cat, -the triangle, free motion presuppose quantity, quality, existence, -and we know not how many other rigorous concepts: they are made with -iron instruments great and small, which logical thought has created, -and which come to be used with such rapidity and naturalness that we -usually end by believing that we have proceeded without them. Whoever -makes conceptual fictions, has already taken his logical bearings in -the world: he knows what he is doing and reasons about it; progress -with his conceptual fictions depending upon progress with his rigorous -concepts, and being continuously remade, according to the new needs and -the new conditions which are formed. Now that the concept of miracle -or witchcraft has been destroyed, the conceptual fictions relating -to the various classes and modes of miraculous facts and acts of -witchcraft are no longer constructed; and since the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> destruction of -the belief in the direct influence of the stars upon human destinies, -the astrological and mathematical fictions, which arose upon those -conceptual presuppositions, have also disappeared.</p> - -<p>Those who have seen errors or sketches of truth in conceptual -fictions have certainly seen something: because (without incidentally -anticipating at this point the theory of errors, or that of sketches -or aids to the search for truth) it may at once be admitted, that -conceptual fictions also sometimes become both errors and obstacles, -and suggestions and aids to truth. But because a given spiritual -product is adopted for an end different from that which rightly belongs -to it (thereby becoming itself different and giving rise to a new -spiritual product), we must not omit to search for the intrinsic end, -which constitutes the genuine nature of this product. The portrait -of a fair lady, white as milk and red as blood, which the prince of -the story finds beneath a cushion by the help of the fairy, may serve -as an incentive to make him undertake the journey round the world -in search of the woman in flesh and blood, who is like the portrait -and whom he will make his wife; but that portrait, before it is an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> -instrument in the hands of the fairy, is a picture, that is to say, a -work of art, which has come from the hands, or rather from the fancy, -of the painter; and must be appreciated as such. Thus conceptual -fictions, before they are transmuted into errors or into expedients, -into obstacles or into aids to the search for truth, have, before -them, a truth already constructed, toward the construction of which, -therefore, they cannot serve; whereas that truth has served them, for -they would not otherwise have been able to arise. They are, therefore, -intrinsically neither obstacles nor aids to truth, but something else, -that is, themselves; and what they are in themselves it is still -necessary to determine.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Practical character of conceptual fictions.</i></div> - -<p>For this purpose it is needful to direct our attention to the moment of -their formation, which, as has been said, is not at all theoretical, -but practical; and to ask ourselves in what way and with what end -the practical spirit can intervene in representations and concepts -previously produced, manipulate them and make of them conceptual -fictions. The view that the work of the practical spirit can give -rise to new knowledge, not previously attained, must be resolutely -excluded: the practical spirit is such, precisely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> because it is -non-cognitive; as regards knowledge it is altogether sterile. If, -then, it accomplishes those manipulations, and says to a cat: "You -will represent for me all cats"; or to a rose: "See, I draw you in -my treatise on botany, and you will represent all roses"; and to -the triangle: "It is true I cannot think you, nor represent you; -but I suppose that you are the same as what I draw with rule and -compass, and I make use of you to measure the approximate triangles -of reality";—in so doing, it recognizes that it does not accomplish -any act of <i>knowledge.</i> But does it, in that case, accomplish an act -of <i>anti-knowledge</i>—that is, does it make these manipulations and -fictions in order to place obstacles in the way of knowledge and to -simulate its products, so that it leads astray the seeker for truth? -If this were so, the "practical spirit" would be synonymous with -the spirit of confusion; and the contriver of conceptual fictions -would deserve the reprobation that attaches to forgers of documents, -sophists, rhetoricians, and charlatans; whereas, on the contrary, -he receives the applause and gratitude of every one. Each one of -us, at every instant, would be guilty of a plot against the truth, -because at every instant each of us forms and employs those fictions;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> -whereas the moral consciousness, delicate and intolerant though it -be, makes no reproof, but indeed offers encouragement. Therefore, the -act of forming intellectual fictions is an act neither of knowledge -nor of anti-knowledge; it is not logically rational, but neither is -it logically irrational; it is rational, indeed, but <i>practically</i> -rational.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The practical end and mnemonic utility.</i></div> - -<p>In this case the practical end in view can be but one. We know in order -to act; and he who acts is interested only in that knowledge, which is -the necessary precedent of his doing. But since our knowledge is all -destined to be recalled as occasion serves for action, or to aid us in -the search for new knowledge (which in this case is a form of acting), -the practical spirit is impelled to provide for the preservation of the -patrimony of acquired knowledge. Without doubt, speaking absolutely, -everything is preserved in reality, and nothing that has once been -done or thought, disappears from the bosom of the cosmos. But the -preservation of which we speak, is properly the making easily available -to memory, knowledge that has once been possessed, and providing for -its ready recall from the bosom of the cosmos or from the apparently -unconscious and forgotten. For this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> purpose there are constructed -those instruments, which are conceptual fictions, by means of which -armies of representations are evoked with a single word, or by which -a single word approximately indicates what form of operation must be -resorted to, in order that certain representations may be recovered. -The cat of the appropriate conceptual fiction does not enable us to -know any single cat, as a painter or a historian of cats makes us -know it; but by means of it, many images of animals, which would have -remained separate before the memory, or each one dispersed and fused in -the complete picture in which it had been imagined and perceived, are -arranged in a series and recorded as a whole. This matters little or -nothing to one who dreams as a poet or who seeks absolute truth; but it -matters a great deal to one whose house is infested by rats, and who -must employ some one to obtain a cat; and it matters not less to the -seeker for the cat, in that he has to study a new animal, and that he -must proceed in that study with some order, though it be artificial, -and though he reject the artifice in the final synthesis. Again, the -geometrical triangle is of no service either to imagination or to -thought, which are developed without it;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> but it is indispensable to -any one measuring a field, in the same way as it may possibly be of -service to a painter in his preparatory studies for a picture, or to -a historian, who wishes to know well the configuration of a piece of -ground where a battle was fought.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Persistence of conceptual fictions side by side with -concepts.</i></div> - -<p>This is the real reason why, however perfect rigorous concepts become, -conceptual fictions remain ineliminable, and indeed obtain from these -fresh nourishment. They cannot be criticized and resolved by means of -rigorous concepts, because they are of a different order from them: -they cannot act as inferior degrees of the rigorous concept, because -they presuppose it. The reason, which we were pledged to give, is -given; and henceforward there can no longer arise any misunderstanding -as to the relation of the concept to conceptual fictions. It is a -relation not of identity, nor of contrariety, but simply of diversity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Pure concepts and pseudoconcepts.</i></div> - -<p>The terminological question remains, and this, as always, has but -slight importance. "Conceptual fictions" is a manner of speech; and no -one would wish to combat manners of speech. For brevity's sake we shall -call them <i>pseudoconcepts,</i> and for the sake of clearness we shall -call the true and proper concepts <i>pure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> concepts.</i> This term seems to -us more suitable than that of <i>ideas</i> (pure concepts), as opposed to -<i>logical concepts</i> (pseudoconcepts), as they were at one time called -in the schools. It must further be noted, that the pseudoconcepts, -although the word "concept" forms part of their name, are not concepts, -they do not form a species of, nor do they compete with, concepts (save -when forcibly made to do so); and that the pure concepts have not got -the impure concepts at their side, for these are not truly concepts. -Every word offers, in some degree, a hold for misunderstanding, because -it circulates in this base world, which is full of snares; the search -for words which should absolutely prevent misunderstandings is vain, -for it would be necessary first of all to clip the wings of the human -spirit. We may prefer one word to another, according to historical -contingencies; and for our part we prefer the words <i>pseudoconcept</i> -and <i>pure concept,</i> if for no other reason than to remind the makers -of fictional concepts to be modest, and to flash above their heads the -light of the only true form of concept, which is logical nature itself -in its universality and in its severity. How can we fail to think -that the choice has been well made if this title<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> of <i>pure concept</i> -please the few, but terrify the many and irritate the most, more than -the red cloth shaken before the eyes of the bull; and if, like every -efficacious medicine, it provoke a reaction in the organism of the -patient?</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_2" id="Footnote_1_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_2"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> These relations are examined in the <i>Philosophy of the -Practical,</i> first part.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="III" id="III">III</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT</h5> - - -<p>The characteristics of the pure concept, or simply, concept, may be -gathered from what has previously been said.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Expressivity.</i></div> - -<p>The concept has the character of <i>expressivity;</i> that is to say, it is -a cognitive product, and, therefore, expressed or spoken, not a mute -act of the spirit, as is a practical act. If we wish to submit the -effective possession of a concept to a first test, we can employ the -experiment which was advised on a previous occasion:—whoever asserts -that he possesses a concept, should be invited to expound it in words, -and with other means of expression (graphic symbols and the like). If -he refuse to do so, and say that his concept is so profound that words -cannot avail to render it, we can be sure, either that he is under the -illusion of possessing a concept, when he possesses only turbid fancies -and morsels of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> ideas; or that he has a presentiment of the profound -concept, that it is in process of formation, and will be, but is not -yet, possessed. Each of us knows that when he finds himself in the -meditative depth of the internal battle, of that true <i>agony</i> (because -it is the death of one life and the birth of another), which is the -discovery of a concept, he can certainly talk of the state of his soul, -of his hopes and fears, of the rays that enlighten and of the shadows -that invade him; but he cannot yet communicate his concept, which is -not as yet, because it is not yet expressible.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Universality.</i></div> - -<p>If this character of expressivity be common to the concept and to the -representation, its <i>universality</i> is peculiar to the concept; that is -to say, its transcendence in relation to the single representations, so -that no single representation and no number of them can be equivalent -to the concept. There is no middle term between the individual and -the universal: either there is the single or there is the whole, into -which that single enters with all the singles. A concept which has been -proved not universal, is, by that very fact, confuted as a concept. -Our philosophical confutations do not proceed otherwise. Sociology, -for instance, asserts the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> concept of <i>Society,</i> as a rigorous concept -and principle of science; and the criticism of Sociology proves that -the concept of society is not universal, but individual, and is -related to the groupings of certain beings which representation has -placed before the sociologist, and which he has arbitrarily isolated -from other complexes of beings that representation also placed or -could place before him. The theory of tragedy postulates the concept -of the <i>tragic,</i> and from it deduces certain necessary essentials -of tragedy; and the criticism of literary classes demonstrates that -the tragic is not a concept, but a roughly defined group of artistic -representations, which have certain external likenesses in common; and, -therefore, that it cannot serve as foundation for any theory. On the -other hand, to establish a universality, which at first was wanting, -is the glory of truly scientific thought; hence we give the name of -discoverers to those who bring to light connections of representations -or of representative groups, or of concepts, which had previously been -separate; that is to say, who universalize them. Thus, it was thought -at one time that will and action were distinct concepts; and it was -a step in progress to identify them by the creation of the truly -universal concept of the will, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> is also action. Thus, too, it was -held that expression in language was a different thing from expression -in art; and it was an advance to universalize the expression of art by -extending it to language; or that of language by extending it to art.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Concreteness.</i></div> - -<p>Not less proper to the concept is the other character of -<i>concreteness,</i> which means that if the concept be universal and -transcendent in relation to the single representation, it is yet -immanent in the single, and therefore in all representations. The -concept is the universal in relation to the representations, and is -not exhausted in any one of them; but since the world of knowledge -is the world of representations, the concept, if it were not in the -representations, would not be anywhere: it would be in <i>another</i> world, -which cannot be thought, and therefore is not. Its transcendence, -therefore, is also immanence; like that truly literary language that -Dante desired, which, in relation to the speech of the different parts -of Italy, <i>in qualibet redolet civitate nec cubat in ulla.</i> If it is -proved of a concept that it is inapplicable to reality, and therefore -is not concrete, it is thereby confuted as a true and proper concept. -It is said to be an <i>abstraction,</i> it is not reality;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> it does not -possess <i>concreteness.</i> In this way, for example, has been confuted the -concept of spirit as different from nature (abstract spiritualism); or -of the good, as a model placed above the real world; or of atoms, as -the components of reality; or of the dimensions of space, or of various -quantities of pleasure and pain, and the like. All these are things not -found in any part of the real, since there is neither a reality that is -merely natural and external to spirit, nor an ideal world outside the -real world; nor a space of one or of two dimensions; nor a pleasure or -pain that is homogeneous with another, and therefore greater or less -than another; and for this reason all these things do not result from -concrete thinking and are not concepts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The concrete universal, and the formation of the -pseudoconcepts.</i></div> - -<p>Expressivity, universality, concreteness, are then the three -characteristics of the concept derived from the foregoing discussion. -Expressivity affirms that the concept is a cognitive act, and denies -that it is merely practical, as is maintained in various senses by -mystics, and by arbitrarists or fictionists. Universality affirms that -it is a cognitive act <i>sui generis,</i> the logical act, and denies that -it is an intuition, as is maintained by the æstheticists, or a group -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> intuitions, as is asserted in the doctrine of the arbitrarists -or fictionists. Concreteness affirms that the universal logical act -is also a thinking of reality, and denies that it can be universal -and void, universal and inexistent, as is maintained in a special -part of the doctrine of the arbitrarists. But this last point needs -explanation, which leads us to enunciate explicitly an important -division of the pseudoconcepts, which has hitherto been mentioned as -apparently incidental.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirical pseudoconcepts and abstract pseudoconcepts.</i></div> - -<p>The pseudoconcepts, falsifying the concept, cannot imitate it -scrupulously, because, if they did, they would not be pseudoconcepts, -but concepts; not imitations, but the very reality which they imitate. -An actor who, pretending on the stage to kill his rival in love, -really did so, would no longer be an actor, but a practical man and an -assassin. If, therefore, with regard to the representations, and when -preparing to form pseudoconcepts, we should think representations with -that universality which is also the concreteness proper to the true -concept, and with that transcendence which is also immanence (and is -therefore called <i>transcendentalism),</i> we should form true concepts. -This, indeed, often happens, as we can see in certain treatises which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> -mean to be empirical and arbitrary, and from which, <i>currente rota, -non urceus, sed amphora exit.</i> Their authors, led by a profound and -irrepressible philosophic sense, gradually and almost unconsciously -abandon their initial purpose, and give true and proper concepts in -place of the promised pseudoconcepts: they are philosophers, disguised -as empiricists. In order to create pseudoconcepts, we must therefore -begin by arbitrarily dividing into two the one supreme necessity of -logic, immanent transcendence, or concrete universality, and form -pseudoconcepts, which are <i>concrete</i> without being <i>universal,</i> -or <i>universal</i> without being <i>concrete.</i> There is no other way of -falsifying the concept; whoever wishes to falsify it so completely as -to render the imitation unrecognizable, does not falsify, but produces -it; he does not remain outside, but permits himself to be caught in its -coils; he does not invent a practical attitude, but thinks. That one -mode is therefore specified in two particular modes, of which examples -have already been given in our analysis of the pseudoconcepts of the -house, the cat, the rose, which are concrete without being universal; -and of the triangle and of free motion, which are universal without -being concrete. There is nothing left to do, therefore,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> but to baptize -them; selecting some of the many names that are applied, and often -applied, sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other of the two forms, -or indifferently to both, and giving to each of them a particular name, -which will be constant in this treatise. We shall then call the first, -that is to say, those which are concrete and not universal, <i>empirical</i> -pseudoconcepts; and the second, or those which are universal and not -concrete, <i>abstract</i> pseudoconcepts; or, taking as understood for -brevity's sake, the general denomination (pseudo), <i>empirical concepts</i> -and <i>abstract concepts.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The other characteristics of the pure concept.</i></div> - -<p>Thus, of the three characteristics of the concept which we have -exhibited, the second and the third constitute, as we can now see, one -only, which is stated in a double form, solely in order to deny and -to combat these two one-sided forms which we have called empirical -and abstract concepts. But, on the other hand, it is easy to see that -the characteristics of the concept are not exhausted in the two that -remain, namely, in expressivity or cognizability, and in transcendence -or concrete universality. Others can reasonably be added, such as -<i>spirituality, utility, morality,</i> but we shall not dwell upon these, -because either they belong to the general assumption<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> of Logic, that -is, to the fundamental concept of Philosophy as the science of spirit, -or they are more conveniently made clear in the other parts of this -Philosophy. The concept has the character of spirituality and not of -mechanism, because reality is spiritual, not mechanical; and for this -reason we have to reject every mechanical or associationist theory -of Logic, just as we have to reject similar doctrines in Æsthetic, -in Economic and in Ethic. A special discussion of these views seems -superfluous, because they are discussed and negated, that is to say, -surpassed, in every line of our treatise. The concept has the character -of utility, because, if the theoretic form of the spirit be distinct -from the practical, it is not less true, by the law of the unity of -the spirit, that to think is also an act of the will, and therefore, -like every act of the will, it is teleological, not antiteleological; -useful, not useless. And, finally, it has the character of morality, -because its utility is not merely individual, but, on the contrary, -is subordinated to and absorbed in the moral activity of the spirit; -so that to think, that is, to seek and find the true, is also to -collaborate in progress, in the elevation of Humanity and Reality, it -is the denial and overcoming of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> oneself as a single individual, and -the service of God.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The origin of the multiplicity and unity of character of -the concept.</i></div> - -<p>Certainly, the form in which the order of our discourse has led us to -establish the characters of the concept—that of enumeration, the one -character being connected with the other by means of an "also"—is, -logically, a very crude form, and must be refined and corrected. Above -all, if we have spoken of <i>characters</i> of the concept, we have done so -in order to adhere to the usual mode of expression. The concept cannot -have characters, in the plural, but <i>character,</i> that one character -which is proper to it. What this is has been seen; the concept is -concrete-universal two words which designate one thing only, and can -also grammatically become one: "transcendental," or whatever other word -be chosen from those already coined, or that may be coined for the -occasion. The other determinations are not <i>characters</i> of the concept, -but affirm its <i>relations</i> with the spiritual activity in general, -of which it is a special form, and with the other special forms of -this activity. In the first relation, the concept is spiritual; in -relation with the æsthetic activity, it is cognitive or expressive, -and enters into the general theoretic-expressive form; in relation -with the practical activity, it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> not, as concept, either useful or -moral, but as a concrete act of the spirit it must be called useful -and moral. The exposition of the characters of the concept, correctly -thought, resolves itself into the compendious exposition of the whole -Philosophy of spirit, in which the concept takes its place in its -unique character, that is to say, in itself.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Objections relating to the unreality of the pure concept -and to the impossibility of demonstrating it.</i></div> - -<p>This declaration may save us from the accusation of having given an -empirical exposition of the non-empirical <i>Concept of the concept,</i> and -so committing an error for which logicians are justly reproved (for -they have often believed themselves to possess the right of treating -of Logic without logic; perhaps for the same reason that custodians of -sacred places are wont, through over-familiarity, to fail in respect -towards them). But it lays us open to censure very much more severe; -which, if it ultimately prove to be inoffensive, is certainly very -noisy and loquacious. The pretended characters of the concepts (it -is said) are, by your own confession, nothing but its relations with -the other forms of the spirit; and the one character proper to it is -that of universality-concreteness, that is, of being itself, since the -"concrete-universal" is synonymous with the concept, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> <i>vice versa.</i> -So it turns out that in spite of all your efforts, your concept of the -concept becomes dissipated in a tautology. Give us a demonstration -of what you affirm, or a definition which is not tautologous; then -we shall be able to form some sort of an idea of your pure concept. -Otherwise you may talk about it for ever, but for us it will always be -like "Phœnician Araby" of Metastasian memory: "you say <i>that it is; -where it is,</i> no one knows."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Prejudice relating to the nature of demonstration.</i></div> - - -<p>Beneath such dissatisfaction and the claim it implies, we find first -of all a prejudice of scholastic origin concerning what is called -<i>demonstration.</i> That is to say, it is imagined that demonstration -is like an irresistible contrivance, which grasps the learner by the -neck and drags him willy-nilly, whither he does not and the teacher -does will to go, leaving him open-mouthed before the truth, which -stands external to him, and before which he must, <i>obtorto collo,</i> bow -himself. But such coercive demonstrations do not exist for any form -of knowledge—indeed, for any form of spiritual life—nor is there a -truth outside our spirit. Not that truth presupposes <i>faith,</i> as is -often said, so that rationality is subordinated to some unknown form of -irrationality; but <i>truth is faith,</i> trust in oneself, certainty<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> of -oneself, free development of one's inner powers. The light is in us; -those sequences of sounds, which are the so-called demonstration, serve -only as aids in discarding the veils and directing the gaze; but in -themselves they have no power to open the eyes of those who obstinately -wish to keep them closed. Faced with this sort of reluctance and -rebellion, the pedagogues of the good old days had recourse, as we -know, not to demonstrations, but to the stool of penitence and to the -stick; so fully were they persuaded that the demonstration of truth -requires good dispositions, <i>i.e.</i> requires those who are disposed to -fall back upon themselves and to look into themselves. How can the -beauty of the song of Farinata be demonstrated to one who denies it, -and will neither appreciate the soul contained in that sublime poem, -nor accomplish the work necessary to attain to the possibility of such -an appreciation, nor will, on the other hand, humbly confess his own -incapacity and lack of preparation,—how can we forcibly demonstrate -to him that that song is beautiful? The critical wisdom of Francesco -de Sanctis would be disarmed and impotent before such a situation. -How can we demonstrate to one who deliberately refuses to believe -in any authority or document, and breaks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> the tradition by which -we are bound to the past, that Miltiades conquered at Marathon, or -that Demosthenes strove all his life against the power of Macedonia? -He will capriciously throw doubt on the pages of Herodotus and the -orations of Demosthenes; and no reasoning will be able to repress -that caprice. What more can be said? Even in arithmetic, for which -calculating machines exist, compulsory demonstration is impossible. -In vain you will lift two fingers of the hand, and then the third -and the fourth, in order to demonstrate to one who does not wish for -demonstration that two and two are four; he will reply that he is not -convinced. And indeed he cannot be convinced, if he do not accomplish -that inner spiritual synthesis by which twice two" and four reveal -themselves as two names of one and the same thing. Therefore, he -who awaits a compelling demonstration of the existence of the pure -concept, awaits in vain. For our part, we cannot give him anything -but that which we are giving: a discourse, directed towards making -clear the difficulties, and towards demonstrating how, by means of -the pure concept, all problems concerning the life of the spirit are -illuminated, and how, without it, we cannot understand anything.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Prejudice concerning the representability of the concept.</i></div> - -<p>But another prejudice, perhaps yet more tenacious than the first, -accompanies this extravagant idea about demonstration. Accustomed as -men are to move among things, to see, to hear, to touch them, while -hardly or only fugitively reflecting upon the spiritual processes which -produce that vision, hearing and touching; when they come to treat of a -philosophic question, and to conceive a concept (and especially when it -is necessary to conceive precisely the concept of the concept), they do -not know how to refrain from demanding just that which they have been -obliged to renounce in their new search, and which they have already -renounced, owing to the very fact of their having entered into it: the -representative element, something that they can see, hear and touch. It -is almost as though a novice, on entering a monastery, and having just -pronounced the solemn vow of chastity, should ask, as his first request -upon taking possession of his cell, for the woman who is to be his -companion in that life. He will be answered that in such a place his -spouse cannot be anything but an ideal spouse, holy Religion or holy -Mother Church.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Protests of the philosophers against this prejudice.</i></div> - -<p>All philosophers have been compelled to protest against the request, -which they have had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> addressed to them, for an impossible external -demonstration and for something representative in a field where -representation has been surpassed. "In our system (said Fichte) we -must <i>ourselves</i> lay the <i>foundation</i> of our own philosophy, and -consequently that system must seem to be without foundation to one -who is incapable of accomplishing that act. But he may be assured -beforehand that he will never find a foundation elsewhere, if he do -not lay such an one for himself, or remain not satisfied with it. -It is fitting that our philosophy should proclaim this in a loud -voice, in order that it may be spared the pretence of demonstrating -to mankind from <i>without</i> what they must create in themselves."<a name="FNanchor_1_3" id="FNanchor_1_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_3" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -Schelling appropriately compared philosophic obtuseness with æsthetic -obtuseness: "There are two only ways out of common reality. Poetry, -which transports you into an ideal world, and Philosophy, which makes -<i>the real world disappear altogether from our sight.</i> One does not see -why the sense for Philosophy should be more generally diffused than -that for Poetry."<a name="FNanchor_2_4" id="FNanchor_2_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_4" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> And Hegel, giving explanations which precisely -meet the present case, says: "What is called the <i>incomprehensibility</i> -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> Philosophy, arises, in part, from an incapacity (in itself only -a lack of habit) to think abstractly, that is to say, to hold pure -thoughts firmly before the spirit and to move in them. In our ordinary -consciousness, thoughts are clothed in and united with ordinary -sensible and spiritual matter; and in our rethinking, reflecting and -reasoning we mingle sentiments, intuitions and representations with -thoughts: in every proposition whose content is entirely sensible (for -example: this leaf is green) there are already mingled categories, -such as being and individuality. But it is quite another thing to -take as our object thoughts by themselves, without any admixture. -The other reason for its incomprehensibility is the impatience which -demands to have before it as representation that which in consciousness -appears only as thought and concept. And we hear people say that they -do not know what there is <i>to think</i> in a concept, which is already -apprehended; whereas <i>in a concept there is nothing to be thought -but the concept itself.</i> But the meaning of this saying is just that -they want a familiar and ordinary <i>representation.</i> It seems to -consciousness as if, with the removal from it of the representation, -the ground had been removed which was its firm and habitual support. -When transported into the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> pure region of the concepts, it no longer -knows <i>what world it is in.</i> For this reason, those writers, preachers -and orators are esteemed marvels of <i>comprehensibility</i> who offer their -readers or hearers things which they already know thoroughly, things -which are familiar to them and which are self-evident."<a name="FNanchor_3_5" id="FNanchor_3_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_5" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Reason for their perpetual recurrence.</i></div> - -<p>Thus have all philosophers protested, and thus will all protest still, -from age to age, because that intolerance, that immobility, that -recalcitrance before the very painful effort of having to abandon -the world of sense (though but for a single instant, and in order -to reconquer and to possess it more completely) will perpetually be -renewed. They are the birth-pangs of the Concept, to escape which no -plans for virginity and no manoeuvres to procure abortion are of any -avail. They must be endured, because that law of the Concept ("thou -shalt bring forth in suffering") is also a law of life.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_3" id="Footnote_1_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_3"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>System de Sittenlehre</i> (in <i>Sämmtl. Werke</i>), iv. p. 26.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_4" id="Footnote_2_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_4"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Idealismo transcendentale,</i> trad. Losacco, p. 19.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_5" id="Footnote_3_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_5"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Encyclopædia,</i> Croce's translation, § 3, Observations.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IV" id="IV">IV</a></h4> - - -<h5>DISPUTES AS TO THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Disputes of materialistic origin.</i></div> - -<p>Disputes as to the nature of the concept have sometimes had their -origin (notably in the recent period of philosophic barbarism, -which "renews the fear of thought," whence we have with difficulty -emerged) in materialistic, mechanical and naturalistic prejudices. -Therefore, as already mentioned, discussion has arisen as to whether -the concept should be considered logical or psychological, as the -product of synthesis or of association, or of individual or hereditary -association. But these are controversies which, for the reasons we gave -before, we shall not spend time in illustrating.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The concept as value.</i></div> - -<p>Nor shall we pay attention to the other controversy, as to whether -concepts are <i>values or facts,</i> whether they operate only as <i>norms</i> or -also as <i>effective forces</i> of the real; because the division between -values and facts, between norms and effective existence (between -<i>Gelten</i> and <i>Sein,</i> as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> it is expressed in German terminology), is -itself surpassed and unified, implicitly and explicitly, in all our -philosophy. If the concept or thought has value, it can have value -only because it <i>is;</i> if the norm of thought operate as a norm, that -implies that it is thought itself, its own norm, a constitutive element -of reality. There is not to be found in any form of spiritual life any -value which is not also reality—not in art, where there is no other -beauty than art itself; nor in morality, where no other goodness is -known than action itself directed to the universal; nor in the life of -thought. The concept has value, because it is; and is, because it has -value.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Realism and nominalism.</i></div> - -<p>But the greater part of these dissensions, which have existed for -centuries and are yet living, rests on the confusion between concepts -and pseudoconcepts, and the consequent pretension to define the concept -by denying one or other of these two forms. This is the origin of -the two opposite schools of <i>realists</i> and <i>nominalists,</i> which are -also called in our times rationalists and empiricists (arbitrarists, -conventionalists, hedonists). The realists maintain that concepts -are real: that they correspond to reality; the nominalists, that -they are simple names to designate representations and groups of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> -representations, or, as is now said, tickets and labels placed upon -things in order to recognize and find them again. In the former case, -no elaboration of representations higher than the universalizing act -of the concept is possible; in the latter, the only possible operation -is that which has already been described—mutilation, reduction and -fiction, directed to practical ends.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Critique of both.</i></div> - -<p>The consequence of these one-sided affirmations has been that the -realists have defined as concepts, and therefore as having a universal -character, all sorts of rough pseudoconcepts; not only the horse, the -artichoke and the mountain, but also, logically, the table, the bed, -the seat, the glass, and so on; and they have exposed themselves from -the earliest beginnings of philosophy to the sarcastic and irresistible -objection that the horse exists, but not horsiness, the table, but not -tabularity. This conceptualization of pseudoconcepts is the error of -which they have really been guilty, not that of conferring empirical -reality on the concepts by placing them as single things alongside -of other things, an extravagance which it is doubtful if any man of -moderate sense has ever seriously committed. The realists who rendered -the concepts real in this sense at the same time rendered them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> unreal, -that is to say, single and contingent, and in need of being surpassed -by true concepts. The nominalists, on the other hand, considered as -arbitrary and mere names all the presuppositions of their mental -life—being and becoming, quality and final cause, goodness and beauty, -the true and the false, the Spirit and God. Without being aware of it, -they have fallen into inextricable contradictions and into logical -scepticism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>True realism.</i></div> - -<p>It is henceforth clear that this secular dispute cannot be decided in -favour of one or other of the contending parties, for both are right in -what they affirm and wrong in what they deny, that is, both are right -and wrong. The two forms of spiritual products, of which each of those -schools in its affirmations emphasizes only one, both actually exist; -the one is not in antithesis to the other, as the rational is to the -irrational. The true doctrine of the concept is realism, which does -not deny nominalism, but puts it in its place, and establishes with it -loyal and unequivocal relations.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Solution of other difficulties concerning the genesis of -concepts.</i></div> - -<p>By establishing such relations we emerge from the vicious circle, -which has given such trouble to certain logicians, who have striven -to explain the genesis of the concepts in terms of nominalism, but -were afterwards, when probing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> their doctrine to the bottom, compelled -to admit the <i>necessity of the concepts</i> as a <i>foundation</i> for the -<i>genesis of the concepts.</i> They believed that they had got out of -the difficulty by distinguishing two orders of concepts, primary and -secondary, formative models and formations according to models; and -they thus reproduced, in the semblance of a solution, the problem still -unsolved. In different words, others admitted the same embarrassment. -They attempted to obtain the concepts from <i>experience,</i> but -recognized at the same time that all experience presupposes an <i>ideal -anticipation.</i> Or they declared that the concept fixes the <i>essential</i> -characters of things, and, at the same time, that the essential -characters of things are indispensable for fixing the <i>concept.</i> Or, -finally, they based the formation of concepts upon <i>categories,</i> which, -enumerated and understood as they understood them, were by no means -categories and functions, but <i>concepts.</i> Primary concepts, formative -models, ideal anticipations, essential concepts, concept-categories, -and the like, are nothing but verbal variants of the pure concepts; -the necessary presupposition, as we know, for the impure concepts or -pseudoconcepts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Disputes arising from neglect of the distinction between -empirical and abstract concepts.</i></div> - -<p>Other disputes, far enough apart in significance and nature, concerning -the nature of the concept,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> acquire a more precise meaning when -referred to our subdivision of pseudoconcepts into <i>empirical</i> or -<i>representative,</i> and <i>abstract.</i> Thereby we can understand why it -has been asked if the concepts are <i>concrete</i> or <i>abstract, general</i> -or <i>universal, contingent</i> or <i>necessary, approximate</i> or <i>rigorous;</i> -if they are obtained <i>a posteriori</i> or <i>a priori,</i> by <i>induction</i> or -<i>deduction,</i> by <i>synthesis</i> or <i>analysis,</i> and so on. This series -of disputes likewise cannot be settled, save by admitting that both -contending parties are right and wrong, and demonstrating that -pseudoconcepts (which are alone here in discussion) are constructed -by analysis, and by deduction are <i>a priori,</i> and have the characters -of abstractness, rigorousness, universality and necessity, if it be -a question of <i>abstract</i> pseudoconcepts, that is to say, of empty -fictions, outside experience; while, on the other hand, they are -constructed by synthesis, and by induction are <i>a posteriori,</i> and have -the characters of concreteness, approximation, mere generality and -contingency, if they be empirical or <i>representative</i> pseudoconcepts, -that is to say, groups of representations, which do not go beyond -representation and experience. Indeed, from this last point of view, no -error was made in denying any difference between the (representative)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> -<i>concept</i> and the <i>general representation.</i> It is false that this -latter is the result of psychical mechanism or association, and the -former of psychical purpose, because there is nothing mechanical in -the spirit; and the general representation, if it is a product of the -spirit, is as teleological as the other, indeed is absolutely one with -the other. It obeys, like it, the law of <i>economy,</i> or, as we have -shown, the practical ends of convenience and utility.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Crossing of the various disputes.</i></div> - -<p>But these last disputes have crossed with that which we first examined -between realism and nominalism, and have sometimes taken on the same -meaning. This must be kept in mind, to serve as a guide in the dense -forest. Is the concept <i>a priori</i> or <i>a posteriori,</i> universal or -general, necessary or contingent? These questions and others like them -were sometimes understood as equivalent to the question: is it real or -nominal, truth or fiction?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Other logical disputes.</i></div> - -<p>Certain problems of Logic, not yet solved in a satisfactory manner, -arise from the failure to make clear the confusion between concepts -and pseudoconcepts, and between empirical and abstract concepts. -Is it or is it not true that every concept must have an individual -representation, taken from its own sphere, as a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> necessary <i>support</i>? -Are concepts of <i>things</i> possible, or is there a special concept -corresponding to every thing? Is a concept of the <i>individual</i> -possible? These three questions may be answered in the affirmative, in -the negative, and in the affirmative-negative, according as they are -referred to the empirical concept, the abstract concept, or the pure -concept.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The representative accompaniment of the concept.</i></div> - -<p>For, if we consider the first question, we must resolutely deny that -the abstract concept has any need of a particular representation as its -necessary support. The geometric triangle, as such, is neither white -nor black, nor of any given size; if the representation of a particular -triangle unites itself to it, geometry discards it. But we must just -as resolutely affirm than an empirical or representative concept has -always an image to support it; the concept of a cat needs the image of -a cat, and every book on zoology is accompanied with illustrations. -The image may be varied, but never suppressed; and it may be varied -only within certain limits, because, if these be exceeded, the concept -itself loses its form and is dissipated. Thus, for the concept of the -cat, we could frame a representation of a white or black or red cat, or -a small or big one; but if scarlet colour or the size of an elephant -be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> attributed to the cat, which serves as symbol of the fiction, the -concept must be changed. That concept has at its command the images -of cats, upon which it has been formed, which, as we know, are always -finite in number. Finally, with reference to the pure concept, it must -be said that every image and no image is in turn a symbol of it; as -every blade of grass (as Vanini said) represents God, and a number of -images, however great it be, does not suffice to represent Him.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The concept of the thing and the concept of the -individual.</i></div> - -<p>In like manner, as regards the second question, it must be answered -that the empirical concept is nothing but a concept of things, or a -grouping of a certain number of things beneath one or other of them, -which functions as a type; that the abstract concept is by definition, -the not-thing, incapable of representation; and that the pure concept -is a concept of every thing and of no thing. And as regards the third, -we must answer that the abstract concept is altogether repugnant to -individuality; the pure concept alights upon every individual, only -to leave it again, and in so far as it thinks all individual things, -it renders them all, in a certain way, concepts, and in so far as it -surpasses them, it denies them as such; while the empirical concept<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> -can be the <i>concept of the individual.</i> Because if in reality, the -individual be the situation of the universal spirit at a determinate -instant, empirically considered the individual becomes something -isolated, cut off from the rest and shut up in itself, so that it is -possible to attribute to it a certain constancy in relation to the -occurrences of the life it lives; so that that life assumes almost the -position of the individual determinations of a concept. Socrates is the -life of Socrates, inseparable from all the life of the time in which he -developed; but empirically and usefully we can construct the concept of -a Socrates a controversialist, an educator, endowed with imperturbable -calm, of which the Socrates who ate and drank and wore clothes, and -lived during such and such occurrences, is the incarnation. Thus we can -form pseudoconcepts of individuals as well as of things, or, to express -it in terms that are the fashion, we can form <i>Platonic ideas</i> of them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Reasons, laws, and causes.</i></div> - -<p>It is also well to note that to adduce the <i>reasons,</i> the <i>laws,</i> -the <i>causes</i> of things and of reality, is equivalent to establishing -concepts, and since the word "concepts" has been applied in turn to -pure and to empirical and abstract concepts, laws and causes have been -alternately described as truths and as fictions. It belongs<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> to the -discussion of terminology to remark that in general the word "reason" -has been used only for researches into pure and abstract concepts, -"cause" for empirical concepts, and "laws" almost equally for all -three, but perhaps a little more for empirical and abstract than for -pure concepts. But to the confusion of these three forms of spiritual -products is to be attributed the fact that there have been discussions, -as, for instance, whether there be <i>concepts of laws</i> in addition to -concepts of things, the issue of which was at bottom the desire to -ascertain whether there exist abstract and pure concepts, in addition -to empirical concepts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intellect and Reason.</i></div> - -<p>The profound diversity of the concepts and of the pseudoconcepts -suggested (at the time when it was customary to represent the forms -or grades of the spirit as faculties) the distinction between two -logical faculties, which were called <i>Intellect</i> (or, also, <i>abstract</i> -Intellect), and <i>Reason.</i> The first of these formed what we now call -pseudoconcepts; the second, pure concepts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The abstract intellect and its practical nature.</i></div> - -<p>But the proper character of neither of the two faculties was realized -by those who postulated them; they fell into the error, which we have -already had occasion to criticize, of conceiving the Intellect as a -form of knowledge, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> either lives in the false, or is limited to -preparing the material for the superior faculty, to which it supplies -a first imperfect sketch of the concept. But the faculty required -for this should be, not of a theoretical nature, but of a practical. -It is a terminological question of slight interest, whether the name -"Intellect" should be retained for the production of pseudoconcepts, -or whether the purely theoretic meaning, which it first had, should be -restored to it, and it should thus be made synonymous with "Reason." -It can only be observed that it will be very difficult to remove -henceforth from "Intellect," from "intellectual formations," and from -"intellectualism," the suspicion and discredit cast upon them by the -great philosophic history of the first half of the nineteenth century; -so much so, that only where a rather popular style is employed, can -Intellect and Reason be used promiscuously.</p> - -<p>With greater truth, Reason was considered as unifying what the -Intellect had divided, and therefore as unifying abstraction and -concreteness, deduction and induction, analysis and synthesis. With -greater truth, although complete exactness would have demanded here, -not so much that to Reason should be given the power of unifying -what has been unduly divided, as that to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> Intellect, that is to -say, to the practical faculty, should be given the power of dividing -extrinsically what for Reason is never divided: a power which the -Intellect, as a practical faculty, possesses and exercises, not in a -pathological, but in a physiological way.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The synthesis of theoretic and practical, and the -intellectual intuition.</i></div> - -<p>The incomplete survey of the so-called Intellect, the theoretic -character of which was preserved, though in a depreciatory sense, -issued in the result that finally to Reason itself was attributed a -character, no longer theoretic, or rather, <i>more than theoretic.</i> -Knowledge, presenting itself in the form of Intellect, seemed -inadequate to truth; to attain to which there intervened Reason, or -speculative procedure, the <i>synthesis of theory and practice,</i> a -knowledge which is action, and an action which is knowledge. Sometimes, -Reason itself, thus transfigured, seemed insufficient, owing to -the presence of ratiocinative processes, which came to it from the -Intellect, and were absorbed by it; and the supreme faculty of truth -was conceived, not as logical reasoning, but as intuition; an intuition -differing from the purely artistic and revealing the genuine truth, -an organ of the absolute, <i>intellectual Intuition.</i> It was urged -against intellectual intuition that it created irresponsibility<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> in -the field of truth, and made lawful every individual caprice. But a -similar objection could be brought against Reason, which is superior to -knowledge, and is the synthesis of theory and practice: while, on the -other hand, it cannot be denied, both of intellectual Intuition and of -Reason, that on the whole they affirmed or tended to affirm <i>the rights -of the pure Concept,</i> as opposed to empirical and abstract concepts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Uniqueness of thought.</i></div> - -<p>For our part, we have no need to lower the cognitive activity beneath -the level of truth, by attributing to it an intellectualiste and -arbitrary function; nor, on the other hand (in order to supplement -knowledge and intellect thus pauperized), to exalt Reason above -itself. Thought (call it Intellect, or Reason, or what you will) is -always thought; and it always thinks with pure concepts, never with -pseudoconcepts. And since there is not another thought beneath thought, -so there is not another thought superior to it. The difficulties -which led to these conclusions have been completely explained, when -we have distinguished concepts from pseudoconcepts, and demonstrated -the heterogeneity which exists between these two forms of spiritual -products.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="V" id="V">V</a></h4> - -<h5>CRITIQUE OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE CONCEPTS AND THEORY OF DISTINCTION AND -DEFINITION</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept.</i></div> - - -<p>Precisely because they are heterogeneous formations, pure concepts and -pseudoconcepts do not constitute divisions of the generic concept of -the concept. To assume that they did, would be a horrible confusion of -terms, not far different (to use Spinoza's example) from that of the -division of the dog into <i>animal</i> dog and <i>constellation</i> dog; though -poets used at one time to talk of the celestial dog also, as "barking -and biting," when the sun implacably burned the fields.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Obscurity, clearness and distinction, not subdivisions of -the concept.</i></div> - -<p>And seeing that our point of view is philosophic, we can take no -account of another division of the concept, which had great fame -and authority in the past: that into <i>obscure, confused, clear</i> and -<i>distinct</i> concepts and the like, or of the degrees of <i>perfection</i> to -which the concept attains. Such a division can retain at the most but -an empirical and approximate value,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> and under this aspect it will be -difficult altogether to renounce it in ordinary discourse; but it has -no logical and philosophic value whatever. The concept is what is truly -concept, the perfect concept, not at all the encumbered or wandering -tendency toward it. Yet that division had great historical importance. -By means of it, indeed, the attempt was made to differentiate the -concept, under the name of <i>clear</i> and <i>distinct</i> thought, from the -intuition, which was <i>clear</i> but <i>confused</i> thought, and both of these -from sensation, impression, or emotion, which was called <i>obscure.</i> -This was attempted, but without success; the problem was set but not -solved; for the solution was only attained when it was seen that, -in this case, it was not a question of three degrees of thought, as -absolute logic claimed, but of three forms of the spirit: of thought -or <i>distinction,</i> of intuition <i>ox clearness</i>; and of the practical -activity, <i>obscurity</i> or <i>naturality.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Non-existence of subdivisions of the concept as a logic at -form.</i></div> - -<p>Logically, the concept does not give rise to distinctions, for there -are not several forms of concept, but one only. This is a perfectly -analogous result in Logic to that which we reached in Æsthetic, when -we established the uniqueness of intuition or expression, and the -non-existence of special modes or classes of expressions (except -in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> empirical sense, in which we can always establish as many -classes as we wish). In distinguishing the forms of the spirit, the -two principal forms, theoretic and practical, having been divided, -and the theoretic having been subdivided into intuition and concept, -there is no place for a further subdivision of the theoretic forms, -since intuition and concept are each of them indivisible forms. The -reason for this indivisibility cannot be clearly understood, save by -the complete development of the Philosophy of the spirit; and it is -only to be remarked here in passing, that the division of intuition -and concept has as its foundation the distinction between individual -and universal. And since in this distinction there is no <i>medium quid</i> -nor an <i>ulterius,</i> a third or fourth intermediate form, so there is no -subdivision; since we pass from the concept of individuality to single -individuality, which is not a concept, and from the concept of the -concept to the single act of thought, which is no longer the simple -definition of logical thinking, but effective logical thinking itself.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The distinctions of the concept not logical, but real.</i></div> - -<p>Since all subdivision of the logical form of the concept has been -excluded, the multiplicity of concepts can be referred only to the -variety of the objects, which are thought in the logical form of the -concept. The concept of <i>goodness</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> is not that of <i>beauty</i>; or rather, -both are logically the same thing, since both are logical form; but the -aspect of reality designated by the first is not the same aspect of -reality as is designated by the second.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Multiplicity of the concepts, and the logical difficulty -arising therefrom. Necessity of overcoming it.</i></div> - -<p>But here arises the difficulty. How can it be that since in the concept -we deal with reality, in its universal aspect, we yet obtain so many -various forms of reality, that is, so many distinct concepts (for -example, passion, will, morality, imagination, thought, and so on), so -many <i>universals,</i> whereas the concept should give us <i>the universal.</i> -If this variety were not overcome or capable of being overcome by the -concept, we should have to conclude that the true universal is not -attainable by thought, and to return to scepticism, or at least to -that peculiar form of logical scepticism which makes the consciousness -of unity an act of the inner life, which cannot be stated in terms of -logic; that is, mysticism. The distinction of the concepts, one from -another, in the absence of unity, is separation and atomism; and it -would certainly not be worth while getting out of the multiplicity of -representations if we were then to fall into that of the concepts. -For this, no less than the other, would issue in a <i>progressus ad -infinitum,</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> for who would ever be able to affirm that the concepts -which were discovered and enumerated were all the concepts? If they be -ten, why should they not be, if better observed, twenty, a hundred, or -fifty thousand? Why, indeed, should they not be just as numerous as -the representations, that is to say, infinite? Spinoza, who counted, -without mediating between them, two attributes of substance, thought -and extension, admitted, with perfect coherence, that two are known to -us, but that the attributes of Substance must in reality be considered -infinite in number.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of eliminating it.</i></div> - -<p>The concept, then, demands that this multiplicity be denied; and we -can affirm that the real is one, because the concept, by means of -which alone we know it, is one; the content is one, because the form -of thought is one. But in accepting this claim, we run into another -difficulty. If we jettison distinction, the unity that we attain is -an empty unity, deprived of organic character, a whole without parts, -a simple <i>beyond</i> the representations, and therefore inexpressible -so that we should return to mysticism by another route. A whole is a -whole, only because and in so far as it has parts, indeed <i>is</i> parts; -an organism is such, because it has and is organs and functions; a -unity is thinkable only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> in so far as it has distinctions in itself, -and is the unity of the distinctions. Unity without distinction is as -repugnant to thought as distinction without unity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Unify as distinction.</i></div> - -<p>It follows, therefore, that both terms are reciprocally indispensable, -and that the distinctions of the concept are not the negation of the -concept, nor something outside the concept, but the concept itself, -understood in its truth; the <i>one-distinct;</i> one, only because -distinct, and distinct only because one. Unity and distinction are -correlative and therefore inseparable.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Inadequateness of the numerical concept of multiplicity.</i></div> - -<p>The distinct concepts, constituting in their distinction unity, cannot, -above all, be infinite in number, for in that case they would be -equivalent to the representations. Not indeed that they are finite in -number, as if they were all alike equally arranged upon one and the -same plane, and capable of being placed in any other sort of order, -without alteration in their being. The <i>Beautiful,</i> the <i>True,</i> the -<i>Useful,</i> the <i>Good,</i> are not the first steps in a numerical series, -nor do they permit themselves to be arranged at pleasure, so that we -may place the beautiful after the true, or the good before the useful, -or the useful before the true, and so on. They have a necessary order, -and mutually imply<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> one another; and from this we learn that they are -not to be described as finite in number, since number is altogether -incapable of expressing such a relation. To count implies having -objects separate from one another before us; and here, on the contrary, -we have terms that are distinct, but inseparable, of which the second -is not only second, but, in a certain sense, also first, and the first -not only first, but, in a certain way, also second. We cannot dispense -with numbers, when treating of these concepts of the spirit, owing to -their convenience for handling the subject; hence we talk, for example, -of the <i>ten</i> categories, or of the <i>three</i> terms of the concept, or of -the <i>four</i> forms of the spirit. But in this case the numbers are mere -<i>symbols</i>; and we must beware of understanding the objects which they -enumerate, as though they were ten sheep, three oxen, and four cows.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Relation of the distinct concepts as ideal history.</i></div> - -<p>This relation of the distinct concepts in the unity which they -constitute, can be compared to the spectacle of life, in which every -fact is in relation with all other facts, and the fact which comes -after is certainly different from that which precedes, but is also the -same; since the consequent fact contains in itself the preceding, as, -in a certain sense, the preceding virtually<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> contained the consequent, -and was what it was, just because it possessed the power of producing -the consequent. This is called <i>history</i>; and therefore (continuing -to develop the comparison) the relation of the concepts, which are -distinct in the unity of the concept, can be called and has been called -<i>ideal history</i>; and the logical theory of such ideal history has been -regarded as the theory of the <i>degrees of the concept,</i> just as real -history is conceived as a series of <i>degrees of civilization.</i> And -since the theory of the degrees of the concept is the theory of its -distinction, and its distinction is not different from its unity, it -is clear that this theory can be separated from the general doctrine -of the concept with which it is substantially one, only with a view to -greater facility of exposition.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction between ideal and real history.</i></div> - -<p>Metaphors and comparisons are metaphors and comparisons and (like all -forms of language) their effectiveness for the purposes of dissertation -is accompanied, as we know, by the danger of misunderstanding. In order -to avoid this, without at the same time renouncing the convenience of -such modes of expression, it will be well to insist that the historical -series, where the distinct concepts appear connected, is <i>ideal,</i> and -therefore outside space and time, and eternal; so that it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> would be -erroneous to conceive that in any smallest fragment of reality, or in -any most fugitive instant of it, one degree is found without the other, -the first without the second, or the first and the second without -the third. Here too, we must allow for the exigencies of exposition, -whereby, sometimes, when we intend to emphasize the distinction, we -are led to speak of the relation of one degree to another, as if they -were distinct existences; as if the practical man really existed side -by side with the theoretic man, or the poet side by side with the -philosopher, or as if the work of Art stood separate from the labour -of reflection, and so on. But if a particular historical fact can in -a certain sense be considered as essentially distinct in time and -space, the grades of the concept are not existentially, temporally, and -spatially distinct.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Ideal and abstract distinction.</i></div> - -<p>An opposite, but not less serious error, would be to conceive the -grades of the concept as distinct only <i>abstractly,</i> thus making -abstract concepts of distinct concepts. The abstract distinction -is unreal; and that of the concept is real; and the reality of the -distinction (since here we are dealing with the concept) is precisely -<i>ideality,</i> not <i>abstraction.</i> The universal, and therefore also all -the forms of the universal, are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> found in every minutest fragment of -life, in the so-called physical atom of the physicists, or in the -psychical atom of the psychologists; the concept is therefore all -distinct concepts. But <i>each one of them is, as it were, distinct -in that union</i>; and in the same way as man is man, in so far as he -affirms all his activities and his entire humanity, and yet cannot -do this, save by specializing as a scientific man, a politician, a -poet, and so on. In the same way the thinker, when thinking reality, -can think it only in its distinct aspects, and in this way only he -thinks it in its unity. A work of Art and a philosophical work, an -act of thought or of will, cannot be taken up in the hand or pointed -out with the finger; and it can be affirmed only in a practical and -approximate sense that this book is poetry, and that philosophy, -that this movement is a theoretic or practical, a utilitarian or a -moral act. It is well understood that this book is also philosophy; -and that it is also a practical act; just as that useful act is also -moral, and also theoretic; and <i>vice versa.</i> But to think a certain -intuitive datum and to recognize it as an affirmation of the whole -spirit, is not possible save by thinking its different aspects -distinctly. This renders possible, for example, a criticism of Art,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> -conducted exclusively from the point of view of Art; or a philosophical -criticism, from the exclusive point of view of philosophy; or a moral -judgment, which considers exclusively the moral initiative of the -individual, and so on. And therefore, here as in the preceding case, -it is needful to guard against forcing the comparison with history -too far, and conceiving, in history, the possibility of divisions as -rigorous as in the concept. If distinct concepts be not <i>existences,</i> -existences are not <i>distinct</i> concepts; a fact cannot be placed in the -same relation to another fact, as one grade of the concept to another, -precisely because in every fact there are all the determinations of the -concept, and a fact in relation to another fact is not a conceptual -determination.</p> - -<p>Certainly <i>distinct</i> concepts can become <i>simple abstractions</i>; but -this only happens when they are taken in an abstract way, and so -separated from one another, co-ordinated and made parallel, by means of -an arbitrary operation, which can be applied even to the pure concepts. -The distinct concepts then become changed into <i>pseudoconcepts,</i> and -the character of abstraction belongs to these last, not to the distinct -concepts as such, which are always at once distinct and united.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Other usual distinctions of the concept, and their meaning, -identicals, disparates, primitives, and derivatives, etc.</i></div> - -<p>This is not the place to dwell upon the other forms of concepts met -with in Logic, known as <i>identical</i> concepts, which cannot be anything -but synonyms, or words;—or upon <i>disparate</i> concepts, which are simply -distinct concepts, in so far as they are taken in a relation, which -is not that given in the distinction, and is therefore arbitrary, so -that the concepts, thus presented without the necessary intermediaries, -appear disparate;—or <i>primitive and derived concepts, or simple and -compound concepts</i>; a distinction which does not exist for the pure -concepts, since they are always simple and primitive, never compound or -derived.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Universals, particulars, and singulars. Intension and -extension.</i></div> - -<p>But the distinction of concepts into <i>universal, particular,</i> and -<i>singular</i> deserves elucidation, for the reason that we are now -giving. Concepts, which are only universal, or only particular, or -only singular, or to which any one of these determinations is wanting, -are not conceivable. Indeed, universality only means that the distinct -concept is also the unique concept, of which it is a distinction and -which is composed of such distinctions; particularity means that the -distinct concept is in a determinate! relation with another distinct -concept; and singularity that in this particularity and in that -universality it is also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> itself. Thus the distinct concept is always -singular, and therefore universal and particular; and the universal -concept would be abstract were it not also particular and singular. In -every concept there is the whole concept, and all other concepts; but -there is also one determinate concept. For example, beauty is spirit -(universality), theoretic spirit (particularity), and intuitive spirit -(singularity); that is to say, the whole spirit, in so far as it is -intuition. Owing to this distinction into universal, particular, and -singular, it is self-evident that intension and extension are, as the -phrase is, in inverse ratio, since this amounts to repeating that the -universal is universal, the particular particular, and the singular -singular.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Logical definition.</i></div> - -<p>The interest of this distinction of universality, particularity, and -singularity lies in this, that upon it is founded the doctrine of -<i>definition,</i> since it is not possible to define, that is, to think -a concept, save by thinking its <i>singularity</i> (peculiarity), nor to -think this, save by determining it as <i>particularity</i> (relation with -the other distinct concepts) and <i>universality</i> (relation with the -whole). Conversely, it is not possible to think universality without -determining its particularity and singularity; otherwise that universal -would be empty.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> The distinct concepts are defined by means of the one, -and the one by means of the distinct. This doctrine, thus made clear, -is also in harmony with that of the nature of the concepts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Unity, distinction as circle.</i></div> - -<p>But the theory of the distinct concepts and that of their unity still -present something irrational and give rise to a new difficulty. -Because, if it be true that the distinct concepts constitute an ideal -history or series of grades, it is also true that in such a history -and series there is a <i>first</i> and <i>last,</i> the concept <i>a,</i> which opens -the series, and, let us say, the concept <i>d,</i> which concludes it. -Commencement and end thus remain both without motive. But in order -that the concept be unity in distinction and that it may be compared -to an organism, it is necessary that it have no other commencement -save itself, and that none of its single distinct terms be an absolute -commencement. For, in fact, in the organism no member has priority over -the others; but each is reciprocally first and last. Now this means -that the symbol of <i>linear series</i> is inadequate to the concept; and -that its true symbol is the <i>circle,</i> in which <i>a</i> and <i>d</i> function, in -turn, as first and last. And indeed the distinct concepts, as eternal -ideal history, are an eternal going and returning, in which <i>a, b, c, -d</i> arise<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> from <i>d,</i> without possibility of pause or stay, and in which -each one, whether <i>a</i> or <i>b</i> or <i>c</i> or <i>d,</i> being unable to change its -place, is to be designated, in turn, as first or as last. For example, -in the Philosophy of Spirit it can be said with equal truth or error -that the end or final goal of the spirit is to know or to act, art or -philosophy; in truth, neither in particular, but only their totality -is the end; or only the Spirit is the end of the Spirit. Thus is -eliminated the rational difficulty, which might be urged in relation to -this part.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction in the pseudoconcepts.</i></div> - -<p>It is still better eliminated, and the whole doctrine of the pure -concepts which we have been expounding is thereby illumined and thrown -into clearer outline when we observe the transformation (which we will -not call either inversion or perversion), to which it is submitted in -the doctrine of the pseudoconcepts. It is therefore expedient to refer -rapidly to this for the sake of contrast and emphasis.</p> - -<p>Above all, certain distinctions, which in the doctrine of the pure -concepts have been seen to be without significance or importance, -find their significance in the doctrine of the pseudoconcepts. We -understand, for instance, how and why <i>identical</i> concepts can be -discussed; since, in the field of caprice, one and the same thing, -or one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> and the same not-thing, can be defined in different ways -and give rise to two or more concepts which, owing to the identity -of their matter, are thus identical. The concept of a figure having -three angles, or that of a figure having three sides, are identical -concepts, alike applicable to the triangle; the concept of 3 x 4 and -that of 6 x 2 are identical, since both are definitions of the number -12; the concept of a feline domestic animal and that of a domestic -animal that eats mice are identical, both being definitions of the cat. -It is likewise clear how and why <i>primary</i> and <i>derived, simple</i> and -<i>compound</i> concepts are discussed; for our arbitrary choice, by forming -certain concepts and making use of these to form others, comes to posit -the first as simple and primitive in relation to the second, which are, -in their turn, to be considered as compound or secondary.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The subordination and co-ordination of the empirical -concepts.</i></div> - -<p>We have already seen that the arbitrary concept differs from the pure -concept in that, of necessity, it produces two forms by the two acts of -empiricism and emptiness and thereby gives rise to two different types -of formations, empirical and abstract concepts. Empirical concepts -have this property, that in them unity is outside distinction and -distinction outside unity. And it is natural: for if it were the case -that these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> two determinations penetrated one another, the concepts -would be, as we have already noted, not arbitrary, but necessary and -true. If the distinction is placed outside the unity, every division -that is given of it is, like the concepts themselves, arbitrary; -and every enumeration is also arbitrary, because those concepts can -be infinitely multiplied. In exchange for the rationally determined -and completely unified distinctions of the pure concepts, the -pseudoconcepts offer multiple groups, arbitrarily formed, and sometimes -also unified in a single group, which embraces the entire field of the -knowable, but in such a way as not to exclude an infinite number of -other ways of apprehending it.</p> - -<p>In these groups the empirical concepts simulate the arrangement of -the pure concepts, reducing the particular to the universal, that is -to say, a certain number of concepts beneath another concept. But -it is impossible in any way to think these subordinate concepts, as -actualizations of the fundamental concept, which are developed from -one another and return into themselves; hence we are compelled to -leave them external to one another, simply co-ordinated. The scheme -of <i>subordination</i> and <i>co-ordination,</i> and its relative spatial -symbol (the symbol of <i>classification</i>),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> which is a right line, on -the upper side of which falls perpendicularly another right line, -and from whose lower side descend other perpendicular and therefore -parallel right lines, is opposed to the circle and is the most evident -ocular demonstration of the profound diversity of the two procedures. -It will always be impossible to dispose a nexus of pure concepts in -that classificatory scheme without falsifying them; it will always be -impossible to transform empirical concepts into a series of grades -without destroying them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The definition in the empirical concepts, and the notes of -the concept.</i></div> - -<p>In consequence of the scheme of classification, the definition which, -in the case of pure concepts, has the three moments of universality, -particularity, and singularity, in the case of empirical concepts -has only two, which are called <i>genus</i> and <i>species</i>; and is applied -according to the rule, by means of the <i>proximate genus</i> and the -<i>specific difference.</i> Its object indeed is simply to record, not to -understand and to think, a given empirical formation; and this is fully -attained when its position is determined by means of the indication of -what is above and what is beside it. In order to determine it yet more -accurately, the doctrine of the definition has been gradually enriched -with other <i>marks</i> or <i>predicables,</i> which,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> in traditional Logic, -are five: <i>genus, species, differentia, property, accident.</i> But it -is a question of caprice upon caprice, of which it is not advisable -to take too much account. And as it would be barbaric to apply the -classificatory scheme to the pure concepts, so it would be equally -barbaric to define the pure concepts by means of <i>marks,</i> that is, by -means of characteristics mechanically arranged.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Series in the abstract concepts.</i></div> - -<p>Where the thinker forgets the true function of the empirical concepts -and is seized with the desire to develop them rationally, and thus -to overcome the atomism of the scheme of classification and of -extrinsic definition, he is led to refine them into abstract concepts, -in which that scheme and that method of definition are overcome: -the classification becomes a <i>series</i> (numerical series, series of -geometrical forms, etc.), and the definition becomes <i>genetic.</i> But -this improvement not only makes the empirical concepts disappear, -and is therefore not improvement but death (like the death which the -empirical concepts find in true knowledge when they return or mount up -again to pure thought); but such improvement substitutes for empiricism -emptiness. Series and genetic definitions answer without doubt to -demands of the practical spirit; but, as we know,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> they do not yield -truth, not even the truth which lies at the bottom of an empirical -concept or of a falsified and mutilated representation. Hence, here as -elsewhere, empirical concepts and abstract concepts reveal their double -one-sidedness, and exhibit more significantly the value of the unity -which they break up; the distinction, which is not classification, -but circle and unity; the definition, which is not an aggregate of -intuitive data; the series, which is a complete series; the genesis, -which is not abstract but ideal.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="VI" id="VI">VI</a></h4> - -<h5>OPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Opposite or contrary concepts.</i></div> - -<p>By what has been said, we have made sufficiently clear the nature of -distinct concepts, that is to say, unity in distinction and distinction -in unity, and we have left no doubt as to the kind of unity which -the concept affirms, that it is not <i>in spite of</i> but <i>by means of</i> -distinction. But another difficulty seems to arise, due to another -order of concepts, which are called <i>opposites</i> or <i>contraries.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Their difference from distincts.</i></div> - -<p>It is indubitable that opposite concepts neither are nor can be reduced -to distincts; and this becomes evident so soon as instances of both -are recalled to mind. In the system of the spirit, for instance, the -practical activity will be distinct from the theoretic, and within -the practical activity the utilitarian and ethical activities will -be distinct. But the contrary of the practical activity is practical -inactivity, the contrary of utility, harmfulness, the contrary of -morality, immorality. Beauty, truth, utility, moral<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> good are distinct -concepts; but it is easy to see that ugliness, falsehood, uselessness, -evil cannot be added to or inserted among them. Nor is this all: upon -closer inspection we perceive that the second series cannot be added -to or mingled with the first, because each of the contrary terms -is already inherent in its contrary, or accompanies it, as shadow -accompanies light. Beauty is such, because it denies ugliness; good, -because it denies evil, and so on. The opposite is not positive, but -negative, and as such is accompanied by the positive.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Confirmation of this given by the Logic of empiria.</i></div> - -<p>This difference of nature between opposite concepts and distinct -concepts is also reflected in empirical Logic, that is, in the theory -of pseudoconcepts; because this Logic, while it reduces the distinct -concepts to <i>species,</i> refuses to treat the opposites in like manner. -Hence one does not say that the genus <i>dog</i> is divided into the species -<i>live</i> dogs and <i>dead</i> dogs; or that the genus <i>moral man</i> is divided -into the species <i>moral</i> and <i>immoral</i> man; and if such has sometimes -been affirmed, an impropriety—even for this kind of Logic—has been -committed, since the <i>species</i> can never be the <i>negation</i> of the -<i>genus.</i> So this empirical Logic confirms in its own way that opposite -concepts are different from distinct.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Difficulty arising from the double type of concepts, -opposites, and distincts.</i></div> - -<p>It is, however, equally evident that we cannot content ourselves with -enumerating the opposite, side by side with the distinct concepts; -because we should thus be adopting non-philosophical methods in place -of philosophical, and in the philosophical theory of Logic should be -lapsing into illogicality or empiricism. If the unity of the concept -be at the same time its <i>self-distinction,</i> how can that same unity -have another parallel sort of division or self-distinction, which is -<i>self-opposition!</i> If it is inconceivable to resolve the one into -the other, and to make of the opposites distinct concepts, or of the -distincts opposite concepts, then it is not less inconceivable to leave -both distincts and opposites within the unity of the concept unmediated -and unexplained.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Nature of the opposites; and their identity with the -distincts when distinguished from them.</i></div> - -<p>It will possibly serve towards a solution of this -difficulty—undoubtedly a very grave one—to go deeply into the -nature of the difference between opposite and distinct concepts. -These latter are distinguishable in unity; reality is their unity and -also their distinction. Man is thought and action; indivisible but -distinguishable forms; so much so that in so far as we think we deny -action, and in so far as we act we deny thought. But the opposites are -not distinguishable in this way: the man who commits an evil action, -<i>if he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> really does something,</i> does not commit an evil action, but an -action which is useful to him; the man who thinks a false thought, <i>if -he does something real,</i> does not think the false thought, indeed does -not think at all, but, on the contrary, lives and provides for his own -convenience and in general for a good which at that instant he desires. -Hence we see that the opposites, when taken as distinct moments, are no -longer opposites, but distincts; and in that case they retain negative -denominations only metaphorically, whereas, strictly speaking, they -would merit positive. In order, therefore, that the consideration of -opposition be not changed when superficially regarded into that of -distinction, it is desirable not to make of it a distinction in the -bosom of the concept, that is to say, to combat every distinction by -opposition, by declaring it to be <i>merely abstract.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another, -as concept from concept.</i></div> - -<p>So true is this, that no sooner are opposite terms taken as distincts -than the one becomes the other, that is to say, both evaporate into -emptiness. The disputes caused by the opposition of <i>being</i> to -<i>not-being</i> and the unity of both in <i>becoming</i> are celebrated in this -connection. And we know that being, thought as pure being, is the same -as not-being or nothing; and nothing, thought as pure nothingness, -is the same as pure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> being. Thus, the truth is neither the one nor -the other, but is becoming, in which both are, but as opposites, and, -therefore, indistinguishable: becoming is being itself, which has in -it not-being, and so is also not-being. We cannot think the relation -of being to not-being as the relation of one form of the spirit, or -of reality, to another form. In the latter case we have unity in -distinction: in the former, rectified or <i>restored</i> unity, that is to -say, reaffirmed against <i>emptiness;</i> against the empty unity of mere -being, or of mere not-being; or against the mere sum of being and of -not-being.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The dialectic.</i></div> - -<p>The two moments should certainly be synthesized, when we attack the -abstract thought, which divides them: taken in themselves, they -are, not two moments united in a third, but one only, the third -(in this case also the number is a symbol), that is to say, the -indistinguishability of the moments. It thus happens (be it said in -passing) that Hegel, to whom we owe the polemic against empty being, -was content for this purpose neither with the words <i>unity</i> and -<i>identity,</i> nor with <i>synthesis,</i> nor with <i>triad,</i> and preferred -to call this indistinguishable opposition in unity the objective -<i>dialectic</i> of the real. But whatever be the words that we chose to -employ, the thing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> is what has been said. The opposite is not the -distinct of its opposite, but the abstraction of the true reality.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The opposites are not concepts, but the unique concept -itself.</i></div> - -<p>If this be the fact, the duality and parallelism of distinct and -opposite concepts no longer exist. The opposites are the concept -itself, and therefore the concepts themselves, each one in itself, -in so far as it is determination of the concept, and in so far as it -is conceived in its true reality. Reality, of which logical thought -elaborates the concept, means, not motionless being or pure being, -but opposition: the forms of reality, which the concept thinks in -order to think reality in its fullness, are opposed in themselves; -otherwise, they would not be forms of reality, or would not be at -all. <i>Fair is foul and foul is fair</i>: beauty is such, because it has -within it ugliness, the true is such because it has in it the false, -the good is such because it has within it evil. If the negative term -be removed, as is usually done in abstract thought, the positive also -disappears; but precisely because, with the negative, the positive -itself has been removed. When we talk of negative terms, or of -non-values and so of not-beings as existing, existence really means -that to the <i>establishment</i> of the fact we add the <i>expression of the -desire</i> that another existence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> should arise upon that existence. "You -are dishonest" means "You are a man that seeks your own pleasure" (a -theoretic judgment); "but you <i>ought to be</i>" (no longer a judgment, but -the expression of a desire) "something else, and so serve the universal -ends of Reality." "You have written an ugly verse" will mean, for -example, "You have provided for your own convenience and repose, and -so have accomplished an economic act" (a theoretic judgment); "but you -<i>ought to</i> accomplish an æsthetic act" (no longer judgment, but the -expression of a wish). Examples can be multiplied. But every one has in -him evil, because he has good: Satan is not a creature extraneous to -God, nor the Minister of God, called Satan, but God himself. If God had -not Satan in himself, he would be like food without salt, an abstract -ideal, a simple <i>ought to be</i> which is not, and therefore impotent -and useless. The Italian poet who had sung of Satan, as "rebellion" -and "the avenging force of reason," had a profound meaning when he -concluded by exalting God: as "the most lofty vision to which peoples -attain in the force of their youth," "the Sun of sublime minds and of -ardent hearts." He corrected and integrated the one abstraction<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> with -the other, and thus unconsciously attained to the fullness of truth.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Affirmation and negation.</i></div> - -<p>Thought, in so far as it is itself life (that is to say, the life -which is thought, and therefore life of life), and in so far as it is -reality (that is to say, the reality which is thought, and therefore -reality of reality) has in itself opposition; and for this reason it -is also <i>affirmation and negation</i>; it does not affirm save by denying, -and does not deny save by affirming. But it does not affirm and deny -save by distinguishing, because thought is distinction, and we cannot -distinguish (truly distinguish <i>i.e.,</i> which is a different thing from -the rough and ready separations made by the pseudoconcepts) save by -unifying. He who meditates upon the connections of affirmation-negation -and unity-distinction has before him the problem of the nature of -thought, and so of the nature of reality; and he ends by seeing that -those two connections are not parallel nor disparate, but are in their -turn unified in unity-distinction understood as effective reality, and -not as simple abstract possibility, or desire, or mere ought to be.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The principle of identity and contradiction; its true -meaning and false interpretation.</i></div> - -<p>If we now wish to state the nature of thought as reality in the form of -<i>law</i> (a form which we know to be one with that of the concept, though<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> -the first term be adopted by preference for the pseudoconcepts), we can -only say that the law of thought is the law of unity and distinction, -and therefore that it is expressed in the two formulæ A is A (unity) -and A is not B (distinction), which are precisely what is called -the law or <i>principle of identity and contradiction.</i> It is a very -improper, or, rather, a very equivocal formula, chiefly because it -allows it to be supposed that the law or principle is outside or above -thought, like a bridle and guide, whereas it is thought itself; and it -has the further inconvenience of not placing in clear relief the unity -of identity and distinction. But these are not too great evils, because -misunderstandings can be made clear, and because—what we will not tire -of repeating—all, all words indeed, are exposed to misunderstandings.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Another false interpretation; struggle with the principle -of opposition. False application of this principle.</i></div> - -<p>We have a much greater evil, when the principle of identity and -contradiction is formulated and understood, not in the sense that A is -not B, but in that of A is A only and not also not A, or its opposite; -because, understood in this way, it leads directly to placing the -negative moment outside the positive, not-being outside or opposite -to being, and so, to the absurd conception of reality as motionless -and empty being.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> In opposition to this degeneration of the principle -of identity and contradiction, another law or principle has been -conceived and made prominent, whose formula is: "A is also not A," or -"everything is self-contradicting." This is a necessary and provident -reaction against the one-sided way in which the preceding principle was -interpreted. But it too brings in its turn the inconvenience of all -reactions, because it seems to rise up against the first law, like an -irreconcilable rival destined to supplant it. In the first formula we -have a duality of principles, which, as has been said, cannot logically -be maintained; in the second, a degeneration in the opposite sense, the -total loss of the criterion of distinction. To the false application -of the principle of identity and contradiction succeeds <i>the false -application of the dialectic principle.</i></p> - -<p>This false application has also been manifested in a form which could -be called doubly arbitrary; that is to say, when it has attempted to -treat dialectically neither more nor less than empirical and abstract -concepts, whereas in any case it could not be applied to anything -but the pure concepts. The dialectic belongs to opposed categories -(or, rather, it is the thinking of the one category of opposition), -not at all to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> representative and abstract fictions, which are based -either upon mere representation or upon nothing. As the result of that -arbitrary form, we have seen vegetable opposed to mineral, society -opposed to the family, or even Rome opposed to Greece, and Napoleon -to Rome; or the superficies actually opposed to the line, time to -space, and the number two to the number one. But this error belongs to -another more general error, which we shall deal with in its place, when -discussing philosophism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Errors of the dialectic applied to the relation of the -distincts.</i></div> - -<p>Here it is important to indicate only that false application of the -dialectic which tends to resolve in itself and so to destroy distinct -concepts, by treating them as opposites. The distinct concepts are -distinct and not opposite; and they cannot be opposite, precisely -because they already have opposition in themselves. Fancy has its -opposite in itself, fanciful passivity, or æsthetic ugliness, and -therefore it is not the opposite of thought, which in its turn has -its opposite in itself, logical passivity, antithought, or the false. -Certainly (as has been said), he who does not make the beautiful -(in so far as he does anything, and he cannot but do something) -effectively produces another value, for example the useful, and he -who does not think, if he does anything,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> produces another value, the -fanciful for instance, and creates a work of art. But in this way we -issue from those determinations considered in themselves, from the -opposition which is in them and <i>which constitutes them</i>; and from the -consideration of effectual opposition we pass to the consideration of -distinction. Considered as real, the opposite cannot be anything but -the distinct; but the opposite is precisely the unreal in the real, -and not a form or grade of reality. It will be said that unless one -distinct concept is opposed to another, it is not clear how there can -be a transition from one to the other. But this is a confusion between -concept and fact, between <i>ideal</i> and therefore eternal moments of the -real and their <i>existential</i> manifestations. Existentially, a poet -does not become a philosopher, save when in his spirit there arises -a contradiction to his poetry, that is to say, when he is no longer -satisfied with the individual and with the individual intuition: in -that moment, he does not pass into but is a philosopher, because -to pass, to be effectual, and to become are synonyms. In the same -way, a poet does not pass from one intuition to another, or from one -work of art to another, save through the formation of an internal -contradiction, owing to which his previous work<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> no longer satisfies -him; and he passes into, that is to say he becomes and truly is, -<i>another</i> poet. Transition is the law of the whole of life; and -therefore it is in all the existential and contingent determinations -of each of these forms. We pass from one verse of a poem to another -because the first verse satisfies, and also does not satisfy. The ideal -moments, on the contrary, do not pass into one another, because they -are eternally in each other, distinct, and one with each other.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its reductio ad absurdum.</i></div> - -<p>Moreover, the violent application of the dialectic to the distincts, -and their illegitimate distortion into opposites, due to an elevated -but ill-directed tendency to unity, is punished where it sins; that -is to say, in not attaining to that unity to which it aspired. The -connection of distinct is circular, and therefore true unity; the -application of opposites to the forms of the spirit and of reality -would produce, on the contrary, not the circle, which is true infinity, -but the <i>progressif ad infinitum,</i> which is false or bad infinity. -Indeed, if opposition determine the transition from one ideal grade -to the other, from one form to the other, and is the sole character -and supreme law of the real, by what right can a final form be -established, in which that transition<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> should no longer take place? -By what right, for instance, should the spirit, which moves from the -impression or emotion and passes dialectically to the intuition, and -by a new dialectic transition to logical thought, remain calm and -satisfied there? Why (as is the contention of such philosophies) -should the thought of the Absolute or of the Idea be the end of Life? -In obedience to the law of opposition, it would be necessary that -thought, which denies intuition, should be in its turn denied; and the -denial again denied; and so on, to infinity. This negation to infinity -exists, certainly, and it is life itself, seen in representation; but -precisely for this reason we do not escape from this evil infinite -of representation save through the true infinite, which places the -infinite in every moment, the first in the last and the last in -the first, that is to say, places in every moment unity, which is -distinction.</p> - -<p>We must, however, recognize that the false application of the dialectic -has had, <i>per accidens,</i> the excellent result of demonstrating the -instability of a crowd of ill-distinguished concepts; as we must take -advantage of the devastation and overturning of secular prejudices -which it has brought about. But that erroneous dialectic has also -promoted the habit of lack of precision<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> in the concepts, and sometimes -encouraged the charlatanism of superficial thinkers; though this too, -<i>per accidens,</i> so far as concerns the initial motive of dialectical -polemic is rich with profound truth.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The Improper form of logical principles or laws. The -principle of sufficient reason.</i></div> - -<p>The form of <i>law</i> given to the concept of the concept has led to this -confusion; for it is an improper form, all saturated with empirical -usage. Given the law of identity and contradiction, and given side by -side with it that of opposition or dialectic, there inevitably arises a -seeming duality; whereas the two laws are nothing but two inopportune -forms of expressing the unique nature of the concept, or, rather, of -reality itself. The peculiar nature of the concept may rather be said -to be expressed in another law or principle, namely that of <i>sufficient -reason.</i> This principle is ordinarily used as referring to the concept -of cause, or to the pseudoconcepts, but (both in its peculiar tendency -and in its historical origin) it truly belonged to the concept of end -or reason. That is to say, it was desired to establish that things -cannot be said to be known, when any sort of cause for them is adduced, -but on the contrary, that cause must be adduced, which is also the end, -and which is, therefore, the <i>sufficient</i> reason. But what else does -seeking the sufficient<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> reason of things mean but thinking them in -their truth, conceiving them in their universality, and stating their -concept? This is logical thought, as distinct from representation or -intuition, which offers things but not reasons, individuality but not -universality.</p> - -<p>It is not worth while talking about the other so-called logical -principles; because, either they have been already implicitly dealt -with, or they are ineptitudes without any sort of interest.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="SECOND_SECTION" id="SECOND_SECTION">SECOND SECTION</a></h4> - -<h3>THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT</h3> - - -<h4><a id="Ib"></a>I.</h4> - -<h5>THE CONCEPT AND VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Relation of the logical with the Æsthetic form.</i></div> - -<p>With the ascent from the intuition-expression to the concept, and with -the concentration upon it of our attention, we have risen from the -purely imaginative to the purely logical form of the spirit. We must -now, so to speak, begin the descent; or rather consider in greater -detail the position that has been reached, in order to understand it in -all its conditions and circumstances. Were we not to do this, we should -have given a concept of the concept, which would err by abstraction.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The concept as expression.</i></div> - -<p>The concept, to which we have risen from intuition, does not live in -empty space. It does not exist as a mere concept, or as something -abstract. The air it breathes is the intuition<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> itself, from which it -detaches itself, but in whose ambient it continues. If these images -seem unsuitable, or somewhat drawn from the sphere of representations, -we may choose others, such as that, which we used on another occasion, -of the second grade, which, to be second, must rest upon the first, -and, in a certain sense, be the first. The concept does not exist, and -cannot exist, save in the intuitive and expressive forms, or in what is -called language. To think is also to speak; he who does not express, or -does not know how to express his concept, does not possess it: at the -most, he presumes or hopes to possess it. Not only is there never in -reality an unexpressed representation, a pictorial vision unpainted, -or a song unsung; but there is never even a concept which is simply -thought and not also translated into words.</p> - -<p>We have previously defended this thesis against the objections which -are wont to be made to it.<a name="FNanchor_1_6" id="FNanchor_1_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_6" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> But in order to recapitulate and thus to -avoid the misunderstandings which might arise from the abbreviating -formulæ which we use, it will be well to repeat that the concept is -not expressed only in the so-called vocal or verbal forms; and if we -mention these more than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> others, it will be by synecdoche, that is to -say, when we refer to them, we desire to take them as representative -of all the others. Undoubtedly, the affirmation that the concept can -also be expressed in non-verbal form may cause surprise. It will be -said that geometry itself, in so far as it describes geometrical -figures, at the same time employs or implies speech; and we shall be -ironically challenged to attempt to set the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> -to music or to make a building of Newton's <i>Natural Philosophy.</i> But -we must carefully beware of breaking up the unity of the intuitive -spirit, because errors arise and become incorrigible, precisely through -such breaking up. Words, tones, colours, and lines are physical -abstractions, and only by abstraction can they be successfully -separated. In reality, he who looks at a picture with his eyes also -speaks it in words to himself; he who sings an air also has its words -in his spirit; he who builds a palace or a church speaks, sings, and -makes music; he who reads a poem sings, paints, sculptures, constructs. -<i>The Critique of Pure Reason</i> cannot be set to music, because it -already has its music; the <i>Natural Philosophy</i> cannot be built in -stone, because it is already architectonic; in exactly the same way -that the <i>Transfiguration</i> cannot be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> turned into a symphony in four -movements, or the <i>Promessi Sposi</i> into a series of pictures. Thus the -challenge, if made, would testify to the lack of reflection on the part -of the challengers, for they would confuse physical distinctions with -the real and concrete act of the intuitive spirit.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æsthetic and Æsthetic-logical expressions or expressions of -the concept; propositions and judgments.</i></div> - -<p>Owing to the incarnation of the concept or logic in expression and -language, language is quite full of logical elements; hence people -are often led astray into affirming (we have already made clear the -erroneousness<a name="FNanchor_2_7" id="FNanchor_2_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_7" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> of this) that language is a logical function. Water -might as well be called wine, because wine has been poured into the -water. But language as language or as simple æsthetic fact is one -thing, and language as expression of logical thought is another, for -in this case, certainly, language remains always language and subject -to the law of language, but is also more than language. If the first -be termed simple expression, <i>logos seimantikos,</i> as Aristotle said, -or <i>judicium æstheticum sive sensitivum,</i> according to the school of -Baumgarten, the second must on the contrary be called affirmation, -<i>logos apophantikos, judicium logicum</i> or <i>æsthetico-logicum.</i> To -this same issue we can reduce, if we understand it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> properly, the -distinction between <i>proposition</i> and <i>judgment,</i> for they are only -distinguishable in so far as it is assumed that the second form is -dominated by the concept, whereas the first is given as free of such -domination.</p> - -<p>But we should seek in vain for facts in proof of expressions belonging -to either form, because we cannot furnish them without making the -proviso that we understand them in the meaning of one or other of -the two forms. Taken by themselves, any verbal expressions which we -adduce or can adduce as proofs are indeterminate and therefore of many -meanings. "Love is life" can be the saying of a poet who notes an -impression with which his soul is agitated and marks it with fervour -and solemnity; or it can be, equally, the logical affirmation of -some one philosophizing on the essence of life. "Clear, fresh, and -sweet waters," when uttered by Petrarch, is an æsthetic proposition; -but the same words become a logical judgment when, for example, they -answer the question as to which is the most celebrated love song -of Petrarch, or pseudological when applied by a naturalist to the -substance water. A word no longer has meaning, or—what amounts to the -same thing—has no definite meaning, when it is abstracted from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> the -circumstances, the implications, the emphasis, and the gesture with -which it has been thought, animated, and pronounced. Nevertheless, -forgetfulness of this elementary hermeneutic canon, by which a word is -a word only on the soil that has produced it and to which it must be -restored, has been in Logic the cause of interminable disputes as to -the logical nature of this or that verbal phrase, separated from the -whole to which it belonged and rendered abstract. It would be much less -equivocal to adduce such poems as <i>I Sepolcri,</i> or the song <i>A Silvia,</i> -as documents of æsthetic propositions, and philosophical treatises -(for examples, the <i>Metaphysics</i> or the <i>Analytics</i>) as documents of -æsthetic-logical judgments or propositions. But here, too, we should -need to add: "poetry considered as poetry," and "philosophy considered -as philosophy," since it is clear that a poem is prose in the soul of -him who reflects upon it, and prose is poetry in the soul of a writer -vibrating with enthusiasm and emotion in the act of composition. Facts -do not constitute proofs in philosophy, save when they are interpreted -through the medium of philosophy; and then, too, they become mere -<i>examples,</i> which aid in fixing the attention upon what is being -demonstrated.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Surpassing of the dualism of thought and language.</i></div> - -<p>The relation between language and thought, conceived as we have -conceived it, does not admit the criticism that it creates an -insuperable dualism, though that criticism was justly aimed at those -who set the two concepts side by side and parallel with one another. -In that case the sole means that remained of obtaining unity was -to present language as an acoustic fact and declare thought to be -the unique psychic reality, and language the physical side of the -psychophysical nexus. But no one will henceforth wish to repeat the -blasphemy that language (the synonym of fancy and poetry) is nothing -but a physical-acoustic fact and merely adherent to thought. We have in -the two forms, notwithstanding their clear distinction, not parallelism -and dualism, but an organic relation of connection in distinction,—the -first form being implied in the second, the second crystallized into -the first,—precisely in conformity with that rhythmical movement of -the concepts which we have already discussed. And thus, too, when asked -if the <i>prius</i> of Logic be the concept or the judgment, we must reply -that the judgment, understood as an æsthetic proposition, is certainly -a <i>prius;</i> but understood as a logical judgment, it is neither a -<i>prius</i> nor a <i>posterius</i> in relation to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> the concept, since it is the -concept itself in its effectuality.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The logical judgment as definition.</i></div> - -<p>This pure expression of the concept, which is the logical judgment, -constitutes what is called <i>definitive judgment</i> or <i>definition.</i> -This, considered on its verbal side, or as the synthesis of thought -and word, does not give rise to any special logical theory in addition -to that which we have already stated, when definition showed itself to -be one with distinction or conceptual thought; nor does it give rise -to any special æsthetic doctrine, since the general doctrine expounded -elsewhere includes this also. The dispute, as to whether the definition -be verbal or real, finds its solution in the relation we have just -established between thought and words; hence definition is verbal -because it is real, and <i>vice versa.</i> And as to the other meaning -of the question, whether, that is to say, definition be <i>nominal</i> -or <i>real,</i> conventional or corresponding with the truth, that finds -its solution in the distinction between pseudoconcepts and concepts, -the first of which, it is clear, are <i>defined</i> only in a nominalist -or conventional way, because they <i>are,</i> in fact, nominalist and -conventional.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The indistinguishability of subject and predicate in the -definition. Unity of essence and existence.</i></div> - -<p>Greater importance attaches to the other dispute, as to whether the -definitive judgment be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> analysable into subject, predicate, and copula, -whether, for example, the definition: "the will is the practical -form of the spirit," can be resolved in the terms: "will" (subject), -"practical form of the spirit" (predicate), and "is" (copula). Now, -the difference between subject and predicate is here illusory, since -predicate means the universal which is predicated of an individual, and -here both the so-called subject and the so-called predicate are two -universals, and the second, far from being more ample than the first, -is the first itself. As to the "is," since the two distinct terms which -should be copulated are wanting, it is not a copula; nor has it even -the value of a predicate, as in the case in which it is asserted of an -individual fact that it is, that is to say, that it has really happened -and is <i>existing.</i> The "is," in the case of the definition, expresses -nothing except simply the act of thought which thinks; and what is -thought is, in so far as it is thought; if it were not, it would not be -thought; and if it were not thought, it would not be. The concept gives -the essence of things, and in the concept <i>essence involves existence.</i> -That this proposition has sometimes been contested is due solely to -the confusion between the essence, which is existence and therefore -concept, and the existence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> which is not essence and therefore -is representation. It is due therefore to the problem to which -representations gave rise in this respect, and with which we shall -deal further on. Freed from this confusion, the proposition is not -contestable, and is the very basis of all logical thought, of which we -have to examine the conceivability, or essence, that is, its internal -necessity and coherence; and when this has been established, existence -has also been established. If the concept of <i>virtue</i> be conceivable, -virtue is; if the concept of <i>God</i> be conceivable, God is. To the most -perfect concept the perfection of existence cannot be wanting without -being <i>itself</i> non-existent.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Alleged emptiness of the definition.</i></div> - -<p>Yet it would seem that though the definition affirms both essence -and existence, and therefore the reality of the concept, it is, -nevertheless, an empty form; for we have recognized that in every -definition subject and predicate are the same, and it is therefore a -tautological judgment. Certainly, the definition is tautological, but -it is a sublime tautology, altogether different from the emptiness -which is usually condemned in that expression. The tautology of the -definition means that the concept is equal only to itself and cannot be -resolved into another or explained by another. In the definition truth -<i>praesentia patet,</i> and if the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> Goddess does not reveal herself by her -simple presence, it is in vain that the priest will strive to discover -her to the multitude by comparing her with what is inferior to her: -with sensible things, which are particular manifestations of her.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Critique of the definition as fixed verbal form.</i></div> - -<p>As in relation to the concept the definition is not to be held -distinguishable, so in its expressive or verbal aspect it must not be -understood as a formula separate from the basis of the discourse, as -though it were the official garb of truth, the only worthy setting -for that gem. Such a conception of its nature has caused <i>pedantry of -definition, hatred</i> of and consequent rebellion <i>against definitions.</i> -That pedantry, however, like all pedantries, had some good in it; that -is to say, it energetically affirmed the need for exactitude; and too -frequently the rebellion, denying, like all rebellions, not only the -evil but also whatever good there might be in the thing opposed, has, -through its hatred of formulæ, made exactitude of thought a negligible -matter. But definition, taken verbally, is not a formula, a period -or part of a book or discourse; it is the whole book or the whole -discourse, from the first word to the last, including all that in it -may seem accidental or superficial, including even the accent, the -warmth, the emphasis, and the gesture<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> of the living word, the notes, -the parentheses, the full stops, and commas of the writing. Nor can we -indicate a special literary form of definition, such as <i>the treatise -or system or manual,</i> because the definition or concept is given alike -in opuscules and in dialogues, in prose and in verse, in satire and -in lyric, in comedy and in tragedy. To define, from the verbal point -of view, means to express the concept; and all the expressions of the -concept are definitions. This might trouble rhetoricians desirous of -devoting a special chapter to the form of scientific treatment; but it -does not trouble good sense, which quickly recognizes that the thing -is just so, and that an epigram may give that precise and efficacious -definition in which the ample scholastic volume of a professor -sometimes fails, although full of pretence in this respect.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_6" id="Footnote_1_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_6"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See <i>Æsthetic,</i> part i. chap. iii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_7" id="Footnote_2_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_7"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See Sect. I. Chap. III.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIb" id="IIb">II</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM, THE SYLLOGISM</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of definition and syllogism.</i></div> - -<p>The definition not only is not a formula separable or distinguishable -from the thread of the discourse, but it cannot even be separated or -distinguished from the ratiocinative forms or forms of demonstration, -as is implied in the custom of logicians, who make the doctrine of the -definition or of the <i>systematic</i> forms, as they usually call them, -follow that of the forms of demonstration. They ingenuously imagine -that thought, after having had a rough-and-tumble with its adversaries, -and after having proclaimed, shouted, and finally vindicated its own -right, mounts the rostrum and henceforth calm and sure of itself begins -to define. But, in reality, to think is to combat continuously without -any repose; and at every moment of that battle there is always peace -and security; and definition is indistinguishable from demonstration, -because it is found at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> every instant of the demonstration and -coincides with it. <i>Definition and Syllogism</i> are the same thing.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Connection of concepts and thought of the concept.</i></div> - -<p>The syllogism, indeed, is nothing but a connection of concepts; and -although it has been disputed as to whether it must be considered so, -or rather as a connection of logical propositions or judgments, the -dispute is at once solved, so far as we are concerned, by observing -:hat precisely because the syllogism is a connection of concepts, and -concepts only exist in verbal forms, that is to say, in propositions -or judgments, the syllogism is also a connection of judgments. This -serves to reinforce the truth that if the effective presence of the -verbal form must always be recognized in the logical fact, it must, on -the other hand, be forgotten when Logic is being constructed and the -nature of Logic and of the concept is being sought. Now, the connection -of the concepts represents nothing new in relation to the thinking of -the concept. As has already been seen, to think the concept signifies -to think it in its distinctions, to place it in relation with the other -concepts and to unify it with them in the unique concept. A concept -thought outside its relations is indistinct, that is to say, not -thought at all.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span></p> - -<p>Therefore, the connection of the concepts, or syllogizing, cannot be -conceived as a new and more complex logical act. To syllogize and -to think are synonymous; although, in the ordinary use of language, -the term "to syllogize" throws into special relief the verbal aspect -of thinking, and, more exactly, the <i>dynamic</i> character of verbal -exposition, which is indeed the very character of this exposition, -for it is with difficulty, or only empirically, that it can be -distinguished into static and dynamic, definition and demonstration.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of judgment and of syllogism.</i></div> - -<p>But if the syllogism be thus identified with the concept itself, it may -nevertheless seem that it must be distinguished from the judgment of -definition seeing that the syllogism is a form of logical thought, and -consequently of verbal expression, quite distinct from and incapable -of being confounded with any other: a connection of <i>three</i> judgments, -two of which are called <i>premisses</i> and the third <i>conclusion,</i> closely -cemented by the syllogistic force, which is placed in the <i>middle</i> -term. This character of triplicity seems ineradicable and peculiar to -the syllogism in contrast with the judgment.</p> - -<p>Some question, however, must be raised concerning this characteristic -because of another<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> characteristic universally recognized in the -syllogism; namely, that the premisses are conclusions of other -syllogisms, just as the conclusion becomes, in its turn, a premiss. -This being so, it might be said with greater truth that the syllogism -is to syllogize or to think; and since this is infinite, so the -propositions of which it consists are also infinite. On the other hand, -there is no judgment which is not a syllogism, since it is clear that -he who affirms a judgment affirms it by some reasoning or syllogism, -present and active in his spirit, though more or less understood in -the words. And are not other propositions understood in the syllogisms -which are properly so-called, not only in the forms, which are called -abbreviated (immediate inferences, enthymemes, etc.), but also in all -the other forms; since it is admitted that every syllogism, as has -just been observed, presupposes other preceding syllogisms, indeed an -infinity of others? It will be replied that at the end of the chain -there must yet be found the difference between judgment and syllogism, -or two first judgments, which are not produced by syllogism, and form -the columns, upon which the structure of the first conclusion rests. -But such an answer (if it do not imply simply the strange fancy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> that -thought has a beginning and therefore also an end in time) will mean -that judgment and syllogism are distinct in intrinsic character, which -makes the one the necessary condition of the other. Now, this intrinsic -distinctive character is precisely what cannot be found, because it -does not exist; and if it be not in every link, it is vain to seek it -at the beginning of the chain.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The middle term and the nature of the concept.</i></div> - -<p>Certainly, that <i>venatio medii,</i> that <i>ergo,</i> that unification -of triplicity, are things of much importance. But whence comes -their importance if not from being the expression of the synthetic -force of thought, of thought which unifies and distinguishes, and -distinguishes because it unifies and unifies because it distinguishes? -And is triplicity truly triplicity, one, two, three, arithmetically -enumerable? But if this be so, how is it that we never succeed in -counting those three, resolving each one of them into a series of -similar terms, or of other propositions and concepts? Upon attentive -consideration we perceive that here, too, the number three is -symbolical, and that it does no more than designate the distinction, -which unifies or thinks the <i>singular</i> concept in the <i>universal</i> -through the <i>particular,</i> or determines the <i>universal</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> through the -<i>particular,</i> by making it a <i>singular</i> concept, whence it remains -perfectly certain that the relation of these three determinations is -not numerical. Such a logical operation, not being anything special, -but simply logical reasoning itself, is of necessity found also in the -judgment.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Pretended non-definitive logical judgments.</i></div> - -<p>A possible objection at this point is that even if the unity of -judgment and syllogism can be held to be demonstrated as regards -definitions and syllogisms which are the basis of definitions, yet -it has not been demonstrated for the other forms of syllogisms and -logical judgments, which are not definitive. But if these judgments -and syllogisms be logical, they cannot fail to be definitive, or to -have for their content affirmations of concepts. "All men are mortal" -is a definition of the concept of man, whose mortality is verbally -emphasized or his immortality denied. It is without doubt an incomplete -definition, because it is torn from the web of thoughts and of speech -of which it formed part; and this web will also always be incomplete -or capable of infinite completion by means of new affirmations and -new negations. But in its incompleteness it is at the same time also -complete, because it affirms a concept of reality, of life and death,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> -of finite and infinite, of spirituality and of its forms, and so on; -these are all presupposed determinations, and therefore existing and -operating in the concepts of <i>man</i> and <i>mortality.</i> "Caius is a man" -(which is the second premiss of the syllogism traditionally adduced as -an example) is certainly not a definition (though it presupposes and -contains many definitions) precisely for the reason that it is not a -pure logical judgment. Hence it happens that the conclusion itself: -"therefore Caius is mortal," is more than a pure logical conclusion, -since it also contains a historical element, the person of Caius. But -we shall speak further on of these individual or historical judgments; -and then we shall also see in what relation they stand to the universal -or pure logical judgments, and if it be truly possible to distinguish -between them, otherwise than for the sake of convenience. The -distinction is in any case convenient and does no harm at this point; -and therefore for didactic reasons we allow it to stand; indeed we make -use of it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The syllogism as fixed verbal form. Its use and abuse.</i></div> - -<p>Just as in the case of definitions, so also in the case of the -syllogism, it is to be noted that the verbal expression does not -consist of an obligatory formula, but assumes the most varied forms,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> -apparently very remote from syllogizing as commonly understood. The -abuse of the syllogism as a formula continued for centuries, notably -in mediæval Scholasticism, and notwithstanding the rebellion of the -Renaissance, it has persisted among many philosophical schools, -its last conspicuous manifestation being the didactic elaboration -of the Leibnitzian philosophy, or Wolffianism. Certain of Wolff's -demonstrations have remained famous, such as that concerning the -construction of windows, contained in his <i>Manual of Architecture.</i> "A -window must be large enough for two persons to lean against it, side by -side," he developed it in this way: "<i>Demonstration.</i> It is customary -to lean against a window with another person in order to look out. But -the architect must serve the interests of his employer in everything. -Therefore he must make the window large enough for two persons to be -able to be there side by side.<a name="FNanchor_1_8" id="FNanchor_1_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_8" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> <i>Q.E.D.</i>"</p> - -<p>No more such syllogistic pedantries have been seen in our times, but -(as has been already remarked in reference to pedantry of definition) -contempt for the formula has too often resulted in contempt even for -the correctness of the reasoning. So<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> that it has sometimes been -necessary to advise a bracing bath of scholasticism, and it has been -observed and lamented of certain new civilizations (for example, of -Russian culture, or of the Japanese people, who are so little addicted -to mathematics), that they have not had a scholastic period, like that -of the West, so general with them is the habit of incorrect, loose, and -passionately impulsive and fantastic reasoning. Certainly the formula, -the exercise of disputation in <i>forma,</i> the <i>logica scholastica -utens</i> has its merits; and we must know how to have recourse to it -when it is advantageous to do so, and to express thought in the brief -and perspicuous formulæ of the syllogism, of the sorites, or of the -dilemma. From this point of view the new methods of mathematical Logic -or Logistic, upon which some are now working, and even the logical -machines which have been constructed, would help; they would help—if -they helped. For the point is just this: when formulæ, methods of -demonstration, machines and the like, are recommended, expedients -and instruments of practical or economic use are thereby proposed; -and these cannot make good their existence otherwise than by getting -themselves accepted for the utility—the saving of time and space, and -so of fatigue, which they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> effect. Like all technical inventions, those -products must be brought to the market; and the market alone decides -upon their value and assigns to them their price. At the present time, -it seems that logistic methods have no value and price, save for -certain narrow circles of people, who amuse themselves with them in -their own way and so pass the time.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in the -pure concepts.</i></div> - -<p>Certain erroneous doctrines take their origin from the undue separation -of demonstration and definition, conspicuously that particular error -which places a difference of degree between <i>truth</i> and <i>reason</i> of -truth, and consequently admits that a truth can be known without its -reason being known. But a truth, of which the reason is not known, is -not even truth; or it is truth only in preparation and in hypothesis. -We hear much about the <i>intuition</i> with which men of genius are -equipped, and which enables them to go straight to the truth, even when -they are not capable of demonstrating it. But this intuition, when it -is not that truth in preparation, or that orientation towards a truth -still quite hypothetical, must of necessity be thought and thus also -be demonstration of truth; it must be truth and also reason of truth; -thought and reasoning performed no doubt with lightning rapidity, -which is expressed in brief propositions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> and needs going over again -and rethinking, in order that it may afford a more ample and, from the -didactic point of view, a more persuasive, exposition; but it is always -thought and reasoning.</p> - -<p>Things are still worse, when not only is a diversity of degree -admitted, but the complete <i>indifference</i> of demonstration to truth is -proclaimed, so that many or infinite possible demonstrations of one -identical truth would be possible. If by this it were meant merely that -one identical truth, or one identical concept, can assume infinite -verbal or expressive forms, and if demonstration were understood as -"exposition" or "expression," there would be nothing to object. But -if by demonstration be meant something truly logical, that which is -properly called by that name in Logic, this thesis leads directly to -the negation of truth, making the demonstration of truth, or truth -itself, an illusion, a sophistical appearance created simply to -persuade. Those acquainted with courts of law know that very often when -a magistrate has made his decision and pronounced sentence he deputes -to a younger colleague the task of "reasoning" it, or of providing an -appearance of reasoning to what is indeed not a logical product, but -simply the <i>voluntas</i> of a certain provision. But though this procedure -be intelligible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> and useful when it occurs in the field of practice and -of law, it cannot be admitted in the theoretical field, where it would -be the ruin of thought and indirectly of the will itself.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Difference between truth and reason of truth in the -pseudoconcepts.</i></div> - -<p>Naturally, all that has been said as to the definition and the -syllogism has reference to the true and proper concept, or the pure -concept. In the case of pseudoconcepts, where practical motives enter, -definition is a simple <i>command</i> (a nominalist definition), and -demonstration has no place, save for those of its elements that are -derived from the pure concept: <i>given</i> the definitions, the reasoning -must logically proceed in a determinate manner. In pseudoconcepts, -then, definitions are separate from demonstrations: the first do not -spring from the second and are not all one with them; the second -presuppose the first and do not produce them. Of these definitions -infinite demonstrations are possible, precisely because in reality -none is possible, for the definitions themselves are infinite; and -when a demonstration is given, this is done only <i>pro forma</i>; it is -a deception, to conceal a practical convenience, or rather a logical -reasoning employed to make it clear. It is for this reason also that -the definitions employed in those demonstrations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> seem to be obtained -by means of an act of <i>faith</i> in the irrational; and here faith -signifies, not the confidence of thought in itself, but the making a -virtue of necessity, accepting as true what is not known as such.—For -the rest, pseudoconcepts and concepts have the same relation with the -verbal form; that is to say, all are expressed in the most various -ways, and there is no obligatory form of language, which can be called -the literary form of logical character. The style of the <i>Civil Code,</i> -which aroused the admiration of Stendhal, is not the eternal style -of laws, for laws were once even put into verse; as in like barbaric -times the sciences used to be put into verse. In the life of the word, -concepts and pseudoconcepts rush forward in such a way that it is vain -to seek there for distinction among them.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_8" id="Footnote_1_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_8"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Mentioned in Hegel, <i>Wiss. d. Logik 2,</i> iii. 370 <i>n.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIIb" id="IIIb">III</a></h4> - - -<h5>CRITIQUE OF FORMALIST LOGIC</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic.</i></div> - -<p>From the fact that in the verbal form all distinctions (pure -concepts, and empirical and abstract concepts, distinct concepts and -opposite concepts) are indistinguishable, and on the other hand all -identities, such as that of concept, definition and demonstration, -appear differentiated or capable of differentiation, we can deduce the -impossibility of constructing logical Science by means of an analysis -of the verbal form. The condemnation of all <i>formal</i> Logic is thus -pronounced.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its nature.</i></div> - -<p>This Logic has been variously called <i>Aristotelian, peripatetic, -scholastic,</i> after its authors and historical representatives; -<i>syllogistic,</i> from the doctrine that forms its principal content; -<i>formal,</i> from its pretensions to philosophic purity; <i>empirical,</i> by -those who tried to drive it back to its place; and although this last -name is correct, it would be better to call it <i>formal,</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> and still -better, <i>verbal,</i> to indicate of what the empiricism to which it is -desired to allude, chiefly consists. Indeed, if empiricism be marked -by its limiting itself to single representations, regrouping them in -types and arranging them in classes, there is no doubt that that method -of treatment is empirical, which takes the logical function, not in -the eternal peculiarity of its character as thought of the universal, -but only in its various particular translations or manifestations, in -which it acquires contingent characteristics. Since these contingent -characteristics come to it, in the first place, from the verbal form, -it can well be called verbalism. Owing to its verbalism, too, it has -happened, that over and above the grammars of individual languages, -there has been conceived as existing a <i>general, rational</i> and -<i>logical</i> Grammar; and this hybrid science, which is no longer grammar -and arose from logical assumptions, has developed in such a way as to -be indistinguishable from empirical or verbal Logic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its partial justification.</i></div> - -<p>Certainly, as mere empiricism, this so-called Logic could not be -condemned. And Hegel was not wrong in remarking that if people are -interested in establishing that there are sixty species of parrots -and one hundred and thirty-seven<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> of veronica, it is not clear why -it should be of less interest to establish the various forms of the -judgment and of the syllogism. That discipline has its utility as mere -empiricism, and it may be useful to any one to employ in certain cases -the terminology in which an affirmation is characterized as positive -or as merely negative, as particular or as universal, as a judgment -that awaits reasoning and demonstration, as an immediate inference, -enthymeme or sorites, as a conclusive or an inconclusive, or as a -correct or an incorrect syllogism, and so on. It is also comprehensible -how, as mere empiricism, it assumed a <i>normative</i> character, and was -translated into <i>rules</i>; rules, which are valid within their own -sphere, neither more nor less than are all empirical rules.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its error.</i></div> - -<p>But it does not limit itself to acting simply as an empirical -description, nor even as a simple technique; it usurps a much more -lofty office. Just as Rhetoric and Grammar, innocent and useful so -long as they limit themselves to the functions of convenient grouping -and convenient terminology, become false and harmful when they assume -the attitude of sciences of absolute values, and must then be resolved -into, and replaced by Æsthetic; so empirical or verbal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> Logic becomes -transformed into error when it claims to give the laws of thought, or -the thought of thought, which cannot be other than the concept of the -concept. It is not, then, <i>formal,</i> as it boasts itself to be, because -the only logical form is the universal, and this alone is the object of -logical investigation; but it is falsely formal, since it relies upon -contingencies, and must, therefore, be called <i>formalist.</i> We reject it -here exclusively in its formalist aspect; that is to say, in so far as -it is a complex of empirical distinctions that wish to pass as rational -and usurp the place of true rationality.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its traditional constitution.</i></div> - -<p>Several of such empirical distinctions, such as the distinction between -thought and principle of thought, truth and reason of truth, judgments -and syllogisms, and such-like, have been recorded and criticized; we -shall proceed to mention others, when suitable opportunities occur. -Here it will be well to refer to the general physiognomy and structure -of that Logic, as it was embodied for centuries in the schools and -still persists in treatises.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The three logical forms.</i></div> - -<p>Its point of departure is the external distinction between words and -connections of words, which belongs properly to Grammar. But words -are then treated by it as concepts, and connections<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> of words, as -judgments. Thus it obtains the identification of the concept with the -abstract and mutilated grammatical word and arrives at the monstrous -determination of the concepts as things which are not in themselves -either true or false. Thus, again, by constantly calling upon the -connections of the concepts for succour, it succeeds in distinguishing -the judgment from the mere proposition. A double criterion is -constantly adopted in establishing these and other fundamental forms: -the verbal and the logical; and formalist Logic oscillates equivocally -between the two different determinations; whence the alternating -appearance of truth and of falsehood, with which its distinctions -present themselves. The syllogism, which should be the third -fundamental form, is conceived as the connection of three distinct -judgments; but if it yet retains its importance and preponderance -over two-membered forms or over serial forms of more than three -propositions and judgments, this is really because to the distinction -and enumeration of the three propositions there is added the criterion -of the concept as a nexus, or as a triunity of universal, particular -and singular.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theories of the concept and of the judgment.</i></div> - -<p>The three fundamental forms have been reduced by some logicians to -two, by others;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> amplified to four or to five, by adding to them -the perceptive form or the definitive and systematic form. These -restrictions and amplifications have always encountered resistance, -because it was justly felt that in this way one form of empiricism was -being mingled with another: the verbal form with empirical distinctions -drawn from other presuppositions. But in determining in particular the -three fundamental forms, formalist Logic has not been able to restrict -itself to the mere distinction of words and propositions, artificially -placed in relation with the pure concept; but has been obliged to draw -from other sources. The concepts are variously classified, sometimes -from the verbal point of view, as <i>identical, equivalent, equivocal, -anonymous</i> and <i>synonymous</i>; sometimes from the logical point of view, -as <i>distinct, disparate, contrary</i> or <i>contradictory</i>; sometimes -from the psychological point of view, as <i>incomplete</i> and <i>complete, -obscure</i> and <i>clear,</i> the concepts further always being understood -as names, so that, for example, distinct concepts are indifferently -philosophically distinct concepts, and empirically distinct concepts; -and the contraries are both the philosophical contraries and those -empirically so-called. The same has occurred in the classification -of judgments where<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> sometimes the determinations of the concept are -taken as foundation and the judgments distinguished as <i>universal -particular</i> and <i>individual;</i> sometimes the intrinsic dialectic nature -of the concept, and they are distinguished as <i>affirmative, negative</i> -and <i>indeterminate</i> or <i>infinite</i>; sometimes the stages passed through -in the search for truth, and they are distinguished into <i>categorical, -hypothetical</i> and <i>disjunctive,</i> or <i>apodeictic, assertory</i> and -<i>problematic.</i> And these forms have further always been understood -verbally. "Universality" is the "totality" empirically designated -by the word, and not true universality; and "individuality," on the -contrary, is not only the individuality of the representation, but -also the single particularity of the distinct concept; "affirmative" -is differentiated from "negative" by accidental grammatical form, and -not because that unique act which is thought, at once affirmation and -negation (as the will is both love and hatred) can be truly divided.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theory of the syllogism.</i></div> - -<p>The classification of syllogisms, founded exactly upon the empirical -conception of the judgment as the copulation of a <i>subject</i> and a -<i>predicate</i> affords a suitable parallel to this method of treatment of -the judgment; subject and predicate being understood in an empirical -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> grammatical manner, whence they are also discovered in those -verbal affirmations, in which they are not distinct, because they are -identical, as in the case of the judgment of definition. For empirical -Logic, in the judgment: "The will is the practical form of the spirit," -"will" is subject and "practical form" predicate in the same way as in -"Peter is a man," "Peter" is subject, and "man" predicate. From the -distinction between subject and predicate, arise the four <i>figures</i> -of the syllogism; the criterion being the position of the middle term -in the two premisses of the three propositions of which the syllogism -is formed. If the middle term be subject in the first premiss and -predicate in the second, we have the first figure; if it be predicate -in both, the second; if it be subject in both, the third; if it be -predicate in the first and subject in the second, the fourth figure -("<i>sub-prae,</i> turn <i>prae-prae,</i> turn <i>sub-sub,</i> turn <i>prae-sub").</i> -But in order to deduce the moods of each figure recourse is then had -to another criterion, indeed to two other criteria; that is, to the -empirical distinctions of judgments into universal and particular, and -into affirmative and negative, with the four consequent determinations -into universal-affirmative judgments (A), universal-negative (E), -particular-affirmative (I),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> and particular-negative (O). Thus, in the -first figure, two universal affirmative premisses constitute the first -mood, and the conclusion is universal affirmative <i>(Barbara)</i>; two -premisses, both universal, but one affirmative and the other negative, -constitute the second, and the conclusion is universal negative -<i>(celarent)</i>; two premisses, one universal affirmative and the other -particular affirmative, constitute the third mood, and the conclusion -is particular affirmative <i>(darii);</i> two premisses, one universal -negative and one particular affirmative, constitute the fourth mood, -and the conclusion is particular negative <i>(ferio).</i> And so on.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal Logic.</i></div> - -<p>This is not the occasion to go on expounding in its other particulars -this construction, of which we have given an example, for it is -very well known: nor to attach importance to criticizing it, since' -its foundations themselves have already been shown to be false and -its hybrid genesis explained. Verbal Logic, which vaunts itself as -rational, carries its own caricature in itself, namely the creation of -<i>Sophisms</i>; because, since it seeks the force of thought in words, it -cannot prevent sophistical ability from making use, in its turn, of -words, in order capriciously to create thoughts and forms of thought. -Thus verbal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> Logic, in order to combat sophisms, is constrained hastily -and eagerly to abandon simple verbal connections, and to take refuge in -concepts and connections of concepts thought in words; that is to say, -neither more nor less than to negate the formalist point of view. And -with analogous self-irony it renounces that point of view and dissolves -itself, when it tries to refute the fourth figure of the syllogism, or -to reduce the second, third and fourth to the first, as the only real -figure, and then the first to a connection of three concepts; not to -mention the permanent self-irony and patent demonstration of falsity -involved in the logical deduction of the figures of the syllogism which -it makes from a series of moods, recognized as <i>not conclusive.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mathematical Logic or Logistic.</i></div> - -<p>Formalist Logic has been the object of many violent attacks from the -Renaissance onwards; but it cannot be said that it has been struck in -its essential part, because up to the present, the principle itself, or -the incoherence from which it springs, has not been attacked. Several -attempts at reform have followed and still follow; they have all of -them the same defect, which is the wish to reform formal Logic without -issuing from its circle, and without refuting its tacit presumption— -the pretension of obtaining thought in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> words, concepts in -propositions. The most considerable attempt of the kind that has been -made, which has many zealous followers in our day, is <i>mathematical -Logic,</i> also called <i>calculatory, algebraical, algorhythmic, symbolic, -a new analytic,</i> or a <i>Logical calculus or Logistic.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its non-mathematical character.</i></div> - -<p>It is admitted by those who profess it and is for the rest evident -from the definitions of Logistic that have been given, that it has -nothing in common with mathematics, for although the majority of its -cultivators are mathematicians and use is made of the phraseology usual -in Mathematics, and it is directed toward Mathematics, in certain of -its practical intentions, there is nothing intrinsically mathematical -in it. Logistic is a science which deals, not with quantity alone, but -with <i>quantity and quality together</i>; it is a science of <i>things in -general</i>; it is <i>universal mathematics,</i> containing also, subordinated -to itself, the mathematical sciences properly so-called, but not -coinciding with these. It means to be, not mathematics, but <i>a general -science of thought.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Example of its mode of treatment.</i></div> - -<p>But the "thought" of Logistic is nothing but the "verbal proposition," -which, in fact, supplies its starting-point. What the proposition is; -whether it be possible truly to distinguish the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> proposition we call -"verbal" from all the others, poetical, musical, pictorial; whether -the verbal proposition does not bear indistinctly in itself, a series -of very diverse spiritual formations, from poetry to mathematics, from -history and philosophy to the natural sciences; what language is and -what the concept is—these and all other questions concerning the forms -of the spirit and the nature of thought, remain altogether extraneous -to Logistic and do not disturb it in its work. The propositions (the -concept of the proposition remaining an unexplained presupposition) -can be indicated by <i>p, q,</i> etc.; the relation of implication of one -proposition in another can be indicated by the sign <i>⊃,</i> hence an -isolated proposition is "that which implies itself" <i>(p.⊃.q.).</i> By -following a method such as this, many distinctions of the traditional -formalist Logic are eliminated, and in compensation for this, new ones -are added and old and new are dressed in a new phraseology. The logical -<i>sum a + b</i> is the smallest concept, which contains the other two <i>a</i> -and <i>b</i> and is what was previously called the "sphere of the concept"; -the logical <i>product a x b</i> indicates the greater concept contained -in <i>a</i> and in <i>b,</i> and answers to that which was previously called -"comprehension." There are also new or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> renovated laws, like the law -of <i>identity,</i> by force of which, in Logic (differently from Algebra), -<i>a + a + a ... = a;</i> by which it is desired to signify this profound -truth, that the repetition of one and the same concept as many times as -one wishes, always gives the same concept;—the law of <i>commutation,</i> -by which <i>ab = ba</i>;—or that of absorption, by which <i>a(a + b) = a;</i> -or—(the convention being that the negation of a concept is indicated -by placing against it a vertical line) the other beautiful laws and -formulæ: <i>a + a | = a| (a | )a = a; aa | = o.</i> This is a charming -amusement for those who have a taste for it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of nature of Logistic with formalist Logic.</i></div> - -<p>Thus it is seen that if the words and the formulæ be somewhat -different, the nature of mathematical Logic in no respect differs from -that of formalist Logic. Where the new Logic contradicts the old, it is -not possible to say which of the two is right; as of two people walking -side by side over insecure ground, it is impossible to say which of -the two walks securely. The very doctrine of the <i>quantification -of the predicate</i> (which has been the leaven of the reform) in no -wise alters the traditional manner of conceiving the judgment, with -the corresponding arbitrary manner of distinguishing subject and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> -predicate. It simply establishes a convention with the object of being -able to symbolize, with the sign of equality, the subject and the -predicate:—the subject being included in the predicate, is part of it: -"men are mortal" equals: "men are some mortals"; and so, "men" being -indicated with <i>a</i> and "some mortals" with <i>b,</i> the judgment can be -symbolized: <i>a = b.</i> For us, it is indifferent whether the modes of -the syllogism be the 64 and the 19 recognized as valid by traditional -Logic, or the 12 affirmative and the 24 negative of Hamilton's Logic, -which distinguishes four classes of affirmative and four of negative -propositions. It is indifferent whether the methods of conversion -be three or two or one. It is indifferent whether logical laws or -principles be enumerated as two, three, five or ten. Since we do not -accept the point of departure, it is impossible for us, far from -admitting the development, even to discuss it; save to demonstrate -that from capricious choice comes capricious choice, as we have made -sufficiently clear in our treatment of formalist Logic. Mathematical -Logic is a new manifestation of this formalist Logic, involving a great -change in traditional formulæ, but none in the intimate substance of -that pretended science of thought.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Practical aspect of Logistic.</i></div> - -<p>As the <i>science of thought,</i> Logistic is a laughable thing; worthy, for -that matter, of the brains that conceive and advocate it, which are the -same that are promulgating a new Philosophy of language, indeed a new -Æsthetic, with their insipid theories of the <i>universal Language.</i> As a -formula of <i>practical utility</i> it is not incumbent upon us to examine -it here; all the more since we have already had occasion to give our -opinion upon this subject. In the time of Leibnitz, fifty years later -in the last days of Wolffianism; a century ago in Hamilton's time; -forty years ago in the time of Jevons and of others; and finally now, -when Peano, Boole, and Couturat are flourishing, these new arrangements -are offered on the market. But every one has always found them too -costly and complicated, so that they have not hitherto been generally -used. Will they be so in the future? The practical work of persuasion, -proper to the commercial traveller seeking purchasers of a new product, -and the foresight of the merchant or manufacturer as to the fortune -that may await that product, are not pertinent to Philosophy; which, -being disinterested, could here, at the most, reply with words of -benevolent patience: "If they be roses, they will bloom."</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="IVb" id="IVb">IV</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Reaction of the concept upon the representation.</i></div> - -<p>Problems of a widely different nature from these formalist playthings -await exploration in the depths of the Science of Logic. And resuming -what we have called the descent of the universal into the individual, -it is of importance, after having established the relation between -concept and form of expression, to examine in what way the concept -reacts upon the representation, from which it appears to be at a stroke -and altogether separated.</p> - -<p>In more precise terms: Beyond doubt the concept is thought only in -so far as it becomes concrete in an expressive form and itself also -becomes, from this point of view, representative. Thus, a logical -affirmation, or one that presents itself as logical, can be viewed -under a twofold aspect, as logical and as æsthetic. It can be regarded -as well thought-out, and so also very well expressed, perfectly -æsthetic because perfectly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> logical; or as very well expressed but ill -thought, or not truly thought, and so not logical, and yet sentimental, -passionate and imaginative. But this expression-representation, -in which the concept lives (and which is, for example, the tone, -the accent, the personal form, the style, which I am employing in -this book to expound Logic), is a <i>new</i> representation, conditioned -by the concept. We now ask, not indeed the character of this -representation (which is sufficiently clear), but of what kind are -those representations, about and upon which, the thought of the concept -has been kindled. Do they remain apart, excluded from the light of -the concept, obscure as before, that is, logically obscure? Does the -concept illuminate only itself in a sort of egoistic satisfaction, -without irradiating with its light the representations upon which it -has arisen?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i> Logicization of the representations.</i></div> - -<p>That would be inconceivable and contrary to the unity of the spirit; -and indeed, such separation and indifference do not exist. The -appearance of the concept transfigures the representations upon which -it arises, making them <i>other</i> than they formerly were; from being -indiscriminate it makes them discriminate; from fantastic, logical; -from clear but indistinct (as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> used to be said), clear and distinct. -I am, for example, in such a condition of soul as prompts me to sing -or to versify, and thus to make myself objective and known to myself; -but I am objective and known only to fancy, so much so, that at the -moment of poetical or musical expression I should not be able to say -what was really happening in me: whether I wake or dream, whether I -see clearly, or catch glimpses, or see wrongly. When from the variety -of the multitude of representations, which have preceded and which -follow it, I pass on to enquire as to the truth of them all (that is -to say, the reality, which does not pass), and rise to the concept, -those representations themselves must be revised in the light of the -concept that has been attained, but no longer with the same eyes as -formerly,—they must not be <i>looked at,</i> but henceforth, <i>thought.</i> -My state of soul then becomes determinate; and I shall say, for -example: "What I have experienced (and sung and made poetry of), was -an absurd desire; it was a clash of different tendencies that needed -to be overcome and arranged; it was a remorse, a pious desire," and -so on. Thus by means of the concept is formed a <i>judgment</i> of that -representation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The individual judgment and its difference from the -definitive judgment.</i></div> - -<p>We have already studied the judgment, which is proper to the concept, -and called it definitive judgment or judgment of definition. We have -shown how in it there is no distinction of subject and predicate, -so much so that it may be said, with regard to it, that there is -neither subject nor predicate, but the complete identity of the two: -a predicate or universal, which is subject to itself. However, the -judgment which is now being discussed is not a simple definition and -does not coincide with the first. It certainly has as its base a -concept and therefore a definition; but it contains something more, -a representative or individual element, which is transformed into -logical fact, but does not lose individuality on that account; indeed -it reaffirms its individuality with more precise distinction. This -judgment is connected with the first, but it represents a further stage -of thought. If the first form be a conceptual or <i>definitive</i> judgment, -the second may be called an <i>individual</i> judgment.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction of subject and predicate in the individual -judgment</i></div> - -<p>Owing to this new element, which the individual judgment contains, -and the judgment of definition does not contain, we eventually find -fully justified in the former that distinction between subject and -predicate which verbal Logic in vain claims to discover in all -judgments,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> including those of universal character (and even in simple -propositions); so that it ends by attributing to that distinction, of -which later we shall perceive the capital philosophical importance, a -purely grammatical or verbal significance. Subject and predicate can -be distinguished only in so far as the one is not and the other is -universal, in so far as the one is not and the other is concept, that -is to say, only in so far as the one is representation and the other -concept. A particular or singular concept (for example, the will) is -always also a universal concept; and therefore not adapted to function -as a subject to which a predicate is applied; because that predicate, -that universal, is already explicitly in the pretended subject itself -which is net thinkable, save by means of that predicate. Only the -<i>representation</i> can be truly <i>subject;</i> and only the <i>concept</i> can -be <i>predicate.</i> This takes place plainly in the individual judgment, -where the two elements are connected. "Peter is good," an individual -judgment, implies the subject "Peter" and the predicate "good," the one -not to be confounded with the other; whereas, in the definition "the -will is the practical form of the spirit," "practical form" and "will" -are identical.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Reasons for the variety of definitions of the judgment and -of certain of its divisions.</i></div> - -<p>When the attempt was made to define the judgment as differing both -from the concept and from the definition, what was aimed at was -the individual judgment. But, if this be so, then the definitions -which conceive the judgment either as relation of representations -or as relation of concepts (the subsumption of one concept under -another, etc.), must be termed false, since it is henceforth clear -that, as individual judgment, it must be conceived as a <i>relation -of representation and concept.</i> On the other hand, some celebrated -divisions of the judgment find their origin in the distinction made -by us (which, we again repeat, is given at this point provisionally -with the intention of seeking the definite formula further on), -between the judgment of the concept and the judgment of the -representation, between definition and individual judgment. In this -way the <i>analytic</i> judgment, defined as that in which the concept of -predicate was obtained from the subject, reveals itself as nothing -but the definition, the identity of subject and predicate; the -<i>synthetic</i> judgment, which adds to the subject something which was -not there previously, is the individual judgment, logical thinking -of the intuition, at first only intuited and not thought. We shall -examine further on the true meaning<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> and the definite formula of this -distinction also.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The individual judgment and intellectual intuition.</i></div> - -<p>To ignore the form of the individual judgment, and to recognize only -that of the concept and of the definition, is an impossible position, -though occasionally there appears a tendency in that direction. -We perceive it, for instance, in those who seek for definitions -of everything, and limit themselves to syllogizing, when there is -certainly a case for thinking, but also one for looking, or for -thinking while we look, and for looking while we think. This may be -said truly to represent knowledge, that complete knowledge in which -all anterior forms unite, and which is the result of all of them. To -know is to know reality; and knowledge of reality is translated into -representations, penetrated with thought. That famous <i>intellectual -intuition,</i> which has sometimes been described as the faculty to which -man aspires, but does not possess, and sometimes as a prodigious -faculty, superior to knowledge itself, should be declared, with the -full rigour of letter and concept, to be nothing but the individual -judgment; which is, in truth, intellectual intuition or intuited -intellection.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of the individual judgment with perception or -perceptive judgment.</i></div> - -<p>But the individual judgment can take another name, much better known -and more familiar:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> <i>perception</i>; and perception, in its turn, should -be called, synonymously, individual judgment, or at least <i>perceptive -judgment.</i> Perception does not consist of opening the eyes, of offering -the ear, and of unlocking any of the other senses, which are wont to be -enumerated, nor, in general, of abandoning oneself to sensation. The -world does not enter our spirit by these wide gates; but has itself -announced, in order to be received with due honours. That good folk -(and among the best of folk are to be counted many philosophers) think -otherwise is in truth to be explained by their wonted neglect or lack -of analysis and reflection.</p> - -<p>And further, perception is not intuition, <i>i.e.,</i> an impression -theoretically fashioned, or that stage or moment of the spirit which -is represented in an eminent degree by the poet, who intuites and does -not know what he intuites, indeed does not know that he does not know -(because the pertinent question has not arisen, and cannot arise, in -him, as poet). To perceive means to apprehend a given fact as having -this or that nature; and so means to think and to judge it. Not even -the lightest impression, the smallest fact, the most insignificant -object, is perceived by us, save in so far as it is thought.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span></p> - -<p>Hence the supreme importance of the individual judgment, which is that -which embraces all knowledge produced by us at every moment, by means -of which we <i>possess the world,</i> by means of which a <i>world exists.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>and with the commemorative or historical judgment.</i></div> - -<p>In perceptive judgments also, are comprised those judgments which -are called by some <i>commemorative</i> or <i>historical,</i> that is to say, -those by which it is recognized that a given fact has occurred in the -past. This recognition can never be founded upon anything other than -present intuitions, intuitions, that is to say, of our present life, -which contains the past in it, and persuades us of the veracity of a -given piece of evidence, as now apprehended by us. And conversely, all -perceptive judgments are, in some way, commemorative and historical, -because the present, in the very act by which we hold it before our -spirit, becomes a past, that is to say an object of memory and of -history.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Erroneous distinction of individual judgments as of fact -and of value.</i></div> - -<p>On the other hand, it would be erroneous to divide individual -judgments, as has often been attempted, into judgments of <i>fact</i> and -judgments of <i>value,</i> claiming that the judgment, "Peter is a man," is -of a different nature from: "Peter is good." Every judgment of fact, in -so far as it attributes a predicate to a subject, gives to it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> a value, -declaring it to participate in the universal or in a determination of -the universal. And conversely, every judgment of value, in so far as -it attributes a value, cannot attribute other than the universal or -a determination of the universal, since outside the universal there -is no value. Even judgments of negative form, such as: "Peter is -not good," or "is not-good," or: "Peter is bad," are attributes of -universality and of value; because, as we know, theoretically they do -not affirm anything other than that Peter has a spiritual determination -different from goodness (for example, that he is utilitarian, not yet -moral). Certainly, in judgments such as these which we have selected -as examples, there is mingled (this too has been noted; and at this -point it suffices to recall it) the expression of an <i>ought to be,</i> -which, in this case, is revealed in the negative formula adopted; but -the expression of an ought to be or of a desire is not a judgment -either of fact or of value; indeed, it is not a judgment at all; it is -a mere proposition, a logos semanticos, not apophanticos, an optative -or desiderative formula, a <i>lyricism</i> of the spirit directed to the -future.<a name="FNanchor_1_9" id="FNanchor_1_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_9" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The individual judgment as ultimate and perfect form of -knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>There is no other cognitive fact to know,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> beyond perception or -individual judgment. In this, the ultimate and the most perfect -of cognitive facts, the circle of knowledge is completed. Obscure -sensibility, having become clear intuition, and then having made itself -thought of the universal, in the individual judgment is logically -thought, and is, henceforward, knowledge of fact or of event, that is, -of effectual reality. The individual judgment, or perception, is fully -adequate to reality.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Error of treating it as the first fact of knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>But precisely because perception is the completion of knowledge, it -must be placed not at the beginning, but at the end of cognitive life. -To place it at the beginning, as mere sensibility, and to derive from -it the concepts, either as the effect of psychological mechanism, -or by an arbitrary act of will, is the error of sensationalists and -empiricists. To conceive it as judgment, and nevertheless to place -it at the beginning, and to deduce from it the concepts by further -elaboration, is the error of rationalists and intellectualists. Against -these, it must be firmly maintained that the first moment of knowledge -is <i>intuitive</i> and not perceptive; and that the concepts do <i>not -originate</i> from the intellectual act of perception, but enter the act -itself as <i>constituents.</i> To begin with perception,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> understood as -perceptive judgment, is to begin at the end, that is to say, with the -most highly complex. Perception is thus the sole problem of gnoseology; -but only because it is the whole problem, which contains in itself -all the others. And it also is, if you like, the <i>first</i> form of the -cognitive spirit, but not because it is the most simple, but precisely -because it is the <i>last</i>; and the last, being also the whole, can also -in an absolute sense be called first.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Origin of this error.</i></div> - -<p>Certainly, the misunderstanding of the sensationalists and the -opposing error of the rationalists contain an element of truth, since -both are really concepts, which are developed from perception and -presuppose it. But, on the other hand, they are not true and proper -concepts, but pseudoconcepts, as we have already defined them, and -these, being developed from perception, give rise, in their turn, -to pseudojudgments. We shall treat of this further on; and thereby -explain the genesis of the misunderstanding, that is to say, the -erroneous theory will be overcome as misunderstanding and determined as -truth. In this difference between individual judgments and individual -pseudojudgments, between perceptions and pseudoperceptions, will -also clearly be found<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> another of the motives (and perhaps the most -profound), which have divided judgments into judgments of fact and -judgments of value.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Individual syllogisms.</i></div> - -<p>It is also easy to understand that, as there are individual judgments, -so there are also individual syllogisms; or rather, that since it -is not possible to distinguish between judgments and syllogisms in -philosophical Logic, for they constitute one indivisible whole, so it -is not possible to distinguish individual syllogisms from individual -judgments, or it is only possible to do so verbally. "Caius is dead," -is indeed the conclusion of a syllogism; since it is not possible to -affirm that he is mortal without some reason: for example, because he -is a man, an animal, or a finite being. Thus, the syllogism: "Men are -mortal, Caius is a man; therefore, Caius is mortal," is only verbally -different from "Caius is mortal." We do not say that the difference of -words is nothing; there is always a spiritual difference, even when, -instead of saying, "Caius is mortal," we say, "He, whom I call Caius, -is mortal," or when the same thought is expressed in Latin or German. -But being here occupied with Logic, we declare that there is none, -because, indeed, there is none, <i>in point of difference of logical -act,</i> both forms being the realization of logical reasoning alone.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_9" id="Footnote_1_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_9"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See above, Section I. <a href="#VI">Chap. VI</a>.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="Vb" id="Vb">V</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE PREDICATE OF EXISTENCE</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The copula: its verbal and logical significance.</i></div> - -<p>Subject and predicate are indistinguishable in the judgment of -definition, and distinguishable and distinct in the individual -judgment; but the act of distinction (which is also union) between -subject and predicate, representation and concept, is again, in the -individual judgment, the same as the act of distinction and union, by -means of which, in the judgment of definition, the concept is defined. -In both cases thought makes essential what it thinks. In this respect -there is no difference between the two forms of judgment, which we have -analysed and have hitherto kept distinct for reasons of analysis. One -identical act of thought distinguishes both from mere representation, -in which there is wanting the "is" (logical and not verbal)—that "is," -which belongs to the judgment of definition and to the individual -judgment, and which in the second of these more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> properly assumes the -name of <i>coptila,</i> because it unites two distinct elements, the one -representative, the other logical. Here, too, of course, we must not -allow ourselves to be deceived by verbalism. The essentialization, the -copula, thought, cannot be made to consist of a word, which, abstracted -from the whole, becomes a simple sound, and as sound can assume any -other signification. In mere representation there can also be found the -"is," or what, verbally and grammatically, is called copula, but there -it has no value whatever as act of thought.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;"> -<i>Nunc est bibendum, nunc pede libero</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 5.5em;"><i>Pulsanda tellus</i></span><br /> -</p> - -<p>is a proposition which possesses the "is," but in this case it has -merely the value of a sign, not of an act of thought, for that phrase -of old Horace is nothing but the expression of a hortatory motion. -The word, too, can be suppressed, but we do not thereby suppress the -act of thought. The exclamation "beautiful!" uttered before a picture -may be an individual judgment, having as subject the representation -of the picture, and as predicate the æsthetic universal, which is -called beautiful, in which the copula (and here, also, the subject) is -verbally understood, but logically existent, and therefore always also -capable of verbal reintegration.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> On the other hand, this reintegration -cannot be effected when it is a case of a mere representation or an -expression of a state of the soul; because, in that case, there would -be, not a reintegration, but an integration, that is to say, it would -carry out that act of thought, and produce that individual judgment -which was not present before.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Questions concerning propositions without subject. -Verbalism.</i></div> - -<p>Thus, in asking a last question concerning the individual judgment, -that is to say, whether it be always <i>existential,</i> we must, as always, -transfer the enquiry from verbal to logical analysis, and not waste -time with speculations as to words or fragments of propositions, -arbitrarily torn from their context, and therefore insignificant and -equivocal. The dispute has been most keen in relation to what are -called propositions without a subject, such as "It rains" and the -like. But, although we do not intend to negate the results, obtained -or obtainable from these disputes, we cannot accept the position which -they imply and which renders it possible to agitate and to discuss the -problem to infinity and therefore makes it insoluble. "It is raining" -said with a smile of satisfaction means: "Thank heaven, it is raining"; -with a feeling of disappointment: "Bother the rain for preventing my -taking a walk"; in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> reply to some one asking what is the noise audible -on the window-panes: "The audible sound is the sound of rain"; to -contradict some one who says the weather is fine: "You are stating a -falsehood and have not given yourself the trouble of observing; it is -raining"; or it is the correction of an historical error. And so on. -It is therefore waste of breath to dispute as to the logical nature of -that proposition if its precise signification be not determined; and -when it is truly determined (for the propositions we have substituted, -taken abstractly, can also appear to have many senses and give rise -to misunderstandings), we have quite abandoned the materiality of -verbalism and passed to the thinking of spiritual acts, taken in -themselves.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Confusion between different forms of judgments with -relation to existentiality.</i></div> - -<p>The question of existentiality in the act of judgment has been -strangely confused, owing both to this verbalism and to the failure -to keep distinct the judgment of definition and the individual -judgment, and even the concept and the pseudoconcept. The question -as to existence has been asked, as if it were the same in the case -of a judgment of definition, like: "The Idea is," and in the case of -an individual judgment like "Peter is." But in the first case, as we -already know, existence coincides with essence,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> and that judgment -only says that the Idea is thought, and therefore is; whereas the -second not only says that Peter is representable, and therefore is, -but that he exists; Peter might be representable and not exist; the -griffin is representable and does not exist. Pseudoconcepts have -also been incorrectly adduced as examples of judgment of definition -in such statements as: "The triangle is thinkable, but does not -possess existence," or: "The genus mammifer is thinkable, but does -not exist as single animals"; for in this case it should have been -said that "triangle" and "mammifer" are not thought at all, but are -constructed, and therefore have neither essence nor existence. For -us, then, the question of existentiality cannot arise, either for the -pure judgment of definition, which is a concept and has existence as -a concept, that is to say, essence; nor for the definitive judgment -of the pseudoconcepts, which is not even thought; but arises only for -the individual judgment, into which there enters as a constituent -a representative element, that is to say, something individual and -finite. Essence does not coincide with existence in the individual and -finite; indeed its definition is just this: the inadequacy of existence -to essence. Therefore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> the individual changes at every instant, and -although being at every instant the universal, yet it is adequate to it -only at infinity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Determination and subdivision of the question of existence -in individual judgments.</i></div> - -<p>Having limited the question to the individual judgment, for which alone -it has meaning, we can opportunely divide it into three particular -questions: (i.) Does the individual judgment always imply that the -subject of the judgment is existent? (ii.) What is the character of -existentiality? (iii.) Does this character suffice to construct that -judgment?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Necessity of the existential character in these judgments.</i></div> - -<p>Beginning with the first, we believe that without doubt the answer -is affirmative and that adherence should be given to those who have -discovered and persistently defended the necessity of the existential -character, thus contributing in no small degree to the progress of -logical science. Whether what is represented exist or not, is doubtless -indifferent to the intuitive man, to the poet or artist, simply -because he does not leave the circle of representation. But it is not -indifferent to the logical man, since he forms an individual judgment. -He cannot <i>judge of what does not exist.</i></p> - -<p>It has been incorrectly objected that the logical judgment always -remains the same, whether I have a hundred dollars in my pocket or -only in my imagination; that a mountain of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> gold is a subject of -judgment, although hitherto at least no one has found one in any part -of the earth; that Pamela is a virtuous woman (whatever Barretti may -have written to the contrary), although she has never lived elsewhere -than in the imagination of Richardson and of Goldoni. No predicate -whatsoever can be attributed to a hundred dollars, to a mountain of -gold, and to a Pamela which do not exist; and if it be said that -those hundred dollars are exactly divisible by two or by five; or -that that mountain of gold, imagined as of a certain base and height, -is measurable in terms of cubic metres, and has a value of so many -millions or milliards on the market; or that Pamela is worthy of esteem -and of reward; it must be noted that neither the hundred imagined -dollars, nor the imagined mountain, nor the imagined Pamela are -judged with these judgments, but that the judgments define simply the -arithmetical concepts of number, prime number and divisibility, or the -geometrical concepts of the cube, and the economic concepts of gold -as merchandise, or the moral concepts of virtue, esteem and reward. -No judgment whatever has been given as to those non-existent facts, -because where there is nothing the king (in this case, thought) loses -his rights.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The absolute and the relative non-existent.</i></div> - -<p>It will be replied that we talk at every moment about these -non-existent things, and consequently judge them. But here care must -be taken not to confuse absolute with relative non-existence, which -latter is non-existent only in name. The absolutely non-existent is -what is excluded from the judgment, implicitly in the affirmative -formula, explicitly in the negative formula. To him who speaks of the -mountain of gold, of the possession of a hundred dollars, and of Pamela -as existing realities, we reply by denying these existences, that is -to say, by denying them in an absolute manner; and of those negated -existences it is not possible to judge, or even to talk, precisely -because they are altogether negated. Here, in fact, we are speaking of -the individual judgment, which excludes its contradictory from itself, -as, for that matter, is also the case with the judgment of definition. -But in that absolute affirmation and negation there is also made, -explicitly or implicitly, a relative affirmation or negation; as when -we say, in the examples given: "The mountain of gold, the hundred -dollars, Pamela, do not exist," we say at the same time: "There do -exist phantasms, products of the fancy or of the imagination, of a -mountain of gold, of a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> hundred dollars, and of a virtuous Pamela." Now -the mountain, the dollars, and Pamela are, as such, not the absolutely -non-existent, but certain facts, <i>subjects</i> of judgment, of which the -predicate is expressed by the word "non-existent," which in this case -is equivalent to "existing as phantasms." The absolutely non-existent -is the contradictory, true and proper nothingness; the relatively -non-existent (which is precisely that of the individual judgment) is -an existence, <i>different</i> from that which the same individual judgment -affirms.</p> - -<p>Certainly relative non-existence, and the whole content of the -concept of existence in general, would require more minute analysis; -from which it would perhaps be seen that the so-called non-existent -resolves itself into certain categories of practical facts; and thus -designates sometimes <i>arbitrary constructions,</i> made by combining -images for amusement or with some other intention; sometimes, on the -contrary, the <i>desires,</i> which accompany every volitional act and are -the infinite <i>possibilities</i> of the real. And it would also be seen -that non-existence in the second sense, or the desires, which have been -represented by art, are not in its circle in any way distinguished -from effective volitions and actions;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> since, in order to distinguish -them, it would be necessary that art should possess a philosophy of -the will, however summary, whereas art is without any philosophy. This -examination would lead us, however, not only outside the problem now -before us, but also outside Logic, to another part of Philosophy,<a name="FNanchor_1_10" id="FNanchor_1_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_10" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -which, although closely related to Logic (as Logic to it), must be -the object of special treatment if we do not wish to produce mental -confusion by offering everything at once. This was the defect, for -example, of G. B. Vico, who put all books into one book, the whole book -into a chapter, and frequently his whole philosophy and history into a -page or a period. The present writer, though proud to call himself a -Vichian, does not propose to imitate the didactic obtuseness of that -man of genius.</p> - -<p>Suffice it to have made clear, as concerns the problem which now -occupies us, that every individual judgment implies the existence of -what is spoken of, or of the fact given in the representation, even -when this fact consists of an act of imagination, that this act may be -recognized as such and as such existentialized. It assumes a concept of -reality, which divides into effective<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> reality and possible reality, -into existence and non-existence, or mere representability. Some modern -investigators of what is called the <i>theory of values</i> (students who -fluctuate between psychology and philosophy, and between an antiquated -philosophy and one that has the future before it) have maintained that -a judgment of value cannot be pronounced when we are not dealing with -an existing thing. Since for us a judgment of value is equivalent to -any individual judgment, we must accept their thesis; freeing it from -the embarrassment in which it finds itself in regard to <i>unreal images</i> -(which yet give rise, as they themselves confess, to such judgments -of value as the æsthetic) by observing that in that case there is the -<i>effectuality,</i> the <i>reality,</i> or, in short, the <i>existence</i> of images, -which have the <i>ineffectual</i> or <i>non-existent</i> as their content.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The character of existence as predicate.</i></div> - -<p>We have in this way opened a path for the solution of the second -question enunciated, which concerns the character to be assigned to -the existentializing act of the judgment. Does this consist of an act -of thought, that is to say, of the application of a predicate to a -subject; or is it an original act of an altogether peculiar nature, -which does not find its parallel in the other acts of thought? In -short, is existence a predicate,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> or is it not? The answer, already -implicitly contained in the foregoing explanations, affirms that -<i>existence</i> in the individual judgment is a <i>predicate.</i> And we say "in -the individual judgment" because in the judgment of definition it is -not predicate, for the reason already expounded, that in that judgment -there is no distinction between subject and predicate, and that in it -existence coincides with essence.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Critique of existentiality as position and faith.</i></div> - -<p>The traditional reply is, on the other hand, that existence, in the -judgment of existence, is not a predicate, but a knowledge <i>sui -generis,</i> sometimes called a knowledge of <i>position,</i> sometimes an act -of belief, or <i>faith;</i> two determinations, which are reducible to a -single one. Because, if being is conceived as external to the human -spirit, and knowledge as separable from its object, so much so that the -object could be without being known, it is evident that the existence -of the object becomes a position, or something placed before the -spirit, given to the spirit, extraneous to it, which the spirit would -never appropriate to itself unless it were courageously to swallow the -bitter mouthful with an irrational act of faith. But all the philosophy -which we are now developing demonstrates that there is nothing external -to the spirit, and therefore there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> are no positions opposed to it. -These very conceptions of something external, mechanical, natural, have -shown themselves to be conceptions, not of external positions, but of -positions of the spirit itself, which creates the so-called external, -because it suits it to do so, as it suits it to annul this creation, -when it is no longer of use. On the other hand, it has never been -possible to discover in the circle of the spirit that mysterious and -unqualifiable faculty called <i>faith,</i> which is said to be an intuition -that intuites the universal, or a thinking of the universal, without -the logical process of thought. All that has been called faith has -revealed itself step by step as an act of knowledge or of will, as a -theoretic or as a practical form of the spirit.</p> - -<p>There is therefore no doubt that existence, if it be something that -is affirmed or denied, cannot be anything but a predicate; it can -only be asked what sort of predicate it is, that is to say, what is -the precise content or concept of existence, and this has already -been indicated or at least sketched in the preceding explications. -Objections have been made to the conceptual and predicative character -of existence, such as that which maintains that if it were a predicate -it would be necessary in the judgment "A is" to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> be able to think the -two terms—A and existence—separately, whereas in the thought of A, A -is already existentialized. But these objections show themselves to be -sophistical; because outside the judgment A is not thinkable, but only -representable, and therefore without existentiality, which predicate it -only acquires in the act of judgment.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Absurd consequences of those doctrines.</i></div> - -<p>For the rest, the difficulties that befall those who conceive -existentiality in the individual judgment as something <i>sui generis,</i> -are illustrated by the theory to which they find themselves led, of a -double kind of judgment, the existential and the categorical, without -their being able to justify this duality. This is at bottom the most -apparent manifestation of their more or less unconscious <i>metaphysical -dualism,</i> which assumes an object external to the spirit, and makes -the spirit apprehend it with an <i>act of faith</i> and afterwards reason -about it with an act of <i>thought.</i> Why not always continue with an act -of faith? Or why not also extend the act of thought to the initial -judgment? We have either to continue upon the same path, or to change -it altogether—this is the dilemma which imposes itself here.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The predicate of existence as not sufficing to constitute a -judgment.</i></div> - -<p>But in rejecting the double form of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> individual judgment, the one -existential, the other categorical, and in resolving both into the -single form, which is the categorical by making existence a predicate -among predicates, we must also explain for what reason (in reply to -the third of the questions into which we have divided the treatment -of existentiality) we now say that the predicate of existence does -not suffice to constitute the judgment. How can it fail to suffice? -If I say that "Peter is," or that "The Ægean is," have I not before -me a perfect judgment? and is it not simply a judgment of existence? -But here, too, we must repeat: <i>cave</i>; beware of the deceptions of -verbalism; think of things, not of words. The judgments adduced as an -example are so little judgments of existence that in them we speak of -the "Ægean" and of "Peter," and since we speak of them, it is clear -that we know that the Ægean, for example, is a sea, and what a sea -is, and so on; that Peter is a man, and a man made in this or that -way, an Italian and not a Bushman, thirty years old and not a month, -and so on. The merely representative element cannot be found in the -judgment by fixing it in a word, which, in so far as it forms part of -the judgment, is, like all the rest, penetrated with logical character; -and when we say that "Peter"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> is the subject and is representation, -and "existing" is the predicate, we speak in a general sort of way and -almost symbolically. If we are looking for the formula of the merely -existential judgment in relation to a representation, that is, of a -judgment which leaves the representation free from all other predicate -save that of existence, such a formula could only be <i>"Something -is."</i> But upon mature consideration this formula would no longer be -an individual judgment, since every logical transfiguration of the -individual and every individual determination of the universal would -not have been excluded: it would correspond neither more nor less than -to a judgment of definition which asserts that "something" (something -in general, indeterminate) "is" or that "reality is."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The predicate of judgment as the totality of the concept.</i></div> - -<p>But our theory concerning the indispensability of other predicates in -constituting the judgment is not to be understood as an affirmation -of the necessity that any <i>other</i> predicate of any sort should be -<i>added</i> to the predicate of existence, nor even that <i>all the others -possible</i> should be added to it. In the first case, we shall always -have an unjustifiable duality of predicates: that of existence and -that necessary for essentializing and completing the judgment; in -the second,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> duality would certainly be avoided, since to constitute -the judgment all the predicates would be necessary, without their -distinction into a double order, and all would be qualitative -predicates; but there would remain the idea of a successive addition -of predicates. Granted this idea, it is impossible ever to understand -what those acts would be, by which the first, or also the second, or -also the third predicate, and so on, should be attributed, without -yet attaining in such attributions the full totality of truth. They -are representations no longer; and not yet judgments: they are then -something insufficient and one-sided, whose existence could not be -admitted save arbitrarily (as in Psychology), and which, therefore, -would be inadmissible in Philosophy. It therefore only remains to -conclude that in the judgment, all possible predicates are <i>given in -one act</i> alone; that is, that the subject is predicated as existence, -and for this very reason determined in a particular way; determined in -a particular way, and for this very reason, as existence.</p> - -<p>In other words, the concept which is predicated in the individual -judgment is not and cannot be a fœtus or a sketch of a concept; -but is the whole concept, in its indivisible unity, as universal,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> -particular and singular. And if existence seem to be a first predicate, -the reason lies perhaps in this, that the concept of existence as -actuality and action, and in its distinction from mere possibility, is -perhaps the fundamental concept of the real, although on the other hand -it is not truly thinkable save as determined in the particular forms -of reality; hence that first predicate is first only in so far as it -contains the last, that is to say, is neither last nor first, but the -whole. To explain these statements is in any case, as has been said, -the task of the whole of Philosophy, not of Logic alone, which here, as -elsewhere, must rest satisfied with demonstrating the point that most -closely concerns it; that is to say, the impossibility of separating -from one another in the judgment, the predicates necessary for the -determination of the reality of the fact, the absence of any one of -which renders the judgment itself impossible.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_10" id="Footnote_1_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_10"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See the <i>Philosophy of the Practical,</i> pt. i. sect. ii. -ch. 6.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIb" id="VIb">VI</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE INDIVIDUAL PSEUDOCONCEPTS. CLASSIFICATION AND ENUMERATION</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Individual pseudojudgments.</i></div> - -<p>As pseudoconcepts imitate pure concepts and the corresponding judgments -of definition, so by means of them are imitated pure individual -judgments, and spiritual formations are obtained, which can be -conveniently called <i>individual pseudojudgments.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Their practical character.</i></div> - -<p>The character of these pseudojudgments, like that of the -pseudoconcepts, is not cognitive, but practical and more properly -mnemonic. Fixing our attention upon certain examples of such judgments, -if we say of an animal: "It is a squirrel," or "It is a platyrrhine -monkey"; if we say of a house: "This house is thirty metres high -and forty wide"; if of a painting we say: "The <i>Transfiguration</i> is -a sacred picture," or "The <i>Danaë</i> is a mythological picture"; or -if of a literary work we say, "The <i>Promessi Sposi</i> is a historical -romance";—what have we learned as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> to the true nature of the <i>Promessi -Sposi,</i> of the <i>Transfiguration,</i> of the <i>Danaë,</i> of that house and of -those animals? Upon close consideration, nothing at all. The animals -have been put into one or another compartment or glass case, decorated -with a name which might also be different from what it is, as the -compartment and the glass case might also be different; the house -has been compared in respect of its dimensions to other houses or to -an object arbitrarily assumed as the unit of measurement, which is -the metre, but which might be the foot, the palm, and so on; the two -pictures and the literary work have been looked at from the visual -angle of an arbitrary character, such as the mythological, religious -or historical subject. As to what they truly are, as to how all these -things came to be and to live, and as to their relation with other -things and with the Whole, we have been silent. Their <i>value,</i> as it is -called, remains unknown.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Genesis of the distinction between judgments of fact and -judgments of value; and criticism of them.</i></div> - -<p>This lack of all determination as to value, which is characteristic of -individual pseudoconcepts, gives support to the distinction between -judgments of <i>fact</i> (as individual pseudojudgments are sometimes -called) and judgments of <i>value;</i> a distinction which makes evident the -further need of supplying the spirit with what the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> first judgments -do not give, that is to say, with the meaning or value of things. But -since the individual pseudojudgments are not for us what they boast -themselves to be, judgments of fact, we have no need to complete them -with judgments of value; which would thus be themselves arbitrary (that -is to say, conceived extrinsically to the determination of fact). True -individual judgments are pure, and in them the universal penetrates the -individual and the determination of value coincides with that of fact. -In pseudojudgments there takes place no such penetration, but only the -mechanical <i>application</i> of a predicate to a subject; so much so, that -here is a true occasion for employing words which signify an extrinsic -placing side by side, a reunion, combination or aggregation of subject -with predicate.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Importance of the individual pseudojudgments.</i></div> - -<p>Having made this clear, it is superfluous to repeat that we do -not intend to remove, or even to attenuate, the due importance of -individual pseudojudgments, as we did not remove or attenuate that of -pseudoconcepts, when we defined them for what they are. And how can -we deny their importance, if each one of us create and employ them at -every instant, if each one of us strive to keep in order as best he -can the patrimony of his own knowledge? It is easier for a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> student to -work without notes and memoranda than for any one not to make use of -individual pseudojudgments. If I pass mentally in review the material -that must go to form the history of Italian painting or literature, I -must of necessity arrange it in works of greater or less importance, -in plays and novels, in sacred pictures and landscapes, and so on; -save when I wish to understand those facts historically, and then I -must abandon those divisions. I must abandon them during that act -of comprehension; but I must immediately resume them, if I wish to -give the result of my historical research; and in this exposition it -will be impossible for me to avoid saying that Manzoni, after having -composed <i>five sacred hymns</i> and <i>two tragedies,</i> set to work upon a -historical <i>romance</i>; or that <i>landscape painting</i> was developed in the -seventeenth century. These words are necessary instruments for swift -understanding, and only a philosophical pedant could propose to expel -them. In like manner, if I wish to buy a house, I shall visit several -houses and arrange them in memory, according to the situation, their -arrangement, their size and other characteristics, all formulated in -pseudojudgments. I shall have to abandon all of these in the act of -choice, for then the house that I shall choose will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> possess one only -characteristic: that of being the one that suits my wants, that is -to say, the one <i>that pleases me.</i> But I shall again have to employ -those abstract characteristics, in my conversation with the person who -sells it to me and in the contract that I make; there I shall speak, -not only of my will and pleasure, but also of a house thirty metres -high and forty wide, and so on. The same must be said of the squirrels -and platyrrhine monkeys, which I cannot contrive to see in a museum -or zoological garden, unless I describe them in that way; and I shall -continue so to describe them, although those abstract characteristics -have no definite value, either in permitting me to describe those -animals with accuracy, or in making me understand their meaning in the -universe, or in the history of the cosmos.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirical individual judgments and abstract individual -judgments.</i></div> - -<p>But in proceeding further to determine the differential characteristics -presented by pseudojudgments in contrast with individual judgments, it -is necessary to consider them according to the double form, empirical -and abstract, assumed by pseudoconcepts, thus distinguishing them as -empirical individual judgments and abstract individual judgments.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Process of formation of empirical judgments.</i></div> - -<p>In comparing empirical individual judgments<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> with pure individual -judgments—for example, "The <i>Transfiguration</i> is a sacred picture," an -empirical judgment, and "The <i>Transfiguration</i> is an æsthetic work," a -pure judgment—the first thing to note is that the empirical individual -judgment presupposes the pure individual judgment. We already know -that pseudoconcepts, empirical or abstract, presuppose the idea of -the pure concept; but that idea does not suffice for the formation of -determinate empirical concepts, which can be employed as predicates of -empirical judgments. We must not only think effectively these or those -pure concepts, but they must be translated into individual judgments. -Were this not so, where would empirical concepts obtain their material? -Before the judgment: "The <i>Transfiguration</i> is a sacred picture," can -be pronounced, we must first have the empirical concept of "sacred -picture." Now this empirical concept (setting aside the fact that it -presupposes other empirical concepts which we do not here take into -account, because they would complicate the problem without aiding -the solution that we wish to give) presupposes in its turn the pure -concept of "æsthetic work"; and it is only when a certain number, more -or less large, of artistic works have been recognized as such,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> that -is, when pure individual judgments concerning them have been formed, -that we can abstract the characteristics and pass to the formation -of the pseudoconcepts: sacred, historical, mythological pictures, -landscapes, and so on. Having obtained these, then, and only then when -we stand before an æsthetic work, for example, the <i>Transfiguration,</i> -and formulate again the pure individual judgment which recognizes it -as such ("The <i>Transfiguration</i> is an æsthetic work"), are we enabled -finally to apply the pseudoconcept and to pronounce the empirical -judgment: "The <i>Transfiguration</i> is a sacred picture."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its foundation in existence.</i></div> - -<p>The consequence of the process here recognized as to the manner in -which individual empirical judgments are formed, and in virtue of which -they have pure judgments as their base, is that empirical judgments -also in the last analysis are based upon the concept of existentiality. -Pseudoconcepts of possibility are not formed, because possibilities are -infinite, and it would be vain, or of no mnemonic use, to fix types of -them. When, as sometimes occurs, such types seem to be formed outside -of all existence, their appearance serves, not a mnemonic purpose, -but a purpose of research.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> This is the case with hypotheses and with -other provisional methods of thought. But the empirical judgment is -related to the individual or existential judgment, and it also employs -pseudoconcepts of existential origin. For this reason, when giving -examples of judgments of existence in the preceding chapter, we availed -ourselves without scruple of empirical judgments also; for these obey -the same law in relation to existentiality. "This animal is a monkey" -implies, not only the existence of the animal taken as subject of the -judgment; but also of that class of animals, of which the character has -been abstracted, and the complex of characteristics which under the -name of a monkey fulfil the function of predicate. An animal that does -not exist and a class of animals that does not exist are not reducible -to subject and predicate, and do not give rise to judgment of any sort.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Dependence of empirical judgments upon pure judgments.</i></div> - -<p>Another consequence is that empirical concepts and judgments are -continually originated and modified by pure individual judgments. -The object of empirical concepts and judgments is to maintain the -possession and the easy use of our knowledge; and this with no other -end than that of serving as base for our actions, and thus also as -a means of attaining new knowledge.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> New knowledge is expressed in -new pure individual judgments, which in their turn supply material -for the elaboration of new empirical concepts and judgments. In this -way empirical concepts and judgments must be and continually are -renewed, by being dipped in the waters of pure individual judgments, -true judgments of reality. From these waters they issue forth with -youth renewed. If they do not do this, the worse for them: they fall -ill, waste away and die. Given a rapid and profound revolution of -thought, or, as it is also called, a transvaluation of all the values -of life and reality, we should also have at once a no less rapid and -profound transformation of all the empirical concepts and judgments -previously possessed and employed. But this is continually occurring -in the life of the spirit, if not in cataclysmic form, then in a more -modest way. For example, who now employs the empirical concept of -phlogiston, or forms judgments based upon it, now that we no longer -admit the existence of that element, which was at one time believed to -be separated from combustible bodies in the act of combustion? Who now -says (save in jest) that such and such a syllogism is in <i>bramantip</i> or -in <i>fresison,</i> or that a certain part of a speech is an <i>ornatum</i> or -a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> <i>hypotyposis,</i> now that we no longer believe the facts upon which -such concepts of the old Logic and Rhetoric were based? Who still -distinguishes human destinies according to the <i>conjunctions</i> of the -stars that presided at birth, as was done when astrology was believed?</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirical judgments as classification.</i></div> - -<p>The empirical judgment, in so far as it applies a predicate to a -subject supplied by the pure individual judgment, makes that subject -<i>enter</i> that predicate, which is a <i>type</i> or <i>class</i>; and therefore it -<i>classifies</i> the subjects of individual judgments. Thus we may also -call empirical judgments, judgments of <i>classification.</i> This explains -why the judgment has sometimes been considered to be nothing but a -relation of subordination: for the empirical judgment does indeed -subordinate a representation (which has first been logically determined -by the individual judgment) to an empirical concept; that is, it places -it in a class.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Classification and intelligence.</i></div> - -<p><i>Classification</i> is an essential function, for the reasons already -given, which it would be useless to repeat; but to classify is not -to <i>realize intellectually,</i> to understand, to grasp, to comprehend. -If therefore, in life, we disapprove of those unmethodical people -who detest classification, we do not disapprove any the less of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> -perpetual classifiers, who content themselves with arranging things in -classes, when on the contrary the needful thing is to penetrate their -nature and peculiar value. It is a very common error to believe that -something has been thoroughly understood and every problem relating to -it completely solved, when it has simply been put into a drawer, that -is, into a class. Thus in the not distant past, instead of establishing -whether the <i>Promessi Sposi</i> were or were not an æsthetic work, and -what movement of the spirit it represents, it was considered to be the -duty of criticism to enquire whether that book were a romance or a -novel, a historical or didactic romance, a historical representation -of persons or of environment, and so on. The zoologist too, instead of -studying the history and transformations of animals, their life and -habits, limited himself to adding a rare specimen to a variety, or a -variety to a subspecies, or a subspecies to a species, and believed -that by so doing he had completely fulfilled the function of science.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Interchange of the two, and genesis of perceptive and -judicial illusions.</i></div> - -<p>The abuse of empirical or classificatory judgments is not less in -relation to perception, which, as we know, is nothing but the series of -individual judgments. It frequently happens that when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> entering upon -the discussion of real facts, and having in mind groups and series of -pseudoconcepts, we hastily form empirical judgments, which take the -place of pure individual judgments and are taken in exchange for them. -From these exchanges have arisen certain famous controversies about -the truth of perception, such as that indicated by the instance of the -stick immersed in water, which seems to the eye to be broken, whereas -it is whole and straight. The usual answer to such a view is that the -error lies in the judgment, since perception as perception is never -wrong. This answer is not altogether correct, since the perception -is a judgment, and if the judgment is wrong, the perception also is -wrong. On the contrary, the error is not in the judgment, but in the -prejudice that the stick in question is in reality straight, and that -when immersed in water the genuine reality is disturbed by a new -element; as though the stick outside the water possessed greater or -less reality than when immersed in the water. This error arises from -the construction of the empirical concept of "stick," taken as a true -and proper concept, so that when the stick is immersed in water and -seems to be broken it seems not to answer to its true concept. Strictly -speaking, the perception of the stick as broken or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> otherwise altered -is not less true than that of the straight stick; the absurdity, -occasioned by the empirical concept, arises from seeking the true -perception among various perceptions, in order to make of it the basis -and foundation of the others declared illusory. This error would seem -to be of slight importance, so long at least as it is a matter of a -stick; but it entails most serious consequences, since it is owing to -similar errors that outside the Spirit there has come to be posited -<i>the Thing in itself.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Abstract concepts and individual judgments.</i></div> - -<p>Passing from the empirical to the abstract concepts, if these latter -presuppose the pure concept, they do not on the other hand presuppose -individual judgments. For example, in order to form the concepts of -numerical series, or of geometrical figures, it is not necessary to -know individual things. Those concepts are abstract, just because they -are without any representative content, and therefore no representative -element is required for their formation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of direct application of the first to the -second.</i></div> - -<p>But if this be so, it is clear that they cannot alone be translated -into individual pseudojudgments. They will certainly give rise to -judgments of definition (though always arbitrary and abstract), but -not to individual judgments. And in truth numerical and geometrical -series is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> applicable to individual facts, as affirmed in -individual judgments. These are at the same time different and yet -inter-connected, in such a way that the one is somehow in the other. -The application of numerical series or geometrical figures implies -that we have before us <i>homogeneous</i> objects (or objects which have -been made homogeneous, which amounts to the same thing). Things -qualitatively different elude such procedure: we cannot add up a cow, -an oak, and a poem. It may be urged that all things have this at least -in common, that they are <i>things</i> and can therefore be enumerated as -such. But things, as such, or things in general are innumerable, being -infinite; which amounts to saying that the series of things in general -is the same as numerical series. Doubtless numerical series can be -constituted; but our enquiry concerns the possibility of making direct -applications of numbers to the individual; that is to say, whether or -not they give rise to <i>abstract</i> individual judgments. We must reply -to this question in the negative. The formula "abstract individual -judgments" is itself a contradiction in terms; for the individual taken -in itself can never be abstract, nor the abstract ever individual, even -through a practical fiction.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Intervention of empirical judgments as intermediaries. -Reduction of the heterogeneous to the homogeneous.</i></div> - -<p>The consequence of this demonstration is then<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> that if abstract -concepts can be applied to individual judgments (and they are as -a fact applied), there must be an intermediary which makes the -application possible. The Individual empirical judgments are just such -an intermediary. They reduce the heterogeneous to the homogeneous -and prepare the ground for the application of the abstract concepts -and for the formation of their corresponding pseudojudgments. These -are therefore more correctly termed empirico-abstract judgments -than individual-abstract judgments. Empirical and empirico-abstract -judgments cannot then be presented as two co-ordinate classes of the -individual pseudojudgment. They are two forms, of which the second is -evolved from the first.</p> - -<p>The reduction of the <i>heterogeneous</i> to the <i>homogeneous</i> is effected -by means of the procedure already discussed, by the formation of -classes and classification with them as basis. Individual varieties, -which escape all numerical application, are thus subdued, and we obtain -in exchange things belonging to the same class, as for example oaks, -cows, men, ploughs, plays, pictures, and so on. These things are finite -in number (as we already know from our analysis of the representative -elements contained in a determinate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> empirical concept) and can -therefore be numbered. Thus we can finally arrive at pronouncing the -empirico-abstract judgments: "These cows number one hundred," "these -oaks are three hundred in number," "there are four hundred houses in -this village," "it contains two thousand inhabitants," "there are two -ploughs in this field," and so on. Or we can say elliptically: "100 -cows," "300 oaks," "400 houses," "2000 inhabitants," "2 ploughs," and -so on, as is done in statistics and inventories.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirico-abstract judgments and enumeration (measurement, -etc.).</i></div> - -<p>If the procedure proper to individual judgments has been described -as <i>classification,</i> that of empirico-abstract judgments is rightly -called<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> <i>enumeration.</i> Enumeration also makes possible another -procedure, known as <i>measurement,</i> and what has been said by way of -example about abstract concepts of number must be repeated <i>mutatis -mutandis</i> of geometrical figures, which are employed as instruments -of measurement. The procedure of measurement is somewhat more -complicated; enumeration and measurement are related to one another as -are arithmetical and geometrical concepts, but substantially they come -to the same thing. The definition sometimes given of measurement can -be extended to enumeration in general, namely, that it is <i>qualitative -quantity</i> applied to quality, strictly speaking, to quality rendered -homogeneous by the process of classification. The empirico-abstract -judgments are in fact qualitative-quantitative.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Enumeration and intelligence.</i></div> - -<p>If classification does not imply understanding things and assigning -to them their value, neither does enumeration imply intelligence -and comprehension, because it consists of a manipulation, which is -altogether extrinsic and indifferent to the quality of the things -enumerated. That given objects are capable of enumeration or measurable -as ioo, or iooo, or 10,000 reveals nothing as to their character. It is -only as the result of gross illusion that value is sometimes believed -to be a function of number, and that value increases or diminishes with -the increase or diminution of number. The common saying that number is -not quality is a good answer to that illusion.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>So-called conversion of quantity into quality.</i></div> - -<p>A mental fact, afterwards called the transition from <i>quantity</i> to -<i>quality,</i> or the conversion of quantity into quality, has certainly -been known since ancient times. This transition finds a parallel in -those logical diversions, in which, granted the admission, apparently -as legitimate as it is slight, that by the removal of a single hair -from the head of a luxuriantly haired individual, that individual does -not become bald, or that by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> the removal of a single grain from a heap, -the heap does not disappear, one hair or one grain after another is -removed, and he of the luxuriant locks becomes bald and for the heap -is substituted the bare ground. But the error is in reality contained -entirely in the first admission. A man with a head of hair or a heap -of grain are what they are, so long as nothing in them is changed. The -change of quantity is translated into change of quality, not because -the first concept is constitutive of the second, but, on the contrary, -because the second is constitutive of the first. Quantity has been -obtained, measurement has been effected, by starting from quality, -determined in the pure individual judgment and made homogeneous in the -empirical judgment, which is the basis of the judgment of enumeration -and of measurement. Thus quality constitutes the only real content -of the abstract quantitative concept. By the taking away of the hair -or the grain, <i>quality</i> itself is changed through the <i>quantitative -formula.</i> That is to say, quantity does not pass into quality, but one -quality passes into another quality. Quantity, taken by itself, as an -abstract determination, is impotent in presence of the real.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mathematical space and time and their abstraction.</i></div> - -<p>A final observation, suggested by the difference between pure -individual judgments (or judgments<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> of reality and value, if it please -you so to call them), and quantitative or empirico-abstract judgments, -is that the entire conception of things as occupying various portions -of <i>space</i> and following one another in a <i>discontinuous</i> manner, -<i>separated</i> from one another in <i>time,</i> is derived from the last type -of pseudojudgments, namely the quantitative. It is an <i>alteration</i> -effected for practical ends from the ingenuous view offered by pure -perception. To show, as we have shown, the genesis of quantitative -judgments and so of mathematical space and time, amounts to describing -their nature and giving their definition. It amounts to revealing them -as thoughts of <i>abstractions,</i> which are not to be confounded with real -thought, or with genuine thought of reality. The Kantian concept of the -<i>ideality</i> of <i>time</i> and <i>space</i> gives the same result. This doctrine -is among the greatest discoveries of history, and should be accepted -by every philosophy worthy of the name. In accepting it ourselves, we -make but one reservation (justified by the proofs given above), namely, -that the character of mathematical space and time should be called not -ideality (because ideality is true reality), but rather <i>unreality</i> or -<i>abstract ideality,</i> or, as we prefer to call it, <i>abstractness.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="THIRD_SECTION" id="THIRD_SECTION">THIRD SECTION</a></h4> - - -<h3>IDENTITY OF THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT THE LOGICAL <i>A -PRIORI</i> SYNTHESIS</h3> - -<hr /> -<h4><a id="Ic"></a>I</h4> - - -<h5><a name="IDENTITY_OF_THE_JUDGMENT_OF_DEFINITION_PURE_CONCEPT_AND_OF_THE" id="IDENTITY_OF_THE_JUDGMENT_OF_DEFINITION_PURE_CONCEPT_AND_OF_THE">IDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE -INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT</a></h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Result of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and -the individual judgment.</i></div> - -<p>The descent, as we have called it, from the pure concept to the -intuition, or the examination of the relations which are established -between the concept and the intuitions, when we have attained the -first, and of the ensuing transformations, to which the second are -subject, might at first sight seem complete. The concept, which was -first contemplated in abstraction, has been demonstrated in a more -concrete manner, in so far as it takes the form of language and exists -as the judgment of definition. Further, we have shown how, when thus -concretely possessed, it reacts<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> upon the intuitions from which it was -formed, or how it is applied to them, as it is called, giving rise -to the individual or perceptive judgment. The transition from the -intuitions to the concept, and so to the expression of the concept or -the judgment of definition, and from this to the individual judgment, -has been followed and demonstrated in its logical necessity. Thus the -two distinct forms are also united, the first being the presupposition -and base of the second, so that the connection seems at first sight to -be perfect. The judgment of definition is not an individual judgment; -but the individual judgment implies a previous judgment of definition. -To think the concept of man does not mean that the man Peter exists. -But if we affirm that the man Peter exists, we must first have affirmed -that the concept of man exists, or is thought.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction between the two: truth of reason and truth of -fact, necessary and contingent, etc., formal and material.</i></div> - -<p>The distinction between the two forms, the judgment of definition and -the individual judgment, is universally recognized. Not only can it be -found, as has already been noted, in at least one of the significations -which have been attached to the two classes of judgments, analytic and -synthetic, but it is even more clearly expressed in the well-known -distinction between <i>truth of reason</i> and <i>truth of fact,</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> between -<i>necessary truths</i> and <i>contingent</i> truths, between truths <i>a priori</i> -and truths <i>a posteriori,</i> between what is <i>logically</i> and what is -<i>historically</i> affirmed. Indeed, it is only on the basis of this -distinction that it seems possible to give any content to the logical -doctrine, which recognizes the possibility of propositions true <i>in -form</i> and false <i>in fact.</i> This doctrine, as usually stated, is -altogether untenable. It is impossible, above all, to maintain that -formal truth can be distinguished from effective truth, always assuming -that "form" is understood in its philosophical sense and not in that of -formalist Logic, where it indicates an arbitrarily fixed externality, -which, as such, is neither true nor false. It is therefore impossible -to maintain that one and the same proposition can be true in one -respect and false in another; for a proposition can be judged only -from one point of view, which is that of its unique signification and -value. But it is clear that once we admit the distinction between truth -of reason and truth of fact, affirmations of both kinds might be found -incorporated in the same verbal proposition, one of them false and the -other true. For example, that the saying of Cambronne, "The Guard dies -and never surrenders," is a "sublime saying" is formally (rationally) -true, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> it is materially (as fact) false, because Cambronne did not -utter those words. On the other hand, that the <i>Assedio di Fiorenze</i> of -Guerrazzi is "a very beautiful book, because it inflamed many youthful -bosoms with love of country," is materially (as fact) true, but it is -formally (rationally) false, because the fact of its having produced -such an effect is not proof of the beauty of a book, since beauty does -not consist of practical efficacy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Absurdities arising from these distinctions; the individual -judgment as ultralogical.</i></div> - -<p>Yet, notwithstanding the apparently glaring distinction between the -judgment of definition and the individual judgment, between truth -of reason and truth of fact; notwithstanding its secular celebrity -and its confirmation by universal agreement and common usage, this -distinction meets with a very grave difficulty. In order to understand -it, we must, above all, establish clearly what we have just stated -in positing that distinction and in making the individual judgment -or truth of fact <i>follow</i> the judgment of definition or truth of -reason. We have already posited a distinction of this kind between -intuition and concept, and have noted that we have thus distinguished -two fundamental forms of the Spirit: the representative or fantastic -form, and the logical. Now, in positing as distinct the judgment of -definition and the individual judgment,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> do we mean to do something -analogous? Do we mean to distinguish the logical form (concept or -definition) from another form, no longer logical, although containing -the logical form in itself as overcome and subordinate, in the same way -that the concept contains in itself the intuition? In other words, is -the individual judgment something <i>ultralogical</i>? It can certainly be -asserted that it is not mere definition; but can it be asserted that -it is not logical? The words used should not lead to misconception. If -in the individual judgment the subject be a representation, it is also -true that this representation is not found there as it would be found -in æsthetic contemplation, but as subject of a judgment, and therefore -not as a representation pure and simple, but as a representation -thought, or made logical. Hegel has several times remarked that whoever -doubts the unity of individual and universal can never have paid -attention to the judgments which he utters at every instant. In these, -by means of the copula, he resolutely affirms that Peter <i>is</i> a man, -or that the individual (the subject) <i>is</i> the universal (predicate); -not something different, not a piece or fragment, but just that, the -universal. Further, are not truths of fact also truths of reason? Would -it not be irrational to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> think that a fact was not the fact it had -been? The existence of Cæsar and of Napoleon is not less <i>rational</i> -than that of quality and of becoming. And are not both kinds of facts -equally necessary—those called contingent not less than those called -necessary? We are right to laugh at those who like to think that things -could have happened otherwise than they have happened. Cæsar and -Napoleon are as necessary as quality and becoming.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>or duality of logical forms.</i></div> - -<p>It follows from these considerations (which could be easily multiplied) -that the individual judgment is not less logical than that of -definition. Truths of fact, contingent and <i>a posteriori,</i> are not -less logical than those of reason, necessary and <i>a priori.</i> But if -this be so, the distinction between the two forms would not be a -distinction between forms of the spirit, but a subdistinction within -the logical form of the spirit: a subdistinction of which we have -already denied the possibility. For it is not clear how a logical -thought, or thought of the universal, can be <i>two</i> thinkings, one in -one way, one in another: one universal of the universal, the other -universal of the individual. Either the first is void, or the second is -improper. Intuition and concept are distinguished as individual from -universal; but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> that universal should be distinguished from universal -by the introduction of individuality as element of differentiation is -inconceivable.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Difficulty of abandoning the distinction.</i></div> - -<p>The difficulty becomes greater from the equal inconceivability and -impossibility of abandoning the result reached above, by which the -individual judgment was shown to be possible only by means of a concept -or judgment of definition. Every attempt that may be made to cancel -that presupposition and to reconceive the individual or perceptive -judgment as preceding the concept and being altogether without logical -character, a mere assertion of fact, unenlightened by universality, -must be considered, for the reasons we have given, to be entirely -vain. If we cannot admit a duality of logical forms, still less can we -admit that an alogical character, below the level of logic altogether, -attaches to the individual judgment.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The hypothesis of reciprocal implication and so of the -identity of the two forms.</i></div> - -<p>There seems to be but one way out of such a difficulty: namely, -to preserve the result attained, that is to say, the necessity of -the judgment of definition as the presupposition of the individual -judgment, but to affirm at the same time the necessity of the -individual judgment as the presupposition of the judgment of -definition. Admitting this supposition by way of hypothesis,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> let us -see what it would mean and what effect it would have in the discussion. -Since the one judgment presupposes the other, and this presupposition -is reciprocal, we could no longer talk of distinction between the two, -but of unity pure and simple, of <i>identity,</i> in which distinction -could arise only by abstraction and the arbitrary act of dividing -what cannot exist save as indivisible. But, on the other hand, the -distinction, although abstract, would always retain its value as a -didactic means of making clear the true nature of the logical act. Thus -we should justify our first proceeding to develop the concept and the -judgment of definition and then the individual judgment, and also the -reservation that we have always made as to the provisional nature of -such distinction, and thus also the new question as to the unity of the -act, put and answered in the way proposed. All the difficulties arising -from the appearance of a duality of logical forms would disappear. -Definitions and individual judgments, truth of reason and truth of -fact, necessity and contingency, <i>a priori</i> and <i>a posteriori,</i> would -be revealed as one act and one truth. And we should also be justified -in talking of them as distinct acts, for in expressing that single -truth and single judgment verbally or in literature, we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> can attach -greater importance now to the definition, and now to the statement of -fact; now to the subject, and now to the predicate.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Objection: the lack of an historical and representative -element in definitions.</i></div> - -<p>This path, which would offer such advantages and would constitute a -true way out of the difficulty, seems, however, to be closed to us by -the fact that in definitions there is no trace whatever of individual -judgments which, on this hypothesis, would have to be contained within -and be one with them. If we say "the will is the practical form of the -spirit," or "virtue is the habit of moral actions," where is to be -found in such statements the individual judgment and the representative -element? We find in them without doubt the verbal form, expressive and -representative, which is necessary to the concept for its concrete -existence; but we do not find the statement of fact of which we are -in search. Thus the proposed hypothesis will prove very ingenious and -rich with all the advantages that we have stated; but since it does not -appear to be confirmed by facts, we must, it seems, reject it, even at -the risk of having to think out a better one, or, if we fail in this, -of renouncing as desperate the attempt at a solution.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The historical element in definitions, taken in their -concreteness.</i></div> - -<p>We must not, however, be in a hurry, but rather carefully recall the -observation just made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> incidentally: that the verbal or literary form -can throw into <i>relief</i> a moment of the judgment, while casting a -shadow over the other and causing it to be forgotten, without thereby -ever being able to suppress it. There seemed, we remember, to be no -trace of concepts in perceptive judgments or judgments of fact, and -especially in those forms of them which are called merely existential -and in those called impersonal. Yet there can be no doubt that none -of those judgments is ever possible without the concept as basis. An -analysis which does not allow itself to be arrested by appearances -and examines verbal forms as regards both what they express and what -they leave to be understood (though this too is expressed in its own -way) has discovered it. Similarly a definition does not exist in the -air, as might appear from the examples given in treatises, in which -the <i>where</i> and the <i>when</i> and the <i>individual</i> and the <i>actual -circumstances</i> in which the definition has been given are omitted. In a -definition thus presented, it would certainly be impossible to discover -a representative element and an individual judgment. But the reason for -this is that it has been mutilated and made abstract and indeterminate, -to such an extent that it can be made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> determinate only by the meaning -which he to whom it is communicated likes to attach to it. If, on the -contrary, we look at the definition in its concrete reality, we shall -<i>always</i> find in it when we examine it with care the <i>representative -element</i> and the <i>individual judgment.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The definition as answer to a question and solution of a -problem.</i></div> - -<p>For every definition is the answer to a question, the solution of a -problem. Did we not ask questions and set problems, there would be -no occasion for giving any definition. Why should we give them? What -need could there be? The definition is an act of the spirit and every -act of the spirit is conditioned. Without contradiction, there can -be no agreement; without the shock of multiplicity there can be no -unity; without the travail of doubt that calls for peace, there can be -no affirmation of the true. Not only does the answer presuppose the -question; but every answer implies a certain question. The answer must -be in harmony with the question; otherwise, it would not be an answer, -but the avoiding of an answer. In reply to a question of a certain -kind, we should turn our deaf ear, as the saying is, or reply with a -blow. This means that the nature of the question colours the answer -and that a definition taken in its concreteness is determined by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> -problem which gives it rise. The definition varies with the problem.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Individual and historical conditionedness of every question -and problem.</i></div> - -<p>But the question, the problem, the doubtis always individually conditioned. The doubt of the child is not that -of the adult, the doubt of the uncultured man is not that of the man of -culture, or the doubt of the novice that of the learned. Further, the -doubt of an Italian is not that of a German, and the doubt of a German -of the year 1800 is not that of a German of the year 1900. Indeed, -the doubt formulated by an individual in a given moment, is not that -formulated by the same individual a moment after. It is sometimes said -by way of simplification, that the same question has been put by very -many men, in various countries and at various times. But in the very -act of saying this, we simplify. In reality, every question differs -from every other question. Every definition, though it may seem to -be the same and bounded with certain definite words, which seem to -remain unchanged and constant, differs in reality from every other, -because the words, even when they seem to be materially the same, -are in effect different, according to the spiritual differences of -those who pronounce them. Each of these is an individual, and on that -account each finds<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> himself in circumstances that are individually -determined. "Virtue is the habit of moral actions," is a formula which -can be pronounced a hundred times. But if it be seriously pronounced -as a definition of virtue each of those hundred times, it answers to -a hundred psychological situations, more or less different, and is in -reality not <i>one,</i> but <i>a hundred</i> definitions.</p> - -<p>It will be replied that the concept remains the same through all these -definitions, like a man who changes his clothes a hundred times. But -(setting aside the fact that even the man who changes his clothes a -hundred times does not remain the same) the truth is that the relation -between concept and definition is not the same as that between a man -and his clothes. No concept exists save in so far as it is thought and -enclosed in words, or in so far as it is defined. If the definitions -vary, the concept itself varies. There are, certainly, variations -of the concept, of that which is, <i>par excellence,</i> self-identical. -These are the life of the concept, not of the representation. But the -concept does not exist outside its life, and every thinking of it is a -phase of this life, never its overcoming, since however far we go, it -is never possible to swim<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> outside water, or however high we climb, to -fly outside air.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The definition as also historical judgment. Unity of truths -of reason and of fact.</i></div> - -<p>If we posit individual or historical conditions for every thinking of -the concept, or of every definition (conditions which constitute the -doubt, the problem, the question, to which the definition replies), -we must admit that the definition, which contains the answer and -affirms the concept, at the same time illumines by so doing those -individual and historical conditions, that group of facts, from which -it comes. It illumines, that is to say, qualifies it as what it is, -grasps it as subject by giving it a predicate, and judges it. And -since the fact is always individual, it forms an individual judgment. -This means just that every definition is also an individual judgment. -And this agrees with the hypothesis we framed: it is the assumption -that seemed doubtful and now is proved. Truth of reason and truth of -fact, analytic and synthetic judgments, judgments of definition and -individual judgments, do not exist as distinct from one another: they -are abstractions. The logical act is unique: it is the identity of -definition and of individual judgment, the thinking of the pure concept.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Considerations confirming this.</i></div> - -<p>Such a theory as this, although it goes against the ordinary way -of thinking (though this, in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> turn, suffers from its own -contradictions), can be made convincing even to ordinary thought, -when it is led to reflect upon what is implicitly understood in any -judgments of definition that are pronounced. For example, definitions -have always in view some particular adversary; they change according to -time and circumstances, and those definitions that we felt constrained -to give, at one stage of our mental development, we abandon at another, -not because we judge them to be erroneous, but because they seem to -us to be inopportune or commonplace. These and other facts, easy to -observe, would not be possible, unless judgment of definite situations -intervened to produce the change. And this judgment, though we may try -to think of it as preceding or as following each one of those acts of -definition, in reality neither precedes nor follows them, but on the -contrary presents itself to the mind as contemporaneous, or rather -coincident and identical with the act of definition. Every one who -attains to a conceptual truth, every one, for instance, who achieves -a definite doctrine of art or of morality, is immediately aware in -himself that henceforth he knows more adequately not only the kingdom -of ideas but also the kingdom of things. He realizes that as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> soon as -an idea becomes more clear <i>ipso facto</i> it makes clearer the things out -of whose vortex and tumult it comes. The star-gazer who forgets the -earth, will be an astronomer, but certainly not a philosopher. In the -act of thought, in the world of ideas, earth and sky are fused in one. -Whoever looks well at the sky sees in it (miraculously!) the earth.</p> - -<p>For the rest, the identity of definition and individual judgment, which -we have demonstrated by various processes that are usually called -negative, hypothetical, or inductive and based upon observation, is -also confirmed by the process called deductive. For if the thinking -of the concept be a degree superior to pure representation, and if in -the degrees of the spirit the superior contain in itself the inferior, -it is evident that representation as well as conceptual elements must -always be found in the concept. But it is also evident that we can -never find them distinct or distinguishable, but mingled in such a -way that every distinction in them must be introduced solely by a -deliberate act. The logical act is certainly spoken, represented, -individualized. But when it is split up into concept and individual -judgment, one of two things must happen: either we make an empirical -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> external distinction, of more or less; or two monstrosities are -asserted: a non-individualized concept, which therefore does not exist, -and a judgment not thought, and therefore non-existent as judgment, and -existing, at the most, as pure intuition.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Critique of the false distinction between formal and -material truths.</i></div> - -<p>As our distinction between definitions and individual judgments was -provisional, so also we must regard the consequence that we showed -to issue from it—the partial justification of the doctrine of -affirmations formally (logically) true and materially (individually) -false. In reality, an error of fact implies a more or less inaccurate -and erroneous definition, and an error of definition implies an error -of fact. Thus this distinction also retains only an empirical meaning -useful for the rough distinction of certain classes of errors from -certain others. And resuming another previous observation, we must -also say that, strictly speaking, it must be held impossible to err as -to facts through the use of pure concepts, since the penetration of -concepts, however great one may think it, is also always penetration -of facts. This formula, too, cannot have anything but an empirical -meaning, to indicate a certain type of errors of concept and of fact, -which is popularly called the use of concepts and the use of facts, -whereas it is the abuse of both.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Platonic and Aristotelian men.</i></div> - - -<p>In ordinary life it is customary to distinguish between those who -cultivate ideas and those who cultivate facts, between <i>Platonic</i> and -<i>Aristotelian</i> men. But if the Platonists seriously cultivate ideas, -they cultivate facts and are also Aristotelians, and the Aristotelians -cultivate ideas and are Platonists. Here, too, the difference is -practical and extrinsic, not substantial; so much so that we are often -astonished both at the singular clear-sightedness and penetration of -the actual situation manifested by cultivators of ideas, and at the -profound philosophy which we discover in the pretended cultivators of -facts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Theory of the application of the concepts, true for -abstract concepts and false for pure concepts.</i></div> - - -<p>Hence the further consequence, that we must avoid the formula which -speaks of the <i>application</i> of concepts, as, for instance, that in -the individual judgment the concept is applied to the intuition. To -say this, is, as a saying, innocuous, since like many others, it is -metaphorical; but the doctrine implied in it, or that may be suggested -by it (and that is indeed rarely separated from it), is altogether -erroneous. The concept is not applied to the intuition, because it -does not exist, even for a moment, outside of the intuition, and the -judgment is a <i>primitive act</i> of the spirit, it is the logical spirit -itself. If that formula has been successful, the reason for its success -must usually<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> be sought in the theory of the pseudoconcepts. Even -these, in relation to the question which engages us now, and in so far -as they are empirical concepts, are indistinguishable from individual -pseudojudgments. To construct an empirical concept is equivalent to -pronouncing that the objects <i>a, b, c, d,</i> etc., belong to a definite -class. The two acts of the construction of the class and of effectual -classification are only to be distinguished in an abstract manner. In -conformity with this, we must now correct the theory that we have given -above. But on the other hand, in so far as they are abstract concepts, -they are void of all representative content, and therefore constituted -outside of every individual judgment. They cannot of themselves give -rise to such judgments. Before they can be united to them, we must -<i>apply them</i> to individual judgments, elaborated into pseudojudgments, -or made homogeneous by the process of classification. And in truth, -'not only the doctrine of application, but also the distinctions -between analytic and synthetic judgments, between definitions and -perceptions, between truths of reason and of fact, between necessity -and contingency, find their confirmation in being referred to abstract -concepts, as distinct from empirical. The same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> may be also said of -the other doctrine, which distinguishes between affirmations that are -formally true and materially false. Two griffins plus three griffins -make five griffins. This is formally true, since it is true that two -plus three equals five; but it is materially false, because griffins -do not exist. Numbers and their laws would, for example, be truths -of reason, necessary, <i>a priori,</i> in analytical judgments and pure -definitions; truths derived from experience would be truths of fact, -contingent, <i>a posteriori,</i> in synthetic and individual judgments. But -though this conception may have currency in a field where, properly -speaking, there is neither thought nor truth, in the field of truth -and of thought the terms of both series are found in the corresponding -terms of the other. Analysis apart from synthesis is as unthinkable -as synthesis apart from analysis. In the same way we can empirically -distinguish intention and action in the practical spirit. But in -reality pure intention outside effectual action, is not even intention, -because it is nothing. And an action beyond and without intention is -nothing, for practical reality is the identity of intention and action. -Here, too, theoretical spirit and practical spirit correspond at every -point.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIc" id="IIc">II</a></h4> - -<h5>THE LOGICAL, <i>A PRIORI</i> SYNTHESIS</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The identity of the judgment of definition and of the -individual judgment, as synthesis a priori.</i></div> - -<p>If analysis apart from synthesis, the <i>a priori</i> apart from the <i>a -posteriori,</i> be inconceivable, and if synthesis apart from analysis, -the <i>a posteriori</i> apart from the <i>a priori,</i> be equally inconceivable, -then the true act of thought will be a synthetic analysis, an analytic -synthesis, an <i>a posteriori-a priori,</i> or, if it be preferred, an <i>a -priori synthesis.</i></p> - -<p>In this manner, the identity that we have established between the -judgment of definition and the individual judgment comes to assume a -name celebrated in the annals of modern philosophy. And by assuming -it at this point, it is also able to affirm, since it has already -demonstrated, the truth of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis, and to determine -its exact content.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Objections raised by abstractionists and empiricists -against the a priori synthesis.</i></div> - -<p>This is not the place to enter again into the objections which the -Kantian concept elicited (indeed could not fail to elicit): objections -which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> in Italy too gave rise to very acute attempts at confutation, -and which ended in the partial absorption of that concept into the -mental organism of its opponents. Suffice it to say that all the -objections to the <i>a priori</i> synthesis, when thoroughly examined, seem -to be derived, as was to be expected, from the upholders of the two -one-sided doctrines which were surpassed by the synthesis. Thus the -dogmatists or abstractionists believed the concept to be thinkable -apart from or above the facts (simple analysis); the empiricists -perceived only the representative element and claimed to obtain the -concept from mere facts (simple synthesis). Both failed to explain -perception, or the individual judgment. The former found it to arise -from the external and almost accidental contact between pure concepts -and given facts; the latter sometimes assumed it without explanation, -sometimes confused it with pure intuition, if not altogether with -sensibility and emotion. It can be said that whoever does not accept -the <i>a priori</i> synthesis is outside the path of modern philosophy, -indeed of all philosophy. Strive to find or to rediscover that path, -unless you wish to incur the punishment of trifling with empiricism, -of lying to yourself with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> mysticism, or of wandering in the void with -scholasticism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>False interpretation of the a priori synthesis.</i></div> - -<p>Instead of noting and of examining all the objections made to the <i>a -priori</i> synthesis (which we have already substantially discussed in -the development of our treatise), it will be of assistance to add some -explanations, which will prevent false interpretations of that concept. -These false interpretations sometimes (as often happens) mingle with -the true even in the philosopher who discovered it, and confer force -and authority upon several of the objections to the very reality of the -<i>a priori</i> synthesis.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>A priori synthesis in general and logical a priori -synthesis.</i></div> - -<p>In the first place, in accordance with the formula given in Logic we -must not speak of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis in general, but of the -<i>logical a priori synthesis.</i> The <i>a priori</i> synthesis belongs to all -the forms of the Spirit; indeed, the Spirit, considered universally, -is nothing but <i>a priori</i> synthesis. The synthesis is operative in the -æsthetic activity, not less than in the logical. For how could a poet -create a pure intuition, if he did not proceed from a given fact, from -some passionate moment of his own, conditioned and constituted in a -particular way? Without something to intuite and to express could there -ever be a poet? And would he be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> a poet, if he were to repeat that -something mechanically, without transforming it into pure intuition? -In his pure intuition, there is and there is not matter: not as brute -matter, but as formed matter, or form. Thus it is said with reason -that art is pure form, or that matter and form, content and form, in -art are wholly one (<i>a priori</i> æsthetic synthesis). The <i>a priori</i> -synthesis is not less operative in the practical activity than in -the æsthetic and logical (that is, in the theoretic activity). It is -impossible to will without material to will, or to will outside the -given material. The practical man accepts actual conditions, and at the -same time transforms them with his volitional act, creating something -new, in which those conditions are and are not. They are, because -the action achieved is in relation to them; they are not, because -being new, it has transformed them. <i>A priori</i> synthesis, in general, -then, means spiritual activity; not abstract but concrete spiritual -activity, that is to say, the spirit itself, which is <i>condition</i> to -itself and <i>conditioned</i> by itself. Thus the <i>a priori</i> synthesis, -which is constituted by the coincidence or identity of the judgment of -definition with the individual judgment, is not <i>a priori</i> synthesis in -general, but logical <i>a priori</i> synthesis.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Non-logical a priori syntheses.</i></div> - -<p>Having clearly established this point we are enabled to eliminate the -confusion caused by the citation of certain spiritual formations, -which do not correspond with that logical act, as examples of <i>a -priori</i> synthetic judgments. Such for instance is the case of the -famous example: "5 + 7 = 12," concerning which it was long disputed -whether it were an <i>a priori</i> synthetic judgment or simply analytical; -the synthetic element being found or not found in it, according to -the point of view. The same thing has occurred in the case of other -examples of a different nature, as in the judgment: "Snow is white." -Here the dispute has been as to whether it be <i>a priori</i> synthetic, -or simply synthetic. The truth is, on the contrary, that in neither -of these two cases is there <i>logical a priori</i> synthesis, because -the judgment "5 + 7= 12" is the expression of abstract or numerical -concepts, and "snow is white" is the expression of empirical or -classificatory concepts. This amounts to saying that both are products, -not of a logical nature, nor of a theoretic nature, but, as we know, -of an arbitrary or practical nature. For this reason, we have denied -the very possibility of simply analytic or simply synthetic judgments -in pure logic. On the other hand,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> both these kinds of spiritual -formations are <i>a priori</i> syntheses, precisely because, being spiritual -formations (though of a practical nature), they cannot fail to be -produced by a creative (synthetic) act of the spirit. This explains why -they sometimes appear as <i>a priori</i> syntheses, sometimes as something -altogether different from the <i>a priori</i> synthesis. It suffices to -add to the affirmative solution the adjective "practical" and to the -negative the adjective "logical" to obtain agreement and truth.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The a priori synthesis, as synthesis, not of opposites but -of distincts.</i></div> - -<p>A question of no less importance is whether the logical <i>a priori</i> -synthesis (we might say, the <i>a priori</i> synthesis in general) is to be -conceived as a synthesis of opposites; if, in other words, intuition -and concept, matter and form, exist in the <i>a priori</i> synthesis in -the same way as Being and not Being exist in true Being, which is -Becoming; or as good and evil, true and false, and so on, exist in the -special forms of the Spirit. The affirmative reply to this question -finds, as is well known, its chief representative in the doctrine -of Hegel. We do not wish to deny the great truth contained in this -doctrine, in so far as by considering the <i>a priori</i> synthesis as -a synthesis of opposites, it insists upon this essential point: -that intuition and concept<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> matter and form, do not exist in the -logical act as two separable elements, merely externally connected. -Outside the synthesis the subject does not exist as subject, and -the predicate does not exist in any way. We must banish altogether -the idea of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis, conceived as the reuniting of -two facts existing separately. But having recognized the true side -of the doctrine, we must correct the inexactness it contains. This -arises from the confusion already criticized, by which the relation -of opposition is unduly extended to distinct concepts, and the unity -of effectual distinction is confused with the dialectic unity, which -declares itself synthetic, only in so far as it makes war against an -abstract distinction.<a name="FNanchor_1_11" id="FNanchor_1_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_11" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> The <i>a priori</i> synthesis -is a unity of distinct concepts and not of opposites. That which is the -material of the logical synthesis and which outside it has no logical -character (is not subject), yet in another and inferior grade of the -spirit is form and not matter, and is called intuition. Hence, there -is distinction and unity together; form is not without matter; but -the new matter was already form and, therefore, had its own matter. -The logical <i>a priori</i> synthesis presupposes an æsthetic <i>a priori</i> -synthesis.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> When considered in the logical sphere, this is certainly no -longer a synthesis, but an indispensable element of the new synthesis. -But outside the logical sphere, it possesses its own proper and -peculiar autonomy. In the logical act intuition is <i>blind</i> without -the concept, as the concept is <i>void</i> without the intuition. But pure -intuition is not blind, because it has its own proper intuitive light. -The concept contains the intuition, but the intuition transfigured. -It is a synthesis, not of itself and its opposite, but of itself and -its distinct concept which is indistinguishable from itself, save by -an act of abstraction. In this way we satisfy the demand expressed -in the formula of the synthesis as unity of opposites, and at the -same time repress its tendency to usurpation. This tendency leads -to the rejection of the concept of æsthetic synthesis, in favour of -the concept of logical synthesis; it means the negation of art by -philosophy, not only in the philosophical field (which would be just), -but in the whole spiritual field. Extending itself from this to other -usurpations and led on by the mirage of an ill-understood unity, it -claims all the other syntheses for logical synthesis, and produces a -great spiritual desert, in which logical thought itself at length dies -of starvation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span></p> -<div class="sidenote"><i>The category in the judgment. Difference between category -and innate idea.</i></div> - -<p>The logical element, the pure concept or judgment of definition -considered in itself, is given the name of <i>category</i> in the logical -<i>a priori</i> synthesis. This term is nothing but the Greek equivalent -for the word "predicate," which we have hitherto employed. It has been -asked if the category is what used to be called an <i>inniate idea.</i> -The answer must be that it is both that and also something profoundly -different. The innate idea was indeed the category, but the category -taken as possessed and thought <i>prior</i> to experience, according to -the view that we have described as abstract or dogmatic. First the -music, then the words; first definitions, then individual judgments or -perceptions. The category, on the contrary, is neither the mother nor -the first-born. It is born at one birth with the individual judgment, -not as its twin, but as that judgment itself. From this aspect the -category or the <i>a priori</i> is not the innate, but the perpetually -new-born. From this we see the vanity of the question, whether the -judgment or the concept be logically <i>prior,</i> not only in the relation, -which we have already examined, of concept with verbal form (judgment -of definition), but also in the relation of concept with individual -judgment. We can say<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> indifferently that to <i>think</i> is to <i>conceive,</i> -or that to <i>think</i> is to <i>judge,</i> because the two formulæ are reduced -to one. Equally vain is the question as to whether the categories -precede the judgment or are obtained from it. They not only do not -precede the judgment, but are not even obtained from it. We never issue -forth from the judgment, as we never issue forth from reality and -history.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The a priori synthesis, the destruction of transcendency, -and the objectivity of knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>A final explanation, not less important than those already given, -concerns the <i>importance</i> of the logical <i>a priori</i> synthesis. This too -has been diminished by the very man who discovered and defined that -mental act, and even more by those who have repeated him, without being -capable of reviving again the moment of discovery, and of understanding -the intimate reasons that brought it about. When the concept was placed -outside and prior to the representative element, and thought prior to -and outside the world, so that the former was applied to the latter, -the world was bound to appear to be something inferior to the concept, -a degradation or an impure contact, which thought had to undergo. -When, on the other hand, the representative element was placed outside -and prior to the concept, the latter seemed to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> inferior to it, -almost as though it were an expedient for taking hold of the world, -without truly being able to do so, and thus in its turn a degradation -or defilement of it. Hence the sigh that we hear already in antiquity -and more strongly in modern times: oh, if <i>words</i> (that is to say -<i>concepts,</i> because concepts were called words) were not, how directly -should we apprehend things! Oh, if <i>thought</i> were not, how vigorously -should we embrace genuine reality!</p> - -<p>In the first instance, reality is inferior to the concept, in the -second the concept to reality; but in both alike, the two elements -are always thought—as mutually external and truth as undiscoverable. -Thus both these one-sided tendencies end in mystery. According to the -former, the world is created by a God external to it, and will be -disintegrated when it shall seem good to him, while the latter holds -that the truth of things is plunged in impenetrable darkness. But -granted the idea of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis, reality is not inferior -to thought nor thought to reality, nor is the one external to the -other. Representations are docile to thought, and thought conceals -representations even less than the tenuous and scanty veil concealed -the beauty of Alcina. The interpenetration of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> two elements is -perfect, and they constitute unity. The false belief in the externality -and heterogeneity of reality and thought can only arise when for the -pure concept and the <i>a priori</i> synthesis there are substitutes, either -abstract concepts with their related analytic judgments, which are -void of all representative content, or empirical concepts with their -related and merely synthetic judgments, which are without logical -form. The value of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis lies in its efficacy in -putting an end to doubts as to the <i>objectivity</i> of thought and the -<i>cognizability</i> of reality, and in making triumphant the power of -thought over the real, which is the power of the real to know itself.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Power of the a priori synthesis never known to its -discoverer.</i></div> - -<p>But this efficacy of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis remained obscure to its -discoverer (and most obscure to his orthodox followers). To such an -extent was this the case, that even to Kant the category did not seem -to be immanent in the real and to be the thinking of its reality, -but an extrinsic, though necessary adjunct, an inevitable alteration -introduced into reality to make it thinkable, an anticipatory -renunciation of the knowledge of genuine reality. Reality itself lay -outside every category and judgment, a <i>thing in itself.</i> Even in Kant, -the <i>a priori</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> synthesis was confused with simple analysis and with -simple synthesis. These being manipulations of the real, extrinsic and -not intrinsic, practical and not logical, useful, but without truth, so -the <i>a priori</i> synthesis appeared to him to be an expedient to which -man has recourse and cannot but have recourse, but which constitutes, -not his power, but his weakness. Kant, too, dreamed of an ideal of -knowledge, which was not <i>a priori</i> synthesis, but the <i>intellectual -intuition,</i> the perfect adequacy of thought to reality, unattainable -by the human spirit. He did not perceive that the intellectual -intuition, which he longed for as an impossible ideal, was precisely -the continuous operation of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis, nor did he think -that what is necessary and insuperable cannot be defective. He never -knew that the <i>a priori</i> synthesis, which he had discovered, is alone -the true concept and the true judgment, and, therefore, operates in an -altogether different way from simple analysis and simple synthesis, -which are neither concept nor judgment; nor finally that if these -last postulate a <i>thing in itself,</i> the <i>a priori</i> synthesis cannot -postulate it, because it has <i>it in itself.</i></p> - -<p>To understand all the richness of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis is to pay -honour to the genius of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> Emmanuel Kant; but it is also to recognize -that the systematic construction of Kant showed itself altogether -unequal to the great principle he laid down, but whose value he -insufficiently estimated.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_11" id="Footnote_1_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_11"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See above, Sect. I. <a href="#VI">Chap. VI.</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIIc" id="IIIc">III</a></h4> - - -<h5>LOGIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The demand for a complete table of the categories.</i></div> - -<p>When the definition of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis and of the category has -been attained, it is usual to demand of logical Science (and this will -be demanded also of our exposition) that it should say how many and of -what sort are the categories, how they are connected among themselves, -<i>i.e.</i> that it should draw up a <i>table</i> of them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>A request extraneous to Logic. Logical and real -categories.</i></div> - -<p>Logic, in our opinion, should reject this demand, the origin of -which lies in the confusion between thought in general and thought -as the science of thought. The categories are certainly affirmed in -the individual judgment, but Logic, as the science of thought, does -not undertake to formulate judgments which will say what are the -predicable terms, the ultimate or pure concepts, the categories, with -which reality is thought. Logic cannot claim to substitute itself for -the other philosophic sciences and itself to solve all the problems -which offer themselves to thought<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> as to the nature of reality. Its -scope is to define categories and to formulate judgments <i>only on that -aspect of Reality, which is logical thought.</i> It is, therefore, under -the obligation to face the question as to whether there be logical -categories, supreme concepts or supreme predicables from the point of -view of logic, and if there be, to indicate and to deduce them. It is -not obliged to indicate and to deduce all the supreme predicables and -categories.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The uniqueness of the logical category: the concept.</i></div> - -<p>Now we have already treated of the question as to the categories -of Logic and have solved it, partly affirmatively, partly in the -negative. That is to say, we have denied to Logic a multiplicity -of categories, since the three fundamental categories, usually -given as concept, judgment, and syllogism, have been revealed to be -identical. The others, derived from formalist Logic and relating to -classes of concepts, to forms of judgments and to figures of the -syllogism (and even these three preceding, if they are taken as -separable or distinguishable), have been shown to be empirical and -arbitrary. Finally, those that were based upon the gnoseology of the -pseudoconcepts have shown themselves to be extraneous to pure Logic. -On the other hand, we have affirmed the category proper to Logic,—the -unique category<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> to which it gives rise. It has been defined as the -pure concept, at once judgment of definition and individual judgment, -the logical <i>a priori</i> synthesis. Thus the enquiry can be looked upon -as exhaustive as regards this part of the subject.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The other categories. No longer logical, but real. Systems -of categories.</i></div> - -<p>A glance at the tables of categories that have appeared in the course -of the history of philosophy, from that of Aristotle, which is the -first, at least among the conspicuous, to that of Stuart Mill, or if -it be preferred, to the Kategorienlehre of E. von Hartmann, which is -the last, or among the last, shows at once that the other categories, -which have been described as logical categories, can be reduced to -verbal variants of this unique one of the pure concept, or belong to -other aspects of the spirit and of reality, as distinct from that of -logical thought. For if in the Aristotelian table the <i>ousia</i> and the -<i>poion,</i> substance and quality, to some extent denote the subject and -the predicate of the judgment, that is to say, the abstract elements -of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis: the <i>poson,</i> on the other hand, appeals -to the processes of enumeration and of measurement, the <i>pou</i> and -the <i>poté</i> to the determination of space and time, the <i>poiein</i> and -the <i>paschein</i> to the principles of practical activity, and so on. -The Kantian table seems to refer, or to mean to refer,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> to logical -thought; but that does not prevent the appearance in it of traces of -the principles of mathematical, naturalistic, heuristic, and other -processes. Furthermore, in the Kantian philosophy, the whole system -of the categories is to be deduced, not from the transcendental Logic -alone, but also from the transcendental Æsthetic (space and time), and -from the Critique of Practical Reason and Judgment, which all lead to -functions or forms, operating as spiritual syntheses and reappearing -as categories in judgments. Finally, we must not neglect the Kantian -metaphysical categories of Physics.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The Hegelian system of the categories and other later -systems.</i></div> - -<p>All this becomes clearer in the doctrine of Hegel, where the categories -are not only those of logical thought or subjective thought, concept, -judgment, syllogism; but also those of quality, quantity and measure, -essence, phenomenon and reality, with their subforms and transitions, -and those of the objective concept, mechanism, chemism, and teleology, -and those of the Idea, life, knowing, and the absolute Idea. The -Hegelian, Kuno Fischer, makes certain declarations in his <i>Logic</i> -to which it is expedient to give heed. Following the example of the -master, he was induced to include knowing and willing among the -categories; "It may at first sight<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> seem strange (he says), that -knowing and willing should appear here as logico-metaphysical concepts, -as categories. Knowledge has need of categories; but is knowledge -itself a category? Willing belongs to Psychology and Morality, not -to Logic and Metaphysic. It seems, then, that the categories lose -themselves now in Physics or Physiology, by means of concepts such -as those of mechanism and organism, now in Psychology and Ethics, -with the concepts of knowing and of willing. Objections of this sort -have often been made. We have shown that the concept must be thought -as object, and that the concept of object demands that of mechanism: -the justification of the thing resides in this proof. Willing and -knowing are indeed categories. If the test, by which we recognize the -categories, consists in that they are valid, not only for certain -objects, but for all, and in that they should express the universal -nature of things, it is not difficult to see in what a profoundly -significant way knowing and willing emerge triumphantly from such a -test. They belong not only to what are called the faculties of the -human spirit, but in truth to the <i>very conditions of the world.</i> If -the world must be understood as end it must also be understood as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> -willing; for the end without the willing is nothing. ... If knowing -and willing were only a small human province of the world, they -would certainly not be categories. Their concept would belong not to -metaphysic, but to the anthropological sciences. Since they are, on the -contrary, both of them cosmic principles, universal concepts, without -which the concept of objects and of the world cannot be thoroughly -thought and known, for that reason they necessarily have the value of -categories. And since, in truth, they compose the concept of the world, -they are the supreme categories."<a name="FNanchor_1_12" id="FNanchor_1_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_12" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> This argument amounts to saying, -that whenever a concept is truly universal (not restricted to this -or that class of manifestations of reality and therefore empirical), -whenever a concept is a pure concept, it is always a category. This -thesis is most exact, but it amounts to excluding such a search from -pure Logic, which does not give the concepts or concept of reality, -but only the <i>concept of the concept.</i> The attempt of Hegel to embrace -the totality of the categories was not understood and was abandoned -at a later date, and a return was made in some sort to the categories -of the theoretic and practical—theoretic spirit alone—(von Hartmann -gives them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> in his fundamental tripartition of the categories into -sensibility, reflective thought and speculative thought). But the -tendency to totality reappeared, in an elementary form, in Stuart -Mill, who opposed to the Aristotelian table his own, divided into -the three classes of <i>sentiments</i> (sensations, thoughts, emotions, -volitions), of <i>substances</i> (bodies and spirits), and of <i>attributes</i> -(quality, relation, quantity): a vertiginous regression to an infantile -conception, which yet sought to embrace in its own way the whole of -reality.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The logical order of the predicates or categories.</i></div> - -<p>The doctrine of the categories has been introduced and retained in -Logic, not only because of the confusion between the thought of thought -and thought in general, which has just been explained, but also because -of another confusion, which must now be explained, as it has far -deeper roots and far greater importance. It has been and may be argued -in this way. It is true that the categories are nothing but simply -the concepts of reality; but these concepts, acting as predicates, -are presented in logic in a necessary order, which it is the task of -logical Science to deduce. In determining reality by means of thought, -we begin with a first predicate, for instance <i>being,</i> judging that -reality is. This judgment immediately shows itself insufficient, -whence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> it becomes necessary to determine it with a second predicate -and to judge that reality both is and is not, or is <i>becoming.</i> This -predicate of becoming appears in its turn vague and abstract, and it -becomes necessary to determine reality as <i>quality,</i> then as <i>quantity, -measure, essence, existence, mechanism, teleology, life, reflexion, -will, idea,</i> in short with all the predicates that exhaust the concept -of reality.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Illusion as to the logical reality of this order.</i></div> - -<p>But we know that this order, this supposed succession, is illusory and -is simply the product of abstract analysis. In the predicate to which -verbal prominence is given, there is concentrated or understood every -predicate, because in every judgment complete reality<a name="FNanchor_2_13" id="FNanchor_2_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_13" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> is predicated -of the subject. Moreover this is shown just by the observation, which -reveals the insufficiency of an isolated and abstract predicate, -and requires for sufficiency nothing less than the totality of the -predicates, the full concept of the Real, of the Spirit or of the Idea. -The concept of Reality, of Spirit or the Idea, can without doubt be -developed, in its unity and in its distinctions; but (let us yet again -repeat) logical Science has for its object, not the effective unity and -distinction of the Real, but the <i>concept</i> of unity and distinction..</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The necessity of the order of the predicates, not founded -in Logic in particular, but in the whole of Philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>The ordering of the variety of the predicates, their gradation -according to their greater or less adequacy to reality, arises from -the fact that disputes as to reality show themselves as one-sided -affirmations of this or that predicate or group of predicates, -coupled with the neglect or negation of others, which are not less -indispensable. When, therefore, we attack such one-sidedness and -affirm the complete indivisibility of the predicates, the single -predicates, the objects of the one-sided affirmations, are scrutinized -one after the other, in order to demonstrate their insufficiency, and -for this very reason a certain order is given to them. This order is, -without doubt, necessary, because the possibility of errors, or of -one-sided thoughts, is a consequence of the distinctions, in which -the unity of the Real lives, and which are necessary to it. But for -this very reason the order must be sought, not in logical Science, -but in the total conception of Reality. For instance, in researches -concerning the ethical concept, only he who thinks, not the concept -of the concept (logical science), but the concept of ethical activity -(ethical science), will be able to determine what one-sided concepts -are there possible and what is their order. Only he who thinks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> a -whole philosophy will be able to determine how many and what and how -connected are the one-sided and erroneous modes of philosophy. This -cannot be found in the concept of the concept; or rather only those -erroneous modes are there found which derive from a one-sided thinking -of the concept of the concept. This we shall see in its place. The -order of the categories in the sense indicated is certainly not -subjective and arbitrary, as a didactic ordering of them would be, a -<i>πρότερον prὸs ἡμᾶς</i>; it is a <i>πρότερον φύσει.</i> But since this first by -nature is identical with the whole concept of Reality, it is not wholly -contained in the concept of Logic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>False distinction of philosophy into two spheres, -Metaphysic and Philosophy, rational philosophy and real philosophy, -etc., due to the confusion between Logic and doctrine of the -categories.</i></div> - -<p>If the confusion between Logic and the Doctrine of the Categories, or -between the thinking of the logical category and the thinking of the -other categories, had produced no other effect than that of introducing -into books of Logic a method of treatment that exceeds their bounds, -the evil would not be great. It would chiefly affect literary harmony -and clarity of didactic exposition. But from that confusion there has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> -sometimes as <i>rational Philosophy and real Philosophy,</i> sometimes as -<i>Gnoseology and Anthropology (or Cosmology),</i> sometimes as <i>Logic and -System of Philosophy,</i> and so on. The conception of Reality is thus -twice described: once as part of Logic (the Doctrine of the Categories, -Ontology, etc.); and again as effective or applied Philosophy. -Philosophy is divided into a Prologue to Philosophy and Philosophy, -or into Philosophy and a Conclusion to Philosophy. But Philosophy, -although it is distinguishable into philosophies (for example, -Æsthetic, Logic, Economic and Ethic), <i>is this distinction itself,</i> -or the unity immanent in it. It never gives rise to a duality of -grades. It is never prologue, development and conclusion, being, at its -every point, prologue, development and conclusion. As from empirical -and formalist Logic arose the idea of a Logic which should not be -philosophy, but an organ or instrument or rule or law for the rest of -philosophy; so from the confusion of Logic with the Doctrine of the -Categories has arisen the idea of a Logic, or Metaphysic, or general -Philosophy, or whatever else it may be called, which should be <i>opposed -to or above</i> the rest of philosophy. But the Science of thought, Logic, -is at once thought<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> and effective philosophy; it is thought itself -which in thinking the Real, thinks itself and places itself, as logical -Science, in the place which belongs to it in the system of the Real.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophy and pure logic: overcoming of the duality.</i></div> - -<p>It may seem that in this way thought and reality are again divided and -a metaphysical dualism created. But the exact opposite is the truth. -When Philosophy is distinguished into general and particular, into -rational and real, into pure and applied, into Logic-metaphysic and -into Philosophy of nature and of man, an irreparable breach is made, -which can only be concealed or attenuated in a more or less ingenious -manner. But when that doubleness of degree is destroyed (and thought -thinking the real thereby thinks itself), and in the construction of -Philosophy, the Philosophy of philosophy, namely Logic, is constructed, -the dualism is for ever overcome. This thought is the thinking of the -distinctions, which the real presents; but to think distinctions and to -think unity is, as has been already demonstrated, the same thing.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_12" id="Footnote_1_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_12"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Logik,</i> pp. 532-3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_13" id="Footnote_2_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_13"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See above Sect. II. <a href="#Vb">Chap. V.</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="SECOND_PART" id="SECOND_PART">SECOND PART</a></h4> - -<h3>PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND THE NATURAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES</h3> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a><br /><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="Id" id="Id">I</a></h4> - -<h5>THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Summary of results as to the forms of acquaintance.</i></div> - - -<p>The result of the preceding enquiries into the constitution of the -cognitive spirit can be resumed, for mnemonic purposes, by saying -that there are <i>two pure theoretic</i> forms, <i>the intuition</i> and -<i>the concept,</i> the second of which is subdivided into <i>judgment -of definition and individual judgment,</i> and that there are two -modes of <i>practical</i> elaboration of knowledge, or of formation of -pseudoconcepts, the <i>empirical concept and the abstract concept,</i> from -which are derived the two subforms of judgment of <i>classification</i> and -of judgment of <i>enumeration.</i> If the methods in use in the mediæval -schools or in those of Port-Royal (which were not without their -utility) were still in vogue, we should be able to embody these results -in a few <i>mnemonic verses,</i> which would render the distinctions we have -made easy to impart.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span></p> - -<p>Easy to impart, but not understood, or worse, ill understood; because, -as we know, both the scheme of classification here adopted and the -arithmetical determination of two or more forms are not truly logical -thoughts adequate to the representation of the process of the real -and of thought. Our grouping constructed to help the memory must -therefore be interpreted with the aid of the developments offered -above, and not only corrected, but altogether resolved in them. In -these developments, the intuition and the concept have appeared as two -forms, not capable of co-ordination, but both distinct and united. The -judgment of definition and the individual judgment have appeared as -logically identical, divisible only from an external or literary point -of view, that is to say, by the greater or less importance attached -either to the predicate or to the subject. Further, the formation of -the pseudoconcepts is outside theory, although founded upon theoretic -elements; it belongs essentially, not to the cognitive spirit, but -to the practical spirit. And if their subdivision into empirical and -abstract concepts is necessary, the necessity is founded upon the fact, -that only in these two modes can the concept be practically developed, -when its synthetic unity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> is arbitrarily split up into two one-sided -forms. Finally, the two fundamental forms of the spirit themselves, the -theoretic and the practical, are not co-ordinate with one another, nor -capable of arithmetical enumeration. The one is in the other, the one -is correlative to the other, because the one presupposes the other.</p> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Non-existence of technical forms, and of composite forms.</i></div> - -<p>No other cognitive or practical-cognitive forms, or other subforms, -beyond those which we have defined, are conceivable. The <i>technical -knowledge,</i> which is discussed in some treatises on Logic, is nothing -but knowledge itself, which is always and entirely technical, preceding -and conditioning the action and practice of life. The same may be -said of <i>normative</i> knowledge, by which, as with technical, it is -especially meant in ordinary language to designate the whole of the -pseudoconcepts. But this is erroneous, when we consider that such -knowledge constitutes the true immediate precedent condition of action. -The pseudoconcepts must be retranslated into individual judgments, in -order that they may be able to form the basis of action, for which, -as is justly remarked, we require direct and concrete perceptions of -actual situations. Formulæ and abstractions aid perception only in an -indirect and subsidiary manner.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span></p> - -<p>The so-called combined or <i>composite</i> forms in which two or more -original forms are brought together, must also be rejected, for the -reason already given, that composite concepts do not exist in pure -Logical thought, and consequently cannot exist in the Science of -Logic, which is the science of that thought. The composite form, then, -is an empirical and arbitrary determination, as may be observed, for -instance, in the case in which we speak of an empirico-philosophic -concept, that is, of the union (which is a successive enunciation) of -an empirical concept and a philosophic concept.</p> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of cognitive forms and forms of knowledge. -Objections to it.</i></div> - -<p>The cognitive forms having thus been established, we pass on to -the question, what and how many and of what kind are the <i>forms of -knowledge.</i> The reply must be that the forms of knowledge (for example, -History and the natural Sciences) cannot be anything but identical with -the cognitive forms, and of the same kind and same number as they. The -first of these statements finds itself at once at issue with common -thought, in which a profound distinction is drawn between the ordinary -and the scientific man, the profane and the philosopher, the poet and -the non-poet, the ignorant and the learned, layman and clergy; and -again, between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> conversation and science, effusion of the soul and -art, collection of facts and history, good sense and philosophy. It -is thought that acquaintance belongs to all: every one communicates -his sentiments, narrates his experiences and those of others, reasons, -classifies and calculates. But art, philosophy, history and science are -believed to belong to the few. That alone deserves those solemn names, -which is the result of exceptional moments, when man is more than man, -or at least when he is no longer one of the crowd, but belongs to an -aristocracy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirical distinctions and their limits. </i></div> - -<p>And, certainly, these distinctions are useful, and therefore necessary -in practice. We all feel the need of creating an aristocracy of men and -things; of distinguishing the word that a sergeant whispers in the ear -of a maid-servant from a sonnet or a symphony; the proverbs of Sancho -Panza from a treatise on Ethics; and the report of a police-agent from -the history of Rome or of England. We distinguish the classification -of the glasses and bowls in use at home from that of Mineralogy or -of Zoology; the reckoning of our daily expenses from the calculation -of the astronomer; and, finally, Tom, Dick and Harry from Aeschylus, -Plato, Thucydides, Hippocrates and Euclid. The <i>odi profanum vulgus</i> is -a motto<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> that should be appropriated by whosoever labours to promote -the life of thought and of art, yet not without adding to it Ariosto's -post-script: "Nor do I wish to absolve any from the name of vulgar, -save the prudent."</p> - -<p>But, admitting all this, we must recognize not less energetically -that these distinctions, imposed by the necessities of life, have in -philosophy no value at all, and that their introduction there, if it -has some excuse in professional custom, is nevertheless the way to shut -off from us for ever all understanding both of the forms of knowledge -and of those of acquaintance. Man is complete man at every instant -and in every man; the spirit is always whole in every individuation -of itself. The philosopher in the highest sense (in the philosopher -worthy of the name) could be defined as one who raises doubts, collects -difficulties, and formulates problems, intent upon clearing up doubts, -upon levelling difficulties, and upon solving problems; the artist as -a man who limits himself to looking and to recording the significance -of what he has seen. In this case, the ordinary man would be he who -encounters no theoretic difficulties and is unaware of spectacles -worthy of contemplation. But in reality the ordinary man also sets -himself problems<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> and solves them, contemplates and expresses the -spectacle of the real. The distinction has value, therefore, only in -descriptive Psychology, which passes in review types of reality and -the perfected organs, so to speak, which reality creates for itself in -great philosophers and great poets. But what empiricism always divides, -philosophy must always unite. To be scandalized when some one speaks of -the poetry, philosophy, science, mathematics, which are in every one's -mouth; to mock those who unify and identify; to appeal to good sense -and to threaten the madhouse, are things that reveal much pedantry -but no humanity, or, at most, very little. It is foolish to fear that -such an identification as we propose will lessen the importance of the -forms of knowledge and render trivial divine Poetry, lofty Philosophy, -severe History, serious Science and ingenious Mathematics. As the hero -is not outside humanity, but is he in whom the soul of the people is -concentrated and made powerful, so poetry, philosophy, science and -history, aristocratically circumscribed, are the most conspicuous -manifestations attained by the elementary forms of acquaintance -themselves. Such they could not be, were they not all one with them, -just as the mountains could not be, were it not for the earth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> upon -which they are raised and of which they are constituted.</p> - -<p>It might be said that the forms of knowledge are rich and complex -manifestations of the human spirit, if this statement did not open -the way to another common prejudice, to the belief that to each of -those forms (for instance, to Art, History and Philosophy) several -spiritual activities contribute. Were this so, we should have before -us a mixture, not a product of an unique and original character, such -as we find, as a matter of fact, in a work of Art, a philosophic -theory, a narrative, and a theorem. By the law of the unity of the -spirit all the forms of the spirit are implicit in one another; and the -results, previously obtained from the various forms, condition each -one of them. But each one of them is, explicitly, itself and not the -others; it absorbs and transforms the results of the others; it does -not leave them within itself as extraneous elements, and it therefore -makes of them its own results. The strength of each one of those -forms of knowledge lies precisely in this <i>purity,</i> which persists -in the greatest complexity. A great poem is as homogeneous as the -shortest lyric or as a verse; a philosophic system as homogeneous as a -definition;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> the most complicated calculations as the addition of "two -and two make four."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Enumeration and determination of the forms of knowing, -corresponding to the forms of acquaintance.</i></div> - -<p>If the forms of acquaintance and the forms of knowledge be identical, -it is proved thereby that the second are as many and of the same -sort as the first; and the existence of combined or composite forms -is also excluded from the forms of knowledge. Thus we are henceforth -freed from the obligation of enquiring into the particular nature of -the various forms of knowledge, a task that we have already fulfilled -when enquiring into the forms of acquaintance. It is sufficient to -name them (in correspondence) with the names already given to the -forms of acquaintance, for thus they will be clearly distinguished and -completely enumerated. The method of denomination itself will not be -new and surprising, because it has been, as it were, anticipated, and -foreseen from the examples of which we have availed ourselves above, -and also from some terminological references. We have now only to make -it manifest, to declare it, so to speak, in clear tones.</p> - -<p>Pure intuition is the theoretic form of Art (or of <i>Poetry,</i> if we wish -to extend to the whole of æsthetic production the name given to a group -of works of art); and art cannot be otherwise<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> defined than as pure -intuition. The thinking of the pure concept, of the concept as itself, -of the universal that is truly universal and not mere generality or -abstraction, is <i>Philosophy,</i> and Philosophy cannot be otherwise -defined than as the thinking, or the conceiving of the pure concept. -And since the pure concept can be expressed either in the form of -definition or in that of individual judgment, there corresponds to this -duplication the distinction of the two forms of knowing, <i>Philosophy -in the strict sense, and History.</i> The method of treatment called -<i>empirical Science or natural Science,</i> or most commonly in our time, -<i>Science,</i> is composed of those pseudoconcepts known as representative -or empirical or classificatory. The mathematical Sciences are -composed of abstract, enumerative and mensurative pseudoconcepts, -and the application of the second of these, by means of the first, -to individual judgments, is nothing else than what is called the -<i>mathematical Science of nature.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Critique of the idea of a special Logic as doctrine of the -forms of knowledge,</i></div> - -<p>It is usual for the treatment of the forms of knowledge to be presented -in the majority of treatises as a <i>special</i> or <i>applied Logic</i>; -following <i>general</i> or <i>pure Logic,</i> which has for its object the -specific forms of acquaintance alone, or as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> it is significantly -expressed, the <i>elementary</i> forms of acquaintance. But we cannot admit -the existence of such a Logic, for the reasons already given. The -elementary or fundamental forms are the only forms philosophically -conceivable and really existing, and the whole of logical Science is -exhausted in them. There is no duality of grades for logical Science -any more than for Philosophy in general. And as no special Æsthetic -exists independent of general Æsthetic, no special Ethic and Economic -independent of general Economic, so there is not a <i>general</i> Logic -alongside of a <i>special</i> Logic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>and as doctrine of methods.</i></div> - -<p>Special Logic is also inadmissible, when it is presented as doctrine -of <i>methods,</i> and especially of demonstrative or intrinsic methods. -The method of a form of knowledge and in general of a form of the -spirit, is not something different or even distinguishable from this -form itself. The method of poetry is poetry, the method of philosophy -is philosophy, the method of mathematics is mathematics, and so on. -Only by means of empirical abstraction is the method separated from the -activity itself; and when this duality has been created, we are led -to add to it a third term, which is called the <i>object</i> of that form. -But since the method is the form itself,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> so form and method are the -object itself. Certainly, all the forms of the spirit have a common -object, which is Reality; but this is not because reality is separated -from them, but because they are reality: they therefore <i>have</i> not, but -<i>are</i> this object. Thus the forms of knowledge have not a theoretic -object, but create it: they themselves are that object. Philosophy has -the pure concept for method and object; art has intuition; science -the empirical concept, and so on. If we wished to treat of methods in -a special Logic, we could not do otherwise than repeat what we have -already said in respect to the character of each form.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Nature of our treatise in respect to the forms of -knowledge.</i></div> - -<p>All this amounts to saying that the things we shall discuss concerning -the various forms of knowledge are not to be understood as a special -Logic, although they are grouped in a second part for literary reasons. -There we shall examine one by one the various forms of knowledge, -in order to confirm their identity with the forms of awareness and -to demonstrate how the characters adopted by them are reducible to -those already explained for the others, and how the difficulties -found in them are overcome by means of the same principles that we -employed to overcome the difficulties presented by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> others. In -so doing, we shall also gain the advantage of making more clear the -doctrines already laid down as to the elementary forms, by fixing -our attention upon those manifestations of them which are presented -on a larger scale. To those who forget or deny the existence of the -pure concept or of the abstract concept, it will be of assistance, -in giving the speculative deduction of those forms, to point out the -masterpieces of Art, of Philosophy, or of Mathematics, and to invite an -examination of their structure. It is true that in our day preference -is given to another method, which is not only antiphilosophical but -also antipædagogic. This method consists in altogether neglecting -philosophic demonstration in the attempt to divert the attention from -notable and luminous manifestations of the spirit, in order to devote -it to rude and uncertain manifestations. Inscriptions of savages are -preferred to the art of Michael Angelo, the philosophy that is still -crudely enveloped in religion and custom to that of civilized times, -something whose nature none can tell precisely, owing to lack of -documents and the elements of research, to what is evidently art and -philosophy. Such enquirers adopt precisely an opposite course to that -followed by the sciences of observation, which have made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> telescopes -and microscopes to enlarge the little and bring the distant near. -They seek for instruments which shall diminish the great and make the -near remote. Theirs is a strange empirical caricature of philosophy, -which substitutes the chronologically remote for the fundamentally -conceptual, and for the logically simple, the materially small, which -is not, on that account, simple and is far less transparent. For our -part (and we say it in passing), we believe that to furnish examples -of where to fix the attention in logical enquiry, the minds of an -Aristotle or of a Kant afford all we require, without there being any -necessity to have recourse to the psychology of sucklings and idiots. -But to study Aristotle and Kant does not suffice for knowledge of the -truth of the concept. We must find in all beings of whatever grade and -importance, the universal Spirit and its eternal forms.</p> - -<p>And since we have studied the first and most ingenuous form of -knowledge, Art, in a special volume, we shall here begin our -examination of the second of its forms, Philosophy; and first of all, -of Philosophy <i>in the strict sense.</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="IId" id="IId">II</a></h4> - - -<h5>PHILOSOPHY</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophy as pure concept and the various definitions of -philosophy. Those which deny philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>All the definitions that have ever been given of philosophy will be -found to contain the thought that philosophy is the pure concept -(or to say the same thing with more words and less precision), that -it has the pure concept as its directive criterion. All, be it well -understood, save those which, in negating the pure concept, negate also -the peculiar nature of philosophy. But such are not, properly speaking, -definitions of philosophy, although even these, by contradicting -themselves, imply and assume the definition of philosophy as an -original form, and so as the pure concept. Such is the case with the -theories already examined, of æstheticism, mysticism, and empiricism -(and also of mathematicism), to which we shall return. For them, -philosophy is art, sentiment, the empirical (or abstract) concept. -But it is an art in some way differentiated from the rest of art, a -sentiment that acquires a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> peculiar value, an empirical or abstract -concept, which raises itself up and looks over the heads of the others. -Thus it is something peculiar, a mode of reflecting <i>sui generis,</i> -and so precisely the pure concept. Empiricism especially reveals this -intimate contradiction, when it advocates a philosophy consisting of a -systematization or synthesis of the results of the empirical sciences. -That is to say, it advocates something not given by the empirical -sciences, because, were they to give it, they would already be -systematized and synthesized of themselves, and the further elaboration -asked for would be altogether superfluous.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Those that define it as the science of supreme principles, -ultimate causes, etc.; contemplation of death, etc.;</i></div> - -<p>All the other definitions which presuppose the peculiarity of -philosophy are reducible, as is easily seen, to the single character of -the pure concept. Philosophy (they say) is the science of the <i>supreme -principles of the real,</i> the science of <i>ultimate causes,</i> of the -<i>origin of things,</i> and the like. In these propositions, the supreme -principles are evidently not real things, or groups of real things, or -empty formulæ, but the ideal generators of the real. Ultimate causes -are not causes (for the cause is never ultimate, being always the -effect of an antecedent cause), but ideal principles. The origin in -question is not the historical origin of this or that single fact, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> -the ideal deduction of the fact from facts or from omnipresent reality. -The same idea is expressed in the imaginative saying that philosophy is -the <i>contemplation of death.</i> For what but the individual dies? And is -not the contemplation of the death of the individual also that of the -immortality of the universal? Is it not contemplation of the eternal? -This remark supplies the motive for that other formula which defines -philosophy as "the vision of things <i>sub specie aeterni.</i>"</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>as elaboration of the concepts, criticism, science of -norms;</i></div> - -<p>The character of the pure concept is also indicated in the definition -of philosophy as the <i>elaboration of the concepts,</i> which the other -sciences leave imperfect and self-contradictory. Indeed, since no human -activity has the imperfect and contradictory as its aim, if the other -sciences are involved in imperfect and contradictory concepts, this -means that they do not aim at constructing concepts and that philosophy -alone elaborates true and proper concepts. For this reason, philosophy -has sometimes been conceived, not as science, but as criticism, and -criticism means placing oneself above the object criticized, in virtue -of a concept superior to those criticized. For this reason, finally, -philosophy has been conceived as the science of <i>norms and values</i>:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> -norms and values, which, if they are to surpass singular things, cannot -be extraneous to them. Hence it is the same thing to speak of <i>norms -and values,</i> or of universal concepts, surpassing and containing in -themselves each single thing.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>as doctrine of the categories.</i></div> - -<p>If philosophy is the pure concept, it is also the distinctions of -the pure concept; it is all the pure concepts capable of serving as -predicates to individual judgments and so of acting as categories. Here -there is another definition of philosophy: philosophy is the <i>doctrine -of the categories.</i> For this reason we have already refused to assign -to Logic the search for the categories: first because the doctrine of -the categories is the whole of Philosophy, whereas Logic is only one -of its links, and consequently seeks only one of the categories, that -of logicity. It could also be said that Philosophy is the doctrine of -the categories, and that Logic, as a part of Philosophy, is a Category -of categories, or a Philosophy of Philosophy. Hence its singular -position among philosophical sciences, so that it appears at the same -time within and without Philosophy, because it completes by surpassing -and surpasses by completing it. In reality, Logic, like every other -philosophic science, is within and not without Philosophy; like the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> -glassy water which reflects the landscape and is itself part of the -landscape.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Exclusion of mathematical definitions of philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>These definitions which we have selected to record and to interpret -(and others which we leave to the reader to record and to interpret) -are all <i>formal,</i> in the legitimate sense of the word. They define -the eternal nature of philosophy, they do not determine actually any -special solution of other philosophical problems, although naturally -they do potentially determine one solution, in that they can agree -only with one solution. Obedient to this formal character, we have -not taken and shall not take account of definitions that imply the -effective solution of all philosophical problems, or of Philosophy in -its totality. Such is, for instance, the definition that Philosophy is -knowledge of oneself, as was said at the dawn of Hellenic thought; or -that it is the return to the inward man where dwells the truth, as St. -Augustine said; or that it is the science of Spirit, as we say. This -definition offers something more than the simply logical aspect of -Philosophy. Looked at from the purely logical standpoint, Philosophy -will be the science of God or of the Devil, of Spirit or Matter, of -final cause or mechanism, or of anything else that may be suggested -as a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> hypothesis for enquiry, provided that this, whatever it be, is -thinkable as a <i>pure concept or Idea.</i> Whoever should negate this -condition, would not negate this or that philosophy, but as we have -seen, philosophy itself, in favour of art, of action, or of something -else.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Idealism of every philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>But if Philosophy is by its logical nature pure concept or idea, every -philosophy, to whatever results it may attain, and whatever may be its -errors, is in its essential character and deepest tendency, <i>idealism.</i> -This has been recognized by philosophers of the most different and -antagonistic views (for example, by Hegel and by Herbart). It should -be taught as truth to those who are ignorant of it and those who have -forgotten should be reminded of it. Determinism negates the end and -affirms the cause; but the cause which it posits as its principle, is -not this or that cause, but the <i>idea</i> of cause. Materialism negates -thought and affirms matter; but not this or that matter, which composes -this or that body, but the <i>idea</i> of matter. Naturalism denies spirit -and affirms nature; not this or that manifestation of nature, but -nature as <i>idea.</i> Finally, when a single natural fact seems to be -posited as the principle of explanation of reality, this fact is -idealized and stands as the idea of itself,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> generating itself and -everything else. Thus (it has been repeatedly remarked) the water -of Thales, by the very fact that it is taken as a principle, is no -longer any given empirical water, but metaphysical and ideal water. -In like manner, the <i>numbers</i> of Pythagoras are not those of the -Pythagorean table, but cosmic principles and ideas. Theism does not -believe it possible to obtain the sufficient reason of reality, without -positing a personal God, above and beyond the world. But this God is -always something non-representative, however much he may be involved -in sensible representation, and placed upon Sinai or Olympus. He is -the idea of personal divinity, the idea of Jehovah or of Jove. The -philosophy which is called idealist in the strict sense of the word (it -would be better called activist or finalist or absolute spiritualism), -strives to prove that, for instance, cause, matter, nature, number, -water, Jehovah, Jove and the like, are not thinkable as pure concepts -and as such imply contradictions, and that therefore such philosophies -are insufficient. This means that it holds the <i>idealism</i> of those -philosophies <i>insufficient,</i> that they are not equal to themselves and -are inadequate to the assumption on which they rest; but it does not -imply that this assumption is not idealistic.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span></p> - -<p>Were it not idealistic, it would not be philosophical, and so it would -not be possible to submit it to criticism from the philosophical point -of view.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Systematic character of philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>From the identity of philosophy with the pure concept can be also -deduced its necessarily <i>systematic</i> character.</p> - -<p>To think any pure concept means to think it in its relation of unity -and distinction with all the others. Thus, in reality, what is thought -is never <i>a</i> concept, but <i>the</i> concept, the <i>system</i> of concepts. On -the other hand, to think the concept in general is only possible by -arbitrary abstraction. To think it truly in general, means to think -it also as particular and singular, and so to think the whole system -of distinct concepts. Those who wish to think an isolated concept -philosophically without paying attention to the others, are like -doctors who wish to cure an organ without paying attention to the -organism. Such a mode of treatment may cure the organ, but the organism -dies and with it dies the healed organ a moment after. The true -philosopher, when he makes even the smallest modification in a concept, -has his eye on the whole system, for he knows that this modification, -however small it may seem, modifies to some extent the whole.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophic and literary significance of system.</i></div> - -<p>The systematic character of philosophy, understood logically, -belongs to every single philosophical proposition which is always a -philosophical cosmos, as every drop of water is the ocean, indeed, the -whole world, contracted into that drop of water. It is hardly necessary -to distinguish from this the <i>literary sense</i> of system, which is the -name given to certain forms of exposition, which embrace definite -groups of problems, traditionally held to be those in which philosophy -is contained. When some or many of those groups do not receive explicit -literary treatment, it is said that system is wanting. It is true -that there is wanting the fulfilment of a literary task (or what here -amounts to the same thing, of a pedagogic task); but the system is -there, even in the case when a very specialized problem is treated, -provided it be approached with philosophic and so with systematic -energy. That the same thinker, when he passes to another problem, -should give a wrong solution contradictory to that previously given, -does not prove that he had not at first a system, but that he has lost -it when faced with the new difficulty. He was at first a philosopher -and so systematic; afterwards, not philosopher enough, and so not -sufficiently systematic.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Advantages and disadvantages of the literary form of -system.</i></div> - -<p>The traditional groupings of problems, and the construction of system -in the literary and pedagogic sense, certainly have their utility -(all that exists has its proper function and value). They preserve -and promote culture already acquired, by obliging it to examine -difficulties, which, were they neglected, might unexpectedly become -a great hindrance and loss. Hence the love for system, or for the -literary form of system, a love which the author of these pages -also nourishes in his soul and of which he has sought to give some -proof, by writing a <i>system,</i> although it is long since systems have -been written, in Italy at least (unless scholastic manuals be thus -called), and it is no slight merit to have braved the ridicule of the -enterprise. But systems have also the disadvantage of sometimes leading -to a tiresome re-exposition of problems that are out of date and -whose solutions have passed into the common patrimony of culture. The -treatment of these problems is better left to be understood, that time -and space may be gained for the treatment of others more urgent. Hence -the rebellion against system, or against the pedantry which can adhere -to that form of exposition. This rebellion is similar at all points -with that against the pedantry of definition, which is a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> legitimate -rebellion, yet cannot eliminate the logical form of definition. Instead -of systems, we write monographs, essays, and aphorisms, but these, if -philosophic, will always be inwardly systematic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Genesis of the systematic prejudice and rebellion against -it.</i></div> - -<p>But the rebellion against systems has another more serious cause, less -literary and more philosophical. Sometimes the demand for a system -becomes a <i>systematic prejudice.</i> This fact merits explanation, because -thus stated it may reasonably appear to be paradoxical. However could -the demand inherent in a function be changed into a prejudice, or into -an obstacle to that function? Stated in these terms, it certainly -seems inconceivable. But it becomes clear and admissible, when we -remember that philosophical enquiry is both induction and deduction, -the thinking of distinction and the thinking of unity in distinction. -Neither of the two processes, which are one single thing, should be -substituted for or dominate the other. If we think the concept of -morality, it should be placed in relation to and deduced from the -other forms of the spirit and thus from unity; but it must also be -thought in itself. The thinking of the peculiar nature of the moral -act cannot remain isolated and atomic, but unity in its turn cannot -give the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> character of the moral act, unless this act be present to -the spirit and make itself known for what it is. In the process of -research, it is possible to deduce the moral act from the consideration -of the other activities of the spirit, without thinking it in itself. -But here a <i>heuristic</i> process is adopted, a <i>hypothesis</i> is made, -and this hypothesis must afterwards be verified, in order to become -effective thought and concept. Now the systematic prejudice consists -precisely in thinking the unity without thinking the distinctions, in -deduction without induction, in changing the hypothesis into a concept -without having seriously verified it. Hence analogical constructions -(or falsely analogical, and so metaphysical and fantastic), which take -the place of philosophical distinctions, and hence the systematic -prejudice, which is a <i>false idea of system.</i> Against this rebellion -is justified. But the mistake is usually made of discarding the true -demand for system through horror of the false, or of denying the -utility of the analogical process, which is blameable in the system, -but useful in enquiry.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Sacred and philosophical numbers; meaning of the demand -which they express.</i></div> - -<p>Another aspect of this same rebellion which has become universal -in most recent times, is the distrust of or open hostility towards -the search for <i>symmetry,</i> the arrangement of philosophic concepts<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> -in <i>dyads, triads, quatriads,</i> or in other suchlike numbers, which -precisely express symmetry in the ordering of those concepts. And -such distrust will be judged reasonable by any one who recalls the -excesses caused by this love of symmetry and the puerilities to which -some even of the loftiest philosophers abandoned themselves, owing to -their excessive attachment to certain numbers. The pedantry of the -Kantian quatriads and triads is truly insupportable, nor are Hegel's -triads less artificial. These were very often reduced by his disciples -to conjuring tricks and almost to buffoonery. It was natural that -there should be a reaction towards the search for the asymmetrical and -towards the doctrine that the concepts attained cannot be arranged -in a beautiful order, for they change their order from one sphere to -another, but that nevertheless they and no others are the concepts of -reality—inelegant but honest; asymmetrical but true. The reaction -is comprehensible, the distrust justifiable; but the hostility is -certainly unjustifiable. If distinct concepts constitute a unity, they -must of necessity constitute an order or symmetry, of which certain -numbers, that can be called regular, are the expression or symbol. The -concepts of an empirical science may be thirty-seven, eighty-three,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> -a hundred and thirteen, or as many as you like according as they -are arranged. But the concepts of philosophy will always be dyads, -triads, quatriads and the like, that is to say, an organic unity of -distinctions and a correspondence of parts. For this reason, the human -race has always had <i>sacred numbers</i> in religion and <i>philosophic -numbers</i> in philosophy. Let him laugh who wills; but we do not say -that he laughs well. The criterion of symmetry must not become a -<i>prejudice.</i> It must, however, act as a control upon the enquiry that -has been accomplished, since it greatly aids, as a heuristic process, -the enquiry that is yet to be made. Astronomers are praised, when, -thanks to their calculations, supported by the criterion of proportion -and symmetry, they form a hypothesis that a star, unseen at the time, -but which the telescope eventually discovers, must be at a certain -place in the sky. Why should not a philosopher be equally praised, who -deduces that for reasons of symmetry, there must be in the spirit a -form, as yet unobserved, or that for the same reasons, there should -be eliminated a form which does not seem to be eliminable, but which -spoils the symmetry? Why should the spirit be less rhythmical and less -symmetrical than the starry sky?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of dividing philosophy into general and -particular.</i></div> - -<p>When the systematic character of philosophy is conceived in this -way, it is seen that the system is not something superadded, like a -thread used for binding together the various parts of philosophy and -quite external to the objects that it unites, so that we can consider -separately the objects and the thread, the parts and the system. In -philosophy, none of the parts are without the whole, and the whole does -not exist without the parts. Translated into other terms, this means -chat there are not <i>particular</i> philosophic sciences, just as there -is not a <i>general</i> philosophy. We have made use of this proposition, -in order to confute the usual conception of Logic as a prologue to -philosophy, and to show how this error (which in the case of Logic -is supported by special reasons) is the principal source of other -like errors. Thus Metaphysic or Ontology, or some other science, -which is supposed to give the unity of the real, of which the special -philosophic sciences give only the distinctions, is placed before or -after the special philosophic sciences like a prologue or an epilogue. -The truth is that general philosophy is nothing but the special -philosophic sciences, and <i>vice versa.</i> The plural and the singular -cannot be separated in the pure concept, where the plural is plural of -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> singular, and the singular is singular of the plural.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Evils of the conception of a general philosophy, separated -from particular philosophies.</i></div> - -<p>The destruction of this erroneous idea of a general philosophy has -direct practical, importance. For, once the so-called science has been -constituted, by means of a group of arbitrarily isolated problems, -which really belong to the various sciences called particular, we -are led to believe that true philosophy consists of a medley, in -constant agitation and shock, and that, thanks to this agitation and -these shocks, it becomes ever more worthy of itself, that is, of -being a medley. But the problems of God and of the world, of spirit -and of matter, of thought and of nature, of subject and of object, -of the individual and of the universal, of life and death, torn from -Logic, from Æsthetic, from the Philosophy of the practical, become -insoluble or are solved only in appearance (that is to say, verbally -and imaginatively). Many young men, ignorant of all particular -philosophical knowledge, attack them as if they were the first step -in philosophy, and many old professors find themselves at the end of -their lives in the same state of mental confusion as at the beginning, -indeed with their confusion increased and henceforth inextricable, -owing to the false path that they have followed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> for so many years. -They have not respected philosophy, in their first relations with it; -they resemble those men who will never really love a woman, because -they failed of respect to women in their youth. On the other hand, -the so-called particular philosophical sciences, deprived of some of -their organs and become blind or deaf or otherwise maimed, fall into -the power of psychologism and empiricism. Hence the empirical and -psychological treatment of Morality, of Æsthetic, and of Logic itself. -In regard to this evil, now more than ever rampant in philosophic -studies, it is necessary to remember, that the history of philosophy -teaches that no philosophic progress has ever been achieved by -so-called general philosophy, but always by discoveries made in one or -other of the so-called special philosophies. The concept of Socrates -and the dialectic of Hegel are discoveries in Logic. Kant's concept -of freedom is a discovery in Ethics. The concept of intuition is a -discovery in Æsthetic. The critique of formalist logic is a discovery -in the Philosophy of language. The old idea of God has been dissolved -by those most modest, yet greatest of men, who contented themselves -with formulating a new proposition on the syllogism or on the will, on -art or history,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> or with defining the abstract intellect or with fixing -the limits of the fancy. Had we been obliged to await these solutions -from the cultivators of that anæmic general philosophy, the old idea of -God would now be more rife than before. And in truth it is still rife -among those philosophers of whom we have spoken, for it reappears from -the midst of the medley which they stir, either with the name of the -Unknowable, or with the old name that still is reverenced.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIId" id="IIId">III</a></h4> - - -<h5>HISTORY</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>History as individual judgment.</i></div> - -<p>Since all the characteristics assigned to Philosophy are verbal -variants of its unique character, which is the pure concept, so all -the characteristics of History can be reduced to the definition and -identification of History with the individual judgment.</p> - -<p>History, being the individual judgment, is the synthesis of subject and -predicate, of representation and concept. The intuitive and the logical -elements are both indispensable to it and both are bound together with -an unseverable link.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The individual element and historical sources; relics and -narratives.</i></div> - -<p>Owing to the necessity for the subject or intuitive element, history -cannot be constructed by pure reason. The vision of the thing done -is necessary and is the sole <i>source</i> of history. In treatises upon -historical method the sources are usually divided into <i>remains</i> and -<i>narratives,</i> meaning by remains (<i>Ueberreste</i>) the things<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> which -remain as traces of an event (for example, a contract, a letter, a -triumphal arch), and by narratives the accounts of the event as they -have been communicated by those who were more or less eye-witnesses, or -by those who have consulted the notes of eye-witnesses. But, in truth, -narratives are valuable just in so far as it is presumed that they -place us in direct contact with the thing that happened and make us -live it again, drawing it forth from the obscure depth of the memories -that the human race bears with it. Had they not this virtue, they would -be altogether useless, as are the narratives to which for one reason -or another credence is refused. A hundred or a thousand narratives -lacking authenticity are not equal to the poorest authentic document. -An authentic narrative is both a document and remains; it is the -reality of the fact as it was <i>lived</i> and as it vibrates in the spirit -of him who took part in it. The search for veracity and the criticism -of the value of sources are reducible in the ultimate analysis, to the -isolation of this genuine resonance of fact, by its liberation from -perturbing elements, such as the illusions, the false judgments, the -preoccupations and passions of the witness. Only in so far as this can -be successfully done, and in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> measure in which it is successful, -do we have the first condition of history as act of cognition—that -something can be <i>intuited</i> and thereby transformable into the -<i>subject</i> of the individual judgment, that is to say, into historical -narrative.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The intuitive faculty in historical research.</i>·</div> - -<p>On this necessity is based the importance which in the examination of -historians is attached to intuition, or touch, or scent, or whatever -else it may be called, that is to say, to the capacity (derived in -part from natural disposition and in part from practical exercise) of -directly intuiting what has occurred, of passing beyond the obstacles -of time and space and the alterations produced by chance or human -passion. An historian without intuitive faculty, or more exactly (since -no one is altogether without it), with but slender intuitive faculty, -is condemned to barrenness, however learned and ingenious he may be in -argument. He finds himself inferior to others, less learned and less -logical than he, inferior even to the uncultured and to the illogical, -when it is a question of feeling what lies beneath words and signs, or -of reproducing in himself what actually happened. For the same reason, -it sometimes happens that an expert in a given trade is astonished to -hear the learned arm-chair historian describe certain orders of facts, -of which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> he has no experience and of which he talks as a blind man -talks of colours. A sergeant can intuite a march better than a Thiers, -and laugh at the millions of men that Xerxes had led into Greece by -simply enquiring how they were fed. A political schemer understands -a court or ministerial intrigue far better than an honest man like -Muratori. A craftsman can reconstruct the successive brush-strokes and -the traces of change of mind in a picture better than the erudite and -æsthetic historian of art. Historical works perhaps defective or even -failures from other points of view, sometimes fascinate by the proof -they give of freshness of impression: and this quality may serve to -increase our knowledge of facts and to rectify the errors into which -their authors have fallen in other respects. To a historian of the -French Revolution we can pardon even the mistaking of one personage -for another, of a river for a mountain, or the confusion of months and -years, when on the whole he has lived again better than others the soul -of the Jacobins, the spiritual conditions of the mob of Paris, the -attitude of the peasants of Burgundy or of La Vendée. What is called an -historical novel sometimes has in certain respects greater value than -a history, if the novel is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> inspired by the spirit of the time and the -history contains merely an inventory.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The intuitive faculty in historical exposition. Similarity -of history and art.</i></div> - -<p>The intuitive faculty, indispensable in research, is not less -indispensable in historical exposition; since it is necessary to -intuite the actual fact, not in a fugitive and sketchy manner, but so -firmly as to be able to express it and to fix it in words, in such a -way as to transmit its genuine life to others. Hence the specially -artistic character that must be possessed by true historians. Here -they resemble pure artists, painting pictures, as they do, composing -poems and writing tragic dialogues. Certainly, every thought, even that -of the most abstruse philosopher and mathematician, becomes concrete -in artistic form. But the historian (in the somewhat empirical sense -of the word) approximates much more nearly to those who express pure -intuitions, since he gives literary preference to the subject over -the predicate. This has been generally recognized both by historians, -who have freely presented themselves as bards of their race invoking -the Muse who represents History upon Parnassus, while there is there -no representative of Philosophy, Mathematics, or Science; and by -theorists, who have constantly debated the question as to <i>whether -history is art.</i> It seems indeed to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> art, when the predicate or -logical element is so well concealed that hardly any attention is paid -to it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Difference between history and art. The predicate or -logical element in history.</i></div> - -<p>I say <i>hardly</i>; because if no attention whatever be paid to it, if -literary emphasis become logical mutilation, art will remain, but -history will have gone. A book of history will no longer merely -<i>resemble</i> a poem or romance, but will <i>be</i> a poem or a romance. What -is it that, from the point of view of intuition, distinguishes an -imaginative vision and an historical narrative? If we open the <i>Divine -Comedy</i> or the <i>Rime</i> of Petrarch and read: "In the middle pathway -of our life, I found myself in a dark forest ...," or, "I raised my -thought to where she whom I seek was and find not upon earth ..."; and -if we open Livy's <i>History,</i> at the place where he recounts the battle -of Cannae, and read: "<i>Consules satis exploratis itineribus sequentes -Poenum, ut ventum ad Cannas est, ubi in conspecta Poenum habebant, -bina, castra communiunt,"</i> nothing at first seems changed; both are -narratives. Yet everything is changed. If we read Livy as we read -Dante or Petrarch, the battle of Cannae in the same way as the voyage -of Dante to the Inferno, or the passage of the spirit of Petrarch to -the third heaven, Livy is no longer Livy, but a story<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> book. In like -manner, if we read a book of stories, as, for example, the <i>Kings of -France</i> or the <i>Guerin Meschino,</i> in the same way as they are read by -the uneducated man of the people, who seeks history in them, the story -book becomes transformed into a historical book, although of a kind -that must be criticized and refuted when a higher degree of culture has -been attained. This suffices to show the importance of that predicate, -which is sometimes left to be understood in the words, but whose -effective presence transforms the pure intuition into the individual -judgment and makes <i>history</i> of a <i>poem.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Vain attempts to eliminate it.</i></div> - -<p>The necessity of the logical element has been several times denied, -and it has been affirmed that the historian must let things speak for -themselves and put into them nothing of his own. This fine phrase may -have some reference to a-certain truth, as we shall see. But if it is -understood as the exclusion of the logical element in favour of pure -intuition (and worse still, if it intends to exclude also the category -of intuition, for in that case we have simple <i>muteness),</i> it proclaims -the death of history. Without the logical element it is not possible to -say that even the smallest, the most ordinary fact, belonging<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> to our -individual and everyday life, has <i>occurred;</i> as, for instance, that I -rose this morning at eight o'clock and took luncheon at twelve. For (to -give no other reasons) these historical propositions imply the concept -of existence or actuality and the correlative concept of non-existence -or possibility, since in affirming them I also deny that I only dreamed -of rising at eight or of taking luncheon at twelve. All will agree that -we cannot speak of a historical fact if we do not know that it is a -fact, that is to say, something that has happened; even stories become -the object of history, in so far as their existence as stories is -attributed to them. A story, told without knowing or deciding whether -it be or be not a story, is poetry; perceived and told as a story, it -is mythography, that is to say, history; the author of the <i>Iliad</i> or -the author of the <i>Niebelungen</i> is not Adalbert Kuhn, Jacob Grimm or -Max Müller.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Extension of historical predicates beyond that of mere -existence.</i></div> - -<p>But the criterion of existentiality does not itself suffice, as some -believe, for the effectual constitution of historical narrative. For -what sort of narrative should we have, if we merely said that something -had happened, without saying <i>what</i> had happened? That something has -happened and does happen at every instant,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> is not, as we know, the -content of historical narrative, because it is the affirmation that -being is, or that becoming is. What has been said of the individual -judgment, namely, that it is constituted by all the predicates -together, that is, of the whole concept, and not by the predicate of -existence alone, torn from the others, must also be said of historical -narrative. It is truly complete and therefore realized, when the -intuition, which supplied it with the rough material, is completely -penetrated by the concept, in its universality, particularity and -singularity. That the consuls, after having sufficiently explored -the routes, followed the Carthaginian, entered Cannae, and seeing -themselves face to face with the army of Hannibal, pitched and -fortified their camp (as runs Livy's narrative), implies a crowd of -concepts, equal in number to the historical affirmations collected in -that sentence. No one ignorant as to what is man, war, army, pursuit, -route, camp, fortification, dream, reality, love, hatred, fatherland, -and so on, is capable of <i>thinking</i> such a sentence as this. And the -obscurity of one of those concepts is sufficient to make it impossible -to form the narrative as a whole, just as any one who does not -understand the meaning of the word <i>castra</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> is not in a position to -understand what forms the argument of Livy's narrative. If the sources -are changed, the historical narrative changes; but this latter changes -no less, if our convictions as to the concepts are changed. The same -matter is differently arranged and gives rise to different histories, -if it is narrated by a savage or a cultured European, by an anarchist -or a conservative, by a protestant or a catholic, by the me of this -moment or the same me of ten years hence. Given that all have the same -documents before them, each one reads in them a different happening.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Alleged insuperable variation in judging and presenting -historical facts, and consequent claim for a history without -judgments.</i></div> - -<p>But the fact here stated seems to lead straight to despair as to the -fate of history, or at least as to its fate, so long as it is bound -to the logical element, to convictions about the concepts. When it is -observed that the same facts are narrated in the most different way; -that what for some is the work of God is for others the work of the -Devil; that what for some is the manifestation of spiritual forces is -for others the product of material movements of the brain, according -as it is well or ill-nourished; that to some the good of life lies in -every explosion and revolt, while to others it lies only in regular -work under the tutelage of laws rigorously observed and made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> to be -observed,—we arrive at the conclusion of historical scepticism, -namely, that history as usually narrated is nothing but a story woven -from such a state of degeneration seems to be a return to the pure and -simple reproduction of the document, or at least to the pure intuition, -which introduces no element of <i>judgment,</i> or of what is called -<i>subjective. </i> But this salvation is only a figure of speech, for pure -intuition is poetry and not history, and to return to it is equivalent -to abolishing history. This, however, is clearly impossible, for the -human race has always narrated its doings, and none of us can dispense -with establishing at every instant how things have happened, what has -really happened, and in what actual or historical conditions he finds -himself.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Restriction of variations and exclusion of apparent -variations.</i></div> - -<p>Historical scepticism is, however, as inexact and one-sided in the -observation of fact as it is puerile in the suggestion of a remedy. -Certainly, there are divergences between the various accounts of -the same fact; but (setting aside <i>apparent</i> divergences, derived -from the different interest taken in a given fact, owing to which -verbal prominence is given to one or to another aspect of it, and -limiting ourselves here to <i>real</i> differences) we must, for the sake -of exactitude,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> take account of all the no less real agreements, to -be found side by side with these divergences. In virtue of them, for -instance, Protestant and Catholic are unanimous in recognizing that -Luther and Leo X. existed, that the one produced a definite movement -in Germany and that the other had recourse to certain definite -prohibitions; and, finally, both Protestant and Catholic recognize (now -at least) the corruption of the ecclesiastical orders at the beginning -of the sixteenth century, and the mundane and political interests of -the German princes in the wars of religion. In like manner no one, -however revolutionary or conservative he is, will question the bad -condition of French finances at the eve of the Revolution; or that -Louis XVI. convoked the States General; or that he attempted flight -and was stopped at Varennes; or that he was guillotined on the 21st -of January 1793; or that the French Revolution was an event which -profoundly changed the social and moral life of the whole of Europe. -Owing to this substantial agreement between two historians in very many -points, and indeed in the greater part of the narrative, it happens -that we can often read and advise others to read histories that are -tainted with the passions of the partisan, while merely recommending -the reader to make<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> a mental allowance for these passions. In like -manner, we can usefully employ a defective instrument of measurement, -provided we include in the calculation the coefficient of aberration.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The overcoming of variations by means of deepening the -concepts.</i></div> - - -<p>As to the remedy, it is clear that if the divergences as to the -concepts arise from ignorance, prejudice, negligence, illegitimate -private or national interests, and from other disturbing passions, -that is to say, from <i>insufficient conceiving of the concepts,</i> or -from inexact thought, the remedy is certainly not to be sought in the -abandonment of concepts and of thought, but in correcting the former -and making perfect the latter. Abandonment would not only be cowardly, -but impossible. Having left the Eden of pure intuition and entered -the field of history, it is not given us to retrace our steps. There -is no returning to blessed and ingenuous ignorance; innocence is lost -for ever, and we must no longer aspire to it, but to virtue, which -is neither innocent nor ingenuous. Why does what seems good to the -Protestant seem bad to the Catholic? Evidently, owing to the different -conception that each forms as to this world and the world above us, -death and life, reason and revelation, criticism and authority, and so -on. It is necessary, then, to open the discussion with the enquiry as -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> whether the truth is with the Protestants or with the Catholics, -or whether it be not found rather in a third view, which goes beyond -both. Once a definite result has been obtained, perplexity will be at -an end (at least for him who has attained it), and the narrative can be -constructed with as much security as the available historical sources -permit. The way indicated will seem hard; but it is the only way. -Whoever decides to retain his own opinions, received without criticism, -will perhaps provide for his own convenience, but he will renounce -history and truth. For the rest, we do not here draw up a programme for -the future, but simply establish what history is in its true nature, -and consequently how it is manifested and has <i>always</i> been manifested. -Men in every age have discussed the concepts with which historical -reality has been interpreted and have agreed upon very many points, -as to which there is no longer any discussion. Both Catholics and -Protestants, Revolutionaries and conservatives are, as has been already -remarked, more in agreement than they were formerly; because something -has passed and penetrated from each to each, or rather the <i>humanity,</i> -which is in both, has become elevated. Scepticism accomplishes an easy -task, but uses an illusory argument, in history as in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> philosophy, -when it catalogues the points of disagreement. These are before the -eyes of all, just because they represent the problems which it is -important to solve. Would it not be worth while to keep in view as of -equal importance the points already solved, and to say, for example, -that historians are henceforth agreed that Anchises did not sleep with -Aphrodite, that the wolf did not suckle Romulus and Remus, and that -William Tell did not establish the liberty of the Swiss Cantons? In -short, it would not be easy to find either those who support or those -who deny Mary's immaculate conception. The Catholic writers who insist -upon such disputes are rare, and those who deny are found only in -little democratic journals of the inferior sort or of degraded taste.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Subjectivity and objectivity in history: their meaning.</i></div> - -<p>To drive <i>subjectivity</i> out of history, in order to obtain -<i>objectivity,</i> cannot therefore mean to drive away thought to obtain -intuition, or worse still, to obtain brute matter, which is altogether -inexpressible; but to drive away false thought, or passion that -usurps the place of truth, and to mount to true thought, rigorous -and complete. If we attain to intuition, instead of saving ourselves -from passion we shall burn in its flames. For intuition says nothing -but what we as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> individuals experience, suffer, and desire. It is -just intuition which, when unduly introduced into history, becomes -subjectivity <i>sensu deteriori;</i> whereas thought is <i>true subjectivity,</i> -that of the universal, which is at the same time <i>true objectivity.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Historical judgments of value, and normal or neutral -values. Critique.</i></div> - -<p>We have thus also solved the question (so much discussed in our day) -as to the <i>criterion of value</i> in history, and whether judgments of -values, as well as judgments of fact belong to the province of the -historian. It is solved, because true judgments of fact, individual -judgments, are precisely judgments of value, or determinations of the -proper quality, and therefore of the meaning and value of the fact. -We admit no other criterion of value than the concept itself. For -this reason, we must also reject the distinction of the <i>history</i> of -fact and the <i>criticism</i> (or valuation) of it. Every history is also -criticism, and every criticism is also history; to say that a thing is -the fact which we call the <i>Divine Comedy</i> is to say what its value -is, and so to criticize it. To think <i>normal</i> or <i>neutral</i> values, -as to which (according to the most modern historical theories) men -of different points of view should agree, seems at the most a mere -<i>symbol</i> of that agreement which men are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> constantly seeking and -realizing in the subjectivity objectivity of thought. This will never -be a <i>fact</i> completely agreed upon, because it is a perpetual <i>fieri.</i> -It cannot be expected of the future, because it will belong to the -future, as it belongs and has belonged to the present and to the past.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Various legitimate meanings of the protests against -historical subjectivity.</i></div> - - -<p>If the protest against the intrusion of subjectivity into history -cannot logically be said to have any legitimate meaning save that of a -polemic against false subjectivity in favour of true subjectivity, it -may also imply, on the literary side, a question of expediency, namely, -that in the historical work of art greater importance should be given -to the representation of facts than to the theoretical discussion of -concepts. A historical should not be transformed into a philosophical -work. But this is a question that must be studied case by case; for -what harm could it do, if a historian, beginning by writing a history, -were to end by writing a philosophic treatise? Certainly, it would not -be a greater evil than if a philosopher, becoming passionate about the -facts he gives as instances, were gradually to abandon his first plan -and produce a history in place of a system. At bottom it would do no -harm, or very little, provided that such philosophy or such historical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> -representation were good; and this is precisely what must be examined -case by case. A more appropriate meaning of the polemic against the -subjectivity of history is the recommendation that in narrating -history, <i>emphatic, negative,</i> and <i>desiderative</i> forms should -accompany logical judgments which, as such, are judgments of value, -as little as possible. These forms, it is argued, are justifiable in -relation to the present or immediate past, because they indicate the -direction of the future, but in relation to the remote past they are -usually empty and superfluous. Indeed, to rage against Marius or Sulla, -Cæsar or Pompey, Frederick Barbarossa or the burgesses of Lombardy, is -somewhat vain, because those historical personages have, in general, -no near or practical interest. But, on the other hand, it is also true -that these characters always have some near and practical interest, -and in that measure we cannot prevent history, even of the remote -past, being here and there revived with the accents of our present -and of our future. Still more legitimate is the significance of that -polemic when the intention is to blame the habit of those who assume -the functions of praise or blame, in relation not only to men, but to -historical events. They applaud paganism, abuse<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> Christianity, weep -over the fall of the Roman Empire, deplore the formation of Islamism, -regret that Buddhism should not have been disseminated in Europe, -sympathize with the Reformation, or disapprove of Catholicism after -the Council of Trent. To them was addressed the saying that history -is not to be judged but to be narrated. But it would be more accurate -to say that history is not to be judged by the categories by which we -judge the actions of individuals, which are subject to the dialectic -of good and evil, because the action of an individual differs from the -historical event, which transcends individual wills. But the definition -of individuality and of event goes outside the gnoseology of history, -and more properly belongs to the Philosophy of the Practical.<a name="FNanchor_1_14" id="FNanchor_1_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_14" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The demand for a theory of historical facts.</i></div> - -<p>The conviction that has been gained as to the necessity of the logical -element, of concepts, criteria, or values, for the formation of -narrative, has induced some to demand, not only that the historian -should continually have clearly and firmly in mind the concepts that -he employs and his intention in employing them, but that a <i>theory -of historical factors</i> or, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> others call it, a <i>table of values,</i> -should be constructed, which should serve as foundation for historical -narrative in general. The demand is exactly similar to that of the man -who, observing that electricians or metal-founders employ physical -forces, demands the construction of a physical theory to serve as the -basis of industry; as if Physics did not exist and supply the basis -for industry; or as if the sciences changed their nature, according -to the men who employ them. The theory of historical factors, or the -table of values, exists, and is called <i>Philosophy,</i> whose precise -business it is to define <i>universals,</i> which are <i>factors</i> and not -facts, and to give the table of <i>values,</i> which are <i>categories.</i> At -the most this demand might be taken to suggest the recommendation of a -popular philosophy, for the use of professional historians; but this -too exists and is natural <i>good sense. A</i> historian who entertains -doubts as to the deliverances of good sense begins to philosophize -(in the restricted and professional sense of the word), and once he -has done this, what is called popular philosophy no longer suffices -him, or serves only to make his mental condition worse, with its -insufficient nourishment. Books on the teaching of history which abound -in our literature of to-day are proof of this.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> Disquisitions as to -the <i>predominance</i> or the <i>fundamental</i> character of this or that -historical factor belong to this popular and more or less dilettante -literature. In strict philosophy, such problems do not arise, or are -promptly dissolved, because it is known that, since every fact of -reality depends upon another fact, so also every factor, or every -constitutive element of the spirit and of reality, is such only in -union with other factors and elements. None of them predominates, -because measures of greater or less are not used in philosophy, and -none is fundamental, because all are fundamental.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of dividing history according to its -intuitive and reflective elements.</i></div> - - -<p>The representative and conceptual elements in historical judgment -are not separable or even, strictly, distinguishable unless it is -intended to dissolve the historical narrative in order to return to -pure intuition. This too is a corollary of what has been said on the -individual judgment. For this reason, every division of history, based -upon the presence or absence of one or other of these elements, must -be held to be without truth. Of this kind is the once popular division -into <i>picturesque</i> and <i>reflective</i> or <i>thinking</i> history. But this -division designates not two kinds of history, but rather, on the one -hand, the return to indiscriminate intuition, and on the other, true -history,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> which is intuition thought or reflected. The same false -division is sometimes expressed in the terms <i>chronicle</i> and <i>history,</i> -or <i>narrative</i> and <i>philosophic</i> history.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirical nature of the division of the historical process -into four stages.</i></div> - -<p>Outside the individual judgment, there is neither subject nor -predicate. Outside the narrative, which synthesizes representation and -concept, and by representing gives existence and judgment, there is no -history. Technical manuals usually divide the process of historical -composition into four stages. The first is <i>heuristic,</i> consisting -of the collection of historical material; the second <i>criticism</i> or -<i>separation</i> of it; the third is <i>interpretation</i> or <i>comprehension,</i> -the fourth <i>exposition</i> or <i>narrative.</i> These distinctions portray the -professional historian's method of work. <i>First,</i> he examines archives -and libraries, <i>then</i> he verifies the authenticity of the documents -found, <i>then</i> he seeks to understand them, and <i>finally</i> he puts his -thoughts on paper and pays attention to the beauty of form of the -exposition. These are doubtless useful didactic distinctions. But it -must be observed that so long as we do not have a historical source -before us (the first stage) the very condition of the birth of history -is wanting. Hence the first stage does not belong to historical work, -but to the practical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> stage of him who goes in search of a material -object. The second stage is already a complete historical work in -itself, since it consists in establishing, whether a given fact, called -sincere evidence, has really taken place. The third coincides logically -with the second, since it is the same thing to ascertain the value of -a piece of evidence and to pronounce on the reality and quality of the -facts to which it witnesses. The fourth coincides with the second and -third, because it is impossible to think a narrative without speaking -it, that is, without giving to it expressive or verbal form.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Divisions founded upon the historical object.</i></div> - -<p>If history be not divisible on the basis of the presence or absence -of the reflective or representative element, it may well be divided -by taking as basis, either the concept that determines the particular -historical composition, or the representative material that enters into -it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Logical division according to the forms of the spirit.</i></div> - -<p>The first mode of distinction is rigorous, because founded upon the -character of unity-in-distinction, proper to the pure concept. Thus, -the human mind cannot think history as a whole, save by distinguishing -it at the same time into the history of doing and the history of -knowing, into the history of the practical activity and the history -of æsthetic production, of philosophic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> thought, and so on. In like -manner, it cannot think any one of these distinctions, save by placing -it in relation with the others, or with the whole, and thinking it -in complete history. Naturally, this intimate, logical unity and -distinction has nothing to do with the <i>books</i> which are called -histories of the practical, philosophic, artistic activities, and the -like. There the correspondence with the division of which we speak is -only approximate, owing to the operation of what we called practical -or economic motives. But every historical proposition, like every -individual judgment, qualifies the real according to one aspect of the -concept, and excludes another, or it qualifies it indeed according to -all its aspects, but distinguishes them, and therefore prevents the -one from intruding upon the other. The literary division of books into -books of practical, philosophic, and artistic history, and so on, gets -its importance from this fundamental distinction, according to which -are also divided the different points of view of historians and the -various interests of their readers.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirical division of representative material.</i></div> - -<p>The second mode is, of necessity, empirical, and cannot be carried -out without the introduction of empirical concepts. For otherwise it -would not be possible to keep the representations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> of reality separate, -since they constitute a continuous and compact series. By means of -empirical concepts, history is divided into the history of the State, -of the Church, of society, of the family, of religion (as distinct -from philosophy), or of philosophy (as distinct from religion). Or, -as the history of philosophy, it is divided into the history of -idealism, of materialism, of scepticism; or as the history of art, -into the history of painting, of poetry, of the drama, of fiction. Or -again, as the history of civilization, it is divided into oriental -history—history of Greece, of Rome, of the Middle Ages, of the -Renaissance, of the Reformation, and so on. Even these last mentioned -criteria (Greece, Rome, the Middle Ages, etc.) are empirical concepts -and not representations, because, as we know,<a name="FNanchor_2_15" id="FNanchor_2_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_15" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> the representation -is individual, and when it is made constant and general it is changed -into a concept of the individual, the summary and symbol of several -representations, in fact, the empirical concept. Each one of these -divisions is valid in so far as it is useful; and equally valid, under -a like condition, are all the divisions that have been conceived, and -the infinite number that are conceivable.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirical concepts in history and the false theory as to -the function that they have there.</i></div> - -<p>But the failure to understand that the true function of the -introduction of empirical concepts is to divide the mass of historical -facts and to regroup them conveniently for mnemonic purposes, has -greatly interfered with the ideas of logicians as to the writing -of history. Just as the individual judgment presupposes neither -the empirical concept, nor the judgment of classification, nor the -abstract concept, nor the judgment of enumeration, whereas all these -forms presuppose just the individual judgment; so history does not -presuppose classifications conducted from the practical point of -view, or enumerations and statistics, whereas on the other hand all -of these do presuppose history, and without it could not appear. We -should not be deceived by finding them fused in historical works (which -continually have recourse to such aids to memory), nor allow ourselves -to forget that their function is <i>subservient,</i> not <i>constitutive.</i> -There can be no abstract idea of the Greek, unless we have first known -the individual life of the men called Pericles and Alcibiades. Nor can -there be any enumeration of the Three Hundred of Thermopylæ or of the -Three Hundred of Cremera, except in so far as each was known in his -individual features, and then classified as a citizen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> of Sparta or a -Roman of the Fabian <i>gens.</i> To avail oneself of these simplifications -is not to narrate history, which is already present to the spirit, -but to fix it in the memory and to communicate it to others in an -easier way. Those others, if they have not the capacity to recover -the individual fact beneath those concepts of class and of number, -will understand nothing of history, thus simplified and reduced to a -skeleton for the purposes of communication.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Hence comes also the claim to reduce history to a natural -science;</i></div> - -<p>The positivist fiction that <i>history can be reduced to a science</i> -(natural science is of course meant) arises from the false -interpretation of the subsidiary character of the pseudoconcepts in -history and from making them a constitutive part of it. History, on -this view, would be rendered a perfect example of what it has hitherto -been only in imperfect outline, a classification and statistical table -of reality. The many practical attempts at such a reduction have -damaged contemporary historical writing not a little, by substituting -colourless formulæ and empty abstractions which are applicable to -several epochs at once or to all times, for the narration of individual -reality. The same tendency appears in what is called <i>sociologism,</i> and -in its polemic against what it calls <i>psychological</i> or <i>individual</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> -history, and in favour of <i>institutional</i> or <i>social</i> history. Against -these materialistic reductions of history, the doctrines of <i>accident</i> -or of <i>little causes</i> which upset the effects of <i>great</i> causes, are -efficacious and valuable, for these and suchlike absurdities have the -merit of reducing that false reduction to absurdity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>and the thesis of the practical character of history.</i></div> - -<p>By reason of the same erroneous interpretation there has come from -philosophers who are not positivists, the theory that history is -rendered possible only by the intervention of <i>the practical</i> spirit. -On this view, the practical spirit, after establishing practical -values, arranges beneath them the formless material and shapes it into -historical narrative. But the practical spirit is impotent to produce -anything in the field of knowledge; it can act only as the custodian -and administrator of what has already been produced. For this reason, -the theory here referred to, by appealing to the practical spirit, -resolves itself into a complete negation of the value of history as -knowledge. And this negation, though it was certainly not foreseen or -desired by those who maintain the theory, yet is unavoidable.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction between historical facts and facts that are not -historical, and its empirical value.</i></div> - -<p>In this connection, there has also been maintained the importance of -the distinction between historical events and events not worthy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> of -history, between historical and non-historical, or between teleological -and ateleological personages. Such a distinction, it has been affirmed, -is afforded by the practical spirit. This is true, but for the reason -already given, it amounts to removing all theoretical importance from -the distinction, by emptying it of all cognitive content. In reality, -for the practical economy of social work, for selecting subjects -for books, or for being easily understood in our own speech, it is -necessary to speak of a definite event or of a definite individual as -a thing and person altogether common and unworthy of history. But it -asks the brain of a pedant to imagine that the individual or the event -has thereby been suppressed, we do not say from the field of reality -(which would be too manifestly absurd), but from that of the <i>narrative -of reality,</i> or from history. What is understood forms part of what -is said; and if we did not always imply a mental reference to the men -we call commonplace, and to insignificant facts, which are more or -less excluded from our words, great men and significant events would -also lose all meaning. Such implications are so little eliminated -or eliminable, that they break out and are even verbally expressed, -according to the various<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> interests that determine books on history at -various times. Thus we have seen domestic and social life, neglected -by the old historians, not only gradually assume importance, but throw -wars and diplomatic negotiations into the shade. We have seen the -so-called masses, neglected in favour of the individual genius, in -their turn conquer, and almost eclipse, the heroes (which does not mean -that these latter will not have their revenge). We have seen names, -once hardly mentioned, become attractive and popular, and others, at -one time celebrated, lose their colour and disappear from view. Even -Italian histories of the most recent events afford instances of such -fluctuations. For instance, in the period of the Risorgimento, the -prevailing interest regarded as supremely important and historical, -the formation of Italian nationality, the constitution of the middle -class and of the commune, and popular rebellions against foreigners -or against tyrants. Now it is the social problem and the socialist -movement that dominate, and preference is given to histories of -economic facts, of class struggles and of movements of the proletariat.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Professional prejudice and the theory of the practical -character of history.</i></div> - -<p>Practical preoccupations are so strong with any one engaged in a given -trade, even though it is that of a maker of books of history, as to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span> -suggest almost inevitably the strange doctrine of the <i>practical</i> -character of history, or the non-theoretic character of that form, -which is the crowning result of the theoretic spirit, and which alone -gives full truth—if truth is the Knowledge of Reality, and if Reality -is history.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_14" id="Footnote_1_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_14"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See on this point my <i>Philosophy of the Practical,</i> part -i. sect. ii. chaps, v.-vi.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_15" id="Footnote_2_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_15"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See above, Part I. Sect. I. <a href="#IV">Chap. IV.</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IVd" id="IVd">IV</a></h4> - - -<h5>IDENTITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Necessity of the historical element in philosophy.</i></div> - - -<p>The necessity of philosophy as a condition of history has been made -evident from the preceding considerations. It is now necessary -to affirm with no less clearness the necessity of history for -philosophy. If history is impossible without the logical, that is, -the philosophical, element, philosophy is not possible without the -intuitive, or historical element.</p> - -<p>For a philosophic proposition, or definition, or system (as we have -called it), appears in the soul of a definite individual at a definite -point of time and space and in definite conditions. It is therefore -historically conditioned. Without the historical conditions that -demand it, the system would not be what it is. The Kantian philosophy -was impossible at the time of Pericles, because it presupposes, for -instance, exact natural science, which developed from the Renaissance -onward. And this presupposes geographical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> discoveries, industry, -capitalist or civil society, and so on. It presupposes the scepticism -of David Hume, which in its turn presupposes the deism of the beginning -of the eighteenth century, which in its turn is connected with the -religious struggles in England and in all Europe in the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries, and so on. On the other hand, if Kant were -to live again in our time, he could not write the <i>Critique of Pure -Reason</i> without modifications so profound as to make of it, not only a -new book, but an altogether new philosophy, though containing within -itself his old philosophy. Stiff with old age, he was even capable -of ignoring the interpretations and developments of Fichte, and of -ignoring Schelling. But to-day he could not ignore either of these, -nor Hegel, nor Herbart, nor Schopenhauer. He could not even ignore -the representatives of the mediæval philosophy, which followed the -classical period of modern philosophy; the authors of positivist myths, -Kantian and Hegelian scholastics, the new combinations of Platonism and -Aristotelianism, that is, of pre-Kantian with post-Kantian philosophy, -the new sophists and sceptics, the new Plotinians and Mystics, nor -the states of soul and the facts, which condition all these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> things. -For the rest, Kant truly lives again in our days, with a different -name (and what is individuality, countersigned with the name, save a -juxtaposition of syllables?) He is the philosopher of our times, in -whom is continued that philosophic thought, which once took, among -others, the Scoto-German name of Kant. And the philosopher of our day, -whether he will it or no, cannot abandon the historical conditions in -which he lives, or so act as to make that not to have happened which -happened before his time. Those events are in his bones, in his flesh -and blood, and it is impossible to drive them out. He must therefore -take account of them, that is, know them historically. The breadth -of his philosophy will depend upon the breadth of his historical -knowledge. If he did not know them, but merely carried them in him as -facts of life, his condition would not differ from that of any animal -(or of ourselves in so far as we are animals or beings that are, or -rather seem to be, completely immersed in will and practice). For the -animal is precisely conditioned by the whole of nature and the whole of -history, but does not know it. The meaning of the demand must therefore -be understood that a truthful answer may be obtained. <i>History</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> must -be known in order to obtain the truth of <i>philosophy.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Historical quality of the culture required in the -philosopher.</i></div> - -<p>This demand is usually expressed in the formula that the philosopher -must be cultured, though it is not clear what is the quality of this -culture that is said to be requisite. Some, especially in our own -days, would wish the philosopher to be a physiologist, a physicist, a -mathematician, that is, that his brain should be full of abstractions, -which are certainly not useless (everything is worth knowing, even the -triviality of girls, for even that is a part of life and of reality), -but which are in no direct relation to that form of knowledge which -must be the condition of philosophy. This form of knowledge is, on the -contrary, history; or, as it is said (with an <i>a potiori</i> intention), -the history of philosophy, which of necessity as the history of a -moment of the spirit, includes all history in itself, as we have shown -above, when criticizing the divisions of history. That is to say, it is -necessary to know the meaning of the problems of our own time, and this -implies knowing also those of the past, in order not to take the former -for the latter and so cause inextricable confusion. And to the extent -that they can be of use according to the requirements of the problem,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> -we must know also the natural, physical, and mathematical sciences. But -we must <i>not</i> know them <i>as stick</i> and develop them as such, but rather -<i>as historical knowledge</i> concerning the state of the natural sciences, -of physics, and of mathematics, in order to understand the problems -that they help to raise for philosophy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Apparent objections.</i></div> - -<p>It is vain to set against this the example of great philosophers -without historical culture, as it is vain in the case of the necessity -of historical knowledge for æsthetic criticism to bring forward -instances of those who, although without any historical knowledge, -have yet given far more true and more profound judgments upon art -than the historically learned. If those judgments are true, then the -critic supposed to be ignorant of history is not ignorant of it. He has -somehow absorbed, scented in the air, divined with rapid perception -those actual facts that were applicable to the given case. And, on the -other hand, the so-called learned man will not be cultured, because his -erudition is not lively and synthetic. The same happens in the case -of those acute philosophers, who are said to be ignorant of the world -and of history and of the thoughts of other philosophers. It cannot -be denied that much or little history may be learned outside<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> the -usual course of teaching by manuals and by orderly mnemonic methods. -But here, too, the exceptional mode of learning confirms the rule and -does not obviate the usefulness for the majority of the customary -modes of learning. On the other hand, if he who is said empirically to -be without historical knowledge, but is not so in a given instance, -should nevertheless prove really ignorant in other instances, where -his unusual way of learning is not open to him, his philosophy also -suffers. For this reason, those philosophers who are ignorant of -history exhibit deficiencies that have often been deplored. They burst -open doors already opened, they do not avail themselves of important -results, they ignore grave difficulties and objections, they fail -to probe certain problems sufficiently deeply, and show themselves -too insecure and too superficial in others, and so on. Thus is the -customary learning of history avenged upon them: and Herbert Spencer, -who would never read Plato or Kant, is rejected, while Schelling and -Hegel are again in the hands of students.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Communication of history as changing of history.</i></div> - -<p>Philosophy also changes with the change of history, and since history -changes at every moment, philosophy at every moment is new. This can -be observed even in the fact of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> communication of philosophy from -one individual to another by means of speech or writing. Change at once -takes place in that transmission. When we have simply created again in -ourselves the thought of a philosopher, we are in the same condition -as he who has enjoyed a sonnet or a melody, by suiting his spirit to -that of the poet or composer. But this does not suffice in philosophy. -We may attain to ecstasy by the recitation of a poem or the execution -of a piece of music, just as it is, without altering it anywhere. But -it does not seem possible to possess a philosophic proposition, save -when we have <i>translated</i> it, as we say, <i>into our own language,</i> when -in reality, relying upon its results, we formulate new philosophic -propositions and solve new problems that have presented themselves in -our souls. For this reason no book ever completely satisfies us. Every -book quenches one thirst, only to give us a new one. So true is this, -that when we have finished reading or are in course of reading, we -often regret that it is impossible to speak with the author. We are led -to say, like Socrates in the <i>Phædrus,</i><a name="FNanchor_1_16" id="FNanchor_1_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_16" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> that written discourses are -like pictures and do not answer questions, but always repeat what has -already<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> -been said. Or we lose patience, like that Paduan professor of the -fifteenth century, who, commenting on the jurist Paolo, and annoyed -at the difficulties, exclaimed at a certain point: <i>"Iste maledictus -Paulus tam obscure loquitur ut, si haberem eum in manibus, eum per -capillos interrogarem!"</i> But if instead of the dumb book, we had -before us a living man, a Paolo obliged to be clear, the process would -still be the same: his speech would be translated into our speech, his -problem would arouse in our spirit our own problem.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The perpetuity of change.</i></div> - -<p>The author of a philosophic work is, however, always dissatisfied, for -he feels that his book or treatise hardly suffices for an instant, -but immediately reveals itself as more or less insufficient. For this -reason, to any philosopher, as to any poet, the only works of his -own that bring true satisfaction are those that he has still to do. -Thus every philosopher and every true artist dies unsatisfied, like -Karl Marx, who, when asked in the last year of his life to prepare -a complete edition of his works, replied that he had yet to write -them. He alone is satisfied who at a certain moment ceases to think -and takes to admiring himself, that is to say, the corpse of himself -as a thinker, and is careful,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> not of art or philosophy, but of his -own person. Yet to no one can even this give the satisfaction he -imagines, for life is no less voracious and insatiable than thought. -In any case, to be satisfied, the author must become philosophically -immobile in a <i>formula,</i> and the reader must content himself with this -formula. Thoughts must become "obtuse and deaf," as Leibnitz called -them, who defined such a spiritual condition as <i>psittacism.</i> The -only consolation left to one who does not become immobile is that of -reflecting, like Socrates, that his discourses will not be sterile, but -fruitful. Other discourses will spring from them in his own soul and in -the soul of others, in whom he has sown the <i>seeds</i><a name="FNanchor_2_17" id="FNanchor_2_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_17" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> He will console -himself with the thought that philosophy, like life, is infinite.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Surpassing and continuous progress of philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>The infinity of philosophy, its continuous changing, is not a doing -and an undoing, but a continuous <i>surpassing of itself.</i> The new -philosophic proposition is made possible only by the old; the old -lives eternally in the new that follows it and in the new that will -follow that again and make old that other which is new. This suffices -to reassure those minds which are easily led astray and inclined to -lament<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> the vanity of things. Where everything is vain, nothing is -vain; fullness consists precisely in that perpetual becoming vain, -which is the perpetual birth of reality, the eternal becoming. Nobody -renounces love because love is transitory, nor abandons thinking -because his thought will give place to other thoughts. Love passes, but -generates other beings, who will love. Thought passes, but generates -other thoughts, which, in their turn, will excite other thoughts. In -the world of thought also, we survive in our own children: in our -children who contradict us, substitute themselves for us and bury us, -not always with due piety.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Meaning of the eternity of philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>No other meaning but this is to be found in the vaunted eternity -of philosophy in regard to time and space. The eternity of every -philosophic proposition must be affirmed against those who -materialistically consider all propositions as valueless existences, -and fugitives which leave no trace, as phenomena of brute matter, -which alone persists. Philosophic propositions, though historically -conditioned, are not effects produced and determined by these -conditions, but creations of thought, which is continued in and through -them. When they appear to be produced determinately, they must be -held to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> be, not philosophy, but false philosophy, vital interests -masquerading as thoughts. That alone can be eternal as philosophy, -which is knowledge and truth. But when eternity is misunderstood as -isolation from those conditions, it must then be denied, and in place -of it the thesis of relativity must be admitted, provided we are -careful that it does not assume the erroneous vesture of historical -materialism and economic determinism. The thesis that the history of -philosophy should be treated <i>psychologically,</i> by the attribution -of ideas to the temporal conditions and the personal experiences of -philosophers, to social history and biography, is reducible (and it -is worth while noticing this) to materialism and determinism in its -least evident form, namely psychologism. Such a thesis is the failure -to recognize spiritual value, or at least (as is the case with some -unconscious æstheticists), the logical value of philosophy, whose -history, when changed into that of the expressions of states of the -soul, comes to coincide altogether with the history of poetry and -literature.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The concept of spontaneous, ingenuous, innate philosophy, -etc., and its meaning.</i></div> - -<p>The eternity of philosophy is its truth, and the conception which is -sometimes brought forward of a <i>spontaneous</i> or <i>ingenuous</i> or <i>innate</i> -or <i>cryptic</i> (<i>abdita</i>) philosophy, which alone should be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> permanent -amid the variations of philosophic opinions, or to which the spirit -should return after many wanderings, is nothing but a symbol of this -truth. The Platonic theory of <i>reminiscence (anamneisis)</i> is reducible -to this conception. In this theory true knowledge is explained as the -recollection of an original state; and it is this reminiscence, as the -restitution of the childish soul, that is described by our Leopardi in -the following verses:</p> - -<p>I believe that to know is very often, if we examine it, nothing but to -perceive the folly of beliefs due to habit, and the careful reconquest -of the knowledge of childhood, taken from us by age; for the child -neither knows nor sees more than we, but he does not believe that he -sees and knows.</p> - -<p>But such philosophy and such reminiscence are really found only in -propositions historically conditioned. Ingenuous philosophy and -primitive knowledge are nothing but the concept itself of philosophy, -fully realized in all and none. "Platonic reminiscence (explained -Schelling) is the memory of that state, in which we are all one with -nature." But since we are one with nature in every one of our acts, -each one of them demands a special reminiscence and so a new thought. -In like manner, <i>the state of nature,</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> celebrated in moral and -political doctrines (the doctrines of morality and rights), was a state -of perfection which can never be found anywhere in the world or at any -moment of time, because it expressed the very concept of the good, of -virtue and of justice. Socrates, in another Platonic dialogue, spoke -of those true beliefs (doxai aleiteis) as elusive like the statues of -Daedalus, that disappear from the soul, unless one binds them with -rational arguments, and only when thus bound do they from beliefs -become knowledge.<a name="FNanchor_3_18" id="FNanchor_3_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_18" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Such is ingenuous philosophy, which in reality -exists only when bound and never when loose and ingenuous, as the name -would suggest; philosophy <i>abdita</i> exists only as philosophy <i>addita.</i> -Certainly, to the consciousness of doctrinaires, obscured with too much -labour, we can sometimes oppose ingenuous consciousness, and to the -pedantry of scholastic treatises we can oppose the truth of proverbs, -of good sense, of children, of the people, or of primitive races. But -we must not forget that in all these cases ingenuous is a metaphor -which designates truth in contradistinction to what is not truth.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophy as criticism and polemic.</i></div> - -<p>The division of philosophy into ingenuous and learned is due to its -convenience and to its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> didactic value, and in like manner philosophy -properly so-called, or <i>system,</i> is distinguished from philosophy as -<i>criticism.</i> The former is looked upon as the solid and permanent -part, the latter as variable and adaptable to times and places, -having as its object the defence of the eternal truths conquered by -the human spirit, against the wiles and assaults of error. In reality -the distinction is empirical: philosophy and philosophical criticism -are the same thing; every affirmation is a negation, every negation -is an affirmation. The critical or negative side is inseparable from -philosophy, which is always substantially a <i>polemic,</i> as can be seen -from the examination of any philosophic writing. Peace-loving people -are fond of recommending abstention from polemics and the expression of -one's own ideas in a <i>positive</i> manner. But only the artist is capable -of expressing his soul without polemic, since it does not consist of -ideas. Ideas are always armed with helmet and lance, and those who wish -to introduce them among men must let them make war. A philosopher, when -he truly abstains from polemics and expresses himself as though he -were pouring out his own soul, has not even begun to philosophize. Or, -having philosophized upon certain problems, he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> makes, as Plato does, -the act of renunciation when he is confronted with others, feeling that -he has attained to the extreme limit of his powers, and from philosophy -he passes to poetry and prophecy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of philosophy and history.</i></div> - -<p>Philosophy, then, is neither beyond, nor at the beginning, nor at -the end of history, nor is it achieved in a moment or in any single -moments of history. It is achieved <i>at every moment</i> and is always -completely united to facts and conditioned by historical knowledge. But -this result which we have obtained and which completely coincides with -that of the conditioning of history by philosophy is still somewhat -provisional. Were we to consider it definite, philosophy and history -would appear to be two forms of the spirit, mutually conditioning one -another, or (as has sometimes been trivially remarked) in reciprocal -action. But philosophy and history are not two forms, they are one sole -form: they are not mutually conditioned, but identical. The <i>a priori</i> -synthesis, which is the reality of the individual judgment and of the -definition, is also the reality of philosophy and of history. It is the -formula of thought which by constituting itself qualifies intuition -and constitutes history. History does not precede philosophy, nor -philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span> history: both are born at one birth. If it is desired to -give precedence to philosophy, this can only be done in the sense that -the unique form of philosophy-history must take the name and character, -not of intuition, but of what transforms intuition, that is to say, of -thought and of philosophy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Didactic divisions and other reasons for the apparent -duality.</i></div> - -<p>Philosophy and history are distinguished, as we know, for didactic -purposes, philosophy being that form of exposition in which special -emphasis is accorded to the concept or system, and history as that form -in which the individual judgment or narrative is specially prominent. -But from the very fact that the narrative includes the concept, every -narrative clarifies and solves philosophic problems. On the other -hand, every system of concepts throws light upon the facts which are -before the spirit. The confirmation of the value of a system resides -in the power of interpreting and narrating history, which it displays. -It is history which is the touchstone of philosophy. It is true that -the two may appear to be different, owing to the external differences -of books, in which only one of the two seems to be treated: and it -is also true that the didactic division is based upon a diversity -of aptitudes, which practice contributes to develop. But, provided -always<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> that the meaning both of a philosophic proposition and of a -historical proposition is fathomed to the bottom, their intrinsic -unity is indubitable. The fact that is so often cited of conflicts -between philosophy and history is in reality a conflict between two -philosophies, the one true and the other false, or both partly true and -partly false. Some thinkers, for instance, are idealist in recounting -history and materialist in their philosophic systems. This means -that two philosophies are at strife within them without either being -sufficiently aware of it. And does it not also happen that we find in -a philosophic exposition propositions that contradict one another and -divergent systems capriciously associated in one system?</p> - -<p>From intuition, which is indiscriminate individualization, we rise to -the universal, which is discriminate individualization, from art to -philosophy, which is history. The second stage, precisely because it is -second, is more complex than the first, but this does not imply that -it is, as it were, split into two lesser degrees, philosophy <i>and</i> -history. The concept, with one stroke of the wing, affirms itself and -takes possession of the whole of reality, which is not different from -it, but is itself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>Note.</i>—May I be permitted an explanation concerning the history of -my thought (and also of its criticism owing to their unity already -demonstrated)? Sixteen years ago I began my studies in philosophy with -a memoir entitled <i>History beneath the general concept of Art</i> (1893). -There I maintained, not that history is art (as others have summarized -my thought) but (as indeed the title clearly showed) that history -can be placed beneath the <i>general</i> concept of art. I now maintain, -sixteen years after, that, on the contrary, history is philosophy -and that history and philosophy are indeed the same thing. The two -theories are certainly different; but they are far less different -than appears, and the second theory is in any case a development and -perfecting of the first. <i>Elle a bien changé sur la route,</i> without -doubt; but without discontinuity and without gaps. Indeed, the objects -of my memoir were chiefly: (1) to combat the <i>absorption</i> of history, -which the natural sciences were then attempting more than they are -now; (2) the affirmation of the <i>theoretic</i> character of art and of -its <i>seriousness,</i> art being then regarded as a hedonistic fact by the -prevailing positivism; (3) the negation of history as a <i>third form</i> -of the theoretic spirit different from the æsthetic form and from that -of thought. I still maintain these three theses intact and they form -part of my <i>Æsthetic</i> and of my <i>Logic.</i> But the proper character of -philosophy, so profoundly different from the empirical and abstract -sciences, was not clear to me<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> at the time, and therefore neither was -the difference between philosophic Logic and Logic of classification. -For this reason I was unable completely to solve the problem that I had -proposed to myself. Owing to this confusion of the true universality -of philosophy and of the false universality of the sciences (which is -either mere generality or abstractness) in a single group, it seemed -to me that the concreteness of history could enter only the group of -art, understood in its greater extension (hence the general concept of -art). In this group, by means of the fallacious method of subordination -and co-ordination, I distinguished history as the <i>representation of -the real,</i> placing it without mediation alongside the representation of -the <i>possible</i> (art in the strict sense of the word). When I understood -the true relation between Philosophy and the sciences (a slow progress, -because to reattain to consciousness of what philosophy truly is has -been slow and difficult for the men of my generation), the nature of -history also became somewhat clearer to me as I gradually freed myself -from the remnants of the intellectualistic and naturalistic method. -In the <i>Æsthetic</i> I looked upon that spiritual product as due to the -intersection of philosophy and of art. In the <i>Outlines of Logic</i> I -made another step in advance, history there appearing to me as the -ultimate result of the theoretic spirit, the sea into which flowed the -river of art, swelled with that of philosophy. The complete identity of -history and of philosophy was, however,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> always half-hidden from me, -because in me the prejudice still persisted that philosophy might have -a form in a certain way free from the bonds of history, and constitute -in relation to it a prior and independent moment of the spirit. That is -to say, something abstract persisted in my idea of philosophy. But this -prejudice and this abstractness have been vanquished little by little. -And not only have my studies in the Philosophy of the practical greatly -helped me to vanquish them, but also and above all, the studies of my -dearest friend Giovanni Gentile (to whom my mental life owes many other -aids and stimulations), concerning the relation between philosophy -and history of philosophy (cf. now especially <i>Critica,</i> vii. pp. -142-9). In short, I have gradually passed from the accentuation of the -character of concreteness, which history possesses in relation to the -empirical and abstract sciences, to the accentuation of the concrete -character of philosophy. And having completed the elimination of the -double abstractness, the two concretenesses (that which I had first of -all claimed for history, and that which I have afterwards claimed for -philosophy) have finally revealed themselves to me as one. Thus I can -now no longer accept without demur my old theory, which is not the new -one, but is linked to it by such close bonds.</p> - -<p>Such is the road I have travelled, and I wished especially to describe -it, in order to leave no misunderstandings which, through my neglect, -might lead others into error.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_16" id="Footnote_1_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_16"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Phædrus,</i> 275.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_17" id="Footnote_2_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_17"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Phædrus,</i> 276-7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_18" id="Footnote_3_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_18"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Meno,</i> 97-8.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="Vd" id="Vd">V</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE NATURAL SCIENCES</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The natural sciences as empirical concepts, and their -practical nature.</i></div> - -<p>The natural sciences are nothing but edifices of pseudoconcepts, and -precisely of that sort of pseudoconcept that we have distinguished from -the others as <i>empirical</i> or <i>representative.</i></p> - -<p>This is evident also from the definitions that they assume as <i>sciences -of phenomena,</i> in opposition to philosophy, the science of <i>noumena</i>; -and as <i>sciences of facts,</i> again in opposition to philosophy, which -is taken to be the science of <i>values.</i> But the pure phenomenon is not -known to science; it is represented by art: and the noumena, in so far -as they are known, are also phenomena, since it would be arbitrary to -break up unity and synthesis. In like manner, true values are facts, -and, on the other hand, facts without the determination of value and of -universality dissolve again into pure phenomena. Hence it is possible -to conclude that those sciences offer neither pure phenomena nor mere -facts, but, on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> the contrary, develop representative concepts, which -are not intuitions, but spiritual formations of a practical nature.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Elimination of a misunderstanding concerning this practical -character.</i></div> - -<p>The word "practical" having been pronounced, it behoves us to eliminate -a misapprehension which leads to the natural sciences (or simply -<i>sciences,</i> as they are also called) being said to be practical, in the -same sense as those whose aim is action. Bacon was a fervent apostle -of the naturalistic movement of modern times and full of this latter -idea or preconception. He proclaimed to satiety that <i>meta scientiarum -non aha est quam ut dotetur vita humana novis inventis et copiis</i>; -that they propose to themselves <i>potentiae et amplitudinis humanae -fines in latim proferre</i>; and that, by means of them, reality <i>ad -usus vitae humanae subigitur</i><a name="FNanchor_1_19" id="FNanchor_1_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_19" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> But in our day also, many theorists -do not tire of repeating that the sciences are <i>ordonnées à faction.</i> -Now, this does not suffice to describe the natural sciences, because -all knowledge is directed to action, art, philosophy, and history -alike, which last, by providing knowledge of the actual situation, is -the true and complete precedent and fact, preparatory to action.<a name="FNanchor_2_20" id="FNanchor_2_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_20" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -The misapprehension in favour<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> of the natural sciences arises from -the vulgar idea that the only practical things in life are eating, -drinking, clothes, and shelter. It is forgotten that man does not -live by bread alone, and that bread itself is a spiritual food if -it increase the force of spiritual life. But further: the natural -sciences, just because they are composed of empirical concepts (which -are not true knowledge), do not <i>directly</i> subserve action, since -in order to act it is necessary to return from them to the precise -knowledge of the individual actual situation. That is to say, in -ordinary parlance, <i>abstractions</i> must be set aside and it must -be seen <i>how things</i> truly and properly <i>stand.</i> The patient, the -individual patient, is treated, not the malady; Socrates or Callias -(as Aristotle said), not man in general: θεραπευτὸν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον: -knowledge of <i>materia medica</i> does not suffice; the <i>clinical eye</i> is -needed. The natural sciences are not directed to action, but <i>are,</i> -themselves, actions: their practical character is not extrinsic, but -<i>constitutive.</i> They are actions, and are therefore not directed to -action, but to aid the cognitive spirit. Thus they subserve action -(that is, other actions) only in an indirect way. If an action does not -become knowledge, it cannot give rise: to a new action.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of unifying them in a concept.</i></div> - -<p>The empirical character (and the practical character in the sense -already established) of the natural sciences is commonly admitted in -the case of such of them as consist in classifications of facts: for -example, of zoology, botany, mineralogy, and also of chemistry, in so -far as it enumerates chemical species, and of physics, in so far as -it enumerates classes of phenomena or physical forces. The universals -of all these sciences are quite arbitrary, for it is impossible to -find an exact boundary between the concept of animal (the universal -of zoology) and that of vegetable (the universal of botany). Indeed -it is impossible to find one between the living and the not living, -the organic and the material. Finally, the cellule, which is, for the -present at any rate, the highest concept of the biological sciences, -is differentiated from chemical facts only in an external way. It will -be objected that there is in any case no lack of attempts to determine -strictly the supreme concepts of the sciences, such, for instance, as -those that place the <i>atom</i> at the beginning of all things and attempt -to show each individual fact as nothing but a different aggregate of -atoms. There are also those who mount to the concept of <i>ether</i> or of -<i>energy</i> and declare all individual facts to be nothing but different -forms of energy.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> Or finally, the vitalists recognize as irreducible -the two concepts of the teleological and the mechanical, of organic -and inorganic, of life and matter. But in all these cases <i>the natural -sciences are deserted,</i> phenomena are abandoned for noumena, and -philosophic explanations are offered. These may or may not have value, -but they are of no use from the point of view of the natural sciences, -or at most ensure to some professor the insipid pleasure of calling an -animal "a complex of atoms," heat "a form of energy," and the cellule -"vital force."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of introducing into them strict divisions.</i></div> - -<p>Since the natural sciences cannot be unified in a concept (hence their -ineradicable <i>plurality</i>), and therefore remain unsystematic, a mass of -sciences without close relation among themselves, logical distinctions -are not possible in any science. No one will ever be able to prove that -genera and species must be so many and no more, or describe the truly -original character by which one genus may be distinguished from another -genus and one species from another species. The animal species hitherto -described have been calculated it over four hundred thousand, and those -that may yet be described as fifteen millions. These numbers simply -express the impotence of the empirical sciences to exhaust the infinite -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> individual forms of the real and the necessity in which they are -placed of stopping at some sort 1 of number, of some hundreds, of some -thousands, or of some millions. Those species, however few or many they -may be, flow one into the other owing to the undeniable conceivability -of graduated, indeed of continuous intermediate forms, which made -evident the arbitrariness of the clean cut made into fact by separating -the wolf from the dog or the panther from the leopard.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Laws in the natural sciences, and so called prevision.</i></div> - -<p>But some doubt is manifested where we pass from classification and -description or from <i>system</i> (as the lack of system of naturalistic -classifications is called, by a curious verbal paradox) to the -consideration of the laws that are posited in those sciences. It is -then perceived that the classification is certainly a simple labour -of preparation, arbitrary, convenient, and nominalistic, but that the -true end of the natural sciences is not the class but the <i>law.</i> In the -compass of the law strict accuracy of its truth is indubitable; so much -so that by means of laws it is actually possible to make <i>previsions</i> -as to what will happen. This is indeed a miraculous power, which places -the natural sciences above every form of knowledge, and endows them -with an almost magical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> force, by means of which man, not contented -with knowing what has happened (which is yet so difficult to know), is -capable of knowing even what has not yet happened, what will happen, -or the future! <i>Prevision</i>(there must be a clear understanding of the -concepts) is equivalent to <i>seeing beforehand or prophesying,</i> and the -naturalist is thus neither more nor less than a clairvoyant.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empirical character of naturalistic laws.</i></div> - -<p>The miraculous nature of this boasted power should suffice to make us -doubt whether the law is truly what it is said to be, a strict truth, -quite different from the empirical concept, from the class, and from -the description. In reality, the law is nothing but the empirical -concept itself, the description, class or type, of which we have -just spoken. In philosophy law is a synonym for the pure concept; in -the empirical or natural sciences it is a synonym for the empirical -concept; hence laws are sometimes called <i>empirical</i> laws, or laws of -experience. If they were not empirical, they would not be naturalistic, -but philosophic universals, which, as we have seen, are unfruitful in -the field of the natural sciences. The law of the wolf is the empirical -concept of the wolf: granted that in reality there is found one part -of the representation corresponding to that concept, it is possible -to conclude<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> that the rest is also found. Thus Cuvier (to choose a -very trite example), arranging the types of animals and hence the -laws of the correlations of organs, was able to reconstruct from one -surviving bone the complete fossil animal. In like manner, granted -the chemical concept of water, H<sub>2</sub>O, and given so much of -oxygen and double that quantity of hydrogen, O and H<sub>2</sub>, -and submitting the two bodies to the other conditions established -by chemistry, it is possible to conclude that water will be seen to -appear. All naturalistic laws are of this type. Certain naturalists and -theorists have reasonably protested against the division of the natural -sciences into descriptive and explicative, sciences of classification -and sciences of laws, and have maintained that all have one common -character, namely, law. But this is not because the law is superior to -the class or to the empirical concept, but because the two things are -identical: the law is the empirical concept and the empirical concept -is the law.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The postulate of the uniformity of nature, and its -meaning.</i></div> - -<p>The postulate of the <i>constancy or uniformity of nature</i> is the -base of <i>empirical laws or concepts.</i> This, too, is something -mysterious, before which many are ready to bow, seized with reverence -and sacred terror. But that postulate is not even an hypothesis, -somehow conceivable, though<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> not yet explained and demonstrated. -Ordinary thought, like philosophical thought, knows that reality is -neither constant nor uniform, and indeed that it is perpetually being -transformed, evolving and becoming. That constancy and uniformity, -which is postulated and falsely believed to be objective reality, -is the same <i>practical necessity</i> which leads to the neglect of -differences and to the looking upon the different as uniform, the -changeable as constant. The postulate of the uniformity of nature is -the demand for a treatment of reality made uniform for reasons of -convenience. <i>Natura non facit saltus</i> means: <i>mens non facit saltus in -naturae cogitatione,</i> or, better still, <i>memoriae usus saltus naturae -cohibet.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Pretended inevitability of natural laws.</i></div> - -<p>Another consequence of this is the inversion of the assertion (to be -found everywhere in the rhetoric of the natural sciences) as to the -<i>inexorability and inevitability</i> of the laws of nature. Those laws, -precisely because they are arbitrary constructions of our own and give -the movable as fixed, are not only not inevitable and do sometimes -afford exceptions; but there <i>is</i> absolutely <i>no real fact,</i> which is -not an <i>exception</i> to its naturalistic law. By coupling a wolf and a -she-wolf we obtain a wolf cub, which will in time become a new wolf, -with the appearance,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> the strength, and the habits of its parents. -But this wolf will not be identical with its parents. Otherwise how -could wolves ever evolve with the evolution of the whole of reality, -of which they are an indivisible part? By chemical analysis of a -litre of water we obtain H<sub>2</sub>O; but if we again -combine H<sub>2</sub>O, the water that we obtain is only in a way of -speaking the same as before. For that combining and recombining must -have produced some modification (even though not perceived by us), -and in any case changes have occurred in reality in the subsequent -moment, from which the water is not separable, and therefore in the -water itself taken in its concreteness. We could consequently give -the following definition: the <i>inexorable</i> laws of nature are those -that <i>are violated at every moment,</i> while philosophic laws are by -definition those that are <i>at every moment observed.</i> But in what -way they are observed cannot be known, save by means of history, -and therefore true knowledge knows nothing of previsions; it knows -only facts that have really happened; of the future there can be no -knowledge. The natural sciences, which do not furnish real knowledge, -have, if possible, even less right (if one may speak thus) to talk of -previsions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span></p> - -<p>Yet, it will be objected, it is a fact that we all form previsions, -and that without them we should neither be able to cook an egg nor -to take one step out of doors. That is quite true, but those alleged -previsions are merely the summary of what we know by experience to -have happened, and according to which we resolve upon our action. We -know what has happened. We do not know, nor do we need to know, what -will happen. Were any one truly to wish to know it, he would no longer -be able to move and would be seized with such perplexity before life, -that he would kill himself in desperation or die of fear. The egg, -which usually takes five minutes to cook in the way that suits my -taste, sometimes surprises me by presenting itself to my palate after -those five minutes, either as too much or too little cooked; the step -taken out of doors is sometimes a fall on the threshold. Nevertheless, -the knowledge of this does not prevent me from leaving the house and -cooking the egg, for I must walk and take nourishment. The laws of my -individual being, of my temperament, of my aptitudes, of my forces, -that is, the knowledge of my past, make me resolve to undertake a -journey, as I did twenty years ago, to begin work upon a statue,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> as I -did ten years ago. Alas! I had not considered that in the meantime my -legs have lost their strength and my arm has begun to tremble. By all -means call the previsions made use of in these cases true or false; -but do not forget that they are nothing but empirical concepts, that -is to say, mnemonic devices, founded upon historical judgments. There -can be no doubt that they are useful; indeed, what we maintain is that -just because they are useful, they are not true. If they possess any -truth, it resides in the establishment of the fact. That is to say, it -does not reside in the prevision and in the law, but in the historical -judgment which forms its basis.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Nature and its various meanings. Nature as passivity and -negativity.</i></div> - -<p>Having thus made clear the coincidence of empirical concepts and the -natural sciences, we must determine exactly the meaning of the word -"natural," which is used as qualifying these sciences. It has not -seemed advisable to change it, since its use is so deeply rooted, -although we have, on the other hand, already given its synonym in -qualifying these sciences as "empirical." What is <i>nature</i>? The first -meaning of "nature" is the "opposite" of "spirit," and designates -the natural or material moment in relation to the spiritual, the -mechanical in relation to the teleological<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> moment, the negative moment -in relation to the positive. Thus, in the transition from one form of -the spirit to another, the inferior form is like matter, ballast, or -obstacle, and so is the negation of the superior form. Hence reality is -imagined as the strife of two forces, the one spiritual and the other -material or natural. It is superfluous to repeat that the two forces -are not two, but one, and that if the negative moment were not, the -positive moment could not be. The pigeon (says Kant), which rises to -take flight, may believe that had it not to vanquish the resistance of -the air, it would fly still better. But the fact is that without that -resistance, it would fall to earth. In this sense, there is no science -of Nature (of matter, passivity, negation, etc.) distinguishable from -that of Spirit, which is the science of itself and of its opposite, and -the science of itself only in so far as it is also the science of its -opposite.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Nature as practical activity.</i></div> - -<p>But in another sense, <i>nature</i> is, not indeed the opposite of spirit, -but something distinct <i>in</i> the spirit, and especially distinct from -the cognitive spirit, as that form of spirituality and activity -which is not cognitive. A non-theoretical activity, a spirituality -which should not be in itself knowledge, cannot be anything but the -<i>practical</i> form<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> of the spirit, the will. <i>Man makes himself nature</i> -at every moment, because at every moment he passes from knowing to -willing and doing and from willing and doing returns to knowing, which -is the basis for new will and action. In this sense, the science of -nature, or the philosophy of nature, could not be anything but the -philosophic science of the will, the Philosophy of the practical.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Nature in the gnoseological sense, as naturalistic or -empirical method.</i></div> - -<p>The natural sciences have nothing to do with a philosophic knowledge -of nature as will, with a Philosophy of the practical. They are, as -has already been said, not knowledge of will, but will; not truth, but -utility. In consequence of this, they extend to the whole of reality, -theoretic and practical, to the products of the theoretic spirit, not -less than to those of the practical spirit; and without knowing any -of them, universally or individually, they manipulate and classify -them all in the way we have seen. They have not therefore a <i>special -object,</i> but <i>a special mode of treatment,</i> their object or matter -being the presupposed philosophic-historical knowledge of the real. -They do not treat of the material and mechanical aspect of the real, -nor even of its non-theoretical, practical, volitional aspect (or what -is incorrectly called the irrational aspect of it). They turn the -theoretical into the practical, and by killing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> its theoretic life, -make it dead, material, and mechanical. Nature, matter, passivity, -motion <i>ab extra,</i> the inert atom and so on, are not reality and -concepts, but natural science itself in action. Mechanism, logically -considered, is neither a fact nor a mode of knowing the fact. It is a -non-fact, a mode of not-knowing: a practical creation, which is real -only in so far as it becomes itself an object of knowledge. This is the -<i>gnoseological</i> or <i>gnoseopractical</i> meaning of the word "nature," a -meaning which must be kept carefully distinct from the two preceding -meanings. When we speak, for instance, of <i>matter</i> or of <i>nature</i> -as not existing, we mean to refer to the puppet of the naturalists, -which the naturalists themselves and the philosophers of naturalism, -forgetting its genesis, take for a real if not a living being. That -matter (said Berkeley) is an abstraction; it is (say we) an empirical -concept, and whoever knows what empirical concepts are will not pretend -that matter or nature exists, simply because it is spoken about.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The illusions of materialists and dualists.</i></div> - -<p>We do not claim to have supplied the full solution of the problem -concerning the dualism or materialism of the real with this discussion -on the theme of Logic. This solution cannot (we repeat) be expected, -save from all the philosophic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> sciences together, that is to say, from -the complete system. But we can already see, from the logical point -of view, that the dualists and materialists cannot avoid the task of -showing that the nature or matter, which they elevate to a principle of -the real or to one of the two principles of the real, is not: firstly, -the mere negation of the spirit, nor secondly, a form of the spirit, -nor thirdly, the abstraction of the natural sciences. They must also -show that it answers to something conceivable and existing, outside -or above the spirit. Logic can pass onward at this point, saying of -materialists and dualists what Dante said of the devils and the damned -struggling in the lake of burning pitch: "And we leave them thus -encompassed."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Nature as empirical distinction of an inferior in relation -to a superior reality.</i></div> - -<p>The word "nature" has yet a fourth meaning (but this time altogether -empirical), which is clear in those propositions which distinguish -natural life from social life, natural men <i>(Naturmenschen)</i> or savages -from civilized men, and again natural from human beings, animals -from men, and so on. Nature, in this sense, is distinguished from -civilization or humanity, and thus the sole reality is divided into two -classes of beings: natural beings and human beings (which are sometimes -also called spiritual as compared with the former, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> are called -material). The vague and empirical nature of this distinction is at -once perceived from the impossibility that we meet with of assigning -boundaries between civilization and the state of nature, between -humanity and animality. Man can be only empirically distinguished -from the animal, the animal from the vegetable, and vegetables from -inorganic beings, which are organic in their own way. Certainly, -what are called <i>things</i> are not organic, for example a mountain or -a plough-share; but they are not organic, because they are not real, -but aggregates, that is to say, empirical concepts. In the same way, -a forest is not organic, though it is composed of things vegetating, -nor a crowd, though composed of men. When we treat of things in the -above sense, we can say with some mathematicians that <i>things</i> do not -exist, but only their <i>relations.</i> Hence if the dualists feel able to -affirm that the two classes of beings, natural and human, are based -upon the existence of two different substances and upon the different -proportions of these in each of the two classes, the task of proving -the thinkability of the two substances and the different proportions of -the compound falls upon them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The naturalistic method and the natural sciences as -extended to superior not less than to inferior reality.</i></div> - -<p>The distinction between nature and spirit being therefore, in this last -sense, altogether empirical,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> it is clear that the natural sciences -(in the gnoseological or gnoseopractical sense in which we give chem -this name) are not restricted to the development of knowledge relating -to what is called inferior reality, from the animal downwards, leaving -to the sciences of the spirit the knowledge that relates to superior -reality from the animal upwards, that is to say, to man. Sciences -of nature and sciences of the spirit, <i>orbis naturalis</i> and <i>orbis -intellectuals,</i> are also, in this case, partitions and convenient -groupings. All do substantially the same thing, that is to say, they -provide one single homogeneous practical treatment of knowledge.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Demand for such an extension, and effective existence of -what is demanded.</i></div> - -<p>On this unity and homogeneity is based the demand so often made -(especially in the second half of the nineteenth century) for the -extension of <i>the method of the natural sciences</i> to the sciences -of the spirit or moral sciences, the <i>orbis intellectualis,</i> for a -naturalistic treatment of the productions of language and of art, or -of political, social, and religious life. Thus were originated or -prophesied a Psychology, an Æsthetic, an Ethic, a Sociology, <i>methodo -naturali demonstratae.</i> It was necessary to draw the attention of those -makers of programmes and advisers (apart from the evil philosophic -intentions, positivist or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> materialistic, which they nourished in their -bosoms) to the superfluity of their demand, and gently to reprove them -with the old phrase: <i>Quod petis in manu habes.</i> Since man was man and -constructed pseudoconcepts and empirical sciences, these naturalistic -classifications have never been limited to animals, plants, and -minerals, nor to physical, chemical, and biological phenomena, but -have been extended to all the manifestations of reality. Naturalistic -Logic, Psychology, Linguistic Sociology and Ethics have not awaited the -nineteenth century ere they should open to the sun. And (without going -too far back in time, or leaving Europe) they already bore flower and -fruit in the Sociology (Politics) of Aristotle, in the Grammatics of -the Alexandrians, in the Poetics and Rhetoric of Aristotle himself, or -of Hermagoras, of Cicero, or of Quintilian, and so on. The novelty of -the nineteenth century has principally consisted in giving the names -<i>social Physics,</i> or the <i>physico-acoustic science of language</i> to what -was once more simply, and perhaps in better taste, called otherwise. -But in saying this we do not wish to deny that certain naturalistic -work has been far more copious in the nineteenth century than in -Greece, and that naturalistic methods have not been applied with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> -singular acumen and exactitude in those fields of study. Linguistic -affords a case in point, with <i>its phonetic laws,</i> by reason of which -it moves so proudly among its companions.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Historical basis of the natural sciences.</i></div> - -<p>The natural sciences and the empirical concepts which compose them -appear therefore like a tachygraphic transcription upon living and -mutable reality, capable of complete transcription only in terms of -individual representations. But upon what reality? Upon the reality of -the poet, or upon the clarified and existentialized reality of—the -historian? The constructions of the natural sciences take history -for their presupposition, just as judgments of classification take -individual judgments. Were this not so, their economic function would -have no way of expressing itself, from lack of matter whereon to work. -To employ the easy example already given, it would be of no use to the -zoologist to construct types and classes of animals that were certainly -conceivable, but non-existent. For while those types and classes would -distract the attention from the useful and urgent task of summarizing -reality historically given and known, they would not exhaust the -possibilities, which are infinite And if it appear that imaginary -animals are sometimes classified, as for example griffins<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> centaurs, -Pegasi, and sirens, it is easy to see that this is not done in Zoology, -but in another naturalistic science,—comparative Mythology, in which -not animals but the imaginings of men are really classified. These -too are historical facts, because they are imaginings or fancies -historically given. They are not combinations of images which no people -has ever dreamed of, nor any poet represented, for such, as has already -been said, would be infinite in number and food for mere diversion.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The question as to whether history is the foundation or the -crown of thought.</i></div> - -<p>History, which has philosophy for its foundation, becomes in its -turn foundation in the natural sciences. This explains why, with the -controversy as to whether history be a science or an art, there has -always been inextricably connected the other question as to whether -history be the foundation of science or science the foundation of -history. The question finds a solution in the solution of the ambiguity -of the term "science," which is used indifferently, sometimes in the -sense of philosophy, sometimes in that of the natural sciences. If -science is understood as philosophy, history is not its foundation, -indeed philosophy is the foundation of history. Both mingle and are -identified in the sense already explained. If science is understood -as naturalistic science,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> then history is its necessary foundation or -precedent. Certainly, naturalistic classifications are also reflected -in historical narrative; but, as we have seen, they do not perform a -constitutive function in it; they are of merely subsidiary assistance.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Naturalists and historical research.</i></div> - -<p>But since history is the foundation of the natural sciences, and the -special treatment of perceptive material or historical data by these -sciences does not possess theoretic value, but is valuable merely as -a convenient classification, it is clear that the whole content of -truth of the natural sciences (the measure of truth and reality that at -bottom they contribute) is history. Therefore it is not without reason -that the natural sciences or some of them have been called in the -past <i>natural history.</i> History is the hot and fluid mass, which the -naturalist cools and solidifies by pouring it into formal classes and -types. Previous to this manipulation, the naturalist must have thought -as a historian. The matter thus cooled and solidified for preservation -and for transport has no theoretic value, save in so far as it can -again be rendered hot and fluid. Similarly, on the other hand, it is -necessary to revise continually the classifications adopted, returning -to the observation of facts, to simple<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> intuitions and perceptions, to -the historical consideration of reality. The <i>naturalist</i> who makes a -discovery, in so far as he is a discoverer of truth, is a <i>historical</i> -discoverer; and revolutions in the natural sciences represent progress -in historical knowledge. Lamarckianism and Darwinism may serve as an -example of this. Naturalists (and we use the word in its ordinary -meaning, applying it to those who explore this "fair family of plants -and animals," and what is called in general the physical world) -feel themselves somewhat humiliated when described as classifiers -careless of truth. But if such classification is exactly what the -natural sciences accomplish from the gnoseological point of view, yet -naturalists as individuals and as corporations of students exercise a -far more substantial and fruitful function. The historical foundation -of the life of the natural sciences is also found in the fact that -a change of historical conditions sometimes renders, if not wholly -useless, at least less useful, certain classifications made with the -object of controlling conditions of life remote from us, or perceptions -concerning life that have now been abandoned. This has occurred -with regard to the classifications of alchemy and of astrology, and -also (passing on to examples from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span> other empirical sciences) to the -descriptive and casuistic portions of feudal law. When the book is no -longer read, the <i>index</i> also falls into disuse.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The prejudice as to the non-historicity of nature.</i></div> - -<p>The strangest of statements, that <i>nature has no history,</i> comes from -forgetting the historical foundation of the natural sciences, from -ignorance that it constitutes their sole truth, and from attributing -theoretic importance to classifications which have merely practical -importance. In this case, nature signifies that reality, from man -downwards, which is empirically called inferior reality. But how, if -it is reality, is it without history? How, if it is reality, is it -not becoming? And further, the thesis is confuted by all the most -attentive studies of so-called inferior reality. To limit ourselves -to the animal kingdom, a century before Darwin the acute intellect -of the Abbé Galiani shook itself free of this prejudice as to the -immobility of animals. He remarks in certain places about cats: -"<i>A-t-on des naturalistes bien exacts qui nous disent que les chats, il -y a trois mille ans, prenaient les souris, préservaient leurs petits, -connaissaient la vertu médicinale de quelques herbes, ou, pour mieux -dire, de l'herbe, comme ils font à présent? ... Mes recherches sur -les mœurs des chattes m'ont donné des soupçons très forts qu'elles -sont perfectibles; mais au bout d'une<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> longue traînée de siècles, -je crois que tous que les cliats savent est l'ouvrage de quarante à -cinquante mille ans. Nous n'avons que quelques siècles d'histoire -naturelle: ainsi le changement qu'ils auront subi dans ce temps, -est imperceptible."</i><a name="FNanchor_3_21" id="FNanchor_3_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_21" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> This slight perceptibility of the relative -changes of what is called nature or inferior reality has contributed -to that prejudice (not to mention the confusion between the fixity -that belongs to naturalistic classifications and reality, which is -always in motion). Nature appears to be motionless, just because of -the slight interest that we take in the shadings of its phenomena and -in their continuous variation. But not only is nature not motionless, -but it is not even true that it proceeds (as the poet says) "with -steps so slow that it seems to stand still." The movement of nature or -inferior reality is fast or slow, neither in less nor greater degree -than human reality, according to the various arbitrary constructions of -empirical concepts which are adopted, and according to the variable and -arbitrary standards of measurement which are applied to them. We watch -with vigilant eye every social movement that can cause a variation in -the price of grain or the value of Stock Exchange securities; but we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> -do not surprise with equally vigilant eye the revolutions that are -prepared in the bosom of the earth or among the green-clad herbs of the -field.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The philosophic foundation of the natural sciences, and the -efficacy of the philosophy that they contain.</i></div> - -<p>But if history is the foundation of the natural sciences, it follows -from this that those sciences are always based upon a philosophy. This -is indubitable, for the naturalist, however much he be a naturalist, is -above all things a man, and a man without a philosophy (or what comes -to the same thing, without a religion) has not yet been found. This -does not mean that the natural sciences are philosophy. Their special -task is classification, and here they are just as independent and -autonomous as philosophy is incompetent. But philosophy is competent -in philosophy, and so we see that those naturalists who possess -philosophic culture avoid the prejudices, errors, and absurdities -that spring from bad philosophies, and to which other naturalists are -prone. For instance, if the chemist Professor Ostwald had possessed a -better philosophy, he would not have abandoned his good chemistry for -that doubtful mixture of things—his <i>Philosophy of Nature.</i> And had -Ernest Haeckel made an elementary study of philosophy, he would never -have given up his researches upon micro-organisms, in order to solve -the riddles of the universe and to falsify<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> the natural sciences. Let -us limit ourselves to these instances, for our life of to-day supplies -innumerable examples of philosophizing men of science, who are as -pernicious to science as they are to philosophy and to culture. The -antithesis between science and philosophy, of which so many speak, is -a dream. The antithesis is between philosophy and philosophy, between -true philosophy and that which is very imperfect and yet very arrogant, -and manifestly active in the brains of many scientists, though it -has nothing to do with the discoveries made in laboratories and -observatories.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Action of the natural sciences upon philosophy, and errors -in conceiving such relation.</i></div> - -<p>The action of philosophy upon the natural sciences is not constitutive -of them, but preparatory. The action of the natural sciences upon -philosophy is not even preparatory, but merely incidental and -subsidiary, having for its end simplicity of exposition and of -memorizing, just as in history. A very common error, derived from a too -hasty analysis of the forms of spiritual life, is that of looking upon -the empirical and natural sciences as a <i>preparation</i> for philosophy. -But in the achievement of the natural sciences, philosophy has been -cold-shouldered, and to recover it we must seek pure intuition, which -is the necessary and only precedent of logical thought.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span></p> - -<p>Still worse is it, when the natural sciences are considered, not -only as preparation, but just as a first sketch, or a chiselling of -the marble block, from which philosophy will carve the statue. For -this view denies without being aware of it, either the autonomy of -the natural sciences, or that of philosophy, according as either the -philosophic method or the naturalistic method is held to be the method -of truth.</p> - -<p>Indeed, in the first case, if the natural sciences be of a philosophic -nature and represent a first approximation to philosophy, they must -disappear when philosophy is evolved, as the provisional disappears -before the definite, as the proof before the printed book. This would -mean that natural sciences as such do not exist and that what really -exists is philosophy. In the second case, if philosophy have the same -nature as the natural sciences, the further development of the first -sketch will always be the work of the naturalistic method, however -refined and however increased in power we may please to imagine it. -Thus, what would really exist would never be philosophy, but always the -natural sciences. This erroneous conception therefore reduces itself -to a denial, either of the natural sciences or of philosophy; either -of the pseudoconcepts or of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> the pure concepts; a negation that need -not be confuted, because the whole of our exposition of Logic is its -explicit confutation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Motive of these errors: naturalistic philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>The genesis of such a psychological illusion resides in the fact that -the natural sciences seem to be tormented with the thirst for full and -real truth, and philosophy, on the other hand, to be intent solely -upon correcting the perversions and inexactitudes of the empirical and -natural sciences. But it is a question of likeness or appearance only, -because the thirst for truth belongs not to the natural sciences, but -to philosophy, which lives in all men, and also in the naturalist. -And the philosophic perversions and inexactitudes which have to be -corrected do not form part of the natural sciences (which as such -affirm neither the true nor the false), but to that philosophy which -the naturalist forms and into which he introduces the prejudices -derived from his special business.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophy as destroyer of naturalistic philosophy, but not -of the natural sciences. Autonomy of these.</i></div> - -<p>The proof of the theory here maintained is that even when philosophy -engages in strife with naturalistic prejudices, it dissolves those -prejudices, but does not and could not dissolve the sciences which had -suggested them. Indeed, a philosopher becoming again a naturalist, -cultivates those sciences successfully, just as his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> philosophizing -does not forbid his going into the garden and there scenting and -pruning the plants. The naturalistic sciences of language and of art, -of morality, of rights and of economics (to take instances from the -intellectual world, which seem to have closer contact with philosophy), -are not only what is called the <i>empirical stage</i> of the corresponding -philosophic disciplines, but persist and will persist side by side with -them, because they render services which cannot be replaced. Thus there -is no philosophy of language and of art which can expel from their -proper spheres, even if it does expel them from its own, empirical -Linguistic, Grammar, Phonetics, Morphology, Syntax, and Metric, with -their empirical categories, which are useful to memory. Nor can they -eliminate the classifications of artistic and literary kinds, and -those of the arts according to what are called means of expression, -by means of which it is possible to arrange books on shelves, statues -and pictures in museums, and our knowledge of artistic-literary -history in our memories. Psychology, an empirical and natural science, -certainly does not make us understand the activity of the spirit; -but it permits us to summarize and to remember very many effective -manifestations of the spirit, by classifying as well<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span> as may be the -species or classes of facts of representation (sensations, intuitions, -perceptions, imaginings, illusions, concepts, judgments, arguments, -poems, histories, systems, etc.), facts of sentiment, and volitional -facts (pleasure, pain, attraction, repulsion, mixed feelings, desires, -inclinations, nostalgias, will, morality, duties, virtue, family, -judicial, economic, political, religious life, etc.), or by classifying -these same facts according to groups of individuals (the Psychology -of animals, of children, of savages, of criminals, and of man, both -in his normal and abnormal conditions). This wholly extrinsic mode of -consideration, which is now prevalent in Psychology, is the source of -the remark that it has risen (or has sunk?) <i>to the level</i> of a natural -science, and that its method is mechanical, determinist, positive, -antiteleological. Sociology, understood not as a philosophic science -(—there is no such thing—), but as an empirical science, classifies -as well as may be the forms of family and the forms of production, the -forms of religion, of science and of art, political and social forms, -and constructs series of classifications to summarize the principal -forms which human history has assumed in the course of its development. -The philosopher expels these classifications from philosophy, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> -extraneous elements causing pathological processes; but that same -philosopher, in so far as he is a complete man, and in so far as -he provides for the economy of his internal life and for more easy -communication with his fellows, must fashion and avail himself of the -empirical. Having ideally destroyed the adjective and the adverb, the -epic and the tragic kinds, the virtues of courage and of prudence, the -monogamous and the polygamous family, the dog and the wolf, he must yet -speak when necessary of adjectives and adverbs, of epics and tragedies, -of courage and of prudence, of families formed in this or that way, of -the species "dog," as though it were clearly distinguished from the -species "wolf."</p> - -<p>Thus is confirmed the autonomy and the peculiar nature of the empirical -or natural sciences, indestructible by philosophy as philosophy is -indestructible by them.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_19" id="Footnote_1_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_19"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Nov. Org.</i> I. §§ 81, 116; and II. in fine.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_20" id="Footnote_2_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_20"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See <i>The Philosophy of the Practical,</i> pt. i. sect. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_21" id="Footnote_3_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_21"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Letter to d'Epinay, October 12, 1776.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="VId" id="VId">VI</a></h4> - - -<h5>MATHEMATICS AND THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCE OF NATURE</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The idea of a mathematical science of nature.</i></div> - -<p>The conception of a <i>mathematical science of nature</i> is at variance -with the thesis that recognizes the ineliminable historical foundation -of the natural sciences and the consequences which follow from it. It -is claimed that this mathematical science, in expressing the ideal and -end of the natural sciences, would express also their true nature, -which is not empirical but abstract, not synthetic but analytic, not -inductive but deductive. The mathematical conception of the natural -sciences would imply perfect mechanism, the reduction of all phenomena -to quantity without quality, the representation of each phenomenon -by means of a mathematical formula, which should be its adequate -definition.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Various definitions of mathematics.</i></div> - -<p>But the nature of mathematics cannot be considered a mystery in our -time. Mathematics (as has lately been said with a subtlety equal to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span> -its truth) is a science "in which it can never be known <i>what</i> we -are talking about, nor whether what we are talking about be <i>true</i>" -These affirmations are made one after the other by all mathematicians -who are conscious of their own methods. In what sense can a process -that merits such a description be called a science? A science that -states no sort of truth does not belong to the theoretic spirit, -since it is not even poetry; and a science which is not related to -anything is not even an empirical science, which is always related -to a definite group of representations. For this reason, others -incline to consider mathematics sometimes as <i>language,</i> sometimes as -<i>logic.</i> But mathematics is neither language in general nor any special -language; it is not language in the universal sense, co-extensive with -expression and with art; nor is it a historically given language, -which would be a contingent fact; nor a class of languages (phonetic, -pictorial, or musical language, etc.), which would be an approximate -and empirical definition, inapplicable in a function like mathematics, -which expresses its own original nature. It is not logic, because -there is only one logic, and thought thinks always as thought. If it -is maintained, on the other hand, that the human<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span> spirit has also a -special logic, which is that of mathematicizing, a return is made to -the problem to be solved, namely, what is mathematicizing? that is to -say, this logic, which is not the logic of thought, because it does not -give truth, and is not the logic of the empirical sciences, because it -does not depend upon representations.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mathematical process.</i></div> - -<p>Any sort of arithmetical operation can serve as an example of -mathematical process. Let us take the multiplication: 4×4 = 16. The -sign = (equals) indicates identity: 4×4 is identical with 16, as it is -identical with an infinite number of such formulæ, since there can be -infinite definitions of every number. What do we learn from such an -equivalence concerning the reality, phenomenal or absolute, to which -the human mind aspires? Nothing at all. But we learn how to substitute -16 for 8×2, for 9+7, for 21-5, for 32÷2, for 4<sup>2</sup>, for √256, -and so on. One or the other substitution is of service, according to -circumstances. When, for instance, some one promises to pay us 4 lire -daily, and we wish to know the total amount of lire, that is to say, -the object that we shall have at our disposal after four days, we shall -carry out the operation 4×4=16. Again, when we have 32 lire to divide -into equal parts between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> ourselves and another, we shall have recourse -to the formula: 32÷2 = 16. Mathematics as Mathematics does not know, -but establishes formulæ of equality; it does not subserve knowing, but -counting and calculating what is already known.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Apriority of mathematical principles.</i></div> - -<p>For counting and calculating Mathematics requires formulæ, and to -establish these it requires certain fundamental principles. These are -called in turn definitions, axioms, and postulates. Thus arithmetic -requires the number series, which beginning from unity, is obtained by -always adding one unit to the preceding number. Geometry requires the -conception of three dimensional spaces, with the postulates connected -with it. Mechanics requires certain fundamental laws, such as the -law of inertia, by which a body in motion, which is not submitted -to the action of other forces, covers in equal times equal spaces. -There has been much dispute as to whether these principles are <i>a -priori</i> or <i>a posteriori,</i> pure or experimental; but the dispute must -henceforth be considered settled in favour of the former alternative. -Even empiricists distinguish mathematical principles from natural or -empirical principles, as at least (to use their expression) <i>elementary -experiences,</i> as experiences which man completes in his own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span> spirit, -in isolation from external nature. This means, whether they like it -or no, that they too distinguish them profoundly from <i>a posteriori</i> -or experimental knowledge. The <i>a priori</i> character of mathematical -principles is made manifest by every attack upon it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Contradictory nature of these a priori principles. Their -unthinkability,</i></div> - -<p>But when they are recognized as being not <i>a posteriori</i> and empirical, -but <i>a priori,</i> difficulties are not thereby at an end. The apriority -of those principles possesses other most singular characteristics, -which render them unlike the <i>a priori</i> knowledge of philosophy, -the consciousness of universals and of values, for instance, of -logical or of moral value. For if it is impossible to think that -the concepts of the true and of the good are not true, on the other -hand it is <i>impossible to think that the principles of mathematics -are trice.</i> Indeed, when closely considered, they prove to be all of -them altogether false. The number series is obtained by starting from -unity and adding always one unit; but in reality, there is no fact -which can act as the beginning of a series, nor is any fact detachable -from another fact, in such a way as to generate a discrete series. If -mathematics abandons the discrete for the continuous, it comes out of -itself, because it abandons quantity for quality, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> irrational, -which is its kingdom, for the rational. If it remains in the discrete, -it posits something unreal and unthinkable. Space is characterized -as constituted of three or more dimensions; but reality gives, not -this space, thus constituted, made up of dimensions, but spatiality, -that is to say, thinkability, intuitibility in general, living and -organic extension, not mechanical and aggregated. Its character is -not to have three dimensions, one, two, three, but to be spatiality, -in which all the other dimensions are in the one, and so there are -not distinguishable and enumerable dimensions. And if the three or -more dimensions as attributes of space prove to be unthinkable, and -also the point without extension, the line without superficies, and -the superficies without solidity—so too in consequence are all the -concepts derived from them, such as those of geometrical figures, none -of which has, or can have, reality. No triangle has, or can have, -the sum of its angles equal to two right angles, because no triangle -has existence. Hence those geometrical concepts are not completely -expressed in any real fact, since they are in none, thereby differing -from the philosophic concepts, which are all in every instant and are -not completely expressed in any instant. Similar results follow<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> in the -case of the principles of Mechanics. No body can be withdrawn from the -action of external forces, because every body is connected with all the -others in the universe; hence the law of inertia is unthinkable.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>and not intuitible.</i></div> - -<p>As they are unthinkable, so are the principles of mathematics -unimaginable; they have therefore been ill defined as imaginary -entities, for they would in that case lose such <i>a priori</i> validity -as they have. They are <i>a priori,</i> but without the character of -truth—they are organized contradictions. Had mathematics (said -Herbart) to die because of the contradictions of which it is composed, -it would have died long ago.<a name="FNanchor_1_22" id="FNanchor_1_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_22" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> But it does not die of them, because it -does not set itself to think them, as a venomous animal does not die -of its own poison, because it does not inoculate itself. Were it to -pretend to think them and to give them as true, those contradictions -would all become falsities.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identification of mathematics with abstract -pseudoconcepts.</i></div> - -<p>Now, a function which organizes theoretic contradictions without -thinking them, and so without falling into contradictions, is not a -theoretic, but a practical function, and is perfectly well known to -us as that particular productive form of the practical spirit which -creates<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> pseudoconcepts. But since those contradictions are <i>a priori</i> -and not <i>a posteriori,</i> pure and not representative, mathematics cannot -consist of those pseudoconcepts which are representative or empirical -concepts. It remains, therefore, that it consists of the other form of -pseudoconcepts, which are <i>abstract</i> concepts, which we have already -defined as altogether void of truth and also void of representation, -as analytic <i>a priori</i> and not synthetic <i>a priori.</i> And we have -demonstrated how, in the falsification or practical reduction of the -pure concept, concreteness without universality, that is to say, mere -generality, belongs to empirical concepts, and universality without -concreteness, that is to say, abstraction, to abstract concepts.</p> - -<p>Such indeed are the fictions of mathematics;—they have universality -without concreteness, and therefore feigned universality. Inversely -to the natural sciences, which give the value of the concept to -representations of the singular, although they succeed in doing so -only by convention, mathematics gives the value of the single to -concepts, also succeeding in this only by convention. Thus it divides -spatiality into dimensions, individuality into numbers, movement into -motion and rest, and so on. It also creates<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> fictitious beings, which -are neither representations nor concepts, but rather concepts treated -as representations. It is a devastation, a mutilation, a scourge, -penetrating into the theoretical world, in which it has no part, being -altogether innocuous, because it affirms nothing of reality and acts -as a simple practical artifice. The general purpose of that artifice -is known; it is to aid memory. And the particular mnemonic purpose of -this is at once evident; it is to aid the recall to memory of series of -representations, previously collected in empirical concepts and thus -rendered homogeneous. That is to say, they serve to supply the abstract -concepts, which make possible the judgment of enumeration; to construct -instruments for counting and calculating and for composing that sort of -false <i>a priori</i> synthesis, which is the enumeration of single objects.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The ultimate end of mathematics: to enumerate and -consequently to aid the determination of the single. Its place.</i></div> - -<p>Applying thus to mathematics what has been said of the judgment of -enumeration, it is now clear that it facilitates the manipulation of -knowledge as to individual reality. Calculation indeed presupposes: -(i) perceptions (individual judgments); (2) classifications (judgments -of classification); and only by means of these latter does it attain -to the first. But it must attain to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span> first, because were there -no single things to recall to the mind, calculation would be vain. -Quantification would be sterile fencing, if it did not eventually -arrive at qualification.</p> - -<p>Mathematics is sometimes conceived as the special instrument of the -natural sciences, <i>appendix magna</i> to the natural sciences, as Bacon -called it; but from what has been said, we must not forget that both -taken together, because co-operating, constitute an <i>appendix magna</i> -or an <i>index locupletissimus</i> to history, which is full knowledge of -the real. It is further altogether erroneous to present mathematics -as a prologue to all knowledge of the real, to philosophy and to the -sciences, for this confuses head with tail, <i>appendix</i> and <i>index,</i> -with text and preface.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Particular questions concerning mathematics.</i></div> - -<p>It does not form part of the task that we have undertaken further to -investigate the constitution of mathematics and to determine whether -there be one or several mathematical sciences; if one be fundamental -and the others derived from it; if the Calculus include in itself -Geometry and Mechanics, or if all three can be co-ordinated and unified -in general mathematics; if Geometry and Mechanics be pure mathematics, -or if they do not introduce representative and contingent elements -(as seems to be without doubt the case<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span> in mathematical Physics); and -so on. Suffice it that we have established the nature of mathematical -science and furnished the criterion according to which it can be -discerned if a given formation be mathematics or natural science, if -it be pure or applied mathematics (concept or judgment of enumeration, -scheme of calculation, or calculation in the act). And for this reason -we shall not enter into the solution of particular questions, like -those concerning the number of possible fundamental operations of -arithmetic, or concerning the nature of the calculus of infinitesimals, -and whether, in this, there be any place for non-mathematical concepts, -that is, the philosophic, not the quantitative infinite, or, again, -concerning the number of the dimensions of space. As to the use of -mathematics, it concerns the mathematician who knows his business to -see what arbitrary distinctions it suits him to introduce, and what -arbitrary unifications to produce, in order to attain certain ends. -For the philosopher, these unifications and those distinctions, if -transported into philosophy, are all alike false, and all can be -legitimate, if employed in mathematics. If three dimensions of space -are arbitrary but convenient, four, five and <i>n</i> dimensions will be -arbitrary, and the only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> question that can be discussed will be whether -they are convenient. Of this the philosopher knows nothing, as indeed -he is sure <i>a priori</i> is the case.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Rigour of mathematics and rigour of philosophy. Loves and -hates of the two forms.</i></div> - -<p>Practical convenience suggests the postulates to mathematics; but the -purity of the elements that it manipulates gives to them the rigour -of demonstrations, the force of truth. It is a curious force, that -has a weakness for point of support,—the non-truth of the postulate, -and reduces itself to a perpetual tautology, by which it is recorded -that what has been granted has been granted. But the rigour of the -demonstrations and the arbitrariness of the foundations explain how -philosophers have been in turn attracted and repelled by mathematics. -Mathematics operating with pure concepts is a true <i>simia philosophiae</i> -(as it was said of the devil that he was <i>simia Dei</i>), and philosophers -have sometimes seen in it the absoluteness of thought and have saluted -it as sister or as the first-born of philosophy. Other philosophers -have recognized the devil in that divine form, and have addressed to it -the far from pleasant words that saints and ascetics used to employ on -similar occasions. Hence mathematics has been accused of not being able -to justify its own principles<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span>, notwithstanding its rigorous procedure; -and of constructing empty formulæ and of leaving the mind vacant. It -has been accused of promoting superstition, since the whole of concrete -reality lies outside its conventions, an unattainable mystery; and of -being too difficult for lofty spirits, just because it is too easy.<a name="FNanchor_2_23" id="FNanchor_2_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_23" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -Gianbattista Vico confessed that having applied himself to the study of -Geometry, he did not go beyond the fifth proposition of Euclid, since -"that study, proper to minute intellects, is not suitable to minds -already made universal by metaphysic."<a name="FNanchor_3_24" id="FNanchor_3_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_24" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> But these accusations are not -accusations, and simply confirm the peculiar nature of those spiritual -formations, eternal as the nature of the spirit is eternal.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Impossibility of reducing the empirical sciences to -mathematics, and empirical limits of the mathematical science of -nature.</i></div> - -<p>The nature of mathematics being explained, we can now resume the thread -of the narrative, left hanging loose, and discover how inadmissible is -the claim for a mathematical science of nature, which should be the -true end and the inner soul of the empirical and natural sciences. It -is said that this mathematical science presides, as an ideal, over -all the particular natural sciences, but it should be added, as an -unrealized and unrealizable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span> ideal, and therefore rather an illusion -and a mirage than an ideal. It is urged that this ideal has been -partially realized, and that therefore nothing prevents its being -altogether realized. But, indeed, whoever looks closely will see that -it has not been even partially realized, because mathematical formulæ -of natural facts are always affected by the empirical and approximate -character of the naturalistic concepts which they use, and by the -intuitive element upon which these are based. When it is sought to -establish in all its rigour the ideal of the mathematical science of -nature, it becomes necessary to assume as a point of departure elements -that are distinct, but perfectly identical and therefore unthinkable; -quantity without quality, which are nothing but those mathematical -fictions of which we have spoken. The idea of a mathematical science is -thus resolved into the idea simply of mathematics, and the much-vaunted -universality of that science is the universal <i>applicability</i> of -mathematics, wherever there are things and facts to number, to -calculate and to measure. The natural sciences will never lose their -inevitable intuitive and historical foundation, whatever progress may -be made in the calculus and in the application of the calculus. They -will remain, as has been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> said, <i>descriptive</i> sciences (and this time -it has been well said, as it prevents the failure to recognize the -intuitive elements, of which they are composed).</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Decreasing utility of mathematics in the most lofty spheres -of the real.</i></div> - -<p>We have already illustrated the slight perceptibility of differences -(or the slight interest that we take in individual differences), -as we gradually descend into what is called nature or inferior -reality. On this is founded the illusion that nature is invariable -and without history. And it also explains why mathematics has seemed -more applicable to the <i>globus naturalis</i> than to the <i>globus -intellectualis,</i> and in the <i>globus naturalis,</i> to mineralogy more -than to zoology, to physics more than to biology. Still, mathematics -is equally applicable to the <i>globus intellectualis,</i> as, for -instance, in Economics and Statistics. And, on the other hand, it -is inapplicable to both spheres, when they are considered in their -effective truth and unity as the <i>history of nature</i> or the <i>history -of reality,</i> in which nothing is repeated and therefore nothing is -equal and identical. Beneath that difference of applicability there -is nothing but a consideration of utility. If the grains of sand on -which we tread can be considered (although they are not) equal to one -another, it happens less frequently that we regard<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span> those with whom we -associate and act in the same light. Hence the <i>decreasing utility</i> of -naturalistic constructions (and of mathematical calculation), as we -gradually approach human life and the historical situation in which -we find ourselves. Decreasing but never non-existent, for otherwise, -neither empirical sciences (grammars, books on moral conduct, -psychological types, etc.) nor calculations (statistics, economic -calculations, etc.,) would continue in use. A constructor of machines -needs little intuition, but much physics and mechanics. A leader of -men needs very little mathematics, little empirical science, but much -intuitive and perceptive faculty for the vices and value of the human -individuals with whom he has to do. But both little and much are -empirical determinations; the Spirit, which is the whole spirit in -every particular man and at every particular instant of life, is never -composed of measurable elements.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_22" id="Footnote_1_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_22"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Introduction to Philosophy,</i> Italian tr., Vidossich, p. -272.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_23" id="Footnote_2_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_23"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> There is a curious collection of judgments adverse to -mathematics in Hamilton, <i>Fragments philosophiques,</i> tr. Plisse, Paris, -1840, pp. 283-370.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_24" id="Footnote_3_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_24"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Autobiography in <i>Works,</i> Ferrari, 2nd edition, iv. p. -336.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIId" id="VIId">VII</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theory of the forms of knowledge and the doctrine of -the categories.</i></div> - -<p>The explanations given as to the various forms of knowledge are -also explanations concerning the categories of the theoretic and -theoretic-practical spirit: the intuition, the concept, historicity, -type, number; and also quality and quantity and qualitative quantity, -space, time, movement, and so on. They form part of that doctrine of -the categories, in which the account of philosophy in the strict sense -is completed. To ask what mathematics or history is, means to search -for the corresponding categories; to ask what is the relation between -history and mathematics, and in general how the various forms of -knowledge are related to one another, means to develop genetically all -these forms, which is precisely what we have attempted.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The problem of the classification of the sciences and its -practical nature.</i></div> - -<p>But the difficult enquiry as to the forms of knowledge as categories -has not been much in favour in recent times. Another problem has, on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> -the other hand, acquired vogue. It has seemed more easy, but that is -not so, because though artfully disguised, it is at bottom identical -with the preceding problem. Instead of putting the question in the -manner indicated above, which implies seeking out the constitution -of the theoretic spirit, a modest request has been made for a -classification of the various forms of knowledge, a <i>classification of -the sciences.</i></p> - -<p>Scant confidence in philosophic thought, and excessive confidence in -naturalistic methods, have so operated that, unable to renounce the -necessity of dominating the chaos of the various competing sciences and -not wishing to have recourse to philosophic systematization, an attempt -has been made to classify the sciences like minerals, vegetables, and -animals. Even now there exist writers occupying professorships who -claim to be specialists in classifying sciences. Volumes on this theme -appear with an unprofitable frequency and abundance.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>False philosophic character that it assumes.</i></div> - -<p>Certainly, if such writers and professors were to proceed in an -altogether empirical manner, corresponding with their declarations, -nothing could be said against their labours, beyond advising them not -to discuss them philosophically in order that they may not waste time -in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> misunderstandings, and to recognize their slight utility. But, as -a fact, none of them contains himself within empirical limits, but -each gives some philosophic and rational basis to the classification -which he proposes. Thus there appear bipartitions of the sciences into -<i>concrete</i> and <i>abstract,</i> into <i>historical</i> and <i>theoromatic</i>(or -nomotechnical), into sciences of the <i>successive</i> and sciences of the -<i>coexistent,</i> or into <i>real</i> and <i>formal;</i> or <i>tripartitions,</i> into -sciences of <i>fact,</i> of <i>law</i> and of <i>value</i>; into <i>phenomenalist, -genetic</i> and <i>systematic</i> sciences; and into similar partitions and -groups, of which some are old acquaintances and correspond to functions -of the spirit that we have already distinguished, while others, on the -contrary, must be held to be false, because they confuse under the -same name functions that are different and divide functions that are -unique. But all of them, true or false, leave the empirical and direct -themselves to the problem of Logic and of theoretic Philosophy. This is -not the place to criticize them, because substantially it has already -been done in the course of the exposition of our theories; and what is -left would reduce itself to a criticism of minute errors, which finds a -more suitable place in reviews dealing with books of the day than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span> in -philosophic treatises. So true is it that those classificatory systems -pass with the day that witnessed their birth.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Coincidence of that problem with the search for the -categories, when understood in a strictly philosophic sense.</i></div> - -<p>We are concerned only to demonstrate more clearly that the demand -inherent in such attempts is identical with that which leads to the -establishing of a doctrine of the categories or a philosophic system. -It is indeed possible to discover now and then in the demands for a -classification of the sciences, two demands, the one limited, the other -wider. The first takes the form of a demand for a classification of the -forms of knowledge, as in the Baconian system, and in the others which -repeat the type. Here the sciences are divided according to the three -faculties, memory (natural and civil history), imagination (narrative, -dramatic and parabolical poetry), and reason (theology, philosophy of -nature and philosophy of man). The other tends to a classification -not according to gnoseological forms alone, but according to objects, -according to all the real principles of being, as in the system of -Comte and in those derived from it. Now a classification of the first -kind coincides with researches relating to the forms of the theoretic -spirit, and the problems that it exposes cannot be solved save by -penetrating into the problems<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span> of these forms. Otherwise it is not -possible to say if, for example, the Baconian classification be exact -or no, and if not, where it should be corrected. But in passing to -the other form of classification, according to objects or to the real -principles of being, we pass from the sea to the ocean, because that -coincides with the entire philosophic system. The classification of -Comte, for example, is his positivism itself, and it is not possible to -accept or refute or evaluate the one, without accepting or refuting or -submitting to examination the other. There are people who ingenuously -believe that they can understand things by representing them on a -sheet of paper, in the form of a genealogical tree or of a table rich -in graphic signs of inclusion and exclusion. But when we seriously -engage upon the work, we perceive that in order to draw up the tree and -construct the table, it is above all things needful to have understood -them. The pen falls from the hand and the head is obliged to bend -itself in meditation, when it does not prefer to abandon the dangerous -game and amuse itself in other ways.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Forms of knowledge and literary-didactic forms.</i></div> - -<p>And this is just the occasion to make clear the distinction that -we have on several occasions employed, between forms of knowledge -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> literary or didactic forms of knowledge, between the orders of -knowledge and books. The arrangement of books is not always determined -solely by the demand for the strict treatment of a determinate problem; -very frequently, its motive is supplied by the practical need of having -certain different pieces of knowledge collected together, in order not -to be obliged to go and search for them in several places, that is to -say, in their true places. Thus, side by side with scientific treatises -properly so-called, are to be found scholastic compilations and -manuals. Such are Geographies, Pedagogies, juridical or philological -Encyclopædias, Natural Histories, and so on. Authors, even outside -strictly scholastic limits, used formerly to consider it convenient -sometimes to isolate, sometimes to unite certain orders of knowledge, -and to baptize the mutilation or mixture with a particular name. It is -evident that when dealing with these hybrid compilations and formations -the philosopher and the historian of the sciences, who seek not books, -but ideas, must carry out a series of analyses and syntheses, of -disassociations and associations, without allowing themselves to be -seduced by the authority of the writers or by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> solidity of these -mixtures, which have become traditional.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Prejudices arising from these last.</i></div> - -<p>But it is not an easy matter. Those mixtures are no longer ingenuous, -nor are the practical motives that have determined them apparent. -Around them has grown up a dense forest of philosophemes, of capricious -distinctions, of false definitions, of imaginary sciences, of -prejudices of every sort. Any one who has succeeded in discerning the -genuine connections and attempts to separate the interlaced boughs, -to isolate the trees and to show the different roots, any one who -sets an axe to those wild tree-trunks, is horrified by cries and -complaints, not less resonant than those that drove Tancred from the -enchanted wood. And there is the traditionalist who admonishes us -severely not to divide <i>natural</i> groupings and not to introduce among -them our own <i>caprice.</i> Thus he calls the capricious natural and the -natural capricious. "What?" (has recently written the shocked Professor -Wundt) "for the excellent reason that the search for the individual -is historical search, must Geology be considered history and research -relating to the glacial epoch be abandoned to the amiable interest of -the historian?" And others lament that the ancient <i>richness</i> of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> -sciences is destroyed by these simplifications, and call the confusion -richness.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Methodical prologues to Scholastic Manuals and their -powerlessness.</i></div> - -<p>It is true that in order to obviate the evil of confusion and the -defective consciousness of the various kinds of research which have -been mingled together, many authors are in the habit of prefixing to -their books theoretic introductions, about the <i>method,</i> as they call -it, of their science. The special logic of the individual disciplines -is to be sought (they say) in the books that treat of these. Manuals -in the German language are especially notable for this arrangement, -preceded, as they are, by the heaviest introductions, which occupy a -great part of the volume or of the volumes of the book. They present a -contrast to French and English books, which usually enter at once <i>in -medias res.</i> This arrangement seems preferable: the German type has -against it the sensible observation of Manzoni, that one book at a time -is enough, when it is not more than enough. He who opens a historical -book in order there to learn the particulars of an event, or a book on -economics in order to learn how an economic institution works, should -not be obliged to read the theory of historica events and disquisitions -on the place of Economics in the system of the sciences. <i>"Il s'agit -d'un<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> chapon et non point d'Aristote,"</i> as the judge in the <i>Plaideurs</i> -said to the advocate who went back in his speech to the <i>Politics</i> of -Aristotle. But, besides the literary contamination, there is also here -the other inconvenience, that science and the theory of the sciences -being different operations and demanding different aptitudes and -preparations, the specialist who is competent in the first is usually -not at all competent in the second; though he may be believed to be so, -owing to a confusion of names. Why, indeed, should an expert on banking -and Stock Exchange business be versed in the gnoseology of economic -science? The affirmation of competence in the one on the strength of -competence in the other constitutes a true and proper sophism <i>a dicto -simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The capricious multiplication of the sciences.</i></div> - -<p>Further, the specialist has his pride, which leads him to exaggerate -what he practises and fail to recognize its true nature and limits. The -multiplication of the <i>Sciences</i> in our days has no other origin than -this; the philosopher contemplates it with astonishment; it is a truly -miraculous multiplication of the seven loaves of bread and five small -fishes. A <i>new science</i> is announced, whenever a crude idea passes -through the brain of a professor. We are made glad<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> with <i>Sociologies, -social Psychologies, Ethnopsychologies, Anthropogeographies, -Criminologies, comparative Literatures,</i> and so on. Some years ago, -an eminent German historian, having observed that some use might be -made of genealogical and heraldic studies, generally abandoned to the -cultivators and purveyors of the mania for birth and titles, instead -of limiting himself to publishing his little collection of minute -observations at once proclaimed Genealogy as a science, <i>Genealogie -als Wissenschaft,</i> and provided the appropriate manual. This begins -by determining the <i>concept</i> of Genealogy, and proceeds to study its -relations with history, with the natural sciences, with zoology, with -physiology, with psychology and psychiatry, and with the knowable -universe.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The sciences and academic prejudices.</i></div> - -<p>Finally, the specialist is generally a teacher, and therefore -accustomed to identify eternal ideal science with his real and -contingent chair, and the organism of knowledge with that of the -university faculties. Hence arises a fashion of conceiving the nature -and scope of the sciences that has become habitual in the academic -world. It consists of <i>personifying</i> science, and telling this -imaginary person what he has to do, without regard to whether the -assignment of the task<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> accords or no with the quality of the function. -"Logic will be occupied with this, but yet will not neglect this other -thing; it will benefit by casting a look on this third thing also, -which is extraneous to its task, but not to its interest; nor will -it fail to aid, with due regard, the student of an analogous matter, -by giving to him suggestions, if not even rules." Whoever reads the -scientific books of our times will recognize in this example, not -a caricature, but a plan constantly repeated and applied. It was -said of the poet Aleardo Aleardi that he treated the Muse like his -maid-servant, since he was at every instant addressing himself to her -and asking her something. The professor ends by treating Science like -his steward, or at least his respectable consort, with whom he naively -comes to an agreement regarding the portions that are to form the meals -of the day, and other matters concerning the management of the family.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h1>THIRD PART</h1> - - -<p>THE FORMS OF ERRORS AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a><br /><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="Ie" id="Ie">I</a></h4> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Error as negativity, and impossibility of treating -specially of errors.</i></div> - -<p>Error has sometimes been called privation or <i>negativity.</i> It is -commonly defined as a thinking of the false, as the non-conformity -of thought with its object, and in other similar ways. These are all -reducible to the first, since, for example, thought which is of a -different form from its object is false thought, which does not attain -to its intrinsic end; and false thought is not thought, but privation -of thought, negativity.</p> - -<p>As negativity error gives rise to a negative concept, responding -to the positive concept, which is truth. True and false, truth and -error, are related to one another as opposite concepts. Now we know -from the logical doctrines just stated that opposite concepts, far -from being separable, are not even distinguishable, and when they are -distinguished, they represent nothing but the abstract division of -the pure concept, of the unique concept, which is the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> synthesis or -dialectic of opposites. And we know from the whole of Philosophy that -Reality, thought in the pure concept and of which the pure concept -is also an integral element, genuine and truly real Reality, is a -perpetual development and progress, which is rendered possible by the -negative term intrinsic to the positive and constituting the mainspring -of its development.</p> - -<p>If then, error is negativity, it is vain to treat it as something -positive. No other positivity or reality belongs to it than just -negativity, which is a moment of the dialectic synthesis and outside -the synthesis is nothing. A treatment of error in this sense already -exists quite complete in the treatment of logical truth; and there is -nothing special to add here to that argument. As a fact, a form of the -spirit distinguishable from the positive and real forms, error does not -exist, and philosophy cannot philosophize upon what is not.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Positive and existing errors.</i></div> - -<p>Nevertheless, we all know errors, distinguishable from truth and -existing for themselves. The evolutionist affirms the biological -formation of the <i>a priori</i>; the utilitarian resolves duty into -individual interest; the Christian says that God the Father sent his -son Jesus to redeem men from the perdition into which they had fallen -through the sin of Adam; the Buddhist preaches<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> the annulment of -the Will. Are not these true and proper errors? Have they perchance -no existence? Have they not been expressed, repeated, listened to, -believed? Whoever does not admit the validity of the examples adduced -can himself find others; there will certainly be no lack of examples in -such a field. Do we wish to maintain that these errors do not exist, in -homage to the definition of error as negativity and unreality? They may -not exist as truth, but they may perfectly well exist as errors.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Positive errors as practical acts.</i></div> - -<p>There is no way of escaping from this antithesis between the -inconceivability of the existence of error and the impossibility of -denying the existence of errors which the mind recognizes and the -fact proves, save by the solution to which we have several times had -occasion to refer. That error, which has existence, is not error and -negativity, but something positive, a product of the spirit. And since -that product of the spirit is without truth, it cannot be the work -of the theoretic spirit. And since beyond the theoretic spirit there -is nothing but the practical spirit, error, which we meet with as -something existing, must of necessity be a product of the practical -spirit. If every way of issue is closed, this one is open; it goes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span> to -the very bottom and leads to the place of rest.</p> - -<p>Indeed, he who produces an error has no power to twist or to -denaturalize or stain the truth, which is his thought itself, the -thought which acts in him and in all men; indeed, no sooner has he -touched thought than he is touched by it: he thinks and does not err. -He possesses only the practical power of passing from thought to -<i>deed</i>; and his doing, in fact his thinking, is to open his mouth and -emit sounds to which there corresponds no thought, or, what is the same -thing, no thought which has value, precision, coherence and truth. -It is to smear a canvas to which no intuition corresponds; to rhyme -a sonnet, combining the phrases of others, which simulate the genius -that is absent. Theoretical error, when it is truly so, is inseparable -from the life of thought, which to the extent to which it perpetually -overcomes that negative moment, is always born anew. When it is -possible to separate and consider it in itself, what is before us is -not theoretical error, but practical act.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Practical acts not practical errors.</i></div> - -<p>Practical act and not practical error, or Evil; for that practical act -is altogether rational. Let him who doubts this cast a glance at those -who produce errors. He will be at once convinced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span> that they act with -perfect rationality. The dauber produces an object which is asked for -in the market by people who wish to have at home pictures of any sort, -to cover the walls and to attest to their own easy circumstances or -riches, and who are altogether indifferent to the æsthetic significance -of those objects. The rhymer wishes to secure an easy success for -himself among people who look upon a sonnet as a social amusement. The -babbler who emits sounds instead of thoughts, often obtains in virtue -of those sounds applause and honour denied to the serious thinker: <i>un -sot trouve toujours un plus sot pour l'admirer.</i> If, by means of those -so-called errors, provision is made for house, firing, food, children's -clothes, or for the satisfaction of self-esteem, ambitions and -caprices, who will say that they are irrational acts? Man does not live -by bread alone, but he does live by bread; and if, by means of those -acts, bread is provided, that is to say, if the wants of each one's -individuality are met, they are well-directed, far-sighted, fruitful, -and therefore most rational.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Economically practical, not morally practical.</i></div> - -<p>This does not, on the other hand, mean that they are moral; they are -rational, economically rational but not moral. Morality demands that -man should think the true. Producers of errors evade, or rather, do -not elevate themselves to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> that duty. Still intent upon the demands -of practical life <i>qua talis,</i> they do not actualize in themselves -the universal life, nor do they create in obedience to this last the -ethical will and the will for truth. Therefore there arises in their -souls, and in the souls of those who see them at work, the desire for -another superior activity, which should supervene upon the preceding -and complete it. They demand, not only to live, but to live well, to -seek not only bread, but that "bread of the angels" with which, as the -divine poet says, we are never sated. The expression of this desire -manifests itself in a cry of discontent, of reprobation, of anguish, -of longing; and therefore, with negative emphasis, it accuses of -irrationality that inferior rationality which has to be surpassed, and -gives the name theoretical error to that which considered in itself -must be called a simple economic act.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Doctrine of error, and doctrine of the necessary forms of -error.</i></div> - -<p>The doctrine here expounded is developed from what has been said above, -or from developments given elsewhere in the Philosophy of the Spirit. -We shall not therefore enlarge further upon the immanence of values -in facts, upon evil as the stimulus and concreteness of the good, -on the non-existence of evil in itself, on the practical character -of theoretical error, on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span> moral responsibility for such error, on -the content of desire exhibited by negative statements accompanying -judgments of value, and so on. In an exposition of Logic the genesis of -the theoretical error could be set aside as presupposed, for in this -didactic sphere any one among the common definitions which present -error as a thinking of the false is sufficient.</p> - -<p>A task in closer connection with Logic is that of enquiring as to the -necessary forms of error, the task, that is to say, not of confuting -all errors (which is performed by Philosophy as a whole), but of -establishing in how many ways the products of the various forms -of knowing and of knowledge can be practically combined, and what -therefore are the gnoseological possibilities of error. If error is -nothing but an <i>improper combination</i> of ideas (as Vico said), we -must see the number to which the fundamental forms of these improper -combinations can be reduced. In traditional Logic, the theory of error -appears as the doctrine of <i>Sophisms</i> or of sophistical refutations: -it has the formalist, verbalist, empirical character common to all -that Logic. In our Logic, it must have a philosophic character, that -is to say, it must depend upon the already distinguished forms of the -theoretic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span> spirit, and deduce from them the arbitrary combinations of -the errors which are formally possible. The ideas or concepts of the -theoretic and theoretic-practical spirit are so many and no more, and -so many and no more must be the possible improper combinations of them -and the forms of theoretic error.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Logical nature of all theoretic errors.</i></div> - -<p>That theoretical error is always at bottom logical error. This is an -important proposition, which merits explicit statement, because it -is customary to speak of æsthetic, naturalistic, mathematical and -historical errors side by side with those that are properly logical -or philosophical. We too have spoken and will speak thus, when more -subtle distinctions and more precise determinations are not necessary. -But in truth, a fact like <i>humano capiti cervicem equinam jungere,</i> -or <i>simulare cupressum</i> in the sea where the shipwrecked struggles in -the waves, does not constitute in itself that practical act, called -æsthetic error, unless there be added to it the false affirmation that -the object produced is an æsthetic object, that is to say, unless there -be added a logical affirmation, so that the practical act becomes, -by means of it, logical error. Taken in itself, the union of a human -head with a horse's neck, or of a cypress with the sea is a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span> sort of -play of the imagination, such as occurs in fancy, in idleness and in -dream. The extrinsic combination of a fancy and a concept is also -altogether innocent, as in the case of allegory, which, in itself, is -not unsuccessful art, but becomes so only when it is affirmed that -the two heterogeneous elements form only one; or rather, it then -becomes, not unsuccessful art, but bad philosophy. In the same way, a -mathematical error (for example, the formula 4 x 4 = 20) is nothing -but a <i>flatus vocis,</i> such as is made in jest or to loosen the tongue. -Only when we add the logical affirmation that in this <i>flatus vocis</i> an -effectual multiplication has been expressed, do we have a mathematical -error, which is therefore a logical error. It is not possible to -consider and to condemn as a theoretical error a combination which -does not intend to deceive any one as to its proper nature; neither -those to whom it is shown, nor him who has made it. Thus, among -æsthetic, naturalistic, mathematical, historical, logical and practical -productions, combinations without cognitive content are quite possible -and constantly to be found; but they do not become theoretical errors -unless they are crowned with an improper logical affirmation, or rather -with an arbitrary judgment formed upon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> a logical affirmation. Indeed, -even illogical combinations of philosophic concepts are not, as such, -logical or theoretical errors, since they can be made tentatively, -in order to see whether the two concepts combine or no. To make them -errors, the arbitrariness of a special act of judgment is necessary. -That arbitrariness consists in a lying to others or to ourselves, in -order to satisfy an interest of our merely individual life, and it is -impossible to lie without employing an affirmation, which is always a -logical product.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>History of errors and phenomenology of error.</i></div> - -<p>In this way the problem of determining the various forms of theoretical -errors, according to the already distinguished forms of knowledge, -becomes transformed and circumscribed in the other problem of -determining the various forms of <i>logical errors,</i> in relation to -the various forms of knowledge, that is to say, of determining the -necessary forms of philosophic errors. Certainly, every individual errs -in his own way, according to the conditions in which he finds himself; -just as every individual according to those conditions discovers -truth in his own way. But Philosophy in the strict sense (in the form -of a philosophical treatise) cannot complete the examination of all -individual errors. This is the task of all philosophies as they are -developed in the ages and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> of the thought of all thinking beings, -who have been, are, and will be. <i>Its</i> task is to illuminate the -eternal ideal history of errors, which is the eternal ideal history -of truth, in its relations with the eternal forms of the practical -spirit. The Philosophy of the spirit, as a treatise of philosophy, -cannot give the history of errors; but must limit itself to giving -their <i>phenomenology.</i> In this sense is to be understood the enquiry -concerning the fundamental forms of philosophical errors. These forms -may be briefly deduced as follows.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Deduction of the forms of logical errors. Forms deduced -from the concept of the concept, and forms deduced from the other -concepts.</i></div> - -<p>The pure concept, which is philosophy, can be incorrectly combined and -mistaken either for the form that precedes it, pure representation -(art), or for that which follows it, the empirical and abstract -concept (natural and mathematical sciences); or it can be wrongly -divided in its unity of concept and representation <i>(a priori</i> -synthesis), and wrongly again combined—either the concept may be -taken as representation, or the representation as concept. Hence -arise the fundamental forms of errors which it will be useful to -denominate as <i>æstheticism, empiricism, mathematicism, philosophism,</i> -and <i>historicism</i> (or <i>mythologism</i>). On the other hand, the other -distinctions of the concept, or distinct concepts, can be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span> incorrectly -combined among themselves in a series of false combinations, -corresponding to the series of the other particular philosophic -sciences, and hence arise the forms of the other philosophic errors. -But in Logic it is sufficient to show the possibility of these last -forms of errors, and to adduce certain cases as examples, because a -complete determination of them would demand that complete exposition of -the whole philosophic system, which cannot be furnished in a treatise -on Logic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Errors arising front errors.</i></div> - -<p>Finally, since it is impossible that any form whatever of these errors, -whether specifically logical or generically philosophic, should -satisfy the mind, which asks for the true and does not lend itself to -deception or mockery, each one of these forms tends to convert itself -into the other, owing to its arbitrariety and untenability, and all -mutually destroy one another. When the attempt is made to preserve -both the true form and the insufficient form, or all the insufficient -forms, we have gnoseological dualism; but with the decline to complete -destruction, we have the error of <i>scepticism</i> and of <i>agnosticism.</i> -Finally, if, having been by these led back to life and being deprived -of every concept that should illuminate it back to life as a mystery, -we affirm that truth lies in that theoretic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span> mystery, in living life -without thought, we have the error of <i>mysticism.</i> Dualism, scepticism -(or agnosticism) and mysticism thus extend both to strictly logical -problems (that is to say, to the possibility, in general, of knowing -reality), and to all other philosophic problems. Hence we can speak of -a practical dualism, of an æsthetic or ethical scepticism, and of an -æsthetic or ethical mysticism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Professionalism and nationality of errors.</i></div> - -<p>Such, stated in a summary manner, is the deduction of philosophic -errors, which we shall now proceed to examine in detail. Upon their -forms, which represent so many tendencies of the human spirit, is based -this other fact, which is constantly striking us, and which may be -called the <i>professionalism</i> of errors. Every one is disposed to use -in other fields of activity those instruments that are familiar to him -in the field which he knows best. The poet by vocation and profession -dreams and imagines, even when he should reason; the philosopher -reasons even when he should be poetical; the historian seeks authority, -even when he should seek the necessity of the human mind; the practical -man asks himself of what use a thing is, even when he should ask -himself what a thing is; the naturalist constructs classes, even when -he should break<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span> through them, in order to think real things; the -mathematician persists in writing formulae, even when there is nothing -to calculate. If the narrowness of the <i>Esprits mathématiques</i> has been -denounced, it must not be believed that the other professions have -not also got their narrownesses. The philosopher's profession is no -exception to this, for he should surpass all one-sided views, but does -not always succeed. It is one thing to say and another to do, and if -a man forewarned is half saved, he is not therefore altogether saved. -That professionalism of error, which we observe in individuals, is also -to be observed on a large scale among peoples. Thus we speak of peoples -as antiartistic, antiphilosophical, or antimathematical: of speculative -Germany, of intellectualist and abstract France, of empiricist -England, of Italy as artistic in the centre and the north, and as -philosophic in the south. But peoples, like individuals, are changeable -and can be educated: so much so that in our days, the traditional -Anglo-Saxon empiricism begins little by little to lose ground before -the speculative education of the English people, due to classical -German thought; France that was abstractionist becomes intuitionist and -mystic. Germany leaves the vast dominion of the skies assigned to her -by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> Heine for that of industry and commerce, and philosophizes somewhat -unworthily; Italy, which in greater part was a country of artists, -poets and politicians, is traversed in every direction by religious and -philosophic currents. Were it not for this capacity for education of -individuals and peoples, History would not be a free development, but -determinism and mechanism, and each of us would possess less of that -courage for social activity which each one exhibits with great ardour -according to his own convictions.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIe" id="IIe">II</a></h4> - - -<h5>ÆSTHETICISM, EMPIRICISM AND MATHEMATICISM</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Definition of these forms.</i></div> - -<p>Æstheticism is the philosophic error which consists in substituting -the form of intuition for the form of the concept, and of attributing -to the former the office and value of the latter. Empiricism is the -analogous substitution of the empirical concept, by means of which -philosophic function and value is attributed to the empirical and -natural sciences. Finally, mathematicism is the presentation of the -abstract concept as concrete concept and of mathematics as philosophy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Æstheticism.</i></div> - -<p>We have met with æstheticism and with empiricism at the beginning of -our exposition, and again here and there throughout its course; and we -have sufficiently determined the nature of both and demonstrated the -contradictions in which they become involved. In every one of their -movements they presuppose the pure concept and the philosophy of which -they mean to take the place. At the same time, they do not develop<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span> the -philosophy which they have presupposed, because they suffocate it in -the vapour of the intuitions and in the chilly waters of naturalistic -concepts. They are not therefore effective thought, but an adulteration -of thought with heterogeneous elements, which by a misuse of words are -said to be furnished with theoretic and logical value.</p> - -<p>Æstheticism has few representatives, because complete abstention -from reflection and reason is too obviously contradictory. Even when -art was considered to be a true <i>instrument</i> of philosophy, in the -Romantic period, this affirmation was put forward in a confused manner, -intuition being finally distinguished from intuition, art from art. -This amounted at bottom to a radical change and an abandonment of -the original thesis. We have seen æstheticism reappear in our times -under the name of <i>intuitionism,</i> or again as <i>pure experience:</i> an -experience which is taken to be not posterior, but anterior to every -intellectual category, and should therefore be called nothing but pure -intuition.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empiricism</i></div> - -<p>The representatives of empiricism are on the other hand most numerous, -now as in the past; so much so that empiricism sometimes seems to -be the sole adversary of philosophy, and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span> true origin of all -philosophic errors. This opinion is without doubt inexact, but it finds -support in the fact that philosophy is obliged to defend itself from -the incessant assaults of empiricism, more than from any other enemy. -The confusion between pure and empirical concepts is, indeed, easy, -since both have the form of universality (though the universality of -the second is falsely assumed) and both refer to the concept (though -in the second the concept is something arbitrarily limited). The -empiricist is like the philosopher, in so far as he immerses himself in -facts and constructs concepts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Positivism, philosophy founded upon the sciences, inductive -metaphysic.</i></div> - -<p>The last great historical manifestation of empiricism is that which, -from the system of Auguste Comte, took the name of <i>positivism</i> and -by its very name expressed the intention of basing itself upon facts -(that is, upon facts historically certified), in order to classify -them, thus reducing philosophy to a classification. This, like all -classifications, proceeded from the poorest to the richest, from the -abstract gradually to the less abstract, though never to the concrete. -Positivism did not seem to be aware that the facts from which it -proposed to proceed and which it believed to be the rough material of -experience, were already <i>philosophic determinations,</i> and could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span> only -in this way be admitted as <i>historically ascertained. Psychologist</i> is -also positivism; positivism, that is to say, more properly applied to -the group of the so-called mental and moral sciences. <i>Neocriticism</i> -can be almost altogether identified with positivism, although its -upholders generally possess some knowledge of philosophical history -(which is altogether lacking to the pure positivists), and this -confers a more specious polish on their doctrine. Neocriticism, -indeed, tends to eliminate every speculative element from the Kantian -criticism, and by so doing approaches positivism—so as almost to -become confounded with it. It is no wonder, therefore, that from -the camp of the neocritics should have originated the proclamation -and programme of <i>a philosophy founded upon the sciences,</i> or of -an <i>inductive metaphysic.</i> This is simply and solely the reduction -of philosophy to the sciences, because a scientific philosophy, an -inductive metaphysic, is not speculation, but classification, or -as those who advocate it ingenuously declare, a systematization of -the results obtained by the sciences. Here too are kindled the most -comical quarrels between scientists and philosophers. For when it is -only a question of classifying and systematizing those results, the -scientist rightly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span> feels that he can dispense with the labours of the -philosopher, indeed, he feels that he alone, who has obtained the -results, knows what these exactly are and how they should be treated -in order to avoid deformation. And the philosopher, who by making -himself an empiricist, a positivist, a psychologist and a neocritic, -has renounced his autonomy, approaches the scientists and offers with -little dignity services that they refuse. He elaborates scientific -expositions, which they call compilations and mistakes, he proposes -additions or corrections at which they mock as superfluous or foolish. -Nevertheless, the philosopher does not grow weary nor become offended -at these repulses and jests; he returns to the charge and indeed it is -only when someone wishes to redeem him from this voluntary servitude -and abjection that he turns upon him with fury, saying that philosophy -should live on <i>familiar terms</i> with the sciences. As if the relations -that we have faithfully described were relations of reciprocal respect -and harmony! The truth is that the majority of empirical philosophers -are failures in science and unsuccessful in philosophy, who out of -their double incompetence compound a logical theory, thus furnishing -another proof (if further proof were needed) in confirmation of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> -practical origin of errors. For our part, we recognise the justice of -the accusation of parasitism, which is brought against a philosophy of -this character, and we will willingly afford our aid to the scientists -in driving out these intruders, who dishonour philosophy in our eyes -not less than in theirs they dishonour the sciences.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empiricism and facts.</i></div> - -<p>Empiricism owes the greater part of its influence upon the minds of -many to its continual appeal to reality and facts. This leads to the -belief that speculative philosophy wishes to neglect reality and facts -and to build, as the saying is, upon clouds. But we have here an -ambiguity and a sophism with which we must not allow ourselves to be -deceived. Not only does speculative philosophy also base itself upon -facts and have the phenomenal world as its point of departure; but -speculative philosophy truly founds itself upon facts and empiricism -does not. The first considers facts in their infinite variety and in -their continuous development; the second, a certain number of facts, -collected at certain epochs and among certain peoples, or at all epochs -and among all peoples empirically known; chat is to say, it considers -a limited number of facts. Speculative philosophy, presupposing the -pure phenomenon, transforms it into (historical)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> fact and is a -true <i>philosophy of fact</i>; empiricism, without being aware of it, -presupposes the facts that it accepts, which are already, though with -little criticism, historically ascertained and interpreted. This -unconsciousness of what it is doing makes its condition worse, so that -it can give nothing but <i>a philosophy of classifications,</i> which are -taken for facts only through habitual lack of reflection. Speculative -philosophy, therefore, can answer the claim and the boast of empiricism -that it is based upon facts, by accepting the claim but denying the -boast, as one to which empiricism has and can have no right, and by -appropriating this achievement to itself.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Bankruptcy of empiricism: dualism, agnosticism, -spiritualism and superstition.</i></div> - -<p>But the bankruptcy of empiricism in all its forms and under all its -synonyms is clear in the dualism to which it leads, of appearance and -essence, phenomenon and noumenon. For while it professes that there is -nothing knowable but the phenomenon, it also postulates an essence, a -noumenon, something that is beyond the phenomenon and unknowable. It -is all very well to say that this unknowable is not, for it, a proper -object for science and philosophy, but it is not to be driven from the -field of reality merely by removing it from science and philosophy. -Every empiricism, then, recognises side by side<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span> with the rights of -thought, the rights of <i>feeling,</i> and thus the circle of reality comes -to be broken at one or more points. When it is wished to continue -working empirically upon the unknowable residue, we have those various -attempts, which can all of them be summarized beneath the name of -<i>spiritualism.</i> Here the hidden truth is sought by means of experiments -of a naturalistic type and spirit is reduced to matter more or less -light and subtle. Empiricism ends in superstition. This has always -happened; in the decadence of ancient civilization, when philosophers -took to converting themselves into thaumaturges; at the eve of the -French Revolution, after a century of empiricism and sensationalism, -when all sorts of fanatics and schemers appeared and were the -favourites of a society of most credulous materialists; in our times, -when they have been favoured by a less credulous public of positivists, -or of ex-positivists.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Evolutionist positivism and rationalist positivism.</i></div> - - -<p>Empiricism has certainly sought to cure its own insufficiencies, of -which it was more or less conscious, and <i>evolutionist positivism</i> -must be numbered among these attempts. This form proposed to correct -the anti-historical character of positivism by providing a <i>history</i> -of reality. But this history was always based upon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span> empirical -presuppositions, and was therefore a history of classifications, not -of concrete reality; an extravagant caricature of the philosophy of -becoming, from whose breast comes History rightly and truly so-called. -Another attempt was that of <i>rationalist positivism,</i> which sought to -check the degeneration of positivism toward dualism, sentimentalism -and superstition, by appealing to the absolute rights of reason. -But this reason is nevertheless always empirical reason, limited to -certain series of facts, extrinsic, classificatory, unintelligent. -Absolute authority can well be attributed to it in words, but such an -attribution does not confer the power of exercising it. This kind of -positivism, therefore, meets in our day with favour in freemasonry -(at least of the Franco-Italian sort). This is a sect, which is -annoying, chiefly because, heedless of facts, it preserves and defends -the habit of making use of empty formulas and phrases, and because -when it has insulted some priestly vestment, it believes that it -has successfully destroyed superstition and obscurantism in man, or -when it has declaimed about liberty, it imagines that by this slight -effort, liberty has been won and established. True <i>reason</i> abhors -<i>rationalism,</i> if it be rationalism of that sort.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mathematicism</i></div> - -<p><i>Mathematicism</i> is much rarer than empiricism, because the confusion -between thinking and calculating is less easy than that between -thinking and classifying. Owing to its rarity and paradoxical -character, mathematicism has something aristocratic about it, -resembling in this the other extreme error, of æstheticism; whereas -the intermediate error, empiricism, just because of its mediocrity, is -popular and indeed vulgar.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Symbolical mathematics.</i></div> - -<p>We cannot properly consider as mathematicism that form of philosophy -which appeared in antiquity as <i>Pythagoreanism</i> and <i>Neopythagoreanism</i> -and has reappeared in our days as a doctrine of the mathematical -relations of the universe and the harmony of the world. In this -conception, numbers are not numbers, but symbols; the numerical -relations are not arithmetical, but æsthetic. The pretended -mathematical philosophers of this type are neither philosophers nor -mathematicians, nor are they arbitrary combiners of these two methods. -They would be better described as poets or semi-poets.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mathematics as demonstrative form of philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>Nor again can we consider to be mathematicism the attempt made by some -philosophers to expound their own ideas by a mathematical, algebraical -or geometrical method. If their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span> ideas were ideas and not numbers, the -method to which they had recourse necessarily remained extrinsic, and -possessed no mathematical character beyond the verbal complacency with -which they adopted certain formulae of definitions, axioms, theorems, -lemmas, corollaries and certain numerical symbols, These formulas and -symbols could always be replaced by others, without any inconvenience -whatever. It is possible to discuss, it has indeed been discussed, -whether such modes of exposition are in good or bad literary taste, -or of greater or less didactic convenience. They can be condemned, -as they have been condemned, and caused to fall into disuse, as they -have fallen; but the quality of the philosophic truth thus expressed, -remains unaltered and is never changed into mathematics. Neither the -system of Spinoza, who employed the geometrical method, nor that of -Leibnitz, who desired the universal calculus, are mathematical systems. -If they were so, modern philosophy would not owe some of its most -important idealist concepts to those two systems.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Errors of mathematicist philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>Better examples of mathematicism than the treatises and systems -developed according to its rules are found in the unfulfilled -programmes of such treatises and systems, or in the mathematicist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span> -treatment of certain philosophie problems. Such, for instance, is that -concerning the infinity of the world in space and time, a problem -which, treated mathematistically, becomes insoluble and makes many -people's heads turn. It is impossible to comprehend the world in one's -own mind with the mathematical infinite; and either to give or to -refuse to it a beginning and an end. Hence the exclamations of terror -before that infinite, and the sense of sublimity which seems to arise -in the struggle joined between it, which is indomitable, and the -human mind which wishes to dominate it. It has, however, already been -observed with reason, that such sublimity is not only very near to the -ridiculous, but falls into it with all its weight; and that such terror -could not in truth be anything but terror of the <i>ennui</i> of having -to count and recount in the void and to infinity. The mathematical -infinite is nothing real; its appearance of reality is the shadow -projected by the mathematical power which the human spirit possesses, -of always adding a unit to any number. The true infinite is all before -us, in every real fact, and it is only when the continuous unity of -reality is divided into separate facts, and space and time are rendered -abstract and mathematical, only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span> then, if the complete operation -be forgotten, that the desperate problem arises and the anguish of -never being able to solve it. Another and more actual example of this -mathematicist mode of treatment is that of the dimensions of space. -Here, forgetting that space of three dimensions is nothing real that -can be experienced, but is a mathematical construction, and on the -other hand finding it convenient for mathematical reasons to construct -spaces of less or more than three dimensions, or of <i>n</i> dimensions, -they end by treating these constructions as conceivable realities, and -seriously discuss bi-dimensional beings or four-dimensional worlds.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Dualism, agnosticism and superstition of mathematicism.</i></div> - -<p>With affirmations such as those of infinites incomprehensible to -thought, and of real but not experienceable spaces, mathematicism also -creates a dualism of thought and of reality superior to thought, or -(what amounts to the same thing) of thought which meets its equivalent -in experience and thought without a corresponding experience. The -unknowable here too lies in wait and falls upon the imprudent -mathematicist philosopher, who feels himself lost before a second, -third, fourth and infinite worlds, excogitated by himself, superior -or inferior worlds to those of man, underworlds and overworlds and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> -over-over worlds. He then becomes even spiritualist and asks with -Zollner, why spiritualist facts should not possess reality and be -produced in the fourth dimension of space, shut off from us. The -contradiction of the mathematicist attempt, like that of the æsthetic -and empiricist, is clearly revealed in the dualistic, agnostic and -mystical consequences to which, as we shall see more clearly further -on, all of them necessarily lead.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIIe" id="IIIe">III</a></h4> - - -<h5>PHILOSOPHISM</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Rupture of the unity of the a priori synthesis.</i></div> - -<p>The three modes of error examined exhaust the possible combinations of -the pure concept with the forms of the theoretic or theoretic-practical -spirit, anterior or posterior to it. Other modes of error arise from -the breaking up of the unity of the concept, from the separation of its -constitutive elements. Each one of these elements, abstracted from the -other, and finding that other before it, annuls, instead of recognizing -the other as an organic part of itself; that is to say, substitutes for -it its own abstract existence.</p> - -<p>The concept, as we know, is the logical <i>a priori</i> synthesis, and -so the unity of subject and predicate, unity in distinction and -distinction in unity, affirmation of the concept and judgment of the -fact, at once philosophy and history. In pure and effective thought, -the two elements constitute an indissoluble organism. A fact cannot be -affirmed without thinking; it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span> impossible to think without affirming -a fact. In logical thought, the representation without the concept is -blind, it is pure representation deprived of logical right, it is not -the subject of a judgment; the concept without representation is void.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophism, logicism or panlogism.</i></div> - -<p>This unity can be severed, practically, in the act which is called -error, where propositions expressing the truth are combined, not -according to their theoretical connection, but according to what is -deemed useful by him who makes the combination. It then happens that -in the first place we have an empty concept, which, being without -any internal rule (owing to this very vacuity), fills itself with a -content which does not belong to it—for this it could have only from -contact with the representation—and gives itself a <i>false</i> subject. -The opposite also occurs, that is to say, a false predicate or concept -is posited, a case which will be considered further on. Limiting -ourselves, meanwhile, to the first and observing that it consists in -the abuse of the logical element, we shall be able to call that mode -of error <i>logicism</i> or <i>panlogism,</i> or also <i>philosophism</i> (since -the abuse of the logical element is identical with the abuse of the -philosophic element).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophy of history.</i></div> - -<p>Logicism, panlogism or philosophism, is the usurpation that philosophy -in the narrow sense wreaks upon history, by pretending to deduce -history a <i>priori,</i> as the process is called. This usurpation is -logically impossible owing to the identity of philosophy and history -already demonstrated, whence bad history is bad philosophy, and -inversely. It may happen that the same individual who at a given moment -creates excellent philosophy (and excellent history at the same time) -may create bad history (and so bad philosophy) the moment after. But -this amounts to saying that he who at one moment has philosophized -well, may philosophize badly and err the moment after, and not by any -means that the two things are possible in the same act. However, the -usurpation, logically impossible, is practically effected, in which -case, it is not strictly speaking usurpation, although it comes to -be so considered from the logical point of view. On the other hand, -the claim for the <i>a priori</i> in history is perfectly just; for to -affirm a fact means to think it, and it is not possible to think -without transforming the representation by means of the concept, and -so deducing it from the concept. But this deduction is an <i>a priori</i> -synthesis and therefore also induction, whereas<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span> the claim to deduce -history <i>a priori</i> would amount to a deduction without induction, -not <i>History</i> (which is, for that very reason, <i>Philosophy),</i> but a -<i>Philosophy of History.</i></p> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The contradictions in this undertaking.</i></div> - -<p>The absurdity of this programme must be clearly set forth, because -those who formulate it are wont to concede equivocally that a -Philosophy of history must be founded upon actual data, and have -induction as its basis. In reality, were those actual data documents -to be interpreted, we should not have the Philosophy of history that -they desire, but simply History. The actual data, the so-called -formless material, in the programme of the Philosophy of history, -are at the most already constructed histories, which do not content -the philosophers of history. They do not content them, not because -they judge them to be false interpretations of the documents (in -which case nothing else would be needed but to correct history with -history, carrying out the work that all historians do); but because -the <i>very method of history</i> does not content them, and they demand -something else. History is despised as mere narration, and considered -not as a form of thought, but as its material, a chaotic mass of -representations. The true form of thought is for them the Philosophy -of history,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span> which appears in history and not in documents. And how -does it appear? If the documents are removed, the <i>a priori</i> synthesis -is no longer possible. It arises, then, by the parthenogenesis of the -abstract concept, which history finds in itself, without the spark -being struck by confrontation with documents. History is deduced -<i>a priori,</i> not in the concrete but in the void. Whatever be the -declarations which philosophers of history add to their programme, its -essence cannot be changed. Were these declarations made seriously and -all their logical consequences accepted, there would be no reason for -maintaining a Philosophy of history beside and beyond history. The -two things would become identical, and the programme itself would be -annulled, both for those who propose it, and for us who judge it to -be contradictory. This is the dilemma, from which there is no escape: -either the Philosophy of history is an interpretation of documents, -and in this case it is synonymous with History and makes no new -claim;—or it does make a new claim and in that case, being no longer -interpretation of documents and intending all the same to think facts, -it thinks them without documents and draws them from the empty concept, -and we have the Philosophy of history, philosophism, panlogism.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophy of history and false analogies.</i></div> - -<p>In order to give itself body, the Philosophy of history has recourse to -analogy. This is a legitimate process of thought, which, in its search -for truth, seeks analogies and harmonies. But it is legitimate, as -we know, only on condition that the analogy does not remain a merely -heuristic hypothesis, but is effectively thinkable and thought. Now the -concepts that the Philosophy of history deduces cannot be effectively -thought, because they are void; they are neither pure concepts nor -pure representations, but an arbitrary mixture of the two forms, and -therefore contradiction and vacuity. Thus the analogies of which the -Philosophy of history avails itself, are <i>false analogies,</i> that is -to say, <i>metaphors</i> and <i>comparisons,</i> transformed into analogies and -concepts. It will declare, for instance, that the Middle Ages are the -negation of ancient civilization, and that the modern epoch is the -synthesis of these two opposites. But ancient civilization is nothing -but an unending series of facts, of which each is a synthesis of -opposites, real only in so far as it is a synthesis of opposites. And -between ancient civilization and the Middle Ages, there is absolute -continuity, not less than between the Middle Ages and the modern epoch. -Facts cannot stand to one another as opposite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span> concepts, because they -cannot be opposed to one another as positive and negative. The fact -that is called positive is positive-negative and so, in like manner, -is that which is called negative. It will further declare (always by -way of example) that Greece was thought and Rome action, and the modern -world is the unity of thought and action. But in reality, Greek life -was thought and action, like that of Rome, and like modern life. Every -epoch, every people, every individual, every instant of life is thought -and action, in virtue of the unity of the spirit, whose distinctions -are never broken up into separate existences. The affirmations that -belong to the Philosophy of history are all of this kind, and when they -are not of this kind, it means that they do not belong to the essence -of the Philosophy of history.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction between the Philosophy of history, and the -books thus entitled. Philosophical and historical merits of these.</i></div> - -<p>The last-mentioned case occurs frequently in books that bear the title -of Philosophy of history. These certainly cannot be considered to have -been refuted when the concept of that science has been refuted. Science -is one thing and the book another. The error of a false attempt at -science is one thing and the value of books, which usually (especially -with great thinkers and writers) have deeper motives and more valuable -parts, is another. Among books upon the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span> philosophy of history are -numbered some masterpieces of human genius,—fountains of truth, at -which many generations have quenched their thirst and to which men -return perpetually. They have often indeed been marvellous books on -history, true history, produced by reaction against superficial, -partisan or trifling histories. They have for the first time revealed -the true character of certain epochs, of certain events, of certain -individuals.<a name="FNanchor_1_25" id="FNanchor_1_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_25" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> The sterile form of duality and opposition between -Philosophy of history and simple History, concealed the fruitful -polemic of a better history against a worse history. Even the formulae, -which were falsely regarded as deductions of concepts (for example, -that the Middle Ages are the negation of antiquity and the Renaissance -the negation of the Middle Ages, or that the Germanic spirit, from the -Reformation to the Romantic movement, is the affirmation of inward -liberty, or that Italy of the fifteenth century represents Art, -France the State, and so on), were at bottom vivacious expressions of -predominant characteristics, by means of which the various epochs and -events were portrayed. These expressions and truths<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span> could be accepted -without there being any necessity for presupposing clear and fixed -oppositions and distinctions, or for denying the extra-temporality of -spiritual forms. Besides these historical characteristics, discoveries -more strictly philosophical appeared for the first time in those books; -hence not only do we find in them the first outlines of a Logic of -historical science (a Logic of the individual judgment), but also, -sometimes in imaginative forms, determinations of eternal aspects of -the Spirit, which had previously been unknown or ill-known. Such is -the case with the concept of <i>progress</i> and <i>providence,</i> and of that -other concept concerning the spiritual autonomy of <i>language</i> and of -<i>art,</i> which presented itself for the first time as the discovery of -the historical epoch, in which man, wholly sense and imagination, -without intelligible genera and concepts, is supposed to have spoken -and poetized without reasoning. In an equally imaginary fashion the -constancy of the spirit, which eternally repeats itself, also found -in those philosophies the formula of the perpetual <i>passing</i> away and -returning of the various epochs of civilization. These philosophical -truths, like the historical characteristics, must be purged, the first -from the representations improperly united with them, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span> second from -the logical character which they wrongly assumed. But they cannot be -discarded, unless we are willing to throw away the gold, through our -unwillingness to have the trouble of separating it from the dross. -And this necessity for purification further confirms the error of the -philosophism, since it is the purification of Philosophy and of History -from the Philosophy of History.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophy of nature.</i></div> - -<p>Another manifestation of the philosophism, somewhat different from -the preceding, is the science which assumes the name of <i>Philosophy</i> -of <i>nature.</i> Here it is claimed to deduce, not the historical facts -themselves, but the general concepts, which constitute the natural -sciences. The philosophy of nature can be considered as the converse -error to the empiricist error, which claims to induce philosophic -categories <i>a posteriori,</i> whereas this claims to deduce empirical -concepts <i>a priori.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its substantial identity with the Philosophy of history.</i></div> - -<p>But the theoretic content of empirical concepts and of the natural -sciences is, as we know, nothing but perception and history. So that, -in the final analysis, the Philosophy of nature can be reduced to the -Philosophy of history (extended to so-called inferior or subhuman -reality), making, like the other, the vain attempt to produce in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span> -void what thought can produce only in the concrete, that is to say, -by synthesizing. And that it tends to become a Philosophy of history -is also to be seen from its not infrequent hesitances before abstract -concepts, or mathematical science, sometimes declaring that the pure -abstractions of the intellect must remain such and are not otherwise -deducible and capable of being philosophized about. The Philosophy -of nature has usually been extended to the field of the physical and -natural sciences, including also some parts of mechanics. But it has -refused to undertake the deduction of the theorems of geometry and -still more the operations of the Calculus.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The contradictions of the Philosophy of nature.</i></div> - -<p>The Philosophy of nature, like the Philosophy of history, has abounded -in declarations of the necessity of the historical and empirical -method. It has recognized that the physical and natural sciences are -its antecedent and presupposition and that it continues and completes -their work. But it is not permitted to complete this work because -this work extends to infinity. And it would not be able to continue -it, save by turning itself into physics and natural sciences, working -as these do in laboratories, observing, classifying, and making laws -(legislating). Now the Philosophy of nature does not wish to adopt such -a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span> procedure, but to introduce a new method into the study of nature. -And since a new method and a new science are the same thing, it does -not wish to be a continuation of physics and of the natural sciences, -but a new science. And since a new science implies a new object, it -wishes to give a new object, which is precisely the <i>philosophic -idea of nature.</i> This philosophic idea of nature would therefore be -constructed by a method which would not and could not have anything -in common with that of the empirical sciences. Yet the Philosophy of -nature is not able to dispense with the empirical concepts, which it -strives to deduce <i>a priori.</i> And here lies the contradictoriness of -its undertaking. The dilemma which confronted the Philosophy of history -must be repeated in this case also:—either it has to continue the work -of the physical and natural sciences, and in this case there will be -progress in the physical and natural sciences and not in the Philosophy -of nature; or it has to construct the Philosophy of nature (the -physical and natural sciences); and this cannot be done, save by an <i>a -priori</i> deduction of the empirical and thus falling into the error of -panlogism or philosophism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>False analogies in the Philosophy of nature.</i></div> - -<p>The Philosophy of nature, like that of history,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span> expresses itself in -false analogies. It will say, for instance, that the poles of the -magnet are the opposed moments of the concept, made extrinsic and -appearing in space; or that light is the ideality of nature; or that -magnetism corresponds to length, electricity to breadth and gravity to -volume; or again (like more ancient philosophers), that water, or fire, -or sulphur, or mercury, is the essence of all natural facts. But these -phenomena which are given as essences, those classes of natural facts -which are given as moments of the concept and of the spirit, are no -longer either scientific phenomena, or the concepts and spiritual forms -of philosophy. The first are intuitions and not categories; the second -categories and not intuitions; and just because they are so clearly -distinguished from one another they mutually mingle in the <i>a priori</i> -synthesis. On the other hand, the concepts of the Philosophy of nature -are categories, which as such present themselves in their emptiness -as intuitions, and intuitions, which in their blindness present -themselves as categories. These thoughts are contradictory. They can -be <i>spoken,</i> or rather <i>tittered,</i> because it is possible to combine -phonetically contradictory propositions, but it is impossible to think -them. Such combinations by their ingenuity often give<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span> rise to surprise -or astonishment. But mental satisfaction is never obtained from them -merely because the mind is excited and deluded. On the other hand, the -Philosophy of nature, in this labour of ingenuity, runs against limits, -which even ingenuity cannot overcome. Then are heard affirmations, -which amount to open confessions of the impossibility of the task. Of -this sort is the assertion that nature contains the contingent and the -irrational and therefore is incapable of complete rationalization; -or that nature in its self-externality is impotent to achieve the -concept and the spirit. In like manner. Philosophies of history end by -confessing that there are facts which are told and are not deduced, -because they are small, contingent and fortuitous matter for chronicle. -Thus, after having announced in the programme the rationality of nature -and of history, they recognize in the execution of the programme that -the contrary is true. They simply deny the rationality of the world, -because they cannot bring themselves to deny the rationality of the -pseudo-sciences of philosophism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Works entitled Philosophy of nature.</i></div> - -<p>Finally, the reservations made in the case of works dealing with the -Philosophy of history are to be repeated for those dealing with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434">[Pg 434]</a></span> -Philosophy of nature. In them, too, there is something more than, and -something different from, the sterile analogical exercises that we have -mentioned. Some of the philosophers of nature, in the pursuit of their -illusions, have made occasional scientific discoveries, in the same way -that the alchemists seeking the philosopher's stone made discoveries -in Chemistry. Those discoveries in physical and natural science cannot -serve to increase the value of the theory of the Philosophy of nature -any more than those made in chemistry increased the value of alchemy. -But they confer value on the books entitled Philosophy of nature, and -do honour to their authors as physicists, not as metaphysicians. From -the philosophical point of view, those works have had the merit of -affirming, though but in imaginative and symbolical ways, the unity -and spirituality of nature, opening the path to its unification with -the history of man. They have the yet greater merit of contributing -effectively in the battle engaged by them against the sciences of -making clear the empirical character of the naturalistic concepts and -the abstract character of the mathematical. Nevertheless, they drew -illegitimate conclusions from such gnoseological truth and carried on -a war of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span> conquest, which must be held to be unjust. In virtue of the -positive elements that they contain, works on the Philosophy of nature -have aided the advance both of the sciences and of philosophy, which in -their properly philosophico-naturalistic parts they have violated and -debased and forced into hybrid unions.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Contemporary demands for a Philosophy of nature and their -various meanings.</i></div> - -<p>In our day demands for a Philosophy of history are rare and received -with scant favour; but it seems that those for a Philosophy of nature -are again acquiring vigour. On seeking the inward meaning of this fact, -it is seen that on the one hand many of those who demand a Philosophy -of nature are empiricists, desirous of a natural science elaborated -into a philosophy, and therefore not properly of a Philosophy of -nature, but of a view of the natural sciences that may supplant -philosophy. Other upholders of a Philosophy of nature echo the only -programme of such a philosophy, as it was formulated especially by -Schelling and by Hegel, but declare themselves altogether dissatisfied -with the attempts to carry it out made by Schelling, by Hegel and by -the followers of both. They are dissatisfied, but incapable of setting -their dissatisfaction at rest by a new attempt at carrying out the -programme. They are also without the intellectual courage<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span> necessary -to question and to re—examine the solidity of the programme itself, -which is in their judgment plausible and guaranteed by such great -names. For what indeed is more plausible upon first inspection than -the affirmation that the empirical sciences must be elevated to the -rank of philosophy? It seems that too much mental liberty is needed -to understand and to distinguish from the preceding, the somewhat -different proposition that empiricism (empirical philosophy) must -certainly be elevated to the rank of non-empirical philosophy, but that -the <i>empirical sciences</i> must be left in peace to their own methods, -without any attempt to render perfect by means of extrinsic additions -that which has in itself all the perfection of which it is capable. -It seems that more intelligence than is usually met with is necessary -in order to recognize that this last proposition does not establish a -<i>dualism</i> of spirit and nature, of philosophy and the natural sciences, -but for ever destroys every dualism by making of the natural sciences -a merely practical formation of the spirit, which has no voice in -the assembly of the philosophical sciences, as the object which it -has created has no reality. An ultimate tendency can be discerned in -the complex movement of the day toward a Philosophy of nature. This -is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span> the attainment of the consciousness that reality is on this side -of the classifications of the natural sciences, and that the natural -sciences must be retranslated into <i>history,</i> by means of a historical -consideration (concrete and not abstract) of the facts that are called -natural. But this tendency is not something that will attain its end -in a near or in a distant future. It has always shown its value and -shows it also to-day; it can be recommended and promoted, but neither -more nor less than every other legitimate form of spiritual activity -can be recommended and promoted. Classifications are classifications; -and what man really seeks out, what continually enriches the empirical -sciences, is always the history of nature,—the series of facts, which, -as we know, can be distinguished only in an empirical manner from the -history of man, and which along with this constitutes <i>History</i> without -genitive or adjective; history, which cannot even be strictly called -history of the spirit, for the Spirit is, itself, History.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_25" id="Footnote_1_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_25"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See my <i>Essay on Hegel,</i> chap. ix. (<i>What is living, etc., -of Hegel,</i> tr. D. Ainslie).</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IVe" id="IVe">IV</a></h4> - - -<h5>MYTHOLOGISM</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Rupture of the unity of the synthesis a priori. -Mythologism.</i></div> - -<p>When by the severance of subject from predicate, of history from -philosophy, the mutilated subject is given as predicate, mutilated -history as philosophy, and consequently a false predicate is -posited, which predicate is an abstract subject and therefore mere -representation; when this happens, there occurs the opposite error -to that which we have just particularly examined. That was called -philosophism; this might be called historicism; but since this last -term has usually been employed to indicate a form of positivism, it -will be more convenient to call it <i>mythologism.</i></p> - -<p>The process of this error (somewhat abstruse in the way that we have -stated it) becomes clear at once in virtue of the name that has been -assigned to it. Every one has examples of myths present in his memory. -Let us take the myths of Uranus and Gæa, of the seven days of creation, -of the earthly Paradise, and of Prometheus,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span> of Danaë, or of Niobe. -Every one is ready to say of a scientific theory which introduces -causes not demonstrable either in the experience or in thought, that it -is not theory, but mythology, not concept, but myth.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Essence of the myth.</i></div> - -<p>What then is it that is called myth? It is certainly not a simple -poetic and artistic fancy. The myth contains an affirmation or logical -judgment, and precisely for this reason may be considered a hybrid -affirmation, half fanciful and erroneous. If it has been confused with -art, it is not so much a false doctrine of the myth that should be -blamed, as a false æsthetic doctrine, which we have already refuted, -and which fails to recognize the original and ingenuous character of -art. On the other hand, the logical affirmation does not stand to the -myth as something extrinsic, as in the case of a fable or image put -forward to express a given concept, where the difference of the two -terms and the arbitrariness of the relation between them declares -itself more or less openly. In this case there is not myth, but -<i>allegory.</i> In myth, on the contrary, the concept is not separated -from the representation, indeed it is throughout penetrated by it. -Yet the compenetration is not effected in a logical manner, as in the -singular judgment and in the <i>a priori</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span> synthesis. The compenetration -is obtained capriciously, yet it gives itself out as necessary and -logical. For instance, it is desired to explain how sky and earth were -formed, how sea and rivers, plants and animals, men and language arose; -and behold, we are given as explanations, the stories of the marriage -of Uranus and Gæa, and the birth of Chronos and of the other Titans; -or the story of a God Creator, who successively drew all things out of -chaos in seven days, and made man of clay and taught him the names of -things. It is desired to explain the origin of human civilization, and -the tale is told of Prometheus, who steals fire and instructs men in -the arts; or of Adam and Eve, who eat the forbidden fruit, and driven -from the earthly Paradise are forced to till the ground and bathe it -with their sweat. It is desired to explain the astronomical phenomena -of dawn or of winter, and the story is told of Phœbus, who pursues -Daphne, or of the same god who slays one after the other the sons of -Niobe. These naturalistic interpretations may pass as examples, however -contested and antiquated they may be. In place of the concepts which -should illuminate single facts, we are given representations. Hence are -derived what we have called false predicates.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span> Philosophy becomes a -little anecdote, a novelette, a story; history too becomes a story and -ceases to be history, because it lacks the logical element necessary -for its constitution. The true philosophic doctrine in the preceding -cases, for example, will be that of an immanent spirit, of which stars -and sky, earth and sea, plants and animals, constitute the contingent -manifestations; the doctrine which looks upon the consciousness of -good and evil and the necessity for work, not as the result of a theft -made from the gods or of a violation of one of their commands, but -as eternal categories of reality; and which regards language, not as -the teaching of men by a god, but as an essential determination of -humanity, or indeed of spirituality, which is not truly, if it does -not express itself. They will also, if we like, be the philosophic -doctrines of materialism and of evolutionism; but these, in order -to be accepted as philosophic, must prove, like the preceding, that -they do not substitute representations for concepts and are strictly -founded upon thought and employ its method, that is to say, that they -are philosophy and not mythology. For this reason, in philosophical -criticism, adverse philosophies often accuse one another of being -more or less mythological, and we hear of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span> mythology of <i>atoms,</i> -the mythology of <i>chance,</i> the mythology of <i>ether,</i> of the <i>two -substances,</i> of <i>monads,</i> of the <i>blind will,</i> of the <i>Unconscious,</i> -or, if you like, of the mythology of the <i>immanent Spirit.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Problems concerning the theory of myth.</i></div> - -<p>The particular treatment of all the problems that concern the myth does -not belong to this place, where it was important solely to determine -the proper nature of that spiritual formation. It is customary, for -instance, to distinguish between <i>myth</i> and <i>legend,</i> attributing -the first name to stories of universal content, and the second to -stories with an individual and historical content. This partition is -analogous to that between philosophy in the strict sense and history, -and as such, though it possesses no little practical importance, it is -without philosophic value, because, as has been remarked, in myth the -universal becomes history and history becomes legend. Nor is it only -legend of the past, but it extends even to the future, and thus appear -<i>apocalypses,</i> the legend of the <i>Millennium,</i> and <i>eschatology.</i> -Again, myths are usually distinguished as <i>physical</i> and <i>ethical,</i> -and this division is in turn analogous to that between the philosophy -of the external world and the philosophy of the internal world, the -philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span> of nature and the philosophy of the spirit, and stands or -falls with it. So that by this criticism we can solve the disputes as -to whether physical myths precede ethical or inversely, whether the -origin of myth is or is not anthropomorphic, and the like.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Myth and religion. Identity of the two spiritual -formations.</i></div> - -<p>But the myth can assume another name, which makes yet clearer the -knowledge of the logical error of which the analysis has been given: -the name of <i>religion.</i> Mythologism is the <i>religious error.</i> Against -this thesis various objections have been brought, such as that religion -is not theoretical but practical, and has therefore nothing to do -with myth; or that it is something <i>sui generis,</i> or that it is not -exhausted in the myth, since it consists of the complex of all the -activities of the human spirit. But against these objections it must -above all be maintained that religion is a theoretic fact, since -there is no religion <i>without affirmation.</i> The practical activity, -however noble it may be held, is always an operating, a doing, a -producing, and to that extent is mute and alogical. It will be said -that that affirmation is <i>sui generis</i> and goes beyond the limits -of human science. This is most true, if by science we understand -the empirical sciences; but it is not true, if by human science<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span> we -understand philosophy, since philosophy also goes beyond or is outside -the limits of the empirical sciences. It will be said that every -religion is founded upon a <i>revelation,</i> whereas philosophy does not -admit of other revelation than that which the spirit makes to itself -as thought. That too is most true; but the revelation of religion, in -so far as it is not that of the spirit as thought, expresses precisely -the logical contradiction of mythologism: the affirmation of the -universal as mere representation, and this asserted as a universal -truth on the strength of a contingent fact, a communication which -ought to be proved and thought, whereas on the contrary it is taken -capriciously, as a principle of proof and as equivalent or superior to -an act of thought. The theory of religion as a mixture hardly merits -refutation, since that complex of the activities of the spirit is a -metaphor of the spirit in its totality; that is to say, it gives not a -theory of religion, but a new name of the spirit itself,—the object of -philosophic speculation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Religion and philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>Since then, religion is identical with myth, and since myth is not -distinguishable from philosophy by any positive character, but only -as false philosophy from true philosophy and as error<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">[Pg 445]</a></span> from the truth -which rectifies and contains it, we must affirm that religion, in -so far as it is truth, is identical with philosophy, or as can also -be said, <i>that philosophy</i> is the <i>true religion.</i> All ancient and -modern thought about religions, which have always been dissolved in -philosophies, leads to this result. And since philosophy coincides -with history, and religion and the history of religion are the same, -and myth and religion are strictly speaking indistinguishable, we can -see very well the vanity of the attempt that is being made beneath our -eyes to preserve a religion or mythological truth side by side with a -history of religions, which on the contrary is supposed to be practised -with complete mental freedom and with an entirely critical method. -This, which is one of the tendencies of so-called <i>modernism,</i> is -condemned as contradictory and illogical, by philosophy not less than -by the Catholic Church.<a name="FNanchor_1_26" id="FNanchor_1_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_26" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> The history of religions is an integral part -of the history of philosophy, and as inseparable from it as error from -the history of truth.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Conversion of errors into one another. Conversion of -mythologism into philosophism (theology) and of philosophism into -mythologism (mythology of nature, historical apocalypses, etc.).</i></div> - -<p>When religion does not dissolve into philosophy and wishes to persist -together with it, or to substitute itself for philosophy, it reveals -itself as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">[Pg 446]</a></span> effective error; that is to say, as an arbitrary attempt -against truth, due to habit, feelings and individual passions. But -the destiny of every form of error is to be unable to persist before -the light of truth. Hence the constant change of tactics and the -passage of every error into the error from which it had at first -wished to disassociate itself, or into which it did not mean to fall. -Thus æstheticism, dislodged from its positions, takes refuge in -those of empiricism; and empiricism either descends again into pure -sensationalism and æstheticism, or becomes volatilized in mysticism. -Thus (to stop at the case we have before us) mythologism, which intends -to be the opposite of philosophism and to work with blind fancy instead -of with empty concepts, is obliged in order to save itself from the -attacks of criticism to have recourse to philosophism; and religion is -then called <i>theology.</i> Theology is philosophism, because it works with -concepts which are empty of all historical and empirical content. Myth -becomes <i>dogma</i>; the myth of the expulsion from Paradise becomes the -dogma of original sin; the myth of the son of God becomes the dogma of -the incarnation and of the Trinity. Nor must it be thought that for its -part philosophism does not accomplish the opposite transition.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">[Pg 447]</a></span> Every -philosophy of nature ends by appearing as a <i>mythology of nature,</i> -every philosophy of history as an <i>apocalypse.</i> Sometimes even a sort -of revelation occurs in them, and we often find that the unthinkable -connections of concepts constituting those pseudo-philosophies are -obtained and comprehended in virtue of second sight, as the result of a -mental illumination, which is the prerogative of but a few privileged -persons. Finally, philosophism and mythologism embrace one another -and fall embracing into empiricism and into the other forms of error -previously described.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Scepsis.</i></div> - -<p>This perpetual transition from one form of error to another gives rise -to a <i>scepsis,</i> which promotes the reciprocal dissolution of errors, -and scorning illusions and confusions, throws their <i>mental vacuity</i> -into clear light. Such a scepsis fulfils an important function. The -lies of æstheticism, mathematicism, philosophism, mythologism, cannot -resist it. Their little wordy strongholds are broken into; the shadows -are dispersed. Especially against mythologism, which in a certain sense -may be called the most complete negation of thought, a scepsis is -helpful; and owing to the resistance offered here more than elsewhere, -by passions and interests, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">[Pg 448]</a></span> often takes the form of violent satire. -The last great epoch of this strife is what is called the <i>Aufklärung,</i> -Encyclopedism or Voltaireism, and was directed against Christianity, -especially in its Catholic form. We must make so many reservations in -what follows concerning the enlightened Encyclopedist and Voltairean -attitude, that here we feel obliged to indicate explicitly its serious -and fruitful side.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_26" id="Footnote_1_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_26"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See with reference to this G. Gentile, <i>Il modernismo e -l'enciclica, Critica,</i> vi. pp. 208-229.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_449" id="Page_449">[Pg 449]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="Ve" id="Ve">V</a></h4> - -<h5>DUALISM, SCEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Dualism.</i></div> - -<p>Total scepticism can be reached only through <i>dualism,</i> which, in -addition to being a particular error in a given philosophic problem, -is a logical error, consisting in the attempt to affirm two methods of -truth at the same time—the philosophic method and the non-philosophic -method, however the second of these be afterwards determined. Such an -error would not be error but supreme truth, if the various methods -were given each its due post (which is what has been attempted in -this Logic); but it becomes error when the various methods are made -philosophical and placed <i>alongside</i> the philosophical. This is the -error of those conciliatory people, who, unwilling to seek out where -reason stands, admit that reason is operative in all of them, and -divide the kingdom of truth amongst all in equal parts. Thus arise -those logical doctrines which demand for the solution of philosophic -problems, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_450" id="Page_450">[Pg 450]</a></span> successive or contemporaneous application of the -naturalistic method, of mathematics, of historical research, and so -on. At the least they demand the combination of the naturalistic -method (empiricism) with the speculative and the use of what they call -the double criterion of <i>teleology</i> and <i>causality,</i> or of <i>double</i> -causality. To the question, what is reality, they reply with two -methods and consequently offer two concurrent and parallel realities. -Beneath the appearance of treatment and solution, they abandon the -philosophic problem. Instead of conceiving, they describe, and -description is given as concept, and concept as description: hence the -justifiable intervention of the scepsis.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Scepsis and scepticism.</i></div> - -<p>But the scepsis, which clears the ground of all forms of erroneous -logical affirmation, is the negation of error and consequently the -negativity of negativity. The negativity of negativity is affirmation, -and for this reason, the true scepsis, like every true negation, always -contains a positive content in the negative verbal form, which can be -also verbally developed as such. If this positive content, instead of -being developed, is choked in the bud, if instead of negation, which -is also affirmation, a mere negation is given,—an abstract negation, -which destroys without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_451" id="Page_451">[Pg 451]</a></span> constructing, and if this negation claims to -pass as truth, the final form of error is obtained, which is no longer -called scepsis, but <i>scepticism.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mystery.</i></div> - -<p>Scepticism is the proclamation of mystery made in the name of -thought;—a definition the contradictoriness of which leaps to the -eye. It is mortally wounded both by the ancient dilemma against -scepticism and by the <i>cogito</i> of Descartes. Nevertheless, since a -singular tenderness for the idea of mystery seems to have invaded the -contemporary world, it is desirable to leave open no loophole whatever -for misunderstanding. The <i>mystery</i> is <i>life itself,</i> which is an -eternal <i>problem</i> for thought; but this problem would not even be a -problem, if thought did not eternally solve it. For this reason, both -those who consider mystery to be definitely penetrated by thought and -those who consider it impenetrable are equally wrong. The first we -already know: they are the philosophists who reduce reality to pure -terms of abstract thought, by breaking up the <i>a priori</i> synthesis -and by neglecting the historical element, which is ever new and ever -assuming forms not determinable <i>a priori.</i> Thus, they claim to shut -up the world for ever in one single act (maybe in some particular -philosophic system). Through their excessive love of the infinite -they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_452" id="Page_452">[Pg 452]</a></span> make it finite; the sun and the earth and all the stars, the -historical forms of life, and what is called human life, which has -been known for some thousands of years, are transformed by them into -categories of thought, solidified and made eternal. This conception, -which appears (at least as a tendency) in certain parts of the Hegelian -philosophy, is narrow and suffocating. The spirit is superior to all -its manifestations hitherto known, and its power is infinite. It -will never be able to surpass itself, that is to say, its eternal -categories, just as God (according to the best theological doctrines) -could destroy heaven and earth, but not the true and the good, which -are his very essence; yet the spirit is able to surpass, and actually -does surpass, its every contingent incarnation. The world, which is -abstractly assumed to be more or less constant, is all in movement and -becoming. Those who will be raised up to think it will know what worlds -will issue from this world of ours. That we cannot know, for we must -think this world which exists at our moment, and must act on the basis -of it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Critique of the affirmations of mystery in philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>But if the philosophers incur the guilt of arrogance, the sceptics, -who affirm a mystery, that is to say, that reality is impenetrable to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_453" id="Page_453">[Pg 453]</a></span> -thought, fall under the accusation of cowardice. These, when faced with -the problems of the real (soluble, we repeat, by the very fact that -they are problems), avoid the hard work of dominating and penetrating -them, and think it convenient to wrap themselves in abstract negation -and to affirm that <i>mystery is.</i> There is mystery, without doubt; and -this means that there is a problem, something that invokes the light of -thought. And it is a beautiful solution which these mysterious ones and -sceptics offer, for it consists in stating the problem and leaving it -untouched. In the same way, when a man asks for help, we might claim to -have given it to him when we had noticed his request. Charity consists -in hastening to render effective aid, not in noting that aid has been -asked for and then turning the back. To think is to break up the -mystery and to solve the problem, not simply to recognize that there is -a problem and a mystery, and to renounce seeking the solution as though -it had already been given and the matter settled by that recognition.</p> - -<p>It seems strange that it should be necessary to explain these -elementary concepts; yet in our time it is necessary, so much have -those concepts been darkened for historical reasons, which it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_454" id="Page_454">[Pg 454]</a></span> would -take long to expound here, and which can all of them be summarized -as due to a certain moral weakening. And it may be opportune here to -give a warning (since we are dealing with a theme that belongs to -the elementary school of philosophy) that to inculcate the courage -to confront and to solve the problem and to conquer the mystery, is -not to counsel the neglect of difficulties, or superficiality and -arrogance. Mysteries are covered and must continually be covered -by their own shadows; problems torment and must torment, yet it is -only through these shadows and by means of those torments that we -attain to momentary repose in the true; and only thus does repose not -become sloth, but the restoration of our forces to resume the eternal -journey. Superficiality, arrogance, neglect of difficulties, belong -to the sceptics who deafen themselves with words and contrive to live -at their ease in their abstract negation. True thinkers suffer, but -do not flee from pain. "<i>Et iterum ecce turbatio</i> (groans St. Anselm -amid the anxious vicissitudes of his meditations), <i>ecce iterum obviat -maeror et luctus quaerenti gaudium et laetitiam. Sperabat jam anima -mea satietatem, et ecce iterum obruitur egestate. Conabar assurgere -ad lucem Dei, et recidi in tenebras meas: immo non modo<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_455" id="Page_455">[Pg 455]</a></span> cecidi in -eas, sed sentio me involutum in eis...."</i><a name="FNanchor_1_27" id="FNanchor_1_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_27" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Such words as these are -the pessimistic lyric of the thinker. Sceptics create no such lyric, -because they have cut the desire at the root. They are as a rule -blissfully calm and smiling.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Agnosticism as a particular form of scepticism.</i></div> - -<p>There is a form of scepticism which would like to appear critical and -refined and which takes the name of <i>agnosticism.</i> It is a scepticism -limited to ultimate things, to profound reality, to the essence of -the world, which amounts to saying that it is limited to the supreme -principles of philosophy. Now, since the principles of philosophy are -all equally supreme, such agnostic scepticism extends its affirmation -of mystery over neither more nor less than the whole of philosophy and -consequently over the whole of human knowledge. Its limits would be -nothing less than the boundaries of knowledge. Indeed, agnosticism is -the spiritual fulfilment sought by all those who negate philosophy, -such as æstheticists, mathematicians, and especially empiricists; and -agnostics and empiricists are ordinarily so closely connected that the -one name is almost synonymous with the other.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mysticism.</i></div> - -<p>The sceptical error, which consists in stating the problem as -solution and mystery as truth, can give way to another mode of error, -in which the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_456" id="Page_456">[Pg 456]</a></span> very affirmation of scepticism is denied and it is -recognized that thought cannot explicitly state mystery. But this -recognition, which would imply that of the authority of thought, is -strangely combined with the most precise negation of such authority. -Thought being excluded, either affirmatively or negatively, as in the -self-contradiction of scepticism, what remains is life, no longer -a problem, or a solution of a problem, but just life, life lived. -To affirm that truth is life lived, reality directly felt in us as -part of us and we part of it, is the pretension of <i>mysticism.</i> -This is the last general form of error that can be thought; and its -self-contradiction is evident from the genetic process which we have -already expounded. Mysticism affirms, when no affirmation is permitted -to it; and it is yet more gravely contradictory than scepticism, which, -though forbidding to itself logical affirmation, does not forbid -itself speech, that is to say, æsthetic expression. To mysticism not -even words can be permissible, because mysticism, being life and not -contemplation, practice and not theory, is by definition <i>dumbness.</i> -But we shall say no more of mysticism, having had occasion to refer to -it, as also to æstheticism and empiricism, at the beginning of this -treatise on Logic.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_457" id="Page_457">[Pg 457]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Errors in the other parts of philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>When we consider these errors more closely, it is easy to see that -dualism, scepticism, and mysticism manifest themselves not only in the -forms of thought, in philosophy as Logic, but also in all the other -particular philosophic problems, distinct from those that are peculiar -to Logic, and in the errors due to them. The complete enumeration of -these and their concrete determination would (as has already been said) -require the development of the whole philosophic system, and therefore -cannot all be contained in the present treatise. Indeed, they take -their name, not from the forms of the spirit, with which the logical -form is confused, or from the internal mutilation of the logical form, -but from the confusion and mutilation of the remaining spiritual forms. -They are no longer called æstheticism, mathematicism, or philosophism, -but ethical utilitarianism, moral abstractionism, æsthetic logicism, -sensationalism and hedonism, practical intellectualism, metaphysical -dualism or pluralism, optimism and pessimism, and so on. It is not -those who, as in the previous instances, deny philosophy itself, that -fall into such errors, but those who admit it and carry it out more or -less badly in its other parts. Without the admission of the method of -philosophic thought, and without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_458" id="Page_458">[Pg 458]</a></span> the assertion of a concept, it is -impossible to conceive logical usurpations in the domain of another -concept, which is not less necessary than the first to the fulness and -unity of the real.</p> - -<p><i>Ethical utilitarianism,</i> for instance, thinks the concept of -utilitarian practical activity; but its fallacy consists in arbitrarily -maintaining that the concept of utility altogether exhausts that of -the practical activity, thus negating the other concept distinct from -it, the practical moral activity. <i>Moral abstractionism</i> commits -the opposite error, affirming the moral activity, but negating the -utilitarian. <i>Æsthetic logicism</i> rightly affirms the reality of the -logical mental form, but is wrong in not recognizing the intuitive -mental form and in considering it to be resolved in the logical -form. Æsthetic <i>sensationalism,</i> directing its attention to crude -and unexpressed sensation, emphasises the necessary precedent of the -æsthetic activity, but then makes of the condition the conditioned, -defining art as sensation. Æsthetic <i>hedonism, utilitarianism or -practicism,</i> is true in so far as it notes the practical and hedonistic -envelope of the æsthetic activity; but it becomes false in so far as -it takes the envelope for the content, and treats art as a mere fact -of pleasure and pain. <i>Practical intellectualism</i> perceives that the -will is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_459" id="Page_459">[Pg 459]</a></span> not possible without a cognitive basis, but by exaggerating -this, it ends by destroying the originality of the practical spiritual -form, and reduces it to a complex of concepts and reasonings. In like -manner, <i>metaphysical dualism</i> avails itself of the difference between -the concept of reality as spirit and that of reality as nature, the -one arising from logical thought, the other from an empirical and -naturalistic method of treatment, in order to transmute them into -concepts of two distinct forms of reality itself, as spirit and matter, -internal and external world, and so on. <i>Pluralism</i> or monadism, -confounding the individuality of acts with the substantiality which -belongs to the universal subject, makes entities of single acts and -turns them into a multiplicity of simple substances. <i>Pessimism</i> and -<i>optimism,</i> each one availing itself of an abstract element of reality, -which is the unity of opposites, maintain that reality is all evil and -suffering, or all goodness and joy. This process of exemplification -could be carried much further, and would become, as we see, a deduction -of all philosophical concepts and errors.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Conversion of these errors with one another and with -logical errors.</i></div> - -<p>Now, each one of those false solutions, obeying the law of errors, -is obliged, in order to maintain itself, to pass into that from -which it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_460" id="Page_460">[Pg 460]</a></span> was distinguished, and then to pass back again from that -to this. Thus utilitarianism becomes abstract morality and abstract -morality utilitarianism. Hence the work of scepsis and the consequent -appearance of a <i>particular scepticism of this or that concept.</i> Ethics -having vainly struggled with the alternate negations, of utility and -of morality, ends in <i>ethical scepticism;</i> Æsthetic torn between -sensationalism and utilitarianism and logicism, and other errors, and -destroying them all with its scepsis, ends in <i>Æsthetic scepticism</i>; -Metaphysics, torn between materialism, abstract spiritualism, -dualism, pluralism, pessimism, optimism, and other erroneous views, -ends in <i>metaphysical scepticism.</i> And to these errors of particular -scepticism, errors of <i>particular mysticism</i> soon succeed. Thus we hear -it said that there is no concept of the beautiful, as there is of the -true or the good, but that it is only felt and lived; or, again, that -there is no possible definition of what is good, since it concerns a -thing that must be left to sentiment and to life; or, finally, that -thought has value within the limits that abstraction has value, but -that it is impotent before complete reality, because life alone is -capable of comprehending reality, by receiving it into its very bosom.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_461" id="Page_461">[Pg 461]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the other hand, it is not possible that any æstheticism, empiricism, -mathematicism, philosophism, mythologism, or logicism whatever, should -remain limited to a determinate philosophic concept without coming -in contact with others, because those forms of error strike at the -logical form of thought itself, and therefore equally at all other -philosophic concepts. The ethical or æsthetic empiricist, for instance, -must logically affirm a general philosophic empiricism if he does not -wish to correct himself by contradicting himself (an hypothesis which -must be neglected and left to be understood in this consideration of -the simple, elementary, fundamental, or <i>necessary</i> forms of error). -He who in a particular philosophic problem has committed a confusion -of concepts, and has thence arrived at a particular scepticism and -mysticism, is led by the systematic and unitary character of philosophy -to widen that mysticism and scepticism from particular to general. From -this general mysticism and scepticism, he is led to return gradually to -mythologism, philosophism, empiricism, and to the other negations of -the logical form of philosophy. Everything is connected in philosophy -and everything is connected in error, which is the negation of -philosophy.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_27" id="Footnote_1_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_27"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Proslog.,</i> c. 18.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_462" id="Page_462">[Pg 462]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIe" id="VIe">VI</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE ORDER OF ERRORS AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Necessary character of the forms of errors. Their definite -number.</i></div> - -<p>Everything is connected in errors; error has its necessary forms. -This implies, in the first place, that the possible forms of errors, -the logical forms of the illogical, are <i>so many</i> and <i>no more.</i> -Indeed, the forms of the spirit or concepts of reality, which can -be arbitrarily combined, can be stated as a finite number (where -the process of numbering can be applied to them). Consequently, -the arbitrary combinations or errors which arise from them can -also be similarly numbered. Only the individual forms of error are -infinite, and that for the same reason which we have already given, -as the individual forms of truth are infinite. Problems are always -historically conditioned, and the solutions are conditioned in the same -way; even false solutions, which are determined by feelings, passions, -and interests, also vary according to historical conditions.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Their logical order.</div> - -<p>In the second place, and as corollary to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_463" id="Page_463">[Pg 463]</a></span> preceding thesis, the -possible forms of errors present a necessary order; and this, because -the forms of the spirit or the concepts of reality stand in a necessary -order to one another. They cannot be placed after or before one another -nor changed at will. This necessary order is, as we know, a genetic -order of degrees, and consequently the possible forms of errors -constitute a series of degrees. It is commonly said that <i>error has -its logic,</i> and we must say more correctly, that it cannot constitute -itself as error, save by borrowing logical character from truth.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Examples of this order in the various parts of philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>This is already clearly seen in the exposition given of the forms of -logical error, and more clearly still when, resuming, we consider -that the spirit, when it rebels against the concept, must by this -very act affirm the term which is distinct from the concept, whether -it be called representation, intuition, or pure sensation. Hence the -necessity of the form of error (in a certain sense the first), which is -<i>æstheticism,</i>—the affirmation of truth as pure sensation. Below this -stage, the spirit can descend to annul the problem in <i>dualism;</i> or, -going further and abandoning affirmation, it may fall into scepticism; -or, finally, abandoning even expression, it may fall into <i>dumbness,</i> -or <i>mysticism,</i> which is the lowest degree. Above<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_464" id="Page_464">[Pg 464]</a></span> æstheticism it -can raise itself to try to take refuge in <i>empiricism,</i> in which -is posited a universal, but one that is merely representative and, -therefore, a false universal. It is the second step, nor can any other -be conceived as second:—we must give a false value either to the pure -representation (æstheticism);—or (taking the second step), to the -representation and the concept together, as is the case in the form of -the empirical concept (empiricism). The third step is the desperate -escape from the insufficiency of the empirical concept, by means of the -abstract concept, which guarantees the universality which the other -lacks, but gives an empty universality (mathematicism). Finding no -refuge in this emptiness from the objections of its adversaries, it is -obliged finally to enter philosophy. But the erring spirit continues -its work in philosophy itself and, once it has taken possession, abuses -it. Now it is not possible to abuse philosophy, save by reducing it -either to a concept without intuition, which is nevertheless taken as a -synthesis of concept and intuition (<i>philosophism</i>); or to an intuition -without concept, which, in its turn, is taken as the requisite -synthesis <i>(mythologism).</i> The result of all this process is always the -renunciation of the philosophic problem, disguised by the admission of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_465" id="Page_465">[Pg 465]</a></span> -the double method (dualism), and hence the descent below the logical -form, either with the affirmation which denies itself (scepticism), -or, again, with that which denies even the possibility of expression -(mysticism) and returns to life, which is not a problem at all, being -life lived.</p> - -<p>The same thing occurs with the other errors, when we refer to the other -concepts of the spirit or of reality, although we shall not be able to -give the complete series without summarizing the whole of philosophy, -which is not necessary here, and by its excessive concentration and -extreme brevity would be obscure. Suffice it to say, by way of example, -that the ethical problem, besides being negated by means of erroneous -sensationalist, empiricist, and mycologist solutions, and so on (to -which, in common with all philosophic problems, it is subject), can -be negated by practical intellectualism, which does not recognize a -practical problem side by side with that of the theoretic spirit, -and reduces virtue to knowledge. Hence <i>ethical intellectualism.</i> -Since ethical intellectualism cannot resist objections, it is obliged -to introduce at least the slightest practical element that can be -admitted, which is that of individual utility, and resolving morality -into this, it then presents itself as <i>ethical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_466" id="Page_466">[Pg 466]</a></span> utilitarianism.</i> -This in its turn, finding itself in contradiction with the peculiar -character of morality, which goes beyond individual utility, arranges -to recognize and to substitute for the first a super-individual -utility, which is the universal practical value or morality. And thus, -by negating the first on account of the second concept, it presents -itself as <i>moralism</i> or <i>ethical abstractionism.</i> The impossibility of -negating both the first and the second, and the necessity of affirming -both, urge the acceptance of the final form of <i>practical dualism,</i> -in which utility and morality appear as co-ordinated or juxtaposed. -Each one of these arbitrary doctrines is critical of the others, -and, by its internal contradictions, of itself. Hence the fall into -scepticism and mysticism. The circle of error can be traversed again, -but it is impossible to alter the place that each of those forms has -in the circle, by placing, for instance, practical dualism before -utilitarianism or intellectualism after moralism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Spirit of error and spirit of search.</i></div> - -<p>There is no gradual issuing from the infernal circle of error, and -salvation from it is not possible, save by entering at one stroke into -the celestial circle of truth, in which alone the mind rests satisfied -as in its kingdom. The spirit that <i>errs</i> or flees from the light must -be converted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_467" id="Page_467">[Pg 467]</a></span> into the spirit of <i>search,</i> that longs for the light; -pride must yield to humility; narrow love for one's own abstract -individuality become wider and elevate itself to an austere love, to -an unlimited devotion toward that which surpasses the individual, thus -becoming an "heroic fury," the "<i>amor Dei intellectualis.</i>"</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Immanence of error in truth.</i></div> - -<p>In this act of love and fervour the spirit becomes pure thought and -attains to the true, is indeed transmuted into the true. But as spirit -of truth it possesses truth and also its contrary transfigured in -that. The possessing of a concept is the possession of it in all its -relations, and so are possessed all the modes in which that concept can -be wrongly altered by error. For instance, the true concept of moral -activity is also the concept of utilitarianism, of abstractionism, -of practical dualism, and so on. The two series of knowledge, that -of the true and that of its contrary, are, in truth, inseparable, -because they really constitute one single series. The concept is -affirmation-negation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Erroneous distinction between possession of and search for -truth.</i></div> - -<p>It will be said that this is perhaps exact in the case of the -<i>possession</i> of truth, but not in that of the <i>search</i> for it, where -the two series may well appear disunited. Truth, to one who searches, -is at the top of the staircase of errors, and as it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_468" id="Page_468">[Pg 468]</a></span> is possible to -climb a great part of the staircase without reaching what is at the -top of it, so when once the desired place has been reached, it is -possible not to see or not to remember the staircase that is below. But -the possession of truth is never static, as in general no real fact -is static. The possession of and the search for truth are the same. -When it seems that a truth is possessed in a static way and almost -solidified, if we observe closely we shall see that the word expressing -it, the sound of it, has remained, but the spirit has flown away. That -truth was, but is no longer thought, and so is not truth. It will be -truth only when it is thought anew, and thinking and thinking anew are -the same, since each rethinking is a new act of thought. In thinking -the truth is search for truth; it is a most rapid ideal motion which, -starting from the centre, runs through all the possibilities of error, -and only in so far as it runs through and rejects them all does it find -itself at its centre, which is the centre of motion.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The search for truth in the practical sense of preparation -for thought; and the series of errors.</i></div> - -<p>In order to separate truth from the search for truth this latter -must be understood, not as the will for thought and so as thought in -action, but as the <i>will which lays down the conditions for thought,</i> -the will which prepares itself for thought,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_469" id="Page_469">[Pg 469]</a></span> but does not yet think -effectually. This indeed is the usual meaning of the word "search." To -search is to stimulate oneself for thinking, by employing opportune -means for that purpose. And there is no more opportune means than that -of confronting one with another the various forms of the spirit and the -various concepts; because in the course of that confrontation there is -produced the true combination; that is to say, thought, which is truth, -is aroused. To search means therefore to <i>run through the series of -errors.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Transfiguration, in the search thus understood, of error -into suggestion or hypothesis.</i></div> - -<p>But the seeker sets to work in quite a different spirit from that of -the assertor of errors. The spirit of research is not the rebel erring -spirit, and therefore the path that both follow is only the same in -appearance; the first was the path of errors, but the second can only -be so called by metaphor. Errors are errors when there is the will for -error. Where, on the other hand, there is the will to unify material -and to prepare the conditions of thought, the improper combination -of ideas is not indeed error, but <i>suggestion</i> or <i>hypothesis.</i> The -hypothesis is not an act of truth, because either it is not verified -and so reveals itself as without truth, or it is verified and becomes -truth only at the moment in which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_470" id="Page_470">[Pg 470]</a></span> it is verified. But neither is it -an act of error, because it is affirmed, not as truth, but as simple -means or aid toward the conquest of truth. In the doctrine of search, -the series of errors is all redeemed, baptized, or blessed anew; the -diabolic spirit abandons it precipitately, leaving it void of truth, -but innocent.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction between error as error and error as -hypothesis.</i></div> - -<p>The distinction between error as <i>error</i> and error as <i>suggestion,</i> -between <i>error</i> and <i>hypothesis</i> or heuristic expedients, is of -capital importance. It is found as basis of some common distinctions, -such as those between <i>mistake</i> and <i>error,</i> between error committed -in <i>good faith</i> and error committed in <i>bad faith,</i> and the like. -These and others like them show themselves to be certainly untenable, -because error as error is always in bad faith, and there is no -difference between error and mistake, save an empirical difference, -or a difference of verbal emphasis, for it can be said according to -empirical accidents that an affirmation is either simply erroneous or -altogether a mistake. But although they cannot be maintained as they -are formulated, they nevertheless suggest the desirability and the -anticipation of this true and profound distinction.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Immanence of the suggestion in error itself as error.</i></div> - -<p>On the other hand, error and suggestion, error and heuristic procedure, -since they have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_471" id="Page_471">[Pg 471]</a></span> in common the practical, extrinsic, and improper -combination of ideas, stand in this relation to one another, that -the suggestion is not error, but <i>error always contains in itself -willingly or unwillingly a suggestion.</i> The erring spirit, though -without intending it, prepares the material for the search for truth. -It means to evade that search or to bring it to an arbitrary end; but -in doing so it breaks up the clods of earth, throws them about, ploughs -and fertilizes the field where the truth will sprout. Thus it happens -that many combinations of ideas, proposed and maintained through -caprice and vanity with the lawyer's object of scoring his point, or -of shining and astonishing with paradox, or for pastime and for other -utilitarian reasons, have been adopted by more serious spirits as steps -in the progress of research. The enemies of the truth not only testify -to the truth but come to serve it themselves, through the unforeseen -consequences of their work. A sort of gratitude comes over us at times -and makes us tender toward these adversaries of the truth, because we -feel that from them has come the stimulus to obtain it, as from them -come the strengthening of our hold upon it and the inspiration, the -clear-sightedness, and the warmth of the defence of it that we make -against them.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_472" id="Page_472">[Pg 472]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Individuals and error.</i></div> - -<p>But it is not necessary in yielding to the generous feeling for human -fraternity to exaggerate in this last direction. The gratitude that we -feel is not deserved by them; at the most, it is God or the universal -spirit or Providence who deserves it. They did not wish to serve the -truth and did not serve it, save through consequences which are not -their work. One-sided and abstract optimism has intruded here also; -and perceiving in error the element of suggestion, it has altogether -cancelled the category of error in favour of that of suggestion and -has pronounced that man always seeks the true, as he always wills the -good. Certainly; but there is the man who stops at his individual -good, <i>fruges consumere natus</i>; and there is the man who progresses -to the universal good. There is the man who combines words to give -himself and others the illusion of knowing what he does not know and -of being able to attend to his own pleasures without further trouble; -and there is the man who combines words with anxious soul and spirit -intent, <i>venator medii,</i> a hunter of the concept. Here, too, the truth -is neither in the optimism nor in the pessimism, but in the doctrine, -which conciliates and surpasses them both. Nor does it matter that -owing to the defect of abstract<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_473" id="Page_473">[Pg 473]</a></span> optimism that very philosopher, -who did more than any other to reveal the hidden richness of the -dialectical principle, was not able to look deeply into the problem of -error.</p> - -<p>The conscience of humanity well understood knows how to do justice to -all men, without, on that account, confounding him who seeks with him -who errs, the man of good will with the utilitarian. It does justice -to them, because in every man, indeed at every instant in the life -of every man, it discovers all those various spiritual moments, both -inferior and superior. Error and the search for truth are continually -intertwined. Sometimes a beginning is made with research, and it ends -with an obstinate persistence in the suggestion that has been made, -which is converted into a result and an erroneous affirmation. At -others a beginning is made, with the deliberate intention of escaping -difficulties by means of some sort of a combination of ideas; and that -combination arouses the mind and becomes a suggestion for research, -which is followed until peace is found in the truth. Each one of us is -at every moment in danger of yielding to laziness and to the seduction -of error and has hope of shaking off that laziness and following the -attraction of truth. We fall and rise up again at every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_474" id="Page_474">[Pg 474]</a></span> instant; we -are weak and strong, cowardly and courageous. When we call another weak -and cowardly, we are condemning ourselves; when we admire another as -strong and courageous, we idolize the strength and courage which is -active within us. When we are in the presence of a complex product, -as, for example, a faith, a doctrine, a book, it would be naïve and -fallacious to look upon it as only error or as only suggestion. For -it is both the one and the other; that is to say, it contains equally -the moments of error properly so-called, and the other moments of -suggestion and search; the voluntary interposition of obstacles to the -truth and the voluntary removal of such obstacles; the disfigured image -of the truth and the outline of the truth. Sometimes we are unable -to say of ourselves whether we are erring or are seeking, whether we -believe that we have found the whole truth or only discovered a ray -of it. The logical criticism which implacably condemns us seems to be -unjust, although we cannot contest its arguments which impose the truth -upon our thought. We feel that that truth was in a way sought, seen -for a moment, and almost possessed in that spiritual state of ours, -which has been summarily and abruptly condemned by others as altogether -erroneous.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_475" id="Page_475">[Pg 475]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The double aspect of errors.</i></div> - -<p>For this reason even that which has been rejected and blamed as false -from one point of view must be accepted and honoured from another as -an approach to truth. Empiricism is perverse in so far as it is a -construction opposed to the philosophic universal, but it is innocuous -and indeed beneficial in so far as it is an attempt to rise from -pure sensation and representation to the thinking of the universal. -Scepticism as error annuls the theoretic life; but as suggestion it -is necessary to the demonstration of the impossibility of dwelling in -that desert when all false doctrines have been annulled. Mythologism -presents this double aspect in a yet clearer manner; religion is the -negation of thought, but it is also in another aspect a preparation -for thought; the myth is both a travesty and a sketch of the concept; -hence every philosophy feels itself adverse to myth and born from -myth, an <i>enemy</i> and a <i>daughter</i> of religions. In what is empirically -defined as religion or as a body of religious doctrines, for example, -in Christianity, in its myths and in its theology, there is so much of -truth and suggestion of truth that it is possible to affirm (always -from the empirical point of view) the superiority of that religion -over a well-reasoned but poor, a correct but sterile philosophy.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_476" id="Page_476">[Pg 476]</a></span> -Nevertheless, a period of reverence, of attentive harkening, of -philosophic study and criticism, which is not pure scepticism, -succeeds to a period of encyclopædism, of irreligious scepticism, of -enlightenment, and of Voltaireism. Those who in the nineteenth or in -this twentieth century have repeated the Voltairean scepticism and have -jibed at religion have with good reason been considered superficial of -intellect and soul, vulgar and trivial people. The philosophy of the -eighteenth century has filled and filled well the office of enemy of -religion; that of the nineteenth century has disdained to give blows -to the dead and has adopted towards religion the attitude of a pious -daughter and diligent heir. For our part we are persuaded that the -inheritance of religion has not been well and thoroughly utilized. -This inheritance is at bottom indistinguishable from the philosophic -inheritance, for is there not religion, in, for instance, the Cartesian -idea of God, which unifies the two substances and guarantees with its -truth the certainty of our knowledge? And is it not also philosophy, -that is to say, the concept (in however gross a form), of the immanent -Spirit which is a self-distinguishing unity and certainty of itself?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_477" id="Page_477">[Pg 477]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Last form of the methodological error; Hypothesism.</i></div> - -<p>We have now attained to the theory of research, yet we cannot abandon -the survey of the necessary forms of error without mentioning a new -form which arises precisely from the confusion between truth and the -search for the conditions preparatory to truth, between truth and -hypothesis. This error, which converts Heuristic into Logic, may be -called <i>hypothesism.</i> It asserts that in regard to truth man can do -nothing more than propose hypotheses, which are said to be more or -less probable, so that his fate is not dissimilar to the punishments -which were assigned to Tantalus, Sisyphus, and the Danaids. But in the -kingdom of the True, differently from that of Erebus:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;"> -The birds do not feed,<br /> -The wheels do not turn,<br /> -The stone is not rolled up the high mountain,<br /> -Nor water drawn with the sieve from the fountain.<br /> -</p> - -<p>The hypothesis is made, because it serves toward the attainment of the -truth; did it not serve this end it would not be made. The spirit does -not admit waste of time; for it time is always money. Hypothesism is -sometimes restricted to the supreme principles of the real, or to what -is called metaphysics, which would thus be always hypothetical; but for -the reasons given in our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_478" id="Page_478">[Pg 478]</a></span> discussion of agnosticism, if the principles -of the real were hypothetical, the whole truth would be so, that is to -say, there would not be any truth. For the rest, hypothesism, besides -being internally contradictory, openly reveals that it is so, in -its reference to the greater or lesser <i>probability</i> of hypotheses. -It would be impossible to determine the degree of approximation to -the true without presupposing a criterion of truth, a truth and -consequently the truth. We should hardly have made mention of this -error did it not constitute the fulcrum of some of the most celebrated -and revered philosophies of our times.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_479" id="Page_479">[Pg 479]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIIe" id="VIIe">VII</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ERROR AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Inseparability of the phenomenology of error from the -philosophic system. </i></div> - -<p>The phenomenology of error, in its double sense of error and of -suggestion, coincides therefore with the philosophic system. Both -error and suggestion are improper combinations of philosophic ideas or -concepts. To determine these improper combinations is equivalent to -showing the <i>obverse</i> of that of which the philosophic system is the -<i>face.</i> But face and obverse are not separable, for they constitute a -single thought (and single reality), which is positivity-negativity, -affirmation-negation. There is, therefore, no phenomenology of error -outside the philosophic system, nor a philosophic system outside the -phenomenology of error; the one is conceived at the moment when the -other is conceived. And since the philosophic system and the doctrine -of the categories are the same, the phenomenology<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_480" id="Page_480">[Pg 480]</a></span> of error is -inseparable and indistinguishable from the doctrine of the categories.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The eternal going and coming of errors.</i></div> - -<p>As such the phenomenology of error is an ideal and eternal circle, like -the eternal circle of the truth. Its stages are eternally traversed and -retraversed by the spirit, being the stages of the spirit itself. At -every instant of the life of history and of our individual life there -are represented the stages that have been surpassed and must again be -surpassed: the lower stages return and announce beforehand the higher.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Returns to anterior philosophies, and their meaning.</i></div> - -<p>In this lies the origin of a fact which cannot fail to attract -attention in the history of philosophy: the tendency which is found -there, to <i>return</i> to one or other of the philosophies of the past, or, -more correctly, to one or other of the philosophic points of view of -the past. The thirteenth century returned to Aristotle, the Renaissance -to Plato; Bruno revived the philosophy of Cusanus, Gassendi that of -Epicurus; Hegel wished to renew Heraclitus; Herbart, Parmenides; -in recent times a return has been made to Kant, and in times yet -more recent to Hegel. These are spiritual movements, which must be -understood in all their seriousness. This consists wholly in the need -of the philosophic spirit of a certain moment, which, struggling with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_481" id="Page_481">[Pg 481]</a></span> -an error, discovers the true concept with which it should be corrected, -or at least, the superior and more ample suggestion, to which we -must pass in order to progress. And since that concept or suggestion -had already been represented in an eminent degree in the past by one -particular philosopher, or by one particular school, they speak of the -necessity of again asserting the superiority of that philosopher and -his school against other philosophers and other schools. In reality -neither Aristotle nor Plato returns, nor Cusanus nor Epicurus, nor -Heraclitus nor Parmenides, nor Kant nor Hegel; but only the mental -positions of which these names are, in those cases, the symbols. The -eternal Platonism, Aristotelianism, Heracliteanism, Eleaticism are in -us, as they were formerly in Plato and in Aristotle, in Heraclitus and -in Parmenides. Divested of those historical names, they are called -transcendentalism and immanentism, evolutionism and anti-evolutionism, -and so on. To the philosophers of the past, as men of the past, no -return is made, because <i>no return is possible.</i> The past lives in the -present and the pretence of returning to it is equivalent to that of -destroying the present, in which alone it lives. Those who understand -<i>ideal</i> returns in this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_482" id="Page_482">[Pg 482]</a></span> <i>empirical</i> sense, do not in truth know what -they are saying.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The false idea of a history of philosophy as the history of -the successive appearances in time of the categories and of errors.</i></div> - -<p>But just because the phenomenology of error and the system of the -categories are outside time, we must also recognize the fallacy of a -history of philosophy which expounds the development of philosophic -thought as a successive appearance in time of the various philosophic -categories and of the various forms of error. On this view the human -race seems to begin to think truly philosophically at a definite moment -of time and at a definite point of space; for example at a definite -year of the seventh or sixth century before Christ, at a definite -point of Asia Minor, with Thales, who surpassing mere fancy posits as -a philosophic concept the empirical concept of water; or in another -year and place, with Parmenides, who posits the first pure concept, -that of being. And it seems further to progress in philosophic thinking -with other thinkers, each of whom either discovers a concept or offers -a suggestion of one. Thus each takes the other's hand and they form -a chain which is prolonged to one who, more audacious and fortunate -than the others, gives his hand to the first, and unites them all in -a circle. After this, there would remain nothing else to do but to -dance eternally,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_483" id="Page_483">[Pg 483]</a></span> as the stars dance in the imaginations of the poets, -without any further necessity to devise suggestions and to risk falling -into error. All this is brilliant but arbitrary. The categories are -outside time, because they are all and singly in every instant of -time, and therefore they cannot be divided and impersonated within -empirical and individual limits. It is not true that each philosophic -system has for its beginning a particular category or a particular -suggestion. A philosophic system, in the empirical signification of -the word, is a series of thoughts whose unity is the empirical bond of -the life of a definite individual. It is therefore without beginning, -since it does not constitute a true unity and refers on the one hand -to its predecessors, on the other to those who continue it, and on all -sides to its contemporaries. In the strict sense, in that system, in -so far as it is philosophic, there is always the whole of philosophy; -and therefore, as we have previously seen, all philosophic systems -(including materialism and scepticism) have, whether they admit it -or not, displayed or implied the same principle, which is the pure -concept, and every philosophy is idealism. Nor is it true that there is -progress in the history of philosophy, in the sense of the passage from -one category to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_484" id="Page_484">[Pg 484]</a></span> another superior category, or from one suggestion to -another superior suggestion. Speaking empirically, we should have in -this case to admit regress also, because it is a fact that a return is -made to inferior categories and suggestions. Philosophically, we can -speak in this case, neither of progress nor of regress, seeing that -those categories and suggestions are eternal and outside time.</p> - -<p>Finally, this conception of philosophic history itself declares its -untenability, since in its last term it is logically obliged to posit a -definitive philosophy (which is that represented by him who constructs -such a history of philosophy), whereas there is nothing definitive -in reality, which is perpetual development. Those very historians of -philosophy themselves, who have desired and in part attempted to give -actuality to that conception, have been perplexed at the assumption of -so great a responsibility as to proclaim a <i>definitive philosophy,</i> -that is to say, to decree the retirement of Thought and so of Reality.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophism both of this false view and of the formula -concerning the identity of philosophy and history of philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>The error which appears in this conception of philosophic history, is -the same that we have already studied under the name of philosophism, -and which appears here in one of its special applications. The formula -of the error is the <i>identity of Philosophy with the History of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_485" id="Page_485">[Pg 485]</a></span> -philosophy.</i> The sense in which this is meant is at once shown by the -tendency which exists in this identity of the two terms, to be enlarged -into a third term, that is to say, into the recognition of the identity -of philosophy and of the history of philosophy with the <i>Philosophy -of history.</i> And this Philosophy of philosophic history, like every -philosophy of history, converts representations and empirical concepts -into pure concepts assigning to each one the function which properly -belongs to the categories, corrupting philosophy and history and -becoming shipwrecked in a sort of mythologism and propheticism.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Distinction between this false idea of a history of -philosophy and the books that are so entitled or profess a like -programme.</i></div> - -<p>But, as in the case of the philosophy of history in general, so also in -this application of it to the history of philosophy, it is necessary -to recognize the elements of truth. These lie in the works of genius -in <i>historical characterization,</i> which under this guise have been -achieved by various thinkers and in various epochs of philosophy. -Certainly Plato is not only transcendental, nor is Aristotle only -immanentist; nor Kant only agnostic, nor Hegel only logical, nor -Epicurus only materialist, nor Descartes only dualist; nor is Greek -thought concerned only with objectivity, nor modern thought with -subjectivity alone. But history takes shape as historical narrative, -by noting the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_486" id="Page_486">[Pg 486]</a></span> prominent traits of the various individuals and of the -various epochs. Without this process it would be impossible to divide, -to summarize, or to record it; without the introduction of empirical -concepts, history could not be fixed in the memory.<a name="FNanchor_1_28" id="FNanchor_1_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_28" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> By means of -those characterizations, it also happens that historical names can be -taken as symbols of truths and errors: all the crudity of dualism is -expressed in Descartes, the paradox of determinism in Spinoza, that of -abstract pluralism in Leibnitz. We owe (as is admitted by all those -competent to judge) the elevation of the history of philosophy from a -chronicle or an erudite collection to history properly so-called, to -historians of philosophy who were tainted with phiiosophism. And since -Hegel was the first and greatest of those historians, we must impute to -Hegel the arbitrary act that he committed, but also the merit of having -been the first to give a history of philosophy worthy of the name -and accord to him all the more merit, in so far as he almost always -corrected in execution the errors of his original plan.<a name="FNanchor_2_29" id="FNanchor_2_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_29" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Exact formula: identity of philosophy and of history.</i></div> - -<p>This original plan (and in general the position taken up by the system -of Hegel) may perhaps<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_487" id="Page_487">[Pg 487]</a></span> be considered as a deviation and aberration -from a just impulse, which still awaits its legitimate satisfaction. -This satisfaction we have attempted to give, by going deeply into the -meaning of the Kantian <i>a priori</i> synthesis and by establishing the -identity of philosophy and history. Thus, as regards the question at -issue, the formula that we oppose to Hegel's formula of the identity -of <i>philosophy and history of philosophy,</i> is that of the identity -of <i>philosophy and history.</i> This difference may at first sight seem -non-existent or very slight, but yet it is substantial. Philosophy is -indeed identical with history, because by solving historical problems -it affirms itself, and is in this way identical with the history of -philosophy, not because this is separable from other histories, or has -precedence over them, but for precisely the contrary reason, that it -is altogether inseparable from and completely fused in the totality -of history, according to the unity in distinction already explained. -Hence it is seen that philosophy does not originate in time, that -there are not philosophic men and non-philosophic men, that there are -not concepts belonging to one individual which another individual -is without, nor mental efforts which one makes and another does not -make, and that philosophy, or all the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_488" id="Page_488">[Pg 488]</a></span> categories, operates at every -instant of the spiritual life, and at every instant of the spiritual -life operates upon material altogether new, given to it by history, -which for its part it helps to create. This amounts to saying that -from that concept we obtain the criticism of philosophism and of the -formula expressing the identity of Philosophy, History of Philosophy -and Philosophy of history; and a more exact idea of the history of -philosophy, free from the chains of an arbitrary classification.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The history of philosophy and philosophic progress.</i></div> - -<p>It may seem that in this way we destroy all idea of philosophic -progress; and certainly philosophy, taken in itself, that is to say -as an abstract category, does not progress any more than the category -of art or of morality progresses. But philosophy in its concreteness -progresses, like art and the whole of life; it progresses, because -reality is development, and development, including antecedents in -consequences, is progress. Every affirmation of truth is conditioned -by reality and conditions a new reality, which, in turn, is in its -progress, the condition of a new thought and of a new philosophy. In -this respect it is true that a philosophy which comes later in time, -contains the preceding philosophies in itself, and not only when it -is truly a philosophy,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_489" id="Page_489">[Pg 489]</a></span> adequate to the new times, which comprehend -ancient times in themselves, but even when it is a simple suggestion, -of the kind we have called erroneous and in need of correction. As -erroneous suggestion it will be, ideally, inferior to the truths -already discovered. The scepticism of David Hume, for instance, is -inferior from this point of view, not only to Cartesianism, but even -to Scholasticism, to Platonism and to Socraticism. But historically it -is superior even to the most perfect of those philosophies, because it -is occupied with a problem which they did not propose to themselves -and initiates its solution, by forming a first attempt at solution, -however erroneous. Those perfect philosophies belong to the past, this, -though imperfect, has the future in itself. Thus it is explained how we -sometimes find far more to learn in philosophers who have maintained -errors than from others who have maintained truths; the errors of -the former are gold in the quartz, which when it has been purified -will add weight and value to the mass of gold, which is already in -our possession and has been preserved by the latter. Fanatics content -themselves with truths, however poor they are, and therefore seek those -who repeat them, even though they be poor of spirit. True thinkers seek -for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_490" id="Page_490">[Pg 490]</a></span> adversaries, bristling with errors and rich with truth; they learn -from them, and while opposing, love and esteem them; indeed, their -opposing them is at the same time an act of esteem and of love.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The truth of all philosophies, and critique of -eclecticism.</i></div> - -<p>The philosophy which each one of us professes at a determinate moment, -in so far as it is adequate to the knowledge of facts and in the -proportion in which it is adequate, is the result of all preceding -history, and in it are organically brought together all systems, -all errors and all suggestions. If some error should appear to be -inexplicable, some suggestion without fruit, some concept incapable of -adoption, the new philosophy is to that extent more or less defective. -But the organic reconciliation, which preceding philosophies must find -in those that follow, cannot be the bare bringing them together in -time, and <i>eclecticism,</i> as in those superficial spirits, who associate -fragments of all philosophies without mediation. Eclecticism (from -the historical point of view also, as for instance in the relation -of Victor Cousin to Hegel, whom he admired, imitated and failed to -understand) is the falsification or the caricature of the vastness of -thought, which embraces in itself all thoughts, though apparently the -most diverse and irreconcilable. The peace of the lazy, who do not -collide with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_491" id="Page_491">[Pg 491]</a></span> one another, because they do not act, must not be made -sublime and confounded with the lofty peace that belongs to those who -have striven and have fraternized after strife, or, indeed, during the -actual combat.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Researches concerning the authors and precursors of truths: -and the reason for the antinomies which they exhibit.</i></div> - -<p>A proof of this <i>constancy</i> of philosophy, which is immanent in all -philosophies and in all the thoughts of men, and also of its perpetual -variation and novelty of historical form, is to be found in the -questions that have been and are raised, concerning the <i>origin</i> or -<i>discovery</i> of truth. Hardly has the truth been discovered, when the -critics easily succeed in proving that it was already known, and begin -the search for <i>precursors.</i> And there can be no doubt that they are -right and their researches deserve to be followed up. Every assertion -of discovery, in so far as it seems to make a clear cut into the web -of history, has something arbitrary about it. Strictly speaking, -Socrates did not discover the concept, or Vico æsthetic fancy, or Kant -the <i>a priori</i> synthesis, or Hegel the synthesis of opposites; nor -even perhaps, did Pythagoras discover the theorem of the square on the -hypotenuse, or Archimedes the law of the displacement of liquids. If -a discovery is represented as an explosion, this happens for reasons -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_492" id="Page_492">[Pg 492]</a></span> practical and mnemonic convenience in narrating and summarising -history; and, for that matter, the explosion, the eruption and the -earthquake are continuous processes. But the rational side of the -search for precursors must not cause the acceptance of the irrational -side, which is the denial of the <i>originality</i> of discoveries, as -though they were to be found point for point in the precursors, or -as though they consisted only in the aggregation of elements which -pre-existed, or in like insignificant changes of form. To attach -oneself to precursors, does not mean to repeat them, but to continue -their work. This continuation is always new, original, and creative -and always gives rise to discoveries, be they small or great. To think -is to discover. The reduction to absurdity of the wrong meaning of -the search for precursors is to be found in the fact that every one -of the most important thoughts can be discovered in a certain sense -in common beliefs, in proverbs, in ways of speech, and among savages -and children. This is so much the case that by this path we can return -to the Utopia of an <i>ingenuous</i> philosophy, outside history; whereas -philosophy is truly ingenuous or genuine only when it <i>is,</i> and it is -not, save in History.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_28" id="Footnote_1_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_28"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See above, Part II. <a href="#IIId">Chap. III.</a></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_29" id="Footnote_2_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_29"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See ch. ix. <i>What is Living and What is Dead of the -Philosophy of Hegel,</i> by the Author, English translation by Douglas -Ainslie.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_493" id="Page_493">[Pg 493]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="VIIIe" id="VIIIe">VIII</a></h4> - - -<h5>"DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE"</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Logic and the defence of philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>Attacks upon Philosophy and defences of it have been made as more -or less academic exercises. But the true defence of it can only be -Philosophy itself, and above all, Logic, which, by determining the -concept of Philosophy, recognizes its necessity and function. And since -Logic itself teaches that a concept is not truly known, save in the -system where it is shown in all its relations, the complete defence is -obtained in our opinion only, when this treatise dedicated to <i>Logic</i> -is placed in relation to the preceding, which treats of <i>Æsthetic,</i> and -with that which follows and has for its object the <i>Philosophy of the -practical.</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The utility of Philosophy and the philosophy of the -practical.</i></div> - -<p>To this last must be relegated the complete elucidation of the problem -concerning the utility or non-utility of philosophy. It is a problem -about which We can here raise no fundamental question, if the equation -posited by us be true:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_494" id="Page_494">[Pg 494]</a></span> philosophy = thought = history = perception -of reality. Thus the doubt concerning the utility of philosophy -would be of equal value with the extravagant doubt as to the utility -of knowledge. The philosophy of the practical also demonstrates -that no action is possible, save when preceded by knowledge, and -that presupposed in action there is always historical or perceptive -knowledge, that is, the knowledge which contains in itself all other -knowledge. And it also demonstrates that reality, being always will -and action, is always thought, and that therefore thought is not an -extrinsic adjunct, but an intrinsic category constitutive of the Real. -Reality is action, because it is thought, and it is thought because it -is action.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Consolation of philosophy, as joy in thought and in the -truth. Impossibility of a pleasure arising from falsity or illusion.</i></div> - -<p>If thought is so useful that without it the Real would not be, the -common concept of an unconsolatory philosophy cannot be accepted. -Consolation, pleasure, joy, is activity itself, which rejoices in -itself. So far as is known, no other mode of pleasure, joy and -consolation has yet been discovered. Now, knowledge of the true, -whatever it is, is activity and promotes activity, and therefore brings -with it its own consolation. "The truth, known, though it be sad, <i>has -its delights."</i> Not a few would wish to attribute<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_495" id="Page_495">[Pg 495]</a></span> these delights, -not to truth, but to <i>illusion.</i> But illusion is either not recognized -as illusion, or it is so recognized. When it is not recognized as such -and yet truly satisfies the mind, it cannot be called illusion, but -truth, which has its own good reasons, since nothing can be held to be -true without good reasons; it is that much of truth which can be noted -in the given circumstances and which from the point of view of a more -complete truth can only arbitrarily be called illusion: the consolation -given by the pretended illusion resides, therefore, in its truth—or -it is recognized as illusion, because the actual circumstances have -changed; and then it is anguish and desire to attain to the truth. If -there is no desire to attain to this truth, and if in order to avoid -it, affirmations are brought forward, which are not adequate to the -new conditions in which we find ourselves, there is error, which, -as such, is always more or less voluntary; and from error, which is -self-critical, arise evil conscience, and remorse, and so again anguish -and desire for the truth, which dissipates illusion and produces -consolation, because ... "the truth though it be sad, yet has its -delights."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Critique of the concept of a sad truth.</i></div> - -<p>Yet (it will be said), the true can be <i>sad;</i> true, but sad. This -prejudice also should be eliminated.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_496" id="Page_496">[Pg 496]</a></span> Truth is reality, and reality is -never either glad or sad, since it comprehends both these categories in -itself, and therefore surpasses them both. To judge reality to be sad, -it would have to be admitted that we possessed besides the idea of it, -the idea of <i>another</i> reality, which should be better than the reality -known to us. But this is contradictory. The second reality would be not -real and therefore not thinkable, and so no idea at all of it could be -formed. And if we did attempt to form an idea of it, thought, entering -into contradiction with itself and striving in a vain effort, would be -seized with terror, and would produce, not that ideal reality, but at -the most an æsthetic expression of terror, like that of a man who looks -upon a bottomless abyss.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Examples: philosophical criticism and the concepts of God -and of Immortality.</i></div> - -<p>Once upon a time and even to-day many found and find consolation in -the idea of a personal God, who has created and governs the universe, -and of an immortal life, above this life of ours, which vanishes at -every instant. And this consolation seems to have diminished in our -times, or to many of us, owing to Philosophies. But he who does not -limit himself to the surface and analyses the state of soul of sincere -and noble believers, realizes that the God who comforted them is the -same who comforts us and whom our Philosophies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_497" id="Page_497">[Pg 497]</a></span> call the universal -Spirit, immanent in all of us—the continuity and rationality of -the universe—just as the Immortality in which they reposed was -the immortality which transcends our individual actions, and in -transcending them, makes them eternal. All that is born is worthy to -perish; but in perishing, it is also preserved as an ideal moment of -what is born from it; and the universe preserves in itself all that -has ever been thought and done, because it is nothing but the organism -of these thoughts and actions. Philosophy has rendered those concepts -of God and of Immortality more exact, and has liberated them from -impurities and errors and thus at the same time from perplexities and -anguish; it has rendered them more, not less, consolatory. On the -other hand, the absurdity which mingled with those concepts, has never -consoled any one who seriously thought them—and serious thinking -of them is an indispensable condition of obtaining consolation from -concepts. If they are not thought, but mechanically repeated, the -consolation is obtained from something else, from distraction and -occupation with life lived, not from the concepts. In the effort -to think a God outside the world, a Despot of the world, we are -seized with a sense of fear for that God,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_498" id="Page_498">[Pg 498]</a></span> who is a solitary being, -suffering from his omnipotence, which makes activity impossible for -him and dangerous for his creatures, who are his playthings. That God -becomes an object of maledictions. Equally, in seriously thinking our -immortality as empirical individuals, immobilized in our works and in -our affections (which are beautiful only because they are in motion and -fugitive), we are assailed by the terror, not of death, but of this -immortality, which is unthinkable because desolating and desolating -because unthinkable. Ideal immortality has generated the poetic -representations of Paradise, which are representations of infinite -peace; the false concepts of an empirical immortality can generate no -other representation than Swift's profoundly satirical picture of the -<i>Struldbrugs</i> or immortals, plunged in all the miseries of life, unable -to die, and weeping with envy at the sight of a funeral.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Consolatory virtue belonging to all spiritual activities.</i></div> - -<p>But we do not wish to close these new considerations upon the old -theme <i>de consolatione Philosophiae,</i> without noting that philosophy -is not the sole or supreme consoler, as the philosophers of antiquity -believed, and some among the moderns, who assumed the same attitude. -It is neither the sole nor the supreme consoler, because thought does -not exist alone, nor does<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_499" id="Page_499">[Pg 499]</a></span> it exist above life: thought is outside and -inside life; and if on one side it surpasses life, on the other it is a -mode of life itself. Philosophy brings consolation in its own kingdom, -putting error to flight and preparing the conditions for practical -life; but man is not thought alone, and if he has joys and sorrows -from thought, other sorrows and joys come to him from the exercise of -life itself. And in this exercise action heals the evils of action and -life brings consolation for life. The error of Stoicism and of similar -doctrines consists in attributing to philosophy a direct action upon -the ills of life and of making it in consequence the whole totality -of the real. But philosophy has no pocket-handkerchiefs to dry all -the tears that man sheds, nor is it able to console unhappy lovers -and unfortunate husbands (as sentimental people pretend): it can only -contribute to their comfort by healing that part of their pain which -is due to theoretic obscurity. Such part is certainly not small: all -our sorrows are irritated and made more pungent by mental darkness -which paralyses or fetters the purification of action. But it is a -part and not the whole. Every form of the activity of the Spirit, art -like philosophy, practical life like theoretic life, is a fount of -consolation and none suffices alone.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_500" id="Page_500">[Pg 500]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Sorrow and the elevation of sorrow.</i></div> - -<p>"He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow" is a false saying, -because the increase of knowledge is the overcoming of sorrow. But it -is true, in so far as it means that the increase of knowledge does not -eliminate the sorrows of practical life. It does not eliminate, but -<i>elevates</i> them; and to adopt the fine expression of a contemporary -Italian writer, superiority is "nothing but the right to suffer on -a higher plane." On a higher plane, but neither more nor less than -others, who are at a lower level of knowledge,—to suffer on a higher -plane, in order to act upon a higher plane.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_501" id="Page_501">[Pg 501]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="FOURTH_PART" id="FOURTH_PART">FOURTH PART</a></h4> - -<h3>HISTORICAL RETROSPECT</h3> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_502" id="Page_502">[Pg 502]</a><br /><a name="Page_503" id="Page_503">[Pg 503]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="If" id="If">I</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE HISTORY OF LOGIC AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Reality, Thought and Logic.</i></div> - -<p>The three terms, <i>Reality, Thought</i> and <i>Logic</i>, and their relations, -could be represented by a system of three circles, the one included in -the other, and by marking at will as the first term that which includes -all, or that which is included in all: R T L or L T R. Limiting -ourselves to the first method, the first circle would be Reality, -which Thought (the second circle) would think, in the same way that -it would in its turn be thought in the third circle, formed by Logic, -the Thought of thought, or the Philosophy of philosophy. This graphic -symbol is probably destined to some fortune; but the reader must not -seek it in our pages, because knowing how much inadequacy, clumsiness -and danger it contains, we share the repugnance, almost instinctively -felt at such materializations, which seem to be and are of slight -value.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_504" id="Page_504">[Pg 504]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Relation of these three terms.</i></div> - -<p>The vice of that spatial figuration is that it divides into three -circles what is three, but three in one, and should consequently be -expressed as a triple circle which should also be a single circle, in -which all the three coincide; which is geometrically unrepresentable. -The relation of Reality, Thought of Reality and Thought of Thought, -divided into three circles, legitimately gives rise to the question: -Why should there not be a fourth, a fifth, a sixth circle (and so on -to infinity) which should include respectively the third, the fourth, -the fifth (and so on to infinity)? Why should not a Logic of Logic, -or a thought of the thought of thought, and so on, follow the thought -of thought, which is Logic? For us, this question raises no objection -that need bring us to a halt for a single instant, just because we have -never divided the one reality into two or more different realities -(matter and spirit, nature and idea, and so on), nor into a series of -different realities, the one following the other; but we have conceived -it as a system of relations and of correlations, constituting a unity, -indeed the only unity concretely thinkable. There is no progress to -infinity, when the terms are coincident and correlative; hence to -think the thought of thought would not be a new act, but equivalent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_505" id="Page_505">[Pg 505]</a></span> -to thinking thought. The mental act will be new (and any mental act -is new) for the individual who accomplishes it in conditions that are -always new; but its spiritual form will always be that of Logic, which -thinks thought and contains within itself, on its side, the process -of reality. Further, the indifference exhibited by the symbol of the -triple circle as to the determination of the first as last and the -last as first, confirms for us the non-existence of a first that is -only first and of a last that is only last; confirms, that is to say, -the coincidence of unity in relation that is first and last. Reality -is not only thought by thought, but is also thought; and thought -is not only thought by Logic, but is also Logic. Those who wish to -expound philosophy and history, proceeding from the centre of the logos -or Logic, and those who wish to expound them, proceeding from the -periphery of facts, are both right and wrong, because the centre is -periphery and the periphery centre.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Non-existence of a general philosophy outside the -particular philosophic sciences:</i></div> - -<p>By adopting this view, which affirms the most complete immanence, it -has never happened that in any part of the Real we have discovered -a division between idea and fact, between general and particular, -between primary and secondary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_506" id="Page_506">[Pg 506]</a></span> reality and the like, but we have found, -in every part, relation and correlation, unity and distinction in -unity. There is no general philosophy opposed to, or consequent on, or -alongside particular philosophies; particular philosophy is general, -and the general is the particular; nor is there a general history, -which is not also particular history, and <i>vice versa.</i> History is -always the history of man as artist, thinker, economic producer, and -moral agent, and in distinguishing these various aspects, it gives -their unity, which does not transcend these various aspects, but <i>is</i> -these various aspects themselves.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>and consequently of a History of general philosophy outside -the histories of particular philosophic sciences.</i></div> - -<p>In like manner, the History of thought, or the History of Philosophy, -which is one of these determinate aspects, is distinguished in the -histories of particular philosophic concepts, as the history of -Æsthetic, of Logic, of Economics and of Ethics; but it is also unified -in them and <i>consists in nothing but them,</i> completely resolving itself -into them. There is no <i>general History of Philosophy,</i> in the sense -of a history of <i>general Philosophy,</i> or of <i>Metaphysics,</i> or whatever -else it may be called, outside particular histories (which are unity in -particularity).</p> - -<p>One of the errors which in our opinion vitiates the writing of the -history of philosophy, appears<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_507" id="Page_507">[Pg 507]</a></span> to be just the prejudice in favour -of a treatment of the general part of this history, in which, for -instance, speculations concerning practice enter only incidentally, a -great part of logical doctrine is excluded as not belonging to it, and -the doctrines of Æsthetic are hardly referred to at all. The prejudice -is derived, in the last analysis, from the old idea of an Ontology or -Metaphysic, as the science of an ideal world, of which nature and man -are the more or less imperfect actualizations; hence the relegation of -a great part of true and proper philosophy to what is called the human -and natural world, and the looking upon this as a special philosophy, -distinguished from general philosophy and consequently lying outside -the true and proper history of philosophy. That prejudice, amounting -almost to a survival, persists even in those who have more or less -surpassed such a conception, and determines the curious configuration -of a general history of philosophy, outside the special histories. -Such a scheme, when closely examined, shows itself to be a complex of -historical elucidations of some problems of Logic, and of some of the -philosophy of the practical (individuality, liberty, the supreme good, -etc.), and of some arising from their relations (knowing and being, -spirit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_508" id="Page_508">[Pg 508]</a></span> and nature, infinite and finite, etc.). These are all without -doubt arguments of philosophical history; but they must be united with -the others, from which they have been wrenched, and without which they -prove but little intelligible. Philosophy is present in the Poetics -and the Rhetoric of Aristotle as much as in the Metaphysics; not less -in the <i>Critique of Pure Judgment</i> of Kant, than in the <i>Critique of -Pure Reason.</i> It is never outside those treatises concerning what are -called the special parts of philosophy. The present-day historians -of philosophy who have overcome so many forms of transcendence -and re-established immanence, must also overcome the residue of -transcendence, which, so to speak, they still retain in their own house.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Histories of particular philosophies and literary value of -such division.</i></div> - -<p>Certainly, the reality of the distinctions between the various aspects -of the real and between the various particular philosophies renders -possible literary divisions, through which there are composed special -treatises upon Ethics and so upon the history of Ethic; upon Logic and -so upon the history of Logic; upon Æsthetic and so upon the history -of Æsthetic; but it is not possible by a like method of division to -construct a treatise upon general Philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_509" id="Page_509">[Pg 509]</a></span> and a corresponding -History of general philosophy. It is not possible, because this -literary division presupposes a distinction of concepts; and a general -philosophy is not conceptually distinguishable. When the attempt to -distinguish it is made, we have, as we saw, a mass of historical -fragments taken from the various philosophic sciences; that is to -say, not the coherent historical treatment of problems relating to a -definite aspect of the real, but a more or less arbitrary aggregate.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>History of Logic in a particular sense.</i></div> - -<p>With these considerations, we have answered the question concerning the -relation between the History of Logic and the History of Philosophy. -This relation is the same as that between Logic and Philosophy,—terms -which are capable neither of distinction nor of opposition. The history -of Logic is not outside the history of Philosophy, but is an integral -part of this history itself. To make it the object of special treatment -always means to compose a complete history of philosophy, in which, -from the literary point of view, prominence and priority are given -to the problems of Logic, the others being thrown, not outside the -picture, but into the background. The same may be said of the History -of Æsthetic or of Ethic or of any other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_510" id="Page_510">[Pg 510]</a></span> particular discipline, which -is never held to be distinguishable.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Works relating to the history of Logic.</i></div> - -<p>Logic being more or less profoundly renovated (as we have sought -to do in this book), it is natural that the histories of Logic -hitherto available can no longer be completely satisfactory. For they -are written from points of view that have been surpassed, such as -Aristotelian formalism or Hegelian panlogism, and therefore either -do not interpret facts with exactitude, or they give prominence and -exaggerated importance to certain orders of facts, neglecting others -far more worthy of mention and of examination.</p> - -<p>Of the special books bearing the title of the History of Logic, there -is really only one—that of Charles Prantl—which, based upon wide -researches, is truly remarkable for its doctrine and for lucid and -animated exposition. Unfortunately this does not go further than the -fifteenth century and omits the whole movement of modern philosophy.<a name="FNanchor_1_30" id="FNanchor_1_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_30" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -But even the period exhaustively treated by him (Antiquity and the -Middle Ages) is looked at from the narrow angle of an Aristotelian and -formal temperament.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_511" id="Page_511">[Pg 511]</a></span> Other works bearing the same title are not worthy -of attention.<a name="FNanchor_2_31" id="FNanchor_2_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_31" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> On the other hand, the better histories of Logic must -not be sought under this title, but especially in the better Histories -of Philosophy, beginning with that of Hegel, which, for the most part, -is precisely a history of Logic.</p> - -<p>In inaugurating a new treatment, governed by the principles which we -have defended, we shall confine ourselves, in the following pages, -to a sketch of the history of some of the principal parts of logical -doctrine, without any claim to even approximate completeness, and with -a view to giving simple illustrations of the things that were said -in the theoretical part. In this theoretical part, in virtue of the -identity of philosophy and history which we have explained, history may -be said to be already contained and projected, even though names and -dates are mostly omitted and left to be understood.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_30" id="Footnote_1_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_30"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande,</i> Leipzig, 1855-1870, -4 vols. Scattered memoirs of certain writers belonging to later times -are being published by Prantl in academic journals, and it would be -opportune to collect these in a volume.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_31" id="Footnote_2_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_31"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> A rapid sketch, compiled in part from the work of Prantl, -with a polemical addition directed against the adversaries of the -Hegelian Logic, precedes the <i>Logic</i><sup>2</sup> of Kuno Fischer. The -historical part of the <i>System der Logik</i> of Ueberweg (fifth edition, -1882, edited by J. B. Meyer) has an almost exclusively bibliographical -character with excerpts, and that contained in L. Rabus, <i>Logik ii. -System der Wissenschaften,</i> Erlangen-Leipzig, 1895, is yet more arid. -The <i>Gesch. d. Logik</i> of F. Harms (Berlin, 1881) is meagre in facts, -verbose and vague. In recent monographs on special points, one feels -the effect of what is called Logistic or new formalism, which makes the -authors pursue ineptitudes and curiosities of slight value.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_512" id="Page_512">[Pg 512]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIf" id="IIf">II</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE THEORY OF THE CONCEPT</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Question as to who was the "father of Logic."</i></div> - -<p>Just as whenever in Æsthetic any one sought the "father" of the science -Plato was usually named, so whenever a like enquiry has been proposed -for Logic that honourable title has been almost unanimously bestowed -upon Aristotle. But even if we admit (as we must) in a somewhat -empirical and expedient sense, the propriety of these searches for -"discoverers" and "fathers," Aristotle could not in our eyes occupy -that position. For if Logic is the science of the concept, such a -science was evidently begun before him. Further, Aristotle himself -claimed the distinction only of having reduced and treated the theory -of reasoning<a name="FNanchor_1_32" id="FNanchor_1_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_32" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> and recognized elsewhere that to Socrates belonged the -merit of having directed attention to the examination and definition of -the concept (τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ όρίζεσθαι), that is to -say, to the very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_513" id="Page_513">[Pg 513]</a></span> principle of logical Science,<a name="FNanchor_2_33" id="FNanchor_2_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_33" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> the rigorous form of -truth.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Socrates, Plato, Aristotle.</i></div> - -<p>In this affirmation of the consistency and absoluteness of knowledge -and of truth (sustained in him by a vivid religious and moral -consciousness) lies the significance of Socrates as opposed to the -Sophists; as indeed in the same thing lies the importance of Hellenic -Logic of the truly classical period. This Logic elaborated the idea -of conceptual knowledge, of science or of philosophy, and transmitted -it to the modern world with a terminology, which is in great part -that which we ourselves employ. We too reject in almost the same -words as the Greek philosophers the renascent sophism, the perennial -Protagoreanism, and the sensationalism which denies truth, and (like -the ancient Gorgias), by declaring it incommunicable by the individual, -individualizes and reduces it to practical utility. In Plato, the -affirmation and glorification of conceptual knowledge was accompanied -by contempt for the knowledge of the individual, and in comparison -with the immortal world of ideas, the world of sensations was for him -so dark and obscure as to disappear in his eyes like phantoms before -the sun. But Aristotle, although he held<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_514" id="Page_514">[Pg 514]</a></span> firmly that there is no -science of the accidental and individual, and of sensation, which is -bound to space and time, to the <i>where</i> and the <i>when,</i> and that the -object of science is the universal, the essence, <i>which is being,</i> -was less exclusive than he; and as he saved the world of poetry from -the condemnation of Plato, so, in all his philosophy and in all his -work as physicist, politician and historian, he affirmed the world of -experience and of history.<a name="FNanchor_3_34" id="FNanchor_3_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_34" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Enquiries concerning the nature of the concept in Greece. -The question of transcendence and immanence.</i></div> - -<p>On the other hand, there was in Socrates only the consciousness of -the universal still indefinite and vague; in Plato there appeared -for the first time the consciousness of the true character of the -universal, and so of its distinction from empirical universals; and -in Aristotle this enquiry gave important results. The problem of the -nature of the concept became, then and afterwards, interwoven with -that other problem of the transcendence or immanence of the concepts; -but since, notwithstanding many points of contact, the two problems -cannot be completely identified, they must not be confounded. Indeed, -the problem of the transcendence or immanence of the universals is -reducible to the more general problem of the relation between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_515" id="Page_515">[Pg 515]</a></span> values -and facts, the ideal and the real, what ought to be and what is; -whereas the other, concerning the nature of the universals, centres -upon the distinction between universals that are truly logical, and -pseudological universals, and upon the greater or less admissibility -of one or the other or of both, and so upon their mode of relation. -The point of contact between the two problems lies in this, that where -pure and real universals are denied and only arbitrary and nominal -universals allowed to subsist, the question of the immanence or -transcendence of the universals also disappears. And as to the first -problem and the polemic of Aristotle against Plato concerning the -ideas, it has appeared to some critics (to Zeller and others) that -Aristotle misunderstood his master and invented an error that Plato -had never maintained, or attacked merely certain gross expositions of -doctrine which were current in some Platonic school. To others again -(to Lotze, for instance), it has seemed that Aristotle thought this -problem, at bottom, in the same way as Plato, who by placing the ideas -in a hyper-Uranian space, in a super-world or a super-heaven, thus -came to refuse to them that reality which Aristotle himself refused -to them and to consider them as <i>values,</i> not as <i>beings;</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_516" id="Page_516">[Pg 516]</a></span> although -Greek linguistic usage prevented Plato from expressing the difference, -just as it prevented Aristotle from expressing the same thing, when it -led him to describe genera as "second substances" (δεύτεραι οὺσίαι). -However, as regards the first interpretation, it certainly seems to -us that it is impossible to raise doubts about such a document as -the testimony of Aristotle<a name="FNanchor_4_35" id="FNanchor_4_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_35" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> by means of such frequently uncertain -documents as the Platonic dialogues. And as regards the second -interpretation, it seems to us that it does not so much purge Plato -of the vice of transcendence as convict his adversary also of sharing -that vice. On this point the opposition of Aristotle to his predecessor -does not coincide with that of modern nominalism and empiricism to -philosophic idealism, for the former sets in question the truth of the -concept itself. Aristotle denied this truth as little as Plato; indeed -he expressly asserted that his predecessor was right, and approved his -definite accusation of the sophists that they were occupied not with -the universal but with the accidental, that is to say, with not-being.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Controversies as to the various forms of concept in Plato.</i></div> - -<p>The beginning of the enquiry as to the nature<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_517" id="Page_517">[Pg 517]</a></span> of universals or of -ideas is to be seen, on the other hand, in Plato's embarrassments -before the questions as to whether there are ideas of everything, of -artificial as well as of natural things, of noble things and vile -things alike, of things only or also of properties and relations; -of good things or also of bad things (καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθὸν -καὶ κακόν)<a name="FNanchor_5_36" id="FNanchor_5_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_36" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> He does not escape from the embarrassments, save -occasionally, by making strange admissions, by accepting ideas of all -the preceding, only to fall immediately afterwards into contradictions, -through which however we see the outlines of the problems of to-day. -Are the ideas representative concepts (of things) or are they not -rather categories (ideas of relation)? Arc opposites particular kinds -of ideas (if there exist ideas of base and ugly things, as well as of -beautiful and good things)? Is it possible to distinguish, from the -point of view of the Ideas, between the natural world and the human -world (between natural things and artificial)? Plato himself refers to -mathematical knowledge as distinct from philosophic knowledge.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The philosophic concepts and the empirical and abstract -concepts in Aristotle. Philosophy, physics and mathematics.</i></div> - -<p>In Aristotle, the determination of the rigorous philosophic concept -and its distinction from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_518" id="Page_518">[Pg 518]</a></span> empirical and abstract concepts make great -progress, although this does not amount to a solution of those Platonic -embarrassments. Aristotle accurately traces the limits between -Philosophy (and so the philosophic concept) and the physical and -mathematical sciences. Philosophy, the science of God or <i>theology</i> -(as he also calls it), treats of being in its absoluteness, and so -not of particular beings or of the matter that forms part of their -composition. The non-philosophical sciences, on the other hand, always -treat of particular beings (περὶ ὄν τι καὶ γένος τι). They take their -objects from sense or assume them by hypotheses, giving now more, now -less accurate demonstrations of them. All the physical sciences have -need of some definite material (ὕλη) because they are always concerned -with noses, eyes, flesh, bones, animals, plants, roots, bark, in short -with material things, subject to movement. There even arises a physical -science that is concerned with the soul, or rather, with a sort of -soul (περὶ ψυχῆς ἐνίας), in so far as this is not without matter. -Mathematics, like philosophy, studies, not things subject to movement, -but motionless being; but it differs from philosophy in not excluding -the matter in which their objects are as it were incorporated (ὡς ἐν -ὔλῃi): the suppression of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_519" id="Page_519">[Pg 519]</a></span> matter is obtained in them by aphairesis or -abstraction.<a name="FNanchor_6_37" id="FNanchor_6_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_37" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The universals of the "always" and those of the "for the -most part."</i></div> - -<p>This divergence between philosophic and physical or mathematical -procedure is the point upon which empiricism and mathematicism rely; -but these, inferior here to Aristotle, deny the science of absolute -being (περὶ ὅντος άπλῶς) and leave in existence only the second -order of sciences, which deal with the particular and abstract. -There is another important distinction in Aristotle, but to tell -the truth it is impossible to say how far he connected it with the -preceding distinction between philosophy and physics, with which it is -substantially one. Aristotle knew two forms of universal: the universal -of the <i>always</i> (τοῡ ἀεί) and that of the <i>for the most part</i> (τοῡ -ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ).<a name="FNanchor_7_38" id="FNanchor_7_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_38" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> He was well aware of the difference between the -first, which is truly universal, and the second, which is so only in -an approximate and improper manner; and he even asked himself if the -<i>for the most part</i> alone existed and not also the <i>always</i>; but his -interest was directed not so much to the comparative differences of -the two series, as to the common character of universality which both -of them asserted as against the individual and accidental. Science (he -said) is occupied, not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_520" id="Page_520">[Pg 520]</a></span> with the accidental, but with the universal, -whether it be eternal and necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) or only approximately -universal (ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ).<a name="FNanchor_8_39" id="FNanchor_8_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_39" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Philosophy, physics and mathematics felt at -this period that they had a common enemy in sensationalism and sophism, -and they formed an alliance against this common enemy, rather than as -happened later, dissipate their energies in intestinal welfare.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Controversies concerning Logic in the Middle Ages.</i></div> - -<p>Without dwelling upon the later scepticism, mysticism and mythologism, -which represented the dissolution of ancient philosophy and the germ -of a new life (especially in Christian mythologism, which had absorbed -elements of ancient philosophy and was accompanied by a very developed -theology), we must pass on to note the progress which the logical -problem made in the schools of the Middle Ages. To look upon mediæval -philosophy (as many do) as a negligible episode, a mere detritus of -ancient culture quite unconnected with the later spiritual activity, is -now no longer possible. Certainly in the disputes of the nominalists -and realists, the problem of transcendence and of immanence was -neglected. It could not be solved on the presumptions of a philosophy -which had at its side a theology, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_521" id="Page_521">[Pg 521]</a></span> which it constituted itself the -handmaiden. The Platonic transcendence was incurable in Christianity, -and those who even to-day seek to purify Christianity from survivals -of Greek thought, do not perceive that, in this purification effected -by their philosophies of action and of immanence, they are destroying -Christianity itself.<a name="FNanchor_9_40" id="FNanchor_9_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_40" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Nominalism and realism.</i></div> - -<p>But in those disputes, besides the question of the place that belongs -to science in relation to religious faith, or to mundane science in -relation to revealed and divine science, the question of the nature -of the concept was also raised; that is to say, they continued the -Platonic-Aristotelian enquiry into the doctrine of the concept in -the second of the meanings that we have distinguished. But no true -conclusion was reached in this enquiry. The conciliatory formula -of the Arabic interpreters of Aristotle, accepted by Albertus -Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, in which the universals were affirmed as -existing <i>ante, in</i> and <i>post rem,</i> in so far as it is possible to -confer upon it an exact meaning, was understood in a superficial -manner, and therefore it has not unreasonably seemed too easy and -too expeditious.<a name="FNanchor_10_41" id="FNanchor_10_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_41" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> A dispute of this sort cannot be solved by -summarizing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_522" id="Page_522">[Pg 522]</a></span> discordant opinions, as in the formula we have mentioned, -or by fixing a mean, as in conceptualism. But the realists, bravely -maintaining the truth of the philosophic universal, maintained the -rights of rational thought and of philosophy; and the nominalists, on -their part, asserting in contradiction to the former, the nominalist -universal, prepared the modern theories of natural science. Realism -produced philosophic thought of high importance, as in the so-called -ontological argument of Anselm of Aosta, which (though through the -myth of a personal God) asserts the unity of Essence and Existence, -the reality of what is truly conceivable and conceived. Gaunilo, -who confuted and satirized that concept, by employing the example -of a "most perfect island," thinkable yet non-existent, seems an -anticipation of Kant; at least of the Kant who employed the example of -the hundred dollars to illustrate the same case—if it is not more -accurate to say that Kant was, in that case, a late Gaunilo. Anselm -replied (as Hegel did to Kant) that it was not a question of an island -(or of a hundred dollars of something imaginable that is not at all -a concept), but of the being than which it is impossible to think -a greater and a more perfect (the true and proper concept). On the -other hand, the nominalists,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_523" id="Page_523">[Pg 523]</a></span> who like Roscellinus maintained that -the <i>universelles substantiae</i> were <i>nonnisi flatus vocis,</i> performed -the useful office of preventing the sciences of experience from being -absorbed and lost in philosophy. In Roger Bacon we see clearly the -connection of nominalism with naturalism. He considered individual -facts, so-called external experience, in its immediacy, as the true and -proper object of science. Concepts were for him a simple expedient, -directed towards the mastery of the immense richness of the individual. -"<i>Intellectus est debilis</i> (he said); <i>propter eam debilitatem magis -conformatur rei debili, quae est universale, qitam rei quae habet -multum de esse, ut singulare.</i>"</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Nominalism, mysticism and coincidence of opposites.</i></div> - -<p>But the nominalists, <i>dialecticae haeretici</i> (as Anselm called them), -were heretics only in the circle of the dialectic. The truth remained -for them something beyond; the concept, the <i>secunda intentio,</i> was -certainly something arbitrary and <i>ad placitum instituta</i>; it was -"<i>forma artificialis tantum, quae per violentiam habet esse,</i>" but -beyond it were always faith and revelation. God is the truth, and in -God the ideas are real; hence Roger Bacon gave to inner light (as -the positivists or neocritics of to-day give to feeling) a place -beside sensible experience. Mysticism, being developed from mediæval -philosophy, both from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_524" id="Page_524">[Pg 524]</a></span> one-sided realism and from one-sided nominalism, -extends its hand at the dawn of the new Era to the philosophy of -Cusanus, to scepticism, to <i>docta ignorantia.</i> This was not a mere -negation; so much so that in it (though in a negative form and -mixed with religion) there appears in outline nothing less than the -theory of the <i>coincidence of opposites,</i> that is to say, the cradle -of that modern logical movement, which was destined definitely to -conquer transcendence. The coincidence of opposites is the germ of -the dialectic, which unifies value and fact, ideal and real, what -ought to be and what is. This important thought reappears in German -mysticism; and (significantly for its future destinies) rings out upon -the lips of Martin Luther, who declared that virtue coexists with its -contrary, vice, hope with anxiety, faith with vacillation, indeed with -temptation, gentleness with disdain, chastity with desire, pardon with -sin; as in nature, heat coexists with cold, white with black, riches -with poverty, health with disease; and that <i>peccatum manet et non -manet, tollitur et non tollitur,</i> and that at the moment a man ceases -to make himself better, he ceases to be good.<a name="FNanchor_11_42" id="FNanchor_11_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_42" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> And before it became -dominant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_525" id="Page_525">[Pg 525]</a></span> in Jacob Böhme it was stripped of its religious form and -eloquently defended in Italy by Giordano Bruno.<a name="FNanchor_12_43" id="FNanchor_12_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_43" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The Renaissance and naturalism. Bacon.</i></div> - -<p>This realist, mystical and dialectical current of thought was destined -to yield its best fruits some centuries later. For the time being, in -the seventeenth century, and yet more in the century that followed, -the victory seemed to rest with nominalism, that is to say, with -naturalism. In Italy, Leonardo da Vinci laughed at theological and -speculative disputes and celebrated, not the mind, but the <i>eye</i> of -man, that is, the science of observation. The same tendency appeared -in the anti-Aristotelians and naturalists, who placed the natural -sciences above scholasticism. In England, the other Bacon, however -slight his importance both as philosopher and naturalist, yet has -much importance as the symptom and spokesman of the self-assertion of -naturalism. In the <i>Novum Organum,</i> the universal of the <i>for the most -part</i> claims its rights as against the universal of the necessary and -eternal. He does not wish, however, to do away with the latter, but -rather to complete it; the syllogism is insufficient, induction also -is needed. Philosophy and theology are well where they are, but a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_526" id="Page_526">[Pg 526]</a></span> -science of physics is also needed; philosophic induction, which goes -at a leap to first causes, must be accompanied by a gradual induction -(the only one that interests the naturalist), which connects particular -facts by means of laws more and more general; final causes must be -banished from the study of nature, and only efficient causes admitted. -<i>Anticipationes naturae,</i> that is to say, the invasions of philosophism -into the natural sciences, are to be prohibited. These utterances are -far more discreet than those that have so often since been heard.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The ideal of exact science and the Cartesian philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>By another school of this period, on the other hand, the pure concept -was wrongly identified with the abstract concept. Thus speculative -rationalism took the form of mathematical rationalism and the ideal -of philosophy was confused with the ideal of <i>exact science.</i> This -tendency is also to be found in Leonardo, who exalted "reason" -alone, that is calculation, as outside of and sometimes superior to -experience. Galileo expressed similar thoughts later. The Cartesian -philosophy is animated with it, that is to say, the philosophy of -Descartes and of his great followers, especially Spinoza and Leibnitz. -Thus this is especially an intellectualist philosophy, full of empty -excogitations and rigid<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_527" id="Page_527">[Pg 527]</a></span> divisions, developed by a mechanical or by -a teleological method, which always operated by means of mechanism. -It is true that even under these improper forms, philosophic thought -progressed. The consciousness of the inner unity of philosophy -progressed with Descartes, that of the unity of the real by means of -Spinoza's concept of substance, and that of spiritual activity by means -of the dynamism of Leibnitz; but Logic remained as a whole the old -scholastic logic. The purity of the concept was asserted at the expense -of concreteness; thus the concept, in the Logic of those writers, is -always something abstract, although its reality is so far recognized -that it is thought possible to think with it the most real (the God -of Descartes, the substance of Spinoza, the Monad of Leibnitz). The -eighteenth century, mathematical, abstractionist, intellectualist -ratiocinative, anti-historical, illuminist, reformist, and finally -Jacobin, is the legitimate issue of this Cartesian philosophy, which -confuses the Logic of philosophy with the Logic of mathematics. France, -which was the country of its birth and where it became most firmly -rooted and most widely disseminated, owes to it, perhaps even more than -to Scholasticism, the mental imprint which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_528" id="Page_528">[Pg 528]</a></span> it still bears and which -the strong Germanic influence that has made itself felt there also in -the last century has not sufficed to eradicate. It is only in our day -that the country which is the type of the abstract intellect strives -to become philosophically more concrete. It is now occupied with -æstheticism or intuitionism, and, unless the movement is suffocated or -dissipated, it may effect a true revolution in the traditional French -spirit.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Adversaries of Cartesianism. Vico.</i></div> - -<p>The opposition to abstractionism had no representatives in the -seventeenth century and for a great part of the eighteenth, except -among thinkers of but slight systematic powers, with whom it did -not progress beyond the logical form of the presentiment and the -literary form of the aphorism. In France, Blaise Pascal was one of -these, with his anti-Cartesianism, his restriction of the value of -mathematics, and his celebration of the reasons of the heart which -reason does not know. In Germany there was Hamann, who possessed such -a strong sense of tradition, of history, of language, of poetry and -of myth, and finally of the truth contained in the principle of the -<i>coincidence of opposites</i> which he had met with somewhere in Bruno. -The Italian Giambattista Vico was the only great systematic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_529" id="Page_529">[Pg 529]</a></span> thinker -to express opposition to abstractionism and Cartesianism. Prior to -and more clearly than Hamann, he perceived the unity of philosophy -and history, or as he called it, of <i>philosophy and philology.</i> He -conceived thought as an <i>ideal history</i> of reality, immanent in the -real history which occurs in time; he abolished the distinctions of the -concept as separate species and substituted the notion of degrees or -moments, which (as Schelling did after him) he called <i>ideal epochs</i>; -he considered the abstractionist and mathematical century which he saw -rising before him, as a period of philosophic decadence, and foretold -the evil effects of Cartesian anti-historicism. (His presage was -fulfilled.) In this way, he sketched a new Logic, very different from -that of Aristotle or of Arnaud which was the most recent, a Logic in -which he attempted to satisfy Plato and Bacon, Tacitus and Grotius, the -idea and the fact. But if the other opponents of abstractionism had -very little effect, because of their immaturity and want of system, -Vico also was ineffectual, because he was born in Italy precisely at -the time when Italy as a productive country was definitely issuing from -the circle of European thought and was beginning passively to accept -the more popular forms of foreign<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_530" id="Page_530">[Pg 530]</a></span> thought. Finally, Naples, the little -country of Vico, was then becoming encyclopædist and sensationalist, -and did not really begin to know until a century later the remedy for -such evils composed in anticipation by Vico.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Empiricist Logic and its dissolution—Locke, Berkeley and -Hume.</i></div> - -<p>The surpassing of the Logic of the abstract concept and the achievement -of that of the concrete concept or pure concept or idea, was realized -in other ways, primarily by a sort of reduction to the absurd of -empiricist and mathematical Logic, in the scepticism which was its -result. This reduction to the absurd, this final scepticism, is to -be observed in the movement of English philosophy, beginning with -Locke or even with Hobbes, to Hume. Locke, starting from perception -as his presupposition, derived all ideas from experience, with the -sole instrument of reflection; and rejecting innate ideas and looking -upon others as more or less arbitrary, he preserved some objectivity -to mathematical ideas alone, which relate to what are called primary -qualities. Berkeley denies objectivity even to the primary qualities. -All concepts, naturalist and mathematical alike, are for him abstract -concepts and to that extent without truth. The only truth is the -"idea," which means here nothing but sensation or the representation -of the individual. His Logic is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_531" id="Page_531">[Pg 531]</a></span> empiricist, because it is in -no respect Logic. At the most it is an Æsthetic substituted for and -given as Logic. It is true, notwithstanding his complete denial of -universals—of empirical and abstract, no less than of philosophic, -which he never even mentions—that he deludes himself into thinking -that he has overcome scepticism; and it is true also that he laid the -foundations of a spiritualist and voluntarist conception of reality, -which in our opinion should be preserved and adopted by modern thought. -But this proves only that his philosophy does not wholly agree with -his Logic, and not that his Logic is not the complete denial of the -concept and of thought. The logical consequence of Berkeley could not, -then, be anything but the scepticism of David Hume, who shakes the very -foundation upon which the whole of the science of nature rests, namely, -the principle of causality.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Exact science and Kant. The concept of the category.</i></div> - -<p>As the effect of this extreme scepticism, the surpassing of empiricist -and abstractionist Logic had to be begun with the restoration of that -Logic itself (because that which does not exist cannot be surpassed), -that is to say, with the demonstration, against Hume, that the exact -science of nature is possible. Such is the principal task of the -<i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_532" id="Page_532">[Pg 532]</a></span> which contains the Logic of the natural -and mathematical sciences, thought no longer by an empiricist, but by -a philosopher who has surpassed empiricism and recognized that the -concepts of experience presuppose the human intellect, which originally -constructed them. Leibnitz had already travelled this road, when in -a polemic against Locke he maintained that reflection to which Locke -appealed, referred back to the innate ideas: for if reflection (he -said) is nothing but "<i>une attention à ce qui est en nous et les sens -ne nous donnent point ce que nous portons déjà avec nous,</i>" how can -it ever be denied "<i>qu'il y est beaucoup d'inné en nous, puisque nous -sommes, pour ainsi dire, innés à nous mêmes? Peut-on nier qu'il y ait -eu nous être, unité, substance, durée, changement, action, perception, -plaisir et mille autres objets de nos idées intellectuelles?</i>"<a name="FNanchor_13_44" id="FNanchor_13_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_44" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> The -<i>New Essays,</i> in which theses and other similar themes were developed, -remained for a time unedited, but appeared opportunely in 1765 to -fecundate German thought, and acted upon Kant, together with English -empiricism and scepticism, the latter giving the problem and the former -almost an attempt at a solution. But the innate ideas of Leibnitz are -profoundly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_533" id="Page_533">[Pg 533]</a></span> transformed in the Kantian concept of the <i>category,</i> -which is the formal element and really exists only in the very act -of judgment, which it effects. Mathematics are thus secured in their -possession, no longer by means of the primary qualities of Locke, but -because they arise from the <i>a priori</i> forms of intuition, space and -time. The natural sciences are also secured, because the concepts of -them are constituted by means of the categories of the intellect, -on the data of experience. In other words, mathematical and natural -science have value, in so far as they are a necessary product of the -spirit.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The limits of science and Kantian scepticism.</i></div> - -<p>But a limitation of value due also to Kant, accompanies this theoretic -reinforcement of exact science. That science is necessary, because -produced by the categories; but the categories cannot develop their -activity except upon the data of experience; so that exact science is -limited to experience, and whenever it makes the attempt to surpass it, -it becomes involved in antinomies and paralogisms and gesticulates in -the void. Science moves among phenomena and can never penetrate beyond -them and attain to the "Thing in itself."</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The limits cf science and Jacobi.</i></div> - -<p>It would seem from this that Kant was bound to end in a renovated -nominalism and mysticism,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_534" id="Page_534">[Pg 534]</a></span> and indeed such is partly the case. -Contemporaneously with him, Jacobi also observed the limit in which -is enclosed the mechanical and determinist science of nature (the -highest philosophic expression of which was then found in the <i>Ethic</i> -of Spinoza), since it works with the principle of causation and is -impotent, unless it wishes to commit suicide, to leave the finite -which it describes in a causal series, and Jacobi concluded in favour -of mysticism and of <i>feeling,</i> the organ of the Knowledge of God. -Kant, like Jacobi, in his turn has recourse to the non-theoretic -form of the spirit, to the practical reason and its postulates, to -provide that certitude of God, of immortality, and of human freedom, -which is not evident to the theoretic reason. But in Kant there are -other positive elements which are not in Jacobi, and these elements, -although not sufficiently elaborated by him and not harmonized with -one another, confer upon his philosophy the value of a new Logic, -more or less sketched. For he recognizes not only a theoretic but -also a practical reason, which cannot be called simply practical, if -it in any way produce (although only under the title of postulates), -knowledge (and knowledge of supreme importance). He recognises also an -æsthetic judgment, which, although developed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_535" id="Page_535">[Pg 535]</a></span> without concepts, does -not belong to the sphere of practical interests; and a teleological -judgment, which is regulative and not constitutive, but not on this -account arbitrary or without meaning. Finally, the very contradictions, -in which the intellect becomes involved, when it wishes to apply the -categories beyond experience, could not reasonably be considered by -him to be mere errors, because they constitute serious problems, if -the intellect becomes involved in them, not capriciously, but of -<i>necessity.</i> All this presages the coming of a new Logic, which shall -set in their places these scattered elements of truth and solve the -contradictions.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The a priori synthesis.</i></div> - -<p>But the Kantian philosophy also contains, in addition to these elements -and these stimulations, the concept of the new Logic in the <i>a priori</i> -synthesis. This synthesis is the unity of the necessary and the -contingent, of concept and intuition, of thought and representation, -and consequently is the pure concept, the <i>concrete</i> universal.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The intimate contradiction of Kant. Romantic principle and -classical execution.</i></div> - -<p>Kant was not aware of this; and instead of developing with a mind free -from prejudice the thought of his genius, he also allowed himself -to be vanquished by the abstractionism of his time and out of the -logical and philosophical <i>a priori</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_536" id="Page_536">[Pg 536]</a></span> synthesis he made the more or -less arbitrary <i>a priori</i> synthesis of the sciences. In this way, the -apriority of the intuition led him, not to art, but to mathematics -(transcendental Æsthetic)<a name="FNanchor_14_45" id="FNanchor_14_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_45" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> the apriority of the intellect led -him, not to Philosophy, but to Physics (abstract intellect): hence -the impotence which afflicted that synthesis, when confronted with -philosophic problems. When he discovered the <i>a priori</i> synthesis, -Kant had laid his hand upon a profoundly <i>romantic</i> concept; but his -treatment of it became afterwards <i>classicist</i> and <i>intellectualist.</i> -The synthesis is the palpitating reality which makes itself and knows -itself in the making: the Kantian philosophy makes it rigid again in -the concepts of the sciences; and it is a philosophy in which the sense -of life, of imagination, of individuality, of history, is almost as -completely absent as in the great systems of the Cartesian period. -Whoever is not aware of this intimate drama and fails to understand -this contradiction; whoever, when confronted with the work of Kant, is -not seized with the need, either of going forward or of going backward, -has not reached the heart of that soul, the centre of that mind. The -old philosophers who condemned<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_537" id="Page_537">[Pg 537]</a></span> Kant as sceptical and as a corrupter of -philosophy, and who confined themselves strictly to Wolfianism and to -scholasticism, and the new who greeted him as a precursor and made of -him a stepping-stone on which to mount higher,—these alone came truly -into contact with Kant's philosophy. For in his case there are but two -alternatives: abhorrence or attraction, loathing or love. In the midst -of a battle one must flee or fight: to sit still and take one's ease is -the attitude of the unconscious and the mad. Certainly it is better to -fight than to flee, but it is better to flee than to sit inactive. He -who flees, saves at least his own skin, or, to abandon metaphor, saves -the old philosophy, which is still something; but the inactive man -loses both life and glory, the old philosophy and the new.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Advance upon Kant: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel.</i></div> - -<p>The new philosophy was that of the three great post-Kantians, Fichte, -Schelling and Hegel. With Fichte, all trace of the thing in itself has -disappeared and the dominating concept is that of the Ego, that is, -of the Spirit, which creates the world by means of the transcendental -imagination and recreates it in thought. In Schelling is found the -concept of the Absolute, the unity of subject and object, which has, as -its instrument, intellectual intuition. In Hegel,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_538" id="Page_538">[Pg 538]</a></span> there is this same -concept, but it has itself as instrument, that is to say, it is truly -logical. All three are Kantians, but all three (and especially the last -two) are not simply Kantian. They employed elements which Kant ignored -or employed timidly, and in particular the mystical tradition and the -new tendencies of æsthetic and historical thought. Thus they pass -beyond the abstractionism and intellectualism of the Kantian period, -and inaugurate the nineteenth century. They are connected ideally with -Vico (Hamann was the little German Vico), and they enrich him with the -thoughts of Kant.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The Logic of Hegel. The concrete concept or Idea.</i></div> - -<p>Neglecting the particular differences between these thinkers and the -genetic process by which we pass from one to the other, and taking the -result of that speculative movement in its most mature form, which is -the philosophy of Hegel, we see in it (like a new, securely established -society after the frequent changes of a revolution) the establishment -of the new doctrine of the concept. Kant's unconsciousness of the -consequences of the <i>a priori</i> synthesis had been such that he had -not hesitated to affirm that Logic, since the time of Aristotle, -had possessed so just and secure a form as not to need to take one -single step backward, and to be unable to take<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_539" id="Page_539">[Pg 539]</a></span> one forward.<a name="FNanchor_15_46" id="FNanchor_15_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_46" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> But -Hegel insisted that this was rather a sign that that science demanded -complete re-elaboration, since an application of two thousand years -should have endowed the spirit with a more lofty consciousness of -its own thought and of its own essential nature.<a name="FNanchor_16_47" id="FNanchor_16_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_47" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> What was the -concept for Hegel? It was not that of the empirical sciences, which -consists in a simple general representation and therefore always -in something finite; it is barbaric to give the name concepts to -intellectual formations, like "blue," "house," or "animal." Nor was -it the mathematical concept, which is an arbitrary construction. All -the logical rationality that there is in mathematics is what is called -irrational. These so-called concepts are the products of the abstract -intellect; the true concept is the product of the concrete intellect, -or reason. It has therefore nothing to do with the immediate knowledge -of the sentimentalists and of the mystics, and with the intuition of -the æstheticists; such formulae as these express the necessity for the -concept, but give only a negative determination of it. They assert what -it is not in relation to the empirical sciences and then misstate what -it is in philosophy. For the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_540" id="Page_540">[Pg 540]</a></span> rest, the shortcomings of the abstract -intellect, generating the pure void or <i>thing in itself</i>(which far -from being, as Kant believed, unknowable, is indeed the best known -thing of all, the abstraction from everything and from thought itself) -prepare the environment for the phantasms and caprices of mysticism -and intuitionism. The true concept is the <i>idea,</i> and the idea is the -absolute unity of the concept and of its objectivity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Identity of the Hegelian Idea with the Kantian a priori -synthesis.</i></div> - - -<p>This definition has sometimes seemed whimsical, sometimes most obscure; -yet it presents nothing but the elaboration in a more rigorous form -of the Kantian <i>a priori</i> synthesis, so that these two terms could -without further difficulty be regarded as equivalent; the <i>a priori</i> -logical synthesis is the Idea and the Idea is the <i>a priori</i> logical -synthesis. If Hegel has not been understood, that is due to the fact -that Kant himself has not been understood. Those who assert that they -understand what Kant meant to say, but not what Hegel meant to say, -deceive themselves. For Kant and Hegel say the same thing, though the -latter says it with greater consciousness and clearness, that is to -say, better.<a name="FNanchor_17_48" id="FNanchor_17_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_48" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_541" id="Page_541">[Pg 541]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The Idea and the Antinomies. The Dialectic.</i></div> - -<p>The idea, the concrete universal, the pure concept, rebels against -the mechanical divisions employed for the empirical concepts. For it -has its own division, its own proper and intimate rhythm, by means -of which it divides and unifies, and unifies itself when dividing -and divides itself when unifying. The concept thinks reality, which -is not immobile but in motion, not abstract being, but becoming; -and therefore in it distinctions are generated one from another and -oppositions reconciled. Hegel not only gives the true meaning of -the Kantian <i>a priori</i> synthesis, recognizing it as the concrete -concept, but replaces the antinomies in its bosom. The contradiction -is not due to the limitation of thought before a non-contradictory -reality, which thought is unable to attain; it is the character<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_542" id="Page_542">[Pg 542]</a></span> of -reality itself, which contradicts itself in itself, and is opposition, -<i>coincidentia oppositorum,</i> the synthesis of opposites, or dialectic. -A new doctrine of opposites and the outlines of a new doctrine of -distinction accompanies the new doctrine of the pure concept. In this -philosophy is truly summarized all the previous history of thought. The -concept of Socrates has acquired the reality of the idea of Plato, the -concreteness of the substance of Aristotle, the unity-in-opposition -of Cusanus and Bruno, the Vichian reconciliation of philosophy and -philology, the unity-in-distinction of the Kantian synthesis and the -æsthetic suppleness of Schelling's intellectual intuition.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The lacunæ and errors of the Hegelian Logic. Their -consequences.</i></div> - -<p>Nevertheless, the history of thought does not stop at Hegel. In Hegel -himself are found the points to which later history must attach -itself; the lacunæ which he left and the errors into which he fell. -The fundamental error was the abuse of the dialectic method, which -originated for the philosophic solution of the problem of opposites, -but was extended by Hegel to the distinct concepts, so that he -interpreted even the Kantian synthesis itself as nothing but the unity -of opposites. Hence arises his incapacity to attribute their true -value and function to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_543" id="Page_543">[Pg 543]</a></span> alogical forms of the spirit, such as art, -and to the atheoretic, such as the natural sciences and mathematics; -and even to logical thought itself, which, violating the laws of the -synthesis, ended by imposing itself upon history and the natural -sciences, attempting to resolve them into itself by dialectizing them, -as the philosophy of history and the philosophy of nature. To this, -therefore, is due the philosophism or panlogism which is characteristic -of the system. This error was assisted by Hegel's want of clearness as -to the nature of the empirical sciences. For him as for Kant, these -remained <i>sciences,</i> that is to say, knowledge of truth, although -imperfect knowledge of it. They therefore constituted even for him -the material or the first step in philosophy. It is true that he also -had other more acute and profound thoughts upon this subject. Amid a -number of incidental observations, he emphasized the arbitrariness -(<i>Willkurlichkeit</i>), with which those forms are affected; and this -is tantamount to declaring their practical and atheoretic character. -But instead of respecting this character, he decided upon surpassing -it by means of a philosophic transformation of those sciences, -which was not so much their death as pretended philosophies (a most -true conclusion),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_544" id="Page_544">[Pg 544]</a></span> as their elevation to the rank of particular -philosophies by means of a mixture of empirical concepts and pure -concepts, of abstract intellect and of reason. The erroneous tendency -found nourishment and took concrete form in the idea of a Philosophy -of nature, which Schelling had obtained, partly from Kant himself -and partly had found in his own at first latent and then manifest -theosophism. In this way, the system of Hegel became divided into three -parts, a Logic-metaphysic, a Philosophy of nature and a Philosophy of -Spirit, whereas it should on the contrary have unified Logic and the -Philosophy of Spirit, and expelled the Philosophy of nature. By its -internal dialectic, panlogism or philosophism was converted, even in -Hegel himself, and still more among his disciples, into mythologism, -and from the system of the Idea and of absolute immanence, because of -the imperfections which they contained, there reappeared theism and -transcendence (the Hegelian right wing).<a name="FNanchor_18_49" id="FNanchor_18_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_49" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Contemporaries of Hegel: Herbart, Schleiermacher, and -others.</i></div> - -<p>It would be vain to seek the correction of Hegel among those thinkers -that were his contemporaries, for they were all, though in various -degrees, inferior to him. None of them had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_545" id="Page_545">[Pg 545]</a></span> attained, through Kant, to -the height attained by Hegel. Dwelling on a lower level, they could -certainly refuse to recognize him and vituperate him, but they could -never collaborate with and beyond him, in the progress of truth. -Herbart held those concepts to which the particular sciences give rise -to be contradictory, but he claimed to surpass the contradiction by -means of an elaboration of the concepts (<i>Bearbeitung der Begriffe</i>), -conducted in the very method of the old Logic, that is, of the Logic -of the empirical sciences. Schleiermacher renounced the attempt to -reach the unity of the speculative and the empirical, of Ethic and -Physics, that is, the realization of the pure idea of knowledge; -and he substituted for that ideal, which for him was unattainable, -<i>criticism,</i> a form of worldly wisdom; that is to say, of philosophy -(<i>Weltweisheit</i>) which gave access to theology and to religious -feeling.<a name="FNanchor_19_50" id="FNanchor_19_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_50" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Schopenhauer accepted the distinction between concept -and idea, the first abstract and artificial, the second concrete and -real; but so slight was his understanding of the idea (which he called -the Platonic idea) that he confused it with the concept of natural -species,<a name="FNanchor_20_51" id="FNanchor_20_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_51" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> that is to say,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_546" id="Page_546">[Pg 546]</a></span> precisely with one of the most artificial -and arbitrary of empirical concepts. Finally, Schelling, who had been -a precursor of Hegel in his youth and had collaborated with him, -not only failed to improve his logic of the intuition in his second -philosophical period, but he abandoned even this embryonic form of the -concrete concept, and gave himself over as a prey to the will and to -irrationality. In his positive philosophy the old adversary of Jacobi -made a bad combination of the alogism of Jacobi with the Hegelian -idea of development and with mythologism, as in metaphysic he had -anticipated the blind will of Schopenhauer.<a name="FNanchor_21_52" id="FNanchor_21_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_52" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Later positivism and psychologism.</i></div> - -<p>The ensuing period, both in Germany and in the whole of Europe, had -little philosophical interest. It was marked by the reappearance of -a form of naturalism and of Empiricism, in part<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_547" id="Page_547">[Pg 547]</a></span> justified by the -abuse of the dialectic, which had sometimes, in the hands of Hegel's -disciples, seemed altogether mad. But this recrudescence was in every -way very poor in thought and inadequate to previous history. With this -Empiricism is associated the deplorable <i>Logic</i> of John Stuart Mill, -one of those books which do least honour to the human spirit. That -less than mediocre reasoner did not even succeed in producing a Logic -of the natural sciences. He became involved in contradictions and -tautologies, talking, for instance, of experience, which criticises -itself and imposes its own limits upon itself, and of the principle -of causality, as a law which affirms the existence of a law that -there shall be a law. Still less had he any notion of what it is -to philosophize, maintaining that in order to make progress in the -moral and philosophical sciences it is necessary to apply to them -the method of the physical sciences. Nothing is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_548" id="Page_548">[Pg 548]</a></span> more puerile than -his nominalism, which gives language a logical character, and then -pretends that language must be logically reformed. Logical science was -altogether lost in the evolutionism or physiologism of Spencer, and in -the psychologism which had and still has many followers in Germany, in -France, and in England, not less than in Italy. The state in which the -Logic of philosophy is found in such an environment can be inferred -from the fact that even mathematical Logic fared ill there, since there -have not been wanting those who have dared to conceive a <i>psychology -of arithmetic.</i> Finally, as a healthy corrective of psychologism, the -danger of which to the old Logic had already been noted by Kant,<a name="FNanchor_22_53" id="FNanchor_22_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_53" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> -there came the revival of the Aristotelian, and even of the scholastic -Logic, in which there yet lived, though in erroneous forms, the idea of -the universal which had been discovered by the Greek philosophers.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Eclectics. Lotze.</i></div> - -<p>Other thinkers have not abandoned all contact with classical German -philosophy; but, in comparison with the thoughts of Kant and of Kant's -great pupils, they seem like children. They try to lift the weapons of -the Titans, and either they do not move them at all or they let them -fall<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_549" id="Page_549">[Pg 549]</a></span> from their hands, wounding themselves with them, but failing -to grip them. The thoughts of Schelling and of Hegel indeed were -discredited, but not touched; and those of Kant were touched, but -ill-treated. In the most esteemed Logics of this description, such -as those of Sigwart and of Wundt, the capital distinction between -pure concepts and representative concepts, between <i>universalia</i> and -<i>generalia,</i> has no prominence at all. Sigwart is obliged to complete -the knowledge obtained from naturalistic and mathematical procedure -by faith and by a gradual elevation to the idea of God. Wundt, who -does not attribute to philosophy a method which is proper to it and -different from that of the other forms of knowledge, conceives the -final result of metaphysical thought as the position of a perpetual -hypothesis. In the Logic of Lotze, who combated Hegelianism and revived -transcendentalism and theism, there is just a luminous streak, a -faint trace, of the idealist philosophy. Lotze understands that it -is impossible to form (empirical) concepts by simply cancelling the -varying parts of representations and preserving the constant parts, -and recognizes that the formation of concepts presupposes the concept: -the universal is made with the universal. He strives to issue from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_550" id="Page_550">[Pg 550]</a></span> -this circle by positing a <i>primary</i> universal, not formed by the method -of the others, but such that thought finds it in itself. This primary -universal has nothing particular and representative; and only by means -of it is it possible to combine heterogeneous and to differentiate -homogeneous elements, and to form the ideas of size, of more or less, -of one and of many and such like, with which the <i>second</i> universals of -the synthesis are afterwards constructed.<a name="FNanchor_23_54" id="FNanchor_23_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_54" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>New gnoseology of Science. The Economic theory of the -scientific concept.</i></div> - -<p>While students of philosophy, although manifesting some doubt and -dissatisfaction, allowed themselves to be intimidated by naturalism -(dazzled, like the public, with technical applications, or confounded -by the applause of the public), a tendency has become more and more -accentuated during the last decades, which seems to us to offer great -assistance to Logic and philosophy in general, if it is understood -how to adapt it to its true end. It has not had any single centre -of diffusion, but has arisen, almost contemporaneously, in several -places, becoming at once diffused everywhere, like something that has -happened at the right time. Several of its founders and promoters -are mathematicians, physicists, and naturalists. From the very fact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_551" id="Page_551">[Pg 551]</a></span> -of their having begun to reflect upon their activity, these men -have certainly ceased to be mere specialists, notwithstanding their -protests to the contrary. Yet they obtain considerable strength from -their specialism, finding in it a guide and a curb to prevent their -losing sight in their gnoseological enquiry of the actual procedure of -naturalistic constructions, which are its origin. The formula of this -tendency is the recognition of the <i>practical or economic</i> character of -the mathematical, physical, and natural sciences.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Avenarius, Mach.</i></div> - -<p>The empirocriticism of Avenarius considers science to be a simple -description of the forms of experience, and conceptual procedure to -be the instrument that alters pure and primitive experience (pure -intuition or pure perception) for the purpose of simplifying it. Ernest -Mach has developed and popularized these views, for as a student of -mechanics he had reached the same conclusions by his own path and in -his own way. The physical sciences (he says), not less than zoology and -botany, have as their sole foundation the description of natural facts -in which there are never identical cases. Identical cases are created -by means of the schematic imitation that we make of reality; and here -toe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_552" id="Page_552">[Pg 552]</a></span> lies the origin of the mutual dependence that appears in the -character of facts. To this therefore he restricts the significance of -the principle of causality, for which (in order to avoid fancifulness -and mythologicism) it would be opportune to substitute the concept of -<i>function.</i> Bodies or things are abbreviated intellectual <i>symbols</i> of -groups of sensations; symbols, that is to say, which have no existence -outside our intellect. They are cards, like those which dealers attach -to boxes and which have no value except in so far as there are goods of -value inside the box. In this economic schematicism lies the strength, -but also the weakness, of science; for in the presentation of facts -science always sacrifices something of their individuality and real -appearance, and does not seek exactness in another way save when -obliged to do so, by the requirements of a definite moment. Hence the -incongruity between experience and science. Since they are developed -upon parallel lines, they can reduce to some extent the interval that -separates them, but they can never annul it by becoming coincident with -one another.<a name="FNanchor_24_55" id="FNanchor_24_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_55" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p> - -<p><i>Rickert,</i> in his book on the <i>Limits of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_553" id="Page_553">[Pg 553]</a></span> Naturalistic Concepts,</i> -maintains similar ideas, though with different cultural assumptions. -The concept, which is the result of the labour of the sciences, is -nothing but a means to a scientific end. The world of bodies and of -souls is infinite in space and time. It is not possible to represent -it in every individual part, by reason of its variety, which is not -only extensive but also intensive: intuition is inexhaustible. The -naturalistic concept is directed to surpassing this infinity of -intuitions. It effects this by determining its own extension and -comprehension, and by formulating its being in a series of judgments. -Thus, in order to conquer intuition altogether, the natural sciences -tend to substitute for concepts of <i>tilings</i> concepts of <i>relations</i> -free from all intuitive elements. But the ultimate concept must always -of necessity be a concept of things (though of things <i>sui generis,</i> -immutable, indivisible, perfectly equal among themselves, expressible -in negative judgments); and besides, they find everywhere insuperable -barriers in the historical or descriptive element, which surrounds them -all and is ineliminable. This naturalistic procedure can be applied -and is indeed applied, not only to the science of bodies, but also to -that of souls, to psychology and sociology; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_554" id="Page_554">[Pg 554]</a></span> Rickert opportunely -insists (as did Hegel in his time) upon the possibility of empirical -sciences of what is called the spiritual world; or (as he says) the -word "nature," as used in this connection, means not a reality, but a -particular point of view from which reality is observed, in order to -reach the end of conceptual simplification.<a name="FNanchor_25_56" id="FNanchor_25_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_56" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Bergson and the new French philosophy.</i></div> - -<p>In France, the same ideas or very similar are represented by a group -of thinkers, who are called variously philosophers of contingency, of -liberty, of intuition, or of action. Bergson, who is the chief of them, -looks upon the concepts of the natural sciences in the same way as -Mach, as <i>symboles</i> and <i>étiquettes.</i> Besides the extremely apposite -applications that he has made of this principle to the analysis of -time, of duration, of space, of movement, of liberty, of evolution, he -has also the great merit of having broken his country's traditions of -intellectualism and abstractionism, of giving to France for the first -time that lively consciousness of the intuition, which she has always -lacked, and of shaking her excessive reliance upon clear distinctions, -upon well-turned concepts, upon classes, formulæ, and reasonings<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_555" id="Page_555">[Pg 555]</a></span> that -proceed in a straight line, but run upon the surface of reality.<a name="FNanchor_26_57" id="FNanchor_26_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_57" class="fnanchor">[26]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Le Roy and others.</i></div> - -<p>Le Roy, one of the followers of Bergson, has set himself to -demonstrate, with many examples, that scientific laws only become -rigorous when they are changed into conventions and depend upon vicious -circles. The course of events is habitual and regular (if you like -to say so), but it is not at all necessary. The great security of -astronomical previsions is commonly praised; but that security is not -always such in actual fact ("<i>il y a des comètes qui ne reviennent -pas</i>"), and in any case it is always approximate. The rigorous -necessity of which the natural sciences boast, is not known, but is -rather postulated, and this postulation has merely the practical object -of dominating single facts and of communicating with our neighbours -("<i>parler le monde</i>"). The law of gravity holds, but only when external -forces do not disturb it. In this way it is well understood that it -always holds. The conservation of energy avails only in closed systems; -but closed systems are just those in which energy is conserved. A body -left to itself persists in the state of repose; but this law is nothing -but the definition of a body<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_556" id="Page_556">[Pg 556]</a></span> left to itself, and so on.<a name="FNanchor_27_58" id="FNanchor_27_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_58" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> Poincaré -boldly affirms the conventional character of the mathematical and -physical sciences, as do Milhaud and several others. They have deduced -it as a consequence of the impression aroused by the theories of higher -geometry, which has contributed more or less successfully towards -revealing the practical character of mathematics, which was formerly -held to be the foundation or model of truth and certainty.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Reattachment to romantic ideas and advance made upon them.</i></div> - -<p>All those criticisms directed against the sciences do not sound new -to the ears of those Schelling, of Novalis, and of other romantics, -and particularly with Hegel's marvellous criticism of the abstract -(that is, empirical and mathematical) intellect. This runs through -all his books, from the <i>Phenomenology of the Spirit</i> to the <i>Science -of Logic,</i> and is enriched with examples in the observations to the -paragraphs of the <i>Philosophy of Nature.</i> But if compared with that of -Hegel, they are at the disadvantage of not being based upon powerful -philosophical thought; they have, on the other hand, this superiority: -that they do not present the characteristics observed in the sciences -as errors which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_557" id="Page_557">[Pg 557]</a></span> must be corrected, but define them as physiological, -necessary, uncensurable characteristics, derived from the very function -of the sciences, which is not theoretic, but practical and economic. In -this way there is posited one of the premisses that are necessary for -preventing the mixture of the economic method with the method of truth, -of empirical and abstract concepts with pure theoretic forms, and thus -for making impossible that speculative hybridism, which is expressed in -philosophies of history and of nature, and which fashions an abstract -reason to work out a dialectic of the naturalistic concepts, and even -of the representations of history. And with the prevention of this -error there is also prepared a more exact idea of the relation between -pseudoconcepts and concepts and a better constitution of philosophic -Logic.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Philosophy of pure experience, of intuition, of action, -etc.; and its insufficiency.</i></div> - -<p>But in order that this result should be obtained, the idea of the -philosophic universal must be reawakened and strengthened, in -conformity with its most perfect elaboration in the history of thought, -at the hands of Hegel. The critics of the sciences are at present -far from this mark. The term that is distinct from the empirical and -abstract concepts, the knowledge of reality which is not falsified -by practical ends and discovered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_558" id="Page_558">[Pg 558]</a></span> beneath labels and formulae, -is supplied, not by the pure concept, by reality thought in its -concreteness, by philosophy which is history, but by pure sensation -or intuition. Both Avenarius and Mach appeal to pure and primitive -experience, that is, to experience free of thought and anterior to it. -Bergson, with an artistic talent that is wanting to the two Germans, -but following the same path, has proclaimed a new metaphysic, which -proceeds in an opposite sense to that of symbolical knowledge and of -generalizing and abstracting experience. He has defined the metaphysic -which he desires, as a science <i>qui prétend se passer des symboles,</i> -and therefore as "<i>Science de l'expérience intégrale.</i>" This metaphysic -would be the opposite of the Kantian ideal, of the mathematical -universal, of the Platonism of the concepts, and would be founded -upon intuition, the sole organ of the Absolute: "<i>est relative la -connaissance symbolique par concepts pré-existants qui va du fixe au -mouvant, mais non pas la connaissance intuitive, qui s'installe dans -le mouvement et adopte la vie même des choses. Cette intuition atteint -l'absolu.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_28_59" id="FNanchor_28_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_59" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> The conclusion is æstheticism, and sometimes something -even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_559" id="Page_559">[Pg 559]</a></span> less than æstheticism, namely mysticism, or <i>action</i> substituted -for the concept. The criticism of the sciences thereby comes to -mean the negation of knowledge and of truth. Hence the protest of -Poincaré<a name="FNanchor_29_60" id="FNanchor_29_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_60" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> against Le Roy, justified in its motive, but ineffective, -because based upon the presuppositions of mathematics and physics. -In others again, it becomes intermingled with the turbid waters of -pragmatism, which is a little of everything, but, above all, chatter -and emptiness.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theory of values.</i></div> - -<p>Finally, another of the thinkers that we have mentioned, Rickert -(following Windelband), wishes to integrate naturalistic and abstract -knowledge with the historical knowledge of individual reality. Being -reasonably diffident as to the possibility of a metaphysic as an -"experimental science" (such as Zeller was among the first to desire), -he moves towards a general theory of values. This indeed is the form -(imperfect because stained with transcendence) by means of which many -in our day are approaching a philosophy as the science of the spirit -(or of immanent value). But in the hands of Windelband and Rickert it -is understood as a primacy of the practical reason, which is taken to -govern the double series of the world of the sciences and the world -of history. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_560" id="Page_560">[Pg 560]</a></span> doubtless represents progress, as compared with -empiricism and positivism; but not as compared with the Hegelian Logic -of the pure concept, which included in itself what is and what ought to -be.</p> - -<p>Such, briefly stated, is the present state of logical doctrines -concerning the Concept.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_32" id="Footnote_1_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_32"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>De sophist. elench.</i> ch. 34.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_33" id="Footnote_2_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_33"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Metaphys.</i> M 4, p. 1078 b 28-30; cf. A 6, p. 987 b 2-3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_34" id="Footnote_3_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_34"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Cf. <i>Æsthetic,</i> part ii. chap. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_35" id="Footnote_4_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_35"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See in this connection the observations of Lasson, in the -preface to his recent German translation of the <i>Metaphysic,</i> Jena, -Diederichs, 1907.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_36" id="Footnote_5_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_36"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Cf. especially the <i>Parmenides,</i> the <i>Theætetus,</i> and -<i>Book of the Republic.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_37" id="Footnote_6_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_37"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Metaphys.</i> E I, p. 1025 b, 1026 a.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_38" id="Footnote_7_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_38"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Metaphys.</i> vi. 1027 a.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_39" id="Footnote_8_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_39"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Anal. post.</i> i. ch. 30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_40" id="Footnote_9_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_40"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> See the writings of Gentile concerning De Wulf and La -Berthonnière in the <i>Critica,</i> iii. pp. 203-21, iv. pp. 431-445.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_41" id="Footnote_10_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_41"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Prantl, <i>Gesch. d. Logik,</i> iii. pp. 182-3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_42" id="Footnote_11_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_42"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> For these references to writings of Luther, see F. J. -Schmidt, <i>Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus,</i> Leipzig, 1908, pp. 44-6.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_43" id="Footnote_12_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_43"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> See my Essay upon Hegel, ch. ii.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_44" id="Footnote_13_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_44"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Preface to <i>Nouveaux Essais.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_45" id="Footnote_14_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_45"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> See what is said on this point in my -<i>Æsthetic,</i><sup>2</sup> Part II. Chap. VIII.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_46" id="Footnote_15_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_46"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Krit. d. rein. Vern.</i> ed. Kirchmann, pp. 22-3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_47" id="Footnote_16_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_47"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Wiss. d. Logik,</i> i. p. 35; cfr. p. 19.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_48" id="Footnote_17_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_48"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Kuno Fischer in his <i>Logic,</i> when expounding the thought -of Hegel, clearly distinguishes the empirical concepts from the pure -concepts, and notes that those which are pure or philosophical, are, -in the spirit, the basis and presupposition of the others. "These -others, the empirical, are formed from single representations or -intuitions, by uniting homogeneous characteristics and separating -them from the heterogeneous; and thus arise general representations, -concepts of classes": empirical, because of their empirical origin, -and representative, because they represent entire classes of single -objects, that is, are generalized representations. But at the base -of each of these are found judgments or syntheses, which contain -non-empirical and non-representable elements, elements which are <i>a -priori</i> and only thinkable. These are the true concepts, the first -thoughts in the ideal order, without which nothing can be thought -(<i>Logik<sup>2</sup>,</i> i. sect. i. § 3). The difference between these -pure concepts or categories and empirical concepts or categories is -not quantitative, but qualitative: the pure concepts are not the most -general, the broadest classes; they do not represent phenomena, but -connections and relations; they can be compared to the signs (+,-, x, -÷, √, etc.) of arithmetical operations; they are not obtainable by -abstraction, indeed it is by means of them that all abstractions are -affected (<i>loc. cit.</i> §§ 5-6).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_49" id="Footnote_18_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_49"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> See my essay, <i>What is Living and what is Dead of the -Philosophy of Hegel,</i> for the criticism here briefly summarized.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_50" id="Footnote_19_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_50"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Dialektik,</i> ed. Halpern, pp. 203-245.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_51" id="Footnote_20_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_51"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Werke,</i> ed. Grisebach, ii. chap. 39.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_52" id="Footnote_21_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_52"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> The movement of Italian thought in the first decades of -the nineteenth century was rather a progress of national philosophic -culture than a factor in the general history of philosophy. In this -last respect, the rôle of Italy was for the time being ended; though -it did not end in the seventeenth century with Campanella and Galileo -(as foreign historians and the Italians who copy them believe). It -ended magnificently in the first half of the eighteenth century with -Vico, the last representative of the Renaissance and the first of -Romanticism. The influence of German philosophy continued to manifest -itself in Italy in the nineteenth century, at first almost entirely -through French literature, then directly. It can be studied in the -three principal thinkers of the first half of the century, Galuppi, -Rosmini, and Gioberti. The first began from the Scottish school, and -while attacking Kant, he absorbed not a few of his principles. The -second, also in a polemical sense and in a Catholic wrapping, can be -called the Italian Kant. The third, who had always only the slightest -consciousness of history, assumed the same position as Schelling and -Hegel. To have attained (between 1850 and 1860) to such historical -consciousness is the merit of Bertrando Spaventa (see especially his -book, <i>La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni con la filosofia -europea,</i> new edition, by G. Gentile, Bari, Laterza, 1908), who -represented Hegelianism in Italy in a very cautious and critical form. -But there was no true surpassing of Hegelianism either by his disciples -or by his adversaries, and some original thought is to be found only -among non-professional philosophers, particularly in Æsthetic, with -Francesco de Sanctis (cf. <i>Estetica,</i> part ii. chap. 15).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_53" id="Footnote_22_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_53"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Krit. d. rein. Vernunft, loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_54" id="Footnote_23_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_54"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Logik,</i> p. 42 <i>sqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_55" id="Footnote_24_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_55"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> See, among other books, <i>L'Analisi delle sensazioni,</i> -Italian translation Turin, Bocca; 1903.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_56" id="Footnote_25_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_56"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Grenzen d. naturwissensch. Begriffsbildung,</i> Freiburg i. -B, 1896-1902, chaps. 1-3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_57" id="Footnote_26_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_57"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> See above, <a href="#Page_528">p. 528</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_58" id="Footnote_27_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_58"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> See his articles in the <i>Revue de métaphys. et de -morale,</i> vols. vii. viii. xi.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_59" id="Footnote_28_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_59"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> "Introduction à la Métaphysique," in the <i>Revue de -métaphys. et de mor.</i> xi. pp. 1-36.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_60" id="Footnote_29_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_60"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>La Valeur de la science,</i> Paris, 1904.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_561" id="Page_561">[Pg 561]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="IIIf" id="IIIf">III</a></h4> - - -<h5>THE THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Secular neglect of the theory of history.</i></div> - -<p>The theory of the individual judgment and therefore of historical -thought, has been the least elaborated of all logical theories in -the course of philosophic history. It is a very true and profound -remark that the historical sense is a modern thing, and that the -nineteenth century is the first great century of historical thinking. -Of course, since history has always been made and individual judgments -pronounced, theoretic observations upon historical judgments have not -been altogether wanting in the past. The spirit is, as we know, the -whole spirit at every instant, and in this respect nothing is ever -new under the sun, indeed, nothing is new, either before or after the -sun.<a name="FNanchor_1_61" id="FNanchor_1_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_61" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> But history, and in particular, the theory of history, did not -formerly arouse interest nor attract attention, nor was its importance -felt,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_562" id="Page_562">[Pg 562]</a></span> nor was it the object of anxious and wide investigations to the -degree witnessed in the nineteenth century and in our times, when the -consciousness of immanence triumphs more and more—and immanence means -history.</p> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Græco-Roman world's ideas of history.</i></div> - -<p>Transcendence, then, which has for centuries been more or less -dominant, supplies the reason why the study of the individual and the -theory of history were neglected. In Greek philosophy, individual -judgments were either despised, as in Platonism, or superseded by and -confused with logical judgments of the universal, as in Aristotle. In -the <i>Poetics</i><a name="FNanchor_2_62" id="FNanchor_2_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_62" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> the character of history did not escape him. Differing -from science (which was directed to the universal) and from poetry -(which was directed to the possible), it expresses things that have -happened in their individuality, <i>ta genomena</i> (what Alcibiades did and -experienced). But in the <i>Organon,</i> although he distinguished between -the universal (ta katholou) and the individual (ta kath' ekastou), -between man and Callias,<a name="FNanchor_3_63" id="FNanchor_3_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_63" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> he made no use of the distinction, and -divided judgments into universal, particular and indefinite. The -theory of history was not raised to the rank of philosophic treatment -in antiquity, like the other forms of knowledge, and especially<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_563" id="Page_563">[Pg 563]</a></span> -philosophy, mathematics and poetry. What mark the ancients have -left upon the argument is limited to incidental observations, and -some altogether empirical remarks here and there upon the method of -writing history. They were wont to assign extrinsic ends to it, such -as utility and advice upon the conduct of life. Such utterances of -good common sense as that of Quintilian, to the effect that history -is written <i>ad narrandum, non ad demonstrandum,</i> do not possess great -philosophic weight. Nor had the rules of the rhetoricians philosophic -value, such as that of Dionysus of Halicarnassus, that historical -narrative, without becoming quite poetical, should be somewhat more -elevated in tone than ordinary discourse; or that of Cicero, who -demanded for historical style <i>verba ferme poëtarum,</i> "perhaps" (wrote -Vico, making the rhetorical rule profound) "in order that historians -might be maintained in their most ancient possession, since, as has -been demonstrated in the <i>Scienza nuova,</i> the first historians of -the nations were the first poets."<a name="FNanchor_4_64" id="FNanchor_4_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_64" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> More important, on the other -hand, are the demands (as expressed especially by Polybius) of what -is indispensable to history. Besides the element of fact, there is -needful (Polybius observed)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_564" id="Page_564">[Pg 564]</a></span> knowledge of the nature of the things -of which the happenings are portrayed, of military art for military -things, of politics for things political. History is written, not -from books, as is the way with compilers and men of letters, but from -original documents, by visiting the places where it has occurred and by -penetrating it with experience and with thought.<a name="FNanchor_5_65" id="FNanchor_5_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_65" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theory of history in mediæval and modern philosophy</i></div> - -<p>The abstractionist and anti-historical character of the Aristotelian -Logic had an injurious effect in the schools, though, on the other -hand, it allied itself well with the persistent transcendentalism. -Certainly, just as in the Middle Ages appeared reflections upon -history, so there could be no avoiding the distinction between what -was known <i>logice</i> and what was known <i>historice,</i> or, as Leibnitz -afterwards formulated the distinction, between <i>propositions de raison</i> -and <i>propositions de fait.</i> But these latter were always regarded -with a compassionate eye, as a sort of uncertain and inferior truth. -The ideal of exact science would have been to absorb truths of fact -in truths of reason, and to resolve them all into a philosophy, or -rather into a universal mathematics. Nor did the empiricists succeed -in increasing their credit.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_565" id="Page_565">[Pg 565]</a></span> These certainly paid particular attention -to facts (hence the polemic of the Anti-Aristotelians and the origin -of the new instrument of observation and induction). But by weakening -the consciousness of the concrete universal they also weakened that -of the concrete individual, and therefore presented the latter in the -mutilated form of species and genera, of types and classes. Bacon, had -he done nothing else, at any rate assigned a place to history in his -classification of knowledge, which was divided, as we know, according -to the three faculties (memory, imagination and reason), into History, -Poetry and Philosophy. He passed in review the two great classes of -history, natural and civil (the first of which was either narrative -or inductive, the second more variously subdivided); thus he even -pointed out the kinds of history that were desirable, but of which no -conspicuous examples were yet extant, such as literary history.<a name="FNanchor_6_66" id="FNanchor_6_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_66" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> -Hobbes, on the other hand, having distinguished the two species of -cognition, one of reason and the other of fact, "altera facti, et est -cognitio propria testium, cujus conscriptio est historia," and having -subdivided this into natural and civil, "<i>neutra</i>" (he added, that is -to say neither the natural nor the civil) "<i>pertinet ad<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_566" id="Page_566">[Pg 566]</a></span> institutum -nostrum</i>" which was concerned only with the <i>cognitio consequentiarum,</i> -that is to say, science and philosophy.<a name="FNanchor_7_67" id="FNanchor_7_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_67" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> Locke is not less -anti-historical than Descartes and Spinoza, and even Leibnitz, who was -very learned, did not recognize the autonomy of historical work, and -continued to consider it as directed towards utilitarian and moral ends.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Treatises on historical art in the Renaissance.</i></div> - -<p>Reflections upon history, suggested rather by the professional needs -of historians than by a need for systematization and a profound -philosophy, continued on their way, almost apart from the philosophy -of the time. From the Renaissance onwards, treatises on historical -art were multiplied at the hands of Robortelli, Atanagi, Riccoboni, -Foglietta, Beni, Mascardi, and of many others, even of non-Italians; -but their discussions usually centred upon elocution, upon the use of -ornament and of digressions, upon arguments worthy of history, and -the like. Among these writers of treatises we must note (here as well -as in the history of Poetics and of Rhetoric) Francesco Patrizio or -Patrizzi (1560), for his ideas, sometimes acute, sometimes incoherent -and extravagant. Overcoming one of the prejudices of empiricism, he -justly wished<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_567" id="Page_567">[Pg 567]</a></span> that the concept of history should not be limited to -military enterprises and political negotiations alone, and that it -should be extended to all the doings of men. With a like superiority -to empirical views, he found historical representation not only in -words, but also in painting and sculpture—(our times, so fruitful -of histories graphically illustrated, should admit that he was to -some extent right), and he did not accept chronological limits. He -also insisted upon the mode of testing historical truth and upon the -degree of credibility of witnesses. But he became extravagant, when he -admitted a history of the future, calling the prophets as witnesses, -and incoherent, when he both denied and affirmed the moral end of -history.<a name="FNanchor_8_68" id="FNanchor_8_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_68" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Treatises upon method.</i></div> - -<p>Another form of empiricism, certainly more important, the -methodological, which dealt with the canons and criteria to be borne in -mind in making historical researches, accompanied the often rhetorical -empiricism of writers of treatises. The reference to the duties of -the historian in one place in Cicero was repeated and commented upon -by all. But this treatment became gradually more wide, as we see -especially in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_568" id="Page_568">[Pg 568]</a></span> the work of Vossius, <i>Ars historica sive de historia -et historiae natura, historiaeque scribendae praeceptis commentatio</i> -(1623). The term "Historic" dates from this book and is formed on the -analogy of Logic, Poetic, Rhetoric, etc., and applied to the theory or -Logic of history. Gervinus (1837) and Droysen (1858) tried to bring -this term again into vogue. The methodological treatment of historical -research was more widely developed in the scholastic manuals of Logic -of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as the <i>Logica seu ars -ratiocinandi</i> of Leclerc (1692).<a name="FNanchor_9_69" id="FNanchor_9_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_69" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> With these canons arising in the -field of research and historical criticism, we may opportunely compare -those concerning the mode of valuing and weighing evidence, which were -gradually unified in juridical literature. Methodological treatment -has also progressed in our times, in manuals such as those of Droysen, -of Bernheim, of Langlois-Seignobos; but the general tendency of these -works (as is also evident from their apparatus in heuristic, in -criticism, in comprehension and in exposition) remains and must remain -altogether empirical.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theory of history and G. B. Vico.</i></div> - -<p>The first philosopher who gave to History<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_569" id="Page_569">[Pg 569]</a></span> an importance equal to -Philosophy was Vico, with his already-mentioned union of philosophy -and philology, of <i>truth</i> and <i>certainty,</i> and with the example that -he offered of a philosophic <i>system,</i> which is also a <i>history</i> of the -human race: an "<i>eternal ideal</i> history, upon which the histories of -nations run in <i>time.</i>" For this reason (not less than from his strong -consciousness of the difference in character between the metaphysical -concept and mathematical abstraction) Vico was an Anti-Cartesian. He -stands between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the opposer -of the past and of the future, or of the nearest past and the nearest -future. Indeed, there is even in Vico a trace of that vice which -arises from a too indiscriminate identification of philosophy and -history, which certainly constitute an identity, but an identity which -is a synthesis and therefore a distinction. Hence, when no account -is taken of this, the substantial truth affirmed loses its balance -in philosophism and mythologism. The real epochs of Vico are too -philosophic and have in them something forced; the ideal epochs are too -historical and have in them something of exuberance and of contingency. -The real epochs are not exempt from philosophistic caprices; the ideal -sometimes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_570" id="Page_570">[Pg 570]</a></span> become converted into a mythology (though full of profound -meanings). For this reason, it has been possible now to praise, now to -blame him for having invented the <i>Philosophy of history.</i> There is -indeed in him, here and there, some hint of a philosophy of history -<i>sensu deteriori,</i> but above all he is the great philosopher and the -great historian.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The anti-historicism of the eighteenth century and Kant.</i></div> - -<p>As the eighteenth century did not really know the concept of -philosophy, so was it ignorant of that of history: its anti-historicism -has become proverbial. There appeared at this time some celebrated -theoretic manifestations of historical scepticism, of the negation -of history, which seemed, as before to Sextus Empiricus, a thing -without art and without method (ἅτεχνον ... καὶ ἐκ τἥς ἀμεθόδον ὕλης -τυγχράνουσαν). The book of Melchior Delfico, <i>Pensieri sull' Istoria -e sull' incertezza ed inutilità della medesima</i> (1808), is one of -the last manifestations of this sort. But all the thinkers of that -time were of this opinion; even Kant, in whose wide culture were -certainly two lacunæ—artistic and historical. And if in the course -of elaborating his system he was led by logical necessity to meditate -upon art, or rather upon beauty, he never paid serious attention to the -problem of history.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_571" id="Page_571">[Pg 571]</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Concealed historical value of the a priori synthesis.</i></div> - -<p>Yet Kant is the true, though unconscious creator of the new Logic -of history. To him belongs the merit, not only of having shown the -importance of the historical judgment, but also of having given the -formula of the identity of philosophy and history in the <i>a priori</i> -synthesis. The logical revolution effected by Kant consists in this: -that he perceives and proclaims that to know is not to think the -concept abstractly, but to think the concept in the intuition, and -that consequently to think is to <i>judge.</i> The theory of the judgment -takes the place of that of the concept and is truly the theory of -the concept, in so far as it becomes concrete. What does it matter -that he is not aware of all this and that instead of referring -the logical <i>a priori</i> synthesis to history, he refers it to the -sciences, constituting it an instrument not of history, but of the -sciences; and that instead of exhausting knowledge in the <i>a priori</i> -synthesis, he leaves outside of it true knowledge as an unattainable, -or theoretically unattainable ideal? What does it matter that when -confronted with the problem of the judgment of existence, he solves it -like Gaunilo and withdraws existence from thought, removing from it -the character of predicate and of concept and making of it a position -or an imposition <i>ab extra?</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_572" id="Page_572">[Pg 572]</a></span> What does it matter that his history is -without historical developments and wanting even in knowledge of the -history of philosophy, and that in the parts of the so-called system -that he has developed (for example, in the doctrine of virtue and of -rights) there reigns the most squalid crowd of abstractions and of -anti-historical determinations? What does it matter that we find the -man of the eighteenth century on every page of his book, and that he -was absolutely without sympathy for the tendencies of thought of the -Hamanns and of they Herders? There always remains the fact that the -<i>a priori</i> synthesis carried in itself even that which its discoverer -ignored or denied.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The theory of history in Hegel.</i></div> - -<p>It would be preferable to say that all Kant's failures in recognition -and all his lacunæ are certainly of importance, just because they -provided his followers with a new problem, and generated by way of -contrariety the philosophy of Schelling and the historical philosophy -of Hegel. Not even in Hegel is there to be found the elaboration of -the doctrine of the individual judgment, nor is its identity with that -of the concept explicitly recognized. But in Hegel not only do we find -ourselves in the full historical atmosphere (suffice it to recall -his histories of art,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_573" id="Page_573">[Pg 573]</a></span> of religion, of philosophy and of the general -development of the human race, which are still the most profound and -the most stimulating writings upon history that exist); but these -historical elucidations are all connected with the fundamental thought -of his Logic: the concept is immanent and is divided in itself in the -judgment, of which the general formula is that the individual <i>is</i> the -universal, the subject <i>is</i> the predicate, every judgment is a judgment -of the universal, and the universal is the dialectic of opposites. For -this reason also, we find in the works of Hegel a historical method -far in advance of all his predecessors and also (save in a few points) -of his successors. He maintained, with much vigour, the necessity of -the interpretative and rational element in history; and to those who -demanded that a historian should be disinterested, in the same way as -a magistrate who judges a case, he replied that since the magistrate -has nevertheless his interest, that for the right, so has the historian -also his interest, namely that for truth.<a name="FNanchor_10_70" id="FNanchor_10_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_70" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>W. von Humboldt.</i></div> - -<p>Hegel's defect in relation to history (as was Vico's before him but on -a larger scale) was the philosophist error, which led him to the design -of a philosophy of history, rising above history<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_574" id="Page_574">[Pg 574]</a></span> properly so-called. -The psychological explanations of this strange duplication, together -with its philosophic motives, have already been adduced.<a name="FNanchor_11_71" id="FNanchor_11_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_71" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> Wilhelm -von Humboldt certainly alluded to Hegel and intended to oppose him in -this respect in his discourse concerning the office of the historian -(1820). Here the method of the writer of history was likened to that -of the artist. Fancy is as necessary to the historian as to the poet, -Humboldt said, not in the sense of free fancy, but as the gift of -reconstruction and of association. History, like art, seeks the true -form of events, the pure and concrete form of real facts. But whereas -art hardly touches the fugitive manifestations of the real, in order to -rise above all reality, history attaches itself to those manifestations -and becomes totally immersed in them. The ideas which the historian -elaborates are not introduced by him into history, but discovered in -reality itself, of which they constitute the essence. They are the -outcome of the fulness of events, not of an extrinsic addition, as -in what is called philosophic or theological history (Philosophy of -history). Certainly, universal history is not intelligible without -a world-order (eine Weltregierung). But the historian possesses no -instrument<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_575" id="Page_575">[Pg 575]</a></span> which enables him directly to examine this design, and -every effort in which he attempts to reach it, makes him fall into -empty and arbitrary teleologism. He must, on the contrary, proceed by -deducing it from facts examined in their individuality; for the end of -history can only be the realization of the idea, which humanity must -represent from all sides and in all the different modes in which finite -form can ever be united with the idea. The course of events can only -be interrupted when idea and form are no longer able to interpenetrate -one another.<a name="FNanchor_12_72" id="FNanchor_12_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_72" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> The protest was justified, not indeed against the -fundamental doctrine of Hegel, but rather against one of its particular -aberrations. But the protest was inferior in the determinateness of -its concepts to the philosophy which it opposed. Even in the healthy -tendency of the Hegelian doctrine, ideas should not be introduced but -discovered in history. And if it sometimes seemed that the Philosophy -of history introduced them from without, this happened because in that -case true ideas were not employed and the concreteness of the fact was -not respected.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>F. Brentano.</i></div> - -<p>The theory of the individual judgment has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_576" id="Page_576">[Pg 576]</a></span> made no progress in the -Logics of the nineteenth century, save for certain timely explanations -concerning the existential character of the judgment given by Brentano -and his school. Brentano, who is an Anti-Kantian, considers the period -inaugurated by Kant to be that of a new philosophical decadence. Yet -notwithstanding his sympathy for mediæval scholasticism and for modern -psychologism, he has too much philosophic acumen to remain fixed in the -one or to lose himself in the other. Thus the tripartition of the forms -of the spirit, maintained by him,<a name="FNanchor_13_73" id="FNanchor_13_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_73" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> beneath the external appearance -of a renovated Cartesianism, bears traces of the abhorred criticism, -romanticism and idealism. The first form, the pure representation, -answers to the æsthetic moment; the second, the judgment, is the -primitive logical form answering to the Kantian <i>a priori</i> synthesis; -and love and hatred, the third form, which contains will and feeling, -is not without precedent among the Post-Kantians themselves. He -reasonably criticizes the various more or less mechanical theories, -which treat the judgment as a connection of representations or a -subsumption of concepts, and defends the <i>idiogenetic</i> against -allogenetic theories. But<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_577" id="Page_577">[Pg 577]</a></span> when he tries to prove that the judgment -"A is" cannot be resolved into "A" and "is" (that is, into A and -existence), because the concept of existence is found in the judgment -and does not precede it, he goes beyond the mark. For the concept of -existence certainly does not precede, but neither does it <i>follow</i> -the judgment: it is contemporaneous; that is to say, it exists only -in the judgment, like the category in the <i>a priori</i> synthesis. -And he goes beyond the mark again, when he makes existentiality -the character of the judgment, whereas existentiality is only one -of the categories and consequently, if it be indispensable for the -constitution of the judgment, it is not sufficient for any judgment, -since for every judgment there is necessary the inner determination -of the judgment as essence and as existence. For the rest, this is -easily seen in the theories of his school, which end by establishing -a double degree or form of judgment, thus creating a duality that -cannot be maintained.<a name="FNanchor_14_74" id="FNanchor_14_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_74" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> In any case, in the researches of Brentano -and his followers, there is affirmed the need for a complete doctrine -of the judgment and of its relation (which in our opinion is one of -identity)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_578" id="Page_578">[Pg 578]</a></span> with the doctrine of the concept. The theories of values and -of judgments of values already mentioned, in their investigation of -the universal or valuative element, express the same need from another -point of view; although none of them discovers, by recalling the -Kantian-Hegelian tradition, that values are immanent in single facts, -and that consequently judgments of value, as judgments, are the same as -individual judgments.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Controversies concerning the nature of history.</i></div> - -<p>Enquiries concerning the character of history may assist the -constitution of a theory of individual judgments. These enquiries have -never enjoyed so much favour as in the last decade of the nineteenth -century. Naturalism or positivism has provided the incentive to such -enquiries, for it brought into being the problem: "whether history is -or is not a (natural) science," by its attempt to violate and pervert -history by raising it (as they said, and it must have sounded ironical) -to the rank of a science, that is to say, of a naturalistic science. -There were two answers to the problem: (1) that history is a science -<i>sui generis</i> (not natural); (2) that it is, not a science, but an art, -a particular form of art, the representation of the real.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Rickert; Xénopol. History as science of the individual.</i></div> - -<p>The first of these answers is to be found in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_579" id="Page_579">[Pg 579]</a></span> work of Rickert -(1896-1902), cited above, and in the almost contemporary work -of Xénopol (1899).<a name="FNanchor_15_75" id="FNanchor_15_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_75" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Rickert's work is that of a professional -philosopher, and a follower of Windelband; the other, of an -intelligent historian, who is somewhat lacking in equipment as a -philosopher. Rickert, after having examined the naturalistic process -and demonstrated how it finds a limit in individuality, next examines -historical process, which takes possession of the field that naturalism -is obliged to relinquish. Xénopol upholds the same distinction, of a -double series of sciences, historical and theoretical, of <i>phénomènes -successifs</i> and of <i>phénomènes de répétition.</i> To both these writers -(besides the merit of having revived, in opposition to naturalism, the -consciousness of individuality) belongs that of having understood that -the field of history extends far beyond that ordinarily assigned to it, -and embraces every manifestation of the real. But merely successive -phenomena or phenomena of mere repetition do not exist and are not -conceivable; nor is it true that the sciences dealing with the former -stop at differences of fact and neglect identities. For how could a -history of political facts be written, if no attention were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_580" id="Page_580">[Pg 580]</a></span> paid to -the constant political nature of those facts? or of poetry, without -paying attention to the constant poetical nature of all its historical -manifestations? or of zoological species, without paying attention -to the constant nature of the organism and of life? The distinction, -therefore, as formulated by Xénopol, is little enough elaborated, not -to say crude. Rickert, for his part, falls into a like error, owing -to his failure to respect that intuitive and individual element, -which he had previously admitted. Hence the serious contradictions, -in which he becomes involved in the second part of his book. After -having defined the concept as peculiar to the naturalistic method, he -eventually claims to find also a species of concept in the procedure -of history, which he had distinguished from and opposed to the former: -a <i>historical</i> concept, which is obtained by cutting out, in the -extensive and intensive infinity of facts, certain groups, which are -placed in relation by means of practical criteria of importance and -of value. It is true (he writes) that the concept has been defined by -us as something of universal content; but now we <i>wish</i> precisely to -surpass this one-sidedness, and therefore in the interest of logic it -is justifiable to give the name concepts also to the thoughts which -express the <i>historical essence</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_581" id="Page_581">[Pg 581]</a></span> of reality.<a name="FNanchor_16_76" id="FNanchor_16_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_76" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> It is worse still -when he attempts to explain the ineradicable intuitive and æsthetic -element of historical narration; for holding art to be without truth -and of use only in producing some sort of artistic (hedonistic?) -effect, he recognizes that element as a means of endowing narration -with liveliness and of exciting the fancy.<a name="FNanchor_17_77" id="FNanchor_17_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_77" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> A consequence of this -lack of understanding of the æsthetic function has been the laborious -and vain attempt which Rickert is obliged to make, to determine to what -personages and facts we are to attribute objective historical value.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>History as art.</i></div> - -<p>The second answer, that history is an art (that is to say, a special -form of art, which is distinguished from the rest, in that it -represents, not the possible but the real), avoids the above-mentioned -difficulties. It distinguishes clearly between the natural sciences -and history; it explains the ineliminability and the function of -the intuitive element in history, and does not lose itself in the -vain search for the distinctive criterion between historical facts -and non-historical facts, because it declares that all facts are -historical.<a name="FNanchor_18_78" id="FNanchor_18_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_78" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> But it must in any case be corrected and completed -with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_582" id="Page_582">[Pg 582]</a></span> the conclusion that the representation of the real is no longer -simple representation or simple art, but the interpenetration of -thought and representation, that is to say, philosophy-history.<a name="FNanchor_19_79" id="FNanchor_19_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_79" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Other controversies concerning history.</i></div> - -<p>All the other controversies recently engaged upon, relate to the -criteria of interpretation, or the system of ideas, which serves as -the basis of any sort of historical narration. Thus there have been -disputes as to the precise meaning and the greater or less importance -in history of climate, of race, of economic factors, of individuality, -of collectivity, of culture, of morality, and of intelligence; and -also as to how teleology, immanence, providence, and so on, are to be -understood in history. In these disputes there recur constantly the -names of Buckle, of Taine, of Spencer, of Ranke, of Marx, of Lamprecht -and of others. It is evident that those controversies concern, not -only the gnoseological nature of historical writing, but the system of -the spirit and of the real, the conception of the world itself. The -materialist and the spiritualist, the theist and the pantheist, will -solve them differently. To write their history here would be to go -beyond the boundaries of Logic and of the particular history of Logic, -that we have set ourselves.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_61" id="Footnote_1_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_61"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See my observations concerning the perpetuity of -historical criticism in <i>Critica,</i> vi. pp. 383-84.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_62" id="Footnote_2_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_62"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Poetics,</i> chap. 8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_63" id="Footnote_3_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_63"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Anal. pr.</i> i. chap. 27.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_64" id="Footnote_4_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_64"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Works</i>, ed. Ferrari.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_65" id="Footnote_5_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_65"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> See (in particular for Polybius) E. Pais, <i>Della -storiografia della filosofia della storia presso i Greci,</i> Livorno, -1889.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_66" id="Footnote_6_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_66"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>De dign. et augm.</i> i. ii. chaps. 1-2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_67" id="Footnote_7_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_67"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>De homine,</i> chap. 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_68" id="Footnote_8_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_68"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> E. Maffei, <i>I trattati dell' arte storica del Rinascimento -fino al secolo XVII,</i> Napoli, 1897.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_69" id="Footnote_9_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_69"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> G. Gentile, "Contribution à l'histoire de la méthode -historique," in the <i>Revue de synthèse historique,</i> v. pp. 129-152.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_70" id="Footnote_10_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_70"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Encycl.</i> § 549; and all the introduction to the <i>Phil. -d. Gesch.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_71" id="Footnote_11_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_71"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See above, Part III. <a href="#IIIe">Chap. III.</a></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_72" id="Footnote_12_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_72"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> "Ueber die Aufgabe des Geschichtsschreibers," in the -<i>Transactions</i> of the Academy of Berlin, 1882, and reprinted in <i>W. W.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_73" id="Footnote_13_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_73"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> F. Brentano, <i>Psychologie,</i> Leipzig, 1874.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_74" id="Footnote_14_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_74"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> F. Hildebrand, <i>Die neuen Theorien der kategorischer. -Schlussen,</i> Vienna, 1891.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_75" id="Footnote_15_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_75"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Les Principes fondamentaux de l'histoire,</i> Paris, 1899; -2nd ed., entitled <i>La Théorie de l'histoire,</i> Paris, 1908.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_76" id="Footnote_16_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_76"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Grenzen d. naturwiss. Begriffsbildung,</i> pp. 328-29.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_77" id="Footnote_17_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_77"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 382-89.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_78" id="Footnote_18_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_78"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> This is the thesis maintained in 1893 by the author of -this book, cf. also B. Croce, "Les Études relatives à la théorie de -l'histoire en Italie," in the <i>Revue de synthèse historique,</i> v. pp. -257-259.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_79" id="Footnote_19_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_79"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> See above, Part II. <a href="#IVd">Chap. IV.</a>, and the note concerning -it.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_583" id="Page_583">[Pg 583]</a></span></p></div> - - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<h4><a name="IVf" id="IVf">IV</a></h4> - - -<h5>THEORIES OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND WORD AND FORMALIST LOGIC</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Relation between the history of Logic and that of the -Philosophy of language.</i></div> - -<p>The history of Logic depends very closely upon the history of the -Philosophy of language, or of Æsthetic, understood as the philosophy -of language and of expression in general. Every discovery concerning -language throws new light upon the function of thought, which, -surpassing language, employs it as an instrument, and therefore unites -itself with language both negatively and positively. It belongs to the -progress of the Philosophy of language, not less than to that of Logic, -to have determined in a more exact manner the relations between thought -and expression, as also to have dissipated or begun the dissipation of -empirical and formalist Logic. This Logic, deluding itself with the -belief that it was analysing thought, presents a series of mutilated -and empty linguistic forms.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Logical formalism. Indian Logic free of it.</i></div> - -<p>This error, which appeared very early in our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_584" id="Page_584">[Pg 584]</a></span> western world, has spread -during the centuries and yet dominates many minds; so true is this that -"Logic" is usually understood to mean just illogic or formalist Logic. -We say our western world, because if Greece created and passed on the -doctrine of logical forms, which was a mixture of thoughts materialized -in words and of words become rigid in thoughts, another Logic is known, -which, as it seems, developed outside the influence of Greek thought, -and remained immune from the formalist error. This is Indian Logic, -which is notably antiverbalist, though very inferior to that of Greece -and of Europe in wealth and depth of concepts, and limited almost -exclusively to the examination of the empirical concept or reasoning, -of naturalistic induction or <i>expectatio casuum similium.</i> Indian -Logic studies the naturalistic syllogism in <i>itself,</i> as internal -thought, distinguishing it from the syllogism <i>for others,</i> that is to -say, from the more or less usual, but always extrinsic and accidental -forms of communication and dispute. It has not even a suspicion of the -extravagant idea (which still vitiates our treatises) of a truth which -is merely syllogistic and formalist, and which may be false in fact. It -takes no account of the judgment, or rather it considers what is called -judgment, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_585" id="Page_585">[Pg 585]</a></span> what is really the proposition, as a verbal clothing -of knowledge; it does not make the verbal distinctions of subject, -copula and predicate; it does not admit classes of categorical and -hypothetical, of affirmative and of negative judgments. All these are -extraneous to Logic, whose object is the constant: knowledge considered -in itself.<a name="FNanchor_1_80" id="FNanchor_1_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_80" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Aristotelian Logic and formalism.</i></div> - -<p>It was a subject of enquiry and of disagreement, especially during -the second half of last century, whether formalist Logic, the Logic -of the schools, could legitimately be called <i>Aristotelian.</i> Some, -among whom were Trendelenburg and Prantl, absolutely denied this, -and wished to restore the genuine thought of Aristotle, opposing it -to post-Aristotelian and mediæval Logic. But they themselves were -so enmeshed in logical formalism, that they were not capable of -determining its peculiar character. The contrast between those two -Logics, so far as it struck them, concerned secondary points. If -the proper character of formalism consists in the confusion between -thought and word, how are we to deny that Aristotle fell into this -error, or that at any rate he set his foot upon the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_586" id="Page_586">[Pg 586]</a></span> perilous way? -Certainly he did not proceed to the exaggerations and ineptitudes -of later logicians. He was ingenuous, not pedantic. And his books -(and in particular the <i>Analytics)</i> are rich in acute and original -observations. He was a philosopher, and his successors were very -often manual labourers. But Aristotle (probably influenced by -the mathematical disciplines) conceived the idea of a theory of -<i>apodeictic,</i> which, from simple judgments, through syllogisms and -demonstrations, reached completeness in the definition as its last -term. The concept was the first term, as the loose concept or name, -the last term was the concept defined. He was not ignorant that not -everything can thus be demonstrated, that in the case of the supreme -principles such a demonstration cannot be given, and it is vain to -look for it, and that there is alongside the apodeictic a science of -<i>anapodeictic.</i> But that did not induce him to abandon the study of -verbal forms for a close study of the concepts or of the category, -which is the demonstration of itself. In his divisions of judgments -he was very discreet; but yet he distinguished them verbally, as -universal, particular and indefinite, negative and affirmative. In the -syllogism he distinguished only three figures, and affirmed that of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_587" id="Page_587">[Pg 587]</a></span> -those the first is the truly scientific (ἐπιστημὀνικον), because it -determines <i>what is,</i> whereas the second does not give a categorical -judgment and affirmative knowledge, and the third does not give -universal knowledge; but these restrictions did not suffice to correct -the false step made in positing the idea of <i>figures</i> and <i>moods</i> of -the syllogism. When we examine the various doctrines of Aristotle -and compare them with the forms and developments which they assumed -later, it can be maintained that no logician was less Aristotelian than -Aristotle. But even he was Aristotelian, and the impulse to seek logic -in words had been begun in so masterly a manner that for centuries it -weighed upon the mind like a fate.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Later formalism.</i></div> - -<p>Why, then, should we rage, like many modern critics, against the later -manipulations and amplifications to which Aristotelian Logic was -submitted by Peripatetics and Stoics, by commentators and rhetoricians, -by doctors of the Church and masters of the University, by Neolatins -and Byzantines, by Arabs and Germans? We certainly harbour no -tenderness for the <i>hypothetical</i> and <i>disjunctive</i> syllogism, or for -the <i>fourth figure</i> of the syllogism, as elaborated from Theophrastus -to Galen, or for the <i>five predicables</i> of Porphyry, or for subtleties<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_588" id="Page_588">[Pg 588]</a></span> -upon the <i>conversions</i> of judgments, or for the <i>mnemonic verses</i> of -Michael Psellus and of Peter Hispanus, or for the geometric symbols -of the concepts and syllogisms invented by Christian Weiss in the -seventeenth century ("to direct blockheads aright,"<a name="FNanchor_2_81" id="FNanchor_2_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_81" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> as Prantl -permits himself to say), or for the calculations upon the moods of the -syllogism made by John Hispanianus, which he found to be no less than -five hundred and sixty in number, thirty-six of which are conclusive. -We also willingly admit that errors have been made in the traditional -interpretation of certain doctrines of Aristotle (for example, in the -doctrine of the enthymeme).<a name="FNanchor_3_82" id="FNanchor_3_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_82" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> But setting aside these errors, we can -say that for those excogitations and distinctions support was already -found in the Organon of Aristotle, and that they were derived from -principles there laid down. Certainly, with their crude roughness and -their evident absurdity, they shock good sense in a way in which the -distinctions of Aristotle did not, for these were in some sort of -relation with the empirical description of the usual mode of scientific -discussions. But the error nestled in themselves; and it was well that -it should be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_589" id="Page_589">[Pg 589]</a></span> intensified, so that it might leap to the eyes of all, -just as it is sometimes well that there should be scandals in practical -life.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Rebellions against Aristotelian Logic. The opposition of -the humanists and their motives.</i></div> - -<p>The rebellions which the school (in the wide sense of the word, -from the Peripatetic to the modern) continued to arouse in regard -to these doctrines might seem to be of greater interest than this -labour of embroidering and carving. But since there has been a time -during which every protest, and indeed, every insult levelled against -the philosopher of Stagira seemed a sign of original thought, of -spiritual freedom and of secure progress, it is well to repeat that an -indispensable condition for surpassing the Aristotelian Logic was a new -Philosophy of language. Such a condition was altogether wanting in the -past and is partly wanting now. It is therefore not surprising that -when those rebellions are closely examined, we discover in the midst -of secondary and superficial disagreement something quite different -from what was expected; not the radical negation, but the substantial -acceptance, explicit or understood, of the principles of formalist -Logic.</p> - -<p>Such is the case with the rebellions of the humanists, Ciceronians -and rhetoricians, which took place in the fourteenth and fifteenth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_590" id="Page_590">[Pg 590]</a></span> -centuries, of Lorenzo Valla, of Rudolph Agricola, of Luigi Vives, -of Mario Nizolio, of Peter Ramus. The motive power with all of them -was abhorrence for the heavy scholastic armour. Culture, leaving -the cloisters, spread itself abroad in life; philosophy began to be -written in the common tongue, and for this reason men sought forms of -exposition that were rapid, easy and clear or eloquent and oratorical. -But under these new forms the direction of logical thought remained -unchanged. Ramus, for example, who applied to Aristotle the elegant -terms of <i>fatuus impostor, chamæleon somnians et stertens,</i> and so -forth, ended by claiming that he alone had understood his true thought, -and showed by the reforms of it that he proposed (among which was the -suggestion that the third figure of the syllogism should pass to the -first place) that he, too, was still revolving in the narrow circle of -formalism.<a name="FNanchor_4_83" id="FNanchor_4_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_83" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>The opposition of naturalism.</i></div> - -<p>Even the opposition of naturalism to the Aristotelian Logic did -not strike it to the heart, but wished to replace and more often -to accompany one form of empiricism with another: the rules of the -syllogism with the precepts of induction, the sophistical refutations -with the determination<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_591" id="Page_591">[Pg 591]</a></span> of the four idols that preoccupy men's minds. -Bacon never dreamed of denying to syllogistic the value of true -doctrine. He believed, however, that it had already been sufficiently -studied and developed, that it lacked nothing, and even possessed -something superfluous, whereas there was still wanting a criterion of -invention and of induction, which was of fundamental importance for -syllogistic itself. In making the inventory of knowledge (he writes) it -is to be observed that we find ourselves almost in the conditions of a -man who inherits an estate, in the inventory of which there is noted: -"ready money, none" ("numeratae pecuniae, nihil").<a name="FNanchor_5_84" id="FNanchor_5_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_84" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Hence he raised -his voice against the abuse of disputations and of reasoning as to -matters of fact; the subtlety of the syllogism is always conquered by -that of nature.<a name="FNanchor_6_85" id="FNanchor_6_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_85" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions -of words, and words are the counters of concepts; but if the concepts -are confused or wrongly abstracted, the syllogistic consequences -deduced from them are without any sort of security. Hence the necessity -of beginning with induction: "<i>spes est una in inciuctione vera.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_7_86" id="FNanchor_7_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_86" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> -Bacon's position (which was therefore not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_592" id="Page_592">[Pg 592]</a></span> anti-formalist, but only -an addition or complement to formalism) has been renewed, word for -word, in all inductive Logics, up to that of the English school of the -nineteenth century, and to ours of to-day. Stuart Mill's book expresses -the combination of the two empiricisms, syllogistic and inductive, in -its very title: "A system of Logic, <i>ratiocinative</i> and <i>inductive,</i> -being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of -Scientific <i>investigation.</i>"</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Labour of simplification in the eighteenth century. Kant.</i></div> - - -<p>In the eighteenth century, while Leibnitz sought an amplification and -perfecting of syllogistic in the logical calculus, and some followed -him who did not, however, attain to true effectiveness in the history -of culture,<a name="FNanchor_8_87" id="FNanchor_8_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_87" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> formalist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_593" id="Page_593">[Pg 593]</a></span> Logic fell always more and more into -discredit, not only as Logica <i>utens,</i> but also as <i>docens,</i> that is to -say, as theory.</p> - -<p>Hence the moderate tendency, to which Kant adhered, which consists of -preserving that Logic, while seeking to correct, and, in particular, -to simplify it. For example, Kant undertook to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_594" id="Page_594">[Pg 594]</a></span> demonstrate the "false -subtlety of the four figures of the syllogism," and at the same time -rendered traditional Logic yet more formalist by withdrawing from it -all examination of the synthesis and the categories, which he referred -to his new transcendental Logic. Traditional Logic, which he respected -and held to be substantially perfect, constituted (he said) a canon -of the intellect and of reason, but only in the <i>formal</i> aspect of -their employment, whatever be the content to which it is applied. Its -only criterion is the agreement or non-agreement of any knowledge -with the general and formal laws of the intellect and of reason; a -<i>conditio sine qua non</i> of every truth, but a <i>conditio</i> which is only -negative.<a name="FNanchor_9_88" id="FNanchor_9_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_88" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Refutation of formalist Logic. Hegel; Schleiermacher.</i></div> - -<p>Hegel, on the contrary, opposed tradition. He understood the -character of formalist Logic marvellously well: this "<i>empirical</i> -Logic, a bizarre science, which is an <i>irrational</i> knowledge of -the <i>rational,</i> and sets the bad example of not following its own -doctrines. Indeed it assumes the licence of doing the opposite of -what its rules prescribe, when it neglects to deduce the concepts and -to demonstrate its affirmations."<a name="FNanchor_10_89" id="FNanchor_10_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_89" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> In so far as it was empirical -it was intellectualist, and presented<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_595" id="Page_595">[Pg 595]</a></span> the determinations of reason -in an abstract and atomic manner in combining them mechanically. The -new concept of the concept, originated by Hegel, creates from itself -its own theories and allows the old formalist theories to disappear -as dead and dry remains. The forms of thought are henceforth the very -forms of the real; the Idea is the unity of concept and representation, -because it is the universal itself, big with the individual. Things -are realized judgments, and the syllogism is the Idea which identifies -itself with its own reality. This at bottom amounts to saying that -thought fully dominates reality, because it is not an extrinsic -addition or an interposed means, but Reality itself, which makes itself -thought, because it is thought. Other philosophers, too, contemporaries -and adversaries of Hegel, rejected formalist Logic, and among these -was Schleiermacher.<a name="FNanchor_11_90" id="FNanchor_11_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_90" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> He made the logical forms of the <i>concept</i> and -of the <i>judgment</i> correspond to the two forms of reality, <i>being</i> and -<i>doing,</i> finding corresponding analogies in <i>space,</i> a dividing of -being, and in <i>time,</i> a dividing of doing. The concept and the judgment -mutually presuppose one another, and give rise to a circle, which is so -only when considered temporally; since at the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_596" id="Page_596">[Pg 596]</a></span> point of indifference, -of fusion, of indistinction the two make one.<a name="FNanchor_12_91" id="FNanchor_12_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_91" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Schleiermacher -differed from Hegel (who attains in thought the unity of the real) -in being obliged to withdraw the syllogism from the number of the -essential forms of thought, because (he says), "if the syllogism were a -true form, a being of its own should correspond to it, and this is not -found to be the case."<a name="FNanchor_13_92" id="FNanchor_13_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_92" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its partial persistence owing to insufficient ideas as to -language.</i></div> - -<p>But if with the Hegelian criticism formalist Logic was surpassed by a -truly philosophical Logic, and thereupon lost all its importance, it -cannot be said that it was definitely dissolved. In Hegel himself there -remain traces of it in certain divisions of the forms of judgment and -of syllogism, which he either accepts and corrects or creates anew. -Definitive criticism demanded that in any case the error peculiar to -this empiricism should be recognized. This error consists in confusing -language and thought, taking thought as language, and therefore also -language as thought. Hegel could not effect this criticism, for he -was logistic as regards the theory of language, conceiving it to be a -complex of logical and universal elements.<a name="FNanchor_14_93" id="FNanchor_14_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_93" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Hence the coincidence -between the forms of language and those of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_597" id="Page_597">[Pg 597]</a></span> thought did not seem to him -irrational, provided that both were taken in their true connection. The -revival of the Philosophy of language, begun by Vico and carried on -by Hamann and by Herder, and then again by Humboldt, remained unknown -to him or had no influence upon him. Nor, to tell the truth, has it -influenced even later Logic, for had it acquired this knowledge, it -would have been freed for ever from formalism or verbalism and have -possessed a method and a power of application to the nature of the -problems that belong to it. Just a trace of serious discussion (but -made rather in the interest of the Philosophy of language than in -that of Logic) appears in the polemic between Steinthal and Becker -concerning the relations between Logic and Grammar.<a name="FNanchor_15_94" id="FNanchor_15_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_94" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Formalist Logic in Herbart, in Schopenhauer, in Hamilton.</i></div> - -<p>For this reason, formalist Logic has continued to exist (with -difficulty if you will, but yet to exist) in the nineteenth century. -From Kant it had received with the name <i>formal</i> a new baptism and -a new legitimization. Among post-Kantians Herbart clung closely -to it, though he somewhat simplified it, and hostile as he was to -all transcendental Logic, he continued to conceive it as the sole -instrument of thought. Schopenhauer held logical forms to be a good -parallel to rhetorical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_598" id="Page_598">[Pg 598]</a></span> forms, and limited himself to proposing some -slight remodelling of the former: for example, to consider judgments -as always universal (both those called by that name and particular -and singular judgments as well), and to explain hypothetical and -disjunctive judgments as pronounced upon the comparison of two or -more categorical judgments. From the syllogism, which he defined as -"a judgment drawn from two other judgments, without the intervention -of new conditions," he dropped the fourth figure, but he proclaimed -the first three to be "ectypes" of three real and essentially -different operations of thought.<a name="FNanchor_16_95" id="FNanchor_16_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_95" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Kant's teaching was followed in -England by Hamilton. Hamilton insisted upon the purely hypothetical -character of logical reasonings; he excluded from Logic discussions -of possibility and impossibility and of the modalities, and declared -that the intrusion into that science of the concepts of perfect or -imperfect induction, which refer to material differences and are -therefore extralogical,<a name="FNanchor_17_96" id="FNanchor_17_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_96" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> was a fundamental error. In this way he -reacted against inductive Logic, which, in his country especially, had -prevailed against formalist Logic or had strangely accompanied it. He -persuaded himself that he could perfect the latter, by simplifying<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_599" id="Page_599">[Pg 599]</a></span> -the doctrine of the judgment, by means of what is called the -<i>quantification of the predicate.</i><a name="FNanchor_18_97" id="FNanchor_18_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_97" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>More recent theories.</i></div> - -<p>Later logicians continued to employ these partial and superficial -modifications. Trendelenburg, as has been mentioned, believed that -he could make progress by referring the thing to its beginning, -that is, by turning from Aristotelianism to Aristotle, and owing to -the curious influence of a thought of Hegel, he assigned to logic -and reality a common foundation which, for him, was not the Idea, -but Movement. Lotze reduced the forms of judgments to three only, -according to the variations of the copula: categorical, hypothetical -and disjunctive judgments; and he made impersonal judgments precede -categorical. By this last class he vainly sought to satisfy the -desire for a theoretic form which is presupposed in properly -logical thought, and it is yet to seek. Lotze always had at bottom -an intellectualistic concept of language: poetry and art seemed to -him to be directed, not to contemplation and expression, but to -emotion and to feelings of pleasure and pain. He could not therefore -recognize the primitive theoretic form in art, in intuition, in pure -expressiveness. Drobisch, the Herbartian, revealed formalism in all -its crudity,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_600" id="Page_600">[Pg 600]</a></span> beginning with the affirmation that "there are certainly -necessary judgments and syllogisms, but no necessary concepts." -Sigwart reformed the classification of judgments (of denomination, of -property and activity, impersonal, of relation, abstract, narrative and -explicative), and retouched that of syllogisms. Wundt, accepting the -old tripartition of logical forms, also attempts new sub-divisions, -distinguishing judgments for example, according to their subject, into -indeterminate, singular and plural; according to their predicate, -into narrative, descriptive and explicative; according to their -relation, into judgments of identity, superordination, subordination, -co-ordination and dependence; and into negative predications and -negative oppositions. Brentano's reform does not in general abandon the -formalist circle; hence, having assigned the quantity of judgments to -their matter, he limits himself to dividing them into affirmative and -negative; among immediate inferences he accepts only the inference <i>ad -contradictoriam</i>; among the laws of the syllogism he denies the law -<i>ex mere negativis,</i> maintaining indeed that <i>ex mere affirmativis nil -sequitur;</i> he defends, as the law of all syllogisms, that of <i>quaternio -terminorum,</i> which used to pass for the sign of the sophism; and he -further<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_601" id="Page_601">[Pg 601]</a></span> abolishes the vain distinctions of figures and moods.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Mathematical Logic.</i></div> - -<p>Opposed as radical innovators to these logicians, who work more or less -with traditional formulas, are the mathematical logicians, who follow, -not philosophy, but certain fictions of the Leibnitzian philosophy. -George Bentham, De Morgan, Boole, Jevons, Grassman and now several in -England, in France, in Germany and in Italy (Peano), have been and are -representative of this tendency. They are innovators only in a manner -of speaking, for they are ultra-reactionaries, far more formalist than -the formalist Aristotle. They are dissatisfied with the divisions made -by him, not because they are toe numerous and arbitrary, but because -they are toe few and still bear some traces of rationality They strive -to the uttermost to provide a theory of thought, from which all thought -is absent This kind of Logic has been well defined by Windelband as -"Logic of the green cloth."<a name="FNanchor_19_98" id="FNanchor_19_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_98" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Inexact idea of language among mathematical logicians and -intuitionists.</i></div> - -<p>These logicians have naturally inherited the other fiction of -Leibnitz, namely that of the possibility of a constant and universal -language,<a name="FNanchor_20_99" id="FNanchor_20_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_99" class="fnanchor">[20]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_602" id="Page_602">[Pg 602]</a></span> thus revealing another reason for their aberration, -and the usual support of the whole formalist error—ignorance of the -alogical nature of language. The nature of language remains obscure -from another point of view, even to the modern intuitionists (Bergson). -They continue to regard as language, not language in its simplicity, -but the intellectualist procedure (classificatory and abstractive) -which falsifies the continuous in the discontinuous, breaks up -duration, and builds a fictitious world upon the real world. They are -therefore ultimately led to attribute the value of a pure expression -of reality to music, as though music were not language, and true -language (not the intellectualist discourse which they accept in place -of it) were not essentially music, that is to say, poetry. For the -intellectualists also, a Logic (were they to resolve upon constructing -one) would be nothing but formalist.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_80" id="Footnote_1_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_80"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See the recent exposition of the secular Indian Logic, in -its most complete form, as found in a treatise of the twelfth century, -in II. Jacobi, "Die indische Logik," in the <i>Nachrichten v. d. Königl. -Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaft zu Göttingen,</i> Philol.-hist. Klasse, 1901, -fasc. iv. pp. 460-484.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_81" id="Footnote_2_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_81"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Gesch. d. Logik,</i> i. p. 362.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_82" id="Footnote_3_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_82"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Hamilton, <i>Fragments philosophiques,</i> French tr. pp. -238-242.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_83" id="Footnote_4_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_83"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Frantl, "Über Petrus Ramus," in the <i>Sitzungsberichte d. -k. bayer. Akad. d. Wissensch.,</i> Philol.-hist. Klasse, 1878, ii. pp. -157-169.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_84" id="Footnote_5_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_84"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>De dign. et augm.</i> iv. ch. 2-5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_85" id="Footnote_6_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_85"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Ib.</i> ch. 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_86" id="Footnote_7_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_86"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Nov. Org.</i> i., aphorism 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_87" id="Footnote_8_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_87"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> It is pertinent to translate here a passage of Hegel, in -relation to this Leibnitzian tendency, which is now again becoming -fashionable. "The extreme form of this (syllogistic) disconceptualized -manner of dealing with the conceptual determinations of the syllogism, -is found in Leibnitz, who (<i>Opp.</i> t. ii. p. i) places the syllogism -under the calculus of combination. By this means he has calculated -how many positions of the syllogism are possible, and thus, by taking -count of the differences of positive and negative judgments, then of -universal, particular, indeterminate and singular judgments, he has -arrived at the result that the possible combinations are 2048, of -which, after excluding the invalid, there remain 24 valid. Leibnitz -boasts much of the utility possessed by the analysis of combination in -finding, not only the forms of the syllogism, but also the connections -of other concepts. This operation is the same as that of calculating -the number of possible combinations of letters that can be made from -an alphabet, or of moves in a game of draughts, or of different hands -in a game of <i>hombre,</i> and so on. From which it is clear that the -determinations of a syllogism are placed on a level with moves in -draughts, or hands in <i>hombre.</i> The rational is taken as something -dead, altogether deprived of the concept, and the peculiar character -of the concept and its determinations is left out; that is to say, -the character that in so far as they are spiritual facts, they are -<i>relation,</i> and that, in virtue of this relation, they suppress their -<i>immediate</i> determination. This Leibnitzian application of the calculus -of combination to the syllogism and to the connection of other concepts -is not to be distinguished in any way from the discredited <i>art of -Lully,</i> save for the greater methodicalness in calculation of which -it gives proof; it resembles that absurdity in every other respect. -Another thought, dear to Leibnitz, was included in the calculus -of combination. He had nourished this thought in his youth, and -notwithstanding its immaturity and superficiality, he never afterwards -abandoned it. This was the thought of a <i>universal characteristic</i> of -concepts, of a writing, in which every concept should be represented as -proceeding from others or as referring to another; almost as though, in -a rational connection, which is essentially dialectic, a content should -preserve the same determinations that it has when standing alone. -</p> -<p> -"The calculus of Ploucquet is doubtless supported by the most cogent -mode of submitting the relation of the syllogism to calculation. He -abstracts in the judgment from the difference of relation; that is to -say, from its singularity, particularity and universality, and fixes -the <i>abstract identity</i> of subject and predicate, placing them in a -<i>mathematical relation.</i> This relation reduces reason to an empty, -tautological formation of propositions. In the proposition, 'the rose -is red,' the predicate must signify, not red in general, but only the -determinate 'red of the rose.' In the proposition, 'all Christians are -men,' the predicate must signify only 'those men who are Christians.' -From this and from the other proposition, 'Hebrews are not Christians,' -follows the conclusion (which did not constitute a good recommendation -for this calculus with Mendelssohn): 'hence, Hebrews are not men' (that -is to say, they are not those men, who are Christians). -</p> -<p> -"Ploucquet gives as a consequence of his invention <i>posse etiant rudes -mechanice tot am logicam doceri, uti pueri arithmeticam docentur. ita -quidem, ut nulla formidine in ratiociniis suis errandi lorqueri, vel -fallaciis circumveniri possint, si in calculo non errant.</i> This eulogy -of the calculus, to the effect that by its means it is possible to -supply uneducated people with the whole of Logic, is certainly the -worst that can be said of an invention which concerns logical Science'" -(<i>Wiss. d. Logik,</i> iii. pp. 142-43).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_88" id="Footnote_9_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_88"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Kr. d. rein. Vern.,</i> ed. quoted, pp. 101-2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_89" id="Footnote_10_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_89"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Wiss. d. Logik,</i> iii. p. 51.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_90" id="Footnote_11_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_90"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Dialektik,</i> ed. quoted, pp. 74-5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_91" id="Footnote_12_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_91"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Work cited, pp. 145, 147-9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_92" id="Footnote_13_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_92"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Work cited, pp. 146, 291-2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_93" id="Footnote_14_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_93"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Wiss. d. Logik,</i> i. pp. 10-11 and <i>passim; Encykl.</i> § -205 and elsewhere.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_94" id="Footnote_15_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_94"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Estetica</i><sup>2</sup>, p. II, ch. xii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_95" id="Footnote_16_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_95"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Werke,</i> ed. cited, ii. pp. 120-135.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_96" id="Footnote_17_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_96"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Work cited, pp. 159, 165.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_97" id="Footnote_18_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_97"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> See above, <a href="#Page_297">pp. 297</a>, dealing with Ploucquet.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_98" id="Footnote_19_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_98"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> In his remarks upon the present state of Logic, contained -in his work <i>Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts</i> -(Heidelberg 1904), i. pp. 163-186.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_99" id="Footnote_20_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_99"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> See my remarks in the <i>Critica,</i> iii. pp. 428-433 -(concerning the work of Messrs. Couturat and Léau); and cf. same, iv. -pp. 379-381.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_603" id="Page_603">[Pg 603]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="Vf" id="Vf">V</a></h4> - - -<h5>CONCERNING THIS LOGIC</h5> - - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Traditional character of this Logic and its connection with -the Logic of the philosophic concept.</i></div> - - -<p>The Logic which we have expounded in this treatise is also in a certain -sense traditional Logic. But it should be connected, not with the -tradition of formalism, but rather with that of the Hegelian Logic, -of Kantian transcendental Logic, and so of the loftiest Hellenic -speculative thought. In other words, its affinity should be sought in -the logical sections of the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> of Kant, or in -the <i>Metaphysic</i> of Aristotle, and not in the <i>Lessons in Logic</i> or in -the <i>Analytics</i> of the same authors. This traditional character endows -it with confidence, because man has always thought the true, and it -is to be doubted if he who fails to discover the truth in the past, -possesses the truth of the present and of the future, of which in his -proud isolation he thinks himself secure.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Its innovations.</i></div> - - -<p>But to be truly attached to tradition means to carry it on and to -collaborate with it. Contact with thought is always dynamic and -propulsive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_604" id="Page_604">[Pg 604]</a></span> and urges us to go forward, since it is impossible to stop -or to turn back. For this reason, this Logic presents some novelties, -of which the fundamental and principal can be thus enumerated:</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>I. Exclusion of empirical and abstract concepts.</i></div> - -<p>I. Accepting the doctrine, which culminates in the last great modern -philosophy of the <i>pure Concept,</i> as the only doctrine of logical -truth, this Logic excludes empirical and abstract concepts, declaring -them to be irreducible to the pure concept.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>II. Non-theoretic character of the second and autonomy of -the empirical and mathematical sciences.</i></div> - -<p>II. Accepting for these last the <i>economic theory</i> of the empirical and -abstract sciences and considering them as having a practical character -and therefore as non-concepts (pseudoconcepts), this Logic denies that -they exhaust logical thought, indeed it altogether denies that they -belong to it and demonstrates that their very existence presupposes -the reality of the pure concept. Hence, it connects the two doctrines -with one another and asserts the <i>autonomy</i> of philosophy, at the same -time respecting the relative autonomy of the empirical and mathematical -sciences thus rendered atheoretical.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>III. The concept as unity of distinctions.</i></div> - -<p>III. In the doctrine concerning the organism of the pure concept, it -accepts the <i>dialectic</i> view or the unity of opposites, but denies its -immediate validity for the distinctions of the concept; the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_605" id="Page_605">[Pg 605]</a></span> unity -of which is organized as a unity of distinctions in the theory of -<i>degrees</i> of reality. In this way, the autonomy of the forms of reality -or of the spirit is also respected and the <i>practical</i> nature of error -established.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>IV. Identity of the concept with the individual judgment -and of philosophy with history.</i></div> - -<p>IV. The richness of reality, of facts, of experience, which seemed -to be withdrawn from the pure concept and so from philosophy by the -separation of it from the empirical sciences, is on the contrary -restored to and recognized in philosophy, not in the diminished and -improper form which is that of empirical science, but in a total and -integral manner. This is effected by means of the connection, which -is a <i>unity,</i> between <i>Philosophy</i> and <i>History</i>—a unity obtained by -making clear and profoundly studying the nature of the concept and the -logical <i>a priori</i> synthesis.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>V. Impossibility of defining thought by means of verbal -forms, and refutation of formalists Logic.</i></div> - -<p>V. Finally, the doctrines and the presuppositions of formalist Logic -are refuted in a precise manner. The autonomy of the <i>logical form</i> is -asserted and consequently the effort to contain its determinations in -words or expressive forms is declared to be vain. These are certainly -necessary, but obey, not the law of logic, but that of the æsthetic -spirit.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><i>Conclusion.</i></div> - -<p>Such, summarily indicated, is the progress upon previous thought, which -this Logic would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_606" id="Page_606">[Pg 606]</a></span><strong></strong> wish to represent. To gain this end, it has availed -itself, not only of the help afforded by ancient and modern Logic, -concentrated in the Hegelian Logic, but also of those others that have -come into being since Hegel, and especially of æsthetic, of the theory -of historical writing and of the gnoseology of the sciences. It has -striven to avail itself of all scattered truths, but of none in an -eclectic manner, that is to say, by making arbitrary collections or -merely aggregations, for it has been conscious that scattered truths -become truly truths when they are no longer scattered but fused, not -many, but one.</p> - -<h4>THE END</h4> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Logic as the Science of the pure -Concept, by Benedetto Croce - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LOGIC *** - -***** This file should be named 54137-h.htm or 54137-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/1/3/54137/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... 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